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
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REFLECTIONS

UPONTHE

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AFFAIRS,

AT

HOME and ABROAD,

PARTICULARLY

With Regard to Subfidles, and the Differences between Great Britain and France.

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FROMA

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

TO A


CONSTITUENT.

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(Price One Shilling.)





REFLECTIONS, &c.

SIR,



ou will perhaps be surprized at this Address from one, you little imagined would ever commence Author, especially in Politics. But the present Conjuncture of Af-

fairs, is so very critical, as perhaps not to be parallell'd in any Period of the History of Europe; and calls for some Explanation. But why from you? It may be said. To tell you the Truth, I do it partly for my own sake, and partly for the Information of the Public. The Part I have taken and am

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determined to take in parliamentary Meafures, is diametrically contrary to all printed Politicks of these Times. And though I do not think myself accountable, not even to my Constituents, for my Conduct in Parliament, yet it would be a kind of Insolence, should I refuse, to arm my Friends with those Arguments that can justify a Conduct, which, considering my former Attachments, may seem to them not only unaccountable but inconsistent.

When I first entered into Parliament. foreign Measures were sometimes mentioned, but feldom debated. This was owing to the Power of the Minister, which I thought alarming, and therefore I listed my felf into the Opposition to ALL his Measures. I say to ALL his Measures. For one of our first Principles was, to keep him from the Credit of doing even what was Right, as well as to load him with the Blame of whatever was Wrong. His indifcriminate Purfuit of his own System was some Justification of this indifcriminate Opposition; while the Pamphlets and Papers wrote by his Connivance, and dispersed under his Influence, were rather Infults upon our Understanding than Apologies for bis Conduct.

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I shall not enter into any Detail of the various Caufes that concurred to remove him from his Power: but I must frankly own, that the Moment that Event took place, I thought the Object of Opposition chang'd. Some Incidents that happened in the Beginning of the late War, gave a plaufible Handle for a new Opposition, which, to all Appearance, was to Measures only; and I am free enough to own, that I entered into that Opposition likewise, though perhaps with Views very different from the Gentlemen, who conducted it. As it was entirely founded on Facts, and as Facts are, at least, Indications of Principles, I took those Facts for granted. But I found, though too late, that they had either been mistaken, or misrepresented. The Progress of the War, encouraged Mediation rather than Opposition. Notwithstanding the public Spirit of his Majesty, the personal Valour of the Duke, and the unparallell'd Intrepidity of our Troops we beheld with Astonishment, the rapid Progress of the French, the Distress of one Ally, the Indolence of another, and the Weakness of both, co-operate to render the Treasure we spent, and the Blood we spilt, fatal, only, to ourselves. Our Troops, after performing Wonders, found themselves on the Brink of being facrificed to the Sword, or to Captivity, by a Situation, in which, Refistance became Temerity, and Valour must have been unavailing, and it was owing, equally, to the high Opinion, which the French had of the English Courage, as to the Success of our Navies, great as it was, that a Secession of Arms was obtained.

By the Peace of Aix la Chapelle, which followed foon after, I acknowledge, that the whole of my political System was new moulded. I had feen France, quietly, nay, foontaneously refign those Conquests, and abandon those Pursuits, which, in my Youth, I had been taught to believe, were the ultimate View of her Ambition. I had feen the Governors of Holland, whom I had been taught to confider as the true Patriots of public Liberty, and the shining Examples of public Spirit, without Resentment, without Jealousy, nay, without Emotion behold France ready to overpower them, without making one Effort for their Freedom, tho' upon their Freedom depended their Property. I had seen a Protestant Prince, in the Heart of Europe, co-operate with every Scheme of French Injustice, and his own Moderation, alone, giving him Law. Countries and TerTerritories, never heard of, pour'd forth the best Troops in Europe, for the Defence of public Liberty, and the House of Bourbon was taught to tremble at the Power it had despis'd. I had seen that same Power check'd by a State, which a little before she had thought too contemptible to be treated, even with common Civility, I mean that of Genoa, and Oppression raise a Spirit, which Power could not subdue. Two great Empires, and one Kingdom, I mean, Germany, Rusha, and Sweden, were secured to Princes, whose greatest Title to them was their Infignificancy in Europe: And, to crown the Scene, the Troops of Rusha were call'd in to check the Ambition of France.

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But what Consequence are we to draw from those, and a thousand other political Events, that happened at that Time? Why, really, that the System of Europe, had undergone a total Renovation; that we had mistaken the Object of the French Ambition, and that the Conquests of the Low Countries and Holland, was far from being of that Consequence to them, which we had been taught to imagine. That the Balance of Power, which the grand Consederacy was form'd to maintain, now no longer existed.

existed, and, in short, that it is, and ever will be, ruinous to Great Britain, if she shall take too great a Concern, in the Affairs of the Continent, with her own Armies; or operate in any other Manner than by and for those Advantages, which her own Situation, and the Industry of her Inhabitants have procured her.

This, Sir, is a fair Account of my polital Creed. And I cannot advance one Inch farther in the Doctrine of Great Britain's Independency upon the Continent. Commerce has given them Connections, which Nature has denied: And Accidents have produced Effects, which Policy did not foresee. The Interest as well as the Reputation, (and Reputation is Interest) of Great Britain calls upon her to protect, strengthen and defend her Allies: And the single Consideration with me is, in what Manner that can be best effected.

There can be no Manner of Doubt, that Great Britain never maintained an Army, upon the Continent, but at three Times the Price, at which, the might have hired an equal Body of auxilliary Troops. Therefore, I think it out of Question, that if there be amongst us, a Man, or, a Minister, who imagines

imagines that Great Britain ought to operate, upon the Continent, by her own Troops, at this Juncture, I scarcely know by what Name to call that Opinion.

If, on the other Hand, we have a Faction, which thinks that we can be fafe, that we can be prosperous, that we can be victorious, though we abandon all our Allies, though we drop all Concern with the Continent, and though we facrifife every Confideration of Liberty and Religon there; such a Faction, must, either, have very wrong Heads, or very bad Hearts, or both. The first Maxim of the Roman Republic, was, to be faithful to its Allies, of every Denomination, however remote, however infignificant, however ungrateful, and, even, burdenfome, they might But some Gentlemen may call this, with many other Examples, both antient and modern, I could produce, mere Declamation. Be it fo. Then I will proceed to Argument.

Admitting our West Indian and American Trade to be, as it certainly is, of the greatest Importance to England, how does that Importance arise? Undoubtedly by England's Connections with the Continent; and B

with the very Powers, which the Ambition of France prompts her to destroy. For let us suppose, (I hope it never shall be more than a Supposition) that France, finding she could do nothing by Sea against Great Britain, should over-run her Allies, upon the Continent. Let us suppose farther (which the Gentlemen in the present Opposition, if they have any Meaning, must suppose) that Great Britain shuts herself up, within herself, makes Use of her naval Power, abandons all Concern with the Continent, and fuffers Friends and Foes to fall indifcriminately before the Power of France. I shall, even, suppose that Great Britain, all this while, enjoys her Triumphs on the Main, that her Fleet carries Terror, wherever it comes, and that she reigns the undoubted and unrivall'd Mistress of the Ocean.

But where is the Source that is to supply all this Flood of Glory, if she stands unconnected with the Continent, by Interest as well as Nature? Her American Colonies must become a Burden upon her, if she can no longer circulate their Commodities, or her own. Her Fleets can then no longer answer their Intention, which is to defend her Commerce, for she would then have none to defend. They must

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must become Objects of unnecessary, but expensive, Parade; and she must be reduc'd at last, like an unsuccessful Publican, to live upon her own Stores, and devour the Provisions she had prepar'd for others.

Will any Man say, that I overstrain those Suppositions? That I do not, will appear by a plain candid Review of what is faid on the other Side of the Question, and which, had I not heard it urg'd in Speeches, and defended in Print, I would not have believed could have been advanced by Men of Sense. You will think, perhaps, from this Introduction, that I intend to bring in a pompous Detail of Facts and Reasonings; but, to your no small Disappointment, all that those Gentlemen have advanced, and all that I have to combat, is, the fingle Proposition, That Great Britain ought to take no Concern in the Affairs of the Continent. What! none at all? None. Not even supposing that France and Prussia are closely connected in Interest? That Sweden and Denmark overaw'd, over-persuaded, or over-paid, shall enter into their Schemes? That Russia, tho' powerful within herfelf, has no Money to put her Armies into Motion? That the Germanic . Germanic Princes, who either fear, envy, or hate the King of Great Britain, shall get fuch a Superiority in the Empire, as to fet aside the pragmatic Sanction, and sacrifice to their Prejudices, or their Resentments, or their immediate Safety, every falutary Maxim of public Liberty? That the natural Enemies of Great Britain, from these united Causes, should obtain such an Ascendency in Europe, as to prohibit all Commerce, nay, Correspondence, between her and the Continent, and that the Confumption of all her Commodities is laid under a total Interdiction? Do not these, and a thousand other Confiderations, fuggest themselves to prove the Absurdity of that general Proposition, fo strenuously defended by some at this Time, That Great Britain ought upon no Ac-COUNT take any Concern in the Affairs of the Continent?

In the Course of the Suppositions I have laid down, I have purposely omitted the Danger which the Protestant Succession here might be exposed to, if such a Concurrence of Events should ever take Place, My Reason is, because I am willing to give the Gentlemen on the other Side of the Question,

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Question, all the Advantages they can, and more than they ought to, require; by supposing Great Britain to be so much the absolute Mistress of the Ocean, and so well united at Home, as to defy all Attempts, either foreign or domestic, to overthrow her Constitution. But granting this, if cut off from all Commerce and Correspondence with the Continent, over what solitary Realms must she reign? From what Resources must she draw her Riches? and by what Means is she to support her Power?

I know it may be said, that these are Suppositions not to be supposed. But Gentlemen can think so only, because when they all come forward at one View, they affect them too strongly; for if they are examined particularly and consequentially, we shall find the Sum total of all the Articles to be the same. Great Britain, by her natural Situation, is the same now, as she has been this three hundred Years; and whatever political Alterations she has undergone, have only been in Proportion to those of her neighbouring States, which seem rather to encourage, than to forbid, her Communications with the Continent.

At the same Time, I hope I shall be allowed to say, that within the Period I have mentioned, she has had many great and wise Princes, many able and honest Statesmen, many experienc'd and successful Admirals, and many glorious and fortunate Generals. But I do not, in all her History, remember, a single Conjuncture thro' all the vast Variety that has happened within that Time, in which it was laid down as a Maxim of sound Policy, that Great Britain ought, uponno Account, to take any Concern in the Assairs of the Continent.

A Position, like this, is no better than a Libel upon the Memory of all such as have ever bere the Name of British Patriots. For what Reason did Queen Elizabeth, with a Liberality somewhat foreign to her natural Temper, support the Revolt of the Dutch, and the Hugonots of France, and take so deep a Concern in every Event that concerned the Germanic Body? Was it to establish Rules of Faith, and Systems of Religion? Was it from a disinterested Concern for the Liberties of Mankind, that she wasted the Blood and Treasure of her Subjects? These Motives were indeed consequential

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quential of the great Spirit, with which the acted; but had they been her primary Impulse, they had been romantic and chimerical, and beyond the natural Power of Great Britain to compass. But her Views were more rational; for tho' she had repell'd the most powerful Invasion ever attempted upon this Island; tho' after that, no Princess ever reign'd over a more dutiful, and a more united People, yet she knew her Interest, as the Sovereign of a trading Nation, connected her with the Continent; and called upon her to affift herfelf, by protecting her Friends. This falutary Maxim was attended with every good Effect of public Spirit; for, in political, as well as personal, Cases, it will always be seen, that social and Self-love are the same.

If there is a Period in which the Government of England seem'd more inclin'd than at any other Time, to throw up all Concern with the Continent, it was during the Reign of James the First, which has been universally stigmatiz'd on that very Account. Let us figure to ourselves what really was the Case then, and is an indelible Brand upon the Annals of that Reign, a Prince

Prince and an Elector of the Empire, whom every Tie of Nature, Religion and Policy, hadrender'd dear to Great Britain, threaten'd to be fiript of his Dominions by the Disturbers of Europe's Repose, for the generous Concern he had taken in the Cause of public Liberty, in which the Interests of Great Britain were included. Let us figure farther, that all required to support that Prince's Territories, and to maintain what was then the natural Balance of Power in Europe, was a Sum of about 300,000 L. which is equal to upwards of 700,000 l. at this Time. But what am I figuring? The Fact was fo; and tho' every Man of Sense and Virtue in England was for granting that Support, yet it was with-held by the Court, for the very same Reasons, that I have heard lately advanced in a fimilat Case. " Great Britain (faid the Court Ora-" tors of that Time) is an Island, she has " nothing to fear from the Continent, she " ought not to engage in the Quarrels " of other Princes, whatever their Conor nexions with her may be; let her extend " and protect her Commerce, let them fight " out and defend their own Cause; and if " Great Britain is to be engaged in the " Defence Defence of Territories, possessed by the Princes related to her Throne, such Re-

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" a Happiness to her."

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Such was the Language of Court Sycophants in that Reign; and shall it be adopted by British Patriots in this? What was then the Consequence? No Consideration could, for a long Time, prevail with that degenerate Court, to operate in the Affairs of the Continent, any other ways than by thoufands of Ambaffadors, and Millions of Negotiations. The dreaded Event took Place; the Protestant Interest in the Empire was reduced to the last Gasp. The Allies of England were over-run, or over-aw'd, and the Oppressors of Europe must soon have reduc'd the Naval Power of Great Britain to a State of Infignificancy, as she could not have had a Port in Europe, to which she could trade, or an Ally to whom she could have Recourfe.

The Spirit of the Nation, and a Course of Accidents unparallelled and unexpected, alone prevented her being in so disagreeable a Situation. The Court was terrify'd by

the wise and honest Part of the People, out of their detach'd Schemes; and the amazing Success of the Swedes in Germany, (an Event never again to be looked for) aided by Troops and Money from Great Britain, procur'd some Respite to the Liberties of Europe, after being brought to the Verge of Destruction, by that pernicious M xim, That Great Britain ought, upon no Account, to take any Concern in the Affairs of the Continent.

I could bring many Instances fince that Time, equally strong to prove, that our feasonable Connexions with the Continent have brought England to that Pitch of Power and Riches she now possesses, and an Adherence to this Doctrine was the Test of Wisdom and Patriotism in every Ministry, to the Accession of George the First. The Tories, during the Reign of Queen. Anne, (till the Design of bringing in the Pretender was in a Manner avow'd,) if not quite fo forward as the Whigs to support the War on the Continent, never were abfurd enough to oppose any one of the general Measures, that had been judged proper by King William, and they seemed to be as much

much attached, as the Whigs themselves were, to the Principles of the grand Alliance.

But the Moment the Resolution of setting the Pretender on the Throne of Britain was adopted, the Doctrine of our Interest detached from the Continent, was adopted likewise. The Language at Court was, "That Great Britain had taken too great a Concern with the Affairs of Eu-" rope, that it was Time to recover from the "Dream of Glory, which had led her into fuch a Profusion of Blood and Treasure, " for Confiderations foreign to her true In-"terests. That she had nothing to do. " but recall her Armies, trust to her Fleet, " extend her Commerce, and Husband her "Money." In Consequence of this Scheme, the Peace of Utrecht was concluded, which, in Fact, was a Prelude to detach us not only from our Interests upon the Continent, but from our Liberties within the Kingdom; and Britain was once more faved by the critical Accession of the House of Hanover to her Throne.

Having said thus much by way of Reflection, I am far from thinking or saying that

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that we have not, upon certain Occasions. even within the Time I have mentioned. misjudged the Part which we ought to have taken in foreign Affairs. I think the War under the Duke of Marlborough might have been carried on with greater Effect, and less Expence to this Nation, and that, confidering the Turn the Affairs of Europe took, it was impossible for us to have made so good a Peace with France, as we might have had at Gertruydenberg. But admitting this, it makes nothing against the general Principle, which is now so much the Object of public Attention: That at present we are called upon by Interest, as well as Gratitude, to take a proper Concern in the Safety of our Allies upon the Continent. We are not called upon to enter into Engagements that may be dangerous, or Alliances that are expensive, but to accommodate ourselves to that System, which a Concurrence of Accidents, Interests, or Events, have introduc'd into Europe. It is not expected we should attempt to retrieve that Balance of Power, which was the Object of the grand Allis ance; but that we ought to do our Endeavour to prevent that which is most our Interest to prevail, from being overset. One

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One of the first and most necessary Maxima in true Policy is; That Dominion (by which is meant every Kind of Acquisition) is to be maintained upon the fame Principles and Means through which it was gained. Lot us look into the History of England, let us consider the Principles on which the acted, and the Means by which the succeeded in gaining this Sovertigaty of the Seas. and in becoming the Emporium of Commerce. Was not her Conduct wife, because founded on metional Interest? Was it not generous, because national laterest led her to confider, that the Balance of Power must be preserved, and that it could not be preferred, without giving Protection, Life, Liberty, and Independency to Thousands Under Queen Elizadeth, the Balance of Power was to be maintained against Spain, fince that Time it has been maintained against France; and it was equally wife to support it against either, when the Circumstances of Europe required it. I shall not at Present, enter upon the Dispute, where the Balance of Power now lies, or by what Means, it is to be guarded: It is sufficient for my Purpose if it is admitted, that it still exists, that it ought to be maintained and that it may be overfet; and I have not ver found

found a Man yet abourd enough to advance a contrary Opinion.

No Man in England is more sensible than I am of the vast Importance of our Fleets for that Purpose; but I will venture to say they are not all-sufficient. The Liberties of Europe may be ruined, though those of England never can be, without employing a fingle Ship of War. France, in the Year 1672, had a great Fleet, and so had Holland, but the one proved as ineffectual for the Attack, as the other for the Defence, of that Country; and it is well known, that though the Dutch were then, perhaps, the greatest naval Power upon the Continent, the Liberties of Europe in three Days time must have been facrificed had not the Pride and Vanity of the French King proved a happy Counterbalance to his Injustice and Ambi-From whence did this proceed, but from the pernicious Indifference with which the Court, in Opposition to the Parliament of England, looked upon all foreign Affairs?

After these general Reslections, which I hope are built upon uncontrovertable Facts, there cannot be the least Doubt, that the Criterion of true Patriotism in England has ever

ever been, her taking a just Concern in the Affairs of the Continent, and that when this Criterion was abandoned, it always was with Views, and for Reasons, which were as pernicious to the Liberties of England, as of Europe.

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I am not here to diffemble, that when the Crown of England was fettled upon her present illustrious royal Family, many very worthy Patriots, Whigs as well as Tories (for some Patriot Tories there have been) were extremely anxious to fecure this Nation from embarking in Quarrels upon the Continent, in Consequence of any Differences or Engagements which the King of England as Elector of Hanover, might have with any of the Powers there. Were I to speak my own Sentiments candidly, I should say, that the Provisions for that Purpose made in the Act of Settlement were carried farther than even the Nature of a limited Monarchy can admit of, and put the King of England under more disagreeable Restrictions than even a private Gentleman could brook. Nay, I am fingular enough to think, that had feveral of those Restrictions omitted, the Nation would not have been a Bit less secure in her Interests and Liberties.

The

The Jealousy of the Public would have been a better Barrier to both, than any written Provisions could devise: And I could name even recent Instances to prove, that it is possible a Time may come when a Ministry of England shall be so tender of violating the Provisions of the Act of Settlement, and a Faction know their own Strength so well, by adopting that popular Topic, that Opportunities for serving the domestic as well as foreign Interests of this Kingdom may be lost, and in vain sought to be retrieved at an immense Expense, in which all Parties would concur without repining.

In some Part of what I have now advanced, I am countenanced by the Wisdom of Parliament itself, which, long before it had any Experience of his Majesty's Virtues as a King, and of his Passion for the Honour, Happines and Liberties of England, repealed several restrictive Clautes in the Act of Settlement, and I think for very just and very wise Considerations, which I shall not enter upon at present. His Majesty has no Subject more convinced than I am of the Importance of preserving the Spirit of that Act: But I am not for having it rendered more dangerous to be a Counseller to our King.

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at d King, than it is to be a Vizier to a Sultan; neither do I wish that, even as it now stands, it should, by a scrupulous Adherence to Words, desea its Intention, which most certainly was to secure the Liberties of England, by concurring to support those of Europe.

But it may be faid, "No Party is against " our taking a just Concern in Affairs of the " Continent. The Opposition that has been " made is only to our embarking in them too " deeply." This I fay, may be faid, but I have not yet heard it faid; for if I understand any thing of common Sense, the Arguments of the Gentlemen in the Opposition to the prefent Measures, tend to dissolve all Kind of Connections between us and other Powers. I shall, however, for once free them from the Imputation of that Absurdity, by supposing that they are willing to agree to our acting such a Part upon the Continent as may be proper for this Kingdom, as a trading Nation, to enter into. Let us therefore examine the Nature of this Propriety, and see if any Juncture ever existed to which it was more applicable than it is at prefent.

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The Propriety of a Measure confists in its being well timed, well intended, practicable, just, and frugal; and if a Measure answers all these Characters, I think there can be no Question that it ought to be pursued.

With regard to the Time or Juncture: We have lately got rid of an expensive, and not over successful, War, and the Event, as I have already hinted, has taught us, that France has struck into a new Scheme of Politics: That her Government is now convinced, that Glory may be attended with Ruin, and Success with Beggary. Experience shewed them that unprotected Commerce is no other than an easy Prey to the first Assaillant: and that the Palms and Laurels which their Arms had transplanted from Abroad produced only Briars and Thorns at Home. They saw Splendor at Court, and Desolation in their Provinces; their Crown poor though powerful; their Armies flarving, though victorious; and their Ships, though vumerous, ufeless. They beheld great Efforts made, but they proceeded rather from Agony than Strength, and indicated, not Health. but Disease. Every Trader in their Kingdom felt the pernicious Influence of Fleury's long

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long pacific Administration; their Parliaments sought to break those Chains the Clergy had imposed, and their Ministers to remedy the Evils their Injustice had occasioned. They made War to no Purpose, and Peace with no Prosit; and the Expence of their Armies threatned to finish the Ruin which their Conquests had begun. It was in vain their Court endeavoured to conceal the Nakedness of their Country, and the Miseries of the People call'd so loud that they at last reach'd the Throne.

England, all this Time, by protecting her Commerce, saw it not only extended but By War, she had acquired Strength, and by Peace, Riches. The Pangs of intestine Commotion have left no Impression upon her Constitution, and the Expence of foreign War had made no Abatement of her Credit. The high founding Bugbear of Eighty Millions of Debt, when stripp'd of the Rags, with which Disaffection and Discontent had cloathed it, appeared less formidable, than a Debt of Fifty Millions was formerly; and that it was easier to pay the one at 3 per Cent, than the other at 5. short, public Credit flourish'd, public Spirit reviv'd, and the Nation entered upon such a

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Pursuit

Pursuits of her true Interests as alarmed France.

It was easy for France to see the Springs of the different Circumstances of the two Kingdoms, and that it was owing to our Merchants and Ministers going Hand in Hand. The French Ministry copied the Moderation of the English; they encouraged Schemes, Propositions, and Addresses upon the Subject of naval Affairs; they turn'd their Thoughts from Conquests to Commerce, and they gave their Monarch a Relish for the Happiness, as well as the Greatness, of his People. The Refult of the whole was, that a regular Scheme was form'd to augment their Sea, by reducing their Land, Force, to open a perpetual and improving Source of Commerce in America; to apply a certain annual Sum for encreasing both the Number and the Strength of their Ships; for erecting Foundaries, and importing Materials for recasting their Cannons; for forming a Nursery of Seamen; for amaffing incredible Quantities of naval Stores, and, in short, for having before the Year 1760 a Fleet, at Sea, of 150 Ships of the Line, superior in every Respect to those of England.

Had the Conduct of this Scheme been as trudent, as its Execution was practicable, no one can take upon him to fay, what the Confequence might have been, even, long before the Period allotted for its Maturity. But happily for Great Britain; the French Vifnels got the better of their Policy. They provoked us before they were able to Support their Quarrel, they were deceived in their Intelligence, about the Tameness, as well as the Divisions, of the English, and they were mistaken in imagining that they should be able to influence Spain to join them. The English, all this while, exerted themfelves with a Spirit that gave Credit to the Ministry; and an Effect that does honour to the Nation. Their Measures were sober. and therefore fuccessful; their Vigour was tempered by Caution, and their Resentment warranted by Justice. Our Government did not look upon the Quarrel as a territorial Dispute, to be confined to the Place where it happen'd. They considered their Possessions in America to be as much Part of national Property as any County in England; and without minding finical, mistaken, Distinctions, they reflected that the Honour of the Crown, and the Faith of the Parliament, stood engaged for the Property and Prefervation

vation of their meanest Englishman in America.

The Conduct of France upon this Occafion, is without Parallel, and beyond Belief.
Too weak to show Resentment, too proud to
make Reparation; she has discovered, at
once, Impotence and Iujustice, tho' she endeavours to cloke both under the specious
Pretexts of public Tranquility and royal
Moderation. Thus her Behaviour has given
the Lye to all those high Ideas of her Power
and Policy, which she and her Friends were
so industrious in propagating. One single
Month has convinced us of a whole Century's Mistake, and one critical Conjuncture
has prov'd France both seeble and fallible.

Here I see you stand amaz'd; for if France is so despicable an Enemy, why are foreign Princes to be subsidiz'd, and foreign Troops hired to oppose her!—But, I mistake; you cannot surely imagine, notwithstanding all I have said, that I think France is a despicable Enemy to Great Britain? No, I think her the most formidable, as well as most ancient, in the World: And I think her Designs, in the Light I see them, are incompatible with the Interests of every wise Man, and the Principles

Principles of every honest Man, in Great Britain; nay, I believe that she has both Power and Influence enough both to confume and corrupt the Kernel, tho' she has not Strength to break the Shell. Our Island may bid Defiance to her Attacks, but she may prove fatal to its Interests; she may, if not prevented, destroy the Sources, from which we derive our Substance; and tho' she must leave us the Appearances of Freedom and Independency, yet she may render them both far less desirable, than they are at prefent. She has, it is true, intestine Divifions; but the Experience of all History tells us, that these soon subside, when her Ambition and Glory comes in Question.

Having faid thus much, I am almost asham'd to encounter the trite Objection, why are we to enter into expensive Engagements, on Account of his Majesty's Electoral Dominions? For I think that the Engagements we have now enter'd into, would have been wise and necessary, tho' his Majesty had not possessed one Foot of Territory upon the Continent. If any one shall be absurd enough to say that Great Britain can be without Allies, that she can subsist, tho' every Port in Europe was shut to her Commerce,

Commerce, and every Power oppos'd to her Interests, I shall not be absurd enough to combat such a Paradox.

I shall, therefore, fairly take it for granted, from the Facts and Principles I have already established, that Great Britain has an Interest in preserving the Balance of Power in Europe, even tho' his Majesty's Germanic Dominions were quite out of the Question. If so, I should be glad to know, what Purpose all the Clamour rais'd about Hanover. can serve, but that of Discontent and Disaffection? Have the Gentlemen, who feem'd to favour, if not to adopt, this Clamour, pretended to fay, that France is so devoid of Refentment, as well as Ambition, as to neglect the Means which her Power and Connexions have put into her Hands, of indemnifying herself for her Disappointments and Losses. No reasonable Man, I think, can fay fo. In what Manner, then, can she operate? Not by Sea; for there, compar'd to Britain, the is impotent. It must therefore be by Land. Will Gentlemen fay, that Russia has so natural a Connexion with the rest of Europe, as to be compell'd by Interest so interpose in the Quarrel? No, her Situation by Land is almost as impregnable

as ours is by Sea. Can it be pretended, that the Germanic Body is, at this Time, fo well united within itself, as to be able to make Head against France and her Allies? If he casts his Eye upon a common Gazette, or Map, he may fee, that it is not. But supposing it were; uay, supposing the Queen of Hungary had Power enough within herself to stipulate that Assistance, which we are to have from others, would it be generous in us to require it? Or, would it be prudent in her to grant it? She has Connexions to observe, she has even Family Interests to consult; and tho' the had neither, her Situation does not admit of her making such a Bargain, or at least on fo cheap Terms, as we have it from her Sister Empress. Can it be pretended, that without Great Britain, the present System of Power in Europe, can long subsist? No. I don't know a Man in England hardy enough to deny, that the Pragmatic Sanction was retrieved by England, and that were we now to withdraw all Concern for, and Connexions with, the Continent, the Liberties of Europe must be more endangered than they were fifteen or fixteen Years ago. What Barrier then can they have, but from the Interpolition of Great Britain? Or, how can Great Britain interpole so effectually as by by Means of those Powers, who have nothing either to sear, or to hope from France?

Such at the Considerations which prove the Wisdom of *Great Britain*'s Interposition at this Time in the Affairs of the Continent: And the same Reasons that shew it to be well timed, prove it likewise to be well intended.

As to the Practicability of this Measure, it is, I think, out of Dispute that the Powers with whom we have contracted are heartily in the Interests of Great Britain, and very able to perform their Engagements. Empress of Russia's Interest is so closely connected with that of England, and her Ministry is so sensible of it, that she has shewed a wonderful Firmness upon all Occasions against every Attempt to detatch her from our Alliance. But, indeed, her Imperial Majesty's own Inclination, as well as Interest, strengthens this Connexion, so that it would be in vain to fay any more upon that Head. I shall only beg leave to remind you of the wonderful Punctuality with which she performed her last Engagements. So far from being scanty as to the Number of Troops the had stipulated, she threw some Thoufands

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fands into the Bargain, so that making the largest Allowances for Mortaliry and other Accidents upon their March, the full Quota must have arrived at the Place appointed; and on our Ministers and Agents had the picking of them out of near 400,000 disciplined Men. These are Facts which I think proper to touch upon, because I know there is but too great Ground of Objection to Measures of this kind, on Account of the vast Deficiencies of the stipulated Numbers when the come to the Place of Action. As to the Landgrave of Heffe Castle, the other Power, with whom his Majesty has entered into Engagements, his long Perseverance in the Interest of England, and his near Connections with the present Royal Family, are more than fufficient to convince us that he will cheerfully and punctually fulfil, all his Engagements.

But, it may be faid, and I know it has been faid, France may over-run the Territories those Troops are hired to defend, before they can come to their Assistance. In answer to this it is sufficient to observe, that they whose Concern it is to entertain the greatest Apprehensions on that Score, seem to have none. The Season of the Year, at present, is too far advanced for E 2

the French to make a Campaign of that kind with any Number of Troops that can alarm the Powers they mean to attack, and his Majesty's Prudence and Vigilance is too well known for us to be under any Manner of Uneasiness on that Account. A Winter Expedition of that Sort, on the Part of France, is what the best Friends of Great Britain have Reason to wish for; and before Spring or Summer, Dispositions may be made to give them a proper Reception.

Supposing, however, any particular Territory out of the Question, I should be glad to know from the Gentlemen, who feem to oppose this Measure, whether, confidering the Nature of the present Dispute between Great Britain and France, and the Dispositions of certain German Powers, it would not be extreamly prudent in us to guard against all Attempts to give France fuch a Footing in the Empire as may enable her and her Allies to give Law to our Friends there? If the smallest Prince in the Empire, in Friendship with Great Britain, were to be over-run; if his being over-run were to be as decisive of the Protestant, as the English, Interest, there; if it might, even do

no more than open the Way to farther Acquisitions that are inconsistent with that Syntem of Power that has been always our Care to preserve in Germany, I say, even in that Case, it would be Madness in us not to enable that Power, however weak in itself, to make Head against all such Attempts.

A happy Circumstance for Great Britain is, that (independent of the Confideration of any Connections with her) she has an Ally in Germany so able as his Majesty is to maintain that Balance which it is always her Interest should prevail there; for upon the Preservation of that in Germany depends, I will venture to fay, the Preservation of the Trade of Great Britain over all Europe. For Trade has many fecret Operations and Springs, which, however distant they may feem, have, all of them, a Relation to each other, and every Turn which Commerce might take to our Disadvantage in the North, would foon operate to our Prejudice in the South, and, by Consequence, in America itself.

With regard to the Frugality of the Meafure, it is perhaps such, as no Juncture can parallel parallel; and I will venture to say, that all the Troops, both Russians and Hessians, for which his Majesty contracted during his last Absence from Great Britain, will cost us less than the cheapest Operation either by Sea or Land, that has been pretended to be pointed out, by the Gentlemen who oppose the Measure. Will these Gentlemen say, that our Fleets can guard our inland Trade? Will they pretend that Great Britain can have any Benefit from Commerce, but by preserving the Balance on the Continent? Or. will they shew that it can be preserved at so cheap a Rate, as by the Measures entered into by his Majesty?

The Members which compose the two Houses of Parliament, by which the Act of Succession was settled, were, to say the least of them, at least as good Patriots as any modern ones; They understood the Constitution, and loved the Liberty, of their Country; they foresaw every Difficulty which has since happened as far as human Foresight could reach, and their Jealousy of our Connections with the Continent was carried perhaps too far. But they could not foresee that a Time would come when a Protestant Power

Power should start up in the Midst of Germany, and draw the Sword for France. They could not foresee, that that Power would become too strong to be controll'd, and too obstinate to be perfuaded. They could not imagine that a Descendent from that Duke of Brandenburg, whom King William called his Father, and confidered as a main of the Protestant Interest in Gershould espouse the Interest of the House of Bourbon, against that of Austria, and act counter to every Principle upon which the grand Alliance was formed. They could not foresee that Religion would turn out a mere State Juggle with many of the German Princes; and that Popery and Protestantism would become with them, two mere Sounds, without any other Ideas annexed to them, than Power and Interest. Had they foreseen this, with many other Revolutions that have fince happen'd in the System of the Germanic Body, can we imagine that the Act of Settlement would have been conceiv'd in the Terms it originally bore. Were they now to fee their Successors divided about a Measure, that for the Expence, at which they maintained a few Regiments on the Continent, was to remedy the the dreadful Evils they could not prevent, and fix the Balance of Power in Europe, what Indignation must they feel!

I am well aware what vast Advantage the Antisubsidizers have in Sounds. ver, Hanoverian Interests, the Naval Power of Great Britain, ber Situation as an Island, ber Commerce, and ber Detachment from the Continent, are popular, plausible, and, when not carry'd into Extravagance, proper, Topics of Argument. But they ought to have their Bounds. When our Crown was fettled on the prefent Royal Family, the Nation well knew the Connexion between it and Hanover; and so far as I can recollect, it never yet has been pretended in the hottest Times of Opposition, that the Act of Settlement, as it now stands, has suffered the finallest Violation. At the Time it pass'd, common Sense could not but dictate, (and in the Nature of Things, it is impossible it should be otherwise) that his Majesty's Germanic Dominions would be confider'd as a Pledge for his Conduct as King of Great Britain, towards those Powers, who should give Law upon the Continent. This, I fay, is diclated by common Sense: But will common

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common Honesty allow his Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, to suffer for that Spirit which he exerts as King of *England?*

Having mentioned common Honesty, let me put the following Case, which tho' improbable, is not impossible. Supposing fome Part of his Majesty's British Dominions to be attack'd on Account of Hanover, and that it is in the Power of the States of that Electorate, for a mere Trifle of Expence, to fave us from an Invasion that may prove fatal to our Liberties, and Commerce. Let an Englishman, I say, lay his Hand upon his Heart in such a Situation of Affairs, and ask himself in what Light he would consider the People of Hanover, were they to refuse to save, nay, to serve, the People of England with so much Ease, and at so small an Expence? I will not fay that this Cafe may not happen; I will not fay that it has not partly happen'd already, and that there was not a Time, when Great Britain was alarmed by the Threats of a most formidable Invasion, merely for the wife Concern, which her King, as Elector of Hanover, took in the Affairs of the North.

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Can we, with any Colour of Probability, imagine, that the Framers of the Act of Settlement were ignorant, that fuch Inconveniencies would happen after the House of Hansver had succeeded to the Throne of England? Might not every Child foresee that many Incidents must happen, in which the Elector of Hanover shall be obliged, as fuch, to take a Part extreamly difagreeable to the other Powers, who will not fail, if an Apportunity should present, to resent his Conduct, be it ever so just and wife, upon the King of England? What was the magical Charm that forced those Opposites in Nature, Charles of Sweden and the Czar of Muscovy, into one another's Arms, and to threaten Great Britain with a refistless Invasion? Nothing but the wife and generous Concern, which his late Majesty took, as Elector of Hanover, in preserving the Peace of Germany, and the Balance of Power in the North. But no Patriot of those Days was hardy enough to charge the then Ministry with involving Great Britain in Affairs that were foreign to her Interests. The Part the acted, was dictated by the Nature of Things. Her Enemies took Advantage of those Circumstances that present themfelves

felves at the very first View, by seeking to force the King of *Great Britain* into Meafures detrimental to the Elector of *Hanover*.

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The popular Outcry, therefore, against our Connexions with Hanover, neither has, nor can have, any Foundation, but in the Act of Settlement itself; for while that Act subsists, those Connexions must subsist likewise; nay, they partly must subsist, were it repeal'd. And, in Fact, they did fubfift before it took Place; because it always has been, and always will be, the Interest of Great Britain to support the Protestant Interest in Germany, which she cannot do, without supporting those Princes, which are at its Head. Whoever is conversant in the History of that Act, and the Principles upon which it pass'd, must be extreamly fensible that the Whigs of those Days, and all the well meaning Tories likewise, thought it a happy Circumstance for England to be ruled by a Prince, who had a great Interest in Germany; and it was with that View that England exerted herself so much in every Thing that con-F 2

cerned the Honour or Interest of the House of Hanover, even before its Succession to the Crown of Great Britain.

Nothing is more easy than florid Declamation; and an Orator of very moderate Parts, by dipping into Magazines and political Pamphlets, may make a very good Figure, by furnishing himself with general Invectives against the Blood and Treasure of England, being employed in Quarre that are foreign to her Interests. He may likewise expatiate with great Eloquence upon the natural Defence of England, which is her Navy, and her Militia; and he may shew, with invincible Force of Reasoning, how easy it is to form a Militia, so as to bid Defiance to all Invafions. Who doubts all this, or disputes any of those general Principles? But I have heard that even Gold may be purchased too dear; and great Chemists have been known to maintain. that the Transmutation of Metals is not impracticable, but that the Profit never could defray the Expence of the Procefs.

But why are Things to be taken for granted without Proof, and against Probability? Who doubts that it is destructive to Britain to enter into a Land War, upon the Continent, uninjured, unprovoked, and uninterested? But is that the Case at present? Have we received no Provocations, from France, that call for Resentment on our Part? Undoubtedly we have. And I have not yet met with a Man, in England, unreafonable enough to fay, we have not. what Manner were we to express our Resentment? By Sea undoubtedly; as being the most natural, the most frugal, and the most effectual Manner. I shall not dissemble, for my own Part, that the Circumstances of the Juncture, when this Resentment became necessary, were such, that I did not conceive we should have acted with the Spirit we have shewn. His Majesty abroad. France and her Allies prepared. alarm'd and elated, by the Defeat of General Braddock; and the naval Power of our Enemy far from being contemptible. The Dutch weak, or divided, beyond Expression. The Queen of Hungary in no Condition to provoke France and Prussia. and not a Power upon the Continent that had fo much as a Pretext for acting with

us, in consequence of our American Disputes. Notwithstanding this, all Considerations of personal and territorial Sasety were generously set aside on the Continent; the Honour, and Interest of Great Britain, took Place of all Arguments; and his Majesty generously passed the Rubicon, with the happy Omen of being seconded by the good Wishes and Approbation of every honest Englishman; and all this to the Amazement of Europe, and the Disappointment of France, who relied upon the Simuation of Matters upon the Continent to protect her against the Resentment of England.

A small Degree of Reslection, upon the Occurrences of a few Months ago, will justify all I have advanced; on this Head. Was this a Conduct, that had the Appearance of making the Interests of Great Britain, only a secondary Consideration? Is it possible to conceive a Conduct that can do his Majesty more Honour, as a King of England? Common Prudence, indeed, led him to enter into two fresh Engagements either to preserve the Peace of Europe, or the Balance of Power in Germany. But had he not been our King, had he, as Elector

lector of Hanover, been no more than the determined Friend of England in Germany; had he been threatned on that Account by Powers, which the Strength of his electoral Dominions could not withfand, and if the Loss of Hanover must have been attended with the Loss of all our Interest not only in Germany, but in the North, I say, supposing all this had been the Case, must not the People of England have been as void of Wisdom and Policy, as of Justice and Gratitude, had they abandoned such an Ally to Destruction, or even to Danger?

Does then his Majesty being connected with us, by Ties more close and sacred than those of a common Ally, alter the Nature of our Duty, our Interests and Engagements? What Prince who had no more Concern with us, than as a mere Ally, would have acted in like Manner, under like Circumstances? Let me ask farther, whether it is possible for his Majesty to have consulted the Interest of Britain in a more frugal, effectual, and, even, decent, Manner, than he has done? Could he have answered the great Trust reposed in him by Parliament, without providing for the Peace and Sasety of Europe?

Europe? Or was there any other Course to be followed, for that Purpose, but that which he has purfued? Had he not purfued it, there had indeed been Field enough for Outcry and Declamation, "To neglect " the Liberties of Europe, the Protestant "Interest, the Safety of our Allies, and " the Honour of Great Baitain for the " Confideration of a paltry Sum, that scarce " is to be mentioned, in Opposition to those " mighty Confiderations, and to expose us " to an immense Expence to retrieve that " Balance of Power, which a Trifle of " Money might have preserved. Add to " this, it is certain to a Demonstration, that " the Money we give to Russia is all laid " out upon our own Manufactures; and that " even the Subfidies we lay out in Germany, " are more than compensated by the Ad-" vantages they bring us in Point of Com-" merce. Was this the Manner, in which " the glorious Queen Elizabeth acted, when " she exposed both her Life and her Crown " to support the Protestant Interest in Europe? " Was this the Spirit which Cromwell thew'd, " when he obliged the French Court, to " drop the Persecution of the Protestants, " though they were her own Subjects? " Did King William proceed upon such " narrow

* narrow pitiful Maxims, when he form'd

" the great Alliance, or the Whig Mi-

" niftry, when they supported it?"

I may venture to refer it to any Man of common Sense, whether, if an Opposition had a Mind to distress a Government, it could be done, in a more effectual Manner. than by adopting the Topics, I have just now laid down? If the Gentlemen, in fuch an Opposition, had a Mind to be as spiteful, as those in some Oppositions we have heard of, they might add, with great Archness, "That fuch a Saving was far from proceed-" ing from any Principles of national Fru-" gality; that it was only in order to " have the more to squander at home, "upon wickedPurposes; that we are playing " the same Game, with the Jacobite Mi-" nistry, who at the End of Queen Ann's "Reign, abandoned the poor Catalans, " and what Prince or People, be they ever · fo despicable, will hereafter either trust or " fear Great Britain."

I do not pretend to fay that the whole of this Invective would be well founded, but, I affirm, that it is a thousand Times more rational, as well as specious, than,

all the Declamation that has been brought against his Majesty's Engagements upon the Continent.

Will Gentlemen, upon the whole fay, that no Juncture can exist, in which Great Britain ought to take any Concern, in Affairs, on the Continent? Will they fay that any Juncture ever did, or can exist more pressing than the present, to induce her to take fuch Concern? Will they pretend, that if the is to take it, the can do it in any less Degree, than by the Measures which his Majesty has pursued, and by fulfilling the Engagements he has form'd? Can they alledge, that these Engagements are expenfive, confidering the great Purposes they a to ferve, or can they conceive it possible to have so powerful and effectual an Assistance upon more frugal and more reasonable Terms? If Gentlemen are abfurd enough to answer in the Affirmative, to all these Questions, I should scarely think it worth while. to give them a Reply; and, till they do it, neither Invective nor Declamation can make any Impression upon me. I shall think my Conscience acquitted, if I give my Vote for enabling his Majesty to fulfil his Engagements upon the Continent; - First,

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First, Because, I am, in my own Heart, convinced that it is for the Interest of England, were all Considerations of his Majesty's Person and Dominions out of the Question, to support the Balance of Power in Germany, and not to suffer France and her Allies to overset it.

Secondly, Because Great Britain must become contemptible beyond all Expression, was she to suffer a Friend and an Ally (putting his Majesty even upon that Footing) to be menaced, far less injured or ruined, for the generous Part he has acted in her Quarrel, and in Support of her Honour and Interest:

Thirdly, because I am sincerely and sirmly of Opinion, that if his Majesty's Electoral Dominions should be attacked, it can be for no other Reason, and upon no other Account than for his noble and spririted Conduct as King of England; and I think, that not to support him in that Case would be to betray the Honour of Parliament, which has always expressed a Resolution to defend his German Territories in such an Event.

Fourthly, Because I am persuaded the whole Commerce of Great Britain all over Europe must be destroyed should she be unactive upon the Continent at this alarming Juncture, and I think that the Expence she is put to by his Majesty's Engagements, is the least that she can possibly incur, when the Purpose is so salutary and momentous.

Having thus, I hope, to the Satisaction of you and my Friends justify'd the Conduct I have pursued, and am determined to pursue, with regard to our subsidiary Engagements, I shall now proceed to a few Observations with regard to the immediate State of Assairs between us and France. There, I own that I ama little singular; for, tho' I am of Opinion in favour of our subsidiary Engagements, yet I am extremely clear as to the Justice and Expediency of the Hostilities we have commenced, and are still carrying on by Sea against France, and that we could not by any other Means obtain Satisfaction or Security.

The Court of France, I am sensible, has filled all Europe with Invectives against our Ministry for attacking their Ships in Time of Peace, that is, before any Declaration of War

War is made, and they want to repreient this Procedure as being directly repugnant to the Law of Nations. This Doctrine has been adopted by some Gentlemen at home. who, I believe, with fincerely well to their Country, and who would be glad that our Proceedings should be as conformable as possible to the Law of Nations and the Principles of Public Equity. 1 shall readily admit, that a formal Indiction, or, if you will, a Proclamation ought to precede all War. The Bounds of this Paper do not admit, that I should state a Distinction which is understood in modern Policy, but is not authorized by the Law of Nations, between Reprizals and Hostilities, and between Hostilities and War. For, whether that Distinction is understood or not, our present Conduct certainly may be justified, and reconciled to the Principles of the purest If we are making Reprifals, who made them necessary? If we are commiting Hostilities, who gave the Provocation? And if we are even carrying on a War, who is to blame? Certainly, the Party who committed the first Injustice, by his Conduct, authorized Reprifals to be made upon him. If he continues to support that Injustice by Force, it is immaterial by what Word you term

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has our ime i of Var term the Operations against him, whether by that of Hostilities or War. No Terms can be more express than those stipulated by the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle for the Evacuation of the Neutral Islands by the French. Affurances could be more ftrong or folemn than those given by their Ministers and Governors for her punctually fulfilling that Article. But how shamefully was it first evaded, then difregarded, and then broken. Stipulations which regard the Division of Territory, Interest and Power between us and France upon the Continent of America, are equally express; yet our Territories were invaded, our Subjects butchered, and our Allies overaw'd, overpowered, or debauched from our Friendship in a Time of profound Peace, and without regard to the most solemn Protestations of Friendship, which the Court of Versailles was at that Time making to that of St. Fames's.

Who was then the Agressor? Who begun War without declaring it, and broke their Faith, without preserving so much as a decent Appearance? The French undoubtedly. They were insolent enough, even not to deny it; and they supported their Insolence by Power. Their King's Commission-

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ners to his Clergy, proclaimed (tho' prematurely) that the great Taxes their Master had laid upon his Subjects were well expended, because they had put him in a Condition to demand Respect by Sea. The Meaning of which was, that they had enabled him to carry into Execution all that System of iniquitous Power, which his Ministers had form'd against the English in Ame-The Consequence soon proved this Construction to be right in Defiance to our most earnest Remostrances, in Disregard of our repeated Warnings. A Fleet was fitted out, a large Body of Land Troops was embarked, and fent to America, and our Enemies, happily for us, were so infatuated, that they over-strain'd their Power, by the Violence of their Attempts. I am not yet authoriz'd to name any Particulars, to justify my faying that their Defens were ambitious beyond Bounds, and cruel without Prece-But, be that as it will, enough of cedent. their Conduct appear'd to all the World, to justify our treating them as Enemies both here and in America: And this Part of our History and their's is so recent, and has been fo fully explain'd, that I shall not enter into any particular Detail of our Injuries, and their Injustice.

But, say the Advocates for France, why had not Great Britain recourse to the Law of Nations, as France never refused to do her Justice? And why did she commence Hostilities without any previous Declaration of War? There seems, no doubt, to be some Weight in this Objection, but a very small Degree of Attention to Terms will remove it. In the mean while, I must ask your Indulgence, if my Sentiments on this Head, are so singular that I can appeal as yet to nothing in Print that I know of, to support them.

The Laws of Nations is a Term by which I cannot bring myself to understand either more or less, than the Practice of a very few Nations, who having the Advantage of Letters, transmitted their Transactions to Posterity. Such were the Greeks, the Romans, the Ægyptians, and one or two other States. Some of these Transactions are very whimfical, and others, especially those of the Romans, are repugnant to every Principle of natural Justice and common Humanity. Authors, however, have made Shift to collect some of the most unexceptionable amongst them, and this Collection, with a few Commentaries of their own, they have dignified with the Appellation of the Law of Nations: A Term which I think has

But if the Law of Nations is no other than the Practice of a few Nations, how can it operate in Cases that could not possibly come under their Cognizances, great Part of which, (and indeed the only Part that is applicable to the present Difference between England and France,) turns upon the Laws and Limits of Territory; and is intended to regulate the Conduct of Princes towards one another in territorial Disputes. But we are to observe, that the Bounds, Situations and Contents of their Territories were fixed and known. The Practice of former Ages, and at fimilar Conjunctures was, in such Cases, a sufficient Direction. And, in Case of any Doubt, they had generally ready Evidences and living Witnesses to produce. When they had not, the Appeal was made to Arms. I am willing enough to allow that such Precedents, or if you please to call them, Laws, ought to be decifive in those Parts of Europe where the same Preciseness of Description takes place.

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48 10 But how does the Case stand with regard to America, which was discovered upwards of 1400 Years after the Date of any such Precedents? Recourse, no Doubt, must be

had to written Evidences, and these have been appealed to on the Part of Great Bri-France, on the other Hand, takes tain. Subterfuge in scientifical Principles arbitrarily laid down, and magisterially pursued. She has form'd fuch Partitions of Territory in America, as best suit her own ambitious Views. She has christened whole Nations by other Names than those they had always born, and have put Constructions upon the Words of Treaties, that never were dreamt of before. Not contented with confining those Disputes to the Cabinet, she brought them into the Field, and supported by Power, what she claimed through Injustice. It is, therefore, ridiculous in her to appeal to the Law of Nations in a Controversy, which it is impossible ever should come under their Cognizance, or to think that England will lie by for the Event of a Dispute amongst Commissaries, which may last for fifty Years; while, at the same Time, France behaves in such a Manner, as if that Dispute was already settled in her Favour, by erecting Forts upon Territories that have been always understood to belong to England, and in making Dispositions which prove she is determined to maintain by Power, what he cannot possess by Justice.

I have not heard that the French have even pretended that Great Britain begun to act hostily upon the Territories in Dispute

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pute veen between us, while the Decision of them was left to the Cabinet. But I am well satisfied in my own Mind, that France did: And that had the Conferences between our Commissaries and her's lasted to this Hour, she would have gone on, in the mean while, to erect her Forts, to debauch our Friends, the Indians, to march her Armies, and to strengthen her Acquisitions, till Great Britain must either have tamely given up all the Points in Dispute, or have been obliged to retrieve them at an Expence too greater, if possible, for their Value.

I here thought of entering into a particular Detail of the Usurpations made by France upon England in America, and of shewing the infamous Chicanery with which she has hitherto conducted the whole of the Dispute between us. I likewise intended to shew the dreadful Confequences to England, if the Maritime Power of France was not immediately check'd: But as these are Points, which I think are agreed upon by all Parties amongst us, (nay, they seem to vie who shall be most ready to urge them,) I shall not enter upon

them at present.

What I have said, will, I hope, convince you that my present Behaviour in Parliament, is such as becomes an honest Man, and an *Englishman*; who has nothing to hape,

hope, but from the Welfare of his Country; and nothing to fear, but from her Enemies. Uninfluenc'd as Jam by Ambiation, and unconnected with Party, my fole Study is to preserve that good Opinion of my Friends, that plac'd me in Parliament, by a steady and disinterested Conduct there. And if this Paper shall have any Effect to that Purpose, I shall not think the few Hours I have bestow'd upon it, misemploy'd.

I am, Sir, with great Esteem,

Your most obedient Servant.

FINITS.

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