

**CIHM
Microfiche
Series
(Monographs)**

**ICMH
Collection de
microfiches
(monographies)**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

© 1995

Technical and Bibliographic Notes / Notes technique et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming are checked below.

- Coloured covers / Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged / Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated / Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing / Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps / Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black) / Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations / Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material / Relié avec d'autres documents
- Only edition available / Seule édition disponible
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin / La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge intérieure.
- Blank leaves added during restorations may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming / Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- Additional comments / Commentaires supplémentaires:

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modifications dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured pages / Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged / Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated / Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed / Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached / Pages détachées
- Showthrough / Transparence
- Quality of print varies / Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material / Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image / Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.
- Opposing pages with varying colouration or discolourations are filmed twice to ensure the best possible image / Les pages s'opposent ayant des colorations variables ou des décolorations sont filmées deux fois afin d'obtenir le meilleur image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below /
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

	10X		14X		18X		22X		26X		30X
	12X		16X		20X		24X		28X		32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:


National Library of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shell contains the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:


Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.


Un des symboles suivants apparaît sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.




MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



APPLIED IMAGE Inc

1653 East Main Street
Rochester, New York 14609 USA
(716) 482 - 0300 - Phone
(716) 788 - 5989 - Fax



The
Political Cleavage
— of —
North America

AN ADDRESS
DELIVERED BY
HON. GEORGE W. ROSS





5.-

THE POLITICAL CLEAVAGE OF NORTH AMERICA

ADDRESS

DELIVERED BY

THE HON. GEORGE W. ROSS

At the 49th Convocation of the University of Chicago. Dr. Harper, President of the University in the Chair. Mr. Ross was introduced in very kindly terms by Mr. James B. Forgan, President of the First National Bank.

Mr. President, Members of University, Ladies and Gentlemen:—

IN my observations this evening I propose considering the causes which led to the division of the North American Continent between the two nations by which it is now so happily occupied in friendly rivalry for national pre-eminence. By right of discovery, North America was for many years in the divided occupation of Spain, France and Great Britain. Early in the last century Spain and France sold their possessions to the United States, thus practically leaving Great Britain and the United States sole occupants of the Continent. It is my purpose to show how this division of the Continent has been ever since maintained amidst the conflicting interests of European and American diplomacy.

My narrative begins with the capture of Quebec in 1759. At that time Great Britain owned the Eastern slope of the Atlantic from Nova Scotia to Florida. This vast territory, 1,700 miles long and three hundred to five hundred miles wide, was occupied chiefly by people of British origin, possessing a large measure of self-government and enjoying a degree of prosperity which was constantly attracting fresh settlers from the Mother

Land. Though more democratic in their ideas of government than their fellow-subjects in the old land, and though free from many of the civil and religious disabilities so oppressive then, and in some respects oppressive still, they were quite contented with their colonial relationship to the Mother Country, and might have continued so, no one can tell how long, had their rights of self-government been respected. They were British by origin, by education and by sentiment, and there was no good reason for any change in their colonial status. The people who occupied Canada on the north had nothing in common with these southern colonists. Their laws, language and religion were different, and if they were to become British subjects in effect as well as in name, they had to be reconciled to new conditions of civil polity and to a government which they naturally disliked and distrusted. To hold them in subjection by force of arms, though sheltered by the ramparts of Quebec, was not considered the best way of securing their confidence, and accordingly with a liberality strangely in contrast with the treatment accorded their subjects in the thirteen colonies, the British Government adopted a policy of conciliation towards the French-Canadians, the effect of which will be more clearly seen at a later stage of my narrative. The most striking features of that policy were:

- (1) The free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion.
- (2) The right to exact tithes of their own people for the support of the Roman Catholic Church.
- (3) Exemption from the Supremacy Act of Queen Elizabeth, by which Roman Catholics in Great Britain were excluded from office.
- (4) The continuation of French laws as to property and civil rights.
- (5) The continuation of the feudal system, which to the French Seigniors of the day was a matter of great moment.
- (6) The promise of a Council, composed of such men as the Governor-General might appoint, for purposes of local administration.

Such a policy, so conciliatory in its spirit, went a great way, as might naturally be expected, to reconcile the subjects of New France to the sovereignty of Great Britain. Anyone, therefore, who could look over the North American Continent in 1763, the date of the Treaty of Paris, might say that the prospects of a British colonial empire of colossal proportions were as bright as the most vivid imagination could desire. With the exception of Louisiana, Florida and the Spanish and Russian possessions on

the West coast, Britain was the sole occupant of North America. Her subjects—French, English and Dutch—were imbued with that spirit of enterprise characteristic of the adventurer and the pioneer in overcoming the difficulties of early settlement amidst the terrors of wild beasts and wilder aborigines; they had acquired a spirit of self-reliance and independence peculiar to themselves. Proud of the land from which they sprang, they transferred its institutions to their new home, adapting them to the changed conditions of their more primitive ways of life. Little did they think that they should be forced to forego their allegiance to the King, in order to preserve these institutions from destruction.

But a change was at hand. The expenditure of the Mother Country in the great Continental Wars of the period, and in the establishment and defence of her colonial possessions, had become so oppressive that relief was sought in measure for the taxation of her colonies in North America. True, the colonies were not parties to these wars; they were not consulted as to their purpose or utility, but they shared in the glory which they brought to the nation, and so they should bear a reasonable share of the burdens which they involved. So, at least, argued the great jurist, Lord Mansfield; so thought the majority of the Lords and Commons of the day, in spite of the remonstrance of Burke and the eloquent appeal of Lord Chatham. But the colonies thought otherwise, and expressed their objections, by a significant disregard of customs' regulations, of the authority of British officers, and finally by a grand remonstrance, known as the Declaration of Rights, drawn up in Philadelphia in 1774, which was afterwards accentuated by the Declaration of Independence on the 4th of July, 1776.

Now it is rather a strange circumstance in the history of this Continent that the Declaration of Rights, which laid the foundation of the American Republic, practically laid the foundation of the Dominion of Canada. If this statement is historically true, we can claim a share in the pride you feel in that memorable gathering out of which has sprung your great Republic, with its wonderful record of democracy and achievement. Let us examine the validity of this statement.

The call to the first Continental Congress in 1774 was responded to by all the North American colonies, excepting Georgia and Canada. I have not seen any good reason why Canada did not appear there. It might have been on account of the difficulties of transportation, or because the French-Can-

dians, who were accustomed to taxation under the French Government prior to the conquest of 1759, did not object to the Stamp Act. But it is not to the absence of representatives from Canada that I desire to call attention, but rather to the objections taken by the Congress to the concessions made by Great Britain to the French-Canadians in the Quebec Act of 1774. After reciting the grievances from which the colonists suffered under the misgovernment of His Majesty's Ministers the Congress denounced the concessions made to the French-Canadians already referred to, but more especially to the provisions of the Quebec Act of 1774. This Act was characterized as an Act "which recognized the Catholic religion, abolished the equitable jurisdiction of England and, ignoring the antagonistic faith of the old colonies, their laws and government, set up civil and spiritual tyranny in Canada to the great danger of the neighboring provinces which had so much aided Britain to conquer our country. Nor can we suppress our astonishment that a British Parliament should ever consent to establish in that colony a religion that often drenched your island in blood and disseminated impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder and rebellion throughout every part of the world."

This was the fly in the pot of ointment. The denunciation of the privileges conceded to the French-Canadians, and particularly their religion in such specific and forcible terms, could not fail to restrain any desire they might have to throw off their allegiance to Great Britain. On the one hand, they had the guarantee of perfect security in the enjoyment of their civil and religious rights by a solemn treaty subsequently embodied in an Act of the British Parliament; on the other hand, they were called to engage in a revolt against British authority, the results of which were, to say the least, uncertain, and against a system of taxation the constitutional incidence of which gave them no concern. Between the privileges they enjoyed, to which the honor of the British Government was pledged, and the doubtful results of revolt, the choice they made was not to be greatly wondered at. Under the British flag they had some assurance that their religion and their laws would be respected; under the flag of the thirteen colonies, both their religion and their laws were declared to be incompatible with the progress of civilization and good government. In all other respects their sympathy would naturally be with the revolutionary party, if it were only as a relief from the sovereignty of Great Britain which was forced upon them by the capture of Quebec; and had they joined

with the other colonies, French Canada would no doubt have been included in the treaty of 1782 as one of the States of the American Republic, and if French Canada had gone, probably with it would have gone Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and all that portion of Canada now forming the Province of Ontario, as far west as the head waters of the Mississippi. Am I not right, therefore, in saying that the Congress of 1774, which was the birthplace of this great Republic, was practically, though unintentionally, the birthplace of the Dominion of Canada?

The next step in the cleavage of the Continent was the expulsion from the United States, at the close of the Revolutionary War, of that section of the people who claimed that all their wrongs could be redressed by constitutional methods without separation from the Empire, and who were afterwards known as United Empire Loyalists. I shall not discuss the motives which led them to resist the revolutionary movement of the day nor the motives for their expulsion. In some cases their conduct towards the revolutionary party was probably as inexcusable as the treatment which they themselves received. Perhaps it was feared that if they remained in the country they would foment rebellion and resist the new government which was about to be formed. Suffice it to say that either for reasons of State, or in a spirit of retaliation, thousands were forced to leave their homes and their possessions in the United States, to begin life over again under the usual conditions of hardship incident to the adventurous pioneer. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that they carried with them a spirit of intense hostility to the country from which they were exiled, and at the same time of gratitude to the Government that sheltered them and, as far as practicable, endeavored to recompense them for their losses and sufferings. Speaking of the effect of the expulsion of the Loyalists from the United States, Professor Goldwin Smith says:

"The Loyalist exiles peopled Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Upper Canada with enemies of the new Republic, and if a power hostile to the Republic should ever be formed under European influence in the North of the Continent, the Americans will owe it to their ancestors who refused amnesty to the vanquished in the Civil War."

If the objection taken to the concessions made to the French-Canadians may be considered as the first step in the establishment of the Dominion of Canada, the expulsion of the United Empire Loyalists may very properly be considered as the

second, and perhaps equally important in the establishment of British institutions in direct antagonism to the republican institutions founded by the thirteen colonies. These two events form the groundwork of the continental cleavage which I set out to consider.

The next problem with which British statesmen had to deal was the confirmation of the Canadian colonies in loyalty to the Mother Country. They were very near to the Republic just organized; were they not in danger of being influenced to demand concessions from the British Parliament, which would be incompatible with British connection? The Government of France was the ally of the thirteen colonies in their revolt; would not France come also to the rescue of the Canadians if they hoisted the revolutionary flag? Was the new Republic prepared to admit them to the union without any curtailment of their civil and religious privileges, or would Britain extend these privileges so that in all respects they would possess as near as may be the same privileges under a colonial government as they could hope to receive under the government of the United States? These were, no doubt, some of the questions which British statesmen asked with some anxiety. And here again, as at the conquest of Quebec, a policy of conciliation was adopted and an effort made to show the Canadians that colonial government was not incompatible with allegiance to Britain, and that every privilege of citizenship that a Republic could confer was attainable under British rule. Anything short, however, of a voice in the administration of their own affairs, it was quite evident, would not restrain the animosity with which the French-Canadians regarded British authority. They had outgrown military rule and military courts and the administration of the country through a Council not of their own choice. And so the desired relief was granted by the concession of a new Constitution, known as the Constitutional Act of 1791, by which all their former privileges were reaffirmed with the additional privilege of a Parliament to which they could send the representatives of their choice, who would presumably govern them according to their own conceptions of civil and religious liberty. And here permit me to notice that, no doubt fearing the buoyant republicanism of the seceding colonies, the British Government held its hand firmly upon its Canadian subjects lest they should become too democratic and too independent of the Mother Country. This control was exercised in three ways:

(1) Over each province the British Government appointed

a Lieutenant-Governor who had the right to veto the legislation of the Assembly, as your State Governore have.

(2) The Upper Chamber, or what is in this country called the Senate of the Province, was appointed directly by the Crown, with the power of refusing its consent to legislation passed by the Lower House, or the Legislative Assembly, as it was called.

(3) The military control of the country remained with the Imperial authorities, as did the collection of Customs and the Post Office, with the proviso that the receipts from these sources should be applied to the payment of the Civil Service, thus rendering the Civil Service of the Provinces independent of the Legislative Assembly.

Limited as were the concessions of the new Constitution it was accepted by the people of Canada for many years as liberal enough for all practical purposes. At all events it suppressed the rising disaffection against the Mother Country and acted as a check upon any latent desire for annexation with their neighbors to the south. The French-Canadian, who for generations acknowledged the sovereignty of France, became reconciled to British institutions. The British immigrant, who made Canada his home, rejoiced in the possession of the larger freedom of a government in which he had a voice and the policy of which he could direct according to his own conception of citizenship and civil rights. It was, therefore, no longer a question with them whether their neighbors to the south enjoyed a greater measure of liberty than they enjoyed. They were freemen, as they understood freedom. More than that, they felt they were trustees, for the British Government, of the land they occupied, and that it was their duty to resent any reflections upon their Constitution and to repel any attack upon their political integrity. And so, when Great Britain and the United States went to war in 1812, all appeals to the Canadians to forewear their allegiance were made in vain. That Canadians should resent the invasion of their country because of a quarrel in which they had no concern and for which they were in no sense responsible, was to be expected. Even if they had harbored a secret longing for republicanism, they could not be expected to entertain much regard for its methods amidst the carnage of the battlefield or the ruins of their burning towns and cities. Moreover, they felt that the conquest of Canada was at least one of the motives which led to the rupture of amicable relations with Great Britain, and every sentiment of heredity and loyalty demanded that they should not submit willingly to a change of government. I dwell

upon this episode—painful though it is—because of its effect upon the political physiography of the Continent. We would be less Canadian in sentiment than we are, had we not made the sacrifices demanded of us by the war of 1812, and it is possible we should be less attached to Great Britain than we are, had she not defended us as gallantly as she did. And while we harbor no resentment, nor must we, using the words of your great poet, James Russell Lowell, “attempt the Future’s portal with the Past’s hoodrusted key,” we cannot in the light of history but admit that the diplomacy which led to the War of 1812, contributed not a little to the formation of a Canadian nationality, and to that political cleavage of the North American Continent which we find has become more marked than it was at the close of the Revolutionary War.

Following the War of 1812, during a period of say forty or fifty years, the people on both sides of the lines appear to have been fully occupied with the settlement of their wild lands, the development of their manufactures, the construction of railways and the various social and political problems which in the natural course of events arise in progressive communities and in popular assemblies. In the evolution of government attachments were formed for the institutions which they created, and in many cases it was not so much a question whether republican or monarchical methods were better, but rather a question of preference for methods to which the people had been accustomed. Though the voice of the social and political reformer was not entirely hushed, the vigor of his tones was to a certain extent subdued by that conservative spirit which comes with wider experience and with riper years. The prosperity which accompanied the phenomenal energy of the American citizen, even at that time, deepened his convictions that republicanism had exceptional virtues. The comfort and security which Canadians felt under the protecting hand of Great Britain increased their confidence in the advantages of colonial self-government. In your case, as well as in ours, there were doubtless wrongs to be removed, but the power of removal lay with the peoples respectively. Strange as it may appear, some of what you might call the anomalies of the early Constitution of Canada were among its greatest safeguards. Let me mention a few:

(1) As I have already said, the French-Canadians were allowed to retain, in a great measure, the institutions they enjoyed at the time of the Conquest, such as the use of the French language in the Courts of law and in the Parliaments of

the Province. Rightly or wrongly, they felt that annexation with the United States would deprive them of this privilege.

(2) The Roman Catholics, whether English or French speaking, had been allowed a system of State Separate Schools, distinct from the Public School System, which was either Protestant or undenominational. These they would not retain under the American system of Public Schools where religious creeds had no preference.

(3) The Anglican Church, always influential, and a certain section of the Presbyterian Church, were recognized as the established Church of Canada, with large endowments from the public domain. The Catholic Church was also allowed to impose tithes, as in France, upon its own supporters. These were privileges which it was considered would certainly be withdrawn in the event of a change of allegiance.

(4) The attitude of the British Government on the question of negro slavery was reflected in the press and public sentiment of Canada. To unite with a nation that recognized negro slavery would be a recognition of negro servitude, for the abolition of which England had taxed herself £20,000,000 sterling.

I do not wish it to be assumed that in regard to all these questions the attitude of the country was theoretically correct. Yet one can readily see how a conservative element like that fostered under an established Church in this old land, and a religious element so alert as that which has guided the action of the Catholic Church in all matters of education, developed a public opinion hostile to the liberal tendencies of republicanism and disposed the Canadians more and more to look with disfavor upon closer relations with your young republic. And even when Canadians disestablished the State Church and you abolished slavery, the reflex action of these opinions did not lose all their force. True, there were many in the middle thirties who believed that Canadians were much restricted in their political privileges—who felt that they were held too firmly in the grasp of the Colonial Office at London, and who distinctly avowed that failing a relaxation of that grasp, coupled with large concessions in the management of domestic affairs, they would press for a union with the United States. And here again, as with the passage of the Constitutional Act of 1791, British statesmen recognized the fact that if the Canadian colonies were to be preserved to the Crown greater liberty must be allowed Canadians in the administration of their own affairs. To meet this demand the Canadian Constitution was again amended in 1841,

and the rights of self-government as fully conceded to Canada as if she were an independent nation, save and except the recognition of our colonial relationship by the acceptance of a Governor-General, appointed by the Crown, as our executive officer. All the privileges of responsible government, as it was understood in England, were conferred upon Canadians through this Act, and if our liberties were in any way restrained or the privileges of citizenship encroached upon, it was henceforth our own act and not the act of the British Government. Whether well governed or ill governed, therefore, the fault was with ourselves, and so we were launched out upon a new career with the power to model our institutions according to our own conceptions of liberty and good government, having before us on the one hand the British Constitution, which had broadened down from "precedent to precedent" and, on the other hand, the Constitution of the United States, unfettered by traditions and unawed by the divine rights of kings. Is it not easy to assume that a people bound by its forms of legislation, its social customs and its literature so closely to Great Britain, would unconsciously evolve a public opinion distinctly British and ultimately adverse, if not unfavorable, to any other form of government? Even in those early days Canadians began to take some pride in Imperial connection and in the expansion of the British Empire, and as a result they became more and more attached to a monarchical form of government and less anxious to face either the uncertainties of absolute independence or an American alliance.

I now come to deal with another class of circumstances, less sentimental, but perhaps even more effective in extending the cleavage which I am now discussing. It is well known to all students of political economy that at the beginning of the last century Great Britain still clung to the protective policy by which her great trade in woollens, cotton and iron had practically secured a monopoly of the markets of the world. In order to develop trade with her colonies, she had, however, given them a preference in her own markets as against foreign goods. The most important feature of this preference, so far as Canada was concerned, related to flour, wheat and lumber, and as a consequence the exports of these articles found their way largely to the British market. With the repeal of the Corn laws in 1846, these privileges were swept away, resulting in a financial panic in Canada which very soon developed into hostility to the British Government for its disregard of Canadian interests. With

the removal of the preference in the British market, and with a protective tariff in the United States against our exports, the financial outlook was most discouraging and public discontent began to express itself in an agitation for closer political relations with the United States. What the result of that agitation would have been, it is now difficult to say, had not Canada and the United States been brought into closer commercial relations by the Reciprocity Treaty negotiated by Lord Elgin, on behalf of Great Britain, and by Mr. Marcy on behalf of the United States. By this treaty a free interchange of natural products between the two countries was agreed upon, and certain other privileges as to fishing and the navigation of the St. Lawrence and the inland lakes were conceded. This treaty was to continue in force for a term of ten years, subject to repeal on one year's notice. Under its operations the trade between the two countries grew from \$14,000,000, the year in which the treaty was ratified, to \$84,000,000 the year of its repeal. To all appearances both countries were satisfied with its operations, and although Canadians had access to a larger market because of the larger population of the United States, it was still thought that the United States profited by the facilities which the Canadian market afforded for the purchase of such natural products as the United States required. But as the unexpected often happens in public as well as in private affairs, so the unexpected happened with regard to the Elgin-Marcy Treaty. The notice required for its repeal was given by the United States in 1864, and in 1866 reciprocal trade between Canada and the United States came to an end. A brief enquiry as to the causes which led to its repeal is another chapter in the history of the continental cleavage which is the subject of my investigation.

The long struggle for the emancipation of the slaves in the Southern states, in which William Lloyd Garrison, Henry Ward Beecher and Wendell Phillips figured so conspicuously, was beginning to overshadow every other consideration, social or political, and immediately after the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, the champions of slavery challenged the people of the United States to accede to their demands or to dissolve the union. I doubt if history affords another instance of such a national Armageddon. On the one side, in this terrible conflict, were the inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the autonomy of the greatest Republic the world has ever seen. On the other side were negro slavery with its manacles and degradation and the shroud of democracy

and of popular government. The struggle was watched from Canada with intense interest, and in the war that followed we contributed 34,000 men to assist in fighting the battles of liberty and the North. Nor were the Monarchies and Despotisms of Europe uninterested spectators, as the overthrow of the Republic would be a confirmation of their right to Royal sceptres which the accident of birth had placed in their hands. Even Great Britain, who thirty years before your Civil War had abolished slavery, and who by her ships had patrolled the seven seas to restrain the traffic in slaves, indulged in whispers of unmerited sympathy with the Southern confederacy. But there was one voice the Nation loved to hear which neither indifference nor cupidity could silence—that was the voice of John Bright—the great tribune of the English nation. Speaking at Rochdale in 1861, he said:

“There may be persons in England who are jealous of those States; there may be men who dislike democracy, and who hate a republic; there may be even those whose sympathies warm towards the slave oligarchy of the South; but of this I am certain, that only misrepresentation the most gross, or calumny the most wicked, can sever the tie which unites the great mass of the people of this country with their friends and brethren beyond the Atlantic. . . . As for me, I have but this to say, I am but one in the audience, and but one in the citizenship of this country; if all other tongues are silent, mine shall speak for that policy which gives hope to the bondsmen of the South, and which tends to generous thoughts, and generous words and generous deeds, between the two great nations who speak the English language, and from their origin are alike entitled to the English name.”

To these clarion notes the response of the nation was electrical, and in spite of the secret efforts of the enemies of your Republic, British sentiment was thereafter decidedly in favor of the North. But this declaration of British sentiment, kindly though it was, came too late to correct the impression already formed in the United States that both Canada and Great Britain would have rejoiced in the dismemberment of your Republic and in the eclipse of the democracy in which equality was the basis of citizenship. And when the war came to a close, when the greatest soldier of the South—General Lee—surrendered his sword to the greatest soldier of the North—General Grant—at Appomattox, you felt, with some show of reason, that the future of your Republic depended upon

the loyalty of its own citizens rather than upon the condescension of any other nation, no matter what might have been its professions of sympathy and good-will. And so in gathering the dislocated forces of your nation together for the restoration of your commerce and the re-establishment of your industries, it was your privilege to regard with indifference all foreign interests as of secondary consideration. Unfortunately for us, at the time at least, the advantages which accrued from the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, already referred to, were felt to be a menace to your commerce, and unequal in the division of international profits. Unfortunately also in promoting its repeal, the impression was made upon the people of Canada that other considerations than those of a purely commercial character actuated the Congress of the United States. Rightly or wrongly, Canadians felt that by the abrogation of the treaty, you hoped that Canada would be obliged to consider terms of union with the United States, and that the best way to bring about such union was by a policy of non-intercourse. The Hon. G. S. Boutell, Secretary of the Treasury in President Grant's second administration, and representative in Congress from Massachusetts at the time of the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty, in his "Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs," says: "The fact of the annexation of Canada to the United States, whether the event shall occur in a time near or be postponed to a time remote, depends probably on our action upon the subject of reciprocity.

"Canada needs our markets and our facilities for ocean transportation, and, as long as these advantages are denied to her, she can never attain to a high degree of prosperity.

" . . . The body of farmers, laborers and trading people will favor annexation ultimately, should the policy of non-intercourse be adhered to on our part, and they will outnumber the office-holding class, and thus the union of the two countries will be secured. It is apparent also that a policy of free intercourse would postpone annexation for a long time, if not indefinitely."

Whether mistaken or not as to the motives by which you were actuated, certain it is that the result for a time, at least, was very disturbing to Canadian commerce. Closed out as we were from markets that we enjoyed for thirteen years, we had to seek other markets under conditions of considerable difficulty. We had to direct the trade which had grown up between us and you to the markets of Europe. We had to seek new customers, adapt ourselves to their wants and tastes, and, in short, to shape our commercial methods and the character of our marketable

products to entirely new conditions. To accomplish this took time; every step taken towards its accomplishment was a step further away from sympathetic intercourse with the putative authors of our adversity—temporary though it was—and a step also towards commercial and political cleavage.

And now I must consider a new phase of this absorbing question. I have been endeavoring so far to show how the policy of the United States towards Canada had first created and then for nearly one hundred years widened the cleavage between the two countries. It now becomes part of my task to show how Canada herself deliberately adopted a course which would render her less dependent on the United States and ultimately make her a distinct nation, so far as that was practicable under the aegis of the British Government. Her history is but another illustration of the growth of Anglo-Saxon communities in the art of self-government, and the tendency, as shown by the thirteen colonies, of scattered communities uniting for purposes of self-protection and political advancement.

The British provinces in North America were organized at different times. The oldest, Nova Scotia, was organized in 1719, Quebec in 1759, Prince Edward Island in 1769, New Brunswick in 1784, and Ontario in 1791. Each province was a distinct political unit, and as against each other (excepting Ontario and Quebec) imposed similar tariffs on interprovincial trade, as upon trade with the United States or any other foreign country. They were situated along the great lakes and the river St. Lawrence down to the Gulf, their extremes being about 2,000 miles apart. In many ways their social and trade relations were far more intimate with the United States than with each other. They were practically in the position of the thirteen colonies prior to the ratification of the Federal compact of 1774, without any well-defined basis of joint action, either commercially or politically.

For several years some of the foremost Canadians had suggested, particularly on patriotic occasions, a union of the British American colonies, apparently with very little response, and yet there is no doubt, although not evident on the surface, that the undertone for union was becoming stronger every day. By a singular coincidence the provinces by the sea as well as those on the West, simultaneously suggested a conference like the Continental Congress of 1774, to consider whether a union were not feasible. Perhaps some of you will say it was extraordinary that this was not thought of at a much earlier day. It must be remembered, however, that until about 1850 the French popula-

tion of Canada was greater than the British population, and one of the difficulties of any federation of the provinces was in adjusting the conditions of such federations to the political aspirations of the French-Canadians. Early in the negotiations, however, it was found that the French-Canadians were quite prepared for the proposed federation, and at a conference between the delegates from the provinces it was agreed upon. The motives for this union were very clear.

(1) A feeling of insecurity pervaded Canada at the close of the American War. The army engaged in the Civil War was about to be disbanded. Already several raiding bodies of a somewhat disreputable composition had crossed the borders with hostile intent, at different points, and although it was well known that they had done so without the sanction of the American Government, there was some fear as to the extent and power of the organization they represented. To be in a position to repel such incursions, should they be continued, was most desirable. A union of the provinces would strengthen us for this purpose.

(2) As we were shut out from the United States very largely by the repeal of the treaty of 1854, it was felt that we could at least partially make up for that loss by improved transportation facilities between the provinces and the abolition of all tariff restraints upon interprovincial commerce.

(3) Attachment to British institutions, with all that is implied in love for the homes and graves of their fathers, powerfully influenced Canadians in favor of a larger basis for the development of British sentiment.

(4) Intermingled with the motives already stated, was also the self-reliance peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race, which was prepared to repel any invasion, either open or veiled, upon their political integrity. Rightly or wrongly the impression prevailed in Canada that the Monroe doctrine, as understood in the United States, meant the Americanization of our half of the North American Continent. The union of the provinces was one form of expressing our doubts on this contentious question.

(5) The two political parties of Canada were so nearly balanced numerically that neither could secure a safe working majority in the Legislature, and rather than continue this unsatisfactory condition of affairs both parties were prepared to seek relief in the larger field of statehood which a federation of the provinces would open out for them.

It was under these circumstances that the Dominion of Canada was inaugurated on the first of July, 1867, under the sover-

eighty of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in principle to that of the Mother Country. Let me notice a few of the more important features of that constitution:

(1) We accepted the federal principle upon which the American Republic was founded. That brings us back again to the Continental Congress of 1774, where your constitution was born, and accentuates a statement already made that that Congress was also the birthplace of the Dominion of Canada. That Congress proposed a federation for defensive purposes, if need be, and our constitution is also a federation. But our constitution is remarkable not for the extent to which it conforms to its American progenitor, but rather for the reverse, arising out of the desire to make the cleavage between Canada and the United States as distinct as possible. Of course it was necessary that we should retain our connection with the Imperial Government by accepting as our chief executive officer a Governor-General appointed by the King. If we elected our Governor-General as you elect your President, then we would have no organic connection with the Mother Country, and consequently would be a Republic as you are.

(2) Our highest legislative body consists of a House of Commons and a Senate, and is known as the Parliament of Canada. Your highest legislative body consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate, and is known as the United States Congress. We have adhered as closely as circumstances would admit to British nomenclature, and no doubt for a purpose.

(3) The Executive Council of Canada is constituted on the British principle, that is to say, it can hold office so long as it commands a majority in Parliament. Your Executive holds office during the pleasure of the President, whether the party it represents has a majority in either House or not.

(4) We are styled the Dominion of Canada, not the Commonwealth, and the various districts of which the Dominion is composed are called Provinces, not States. The fathers of Canadian Confederation were evidently inclined to reject your nomenclature in these respects also.

(5) In order to strengthen the Central Government of the Dominion it was distinctly provided that any residuum of administrative power, not vested in the provinces, should remain in the Central Government. This doctrine is the reverse of that so strongly advocated by Calhoun and Henry Clay fifty years ago as the true basis of the United States Government. The

argument for secession on the ground of State sovereignty is greatly weakened by this provision in the Canadian constitution.

(6) The military forces of Canada were placed under the control of the Dominion Government, and in the event of a call being made for military service, the call would be directly to the people, not to the Provincial Legislatures. In your case, each State is called upon to furnish a certain quota of men for military service.

(7) No officer connected with the administration of justice, such as a constable, sheriff or judge is elected by the people of Canada; all such officers are appointed by the central authority and hold office during pleasure—that usually means during life.

(8) The members of our Senate are nominated by the Crown, that is by the Government, not elected by the State legislatures as in this country, and hold office during life. This is as near as we could go to the House of Lords without introducing the hereditary principle.

(9) As a token of good faith towards the language and institutions of the French-Canadian, the French language was allowed the same status in the Parliament of Canada as English, both in the debates and the publication of reports and proceedings.

These are some of the points—and I have not exhausted the list—which indicate the intention of the people of Canada in the federation of the British American provinces. It may be that a closer imitation of your Constitution would have been better for us, but that was the very thing Canadians wanted to avoid. The Federal principle we had to adopt, but in its application we avoided, as far as practicable, the methods of your Constitution, lest by imitation we should encourage ultimate assimilation. That the fear of union with the United States dominated the action of the Fathers of Confederation is evident from their speeches when the Constitution was under discussion. For instance:

Sir E. P. Tache, at that time Premier of the old Parliament of Canada, said: "He thought Confederation had become an absolute necessity, and that it was a question to be or not to be. If we desired to remain British and monarchical, and if we desired to pass to our children these advantages, this measure was a necessity."

The Right Hon. Sir John A. Macdonald said: "If the House and country believe this union to be one which will ensure for us British connection and British freedom and increase

and develop the social, political and material prosperity of the country, then I implore the House and the country to lay aside all prejudices and accept the scheme."

Sir George E. Cartier, leader of the French-Canadians: "The matter resolved itself into this, either we must obtain British North American Confederation or be absorbed in an American Confederation. . . . The annexationists were aware that so soon as this project was adopted there would be no avail in any cry of separation to form a part of the American Union."

Hon. George Brown said: "I believe that, while granting security for local interests, the federation of the British provinces will give free scope for carrying out the will of the people in general matters—that it will draw closer the bonds that unite us to Great Britain—and that it will lay the foundations deep and strong of a powerful and prosperous people. . . . I am in favor of the union of the provinces because in the event of war it will enable all the colonies to defend themselves better and give more efficiently to the Empire than they could do separately. . . . The threatened repeal of the Reciprocity Treaty, the threatened abolition of the American bonding system for goods in transit to and from these provinces, all combine at this moment to arrest earnest attention to the gravity of the situation and unite us all in one vigorous effort to meet the emergency like men."

No sooner was the Dominion of Canada launched on its new career than efforts were made to bring under its control the remaining portion of British North America. By a charter granted over two hundred years before the Canadian federation was formed, a fur trading company, known as the Hudson's Bay Company, was given the exclusive right of the fur trade of what is sometimes known as Prince Rupert's Land or the Northwest Territories, extending from the United States boundary to the Arctic Ocean, and from the boundaries of Ontario on the east to the Rocky Mountains on the west—a distance of about 1,000 miles. The interests of the Hudson's Bay Company in these lands were purchased by Canada for 300,000 pounds, and in 1870 the work of extending Canada westward was begun by the formation of the Province of Manitoba. In 1871 British Columbia on the Pacific coast—a province extending from the American boundary to Alaska and eastward to the Rockies—was admitted into Confederation. In 1873 the Province of Prince Edward Island, on the Atlantic coast, joined its fortunes

with Canada. Territorial Governments were established in the sparsely settled districts that were not ready for admission to the Dominion with Provincial status. By an Act of the Imperial Government, Labrador and the lands surrounding Hudson's Bay were placed under the jurisdiction of Canada, and now with the exception of Newfoundland and Alaska, the Canadian ensign is recognized throughout the whole of the northern half of North America. The geographical cleavage is, therefore, complete and distinct.

A similar policy of cleavage has actuated recent commercial movements in Canada. The Canadian Pacific transcontinental railway was projected for the double purpose of affording communication with the provinces of the West and for preventing as far as possible, the trade of Manitoba and the Territories being diverted to American channels. For the construction of this road the Dominion Government has contributed well nigh one hundred million dollars. A second road has also been subsidised—known as the Canadian Northern—which discharges its trade at a Canadian port on Lake Superior, and the remainder of the route to the sea is under Canadian control. A third line was projected last winter, flanking the south side of Hudson's Bay, with Port Simpson on the Pacific coast as its western terminus and Moncton in New Brunswick at the head of the Chignecto Bay as its eastern terminus. By the terms of its charter this railway line is not allowed to divert the trade of Canada towards American seaports on the Atlantic coast. As a result of these efforts to retain control of our commerce, Montreal now handles the greatest portion of the grain products of the West. Canada is therefore commercially, as well as geographically and politically, receding from, rather than approaching towards, closer relations with the United States.

And what shall I say of the movement recently inaugurated by the Right Honorable Joseph Chamberlain, to federate the colonies on the basis of imperial protection against the world? It requires no argument to show that the establishment of commercial relations within the Empire on the basis of preferential tariffs would greatly strengthen the ties which bind all the colonies, including Canada, to the Empire, and remove still further into the background whatever inducements remain for closer political or commercial relations with the United States.

And now, lest I should have left the impression upon you that Canadians look with aversion upon your form of government and the extraordinary enterprise which you have exhibited

in every department of human activity, you will permit me to cite several instances in which you have directed the opinion of Canada, and I might add the world, and in which we have followed your example greatly to our own advantage.

(1) In commerce, we have accepted the terminology of your currency, as well as your standards for weights and measures. We have accepted your railway system both as to gauge and railway carriages. We have accepted your methods of surveying your territories and prairie lands. Our municipal system is very much like yours, but with less power to the head of the municipality than you have conceded. Our modes of assessing property and collecting taxes and the management of highways are based upon your methods *mutatis mutandis*. We hold elections less frequently than you do, but with a preference, as in your case, for a short parliamentary term. We have adopted your system of voting by ballot, and extended the franchise in nearly every province to persons twenty-one years of age, and as might be expected with two peoples bearing such a close resemblance to each other, we conduct our elections amid the vociferations of opposing parties and with such platform oratory and public discussion as circumstances require or party funds admit. Greater freedom than we enjoy in political matters, either in the criticism of our opponents or in the methods by which elections are conducted, would rather hinder than advance our political liberties.

It is perhaps in the work of education that we have most closely followed in your footsteps. We adopted your free school system very soon after it was declared to be indispensable by leaders of education in the evolution of citizenship. We adopted your Normal school system for the training of teachers of primary schools, and have pushed it further than you, for we extend it to our teachers of Grammar or Secondary schools. We have endowed our university from the public domain as you have done. We have agricultural colleges and kindergarten and technical schools at the expense of the public treasury and the taxpayer. The education for the learned professions, such as law and medicine and theology, are comprehensive and reasonably efficient. College courses of study are supposed to be adapted to the requirements of modern education, and although our endowments may not be as generous as yours, and although we may be wanting in the wealth of equipment in libraries and scientific apparatus which you possess, I think I can safely say, and with becoming modesty, that it is the ambition of our col-

leges and universities to do honor to the highest ideals of university education, to discourage empiricism and superficiality in every department of instruction, and to fully equip our young men and women for the varied responsibilities of citizenship. If in this respect we emulate the example which is given us by the great universities of the United States—and in that list I include the university of which I am to-night the guest—you will not blame us, I hope, for copying methods so meritorious and so distinguished.

Now what is the significance of the various historical events which have entered into my narrative, assuming, of course, that I have stated them correctly? Do they not clearly indicate a tendency towards the segregation of British North America and the United States—a tendency not weaker but stronger in recent years? Are we warranted then on the facts submitted in making any forecast of the future? I admit that the Divinity that shapes the destinies of a nation works on such a gigantic plan that no one standing at any point in a nation's history can speak with confidence of its relation to other nations in summers far to come. Looking back but a few centuries, the history of the world is full of surprises. One hundred and fifty years ago France owned at least one-half of this continent; now she owns only a few islands on its eastern coast. A little over a hundred years ago Spain owned one-quarter of North America and nearly all of South America; now she does not own an acre. What seer at the middle of the eighteenth century could have predicted the expulsion of either France or Spain from the Western Hemisphere? The most sanguine believer in the virtues of a democracy could see no sign in the heavens of this great Republic with its wealth of material possessions and its greater wealth of men and energy and national virtue 150 years ago. Even within our own time, unlooked for and unexpected, the scattered fragments of the German fatherland were welded in "blood and iron" by the master hand of Bismarck; and Italy, the popular prey of internal factions, was consolidated by the statesmanship of Cavour. "Fold up the map of Europe," said the great Pitt, after he heard of Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, but Napoleon passed away, and the forces which he attempted to stifle ranged themselves under other leaders and the map of Europe resumed its former coloring.

What shall be the coloring of the map of North America, even before this century closes, none of us can tell, nor need we vex the oracle for any Adelpic forecast. Sufficient for us to

know that Providence has imposed upon us under different forms of government tremendous responsibilities—moral and national. We are possessed of an equipment for the uplifting of the people of which our fathers never dreamed. Are we using that equipment wisely? The printing press conveys a message from us daily to the fireside of millions of the people. Are we sure that that message has the potency of celestial wisdom and the renovating qualities of celestial fire? The college and the university lift us to the serener heights of reason and reflection. Are we sure that no prejudice follows us in our ascent? The Councillors of the nation in Parliament assembled direct us along the highway of liberty and progress—are we sure that they are always trustworthy guides? To waste our energies in forecasting a future which we cannot determine would be a futile task; to realize the urgent demands of the present would be the only statemanship worthy of our intelligence and our opportunities. Whether you are to be republican "so long as time moves round in an eternal sphere," or whether we are to be monarchical for a few brief years, is of small consequence compared with the duty imposed on each of us to make broader "the foundations of freedom" and show to the world that the civilization of this Continent, whether American or Canadian, endows its citizens with every privilege of civil and religious liberty which is necessary for their fullest happiness and their highest intellectual and moral development.

