




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


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Facts and Reflections

BEARING ON

ANNEXATION, INDEPENDENCE

AND

IMPERIAL FEDERATION.



MORTIMER & Co.,
OTTAWA.

JAMES DOUGLAS

Can. Dauphine, James

Pam.

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FACTS AND REFLECTIONS

BEARING ON

Annexation . . .

Independence, and .

Imperial Federation



BY

JAMES DOUGLAS,

A Canadian Residing in the United States.

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FACTS AND REFLECTIONS.

The political future of Canada should and does occupy a foremost place in the thoughts of its people. It may be true that at present there is no widespread discontent with its existing constitution and relations, but it does not consequently follow that the discussion of the question is premature. Some change in the alliance between Canada and the mother country must, sooner or later, take place, as the relations between parent and child alter when childhood passes to boyhood and boyhood merges into manhood.

The parental control stage of Canadian history ended in 1842. Since then we have been out of leading-strings, managing our own internal affairs, trying to work out a system of government, based on representative principles, which would harmonize discordant elements at the centre, and permit of the absorption and development of territory at the periphery of our possible domain. The mother country has held over us the ægis of her protection, which, happily, has never had to ward off a dart actually thrown.

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She has been ready to advise us, to lend us money, and in every way assist us, while we were growing, let us hope, in wisdom and stature to the full measure of sturdy manhood. When that measure has been reached, it will be as ignominious to remain dependent and accept support from the parent state, as it is on the part of a full grown man to look to his sire, not only for counsel, but for assistance.

A man is never too old to ask and take advice without derogation to his dignity, but he cannot accept alms without loss of self-esteem. He may enter a partnership penniless and yet contribute in energy and industry more in value than his partner's wealth. In some such partnerships the children of the great British family might be incorporated. Some such mutual compact for profit and protection, there may arise a statesman, endowed with the wisdom to frame, and the sagacity and tact to manage. As yet, however, and though every thoughtful Englishman at home and in the Colonies knows that to be the most momentous, if not the most urgent, question of the day, no feasible plan of Imperial Federation has been formulated. Meanwhile the inevitable moment for decision, arising out of some unforeseen complication, approaches.

In the case of the Colonies in the Southern Hemisphere, no outward pressure or internal convulsion threatens to create necessity for sudden decision and prompt action.

As less and less territory remains to be occupied or seized in the islands of the South Pacific by England or her rivals, the most pregnant cause for irritation there is disappearing. Australia's enormous debt, held in England, is a balance-wheel which is regulating the relations of the borrower and the lender, and tends to repress hasty action by the one or the other. In South Africa, a collision between the British, and the Dutch or Portugese communities might hasten disruption of existing relations ; but it would probably have the opposite result, for the Colonies acting in unison would be stronger than their antagonists, and political considerations would probably not restrain the parent state from tendering assistance.

But here a grave difference of policy between ourselves and our neighbors, even on an economical question, affecting, for instance, international commerce by land or water, which might produce distress on one side of the line, and irritation on the other, may arise at any moment and endanger good-fellowship and neighborliness. It is certain that the offence would have to be very clearly chargeable to our neighbor, and would have to assume the gravity of an international affront, before England would embroil herself in a quarrel with the States on our account. In the case of reluctance on the part of England to actually champion our cause, general discontent with the existing anomalous relations,

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which, very reasonably deny us control of our foreign affairs, though they expose us to all the consequences of a quarrel for which we may not be even remotely responsible, would ensue.

Thus, while we can easily conceive of international complications arising which would create a crisis, we are at the same time certainly suffering from internal morbid conditions of the body politic, which will call, ere long, for the application of some remedy. Nowhere in the Empire are the external and internal incentives to change as imminent and threatening as here, and nowhere are the alternative policies which offer themselves, more perplexing. No plan yet proposed meets with even wide approval, for none is free from grave objections.

The *far niente* policy would be the best if all our internal forces could slumber; and all external foes, should we have any, would remain dormant. But, if we indulge in the hallucination that while the world revolves we can stand still, we shall certainly find ourselves in the same sorry plight as the "Foolish Virgins," with no oil, no light, and no home. As a people we should act with the same prudence and foresight that we bring to bear on our private affairs; make plans for our future guidance, whether Providence permits us to carry them out or not, and face the future manfully, determined that we will steer a straight course towards

a definite goal, and try and shape our destiny in imitation of some worthy model.

Fortunately or unfortunately, circumstances do not point to any conspicuous goal as that towards which we should steer. If we compare our position and the prevalent public sentiment with those which the old New England colonists occupied and entertained towards the mother country, we can conceive how much easier it was for them, once a break of existing relations occurred, to decide upon a course of action than it is for us. The Puritan immigrants were Englishmen, it is true, but they left their homes because their opinions and practices were at variance with those of the Government and of the majority of their fellow-countrymen; and ever and anon, during the century and a half which intervened between the date of their landing on Plymouth Rock and the outbreak of hostilities, there were mutterings of the hurricane which was brewing.

At one time the colonists resented the interference of Parliament because they were Crown colonies. At another time they protested against the dictation of the Crown, because it trespassed upon their liberties as Englishmen. One cannot read the story of the gathering of the storm without feeling that thunder and lightning were stored in that sultry atmosphere, and a tempest was liable at any moment to burst. Not only Samuel Adams, but many another colonist, had made up

his mind before the crisis arose that a collision must occur, and separation result. The colonists' opinions were but the fruit of their wishes, and their wishes were the flames which kindled the revolution.

The case is different with Canada. The sentiment of the great bulk of the people is distinctly and strongly English. The large majority which the Conservative party commands is due primarily to a suspicion, that under the guise of a commercial union with the United States is hidden designs for a political union, and from this, which means a severance of those strong sympathetic ties which bind English Canadians to the Old Country, the hearts of Canadians revolt. So long as England and Home are synonymous terms in Canadian speech, the sentimental bond attaching the child to the parent will be too strong to yield to merely economical considerations. Canadians have not and never had a serious grievance against the parent country, for the disaffection of 1837 was far from being shared by the people at large, and it left hardly a trace of bitterness towards the mother land. The legislative independence, which rewarded not only the rebels, but their foes, long ago obliterated any rancour excited by the event.

If, as one result of the almost absolute independence which ensued, the racial alienation between the Canadian French and the Canadian English is growing into racial antipathy,

this antagonism is traceable to internal causes, and does not originate in animosity towards England. Thus, though, there may be urgent reasons for changing our constitution, and modifying the terms of our alliance to the Empire, these reasons do not spring from discontent with the policy and action of the parent state, and consequently they do not, as in the case of the revolting colonists of last century, indicate the direction in which the change should be made.

In reality there are but two alternatives open, either Annexation or Independence, more or less complete. A third course, that of Imperial Federation, if it be effected, is most likely to follow as a consequence of a scheme of independence, rather than to precede it; for any feasible plan of Imperial Federation necessarily involves virtual independence of the federated states. Were the Colonies still Colonies, subject, even nominally, to interference by the central state, arguments coming from her would savor of commands and suggestions of coercion. No people are so sensitive to slights as little people, and weak persons are most prone to stand on their dignity, as they have generally little else to stand upon.

The discussion of a scheme of federation, with a view to its actual realization, would lead to practical results, only, if carried on between perfectly independent autonomous powers. The powers may differ widely in strength and re-

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sources, and thus differing, modify their claims in conformity with their real importance, but it almost follows without argument that it would be impossible to reconcile the divergent interests of the many branches of the British family, did not each enter the family council with all the rights of independent action possessed by a full grown man.

Strong as may be its attachment to the parent state, every community would resent the faintest suspicion of pressure, and it is almost certain that were not absolute independence of all the contracting parties a precedent, pressure would almost inevitably follow reluctance on the part of any member of the proposed league, to follow the policy which the majority might agree to. Consent wrung by pressure never becomes cordial acquiescence. Our own Maritime Provinces, rightly or wrongly, believed themselves cajoled, if not coerced, into the union, and they have never entirely rid themselves of a certain sense of injury.

How Independence is to be brought about, circumstances will probably indicate. It must not be effected by violent means. The genius of the English race is to bring about political and social changes, so great as to be revolutionary in their effects, by slow, constitutional means; but the changes must be seen and recognized as necessary and salutary; and the means must be put in motion to bring them about. Let Independence become a distinct issue, not

one of party politics, but in the national aspirations and aims of all the great groups of the British family, and Independence will come about without clash of arms, or severance of sympathetic ties.

Participation by right and not merely by courtesy, over their foreign, as well as their domestic affairs, must be exercised by every self-governing community. Dependence on themselves, and on their own diplomatic skill, as well as, when necessary, on their own strength, can alone build up a vigorous, self-reliant, national character ; while on the other hand, reliance on a foreign power, even though it be a parent state, enfeebles and degrades.

Great Britain has recognized in fact the rights of her Colonies to participate in all deliberations with foreign powers, when their interests are affected ; but, as in the recent Behring Sea deliberations, the foreign power is naturally irritated, and the negotiations are embarrassed by the fact that Canada could not make her side known by direct utterances of her own diplomatic agencies, and that Great Britain had more than once to shift her position in deference to the wishes, secretly expressed, of her dependency. How far this was really the case or not, the United States public cannot, of course, know, but the suspicion of its being true did not raise Canada in the estimation of her neighbor, nor smooth the path of British diplomacy.

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The Constitution of an Imperial Federation will have to be drawn on lines not heretofore laid down for any ship of state. It is inconceivable, for instance, that such widely separated members of the British family as the Canadian, the Australian, the South African, and the West Indian groups, would yield so much of their sovereign rights to any federated government, as the States of the Union yield to the Government of the United States, which is not only theoretically, but actually and locally, an embodiment of themselves, or would delegate to their representatives, sitting and deliberating, under the influence of the central powers, with its magical over-weening spell, even though, partly because, carrying the prestige of age and parentage, the same control as the people of the Republic entrust to their representatives in Congress.

The impossibility of applying any system similar to the American Constitution, is indicated by the sense of incompatibility which influences the public mind of the people of the United States, when the question of annexation of any distant territory is presented. The tie which can bind, without irritating, such scattered communities as we have enumerated, must derive its strength from unanimity of national sentiment, from reverence for a common historical past, and a determination to maintain and live up to the political principles which

underlie the self-government of every Anglo-Saxon community, however diverse may be the form and fashion of the institutions through which they see fit to apply these principles. A common selfish interest may be the impelling motive, but will really in the long run be a more feeble cohesive influence than the sympathetic.

If we glance back to that most instructive century and a half, between the landing of the pilgrim fathers, and the Declaration of Independence, we see how much more sensitive the colonies were of parliamentary, than of kingly interference. They were willing to recognize a certain titular sovereignty as residing in the king, but resented any approach to parliamentary meddling. Had their charters conferred somewhat more ample power, and been religiously respected, and had the crisis not been precipitated by the gross stupidity and ignorance of English statesmen, and the perverse obstinacy of an English king, that deeply implanted reverence which all Englishmen feel for the king as the head of the State, and the representative of the people of all classes and all parties, supposed to be unswayed by political ambition, and holding the balance between opposing factions, might have been potent enough to restrain the allegiance of the colonies towards the parent state, till broader views of colonial independence had grown up, and a less officious, if not a wiser king, sat upon the throne, for, alas ! wisdom was not a

conspicuous trait of any of George the Third's immediate successors.

So now, if the so-called dependencies of Great Britain are to continue to be affiliated to the old country, harmony will be maintained only if each is free to shape its own course in foreign, as well as domestic affairs, except where the wider interests of the whole are concerned. Each must in fact be a perfectly independent power, acting in concert where the interests of trade and commerce, and the momentous question of general and mutual defence demand, but bound to the mother country and the other members of the family politic, not so much by a rigid constitutional fetters as by the sympathetic ties of common blood, common aims, pride in the glorious past, and aspirations towards a still more glorious future. But such a co-fraternity can be better effected and the institutions, by which it is to be made operative and maintained, can be better conceived and created, once the idea of dependence has been banished from the thoughts of Englishmen of both the greater and the lesser Britain, and the sense of *inter*-dependence in its highest meaning, has permeated the conceptions of all the free independent people of English nationality. They may be widely separated, geographically, and the forms of government may differ widely in details, but all must embody, and all must apply to their diversified conditions of in-

dustrial and social life, the same fundamental principles of liberty and self-government, which Englishmen brought over to Jamestown and to Plymouth, which Englishmen have planted and Frenchmen have adopted in Canada, and which even in the Tropics seem to withstand the enervating influence of climate.

Sentiment even more than self-interest must be the adhesive force. Sentiment will help to solve many a difficulty, and primarily that question as to the personality and function of the head of the Federation. Although no member of the Federation would create a king to preside over their local government, a constitutional monarch might appropriately be the head of the Federation. He would represent in his person the traditions of the past, and embody the historical continuity of the race. Powerless to interfere arbitrarily, but not, therefore, bereft of influence, the creation of his subjects, though nominally the controller of their fate, his right to avert injustice, and enforce fair play, even though never exercised, would exert a restraining power. Such a nominal head would be a less dangerous, and more picturesque chief, than an elected president.

A far more difficult problem would be to balance the power of the executive legislature and judicial branches ; to define the functions of the elective representatives of the Federal Council ; to fairly apportion representatives to it ; to

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decide whether it should be a mere board of arbitration for the settlement of inter-state disputes and questions affecting trade and commerce, or whether it should be endowed with the higher function of Parliament, and empowered to commit the Federation to defensive and offensive war. All these and a hundred other decisions could only be made by states of complete independent integrity, free from the dictation or overt influence of a paramount power.

Moreover, the less comprehensive the sphere of interference, and consequently the more complete the right of independent action of each state within its own domain, the less jealousy and friction there would be. An experiment (for experiment it necessarily will be) at Federation should aim at accomplishing as much as possible with the simplest possible machinery, leaving to the future the development of a more intricate and comprehensive system, if experience should call for it.

The most direct step ever taken towards Imperial Federation was when Lord Salisbury proposed, or rather suggested, a commercial *Zoll-verein* between the mother country and her friendly children. Unfortunately the circumstance which elicited the suggestion was the adverse trade policy of England's oldest and most refractory offspring. When the North American colonies were dependencies, one of their grievances was the selfish trade and commercial policy of

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the mother country. Since then the mother country has adopted the freest trade policy ever pursued by a great nation, but her old dependencies have not unlearned some of the lessons she so emphatically impressed upon them. It is not from overt hostility but from self-interest that not only the great republic, but most of the British colonies refuse to follow her example. In the case of the United States, her fiscal system dictates that policy, but it has created a trade rivalry which must necessarily become more and more acute, though it need not degenerate into unfriendliness.

Half a century ago, when England saw fit to adopt the principles of free-trade, there seemed to be a leaning in the same direction on the part of the United States. Its government was then controlled by the South. The South produced cotton, of which England was by far the largest purchaser. In return for cotton, England offered the South every class of manufactures at a less cost than they could be bought at home. But the War of Secession banished all thought of any nearer approach to a common trade policy. A high tariff was imperatively forced on the country. It was imposed for purposes of revenue, but it fostered manufactures and made many rich. When the amount yielded by customs grew to be in excess of the requirements of government, the Democratic party urged reform of the tariff, and curtailment of duties. The Mills Bill, framed with this object, was defeated.

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The following congress was Republican, and passed the McKinley Tariff Bill, avowedly as a measure of protection, nominally in the interest of the working masses, really in the interest of the accumulating classes.

The New York *Tribune* during the national campaign which followed the passage of the bill, covered the first page of several issues of its Weekly Edition with a list of the wealthy men of the country, designating by an asterisk those who had been enriched by Tariff Legislation. Long as the list was, it included but a fraction of the population which had contributed, in higher cost of living, to the wealth which has made a plutocracy of the few. It might be supposed, more appropriately, to be a campaign document of the anti-tariff party. On the contrary, it was a shrewd move to win votes, not from the workingmen, but from the average trader and small manufacturer, who, excited by the wealth which had accrued to so many, were tempted to support a system which in a few years might elevate them to the same glorious height, and cause their names to be enrolled in the McKinley peerage of wealth.

But while parties have been using the tariff as a party issue, the cost of government has been increasing so rapidly that the whole proceeds of even the tariff for protection are being absorbed. The pension list, let who will be

responsible for its length, must be paid. A navy must be built. The appropriation for harbor and river improvements must grow greater and greater. The cost of government, already in excess of that of Great Britain, will go rolling on and render it practically impossible to reduce the tariff, unless resort be had to direct taxation. But if a high tariff is to be maintained, foreign trade will be shut out, and consequently commercial intercourse will dwindle from sheer lack of exchange.

To avoid this inevitable consequence, which all but the extremest protectionists recognize and admit would be a misfortune, Mr. Blaine devised a scheme of reciprocity by which other high tariff countries should admit certain American products and manufactured articles in return for free admission into the United States of certain of their commodities, principally raw materials. When the admission of the foreign commodity injures a home industry of considerable industrial or political importance, the home interest is recompensed by a bounty. Thus Cuban and other sugars enter duty free, and the cost of sugar to the American consumer seems to have correspondingly declined. But what the sugar consumer thinks he saves, because he pays his grocer less, he pays into the Treasury as increased taxation, to reimburse the Louisiana sugar planter, for the protection of which he has been deprived!

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The system has not been on trial long enough to be an assured success or an assured failure, but one thing it has done: while it has led to reciprocity treaties between the United States and some high tariff countries, whose exports are of raw material, it has induced other high tariff countries, whose exports are only manufactured goods, and whose trade with the United States was certainly hampered by the McKinley Bill, to combine among themselves for mutual protection and effective recrimination. But England, consistent in her free trade policy, stands alone and powerless. She even allows her sugar dependencies in the West Indies to enter the United States *Zollverein*. Canada has treated with her neighbor with the same object in view, but the United States must decline to admit Canadian raw material free, unless Canada will, in her tariff on manufactured articles, discriminate in her favor, which is the gist of a reciprocity treaty, and therefore against Great Britain.

If, after a fair trial, the United States finds, or thinks it to be to her advantage, to persist in this dual policy of high protection at home, and preferential discrimination in favor of reciprocating communities abroad, and other countries follow her example, it is difficult to see how Great Britain is to defend herself, except by adopting similar tactics.

Be their fiscal policies what they may, England and the

United States are certain to be competitors in the World's markets for the sale of the great staples of the manufacturers' skill; for, despite the great growth of population in the United States, the growth of her iron and steel, and of her textile-fabric industries, is gradually outstripping the demands of her home market.

To divert the inevitable decline in prices which results from overstocking the home market, every trade has organized, under one form or another, a trust or combination whose efforts are directed to checking unbridled competition, and keeping within the limits of consumption the production of protected articles: for those trusts are most easily managed and most successful which manipulate the movement of commodities which are the product of a limited region, such as petroleum, and anthracite coal, or highly protected articles like iron and steel. But the day inevitably comes when the laws of trade, or cupidity of the more favored mines or mills, or the necessities of the financially embarrassed, induce some works of large capacity to overstep the artificial barrier, to produce in excess of its allowance, and thus to break faith with its partners, but not to break the law.

Then commences a competitive stampede, in which each large corporation uses its plant and resources to the utmost limit of its capacity and of its credit. This they

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do, either impelled by ambition to stand at the head of the list as the biggest producer, though every inch of increase means an ell less of profit, or from valid economical motives, in the endeavor to reduce the percentage of administration expenses by distributing them over a larger output.

Once the control of the management of a combination is weakened, competition again comes into play, and from one motive or another individual folly and selfishness bring about excessive production. That excessive product must be sold at any price, and must therefore of necessity seek a foreign market. The price of the foreign market soon comes to fix the price at home, and then protection ceases to protect. This sequence of events has already followed in the history of some protected industries in the United States, and if laws against trusts can be enforced it will be the fate of others, unless admission for protected articles be secured to other protected markets, which is the aim of the reciprocity politicians and economists. The natural resources of the Union are so vast, and the energy and ingenuity of its people so uncontrolable and keen, that production will in any case sooner or later refuse to be restricted to home consumption.

Whether, therefore, by shutting out England's manufactures from her own market by a protective tariff, or from other markets by reciprocity temptations, or whether by cheapening the cost of her own goods through a free trade

policy, and entering as a competitor on equal terms the markets of the world, the United States is sure to be England's antagonist, not, at any rate for a long time to come, her commercial ally.

Looking at the natural resources, still undeveloped and not half discovered, and the growing population of the Republic, occupying half a new continent, and looking at the little Island digging deep for its mineral wealth, and teeming with people who jostle one another for mere existence, one can hardly doubt what the issue will be, unless the little Island can gather into a commercial league, offensive and defensive, the scattered members of her family from north and south and east and west, who still bear to her filial affection. Whether even that will avail, must depend upon the course of trade relations the world over. If the nations of the earth are to be marshalled into hostile commercial camps—as is the indication at present—legislating in their own favors as against all others, it would seem as if England and her colonies could, advantageously to its members, compose a powerful *Zollverein*, strong enough to be self supporting, and to enforce respectful recognition of its rights by others. And should in time the policy of isolation be abandoned by the nations in favor of more cosmopolitan commercial intercourse, out of these close trade relations, which we will suppose have been so harmoniously maintain-

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ed by the British *Bund*, might grow a political partnership of still wider range, which would realize the highest aspirations of the Federalists.

But neither a commercial union of Britain and her Colonies alone, nor a political federation of the whole Anglo-Saxon race, would be durable, if effected at the dictation of one or more supreme powers, or if the suspicion even existed that the *Bund* was formed to subserve special local interests. Take, for instance, Canadian trade relations to United States to-day, reasonable as it is that Canada should not make a reciprocity treaty with the States which would discriminate against British manufacturers, it is unfortunate that the relations to the mother country are such that she could not if she would, without the acts being passed upon, and possibly cancelled by the supreme power. The moral effect of refusing to do so, if perfectly free and untrammelled, would be felt appreciably on both sides of the Atlantic—as keenly in the United States as in England, whereas a vague sense of degradation of necessity accompanies the refusal in the mind of every Canadian when he feels that he is virtually obliged to consent to a course which fairness and patriotism would impel him to adopt, were he politically independent.

It is impossible to weigh the material advantages which might accrue from commercial intercourse with the United

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States, as against those which might give membership in the great Confederation of other Anglo-Saxon communities, capable of raising all the raw materials and manufactures that are natural to the tropics, the temperate, and the arctic zones ; possessing an abundance of mineral wealth and skill to turn it to account, and above all, imbued and impelled by the same love of liberty and the same faculty of adapting themselves and their principles to the most diverse conditions of existence. At the same time, this marshalling of industrial communities into hostile armies bears the semblance of a retrograde movement, seeing that for nineteen centuries the gospel of Christian Communism has been in men's hands, if not in their hearts.

We return, therefore, to the proposition with which we set out, that Independence or Annexation is the alternative offered to the Canadian people, inasmuch as Imperial Federation involves Independence and is only possible as its consequence ; whereas, Annexation is a very possible sequence to Canada's present dependent position. In coming to a decision, supposing the decision to be reached by mere process of reasoning and feeling, without any outward controlling pressure, the people at large may be expected to be influenced by the same motive as would impel an individual Canadian.

There are many Canadians and Englishmen in the

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United States, engaged in business and owning property, who have not taken out their naturalization papers, and therefore remain aliens in a friendly land. Why do they impose political ostracism on themselves; when, in most cases, they are in hearty sympathy with the Republican institutions under which they thrive? Simply because, unable to throw off the strong attachment to their native land, they will not apply for citizenship. They feel also, that so long as those sympathies are strong, they would be unable to act as loyal citizens of the United States in case of any quarrel between their adopted country and that of their birth; for no elderly person can so divest himself of his prejudices (if they be so), and of his affection for, or antipathy towards the home of his forefathers, as to be a perfectly impartial citizen of another country. Many Englishmen, therefore, think they are truer to the land which has treated them generously, and that they relieve themselves from many a perplexing case of conscience, by retaining their allegiance to Great Britain and depriving themselves of certain advantages which the land of their adoption liberally offers. Living under American institutions, an Englishman enjoys the common privileges of the Anglo-Saxon race, and he feels that there is no such incongruity in making the United States his home, and seeing his children settle there and grow up into Americans, as there would be in deciding to end his days and contemplate

the education, and domestication, and naturalization of his family in any European State.

Another reason which repels Englishmen from seeking naturalization is the bitterness expressed against England by a section of the American people, and the unfair criticisms, unjust insinuations, and imputations of unwarrantable motives with which English affairs and the relations of England to America, are discussed in the American press. We know that much of this rhodomontade is but a dishonest bid for votes, and a contemptible method of increasing the sale of newspapers; but, nevertheless, the votes must be many which respectable politicians will descend to secure by such methods; and abuse of Great Britain must be grateful to a large number of readers, to induce influential journals to print the ridiculous statements and criticisms which irritates not only Englishmen, but all intelligent and candid Americans. The Roman Catholic Irish population of the United States is, to a man, violently anti-British, and it is *per capita* politically the most active, and, therefore, influential, section of the people. The Germans and Scandinavians have no acute antipathy to Great Britain, but they have no sympathy for her, and were an anti-English cry raised, would readily join in it. The presence of this antipathy jars on the feelings of an Englishman resident in the United States, and

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deters him from accepting the privileges which citizenship confers.

The same feelings, excited by the same causes, undoubtedly animate a large section of the Canadian people against Annexation. It may be very foolish on the part of an Englishman to deny himself the advantages and the security of property which citizenship confers, and on the part of Canada to allow sentiment to interfere with prosperity (supposing that it does), but the United States would not be the United States were it not that it owes its institutions and racial strength to that very England, whose sons to-day, while admiring it and living under its flag, and working hard to advance its prosperity (and their own), yet cling too tenaciously to the traditions of the old stock, to readily disown allegiance to the Mother Country; and Canada would not be Canada were it not for a large infusion of the United Empire Loyalist character into the population of Ontario and the Maritime Provinces, and of that spirit which impelled those fugitives to forsake home and to abandon their property for an idea, and that idea patriotic affection to England.

It is undeniable that in Canada itself there are groups of the population indifferent, if not hostile to Great Britain. The Celt of Canada is a Celt still, with all his Saxon antipathies, and the French Canadian is a Frenchman still, with

religious principles, and racial interests and traditions and memories, which tend to keep him from amalgamating into one people with the English elements of the body politic. In the United States the anti-English sentiment is expressed or encouraged by party leaders and newspapers, in order to weld into more manageable shape, for political purposes, certain classes of voters. Some Canadian politicians have tried cautiously, but found it dangerous, to use the same tactics; for while the bulk of the population on the one side of the line is loyal to England, the bulk of the population on the other is simply indifferent.

But this hostility or indifference pervades the people of the United States less widely than might be expected, and the feeling of attachment to England is extraordinarily strong, considering how dilute and remote the kinship is becoming.

The colonists who revolted numbered less than three millions*, and of these the Dutch of New York, and the Swedes, Dutch and Germans of Pennsylvania, formed a large contingent. The white population had not increased to much above 5,000,000 when the war of 1812 embroiled the kindred people in hostility. Since then there has been incorporated by direct immigration 3½ millions of Irish,

* The census for 1790 gives the white population at 3,172,006 and the black at 757,208.

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all cherishing grievances against the land of their expatriation. Six millions of Germans, Scandinavians and Slavs, who, if they do not harbor dislike, have brought with them from their homes a vague jealousy of Great Britain, and 1½ millions of French and French-Canadians, with whom aversion to, amounting in some to hatred of, "perfidious Albion," is an article of faith. And yet this mixed population has assimilated English ideas, has adopted the English language, and is applying in practice the essential doctrines of English political liberty and jurisprudence. In fact the universal use of the English language is a most noteworthy instance of the homologating process now going on in the United States. Wherever English is spoken, it is intelligible English. In England there are dialects so different from literary English and so obscure that a cultivated native cannot understand them. But the English of America is a language which every English thinking and speaking person can comprehend and converse in. There are peculiarities of intonation and accentuation in the American speech; and the use of certain peculiar words and phrases distinguish different sections, but the English of the east understand those of the west, and those of the north understand those of the south, while a Dorsetshire peasant cannot converse with a Yorkshire man!

The universal use of the English language and

consequent familiarity with English literature, coupled with a closer and closer commercial and social intercourse between Old England and New England, in her expansion over the whole continent, is creating an English sentiment, and is obliterating the positively hostile feeling which was acute in 1812; which was dying out prior to the War of Secession, but which was then revived by England's staunch neutrality and Canada's undisguised sympathy with the Southern cause.

In April last, when the marines and seamen of the nine fleets which anchored in New York harbor to celebrate the Columbian quadri-centennial, marched through the streets of New York, a heartier and warmer welcome was shouted to the English contingent than even to that of the French and Russian. The seamen of the American and English fleets marched with the same elastic swing and good humor that bespoke a brotherhood of race, and inherited sea instincts. This co-fraternity appealed so irresistably to the crowds of Americans of diverse origin (not half of them of American parentage) which lined the streets, that it elicited for the British tars almost as hearty cheers as those which greeted the men of the White Squadron; and this occurred at the very time a court of arbitration was sitting in Paris to settle a dispute, which in any other age than to-day, or if existing between

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Were Canadians to become citizens of the United States by their own will and option, there would be little seen and heard, unless they sought offense where none was meant, which would wound their love for their old home; while the influence of their own votes, and still more of their moral and sentimental influence in favor of England, would add weight and impetus to the existing forces which bind in ever closer and friendlier relations the great Republic to the country which is the mother land of us all.

Although, therefore, patriotic feeling influences, and should influence, Canadians, individually and collectively, it should not be allowed to unduly bias the decision on the question of Annexation. This should be reached dispassionately by considerations of the common good, not only mercenary, but political and social.

Were England in a life and death struggle, and did her children desert her from sordid motives, the ignominy of the act would stamp it with the approbrium which attached to the betrayal of the Master by his perfidious Disciple, but there would be nothing base or sordid in a political alliance of one branch of the Anglo-Saxon family with another whose political institutions, if not identical, are in harmony even though the prominent impelling motive were financial.

betterment ; provided the rupture of the old tie were made with the full consent of the old partners.

The question therefore arises : assuming that England would consent to Annexation, would Canada annexed be more prosperous, not than Canada as she now is, but than she might be if by gentle inducement, or by violent shock, she could be galvanized into greater activity than she displays to-day? That Canada as a whole does not progress as rapidly as her neighbor is a statistical fact, and one of such serious importance that it claims anxious investigation.

Every Canadian census, till the last, has shown a healthy active growth. Now that Canada undoubtedly occupies a more important position among the communities of the world, politically, industrially and geographically than ever before, population ceases to flow in, or if it flows in, it flows out again in so steady a stream that she barely maintains the normal increase that is natural to a young people with abundance of land unoccupied, and of resources undeveloped. She has exhibited since 1880 a power of attracting and absorbing population equal to only half of that of her neighbor. In this comparison lies the most perplexing and disquieting feature of the question : for if the United States continues growing into a giant, while Canada shrinks into a dwarf, with the distorted and unhealthy impulses

which affect people, as well as individuals, of impaired development, the result can be easily forecast.

The growth of population in Canada has not even reached a high standard of natural increase, and therefore the 500,000 who have entered as immigrants have about compensated for an equal number of emigrants, composed in part of those same immigrants, who merely passed through Canada, but principally of Canadians, who left to seek their fortunes elsewhere, most, but not all, in the United States.

The decennial increase of the following European nations between 1860 and 1870 was calculated by a Commission of French savants, into whose table I insert the per centage growth of the United States and Canada between 1880 and 1890. These figures are in most cases higher than those arrived at by Bodio.

			Per cent.	Per cent.
			per annum	per annum
United States, between 1880 and 1890..			24·8	or 2·48
Russia	do	1860 and 1870..	13·9	1·39
Sweden	do	do ..	13·3	1·33
England & Wales	do	do ..	12·6	1·26
Prussia	do	do ..	12·6	1·26
Canada	do	1880 and 1890..	11·6	1·16
Italy	do	1860 and 1870..	8·3	·83
Spain	do	do ..	6·7	·67
France	do	do ..	3·8	·38

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None of these countries, except the United States and Canada, were notably affected by immigration, though some lost heavily by emigration. Canada thus stands at the foot of the class of nations of healthy growth. But considering the prolific habits of the French Canadian peasantry, she should stand higher from natural increase alone. She should be the compeer of Australia and the United States, for they and Canada for several decades have been the magnetic centres to which the world's surplus population has been attracted.

Of the three, Australia has grown the most rapidly. Comparing the population of her constituent colonies and of New Zealand and Tasmania in 1871, 1881 and 1891, we find the decennial gain in population to have been as follows:—

Per cent.	Per cent. per annum		1871.	1881.	Per cent. Gain.	1891.	Per cent. Gain.
24·8	or 2·48	New Zealand	256,393	489,933	..90·9	626,658	..20·8
13·9	1·39	Victoria	731,528	862,346	..17·8	1,140,405	..32·2
13·3	1·33	South Australia . .	185,626	279,865	..50·8	320,430	..18·0
12·6	1·26	New South Wales .	503,981	751,468	..49·1	1,132,230	..52·0
12·6	1·26	Queensland	120,104	213,525	..77·7	393,718	..84·3
11·6	1·16	West Australia . . .	25,353	29,708	..17·1	49,782	..67·5
8·3	·83	Tasmania	101,785	115,705	..13·4	126,667	..9·4

The total population of the above colonies was in 1871, 1,924,770, and in 1891, 3,809,895. Their growth in 20

years was about 97·9 per cent. or 4·8 per cent. per annum.

There is no doubt of the inaccuracy of the results of the United States' census for several decades past. Apart from the errors in local enumeration, the Census Bureau itself discredits the reliability of the census of 1870, and wishes to revise the totals. Taking the figures as they stand, the population of the United States was in—

		Per cent. gain.
1860	31,443,321
1870	38,558,371	.. 22·6
1880	50,155,783	.. 30·0
1890	62,622,250	.. 24·8

As revised for 1870, the totals would stand :—

		Per cent. gain.
1860	31,443,321
1870	39,818,449	.. 26·6
1880	50,155,783	.. 25·9
1890	62,622,250	.. 24·8

The population of Canada during the same period shows the following fluctuations :—

		Per cent. gain.
1861	3,171,418
1871	3,686,596	.. 16·2
1881	4,324,810	.. 17·3
1891	4,829,411	.. 11·6

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Australia has, therefore, grown more rapidly than any of the other off-shoots of the Anglo-Saxon stock. Though her total population is comparatively small, and the actual increment has been only about 8 per cent. of that of the United States, nevertheless her marvelous vitality would seem conclusively to contradict the assumption that her colonial form of government has had a repellent influence on immigration. While the socialistic tendency of Australian legislature may have had an attraction for such intelligent immigrants as have been able to meet the cost of a voyage to the antipodes, the inference nevertheless is that emigrants in general are not prejudiced in favor of one form of representative government over another, provided there be full liberty of self-government. If this be so, Canada is not deserted because she is a colony and not an independent power, but for other reasons.

There are points of resemblance between Australia and the United States, and points of difference between Canada and Australia, which may help to explain Canada's retrogression.

Climate is a potent factor in determining immigration. Between Southern New Zealand and Northern Queensland, there is a wider range of temperature than between Texas and Maine. Though New Zealand has the mean temperature of Eastern New York, the Northern half

of Australia is in the tropics. In spite of the aridity of Australia, the absence of extreme cold has undoubtedly its effect on the fancy of the immigrant. And no wonder! for half the energies of the population of Quebec and Manitoba, and no small share of its wealth, are expended in keeping itself warm and battling with snow and ice.

Though the absence of such vast tracts of fertile land as have drawn so much of the surplus population of the world to the prairies of the west, will of necessity limit the number which Australia can ultimately accommodate, her very aridity has facilitated the discovery of minerals and been the prime mover thither of population. In a barren, treeless region, where the rocks are exposed, minerals, if they exist, are easily and rapidly discovered.

The surprising speed with which the mining of precious metals drew the hardiest and most enterprising of the reckless spirits of the world to California, after 1848, was almost exceeded during the next decade in the experience of Australia. Of the multitudes who then and have since flocked to both scenes of mining excitement, the major part, disappointed in their search for fortune beneath the soil, have, in despair, turned their energies to cattle ranching, or agriculture, and created large communities of people, far above the average in intelligence and enterprise.

Canada has undoubtedly mineral wealth, but nature has

very carefully hidden it, as if to save it for future generations and prevent its reckless exhaustion. The Canadian Rocky Mountains are probably as richly impregnated with gold and silver, as the same ranges south of the line, but they are heavily clad with soil and forest. Exploration is, therefore, difficult, discovery is slow, and the enthusiasm of the prospector seldom reaches that white heat which precedes and creates a "rush."

Of the direct effect of climate, the United States census gives many an example. For instance, its rigorous climate is doubtless the reason why Maine, between—

	Per Cent.
1860 and 1870, declined.....	0.22
1870 and 1880, increased only.....	3.51
1880 and 1890, " "	1.87

While North Carolina, with as poor a soil, and but few manufactures, even during the war period, from—

	Per Cent.
1860 to 1870, gained.....	1.9
1870 to 1880, "	30.6
1880 to 1890, "	15.5

The tremendous waves of population which flow into a district, under the influence of speculative mining, nearly doubled the population of Colorado between 1870 and 1880, and more than doubled the population of Montana between

1880 and 1890. Both these States, like California, had other latent resources than mines, which resources those who failed in mining, turned their hands to developing, and have thus created communities with permanent and stable industries.

Australia, under like physical conditions, has experienced similar accessions to its population. If Canada has not, is it not because her climate and physical conditions, and her geographical situation forbid?

These reasons may explain why the eastern provinces make no better progress than Maine, and why British Columbia does not keep pace with Montana. The United States has heretofore won most of her immigrants by offering them high wages in her mines and manufactures, or by presenting them with cheap rich lands in a temperate zone. Canada has not, and cannot, hold out similar or equal inducements, and therefore till wages fall in the United States, and the more desirable lands are absorbed, it is unlikely that Canada will keep pace with her neighbor.

Canada cannot attract a large manufacturing population, because she cannot give them work. The reason why she cannot is not far to seek. The most palpable cause for the languishing state of certain manufactures in Canada, is the want of a large home market. Applying high duties keeps out foreign goods and secures the home market to the home

manufactures. If the home market be big enough, the policy works admirably for the manufacturer and the operative. Dear goods can afford to pay costly labor, and all are happy but the consumer, who has to buy the dear goods. If the consumers are numerous enough to support extensive industries, and the industries by means of trusts and combinations restrict their production to the home demand, the manufacturer heaps up wealth, certain groups of the laboring classes are well paid, and people in certain sections are prosperous. The whole train of consequences follows the protective policy of the United States, because the home market is so large, and is ever growing. It did not follow the National Policy in Canada, because the market was too restricted to allow of manufacturing on a scale which would employ enough of her native population to raise wages to anything like the standard in the Eastern and Western States. No immigrant was tempted to enter Canada from abroad by the offer of high wages, and no Canadian was restricted from migrating by the offer of even equal wages at home to those that tempted him in the Eastern and Western States.

If, therefore, the National Policy has failed to produce all the results which were anticipated from it, will absolute reciprocity confer the coveted benefit? If mills have not been built, and population has not flowed in to work them, because Canada has only 5,000,000 of people to clothe and

house, would her lot be better were she coupled up with her 63,000,000 of neighbors? We doubt it.

Maine is within the charmed circle. It has lumber in abundance, and water power runs to waste in a hundred rivers, but the population of Maine by the last census shows an increase of only 1.8 per cent. in 10 years. But Maine is as cold as Quebec, her soil is poor and the labor of reclaiming it oppressive.

At the same time that the higher wages which have prevailed through active manufacturing in some sections of the United States have attracted immigrants, the abundance and cheapness of land in a temperate climate has been another temptation. We also possess boundless lands which is open to occupation, under the Homestead Act, as freely as that in the United States; but the unoccupied of Quebec and Ontario are uninviting, and the prairie lands of the North-West are repellently cold. The movement of population in North Dakota exemplifies the aversion of the emigrant to cold, and the risk which it entails. Dakota is Manitoba's neighbor to the south, and the statistical returns from that State are particularly instructive :

Between 1880 and 1890 North Dakota grew from 36,909 to 182,719 or 39.505%; South Dakota from 98,268 to 328,808 or 234.60%; considered as one, from 135,177 to 511,527 or 278.00%.

But in 1885 a territorial census was made, and showed that the growth between 1880 and 1885 was 205.5 per cent. between 1885 and 1890 was 23.1 per cent. Evidently, therefore, climatic conditions have disappointed the Dakotan farmer as well as the Manitoban.

In the old Prairie States where land is no longer obtainable for the mere asking, rapid growth has of necessity ceased. The following paragraphs from the Census Bulletin No. 16 are worthy of study :

“ In Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri and in Illinois, if the city of Chicago be dropped out of consideration, the rate of increase has declined very decidedly. In Ohio it has fallen from 20 to 15 per cent. In Indiana from 18 to 11 per cent. In Iowa from 36 to 18 per cent. In Missouri from 26 to 24 per cent., in spite of the rapid growth of St. Louis and Kansas City, and in Illinois, dropping Chicago from consideration, from 14.9 to 5.9 per cent. In these states the agricultural industry, which is still the prominent one, has begun to decline, owing to the sharp competition of western farms.”

But, despite this sharp competition, we have seen that Dakota, the newest and most vigorous of these western rivals, has ceased growing with phenomenal rapidity, and Kansas, the most powerful, according to the State Census, accumulated two-thirds of her decennial gain during the

first half of the decade, and during the last year of the decade actually lost 37,818 of her inhabitants.

Returning to the statistical summary given above, the manipulated figures show a percentage decline in the growth of the United States' population between 1880 and 1890 of 1.1 per cent., but following the actual returns, the decline was 5.22 per cent., as against a decline 5.65 per cent. in that of the recent Canadian Census. Of course we do not pretend that a percentage decline of equal amount from such different aggregates, as the population of Canada and the United States are equally portentous to both, but a decline in both cases may mark the turning point in the movement of population to this continent. Naturally the decline will be more marked in the less favored region, and taken as a whole and all in all, Canada is less favored than the United States. In point of fact the volume of immigration to the United States is not rapidly declining, but the quality and destination of the immigrants is changing most notably.

The report on immigration published by the Treasury Department of the United States, shows that in 1870 England contributed 23.20 per cent. of the total immigration, in 1880 13 per cent., and in 1890 only 12.05 per cent. Germany in 1870 sent 30.5 per cent.; in 1890, 20.3 per cent., while Austria-Hungary's portion which was only 1 per cent. in 1870, reached in 1880 12.3 per cent. It was 1872 before Italy

appeared, with 1 per cent. ; now she forwards 11'24 per cent. Russia and Poland stand still lower in the list in 1870, but in 1890 contributed 9'8 per cent.

This large influx of Poles, Slavs and Italians settles in the seaboard cities, and in the iron, coal and coke regions. Italians have largely replaced the Irish as street-sweepers and railroad navvies, and Poles furnish the hands with which the iron and coal magnates have opposed the demands of the native laborers. With the percentage decrease of English, Scotch, and Germans there has been a decrease in the introduction of skilled labor and good farmers, and an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants, who cannot and do not combine to maintain a standard of wages. The result, if this state of things continues, will be, not only that the intellectual status of the electorate will be lowered, but the standard of wages paid for unskilled labor will sink and the temptation to indiscriminate immigration will be lessened.*

To sum up, Canada can offer no inducement to foreigners to operate her manufactories, which were and will be few till her population is large enough to absorb the product of many, or she seeks a foreign market, for she has a surplus

*The United States Treasury Department's Statistics of Alien Passengers and Immigrants, gives the number of immigrants from British America between 1873 and 1885 as 688,813. Since 1885 the law has made no provision for taking count of immigrants entering the United States by land.

of cheap labor at home. Her wild forest lands are too difficult to reclaim, and too slow in supporting the farmer, to be occupied while there is any prairie land unappropriated. Her prairie lands lie north of the favored zone, and, as in the case of her neighbor Dakota, are less largely coveted, when their climate has been experienced, than lands to the south. British Columbia, unfortunately, comprises within her bounds so little agricultural land, that were every acre of it occupied, the growth of population could not be a tithe of that of Washington Territory ; and British Columbia's mineral wealth is so hidden by forest and soil, that though a large contingent of American prospectors are searching for it, discovery is of necessity far slower than in the contiguous states of Montana and Idaho. These natural disadvantages would attach to her, as they do to Maine and North Dakota, be her political condition or affiliations they may.

Canada must face the fact that she has serious physical and geographical obstacles to contend against, and be content to make haste slowly. This, after all, is a lesser evil than being overrun by a large horde of ignorant alien immigrants.

There are, therefore, good and substantial reasons why Canada's progress in population should be less than that of her neighbor, but there is no good reason why it should be so slow as it is. There is in Canada a latent suspicion that something is wrong, but instead of seeking for the source of

her shortcomings at home, in her own habits and business methods, she is prone to charge them wholly to external causes, and to look for a remedy in political changes. To some minds, and at one time or another to some leaders of almost all the political groups, annexation has been the panacea.

Assuming that annexation were effected, whence would result the magical improvement in Canada's financial position which some anticipate from it. Canada's public debt is much larger (per capita) than that of the United States. The difference would have to be distributed among and borne by the annexed States and added to the expenses of State Government, which would not be less than they now are. The system of State taxation would, moreover, have to be revised, as there would be no contribution by the Federal Government for the maintenance of the State. The more impecunious States would whine in vain for better terms when in financial straits.

It is questionable whether manufacturing in general would be stimulated by annexation. There is a tendency towards segregation in manufacturing industries directed by influences which it is not always easy to detect. The cotton mills of the United States were first attracted to certain localities in New England by water power, and when they had grown beyond the capacity of the water power they still

remained, because capital was invested and skilled labor had been congregated there, though the material is brought to the mills from the other end of the Union. So, likewise, nearly all of the copper of the United States is converted into manufactured articles in the Naugatuck Valley, though Connecticut itself produces no copper, and re-ships a large proportion of the manufactured goods back over the roads by which the raw material reached her. Woollen manufacturing is largely localized near Philadelphia, though Pennsylvania raises comparatively little wool. If manufacturers went to the cheap labor centres, all the cotton mills would be removed to the South, where the raw material is raised, and where labor is cheaper by far than it is in Canada. But though a cotton mill, in rivalry with the North, is springing up here and there throughout the Southern States, the cotton manufacturing trade remains immovable where it has long been located, and where economically it ought not to be, far from raw material, from cheap labor, and from fuel.

What likelihood is there, therefore, that mills would be built in Canada to employ the hands who now flock to New England? Would not this labor continue to go from the State of Quebec, instead of from the Province of Quebec, to the States of Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island or Massachusetts. The mills would remain where the mills

are now, and labor would go to the mills, and the mills to the labor.

There are special branches of manufacture which at first sight it would seem should be carried on in Canada. She possesses far vaster resources in lumber than the United States. They are now being used as rapidly, perhaps more so, than is prudent; but the lumber leaves Canada in an unmanufactured shape. A minimum of labor and skill has therefore been expended on it. When it reaches its destination across the line, it is converted into special forms for special uses. Prosperous towns have grown up on the southern shores of the great lakes, whose main industry is turning Michigan and Canadian lumber into furniture and architectural decorations; but these manufacturing centres are nearer their market than any point in Canada would be. As it is much cheaper to transport lumber in the rough than furniture, and as so little is now wasted, it is very doubtful whether the furniture manufacturing trade could be shifted from the consumer to the forest under any circumstances. Canada's true policy is to turn her fine hard woods into specialized forms for other markets than the United States, and that she could do to-day as well as imported energy would do it for her after annexation.

Mining would doubtless be more active under annexation than it is at present, provided the United States

protective tariff remains in force, but this is a proviso that is dangerous to count upon. The existing duty of 75 cts. per ton is sufficient to exclude Nova Scotia and Cape Breton coals from the New England market, and secure the fuel supply to Pennsylvania. Were it removed, New England would take vastly more coal from the Maritime Provinces than she did before the expiration of Lord Elgin's Reciprocity Treaty, and would much more than compensate for the loss of the Ontario market, which would in case of annexation or reciprocity, become the perquisite of Pennsylvania. But from present appearances the Democratic party will remove the duty on raw material, and these trade benefits will accrue to Canada without any change in her political status. American capitalists, anticipating this contingency, have already invested largely in Maritime coal.

The same is true of iron ores. Canadian iron manufacturing has not prospered. Why? Because it is said the home market was too small, the English market was too cheap and the United States market was closed. All that is only partially true. The attempt at manufacturing iron on a large scale has been made at Londonderry, Nova Scotia, but though the Government offered all the assistance that it dared in the way of bounty and high tariff, Canada in 1891, made only 21,772 tons of pig iron, though her consumption of iron and steel in all forms was estimated as equivalent to

400,000 tons of pig. If her iron resources are what they are supposed to be, why is not this 400,000 tons of pig, of wrought iron and steel, made with her own coal, out of her own ores, and by her own people? If the material for manufacturing be there, with the benefits of a protected market, all that would seem to be lacking is the capital, energy and skill necessary to supply the market with the material. Pictou County, Nova Scotia, is the only spot on the Atlantic coast where coal, iron ore and flux exist side by side on tide water, but Canadian enterprise has not yet exerted itself to even determine whether the iron ore deposits are of workable extent, despite Sir William Dawson's reiterated opinion as to their apparent value. Doubtless, were Canada annexed, American energy would soon determine the point, but is it creditable to Canadians thus to shift their responsibility, because they dread the risks, to Yankee shoulders and Yankee pockets?

The principal copper deposits in Canada are now in the hands of Americans, namely, the pyrites mines near Lennoxville, in the Province of Quebec, and the largest of the nickel-copper ore of Sudbury, in the Province of Ontario. The same is true of Canada's lead resources. Americans risked their money and failed on Lake Temiscamingue, and Americans have bought the immense lead deposits of Lake Kootenay in British Columbia. These will be developed

regardless of reciprocity or annexation ; and if the duty be removed from ores entering the United States, they will be introduced in the raw state into the United States as though they had been produced on American territory. Thus the profits will go to those who take the risks, not to the Canadians who clamor for annexation that they may the more readily sell their birthright. If Canada were annexed, or should reciprocity be secured, mining would receive an impulse, and more Canadians would be employed on wage-work, for the foreign corporations who would reap the profits which should to-day accrue to Canadian enterprise, were it willing to jeopardize a little of its capital.

It must be, however, remembered that the removal of protective duties from ore and metals entering the United States will reduce their price to the level which they command in the European market, and therefore to a lower price than they command to-day in the protected market of Canada. The economical questions involved in reciprocity or annexation are much more complicated and far-reaching than at first appears. Canada has refused to follow the lead of her Mother Country as a Free Trader. Should she ally herself with the United States politically, she would have only a $\frac{1}{2}$ interest influence in determining her own future fiscal policy, and must obey the will of her dominant sister States, whether they be in the direction of Free Trade or

Protection, and it probably will not be towards the latter.

Passing from mining and mineral to agricultural interests, it is undeniable that the nearest market to most sections of Canada is the United States, and that the prices are higher in New York than in Montreal, but the farmer does not always get his fair share of that higher price. Cereals are produced in excess of consumption by both countries. But one of the cereals raised in Canada is largely purchased and used in the States, and that is barley. The McKinley Bill injured Canada by imposing a heavy duty on that grain. This imposition was not generally popular, and in any revision of the tariff will probably be removed.

Looking at the exports of the United States and Canada to England, we find the following figures: United States supplied England, in 1890, with wheat of the value of \$34,500,000, equal to 55 cents per head of the United States population; Canada supplied her with only \$2,315,000, equal to about 40 cents per head of the Canadian population. Clearly, the United States would, therefore, not be a good customer for Canadian wheat.

The United States sent to England, in 1890, \$30,000,000 worth of beef, equal to about 48 cents per head of the United States population; Canada sent her only \$375,000 worth, or only 8 cents per head of the Canadian population. Thus the New York market does not stand

in need of Canadian beef, and would not pay for it more than the export cost, no matter what the retail price of beef may be to the New York housekeeper.

The shipment made of bacon and hams to Great Britain, in 1890, by the United States, was of the value of \$47,000,000, equal to 70 cents per head ; Canada supplied \$2,500,000, or 60 cents per head of the Canadian population. In these three articles of largest agricultural production, the United States and Canada produced largely in excess of their own consumption, and neither is, therefore, a profitable market for the products of the other. The foreign market, in which both compete, would consume neither more nor less, or pay a higher price for the supply from the North American Continent, whether it be politically under one or two governments.

What Canada can do is well exemplified in her cheese industry. In 1890 she shipped to England \$9,500,000 worth, equal to \$1.99 per head of the population, whereas the United States shipped only \$104,000 worth, equal to only 1.6 cents per head of her population. One would naturally expect that the butter shipment would be in the same proportion, but Canada shipped only $\frac{1}{3}$ as much butter, namely, \$300,000 worth, or 6 cents per head, as was shipped by the United States, which amounted to \$1,600,000, equal to 2 cents per head. Why should England import over \$20,000,000 worth of butter from Denmark, and only

\$300,000 worth from Canada? The one reason is that Canada's butter is so slovenly packed and so unreliable in quality, that it could nowhere command high prices. Throughout the West Indies, South America and South Africa, there is an almost unlimited market for butter, packed in tin cans, at a fabulous price; but it must be of the finest quality. That butter Canada should, but does not, supply.

London is as accessible a market for Canadian eggs as is New York, yet England pays France \$6,000,000 annually for eggs, and her own colonies offer her only \$50,000, or not one per cent. of what she buys from France. The wider channel is now-a-days no greater an obstacle to commerce than the narrow one. What the Canadian farmers want is not a market, but energy, skill and industry with which to compete in the world with their more pushing neighbors or more thrifty rivals. Annexation might result in an infusion of energy. It might result in a transfer of the land from the lethargic to the more industrious. In fact, probably it would leave matters precisely where they are, for New England has been abandoned by her farmer classes in the mad rush for the West, and when that is stayed, there are deserted homesteads by the hundreds waiting to be reoccupied, that are nearer the large city markets of the coast than any Canadian farms.

The fishermen of the Maritime Provinces would profit

by reciprocity or annexation, but they do not make the best of the market within their own reach. Long after the International railroad was opened, the Lower Canadian market was supplied with frozen haddock, not by Nova Scotia over that road, but by the State of Maine over the Grand Trunk.

Annexation would probably improve the financial status of the territory represented by Canada, but it would improve the financial condition of the Canadians themselves, only if they yielded to the impulses which would reach them from across the line. These, if they did not push them *on*, would push them *out*. But is there not inherent activity enough in Canada to render such external impulses unnecessary, and cannot one section re-act on another as effectually as it is thought American go-aheadativeness would overcome the inertia of sluggishness which characterizes certain communities in the Dominion? Cannot the Scotch of Ontario infuse into the Scotch of Nova Scotia some of those qualities which have made Ontario the only prosperous and contented province in the Dominion, as wealthy and progressive as any similarly situated area in the United States?

It is doubtful, therefore, whether Canada would gain by annexation financially more than her own people can win by their own will and wits, if they exert them. The market of the world is the arena in which both communities must compete for the sale of the same articles which both now

produce in excess, and of which Canada's resources are vast enough to make her prosperous, if her people only make good use of them.

In addition to a better market for the fruit of his toil, which tempts the farmer to try, as a remedy, a change of dynasty, better wages are promised the laboring man. It is natural that the wage question should influence the opinion of the bulk of the people. Were it certain that a political change, involving none of the degradation of conquest, would double a man's income, there is very little doubt how his vote would be cast on any political issue involving that consequence. The argument is freely used that annexation or intimate fiscal union with the United States will at once raise the standard of wages in Canada to that of the United States. But what is the United States standard? There is in fact none. Wages there, as elsewhere, are determined by the quantity of the supply in any given place at any given time. At present unskilled labor commands from \$1.25 to \$1.50 along the seaboard of the North and Middle States, but in some of the crowded manufacturing centres in Eastern Pennsylvania it can be had abundantly for \$1.10. In the Southern States it is worth much less. In the more western Prairie States and in Colorado, which are accessible, and are therefore being filled to the point where labor competition is operative, wages have sunk to the level of the Eastern

seaboard, while in the thinly peopled Territories and the Rocky Mountain States, \$2.50 has heretofore been the current price of unskilled labor. Across the Sierra Nevada, in the more populated States of California and Oregon, unskilled labor has with difficulty commanded Eastern prices.

The cost of living influences the value of labor, chiefly because where the cost of living is high, the poor cannot congregate and labor is consequently comparatively scarce. Moreover, when commercial depression prevails and employment is scarce, the price of labor sympathises.

For years during the depression subsequent to the panic of 1873, some of the most arduous labor in Pennsylvania was paid only 75 cents per day. It is therefore by no means certain, for instance, that the French Canadian in the Province of Quebec would get any more after annexation than before. He is at present, to the operative of the Eastern States, what the Chinaman is to the Western laborer, the intractable, uncombinable, depressing element in the labor market of the New England States. If, after annexation, he flocked away from his home to the centres of industrial activity, then, as now, he would be heartily welcomed and readily employed by the manufacturer who is at issue with his old hands, and for whom he will work at wages and under conditions which others have refused, or at any rate resisted. But in his French Canadian village the wages would remain just as

much below the average of that which he obtains in the factories of New England, or in the brick yards of the Hudson, as the wages in some of the more remote counties of Pennsylvania, and in the agricultural regions of the South, are below those which prevail in the cities of Philadelphia or New York.

Looking at the question from a political point of view : The adoption of a new constitution pre-supposes a belief that the new is better than the old. Assuming that some change must be made either by choice or under force of circumstances, will Canada retain in its new constitution the main features of the British system of representative government, or that worked out by the framers of the United States Constitution? If Canada is satisfied with government by a responsible ministry and an all-powerful lower house, she had better work out her destiny by modifying that plan of government to meet her peculiar conditions than by adopting the constitution of her neighbour.

Already the Canadian Constitution embodies some of the features of that of the United States, and approaches that of the United States in recognizing in her Governor-General a chief executive, whose term of office is transitory instead of being permanent. The Canadian Constitution differs from that of the United States by reducing the autonomous independence of the States, especially in financial matters,

and of course in curtailing the functions of the head of the State to a nominal control, under the dictation of the chief of the party in power. That the Governor should remain a nominee of the Crown is impossible. That instead he should be a President elected for a short term will not, in view of the oft recurring disturbance of the presidential year across the line, approve itself to the Canadian people, when a new constitution is under discussion.

That whatever the term of office or manner of selection be, he should be endowed with as arbitrary power as the President, would jar on the constitutional habits of Canadians; and it would seem to them a departure from purely democratic methods, to forego the satisfaction and advantage of questioning publicly on the floor of the House, those into whose hands they have entrusted the responsibilities of government, as to the conduct of their offices. Both in England, in the United States and in Canada, the mode of election or selection, of the members of the Upper Chamber, and assigning functions to its members have been the most difficult problems for solution by constitution makers.

The English House of Lords is recruited from the best men of the Kingdom, and enjoys the presence of the heads of the established Church of England, who, however, under the awe of their hereditary colleagues, fail to express their opinions

as freely and emphatically in the House, as in the pulpit. But owing to its hereditary character, in these days of popular government, it never ventures to use to their full extent its delegate powers, and under no circumstances could it be duplicated or even imitated in one of England's Democratic off-shoots.

The United States Senate is pointed to as the masterpiece of the American Constitution builders. Each State sending two Senators, irrespective of population, asserts the supremacy of the federal principle, and the Senate being endowed with executive functions, serves as a check on the Executive, and prevents the abuse of his wide and arbitrary power by the President. While the United States consisted of a group of well organized communities, whose legislators were composed of the best men the State could elect, the selection of Senators by such State legislatures generally resulted in the appointment of two men, as fit for the high office as could be found. But of late nearly all of the Territories have been endowed with Statehood, and thus Nevada with its 45,000 inhabitants, Idaho with 84,000, Wyoming with 60,000, send each two Senators to Washington, though they are entitled to but one Representative apiece in the Lower House. The members of the Legislatures of the Rocky Mountain State, elected by a scanty population scattered over enormous tracts of wilder-

ness, to whom the selection of the Senators is entrusted, do not feel sufficiently the responsibility of choosing even the best man, within the range of their vision, small as that is, but are influenced by considerations not always the most patriotic and lofty. The Senators thus elected are liable to take narrow views of national politics, and combine to force local issues on their colleagues, as is instanced by their attitude towards the Silver question. It is generally felt that these new Senators have lowered the tone of the Senate, and thoughtful men are discussing plans for modifying, not only the methods of electing Senators, but the redistribution of the Senatorial representation.

It is significant that at the same time there should be an agitation on foot against both the United States Senate and the British House of Lords. Did the American people put more confidence in the legislators they sent to their State and Federal legislative assemblies, a proposal to curtail the powers of the President and the Senate, and increase that of the Lower House, might be considered, as well as that of merely changing the mode of Senatorial election ; but there is such a wide-spread and growing distrust of their popular assemblies, that all the new State Constitutions embody in the organic law what in England and her colonies is confided to the legislators.

The United States Senate was as cunningly devised

and constituted a balance-wheel to the machine of State as human ingenuity ever conceived, but during the past century many changes have taken place, —Federal power has grown and State influence has declined. The thirteen States, peopled by a homogenous race of kindred habits, who had worked out in their several colonies the problems of self-government, which they were now to apply in a more complex form on a wider field, have grown into forty-five States, with many clashing interests, and peopled by a most heterogeneous population. The United States Senate as part of the American system, was as useful an Upper Chamber as could have been devised, but it is doubtful whether the framers of the Constitution, if doing their work afresh to-day, would distribute the Senators so unequally as to population, even in recognition of the federal principle; and certainly none of the Anglo-Saxon communities would follow closely the American precedent in this respect.

The Canadian Senate has departed from the United States model, but it is not likely to find imitators. In fact when we cast our glance over the many pieces of machinery devised by men, through which the essential features of the representative system are applied to the production of government, we see how faulty is the best, what a field there is for improvement, and even inven-

tion. But improvement is most rapid when many minds are at work in solving the same problems, and therefore the more communities there are intelligently endeavoring to elaborate systems of self-government on the general lines of self-government, through popular representation, the better.

England, despite her reputed conservatism, has been experimenting in a distant direction, that of delegating legislative powers to even smaller sections than the States of the Union, without, however, endowing them with such autonomous rights as those claimed by the States, which rights would never have been asserted had not the States possessed them before associating themselves in a federation for mutual intercourse and defence. No concrete power voluntarily submits to disintegration, and no Parliament voluntarily deprives itself of its powers, such as those original colonies reserved. The United States, despite the rigidity of their Constitution, have amended it, and as experience shows the necessity of further change to meet changing circumstances, will continue to amend it.

Meanwhile the different States are so many political laboratories in which are being tried notable political and social experiments, many of which would be dangerous were it not for the sound sense, and high average intelligence of the experimenters, and their fidelity to the fundamental principles of representative government. In the

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Australian group of the Anglo-Saxon communities the legislative experiments are being made diametrically in the direction of Communism, so far with rather disastrous financial results.*

The Anglo-Saxon are steadily moving northward from the Cape of Good Hope over the whole of South Africa. Under the impetus of diamond and gold discovery, the old sleepy communities of the Cape Colony and Natal are themselves waking up, and being involved with the Boor republics of the Transvaal and South Africa, in a wide-spread confederation which must inevitably adopt a form of responsible government differing widely in its features from any yet devised. Already Englishmen are outnumbering the Dutch on Dutch territory, but find nothing uncongenial in the essential features of Republican government. The Transvaal is already under a certain vague British protectorate, which seems to satisfy the national sympathies of the English colonists and miners settled there. Ere long the

*[NOTE.—The Australian bank crisis reminds us how intimate is the relation of all of the great commercial communities to one another, and how sensitively all feel any reverse in prosperity which overtakes one of their number. The Australian Colonies borrowed too lavishly in England to build public works in excess of the immediate demand. A general bank failure followed, which involved a large volume of British capital. To meet urgent demands England sold American securities which had to be paid for by the United States. Their value fell and the balance of exchange was disturbed. Gold flowed across the Atlantic and aggravated the feeling of distrust already prevailing in America, and fanned distrust into a panic.]

mineral and agricultural resources of Mashonaland, stretching away to the north, will fill it with Englishmen and a sprinkling of Americans. The influences of adjacent republicanism will probably shape somewhat its constitution and create a more or less distinct system of representative government.*

Even India, as it grows out of the state of governmental dependence under which it has heretofore necessarily existed, with its hundreds of millions of natives of diverse race, social habit and religious belief, and its handful of alien Englishmen, leavening the vast mass with western political

*[NOTE—Will not also India create a new phase of Christianity? Christianity is an Eastern religion; its writings are full of Eastern imagery, addressed to Eastern thought, and which must convey to the Eastern mind very different impressions to what they convey to the Western. Its poetry has been confused with its facts by matter-of-fact Western theologians, and both have been interpreted by the Western Church in conformity with Roman law. This interpretation, with lesser variations, has been formulated into a metaphysical conception of Christianity, which is assumed by the Western Church to be Christianity itself, and as such is presented to the Oriental. He refuses to accept it. When the writings of the New Testament, freed from Western gloss and commentary, and not regarded as a part of the system of foreign politics, come to be studied by the intelligent Oriental, will he not see in them even more clearly than we have done a divine message, and interpret it for us more truly than we have tried to interpret it to him. At present his prejudices are aroused against it because it is the religion of the West, and the presentation of it by bigoted and often ignorant advocates of warring sects, repels him from giving it independent and candid study. But as his political education grows and he comes to recognize the value of Western political institutions and apply them, will he not regard very differently, that religion from which we have drawn our political inspiration and see in it higher and deeper truths than we have yet elicited?]

and social ideas, will evolve still another and more original departure from the primitive type of British representative government.

Thus by the Anglo-Saxon communities the world over is this magnificent experiment of self-government through representative assemblies being tried. Nowhere has any one system been devised and applied which is faultless ; which evenly balances the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government ; which provides checks against hasty legislation without unduly embarrassing it ; which secures the rights of minorities as well as of majorities ; which gives free vent to legitimate discussion within and without the legislative halls, while throttling obstructive debate and preventing licentious criticisms ; which distributes the control over domestic affairs to central and sectional assemblies, so as to give the latter sufficient power without dangerously weakening the supremacy of cohesion which must reside in the Central Power ; which has successfully defined the limits of State interference over industrial enterprise and State ownership of the media of commerce ; which secures the independence of the judiciary both from executive influences, and from popular favor ; which has defined a system of taxation that bears on the rich and the poor in proportion to their ability to support the weight ; which, in fine, has created the perfect state ; wherein no injustice and

no inequality shall exist, that it is possible for human interference to remove.

Is it not the mission of the English speaking people, all the World over, to struggle and strive, and, by the application of those same principles of liberty, which they have already embodied in so many more or less successful constitutions, to achieve this glorious consummation, and will this not be best done by effort and experiment along different lines, rather than in one direction, and by many communities rather than by one?

Looking at the question as a Canadian living in the States, as an alien in law, yet feeling in perfect sympathy with the land of one's adoption, such a Canadian feels that it would be better for the two great communities which divide the continent, to live in closest commercial and social intercourse, but in separate houses. Canada has her own domestic troubles, and the United States has hers. To take typical examples: The greatest trouble pending over Canada is the reconciliation of the English and the French races, involving Protestant and Catholic antagonism. This trouble would probably be most summarily settled by annexation, but if I were a citizen of the United States, I would consider it as a serious bar to that step. The homogeneity of the French Catholic party would not be destroyed by annexation.

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Insignificant as the French population of Louisiana and the lower Mississippi was, three-quarters of a century has not sufficed to absorb it into the body politic. The French market-woman of New Orleans still dresses as a French woman, speaks French and thinks French, as unequivocally as her sister who drives her little cart filled with vegetables and flowers from the Beauport flats, into the Quebec market on a Saturday morning.

Add one and-a-half millions of French to the million already in the States, and bring these two and-a-half million into antagonism with the other sixty millions of the United States, and the two and-a-half millions would become an even more concret unit than they are to-day. It would organize, and stand unflinchingly on the defensive to preserve its religious, social and judicial institutions. Its solid vote would at once become an object of bargain and sale in the American political market. The Roman Catholic Church in the United States, already divided into Liberal and Conservative wings, feels the impossibility of resisting the impulse of American ideas, especially, on the subject of education and common schools, and the liberal prelates, having enlisted the Papal delegate and the Pope on their side, have advocated, and in places carried into practice, a nondescript combination of secular and ecclesiastical education, which must be an abomination to Cardinal Taschereau and the whole ultra-montayne

Church of Canada. How far the influences of Canadian Catholicism, if thrown into the other scale would reverse the liberalizing movement is a question so difficult of determination that both Protestant and liberal Catholics in the United States, may well hesitate to put the experiment to the test.

On the other hand, the dense population of sections of the United States, the prodigious development of corporative industrial enterprises, and the dangerous growth of individual wealth, have there produced an acute phase of the labor problem from which Canada is practically free, and in which Canada, if wise, will hesitate to embroil herself.

If Canada is really not to gain much if anything, industrially, by annexation, why submit to the shock of the operation which such a radical political change undoubtedly would produce? What she and the United States would gain by annexation, can be secured by reciprocal trade relations which, if not found to be advantageous, can be modified with much less friction, than uncongenial political ties can be severed. This, however, Canada should recollect, that she is a body politic of 5,000,000 inhabitants, side by side with 63,000,000, and that if she is to remain at peace and harmony with her neighbor, she must, as far as consistent with self-respect and independence, shape her policy in conformity with hers, and strive to avoid needless causes of

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irritation. In the fishery controversy, in the canal controversy, and in the railroad controversy, she has displayed a spirit of *bumtiousness* in her acts and utterances which, however well fitted to draw down party applause on party leaders, is not so well fitted to propitiate the good will of the 63,000,000.

In the great family of Nations, as in the narrow circle of our home, the maxim should be "bear and forbear." It is in obedience to it that arbitration is taking the place of war in the settlement of National disputes, and if Imperial Federation and later a confederation of all the Anglo-Saxon communities is ever effected, it will be only through the separate members waiving supposed rights in deference to the general will and weal. Such a confederation may be to-day but a dream. It depends largely on Canada in her relations with the United States, whether it shall ever become a reality. It is possible for Canada to remain independent, and yet prove to her neighbor that civility is not servility, and that independent units of the great body politic may be more helpful to one another, and more stimulating to healthy political and commercial rivalry, than if organically one. This once fully recognized, the practice of the principle of international aid and rivalry, would expand and spread till it embraced the whole English-speaking peoples of both hemispheres, and we would become a

power on the earth irresistible, through moral strength more than even by numbers.

To achieve this it would not be necessary, as Mr. Carnegie conceives, that there should be uniformity of political institutions. There exists a unity of type in the constitutions of all of the Anglo-Saxon communities, but a wide diversity of form. As in the animal and vegetable kingdoms we admire diversity in unity, and recognize the advantages and beauty which accrue from the prolific variations from original types, and as in society, life would be unendurably monotonous, and progress in all directions slow, if human character did not possess in all infinite individuality; so in such a confederation of congenial, but distinct, States, there might exist wide divergence of institutions, if only the same spirit and guiding principle animated all.

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