




THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC
AND THE
BATTLE OF THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

SECOND VOLUME







James Wolf.

from the painting by Sainsborough, in the possession of Mr. Pym, of Bristol, Kent.

Governor-General

The Siege of Quebec

Battle of the Plains of Abraham

In six volumes, with plates, maps and views

By the Hon. G. B. S. MILNE



James Wolf

Age 18 months, taken at the residence of Mr. J. Wolf, New York

Government Edition

The Siege of Quebec
AND THE
Battle of the Plains of Abraham

BY

A. DOUGHTY

IN COLLABORATION WITH

G. W. PARMELEE



In six volumes, with Plans, Portraits and Views

SECOND VOLUME



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1901

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
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NAVAL STATEMENT

(1) In this chapter an extract is made from the thirty-fourth volume of The Jesuit Relations, and allied Documents (Burrows) by permission of the editor, R. G. Thwaites, Esqr.

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ILLUSTRATIONS

James Wolfe.

Photogravured by the Rembrandt Portrait Studio, from the painting by Gainsborough in the possession of Mrs. Pym, of Brasted, Kent.

A view of the City of Quebec, the Capital of Canada, taken partly from Pointe des Pères and partly on board the Vanguard, Man-of-War, by Captain Hervey Smyth.

Collotyped by Hyatt, from an engraving in the British Museum.

The Right Honourable Isaac Barré, Adjutant-General in Wolfe's army.

Collotyped by Hyatt, from an engraving in the British Museum.

The Duchess of Bolton, née Miss Katherine Lowther.

Photogravured by Hyatt from a crayon drawing at Lowther, by permission of the Countess of Lonsdale.

Quebek, de Hoofdstad van Kanada aan de Rivier van St. Laurens. (1759), with numerous references.

Collotyped by Hyatt, from an engraving in the British Museum, published in Amsterdam.

General Townshend.

Collotyped by Hyatt, from an engraving in the possession of the authors.

View of Quebec, showing the Heights and a part of the River St. Lawrence.

Albertyped by the Forbes Company, Boston, from a photograph taken by Livernois for this work in 1898.

General Hale.

Photogravured by Hyatt from an engraving after the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds, in the possession of E. J. Hale, Esqr., Quebec.

Madam Hale.

Photogravured by Goupil et Cie., Paris, from an engraving of the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds, in the possession of H. T. Machin, Esqr., Quebec.

A View of the Treasury and Jesuits' College.

Collotyped by Hyatt, from an engraving in the British Museum, after the drawing by Robert Short.

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Fac-simile of a letter signed by the Marquis de Montcalm.

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Photogravured by Hyatt from an engraving after the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds.

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Collotyped by Hyatt from an engraving in the British Museum, after the drawing by Robert Short.

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Plan of the lands of Abraham Martin.

Lithographed by the Forbes Company, Boston, from a copy sent for this work by Lieut. Colonel Blackburne, R.E., of the Fortress, Gibraltar.

The original deed of the Plains of Abraham.

Albertyped by the Forbes Company, from the original in the possession of the Reverend Ladies of the Ursuline Convent, by permission of the Rev. L. St. G. Lindsay.

CHAPTER I

PREPARATIONS.

THE operations of 1758 were satisfactory to England, but disheartening to France. In America the English attack upon the central position of her rival had produced no results, but the reduction of Louisburg and of Duquesne with the destruction of Frontenac had put French Canada upon her defensive, confined her to her own territory, and relieved the New England border villages of all fear of the dreaded raids.

In Europe too, England's position grew strong while France was sapping her energy to assist her ancient foe, Austria, in a vain attempt to crush Frederick of Prussia. England's contribution to Frederick was in money instead of men, but France, with a peculiar ignorance of relative values, had 100,000 men upon the tented field in Europe fighting for new found friends at a time when she could afford nothing for the salvation of her expiring colony across the sea. This struggling, deserted colony in the midst of famine, defeat and disaster, was still bringing more glory to French arms than were the troops marching under similar banners across the Rhine and back again.

Pitt, with a servile Parliament to support his every plan,

was more determined than ever to humble France, rob her of her colonies, destroy her navy, capture her trade, and settle the question of national supremacy for many years to come. His conviction that Canada must be taken showed a wise, farseeing statesmanship. He did not see the ultimate results upon the aspirations of the Anglo-Saxon across the sea, that openly showed themselves in 1776, but he saw that with the thousands of miles of frontier between the French and English of America, with immediate contact down the Mississippi valley, there would never be peace until it should be made by a decisive victory. Accordingly the campaign of 1758 was hardly over before he began his aggressive plans for the following year.

Quebec, the stronghold of Canada, was chosen for attack by armies which were to converge upon it. The first was to approach by the River St. Lawrence, and the second was to come through Lake Champlain and down the Richelieu, engaging a part of the French army on the way, and thus weakening the defence available against the other attacking force. At the same time Niagara was to be reduced and the French posts from Lake Erie to Duquesne were marked for destruction.

After the western division had performed its allotted task, it too was to proceed to Quebec, to aid in the complete reduction of French power in Canada.

Amherst was selected as commander in chief of the forces in America, and was to lead his army, over 11,000 strong, one half being regulars, and having fifty four guns, down the Richelieu. With his failure to form a junction with Wolfe before Quebec, we have not now much concern

further than to point out that Pitt attached much importance to Amherst's part of the plan, and that he hardly anticipated that Wolfe would reduce Quebec with his forces alone, which were, but for the fortunes of war, entirely inadequate to the task of attacking so skilful a general as Montcalm, in an entrenched position.

He expected at least that Amherst would make so vigorous an attack as to draw off the enemy to some extent from Quebec in order to check his approach, thus assisting Wolfe by diminishing the French force at Quebec, or that if weakly opposed he would push on to unite the British forces.

As already intimated, Wolfe was chosen by Pitt to operate with the fleet in the St. Lawrence, and chosen, too, in defiance of rank and of the claims of seniority. The expedition by way of the St. Lawrence had no attractions for the older generals, who appear to have been satisfied by the fact that Wolfe's commission as major-general applied only while on service in America. But Pitt wanted none of them. The only man who had shown at Rochefort the qualities that appealed to the impetuous nature of Pitt had further distinguished himself at Louisburg. A masterly self-reliance, activity, resource, and courage bordering on recklessness, had marked Wolfe for the leader of a great enterprise. So unlike the ordinary British officer was he that it was remarked to the King in conversation that "that fellow Wolfe is mad." "Mad, is he?" was the crushing reply, "I wish, then, he would bite some of my generals." Wolfe, during his interviews with Pitt, asked for a larger force than the latter thought he could provide


for the St. Lawrence expedition. Upon receiving the minister's refusal to give him adequate numbers he promptly suggested that the choice of his own officers would then be a partial compensation. Wolfe was therefore allowed practically to choose his own general and staff officers, and very well did he exercise his judgment. His first brigadier was Robert Monckton, second son of John Monckton, Viscount Galway. He had served in Germany in 1743, and in Flanders two years later. In 1751 he was a member of Parliament for Pontefract, and was sent to Nova Scotia in the following year. In 1754 he was in Boston in order to induce Shirley to raise two thousand men for service in Nova Scotia, and in 1755 he assisted in the expatriation of the unhappy Acadians.⁽¹⁾

His knowledge of the conditions which prevailed upon the scene of future operations, and his experience of the new country methods of warfare particularly marked him as the man for an important place in the campaign for which England was now preparing.

The second Brigadier was the Eldest son of Viscount Townshend, George, afterwards Marquess Townshend, the superior of Wolfe in birth and influence, but vastly his inferior in all pertaining to the profession of arms.

Walpole describes him as "a very particular young man, who, with much address, some honour, no knowledge, great fickleness, greater want of judgment, and

(1) After the conquest of Quebec he became Governor of New York, and led the successful expedition against Martinique in 1761. He returned to England in 1763, and in 1770 he attained the rank of lieutenant-general. Born 1726, died 1782.




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
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A View of the City of QUITO, the Capital of Peru, taken from the Bay of Guayaquil, the 17th of July 1763. (Engraved by G. Kneller)

This engraving is from the original drawing by G. Kneller, which was taken from the view of the City of Quito, taken from the Bay of Guayaquil, the 17th of July 1763. The original drawing is in the possession of the Honorable Company of the Indies, London.

The City of Quito is situated on a high mountain, and is one of the most beautiful cities in the world. It is surrounded by a wall, and is defended by several castles. The harbor is one of the best in the Indies, and is frequented by many ships.



“ with still more disposition to ridicule, had promised once “ or twice to make a good speaker ”. “ To Wolfe was “ associated George Townshend whose proud and sullen “ and contemptuous temper, never suffered him to wait for “ thwarting his superiors till risen to a level with them ” . . . “ The haughtiness of the Duke of Cumberland, the talent “ or blemishes of Fox, the ardour of Wolfe, the virtue of “ Conway, all were alike the objects of Townshend’s “ spleen or contradiction ; but Wolfe was not a man to “ waive pre-eminence from fear of caricatures.” ⁽¹⁾ When Townshend’s appointment was known, the same writer declared that “ George Townshend has thrust himself “ again into the service ; and, as far as wrongheadedness “ will go is very proper for a hero.”

Junius whose pen portraits are always painted in striking colours has spoken of him as “ a boaster without spirit, and “ a pretender to wit, without a grain of sense ; in a word a “ vain-glorious idler without one single good quality of “ head or heart ” . . . “ Is it not universally known that the “ ignorance, presumption, and incapacity of that man have “ ruined the King’s affairs in Ireland ” ?

So far as we are concerned with Townshend and the siege of Quebec these judgments require some revision. He cer-

(1) Possibly this has reference to an incident which occurred during the progress of the siege. At mess one night Townshend made a ridiculous and insulting sketch of his commander in chief and passed it down the table to his brother officers. It finally reached the hands of Wolfe who quietly observed “ If we live, this shall be enquired into ; but we must first beat the enemy.” Probably, however, it is an allusion to the clever but coarse caricatures which Townshend made at the expense of the Duke of Cumberland, whose party he had deserted for that of the Prince of Wales.

tainly was no idler, nor was he devoid of military sense and judgment. It may be observed too that he had served with credit in Europe during the last war, and that his enemies never accuse him of lack of physical courage. The strictures upon his temperamental peculiarities must unfortunately be taken with a smaller allowance for rhetorical exaggerations.

Wolfe does not appear to have taken his second brigadier of his own uninfluenced choice. Certain it is that he did not send in Townshend's name with the other names, and that his list was drawn up for some time with a blank space left for the name of the commander of the second brigade. It is certain also that Townshend was anxious for military service, that he was finally accepted only two or three days before the fleet sailed for Canada, and that he received assistance from his friends in order to get his appointment. His most active friend was Sir Richard Lyttleton, who summoned him to London in haste on the 21st of December, 1758, for "very cogent reasons" which he could not give in his letter. A week later he wrote to Townshend "Lord Ligonier was yesterday in the closet, your affair " was mentioned and very *graciously* agreed to by His " Majesty. I congratulate you most sincerely upon the " honour this spirited and magnanimous acceptance of " yours will do you in the world as soon as it becomes " known." Sir Richard then proceeds to offer further felicitations upon the glory Townshend is certain to achieve, and upon the applause of all mankind which will be heard when his resolution is known to the world.

Townshend's satisfaction with his work was not equal

to his expectations, it may be remarked, for on the 6th of September, when before Quebec, he wrote to his wife "I never served in such a disagreeable campaign. It is war in the worst shape. . . A sceene I ought not to be in."

Perhaps as Walpole says, he was thrust upon Wolfe. The progress of the story of the siege will display to the observing reader the fact that Townshend did not enjoy the full confidence of the Major-General, who usually placed him in positions of least importance and responsibility. ⁽¹⁾

The third brigadier was the Honourable James Murray, son of Lord Elibank, who had served with Wolfe at Louisbourg and who was certainly chosen by Wolfe because of the great confidence which the latter had in his courage, his military talents and his energy.

In a letter addressed to Lord Sackville in 1758, Wolfe had spoken of Murray as his old "antagonist," the term being used in the sense of rival, who had acted with infinite spirit, and to whom the public was indebted for great services in advancing the affairs of the siege. Lord Sackville was asked to get him a regiment or the rank of Colonel.

Wolfe appears to have retained confidence in Murray, throughout the campaign, for on the 13th of September, even, he placed him in an important position on the battlefield. Murray's name is familiar to all students and, indeed, to all casual readers of Canadian history because

(1) Questions regarding the relations of these two men during the siege, and concerning the claims of Townshend after Wolfe's death will fall naturally into subsequent chapters of this work.

of his connection with the Battle of St. Foye in April 1760 when de Levis and his "braves" took their revenge in a fruitless victory, and because of his efforts to establish the government of Canada after the conquest when he was the first military governor.

The enlightened view he took of the situation created by a British conquest of a Colony that was French and Catholic at the same time, together with the toleration and sympathy which he manifested for a people who had suffered defeat with honour, did much to endear him to those people, and to hasten the time when they should become French Britishers, proud and worthy of the institutions which allow them to work out their destiny as an important part of a great Empire.

A strong friendship had for some time existed between Wolfe and Guy Carleton who eventually became quartermaster general for Wolfe's division of the army in America. Some six years before, he was mentioned with approval by Wolfe in his letters as "my friend Carleton".

If Townshend was thrust upon Wolfe, Carleton was not. In an unguarded moment Carleton had been guilty of the indiscretion of saying uncomplimentary things of the Hanoverian troops. The King who could remember an injury as well as any one, drew his pen through Carleton's name when the list of officers was sent to him for approval. Wolfe had wished for Carleton's assistance the year before, but the latter had been sent to Europe instead of Cape Breton under circumstances "extremely unpleasant to him", to quote Wolfe, possibly for the same reasons that prevented his advancement at this time.

After Louisbourg had been taken, Wolfe declared that if Carleton had been allowed to go as Engineer, with Delaune and two or three others for the light foot, the matter would have been cut much shorter, and they might have been ruining the walls of Quebec and completing the conquest of Canada during the autumn of 1758. "So much" he adds "depends upon the abilities of individuals, "in war, that there cannot be too much care taken in the "choice of men for the different offices of trust and importance." It is no wonder that holding these views Wolfe should now insist upon Carleton's appointment.

To Lord Ligonier, upon this occasion, fell the duty of asking the King's reconsideration of the matter. His efforts were unavailing. Again Wolfe insisted that he should not be deprived of Carleton's ⁽¹⁾ services without serious reasons. Through Pitt it was then represented to the King that the posture of affairs was such that the desired appointment should be made; that it was policy in matters of such weight to concur in the views of the man who was to be responsible, so that he could urge no excuse in case of failure.

This reasoning appealed to the better sense of the King and he reluctantly, after the third time of asking, sanctioned

(1) Before leaving for Louisbourg Wolfe had by power of attorney made Major Warde and Carleton responsible for the transaction of his business in event of his father's expected death before his return. Carleton performed important services in Canada, his connection with the fortunes of the colony being nearly continuous from 1766 to 1796 when he resigned the Governorship of Quebec. For his defence of the colony against the attack of the continental army under Montgomery and Arnold he was knighted, and in 1786 he was created Baron of Dorchester.

the appointment of the deputy quartermaster general whom Wolfe had nominated.

Major, afterwards Colonel, Isaac Barré, the celebrated political character remembered especially for his espousal of the cause of the American Revolution in the House of Commons, had been marked for promotion by Wolfe only a short time before, not because of friendship, but because Wolfe had learned from good sources the military value of Barré. He became deputy adjutant-general. In 1760 he wrote to Pitt, "For want of friends I had lingered a subaltern officer for eleven years, when Mr. Wolfe's opinion of me rescued me from that obscurity".⁽¹⁾

The staff was completed by Captains Hervey Smith and Thomas Bell, aides-de-camp; Captains Caldwell and Leslie assistants to the deputy quarter-master general; and Captains Gwillam, Spital, and Lieutenant Dobson, as majors of brigade. Major Mackellar filled the important office of Chief Engineer, such officers not being then on the staff.

All these officers from the Major General down were either young, or in the prime of life, and the future career

(1) He adds in his letter to Pitt,—“by the neglect that I have met with” (since Wolfe's death) I am apprehensive that my pretensions are to be buried with my only protector and friend”. However, he entered Parliament in 1761 and was there distinguished as an orator. He was especially a master of abuse and invective. The letters of Junius have sometimes been attributed to him, owing to a similarity of literary style, but the probabilities point more strongly to Sir Philip Francis or others. His career in Parliament is well known, and notwithstanding the fact that he voted for the Boston Port Bill after having voted consistently against the ministry on its American war policy, his name is much in honour in the United States. Barré in Massachusetts, and Wilkes-Barré in Pennsylvania preserve his name. His portrait is included in the West picture, showing him standing directly behind the dying hero.



THE RIGHT HONORABLE

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
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THE RIGHT HONORABLE ISAAC BARRE



of each fully justified Wolfe's judgment in the selection he made. The list of incapable, unadaptable, blundering British officers employed in America during the seven year's war, although long enough in all conscience, contained the names of none of these. It may be worth mentioning here that John Jervis (Earl of St. Vincent) the friend of Wolfe from boyhood, and James Cook, the circumnavigator made a part of the group of ambitious men whose names are now written large in history.

Wolfe as commander in chief of an army distinct from any other was technically to serve under Amherst, who had the title and rank of commander in chief. This had no significance for Wolfe, since Amherst was his senior, further than as it affected his pay. He should have received the pay of ten pounds a day, with an allowance of one thousand pounds for extraordinary and unforeseen expenses, the remuneration of a commander in chief in America; but as Wolfe had been promoted to the rank of major-general only he was considered to be entitled to but two pounds a day with no stated allowance. Accordingly he applied in modest terms to the Secretary of War, Lord Barrington, who procured a warrant for the sum of five hundred pounds and promised that if Wolfe should be obliged to spend a larger sum over and above his pay it would be provided from the public funds. These arrangements seemed to be more liberal than Wolfe, who had proposed borrowing money from his father, anticipated.

All who have read any extended biography of Wolfe, or have followed his correspondence, must have formed some rather definite estimate of his character. Lord Mahon in

his History of England gives currency to an anecdote which has been many times repeated to the disparagement of Wolfe and has been generally accepted, not only as true in the main, but as accurate in the details. These are Lord Mahon's words :

“ After Wolfe's appointment, and on the day preceding his embarkation for America, Pitt, desirous of giving his last verbal instructions, invited him to dinner, Lord Temple being the only other guest. As the evening advanced, Wolfe, heated perhaps by his own aspiring thoughts and the unwonted society of statesmen, broke forth into a strain of gasconade and bravado. He drew his sword, he rapped the table with it, he flourished it round the room, he talked of the things which that sword was to achieve. The two ministers sat aghast at an exhibition so unusual from any man of real sense and real spirit. And when at last Wolfe had taken his leave, and his carriage was heard to roll from the door, Pitt seemed for the moment shaken in the high opinion which his deliberate judgment had formed of Wolfe ; he lifted up his eyes and arms, and exclaimed to Lord Temple, “ Good God ! that I should have trusted the fate of the country and of the Administration to such hands ! ”

Lord Mahon seeing the improbabilities of this story which he had received from Mr. Grenville, who in turn had it from Lord Temple, says that it “ confirms Wolfe's own avowal that he was not seen to advantage in the common occurrences of life, and shows how shyness may at intervals rush, as it were, for refuge into the opposite extreme ; but it should also lead us to view such defects

of manner with indulgence, as proving that they may coexist with the highest ability and the purest virtue".

Wright in his "Life of Wolfe" makes a close analysis of this anecdote and of Lord Mahon's comments. He points out that such a representation is so inconsistent with the character of Wolfe as to demand refutation. The hero's modesty had only a few days before touched Lord Barrington and it was not likely that he should have drawn his sword and flourished it in a gentleman's dining room. It was not likely that a man whose private letters, written on the impulse of the moment, never breathe a boastful word, nor aught savouring of personal vanity, should have acted the part of a braggart in the society of statesmen. Nor could the great minister have entertained a fear for the fate of the expedition under the leadership of him who in the words of a contemporary historian "was formed to execute the designs of such a master as Pitt." Passing from these considerations Wright asks whether Lord Mahon did not, unconsciously perhaps, heighten the colouring of Mr. Grenville's version; whether the latter's antitheses were so striking or his periods so artistically rounded? Without impugning the veracity of Mr. Grenville, Wright questions the accuracy of his memory, for he must have heard the story from Lord Temple many years before he repeated it to the historian. Coming to Lord Temple himself Wright makes fewer allowances for good faith. This colleague of Pitt's quarrelled with him, and after the break in their relations Pitt accused him of divulging confidential secrets, and of torturing private conversations into a thousand time serving forms. "The

fact of the matter when stripped of all accumulations, would therefore seem to be that the sedate, apathetic, selfish peer, whose highest aspiration was the Garter may have been shocked by some hearty outburst of Wolfe's indignation,—probably against the cruel practices of the French and their savage allies in America; and upon some nucleus of truth the imaginative minister—who was utterly incapable of appreciating a man of Wolfe's openness of mind and self-devotion to his country—founded an *extravaganza*”.

Thus far we have practically reproduced Wright's account of the affair with his comments. He proceeds further to show the improbability of the story as told by Lord Mahon, but we may dismiss the matter by the observation that apparently there was some foundation for the story, with every probability of the exaggeration and inaccuracy that almost invariably characterize tales which pass by repetition to several persons before being written in their permanent form.

Shortly before the evening when he dined with Pitt and Lord Temple he had written private letters in regard to his proposed campaign which were modest enough in tone to suit Lord Temple had he ever lived to see them.

From Salisbury on the first day of December 1758 he wrote to Rickson, his intimate friend from the time of his early campaigns on the continent, a long and interesting letter. ⁽¹⁾

“ Amongst ourselves, be it said, that our attempt to land

(1) A fac-simile of this letter is in our possession.

where we did ⁽²⁾ was rash and injudicious, our success unexpected (by me) and undeserved. There was no prodigious exertion of courage in the affair; an officer and thirty men would have made it impossible to get ashore where we did." "We lost time at the siege, still more after the siege, and blundered from the beginning to the end of the campaign." And further in the same letter he says "I have this day signified to Mr. Pitt that he may dispose of my slight carcass as he pleases, and that I am ready for any undertaking within the reach and compass of my skill and cunning. I am in a very bad condition both with the gravel and rheumatism, but I had much rather die than decline any kind of service that offers.."

"My opinion is, that I shall join the army in America, where if fortune favours our force and best endeavours, we may hope to triumph."

On the twenty-ninth of January in 1759, he wrote an equally sober and manly letter to his uncle Walter. He says "If the Marquis de Montcalm finds means to baffle our efforts another summer, he may be deemed an able officer; or the colony has resources that we know nothing of; or our Generals are worse than usual."... "I am to act a greater part in this business than I wished or desired. The backwardness of some of the older officers has in some measure forced the Government to come down so low. I shall do my best, and leave the rest to fortune, as perforce we must when there are not the most commanding abilities. We expect to sail in about three weeks. A London life

(2) At Louisbourg a few months previously.

and little exercise disagrees entirely with me, but the sea still more. If I have health and constitution enough for the campaign, I shall think myself a lucky man; what happens afterwards is of no great consequence."

Wolfe had become engaged to Miss Katherine Lowther, a sister of the first Lord Lonsdale. Of this love affair we know little. The siege of Louisbourg and the preparation for Quebec left no time for such correspondence and such confidences as marked his former courtship, and it is likely too that his added years had cooled his ardour while they increased his good sense.

It may not be regarded as strange that none of his letters to Miss Lowther should be made public, but it is rather singular that her name is mentioned by Wolfe in writing only in his will. ⁽¹⁾

(1) A fac simile of this will is published for the first time in this work.



The Duchess of Devonshire in the original portrait
Painted by Sir Thomas Gainsborough in 1769

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The Duchess of Bolton nee Miss Katharine Lowther. James Ryall Sc.
From a Craven drawing at Lowther by permission of the Countess of Lonsdale.



CHAPTER II

THE RENDEZ-VOUS

ON the 5th day of February, the King caused secret instructions relating to the plan of campaign to be prepared and delivered to General Wolfe, together with extracts from or copies of three letters written by one of the principal secretaries of State to Amherst, a list of the troops and of the artillery and stores that were to be provided for his army, copies of three letters to Rear Admiral Saunders and of one to Rear Admiral Durell. His directions and the information as to the orders given to the others who were to act with him were as full and as definite as the nature of the circumstances would permit.

On the 14th day of February, sixty transports, six sail of the line, and nine frigates left Portsmouth for America, and on Saturday, the 17th Major General Wolfe sailed from Portsmouth with Admiral Saunders, on board the Neptune. He was directed to proceed to Louisbourg where the troops destined for the expedition against Quebec were to rendezvous on the 20th of April, and in concert with Admiral Saunders he was to embark his troops, artillery and stores in order to be ready to set sail for Quebec on or about the 7th day of May. Many writers have insisted that Pitt

never expected, or supposed it possible, that Wolfe should reduce Quebec before a junction had been formed with Amherst in the St. Lawrence. In this they follow a cleverly written pamphlet by Israël Mauduit, entitled "An Apology for the life and actions of General Wolfe."⁽¹⁾

The secret instructions, a copy of which was not available, of course, in 1765, show conclusively that Pitt did not regard the reduction of Quebec by Wolfe alone with the army of 12,005 which was intended for him as an impossibility, or even an improbability. On the 29th of December, 1758, Pitt sent to Amherst a carefully prepared plan of operations for the approaching campaign. After designating the troops which were to rendez-vous at Louisbourg to serve under Wolfe he directed Amherst to make an attempt to invade Canada by the way of Crown Point, or La Galette, or both, as should appear most practicable, and to attack Montreal, or Quebec, or both of these places successively with such forces as should remain available after the 12,005 had been transferred to the command of Wolfe. Amherst was urged to quicken his own movements so as to open his campaign by the first of May, "as nothing can contribute so much to the success of the operations to be undertaken in different parts of North America, and particularly of the attempt on Quebec, as putting the forces early in motion on the other frontiers of Canada, and thereby distracting the enemy, and obliging them to divide their strength."

(1) Only 25 copies of this pamphlet were printed. The copy in the British Museum is corrected in the handwriting of its author. London, 1765.

The secret instructions sent to Wolfe were written, as previously stated, on the 5th day of February, 1759, and a copy was sent to Amherst a few days later for his information. After giving Wolfe preliminary directions, the instructions continue into the region of the more uncertain movements which were to follow the first expected successes.

“In case, by the Blessing of God upon Our Arms,” section three quaintly says, “you shall make yourself master of Quebec, Our Will and Pleasure is that you do keep Possession of the said Place, for which purpose you are to appoint, out of the Troops under your command a sufficient and ample Garrison under the command of such careful and able officer, as you shall judge best qualified for so important a Trust, effectually to defend and secure the said Place; and you will immediately make, in the manner most practicable, such Repairs to the Works, as you shall find necessary for the Defence thereof; until you shall receive further orders from Us; and you are forthwith to transmit an exact Account, to be laid before Us, of the State and Condition of the said Place.”

In the next paragraph the reduction of Quebec by Wolfe is again anticipated “by the Blessing of God upon Our Arms” and he is told, should he make himself master of that place, that he and Rear Admiral Saunders must act as circumstances require, and determine what ulterior operations are to be undertaken higher up the St. Lawrence. He is enjoined to give information concerning these operations to Amherst and as far as may be possible “to concert the same with our said General, in order that the oper-

ations, in different Parts, may coincide, and mutually facilitate and strengthen each other."

Wolfe is further instructed to leave a strong garrison at Quebec, and after the reduction of the city to provide for the defence of any other posts which it may be necessary to maintain; he is to dispose of the remaining troops as Amherst may direct.

If from the distant operations in which Amherst may happen to be engaged prejudice may arise by waiting for orders from him Wolfe is to use his best discretion in disposing of the forces "in the manner most conducive" to the service; he is then to place himself under the command of Major General Amherst, Brigadier General in North America.

From this it will be seen that the plans as outlined by Pitt in the month of February, supposed the possibility or even the probability of Wolfe's success with no aid from Amherst further than that afforded by a division of the French force in order to hold them in check.

Later in the year when it was known that Wolfe had but two-thirds of the force which had been intended for him it became the conviction of many competent judges that Quebec could be reduced only after a junction of the forces of Amherst and Wolfe before its walls, but it is plain that Pitt's original plans contemplated either the capture of Quebec by Wolfe alone while Amherst was engaging the enemy elsewhere, or in conjunction with Amherst should the latter be able to reach Quebec in time.

Although it was expected that all the troops and stores would be at Louisbourg on the 20th of April, the passage

from Portsmouth was so stormy and difficult that Saunders with Wolfe, Townshend and Carleton, did not sight Cape Breton's shore till the 30th of that month. However, on account of the ice which filled the harbor he was unable to enter, and therefore he sailed on to Halifax. Here, Admiral Durell had passed the winter, having under his command eight men of war. Upon hearing early in April of the intended expedition up the St. Lawrence, he set about his preparations with alacrity, and Murray, who was at Halifax also, applied to Governor Lawrence for permission to purchase supplies without delay for the expedition. Monckton arrived from the continent on the 22nd of the month of April, and gave his approval to the steps that had been taken to have everything in readiness at the arrival of Wolfe.

The fleet began to refit on the 2nd of May, and on the following day, Durell, with his vessels set sail for the lower St. Lawrence in order to cut off the approach of the French vessels which were expected to convey succor to the starving colony. On account of the weather, which appears to have been particularly boisterous, he was obliged to cast anchor for two days off Mauger's Beach. The importance of capturing the French vessels was fully appreciated, but still valuable time was lost to the advantage of the French.


On the 13th of May, Saunders sailed for Louisbourg and off Cape Sambro fell in with Holmes who accompanied him with the "Somerset" and the "Terrible" to Louisbourg. They entered the harbor on the 15th and two days later were joined by the "Nightingale" from New York

carrying Fraser's regiment. On the last day of May, Monckton arrived with four battalions from Halifax, and at last the establishment was complete. However, instead of 12,005 men which was the number intended by Pitt, there were but 8,535 all told, and these were further augmented by the 100 who joined under Captain Danks at Bird Island on the 9th of June. The number is authentic, and is taken from the statement signed by Wolfe on the 5th of June, as the number of troops under his command who had embarked with him. Major Moncrief had mentioned 8,535 on the 31st of May, as the number of men who were fit for duty. The statement of Wolfe signed on board the Neptune is as follows :


	Com. Officers.	Non. C. O.	Rank & file.	Total.
15th Regt. M. G. Jeffrey Amherst	34	36	524	= 594
28 " L. G. Phillip Bragg	26	27	538	= 591
35 " L. G. Charles Otway	36	40	823	= 899
43 " M. G. James Kennedy	29	30	656	= 715
47 " L. G. Peregrine Lascelles	36	40	603	= 679
48 " Col. Daniel Webb	36	39	777	= 842
58 " Col. Robt. Anstruther	27	28	561	= 616
60 2nd Bat. Gen. Robt. Monckton	27	34	520	= 581
60 3rd " Col. Chas. Lawrence	29	34	544	= 617
78 Col. Simon Fraser	50	51	1168	= 1269
3 Companies from Louisbourg				
Grenadiers, Lt. Col. Murray	13	13	300	= 326
6 Companies Rangers, Capt. Goreham	7	5	83	= 95



	Com. Officers.	Non. C. O.	Rank & file.	Total.
Capt. Stark	3	4	88	= 95
“ Brewer	3	4	78	= 85
“ Hazzans	3	4	82	= 89
“ Rogers	4	4	104	= 112
“ Danks	Major Scott.			
Artillery	7	6	94	= 107
Col. Williamson	14	12	197	= 223
				<hr/> 8,535

To this number add Captain Dank's Company and the total strength was 8,635, or 3,370 less than Pitt expected to find in the regiments which were designated for service in the St. Lawrence, and whose parade state he did not know. These troops embarked in 76 vessels, besides which there were 17 flat bottomed boats, 122 cutters and 13 whaleboats. The transports were divided into three divisions under Monckton, Townshend and Murray, respectively, each brigadier flying a distinguishing pennant from his frigate.









- AANWYKING DER LETTERTEN.**
- a. Plaats der Landing van de Capitein Krijgsmagt v. Sillery.
 - b. Het Stadje van de Plaats onder Admiraal Heilmans maant.
 - c. De Ingevoerde van het water van onder.
 - d. Boudelaten, die de Fundas van de fons laten aflyzen.
 - e. Begren van Capitein van Trogen leggen, en die v. n. terrein.
 - f. Begren van Admiraal Stauders Stadje.
 - g. Het Admiraalshap.
 - h. Een deel der Trogen met Trogen ten onder.
 - i. Batterijen van voor de Stad bewaakt word.
 - k. Lagerplaats van Generaal Montan.
 - l. Het van Agier Harty.
 - m. Generaal Wille Kampment.
 - n.n. Lagerplaats der Francken, onder de Stad.
 - n.o. Meer Batterijen en Verduwelingen.
 - p. Rond der Rive River met in Boen gestoken.
 - q. Begren van de Rivier door een Schans gebouwt.
 - r. Dierende Batterijen v. de Trogen v. Een deel der Francken.
 - v. Het Kasteel of de Citadel.
 - v.z. Batterijen der Francken.

QUEBEK.
 De Hoofstet van
KANADA:
 aan de Rivier van St. Lawrence:
 door de Capitein Krijgsmagt van by Newby ontworpen,
 in 't jaar 1700.
 Het Capitein Krijgsmagt van 70 in een Graad.

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CHAPTER III

PREPARATIONS IN CANADA

WHILE all was activity along the coast of Acadia the French upon the banks of the St. Lawrence were eagerly awaiting news from the outside world, which they could have only after the opening of navigation. To be sure they expected but little of real benefit to them, but still they hoped that Bougainville, than whom a better qualified man could not have been chosen as delegate to the Court, would be able so to represent the situation of the colony as to bring some relief from the mother country. He returned, however, practically empty handed. When he became urgent with the minister he was told that one does not concern himself about the fate of the stable when one's house is afire, and his only satisfaction was the retort to the effect that at any rate the minister did not talk like a horse.

On the 10th of May, Bougainville arrived on board the "Chezine" with an acknowledgment of failure in his mission, but his lively celtic nature was not cast down, neither were his brother officers unduly dispirited. Montcalm was courteously but frankly told by the minister that he could expect no aid from France; that it was impossible to equal

the efforts England was putting forth to crush the French in America; that he should retire from his outposts and concentrate his power in order to preserve a foothold in America; that such a policy would make it easier for France to re-establish herself after peace had been declared than if she had lost every foot of her territory. This was not encouraging, but the letter in which this cruel advice was given ended by an expression of confidence in the zeal, devotion and skill which Montcalm had given so many evidences of in the past, and it may be added of which he gave ample evidence during the evil days that were left to him. However, there would have been a crumb of comfort in the reflection that Durell was too late to intercept some 15 merchantmen which arrived immediately after the *Chezine*, but how near or how great was their danger the French officers did not know until about the middle of May, when the first news was brought. A few day later a courier arrived with the tidings that 14 English sail had come as far up the river as St. Bernabie, some 40 French leagues below the capital of Canada. The bustle, haste, and temporary confusion which followed were what one would expect. Preparations to meet the enemy and to make his victory a costly one, or to baffle his best efforts, were actively and skilfully begun.

Vaudreuil who was full of resource and confidence after the event felt, as usual, the need of a stronger mind and character to meet the crisis which was approaching. Besides, the place of the General of the army was where the greatest danger lay. He requested Montcalm to proceed to Quebec from Montreal, where he had been since March,

to direct the campaign in western Canada. On the 23rd he arrived in Quebec. Five battalions were brought from Montreal and a body of cavalry, 200 strong, was raised and put under command of de la Roche Beaucour. The Beauport side of the river was fortified with extensive earthworks from the River St. Charles to the Falls of Montmorency. A bridge of boats was built across the St. Charles and *la tête du pont* was protected by a horn work, while an entrenchment was made in the meadow of Monsieur Hiché and carried from St. Rochs to the bridge. The entrance to the St. Charles was secured by a boom which was defended by two hulks mounted with cannon and run ashore. (1) Several boats were put upon the stocks and armed with 12 and 14 pounders. Captain Duclos of the Chezine was put in command of a floating battery which he had designed, and which was in course of construction. It was to have 12 embrasures for 12, 18 and 24 pounders, and required 90 men to man it. Batteries *en barbette* were set up at the Quay du Palais, and the batteries in Lower Town were overhauled; a street was opened in the garden of the Bishop's palace for communication which the town and with the ramparts. A passage which led to Lower Town was blocked up, the walls of adjoining houses were pulled down, palisades were made, and when possible breaches in the walls were repaired. Work too was begun on the fireships which were intended to destroy the British fleet and save Canada.

This is an enumeration of the principal works under-

(1) See plan of original surveys of the British army.

taken, and for the greater part carried to a successful conclusion, by the French while they were awaiting the approach of the enemy. It is long enough to justify the statement that the activity and determination of the defenders of Canada at this time are almost unexampled in history.

Orders were given for all male persons, old and young, capable of bearing arms, to report themselves.

All these preparations were made by a people who knew that they were making a last stand to save their colony to the mother land, whose ministers had become so involved at home that they deliberately decided to abandon Canada to her own resources.

Defeated in Germany, in India, in Africa and in the Antilles, she had such success and such honour to her arms as were won by her sons in America.

While Wolfe might consider himself at a disadvantage by reason of an insufficient army, at any rate his troops were all regulars, as good as the British army could produce, men especially fitted for pitched battles in an open field such as the Plains of Abraham furnished him at last. Opposed to him were some 15,000 men capable of bearing arms, counting all from youth to old age, some regulars, some militia men, and some Indians. The first could be best depended upon in engagements after the European style of warfare; the second were superior in all those tactics that are necessary in a new and broken country; while the Indians were of doubtful value at any time.

The British army was well fed and well armed; their enemy had been reduced at times to half a pound of flour

and half a pound of pork, per day, sometimes half a pound of horseflesh instead of pork. The harvest in 1758 had been below the average owing chiefly to insufficient seeding during the absence of the husbandmen, on active service. Besides, the extortion of the Intendant who fixed prices caused the concealment of grain, lest the family should suffer after selling at a low price and be unable to buy again at the higher price. The British forces had taken the field to remain there during the campaign; the French militiaman was anxious to get a furlough in order to sow his seeds and reap his harvest. The British had, too, nearly 50,000 men ready to take the field at the beginning of this campaign, backed by a people prosperous, hopeful and determined to bring the year to a glorious issue. The imperial grant from the war chest was 12,000,000 pounds sterling, no mean sum a hundred and fifty years ago, which was to be expended on the campaign of 1759. Louisbourg gave a base of operations for the control of the St. Lawrence. These things the French of Canada learned from various sources, and the wonder is that they should set themselves to work as they did to meet such an invader after France had replied to their appeal by sending them some 326 men, 17 vessels laden with provisions and ammunition, but decorations in abundance for past distinguished services, and much good advice. Montcalm was forced to observe that a little is precious to him who has nothing.

Again there was a contrast in the relations of the chief officers. Although there may have been petty jealousies, and a lack of cordiality, amongst the British officers they

did not interfere with the conduct of operations or with the plans of the commander. Townshend chafed under the fact that he was subordinate to Wolfe, but he submitted to the iron will of his young chief, who was indeed chief until the moment of his death. Amongst the French officers it was not so. They had been long together and petty misunderstandings had grown into open quarrels, and envy into hatred and a desire for revenge. Authority too was divided. The four men who stood out large were Vaudreuil, the Governor; Montcalm, the General; Bigot, the Intendant; and Cadet, the army contractor. The characters of the two first named men will not be examined in detail here. Nor will we hold the balance of right and wrong between the two men except as the occasions demand it in the progress of the story of the Siege. Suffice it to say that they were as much unsuited to each other as possible, and that their duties brought them constantly into collision. Vaudreuil held the higher office, and neither forgot the fact nor allowed any one else to do so. His despatches, orders and letters display vanity and an egotism that make the reader antagonistic even to-day. If his manner was as pompous and offensive, nothing but the greatest talents could have secured respect for him. These he certainly had not. Although not a military man he assumed a superiority in all matters of a purely military nature. It was his activity, his zeal, his plans, that had accomplished everything, and that would eventually confound the English and frustrate all their designs. Yet he sought advice when a crisis was on, and depending on the judgment of another he put it forward as his own. Worst of all were his disloyalty to

his associates and the attacks which he made upon Montcalm, living and dead, in letters to the Court.

Montcalm, despite his chivalrous character, his military skill, his learning and literary tastes, was candid, impetuous, impatient, and prone to speak inadvisedly, even harshly and bitterly. With these characteristics, some of them virtues exaggerated into vices, he could not endure the peculiarities of the Governor, nor could he keep the latter in ignorance of the fact. His journal shows that he held Vaudreuil in profound contempt and shows too that he was a master of ridicule. His contemptuous attitude and outspoken criticism of the Governor and his friends produced a bad effect upon the army officers. They looked to Montcalm rather than to Vaudreuil for protection and advancement, while they probably found the former a more congenial companion. So bitter was the feeling between the two men who ought to have been united in a common cause that it is not uncommon to hear partisans of one or the other in historical circles to-day say that one opposed any specific action simply because the other favoured it.⁽¹⁾

(1) Vaudreuil, it appears kept a daily journal of the events of the siege which threw much light on his conduct towards Montcalm. This journal was unfortunately destroyed about thirty years ago. Count Jacques de Clermont-Tonnerre, a descendant of the Vaudreuil family, in a letter addressed to the authors in November, 1900, refers to the subject in these words :—

“ Mon grand oncle, le Comte Charles de Vaudreuil, possédait un
“ recueil de notes quotidiennes du Marquis de Vaudreuil pendant la
“ défense du Canada. Ces notes montraient sa patience extrême envers
“ Montcalm, les assauts qu'il eût à subir de la part de son entourage :
“ connaissant admirablement le pays, il s'évertua dans maintes occasions
“ à éviter à M. de Montcalm des fautes graves. Par une aberration que
“ je ne m'explique pas, au moment de la guerre de 1870, mon oncle

Undoubtedly their judgments were biased and their actions influenced by their mutual hatred. Each suspected the worst of the other. Montcalm wrote to the minister of war after Carillon that it was hard for a well meaning general 1,500 leagues from his country to be in constant fear of the necessity of justifying himself. Again he said that Vaudreuil was constantly writing him to the effect that it was possible with large detachments to drive the enemy from his position at the foot of Lac Saint Sacrement. He feared that this advice was given in order to compromise him. Vaudreuil wrote to demand Montcalm's, recall in order that he might be replaced by Levis. Montcalm of course ignorant of this act of the Governor but conscious of the disastrous consequences of this unhappy feud made overtures through Bougainville for a better understanding. This was reached, but unfortunately owing to the meddling of persons interested in continuing the quarrel it did not last.⁽¹⁾

When Wolfe found himself disappointed in the recruits which he expected from the West Indies, and discovered the numerical weakness of the regiments which had reported, he made every possible effort to augment the numbers and to improve the quality of his meagre force.

" brûla ces notes pour les empêcher de tomber dans les mains Prussiennes !
" Je déplore d'autant plus ce sacrifice inutile que c'était le plus beau
" monument élevé par son auteur à la valeur et à la constance Cana-
" diennes."

(1) Those who wish to pursue the various phases of this question should consult the de Levis Collection of Documents, in which they may find much to interest them, and to enable them to form an independent judgment.

He applied to Amherst for 300 pioneers in order to relieve the militia, and for orders to Whitmore, Governor of Louisbourg, to transfer one company of light infantry from the garrison of Louisbourg to his command. This company had been designed for service with Wolfe, but mention of it had been accidentally omitted from the orders which had come from England. As it was three weeks before Wolfe's letter reached Amherst in Albany, Wolfe applied in the meantime to Whitmore for this company, setting forth his reasons fully for doing so and asking at the same time that two other companies of the light infantry be given in exchange for an equal number of men from the Rangers and from Fraser's companies. These men he regarded as sufficiently good for garrison purposes, but as inferior to the infantry for field work. Whitmore, poor, old, sleepy man as Wolfe had described him the year before, replied rather curtly that by His Majesty's instructions he was to obey the orders of Major General Amherst, or the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's forces in North America, and that as yet he had received no orders from Major General Amherst to detach a company of light infantry from the garrison. To the application for an exchange of the two companies he deigned no reply. However, Amherst applied for the pioneers to Lt. Governor Hutchinson, who with commendable promptitude promised that they should be embarked at Boston, within 48 hours. At the same time Amherst authorized Wolfe to take the company of light infantry, if Whitmore should think the important island of Cape Breton sufficiently secure.

That Wolfe was not sanguine of success appears in all

his letters. He said that the least loss in the river, or sickness amongst the men, would reduce the undertaking to little more than a diversion. He felt that he was very liable to accident, and was sure that the French would throw in succors before the English squadron could intercept them. Unless he could get into the river before the French he had little hope of success. Besides, there was a great siege to be undertaken and he had not a farthing to pay his workmen, a fact which he emphasized by repeating that he had not a dollar of public money. "And yet, it is much a question among the military men, whether we shall not be obliged to fight first and besiege afterwards."

Amherst on the contrary felt sure that success would come from the east or from the west, he hardly knew where. He told Wolfe that his actions would depend upon circumstances as he should find them but "my point in view shall be to distract the enemy and force them to give up one avenue, which is sufficient for us to take all Canada, or if they will attempt to defend themselves in every corner, I hope they will be disappointed in all, as they must be weak everywhere." It is well known that Amherst failed to distract the enemy from its central position at Quebec, or to enter Canada through the avenue which was practically open to him, while on the other hand despite the fact that Durell was too late to prevent the entrance of supplies from France, that Wolfe's forces were entirely inadequate to the undertaking before them, that the commander was absolutely without financial resources, it was Wolfe who by dash, determination, and military skill with

a large share of the favorable chances of war converted an expected diversion into the victory that gained a continent. Such are the surprises of warfare.

If we cite the personal difficulties amongst the French to show how the public service was injured by lack of harmony and sympathy, we touch only the fringe of the internal troubles under which the wretched colony was suffering.

One of the most melancholy pages of Canadian history is that which preserves a record of the speculation and frauds of Bigot and his associates. François Bigot who had acted as commissary at Louisbourg, in 1744 and 1745, when that place was taken by Pepperell, became Royal Intendant in 1748, in succession to M. Hocquart. His record at Louisbourg had not been a good one, and he was suspected of corrupt practices which, however, were only preliminary to those he was about to undertake in his larger field. His powers as Royal Intendant were extraordinary. He had control of the finances of the colony, the purchase and distribution of supplies for the troops and for the various military posts, the importation from France of such merchandise as was required for the public stores. These supplies included articles for the dress and accoutrement of the soldiers, for the support of the Indian allies, together with such luxuries as the colony could not provide, such as finer flour, wines and spirits.

His power arbitrarily to regulate prices and thus to interfere with commerce even in times of peace was so large as to be almost incomprehensible in our democratic times.

He determined the price, from time to time, at which

products of the soil and the necessaries of the life were to be bought and sold, either for the public service or for private wants.

Besides, his authority in the colony was commensurate with his responsibility. He was a member of the Supreme Council and was over ranked only by the Governor himself. These powers seem to have been abused for private gains by many intendants.

Montcalm, when on his way to Canada in 1756, wrote of Hocquart, whom he had just seen, as an intendant who had not enriched himself at the expense of his office, and this he wrote as though the fact was quite remarkable.

But whatever his predecessors had or had not done, Bigot made a record for shameless corruption and profligacy. While one does not wish to draw distinctions as to the moral qualities of different acts of theft it must be admitted that Bigot's greed and dishonesty were rendered more odious by his cruelty, and by his heartless robbery of the poor as well as the rich. And so desperate had he become that the warnings which were accusations at the same time, and which he received from the Minister of Marine, had no effect upon him so far as can be seen by his actions, except to make him more careful to provide against detection. The Minister declared that Bigot himself had made purchases for the King at double the price at which he could have obtained the articles in question from other sources, doing this through third parties, and thus enriching those who were in league with him in those and other enterprises. He further told Bigot that the latter was alleged to be living in a most splendid style while sur-

rounded by a state of public distress, and exhorted him to reflect seriously upon the tendency of his methods of conducting the affairs which had been entrusted to him. In October 1756, a contract had been entered into between Bigot as intendant of justice, police and finance, and Joseph Cadet, by which the latter was to have practically a monopoly as contractor to furnish food and the necessary "refreshments" for the service of the King as well in the cities as in the military posts from Gaspé to the Ohio. This contract was for nine years, and could not have been better suited to the purposes of fraud, although it provided apparently all the safeguards that could reasonably be expected.

Its worst feature perhaps was its hard and fast list of prices for some forty articles of consumption, without regard, excepting as insufficiently provided for, to the fact that times of famine and the capture of provisions by the English might increase the cost of these articles far beyond the contract price. Thus Cadet found himself at once in the power of Bigot who could not only compel him to fulfil his contract, but could so fix prices as to ruin the contractor.

Of course no one will ever know exactly the nature of the understanding between these two accomplished rascals, or which was the more ready to rob his country, even in the face of the private contract which existed between them; but it is certain that Cadet appears in the public contract as the dupe.

This was Bigot's first step, and once Cadet was at his mercy he could and did dictate his own terms. The immediate consequence of an extraordinary rise in values, which

from the nature of the business should have been anticipated by Bigot and Cadet, was the ruin of the contractor.

After the complaints had become so loud and so frequent in 1758, de Berryer sent one Querdisien Tremais to Canada to make a thorough investigation of the accounts of Bigot and of his financial operations.

One of the first things he discovered was a huge swindle which was admitted by the participants, who however, pleaded that it was only an attempt to do justice to the contractor and save him from loss.

The market value of many articles had risen to ten times the contract price, although undoubtedly the cost to Cadet had not risen at the same rate. To protect himself against loss and to make an honourable profit, as he urged, he arranged with the commanders of various military posts to sign receipts for say ten times the amount of necessaries really supplied. In that way, he insisted, although he produced vouchers for ten times as much as he sold in certain instances, he received only one tenth of the real value of the goods described in his bill.

Notwithstanding the fact that an elaborate system of requisitions and vouchers was in operation there was no difficulty in carrying out this kind of fraud by the assistance, and of course at the profit, of all concerned in the transaction. Bigot, according to the defence made at his trial in 1762, was shocked at these evidences of rascality, and protested that since the proper receipts came to him, signed by reputable men, he had no suspicion of the real nature of the business. However, others who had neither Bigot's knowledge of nor interest in the matter knew what

was going on. Montcalm, in his journal gives some interesting specimens. The contract in question provided that the employees of Cadet should ⁽¹⁾ be exempt from military duty, a reasonable arrangement seeing that they would really be serving in the commissariat department. Under cover of this, Cadet practically paid the cost of the transportation of necessaries to distant posts by giving these exemptions to the farmers in return for their labour. This was greatly to his advantage as the cost of transportation to distant posts was frequently in excess of the original price of his goods.

Again provisions were sent out to be delivered at several points, while the items were mentioned on one return. The various commandants signed this return without noting upon it the quantity actually received by each. When accused they pretended that they were under the impression that the articles not received by them had been delivered to others.

Thus vouchers were brought back for goods that had never been sent out at all. In short most of Cadet's frauds were committed by falsification of the various accounts and by the connivance of scores of officers many of whom pleaded ⁽²⁾ afterwards that they were practically compelled to affix their signatures to false statements because they were subordinate to those who were really guilty and who profited by the frauds.

In course of time, so much are men influenced by en-

(1) See contract in appendix.

(2) Procès Boishebert.

vironment and by prevailing opinions and morality, all these things were looked upon as matters of course—a necessary condition of life in the colony.

Besides, Bigot was a man who dominated all who came into contact with him. His personal qualities were charming, although his features were plain, and his intellectuality was such as to make him felt as a force. The influence he exerted over Vaudreuil for instance was incomprehensible. The latter was weak, vain, revengeful, but he was always regarded as honest.

He came out of his trial in 1762, with his reputation for personal honesty untouched. Yet, he had a fair share of intelligence and even of shrewdness. But despite this he could remain for years on the most perfect terms of friendship with Bigot, the intendant, with whom according to all precedent, he, as governor should have had continual difficulties. He could repeatedly write certificates of character filled with assurances of Bigot's zeal and of his sacrifices for his master the King. He should have known, in fact he must have known, that Bigot was accepting and paying accounts for the provisions of thousands of men where there were only hundreds. Yet, while Bigot was making his millions, Vaudreuil was making nothing. This is one of the mysteries of human nature that can furnish ample scope for conjecture, and none for dogmatism. Can it be that Bigot had in some way got Vaudreuil into his power, and that the latter had purchased silence by silence? Notwithstanding the connection between Bigot and Cadet which we must assume although it was never proved in the investigation which was held in France,

the former did not find his greatest profit in his share of the contractor's plunder. Some ten years before the siege of Quebec he and Bréard, the naval comptroller at Quebec, entered into partnership with a wholesale house in Bordeaux, which shipped large quantities of general supplies to Canada. These supplies were declared at the custom house to be the property of the King and destined for the public stores. Thus the import duty was saved. Bigot had previously advised the colonial minister that there were supplies enough in Canada to last three years, and that it would be better to purchase in Canada and avoid the risk of capture by the English, to which the French ships were liable. He then as intendant bought at exorbitant prices from his own firm, always using fictitious names, or selling first to some friend who would resell the goods and take his share of the profit. In this way the King was made to pay three or four times the actual value of the articles which were put into his stores. Later he established a store in Quebec, using the name of Claverie, a trader, to hide his own connection with the business. This was soon popularly known as La Friponne, "The Cheat," for obvious reasons. Further, he charged exorbitant prices for the use of boats which he owned, or hired from others, in order to transport troops and munitions of war. He sold the cargo of an English ship, captured by the French, for 800,000 francs and bought back a part of it for 1,000,000 francs, for the King. When he and his confederates had completed their transactions in regard to this cargo they had a clear profit of about 2,000,000 francs. The various means taken by Bigot,

Cadet, Péan, and their associates to enrich themselves at the expense of their country are matters of common history and need not be further dealt with here. Enough has been said to show how honeycombed the whole system was with the corruption for which circumstances were so favourable. Had this gigantic swindle been perpetrated only at the expense of the exchequer in France, the case would not have been so serious for the colony. As a matter of fact the colonists themselves suffered acutely.

When Cadet represented to Bigot that he could not buy grain because the inhabitants were concealing it, the latter issued an order that grain must be sold at a low price, which he fixed, on pain of confiscation. It was then bought by Cadet and sold later, even to the original owners, at exorbitant profits. In addition to this form of fraud the currency of the country, which was insufficient, afforded another opening for Bigots' methods, and in order to provide a circulating medium, he issued a sort of note called "ordonnances" which was not guaranteed by the French government.

At first these were honoured promptly by being exchanged in large numbers for bills on the royal treasury of the mother county. After a while there were delays, confidence in the "ordonnances" was shaken, and they depreciated so rapidly as to throw the whole monetary system into confusion.

In 1759, in fact, the French government repudiated them entirely because of their magnitude. The extent of the iniquitous operations of Bigot and his associates, which undoubtedly got beyond his power of control, can be appre-

ciated only by a perusal of the documents forming the dossier of the trial of the malefactors in 1762.

In December 1763, the principal offenders were condemned to punishment as follows:

Bigot, perpetual banishment from the kingdom, 1000 livres fine, one million and five hundred thousand to be restored.

Cadet, banishment from Paris for nine years, 300 livres fine, and six millions to be restored.

Bréard, to restore 300,000 livres;

Pénissault, Maurin, Corpon, 600,000 each;

Estèbe, 30,000; Martel-de-Saint-Antoine, 100,000.

Péan, who had been thrown into the Bastille had compounded by disgorging 600,000, and including this sum more than ten million livres were returned to the coffers of France.

The two men Bigot and Cadet, have been painted in strong colours by historian and novelist alike, but the fact that they were bad men has obscured the less obtrusive fact that they were great men. The dominant mind of Bigot controlled the destiny of New France. Endowed with marked administrative ability, intellectual vigour, wit, and capacity for work, he might have become her benefactor and have led her on to grand achievements. That he could not have saved the colony to France is certain, but had his energies been well directed the annals of France would have no more glorious or honourable records than those of the expiring, deserted colony in America. He chose, however, to enrich himself and in so doing to hasten her ruin. In the accomplishment of his designs

he did not scruple to employ the loftiest as well as the pettiest agents. Even Vaudreuil, who, with a stronger moral fibre or with better environment would have preserved a spotless life, was considered his tool, if not his accomplice, and has left to the historian the impossible task of exonerating him before the world. Although the court found him technically not guilty it is certain that his endorsement of Bigot's acts stifled investigation until the offences were so outrageous that they appealed to heaven for redress. Bigot was colossal in all things, in his pleasures as in his vices.

As a palliation of his offences it is urged that he became encircled by a web of intrigue, which, although of his own making, he could not escape from, and that he was acting under the secret instructions of La Pompadour, who received a large share of his illegitimate profits.

Cadet too, has his apologists who serve the purpose of showing that there are two sides to the nature of every man, and that as pure virtue exists only as an ideal in human life, so vice is not to be found unmixed with good.

The splendid business ability of this self made man who rose from the most humble position of life to be the richest and one of the most important of the men in New France, is shown not only by his ability to carry on an enormous business of fraud but equally by his provisionment of the army during his tenure of office.⁽¹⁾

(1) M. Alfred Barbier, President of the " Société des Antiquaires de l'Ouest " has written a monograph entitled *Un munitionnaire du Roi à la Nouvelle France, Joseph Cadet*. Printed by Blais & Roy, at Poitiers, 1900. M. Barbier, gives a good sketch of Cadet's life in which are shown

In the midst of the preparations some important circulars were addressed to the people of Canada in order to stir them to a supreme effort to save the colony. The Bishop, Henri de Pontbriand, issued a pastoral letter to his clergy which is most important as giving a glimpse of the social life of Canada as it appeared to one who was completely unbiassed, but who from his piety and his vocation viewed the sins of his people with a natural austerity. His letter opened with the statement that his brethren must be aware of the immense preparations which the enemy were making in order to attack the colony from different points, and that their troops were at least six times as many as the French could muster. Montcalm in his Journal took exception to this statement, not as contrary to fact but because he thought it unwise or useless to inform the simple habitant of the inequality in the strength of the armies.

The good Bishop proceeded to point out that English emissaries had been sent to all the Indian nations to incite them to forsake the French cause, that the English already occupied the harbours at the lower end of the river which had been looked upon as so many barriers; that the uncertainty of affairs in Europe, the dangers to which succors from France were exposed, the general scarcity that prevailed, and the numerous fleets destined for the destruction of the French, ought to make a profound impres-

the great services and the great faults of the famous army contractor. He was born in Quebec, December, 24, 1710. He died in Paris, in 1781, a poor man. At the close of his trial in Paris, in 1763, he was condemned

sion upon the minds of all. But what was of greater concern to the Bishop was the moral and religious aspect of his surroundings. He lamented that every where the zeal for piety was small; that injurious and wicked speeches were maintained against those in whom confidence should be placed; that there were intolerable excesses in games of chance; that religion was held in derision, or rather in contempt; that various crimes against heaven had multiplied during the winter. During eighteen years he had watched over the diocese and had frequently seen his people suffer by famine, by disease, and by continual war, but this year was the most deplorable of all, because the most criminal.

Were there ever, he asks, such open robberies, so many gross acts of injustice, such shameless rapines! Some families were devoted, so to speak, to crimes of the most odious nature, and in all ranks the contagion was almost universal.

Then followed a stirring appeal for a true and sincere repentance that would turn the avenging hand of God from them and remove the punishment they had deserved.

Directions were then given for processions, for the offering of prayers and masses for the remission of sins. This mandement was read in all parish churches in the diocese and of course made a profound impression. Montcalm thought the Bishop should have dispensed with cer-

to pay a fine of 300 livres, to restore six millions, and to be banished from Paris for nine years. A few months later he was pardoned as to the banishment, for the express purpose of securing his services in a settlement of the finances of the lost colony.

tain instances of immorality which he cited,⁽¹⁾ but it is worthy of note that he did not deny the accuracy of any statement in particular or of the general charges contained in the mandement of which we have given only a summary.

Vaudreuil who had the pen of a ready writer sent a circular letter to the militia officers, and on the seventh of June another letter which is reproduced here in full because of the fact that so far as the authors are aware it has never been published. In the circular to the militia officers he declares that as for himself he will never consent to capitulation, in hopes that this determination may have the most ruinous consequences to the English. He assured them that it would be more merciful for the inhabitants to be buried in the ruins of the colony than fall into the hands of the enemy who would make them suffer the hardships that had befallen the Acadians. Moreover, he had evidence of the ill conduct of the enemy in the treatment which had been given to the inhabitants of Cape Breton notwithstanding the terms of the Capitulation (of Louisbourg). He had, he declared, no real apprehension for the safety of the colony, yet he would adopt the most efficacious means to secure to the inhabitants their rights and their property.

This was all done to excite the patriotic feeling of some,

(1) Le Saint évêque aurait dû se dispenser d'y parler des mascarades indécentes qu'il prétend y avoir eues cet hiver à Québec, comme celle de s'être masqué en religieuse et en évêque, et d'une maison de prostitution qu'il assure être établie près du rempart de Québec. Il aurait dû aussi entrer dans moins de détails sur le danger où est la colonie.—Journal de Montcalm, De Levis Collection, p. 510.

and to arouse the fear of others who could not be reached by such considerations, so that all might unite in the almost despairing struggle against the strength and confidence of the enemy.

However, the history of Canada and particularly of this period shows that such arguments were unnecessary.

Although the French habitant did think that his religion, and his institutions, and perhaps his language, were endangered by a change of masters, he did not need these reflections to keep him loyal to his mother country, even though she was proving a bad mother.

The second document, a more desperate one than that which was written on the fifth of June, here follows :

QUÉBEC, 7 juin, 1759.

J'ai reçu Monsieur, la lettre que vous m'avés fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 6 de ce mois.

Je ferai partir incessamment les 100 hommes que vous m'avés demandé ils porteront avec eux des vivres pour 12 jours mais vous les conserverés précieusement si vous pourés vous en passer en donnant à ce détachement de la Viande.

les feux de signaux parurent à la pointe de levis hier sur les huit heures nous ne scaurons positivement ce qu'ils nous annoncent que lorsque les depeches de M. aubert me seront parvenues,

il ne faut point se flater le gros de la flote anglaise ne peut tarder à paraître. le premier vent de Nord-en peut nous l'amener ainsi, Monsieur, il faut que vous employées toutes vos ressources et votre crédit auprès des habitants pour qu'ils se hâtent à placer leurs familles et leurs animaux aussi avant dans les profondeurs des bois qu'il sera possible ce n'est que sous cette condition que j'ai en égard à leurs representations dites leur bien positivement que leur transmigration m'est expressément ordonné par le Roy dans l'unique vue de prévenir le triste sort que les anglais se préparent à leur faire subir—leur projet étant de massacrer tout ce qui est Canadien sans distinction de sexe ni d'age—ce ne sera par conséquent

qu'en se retirant dans les profondeurs les plus reculées des bois que leurs familles pourront être en sûreté car les anglais ne manqueront pas de faire chercher ces familles par des coureurs de bois. cette retraite presse plus que je saurois vous le dire c'est dans la vue de l'accélérer que je vais vous envoyer les 100 canadiens que vous avés demandés au moyen de quoy vous pourrés renvoyer les habitants qui sont près de vous auprès de leur famille pour acclerer toutes choses dites leur bien positivement que le moindre retardement peut occasionner la perte totale de leurs familles et de leurs animaux. je compte que le premier courier que vous m'expedierés m'apprendra que cette operation est bien avancée.

Je vous réitere que tous les hommes en état de porter les armes depuis quinze ans en sur doivent se tenir prêts à joindre l'armée au premier ordre avec armes et bagage. avertissés les tous que j'en ferai faire la revue exacte compe par compe et que quelque amour que j'aye pour tout ce qui est canadien je ne pourrai éviter de faire un exemple de ceux qui ne s'y trouveront pas.

Adressés vous je vous prie à Mr. les Curés, communiqués leur ma lettre elle servira pour eux comme pour vous je reclame avec instance au nom du Roy leur zèle pour la Religion et pour la conservation de leurs paroissiens afin qu'ils leur fassent connaître les puissans motifs de mes intentions, et qu'ils les leur fassent mettre à exécution.

J'écris à M. de Montesson une lettre pareille à celle cy, quoi qu'il y ait déjà consequemment mes ordres je lui recommande de hâter toutes choses et je vous reitère à vous comme à lui que le moindre retardement peut avoir les suites les plus facheuses.

J'ai l'honneur d'être très sincèrement Monsieur, votre très humble et très obeissant serviteur.

VAUDREUIL

Vous pensés bien Monsieur, que les familles qui voudront transmigrer seront facilitées pour le transport de leurs bestiaux et de leurs effets-s'ils s'en presentent qui prennent ce parti vous pourrés leur procurer des batteaux.

On the 8th of October Monckton sent a despatch to Pitt in the course of which he animadvertes on Vaudreuil's lack of faith and declared that it was impossible to have

any dealings with him because his letters were always "filled with untruths."

In order to show the methods Vaudreuil had used and would probably use again he enclosed a memoire and a letter which had been found in some of the villages with the other papers, by one of the English parties.

This letter calls for no special comment. It is more extravagant than usual, in parts but is less boastful. Although he was so dilatory in making arrangements to meet the coming attack as to vex the soul of Montcalm, he wrote letters in abundance from which we always gather that the safety of the colony depends entirely upon him and that there is "no ruse, no resource, no means which my zeal does not suggest to lay snares for them (the enemy) and finally when the exigency demands it to fight them with an ardor, and even with a fury, which exceed the range of their ambitious schemes."

He declares that his firmness is generally applauded and that it is his determination to be buried under the ruins of the colony rather than surrender to the English.

Again he declares that he is resolved to yield nothing to the enemy but to hold his ground even to annihilation. Although optimism is good, it may become ridiculous.

Montcalm, Levis, Doreil, Bigot all present a strong contrast to the gasconnade of their Governor. They, and even the Bishop who was a man of peace rather than of war, had a just conception of the danger to which the colony was exposed, and probably knew better than Vaudreuil what steps should be taken to meet it.

Although we know almost to a man the number of the

land forces in the attacking party in this struggle there is room for conjecture and calculation in regard to the strength of the defence.

In January, 1759, a census had been taken which showed that there were about 85,000 souls in all Canada, but Vaudreuil in a letter to Montcalm, in regard to the plan of defence, dated April first, speaks of the subsistence of about 90,000 souls who are in this colony. Of these there were probably twenty-one or two thousand, including youths and old men, who were capable of bearing arms, or were considered to be able in such urgent circumstances to do so.

This number was distributed throughout the colony in order to make a defence to the various approaches of the British. Bourlamaque with upwards of 3,000 men occupied the military posts on Lake George, Lake Champlain and the river Richelieu, with instructions to fall back from post to post towards Montreal without risking a serious engagement with the superior force which he intended simply to check and harass. M. de la Corne with 1200 men was to defend Lake Ontario, while Captain Pouchot was provided with several hundred Canadians and savages and three hundred regulars for the occupation of Niagara.

The garrison of Quebec consisted of about 2,000, and the rest were assembled in the Beauport camp. The number of savages is variously estimated at 1000 to 1200, but their value excepting to terrify the enemy by their atrocities from time to time was not great; perhaps, as Montcalm said, three hundred were as good as a thousand. Apparently too they came and went at their pleasure for

in July, Vaudreuil by his own calculation had only 744 savages, ⁽¹⁾ but in his letter to the minister in October, 1759, he stated that the entrenchments from the St. Charles to Montmorency were occupied at the beginning of the siege by 14,000 men, 200 cavalry, and about 1000 savages of the Abenaki and other nations.

Bigot, in a letter to the minister on the 25th of October, gave the numbers as 13,000 men and 1000 to 1200 savages, besides the 2000 soldiers in the garrison of Quebec. Other numbers have been given by French officers of the time but they are only estimates and indicate that there were about 16,000 men all told, in and about Quebec awaiting the arrival of the British fleet.

Although the advantage of numbers as well as of position lay with the French the former advantage was not of great value. The regulars of the French army were but 4000 in round numbers, while Wolfe's men were not only regulars but first class regulars, excepting six companies of North American Rangers whom Wolfe, before having any experience of them, declared to be the worst soldiers in the universe.

For scouting, harassing the enemy, fighting under cover of wood or earthworks, the undisciplined native American soldier whether French or English could not be equalled by any regulars, but for the open attack in the field such as terminated this campaign the regulars were superior.

The intelligence department of the British army seems to have done effective work. Wolfe, on the 19th of May,

(1) P. 180, *Lettres et Pièces militaires*.—Levis collection.

said in a letter to his uncle Walter, that the "regular troops in Canada consist of eight battalions of old Foot—about 400 a battalion—and forty companies of Marines (or colony troops)—forty men a company. They can gather together 8000 or 10,000 Canadians and perhaps 1000 Indians. As they are attacked by the side of Montreal by an enemy of 12,000 fighting men, they must necessarily divide their force; but as the loss of the capital implies the loss of the colony, their chief attention will naturally be there, and therefore I reckon we may find at Quebec six battalions, some companies of Marines, four or five thousand Canadians, and some Indians; altogether, not much inferior to their enemy." Wolfe had, as appears from this letter, a fairly good knowledge of the topography of the scene of future operations and had a tentative plan of action already outlined. He says, "The town of Quebec is poorly fortified, but the ground round about it is rocky. To invest the place, and cut of all communication with the colony, it will be necessary to encamp with our right to the river St. Lawrence, and our left to the river St. Charles. From the river St. Charles to Beauport the communication must be kept open by strong entrenched posts and redoubts." It is of interest to note that Montcalm's first plan was to encamp precisely where Wolfe here proposed to establish himself, and that Montcalm intended to make the river St. Charles his line of defence. Later when he selected the flats of Beauport from St. Charles to Montmorency for his entrenchments he hit upon the same ground that Wolfe wished to keep open. This choice of course was not accidental, but was the

natural result of the situation which was similarly viewed by the two experienced military chiefs. Wolfe proceeds:

"The enemy can pass that river at low water; and it will be proper to establish ourselves with small entrenched posts from the Point of Levi to La Chaudière. It is the business of our naval force to be masters of the river, both above and below the town. If I find that the army is strong, audacious, and well commanded, I shall proceed with the utmost caution and circumspection, giving Mr. Amherst time to use his superiority. If they are timid, weak, and ignorant, we shall push them with more vivacity, that we may be able before the summer is gone to assist the commander in chief." This last remark is another confirmation of our statement that the reduction of Quebec by Wolfe alone was looked upon as a reasonable contingency. But the next sentence is still more remarkable in connection with the events of September 13, and with the claims that have been made to the plan of attack which proved successful. "I reckon we shall have a smart action at the passage of the river St. Charles, unless we can steal a detachment up the river St. Lawrence, and land them three, four, five miles, or more, above the town, and get time to entrench so strongly that they won't care to attack."

Another reference will be made to this in the proper place. Where Wolfe expected Montcalm and his army to be all this time does not appear, but he may have assumed that they would shut themselves up in the city.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE ST. LAWRENCE.

REAR Admiral Durell was despatched from Halifax with ten sail on the 4th of May with orders to proceed up the river and to cut off all succors from France. As already seen he failed to arrive in time to intercept the main fleet from France under Kanon who was bringing out provisions to Cadet with a few recruits for the army, and who succeeded in sailing into Quebec with seventeen vessels to the great joy of the French.

As only three belated vessels were captured later by Durell, Canada received practically all the aid that the mother country intended to give her for this campaign, and Durell failed in his expedition.

However, he found some excellent charts of the St Lawrence in one of the prizes. This fact was of great importance to the British who knew nothing of the dangerous navigation of this river.

He at once tested the charts by soundings and found them accurate.

On the first of June the fleet under Saunders began to depart from Louisbourg and in a few days all the ships had cleared the land, bearing an enthusiastic, shouting,

cheering army. The most popular toast at the officers' mess was, "British colours on every French fort, port, and garrison in America." Knox, whose chronicles are invaluable writes, "I had the inexpressible pleasure to observe at Louisbourg that our whole armament, naval and military were in high spirits; and though by all accounts, we shall have a numerous army and a variety of difficulties to cope with, yet under such admirals and generals, among whom we have the happiness to behold the most cordial unanimity, together with so respectable a fleet, and a body of well-appointed regular troops, we have reason to hope for the greatest success."

As soon as the fleet was at sea, Saunders sent a ship to England with a despatch to the Admiralty. This is printed in the appendix.

Wolfe took occasion at the same time to send his first despatch to Pitt, and as a special interest attaches to his letters and reports on account of his high office, his melancholy end, and his clearness of thought and expression, we insert it in the text to form a part of the narrative. It has already been printed in part in Thackeray's *Life of Pitt*:

"On board the "Neptune", June 6, 1759.

"Sir,

"By the report ⁽¹⁾ which I have the honour to enclose, you will see the strength of the army under my command,

(1) This report is to be found at the end of this volume.

when they embarked, and when they came to Louisbourg. The fogs on this coast are so frequent and lasting, and the climate in every respect so unfavourable to military operations, that if we had been collected a week sooner, I doubt if it would have been possible to sail before we did. One company of Rangers (the best of the six), is not yet arrived, and a very good engineer, by some mistake, has had no orders to join us. General Amherst forwarded everything to the utmost of his power, and the officers employed by him were indefatigable. Finding that several regiments were weak, and that no recruits were likely to come from the West Indies, I applied to Mr. Whitmore for three companies of light infantry of his garrison:—my letter and the Governor's answer are enclosed. If Brigadier Whitmore did not consent to my proposal, it has proceeded from the most scrupulous obedience to orders, believing himself not at liberty to judge and act according to circumstances. The four new companies of Rangers are so very bad that I expect no service from them, unless mixed with the light infantry; and it was with that view that I applied to the Marshal for a company of volunteers from Louisbourg. Five field-officers of these regiments and several captains are sick or employed upon the continent; forty men of Bragg's regiment upon duty at St. John's. We leave eighty sick at Louisbourg, and an hundred invalids. Several transports have not yet joined us; their provisions and their boats are very much wanted. However, I have taken 3000 barrels of flour and biscuit from the contractor's store at Louisbourg. I writ to General Amherst for money, but he could send me none; this is one of the first sieges,

perhaps, that ever was undertaken without it. The camp equipage of three regiments is supposed to be either lost or taken upon the passage from Philadelphia. We have supplied them with tents from the ordnance stores, and must make the old kettles, etc., serve the campaign. There are 1000 of the Boston Militia at Louisbourg. I desired Brigadier Whitmore to complete our companies of Rangers from them, and to give me 100 labourers, solely as pioneers. The men were asked if they chose to go, and as it seldom happens that a New England man prefers service to a lazy life, none of them seemed to approve of the proposal; they did not ask it, and the General would not order them.

“ If the Admiral had, as I wished, deferred sending his letters till the fleet got up to the Isle of Bic, and till we knew what progress Mr. Durell had made, (of which we are at present entirely ignorant), you, Sir, would have been able to form some judgment of the state of affairs. There we might learn what succours (if any) got up before the Rear-Admiral, and other circumstances of moment. Since the fleet came out, I have received a letter from the Lieut.-Governor of the Massachusetts Bay, acquainting me that he is preparing to embark 300 of the militia of his province to serve with us. These are the pioneers which I desired Gen. Amherst to send.

Colonel Burton and Major Barré, who were employed by the General at Boston, have spoke of Mr. Hutchinson's zeal for the public service, and very great knowledge of the affairs of his province, in a manner much to his advantage. We expect to find a good part of the force of Canada at Quebec, and we are prepared to meet them. Whatever the



GENERAL TOWNSHEND.


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GENERAL TOWNSHEND.



end is, I flatter myself that his Majesty will not be dissatisfied with the behaviour of the troops.

“ I have the honour to be, etc.,

“ J. WOLFE.”

Rear Admiral Durell had advanced to St. Paul's Bay and taken possession of the Isle aux Coudres.

Vaudreuil having learned of his arrival sent a detachment of sixty Canadians and an equal number of Indians down as a reconnoitring party. The Indians “ amused themselves ” by killing and eating cattle and sheep that had been left on the Island of Orleans by the inhabitants who had departed in fear and in haste. The detachment was under command of M. de Niverville who evidently decided to return without result. Le Sieur Desrivieres who was with him as a volunteer, dissatisfied with a fruitless expedition, took seven Canadians who had fled from the Isle aux Coudres to St. Joachim and with their aid captured three young Englishmen who had gone ashore for a good time, as Montcalm says, or more likely to plant the British colours on an eminence, according to Panet.

They were brought prisoners to Quebec where they increased the consternation of the French by declaring that the English land force amounted to 20,000 men, and by other similar exaggerations.

The main fleet keeping well together passed off Anticosti on the 11th of June. Townshend noted the fact that he had not met any one French or English who knew or ever heard of any port in this large island, or of any inhabi-

tants thereon. If there were a haven, the island, he thought, would be an excellent situation for the establishment of a fortified harbour to curb Canada. The English were fortunate in the possession of some French pilots whom they compelled to serve under pain of death.

One Denis de Vitré, a Canadian of good birth who had been captured at sea some time before, was sent on with Durell because he, de Vitré, knew best the navigation of the South shore, while Saunders retained one Raby, whose principal knowledge had to do with the channel to the north east of Anticosti and the river above that island. There were other pilots as well doing enforced labour. When Durell reached the point higher up the river where the pilots were usually taken aboard, he raised the French colours, thus luring the pilots to a hated service. When they were taken aboard, the British colours went up and the hopes of the inhabitants were cruelly dashed.

It is recorded that a parish priest who viewed the occurrence from the shore received such a shock that he fell dead.

The unwillingness of the pilots to perform their tasks was great, but they knew the consequences of a refusal. However, in one case at least according to Captain Knox, vigorous expression was given to their feelings. The pilot on board the Goodwill said he had no doubt but that some of the fleet would return to England but they would have a dismal tale to carry, for Canada would be the grave of the whole army. He expected in a short time to see English scalps decorating the walls of Quebec. Thus he was unconsciously giving an equivalent for the gascou-

nading of the English boys who were prisoners in Quebec at the time. However, the master of the transport, a man named Killick, did not call upon the angry pilot to show the way, but with the aid of his sounding boats which lay off the side of his vessel he directed the course himself, even though he was approaching the Traverse,⁽¹⁾ the most dangerous part of the river St. Lawrence below Quebec.

The French had considered this part of the river un-navigable by large craft; excepting when the greatest care was taken under direction of the local pilots, a mistake that the pilots themselves had no interest in correcting.

As no attempts were made to set up cannon commanding the Traverse, it would appear that the natural dangers to navigation were a sufficient safeguard against invasion by a fleet in this direction. Vaudreuil has been severely blamed for neglecting this fine opportunity to pour shot into the English vessels as they passed through this narrow channel, but his excuse is itself a tribute to British seamanship. In a letter addressed to the Minister on the 22nd of October, 1759, the Marquis states that "the enemy passed sixty ships of war where we had hardly dared to risk a vessel of a hundred tons." In the "Memoire pour M. Bigot,"⁽²⁾ surprise is expressed in a similar way. He says, through his attorney, that the French took all the precaution for a frigate of thirty guns as for a vessel of sixty, and that although the painted towers and other signals had been removed the English made child's play of it (Les

(1) For a description of this place at the lower extremity of the Isle of Orleans, see p. 242 of Vol. IV.

(2) Page 220.

Anglais s'en jouèrent.) "They passed with vessels of from seventy to eighty guns; they passed by night as well as by day; they even passed several together tacking to windward. In consequence of this, M. Bigot knew, but too late, the inexperience of the pilots." It is evident from these facts, especially from the fact that even with pilots on board Admiral Saunders caused soundings to be made at intervals all the way up the river, that one must not attach too much importance to the part played by Denis de Vitré, Raby, and their fellow pilots. Indeed a British sailor who had been captured by the Indians stated after the passage of the Traverse that three days before he had taken soundings of the Channel, and that he could easily pilot a ship of 120 guns therein. This statement having been made in presence of the Governor and the principal French officers, the pilot of the port of Quebec was called and questioned. He declared that he had not taken soundings for the last 25 years, and that when he had proposed to do so, the necessary expenses had been refused. Thus the whole fleet of nearly two hundred sail approached Quebec with no molestation, excepting that the inhabitants fired upon the sounding boats near Rimouski, but as no lives were lost the Admiral attempted no reprisals.



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CHAPTER V.

BEFORE QUEBEC

TOWARDS the evening of the twenty sixth of June, the last of the British transports passed safely through the Traverse, slowly approached Quebec, and came to anchor without damage of any sort.

The view that met the gaze of the British invaders was one of rare beauty, and drew words of surprise and delight from several chroniclers. "It is a bountiful Island," says Sergeant Johnson, "and well cultivated, and produces all kinds of grain, pasture and vegetables; is full of villages, plantations, and abounding in people."

Knox says "Here we are entertained with a most agreeable prospect of a delightful country on every side; wind-mills, water-mills, churches, chapels, compact farm-houses all built with stone, and covered, some with wood, and others with straw."

The church near them was the parish church of St. Laurent, from which the city could not be seen. From the western point of the Island, a few miles distant, the city of Quebec with its cathedral, its college, its public and private buildings, rose against the horizon, in reality a city set

upon a hill. Its walls were guarded by batteries ⁽¹⁾ which swept the river towards the sea, and which themselves were so high as to be beyond the elevation of cannon upon vessels in the river below.

The lower town of the city was a narrow strip upon the water's edge some three hundred feet beneath, from which the cliff rose almost sheer. As the British looked upon this naturally fortified city it seemed to stand on an immense rocky plateau jutting into the river which disappeared from view around the Southern side. Could they have looked beyond they would have seen the same high forbidding cliffs turning towards the west from the city, and continuing for miles to form a barrier to the plateau above—a barrier they could hardly pass when unmolested and could not hope to pass at all with opposition. Between them and the city on their right was a broad sweeping bay whose muddy banks were bared by the receding tide. Here landing, even from shallow boats, would at any time be laborious and slow, and with fair defence impossible. But now earthworks had been thrown up from the river Montmorency, almost opposite the British vessels, to the river St. Charles near the city; and encamped within was the French army under the command of a skilful, experienced, and frequently victorious general, whose reputation was greater than that of the young commander of the British forces.

Besides, he knew every foot of the ground, could be expected to guard every vulnerable point, to make use of

(1) See the first pages of the Foligné journal in the appendix, Vol. IV.

every advantage of nature and art and finally to fight to the death. The British soldier has always considered himself superior to any other, and perhaps it is well that he should, but in this case he did not despise the enemy.

Wolfe had said significantly to Pitt "the Marshal must know that every man in Canada is a soldier"; and writing many years after, Quartermaster Sergeant Johnson, who was one of the army before Quebec, spoke of the inhabitants of Canada as "brave and resolute even to a proverb." The fate of Braddock and of Abercrombie had not gone from the memory of the British soldiery, nor were they ignorant of the fact that to assault an entrenched position with hope of success three to one should be the odds in favor of the attack, under conditions which then prevailed.

When for the first time Wolfe looked out upon the works and the position of his enemy he must have been perplexed. He had told his uncle a few weeks before ⁽¹⁾ that "to invest the place, (Quebec) and cut off all communication with the colony, it will be necessary to encamp with our right ⁽²⁾ to the river St. Lawrence, and our left to the river St. Charles. From the river St. Charles to Beauport the communication must be kept open by strong entrenched posts and redoubts."

This plan was very good, but Wolfe now saw that it was impossible for him to occupy his chosen ground, and

(1) Major Walter Wolfe. Letter of May 19, 1759, from Louisbourg.

(2) Those who are familiar with the city of Quebec and its vicinity will readily recognize the position chosen by Wolfe in advance; others may consult any of the plans contained in this work. This letter is more fully quoted on page 53 of this volume.

was soon to see the difficulties presented by the shore line above the city. He already had in his possession an admirable description of the city of Quebec, drawn up by Major Mackellar and accompanied by a plan with numerous references to the various fortifications of the French. ⁽¹⁾

The fleet arrived so late that it was impossible to disembark the troops on the evening of the twenty-sixth. However, a lieutenant and forty rangers effected a landing and occupied a farm house till day-break. On the following morning the British force began to land without opposition of any sort.

On the previous day 1200 Canadians and Indians had crossed over from the Island of Orleans to Beauport by the order of Vaudreuil who expected that an attack would be made there. Thus another opportunity to harass the enemy and to check their progress was lost, the first being the failure to set up batteries to rake the Traverse.

However, de Bougainville and the Engineer de Pontle-roy had made an examination of the Island and had reported that it was not susceptible of defense, while Montcalm is credited with a desire, overruled by de Vaudreuil, to erect batteries at Cap Tourmente.

Before noon the greater part of the army had formed upon the Island at St. Laurent, whose church was visited by Captain Knox and a few other officers.

The parish priest had gone, but before his departure he had found time to write a letter which he affixed to the church door. The letter was addressed "To the worthy

(1) This description is printed in extenso at the end of this volume.

officers of the British Army" and requested them to protect the church, and the priest's house which adjoined it. He also expressed his regret which we must understand as an expression of courtesy only, that the officers had not arrived earlier in the season in order that they might have enjoyed the radishes and asparagus, which were now, unfortunately, running to seed.

During the afternoon a heavy gale sprang up, causing some of the transports to foul, doing much damage to the boats, and even sinking some of them. Immediately after his arrival, General Wolfe prepared a proclamation to the inhabitants of Canada, which being translated into French was affixed to the door of the Church. This document has been severely criticised, but, as a French writer⁽¹⁾ says, it belongs to history and here it is :

" De par Son Excellence James Wolfe, major-général, colonel d'infanterie, commandant en chef des troupes de Sa Majesté britannique sur la rivière de Saint-Laurent.

" Le Roi mon maître, justement irrité contre la France, et résolu d'en rabattre la fierté, et de venger les insultes faites aux Colonies Anglaises, s'est aussi déterminé à envoyer un armement formidable de terre et de mer que les habitants voient avancer jusque dans le centre de leur pays. Il a pour but de priver la couronne de France des établissements les plus considérables dont elle jouit dans le nord de l'Amérique.

" C'est à cet effet qu'il lui a plu de m'envoyer dans ce

(1) Le R. P. X. Martin.—*Le Marquis de Montcalm*. " Ce document appartient à l'histoire. Il ne fait pas honneur à son auteur. Le voici : . . . "

pays à la tête de l'armée redoutable actuellement sous mes ordres. Les laboureurs, colons et paysans, les femmes, les enfants ni les ministres sacrés de la religion, ne sont point l'objet du ressentiment du Roi de la Grande-Bretagne; ce n'est point contre eux qu'il élève les bras. Il prévoit leurs calamités, plaint leur sort, et leur tend une main secourable.

“ Il est permis aux habitants de revenir dans leur famille et dans leurs habitations, je leur promets ma protection, et je les assure qu'ils pourront sans craindre les moindres molestations, y jouir de leurs biens, suivre le culte de leur religion, en un mot jouir au milieu de la guerre de toutes les douceurs de la paix, pourvu qu'ils s'engagent à ne prendre directement ou indirectement aucune part à une dispute qui ne regarde que les deux Couronnes. Si au contraire un entêtement déplacé et une valeur imprudente et inutile, leur font prendre les armes, qu'ils s'attendent à souffrir tout ce que la guerre offre de plus cruel. Il leur est aisé de se représenter à quels excès se porte la fureur d'un soldat effréné. Mes ordres seuls peuvent en arrêter le cours, et c'est aux Canadiens par leur conduite à se procurer cet avantage. Ils ne peuvent ignorer la situation présente. Une flotte considérable bouche le passage aux secours qu'ils pourraient se flatter de recevoir du côté de l'Europe, et une armée nombreuse les presse du côté du continent.

“ Le parti qu'ils ont à prendre ne paraît pas douteux. Que peuvent-ils attendre d'une vaine et aveugle opposition? Qu'ils en soient eux-mêmes les juges. Les cruautés inouïes que les Français ont exercées contre les sujets de la

Grande-Bretagne établis dans l'Amérique, pouvaient servir d'excuses aux représailles les plus sévères. Mais l'Anglais repousse ces barbares méthodes. Sa religion ne prêche que l'humanité, et son cœur en suit avec plaisir le précepte.

“ Si la folle espérance de nous repousser avec succès porte les Canadiens à nous refuser la neutralité que je leur propose, et leur donne la présomption de paraître les armes à la main, ils n'auront sujet de s'en prendre qu'à eux-mêmes, lorsqu'ils gémiront sous le poids de la misère à laquelle ils ne seront exposés par leur propre choix. Il sera trop tard de regretter les efforts inutiles de leur valeur martiale lorsque pendant l'hiver, ils verront périr de famine, tout ce qu'ils ont de plus cher.

“ Quant à moi, je n'aurai rien à me reprocher. Les droits de la guerre sont connus, et l'entêtement d'un ennemi fournit les moyens dont on se sert pour le mettre à la raison.

“ Il est permis aux habitants du Canada de choisir. Ils voient d'un côté l'Angleterre qui leur tend une main puissante et secourable,—son exactitude à remplir son engagement,—et comme elle s'offre à maintenir les habitants dans leurs droits et leurs possessions.

“ De l'autre côté la France, incapable de supporter ce peuple, abandonne leur cause dans le moment le plus critique, et si, pendant la guerre, elle leur a envoyé des troupes, à quoi leur ont-elle servi? à leur faire sentir avec plus d'amertume le poids d'une main qui les opprime, au lieu de les secourir.

“ Que les Canadiens consultent leur prudence! Leur sort dépend de leur choix.

“Donné à notre quartier général, à la paroisse Saint Laurent, Ile-d'Orléans, le 27 juin 1759.”

If Wolfe ever thought that the Canadians would heed the menacing invitation he gave them to remain neutral while he captured their country, he certainly showed less wisdom than usual.

Moreover, it is doubtful whether he felt the confidence he expressed in his manifesto or whether the whole document was prepared for its moral effect and with a view to his future operations. At any rate the inhabitants gave absolutely no heed to it, although it is said that one of them took it from the church door and carried it to Vaudreuil. To understand sympathetically Wolfe's mental attitude in the matter, we must try to realize the situation as it appeared to him. He knew the wretched, starved condition of the colony, and the oppression to which the inhabitants as distinguished from the official class had long been subject. Here was to him one motive for a change of masters. Although England had not yet learned the political wisdom of extending the powers of self government to her colonies, he knew that her administration would be far superior in every way to that of France.

The latter had not learned to govern her people by her people even at home.

What was more natural than that the Frenchman of Canada should avail himself of a good opportunity to escape from the vortex of corruption and maladministration which was overwhelming him, and for whose existence he was not in any way responsible? Probably too, he had

that subconscious conviction, always so common, that although a traitor to Britain is odious and contemptible, treachery to a hostile nation is venal, if not praiseworthy. If so, he grossly misjudged the character and the feelings of the people to whom he was appealing. With all her faults France—*la belle France*—was firmly planted in their affections.

The grandfathers with their proneness to reminiscence told of the beautiful vine clad hills, the fertile valleys and the rich meadows of their home land, now seen in fancy's eye through many years of toil in a rougher clime. The love of country, even though no longer founded on reason was a sentiment which had to be reckoned with, and which Wolfe ignored.

His proposition that all those who were not soldiers should refrain from activity against him was reasonable, and his threats of retaliation, even if ill timed, were not unjust. Although war was not intended against the inhabitants, they must not become the aggressors and use their farms for a base of supplies, and for means to annoy the enemy. Especially they must not be what are now called "snipers." But one more objection can be urged to the manifesto. It did not and could not reach the people who were concerned.

It was a proclamation, but the publication of it as such was a fiction, similar to the constitutional fiction of to-day that every man knows the law, and knows it before it is actually printed or accessible.

The document may be safely left, however, to the judgment of the reader.

The Marquis de Montcalm was now aware of the real and immediate danger to which he was subject. In common with other French officers he had overestimated the difficulties which the dangers of navigation in the river would interpose.

Now he had the British fleet within his view, crowded into the south channel of the river between the Island and the main land.

That the fleet would soon ride in the harbour had been anticipated as a possibility for some weeks, and preparations of an elaborate and expensive character had been undertaken. Eight "brulots" or fire ships had been purchased and fitted out with every kind of explosive and combustible that could be obtained. Four of Cadet's vessels had been purchased by Bigot with four others, at a total cost of 640,000 livres ⁽¹⁾ in bills of exchange payable in the following June.

Montcalm had said that these fire ships had cost nearly a million and, he feared, would be of no use.

It was intended to float these vessels down with the tide and current into the midst of the British fleet now huddled together and unable to move freely, and thus to fire the whole fleet as it lay helpless.

A meeting was held for the purpose of devising a suitable plan for the adventure.

A man of rare courage ⁽²⁾ and coolness was needed as commandant of the little squadron of fire ships. One

(1) Mémoire pour M. Bigot.

(2) See the Foligné Document for the names of the commanding officers of the respective ships.

Captain Delouche, a young man of zeal, enthusiasm and confidence was convinced that he could succeed.

His own opinion of himself was accepted and Vaudreuil ordered him to take the command. On the evening of the 28th of June, seven of the fire ships were in readiness, and at about ten o'clock, the weather being fair and the wind favorable, they began to drop down the stream.

The plan of attack was simple, but still, there was a lack of definite organization.

The only detail agreed upon was that the captain of the foremost ship should ignite his vessel and by firing two guns give the signal to the others.

The seven rafts approached at some distance from one another until the first had passed Point Levis and was still a long way from the British fleet when through fear, it would be charitable to say through an error of judgment, the commanding officer ignited his vessel and deserted it. This was accepted as a signal by five others from whose ships projectiles were soon flying in every direction.

The panic did not strike Captain Dubois de la Multière, a hero whose name should be preserved from oblivion. He continued on his way hoping for half an hour to come within a reasonable distance of the enemy before firing his explosives. Finally, he found himself beset in front and rear by the burning ships, and being unable to escape he, his second officer, and a sailor perished.

When the British saw the first raft approaching they began to take precautions to protect their shipping, and some sailors put off in boats watching for an opportunity to grapple the rafts and tow them away.

Their fortitude in the face of danger was not put to a severe test, for with rejoicing they discovered the harmlessness of the burning vessels, and with loud huzzas towed them ashore where they illumined the vicinity for several hours.

During the previous day their fleet had withstood the fury of wind and wave, and now when a second catastrophe was averted the sailors regarded their deliverance as a good omen.

The French had gathered to watch the progress of their unusual plan of attack, Montcalm and his officers having stationed themselves in a commanding position near Beauport church.

They were much disappointed at the failure of the enterprise and roundly denounced Delouche and his comrades. They regretted that the command had been refused to a M. Courval, who, they now imagined, would have been successful. Courval could certainly not have done worse and might easily have done much better, but it is doubtful whether he could have caused much damage to the British ships.

In Major Mackellar's description of Quebec, already cited, is the statement that Baron Dieskau and his aid de camp, M. Bernier talked at New York of an invention the French had made for infallibly destroying the ships going up the river. "At Quebec,"⁽¹⁾ the major says, "we found this Invention to be what [they] call (Radeaux a Feu) fire

(1) When does not appear, but the description was evidently written before the fire rafts were sent down as here recorded.

Rafts, of which there is a Store provided. They are Loggs of Timber tyed together by the Ends so as to form a chain, and coated over with the strong composition; they are to be set in Fire where the Ships are near and floated off from some of the Islands down the Stream and clinging round the Ships Bows set them on Fire."

"Tho, this Invention does not Seem to threaten much danger, especially if the Boats are out, it is advisable to be prepared against its taking Effect."

Although the appearance of these fire ships, more formidable than the British could expect from the description just given, threw the pickets into a panic, it is likely that the officers were neither surprised nor unprepared.

However, the citizens of Quebec were not less disappointed than the French officers and soldiers. They indignantly assembled at the Chateau St. Louis and demanded that all the captains concerned in the inglorious attempt be put on trial. They even insulted the returned captains whom they greeted with cries of "treason" and "treachery." Vaudreuil listened to the complaints of the citizens and in order that proceedings might be regular he summoned the captains to appear before him ⁽¹⁾ to explain their conduct.

As usual in such cases each one was blameless, according to his version of the affair. They all declared that they simply carried out instructions, and fired their ships after Delouche gave the signal.

(1) It would appear by the Foligné document that Montcalm took part in the enquiry. *Journal de Foligné*, p. 172.

Delouche, with great effrontery and inconsequence blamed Bigot and M. Mercier for forcing him to depart before his preparations were entirely made, and left the impression that they had done so in order that the plan should miscarry. He did not show, however, any reason for firing his own ship when half a mile from the enemy, and when the others were much more distant.

Upon this the whole matter rested. In Montcalm's Journal, Levis collection, it is sarcastically stated that the ships were fired three leagues from the British fleet. Although these explanations and recriminations saved the culprits from punishment they did not satisfy the accusers.

One of the captains who apparently voiced the general sentiment admitted that they had played the part of cowards. "There remains one "brûlot," he cried, let us mitigate our shame by success or death. His noble sentiment found response from one; the rest including Delouche who had so loudly proclaimed his innocence and his zeal a few moments before, kept silence.

Thus ended the costly experiment, upon the success of which so much dependence had been placed by the French.

It had been to their interest to magnify the dangers of the river navigation and their ability to defend themselves against attack from that side, but the British navy was equal to all emergencies that arose.

In the afternoon of the 29th of June, Colonel Carleton with the Louisbourg Grenadiers, Major Dalling's Light Infantry, and two companies of Rangers, were ordered to encamp upon the Island of Orleans opposite Montmorency Falls, and in the evening, General Monkton's brigade and

three companies of Light Infantry were ferried across the south channel and marched to Beaumont where they encamped for the night.

Next morning, Monckton's troops, while returning to Levis, were attacked by a French scouting party of about sixty Canadians and thirty Indians, which was augmented as soon as assistance could be sent for by a re-inforcement of three hundred more Canadians and Savages, commanded by MM. Charet and Legris.

A brisk encounter ensued at close range, the British troops continuing their march as well as possible under a galling fire from the enemy, which adapting itself to the conditions of the country took advantage of cover.

The Savages succeeded in taking about a dozen scalps, some French diarists give as many as thirty, from the fallen British, and one prisoner, while the French escaped without loss. The scouts were too few to profit by their opportunity and decided to encamp upon the ground. Their prisoner was sent to Vaudreuil to whom he declared that the British really intended to make, the next night, a descent upon Beauport and had sent troops to the south side simply to distract the attention of the enemy and divide their force. In consequence of this tale Vaudreuil withdrew his scouts from Levis and kept his camp in readiness for the attack that never came.

Whether the prisoner acted in good faith or not, we do not know, but presumably he did. On more than one occasion during the progress of the siege, Wolfe changed his plans abruptly, and so far as his letter writing critics could see without the colour of reason.

These changes, however, coincided remarkably with the escape of deserters. He was accused by some, to whom of course he did not communicate either his plans or his reasons, of acting with great fickleness. The value of surprise in warfare is well known, and the difficulty of planning for attack is often much increased by the necessity of keeping the enemy in doubt and suspense, in a state of equal readiness at several points and thus weak in all.

The prisoner gave one reassuring piece of information when he said that there were about 10,000 men of the land-force before Quebec in place of the 20,000 previously claimed by the prisoners who had been captured down the river.

Montcalm now expecting an attack from the Beauport river to the St. Charles made his dispositions accordingly. He ordered Levis to draw the left wing over towards the centre and he stationed the cavalry at la Canardière.

The French army assembled at Beauport consisted of five battalions of from 700 to 800 men in each battalion, with the troops of the colony, a number of Indians, and the militia, making a total of about 14,000 men.

The church of Beauport was the centre of the camp; the left extended to the Falls of Montmorency, and the right to the Decoy. The battalions of Royal Roussillon, the volunteers of Dubrel, the militia of Montreal and all the Indians, were upon the left under the command of the Chevalier de Levis. Monsieur Dumas commanded the right wing, composed of the militia of Quebec, of Three Rivers, and a part of the troops of the Colony. Monsieur de Senezergue, Brigadier General, commanded the centre

of the camp, and had under his orders the battalions of La Sarre, Languedoc, Guyenne and Bearn.

The headquarters were established in the house of Monsieur de Vienne, called "La Mistanguienne."

The garrison of the town was composed of the burghers and seamen, and consisted of about 2000 men. The troops and the burghers did duty with one another, and the seamen and their officers were employed at the batteries under the command of artillery officers. The troops in the garrison were relieved every four days from the camp. A company of pioneers under the command of the Surveyor, or builder of ships to His Majesty the King of France, conducted the works during the siege. Monsieur de Ramesay, Lieutenant of the King, commanded the town, and had under him, Monsieur le Chevalier de Berne, to whom the defence of the Lower Town was particularly entrusted.

The question of fortifying Point Levis before it could be occupied by the British had engaged the attention of Montcalm before he heard of the skirmish to which reference has been made. He went up to the city especially to urge Vaudreuil to have a large detachment sent over to the Point and from him he learned of the attack which the prisoner alleged to be intended. The Governor and the General seemed agreed, however, not to send a detachment until after the expected attack upon the Beauport lines.

As the descent did not take place, Vaudreuil expressed the wish that the order which he had given and countermanded on the previous day be carried out and that 1200 men proceed to Levis.

He, however, re-examined the prisoner who persisted in his former statement, and asserted that General Wolfe had actually issued all the orders for the descent, which would surely take place.

The Marquis again withdrew his command.

Again the French army remained under arms all night, but the British did not appear.

On the second of July, according to the writer of Montcalm's Journal that day, the General dictated a *mémoire* relating to the expedition to Point Levis which was sent at once to the Marquis de Vaudreuil.

This memoire presented the case in "all its details" and in "all points of view," but was not accepted by Vaudreuil.

Montcalm saw the great strategic value of Levis, which was so situated as to command the Town if batteries were set up there.

Had this position been taken by the French as it should have been, and held, as it might or might not have been, the city would have been saved from effective bombardment.

The Island was too distant for the cannon of the day, and the elevation from ships would have been so great that little damage could have been done from that source.

Besides, the British fleet would have been much hampered in its operations had a strong French battery been ready to play from the heights on the south shore. However, Montcalm soon saw that the proper time for occupying Levis had passed, for by the aid of telescopes and by information brought by Canadians and Indians he ascertained

that the British had at least 5000 men and many pieces of artillery opposite Quebec, where Wolfe was willing to risk a battle even with his forces divided.

Wolfe escorted by Monckton and the Light Infantry had reconnoitred the north shore for two miles in the hope of finding a place suitable for attack below the city.

On the 4th of July in the morning an attempt was made to land the Officers' tents, but the men were compelled to abandon their task on account of a heavy hail storm which continued for six hours.

The French observing that the defence of the Island of Orleans had been greatly reduced by the withdrawal of so many troops to Point Levis, contemplated sending over 5,000 men to occupy the Island. The project was abandoned owing to the unfavourable condition of the weather. In the afternoon a boat was sent up the river bearing a flag of truce from the Admiral to the Town. The bearer conveyed a message from General Wolfe to the Governor General, to the effect that it was the intention of the British army to attack Quebec on behalf of the King, and also informed the Governor that His Majesty desired the war to be carried on with the utmost leniency. The General therefore hoped that the inhuman practice of scalping would not be resorted to in the future either by Canadians or Indians; that the British would observe this rule, and would surely avenge any departure from it. At the same time General Wolfe offered to liberate twenty-five ladies who had been taken on the river near Miramichi, amongst whom were Madam Pomeray, Madam Beaumont and her daughter and daughter-in-law. The boat carried the French

colours in the bow, and the British colours astern. When the boat came within gun shot of the Town, a vessel was sent from the garrison to receive her errand. In the evening a boat came down the river carrying the British colours in the bow and the French flag astern. A white flag was then hoisted in the bow of the "Trent" and a French officer, the Chevalier le Mercier, came on board. He delivered a polite message to the Admiral from the Marquis de Vaudreuil, to the effect that when the British fleet and army had finished gasconading in the French territories, the two gentlemen belonging to the fleet under the command of Admiral Durell, who were captured near Ile-aux-Coudres, would be liberated, and that in the meantime they would be treated with due respect. When the French saw the boat approaching with the flag of truce, they thought that it was simply a pretext on the part of the British to ascertain the strength of the city, and that an engineer was probably disguised as a sailor for the purpose. They therefore sent out a boat to receive the message.

This was the first exchange of a flag of truce between the two armies.

Several batteries directed against the town were commenced at Pointe-aux-Pères on the following day. To protect the men engaged in this work, Major Dalling's Light Infantry and a battalion of the forty-eighth regiment were encamped and canteened, close to the site. Several boats passed to and fro between the Admiral's ship and the town, returning the ladies according to the terms arranged on the previous day. At this time many acts of politeness and courtesy were exchanged.

The advantageous position occupied by the French rendered the operations of General Wolfe exceedingly difficult.

From the heights of Beauport, or from the rock upon which Quebec stands, the whole of the British camp could be distinctly seen. Every movement made by the British was met with a corresponding movement on the part of the French. The erection of the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères was therefore a perilous undertaking, and on the first day sixteen men were killed by the French floating batteries which hovered near. Admiral Saunders rendered valuable assistance at this time by sending a frigate to keep the river clear. Similar works were commenced at the west end of the Island of Orleans, but until they were all completed the British were in an unenviable position.

The attitude of the inhabitants was a source of much anxiety to General Wolfe at this time. Skirmishes were reported daily, although it was the General's desire that the Canadians should not be molested.

In the General Orders issued from the camp at Orleans on this day, the objects of the campaign, and the General's intentions towards the inhabitants were clearly set forth.

“ The object of this campaign is to complete the conquest of Canada, and to finish the war in America. The army under the Commander-in-chief will enter the colony on the side of Montreal, while the fleet and army here attack the Governor General and his forces. Great sufficiency of provisions and a numerous artillery are provided; and from the known valour of the troops the nation expects success. These battalions have acquired reputation

“ in the last campaign, and it is not to be doubted but they
“ will be careful to preserve it. From this confidence the
“ General has assured the Secretary of State in his letters,
“ that, whatever may be the event of the campaign, His
“ Majesty and the country will have reason to be satisfied
“ with the army under his command. The General means
“ to carry the business through with as little loss as pos-
“ sible, and with the highest regard for the preservation of
“ the troops. To that end he expects that the troops work
“ cheerfully and without the least unsoldierlike murmur
“ or complaint, and that his few but necessary orders will
“ be obeyed.

“ As the safety of the army depends in a great measure
“ upon the vigilance of the outguards, any officer, or non-
“ commissioned officer, who shall suffer himself to be sur-
“ prised by the enemy, must not expect to be forgiven.
“ False alarms are hurtful in an army, and dishonour-
“ able to those who occasion them. The outposts are to be
“ sure that the enemy are in motion before they send
“ their intelligence. In most attacks by night it must be
“ remembered that bayonets are preferable to fire. No
“ church, houses, or buildings of any kind, are to be des-
“ troyed without orders. The persons that remain in their
“ habitations, their women and children, are to be treated
“ with humanity. If any violence be offered to a woman, the
“ offender shall be punished with death. If any persons
“ are detected robbing the tents of officers or soldiers, they
“ will be, if condemned, certainly executed.

“ The commanders of regiments are to be answerable
“ that no rum, or spirits of any kind, be sold in or near the

“ camp. When the soldiers are fatigued with work, or wet
“ upon duty, the general will order such refreshment as
“ he knows will be of service to them, but is determined
“ to allow no drunkenness or licentiousness in the army.
“ If any sutler has the presumption to bring rum on shore,
“ in contempt of the General's regulations, such sutler
“ shall be sent to the Provost in irons and his goods con-
“ fiscated. The General will make it his business, so far
“ as he is able, to reward such as particularly distinguish
“ themselves, and on the other hand, will punish misbe-
“ haviour in an exemplary manner.”

Monsieur Charest, with a small body of Canadians reconnoitred the British camp at Levis between the church and the mill, and reported to M. de Vaudreuil that the camp was almost evacuated. He therefore desired that troops should be sent to attack the British position. His request was not granted, as the French observed from the city that the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères were rapidly progressing, even if there were only a few men there. A rumour was circulated in the British camp that some more fire ships would be sent down the river, in consequence of which the Admiral ordered a number of boats to be kept on the river as a row-guard.

On the sixth, a barge belonging to Admiral Saunders, engaged in taking soundings of the river, was captured by armed men in a canoe. When the boat passed near the shore the sailors jumped into the river and escaped with little injury.

The constant movement of the British troops caused

much speculation amongst French officers, for they were unable to determine whether the greater part of the army was at Point Levis or upon the Island of Orleans. The French employed a new floating battery, mounted with 14 pieces of cannon, two of which were 24 pounders, six, 18 pounders, and six, twelve pounders. This formidable battery was a source of much annoyance and danger to the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères, until two powerful vessels of the fleet brought their guns to bear on the battery. There was a brisk engagement between a French frigate and some boats above the Falls of Montmorency on this day.

7th. The forty-eighth regiment was ordered to take up a position within a strong redoubt situate 2,500 feet in the rear of the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères. This place was afterwards known as "Burton's Redoubt." The French bombarded the batteries during the whole day. General Wolfe remained within the redoubt directing the return fire. Three hundred men of the Light Infantry, under Major Dalling, were ordered to conceal themselves within a swamp inclosed by a wood until 10 o'clock at night, when they were to march to Beaumont. The troops reached Beaumont Church at midnight, where they were quartered until day-break.

8th. Towards noon, some Canadians were observed on the outskirts of a wood near Beaumont, and a company was detached to make them prisoners. They did not succeed, however, but in the place of prisoners they brought into camp a quantity of household furniture and apparel, and many head of cattle.

The action of the soldiers greatly displeased Major Dalling, who immediately ordered the household goods and clothing to be deposited within the church and placed at the disposal of the owners. The ships cannonaded M. de Levy's camp, and one man was slightly wounded by a shell.

9th. M. de Levy broke up his camp and retired within his entrenchments. The British troops returned from Beaumont to Levis, and immediately struck their tents and sought the cover of a wood where they remained twelve hours. In the meantime Monckton's Brigade marched some miles above the town on the bank of the river, while the lighter vessels of the fleet came as close to the shore as the depth of the water would allow, and opened fire upon the French lines between the river St. Charles and Montmorency. These various movements were made for the purpose of "amusing the enemy" while General Wolfe and a great part of his army crossed over from the Island of Orleans to the east of the Falls of Montmorency.

The General's purpose was accomplished with slight loss, and he was now separated from the French by the rocky chasm of the Falls. By night fall the British were strongly intrenched and had brought some of their guns to bear upon the French works. Wolfe now possessed three distinct camps: Montmorency, Point Levis, and the Island of Orleans.

According to Townshend's account, his brigade made the second embarkation. When he landed on the Montmorency shore, he found no one awaiting him to show him the way, although the night was very dark, that had

been taken by the first brigade which had preceded him under the command of General Wolfe in person. He found the baggage of the Grenadiers and Light Infantry left in a string in the meadows near the shore with no officer in charge, no orders, and with nowhere five men together, so that ten savages might have plundered the whole and massacred the men one by one. Townshend assembled the baggage and left a body of men to guard it, and that belonging to his own brigade.

He then pressed on to the higher ground taking a road to the right, and after one regiment had ascended the hill he halted and sent a detachment to haul up the guns.

Upon arriving at the camp after day break, he received a mild reprimand in the form of a hint that he had been dilatory. However, he had halted only to put a proper escort over the baggage, which General Wolfe had neglected to do, and to get the guns up the hill; Townshend complained of this in his journal and of the fact, too, that he had not even time to examine several copses through which he passed, and that there had not been a single connecting file on the way to direct him.

After Townshend's arrival he learned from Carleton the disposition that had been made of the forces which were already on the ground, but the former criticised this action of Carleton, and the new position as well which was chosen by Wolfe while they were in conversation. "By this position," says Townshend, "we should have had our front to our friends on the Isle of Orleans—our right flank to the enemy and a pass under the falls—and our rear open to the woods and be exposed to the incursion of all the sav-

ages they chose to pass over the fords up the river to annoy us."

Without knowing Wolfe's reasons for the position just described, we may say that Townshend's objections were sound, but it must be recollected that these objections have the advantage of coming after the event.

Wolfe's reasons for his actions on occasions when he departed from the usual military rules, as every general must sometimes do, are not given in the journals.

We have Townshend's word for the fact that he did not frequently consult his brigadiers during the campaign ⁽¹⁾ and it is certain that he would take no trouble to justify himself to Townshend by explaining his motives for any particular course of action.

However, during the morning, a detachment of Canadians and Indians that had been sent across the Montmorency to annoy the British advance party rushed suddenly down from the height in rear of the British lines and drove a few Rangers therefrom down to Townshend's quarters for refuge.

Here the savages scalped thirteen or fourteen men and wounded two officers before they were driven off by Bragg's Grenadiers, while Murray's Grenadiers made an unsuccessful attempt to surround them. In this situation Townshend remained with his brigade until near night, when although he had no orders to entrench he thought it necessary to provide some protection against a night attack.

Accordingly in less than three hours he ran up a parapet

(1) Page 195, vol. V. See also letter of James Gibson, page 65, vol V.

with re-entering angles to cover the front of the two battalions facing the accessible part of the country.

Moreover, he fortified by means of a parapet around his house *à barbette* for cannon which could rake the rocky height above from which the Indians could before annoy him. In short he made his camp secure and unattackable.

During the night, there were no alarms although the Indians were still lurking about. The next morning, Wolfe who had gone early to rest the night before, appeared, and Townshend reported what steps he had taken to secure his camp. The General went around the front and disapproved not of the fortifying of the camp, but of the manner in which it was done. Townshend was told that he had indeed made himself secure for he had made a fortress.

What reply he made to his General does not appear, but in his notes he makes a spirited defence ⁽¹⁾ of his work and especially shows that he might easily have been forgiven for making his work too strong in three hours time! Although a careful perusal of Townshend's version of the matter will still leave room for the opinion that he took more trouble than the circumstances of the case required, yet it will show that he was energetic, careful, and at the same time quite modern in his ideas. ⁽²⁾

(1) Page 243, vol. V,

(2) Lt. Col. C. V. F. Townshend, C. B., D. S. O., a descendant of General George Townshend, has just published, 1901, "*The Military Life of Field Marshal George, First Marquess Townshend.*"

He says that he has a rough sketch in George Townshend's pocket book, showing the form of these breastworks, "in which all modern requirements in the shape of flank fire, etc., are provided for." It is the opinion of Col. Townshend that his ancestor "was far more advanced in his views than Wolfe."

That Townshend was much hurt, although not a particularly sensitive man, by his general's criticism is very apparent from his notes. He records the fact that he reported to Wolfe at about this time that he had observed some French officers reconnoitring from the opposite side of the Montmorency as if with the intention of establishing a battery there in order to open fire upon the British flank.

Townshend's apprehensions "were treated lightly" and two of his cannon were removed "to grace the park of artillery, the General chose to ornament his quarters with upon the descent of the hill, and our whole right and front left without any."

The next day, Townshend saw an officer with an escort, who he thought was very like Montcalm, examining the British camp from the same spot. He acquainted Wolfe with this who rather laughed at it and at Townshend's expectation of any annoyance from that part.

While upon the subject of the unpleasantness which existed between these two men we may record the severe rebuff which Wolfe administered to his brigadier a few days later.

In Townshend's words, with spelling altered, this is what occurred. "I heard that the General was set out for the Point of Orleans, thence to pass over to the Point of Levis, leaving me the first officer in the camp, not only without orders but even ignorant of his departure or time of return. Upon this I ran down as fast as I could (just recovered of a fever) to the water side—and having desired Mr. Caldwell to stop him till I could come up with him.

He received me in a very stately manner, not advancing

five steps. I told him that if I had suspected his intention of going over I had waited on him for his commands which I should be glad to receive and execute to his satisfaction. 'Sir,' says he very drily, 'the Adjutant General has my orders; permit me, Sir, to ask are the troops to encamp now on their new ground or not to do it until the enemy's battery begins to play'?"

Wolfe, as already stated, now had three distinct camps in the presence of the enemy, one on the Island of Orleans, in the centre of the river St. Lawrence, one at Levis, on the south shore opposite Quebec, and the third on the north shore in a line with the French entrenchments from which it was separated by the river Montmorency.

For this division of his already small army, Wolfe has been criticised. He violated to be sure what is considered an elementary principle of strategy, but he was not ignorant of that fact.

The plan of his wily and skilful adversary had developed before him during the past fortnight, and he was certain that it was the Fabian policy which Montcalm had determined to pursue. Otherwise it would be impossible to account for the fact that the British fleet had been allowed to pass the Traverse unmolested, that the Island of Orleans was not fortified, that Wolfe was allowed to disembark his troops at his pleasure, that Levis was not occupied, and finally that the fire ship fiasco was not followed up by any offensive demonstration.

Wolfe could draw from this series of considerations the conclusion that Montcalm must be tempted to come out of his lines, even if from his previous knowledge of the

condition of the colony and its military strength he could not have anticipated the French plan.

No doubt he was willing to give the enemy some advantages, in the expectation that his own smaller number of thoroughly disciplined troops would be more than a match for the few French regulars and the French militia in a pitched battle.

He was now threatening the left of the French position and hoped either to cross the Montmorency at a ford some three miles above the Falls and attack from the rear or to cross below the Falls where the river enters the St. Lawrence.

While the principal post of the British army was thus threatening the French left, and Montcalm's lines were admittedly too long for the force at his disposal, or rather his force was too small for the extent of the lines he had to defend, there was little danger that the French would detach any considerable force for an expedition against the camp at Levis or the one on the Island.

In such circumstances, the parcelling up of the British forces was a wise action if it was intended to encourage the French to take the offensive. In fact Wolfe, in conversation with some French prisoners a little later, expressed his astonishment that Montcalm had not attacked him in force, saying that there had been opportunities enough offered.

When the French observed that the camps at Levis and on the Island of Orleans were greatly diminished, they expected the design was to attack Beauport. They however, sent out some Indians and Canadians as far as the

Falls, who were surprised. Two Canadians and the interpreter of the Indians were killed and several were wounded. The scouts reported that the British had 5,000 men posted on the heights of Ange-Gardien. The Marquis de Levis sent some troops to assist the Canadians, but when they arrived it was too late. The French sent a mortar to the Beauport shore in the afternoon which bombarded the ships and forced them to retire out of range.

The Marquis de Vaudreuil, now encouraged by the strategy of the enemy, proposed to attack the British in force, and held a council of war to determine upon a plan. The result of this council was that the troops remained in their trenches. The only voice at the council in favour of an attack was the Intendant Bigot, whose reasons are here given :

1. " Que l'ennemi était dans une position très désavantageuse, puisque le terrain qu'il occupait était absolument commandé par les bois d'ou nous devons l'attaquer.

2. " Qu'en supposant que nous eussions été repoussés, ces mêmes bois eussent toujours assuré notre retraite, puisque non-seulement il fallait les traverser pour gagner les gués de la rivière, mais c'est qu'encore étant très fourrés et adossés à de hautes montagnes, ils n'étaient certainement point susceptibles d'être tournés.

3. " Que la raison des subsistances méritait aussi une sérieuse attention. Le pays éprouvait déjà une grande disette ; il devait donc paraître d'autant plus essentiel de faire tous ses efforts pour tâcher de mettre l'ennemi dans le cas de lever promptement le siège de Québec ; qu'en

“ admettant même qu’il n’eût pu s’emparer de vive force
“ de cette place, il était toujours à craindre pour nous qu’en
“ faisant traîner les choses en longueur, il ne nous eut mis
“ par le défaut de vivres, dans la nécessité de lui en ouvrir
“ les portes et par conséquent celles de toute la Colonie.
“ On sait que rien n’est plus casuel que la récolte de ce
“ pays, et il fallait que celle de cette année fut aussi abon-
“ dante qu’elle l’a été (contre le cours ordinaire des choses)
“ pour qu’on n’y éprouvât pas les rigueurs de la famine ;
“ d’ailleurs, nous n’avions pas besoin de toutes nos forces
“ pour attaquer M. Wolfe dans le poste désavantageux
“ qu’il occupait ; j’ajouterai qu’il ne se voit jamais plus
“ d’ardeur que n’en montrèrent dans cette occasion, le
“ soldat, le Canadien et le sauvage, et je dois à plusieurs
“ officiers des différents corps la justice de dire, qu’ils paru-
“ rent désespérés de voir négliger des dispositions aussi
“ heureuses.”

In Montcalm's Journal it is recorded under date of the 6th of July that the Intendant proposed to attack the enemy in order to diminish the number of mouths, and that he wished to take by authority all the wheat in the colony, as well as the approaching harvest, and distribute it at the rate of half a pound a head amongst the inhabitants and soldiers. This piece of extreme socialism would have caused the concealment of all grain as had occurred before. Montcalm formally opposed both of these schemes, and gave his views in writing, as it had become his custom to do for his own protection in important matters.

Three days later the Intendant had further military

advice to offer, and this time he was seconded by the Governor, if indeed the latter were not the instigator of it.

They wished to cross the Montmorency to attack the enemy, but the contrary view prevailed, Montcalm being supported by all but these two men, neither of whom was an adept in warfare upon land. It is worthy of special remark that Montcalm's policy of defence was deliberately taken and consistently held by him until the surprise of the 13th of September, and that in his policy he was in perfect unanimity with his principal officers, including de Levis. Indeed, the latter had drawn up a plan of defence in the month of April, which was in harmony with that pursued by Montcalm. Those who can hardly forgive Montcalm for what they regard as his fatal errors on the 13th of September, which will be discussed in the proper place, are accustomed to say that had de Levis been in supreme command during the campaign, the end would have been different. It might indeed have been different but there is nothing to indicate, and this is no disparagement of de Levis, that he could have done better or that his general plans would have differed from Montcalm's. (1)

On the 10th of July, a soldier deserted from the British camp and crossed over to Quebec.

He told the officers that six fourteen inch mortars and eight thirty-two pounders would be ready that night, or at farthest next morning to play upon the town; that 6,000

(1) Another plan of the campaign was drawn up by the Chevalier de Levis on the 10th of June. It is now in the possession of the Marquess Townshend.

to 6,500 men had landed at Beaupré, and that not more than 1000 remained at the camp at Point Levis.

This information was probably the cause of what is described in a journal on the following day as a fermentation in the heads of the inhabitants of Quebec, who wished to govern and to direct the operations of war. "The lieutenant general of police, Chevalier de Saint-Jean de Latran united with *l'agent du commerce* to present a plan to the Marquis de Vaudreuil; and thereupon it was determined to send to the south side a detachment under command of Mr. Dumas, major and inspector of the troops of the Colony."

It would appear from this that Montcalm simply concurred with reluctance in the plan which was carried into execution a few days later.

Lt.-Col. Townshend in his *Military Life of Field Marshal George, 1st Marquess Townshend*,⁽¹⁾ in order to

(1) This book is very interesting because of the fact that it is written, not only by a descendant of Brigadier General Townshend, but by an officer in the British army whose reputation as a soldier is good, and whose experience is wide.

However, a not unnatural bias in favor of Townshend and an irritation as against Wolfe, which is caused no doubt by the severe treatment which General Townshend has received at the hands of historians, have shown themselves too plainly where judicial treatment is expected.

Moreover, although the military observations which the author makes from time to time are instructive and pointed, his evident want of knowledge of the topography of Quebec and his limited acquaintance with documents concerning the Siege, other than the Townshend papers, have placed him at a serious disadvantage.

Things which he speaks of as "mysteries" from his point of view are no mysteries at all to a subaltern militia officer in Quebec. We shall have occasion to mention some of these points from time to time in general terms or by specific reference to Col. Townshend's book. It will suffice to say that the incident regarding the parcelling up of the army is an illustration of the fact that a knowledge of details is necessary for a

make a point against Wolfe, when criticising him for parcelling up his forces into three parts, declares that "Montcalm was not slow to notice Wolfe's error in frittering up his forces, and at once determined to try to surprise Monckton at Point Levis at night." The fact is, as has already been intimated, Wolfe was not guilty of an error in this particular instance. He took risks, but events justified his judgment. Montcalm had declined to accept the invitation of Wolfe, and the suggestion of his own colleagues the Intendant and the Governor, to attack the Montmorency camp of the British, and now he had no wish to empty his trenches in order to send a sufficient force to Levis while the main part of the British army was ready to enter them across the Montmorency.

The French expended their ammunition somewhat freely in an attempt to destroy the British batteries on the tenth, but orders had been given to fire with moderation.

"We have," says Montcalm's Journal, "an immense number of cannon, enough mortars, four thousand bombs, many bullets, but powder is lacking. On that subject many things could be said."

In the evening of the same day the British drew up a vessel as near as possible to the Beauport shore and fired broadsides into the camp, which caused the French to alter their position and seek the shelter of a wood.

trustworthy judgment on military matters, even when one does not wish to be guided by preconceived military notions. As an illustration of the limitations as to local knowledge, we may quote two sentences which appear in page 250 of the *Military Life*: "As for the province of Quebec it is as much French now as in the time of Wolfe and Montcalm. French emigrants arrive there daily." Remarks are superfluous.

This alteration in the position of the French camp rendered the battery erected by the British at Montmorency on the 9th practically useless. "Nevertheless it is to be hoped that our engineers will use their utmost efforts to reconnoitre their situation, and erect on some advantageous ground another for their amusement." The Marquis de Montcalm appears to have thought that the amusement was confined to the British side, and he did not consider the proximity of Wolfe's camp as a serious menace. When the Marquis de Levis urged Montcalm to dislodge the British from this position, he replied "Drive them thence and they will give us more trouble; while they are there they cannot hurt us, let them amuse themselves."

By occupying this position Wolfe hoped to be able to penetrate the French lines, and finally to cut his way through to the city on this side; but he soon discovered that Montcalm's position was too strong. He also endeavoured by making feints to cross the stream, and by countermarching in view of the enemy's camp, to draw the French from their trenches and engage them in open battle. The French General however, was still too wary to be thus tempted.

While Wolfe's operations were being closely watched at Montmorency, additional batteries were commenced at Pointe-aux-Pères. The British also commenced the construction of rafts for transporting the troops on this day. They were made upon a plan projected by the Chevalier Tolzar, "except that some had alterations made by one—Frizer—one of the many quacks which we import from

“foreign services.” The Canadians renewed their representations to the Marquis de Vaudreuil for permission to form a strong detachment with which to cross to Levis and destroy the British works. The General, who was acquainted with the intrepidity of the farmers, promised to send a detachment under the command of Major Dumas, notwithstanding the remonstrance that had reached him from other quarters.

12th. Early in the morning, four Sauteur Indians penetrated the British camp near Ange-Gardien, and killed two men. Two of the Indians were wounded. The British heard the shots, and moved towards the post commanded by Captain de Repentigny which protected the pass on the hill near the Falls.⁽¹⁾ The Captain gave the order to fire, and killed a great many, but only lost two Canadians.

Two additional batteries were opened at Pointe-aux-Pères, one consisted of six thirty-two pounders, and the other of five thirteen inch mortars. In the evening a sky rocket was sent up as a signal for all the batteries to play upon the town. The first shells fell short of the town, much to the amusement of the French in the Upper Town, but they soon perceived that they were causing great havoc in the Lower Town. At noon, on this day, several boats were observed falling down the river and landing men. As a

(1) Repentigny's post, which appears to have been of considerable importance, is not indicated on the ordinary plans of the Siege, as it was too far north. In a fine manuscript plan, eight feet in length, in the Library of Congress at Washington, Repentigny's camp is shown on an extension. It was situate about 8000 feet north-west of Wolfe's head quarters at Montmorency. A fac simile of this plan is in the possession of the authors.

great many red coats could be distinguished amongst them, it was thought that they were prisoners from Amherst's regiments.

M. Dumas who commanded the detachment designed to proceed to Point Levis conducted his men to Cap Rouge, above Quebec, to be prepared to cross the river at night to the south shore, and to surprise the British on the next morning at day-break. The detachment of about 1500 men, was composed of 150 regulars under the command of Captain Dumas, of the regiment of Languedoc, a number of students of the Seminary, a body of militia and a large number of citizens. "He would have had a larger number had all those who earnestly entreated been allowed to go." Even the magistrates appeared willing to join. As the batteries at Levis were all playing against the town the expedition postponed its operations.

13th. The French commenced a battery which threatened the British position at Montmorency. The General therefore made a fresh disposition of his troops and marked out the ground for a battery to oppose the French fire. Owing to the heavy rains which fell the batteries were silent on both sides. General Wolfe passed over from Montmorency and remained in the camp at Point Levis all night, as there was a rumour of an intended attack.

In the evening, the expedition led by Monsieur Dumas again crossed the river and prepared to put its plans into operation. The detachment was divided into two columns and the first column advanced to strike the coup. When the first column had proceeded about a mile some of the men became alarmed at a noise in a wood, and turned

back. The second column observing the hasty approach of the men mistook them for a detachment of the British, and commenced to fire upon them. A skirmish followed, each returning the other's fire. Several men were killed and wounded in this enterprise, but most of them had reached their boats and gained the city before the British were fully aware of their intentions.

The failure of this expedition, following so closely upon the miscarriage of the fire rafts, and the terror caused by the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères, created a panic in the city, and many women sought shelter in the suburbs.

On the 14th of July, news was received in the British camp that one of the frigates had captured a French vessel off Anticosti, proceeding from Rochelle to Quebec, laden with flour, biscuit, brandy, wine and stores. At the same time a fleet of transports bearing all kinds of provisions, and three hundred provincials to recruit the ranging parties, arrived from Boston and New York.

The French kept up a heavy bombardment from their batteries rear Montmorency, and with their floating batteries engaged some boats which were conveying troops and ammunition from the British ships to the camp.

The frigates coming to the assistance of the boats, the French battery withdrew.

15th. General Wolfe observing the activity of his enemy near Montmorency, strengthened his position still further.

The forty-third regiment was reviewed by Brigadier Monckton, as General Wolfe had not had an opportunity of seeing the men before they left Louisbourg for the St. Lawrence.

The review took place in a cornfield, to the entire satisfaction of the Brigadier.

An amusing exhibition followed. A sergeant was allowed to go to the front, by whose orders it could not be ascertained, to explain a new method of "pushing bayonets." The operation is thus described: "The left hand under the swell below the lowermost rammer pipe, and the right hand across the brass at the extremity of the butt. Thus was the firelock secured, which he poked out before him, in like manner as an idolent haymaker turns hay with a forked pole."

The French batteries were active all day, and a brisk return fire was kept up. Ninety-six shells and seven cascades were thrown into the town from the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères. At 11 o'clock, one of the cascades set fire to some houses in Fabrique street, on the north of the Jesuits', which extended to the Cathedral and did much damage. The church in Lower Town, and Mr. Amiot's house were perforated by shots. The French became exasperated and replied with renewed vigour. A band of Indians, followed by some Canadians, appeared on the high ground near the British camp at Montmorency, and prepared to make an attack, but they were dispersed by the Rangers and some pickets of the Grenadiers.


16th. The French observed that the British batteries were directed against the powder magazine, and they therefore distributed the powder in the suburbs of St. Louis and St. John. A shell fell on Mr. Chevalier's house, on Mountain Hill, and set fire to it. The flames spread rapidly and destroyed nine dwellings, including those

owned by Mr. Moran, M. Chennevert and Madam Bois-hébert. A large quantity of grain was also consumed, which at this particular time was a severe loss. At midnight, three whale boats were discovered near the shore, just below the town, by Captain Goreham, of the Rangers, and they were hidden in a copse for future service.

17th. Two of the floating transports or stages which were commenced on the 11th, were sent to the Island of Orleans for trial. Each was capable of accommodating three hundred men. A description of the stages is given in these words: "They are supported on the water by a parcel of iron bound pipes or casks, fastened together with small cables; they are exactly square, with a hand rail to three faces; and the fourth is covered with a kind of mantlet, or wooden fence, musket proof, which upon the floats being towed towards the shore, lets down, and forms a stage for the troops to disembark on—I confess I think they are unwieldy and not likely to answer the intended purposes."

Captain Crossman was killed with five of his men while placing some sentinels at an advanced post near Montmorency. Three of the men were scalped by the Indians; and three men were taken prisoners who informed the French that the British had about 7000 troops at Ange-Gardien, and that they were anxious about thirty vessels which were believed to be on the river. An officer named Collet, of Parent's battery, was killed by a shot while standing in front of his house. M. Pouliot, of Ste. Foye, was struck by a shell and killed, and two men, Brassard and Dufour were wounded.






A View of the University and Faculty College, New York, as seen from the Street in Wall Street.

Engraved by C. H. Johnson.

Designed by W. H. M. Mason del.

In the orders issued from the British camp on this day the general was pleased to give "two sheep and some rum to the Grenadiers of Captain Crossman's company for the spirit they showed this morning in pushing those scoundrels of Indians."

Owing to the number of shells which were constantly falling upon the houses in the town, the bakeries ceased operations, and the people were reduced to biscuit until ovens were built in the suburbs. "A small detachment of our Indians having crossed the River of the Falls, took some prisoners, three of whom they brought to us, according to whose report we could scarcely determine Mr. Wolfe's real intentions; we merely discovered, from the detail they gave us of his forces and movements, that, having only 9,000 or 10,000 Regulars at most, and estimating our army at 15,000 to 18,000, not only did that General not dare to attack us in front, but he was still under a continual apprehension of being attacked himself; they added, that it was generally reported in their army that the General was not sanguine about taking Quebec until he could be joined by General Amherst, whom he was expecting with the greatest impatience, and that, fearful of running short of provisions, the soldiers' rations had been reduced to 7 ounces of biscuit and an equal quantity of salt meat. The dispositions made by the different prisoners or deserters are pretty uniform as to that reduction. The same prisoners told us moreover that an old man and some women on the north shore were daily carrying refreshments to the English camp, and had also pointed out to General Wolfe



A View of the City of New York, from the Battery, looking North, showing the City Hall, the Court House, and the Custom House, with the Bay and the Harbor in the background.

Engraved by J. H. Johnson, 1840.

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“ the fords of the River above the Falls. 'Tis easy to be
“ inferred, from this intercourse, that the enemy was in
“ no wise harassed.”

“ An English sailor who had been taken prisoner, on
“ being interrogated as to what was thought of our fire
“ ships in the fleet, told us that great alarm had been felt
“ as to their effects, but much surprise was created by the
“ manner they had been conducted, especially at the pre-
“ cipitancy with which they had been set on fire.”

“ M. de Levis was terribly exercised this night by the
“ mortars and batteries erected on the Falls of Mont-
“ morency. He had only 58 men killed however.”

18th. General Wolfe reconnoitred the north shore oppo-
site the town in the morning, presumably with a view of
making an attack there; ⁽¹⁾ and Major Dalling, with two
companies of Light Infantry, proceeded along the south
shore for the purpose of finding a place suitable for the
troops to ascend in the event of a landing being effected.
In a note to one of the journals it is stated that many pro-
jects were talked of at this time to amuse the enemy, in
order that false intelligence might be circulated in the
French army, in the event of any soldier deserting. Pre-
parations were made by the British for a naval demonstra-
tion in the evening. At 10 o'clock the “Sutherland” and
“Squirrel” frigates, with several sloops and three catts,
succeeded in passing the town without damage, although
thirty-one shots were fired from the French batteries.
General Wolfe watched the passage of the ships with great

(1) Probably near where the ascent was made on the 13th of September.

interest, and kept up a constant fire against the town in the meantime. The French officers, however, were much disconcerted, for they realized that if the ships could thus pass the town in safety, their provisions and communication with Montreal by water could easily be cut off.

The design of the British was not understood, and it was thought that an attack was intended at one of the coves. The drum was beaten in the town calling all to arms, and Mr. Dumas with five hundred Canadians marched with haste to L'Anse du Foulon to oppose any landing there. The number of troops was increased to 900, which Mr. Dumas divided into platoons and sent to all the coves in which the British could possibly land between Québec and Cap Rouge. The French brought a few pieces of cannon and a mortar and ranged them along the shore, but the ships withdrew out of range and did not receive any damage. One of the fire ships which was not exploded on the 29th of June, was anchored at Anse-des-Mères. The frigates fired a few shots at the raft, and perceiving that there was no one on board, some sailors put off in a boat and attempted to set it on fire, but were repulsed.

Col. Townshend, in his '*Military Life*,' and other writers have expressed surprise that Wolfe did not push past the Town and encamp at first between Montcalm and the source of supplies.

Considering the information which Wolfe had he acted with the best judgment in disembarking below the city. It is doubtful whether the Admiral could have been prevailed upon to risk his fleet in the comparatively narrow

passage, less than a mile in width, between the citadel and the Levis side.

Until this experiment was made under favourable conditions nearly three weeks after arrival it was not supposed that the ships could stand the fire of the French batteries, and, indeed, had the Lower Town batteries been as numerous and as efficient as they could naturally have been expected to be the British fleet could never have passed beyond the Town. Although the anxiety of the British officers was great during the progress of the trial passage, the success which attended it was most encouraging. In fact failure at this point would probably have meant an inglorious ending of the campaign.

Perhaps the interest in this struggle for supremacy in America has centred around the two great characters, Wolfe and Montcalm, to such an extent as to make us lose sight of the important part played by the British navy. Had Admiral Saunders lost his life upon the 13th of September, his name would have been linked with the names of the two heroes of the army, and the share of the navy in the victory would have been represented in its true light.

The condition of the garrison at this time appears to have been particularly wretched. An intercepted letter from a priest at Quebec reveals the situation: "The English are too many for us; and who could have suspected it? Part of their fleet passed all of our batteries,"⁽¹⁾

(1) That the ships could pass the town was a surprise to the English, as well as to the French. See letter of Capt. Calcraft, vol. VI.

“ and are now riding in safety above the capital. They
“ have made this town so hot that there is but one place
“ where we can with safety pay adoration to our most gra-
“ cious, but now wrathful and displeased God, who, we
“ fear, has forsaken us.”

19th. A gibbet was erected over the Grand Battery in the Lower Town for the execution of two sentinels who were condemned to death, presumably for not having signalled the approach of the fleet on the previous evening. It is also stated that it was set up to warn certain guardians of the town, who, during the confusion caused by the shells, robbed the houses under their charge. The *Diana* frigate which ran aground on the previous night near Point Levis was got off by the sailors with much difficulty. The French brought their floating batteries to bear on the sailors as they were landing the guns to lighten the vessel, and it was not until General Monckton had brought up two field pieces that they were able to continue their work.

In this encounter the French had five men killed and wounded, and two of their floats were destroyed. A battery was set up by the French at Sillery on this day, consisting of one mortar and four 18 pounders.

The Grenadiers and Highlanders marched towards the mill at Pointe-aux-Trembles.

20th. A company of Rangers marched seven miles above the town for the purpose of taking prisoners. The alarm was given too soon and the expedition proved fruitless.

An instance of the fearless nature of the Canadians was shown on this day. As a body of troops were marching towards their cantonments, a Canadian and his son, a boy

of about twelve years, crossed their path. One of the soldiers fired upon the man, who, notwithstanding the fact that he was surrounded by a hundred men, returned the fire and killed a soldier of Fraser's company. The Canadian's life was spared, possibly on account of his daring act.

Four sea service mortars, three of thirteen inches, and one of ten, were set up at Pointe-aux-Pères, in place of bomb ketches previously employed. The sea service mortars were found to be more effective.

A servant in the employ of General Townshend deserted and went over to the French camp. He informed the officers that the British had only about three thousand men at the Falls. As this information agreed with their observations, M. de Montcalm recalled some troops from the left to reinforce the centre.

21st. While General Wolfe was inspecting the batteries at Point Levis, fifty shots were fired from the town batteries, but no loss was reported by the British. The French opened their battery, at Samos, to oppose the return of the vessels which passed the town on the 18th, and this with such effect as to compel them to withdraw beyond the range of the guns.

The speedy retirement of the ships was apparently a timely precaution, for the mast of the boat conveying General Wolfe was carried away by a shell from this battery.

On the same day, the Rangers, under Captain Goreham, established a post in a large house opposite the Samos battery. This movement of the British above the town,

with indications that they intended to follow up the advantage by sending up other vessels, alarmed Montcalm.

He feared they would gain the heights above Quebec, and thus cut off his communication with his source of supplies of food, and of ammunition as well. He hoped, however, that Wolfe's sole aim was to compel him to divide his forces, a thing he did not wish to do, and that he expected to evade. But if his communication were actually cut he knew that nothing but a fortunate battle would save the colony.

On the other hand, Montcalm expressed the opinion to de Bougainville, upon whom he seems to have placed the greatest reliance, that the essential point was to observe the movements of the British; that they still had a large body of men at Montmorency, and that they would certainly not leave the batteries at Levis without a sufficient guard; that not being numerous they could not detach more than three or four thousand men at the most to operate above the Town, and that with the advantage of the heights, the Indians, the Canadians and three hundred picked men could by rapid marches protect the heights above. ⁽¹⁾

He was sure that Wolfe was threatening the right and the left of the French lines in order to weaken the centre and to make his chief attack at the River St. Charles.

Thus, if Montcalm's views changed rapidly, it was because of the changing indications, as his adversary's policy developed.

According to all accounts, he had a difficult task. There

(1) Correspondance de Bougainville, Vol. IV.

were movements and counter movements designed to deceive the vigilant enemy and to keep the British soldiery, in case of desertions, in ignorance of the General's real intentions. James Gibson, at about this time, July 20, declared that "Within the space of five hours we received at the General's request three different orders of consequence, which were contradicted immediately after their reception; which indeed has been the constant practice of the General ever since we have been here, to the no small amazement of every one who has the liberty of thinking. Every step he takes is wholly his own; I'm told he asks no one's opinion, and wants no advice; and therefore as he conducts without an assistant, the honour or . . . will be in proportion to his success."

It must be admitted in the light of subsequent events that Montcalm's confidence in the natural protection of the cliffs above Quebec was too great, but that confidence on the part of so skillful and experienced a military man is a justification to Wolfe for his reluctance when on the spot to attempt a landing in force above the town until all other plans had failed.

While the French were watching the movements of the ships above the city and wondering what would be done next, a descent was made upon Pointe-aux-Trembles.

Unusual activity was observed at the same time near the Falls of Montmorency, where the British discharged about a hundred bomb shells which seriously inconvenienced the French workmen, who were strengthening the left. M. Dumas who was watching the progress of the ships arrived at Pointe-aux-Trembles in time to hasten

the re-embarkation of the British, but too late to prevent their capture of about 150 ladies together with the " Marquis de Beauport, a militia officer, a Jesuit, and a few peasants." A French diarist gives the following account of the incident :

" We learned that 4000 of the enemy's grenadiers had
" landed at Pointe-aux-Trembles. M. Dumas received
" orders to march thither, and a portion of the cavalry
" was added to his detachment; but the enemy had re-
" embarked, their object having been to obtain exact
" intelligence of what was passing in the country; they
" contented themselves with seizing all the women whom
" they found in the village, about one hundred only of
" whom they carried away; among these were some ladies
" of the town, who had taken refuge there; the enemy
" were harassed and pursued by some Indians, who ran
" and killed some of their men; General Wolfe had
" received the idea of this expedition from Stobo, an
" English officer, who had been taken as a hostage for the
" affair of Fort Necessity; convicted of having, notwith-
" standing his character, kept up some correspondence
" with the English Generals prejudicial to the service, he
" had been condemned to be hanged, but the court having
" ordered the suspension of that sentence, 'twas thought
" proper to restore him the liberty he had previously
" enjoyed in his quality of hostage; he took advantage
" thereof to effect his escape and was seconded therein by
" an individual who had deserted from New England, and
" had been some years settled at Quebec, who, acquainted

“ with navigation, embarked with him about the middle of
“ last May in a simple canoe, in which they reached
“ Louisbourg.”

The French generally had learned of the presence of Stobo, who undoubtedly gave valuable and accurate information as to the topography of Quebec and the vicinity.

The biographer ⁽¹⁾ of Stobo gives him great credit for the alleged part he took in the conduct of the siege, going so far as to say that it was he who pointed out to the British general the spot which is now known as Wolfe's Cove, and that it was he who led the way on the morning of the 13th of September. Whether he had ever pointed out or mentioned the Cove to Wolfe we can not learn from any document, but we know that Stobo was not with the British army before Quebec, when Wolfe chose the place for disembarkation and attack, nor when the battle was fought. As a matter of fact he left Quebec to join Amherst on the 7th of September and arrived at Crown Point on the ninth of October. ⁽²⁾

The French when they heard of his return to Quebec were naturally indignant, and no doubt regretted that they had pardoned him after his sentence of death as a result of the information he gave to Braddock, while he himself was a hostage and on parole.

Any credit that can be given to him for his assistance

(1) Memoirs of Major Robert Stobo, of the Virginia Regiment, Pittsburg, 1854. Justin Winsor, refers also to the *Boston Post Boy*, No. 97, and to the *Boston Evening Post*, No. 1258, in confirmation of the statement that it was asserted that Wolfe was directed in his choice by Stobo.

(2) See letter of Amherst, vol. VI., p. 44.

during the siege is at the expense of his honour. In Montcalm's Journal, July 22, we find the statement. "It is he, they say, who conducts everything, and he is in a position to give a good account of the condition of our colony in every respect."

The English speak more sparingly of him than do the French, and not always in the most respectful terms.

For instance, Gibson says on the 22nd of July, "The General with a party of Highlanders and Royal Americans were conducted by one Stobo (whom you have undoubtedly heard is among us) to a place called Point au Tremble."

His services were accepted much in the same spirit as those of deserters, and although his actions have been well adapted to the romance of historical novels his real character has not received the reprobation it deserves.

On the 22nd of July, the British sent word to the city that they were willing to return the ladies captured on the 21st, on the condition that a small vessel conveying their sick and wounded should be allowed to pass the city. They also agreed to suspend the bombardment of the town for six hours in order to allow the ladies to retire to a place of safety.

The offer was accepted and the British kept their promise, but Foligné asserts that they took advantage of the occasion to pass down several boats containing cattle and provisions which they had captured at Pointe-au-Tremble.

The ladies were escorted to the town by Captain Smyth, aide-de-camp to General Wolfe. Among them were Madam Duchesnay, Madam De Charnay, her mother and sister, Madam Joly and Madam Magnan. "All the women,

“ though of different rank, spoke equally well of the treatment they had received from the English officers; several of them even supped with General Wolfe, who joked considerably about the circumspection of our Generals; he told these ladies that he had afforded very favourable opportunities for an attack and had been surprised that no advantage had been taken of them.”

One English journal states that Captain Smyth was not very politely received by the French in the town on this occasion. A heavy bombardment was commenced against the town at 9 o'clock, and sixteen houses were destroyed, including Mr. Rotot's. A bomb fell on Mr. Ouillame's house and injured his servant. Some heavy pieces of artillery were brought over from Montmorency and set up in Burton's redoubt at Point Levis. The movements and counter movements of the British continued to cause much uneasiness in the city.

23rd. Colonel Frasers's regiment, consisting of 500 Highlanders remained under marching orders all day. Two ships were ordered to pass the town early in the morning, but were forced to come to anchor owing to a contrary wind and a heavy fire from the French batteries. The French sent a detachment of 300 men under the Sieur de Robeau, one of the hostages who had escaped from Fort Necessity, to Pointe-aux-Trembles. A barge belonging to the "Lowestoffe" which had fallen into the hands of the French a few days previously was recovered by Captain Goreham's Rangers during the night.

The inhabitants of Quebec complained of the inactivity of the regular troops. Day by day the town was in a state

of alarm owing to the constant fire that was maintained by the batteries at Pointe-aux-Pères. Houses were destroyed and lives were sacrificed while the troops remained safely intrenched at Beauport. The British forces were divided and the inhabitants could not understand why an attack was not made on one of their positions, but the Marquis de Montcalm was aware of the strength of his position and wisely pursued his own policy.

24th. The French had proof of the want of discipline in their army on this day. A number of men had gone out to hunt, and finding an abundance of game at St. Foye, they kept up a constant fire. The noise attracted the Indians who thought that there was an attack at Sillery. On their return they reported that such practices might lead to serious consequences, and the Marquis de Vaudreuil at once issued orders forbidding hunting for the future.

A young Canadian, quite a boy, who had been taken prisoner by the British came into the French camp with an anonymous note to M. de Vaudreuil, containing injurious reproaches against the Governor on the subject of some scalps taken by the Indians and of some soldiers killed by the Canadians, whom they called assassins. M. de Vaudreuil and M. de Montcalm thought it fitting to come to some explanation with General Wolfe on the subject, and M. le Mercier was intrusted with the negotiations.

Foligné relates that M. Mercier represented to the General that it would be expedient to find a pretext for securing a truce in order to give the French time to repair certain platforms and to remount cannon that had been

overturned by the balls of the enemy. Whether the pretext was sought as an "offset" against the bringing down of provisions instead of the sick, as alleged against the British a few days before, does not appear.

However, Foligné proceeds to say that the plan being for the good of the service, the General acquiesced in Mercier's proposal, which was that a reply be made to the politeness of General Wolfe who had sent the French officers some cases of liquors which he had taken from a captured French vessel. Accordingly Mercier departed at about ten in the morning with the compliments of the French officers and a few cases of wine for the General and the Admiral. M. Mercier conducted his delicate mission with so much tact and judgment that he succeeded in "killing time" until the French had nearly completed their labours. However, the British discovered the ruse apparently, for the moment Mercier returned and removed the flag of truce a furious bombardment was re-commenced.

Whether Montcalm was concerned in this matter is doubtful, if indeed it is not certain that he had nothing to do with it. The whole affair would appear more in harmony with Vaudreuil's methods. Besides the Journal of Montcalm, probably written at this time by the pen of the brilliant but bitter Bougainville, derides Mercier and his customary visits to the British vessels. In one place it says that he has gone "without doubt upon an important negotiation but of which I have not been able to learn (savoir) the secret." Again, "His visits have had such a bad effect that the Marquis de Vaudreuil has almost repudiated them. In what hands are we, and what can result from the man-

œuvres of such people"? And further, "The mysterious missions of M. Mercier have had and can have no result but evil. He departs charged with from ten to twelve matters from M. de Vaudreuil, concerning the suspension of hostilities, which he finds too frequent"

"Their minds have become embittered, and M. Wolfe has written quite a singular letter."

This was followed by still another letter on behalf of Wolfe, signed by Col. Barré and containing some examples of the rude strength for which he afterwards became famous in Parliament.

"Monsieur,

"Par ordre de mon général, j'ai l'honneur de répondre à une lettre de Votre Excellence qui lui était apportée hier par M. Le Mercier, concernant quelques articles particulières à l'occasion des parlementaires dans laquelle il se plaint au nom de Votre Excellence de l'usage trop fréquent des dits parlementaires.

"Le Général ne saurait assez s'étonner de cette requi-sition, et pourquoi les Anglais ont-ils donc demandé à parlementer que la réponse soit faite par ceux qui ont reçu leur liberté à l'occasion des dits parlementaires.

"M. le général Wolfe, par une lettre interceptée écrite du camp de Beauport, apprend que trois grenadiers du régiment royal américain, pris il y a quelques jours, étaient destinés à être brûlés vifs dans votre camp; M. Wolfe désirerait de savoir ce qu'il sont devenus, pour régler à l'avenir là-dessus conduite.

"Les troupes britanniques ne sont que trop ulcérées;

“ les cruautés énormes qu'on à déjà exercées, et surtout la
 “ basse infraction de la capitulation du Fort George, sont
 “ encore présentes à leur cœur.

“ De tels actes méritent et trouveront certainement à
 “ l'avenir, s'ils sont réitérés, la plus sévère repressaille ;
 “ toute distinction cessera entre Français, Canadiens et
 “ Indiens ; tous seront traités comme une troupe cruelle
 “ et barbare altérée de sang humain.

J'ai l'honneur d'être

ISAAC BARRÉ,
Adjutant Général.

The answer of the Marquis de Vaudreuil to this communication is described in Montcalm's Journal as a very becoming (decente) letter,⁽¹⁾ and the writer proceeds to say that it was dictated by Montcalm who, not for the first time, found himself obliged to repair the follies of others, which had been concealed from him. The dignified terms of the letter are in marked contrast with the language of Barré.

Monsieur,

“ Par ordre de M. le Mis. de Vaudreuil, je réponds à la
 “ lettre qui a été écrite par M. Isaac Barré à l'occasion des
 “ trois grenadiers du royal américain pris prisonniers.
 “ V. E. aurait dû regarder comme des propos soldatesque,
 “ les discours exprimés dans la lettre interceptée ; le sort
 “ de ces trois prisonniers a été le même que celui de tous

(1) Journal de Montcalm, p. 583.

“ les autres qui ont été fait par les sauvages ; le Roi les a
“ rachetés à grands frais de leur mains ; M. le Mis de
“ Vaudreuil ne m'a point chargé de répondre aux menaces,
“ aux invectives et aux citations dont est remplie cette
“ lettre que vous n'aurez pas, sans doute, lue ; rien de tout
“ cela ne nous rendra crainitifs ni barbares ; nos procédés
“ sont connus en Europe, et nos papiers publics font foi
“ de notre justification sur l'infraction de la capitulation
“ du F. G.

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

BOUGAINVILLE.

As a result of this correspondence an order was issued commanding the outposts “ to burn and lay waste for the future, sparing only churches or houses dedicated to divine worship. It is again repeated that women and children are not to be molested on any account whatsoever.”

Orders were also issued from the camp at Montmorency strictly forbidding the “ inhuman practice of scalping except when the enemy are Indians, or Canadians dressed like Indians.”

The exception shows that the practice was tolerated by the British in certain instances, while the journals of the French indicate that they looked upon it as a natural thing to expect from the savages.

The barbarous and essentially Indian custom would undoubtedly have been cut short by Montcalm and Vaudreuil had they been able to do as they wished. Their savage allies could not be reduced to any semblance of discipline.

At this time, the inhabitants of Quebec were very much displeased at the conduct of the Indians, and one writer records the fact in the following words.

“ Il y avait au camp plus de 900 sauvages campés qui refusaient de marcher, parce qu'on ne joignait pas eux un nombre de français égal au leur ; ils restaient ainsi oisifs consommant nos vivres, ou courant nos campagnes, où ils faisaient plus de dégats que l'ennemi même n'en aurait fait.”

Could the Indians have been controlled there would have been no scalping on either side.

The French who scalped occasionally were those who had joined themselves to the Indians and had adopted many of their customs, while the British who adopted this barbarous mutilation of the dead were men who were accustomed to the Indian atrocities and took this means of gruesome revenge. The fact, however, remains that there was scalping on both sides, but on the French side it was more frequent because of the savages.

Wolfe found that his proclamation to the French inhabitants of Canada had produced no effect. Old men and boys fired upon his war parties from places of concealment, and neutrality was not observed in the least. In consequence of this, and probably on account of the irritation he felt at his own futile measures to fight the enemy, he issued another placard which was more minatory and less hortative than the other.

It reads as follows :—

“ De par Son Excellence, major-général, James Wolfe, commandant en chef des troupes de Sa Majesté britannique sur la rivière Saint-Laurent.

“ 25 juillet 1759.

“ Son Excellence, piquée du peu d'égards que les habitants du Canada ont eu à son placard du 29 juin dernier, est résolu de ne plus écouter les sentiments d'humanité qui le portent à ménager des gens aveugles sur leur propre intérêt. Les Canadiens, par leur conduite, se montrent indignes des offres avantageuses qu'il leur faisait. C'est pourquoi il a donné ordre aux Commandants de ses troupes légères et autres officiers, de s'avancer dans le pays pour y saisir et emmener les habitants et leurs troupes, et y détruire et renverser ce qu'ils jugeront à propos. Au reste, comme il se trouve fâché d'en venir aux barbares extrémités dont les Canadiens et les Indiens leurs alliés lui montrent l'exemple, il se propose de différer jusqu'au 10 août prochain à décider des prisonniers envers lesquels il usera de représailles, à moins que, pendant cette intervalle, les Canadiens ne viennent se soumettre aux termes qu'il leur a proposés dans son placard, et par leur soumission toucher sa clémence et le porter à la douceur.

“ Donné à Saint-Henri, le 25 juillet 1759.

“ JOSEPH DALLING,
Major des troupes légères.”

Major Dalling's party brought in a large number of prisoners, 300 head of cattle, horses, cows and sheep,

which were taken below the river Etchemin. The condition of the French was known to be much worse in regard to supplies than that of the British who were daily bringing in cattle.

An intercepted letter from an inhabitant of Quebec addressed to a person in the country gives an insight into the condition of the garrison: "I herewith send you fourteen biscuits, all that I can spare, and in our present distressful and deplorable situation they are no mere compliment."

The French gun boats that were anchored below Quebec on the south shore were captured by a detachment from the fleet, but their crews escaped. Fifteen Canadians maintained a heavy fire against the sailors and prevented them from capturing some of the other vessels.

25th. A new battery was opened at Pointe-aux-Pères. On the 26th, General Wolfe with Brigadier Murray, the 35th regiment, five companies of Light Infantry, a company of Rangers, and two field pieces, left the camp at Montmorency at 3 o'clock in the morning to reconnoitre some fords about five miles above the Falls. After they had proceeded about a mile and a half, the field pieces were returned to the camp as the condition of the roads rendered it impossible to take them further. "About half way between the camp and the ford the road passes through a remarkable ravine, which is about three hundred yards long, very narrow, and the banks upon each side about twenty feet high, and so steep as to admit of no outlet but where the road crosses. While on the march we were frequently challenged by the enemy from the oppo-

“ site side of the river, for they observed all our movements,
“ with great vigilance. Upon our coming to the nearest
“ ford we found they had a breast work of a considerable
“ extent upon the opposite bank. On our side of the river
“ there was an open space of ground with a house in the
“ centre of it, and upon the left of this opening the road
“ to the ford passes through the woods. Our troops were
“ drawn up to be in readiness in case of being attacked ;
“ the 35th across the road, and the Light Infantry upon
“ the right along the skirts of the opening, the whole so
“ far in the woods as to be concealed. The ford and the
“ enemy’s works and positions were then reconnoitred, and
“ the company of Rangers and the French deserter were
“ sent to reconnoitre the other ford, which is about a mile
“ higher up. Between eight and nine o’clock there were
“ about thirty Canadians and Indians seen going into
“ the house, upon which there was a platoon of the 35th
“ ordered through the woods between them and the river
“ to attack them ; just as the platoon marched off it was
“ fired upon, and wounded, by those very people who had
“ by this time got round them into the woods, but the
“ platoon being joined by a company of the Light Infantry,
“ they were soon beaten back across the river.

“ There was an ambuscade laid in case of a second
“ attack, which was done by posting a company of Light
“ Infantry on an eminence near the river, in the woods,
“ and below the opening ; with orders if attacked to
“ retreat back along the road, which would lead the enemy,
“ if pursued, into the fire of the battalion ; and give a fair
“ chance of cutting off their retreat with the Light Infantry.

“ There were two other advantageous eminences taken
“ possession of at the same time, one with two companies
“ on our left flank, near the river, and the other with one
“ company in the rear of the same flank upon the right of
“ the road. About one o'clock a detachment of 1,500
“ Canadians and Indians crossed the river a considerable
“ way from the opening, and marching down unperceived
“ under cover of its banks, got up a ravine upon the right
“ of the advanced Light Infantry. The officer commanding
“ that company kept them in play till he called in his
“ sentries and then retreated according to orders; but the
“ enemy instead of pursuing him, as was expected, along
“ the road, endeavoured to gain the height where the three
“ companies were posted. When they got near it the two
“ companies wheeled and attacked their flank, which being
“ quite unexpected, they instantly turned their backs, and
“ the Light Infantry coming upon their rear at the same
“ time, they were soon driven into the river. They suffered
“ very considerably in crossing, being quite open to our
“ fire; we did not learn the number of their killed and
“ wounded, but the Indians were dispirited from that day's
“ loss for the rest of the campaign.

Major General Malartic, of General Montcalm's army gives the loss to the French on this day as 18. “ Nous avons eu dix-huit hommes tués ou blessés. On ignore la perte des Anglais, mais on a vu descendre de leur camp plusieurs brancards.”

“ We had 55 men killed and wounded, officers included.

“ We suffered chiefly in pursuing the enemy to the rear, from the breastworks upon the opposite side where the numbers, exclusive of those that attacked, amounted, as we were afterwards told, to 2,500 men. After burying the dead, our detachment was ordered to carry off the wounded and return to camp, which was effected without molestation.”

M. de Repentigny led the attack on the French side. A surgeon's mate a corporal and six men were overtaken near Point Levis, by a detachment of 20 men under the Sieur Legris, an officer of Militia. The mate and two others were instantly killed, and three were taken prisoners.

From these prisoners the French ascertained that the English had entered St. Henri, one of the Parishes in the concessions of Point Levis, and had captured the priest of Levis, who had retired to St. Henri, besides 54 men capable of bearing arms, 64 women, and 169 children, whom they had conveyed on board a ship. Three prisoners were taken on this day and were released on the surrender of Quebec, when they reported that they had been treated with great humanity.

27th. The French did not easily give up the idea of the fire raft. Although they did not a second time employ any thing so costly or so formidable as the fire ships with which they greeted the enemy in June, they caused a great deal of annoyance both by their floating batteries and by fire rafts.

Sieur Courval, a Canadian, whose reputation for courage was established by his conduct during the few years pre-

ceding 1759, and whose name was so favorably mentioned when the fire ships were first sent down, was commissioned to conduct some seventy-two fire rafts against the enemy's fleet.

This he did with a bravery and a skill that deserved success but did not achieve it.

He did not fire his rafts until they were within musket range of the first ship, but the British sailors met them with grappling irons, and drew them away from the fleet. Courval himself, narrowly escaped. A few of the British were wounded in this encounter, and they began to dread the appearance of the fire rafts which could not be regarded as free from danger. Indeed two of their ships, notwithstanding the intrepidity and exertions of the sailors, were set on fire, but the fire was soon extinguished. In the midst of danger and toil the British tar did not lose his sense of coarse humour. "Damn me, Jack," one was heard to say, "didst thee ever take Hell in tow before?"

The next day, Wolfe sent a flag of truce and a messenger with the threat that "If you presume to send down any more fire rafts, they shall be made fast to the two transports in which the Canadian prisoners are confined, in order that they may perish by your own base inventions." The French probably knew from Wolfe's vigorous acts of retaliation which they had already endured that he was not making an idle threat. At any rate they did not dare to take the risks involved for the sake of the small success they might expect. Wolfe had that courage and determination which enabled him to make some effective retorts, as the following incident further shows.



Prisoners unable to bear arms he returned to the city while the others were detained on board the transports. De Ramsay on one occasion went to the British camp to complain because the British seized women, old men and helpless children. He sneeringly intimated that these were returned simply because they were a source of embarrassment to their captors. He was promptly told to inform his superiors that since they did not appreciate the English commander's leniency and generosity prisoners would not be restored in the future, but as there were provisions in abundance they would all be accommodated in the transports.

29th. But Wolfe had his own grievances which he again laid before Vaudreuil. While returning some women he sent a letter complaining of the cruelties which were practiced by the Indians and Canadians.

Vaudreuil replied that he was sure that no Canadians had been guilty of taking scalps.

That the Indians had done so was not surprising since it was a well known custom amongst them. When the truce which these exchanges of message had occasioned came to an end the British opened fire more furiously than ever from their batteries.

A deserter came over from the French and gave information concerning fords across the Montmorency, which he had passed. He claimed to have been taken prisoner by the French, and to have been compelled to carry arms against his own people. He reported too that the Canadians were becoming uneasy and very anxious to return to their farms to harvest their hay.



The Bay of Amherst, from the Point of View of the Bay, looking towards the Mountains of Amherst, in the Province of New Brunswick, North America.

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The information seemed to please the English general.

An attack was contemplated for the following day, the 30th, and orders were issued from the camp at Montmorency for the regiments to be under arms at five o'clock in the afternoon at the head of their encampment and to remain there until ordered to proceed to their respective alarm posts. The Light Infantry on the Island of Orleans was ordered to cross over to the Montmorency camp, while the batteries at Levis maintained a brisk fire against the town. Although the soldiers did not know the nature of the plans they were excited at the prospect of an engagement.

The French observed the activity of the enemy, and expected an attack upon Sillery; as there was a number of barges in the river Etchemin, and the ships at Cap Rouge had moved nearer the city. ⁽¹⁾

30th. In the morning Colonel James, the commanding officer at Pointe Levis, received orders to hold all the troops in readiness to march at a moment's notice.

A sergeant of the Royal Americans who was on an advanced picket at Pointe Levis found it a good time to desert. He informed the French that several frigates were to pass by the city, and that an attempt was to be made at Sillery. He said further that there were sixty barges at the Pointe ready to embark the troops who were to pass along the south shore and join the vessels before Sillery. This information, if seriously regarded by the French, served the purpose of the British who were naturally

(1) On this day General Wolfe added a codicil to his will, disposing of the remainder of his property.


desirous of deceiving the enemy. It is no wonder, however, that the writer of Montcalm's Journal a few days before had said with a terseness worthy of Tacitus "déserteurs, verbiage, aucune lumière."

As every thing was not in readiness on the 30th, the attempt was postponed till the following day, ⁽¹⁾ but the bombardment of the town was continued.

The Marquis de Vaudreuil organized at this time a staff of twelve special officers for the better protection of the city.

The officers were chosen from amongst the most notable inhabitants of Quebec, and their commissions conferred upon them powers equal to those of regular officers of the army. It was their duty to preserve order within the town, to prevent robbery and pillage, which were more prevalent than usual owing to the greater temptations in these times of necessity, and to make the rounds of the ramparts each night. The severity of the discipline within the city may be judged by the fact that a man was executed for stealing brandy at St. Rochs.

(1) See letter No. 6, *Galway Papers*, page 66, Vol. VI.



CHAPTER VI

MONTMORENCY

THE month of July was drawing to a close, nearly half the summer was gone, and the eager, restless, British commander found himself no nearer victory than when he landed on the beautiful Island of Orleans some five weeks before. His wary antagonist, generally ready to fight, refused to be tempted to a decisive action. Knowing how much depended upon a prolonged defence of his position he calmly pursued his own policy despite the suggestions of his friends, the taunts of his enemy, or the favourable chances of battle which were offered. Wolfe's favourite plan was to ford the river Montmorency above the Falls and to pierce the French lines from the rear.

This he found impracticable owing to the nature of the country and to the readiness of his enemy to dispute his passage of the river. ⁽¹⁾

His intention to land above Quebec, preferably near St. Michael's, to which he refers in a letter which soon follows, was changed because of the hazards he foresaw. He was

(1) The authors have a plan which shows the ford and Repentigny's post above the Falls.

becoming more anxious, as useless days went by, to strike a blow, if not where he would at least where he could. On the 29th of July he had evolved a new plan which he intended to put into effect on the following day, and for which he issued orders.

Preparations being incomplete at the appointed time, action was deferred until the 31st of July, a day which came painfully near ruining his reputation as a commander.

His general plan was to bring Monckton's brigade over from Levis to Orleans, and thence to a point about three quarters of a mile west of the Montmorency river, where the troops were to land upon the Beauport shore near a French redoubt. The landing of this brigade was to be protected by three vessels which were to run in as far as possible, in advance of the transports, and even to ground if necessary.

Townshend and Murray were to ford the Montmorency below the Falls and march along the beach to join Monckton's brigade and to support it. In order to prevent Montcalm from massing his troops at the left of his line where the attack was intended, a regiment and a body of light infantry were to march up the Montmorency, in view of the enemy as though with the intention of crossing above the Falls to attack in the rear. They were then to return to rejoin Townshend's brigade. For the same purpose a regiment was to march along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence towards the west; Wolfe was to accompany Monckton's troops. The plan so far seems clear and natural if an attack was to be made on the enemy's left, but it

is not easy to understand what was Wolfe's idea in combining a land and a sea attack with their disadvantages in union, instead of confining himself to the first and using his boats to distract the enemy's right.

We shall not follow the various movements in detail by which the plan was carried forward to a failure, but will give the main features only, with running comments. The curious readers will find details in abundance in the various relations contained in the appendices to this work, and a resumé in the letters of Wolfe which follow in this chapter.

He will find also the positions and the movements of the British troops clearly indicated upon the "Plans of the Town of Quebec &c" in this work.

At ten o'clock in the morning Monckton's brigade which consisted of thirteen companies of the Louisbourg Grenadiers, the 15th and the 78th regiments and two hundred of the Royal Americans, embarked and put off. They remained half channel over awaiting further orders while two small ships fitted with 14 guns each ran in shore and grounded at high water within two musket shots of the entrenchments of the French near the mouth of the Montmorency. A larger vessel, the "Centurion," carrying 60 guns, fell down the channel about five hundred yards from the smaller vessels, but as near shore as the water would allow.

They were not placed in the most effective positions, but without loss of time they opened upon the point of attack. Townshend's artillery in the Montmorency camp opened fire simultaneously, while the batteries at Levis began to bombard the city.

Before this hour Montcalm had become convinced by the demonstrations that an attack was to be made, probably on his left, and accordingly he ordered down re-inforcements for de Levis. Early in the afternoon Montcalm and de Levis held a consultation, when they agreed to hold themselves in readiness to move to each other's assistance as the British plan of attack should develop.

It was apparent that the right would not be attacked, and therefore the troops were marched down to strengthen the lines from Beauport to the Falls.

The French troops responded to the challenge to measure their strength with the enemy and marched down, or remained in readiness to do so, with shouts of joy and defiance. The fire returned by the French batteries was so hot that some of the troops who had been left on the armed ships were removed in boats to a place of safety with the others who were awaiting further orders.

Thus the troops from Levis and Orleans lay in their boats under the broiling July sun until after three o'clock in the afternoon before they received orders to advance. The cause of the delay is not apparent. As they approached the shore some of the boats ran upon concealed shoals and the difficulty of getting them off caused a further delay. Although this accident has been sometimes spoken of as a reason for the British failure it does not seem to have made any real difference in the action or in the result.

Wolfe who had been upon one of the grounded transports during the day signalled Townshend to bring his brigades across the ford, took a boat and joined Monckton's men.

The Louisbourg Grenadiers were the first to reach the

shore, while Townshend was crossing the Montmorency to their support, and the 15th and 78th regiments were following them at a short distance. Then occurred one of those strange events that defy all explanations.

The Grenadiers, Wolfe's best soldiers, who had been chosen at Louisbourg for special excellence, started with a shout, a disorderly mob, without the semblance of any formation, for the enemy's redoubt on the beach.⁽¹⁾

The 15th and the 78th landed and formed in good order, and Townshend hastened forward. They arrived only in time to meet the Grenadiers coming back in better order, perhaps, than they had observed in their advance against the enemy, but having left four or five hundred of their companions dead or wounded. In face of a hot fire they had approached the first redoubt, from which the French retired, some of their diarists say for want of ammunition, others say because of previous orders. They then attempted the ascent of the steep declivity and were met by a storm of grape and musketry which even their misplaced valor could not stand. At this point rain began to fall with great violence and Wolfe saw that it would be impossible to form again with the broken Grenadiers and the fresh troops. Besides the tide was coming in, and in about an hour retreat across the ford in case of a second repulse would have been impossible, while a victory, now much less probable than before, would have been robbed of its advantages by the rapidly approaching night. Wolfe

(1) For the position of this redoubt see drawing made on the spot by Capt. Smyth, which is reproduced as one of the illustrations to this volume.

therefore ordered Townshend to return to his camp, the 15th to re-embark for Levis, the Grenadiers and the picket for the Island of Orleans, and the 78th to the Montmorency Camp.

All the movements necessary to carry out these commands were executed with good order, although the men were still within range of the French cannon.

Two matters especially in this incident have been viewed in various lights—the cause of the precipitancy of the Grenadiers and the effect upon the two armies of the violent rain storm.

Warburton says, and is followed by others, that the Grenadiers advanced in spite of the orders and imprecations of their officers. He appears to have followed Knox, whose observation must have something read into it to justify such expressions. He says that they “regardless of discipline and the commands of their Officers, were eager to distinguish themselves under a man, of whom they, and indeed the soldiery in general, had the highest opinion and confidence”. It is probable that some of the officers rushed forward with the same impetuosity as the men displayed, although how they could have done so without waiting for some kind of formation or orders from their superiors it is not easy to see.

On the other hand those who have been under fire almost invariably declare that even with the best of troops the orders and the encouragement of the officers are necessary to lead men into an attack. It would seem that through some error the officers as well as the men believed that they were ordered to advance. One chronicler states that some

sailors gave a hearty cheer, which was mistaken for an indication that the rest of the division had arrived from Orleans. Thereupon one officer, whose name fortunately is not known, ordered the "advance" to be sounded, and the mischief was done. Wolfe's account of the occurrence is in harmony with this statement.

"The Grenadiers were ordered to form themselves into four distinct bodies, and to begin the attack, supported by Brigadier Monckton's corps, as soon as the troops had passed the ford, and were at hand to assist.

But whether from the noise and hurry at landing, or from some other cause the Grenadiers instead of forming themselves as they were directed, ran on impetuously, &c."⁽¹⁾

On the following day Wolfe published orders from which we extract the first part.

"The check which the Grenadiers met with yesterday, will, it is hoped, be a lesson to them for the time to come; such *impetuous, irregular, and unsoldierlike* proceedings destroy all order, make it impossible for their commanders to form any disposition for an attack, and put it out of the General's power to execute his plan.

"The Grenadiers could not suppose that they alone could beat the French army, and therefore it was necessary that the corps under Brigadier Monckton and Brigadier Townshend should have time to join, that the attack might be general; the very first fire of the enemy was sufficient to repulse men who had lost all sense of

(1) Townshend in his journal uses almost the same words as Wolfe.


“ order and military discipline ; Amherst’s and the High-land regiments alone, by the soldierlike and cool manner “ they were formed in, would undoubtedly have beat back “ the whole Canadian army, if they had ventured to attack “ them.

“ The loss, however, is inconsiderable and may be easily “ repaired, when a favourable opportunity offers, if the “ men will show a proper attention to their officers.”

The publication of this order seems to have caused some feeling. James Gibson said that the Grenadiers retreated “ as regularly and soldierlike as they advanc’d, at least we generally think so here, notwithstanding the cruel aspersion the enclos’d paper threw on them two days after the action, and has disgusted every man who was an eye witness of such gallantry as, perhaps, is not to be parallel’d.” Every one admires physical courage, and forgives much to the man who risks his life in the performance of duty.

Whatever mistake the Grenadiers made they had the sympathy and respect of the soldiery. And while showing his admiration for the Grenadiers, Gibson gives his opinion of the plan of battle. “ The attempt was, I had almost said impracticable ; which some Genl. Officers scarcely hesitate to say. One of them of knowledge, Fortune and Interest I have heard has declar’d the attack *then* and *there*, was contrary to the advice and opinion of every officer ; and when things are come to this, you’ll judge what the event may be !”

Let us now recur to the question of the severe storm





A
PLAN
of the Ground near y^e R. Mont-
morenci, whereon
GENERAL WOLF
encamp't July
and which he quit September 1759 at 12 o'clock
of the Day in sight of the French Army
without the loss of a man.



which has been mentioned by nearly all the chroniclers, some looking upon it as a piece of good luck for the British, and others as especially fortunate for the French, and this difference of opinion is somewhat independent of nationality. For instance, the pious Quartermaster Sergeant Johnson thinks that "the good Providence of the Almighty with his all piercing eye, saw our distressed situation, out of his tender compassion towards us, sent, as in an instant, a surprizing Shower of Rain." Captain John Knox takes an opposite view. "The storm of uncommon heavy rain, that not only damaged our powder, but rendered the precipices to the enemy's work so slippery as to become impossible for men to ascend them." On the French side the same differences appear. The storm was generally described as unfortunate, but one writer says:

"Notre salut ce jour-là fut un orage qui vint au moment de l'attaque, et d'autant plus à propos, que nous manquions de poudre et de balles; que depuis longtemps on n'avait plus de mèches pour le canon, auquel on mettait le feu avec un bassinet de fusil."⁽¹⁾

Considering in this case the circumstances in which the Grenadiers had placed themselves, as well as the opinions of people who were present, it seems clear that the balance of advantage from the storm was on the side of the British. Had the attack been made in form as intended by Wolfe it is doubtful whether it would have succeeded. The probabilities are that it would not, and that

(1) The Hartwell Library Manuscript of which a copy was brought to Canada by the late Hon. D. B. Viger.

the loss on his side would have been much greater than he could hope to inflict on the enemy. If the slippery hillside impeded the Grenadiers, so much the better for them. "Certain it is," says a French officer "that had he attempted to have forced our lines, his whole army would have run a risque of being cut to pieces; for he must have carried the intrenchments by an escalad on three sides very difficult to be mounted, and that in the face of an army much superior to his own." The fact is that the advantage of position and numbers in favour of the French was so great that after the first check the enemy could not hope for success.

Not only did the French regulars acquit themselves well, but the Canadians fought with such spirit and steadiness as to merit and receive high praise from de Levis. ⁽²⁾

The losses on the French side were only sixty six in killed and wounded, although they were subject to an unusual cannonade from ten o'clock till six: while the British losses numbered four hundred and twenty men, and thirty officers. The two small grounded vessels were burnt to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

A review of the operations of the British from the 26th of June until after the battle of Montmorency, is given by General Wolfe in a letter addressed to The Right Honourable William Pitt, on the 2nd of September, 1759. A portion of this letter is here quoted in continuation of this narrative.

(2) In a letter, Aug. 2, to Bellisle he gives an admirable account of the affair, but as the French were simply on the defensive his relation has to do chiefly with the movements of the British.

“ Head Quarters of Montmorencie
in the River St. Lawrence.

“ Sir,

“ I wish I could, upon this occasion, have the honour of
“ transmitting to you a more favourable account of the
“ progress of his Majesty’s arms, but the obstacles which
“ we have met with in the operation of the campaign are
“ much greater than we had reason to expect, or could
“ foresee; not so much from the number of the enemy
“ (though superior to ours) as from the natural strength
“ of the country, which the Marquis de Montcalm seems
“ wisely to depend upon. When I learned that succors of
“ all kinds had been thrown into Quebec, that five bat-
“ talions of regular troops completed from the best inha-
“ bitants of the country, some of the troops of the colony,
“ and every Canadian that was capable of bearing arms,
“ besides several nations of Savages, had taken the field in
“ a very advantageous situation, I could not flatter myself
“ that I should be able to reduce the place. I sought,
“ however an occasion to attack their army, knowing well
“ that with these troops I was able to fight, and hoping
“ that a victory might disperse them. We found them
“ incamped, along the shore of Beauport, from the river
“ St. Charles to the fall of Montmorencie and intrenched
“ in every accessible part. The 27th of June we landed
“ upon the Island of Orleans; but, receiving a message
“ from the Admiral, that there was reason to think that
“ the enemy had artillery and a force upon the Point de
“ Levi, I detached Brigadier Monckton with four battalions
“ to drive them thence. He passed the river on the 29th at

“ night, and marched the next day to the Point ; he obliged
“ the enemy’s irregulars to retire and possessed himself of
“ that post ; the advanced parties on this occasion had two
“ or three skirmishes with the Canadians and Indians,
“ with little loss on either side. Colonel Carleton marched
“ with a detachment to the westernmost Point of Orleans,
“ whence our operations were likely to begin. It was abso-
“ lutely necessary to possess these two points, and fortify
“ them ; because from either the one or the other the
“ enemy might make it impossible for any ship to lie in
“ the bason of Quebec, or even within two miles of it.
“ Batteries of cannon and mortars were erected with great
“ dispatch on the Point of Levi, to bombard the town and
“ magazines, and to injure the works and batteries, the
“ enemy perceiving these works in some forwardness,
“ passed the river with sixteen hundred men to attack and
“ destroy them. Unluckily they fell into confusion, fired
“ upon one another and went back again, by which we
“ lost an opportunity of defeating this large detachment.
“ The effect of this artillery has been so great, though
“ across the river, that the upper town is considerably
“ damaged, and the lower town intirely destroyed. The
“ works, for the security of our hospital and stores upon
“ the isle of Orleans, being finished, on the 9th of July, at
“ night, we passed the north channel, and incamped near
“ the enemy’s left, the river Montmorencie between us.
“ The next morning Captain Dank’s company of rangers,
“ posted in a wood to cover some workmen, were attacked
“ and defeated by a body of Indians, and had so many
“ killed and wounded as to be almost disabled for the rest

“ of the campaign ; the enemy also suffered in this affair,
“ and were, in their turn, driven off by the nearest troops.
“ The ground to the eastward of the fall seemed to be, as
“ it really is, higher than that on the enemy’s side, and to
“ command it in a manner that might be made useful to us.
“ There is besides a ford below the fall, which may be
“ passed for some hours in the latter part of the ebb, and
“ beginning of the flood tide ; and I had hopes that possi-
“ bly means might be found of passing the river above, so
“ as to fight the Marquis de Montcalm upon terms of less
“ disadvantage than directly attacking his intrenchments.
“ In reconnoitring the river Montmorencie, we found it
“ fordable at a place about three miles up ; but the oppo-
“ site bank was intrenched, and so steep and woody, that
“ it was to no purpose to attempt a passage there. The
“ escort was twice attacked by the Indians, who were as
“ often repulsed ; but in these rencounters we had forty
“ officers and men, killed and wounded. The 18th of July
“ two men of war, two armed sloops, and two transports,
“ with some troops on board, passed by the town without
“ any loss, and got into the upper river. This enabled
“ me to reconnoitre the country above, where I found the
“ same attention to the enemy’s side, and great difficulties
“ on ours, arising from the nature of the ground, and the
“ obstacles to our communication with the fleet. But what
“ I feared most was, that, if we should land between the
“ town and the river Cape Rouge, the body first landed
“ could not be reinforced, before they were attacked by the
“ enemy’s whole army. Notwithstanding these difficulties,
“ I thought once of attempting it at St. Michael’s, about

“ three miles above the town : but, perceiving that the
“ enemy jealous of the design, were preparing against it,
“ and had actually brought artillery and a mortar, which,
“ being so near to Quebec, they could increase as they
“ please, to play upon the shipping; and as it must have
“ been many hours before we could attack them, even
“ supposing a favourable night for the boats to pass the
“ town unhurt, it seemed so hazardous that I thought it
“ best to desist. However to divide the enemy’s force, and
“ to draw their attention as far up the river as possible,
“ and to procure some intelligence, I sent a detachment
“ under the command of Colonel Carleton, to land at Point
“ de Tremble, to attack whatsoever he might find there,
“ bring off some prisoners and all the useful papers he
“ could get. I had been informed that a number of the
“ inhabitants of Quebec had retired to that place, and that
“ probably we should find a magazine of provisions there.
“ The Colonel was fired upon by a body of Indians the
“ moment he landed; but they were soon dispersed, and
“ driven into the woods; he searched for magazines, but
“ to no purpose; brought off some prisoners, and returned
“ with little loss. After this business I came back to
“ Montmorencie, where I found that Brigadier Townshend
“ had, by a superior fire, prevented the French from erecting
“ a battery on the bank of the river, whence they intended
“ to cannonade our camp. I now resolved to take the
“ first opportunity which presented itself of attacking the
“ enemy, though posted to great advantage, and every-
“ where prepared to receive us. As the men of war cannot
“ for sufficient depth of water, come near enough to the

“ enemy’s intrenchments to annoy them in the least, the
“ Admiral had prepared two transports, drawing but little
“ water, which upon occasion, could be run aground to
“ favour a descent. With the help of these vessels, which
“ I understood could be carried by the tide close in shore,
“ I proposed to make myself master of a detached redoubt
“ near to the water’s edge, and whose situation appeared
“ to be out of musket shot of the intrenchments upon the
“ hill: if the enemy supported this detached piece it would
“ necessarily bring on an engagement, what we most
“ wished for; and, if not, I should have it in my power to
“ examine their situation, so as to be able to determine
“ where best to attack them. Preparations were accordingly
“ made for an engagement.

“ The 31st of July in the forenoon, the boats of the fleet
“ were filled with Grenadiers, and a part of Brigadier
“ Monckton’s brigade from the Point Levi; the two bri-
“ gades under the Brigadiers Townshend and Murray
“ were ordered to be in readiness to pass the ford, when it
“ should be thought necessary. To facilitate the passage
“ of this corps, the Admiral had placed the Centurion in
“ the channel, so that he might check the fire of the lower
“ battery which commanded the ford; this ship was of
“ great use, as her fire was very judiciously directed. A
“ great quantity of Artillery stores was placed upon the
“ eminence so as to batter and enslave the left of their
“ entrenchments. From the vessel which ran aground
“ nearest in, I observed that the redoubt was too much
“ commanded to be kept without very great loss; and the
“ more, as the two armed ships could not be brought near

“ enough to cover both with their artillery and musketry,
“ which I at first conceived they might. But as the enemy
“ seemed in confusion, and we were prepared for action, I
“ thought it a proper time to make an attempt upon their
“ intrenchment. Orders were sent to the Brigadier General
“ to be ready, with corps under their command ; Brigadier
“ Townshend and Murray to pass the ford. At a proper
“ time of the tide, the signal was made, but in rowing
“ towards the shore many of the boats grounded upon a
“ ledge that runs off a considerable distance.

“ This accident put us in some disorder, lost a great
“ deal of time, and obliged me to send an officer to stop
“ Brigadier Townshend's march, whom I then observed to
“ be in motion. While the seamen were getting the boats
“ off, the enemy fired a number of shot and shell, but did
“ no considerable damage. As soon as this disorder could
“ be set a little to rights, and the boats were ranged in a
“ proper manner, some of the officers of the navy went in
“ with me to find a better place to land. We took one flat-
“ bottomed boat with us to make the experiment ; and as
“ soon as we had found a fit part of the shore, the troops
“ were ordered to disembark, thinking it not too late for
“ the attempt. The thirteen companies of Grenadiers, and
“ two hundred of the second Royal American battalion,
“ got first on shore. The Grenadiers were ordered to form
“ themselves into four distinct bodies, and to begin the
“ attack, supported by Brigadier Monckton's corps, as soon
“ as the troops had passed the ford, and were at hand to
“ assist, but, whether from the noise and hurry at landing,
“ or from some other cause the Grenadiers instead of

“ forming themselves as they were directed, ran on im-
“ petuously towards the enemy’s intrenchments, in the
“ utmost disorder and confusion, without waiting for the
“ corps which was to sustain them, and join in the attack.
“ Brigadier Monckton was not landed, and Brigadier
“ Townshend was still at a considerable distance, though
“ upon his march to join us, in very great order. The
“ Grenadiers were checked by the enemy’s first fire, and
“ obliged to shelter themselves in or about the redoubt,
“ which the French abandoned upon their approach. In
“ this situation they continued for some time, unable to
“ form under so hot a fire, and having many gallant offi-
“ cers wounded, who, careless of their persons, had been
“ solely intent upon their duty. I saw the absolute neces-
“ sity of calling them off, that they might form themselves
“ behind Brigadier Monckton’s corps, which was now
“ landed, and drawn up on the beach, in extreme good
“ order. By this new accident, and this second delay, it
“ was near night, and a sudden storm came on, and the
“ tide began to make, so that I thought it most advisable
“ not to persevere in so difficult an attack lest, in case of a
“ repulse, the retreat of Brigadier Townshend’s corps
“ might be hazardous and uncertain. Our artillery had a
“ great effect upon the enemy’s left, where Brigadiers
“ Townshend and Murray were to have attacked; and it
“ is probable that, if those accidents I have spoken of had
“ not happened, we should have penetrated there, whilst
“ our left and center, more remote from our artillery, must
“ have borne all the violence of their musketry. The
“ French did not attempt to interrupt our march. Some of

“ their savages came down to murder such wounded as
“ could not be brought off, and to scalp the dead, as their
“ custom is. The place where the attack was intended has
“ these advantages over all others here about : our artillery
“ could be brought into use, the greatest part, or even the
“ whole of the troops, might act at once, and the retreat,
“ in case of a repulse, was secure, at least for a certain
“ time of the tide ; neither one or other of these advantages
“ can anywhere else be found. The enemy were indeed
“ posted upon a commanding eminence ; the beach upon
“ which the troops were drawn up was of deep mud, with
“ holes, and cut by several gullies ; the hill to be ascended
“ very steep, and not everywhere practicable ; the enemy
“ numerous in their intrenchments, and their fire hot. If
“ the attack had succeeded, our loss must certainly have
“ been great, and theirs inconsiderable, from the shelter
“ which the neighbouring woods afforded them. The river
“ St. Charles remained still to be passed, before the town
“ could be invested. All these circumstances I considered ;
“ but the desire to act in conformity to the King’s inten-
“ tions induced me to make this trial, persuaded that a
“ victorious army finds no difficulties.”

The draft of this letter appears to have been discussed by the officers, and certain changes were made at the instance of vice-Admiral Saunders. General Wolfe’s answer to the Admiral contains many interesting particulars regarding the operations of the 31st July, and it is therefore quoted in full.

“ Dear Sir,

“ I did not see the letter you did me the honour to write
“ till just now, nor indeed could I have answered it before,
“ if Major Barré had shewn it me. I shall leave out that
“ part of my letter to Mr. Pitt which you object to, although
“ the matter of fact, to the best of my recollection, is strictly
“ as I have stated it. I am sensible of my own errors in
“ the course of the campaign ; see clearly wherein I have
“ been deficient ; and think a little more or less blame to a
“ man that must necessarily be ruined, of little or no
“ consequence. If you had recollected the purport of my
“ letter you would not have found “ that it throws any
“ difficulties I met with in landing on the two cats not
“ being placed so to annoy the two small batteries with
“ their great guns.” On the contrary the cats did annoy
“ the upper battery with their great guns, and performed
“ that part of the service as well as could be expected ; and
“ yet that battery was not abandoned by the enemy, but
“ continued firing till the grenadiers ran (like blockheads)
“ up to it. However, its fire was of no consequence, and
“ not worth mentioning, nor the least impediment to land-
“ ing. Mr. Cook ⁽¹⁾ said he believed the cats could be carried
“ within 40 or 50 yards of the redoubts. I told him at the
“ time, that I would readily compound for 150 or 200 yards,
“ which would have been near enough, had the upper
“ redoubt been as far from the enemy’s entrenchments as
“ it appeared from our camp to be, and had I judged it
“ advisable to attack it with a view to lodge in it, which I

(1) Captain Cook, afterwards distinguished navigator.

“ did not upon seeing that it was too much commanded.
“ You will please to consider the difference between landing
“ at high water with four companies of grenadiers to attack
“ a redoubt under the protection of the artillery of a vessel,
“ and landing part of an army to attack the enemy’s
“ entrenchments. For this last business a junction of our
“ corps was necessary ; and to join, the water must fall a
“ certain degree. I gave up the first point (that of the
“ redoubt) upon finding my mistake as to the distance
“ from the entrenchment, and determined upon the latter
“ (which I always had in view) upon observing the enemy’s
“ disorder, and remarking their situation much better than
“ I ever could do before. The fire of the lower redoubt was
“ so smart during the time that we were on board the
“ Russel (I think it was) that, as neither her guns, nor the
“ guns of the other cat could be brought to bear against
“ it, I thought fit to order the grenadiers out of her, by
“ which I saved many lives. I was no less than three times
“ struck with the splinters in that ship, and had my stick
“ knocked out of my hand with a cannon-ball while I was
“ on board reconnoitring the position and movements of
“ the enemy ; and yet you say in your letter, they did
“ (the cats) great execution against the two small batteries,
“ and on your first landing you did not lose a man.

“ With regard to the Centurion, I am ready to do justice
“ to Cap. Mantle ; but I am very sure, whatever his merit
“ may be, the approbation would be more to the purpose
“ coming from you than from me. In reality the position
“ of the ship was in consequence of your orders, and I am
“ very sure that, if you could have placed the whole fleet

“ so as to have been useful to us, you would have done it.
“ The Centurion had no enemy to encounter; her position
“ was assigned, and her guns were fired judiciously. The
“ fire of that, and of the four gun battery near the water
“ side, together with the want of ammunition, kept their
“ lower battery silent for some time, but yet we received
“ many shot from that battery at landing; and Brigadier
“ Townshend's Corps was fired upon particularly in return-
“ ing over the ford, though with little damage.

“ When I had resolved to attack the French army I
“ sent Mr. Leslie to see how the water fell, that I might
“ land at a proper time to join with Townshend; and,
“ when he made me his report, I made the signal to Col.
“ Burton. Many of the boats ran upon the ledge; and the
“ delay occasioned by the accident was such, that I sent
“ Captain Smith, my aid-de-camp, to stop Townshend, who
“ was then crossing the ford; and yet, Sir, you assert that
“ there was no delay by this accident. None indeed that
“ would have had any consequence if the strange behaviour
“ of the Grenadiers had not lost us more time, and brought
“ on the night, and perhaps very luckily for the army,
“ considering the disadvantageous nature of the attack. I
“ remember you did me the honour to call to me from
“ your boat to go in and see for a landing place; and I
“ remember some gentleman's calling out at the same time
“ from the boat, that it was a proper time to land; and you
“ may remember I went in, and made the experiment with
“ a flat bottomed boat, and one of the captains (I believe
“ Capt. Shade,) and when we had found what we sought
“ for, I desired him to bring the boats forward. The rest


“ makes up the remaining part of the story of that unlucky
“ day ; the blame of which I take entirely upon my own
“ shoulders, and expect to suffer for it. Accidents cannot
“ be helped. As much as the plan was defective falls
“ upon me ; and it is I think a matter of no vast conse-
“ quence whether the cats fired well or ill ; were well or
“ ill placed ; of no great consequence whether an hour or
“ two were or were not lost by the boats grounding ; and
“ of as little consequence whether the Centurion’s gunner
“ directed his shot well or ill. In none of these circum-
“ stances the essential matter resides. The great fault of
“ that day consists in putting too many men into boats,
“ who might have been landed the day before, and might
“ have crossed the ford with certainty, while a small body
“ only remained afloat ; and the superfluous boats of the
“ fleet employed in a feint that might divide the enemy’s
“ force. A man sees his error often too late to remedy. My
“ ill state of health hinders me from executing my own
“ plan ; it is of too desperate a nature to order others to
“ execute. The Generals seem to think alike as to the
“ operations, I, therefore, join with them, and perhaps we
“ may find some opportunity to strike a blow.”

If one reads these letters critically he can hardly understand why Wolfe should have made an attack where he did, or should have adopted the tactics he used.

If one examines the plans of the place showing the narrow beach and the steep hill behind it bristling with hostile muskets his wonder will grow. The few advantages of attacking in this particular place are soon set down by

Wolfe. The artillery could be used, the greater part or the whole of the troops might act at once, and in case of repulse a retreat was open.

Against these advantages he sets a formidable array of difficulties, all of which he saw before the attempt was made. But in order to do something in accordance with his instructions from the King he was resolved to make a trial, if not expecting success, being certain that he could retire without more damage than the chances were worth. This view is the best justification that can be given for the failure of the 31st of July, a failure that caused a temporary abatement of the enthusiastic regard in which Wolfe was held by officers and soldiers alike. Probably Townshend had this in mind when he wrote his wife, on the 6th of September, that Wolfe's health "is but very bad. His Generalship in my poor opinion is not a bit better, this only between us. He never consulted us till the latter end of August, so that we have nothing to answer for I hope as to the success of this campaign, which from the disposition the French have made of their force must chiefly fall to Genl. Amherst and Genl. Johnson." Although in the same letter Townshend says that "Our unequal force has reduced our operations to a scene (sic) of skirmishing, cruelty, and devastation," it is plain that he made little allowance for Wolfe because of the tremendous difficulties the latter had to face and from amongst which he had simply to make a choice.



CHAPTER VII.

DEEDS OF VALOUR

THE STORY OF CAPTAIN OCHTERLONEY AND OF ENSIGN PEYTON.

THE Battle of Montmorency, regarded from the British standpoint, was a signal defeat. The enemy, masters of the art of fortification, had rendered the green bluff overlooking *le beau prêt* a veritable fortress. The constructors of the entrenchments and redoubts had foreseen just such an attempt as made by Wolfe and had prepared for it so thoroughly that even the impetuous and daring rush of the Grenadiers was rendered inoperative, and proved but a futile sacrifice of life.

Although the musket was a cumbrous weapon whose effective range did not exceed 250 yards, yet, in the hands of the French behind their earthworks, it wrought fearful havoc, for it was the small arm fire that completely shattered the British advance. It is an axiom of military science that the frontal attack is always conducted at a terrible cost, and an illustration of this may be shown by the fact that at this affair of July 31st 1759, Wolfe lost in killed and wounded over 400 men, a very large proportion of the attacking force. No one could say that the British had

lacked courage. They had conducted themselves like the steady veterans they were ; but even the most daring could not advance against the storm of lead that swept that green and smiling field.

At a time when there was a startling lack of both private and public virtue at the Courts of Europe—when English Government officials unblushingly plundered the Treasury and grew rich by dubious means, when an army commission could be purchased by any one willing to pay for sending his son to the wars ; at a time indeed when public morality was at a low ebb, it is strange to observe the class of men which held His Majesty's commission both in the army and navy.

Although entering the profession of arms inadequately qualified for duty, they rapidly became efficient and valuable officers, fought like demons and died like the gentleman they were for the honour of the time worn flag and for the glory of their beloved Britain. Notwithstanding the tendencies of the age which were not calculated to foster exalted sentiments, the Englishman in private considered honour his most precious possession. Utterly conscienceless concerning the maladministration of public affairs, *blasé* in the pursuit of vicious pleasures, cynical in his view of the corruption of the court, he nevertheless would rather die than commit a mean act, he told the truth with manly defiance of results and the giving of the lie was a deadly offence only to be wiped out in blood. The duello flourished, and thousands of gallant men fell a victim to this method of effacing insult.

In the army especially was it in vogue and scarcely was

there an officer of spirit who had not attended one of these early morning encounters with pistols at ten or fifteen paces. Wolfe's army was full of such gallant reckless gentlemen, and affairs of this kind frequently took place.

On the day preceeding the battle of Montmorency, Captain David Ochterloney, the brilliant and popular commander of a company in the second Batallion of Royal Americans fought a duel with a German officer, and although he came out victorious, having succeeded in disarming his antagonist, he had himself received a painful wound under the right arm. In the morning, when a portion of his regiment was ordered to the attack, he was urged by his friends to remain in camp and give his wound a chance to heal. This proposition he firmly resisted on the ground that when his country required his services his honour could not suffer the results of a private quarrel to stand in the way. This forcible argument could not be controverted in the light of the spirit of the time, and so Captain Ochterloney marched to the battle utterly oblivious of the pain of his wounds. Accompanying this dauntless captain was his brother officer and friend Eusign Peyton, shortly afterwards promoted to a lieutenancy. Ochterloney, as his name would show, was from Scotland, while Peyton was an Irishman and a worthy representative of that green isle, the cradle of warriors. In the attack on the French position both gentlemen had the misfortune to be wounded, Ochterloney through the lungs, while a bullet had shattered the small bone of Peyton's left leg. They were near together when they fell and although disabled were in a position to converse. Through the awful rain storm which

drenched the combatants these officers and hundreds of the soldiers lay while the noise of the conflict roared in their ears and while the British struggled in vain to oust their opponents from the masterful position they occupied. At last the impossibility of the attack became evident and the British officer gave the order to retreat. So hot was the French fire that there was not even an opportunity to remove the wounded to a place of safety, and almost before the British had begun to march towards their camp the French Indians were among the fallen, killing, stabbing and scalping with the deviltry of which they alone were capable. The Highlanders passed close to where Ochterloney and Peyton lay and immediately began to make preparations to carry the officers off the field. But strange to say the Scottish captain rejected their advances. Again his "honour" interposed and he gravely assured his would be rescuers that his honour would not permit him to leave the field after such a signal repulse. Realizing the impossibility of moving the Captain from his determination the soldiers turned to Peyton. From him they received the answer that Captain Ochterloney was his friend and that while he lived he would remain by his side. Such self sacrificing devotion as that of this young Irish officer accords but ill with the selfish spirit of the times, and in civil life would have been scorned and ridiculed. But in the army there still lingered the best relics of the Crusader's chivalry, and these memories had been preserved by the gallant self forgetfulness of thousands of his lineal successors. No wonder the traditions of the British army are cherished. Its high ideals are fostered

by just such officers and men as Ensign Peyton, and in modern days by the heroes who wear on their breasts the bronze cross "For Valour."

Their offer of aid rejected, the Highlanders marched slowly away towards the fast deepening ford below the Montmorency Falls and in the gathering shadows of evening these two officers found themselves left to the horrors of solitude or the far more fearful vengeance of the Indians. Ochterloney who believed his wound fatal had protested most strongly against Peyton's sacrifice, but in vain. The young Ensign could not be moved, and it can be readily imagined with what pride and pleasure the Scottish Captain learned the strength of the attachment that bound this young officer to him. A man who for the sake of friendship can look death in the face deserves immortal fame, but he who can await not only death but torture at the hands of those fiends in human form, the Indians, shows a divine unselfishness. No monumental brass, no pyramid of granite could adequately preserve his memory. It must forever live in the hearts of his successors as a bright page in the annals of the British army. Having given themselves up to die, Captain Ochterloney and Ensign Peyton awaited the outcome with the calmness of despair.

For a time they were not noticed, but towards seven o'clock two Indians and a French colonial soldier discovered the two gentlemen and advanced to the attack. Captain Ochterloney believing that so long as the savages were accompanied by a French soldier there was no danger of outrage, called out to the soldier, offering to surrender,

and trusting that he and his companion, the Ensign, would be treated honourably as prisoners of war. The soldier paid not the slightest attention to this, notwithstanding the fact that Captain Ochterloney had spoken in French; on the contrary he ransacked the helpless Captain's pockets of money and watch and even took the gold laced hat he was wearing. This done he calmly walked away leaving the wounded officers to the tender mercies of the Indians. The savages immediately attacked him viciously; one of them clubbed his musket and struck at the Captain's head. The blow, however, was not well aimed and fell on his shoulder; at the same time the other Indian deliberately shot him in the breast. Captain Ochterloney immediately shouted to his friend Peyton. "O Peyton, the villain has shot me!" whereupon the Indian without more ado sprang forward and sought to complete his bloody work by stabbing the captain in the abdomen with a scalping knife. In the meantime the other was attempting to strangle the officer with his own sash. Peyton was aroused by the sad plight of his friend, and forgetting his own pain he crawled to where a double barreled musket was lying and immediately shot one of the Indians dead. The other advanced, but Peyton fired again seemingly without effect, for the Indian rushed upon him with a bayonet, wounding him in the shoulder. Withdrawing the weapon the savage was about to plunge it into the Ensign's body, but Peyton seized the bayonet with his hand, with a jerk pulled the Indian towards him and drawing a dagger which hung at his belt he stabbed the redman in the side. A struggle of the most terrible character ensued, but the Indian's wound was

of so severe a nature that his strength quickly ebbed away, and Peyton who had obtained the advantage used his dagger once more, this time with fatal effect. During this fight Captain Ochterloney had become unconscious. When Peyton arose after despatching his assailant, he saw rapidly advancing a party of some thirty Indians. Despite his wounded leg the officer grasping his musket attempted to run, but was only able to proceed about a hundred yards when he sank exhausted and fainting to the ground. He mustered up sufficient strength, however, to load his piece, and when the party arrived within range, he held them at bay until assistance came to him. He had seen at some little distance a party of Highlanders, and waving his hand in signal of distress the officer in charge of the party, Capt. Macdonald, sent three men to the help of the brave Ensign, and they finally succeeded in getting him to the boats, although only under the most withering fire from the French lines. Safe in the British camp, he finally recovered from his wounds and was shortly afterwards promoted to a Lieutenancy. Captain Ochterloney was found on the field by a soldier of the regiment of Guyenne who conveyed him to Quebec and placed him in the General Hospital.

Two days later, on the 2nd of August, the French sent an officer with a flag of truce to the British lines requesting that Capt Ochterloney's effects be sent to him at the hospital; at the same time Admiral Saunders received details of the Captain's rescue from the Indians and information as to his condition. General Wolfe was much moved at the Captain's misfortunes and he sent with the French

officer the sum of twenty pounds sterling as a gift to the soldier of the Guyenne regiment by whose humanity and kindness Captain Ochterloney had been saved from the hands of the Indians and from a fate far worse than death. On the 4th of August, another flag of truce came from the town, the bearer of which returned the money that General Wolfe had sent to the French soldier. The Marquis de Vaudreuil stated that he was unable to accept money on behalf of his soldiers, who simply carried out the orders that had been given to them.

General Wolfe took advantage of this opportunity to send a letter to Madame de Ramezay, Directress of the General Hospital, thanking her for the attention paid to the wounded officer who had been taken to the Hospital on the 1st of August, and assuring her that if fortune favoured the British troops, he would extend his protection to her and to the Hospital.

How this promise of General Wolfe's became known is a mystery, but the fact remains that from this time until the end of the siege, the General Hospital was regarded by the townspeople as a safe place, and very many persons removed their money and valuables there, so that if the siege by any chance were to prove successful and the British were to enter the gates of Quebec they would be secure against personal inconvenience and loss.

It is probable that Captain Ochterloney died on the 23rd of August, for it is recorded that on the 24th of August, there was a cessation of hostilities from seven o'clock until nine o'clock in the morning while Captain St. Laurent under cover of a flag of truce came from the town with the


effects of Captain Ochterloney, who had died of his wounds received on the 31st of July.

After the capitulation of the city, it was learned from the surgeons who attended the captain in the Hospital that the main cause of his death was the wound in the abdomen caused by the Indian's scalping knife. He might probably have recovered from the gunshot wounds in the breast. The incident and its attendant inhumanities had made such a deep impression on the minds of the British officers of high rank that General Townshend, after he had entered the town expostulated with the French officers upon keeping up such a severe fire against two wounded gentlemen who were destitute of all hope of escape. He was informed that the regulars had taken no part in this disgraceful affair but that the responsibility rested on the shoulders of the Canadians and Indians who were not to be restrained by discipline.

It may be interesting to note that the family to which this unfortunate young officer belonged is at present represented by Sir David Ochterloney, Bart., of Edinburgh. In a letter recently received by the authors of this work, Sir David states that there is no authentic portrait of Captain Ochterloney who was killed during the siege of Quebec. He was kind enough however to send a chart showing just in what way the Captain is related to him. A copy of this chart appears on the following page.

Common Ancestor

JAMES OCHTERLONEY OF AUCHTERLONEY
of Wester Seaton and Tillifroskie






*Abi Sibi,
Sed Patria vocat*

Crested Ancestor


JAMES MCINTYRE OF AUCHTERLONEY

of Wester Seaton and Tillifroskie





*Abn sibi.
sed Patrie vixit.*



CHAPTER VIII.

THE SECOND MONTH OF THE SIEGE

THE month of August opened inauspiciously for the contending armies.

On the French side there had been little loss of life, but numbers of the inhabitants were ruined and homeless through the devastation wrought by the British, and were at the same time experiencing the horrors of famine.

The British were in an unenviable situation. The severe repulse at Montmorency had thinned the ranks and damped the ardour of the soldiers. Moreover, the inclemency of the weather, the exposure of the camps, and the fatigue of the last four weeks threatened the health of the remainder of the army.

To alleviate the sufferings of the men as much as possible all the sick were removed to a sheltered spot on the Island of Orleans, and orders were given to the officers to send all the cattle taken in future to the Island for the use of the invalids. This wise precaution seems to have had a beneficial effect for many of the men were soon fit for duty. Wolfe had told the men that whenever he considered that they needed extra refreshment he would order it for them, and he now recognized the necessity of fulfilling

his promise by ordering a half gill of rum to be delivered regularly every morning to each man.

2nd On this day the French record that it was absolutely necessary to obtain a supply of provisions at once. As the British commanded the river, the French were compelled to convey their stores from Batiscan, a distance of eighteen leagues from the town. There were few hands to be found for the work, except old men, women and children. "It was however, by the aid of such weak hands that 700 barrels of pork or flour were conveyed in 271 carts from Batiscan."

The British batteries continued to shatter the French works on the ramparts, and thirteen men had been killed or mortally wounded between the first and second days of August.

The French therefore took advantage of the respite afforded by a flag of truce to clear away the wreckage and to provide shelter for the gunners. They also strengthened their batteries at Montmorency.

3rd Towards evening, on the third of August, a deserter arrived in the British camp who stated that the Marquis de Levis intended to cross the river at the head of three thousand men to attack the batteries at Pointe des Pères, and on the same evening a sergeant deserted from the British camp, taking the company's orderly book with him. ⁽¹⁾

The troops that had been under the command of M.

(1) This book is now in the archives of the war department in France.

Dumas at Jacques Cartier returned to the French camp on this day.

4th Some of the Light Infantry under Col. Howe appear to have been of a literary turn of mind, for amongst the spoils brought into the camp was a library. "The Light Infantry returned this afternoon with a great flock of cattle and other plunder, amongst which was a library, said to belong to a priest."

A strong detachment of the troops received orders to proceed with the division of the fleet under Admiral Holmes, to make a diversion above the town.

Five deserters are reported to have crossed over to the French camp on the fourth.

A French Journal records the fact that the Canadians were becoming restless under prolonged service. Their duties towards their country compelled them to remain under arms, while their families were starving for the necessaries of life. There was an abundant harvest, and yet famine threatened them because there were no labourers to gather it in.

Montcalm was unwilling to disperse the Canadians at this time for fear that Amherst would advance further into the country, and that he might be compelled to withdraw troops from the town, and thus leave a way open to the British.

The French received information on the fourth of the evacuation of Forts Carillon and St. Frederic, which were blown up, the former on the 27th and the latter on the 31st of July.

5th On the fifth of August a French officer stated that

from the 12th of July until the 4th of August four thousand shells and between nine and ten thousand cannon shot had been discharged against the town by the British batteries.

The heavy guns were found to be no longer required, and orders were given to replace the thirty two pounders at Point des Pères with twenty four pounders, and ten inch mortars were set up in the place of thirteen inch.

During the operations of the British before Quebec the French fleet was at Richelieu, and a plan was now proposed for the destruction of the vessels. Twelve hundred men were detailed for this expedition under the command of Brigadier Murray, who had also received instructions to destroy a magazine at Deschambault, which according to the report of scouts contained many valuable stores. The descent was not made at Deschambault until the morning of the 19th.

Twenty-four flat bottomed boats passed the town in the evening, unperceived by the French, under cover of a dense fog, while the batteries maintained a heavy fire.

“As these different movements which the enemy was observed making in that quarter, created an impression that it might be with a design to attempt something there, M. de Montcalm determined to send a reinforcement thither, so that we found ourselves then having, between Quebec and St. Augustin, about 1,000 men, whereof M. de Bougainville had the chief command.”

6th Captain Goreham at the head of the Rangers, and a detachment from another regiment, sailed down the river towards St. Paul's Bay, to lay waste the adjacent country.

The expedition, it is stated, was for the purpose of punishing the inhabitants for firing upon sounding boats belonging to the fleet. A brisk engagement occurred between one of the British frigates and four of the French floating batteries, near the Island of Orleans. General Wolfe sustained the frigate from an eminence on the Island, whereupon a general cannonading ensued for the space of an hour and a half. One of the batteries was blown to pieces, one escaped to the town, and two were driven ashore.

Captain Knox records this incident under the date of the 6th. "This morning I was an eye-witness to the ceremony of burying a man alive, *mirabile dictu*, for the sea-scurvy. To explain this matter it must be observed, that a pit was made in the ground, and the patient stood in it, with his head only above the level earth; then the mould was thrown in loose about him, and there he remained for some hours; this I am told, is to be repeated every day until his recovery is perfected; the poor fellow seemed to be in good spirits and laughed and conversed with the spectators of those who were about him."

7th The effects of the half gill of rum ordered on the 3rd of August, were apparently other than those desired, for on this day the following order was issued.

"Whatever soldier is seen drunk, is to be struck off the roll of those who received rum; this order is repeated, and will be more strictly complied with for the future."

The discipline and privations of camp life are, no doubt, an excellent remedy for the cure of epicurean tastes, and they were probably fruitful in producing the spirit of

contentment which is expressed by Captain Knox in a passage under this date. "We are now tolerably well provided with the necessaries of life; at times butcher's meat is scarce, but that is supplied by young horseflesh; a loin of a colt eats well roasted, and there are other parts of the carcase, which, if disguised in the same manner that one meets with other victuals at the table, may deceive the nicest palate."⁽¹⁾

Several vessels anchored at Cap Rouge, after being lightened, went up as far as Point aux Ecureuils. "The King's frigates and ship La Fronsac were then at anchor at the foot of the Richelieu, i. e. 3 leagues above Point aux Ecureuils. The wind did not yet allow of their going higher up; the intention of the English was probably to capture them, but they took advantage of the wind which had brought the latter to ascend the rapid. M. de Bougainville thinned his post somewhat, in order to form a detachment with which to follow the enemy's ships along the river side."

8th At ten o'clock in the morning the troops that had embarked under Brigadier Murray on the 5th were ordered to land on the north side of the river opposite the church of Pointe-aux-Trembles; the signal being the wave of a Brigadier's hat. A reef of rocks prevented a landing at this place, and the boats were compelled to draw up immediately in front of a body of the enemy posted in a copse. Captain Fraser, in charge of the detachment, per-

(1) The French were frequently reduced to eating horseflesh. See *Life of Montcalm*.

ceived a number of the enemy still further to the left, and thought it imprudent to commence the attack until a larger number of men could be landed. He therefore signalled to Brigadier Murray's boat, which was near for assistance. The Brigadier who, apparently, did not realise the situation, attributed the delay in landing to "shyness" on the part of the grenadiers. Captain Delaune's company thereupon landed where Fraser's men were drawn up, and although the interval between the first and second landing was only sixteen minutes, the tide had risen, and the men were wading in three feet of water. In this situation the men were exposed to the enemy's fire to which they were unable to reply on account of the damage to their ammunition caused by the water. The General therefore ordered a retreat. After the boats had been drawn off, and the wounded had been placed on board a sloop, a second attack was made, but the enemy strongly opposed the landing, and the British were repulsed a second time. The losses reported on this day were 26 killed; 10 officers and 36 privates wounded, and 10 sailors belonging to the "Sutherland," killed or wounded. The French were under the command of Bougainville, who later was highly complimented for his action.

Some of the regiments did not seem very willing to return certain articles which they had borrowed and therefore this order appears to have been necessary. "Those regiments and corps that have got hand barrows from the artillery are forthwith to return them."

"Le même jour fut fatal pour moi et pour bien d'autres. Les Anglais qui n'avaient cessé de canonner et bom-

“ barder depuis le 12 juillet firent, lorsque vint le soir, un
“ nouvel effort; ils jetèrent des pots à feu sur la basse-
“ ville, dont trois tombèrent, un sur ma maison, un sur
“ une des maisons de la place du marché et un dans la rue
“ Champlain. Le feu prit à la fois dans trois endroits. En
“ vain, voulut-on couper le feu et l'éteindre chez moi, il
“ ventait un petit Nord-Est, et bientôt la basse-ville ne
“ fût plus qu'un brâsier; depuis ma maison, celle de M.
“ Désery, celle de Maillou, rue du Sault au Matelot, toute
“ la basse ville et tout le Cul-de-Sac jusqu'à la maison du
“ Sr. de Voisy, tout a été consumé par les flammes.”

9th The English report this fire to have taken place on the ninth, it probably occurred near midnight on the eight. About one o'clock in the morning a shell from the batteries at Point aux Pères penetrated a vault near the Church of Notre-Dame des Victoires, and ignited twenty two pipes of brandy, and several smaller casks of spirituous liquors which had been deposited there for safety. The flames spread with great rapidity and destroyed many houses. The French report that 160 houses were ruined, and that many wealthy families were rendered penniless by the conflagrations. The lower town naturally suffered the most damage from the batteries, but it was found that the upper town and even the suburbs could be reached by the powerful guns of the British.

“ Our artillery officers observe that they can now reach
“ the north suburbs where the Intendant's superb palace
“ is situate, and this quarter they hope they shall soon
“ place on the same romantic footing as the rest.”

During the progress of the fire in the lower town General

Wolfe ordered the pickets and grenadiers to march down to the beach and make a feint to cross the ford. The French immediately stood to arms and lined their trenches, whereupon a general discharge was ordered from all the British cannon and howitzers, which did great execution.

Lieutenant Crofton of the Rangers was commanded by the Brigadier to proceed with twenty men to St. Nicholas and take prisoners. The order was carried out at nine o'clock, and a barn defended by nine Canadians was captured. Four of the Canadians were killed in the struggle, and five were taken prisoners.

The Marquis de Montcalm was much pleased with the conduct of the French sailors, and as a token of his appreciation he caused one hundred louis to be distributed among them.

10th Frequent mention is made in the journals of the lack of grain, but the scarcity would appear to have been due to the action of the holders, rather than to deficiency.

“ On avait ci-devant dit qu'on avait invité tous ceux qui avaient de l'or ou de l'argent blanc, à le donner pour être employé à acheter du bled. La vue de l'espèce sonnante produisit tout le secours désiré. On a ramassé en très peu de temps jusqu'à 21,000 minots de bled dans le gouvernement de Montréal, preuve convaincante que la famine n'a jamais été dans le pays.”⁽¹⁾

Several copies of the manifesto issued by Gen. Wolfe on the 24 of July, by which protection was extended to

(1) In connection with the question of provision in the French army at this time it is interesting to study the “Correspondance de Bougainville” printed in the first part of the appendix.

the Canadians until the 10th of August, were brought into the French camp at this time.

Four deserters from Montmorency arrived in the French camp towards evening. They informed the officers that many of the soldiers would follow their example if it were not for their fear of the Indians.

A manifesto was therefore issued in French, English and German, in the name of the Marquis de Montcalm, setting forth that all who wished to desert from the British army would receive the greatest favours, and that they would have nothing to fear from the Indians. On the contrary they were assured that if they would carry their muskets in a certain manner as a sign to the Indians, they would rush to their assistance, and fire upon those who pursued them, and conduct them in safety to the French camp.

The British effected another landing at St. Nicholas, and a skirmish followed, resulting in a loss to the French of five killed and one prisoner. The British loss was one killed and seven wounded, among whom was Captain Rutherford, of Amherst's regiment. General Wolfe, with Colonel Carleton in command of two companies of Grenadiers, went down the river on a reconnoitring expedition.⁽¹⁾

Notwithstanding the disasters which had attended the several experiments with fire rafts the French still believed that they could eventually destroy the British fleet by this means. On the evening of the tenth towards ten o'clock the camp at Levi was alarmed by a volley of small arms

(1) See letter 34 "Correspondance de Bougainville."

which appeared to the soldiers to be quite close to them.

“ Upon immediate inquiry, our centries informed us it
“ was on the river abreast of the Point; it proved to be a
“ base invention called a fire organ, sent down by the
“ enemy as a bait for some of the boats which are moored
“ ahead of our ships. This machine was placed in a shallop
“ and consisted of a square of timber placed on the seats,
“ and in which were fixed a number of barrels, resembling
“ pipes in the sound board of an organ, twenty inches in
“ length, loaded up to their muzzels with old nails and
“ square slugs of lead and iron, and pointed inwards:
“ there was a groove in the frame for a train of powder, and,
“ when it was set adrift a slow match was left burning.
“ A midshipman, who was in the hindmost boat, seeing
“ the shallop falling down with the current, rowed up till
“ he got along side of it, and then he, with two of his men,
“ jumped into her, when, instantly, the fire catched, and
“ discharged the pipes among them: the officer and two
“ men were severely wounded, and, I am told, a man in
“ the boat, that lay close to her, was killed.”

The batteries at Pointe des Pères and Montmorency kept up a heavy fire during the remainder of the night.

11th. A detachment was sent out in the morning from the camp at Montmorency to make fascines. After the men had settled to work in the woods, they observed some Indians, who had crossed the river of the Falls, creeping towards them.

They were completely taken by surprise, and, in the excitement of the moment, rushed to their arms and commenced to fire upon everyone in sight, whether friend or

foe. The noise was heard in the camp, and General Wolfe sent out troops to assist his men, and succeeded in rallying them into order. The Indians made a vigorous stand and attempted to flank the party. A timely move was made by an officer at this moment, and the Indians were prevented from carrying out their plan, and were finally driven across the river. The British give their loss as 15 wounded. The French considered the number much greater. "The firing was pretty sharp: 'twas calculated that 100 men had been killed or wounded; we had only seven wounded; things would have been pushed farther had the Outaouas been willing to attack. They did not feel, on that day, disposed to fight, and took scarcely any part in this affair; under all circumstances an adverse fortune appeared to discounvert enterprises from which we might expect the most fruit." One French journal places the attacking force as composed of 300 Canadians and 300 Indians, in the rear of which were 900 Canadians.

12th. A return of the British killed and wounded from the 1st until the 11th was ordered.

The wet weather on this day prevented any serious work being undertaken.

From the movement of the British in the neighborhood of Pointe-aux-Trembles, the Marquis de Montcalm apprehended that another serious attempt was contemplated there, and he proposed a plan to attack the new camp.

Reinforcements were hastily sent to Bougainville, who was now in command of 1600 men, but the weather again interfered with the execution of the plan.

The French give this account of the affair.

13th. The Marquis de Montcalm wishing to profit by the circumstances of the passage at Pointe-aux-Trembles the troops he was sending to the rapids, to have the enemy attacked in their new camp, by M. de Bougainville's corps, gave orders to that Colonel to cross to the right of the river, whilst his posts, well guarded, would become a snare into which the enemy might fall if they did not expect him on the other side ; nothing was better combined, but the bad weather deranged all, and the fear of delaying too long the relief which was being sent to the rapids, caused the project to be abandoned."

The sentries of Otway's regiment were the first to earn the reward offered by General Wolfe for the capture of an Indian alive. This reward was offered in consequence of the severe annoyance caused by the savages who nightly hovered near the camps, and frequently scalped the sentries. The general hoped by this means not only to render the guards more vigilant, but also to terrify the Indians. He therefore ordered " five guineas to be given to the centries of Ottaway's for taking an Indian alive."

As the Indians are so frequently mentioned during the campaign a chapter is especially devoted to their peculiar characteristics.



CHAPTER IX.

THE INDIANS

DURING the whole progress of the war in America of which the Siege of Quebec was the decisive event, the Indian nations or rather tribes played a very important part. From 1608 when the first French settlement was established on the frowning heights of Cape Diamond the hardy French adventurers had been mingling with the savages, trading, hunting and fishing in the wide untrodden forests and the rushing rivers of the North. Champlain by joining the Hurons and Algonquins in their struggle against the Five Nations had cast the die for France and from thenceforward the confederacy had ravished, robbed, scalped, or murdered every French prisoner that they could secure. Even the towns were not safe against the raids, as instance the massacre at Lachine, in which three hundred French and Canadians perished at the hands of Iroquois. It is far from easy in these days of peace and security to realize what constant anxiety must have filled the breasts of the gallant voyageurs who laid the foundation of civilization on this Continent. Surrounded by pathless forest, with no means of communication with their fellows they were prepared at every moment for an attack

by Indians which would be attended with all the horrors and atrocities of which none but this strange people was capable. Capture meant for the white man the most excruciating tortures, cruel beyond conception; for the white woman, the most awful fate that a morbid imagination can picture. Nor were the friendly Indians much better. They expected and even demanded from the settler the most elaborate presents whenever they deigned in their haughtiness to visit him. They took offence from the slightest causes and would not scruple to murder the person who they considered had insulted their dignity. Whenever possible they secured brandy from the traders and under its fiery influence committed the most horrible excesses; finally they would bring their prisoners of war in close proximity to the settlements and torture them to death where the sufferings of the poor wretches could be witnessed by the horrified Europeans and their terror-stricken wives and daughters.

Such were among the few perils and inconveniences the early inhabitants of this Continent suffered.

The North American Indians in their savage state were probably the most remarkable aborigines in the world's history. Their origin an enigma, it is generally supposed that they are of mongolian blood and reached this continent from Asia via the Aleutian Isles and Alaska, generations before the Caravels of Columbus appeared off the American Coast. This is further supported by their traditions and to a certain extent by their appearance. None but Mongols have the high cheek bones so prominent in the Indian. But whatever their origin, at the time of the

discovery of America they were pretty well distributed over the continent, were divided into nations and tribes of different languages and waged a continual war one against the other. Physically they were marvels of perfection, mentally they were of remarkable strength, and morally they were on a much higher level than many of the native races of Australia or of the South Seas. They had a well defined reverence for their Manitou or Great Spirit whose will was interpreted to them through the intermediary of the medicine man or juggler. Although their women were regarded as simply beasts of burden the marriage ceremony was most elaborate, the family life was far purer than in some civilized nations to-day and their love for their children was most tender. They had a great respect for their ancestors, honored the traditions of their tribe, and had a pride of origin and haughtiness of demeanor which would put to shame the most vaunting patriot of this or any other age. Their occupation was two-fold, hunting and war. Continuous exercise in the chase had made them experts. Their native weapons of offence were of a high quality and the bow even surpassed in effectiveness the fourth class firearms supplied to them by the European traders. To France and England, however, they were indebted for the iron tomahawk and scalping knife, the two weapons which made the Indian's name feared from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico.

The Sage of Chelsea is credited with the observation that to be "a good hater" is one of the characteristics of mental greatness. No more implacable haters ever lived

than the North American Indians, and in this case Carlyle's dictum proves its correctness, for considering their savage and untutored state, the Indians were veritable giants of intellectuality. They had a very keen sense of justice and a detestation of treachery. This may seem strange when the character of their warfare is considered, but it must be remembered that with them treachery was of only one kind, the betrayal by an Indian of his tribe or people into the hands of an enemy whether white or red. Such a crime if detected was always visited with the most terrible punishment. The Indians were a silent race. They scorned the "empty vapourings of the fool" and reserved their oratorical flights for state feasts. As after dinner speakers they could have instructed many of the orators of to-day. They had a lively imagination, a talent for poetic imagery and a depth of insight truly remarkable. A jesuit missionary for many years resident among the Micmacs, and entirely conversant with their language, gives the following as a sample of a speech made to the Sun by one of the oldest of the sagamos or chieftains.

"Be witness, thou great and beautiful luminary, of what we are this day going to do in the face of thy orb! If thou didst disapprove us, thou wouldst, this moment, hide thyself, to avoid affording the light of thy rays to all the actions of this assembly. Thou didst exist of old, and still existeth. Thou remainest for ever as beautiful, as radiant, and as beneficent as when our first forefathers beheld thee. Thou wilt always be the same. The father of the day can never fail us, he who makes everything vegetate, and without whom cold, darkness, and horror,

“ would everywhere prevail. Thou knowest all the iniquitous procedure of our enemies towards us. What perfidy have they not used, what deceit have they not employed, whilst we had no room to disturb them.

“ . . . Beautiful, all seeing, all penetrating luminary without whose influence the mind of man has neither efficacy or vigor, thou hast seen to what a pitch that nation, (who are however our brothers) has carried its insolence towards our principal maidens. Our resentment would not have been so extreme with respect to girls of more common birth and the rank of whose fathers had not a right to make such an impression on us. But here we are wounded in a point there is no passing over in silence or unrevenged. Beautiful luminary! who art thyself so regular in thy course, and in the wise distribution thou makest of thy light from morning to evening, wouldst thou have us not imitate thee? And whom can we better imitate? The earth stands in need of thy governing thyself as thou dost towards it. There are certain places where thy influence does not suffer itself to be felt, because thou dost not judge them worthy of it. But, as for us, it is plain that we are thy children; for we can know no origin but that which thy rays have given us, when first marrying efficaciously with the earth we inhabit, they impregnated its womb, and caused us to grow out of it like the herbs of the field, and the trees of the forest, of which thou art equally the common Father.”

Although this is but an extract it shows conclusively to what intellectual heights the North American Savages had attained.

But it must not be thought that because these aborigines had more than the common allowance of brain power that they were the heroic figures that a certain romantic author has described. On the contrary they were simply intellectual enough to become the most cruel, unrelenting, and devilish human beings that ever the sun shone upon. Their skill in woodcraft enabled them to track the enemy for miles through the forest, to steal upon him unexpectedly and when they had either killed or captured him to retrace their steps in such a way that it would be next to impossible to follow them. They invented the most fearful methods of torture and if the victim endured his anguish with fortitude they drank his blood in order to partake of his courageous spirit. In such cases they also practiced cannibalism eating particularly the heart of the brave victim of their cruelty.

Their orgies and rites were of the most filthy and disgusting character, their greatest food delicacy was roast dog. In war they deemed the most treacherous devices as honourable. They fought with the utmost ferocity—from behind trees or other shelter—and they killed the wounded without the slightest compunction, in order to secure the scalps, trophies which to them were invaluable as showing with what bravery they had conducted themselves upon the field of battle. In some of the battles between different Indian nations the ferocious nature of the quarrel was such that perhaps ninety per cent of all the combatants would be killed or wounded. A description of the attack by the Iroquois on the Huron Country in 1649, when Father Jean de Brebeuf and Father Gabriel L'Allemant, Jesuit

missionaries met their death is to be found in " The Jesuit Relations. and Allied Documents " (Burrows), Vol. xxxiv, p. 25.

The description which here follows is by Christophe Regnaut a lay brother of the order :

A VERITABLE ACCOUNT OF THE MARTYRDOM AND BLESSED DEATH OF FATHER JEAN DE BREBŒUF AND OF FATHER GABRIEL L'ALLEMANT, IN NEW FRANCE, IN THE COUNTRY OF THE HURONS, BY THE IROQUOIS, ENEMIES OF THE FAITH.

Father Jean de Brebœuf and Father Gabriel L'Allemant had set out from our cabin, to go to a small Village, called St. Ignace, distant from our cabin about a short quarter of a League, to instruct the Savages and the new Christians of that Village. It was on the 16th day of March, in the morning, that we perceived a great fire at the place to which these two Fathers had gone. This fire made us very uneasy ; we did not know whether it were enemies, or if the fire had caught in some of the huts of the village. The Reverend Father Paul Raguenu, our Superior, immediately resolved to send some one to learn what might be the cause. But no sooner had we formed the design of going there to see, than we perceived several savages on the road, coming straight towards us. We all thought it was the Iroquois who were coming to attack us ; but, having considered them more closely, we perceived that they were hurons who were fleeing from the fight, and who had escaped from the combat. These poor savages

caused great pity in us. They were all covered with wounds. One had his head fractured; another his arm broken; another had an arrow in his eye; another had his hand cut off by a blow from a hatchet. In fine, the day was passed in receiving into our cabins all these poor wounded people, and in looking with compassion toward the fire, and the place where were those two good Fathers. We saw the fire and the barbarians, but we could not see anything of the two Fathers.

This is what these Savages told us of the taking of the Village of St. Ignace, and about Fathers Jean de Brebœuf and Gabriel L'Allemant.

“ The Iroquois came, to the number of twelve hundred men; took our village, and seized Father Brebœuf and his companion; and set fire to all the huts. They proceeded to vent their rage on those two Fathers; for they took them both and stripped them entirely naked, and fastened each to a post. They tied both of their hands together. They tore the nails from their fingers. They beat them with a shower of blows from cudgels, on the shoulders, the loins, the belly, the legs, and the face, there being no part of their body which did not endure this torment.” The savages told us further, that, although Father de Brebœuf was overwhelmed under the weight of these blows, he did not cease continually to speak to God, and to encourage all the new Christians who were captives like himself to suffer well, that they might die well, in order to go in company with him to Paradise. While the good Father was thus encouraging these good people, a wretched huron renegade,—who had remained a captive with the Iroquois,

and whom Father de Brebœuf has formerly instructed and baptized,—hearing him speak of Paradise and Holy Baptism, was irritated, and said to him. “Echon,” that is Father de Brebœuf’s name in Huron, “thou sayest that Baptism and the sufferings of this life lead straight to Paradise; thou wilt go soon, for I am going to baptize thee, and to make thee suffer well, in order to go the sooner to thy Paradise.” The barbarian, having said that, took a kettle of boiling water, which he poured over his body three different times, in derision of Holy baptism. And, each time that he baptized him in this manner, the barbarian said to him, with bitter sarcasm, “Go to Heaven, for thou art well baptized.” After that, they made him suffer several other torments. The 1st was to make hatchets red-hot, and to apply them to the loins and under the armpits. They made a collar of these red-hot hatchets, and put it on the neck of this good Father. This is the fashion in which I have seen the collar made for other prisoners: They make six hatchets red-hot, take a large withe of green wood, pass the 6 hatchets over the large end of the withe, take the two ends together, and then put it over the neck of the sufferer. I have seen no torment which more moved me to compassion than that. For you see a man, bound naked to a post, who, having this collar on his neck, cannot tell what posture to take. For, if he lean forward, those above his shoulders weigh the more on him; if he lean back, those on his stomach make him suffer the same torment; if he keep erect, without leaning to one side or other, the burning hatchets, applied equally on both sides, give him a double torture.

After that they put on him a belt of bark, full of pitch and resin, and set fire to it, which roasted his whole body. During all these torments, Father de Brebœuf endured like a rock, insensible to fire and flame, which astonished all the bloodthirsty wretches who tormented him. His zeal was so great that he preached continually to these infidels, to try to convert them. His executioners were enraged against him for constantly speaking to them of God and of their conversion. To prevent him from speaking more, they cut off his tongue, and both his upper and lower lips. After that, they set themselves to strip the flesh from his legs, thighs, and arms, to the very bone; and then put it to roast before his eyes, in order to eat it.

While they tormented him in this manner, those wretches derided him, saying: "Thou seest plainly that we treat thee as a friend, since we shall be the cause of thy Eternal happiness; thank us, then, for these good offices which we render thee, for, the more thou shalt suffer, the more will thy God reward thee."

Those butchers, seeing that the good Father began to grow weak, made him sit down on the ground; and, one of them, taking a knife, cut off the skin covering his skull. Another one of those barbarians, seeing that the good Father would soon die, made an opening in the upper part of his chest, and tore out his heart, which he roasted and ate. Others came to drink his blood, still warm, which they drank with both hands, saying that Father de Brebœuf had been very courageous to endure so much pain as they had given him, and that, by drinking his blood, they would become courageous like him.

This is what we learned of the Martyrdom and blessed death of Father Jean de Brebœuf, by several Christian savages worthy of belief, who had been constantly present from the time the good Father was taken until his death. These good Christians were prisoners to the Iroquois, who were taking them into their country to be put to death. But our good God granted them the favor of enabling them to escape by the way; and they came to us to recount all that I have set down in writing.

Father de Brebœuf was captured on the 16th day of March, in the morning, with Father L'Allemant, in the year 1649. Father de Brebœuf died the same day as his capture, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Those barbarians threw the remains of his body into the fire; but the fat which still remained on his body extinguished the fire, and he was not consumed.

I do not doubt that all which I have just related is true, and I would seal it with my blood; for I have seen the same treatment given to Iroquois prisoners whom the savages had taken in war, with the exception of the boiling water, which I have not seen poured on any one.

I am about to describe to you truly what I saw of the Martyrdom and of the Blessed deaths of Father Jean de Brebœuf and of Father Gabriel L'Allemant. On the next morning, when we had assurance of the departure of the enemy, we went to the spot to seek for the remains of their bodies, to the place where their lives had been taken. We found them both, but a little apart from each other. They were brought to our cabin, and laid uncovered upon the bark of trees, where I examined them at leisure, for more

than two hours, to see if what the savages had told us of their martyrdom and death were true. I examined first the Body of Father de Brebœuf, which was pitiful to see, as well as that of Father L'Allemant. Father de Brebœuf had his legs, thighs, and arms stripped of flesh to the very bone; I saw and touched a large number of great blisters, which he had on several places on his body, from the boiling water which these barbarians had poured over him in mockery of Holy Baptism. I saw and touched the wound from a belt of bark, full of pitch and resin, which roasted his whole body. I saw and touched the marks of burns from the Collar of hatchets placed on his shoulders and stomach. I saw and touched his two lips, which they had cut off because he constantly spoke of God while they made him suffer.

I saw and touched all parts of his body, which had received more than two hundred blows from a stick. I saw and touched the top of his scalped head; I saw and touched the opening which these barbarians had made to tear out his heart.

In fine, I saw and touched all the wounds of his body, as the savages had told and declared to us; we buried these precious Relics on Sunday, the 21st day of March 1649, with much Consolation.

I had the happiness of carrying them to the grave, and of burying them with those of Father Gabriel l'Allemant. When we left the country of the hurons, we raised both bodies out of the ground, and set them to boil in strong lye. All the bones were well scraped, and the care of drying them was given to me. I put them every day into

a little oven which we had made of clay, after having heated it slightly; and when in a state to be packed, they were separately enveloped in silk stuff. Then they were put into small chests, and we brought them to Québec, where they are held in great veneration.

It is not a Doctor of the Sorbonne who has composed this, as you may easily see; it is a relic from the Iroquois, and a person who has lived more than thought,—who is, and shall ever be,

Sir,

Your Very Humble and very obedient servant,

CHRISTOPHE REGNAUT.

The work of the Jesuit Missionaries in attempting to Christianize these fierce and bloodthirsty peoples was one of herculean nature. The story of their efforts will live forever as showing the greatest heroism and self-sacrifice in the annals of missionary effort. The Jesuits in Canada were without exception men of most brilliant mental power; in France they had held high and responsible positions which they relinquished with joy in order to bear the gospel to the depraved and benighted children of the American Forest. They went bravely into the villages of the Indians, lived with them in their smoky huts, ate of their food, conformed as nearly as they could to their customs, cared for their sick, shared with them the pains of hunger, the winter's cold, and the fatigues of the march, built a little church, baptized dying children, told the story of the Cross, and all too often gave their lives to seal their devotion. Whatever criticisms may have been directed against

the Society of Jesus and its methods, the history of the Order in North America shows on the part of the Fathers only the most valiant heroism and self-sacrifice.

But despite all that they attempted their work was not an entire success. Numbers of Indians professed Christianity in peace, but in war were just as bloodthirsty and implacable as ever ; went back to their barbarous cannibal practices and hearkened again to the voice of the juggler or medicine man. This was an endless trouble to the good Fathers, but with great naïveté they decided that if their pseudo converts must fight, it would be preferable that they fight for the French, therefore they did their best to hold their savage charges loyal to King Louis and the fleur-de-lis. That they succeeded in this part of their patriotic work is indubitable for during the Siege of Quebec there were with the defenders over nine hundred Indians some of whom came from as far west as Michilimackinac. These savages acted for the most part as scouts and spies, and were a constant terror to the besiegers.

In the early days of North American colonization by France and England there were perhaps fifty tribes of Indians of greater or lesser importance scattered in small bands from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. Occupying Acadia were the MicMacs and Melecites. Their neighbors to the westward were the Abenakis who were on the northern border of New Hampshire between that British Colony and the St. Lawrence. The Algonkins were between Three Rivers and Montreal, and from Montreal to Lake Superior were bands of the Ottawas and Ojibwas. The country to the south of Georgian Bay was the habitat of the Hurons,

the remnant of whom were in 1650 removed to Lorette, only nine miles from Quebec; a small band was also at Detroit. South of Lake Ontario were the Iroquois or Five Nations.⁽¹⁾ On the western borders of Pennsylvania and Virginia were the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes and Mingoes, while still further south were the Cherokees. The Pottawattamies were east of Lake Michigan. On the western shore of Lake Michigan were the Winnibagoes and Menomonies. To the west of them again were Sacs, Foxes, Ottigamies and Iowas, and south of Lake Michigan were Miamis and Illinois.

This of course is but a general outline of the location of some of the more important tribes. Of all these, during the early years of the Eighteenth Century the only tribes friendly to the British Colonies were the Iroquois, the Delawares, and Shawanoes.

Mention has been made heretofore of the enmity of the Five Nations against the French. This caused the Colony of New France incalculable trouble and loss, and every effort was made to placate them. The Jesuits sent out missionaries to them, but their work was beset with perils. Converts were few and these were subject to the sneers and persecutions of their pagan relatives, so that the Fathers thought it advisable to remove the converts to a point somewhat nearer the centre of French influence. Accordingly they brought them to Caughnawaga on the shore of

(1) The Five Nations were the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Oneidas and Cayugas. Later the Tuscaroras were admitted to the Confederacy which was then known as the Six Nations.

Sault St. Louis, now the Lachine Rapids, only a short distance from the settlement of Montreal.

This Iroquois settlement had progressed satisfactorily. The allegiance of the new converts was soon won away from the English to "Onontio" the French Governor, who placated them with many presents and treated them with much consideration. They remained loyal to France and their war parties continually harassed the borders of the New England Colonies.

In 1749, Father Piquet with the approval of De la Galissonière, the Governor of New France, established a fort where Ogdensburg now stands, with the intention of wooing away from the English the western tribes of the Iroquois. This fort called La Presentation also prospered and like Caughnawaga was the refuge of the converts to the Faith. But the patriotic side of the undertaking was not lost sight of, and the warriors who removed there also became firm allies to the French, chiefly owing to the unremitting efforts of Father Piquet.

For the next few years immediately preceding the war, the history of the continent can be described in a sentence; the efforts of English and French to capture the bulk of Indian trade and thus to secure savage allies for the struggle which was imminent. The Indians were as a rule entirely neutral. They desired the best market for their furs, and hence were favourable to English traders. But they foresaw that a struggle between the Colonies and Canada was impending and as it was their firm determination to be on the winning side they inclined towards France, everything seeming to be in her favour. But

English traders began to visit the west. They had cheap goods—and fiery rum—moreover they asserted that the French were robbing the Indians of their hunting grounds, and that the English king was going to send many soldiers and punish them.⁽¹⁾ French ascendancy was on the wane and nowhere was this better realized than in Quebec the Capital of the Colony. Céloron de Bienville was sent with an expedition as far west as the Mississippi to formally take possession of the country in the King's name, to disperse all English traders, and to regain the Indians to the French standard. His effort was successful only in part. One of the Miami chiefs called La Demoiselle by the French and Old Britain by the English could not be cajoled. He and his tribe remained faithful to the English. He was established at a village called Pickawillany on the Miami river some one hundred and fifty miles due south of Detroit. This hot bed of sedition caused much anxiety at Quebec and various methods for suppressing it were discussed. At last, in June 1752, Charles Langlade a French trader who was married to a squaw, and had himself become a half Indian, left his home at Michilimackinac with 250 Ottawa and Ojibwa warriors with the avowed intention of attacking Pickawillany. They arrived there on the 21st of June,

(1) As an illustration of the discussions which took place between the Indians as to the merits of the two great European nations, we quote a portion of a letter dated at Albany, N-Y., October 23rd, 1759.

“ Cayenquiquoa and Rattle-snake Sam, two Mohawk Indians, came here yesterday. They were about fourteen days ago at Oswegatchie, in Canada, on a visit to some relations who have been many years settled with the French. They say they endeavoured to persuade their relations, and the other Mohawks at Gowegatchie, to leave the French in good time, and return to their own country; telling them, “ That the

surprised the place and captured it. Many of the enemy were killed, chief among them being the *Demoiselle*, who, after the victory was boiled and eaten by *Langlade's* warriors. There were seven English traders in the village during the attack. Five of these were captured and two escaped. For the time being New France had nothing to fear from the Indians, but soon the old trouble reasserted itself.

In 1753 *Marin* a trustworthy old soldier was sent on a pacifying expedition to the west but he only reached *Presqu'île* and *Fort LeBœuf*. The *Miamis*, *Sacs*, *Pottawattomies* and *Ojibwas* hastened to make their peace with the French, while the *Iroquois*, *Delawares* and *Shawanoes*, hitherto tacitly English came to the French Camp and offered their allegiance to the *fleur-de-lis*. This practically gave the French control of every Indian tribe on the continent. But the promises of the savages were as ropes of sand. In May 1754 *Washington's* little force on the *Youghiogany* destroyed the scouting party of *Coulon de Jumonville* sent out from *Fort Duquesne*. Immediately the forces of *Washington* were augmented by wavering Indians, and a French scalp was sent to the *Delawares* urging them to join. But almost before the envoys could

“ English, formerly women, were now all turned into men, and were as thick all over the country, as the trees in the woods. That they had taken the *Ohio*, *Niagara*, *Cataracqui*, *Ticonderoga*, *Louisbourg*, and now lately *Quebec*; and they would soon eat the remainder of the French in *Canada*, and Indians that adhered to them.” But the French
“ Indians answered, Brethren, you are deceived, the English cannot eat up the French; their mouths are too little, their jaws too weak; and their teeth not sharp enough. Our father *Onontion* (that is, the governor of *Canada*) has told us, and we believe him, that the English,

reach the Delawares, Washington had been defeated at Fort Necessity, and again all the Indians were French allies. On the 9th July, 1755, Braddock's entire force of British regulars and Virginians was crushed at Fort Duquesne. This strengthened the Indians in their allegiance to the French cause. At this memorable fight the Indians present consisted of Iroquois from Sault St. Louis and La Presentation, Hurons from Lorette, Abenakis from St Francis, Pottawatomies and Ojibwas, Shawanoes and Min-goies and a detachment of Ottawas from Detroit, commanded, it is said, by the famous Pontiac—in all about eight hundred warriors, not all of whom however took part in the engagement.

After the fight was over the Savages had full possession of the battlefield where they committed many atrocities and took hundreds of scalps. Of their conduct on their return to the fort, James Smith, a prisoner at Fort Duquesne on that day says :

“ About sundown I beheld a small party coming in with about a dozen prisoners, stripped naked with their hands tied behind their backs and their faces and part of their bodies blacked; these prisoners they burned to death on the bank of the Alleghany River opposite the fort. I stood on the fort wall until I beheld them begin to burn one of

“ like a thief, have stolen Louisbourg and Quebec from the great King,
“ whilst his back was turned, and he was looking another way; but now
“ he has turned his face, and sees what the English have done, he is
“ going into their country with a thousand great canoes, and all his
“ warriors; and he will take the little English King, and pinch him till
“ he makes him cry out, and give back what he has stolen, as he did
“ about ten summers ago; and this your eyes will soon see.”

these men ; they had him tied to a stake, and kept touching him with firebrands, red hot irons, etc., and he screaming in the most doleful manner, the Indians in the meantime yelling like infernal spirits."

To show how the British prestige had suffered during the few years preceding Braddock's defeat, it is only necessary to point out that this unfortunate General had with his forces but fifty Indians, only eight of whom remained until the close of the battle. The English army in its advance from Virginia had found it necessary to cut a wide road through the forest to accommodate the waggons, and it was by this way that the remnant of the army retreated after the disastrous battle near Fort Duquesne. Immediately after the English defeat the Indians found this road very convenient, and soon, bands of howling savages were on the frontier of the colonies, burning, ravaging, and murdering. A contemporary writer describing this border warfare says : " They kill all they meet, abuse the women, and even scalp young children alive."

The fickleness of these roving tribes in North America has been touched upon ; another instance occurred at the capture by the English of Fort Gaspereau in Acadia. The MicMacs of this country were allies of the French but their allegiance had been shaken by the capture of Fort Beauséjour where their loss had been heavy.⁽¹⁾ When the invaders moved up to Gaspereau, one hundred and fifty Indians, suddenly converted from enemies to pretended friends, stood on the strand firing their guns into the air as a

(1) After the capture of Fort Beauséjour a song was composed which

salute, and declaring themselves brothers of the English.

In the meantime Baron Dieskau had become commander-in-chief of the French forces and was opposed at Crown Point by William Johnson, afterwards Sir William Johnson, the one Englishman who had a talent for managing the Indians, and had succeeded in securing three hundred warriors, mostly Mohawks, to join his force. The Iroquois had too many relatives fighting for the French to be too eager in support of the English cause. The bulk of the savages of the country were arrayed against Johnson, but Dieskau evidently had no particular love for his red allies. Said he: "They drive us crazy from morning to night. There is no end to their demands. They have already eaten five oxen and as many hogs, without counting the kegs of brandy

was probably sung in the French Camps. As we believe that it has not hitherto been published it is here given. See also reference in "Bibliography."

" Le Français comme l'Anglais,
Prétend soutenir ses droits,
Voilà la ressemblance.
Le Français par équité,
L'Anglais par duplicité,
Voilà la différence.

" L'Anglais fait des prisonniers,
Nous en faisons des milliers,
Voilà la ressemblance.
Le Français les traite bien,
Mais l'Anglais les traite en chien,
Voilà la différence.

" Il nous a pris des vaisseaux,
Nous lui prenons des châteaux,
Voilà la ressemblance.
Il nous rendra notre bien,
Et nous garderons le sien,
Voilà la différence.

" L'Anglais cherche des lauriers,
Autant en font nos guerriers,
Voilà la ressemblance.
Les Français en font amas,
L'Anglais n'en moissonne pas.
Voilà la différence."

• Chouaguen vaut Beauséjour,
Chacun triomphe à son tour,
Voilà la ressemblance.
Mais vis-à-vis Port-Mahon,
Qu'a-t-il à mettre de bon ?
Voilà la différence."

they have drunk. In short, one needs the patience of an angel to get on with these devils and yet one must always force himself to seem pleased with them." Just here the famous Montcalm's opinion will be of interest as corroborating that of his predecessor in the supreme command. In a letter to his mother he says: "They are *vilains messieurs*, even when fresh from their toilet at which they pass their lives. You would not believe it, but the men always carry to war, along with their tomahawk and gun, a mirror to daub their faces with various colours, and arrange feathers on their heads, and rings in their ears and noses. They think it a great beauty to cut the rim of the ear, and stretch it till it reaches the shoulder. Often they wear a laced coat with no shirt at all. You would take them for so many masqueraders or devils. One needs the patience of an angel to get on with them."

Another appreciation comes from Bougainville in his journal. "The very recital of the cruelties they committed on the battlefield is horrible. The ferocity and insolence of these black-souled barbarians makes one shudder. It is an abominable kind of war."

These it must be remembered are opinions concerning friendly Indians. Hostile savages must certainly have appeared as fiends incarnate.

Despite all efforts it seemed impossible to gain the tribes to England; even the Mohawks at Crown Point did not exert themselves in the conflict. The most of them simply sounded the war whoop and said they had come to see their English brothers fight. After the battle when Dieckau was a prisoner it was with the greatest difficulty that

he was protected from these same Mohawks who were burning to kill him.

When in these days we shudder at the blood-thirstiness of the Indians, we are too inclined to forget that their expeditions of pillage and murder were always incited by Europeans. There was no Geneva Convention in those days, war was war in earnest, and the use of savages auxiliaries was regarded as perfectly legitimate. An enemy had no rights and existed simply as an object of attack. Then too the constant association of the Europeans in America with the Indians had rendered them callous to the atrocities of the savages. A young man named Duchet in a letter to his father, 15th July 1756, says with ghastly levity. "Not a week passes but the French send them (the English) a band of *hairdressers* whom they would be very glad to dispense with. It is incredible what a quantity of scalps they bring us." Before the onset between Johnson and Dieskau at Crown Point, an English prisoner was brought in and told with a refinement of 18th Century consideration and politeness that if he did not tell the truth he would be handed over to the Indians for torture. Even the commander-in-chief on the French side was not over scrupulous regarding the shedding of blood, for in his orders for September, 1755, we read:

"Indians are not to amuse themselves by taking scalps till the enemy is entirely defeated since they can kill ten men in the time required to scalp one." It seemed to be but a question of time with the worthy general.

After Johnson's success at Crown Point he did not find

it difficult to persuade the Indians that to be allies of the English was their manifest destiny. He succeeded in gaining the Onondagas, the Mohegans from the Hudson, the Delawares and the Shawanoes from the banks of the Susquehanna. But soon afterwards in August, 1756, Montcalm had reduced the English fort of Oswego on Lake Ontario. He had a large Indian force with him whom he restrained with difficulty from falling on the surrendered garrison. The news of the French success flew through the land and the English Indians were moved to reconsider the compact they had made with Sir William Johnson. In the following November representatives of the Five Nations met the Marquis de Montcalm at Montreal where there was a grand pow-wow of two thousand Indians gathered from all parts of the Continent. ⁽¹⁾ At this time the Iroquois trampled under foot the medals received from the English and pledged their allegiance to France.

The French victory at Fort William-Henry followed in August 1757, but its brilliance was clouded by the massacre of a number of the captured English garrison. This was due entirely to the Indians who in the lust for blood broke all bonds of discipline. ⁽²⁾

The year 1758 was marked by the expedition of Abercromby against Ticonderoga which failed. There were however no Indians at this struggle. They came after the fight and for some time carried on border warfare. At this time they captured Major Israel Putnam afterwards a

(1) See list of Indians at end of the chapter.

(2) See Life of Montcalm.



Q Montreal le 3 Septembre 1757.

Madame

N^o 5 - P. D.

Jay tres grand tort de ne vous avoir par rendu compte encore de
ce que j'ay fait de votre lettre de M^r de la Duchesne
de M^r de la Riviere qui me marque que vous avez
de M^r de la Riviere et qu'elle se dispute, quelle se reconnoisse
fortement sur de M^r de la Riviere et que je luy envoie de
de la Riviere sur votre lettre en votre faveur quelle est
et que j'ay fait de M^r de la Riviere et que j'ay fait de
deux jours a Quebec et j'ay fait ce qui est en votre
et je vous envoie de votre reconnaissance de tout son
deux de votre fante Commisaires ainsi que de la
deux de votre fante Commisaires ainsi que de la
deux de votre fante Commisaires ainsi que de la

Je suis avec Respect
M^r de la Riviere

Votre tres humble
obéissant serviteur
M^r de la Riviere

celebrated general in the Revolutionary Forces. The French party were under command of Marin, but before we could learn of it the Indians had inflicted severe torture on the captive and were preparing to burn him alive. With a courage rare indeed in those days, Marin rescued Patnam from their hands and he finally reached Montreal in safety.

In the same year, Fort Frontenac fell into English hands, a number of Oneida Indians who were with the victors desiring to scalp all the prisoners. They were restrained with the greatest difficulty. This victory did much to cause discontent among the French Indians and when Brigadier Forbes was preparing for his advance against Fort Duquesne, the Savages were wavering in their allegiance. Assisted by Sir William Johnson, Forbes held a great pow-wow at Easton, in September, 1758, at which representatives from the Five Nations, the Delawares and Shawanoes were present. The Western Delawares held aloof and after the convention their Eastern brethren sent a string of wampum to them urging them to join the English forces.

The messenger of peace was Christian Post a Moravian missionary whose reputation for honesty and fair dealing was well known among the Indians. His journey was one of the greatest peril and the manner of his reception did not reassure him. Greatly to his surprise, however, he was successful, and despite the efforts of the French to counteract his influence he succeeded in enrolling the Mingoes, Delawares and Shawanoes on the English side. At this time there was great dissatisfaction among the Indian

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allies of the French. French goods were few and dear while those of the English were plentiful and cheap. Moreover the successes of the English did much to turn the scale and from henceforward the Indians were of little assistance to the French. Forbes marched on Fort Duquesne, where there were with the French, Hurons, Ottawas, Pottowattamies and Miamis, but there seemed no certainty that these would remain faithful if the fort were attacked, so the French evacuated the place and turned all their forces towards the defence of Niagara. Only two hundred Indians were with the defenders and after the English under Johnson had reduced the place, the remnant of the Savages withdrew to Detroit, the forts of Presqu'île, LeBœuf and Venango in the Ohio Country being evacuated and burned. The most important event of the year in Indian annals was the attack by Majr. Robert Rogers on the Abenaki village of St. Francis. These were Mission Indians but they had been the most vicious of the allies of the French, and had committed terrible depredations on the colony borders. Rogers by a forced march brought his company of bushfighters to the village, fell upon the Indians by surprise and destroyed the place, killing about two hundred. Other Indians and French pursued him, but he succeeded after the most desperate privations in getting back safely, although a large number of his party were lost. In this village of St. Francis there were hundreds of English scalps dangling from poles in front of the houses, and by this attack Rogers put an end to the series of atrocities which had made the name of the Abenakis feared in every homestead of New England.

Before the Siege of Quebec, France had gathered nearly a thousand Indians from her western country to do battle against Wolfe. Many complaints were entered against the conduct of those savages who remained in the city. They would do no work, they ate prodigiously and drank unceasingly. By plundering and pillaging private houses they caused immense loss and the citizens were in continual fear. One of their pleasantries was to watch for the falling of the English shells. As soon as one struck a house, and the terrified inhabitants rushed out, the Indians rushed in and carried away everything of value for their own use. Some damage was done by the scouts to the English encampments and at the Battle of Montmorency they took many English scalps, but on the whole they were of no use whatever, and their room would have been much preferable to their company. When on the 13th of September Wolfe gained the heights and Montcalm gave him battle, a large force of Indians was stationed in a little copse to the left of the English line keeping up a galling fire upon the British, but only for a time; they were soon dispersed by the Highlanders and the dusky warriors disappeared and made their way back to their villages and the more peaceful occupations of hunting and fishing.


TABLEAU PARTICULIER DES

DOMICILES	Officiers attachés aux Sauvages	
Nipissings.....	93	Mrs. de La Corne La Luc
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" des Trois-Rivières..	23	Mrs. Langy & Montegas....
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" de Panawarwski.....	36	} de Longeuil, Sabrevoix.....
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" Sinugo.....	39	} Florimont.....
" de la fourche.....	70	
" Megnigan.....	10	} Hubin.....
" de l'Île au Castor....	44	
" du Detroit.....	30	} La Plant.....
" Saguinau.....	94	
Sauteux de Chagoamigan.....	32	} Lorimer.....
" du Castor.....	24	
" Caoschemagou.....	14	} sd
" de la Carpe.....	37	
" de Kabilonocke.....	90	} Marin
Mississagues de la Carpe.....	43	
" de Toronto.....	39	} Cher. de Langis
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Peteotamis de St Joseph.....	70	} Bellestre.....
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Folles-Avoines de l'Orignal....	62	} Bellestre.....
" du Chat.....	67	
Miamis.....	19	} Bellestre.....
Puans de la Baye.....	46	
Agopais.....	10	} Bellestre.....
Renards.....	20	
Ouillas.....	10	} Bellestre.....
Lakis.....	36	
Loups.....	9	

(1) From an unpublished manuscript in Quimper, France.

SAUVAGES DES DIFFERENTES NATIONS (1)

<i>Missionnaires en chef.</i>	<i>Interprètes</i>
L'abbé Mataret Sulpicien.	St. Germain
Le père Oubot, Jesuite,	Chateaufieux
L'Abbé Piquet sulpicien.	Perthuis La Force
.....	St Martin
sd.....	Launiere
L'Abbe Mataret pour Farby.....	
quelques Sauvages du St Jean.....	
Detroit et de Michillimakinac.....	
.....	Chesne
.....	
.....	des Tailly Réaume



CHAPTER X.

THE THIRD MONTH OF THE SIEGE

THE news of the repulse of the British at Pointe-aux-Trembles on the 9th, caused great satisfaction in the French camp. Malartic, writing to Bougainville under date of the 13th of August, compliments the Brigadier in these words.

“ C'est affaire a vous de battre les ennemis deux fois le même jour toute l'armée l'a appris avec grand plaisir et moi particulièrement qui étois tranquille sur cette partie vous y sachant ; il seroit a souhaiter qu'ils nous missent ici en même de suivre votre exemple.”

Upwards of one thousand cannon shot, and twenty thirteen inch shells, which had been discharged from the batteries of the town, were collected and placed on board an ordnance ship to be transferred to Louisbourg. The soldiers were allowed two pence for finding each shot, two shillings and six pence for each ten inch, and five shillings for each thirteen inch shell.

A body of Canadians attacked four hundred men under the command of Major Dalling, near St. Croix. A captain and four Rangers were wounded. General Wolfe at once issued orders for all the houses in the east part of the


parish of St. Croix to be set on fire, and at the same time
“ fixed a manifesto on the church door, declaring that if
“ they should anoye any of our troops passing or repassing
“ the communication, for the future, that no quarter will
“ be given to the inhabitants when taken, without exception
“ or respect of persons.”

Although this manifesto was only issued on the 13th a copy of it was read in the French camp on the same day, having been taken there by a deserter. Each army was apprised of the public acts of the other, almost immediately. The secrecy which Wolfe maintained, however, prevented deserters from disclosing his plans. A courier arrived at Beauport with the information that the French had landed at St. Paul's Bay, and had destroyed twenty two houses.

14th Seven marines who had strayed about 800 yards from the camp at St. Nicholas, were taken prisoners by the Indians, and some of them were massacred and left upon the beach. Two French sailors were killed while standing near the ramparts of Quebec by a discharge from the batteries at Pointe-des-Pères.

Owing to the illness of M. de Ramezay, governor of the town, who had retired to the General Hospital, a change was made in the staff. The commanders of the posts near the town filled the position alternately.

“ This change of staff in the Upper Town exposed the
“ abuse, disorder, and negligence which had reigned there.
“ Not half of the people were found for whom provisions
“ were distributed each day. The number of workmen
“ paid 40 sols per day were found to be far less than
“ reported. Forty vehicles were reported to be in the




“ service of the artillery at 7 fr. 100 per day, whereas the
“ actual number was found to be 8. The discipline of the
“ town was very poor, there were no fixed posts or regular
“ guard.”

“ The commanders of the battalions who took charge of
the town, brought their majors with them and reorganized
the service.”

15th The British made a determined effort to destroy all
the principal buildings in the upper town of Quebec. A
new six gun battery directed against the Bishop's Palace
was opened on this day, and Colonel Williamson was
ordered to commence the construction of a battery to des-
troy the citadel and the buildings in its vicinity.

A deserter brought word to the French camp that the
British were scattered at Ange-Gardien and that a strong
detachment could effect their capture. Twelve hundred
men were sent there immediately for this purpose, but
nothing was accomplished: “ The Indians, following the
“ example of the troops, who for some time occupied them-
“ selves solely with marauding and pillage, disbanded
“ themselves, and advanced without precaution towards a
“ house, which they supposed abandoned; 'twas full of
“ Englishmen, whose fire they received, which put them
“ to flight: nothing was to be undertaken in this direction
“ and a retreat was necessary.”

The Marquis de Vaudreuil, wrote to Bougainville on
this day: “ Il est bien facheux que les Anglois continuent
“ à incendier les habitations et que la pluspart des Cana-
“ diens n'ayent pas exactement suivi les avis que vous
“ leur aviés fait donner.”



A View of the Buildings at Fort Mifflin, on the Schuylkill River, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, as they appeared in 1812. The drawing is by J. B. Say, and the engraving is by J. B. Say.

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 “ actual number was found to be 8. The discipline of the
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 “ à incendier les habitations et que la plupart des Cana-
 “ diens n'ayent pas exactement suivi les avis que vous
 “ leur aviés fait donner.”

16th The French endeavoured to intercept the communication between the British fleet and army, and for this purpose they kept several floats on the river beyond the range of the guns. A detachment of the Forty-third regiment was prevented by this means from crossing to the Levis Camp from Goreham's advanced post.

The Major commanding finally succeeded in fording the river Etchemin, which was a perilous undertaking. Many of the soldiers were carried off their feet by the rapidity of the current, and one man was drowned. The situation of the troops was rendered more dangerous by the batteries at Sillery which kept up a brisk fire against the men while they were in the water.

The summer of 1759 was unfavourable for military operations owing to the unusually heavy rain storms. Several of the French journals make special mention of this fact and they claim that the roads were made impassable thereby. Between St. Augustin and Quebec travelling was particularly heavy, and the cost of transporting provisions was excessive.

The Journal kept by an inhabitant of Quebec during the siege, records many interesting details on this day.

“ Ils ont fait peu de feu, pendant le jour, mais à l'entrée
“ de la nuit ils ont jeté beaucoup de bombes et pots à feu
“ dont un, sur les neuf heures du soir, mit le feu à la
“ maison de la veuve Pinguet, vis-à-vis les murs des
“ Récollets. Ce feu fut assez bien servi suivant que je
“ l'ai vu. Deux frères Récollets et deux charpentiers
“ empêchèrent la communication du feu, en montant sur
“ la maison voisine de Planty et la découvrant malgré les

“ bombes et les canons dont la direction était sur le feu.
“ Il n'y eut personne de blessé, et M. Lusignan et moi en
“ furent quittes pour la peur, deux boulets nous ayant
“ razés, et une planche des Récollets, détachée par un
“ boulet de canon de dessus la couverture de leur Eglise,
“ ayant passé entre le frere Noel et moi.”

The French ascertained that 600 men were sent every day by the British to gather peas on the farms. Preparations were made to surprise the party, but the Indians were too precipitate, and would not obey the instructions of M. de Repentigny, who had charge of the advanced posts, and thus the plan was frustrated.

“ Three prisoners were brought in from the south shore.
“ They were taken by some Canadians, but siezed by the
“ Indians, who also brought us four scalps.”

17th A volunteer named Cameron, a sergeant, a corporal, and sixteen men of Lascelles's Light Infantry, who were posted in a house below the camp at Montmorency, successfully withstood the assault of one hundred Canadians and Indians for nearly two hours, until assistance came from the camp. When the facts of this defence were made known to General Wolfe, he ordered “ That the next vacant commission in the army be given to Mr. Cameron, in
“ acknowledgement of his good conduct and very gallant
“ behaviour.”

Quarter Master Sergeant Johnson thus refers to the incident :

“ Although every Officer, Soldier and Seaman, who were
“ employed in this great and dangerous undertaking, of
“ the Siege of Quebec deserves the highest commendation,

“ yet the following ought not to be omitted a place in these
“ Memoirs.

“ A Sergeant being sent on an Out party with a Corporal
“ and twelve men, as usual, to keep as much as possible
“ the Skulking parties, of Canadians and Indians in Awe,
“ who continually kept hovering, Night and Day, about
“ the Flank, and Rear of our Camp; and often surprized
“ those who went into the Skirts of the Wood to gather
“ Sticks, to dress their victuals, or to get some of the
“ Vegetable herbs to eat with their Salt meat :—The above
“ Party being Skirting, along the Side of the Wood, behind
“ the Camp, on the Road, leading towards Ange Jardiene;
“ and at the distance of about two English Miles from the
“ Camp; they were suddenly attacked by a Body of these
“ Cannibals, to the number of two hundred or upwards:
“ The Sergeant finding himself, utterly unable to with-
“ stand so great a multitude, he took shelter in a house at
“ a small distance from the place where he was at first
“ attacked, and where he defended himself with the utmost
“ bravery for upwards of four hours; although they made
“ attempt several times to Storm the house, he always drove
“ them back with considerable loss :—In this distressful
“ Situation, he continued until the Alarm reached the
“ Camp, when a considerable detachment was immediately
“ ordered to march to his Assistance.—The enemy no
“ sooner saw the detachment coming towards them but
“ they immediately retired into the Wood hard by, taking
“ with them their killed and wounded; which by the quan-
“ tity of blood appeared to be a considerable number; The
“ Sergeant was no sooner arrived at the Camp and General





General Hale.

James Heath. sc.

*From an engraving after the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds,
in the possession of G. J. Hale Esq. Dublin.*

" Wolfe being then at Montmorenci, but he Sent, and
 " expressed himself so as to shew that he was highly
 " satisfied at his gallant behaviour, by giving him a Com-
 " mission, which was then vacant, as a reward for his
 " Courage and Gallantry; as well as to inspire the Ser-
 " geants of the Army, with right sentiments of his
 " generosity, to the truly deserving Soldier.—"

One man was killed, and three were wounded at the batteries. It is a remarkable fact, that this was the first man killed by shot or shell from the town since the batteries were opened on the 2nd of July.

" Le 18 Aoust les ennemis au Sault parurent embarquer quelques pieces d'artillerie avec des équipages ce qui fait croire qu'ils veulent evacuer cette partie ou ils ont mis le feu à toutes les maisons de cette coste. Tout ce jour les ennemis devant la ville dirigerent leurs bombes partie sur les tentes des écrivains (?) campés le long de la coste d'Abraham, partie vers un moulin au passage, ou ils croyent que nous avons des poudres, partie sur les deux vaissx. embossés à l'entrée de la Rivière St Charle, sans avoir causé aucun dommage; quelques bombes poussés à toute vollé vinrent proche de l'hopital général ou toutes les Religieuses Urcelines et de l'hotel dieu estoient retrégués pandt. le bombardement ainsi que quantité de particulier de la ville les dames Religieuses de cette maison. ce sont merités les louanges de nos generaux et de tout le public par leurs manieres nobles de secourir tout le monde; Mr. le Marquis de Montcalm leurs a temoigné souvent sa reconnoissance et ce proposoit de chanter leurs louanges jusqu'à la Cour."



General Haldane

James Kneller del.

*From an engraving after the painting by Sir William Verelstam,
in the possession of H. H. Lang, Esq.*

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18th "One hundred and fifty of the Highland regiment came down here from Point Levi at two in the morning. They were afterwards sent to the villages below to prevent the Canadians getting in their harvest."⁽¹⁾

The elaborate preparations which had been made for the capture of the stores at Deschambault, were put into effect on this day. The troops destined for this expedition were to leave their tents standing and to depart under cover of the night. During the previous six days there had been great activity in the French camp along the north shore, and the expedition had been delayed until the suspicions of the French were somewhat allayed. For two days boats had been sent up and down the river with apparently no object in view, and the enemy was getting accustomed to these methods. The darkness favoured the enterprise, and accordingly at 11 o'clock the signal was given to embark, and at midnight the expedition started up the river.

19th At day break the boats drew near the shore, and an hour later the troops effected a landing two miles below St. Joseph's church.

A column was then formed with Delaune's and Cardin's companies in the van, while the rear guard was composed of Fraser's company and a detachment of the Royal Americans. When the van came within a short distance of St. Joseph's church, a captain and sixty regulars of the regiment of La Sarre were observed to be preparing to make a stand. The French, however, believing that the

(1) See also Journal of *Montresor*, page 329. Appendix part I.

British had landed in force retreated to the shelter of a wood. "Near the Church was found a store house, in which store house was all the effects, including equipage and apparel, of all the officers in Quebec, civil and military, besides arms and ammunition, the whole valued at 90,000 pounds sterling money, which we consumed by fire."

"Les Anglais firent une descente à Deschambeault à la maison de M. Perrot, capitaine du lieu. Cette maison servait de retraite à la belle Amazone avanturière. C'est madame Cadet, femme de sieur Joseph Ruffio. Cette maison était riche par le dépôt que plusieurs officiers avaient fait de leurs malles, lesquelles ainsi la maison ne furent point sauvées de l'incendie."⁽¹⁾

One French journal states that the British did not lose a man during this expedition, but that they reembarked when the French troops arrived. "I must say that no blame can attach to our troops if they were not able to charge the troops when retreating; they endeavoured to do so with much ardour; they used prodigious diligence to get there, but the English commander, who expected to be attacked, had them closely watched by his ships, attending to whose signals he regulated his movements."

Another version of this affair is furnished by an aide-de-camp of the Marquis de Montcalm.

"Les Ennemis au nombre d'environ 1200 hommes, après leur seconde tentative à la pointe aux trembles

(1) See also "Relation du Siège de Québec" App. part II. p. 320 and Journal de Foligné App. part I. p. 197.

“ furent prendre poste à St. Antoine, Paroisse de la cote du
“ sud à environ sept ou huit lieues de Québec, et faisoient
“ de là des incursions dans les campagnes pour brûler et
“ ravager les habitations. Les Ennemis instruits par les
“ correspondances qu'ils entretenoient dans le pays, que
“ nous avions à Deschambeaux à douze lieues de Québec
“ des magasins où tous les officiers des cinq bataillons de
“ l'Armée et plusieurs autres avoient leurs équipages, y
“ firent une descente au nombre de mille hommes, brûle-
“ rent ces magasins sans y trouver d'opposition que celle
“ d'une garde de vingt soldats estropiés aux ordres d'un
“ Lieutenant du Regiment de Languedoc, qui avoit perdu
“ un bras à l'affaire du 8 juillet 1758. Cette garde fut
“ obligée de se retirer. M. de Bougainville dès qu'il fut
“ averti de cette irruption, y marcha de suite avec sa Cava-
“ lerie, deux Compagnies de grenadiers qu'il avoit à ses
“ ordres, et les troupes qu'il put rassembler. Les Enne-
“ mis se rembarquèrent à son arrivée. La Cavalerie char-
“ gea leur arrière garde, leur tua quelques hommes et fit
“ deux prisonniers.”

The British troops returned to their camp at ten o'clock at night.

Under the direction of a Swiss guide, who had formerly been in the service of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the Rangers, led by Captain Goreham, secured 20 head of cattle and a quantity of plunder. The guide also informed the officers that two thousand Canadians had been permitted to leave the army to gather in the harvest.

On this day Wolfe wrote to Brigadier Monckton “ I



" furent prendre poste à St. Antoine, Paroisse de la cote du
 " sud à environ sept ou huit lieues de Québec, et faisoient
 " de là des incursions dans les campagnes pour brûler et
 " ravager les habitations. Les Ennemis instruits par les
 " correspondances qu'ils entretenoient dans le pays, que
 " nous avions à Deschambeaux à douze lieues de Québec
 " des magasins où tous les officiers des cinq bataillons de
 " l'Armée et plusieurs autres avoient leurs équipages, y
 " firent une descente au nombre de mille hommes, brûle-
 " rent ces magasins sans y trouver d'opposition que celle
 " d'une garde de vingt soldats estropiés aux ordres d'un
 " Lieutenant du Regiment de Languedoc, qui avoit perdu
 " un bras à l'affaire du 8 juillet 1758. Cette garde fut
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Giuseppe De Seta, Venus.



wish we had Murray's corps back, that we might be ready to decide it with 'em." (1)

20th The French observed that four English ships anchored at Ecureuils were taking in water and were preparing to effect a landing. The ships were barricaded with large pieces of timber. "On ne peut s'empêcher d'observer, que les entreprises heureuses de l'ennemi étaient dues au parti qu'on avait pris d'abandonner la rivière, et de faire remonter tous les vaisseaux et les frégates jusques vers les Trois Rivières, contre l'opinion de quelques gens sûrs, qui avaient soutenu qu'il fallait tenir les deux frégates du roi bien armées au-dessus de Québec; lesquelles auraient empêché les berges anglaises de paraître de ce côté-là, et nous auraient assuré la navigation de la rivière."

The heavy rain at this time caused much inconvenience to the troops. The Light Infantry remained under arms all day. At night the sentries discovered some stragglers near the camp, and fired on them. A number of Fraser's Highlanders were posted at the priest's house at St. Joachim.

An Indian prisoner on board the admiral's ship managed to elude his guards, and taking advantage of the darkness, threw himself into the river and escaped.

Two farms were destroyed by the British at St Joachim. The batteries were opened against the town for a short

(1) See Galway papers, Ap. III, p. 68. This letter also refers to the commission promised to Mr. Cameron, about which there appears to have been some confusion.

time, but drenching rain prevented much firing. The Brigadier sent for Captain Fraser and informed him that he considered a diversion above the town advisable. Preparations were made for the expedition but it was abandoned on account of the weather. Admiral Saunders took soundings of the channel on this day.

The return of Brigadier Murray was anxiously looked for. In a letter to Monckton on this day Wolfe said, "Murray, by his long stay above and by detaining all our boats, is actually Master of the operations or rather puts an entire stop to them."⁽¹⁾

The General also said that he intended "to burn all the country from Kamouraska to Point-Levi," and that Scot's Rangers and some Volunteers were to execute part of the work.⁽²⁾

Frequent mention has been made of Wolfe's poor state of health, but he appears to have bravely concealed his sufferings as long as possible.

On this day, however, it became known throughout the camp that he was suffering from a slow fever at the camp at Montmorency. The news was received with sorrow by the troops, for Wolfe was familiarly known in the camp as "The Soldier's Friend." For a few days the General was too weak to move but he still continued to give orders through Major Barré to Brigadier Monckton.

Orders were received on this day limiting the fire of the British batteries to twenty-five rounds for each gun in 24

(1) Galway papers, Ap. Pt. 111. p. 68.

(2) The Memoire of Joannes also refers to this destruction.

hours, and the mortars to forty-five rounds each for the same period.

A French boat passing from the Lower Town to the river St Charles was destroyed by a cannon shot, and out of the five passengers on board, only two were observed to gain the shore. A detachment of the British troops was sent out "to pull pease this forenoon, who discovered a party of the enemy and retired. The British set fire to the mill at the falls and to some houses at Chateau Richer."

23rd The destruction of property threatened by the British was now put into terrible effect. Parties were sent out daily with instructions to lay waste the villages and farms, sparing only the churches; and still the Canadians would not lay down their arms.

The fire at Chateau Richer and in the neighborhood continued on this day, and much damage was done along the shore near Pointe-aux-Trembles. "A dozen shells and twenty bombs were discharged by the French batteries."

A letter was received from a British officer who had been twelve miles above the north camp, stating that the Canadians were gathering in peas and barley.

"At 12 o'clock received orders to get under arms, the whole to march in three different divisions, viz. the third battalion Royal Americans to the right of our camp the length of St. Croix, the 15th regiment with captain Fraser's company of Light Infantry the length of St. Nicholas to the left of our camp under the General, the former division by Major Dalling; the third division in boats, consisting of company of Light Infantry, com-

“manded by Capt. Charters of the Royal Americans. The consequence of which scout ended in burning a battery, a sloop, and 2 saw milns.”

24th It was made known during the day that a priest and four score of his parishioners had fortified themselves in a house at Chateau Richer: A detachment was ordered out against them, “with a six pounder and a howitzer.”

In accordance with a manifesto issued some time previously the troops under the command of Captain Montgomery ⁽¹⁾ marched to attack the village to the west of St Joachim. “There were several of the enemy killed and wounded, and a few prisoners were taken, all of whom the barbarous Captain Montgomery, who commanded us, ordered to be butchered in a most inhuman and cruel manner, particularly two who I (Col. Frazer) sent prisoners by a sergeant, after giving them quarter; and engaging that they should not be killed, were one shot, and the other knocked down by a tomahawk, and both scalped in my absence, by the rascally sergeant neglecting to acquaint Montgomery that I wanted them saved, as he, Montgomery, pretended when I questioned him about it; but even that was no excuse for such an unparalleled piece of barbarity.”

“Le 24 Aoust apres plusieurs demandes des Canadiens habitans de retourner ches eux vinrent encore solliciter Mr. le general de leur permettre d'aller faire leur recolte ce que Mr. le general leur refusa leur promettant d'y pour-

(1) This Montgomery was brother to Richard Montgomery who led the troops against Quebec six years after, and who met his death December 31st, 1775.

voir, mais les Canadiens paroissent pas vouloir s'en rapporter aux promesses de Mr. le general prennent leur partie en sorte qu'il n'est pas de nuit qu'il ne s'en sauvent plus de deux cent, sans que Mr. le general y mit ordre, malgre les plaintes de Mr. le Marquis de Montcalm, qui craint que les ennemis s'appercoivent de cette desertion qu'il estime a plus de deux milles hommes." (1)

A few men made their appearance on horseback in the morning, but they retired as a party advanced towards them. This is the first mention made in the journals of the British meeting a mounted body of the enemy.

The Light Infantry, the Rangers and other Companies continued their march and destroyed more houses in the vicinity of L'Ange Gardien. Orders were given to the regiments at Point Levi to be prepared to march on the morrow.

The British set fire to some trenches at the Falls.

25th Thirty of the unfortunate parishioners who had fortified themselves within a house at Château-Richer were killed and scalped. "A detachment of the Light troops laid an ambush in the skirts of the wood near his house, and as soon as the field piece was brought up and began to play, he, and his men, sallied out, when falling into the ambush, thirty of them with their leader, were surrounded, killed and scalped; the reason of their being treated with such cruelty proceeded from the wretched parishioners having disguised themselves as Indians."

(1) The celebrated letter of Montcalm to de Molé, which many authorities consider to be spurious, is dated on this day. The letter is too long to be given here as a note, and it is therefore printed at the end of this volume. Further particulars concerning the authorship of this letter are given in the Bibliography, Vol. VI, part I, No. 116.

The fortified house and other buildings in the parish were then destroyed by fire.

In the "Journal abrégé d'un aide-de-camp" the affair is referred to in these words:

"Une vingtaine d'habitants de la paroisse de Ste Anne ayant été surpris et emmenés prisonniers par un détachement des ennemis furent tous massacrés inhumainement, et le curé de cette paroisse ⁽¹⁾ subit le même sort. Son corps fut indignement mutilé, on lui leva la chevelure, et son église fut brûlée. Quelle barbarie! les sauvages sont moins cruels, ils ne tuent presque jamais leurs prisonniers de sang froid."

A soldier of the 48th regiment was found scalped about 300 yards from the camp.

The general informed the troops through Brigadier Monckton that he had received intelligence of an attack directed against the camp at Orleans, and that it would probably be put into execution that night.

Two men were killed on the ramparts by discharges from the batteries at Pointe-des-Pères.

The French received information that the Abenakis at St. Francis had stopped two officers, Lieutenant Hamilton and Captain Kennedy, with some Indians, whom General Amherst had despatched through the woods to General Wolfe. From these men they ascertained that Amherst's operations would depend upon the success that Wolfe should meet with before Quebec.

(1) The Priest's name is given in the "Relation du Siège de Québec," page 321, Ap. part. II, as "M. Porneuf, curé de St-Joachim."



As the British ships anchored above Quebec, greatly embarrassed the transportation of provisions to the French camp, a project was formed to have them carried off by the frigates.

"Le 25 Aoust une goualette et plusieurs de nos bateaux charges de vivres venant de Jacque Cartier furent apperçus des ennemis qui detachèrent une frégate et plusieurs batteaux pour intercepter nos batteaux qui eurent le tems d'entrer dans les rivières du cap rouge ou notre monde après avoir débarqué attendirent de pieds fermes ; la fregate apres quelque coups de canons ce retira au large et les berges remonterent joindre les navires ; tout ce jour ce passa sans aucun mouvement de la part des ennemis qui continuerent de bombarder la ville."

Admiral Saunders records under this date that Admiral Holmes and General Murray with part of the troops returned at night, having destroyed "a magazine and other things."

On the 22nd of August General Wolfe complained of the absence of Murray and on the 24th he had ordered some rockets to be thrown up from Goreham's post in order that the ships might see them, which would be a hint that something was wanted. Admiral Holmes reported that he had been twelve leagues up the river, but did not think it practicable to go further.

26th A daring plan was proposed by the French seamen at this time to capture a British vessel. "M. de Vanclain,"⁽¹⁾

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captain of one of the King's frigates" made a request for five or six hundred men, stating that with this force and two frigates he would accomplish his purpose and board the vessel.

In the Life of Montcalm, frequent mention is made of the spirit of jealousy which was manifest in the conduct of Vaudreuil towards Montcalm.

This unfortunate state of affairs was not confined to these two men: it extended through all ranks in the army, and often seriously retarded the cause of the French arms.

As soon as the captain of the King's frigate, M. de Vauquelin, had made known his project, the sieur Cadet proposed a similar plan which he desired to execute under the command of the sieur Kanon.

Cadet apparently had more influence with the superior officers than Vauquelin, and his offer was accepted. Four hundred and fifty sailors were withdrawn from the town batteries, and preparations were made for carrying out the expedition.

" Il fut arreté par nos generaux de rassembler tous les
" matelots repandus sur les batteries pour armer cinq de nos
" fregattes, le Marcheaux la Chezinne le Maréchal Senec-
" taire, la Manon, le Bienfaisant pour les faire descendre
" à la pointe au tremble, ou ils doivent livrer combat aux
" vaisseaux ennemis en consequence sept officiers marains
" attachés au service du munitionnaire recurent des ordres
" pour partir dans la nuit prochaine toutes choses étant
" arrangés."

In the meantime M. de Vauquelin was much incensed at the action of his superiors, and his friends did not hesitate

to criticise those who were responsible for the rejection of his offer. Vauquelin had distinguished himself at Louisbourg, and on this ground they considered that his proposition should have been accepted.

The sieur Cadet was very enthusiastic over the success of his plan to capture the British ship, but he had not calculated on the vigilance of the sailors under Admiral Saunders.

Observing unusual activity on the shore, the Admiral ordered the "Lowestoffe," the "Hunter" sloop, and two transport cats to pass the town at nine o'clock in the evening.

This movement greatly annoyed the French and two hundred shots were discharged at the vessels while passing. One sailor was killed, and two were wounded. The enterprise of the Sieur Cadet was, however, abandoned.

The project of M. Vauquelin was communicated to the Marquis de Vaudreuil by de Bougainville, and the Governor appears to have considered the plan a good one for he said that he had thought of the same method himself, with a few changes. He however proposed to intrust the expedition to Captain Kanon.

"J'ay agréé, Monsieur, votre projet que j'avois déjà penssé moy-même avec quelques changemens. Je charge de l'expédition le Capitaine Kanon avec six fregattes. . . Je fais partir le nombre de matelots necessaires pour le bien armer demain je les fais passer par eau vous pourres les envoyer le 27 à Deschambault ou aux Grondins à votre choix. Ils seront à Batiscan le 28. D'après cela je pense que l'on peut opperer le 20 ou le 21 au matin

“ suivant que vous en conviendrez avec M. Kanon . . . Je me serois volontiers servy d'une fregatte de M. Vauque- lin, mais il n'a que du 8.”

27th It was reported that General Wolfe was recovering from his illness. Some of the soldiers were engaged on this day in felling fruit trees and in cutting corn at L'Ange-Gardien.

An English prisoner at Quebec records the following in his memoirs :

“ Captain Mayors came in from the hospital, he told me that there had been a great many people died there, almost all wounded men, three and four almost every day; yet these people will not own that they have lost any men . . . Bread at this present time is 2s. and 6d. sterling per pound.”

Colonel Young was commanded to proceed to St. Anthony with the third battalion of Royal Americans, and 2,000 men to take possession of the ground previously occupied.

Major Stobo received a letter from a gentleman in the town requesting him to obtain the protection of the General for his country house on the Island of Orleans. His request “ was chearfully granted.”

M. de Bougainville was also under orders to cross over to the south shore near St. Anthony to encounter the British.

A deserter from the Royal Americans informed the French officers that the British fleet would depart in a short time, and that General Wolfe would break up his camp at the Falls within 8 days. He added that the Abbé de Portneuf “ parish priest of St-Joachim, having been

“ taken by the Rangers, together with 9 farmers who were with him, had been massacred after laying down their arms, and that the scalps of these unfortunate men had been carried to the camp.”

“ Les batteries des Anglais firent un feu d'enfer de la Pointe Lévi tant en bombes qu'en canons. Il y eut sur les remparts un homme tué, à côté de moi, d'un boulet de canon qui passa au travers des banquettes de la batterie; 3 hommes de tués à la batterie Dauphine de M. Gareu, et 15 blessés et brulés par des gargousses qui prirent en feu à la vieille batterie.” An assistant gunner at one of the British batteries was instantly killed at his post, on account of his gun not having been properly sponged.

The movements of the fleet led the French to believe that an attack was contemplated in the vicinity of Anse-des-Mères. Four pickets of 50 men each were sent from the camp at Beauport, and 50 Grenadiers. M. de Bernetz, commander of the town, placed one of the pickets at Anse-des-Mères, one at Samos, one at Sillery, and the Grenadiers were stationed to oppose the landing.

In the course of a letter to Bougainville on this day Vaudreuil wrote :

“ Je vous ay déjà mandé, Monsieur, qu'il a déjà passé cinq batimens, en consequence j'ay rappelé par mon ordre nos equipages, parce que toute expedition maritime devient impossible. Depuis j'ay fait les reflexions suivantes. Ce peut être une ruse pour nous faire passer beaucoup de monde au dessus de Québec, et nous faire demain une attaque generale. je m'y attens, et je me

“ tiens sur mes gardes. 2° sy ce sont des vaisseaux ou fregattes, les demarches qu'ils ont fait hier et avant hier n'auront été qu'une feinte pour vous rapeler et profiter de votre absence pour s'établir dans la communication.”

28th Captain McDonell, with Captain Ross and a detachment, marched to Chateau Richer, where they took post.

“ The face of the camp at Point Levis is entirely changed owing to the encouragement given to venders of all kinds.

“ The weather is very agreable.”

“ Courval, qui commande la frégate le Brassavran, fut blessé à la cuisse, dangereusement, en revenant avec son monde, suivant les ordres, à Jacques Cartier, par un Canadien, qui était dans le bois, et, qui, ayant eu peur, tira sur lui. Il avait malheureusement un habit comme un Anglais; on craint qu'il n'en revienne point.”

The information brought into the French camp at this time by deserters caused much uneasiness. “ It was thought that the English genls. were more secret in their deliberations than we were, and caused reports to be circulated amongst their troops that were quite contrary to what they proposed to carry out.”

The policy pursued by Wolfe throughout the campaign was a cause of annoyance not only to the French but also to his own officers.

To those only who were entrusted with the execution of any plan were Wolfe's intentions disclosed. Sometimes his action in this respect was discussed at the mess, and frequently orders were given and then immediately countermanded for no apparent reason. The troops were in a constant state of uncertainty and comment was not always

complimentary to Wolfe. By this means, however, deserters were never in a position to divulge information of much service to the enemy and indeed it is stated that projects were discussed simply to mislead the soldiers.

The French do not seem to have exercised the same amount of caution, and in the course of time they placed little reliance on any information they received. The movements and counter movements ordered by Wolfe occupied the attention of the enemy continually and when at last the crisis came they were still unwilling to believe that anything serious was contemplated.

“ Les vents au nord est les ennemis profiterent de la marais du soir pour faire passer quatre navires à la faveur de la nuit, qui malgré le feu vif de nos rempards furent joindre leurs navires à la pointe au tremble. Ce qui determina nos generaux d'envoyer aux officiers des fregattes ordre de ne pas descendre, de continuer d'occuper la rade du Richelieu et de renvoyer les matelots qui regretterent de perdre l'occasion de ce signaler, tout ce jour canonade ordinaire sur la ville.”

Deserters who went over to the French camp informed the officers that General Wolfe had been suffering from a fever for the last six days.

An order was given for a detachment of the soldiers off duty to go out to strip houses, boards being required for the floors of the men's tents for the preseveration of the health of the British troops.

“ We are informed at point Levi camp that three Rangers have brought in three scalps from St Andre, and took a courier with letters, orders, and directions to

“ the captains of militia and friers, desiring them to keep
“ constant guards and inform the inhabitants that we shall
“ be soon obliged to leave the country.”

The French batteries to the west of the Falls fired on some boats that were passing to General Wolfe's camp to bring off a number of women, the heavy baggage, and the sick and wounded. A volley from all the cannon and howitzers silenced the French guns.

30th “ The enemy unmasked a new battery at point
“ Levis. Twenty one pieces were then there.”

“ The English ships that were before St. Augustin and
“ Cap Rouge did considerable cannonading from one o'clock
“ to eight in the morning. About five o'clock they attempted
“ a landing in flat bottomed boats near St. Augustin. Forty
“ sailors from Mr. Denet's boats commenced firing upon
“ the British who retired. One Canadian was killed and
“ one was wounded.”

An engagement occured between the Rangers and some Canadians near Beaumont. Two of the Rangers were wounded.

Three bags were found on a field where the Canadians had been reaping. One bag contained bread, the second powder, and the third letters. Some of these letters revealed the misery and distress of the inhabitants.

“ By order of his Excellency General Wolfe, the three
“ Brigadiers assembled in order to consult the measures
“ most practicable for the good of the service.”

Aug. 31st “ The town sergent told us that he had orders from the Governor to make a search for all our papers, and carry them to him. The thing he completed according to

his order, paper, ink and pens and everything of that kind, excepting this small pamphlet of mine, that when he was in search of the rest I hid it under the straw bed, the rest he took with him. . . . We were confined to small apartment in the Prison, about 14 foot one way and 8 the other, with three Beds and the Rest of oure small Necessaries, there being Nine of us in Number, Capt. Wally, Capt. Sweatland, Capt. Grow, Capt. Mayors, Capt. Hoborn, Mr. Hawes, Mr. Stadford, Thomas Colley, a young lad and my sealf. That according to the old saying we are as thick as three in a bed. Now could any one of Reason suppose how much we could long for liberty—and no conveniency—looking through these Iron grates like so many malefactors till our cheek Bons are grown thine.”⁽¹⁾

Some of these prisoners appear to have been still more closely confined during the early days of September.

“ This occasion of our being confined, as I understood, was by some of the ruffians as I may well call them, whose tongues can never be still, although it is to their own hurt their being so free in their talk, and making their brags that if this place should be taken Mr. Lorais would be the first man they would strip.”


“ The Doctor that attended the prison being a man somewhat free to speak his mind, he told us he would be glad how soon the country would be given up, for the view he had of it was that if it was not the people would be in a terrible condition ; he told us that he had a wife and children and little or nothing to give them, as they

(1) From the diary of an English prisoner at Quebec.

had nothing but their allowance, and I am very sure any one will say it is small enough to have it." (1)

It is mentioned under the date of the 30th of August that Wolfe requested his Brigadiers to consider measures for promoting the success of the British arms. In making this request the general gave his officers the benefit of his own ideas on the subject, as will be seen by the letter which is quoted at the commencement of the next chapter.

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


The Landing of Quebec
From an engraving in the possession of H. H. J. Mackay, Quebec

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The Taking of Quebec
From an engraving in the possession of Mr. H. J. Machine Quebec



CHAPTER XI.

THE PLAN OF THE BRIGADIERS

THE letter written by General Wolfe, although not dated, appears to have been sent to General Monckton on the 29th of August.

The answer which followed, and the plan proposed in consequence, have caused much confusion and many errors have resulted therefrom.

These mistakes will be pointed out in their proper place. General Wolfe's letter read as follows :

“ Head Quarters Montmorency Augst. 1759.

“ To The Brigadiers,

“ That the public Service may not suffer by the Generals indisposition, He begs the Brigadiers will be so good to meet, and consult together for the public Utility and advantage, and to consider of the best method of attacking the Enemy.

“ If the French Army is attacked and defeated, the General concludes the town would immediately surrender, because He does not find they have any provisions in the place

“ The General is of opinion the army should be attackt
“ in preference to the place, because of the difficulties of
“ penetrating from the lower to the upper Town, in which
“ attempt neither the Guns of the Shipping, or of our own
“ Batteries could be of much use

“ There appears three methods of attacking this Army.

“ 1st In dry weather a large detachment may march in
“ a day and a night so as to arrive at Beauport (fording
“ the Montmorency 8 or 9 Miles up) before day in the
“ morning—it is likely they could be discover'd upon this
“ March on both sides the River. If such a detachment
“ penetrates to their intrenchment and the rest of the
“ Troops are ready, the consequence is plain

“ 2^{dly} If the troops encamped here passed the Ford with
“ the falling Water and in the night march on directly
“ towards the point of Beauport, the light Infantry have
“ a good Chance to get up the Woody Hill, trying different
“ places and moving quick to the Right, would soon dis-
“ cover proper places for the rest. The upper Redoubts
“ must be attackt and kept by a company of Grenadiers.
“ Brigadier Monkton must be ready off the point of Beau-
“ port to land when our people have got up the Hill, for
“ which Signals may be appointed

“ 3^{dly} All the chosen Troops of the Army attack at the
“ Beauport at Low water—a division across the Ford an
“ hour before the other attack.

“ N : B : For the 1st it is enough if the Water begins to
“ fall a little before day light or about it. For the other
“ two it would be best to have it low water about half an
“ hour before day. The General thinks the Country should

“ be ruined and destroyed, as much as can be done con-
“ sistant with a more capital operation.

“ N. There are guides in the Army for the detachment
“ in question.”

From the text of another document we find that the
answer of the Brigadiers was sent on the 30th of August.

Answer of the Brigadiers


To General Wolfe

“ The natural Strength of the Enemy's situation, between
“ the River St Charles and the Montmorency, now im-
“ proved by all the Art of their Engineers, makes the
“ defeat of the French Army if attackt there very doubtful.
“ The advantage their easy communication on Shore has
“ over our Attacks from Boats and the Ford of the Mont-
“ morency is evident from late experience, and it cannot be
“ denied that That part of the Army which is proposed to
“ March thro' the Woods nine miles up the Montmorency
“ to surprize their Army is exposed to certain discovery,
“ and consequently to the continual dis-advantage of a Wood
“ fight — But allowing we got footing on the Beauport side,
“ the M. de Montcalm will certainly still have it in his
“ power to dispute the passage of the St Charles, till the
“ place is supplied with two months provisions (the utmost
“ you can lye before it) from the Ships and Magazines
“ above from which it appears they draw their subsistance.
“ We, therefore, are of Opinion that the most probable
“ method of striking an effectual Blow is by bringing the
“ Troops to the South shore and directing our operations

“ above the Town. When we have established ourselves on
“ the North Shore, of which there is very little doubt, the
“ M. de Montcalm must fight us upon our own terms, we
“ are between Him and his provisions and betwixt him
“ and the French army opposing General Amhurst. If
“ He gives us Battle and we defeat Him Quebec must be
“ ours, and which is more all Canada must submit to His
“ Majesty’s arms, a different Case from any advantage we
“ can hope for at Beauport, and should the Enemy pass
“ the St Charles with Force sufficient to oppose this opper-
“ ation, we can still with more ease and probability of suc-
“ cess execute your third proposition, (in our Opinion the
“ most eligible of the three you have made) or any other
“ attempt on the Beauport shore, necessarily weakened by
“ the detachments made to oppose us above the Town.


“ With respect to the expediency of making an imme-
“ diate attack, or the postponing it to be able the more
“ effectually to prevent the Harvest and destroy the Col-
“ ony ; or with a view of facilitating the operations of our
“ Armies now advancing into the Heart of the Country, we
“ cannot take upon us to advise, altho’ we cannot but be
“ convinced that a decisive affair to our disadvantage must
“ enable the Enemy to make head against the army under
“ the Command of General Amhurst already far advanced
“ by the diversion this Army has made on this side”

Wolfe’s letter and the answer of the Brigadiers have
been published several times, but we are unable to say
with certainty whether the “ Plan of Opperations in conse-
quence of the above answer ” has ever been published until
quite recently. It appears in the “ Military Life of Field



STATE AND CONDITION OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS UNDERMENTION'D, UNDER THE COMMAND OF VICE ADMIRAL SAUNDERS, OFF POINT LEVI, 30 AUGUST 1759.

SHIPS	Complement	Borne	Mustered	CHEQUED				SICK		OF THE COMPLEMENT				SUPERNUM ^{rs} .					PROVISIONS ON BOARD FOR THE COMPT. (whole Allowance)														OFFICERS			Condition of the Ships	When last clean'd.					
				Widows Men	With Leave	Without Leave	Lent	on Board	on Shore	Ofrs. & Servants	Petty & Able	Ordinary	Landmen	Marines	of no Ships	of other Ships	of the Troops	Pilots	Prisoners	Victualled in all	DAYS					WEEKS									Stores wanting			Absent	Occasion			
																					Bread	Beer	Wine	Rum	Brandy	Beef	Pork	Pease	Oatmeal	Flour	Suet	Fruit	Butter	Cheese	Oil					Vinegar	Tons of Water	Boatswains
Sterling Castle	480	477	407	5	63	26	2	45	301	36	21	74	137	1	7	552	99	1	40	21	17	11½	17½	13	16	5	3½	2	11	8	160	Part.	Part.	Part.	None	None	Fit for Sea	15th January 1759	
Dublin	615	610	458	6	113	86	33	63	187	199	68	98	54	1	1	514	45	7	38	40	12	17	14	16	6	½	5	3	12	10	145	do.	do.	do.	4 Lieuts. Capt. 1 & 2d. Lieuts. of marines	Lent Duty on shore	Do.	31 do.
Shrewsbury	600	564	467	6	90	1	70	48	179	110	129	98	91	1	1	560	119	7	42	40	12½	16	7	16½	5½	5½	5½	12	7	100	do.	do.	do.	2d. Lt.	Wanting	Do.	16 Decr. 1758
Alcide	500	500	394	5	101	45	48	124	140	125	36	75	1	1	1	472	84	3	25	50	13	13	13	9	4	4	4	½	½	5	3	120	do.	do.	do.	2d. Lt.	Wanting	Do.	4 Jany. 1758
Vanguard	520	475	391	5	64	15	15	48	305	46	11	65	89	2	1	483	71	3	45	38	11	9	16½	11	13	8	1	5	4½	8	3	140	do.	Do.	9 March 1758	
Centurion	350	321	276	3	35	96	7	36	246	39	89	2	367	83	42	51	13½	15	4	13	5½	5½	2	5	5	90	Part.	do.	Part.	3d. Lt. Surgn 2 Mts. 4 Lts. on duty above the Town	Master Lent	Do.	6 Feby. do.	
Captain	480	459	367	5	82	18	5	32	348	6	73	139	1	2	509	100	2	46	55	10	15½	7½	15	6	3	3	10½	10	140	do.	do.	do.	None	Do.	10 Decr. do.
Medway	420	412	323	4	82	44	40	222	63	20	67	93	12	424	50	2	40	50	1	11	18½	10½	15	4½	4½	4½	8	10	120	None	Do.	1 Jany. 1759	
Pembroke	420	360	295	4	54	30	7	42	135	78	49	55	43	94	2	1	4	435	67	1	46	50	17	16	10	13	8	2	2	3	10	100	Surgn 2 Mts.	None appd.	Do.	28 Octr. 1758	
Sutherland																																										
Squirrel																																										
Richmond	220	210	207	2	17	31	70	42	23	49	210	63	26	30	8	13	7	7	1	3	7	60	pt.	pt.	pt.	Alexr. Levingstone Lt. Marines on shore	Do.	28th Feby. 1759		
Diana																																										
Lowestoffe																																										
Trent	200	189	177	2	10	27	49	40	39	34	183	25	3	30	33	6	9	10	11	4	3	2	1	2	8	50	pt.	pt.	pt.	None	None	Do.	5th Jany. 1759
Hunter																																										
Porcupine	125	116	111	1	2	14	2	25	49	14	28	4	1	5	121	51	3	24	6	6	6½	6½	6	6	3	1	3	5	36	pt.	pt.	pt.	Capt.	Lent Squirrel	Do.	26 Feby. 1759
Racehorse	70	67	62	1	7	4	18	37	12	62	82	40	7	4	13	5	14	3	3	7	7	20	do.	do.	do.	Do.	21 Jany. do.	
Baltimore	60	56	54	1	16	31	1	6	1	1	56	49	6	49	17	4	22	12	11	9	15	8	8	21	do.	do.	do.	Do.	9 do. do.		
Pelican	60	58	56	1	5	17	15	9	17	56	30	50	6	10	16	16	3	3	7	25	do.	do.	do.	Do.	21 do. 1759	
Vesuvius	45	41	25	16	6	8	33	55	10	42	35	11½	11½	8½	8½	4½	11½	8½	28	Surgn. Lt. to Marines on shore	Do.	4 do.		
Sea horse	160	151	147	2	12	26	53	24	16	30	149	66	10	42	42	1	14	14	10	10	8	3	3	4	40	pt.	pt.	pt.	Do.	6 Dec. 1758	
Trident	500	477	462	5	11	8	10	47	342	17	3	68	464	72	17	22	8½	12½	8	9	one	3	3	3½	140	do.	do.	do.	3d. Lt. Surgts. 1 Mts. in a Prize Lt. Marines & Cook wanting	Fit for Sea	Do.	30 Nov. do.	
Scorpion	125	104	99	1	9	4	23	53	18	10	13	114	30	25	36	11	16	1	10	3	30	do.	do.	do.	Do.	24 Jany. 1759			
Zephyr	110	101	99	1	4	22	49	6	5	19	1	1	101	54	11	24	10½	12	12	9½	10	4½	5	3	27	do.	do.	do.	acting Lieut. & Master	Do.	Do.	5 Feby. do.	



Marshal George, First Marquess Townshend" and the author, Colonel Townshend, believes that it has not hitherto been printed.

The Plan of the Brigadiers is here given.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE
ABOVE ANSWER ⁽¹⁾

By the Brigadiers.

" It is proposed to remove the Ordnance and Troops from
" Montmorency in three days, beginning with the heavy
" Artillery to morrow night : the Stores to be carried to the
" Water side directly to gain time.

" The Troops to be transported to the Isle of Orleans,
" some Corps may go from hence to-morrow night that they
" may assist in putting the Works at the point of Orleans
" in a good State of defence. The sick to be transported
" the day after to morrow, by which time provisions must
" be made for them in the Hospitals. 600 Men of the
" Marines and Hardy's Corps for the defence of Orleans—
" 600 for point Levy and 1000 for the Batteries.

" The Army to encamp on the other side of the Etche-
" min, as many Transports as will contain Two Months
" provisions to get up the first Opportunity. The boats of
" the Fleet will disembark 2500 Men, the remainder of the
" Troops or any part of them to be sent on board the ships
" which are to be stationed so as to be ready to land the Men
" as immediately as possible to sustain the first Corps that

(1) From an official copy obtained from the British Museum.

“ disembark from the Boats. There can be no difficulty
“ to effectuate a landing in the night without the least
“ loss, it may be done any where for an extent of a few
“ Leagues, viz. from the heighth of S^t John to Cap rouge
“ River. Two attempts may be made, either of which suc-
“ ceeding is sufficient. Allowing the transports cannot
“ get up in a few days the Enterprize need not for that
“ Reason be delayed a moment. We have a sufficient
“ number of Carts to make a dépôt at the Camp of the
“ Etchemin, and we have a further resource from our Boats
“ which at all times we know, without interruption, can pass
“ and repass the Town. Another method of effecting the
“ landing on the North Shore, 2000 Men to embark at the
“ Point of Levy in the Boats at low water the middle of
“ the night: By break of day they will have passed the
“ Town, have arrived and disembarked at a proper place
“ for the purpose half a League above the River Cap
“ Rouge. The same night the Troops to move up to the
“ Camp of the Etchemin already mentioned. Previous to
“ this it will be right to fill the ships already above the
“ Town with as many Troops as they will contain. That
“ may be done from Gorham’s Post in three nights with-
“ out giving the smallest jealousy by the Boats already
“ above, but for this purpose the Ships already above must
“ fall down to a proper station. The Ships already above
“ the Town will contain for the requisite time 2000 Men,
“ consequently 4000 Men may in one tide be landed without
“ the least jealousy given to the Enemy, and the remainder
“ may be brought over with any number of Artillery, the
“ next from the Etchemin camp ”

Colonel Townshend publishes this Plan of Operations from papers in his possession belonging to the Marquess Townshend.

After the words "the next from the Etchemin Camp," on page 208 of Colonel Townshend's book, line 2, this note occurs. " [Here some pages are missing from the manuscript :—C. V. F. T.] . . . no doubt but that we are able to fight and to beat the French Army, in which I know that you will give your best assistance.

" I have the honour &c.,

" JAM. WOLFE."

" Sutherland, 8½ o'clock,
12 September, 1759."

The words following the note by Colonel Townshend have, however, no relation to the plan. They belong to a letter addressed by Wolfe to General Townshend on the 12th of September. ⁽¹⁾

In the preface to his work, page eight, Colonel Townshend says :

" It will be seen that the unexpected and surprising manner in which Quebec was taken was the plan of the Brigadiers, and not of Wolfe.

" That Wolfe put into happy execution the plan of others is no disparagement to his glorious memory—such things are not unknown to students of military history."

(1) For the full text of this letter see Volume VI, page 61 of this work. It is quite probable that this portion of Wolfe's letter may have been on a detached sheet and that it was mixed with the other pages of the Plan in the possession of Colonel Townshend.

In support of this statement that Wolfe simply carried out the plan of his Brigadiers Colonel Townshend publishes the letter of General Wolfe, the Answer of the Brigadiers, and the "Plan of Operations in consequence of the Above Answer," and on page 203 we find these words: "Wolfe instantly adopted their plan. I here produce the "two original letters—viz. that of Wolfe to the brigadiers, "and their reply—which I do not believe can have been "published before; this documentary evidence directly "contradicts Lord Mahon, and proves that he was wrong "when he went out of his way in his History to say, "The honour of that first thought belongs to Wolfe alone." If Colonel Townshend had been in possession of the whole of the letter, a portion of which he publishes as forming the conclusion of the "Plan of Operations", he would probably have avoided a much more serious error than that which he attributes to Lord Mahon, and many of the passages in his book would, no doubt, have been omitted.

The complete letter forms a link in the chain of evidence which establishes that the plan by which Quebec was taken was Wolfe's alone, for it is in answer to a communication in which General Townshend acknowledges above his own signature that he is in ignorance of the General's plan.

CHAPTER XII.

WOLFE'S PLAN

ON the 12th of September, 1759, a few hours before the battle of the Plains, Generals Townshend, Monckton and Murray addressed a letter to Wolfe in which they stated that they did not consider themselves sufficiently informed of what was expected of them on the morrow.

“ We must beg leave to request of you as distinct Orders as the nature of the thing will admit of, *particularly of the place or places* we are to attack. This circumstance (perhaps very decisive) we cannot learn from the public orders, neither may it be in the power of the naval officer who leads the Troops to instruct us.”

In a short time the expedition would be on its way, and yet the Brigadiers did not even know the place of the intended attack! This was perfectly true. But the officers who were to conduct the troops to the landing place and who had charge of the boats and of the first men who were to ascend the heights had received ample instructions. The plan was Wolfe's and he had not yet thought it necessary to give his Brigadiers any more minute instructions. If we had this letter only to offer in refutation of Colonel Townshend's statement, we think that it would be sufficient.

Wolfe's answer to this communication dated on board the Sutherland at 8½ o'clock, on the 12th of Sept, however, settles the question beyond dispute. The general addresses his remarks to Brigadier Monckton whom he informs that the place of attack is the Foulon, situate about 2 miles from Quebec. He states also that when choosing the place he took Capt. Shads with him and also the Admiral.

He then designates the exact spot where they are to land and concludes by saying :

“ It is not a usual thing to point out in the public orders
“ the direct spot of our attack, nor for any inferior officers
“ not charged with a particular duty to ask instructions
“ upon that point. I had the honour to inform you to day
“ that it is my duty to attack the French Army. To the
“ best of my knowledge and abilities, I have fixed upon
“ that spot where we can act with the most force and are
“ most likely to succeed. If I am mistaken, I am sorry
“ for it and must be answerable to His Majesty and the
“ public for the consequence.”

In addition to this letter Wolfe addressed a brief communication at the same time to Townshend giving him instructions regarding the troops, and it is the termination of this document which Colonel Townshend publishes as a part of the “ Plan of Operations.”

It is true that the Brigadiers had prepared a plan of attack based on the lines indicated.

They proposed to make a descent on the north shore, twelve miles above Quebec, and all the details were arranged and assented to by Wolfe in the early days of September.

However, on the 10th of the month, three days before the

battle he reconnoitered the north shore himself, and at once discarded the plan of the Brigadiers and selected the Foulon as the place of attack.

As early as the eighteenth day of July when the first ships passed the town, more than a month before the date of the Brigadiers' plan, he had considered the advisability of making an attack in the vicinity of Foulon. In the Journal of an officer of Fraser's regiment we find this entry on the 18th of July :

“ This morning General Wolfe reconnoitred the opposite or north shore above the town : seems to think a landing practicable. In the afternoon Major Dalling marched with two companys along the south shore three miles to the westward of our post, in order to look for places most convenient for the troops to ascend on the north shore. He found two or three.”

Wolfe's attention at this time was directed to Montmorency where he determined to make an attack, but it is evident that the idea of attempting the north shore above the town did not emanate from the plan which we have quoted, for an inspection of the ground had been made long before the document in question was prepared.

If Wolfe had followed the suggestions of his Brigadiers, and made a descent twelve miles above the town, he would have had to encounter the force of Bougainville at Cap Rouge, but by the clever ruse which he adopted on the morning of the thirteenth of drawing Bougainville's force nearly twenty miles up the river, while his own army gained the heights within a mile and a half from the town, he not only disposed of a powerful foe in the meantime,

but he was able to occupy a commanding position within three quarters of a mile from the town batteries.

Wolfe's sudden rejection of the plan of the Brigadiers after all the details had been arranged naturally caused a feeling of resentment at the moment, and protests were made. This may have been the reason why Wolfe did not disclose his plan more fully to his officers at the time. He certainly had the utmost confidence in his Brigadiers as soldiers and neither he nor they would allow any personal feeling to interfere with their efforts in behalf of the cause in which they were engaged. Their letter to Wolfe clearly shows this, and the General's answer proves that he had not abandoned their plan in a spirit of jealousy, but simply for what he considered to be the good of the service. The Brigadiers had become accustomed to the independent actions of Wolfe, and they frequently did not approve of his conduct, but the zeal which they manifested during the campaign and particularly after this affair is striking evidence of the true nobility of the men.

Admiral Holmes, who had charge of the landing of the troops on the morning of the 13th of September, and who was therefore acquainted with the exact spot, refers to the change of the plan in these words: ⁽¹⁾


“ A plan was immediately set on foot, to attempt a
“ Landing about four leagues above the town, and it was
“ ready to put into execution when General Wolfe recon-
“ noitred down the River and fixed upon Foulon, a spot

(1) This letter is dated the 18th of September 1759, three days before the date of the official despatch which was sent to England.



The Battle of the Nile, 1798. The British fleet, under Admiral Horatio Nelson, defeated the French fleet, under Admiral Brueys, on the night of the 1st August 1798. The British ships were superior in firepower and maneuverability, and the French fleet was caught in a narrow channel. The British ships fired a total of 1,200 guns, and the French ships were destroyed or captured. The British fleet then sailed on to Alexandria, where they landed troops and supplies. The British then moved on to Cairo, where they defeated the French army, under Napoleon Bonaparte, at the Battle of the Pyramids on the 21st July 1798. The British then evacuated Egypt in 1801, and the French returned to power in 1802.

“ adjacent to the Citadel, which, tho' a very strong Ground,
“ being a steep Hill with abbatis laid across the accessible
“ parts of it and a Guard on the Summit. He nevertheless
“ thought that a sudden brisk Attack, a little before day-
“ break, would bring his Army on the plain, within two
“ miles of the Town. The alteration of the Plan of Oper-
“ ations was not, I believe approved of by many, besides
“ himself.”



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“ himself.”



CHAPTER XIII.

WOLFE'S REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

A portion of General Wolfe's letter to the Secretary of State which was despatched to England on the 2nd of September is printed in this volume after the narration of the battle of Montmorency. The remainder is here quoted, as it forms a summary of the events between the first and the thirty first of August :

“ The enemy have been fortifying ever since with care,
“ so as to make a second attempt still more dangerous.
“ Immediately after this check, I sent Brigadier Murray
“ above the town, with twelve hundred men, directing him
“ to assist Rear Admiral Holmes in the destruction of the
“ French ships, if they could be got at, in order to open a
“ communication with General Amherst. The Brigadier
“ was to seek every favourable opportunity of fighting
“ some of the enemy's detachments, provided he could do
“ it upon tolerable terms; and to use all the means in his
“ power to provoke them to attack him. He made two
“ different attempts to land upon the north shore, without
“ success; but in a third was more fortunate. He landed
“ unexpectedly at de Chambord, and burned a magazine
“ there, in which were some provisions, some ammunition,

“ and all the spare stores, cloathing, arms, and baggage of
“ their army. Finding that their ships were not to be got
“ at, and little prospect of bringing the enemy to a battle,
“ he reported his situation to me, and I ordered him to
“ join the army. The prisoners he took informed him of
“ the surrender of Niagara ; and we discovered by inter-
“ cepted letters, that the enemy, having abandoned Caril-
“ lon and Crown Point, were retired to the isle au Noix ;
“ and that General Amherst was making preparations to
“ pass the lake Champlain, to fall upon Monsieur de
“ Bourlemacque’s corps, which consists of three battalions
“ of foot, and as many Canadians as make the whole
“ amount to three thousand men. The Admiral’s dis-
“ patches and mine would have gone eight or ten days
“ sooner, if I had not been prevented from writing by a
“ fever. I found myself so ill, and am still so weak, that
“ I begged the general officers to consult together for the
“ public utility. *They are all of opinion*, that, as more
“ ships and provisions are now got above the town, they
“ should try, by conveying up a corps of four or five
“ thousand men, which is nearly the whole strength of the
“ army, after the Points of Levi and Orleans are left in a
“ proper state of defence, to draw the enemy from their
“ present situation, and bring them to an action. *I have*
“ *acquiesced* in their proposal, and we are preparing to put
“ it into execution. The Admiral and I have examined
“ the town, with the view of a general assault ; but,
“ after consulting with the chief Engineer, who is well
“ acquainted with the interior parts of it, and after viewing
“ it with the utmost attention, we found that, though the

" batteries of the lower town might be easily silenced by
 " the men of war, yet the business of an assault would be
 " little advanced by that, since the few passages leading
 " from the lower to the upper town are carefully intrenched,
 " and the upper batteries cannot be affected by the ships,
 " which must receive considerable damage from them, and
 " from the mortars. The Admiral would readily join in
 " this, or in any other measure for the public service; but
 " I could not propose to him an undertaking of so dan-
 " gerous a nature, and promising so little success.

" To the uncommon strength of the country the enemy
 " have added, for the defence of the river, a great number
 " of floating batteries and boats: by the vigilance of these,
 " and the Indians round our different posts, it has been
 " impossible to execute anything by surprise. We have
 " had almost daily skirmishes with the Savages, in which
 " they are generally defeated, but not without loss on our
 " side. By the list of disabled officers ⁽¹⁾ (many of whom
 " are of rank) you may perceive that the army is much
 " weakened. By the nature of the river, the most formid-
 " able part of this armament is deprived of the power of
 " acting, yet we have almost the whole force of Canada to
 " oppose. ⁽¹⁾

" In this situation *there is such a choice of difficulties,*
 " that I own myself at a loss how to determine. The affairs

(1) Colonel Burton, Colonel Fraser, Major Irving, Major Prevost,
 Sixteen Captains, Twenty four Lieutenants and three Ensigns were
 wounded; and three Captains, Six Lieutenants and one Ensign were
 killed between the 27th of June and the 2nd of September. See also
 table at the end of this volume.

“ of great Britain, I know, require the most vigorous measures ; however, you may be assured that the small part of the campaign which remains shall be employed (as far as I am able) for the honour of His Majesty, and the interest of the nation ; in which I am sure of being well seconded by the Admiral and the Generals. Happy if our efforts here can contribute to the success of his Majesty's arms in any other part of America.”


This letter, as before mentioned was despatched from Quebec on the second day of September. Wolfe refers to the plan of the Brigadiers and states that he has “ acquiesced ” in their suggestions, as early as the first or second day of September. Colonel Townshend, however, gives the date of the plan as September the 12th which is a further proof of the error into which he has been led by the detached pages in his possession.

Wolfe's letter is not encouraging, but he promised to employ the “ small part of the campaign which remains ” for the honour of His Majesty and the welfare of the nation. How nobly he redeemed his promise is disclosed in the pages of the third volume of this work.


31st A French regular deserted from the Beauport Camp. He confirmed the intelligence already received, that two officers and four Mohawk Indians who had been despatched by General Amherst to the camp before Quebec, had been captured by the French at Three Rivers. “ Two of the Indians were roasted alive, and two were scalped while living, while the officers were placed in chains.”


Heavy firing was kept up by the batteries at Point Levis.

In the evening the Sea Horse and some transports passed the town. Several of the heavy guns at Montmorency were removed to Point Levis.










River St. Lawrence

S. Mifflin River

Plan of the Battle fought on the Plains of Mifflin, September 26th 1777

1. Grenadiers of the 60th Regt
 2. Light Infantry of the 60th Regt
 3. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 4. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 5. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 6. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 7. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 8. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 9. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 10. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 11. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 12. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 13. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 14. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 15. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 16. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 17. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 18. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 19. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 20. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 21. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 22. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 23. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 24. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 25. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 26. The Battalion of the 60th Regt
 27. The Battalion of the 60th Regt



CHAPTER XIV.

MONTMORENCY ABANDONED

ONCE more the mysterious movements of the British caused the French to expect an attack of some importance, but they had no idea either of the nature of Wolfe's intentions, or of the place where he intended to make his final effort. Speculation was rife, as the following quotation shows:—

“ Considerable movement occurred in point Levis Camp ;
“ also in the fleet ; which made us suppose that the enemy
“ was preparing to send some vessels above Quebec ; those
“ already above went up from St. Augustin to point aux
“ Trembles, whence, 'twas inferred that they designed
“ attempting the passage of the Richelieu to go and attack
“ our fleet ; we had heard two days previously, that a ship,
“ no matter what her draft, could easily ascend that rapid.
“ This caused us the greater uneasiness as one of the
“ strongest of the contractor's frigates had the evening
“ before run ashore at Grondines. Our little naval force
“ became by that loss, reduced to the other three of his
“ frigates, all of which had orders to prepare to oppose the
“ passage of the English.”

In accordance with the resolution which was adopted

the scene of future operations was to be transferred to the north shore. Orders were therefore issued for the removal of the camp from Montmorency to Point Lévis. This was a laborious and dangerous undertaking.

When Wolfe first occupied this position the risk of transferring the heavy pieces of cannon from Lévis to Montmorency was great, but as soon as he commenced his operations in this quarter the French naturally strengthened their batteries, and they were now able to offer formidable opposition to any movement on the water. It therefore became necessary to detract the enemy's attention. Great preparations were consequently made by the fleet for an expedition above the town, and the French feared that another attack was meditated at Richelieu or in its vicinity. While all these different movements were being executed, two boats for each regiment left Lévis for Montmorency at nine o'clock and the work of transferring the camp was commenced in earnest under the direction of Colonel Carleton

“ Comme cette manœuvre pouvoit n'être qu'un jeu pour
“ tomber sur quelque partie de notre ligne si l'ennemi se
“ fût apperçu qu'elle eut été mal gardée, M. le Marquis de
“ Montcalm avoit fait prendre les armes une heure avant
“ le jour à toute la ligne avec ordre de border les retran-
“ chemens, chaque corps aux endroits qui lui étoient assi-
“ gnés. Les troupes restèrent sous les armes jusqu'à midi
“ que le mouvement des ennemis fut entièrement déterminé.
“ Leur retrait avoit été protégée par une chaîne de redoutes
“ sur la hauteur de leur camp, garnies de fortes gardes qui
“ s'embarquèrent après que toutes les troupes furent hors

“ de portée d'être insultées. On se contenta de canonner
“ et bombarder les berges tant qu'elles furent à portée de
“ nos batteries.”

Several letters from Quebec were intercepted by the Rangers on this day from which it was ascertained that the Marquis de Montcalm apprehended that the British fleet would soon sail down the river with the army, and that the Canadians would be discharged from service on the 25th. A rumour was circulated in the British camp to the effect that the General intended to make a descent upon the north shore near Cape Rouge.

“ The English continued to cannonade the town, directing their fire against St. Roch. We learned from deserters
“ from Mr. Amherst's army, that that General was disposed
“ to confine the operations of this campaign to repairing
“ Forts Carillon and St. Frederic (the latter had been
“ totally destroyed). And on the other hand, M. Bourlamaque assured that the advantageous post he had taken
“ at Ile aux Noix, the intrenchments he had thrown up,
“ and the formidable artillery he had mounted there,
“ placed him in a position not to fear the enemy, however numerous they might present themselves.”

2nd. The work of transferring the camp from Montmorency was continued on this day. There were no less than 50 pieces of cannon there, which entailed great risk and labour. The batteries at Pointe des Pères were ordered to play against the town in the meantime to divide the attention of the enemy.

General Townshend, in his notes of the siege, gives the following particulars regarding the removal of the camp:

“ Moncktons Regt. the 3 Companies of Grenadr. of
“ Louisbourg & the Detachment of Highlanders were sent
“ over to the Island of Orleans this Morning, orders were
“ given to all the Regts, to strike their Tents after Dark
“ and Carry them down to the Water Side when Boats
“ was ready to Receive them & Carry them to Point
“ Levy—The men was to Collect all the Boards and Burn
“ them, that no fires may be seen after Midnight. The
“ Disposition for the Retreat was the Regt. to meet at 12
“ o’Clock Viz. to Bragg to occupy 4 Houses on the Right.
“ Otways & Lascelles to go into the Redoubts on the Left
“ Anstruther to make a show on the face of the Hill as if
“ designed to Cover our Retreat. The Light Infantry to
“ lay conceal’d in their Camp—Great silence was to be
“ observed and not a man to show himself on any account
“ but to lay conceal’d in their Posts to try once more if the
“ Enemy would attack us—When the time of tyde wou’d
“ admit our going down to the Boats then was a Signal to
“ be made by Burning a Barn in the Front of Genl. Town-
“ shend Quarters. Then Genl. Townshend was to march
“ of from the Right with Braggs Lascelles Anstruthers &
“ Otway was to march by Files down the Board in the
“ rear of Anstruthers Camp that Hoitzer with Lascelles
“ Regt., they were to be under the Command of Brigadr.
“ Murray, Col. Howe with the Light Infantry To Cover
“ the Retreat and to March down from his Camp on
“ Braggs Regt. being drawn up on the Top of the Hill
“ the Regt. was to leave Detachment in their Rear to burn
“ the Houses.”

A sloop of war sailed for England bearing the dispatches



Major General Hunt Walsh.

From a painting in the possession of Sir Hunt A. Walsh Bart. Bedfordshire.

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James Sneyd del.

Major-General Hunt Walsh.

From a painting in the possession of Sir Hunt K. A. Walsh Bart. Ballyglannon.



of the General. From the movements made by the British fleet, the French were under the impression that an attack was to be made at Beauport.

“ Sur les dix heures du matin, nous vîmes un mouvement considérable de la part des ennemis : trois gros vaisseaux anglais ayant le cap sur la ville avec petit nord-est étaient mouillés entre la pointe de l’île de la Pointe Lévi. Nous aperçûmes clairement environ 40 berges chargées de monde, entre ces batiments et qui se tenaient au courant. Ce mouvement donna alerte à la ville ; je me rendis, après avoir bu deux coups de liqueur, chez Magnan à la porte St Jean, et nous bûmes le troisième à l’alerte. Nous nous rendîmes à la porte St Louis où était le commandant, lequel ayant vu la manœuvre, me détacha, volontairement, pour aller à la batterie St Louis ; de là, je découvris que les berges reviraient à la Pointe Levy ; qu’il y en avait 40 autres qui suivaient le chenal du nord, qui se rendaient à l’Isle d’Orléans ”.

“ Les vents continuant d’être nord est grand frais on craignit que les ennemis ne fissent passer d’autres de leurs vaisseaux pour joindre ceux au dessus de la ville actuellement au nombre de dix sept, en consequence Mr. le general ordonna qu’on fit bonne garde à la ville et sur la rade.

“ M. le Marquis de Montcalm ordonna au regiment de Guienne de partir journallement une heure devant jour, et ce poster sous les murs de la ville a fin de ce transporter aussitôt sur les lieux ou les ennemis paroitraient essayer la descente ; M. de Bougainville avec trois compagnies de grenadiers et environ douze cents hommes

“gardoit la coste depuis le Cap rouge jusqu'à la pointe au
“tremble.

3rd Early in the morning a barge was set on fire in front of Brigadier Townshend's house at Montmorency, as a signal for the troops to march towards the boats and to embark for Point Levis. The removal of the arms and baggage was effected without the loss of a man, although the boats were fired upon as they were passing the Island of Orleans. The General established his headquarters at Orleans.

The Royal Americans were landed at Orleans, and the remainder of the troops were posted along the road in the rear of the batteries at Pointe des Pères.

A return issued on this day shows the total casualties between the 26th of June and the 2nd of September, to have been 834, made up as follows. Killed 182; wounded, 635, missing, 17. Colonel Howe was placed in command of the Light Infantry on this day.

“Mr. de Repentigny avec environ sept cents hommes passa le Sault ou il doit distribuer son monde pour la garde de cette côte jusqu'à St. Jochin, afin d'y faciliter les habitans de faire leur récolte, à laquelle les ennemis n'ont causé aucun dommage, cette précaution de nos généraux est en consequence de deux vaisseaux que les ennemis ont de mouillé par le travers de l'ange gardien.

Ce memme jour les ennemis continuerent de ravager les costes de l'isle d'orleans et de la pointe Levy ou ils continuerent de canoner la ville et de la mettre dans un triste état.”

Seventeen of the English ships were anchored between

Sillery and Cap Rouge in a semi-circular form, in consequence of which 500 men under M. de Bougainville were sent to guard the shore. Three men were killed on this day by discharges from the batteries at Pointe-des-Pères. Two of them belonged to M. Denet's battery, and one to the ramparts. The Marquis de Montcalm formed four small camps between the Falls and the river St. Charles.

“ At 6 o'clock in the morning we noticed quite a movement in the camp and fleet of the enemy. One hundred barges or canoes full of men started from Point Levis in order to go and lie in the centre of the fleet; 'twas remarked at the same time, that some fifty more of them were going through the same manœuvre near the Falls of Montmorency; there was no longer a doubt of the enemy wishing to effectuate the attack which the bouys of the preceding evening appeared to announce. The entire army was ordered under arms. The different corps formed in line of battle each at the head of its camp, and in this position waited for the fleet under the cover of which the English were expected to effect their landing. The weather was fine although the wind was from the north east. They got off about 10 o'clock and the barges which had gone from Point Levis returned thither. 'Twas thought at first that the roughness of the river had alone obliged them to do so, but the barges of the Falls that had gone into the offing, having taken the same course, opened our eyes by recalling our attention to the camp at Ange-Gardien which was completely evacuated. Then those who were heard secretly finding fault with M. de Montcalm because Chevr. de Levy did not attack

“ the English when they landed at the Falls of Montmo-
“ rency, although the latter could plead the orders he had
“ received not to hazzard anything, treated him with the
“ same rigour for not having fallen on their rear guard on
“ the same ground and under circumstances infinitely
“ more favourable. (I have already spoken elsewhere of
“ this ground.) M. de Montcalm and his principal officers,
“ to try to justify themselves for having lost so fine an
“ opportunity, answered that if the enemy had not been
“ attacked when re-emarking, 'twas only because more than
“ two thousand men were perceived lying on their faces
“ behind the intrenchments of their camp, at the moment
“ that they were thought to have crossed again over to the
“ Island of Orleans, and there was danger of falling into
“ some snare.”

4th An officer of the Rangers arrived in camp bearing
dispatches from General Amherst, dated at Crown Point,
August 8th. General Wolfe's forces were augmented on
this day by the arrival of Captain Fraser of Culduthel and
his company. Captain Cameron, of Colonel Fraser's regi-
ment, who had died of fever on the 3rd, was buried in the
evening between the colours of the regiment. The Grenadi-
ers from the Island of Orleans joined the troops at Point
Levis during the night.

“ The Marquis de Montcalm, regulating his movements
“ by those of the enemy, stripped his left somewhat and
“ removed the principal part of his forces to the right of
“ his camp. He also sent the battalion of Guienne to
“ encamp, on the heights of Quebec, whence it could repair,
“ in case of need, either to Sillery or into the town, or



Joffen, first Lord Ankerst.
By the painter by the painter.

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*Jeffery, first Lord Amherst,
from the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds.*



“ towards the River St Charles. Our misfortune willed, “ as is soon to be seen, that it should be withdrawn from “ that post two days afterwards.”

In the afternoon the French observed that the British troops appeared behind their trenches at Point Levis, as if they intended to camp there. Some tents were set up, but at night, under cover of the darkness they struck their tents and gained their ships, but in what numbers they could not ascertain.

Two small vessels were anchored near Ange Gardien.

The French visited the camp evacuated by the English, and reported that the grain in the vicinity was in good order, and had received less damage than that near their own camps. They also found about fifty horses quietly grazing; and a quantity of beef.

“ Nous avons appris, savoir s'il est vrai, qu'un ingénieur anglais pris par Dufy, et 5 autres soldats et 3 sauvages, “ que le général Amherst ne comptait pas paraître plus “ loin; qu'il risquait le monde pour porter des nouvelles “ au général Wolfe. Cet ingénieur rapporte que les nouvelles sont que, nous sommes maîtres de la meilleure “ partie de l'Irlande; je voudrais que cela fût.”

“ Les ennemis demasquerent une nouvelle batterie de “ cinq canons dans les intervalles ce trouvent les mortiers “ couverts d'un épaulement de trois pieds de haut, ce qui “ fait un point de vue pour nos canoniers peu possible de “ tirer a demonter, les ennemis s'etendent tantôt d'un costé “ de la ville tantôt de l'autre, ce qu'ils font depuis près de “ deux mois, la ville ne peut être dans un état plus pit- “ toiable, a moins d'être rasé.”

5th The detachments at Levis under the command of Brigadier Murray, marched to Goreham's post, within half a mile of the river Etchemin. At nightfall the river was forded at a place where it is not more than 50 yards wide. A constant fire was maintained by the two-gun battery at Sillery while the men were crossing. The troops then marched to the Cove, where flat bottomed boats were waiting to conduct them to their ships.

The accommodation on the ships was limited and the majority of the troops suffered in consequence. The Forty Third regiment were, however more fortunate, as they were quartered on board the Sea Horse, where they were entertained "in a most princely manner" by captain Smith and his officers.

"Les ennemis au point du jour parurent lors de l'evitage des vaisseaux faire de grands mouvements avec leurs berges comme s'ils vouloient essayer une descente à la Canardière, ce qui fit entrer notre armé dans les retranchements, mais inutilement, ils retournerent à la pointe de Levy, d'où ils continuerent de canoner la ville."

A party of highlanders was ordered out during the evening in pursuit of some stragglng sailors. While returning to the camp "curiosity led some of them to look "into the ruins of an old house, where to their surprise they found a French soldier whetting a knife, "whom they immediately secured and conducted to the "general."

"A corps of about three thousand English having "marched towards the Etchemins river, M. de Montcalm "reinforced M. de Bougainville by pickets from the army,

“almost all the Indians and the remainder of the volunteers.”

“Les Anglois levèrent encore leur dernier camp de la pointe de Levy, marcherent en colonne au nombre de 5000 hommes vers le haut du fleuve, ce qui indiquait une descente générale au dessus de Québec d'autant qu'ils avoient passé 30 berges pendant la nuit qui furent rejoindre les Batimens mouillé à Sillery.”

6th A small schooner, named by the men “The Terror of France”, passed the town without receiving damage. One of the guns on the ramparts directed against this vessel was dislodged by a discharge from a battery at Point des Pères, and a number of firelocks which were placed against an adjoining wall were discharged thereby. By this accident two officers and seven men were killed, and four men were wounded.

Brigadiers Monckton and Townshend marched from Point Levis, forded the river and joined the fleet. General Wolfe placed Colonel Carleton in charge of the post at Orleans, and the batteries at Point des Pères and the camp at Levis were left under the command of Colonel Burton. The General joined the fleet in the evening.

Rumours were circulated of an attempt to reduce the garrison of Quebec.

The movements of the British caused much uneasiness in the French camp. Information was given from Dunet's battery that a column of British troops was passing over the main road above the Begin shore. The sieur Dunet fired a 24 pounder at the column, which apparently did some execution.

“ Une Gabarre de 15 a 20 tonneaux passa encore en
“ cotoyant, et quoiqu'on fit sur elle un très grand feu elle
“ ne recut de dommages que dans ses voilles.”

7th The squadron under Rear Admiral Holmes weighed at day-break, and at six o'clock doubled the mouth of the Chaudiere river. At eight o'clock the ships came to anchor off Cap Rouge. Here the French were observed fortifying a house near the cape, and a number of French troops were seen in the vicinity. The artillery “ cloathed in blue “ and mounted on neat light horses of different colours ” were very alert, parading and counter-marching between the woods on the heights in the rear. The cavalry dismounted, formed on the right of the Light Infantry, rushed down the precipice and manned their works.

At two o'clock the “ Sea-Horse ” the “ Lowestoff ” and two floating batteries, which had been taken a few days before, were ordered to edge towards the Cove and attack the French armed floats, while the troops manned their boats and rowed up and down the river, as if they intended to land at different places. Towards night General Wolfe and the chief officers went up the river as far as Point aux Trembles in the Hunter sloop to reconnoitre the coast. Large herds of cattle were observed by the French on the Island of Orleans, which led them to believe that the British were well provided with food.

“ Les batimens Anglois qui étoient descendus jusque
“ vis-à-vis le Cap Rouge canonnèrent ce poste jusqu'au
“ jour sans effet.”

The French were closely observing the movements of the British and taking what precautions they could to

prevent surprise. Various suggestions were made, but from past experience Montcalm deemed it advisable to retain the greater part of his army at la Canardière. In the meantime the British scoured the country for miles in search of cattle, and still pursued their policy of destruction. The end was drawing near and there remained only the preparations for the decisive conflict which was to change the destiny of New France.



“MAJOR MACKELLAR'S DESCRIPTION OF QUEBEC.”

“A DESCRIPTION OF THE TOWN OF QUEBECK IN CANADA
ACCOMPANIED WITH A PLAN

“The Place consists of what they call the High and the Low Town. They are parted from one another by a Cliff or precipice of Rock which is a natural Fortification to about two thirds of the High Town.

“*Cliff.* The Cliff begins about a mile up the River and is quite inaccessible where it surrounds the Town excepting in the Communications undermentioned.

“The greatest height of the Cliff is a little above and below the Redoubt of Cape Diamond, where it must be at least 200 feet high. It falls from thence in several easy Breaks to the Elbow (I) at the North End, where it is about 80 or 90 feet. It falls from this Elbow to the Westward with a gradual Descent to the Gateway (II) where it may be about 40 or 50 feet, but about the Gateway dies into a quick Slope, from this Gateway it runs into the Country to the Westward and branches into different Breaks a little way without the Town.

“*High Town.* The High Town from these differences of heights has a considerable decivity from South to North, and still a greater from South East to North West. It has a great deal of Vacant Ground, and the Buildings,


a few excepted, are so retired from the Edge of the Precipice, that it cannot be easily damaged by either Shot or Shells from Shipping, and the Precipice upon the East Side is so high, that Ship Guns can scarce have Elevation enough to clear it, or if they do, the Shot must fly over.

“*Low Town.* The Low Town on the East Side is a fair object for both Shot and Shells from Shipping. The Buildings are in general High and pretty close. This is by much the Richest part of the whole, being chiefly taken up with the Dwellings Warehouses and Magazines of the Principal Merchants which are reckoned of considerable value, and some of them are said to be the Kings, this part of the Town can be hurt by Land Battery, only from the Hills on the South Side of the River, and they are at a distance of 13 or 1400 yards.

“The Remainder of the low Town above the Dock, and on the North West Side consists, only of Straggling Houses inhabited by poor People, excepting the Intendants and a few houses near it. In the Dock Yard they Build 70 Gun Ships.

“*Communications.* These are the two principal Communications between the two Towns, one upon the East Side marked (10) and the other upon the North West Side marked (11).

“The former of these marked (10) leads from the publick landing place marked (3) thro' the low Town, and leads to the High Town, either by keeping the Bishops Palace (marked h) upon the Right which is the main branch of it, or to the 57 Gun Battery (marked l) by leaving the Bishops Palace on the left.







ACORRECT PLAN
OF THE
ENVIRONS OF QUEBEC,

AND OF THE
BATTLE fought on the 13th September, 1759:


Together with a particular Detail of
The FRENCH LINES and BATTERIES,
And also of the
ENCAMPMENTS, BATTERIES and ATTACKS of the
BRITISH ARMY.

And the Investiture of that City under the Command of
VICE ADMIRAL SAUNDERS,
MAJOR GENERAL WOLFE,
BRIGADIER GENERAL MONCKTON,
And BRIGADIER GENERAL TOWNSEND.

Drawn from the ORIGINAL SURVEYS by the ENGINEERS of the Army,
Engraved by THOMAS JEFFERYS,
Geographer to His MAJESTY.



- List of the BRITISH ARMY on service at the
SEIGE of QUEBEC.
- 55th Amherst
 - 56th Broghe
 - 57th Kincaid
 - 58th Ligonier
 - 59th Webb
 - 60th Mordaunt
 - 61st Mordaunt
 - 62nd Mordaunt
 - 63rd Mordaunt
 - 64th Mordaunt
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 - 89th Mordaunt
 - 90th Mordaunt
 - 91st Mordaunt
 - 92nd Mordaunt
 - 93rd Mordaunt
 - 94th Mordaunt
 - 95th Mordaunt
 - 96th Mordaunt
 - 97th Mordaunt
 - 98th Mordaunt
 - 99th Mordaunt
 - 100th Mordaunt



2

" This Communication has at present no Fire upon it, either to flank or Scour it, but being narrow, Crooked, and Steep, may be easily secured.

" The Communication (marked 11) leads from the Country, the Intendants house &c., through a Gateway Straight forward into the High Town, or by the first turning upon the left within the Gateway to the West End of the Battery (1) behind the Nunnery Garden. This Gateway has something of a Flank Fire on both Sides, but seems to be too much under the Fire.

" There is a break in the Cliff beyond the 8 Gun Battery (marked 4) where four or five people may pass abreast, it is pretty Steep, and may easily be secured.

" Between the Break and the Communication 10 there are two more places where Men climb up Singly, but they must be very Careful, there is likewise a narrow rugged path from the Dock Yard up to the Redoubt of Cape Diamond, I think there are none of these Communications to be forced, if there is any tolerable Resistance made; three of them are liable to be surprised viz: 10, 11, and that by the 8 Gun Battery, but their Communication with one another only at low Water, and the Principal ones 10 and 11, are at half a Mile Distance.

3.

" Defences to the Water. The Defences to the River or Anchoring Ground are as follows—viz:

From the High Town	Guns.
Battery (R).....	14
11-18	

Guns.

Battery (L) consisting in all of 57 Guns, but the
Anchoring Ground points only..... 36

From the Low Town

Battery (O) by some Accounts consists of 16
Guns but by others more to be depended on
only of..... 4
Battery (Q)..... 8
Battery (P)..... 12

Total..... 74

“ Upon Occasion there may be more Guns mounted
towards the Anchoring Ground in Several places, particu-
larly along the Wharf of the Dock Yard.

“ The other Defences to the Water on the North West
Side are as follows viz:

Remainder of the Battery (r)..... 21
Battery (4)..... 8

Total..... 29

“ The Battery (r) has Room for a great many more
Guns than there are at present.

4.

“ The use of this Defence is to Scour the Bay or Strand
along the Rivulet of St. Charles. At low Water this Bay
is dry and all over passable the Bottom being a flat Rock
thinly Covered in some places with a little Mud Sand or
Gravel.

" Defences to ye Land. The Defences to the Land I can speak of only from the Plan and a little imperfect Intelligence.

" The Plan appears to have been taken about the year 1740, and I have not heard that there have any Additions to the Fortifications since that time.

The Inner Line which runs quite across from the Redoubt of Cape Diamond (b) to the Hangmans Redoubt (w) is a Wall of Masonry three or four feet thick, and Seems to have designed only against Small Arms, probably against the Incursions of the Savages.

" This Line I saw in several places and have had a little Information about it, and think it Can make but little resistance against Cannon it has a Ditch before some of the Faces where the Ground seems to Obstruct the Defence of the Opposite Flanks.

5.

" The Outward Line (s, t, u) Seems to be of a more Modern Construction, and probably part of a Design, intended to be Cannon proof, and continued across to the Bay.

" This Line Stands upon the highest Ground without a Ditch, and by the Information I had, continues no farther than the Plan represents it.

" The Lines marked (old) Intrenchments have probably been thrown up, upon first Settling the Country without the Direction of Engineers, and Seem to have been Demolished where they interfered with the Designs that were afterwards executed.

" The Redoubts (v, w, x) seem to be of little Consequence

but must probably be Silenced before a Besieger Comes within them.

“ The only Works within the inner Line are the Redoubt or Citadel (b) the Cavilier (c) and the Castle or Chateau (a).

“ The two former I can give no Account of but was told they were at Work upon them when we were there, they must however be of little Consequence by their Smallness, they neither of them Scour any of the Streets, they Stand very high and probably intended to defend the Ground, without the Line.

“ The Castle (a) likewise called a Citadel seems only intended for the Defence of the Governor Generals Palace, and is a sort of a Court to it, taken up at present with Guns Mortars and their Carriages there a few Small Arsenals round it, It is a Wall of Masonry four or five feet thick and Scours only a Street or two.

“ I am persuaded from all the Circumstances I could learn that the place must be weak towards the Land, and the difficulty they made of our Seeing it Seems to Confirm it.

“ There is however one Circumstance much in its favour which is, that they Can have Intelligence of a Fleets appearing in the Gulf and time to bring the whole Force of Canada to their Assistance before that Fleet can probably get up the River.

“ Attack by Shipping. From some of the foregoing Circumstances, I think it will appear that Shipping can Annoy the low Town only and can do little or no prejudice to the High Town, but Supposing the low Town Destroyed

or in possession of the Besieger, he is Still as far from being Master of the High Town as he was before, he can make no lodgment in the former, that he Can keep possession of nor take any Steps that shall facilitate his getting into the latter, and the Ships if within Cannon reach, lay under a great disadvantage, as they are exposed to the Fire of a Considerable Battery (1 of 36 Guns) to which they can do no hurt. But if it is thought worth while to destroy the low Town for its own Sake, I should think it most adviseable to do it by Shells only and at a Distance beyond Cannon Shot.

“Attack by Land. An Attack by Land is the only Method that promises Success against the High Town, and in all probability, it cou'd hold out but a few Days, against a Sufficient Force properly Appointed.

“There is no judging with any Certainty where the Attacks may be Shortest, the Easiest Carried on, without having Seen the Ground, which I am told is very uneven and Rocky, very thin of Soil and the Rock extremely bad.

“The weakest part of the Plan seems to be the half Bastion 8 and the Bastion to the left of it, but the Ground least favourable, and where the Ground best viz: round the Gardens about the Bastion (s) the Works seem to be the Strongest, which they must undoubtedly aware of, but the Choice of an Attack cannot long remain a doubt after the place has been properly reconnoitred.

“If the Besieger once gets into the Town there is nothing of Consequence that can afterwards oppose him. The Works (a. b. c.) are the only things that Can, and they have been already described as far as I know about them.

“It will be very proper in case of getting in, to take the possession immediately of the Buildings round the Great Square particularly the Jesuits Convent (r) and the Parish Church (g). The 57 Gun Battery (r) ought to be Secured at the same time, and its Guns made use of in Case of Necessity against the above Works which will Save time and trouble.

“*Navigation of the River St. Lawrence.* Tho' the Navigation of the River ought not to be undertaken without the Assistance of a Pilot well Acquainted with the head Lands Currents and Anchoring places, yet I am far from thinking it to be as difficult and dangerous as the French would have the World believe. In the Passage down the River we met only with two Difficulties worth mentioning and they are observed by Charlevoix, and in a Chart of the River lately published by Mr. Jefferys.

“The first was in the Traverse of Crossing at the lower End of the Isle of Orleans, where the Channell is very Narrow and Somewhat Crooked, and not to be attempted but with enough of day light and a fair wind, there are Directions in Jefferys Chart for Sailing through it.

The next Difficulty was at the Island of Coudres, where there is a whirlpool that forms two different Currents According as it happens to be Tide of Flood or Ebb, these Currents carry the Vessels inevitably ashore unless they have fair Wind enough to Stem them.

“I remember Charlevoix mentions several others Difficulties in the Account of his Voyage up the River, particularly some round the Red Island, And contrary to the received Opinion, He says there is no Harbour in the

Island of Anticosti. Tho' his Account is worth perusing, it is not to be Supposed Compleat as he was no Seaman and never made the Voyage but once.

“ The Baron Dieskau and his Aid de Camp Monsr. Bernier talked at New York of an Invention the French had discovered for infallibly destroying Ships going up the River.

“ At Quebeck we found this Invention to be what (they) Call (Radeaux a Feu) fire Rafts, of which there is a Store provided. They are Loggs of Timber Tyed together by the Ends as to form a Chain, and Coated over with the Strong Composition. They are to be set on Fire when the Ships are near and floated off from some of the Islands down the Stream and clinging round the Ships Bows set them on Fire.

“ Tho' this Invention does not Seem to threaten much danger, especially if the Boats are out, it is advisable to be prepared against its taking Effect.

“ Landing the troops. It will be an Advantage to Land the Troops on the Town Side of the River, which is the North, but I am very doubtful whether their Landing within a proper distance of the place, can be Cover'd by the Shipping. It is said there is not Water enough in the North Channell of the Isle of Orleans for Vessels of Burden and above the Island that it is Shallow Water along the North Shore a good way out.

“ For these Reasons I shou'd think it most adviseable to Land upon the Island and make it a Rendez-vous. The Ships may get a proper Anchoring Ground either in the South Channel or between the Island and Town, and I

think measures may be taken for making a Descent or landing from thence in an easier and better manner than from on Board.

“ It will probably make the Enemy more doubtful where the Landing is intended which may be a very Considerable Advantage.

“ I should think it very Commodious to keep possession of this Island while the Troops remain there but to this, the great Extent of it may be an Objection. ⁽¹⁾

“ PAT. MACKELLAR ENGR. IN ORDY.”

(1) Major Mackellar's description of Quebec is referred to at page 66 of this volume.

COPIE D'UNE LETTRE DU MARQUIS DE MONTCALM À
MONS. DE MOLÉ, PREMIER PRÉSIDENT AU
PARLEMENT DE PARIS

(From the British Museum, 103, l. 34, p. 20.)

Monsieur & cher Cousin,

Me voici, depuis plus de trois mois, aux prises avec Mons. Wolfe: il ne cesse, jour, & nuit, de bombarder Quebec, avec une furie, qui n'a guères d'exemple dans le siege d'un place, qu'on veut prendre & conserver. Il a deja consumé par le feu presque toute la basse ville, une grande partie de la haute est écrassée par les bombes; mais ne laissa-t-il pierre sur pierre, il ne viendra jamais à bout de s'emparer de cette capitale de la colonie, tandis qu'il se contentera de l'attaquer de la rive opposée, dont nous lui avons abandonné la possession. Aussi après trois mois de tentative, n'est-il pas plus avancé dans son dessein qu'au premier jour. Il nous ruine, mais il ne s'enrichit pas. La campagne n'a guères plus d'un mois à durer, à raison du voisinage de l'automne, terrible dans ces parages pour une flotte, par les coups de vent, qui regne constamment & periodiquement.

Il semble, qu'après un si heureux prelude, la conservation de la colonie est presque assuré. Il n'en est cependant rien: la prise de Quebec depend d'un coup du main. Les

Anglais sont maîtres de la riviere : ils n'ont qu'à effectuer une descente sur la rive, où cette ville, sans fortifications, & sans défense, est située. Les voilà en état de me presenter la bataille, que je ne pourrai plus refuser, & que je ne devrai pas gagner. M. Wolfe, en effet, s'il entend son metier, n'a qu'à essayer le premier feu, venir ensuite à grand pas sur mon armée, faire à bout parlant sa decharge, mes Canadiens, sans discipline, sourds à la voix du tambour, & des instrumens militaires, derangés par cet escarre, ne sçauront plus reprendre leurs rangs. Ils sont ailleurs sans bayonnettes pour repondre à celles de l'ennemi : il ne leur reste qu'à fuir, & me voilà, battu sans ressource. Voilà ma position ! — Position bien facheuse pour un général, & qui me fait passer de bien terribles momens. La connoissance que j'en aye m'a fait tenir jusqu'ici sur la defensive, qui m'a réussi ; mais réussira-t-elle jusqu'à la fin ? Les événemens en decideront ! Mais une assurance que je puis vous donner, c'est, que je ne survivrois pas probablement à la perte de la colonie. Il est des situations où il ne reste plus à un général, que de perir avec honneur : je crois y être ; &, sur ce point, je crois que jamais la postérité n'aura rien à reprocher à ma mémoire ; mais si la Fortune decida ma vie, elle ne decidera pas de mes sentimens — ils sont François, & ils le seront, jusque dans le tombeau, si dans le tombeau ou est encore quelque chose ! Je me consoleraï du moins de ma defaite, & de la perte de la colonie, par l'intime persuasion où je suis, que cette defaite vaudroit un jour à ma patrie plus qu'une victoire, & que le vainqueur en s'aggrandissant, trouveroit un tombeau dans son gg andissement même.

Ce que j'avance ici, mon cher cousin, vous paroîtra un paradoxe ; mais un moment de reflexion politique, un coup d'œil sur la situation des choses en Amerique, & la vérité de mon opinion, brillera dans tout son jour. Non, mon cher cousin, les hommes n'obéissent qu'à la force & à la nécessité, c'est-à-dire, que quand ils voyent armées devant leurs yeux, un pouvoir toujours prêt, & toujours suffisant, pour les y contraindre, ou quand la chaine de leurs besoins, leur en dicte la loi. Hors de là point de joug pour eux, point l'obéissance, de leur part : ilss ont à eux ; ils vivent libres, parcequ'ils n'ont rien au dedans, rien au dehors, ne les oblige à se depouiller de cette liberté, qui est le plus bel appanage, le plus precieuse prerogative de l'humanité. Voilà hommes ! & sur ce point les Anglois, soit par éducation ; soit par sentiment, sont plus hommes que les autres. La gêne de la contrainte leur deplait plus qu'à tout autre : il leur faut respirer un air libre & degagé ; sans cela ils sont hors de leur élément. Mais si ce sont là les Anglois de l'Europe, c'est encore plus les Anglois de l'Amerique. Un grand partic de ces colons sont les enfans de ces hommes qui s'expatrièrent dans ces temps de trouble, où l'ancienne Angleterre, en proye aux divisions, étoit attaquée dans ses privileges & droits, & allerent chercher en Amerique une terre, où ils puissent vivre & mourir libres, & presqu'indépendants ; & ces enfans n'ont pas degenerées des sentimens republicains de leurs pères. D'autres sont des hommes, ennemis de tout frein, de tout assujettissement, que le gouvernement y a transporté pour leurs crimes. D'autres, enfin, sont un ramas de différentes nations de l'Europe, qui tiennent très peu à l'ancienne

Angleterre par le cœur & le sentiment. Tous, en général ne se soucient guères du roi du parlement d'Angleterre.

Je les connois bien, non sur des rapports étrangers mais sur des informations & des correspondances secrets, que j'ai moi-même menagés, & dont un jour, si Dieu me prête vie, je pourrois faire usage à l'avantage de ma patrie. Pour surcroit de bonheur pour eux, tous ces colons sont parvenus dans un état très florissant: ils sont nombreux & riches; ils recueillent, dans le sein de leur patrie, toutes les necessités de la vie. L'ancienne Angleterre a été assez sotté, & assez dupe, pour leur laisser établir chez eux les arts, les metiers, les manufactures; c'est-à-dire, qu'elle leur a laissé briser la chaîne de besoins, qui les lioit, qui les attachoit à elle, & qui en fait dependans. Aussi toutes ces colonies Angloises auroient, depuis longtems, secoué le joug, chaque province auroit formé une petite republique independante, si la crainte de voir les François à leur porte n'avoit été un frein qui les avoit retenu. Maîtres pour maîtres ils ont préféré leurs compatriotes aux étrangers, prenant cependant, pour maxime, de n'obéir que le moins qu'ils pourroient; mais que le Canada vint à être conquis, & que les Canadiens & ces colons ne fussent plus qu'un seul peuple, & le premier occasion, où l'ancienne Angleterre sembleroit toucher à leurs intérêts, croiez-vous, mon cher cousin, que ces colons obéiroient? Et qu'auroient-ils à craindre, en se revoltant? L'ancienne Angleterre auroit-elle une armée de cent ou de deux cens milles hommes à leur opposer dans cette distance? Il est vrai, qu'elle est pourvue de vaisseaux, que les villes de l'Amérique Septentrionale, qui sont d'ailleurs en très petit nombre, sont


toutes ouvertes, sans fortifications, sans citadelles, & quelques vaisseaux de guerre dans le port suffiroient pour les contenir dans le devoir ; mais l'interieur du pays, qui forme un objet d'un bien plus grande importance, qui iroit le conquerir à-travers les rochers, les lacs, les rivieres, les bois, les montagnes, qui le coupent par-tout, & où une poignée d'hommes connoissans le terrain, suffiroit pour détruire de grands armées ? D'ailleurs, si ces colons venoient à gagner les sauvages, et à les ranger de leur côté, les Anglois, avec toutes leurs flottes, seroient maîtres de la mer ; mais je ne sçais s'ils en viendroient jamais à débarquer. Ajoutez, que dans le cas d'une révolte générale de la part de ces colonies, toutes les puissances de l'Europe, ennemis secrettes & jalouses de la puissance de l'Angleterre, leur aideroient d'abord sous main, & avec le temps ouvertement, à secouer le joug.

Je ne puis cependant pas dissimuler que l'Ancienne Angleterre, avec un peu de bonne politique, pourroit toujours se reserver dans les mains une ressource toujours prête pour mettre à la raison ses anciennes colonies. Le Canada, consideré dans lui-même, dans ses richesses, dans ses forces, dans le nombre de ses habitans, n'est rien en comparaison du conglobat des colonies Angloises ; mais la valeur, l'industrie, la fidelité de ses habitans, y supplie si bien, que depuis plus d'un siecle ils se battent avec avantage contre toutes ces colonies : dix Canadiens sont suffisant contre cent colons Anglois. L'experience journaliere prouve ce fait. Si l'ancienne Angleterre, après avoir conquis le Canada sçavoit se l'attacher par la politique & les bienfaits, & se le conserver à elle seule, si elle le laissoit

à sa religion, à ses loix, à son langage, à ses coûtumes, à son ancien gouvernement, le Canada, divisé dans tous ces points d'avec les autres colonies, formeroit toujours un pais isolé, qui n'enteroit jamais dans leurs intérêts, ni dans leurs vuës, ne fut ce que par principe de religion : mais ce n'est pas là la politique Britannique. Les Anglois font ils une conquête, il faut qu'ils changent la constitution du pays, ils y portent leurs loix, leurs façons de penser, leur religion même, qu'ils font adopter sous peine, au moins, de privation des charges ; c'est-à-dire, de la privation de la qualité de citoyen. Persecution plus sensible que celle des tourmens ; parce qu'elle attaque l'orgueil & l'ambition des hommes & que les tourmens n'attaquent que la vie, que l'orgueil & l'ambition font souvent mépriser. En mot, êtes-vous vaincu, conquis par les Anglois ? il faut devenir Anglois ! Mais les Anglois ne devoient-ils pas comprendre, que les têtes des hommes ne sont pas toutes des têtes Angloises, & sur tout d'esprits ? Ne devoient-ils pas sentir, que les loix doivent être relatives aux climats, aux mœurs des peuples, & se varier, pour être sage, avec la diversité des circonstances ? Chaque pays a ses arbres, ses fruits, ses richesses particuliers : vouloir n'y transporter que les arbres, que les fruits d'Angleterre, seroit une ridicule impardonable. Il est de même des loix, qui doivent s'adapter aux climats ; parce que les hommes eux-mêmes tiennent beaucoup des climats.

Mais c'est là une politique que les Anglois n'entendent pas, ou plutôt ils l'entendent bien, car ils ont la reputation d'être un peuple plus pensant que les autres, mais ils ne peuvent pas adopter un tel système par le système mau-

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qué & défectueux de leurs constitutions. Sur ce pied le Canada, pris une fois par les Anglois, peu d'années suffiroient pour le faire devenir Anglois. Voilà les Canadiens transformés en politiques, en negocians, en hommes infatués d'une prétendue liberté, qui chez la populace tient souvent en Angleterre de la licence & de l'anarchie.

Adieu, donc, leur valeur, leur simplicité, leur generosité, leur respect pour tout ce qui est revêtu de l'autorité, leur frugalité, leur obéissance, & leur fidelité; c'est-à-dire, ne seroient bien-tôt plus rien pour l'ancienne Angleterre, & qu'ils seroient peut-être contre elle. Je suis si sur de ce que j'écris, que je donnerai pas dix ans après la conquête de Canada pour en voir l'accomplissement.

Voilà ce que, comme François, me console. Aujourd'hui du danger eminent que court ma patrie, de voir cette colonie perdue pour elle; mais, comme général, je n'en ferai pas moins tous mes efforts pour le conserver. Le Roi, mon maître, me l'ordonne; il suffit. Vous sçavez que nous sommes d'un sang, qui fut toujours fidele à ses Rois; & ce n'est pas à moi à degenerer de la vertu de mes ancêtres. Je vous mande ces reflexions, à-fin que, si le sort des armes en Europe nous obligeoit jamais à plier & à subir à la loi, vous puissiez en faire l'usage, que votre patriotisme vous inspirera. ⁽¹⁾

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c., &c.,

MONTCALM.

Du camp devant Quebec, 24 d'Août, 1759.

(1) Montcalm's letter is referred to at page 225 of this volume.



THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE PLAINS

THE account of the Siege of Quebec has now been brought up to the date of Wolfe's preparations for the final assault. Before entering upon the story of the Battle of the Plains, to which the following volume of this work is mainly devoted, it is judged appropriate to furnish a description of the site upon which it was fought.

To avoid the misapprehension into which many modern authors and visitors to Quebec have inadvertently fallen, it is advisable to state at the outset, that the ground now commonly known as the Plains of Abraham, which has recently been acquired by the city of Quebec for a park, formed no part of the famous battlefield of September the 13th, 1759. Neither was any portion of this ground ever owned by Abraham Martin, from whom the Plains, whereon a part of the struggle occurred, derived their name.

Martin seems to have been a person of considerable importance in Quebec, where he was known as the King's Pilot, and was usually referred to in contemporary journals and registers by his Christian name only. "Maitre Abraham," as he was called, must have forfeited much of the esteem which he at first enjoyed amongst his neighbors and acquaintances, for on the 19th of July, 1648, an unfortunate girl aged between 15 and 16 was hanged for theft,—

this being the first capital execution in Quebec, — and at the same time Abraham Martin was in prison on a scandalous charge in connection with this girl, though he was then fifty-nine years of age and the father of a large family. *The Jesuits' Journal* of that year reports that his trial was postponed "until the arrival of the ships."

Abraham's property consisted, in all, of 32 arpents, divided into three distinct lots. Twelve of these arpents came to him from the Company of New France, and the balance of the property was a gift, under two distinct deeds of donation, from Adrien Duchesne.

The earliest instrument relating to this property is the *Procès verbal de bornage et arpentage de douze arpents de terre à Abraham Martin*, dated the 4th of December 1635, a transcript of which is published herewith. A facsimile of the original document is also given as an illustration, as well as a copy of the seal of the Company of New France, which is affixed to the Ratification of the Concession. Special interest is attached to this document from the fact recorded in it that S^r. François Derre, who gave the original concession to Abraham Martin on the 4th of December 1635, acted for Sieur de Champlain, the founder of Quebec, who was at that time detained in bed by sickness. Champlain died on the 25th of December, 1635, twenty-one days after the execution of this deed. ⁽¹⁾

The deeds of donation of twenty arpents of land from

(1) For permission to reproduce this interesting document we are indebted to the Reverend Lionel F. G. Lindsay, late Chaplain to the Ursuline Convent, and to the Reverend Ladies of the Community.



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Adrien Duchesne to Abraham Martin were dated the 10th October, 1648, and 1st February, 1652.

On the 1st of July 1667, the heirs of Abraham Martin, sold the entire thirty-two acres in question, which extended from Ste. Geneviève to Claire Fontaine streets, over half a mile distant from the Race-Course, to the Ursuline Ladies of Quebec, and subsequent deeds show that much of this property has been conceded in small lots for building purposes, during the last century and a quarter. As a matter of fact, a large part of Montcalm and St. John wards, important suburbs of Quebec, are now built upon the original Plains of Abraham, and cover a portion of the famous battlefield.

The property which has in late years usurped the name of Abraham's Plains, and has been used as a Race-Course for a long term of years, is situated between the St. Louis Road and the edge of the cliff sloping down to the St. Lawrence, and extends from Marchmont to within a few hundred feet of the monument erected to mark the spot where Wolfe died.

The deeds of the Race-Course, the present so-called Plains of Abraham, are still preserved. They show conclusively that Abraham Martin never owned any part of this property. It was acquired by the Ladies of the Ursuline Convent in four or five different lots on as many different occasions. These lots were originally ceded by the French Crown to Sieur de Maure, to Denis Duquet, to Guill. Gaultier, to Ant. Brassard, and to Pierre and Gervais Normand. The two last mentioned obtained their concessions on the 14th of November 1647, Denis Duquet received his on the 15th

of September 1645, Gaultier's deed is dated the 8th of May 1651, and Brassard's, the 14th of February 1647. Duquet sold his property to the Ursuline Ladies on the 12th of March 1671, the heirs of Brassard sold theirs on the 28th of April 1675. Normand sold to Noel Pinquet, and Pinquet sold to the Ursulines on the 20th of November 1678. Of the remaining lots completing the Race Course property, the Ladies of the Hôtel-Dieu gave their sisters of St. Ursula a strip of land one arpent in width, in exchange for a property in another part of the town, and Jn. Lemire, who had come into possession of the lot originally conceded to Maure, sold it to the Ursulines on the 25th June 1682. The Ursulines became the owners of this land seventy-five years before the battle of the Plains, and it remained their property until September 1901, when it was sold for \$80,000, to the Government of the Dominion of Canada, and transferred to the City of Quebec. The land had been under lease to the Government for a hundred years previously, and the proposal of the proprietors, to dispose of the ground in building lots at the termination of the lease, was so repugnant to those who were ignorant of the true site of the battle, that the Government, in order to ensure its preservation as a public park, purchased the property and gave it to the city. The deeds of this transfer however show that the purchase and preservation of this estate was not made upon the erroneous assumption that it formed part of the historic battlefield, though much of the indignation aroused, both at home and abroad, when it was learned that the land was to be divided up and sold for building lots was due to the mistaken idea that it was the

actual site of the conflict of September 13th 1759. The ground is desirable as a park and will be appreciated by the rising generation. It is quite certain, however, that if a battle had occurred in this part of the town, it must have extended to the other side of the St. Louis Road, the road which borders it on the North. Yet no attention seems to have been directed to the fact that building operations were proceeding on the opposite side of the roadway, nor was any explanation forthcoming as to why the Race Course property, if it really had formed a part of the battlefield, should be considered more sacred than any other portion of it. It would not have been possible for Wolfe to have drawn up his entire army upon the Race Course in the formation described by those present at the battle and depicted upon the plans of the period. Even were it possible to have done so, it would not have been the part of military wisdom for Wolfe to have concentrated all his men upon so small an area, leaving the declivity towards the St. Charles clear for the ascent of the enemy and thus to have invited a rear attack.

The comparatively modern blunder of locating the Battle of the Plains upon the land in question seems to date from the publication by Hawkins, in 1834, of *Picture of Quebec with historical recollections*, in which it is first placed on record as a historical fact. Seeing that most of the actual battlefield had been divided into lots, and much of it fenced off or built upon before this period and that other local historians repeated the statement of Hawkins, the site, which is the only large piece of vacant ground near the monument, came to be generally pointed out as that

of the great conflict between the armies of Wolfe and Montcalm.

No such misconception as to the real site of the battle existed in 1790, for it was at that time that a part of the actual battlefield, since covered with buildings, was parcelled off for sale, and the utmost indignation was the result. One writer in the local press, when referring to the farming out of "All Abraham's Plains for a term of forty years, at ten shillings per annum for every superficial acre, in different parcels to be picketed or fenced in by the lessees," appealed to the citizens of Quebec to prevent the outrage on the basis that it was "on this spot that the bleeding patriot who sacrificed his life for his country, expired."

About this time the ground known as the Race Course was offered for sale, and soon after the Marchmont property which adjoins it, but no protest was made by the citizens of Quebec at the time, simply because at that date, one hundred and ten years ago (thirty years after the battle) it was well known that the Race Course was not the battlefield. There might have been some pretext for opposition to the erection of buildings on the Marchmont property, because it adjoins the landing place, and also because the ground was converted into a post for protecting the rear. If the battle had occurred in this portion of the city it would not have been confined to the narrow bounds of the enclosure of the Race Course, yet no objections were made to the early construction of buildings on the opposite side of the St. Louis Road from the Race Course, though they would certainly have been forthcoming had anyone

in those days believed the buildings to have been situated on the scene of the historic struggle.

No one appears to have thought of placing the battle on the Race Course until Hawkins made the statement, seventy five years after the event. In the days of Hawkins the Plains presented a fine level tract of land eminently suitable for a parade ground. As there was no other equally clear space it was perhaps very natural to associate this spot with the battlefield, especially as the author admits that his sources of information were very limited. However, the mistakes of Hawkins, the errors of his successors, and the various traditions of which we at times receive hints, but are never able to substantiate, disappear in the light of positive facts. *On the day of the battle the ground known as the race course was in such a condition that it would have been impossible for an army to have been drawn up there in the position indicated on the several plans.* The western part, including a portion of the Marchmont property was sown with Indian corn, and early in the morning of the 13th of September, the soldiers of Vergor's post escaped owing to the protection which it afforded.

This fact is emphasized in the relation of an incident which occurred during the landing of Wolfe's troops, when it was found difficult to distinguish whether friends or foes were concealed in the growth in question, situated to the right of the British forces when they had reached the summit of the cliff.

The eastern part of the Race Course, and in fact all the ground to the vicinity of Wolfe's monument was covered with underwood, and was very uneven.

A few years after the battle this ground was cleared and in 1780 it presented a fairly level appearance. It was not however until the commencement of the century that it was levelled in its present form. ⁽¹⁾

It is not necessary to say more about that portion of the Plains of Abraham which is not strictly historic ground. The question has engaged our attention merely because of the traditions, lacking historic accuracy, that have clustered about it, and which, because of their popular character, are not easily disapproved, except by such unassailable evidence as furnished by contemporary plans and journals of the battle. These are plentifully forthcoming, and leave no possible doubt as to the actual scene of the battle.

All the plans show the position of the two lines of battle formed by the rival armies, as they were drawn up prior to the fatal conflict on the morning of the 13th September, 1759, and these have been carefully transferred to a modern plan of Quebec, so that there may be no difficulty in determining the exact position of the battlefield. To state the case clearly and to render the statement as intelligible as possible to those who are acquainted with the topography of Quebec, or who will consult the modern plan, the British army was drawn up in battle array, facing the town, almost on the present line of de Salaberry street,

(1) So many interesting details have been gathered regarding the work of clearing this ground, its appearance, the first review held upon it after it was cleared, the persons who owned the ground and the various sketches which have been made from time to time, that it has been considered advisable to prepare a paper on the subject in which more details can be given than in the present work.

and extending from near the heights overlooking the St. Lawrence, almost at right angles across the Grande Allée and St. John street.


The opposing line faced it close to Claire Fontaine street, near the summit of Perrault's Hill, then known as the *Buttes à Neveu*; and before the commencement of the eventful advance, a distance of about twelve hundred feet separated the two armies. Before the fight commenced they approached a little closer to each other. Then the French advanced a hundred paces to the charge, and though skirmishing had been indulged in for some little time, they fully opened fire upon the invading force when within a hundred and thirty yards of their front column. The British reserved their fire, while the advance and assault of the French army continued, until a distance of only forty yards, — and some authorities mention even thirty yards,—separated the foremost ranks of the contending armies. Then a rain of British bullets followed the rattle of musketry, with such deadly aim that those of the foe who were not mown down, immediately gave way, gallantly to rally, it is true, for a final stand, but only to be dispersed in utter confusion by the charge of British swords; the two armies having faced each other in a stand up fight for not more than seven or eight minutes in all. The fugitive troops were followed by the various regiments of the victorious army, hundreds of them being subsequently slaughtered, some under the walls of the city in full view of those upon the fortifications, some in the vicinity of St. Louis and St. John's gates and many on Côte Ste. Geneviève.

The pursuit and slaughter of the defeated forces was thus spread over a large section of country, while most of the sharp, decisive conflict that settled the fortune of the day was fought upon the land then known as the Plains of Abraham, of which a goodly part was at one time the property of Abraham Martin.

The plan of Martin's property published herewith, is a fac-simile of a copy sent for the purpose of this work by Lt. Col. Blackburne, R. A., of the Fortress of Gibraltar, who has also kindly supplied many interesting notes regarding Martin, of which the following are from a rare volume entitled *The Plains of Abraham, Notes, original and selected*, by Lt-Col. Beatson, Royal Engineers Gibraltar: Printed at the Garrison Library Press, 1858:—

“ Notwithstanding the world-wide celebrity of these
“ Plains, it was not until very recently (1854) that the
“ derivation of their name was discovered; and, as it is
“ still comparatively unknown, even in Canada, the fol-
“ lowing explanation of its origin will, doubtless, possess
“ attractions for such as are fond of tracing to their sources
“ the names of celebrated localities: and who may be sur-
“ prised to learn that, upwards of a century previous to
“ the final conquest of Canada by British arms, the scene
“ of the decisive struggle for national supremacy in the
“ northern division of the New World had derived its name
“ from one who, if not a Scotchman by birth, would seem
“ to have been at least of Scottish lineage.

“ This apparently improbable fact will, however, appear
“ less extraordinary when it is known that he was a sea-
“ faring man; and when it is considered how close was



“ the alliance and how frequent the intercourse which,
“ for centuries before that period, had subsisted between
“ France and Scotland.

“ This individual, whose name was Abraham Martin, is
“ described in a small legal document, dated 15th August,
“ 1646, and preserved among the archives of the Arch-
“ bishop's Palace at Quebec — with a perusal of which I
“ have, through his lordship's kindness, been favoured —
“ as (the King's) Pilot of the St. Lawrence: an appoint-
“ ment which probably conferred on its possessor consi-
“ derable official rank; for we find that Jacques Quartier,
“ or Cartier, the enterprising discoverer and explorer of
“ the St. Lawrence, when about to proceed, in 1504, on
“ his third voyage to Canada, was appointed by Francis
“ I. Captain-General and Master-Pilot of the expedition
“ which consisted of five vessels.

“ That Martin was a person of considerable importance
“ in the then infant colony of New France may also be
“ inferred from the fact that, in the journal of the Jesuits
“ and in the parish registers of Quebec, he is usually
“ designated by his Christian name only,—Maistre Abra-
“ ham; as well as from the circumstance of Champlain,
“ the distinguished founder of Quebec, and the Father of
“ New France, having been godfather to one of Abraham's
“ daughters (Helène,) and of Charles de St. Etienne, Sieur
“ de la Tour—of Acadian celebrity—having stood in
“ the same relation to Martin's youngest son, Charles
“ Amador.

“ The earliest mention of Martin's name occurs in the
“ very first entry in the parish register of Quebec; viz.,

“ on the 24th of October, 1621 : when his son Eustache,
 “ who died shortly afterwards, was baptized by Father
 “ Denis, a Franciscan (Récollet) Friar. The second bap-
 “ tism therein recorded is that of his daughter Marguerite,
 “ which took place in 1624 : and it is stated in the register
 “ that these children were born of the legitimate marriage
 “ of Abraham Martin—surnamed, or usually known as,
 “ the Scot (“ dict l’Écossais ”)—and Marie Langlois.

“ Their family was numerous ; besides Anne and other
 “ children born previously to the opening of the register
 “ in 1621, the baptisms of the following are therein
 “ recorded ; viz :

Eustache	born in	1621
Marguerite	“ “	1624
Helène	“ “	1627
Marie	“ “	1635
Adrien	“ “	1638
Madeleine	“ “	1640
Barbe (Barbara)	“ “	1643
Charles Amador	“ “	1648

“ who was the second Canadian raised to the priest-hood ;
 “ and became a Canon at the erection of the Chapter of
 “ Quebec.

To the kindness of my friend, the Rev. J. B. A. Ferland,
 one of the Chaplains to his lordship the Archbishop of
 Quebec, I am indebted for the following extract from very
 interesting “ Notes ” (since then published in one of the
 French journals of that city) “ Sur les Régîtres de Notre-
 Dame de Québec : ”—

“ Il est à remarquer qu’au moment où l’on commençait à tenir les régîtres de Québec, le premier établissement Européen venait d’être fondé dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre : le 31 Décembre, 1620, ceux que nos voisins nomment “ the pilgrim fathers ” (pères pélerins) célébrèrent la prise de possession du pays, dans la première maison qui ait été élevée à Plymouth.

“ Depuis le 24 Octobre, 1621—date de l’ouverture des régîtres de Québec—jusqu’en 1629, il n’y eut dans la colonie Française que six baptêmes et deux mariages, parmi les Européens. Le premier mariage, fait le 1^{er}. Août, 1621, fut celui de Guillaume Couillard et de Guillemette Hébert : dont la nombreuse famille s’est étendue dans tout le district de Québec ; et plus particulièrement dans la côte du Sud, au-dessous de la Pointe-Lévi.

“ Deux mois et demi auparavant—savoir le 12 Mai—avait eu lieu le premier mariage célèbre dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre : celui d’Edward Winslow et de Susannah White.

“ Le 24 Octobre, 1621, le Père Denis, Récollet, baptisa Eustache Martin : qui vécut peu de temps : le second baptême qui eut lieu en 1624—est celui de Marguerite Martin : elle vécut de longues années. A l’âge de 14 ans, elle épousa Etienne Racine ; qui fut un des premiers habitans de la côte Beaupré.

“ Eustache et Marguerite étaient nés du légitime mariage d’Abraham Martin (dict l’Escossois) et de Marie Langlois.

“ Un pilote nommé Martin fut employé, par MM. de

“ Poutrincourt et de Monts, sur les côtes de l'Acadie : ce
 “ ne saurait être celui dont il est ici question, qui n'aurait
 “ eu alors qu'environ vingt ans.

“ Abraham devint Pilote-du-Roi pour le fleuve Saint
 “ Laurent ; il fut père d'une famille très-nombreuse. Un
 “ de ses fils—Charles Amador Martin—reçut le premier
 “ de ses noms de son parrain, Charles de St. Etienne,
 “ Sieur de la Tour, qui se rendit célèbre par sa bravure et
 “ sa fidélité à la France dans les guerres de l'Acadie. ⁽¹⁾

“ Amador Martin fut le second Canadien qui eut l'hon-
 “ neur d'être élevé au sacerdoce : il fut nommé Chanoine
 “ à l'érection du Chapitre de Québec.

“ Des filles d'Abraham sont descendue quelques-unes
 “ des plus anciennes familles du pays.

“ Anne Martin épousa Jean Coté ; dont la postérité s'est
 “ répandue de l'île d'Orléans dans toutes les parties du
 “ Canada.

“ Une arrière-petite-fille d'Anne fut mariée au célèbre
 “ botaniste Sarrasin ; qui a donné son nom à une plante
 “ remarquable de l'Amérique—la Sarracenia.

“ Hélène Martin devint femme de Médard Chouart des
 “ Groiseliers ; ⁽²⁾ excellent pilote qui, en 1663, conduisit
 “ les Anglais dans la Baie d'Hudson, (Vide Charlevoix).

(1) “ Charles de Saint-Etienne, Sieur de la Tour, Forcé par Charnisé
 “ de quitter l'Acadie, vint se réfugier à Québec ; où il passa plusieurs
 “ années. Il y arriva au mois d'Août de cette année (1646) dans son
 “ phlibot—dit le journal des Jesuites ”.

(2) “ En Octobre 1640, eut lieu le mariage de Claude Etienne, de
 “ Gelicourt en Lorraine, avec Hélène Martin. Il mourut au bout de peu
 “ d'années ; et sa veuve, comme il a déjà été dit, se remaria au Sieur
 “ Chouart des Groiseliers ”.—Mr. Freland's “ Notes ”.

“ La Révérende Mère de l'Incarnation, Supérieure des Ursulines de Québec, parle de lui dans les termes suivants :

“ Il y a quelque temps qu'un François de notre Touraine, nommé des Groiseliens, se maria en ce pays ; et n'y faisant pas une grande fortune, il lui prit fantaisie d'aller en la Nouvelle-Angleterre, pour tâcher d'y en faire une meilleure. Il y faisait homme d'esprit, comme en effet il en a beaucoup. Il fit espérer aux Anglois qu'il trouveroit le passage de la Mer-du-Nord. Dans cette espérance on l'équipa pour l'envoyer en Angleterre ; où on lui donna un vaisseau avec des gens, et tout ce qui étoit nécessaire à la navigation. Avec ces avantages, il se met en mer ; où—au lieu de prendre la route que les autres avoient coutûme de prendre, et où ils avoient travaillé en vain—il alla à contrevent ; et a si bien cherché qu'il a trouvé la Grande Baie du Nord.

“ Il y a trouvé un grand peuple, et a chargé son navire, ou ses navires, de pelletterie pour des sommes immenses.

“ Il a pris possession de ce grand pays pour le Roi d'Angleterre ; et pour son particulier, le voilà riche en peu de temps ! L'on fait une Gazette en Angleterre pour louer cet aventurier François. Il'étoit tout jeune quand il vint ici et fit grande connoissance avec moi. Sa femme et ses enfants sont encore ici. (Lettres hist., 27 Aoust, 1670).

“ Étant rentré au service de la France, il decouvrit le Port Nelson, et la rivière du même nom. Dans cette expédition, à la tête d'une petite bande de traiteurs, partis avec lui de Québec, il fit prisonniers plus de 80 Anglois.

“ Qui connaît aujourd’hui le nom d’Abraham Martin, même parmi ses descendants? Et cependant ce nom est devenu fameux dans l’histoire; et a été célébré, en vers et en prose, par les poètes et par les orateurs de l’Angleterre.

“ L’on a souvent demandé d’où venait le nom donné aux Plaines sur lesquelles s’est décidé le sort de la Nouvelle-France. Il a été suggéré par le Vénérable Monsieur Maguire qu’une partie des Plaines, ayant appartenu à un individu portant le nom d’Abraham, avait été nommée la Terre d’Abraham, ou la Plaine d’Abraham; et tout doute à ce sujet doit disparaître si l’on fait attention aux remarques suivants.

“ Le nom des Plaines d’Abraham était autrefois appliqué à ce terrain, comparativement uni, qui s’étend du pied du Côteau Saint-Louis jusqu’à la cime du Côteau Sainte Geneviève: le reste des hauteurs à l’ouest de Québec était désigné sous les différents noms de Buttes-à-Neveu, Grande-Allée, Côte Saint-Michel. Le chemin conduisant de la vallée de la rivière Saint-Charles à la Plaine d’Abraham était appelé Côte d’Abraham.

“ Si l’on examine les registres de la paroisse de Québec, entre les années 1621 et 1700, l’on n’y trouvera qu’un seul homme qui ait porté le nom d’Abraham; et cet homme est Abraham Martin. Le Journal des Jésuites et les registres de Québec le désignent à plusieurs sous son premier nom seulement — Maître Abraham. Mais, a-t-il possédé quelque partie des Plaines? Dans une collection de vieux documents, réunis par les soins de notre estimable concitoyen, M. Faribault — à qui sont

“ dues des découvertes bien précieuses pour l'histoire du
 “ pays — on rencontre une pièce propre à jeter du jour sur
 “ l'objet de nos recherches. C'est un certificat donné par
 “ quelques-uns des premiers habitants du Canada. Le
 “ voici :—

“ Nous soussignez certifions à qui il appartiendra que
 “ l'an dernier, mil six cent quarante-cinq, que le Sieur
 “ Adrien Duchesne, chirurgien dans le navire de M. de
 “ Repentigny, estant à Québec, nous a dict qu'il avoit
 “ donné la terre qui lui a esté donnée en la ville de Québec,
 “ à Abraham Martin, pilote de la Rivière Saint-Laurent,
 “ et qu'il y pouvoit faire travailler en tout assurance. Si
 “ le temps luy eust permis d'en passer contract-de-donation,
 “ il l'auroit faict. Ce que nous attestons estre véritable,
 “ faict ce quinziesme jour d'Aoust mil-six-cent-quarante-six.

(Signé) GIFFAR,
 TRONQUET,
 LE TARDIF,
 DE LAUNAY,
 BISSOT,
 GUETET.”

“ Voilà bien une terre appartenante à Abrabam Martin ;
 “ mais il est impossible de déterminer sa position avec des
 “ désignations aussi vagues. Une note placée dans les
 “ registres de l'Archevêché fait connaître que les Dames
 “ Ursulines achetèrent, d'Abraham Martin, une terre située
 “ vers le Côteau Sainte-Geneviève, et attenante à celle
 “ qu'elles possédaient déjà sur le Côteau Saint-Louis.
 “ L'obligeance de M. le Grand-Vicaire-Maguire m'a fourni

“ le moyen d'arriver heureusement au but de ces recherches.
“ Parmi les titres des Dames Ursulines se trouvent les
“ contrats suivants : Donation, du 10 Octobre, 1648, et du
“ 1^{er}. Février, 1652, par Adrien Duchesne à Abraham
“ Martin, de 20 arpents de terre. Concession, du 16 Mai,
“ 1650, par la Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, de 12
“ arpents de terre, à Abraham Martin. Vente, du 1^{er}. Juin,
“ 1667, aux Dames Ursulines de Québec, par les héritiers
“ d'Abraham Martin, d'un terrain contenant 32 arpents en
“ superficie.

“ Le plan qui accompagne ces titres montre que la terre
“ d'Abraham était renfermée entre la rue Sainte-Geneviève,
“ qui descend vis-à-vis du cimetière protestant ; la rue
“ Claire Fontaine, qui passe devant l'église Saint-Jean)
“ desservie aujourd'hui par un descendant de l'ancien pro-
“ priétaire ; la grande rue Saint-Jean ; et une ligne suivant
“ la crête du Côteau Sainte-Geneviève, et se terminant à
“ la descente nommée Côte d'Abraham.

“ La terre d'Abraham occupait donc précisément le ter-
“ rain qui porta longtemps le nom ' Plaine d'Abraham '
“ avant que cette désignation eut été étendue au plateau
“ voisin ; et l'on ne saurait contester au vieux pilote l'hon-
“ neur d'avoir légué son nom au Champ-de-bataille où se
“ rencontrèrent les armées de Wolfe et de Montcalm. ”

My truly estimable and much-lamented friend, the late
Very Reverend Abbé Maguire, Grand-Vicar of the diocese
of Quebec, and Chaplain of the Ursuline Convent in that
city—but for whose indefatigable industry these interest-

ing facts might never have been rescued from oblivion, and whose active frame and penetrating mind retained, at the age of eighty-four, much of their former vigor—having kindly furnished me with a manuscript copy of the plan alluded to, together with the following explanatory memorandum; I gladly insert these addenda to the foregoing extract from M. Ferland's "Notes."

R. S. B.

Of these 32 arpents, Abraham Martin had obtained 12 from the Company of New France, by deed of concession, of 16th May, 1650, and the 20 others, from Adrien Duchesne, by deed of donation (gift), of 10th October, 1648, and 1st February, 1652.

It appears that the 32 arpents with the adjoining lands and the road down the hill on their northern side derive their names—"Plaines d'Abraham" and "Côte d'Abraham"—from the above Martin. All the deeds are in possession of the Ursuline ladies.

(Signed) THOS. MAGUIRE.

4th March, 1854.

4e DÉCEMBRE 1635, PROCÈS VERBAL DE BORNAGE ET
ARPENTAGE DE DOUZE ARPENS DE TERRE À
ABRAHAM MARTIN, PAR JEAN BOURDON,
ARPEUTEUR.

Je sous signé, François Derré Sieur de Gan, ⁽¹⁾ Commis Général et l'un des officiés de la Compagnie de la Nouvelle France que en vertu du pouvoir à moy donné par Mr. de Champlain, Lieutenant général pour Le Roy, et de Monseigneur Le Cardinal Duc de Richelieu à Québec et en toute l'estendue du fleuve St-Laurens en lad. Nouvelle France, et terres circonvoisines comme aussy faisant pour Messieur les associés au peuplement et défrichement des terres de lad. Nouvelle France et tout ce qu'il jugera estre nécessaire suivant le pouvoir et commission de Messieurs Les Intendant et Directeurs de lad. Compagnie et dautant que led. Sieur de Champlain seroit atteint d'une griesve maladie pour ne pouvoir agir en vertu dud. pouvoir, Jay pris avec moy Mr Olivier Le Tardif, ⁽²⁾ Commis general au Magazin pour Messieurs de La Compagnie particuliere et le Sieur Bourdon Ingénieur et Arpenteur, me serois transporté ce quatriesme jour de décembre Mil Six Centz Trente Cinq ⁽³⁾ aux terres données à Abraham Martin au nombre de douze arpens Lesquels Jay fait mesurer, arpenter et borner par led. Sieur Bourdon pour y mettre led. Martin

(1) François Derré, Sieur de Gand, was buried beside Champlain as a mark of honour.

(2) Le Tardiff was one of the first inhabitants of Côte Beauré.

(3) Twenty-one days before the death of Champlain, which occurred on Christmas day the same year (1635).

en pleine possession pour en jouir luy et ses hoirs et ayans cause à l'avenir, à la charge qu'il prendra ratification du don desd. Messieurs les Intendant et Directeurs, Lesquels se sont Réservé de donner les titres honneurs et Redevances et d'autant qu'il est nécessaire d'avoir Une Mesure dans led. pays pour arpenter, en a jugé à propos de prendre celle de Paris qui font dix-huit pieds pour perche et cent perches pour arpent à ce qu'à l'advenir toutes Choses soient Régliées esgallement, les bornes des terres dud. Martin sont d'un costé le long d'un Costeau proche du chemin des Recollets, d'autre costé les terres non désertes, d'un bout Guillaume Hubou ⁽⁴⁾ et d'autre bout lesd. terres non désertes tirant vers Recolletz, les lignes courantes à Lest quart de norddest de ouest quart de sorrouest, et d'autre ligne au sud quart de sudest et nord quart de norrouest jusques à la fourniture desd. douze arpens.

Faict les ans et jour que dessus.

(Signé) DERRÉ, (avec paraphe) LETARDIF, (avec paraphe)
 JEHAN BOURDON, ⁽⁵⁾ De la
 ville (avec paraphe) Greffier
 Commis à la Juridiction
 de Québec.

(4) Guillaume Hubou was one of the first settlers. His house occupied the present site of Mr. Darlington's establishment, corner of Buade and Du Fort streets. The said Hubou was collector of revenues of the parish church of Quebec.

(5) Jean Bourdon's name is perpetuated in that of St. John street.



NOTES TO ILLUSTRATIONS

GAINSBOROUGH'S PORTRAIT OF WOLFE

In the Notes to Illustrations in the first volume, numerous portraits of General Wolfe are mentioned.

A colotype of the Gainsborough portrait was made by Mr. Hyatt, but as it did not appear to him to be entirely satisfactory, he preferred the photogravure of the original painting in the possession of Mrs. Pym, of Brasted, Kent, which forms the frontispiece to this volume,

A VIEW OF THE CITY OF QUEBEC

The Capital of Canada.

From a drawing by Captain Hervey Smyth, A.D.C. to General Wolfe.

To the talent of Captain Smyth as an artist we are indebted for many excellent sketches of Quebec in 1759. The sketch made from the north shore gives a fair idea of the city of Quebec as it appeared in the days of the siege.

The view of the Falls of Montmorency and of the position of the Grenadiers during the attack on the 31st of July, 1759, will enable the student to understand the difficulties which the British had to encounter at the Battle of Montmorency.

Another sketch made on the 13th of September, 1759, while the Battle was in progress, will prove of interest to those unfamiliar with the scene of Wolfe's operations.

Captain Hervey Smyth, afterwards Sir Hervey, entered the Royal Horse Guards as a Cornet on the 27th of August, 1753. He became Captain of the 15th Foot on the 8th of November, 1756; Captain of the 2nd Dragoon Guards 13th January, 1760; Lieut.-Col.-Brevet, 26th November, 1762; Captain 3rd Foot Guards 26th October, 1763, and retired 12th May, 1769.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE ISAAC BARRÉ

Adjutant General in the campaign of 1759.

Although Wolfe suggested the name of Barré as Adjutant for the Expedition against Quebec, he does not appear to have known him personally at the time. In a letter to his friend Colonel Rickson, dated the 7th of February 1758, Wolfe says: "I did not know that Barré was your friend, nor even your acquaintance. Now that I do know it I shall value it all the more upon that account: by accident I heard of his worth and good sense, and shall have, I trust, to thank the man that mentioned him. Nay, I am already overpaid by the little I did, by drawing out of his obscurity so worthy a gentleman; I never saw his face till very lately, nor never spoke ten words to him before I ventured to propose him as Major of Brigade."

Barré's conduct throughout the Siege justified Wolfe's choice, and he appears to have been trusted by him to the utmost.

By his will Wolfe left a hundred guineas to Barré to buy a sword and ring in memory of his Friend. Barré was also one of the witnesses to the codicil which Wolfe added to his will on the eve of the battle of Montmorency.

MISS KATHERINE LOWTHER

Afterwards the Duchess of Bolton.

The photogravure in this volume is from a crayon drawing at Lowther Castle, a copy of which was kindly sent for this work by the Right Honourable the Countess of Lonsdale. In the Notes to the Illustrations in the first volume there are many interesting particulars regarding the Lowther family.

QUEBEK, DE HOOFDSTAD VAN KANADA

With numerous references.

In the Bibliography of the Siege of Quebec, which forms a part of the sixth volume of this work, a long list of plans is given.

Nine of the plans mentioned therein are reproduced as illustrations, and will be referred to at greater length in the third volume, which treats of the Battle of the Plains.

The plan mentioned at the head of this note was published in Amsterdam, and appears to have been very carefully engraved.

GENERAL TOWNSHEND

Application was made to the Marquess Townshend for permission to reproduce the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds, at Raynham. As the consent of the Marquess was not obtained, a collotype was made of an engraving in our possession.

In the *Military Life of Field Marshal George, First Marquess Townshend*, by Lieut-Colonel Townshend, C.B., D.S.O. (Murray 1901) there is a reproduction of the painting by Sir Joshua, and also a photogravure of the painting by Hudson.

The engraving which is given in this volume is evidently not taken from either of the paintings mentioned.

VIEW OF QUEBEC

Showing the Heights, and a part of the River St. Lawrence.

This illustration gives a good view of the formation and height of the cliff, and shows the strength of the natural objects which Wolfe had to overcome before he could reduce Quebec.

GENERAL JOHN HALE

John Hale, Colonel in command of the 47th Regiment at the battle of the Plains of Abraham, was born in 1728, and educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. His family trace their descent from "Nicholas de Hales, of Hales Place, one of whose sons, Sir Robert, treasurer of England, prior to the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, temp. Edward III, 1381, was killed by the insurgents in Wat. Tyler's insurrection; and from Thomas Hale, who, in 1400, held Codicote, the family seat in Hertfordshire, England, as per inscription in the old family mansion there, which was pulled down and rebuilt in 1774; and from Richard Hale, of King's Walden and Stagenhoe, in Hertfordshire, temp. Elizabeth, 1567-1588."

A few days after the battle of the Plains, Colonel Hale, in company with Captain Douglas, proceeded to England with the despatches announcing the victory of the 13th of September. (1)

For this service the king granted the sum of £500 to Colonel Hale, and ordered him to raise the 17th Regiment of Light Dragoons.

(1) General Monckton wrote a letter to Townshend in which he expressed a wish that Colonel Hale should take the despatches.

In 1764 Colonel Hale married Mary, second daughter of William Chaloner Esqr. "Mrs. Hale was sister to Anne, Countess of Harewood, " and was one of the celebrated beauties of the day, her portrait having " been painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds as Euphrosyne."

A reproduction of Sir Joshua's portrait of Madam Hale is included in this volume. The photogravure was made by Goupil et Cie, of Paris, from a copy of the painting in the possession of H. T. Machin, Esqr., of Quebec.

When Benjamin West painted his famous picture of the Death of Wolfe, it appears that he was willing to include the portrait of Colonel Hale in consideration of the payment of £100. As Colonel Hale did not feel disposed to comply with this demand, his portrait was omitted.

The photogravure of Colonel, afterwards General Hale, which is given in this volume, is from the painting by Sir Joshua Reynolds, in the possession of E. J. Hale, Esqr., of Quebec.

In the History of the 17th Lancers, by the Hon. J. W. Fortescue, the following account of Colonel Hale is given :—

" And while these two first Light Dragoon Regiments are a forming, " let us glance across the water to Canada, where English troops are " fighting the French, and seem likely to take the country from them. " Among other regiments the 47th Foot is there, commanded since 1758 " by Colonel John Hale, the man whom we saw fighting in Scotland as " an Ensign fourteen years ago. Within the past year he has served " with credit under General Amherst at the capture of Cape Breton and " Louisbourg, and in these days of August, while Burgoyne is raising " his regiment, he is before Quebec with General Wolfe. Three months " more pass away, and on the 13th of October, Colonel John Hale sud- " denly arrives in London. He is the bearer of despatches which are to " set all England aflame with pride and sorrow; for on the 13th of " September was fought the battle on the Plains of Abraham which " decided the capture of Quebec and the conquest of Canada. General " Wolfe fell at the head of the 28th Regiment in the moment of victory; " and Colonel Hale, who took a brilliant share in the action at the head " of the 47th, (1) was selected to carry the great news to the King. " Colonel Hale was well received; the better for that Wolfe's last

(1) For the position of the 47th Regiment at the Battle of the Plains, see the plan by three Engineers of the British army.

“ despatches, written but four days before the battle, had been marked
“ by a tone of deep despondency ; and, we cannot doubt, began to wonder
“ what would be his reward. He did not wonder for long.

“ Very shortly after Hale's arrival the King reviewed the 15th Light
“ Dragoons, and was so well pleased with their appearance that he
“ resolved to raise five more regiments, to be numbered the 17th to the
“ 21st.

“ The raising of the first of these regiments, now known to us as
“ the Seventeenth Lancers, was entrusted to Colonel John Hale, who
“ received his commission for the purpose on the 7th November. For
“ the time, however, the regiment was known as the Eighteenth, for
“ what reason it is a little difficult to understand ; since the apology for
“ a corps which received the number Seventeen was not raised for a full
“ month later (December 19th). As we shall presently see, this matter
“ of the number appears to have caused some heartburning, until Lord
“ Aberdour's corps, which had usurped the rank of Seventeenth, was
“ finally disbanded, and thus yielded to Hale's its proper precedence.

“ On the very day when Colonel Hale's commission was signed,
“ which we may call the birthday of the Seventeenth Lancers, the
“ Board of General Officers was summoned to decide how the new
“ regiment should be dressed. As to the colour of the coat there could
“ be no doubt, scarlet being the rule for all regiments. For the facings
“ white was the colour chosen, and for the lace white with a black edge,
“ the black being a sign of mourning for the death of Wolfe.

“ But the principal distinction of the new regiment was the badge,
“ chosen by Colonel Hale and approved by the king, of the Death's
“ Head and the motto “ Or Glory,”—the significance of which lies not
“ so much in clap-trap sentiment, as in the fact that it is, as it were, a
“ perpetual commemoration of the death of Wolfe. It is difficult for us
“ to realise, after the lapse of nearly a century and a half, how power-
“ fully the story of that death seized at the time upon the minds of
“ men.”

A VIEW OF THE TREASURY AND JESUITS' COLLEGE, AND A VIEW OF THE BISHOP'S HOUSE

These two plates are from drawings made on the spot by Robert Short, and show the ruin wrought by the British batteries during the Siege.

A VIEW OF QUEBEC

Showing a portion of the battlefield on September 13th, 1759.

The large building on a slight eminence in the back ground, near the river, is the Quebec Gaol. Wolfe's army was drawn up with this eminence immediately in the rear.

The British line extended almost from the bank overlooking the river to the St. Foye Road. The broad road shown in the engraving is the St. Louis Road, or Grande Allée, and the St. Foye Road runs almost parallel with it, about eighteen hundred feet to the right, or north.

A large building will be observed in the foreground, on the left of the road. General Wolfe fell between this building and the Gaol and he was then carried to the ground marked by his monument, which is just beyond the Gaol.

MAJOR GENERAL, HUNT WALSH

Lieutenant Colonel Hunt Walsh " was the eldest son of John Walsh " (younger brother of Hunt Walsh of Ballykilcavan) by Abigail, daughter of Benjamin Burton, of Burton Hall, Co. Carlow. He left the army " on inheriting, from his uncle, the afore-mentioned Hunt Walsh, the " family property of Ballykilcavan, and died unmarried in 1795, having " been M. P. for Wareborough in the Irish Parliament." (1)

During the campaign of 1759, Lieutenant Colonel Walsh was in command of the 28th, or Bragg's Regiment which played an important part throughout the siege and particularly on the 13th of September. It was Colonel Walsh who led Bragg's regiment right up to the walls of the city and by a judicious movement forced the Canadians to retire from the position they had taken near St. John's Gate.

Colonel Walsh was frequently employed in command of scouting parties and he appears to have been particularly successful in securing provisions for the army. On one occasion his party drove three hundred cattle and several horses into the camp. His services are also frequently mentioned after the 13th of September.

We are indebted for this portrait which has not hitherto been published, to Sir Hunt H. A. Walsh, Bart. of Ballykilcavan.

(1) Extract from a letter of Sir Hunt H. A. Walsh, Bart. of Ballykilcavan, Queen's Co.

THE SIEGE AND TAKING OF QUEBECK, WITH A VIEW OF
THE GLORIOUS BATTLE BEFORE THE TOWN

The curious engraving from which this plate was made, was kindly lent to the authors by Mr. H. T. Machin, Assistant-Treasurer of the Province of Quebec. At one time it formed a part of the famous collection of engravings in the possession of Dr. Emmett, of New York, who gave it to Mr. Machin several years ago. The engraving was published in London, on the 17th of October, 1759, only twenty-nine days after the capitulation, and it is undoubtedly the earliest illustration of the Siege which appeared in England.

Although there appears to be nothing on the plate to identify it with Quebec, except the title, it is exceedingly valuable as a curiosity, and as evidence of the first impressions that the British received of the newly-acquired territory.

Dr. Emmett's collection is now in Lenox Library, New York.