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




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


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
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
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
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
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S Jenuns ТНЕ OBJECTIONS TO THE TAXATION OF OUR American COLONIES, BY THE LEGISLATURE of Great Britain, Briefly Confider'd, LONDON: Printed for J. WILKIE, in St. Paul's Church-yard. 1765. [ Price Six-pence. ]



THE

# OBJECTIONS TO THE

# TAXATION

#### OF

# Our American COLONIES, &c.

HE Right of the Legislature of Great Britain to impose Taxes on her American Colonies, and the Expediency of exerting that Right in the present Conjuncture, are Propositions fo indifputably clear, that I should never have thought it neceffary to have undertaken their Defence, had not many Arguments been lately flung out both in Papers and Conversation, which with Infolence A 2 equal

[ 4 ]

equal to their Abfurdity deny them both. As thefe are ufually mixt up with feveral patriotic and favorite Words, fuch as Liberty, Property, *Englifemer*, &c. which are apt to make ftrong Imprefilons on that more numerous Part of Mankind, who have Ears but no Understanding, it will not, I think, be improper to give them fome Anfwers: To this therefore I shall fingly confine myself, and do it in as few Words as possible, being fensible that the fewess will give least Trouble to myself, and probably most Information to my Reader.

The great capital Argument, which I find on this Subject, and which, like an Elephant at the Head of a Nabob's Army, being once overthrown, must put the whole into Confusion, is this; that no *Englishman* is, or can be taxed, but by his own Confent: by which must be meant one of these three Propositions; either that no *Englishman*  th. As patriotic Property, e ftrong of Manding, it em fome confine poffible, Trouble ation to

find on at at the rthrown, is this; but by eant one to Englifbman

# [ 5 ]

*liftman* can be taxed without his own Confent as an Individual; or that no *Engliftman* can be taxed without the Confent of the Perfons he chufes to reprefent him; or that no *Engliftman* can be taxed without the Confent of the Majority of all those, who are elected by himfelf and others of his Fellow Subjects to represent them. Now let us impartially confider, whether any one of these Propositions are in Fact true: if not, then this wonderful Structure which has been erected upon them, falls at once to the Ground, and like another *Babet*, perishes by a Confusion of Words, which the Builders themselves are unable to underftand.

First then, that no Englistman is or can be taxed but by his own Confent as an Individual: this is fo far from being true, that it is the very Reverse of Truth; for no Man that I know of is taxed by his own Consent; and an Englistman, I believe,

# [ 6 ]

I believe, is as little likely to be fo taxed, as any Man in the World.

Secondly, that no *Englifbman* is, or can be taxed, but by the Confent of those Perfons, whom he has chose to represent him; for the Truth of this I shall appeal only to the candid Representatives of those unfortunate Counties which produce Cyder, and shall willingly acquiesce under their Determination.

Laftly, that no *Englifhman* is, or can be taxed, without the Confent of the Majority of thofe, who are elected by himfelf, and others of his Fellow Subjects, to reprefent them. This is certainly as falfe as the other two; for every *Englifhman* is taxed, and not one in twenty reprefented: Copyholders, Leafeholders, and all Men poffeffed of perfonal Property only, chufe no Reprefentatives; *Manchefler*, *Birmingham*, and many taxed, as

r can be Perfons, ; for the he candid Counties ingly ac-

a can be ajority of nd others . This is for every wenty reand all chufe no bam, and many

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many more of our richeft and most flourishing trading Towns fend no Members to Parliament, confequently cannot confent by their Reprefentatives, because they chuse none to represent them; yet are they not *Englishmen*? or are they not taxed?

I am well aware, that I fhall hear Lock, Sidney, Selden, and many other great Names quoted, to prove that every Englifbman, whether he has a Right to vote for a Reprefentative, or not, is ftill reprefented in the Britifb Parliament; in which Opinion they all agree: on what Principle of common Senfe this Opinion is founded I comprehend not, but on the Authority of fuch refpectable Names I fhall acknowledge its Truth; but then I will afk one Queftion, and on that I will reft the whole Merits of the Caufe: Why does not this imaginary Reprefentation extend to America as well as over the whole Ifland of Great

I Britain?

#### [ 8 ]

Britain? If it can travel three hundred Miles, why not three thouland? if it can jump over Rivers and Mountains, why cannot it fail over the Ocean? If the Towns of Manchefter and Birmingham fending no Reprefentatives to Parliament are notwithftanding there reprefented, why are not the Citics of Albany and Boston equally reprefented in that Affembly? Are they not alike *Britisth* Subjects? are they not *Englishmen?* or are they only *Englishmen*, when they follicit for Protection, but not *Englishmen*, when Taxes are required to enable this Country to protect them?

But it is urged, that the Colonies are by their Charters placed under diftinct Governments, each of which has a Legiflative Power within itfelf, by which alone it ought to be taxed; that if this Privilege is once given up, that Liberty which every *Englifbman* has a Right to, is torn from them, they are all Slaves, and all is loft.

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red Miles, ump over ail over the and *Bir*to Parliaed, why are ally reprenot alike *ten?* or are it for Proxes are ret them?

re by their nents, each ithin itfelf, that if this berty which torn from ft. The

# [ 9 ]

The Liberty of an Englishman is a Phrafe of fo various a Signification, having within thefe few Years been used as a fynonymous Term for Blafphemy, Bawdy, Treafon, Libels, Strong Beer, and Cyder, that I shall not here prefume to define its meaning; but I shall venture to affert what it cannot mean ; that is, an Exemption from Taxes imposed by the Authority of the Parliament of Great Britain; nor is there any Charter, that ever pretended to grant fuch a Privilege to any Colony in America; and had they granted it, it could have had no Force; their Charters being derived from the Crown, and no Charter from the Crown can poffibly supersede the Right of the whole Legislature: Their Charters are undoubtedly no more than those of all Corporations, which impower them to make Bye Laws, and raife Duties for the Purpofes of their own Police, for ever fubject to the В fuperior

# [ 10 ].

fuperior Authority of Parliament; and in fome of their Charters, the Manner of exercifing thefe Powers is fpecifyed in thefe express Words, according to the Course of other Corporations in Great Britain: And therefore they can have no more Pretence to plead an Exemption from this parliamentary Authority, than any other Corporation in England.

It has been moreover alledged, that, though Parliament may have Power to impofe Taxes on the Colonies, they have no Right to use it, because it would be an unjust Tax; and no supreme or legislative Power can have a Right to enact any Law in its Nature unjust: To this, I shall only make this short Reply, that if Parliament can impose no Taxes but what are equitable, and if the Performs taxed are to be the Judges of that Equity, they will in effect have no Power to lay any Tax at all. No Tax can be imposed

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t, though ofe Taxes to ufe it, ; and no e a Right To this, at if Parare equitto be the effect have Tax can be impofed

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impofed exactly equal on all; and if it is not equal, it cannot be juft; and if it is not juft, no Power whatever can impofe it; by which fhort Syllogifm, all Taxation is at End; but why it fhould not be ufed by *Englifbunen* on this Side the *Atlantic*, as well as by those on the other, I do not comprehend.

Thus much for the Right. Let us now a little inquire into the Expediency of this Meafure; to which Two Objections have been made; that the Time is improper, and the Manner wrong.

As to the Firft, can any Time be more proper to require fome Affiftance from our Colonies, to preferve to themfelves their prefent Safety, than when this Country is almost undone by procuring it? Can any Time be more proper to impose fome Tax upon their Trade, than when B 2 they

### [ 12 ]

they are enabled to rival us in our Manufactures, by the Encouragement and Protection which we have given them? Can any Time be more proper to oblige them to fettle handfome Incomes on their Governors, than when we find them unable to procure a Subfiftence on any other Terms than those of breaking all their Instructions, and betraying the Rights of their Sovereign? Can there be a more proper Time to compel them to fix certain Salaries on their Judges, than when we fee them fo dependent on the Humours of their Affemblies, that they can obtain a Livelihood no longer than quam diu se male gefferint? Can there be a more proper Time to force them to maintain an Army at their Expence, than when that Army is neceffary for their own Protection, and we are utterly unable to fupport Laftly; Can there be a more proper Time it. for this Mother Country to leave off Feeding out of her own Vitals, thefe Children whom the has nurfed factures, hich we ore pro-Incomes d them y other Inftrucir Soveime to n their pendent hat they uam diu er Time xpence, eir own fupport er Time ding out the has nurfed

# [ 13 ]

nurfed up, than when they are arrived at fuch Strength and Maturity as to be well able to provide for themfelves, and ought rather with filial Duty to give fome Affiftance to her Diffrefies.

As to the Manner; that is, the impofing Taxes on the Colonies by the Authority of Parliament, it is faid to be harfh and arbitrary; and that it would have been more confiftent with Juftice, at leaft with maternal Tendernefs, for Administration here to have fettled Quotas on each of the Colonies, and have then transmitted them with Injunctions, that the Sums allotted should be immediately raifed by their respective Legislatures, on the Fenalty of their being imposed by Parliament, in Cafe of their Non-compliance? But was this to be done, what would be the Confequence? Have their Affemblies shewn fo much Obedience to the Orders of the Crown, that

#### [ 14 ]

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that we could reafonably expect, that they would immediately tax themselves on the arbitrary Command of a Minister? Would it be possible here to fettle those Quotas with Justice, or would any one of the Colonies fubmit to them, were they ever fo just? Should we not be compared to those Roman Tyrants, who used to fend Orders to their Subjects to murder themfelves within fo many Hours, most obligingly leaving the Method to their own Choice, but on their Difobedience threatening a more fevere Fate from the Hands of an Executioner? And fhould we not receive Votes, Speeches, Refolutions, Petitions, and Remonstrances in abundance, instead of Taxes? In fhort, we either have a Right to Tax the Colonies, or we have not : If Parliament is poficified of this Right, why fhould it be exercifed with more Delicacy in America, than it has ever been even in Great Britain itfelf? If on the other hand, they have no fuch Right, ney would arbitrary e poffible or would em, were compared fend Orlvcs withaving the their Dif-Fate from hould we ons, Petie, inftead a Right : If Parfhould it America, Britain ite no fuch Right,

# [ 15 ]

Right, fure it is below the Dignity as well as Juffice of the Legiflature, to intimidate the Colonies with vain Threats, which they have really no Right to put in Execution.

One Method indeed has been hinted at, and but one, that might render the Exercife of this Power in a British Parliament just and legal, which is the Introduction of Reprefentatives from the feveral Colonies into that Body; but as this has never ferioufly been propofed, I shall not here confider the Impracticability of this Method, nor the Effects of it, if it could be practifed; but only fay, that I have lately feen fo many Specimens of the great Powers of Speech, of which these American Gentlemen are possified, that I should be much afraid, that the fudden Importation of fo much Eloquence at once, would greatly endanger the Safety and Government of this Country; or in Terms more fashionable, though

#### [ 16 ]

though lefs underftood, this our most excellent Conflitution. If we can avail ourfelves of these Taxes on no other Condition, I shall never look upon it as a Measure of Frugality; being perfectly satisfyed, that in the End, it will be much cheaper for us to pay their Army, than their Orators.

I cannot omit taking Notice of one prudential Reafon, which I have heard frequently urged against this Taxation of the Colonies; which is this: That if they are by this Means impoverished, they will be unable to purchafe our Manufactures, and confequently we shall lose that Trade, from which the principal Benefit which we receive from them must arife. But furely, it requires but little Sagacity to fee the Weakness of this Argument; for should the Colonies raise Taxes for the Purposes of their own Government and Protection, would the Money

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prudencquently colonies; s Means purchafe we fhall al Beneft arife. y to fee ould the of their ould the Money

### [ 17 ]

Money fo raifed, be immediately annihilated? What fome pay, would not others receive? Would not those who so receive it, stand in need of as many of our Manufactures, as those who pay? Was the Army there maintained at the Expence of the Americans, would the Soldiers want fewer Coats, Hats, Shirts, or Shoes, than at prefent? Had the Judges Salaries afcertained to them, would they not have Occasion for as coffly Perriwigs, or Robes of as expensive Scarlet, as Marks of their legal Abilities, as they now wear in their prefent State of Dependency? Or had their Governors better Incomes fettled on them for observing their Instructions, than they can now with Difficulty obtain for difobeying them, would they expend lefs Money in their feveral Governments, or bring Home at their Return less Riches, to lay out in the Manufactories of their native Country?

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### [ 18 ]

It has been likewife afferted, that every Shilling, which our Colonies can raife either by Cultivation or Commerce, finally centers in this Country; and therefore it is argued, we can acquire nothing by their Taxation, fince we can have no more than their All; and whether this comes in by Taxes or by Trade, the Confequence is the fame. But allowing this Affertion to be true, which it is not, yet the Reafoning upon it is glaringly falfe : for furely it is not the fame, whether the Wealth derived from these Colonies flows immediately into the Coffers of the Public, or into the Pockets of Individuals, from whence it muft be fqueezed by various domestic Taxes before it can be rendered of any Service to the Nation : Surely it is by no means the fame, whether this Money brought in by Taxes enables us to diminish Part of that enormous Debt contracted by the laft expensive War, or whether coming in by Trade

ery Shilr by Culnis Counn acquire have no comes in ce is the be 'true it is glawhether flows im-, or into e it must before it Nation : ether this to dimiracted by ing in by Trade

# [ 19 ]

Trade it enables the Merchant, by augmenting his Influence together with his Wealth, to plunge us into new Wars and new Debts for his private Advantage.

From what has been here faid, I think that not only the Right of the Legislature of Great Britain to impose Taxes on her Colonies, not only the Expediency, but the abfolute Neceffity of exercifing that Right in the prefent Conjuncture, has been to clearly, though concilely proved, that it is to be hoped, that in this great and important Queftion all Parties and Factions, or, in the more polite and fashionable Term, all Connections, will most cordially unite; that every Member of the Britifb Parliament, whether in or out of Humour with Administration, whether he has been turned out becaufe he has oppofed, or whether he oppofes, becaufe he has been turned out, will endeavour to the utmost of his Power to support this Meafure.

# [ 20 ]

fure. A Measure which must not only be approved by every Man, who has any Property or common Sense, but which ought to be required by every *English* Subject of an *English* Administration.

#### FINIS.

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