

The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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Asia Pacific Security: The Dawn of Multilateralism?

PMD photo



Prime Minister Jean Chrétien with US President Bill Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC Summit in Seattle last November. The Summit — the first APEC gathering at the head of state or government level — is one of a series of developments exemplifying the growth of multilateralism in Asia Pacific.

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The "news" portions of North American news reports tend to turn to Europe — mainly Bosnia — and the "trade and business" portions to Asia Pacific. This is rather misleading. While Asia Pacific's importance to the global — and Canadian — economy has grown by leaps and bounds since the early 1980s, there is more to the region than dollars. Asia Pacific is filled with long-standing animosities, competing territorial claims, ethnic tensions and resource rivalries. While some conflicts have wound down, as in Cambodia, others still pose a high risk to peace, as in Korea and India-Pakistan. Partly as a consequence, the region has failed to parallel the global downward trend in military spending and arms acquisition, and is the focus of most current worries about

nuclear weapon and ballistic missile proliferation.

The Cold War in Asia Pacific was conducted through a set of bilateral relationships. The resulting absence of European-style alliances has left the region with few building blocks to reorient itself in the post-Cold War environment. Only recently have Asia Pacific countries come to recognize the merits of discussing security concerns multilaterally and of working together to prevent and resolve conflicts. Canada played a key role in changing regional perceptions with its launch in 1990 of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). Through the NPCSD, academics and officials from North Pacific countries (Canada, the US, Russia, China, Japan and the two Koreas) met during the course of six workshops and conferences to discuss various aspects of cooperative security in the region. Having achieved its objective of fostering dialogue, the NPCSD process was formally concluded last year.

Multilateralism in Asia Pacific is poised to enter a new phase with the remarkable decision, reached by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations last summer, to create a forum for region-wide discussion of security issues. This issue of the *Bulletin* looks at where the ASEAN Re-

Regional states increasingly see the merits of working together to prevent and resolve conflict.

gional Forum might lead and explores how Canada, with important political, economic, social and environmental interests in Asia Pacific, is continuing to promote security in the region. ■

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ASEAN Provides Forum for Region-Wide Security Dialogue

Asia Pacific's willingness to discuss security issues multilaterally has become most evident in a process spearheaded by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent years, security questions have been on the agenda of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), an annual meeting between the ASEAN foreign ministers and their counterparts from so-called "dialogue partners" (Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the US and the European Union).

At last year's ASEAN meeting, participants announced the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an annual gathering devoted to the discussion of security issues. The ARF will hold its inaugural meeting this July in Bangkok, Thailand. In addition to PMC participants, foreign ministers from Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea will attend.

A Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Bangkok in May will prepare the agenda for the ASEAN PMC. At their 1993 meeting, senior officials tasked various countries with preparing papers for discussion. Canada was asked to present two papers: one on conflict prevention and dispute settlement, and one on non-proliferation. Australia was asked to prepare a paper on confidence-building measures and South Korea a paper on the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Canada has completed its papers and is circulating them to other participants for comment.

The ARF reflects two Canadian priorities: it brings together all major players, including Russia and China, and it has the ability to focus on regional security issues. Canada's principal goal now is to move the nascent dialogue from issues of process to issues of substance. We would like to see the ARF and SOM focus on, *inter alia*, conflict prevention and manage-

ment, peacekeeping and non-proliferation. These are areas in which Canada has recognized expertise and in which ARF participants could exchange views and develop a work program. As a first step, we would like to see participants develop a modest set of guiding principles for dealing with regional tensions and conflicts.

While the focus for multilateral regional security discussion remains with the ARF and SOM, some North Pacific countries are of the view that these dialogues will not adequately address their specific concerns. Unlike other Asia Pacific sub-regions, the North Pacific has no formal consultative arrangements, though efforts are underway to formalize a dialogue.

Canada has supported efforts to encourage dialogue at the sub-regional level — our own initiative, the NPCSD, was designed to promote this process. We continue to believe that a North Pacific security dialogue would be useful, and would want to be included in any discussions in the North Pacific devoted to broader cooperative security issues. Canada does not expect to be involved in every discussion, but seeks to participate in those where we have interests at stake and something to contribute to the process. ■


Potential for Progress in South Asia

South Asia — where the countries of Central Asia intersect with China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, with Russia and Iran on the margins — remains an area afflicted with regional tensions. The most vexing problem in the region involves the confrontation between India and Pakistan. This arises from long-standing territorial disputes, including in the Siachen Glacier region, and Pakistan's alleged support for terrorist secessionist groups in Kashmir and Sikh separatists in Punjab.

Although the basic issues have not changed, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, combined with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, have transformed the overall dynamics of the situation. The Soviet demise ended the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, first signed in August 1971, and there have been other Russian diplomatic shifts away from India on various issues in international fora. While Russia has aligned itself with the desire of the US, Canada and others to promote a multilateral regional security dialogue, the policies of other states of the former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine and the Central Asian republics, towards India and Pakistan have been ambivalent.

At present there exists no regional security framework within which South Asian countries can systematically address security concerns. Canada and other G7 countries have tried to engage India and Pakistan in broader security policy discussions and to move through these to specific issue areas such as non-proliferation. The most recent initiative, launched by the US, appeared to make some headway in encouraging India to accept a multilateral regional security dialogue modelled on the Middle East peace process. However, India remains cautious in its relations with the US.

Until a multilateral framework for dialogue is agreed on, Canada will continue its efforts to encourage progress bilaterally between India and Pakistan and to engage both parties in broader security discussions on topics such as non-proliferation and verification. The government recently decided to fund a project by Canadian academics and non-governmental organizations, including the Canadian Centre for Global Security, to explore the feasibility of initiating an unofficial dialogue involving the two countries. The Centre's report is expected by the end of March. ■



Secretary of State for Asia Pacific Raymond Chan lays a wreath at the memorial in Saiwan Cemetery, Hong Kong. The memorial is dedicated to Canadians killed in the World War II Battle of Hong Kong.

North Korea Poses Nuclear Concern

The most immediate arms control concern in Asia Pacific — indeed, globally — is North Korea's continuing failure to comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

In March 1993, North Korea indicated its intention to withdraw from the NPT — the first state in the Treaty's history to do so. Prior to its decision, North Korea had resisted the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct "special inspections" of two suspected, but undeclared, nuclear facilities, as provided for under North Korea's safeguards agreement with the Agency. In June, North Korea suspended its NPT withdrawal, pending the outcome of a series of bilateral talks with the US. However, North Korea did not permit the resumption of IAEA inspections.

While US-North Korean talks aimed at returning North Korea to the NPT continue, there are concerns about how much longer the IAEA will be able to provide assurances that no diversion of safeguarded material has taken place, since the film and batteries in IAEA monitoring equipment in North Korea need to be replaced. If the continuity of safeguards is broken, the IAEA may decide to report North Korea's continuing non-compliance to the UN Security Council.

Canada strongly supports the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula and a strong non-proliferation regime. We continue to urge North Korea to accept IAEA inspections, as required by its nuclear safeguards agreement. We also urge Pyongyang to fully implement its December 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea and to comply fully with the NPT.

Press-time update: In mid-February, North Korea agreed to allow a group of IAEA inspectors to check its seven declared nuclear installations. However, Pyongyang still has not agreed to comply fully with its safeguards agreement or to allow inspectors access to the two suspect sites.

Linking Asia Pacific and Global Security

The value of any Asia Pacific security initiative will depend not just on its ability to address "local" issues, but on its ability to relate those issues to broader global concerns. Just as multilateral Asia Pacific security cooperation should complement existing bilateral cooperation in the region, efforts taken at the regional level — whether bilaterally or multilaterally — should reinforce global efforts to build peace and security, primarily through the United Nations.

In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali challenged regional organizations to broaden their understanding of security and to place more emphasis on the prevention of conflict. He asked that action be taken to deal with problems locally before they require global attention. He also encouraged regional organizations to participate in UN efforts and to help build "international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it."

Conflict Prevention

Asia Pacific is riddled with historical animosities, territorial and jurisdictional disputes, and potentially explosive ethnic mixes. However — the Korean Peninsula notwithstanding — the region to date presents a less gloomy post-Cold War picture than Europe. Increased economic interdependence and a desire to avoid anything that could jeopardize continued high growth rates have stimulated an interest among regional states in conflict prevention and management.

ASEAN has held three workshops with the UN on peace and preventive diplomacy, most recently in Bangkok on February 17-18. Canada provided funding for these workshops and presented papers on conflict prevention and resolution (1993) and dealing with conflict and dispute settlement (1994). The papers drew on Canadian experience and suggested some practical steps that could be taken to enhance cooperation and confidence in the region. These included:

- the development of a set of basic principles to ensure a common approach to regional cooperation;
- the development of conflict prevention and management mechanisms, such as a register of experts upon whom interested states could call to find facts, facilitate dialogue, or act as rapporteurs or conciliators;
- the consideration of measures to increase transparency, such as the publication of defence white papers and budgets, the prior notification of major military and naval exercises, and the invitation of observers to such exercises; and
- the promotion of dialogue among defence officials on issues of doctrine, strategy and threat perceptions.

Canada will be pursuing these ideas at the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in May.

Peacekeeping

One of the most successful UN peacekeeping operations in recent years took place in Asia Pacific: the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This was the most ambitious operation ever mounted by the UN and led to a fair election in a very difficult environment. Many Asia Pacific countries, including Canada, were deeply engaged in the long diplomatic process that led to the establishment of UNTAC and in UNTAC itself. Asia Pacific countries are also involved in the complex operation of peacebuilding that is succeeding UNTAC.

The Cambodian peace process is a good example of the potential for complementarity between regional and global efforts when dealing with issues that exceed regional capabilities, be these due to financial or political reasons, "spillover" outside the region, or the need for the unique political and moral authority of the UN Charter and Security Council in embargoes and peacekeeping.

Canada sees room for Asia Pacific countries to enhance their ability to contribute to UN peacekeeping efforts. Countries could share technical expertise and address logistical challenges in bilateral and multilateral exchanges, as well as in regional seminars. Seminars could also provide the UN with an Asia Pacific perspective on the implementation of *An Agenda for Peace*. Peacekeeping issues being discussed at the UN, such as



Canadians serving with the (now completed) UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

the development of common logistics, standby forces or peacekeeping training could be reviewed at the regional level.

Non-proliferation

As home to three nuclear-weapon states (the US, Russia and China), two major nuclear concerns (the Korean Peninsula and South Asia) and several of the world's leading importers and exporters of conventional arms, Asia Pacific demonstrates vividly the impossibility of severing the connection between the "local" and the "global" as far as weapons proliferation is concerned. To be viable, region-specific proposals aimed at preventing proliferation have to be placed within a framework that involves strong international non-proliferation instruments as well as general efforts to create a benign regional security environment.

Asia Pacific states have already taken steps towards this last. The ASEAN countries have long been active in the development of a political framework within which conflict would come to be regarded as impossible. Starting with the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, through proposals for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, to the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN nations have laid a firm foundation for

cooperation and dialogue on security issues.

In 1985, countries of the South Pacific established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in which the stationing, manufacture and testing of nuclear explosive devices and the dumping of nuclear waste is prohibited.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan have developed and implemented a number of bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), including:

- an agreement to give prior notification of troop movements within a certain distance of the border;
- a commitment not to attack each other's nuclear facilities;
- an agreement for regular contact by regional military commanders along the border; and
- a "hot line" agreement.

Prior to the recent difficulty over North Korea's adherence to the NPT, the two Koreas were slowly beginning to develop a dialogue that dealt with implementation of their December 1991 accord on a nuclear-weapon-free peninsula, as well as with broader issues.

Canada has been a supporter of Asia Pacific confidence-building efforts and is ready to provide assistance wherever Canadian experience might be relevant. Con-

fidence-building measures need not always take the form of steps like the notification of troop movements. The negotiation of political declarations and a regular process of dialogue are equally important in generating the political will required to reduce tensions. Within the ASEAN Regional Forum, specific military CBMs could be considered if participating states believe such measures would assist in moving cooperation beyond the declaratory stage.

At the global level, countries participating in the ARF may wish to consider steps they could take jointly to signal to other regions their commitment to non-proliferation. At the ASEAN SOM, Canada will be suggesting diplomatic efforts on behalf of:

- securing universal adherence to and the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995;
- the creation of an effective verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC);
- rapid implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
- adherence to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); and
- submission of data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

Canada is also proposing that Asia Pacific states consider taking regional or sub-regional steps to build upon global non-proliferation instruments. These might include such things as special verification provisions. For example, countries could agree to permit a larger number of inspections by other ARF participants, and those inspections might be more intrusive than usual. In addition, participants might wish to enhance transparency or information ex-

Successful non-proliferation strategies require both global and regional measures.

change mechanisms with respect to facilities, goods and services covered under the international agreements.

In terms of the UN Arms Register, Asia Pacific countries might want to agree to submit data on the production of conventional weapons and overall military holdings. In the ballistic missile area, countries could consider negotiating a regional or sub-regional agreement not to be the first to acquire or deploy ballistic missiles.

Opportunities

Creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum provides Asia Pacific countries with an opportunity to establish a distinctive security agenda that responds to the real concerns of regional states and reinforces the UN's work in building global peace and stability. The relationship between regional activity and that of the UN might be strengthened by inviting a UN representative to be an ARF observer.

While it is important not to overburden the ARF, there are many conflict prevention, peacekeeping and non-proliferation issues in Asia Pacific that could benefit from discussion at the ARF or in related working groups. The extent to which the ARF will help prevent and address conflict in the region remains to be seen. The potential is there. Its realization depends on the willingness of all Asia Pacific countries, including the major players, to make an intellectual contribution and political commitment to build cooperative security and reduce threats rather than simply meet them. ■

Canada Aids Conflict Prevention in the South China Sea

A notable example of preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region is the South China Sea Initiative, co-sponsored by the Canadian and Indonesian governments and coordinated by the University of British Columbia's Centre for Asian Legal Studies. This "track two" (see below) initiative focuses on the Spratly Islands, which are variously claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, and the Paracel Islands, claimed by China and Vietnam. The surrounding waters are believed to hide rich oil and gas reserves. The Spratlys were the scene of military clashes between China and Vietnam as recently as 1988 and are still widely regarded as a potential flash-point in the region.

Experts from claimant countries as well as non-claimant "interested states" participate in a series of meetings on the history, legal and technical maritime issues surrounding the disputes. They also address the possible cooperative exploitation of resources in the South China Sea. Claimants have agreed not to enforce their claims militarily but to proceed through peaceful means.

The initiative is, in essence, a cooperative security dialogue — addressing a security issue at its roots, which in this case are found in questions of economics and resource management in addition to strict territorial questions. The experience reveals that it may be possible to deal with difficult, sensitive issues by focusing on modest efforts which, in themselves, provide opportunities to build confidence and enhance transparency, thus facilitating political settlement. The project has led to four workshops and two technical meetings. Two more technical meetings are scheduled for early this year, followed by a workshop in the summer. ■

Asia Pacific's "Track Two" Nourishes Official Dialogues

Although the ASEAN Regional Forum is Asia Pacific's first region-wide forum for governmental discussion of security issues, regional and sub-regional security dialogues have burgeoned over the past three years in non-governmental or "track two" fora. Track two activities, such as workshops and conferences, involve academics, researchers and journalists as well as officials acting in their private capacities.

The value of track two is multifold. It serves as a sounding board for new ideas. It encourages interaction between representatives of countries that have poor — or non-existent — diplomatic relations with one another. It moves thinking ahead when official dialogues are absent and contributes to a "habit of dialogue" that may later manifest itself at the official (or "track one") level. The fact that ASEAN has invited other countries to join it in a security forum is due in large part to ideas and momentum generated in track two.

Track two is not unique to Asia Pacific, but its breadth and depth in the region exceed that of anything similar elsewhere around the globe. Canada played a prominent role in encouraging Asia Pacific's second track with its North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue. NPCSD involved both official diplomatic contacts and non-official conferences, workshops and publications, with participation from around the region. The second track — coordinated by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies and the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies — developed multilateral dialogues on a range of proposals for enhancing security in the North Pacific and elicited regional reactions to those proposals.

Other ongoing track two dialogues include an annual ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies roundtable on Asia Pacific security (in Kuala Lumpur), an annual UN Meeting on peace and disarmament in the Asia Pacific region (in Katmandu), and an annual international defence conference in Seoul, sponsored by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. Countless other seminars and conferences are sponsored by think tanks and universities around the region.

The intensity and policy significance of track two is likely to grow as governments continue to seek support for progress at the official level. However, the proliferation of track two activities is already stretching the financial and human resources available in individual countries. This has led — internationally — to efforts to streamline track two, and — nationally — to efforts to improve Canadian participation.

Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security

The Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS) is an initiative by scholars interested in maintaining and enhancing the Canadian interest in and profile on Asia Pacific security issues. It will pick up where NPCSD left off. The objective of CANCAPS is to promote research, publication, public awareness and exchange activities on Asia Pacific security issues and Canadian involvement in them. Participation is open to Canadians based in academic institutions, research institutes and the private and public sectors who have expertise, experience and an active engagement in questions related to the changing security

environment in the Asia Pacific region and Canada's role in this environment. Seed funding for the Consortium is being provided by DFAIT's Pacific 2000 Program and an administrative base has been established at the University of British Columbia and York University.

CANCAPS was formally launched at a meeting in Toronto on December 3-4. Officials from DFAIT, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency participated. They will continue to be involved in CANCAPS in their private capacities.

Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific

The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was founded in June 1993 by 10 institutes around the region, including the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies. The purpose of CSCAP is to create a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia Pacific security matters. The main focus of CSCAP activity will be working groups, which will undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional political-security problems. CSCAP does not aspire to become the region's sole track two channel, but rather to help coordinate efforts and avoid redundancy.

Countries and territories participating in CSCAP (initially Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and the US) are required to create broadly based member committees composed of academics, government officials (acting in their private capacities) and other relevant individuals. The Canadian Member Committee is currently being formed.

For further information about CANCAPS, contact one of the following:

Institute of International Relations
University of British Columbia
C456-1866 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z1
tel. 604-822-6595, fax 604-822-5540

or

Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies
270 York Lanes
York University
4700 Keele Street
North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3
tel. 416-736-5786, fax 416-736-5688.

The Joint Centre can also provide information about CSCAP.

L. Bianco, Geneva



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (fifth from left, middle row) with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (front row, centre) and other members of the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters at their meeting in Geneva on January 12-13. The Board considered practical ways of putting the tools and expertise of "disarmers" more directly at the disposal of UN preventive diplomacy and "peace" operations. Participants highlighted a new study by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a new UN Group of Governmental Experts Study on the role of the UN in verification (the latter is chaired by Ambassador Mason).

The Secretary-General expressed particular interest in the effort currently underway — chaired by Canada — in the UN Disarmament Commission to develop agreed principles among suppliers and recipients of sensitive dual-use technologies. He suggested this could be a first step towards a more cooperative and broadly based multilateral approach — perhaps similar to the IAEA safeguards system — that might allow equitable and responsible access by all states.

Canadian-Korean Verification Cooperation

Canada has been strongly supportive of the two Koreas' attempts to improve their mutual relations, including their steps to build confidence and reduce arms with appropriate verification. Canadian efforts have focused, in particular, on exchanges of information with South Korea, drawing on our experience in the verification process from a number of perspectives.

In June 1992, officials from DFAIT's Verification Research Unit were invited to participate in a verification workshop in Seoul sponsored by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). This was followed in December 1992 — at the request of the South Korean government — by a week-long seminar in Ottawa designed to familiarize 11 senior Korean military officials with conventional forces inspection techniques. This training seminar drew on the expertise of Department of National Defence and DFAIT officials with regard to the verification provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the CSCE Vienna Document.

In addition, representatives from KIDA and Korea's Research Institute for National Unification have participated in a number of symposiums and workshops in Canada — organized by Royal Roads Military College and York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies — as part of DFAIT's Verification Research Program. This informal Canadian-Korean cooperative research program on verification has proven to be of considerable mutual benefit and is continuing.

UN Encourages Asia Pacific Disarmament

A little-known aspect of the UN's work is its three regional centres for peace and disarmament: one in Latin America, one in Africa and one in Asia Pacific. This last, established in 1988 and located in Katmandu, Nepal, has a mandate to provide, on request, substantive support for peace and disarmament-related activities agreed by the states in the region. The Centre also coordinates the implementation of UN Disarmament Information Program (formerly World Disarmament Campaign) activities in Asia.

There is wide recognition among Asia Pacific states that the Centre should encourage regional and sub-regional dialogue to enhance confidence and promote disarmament and security. Towards this end, the Centre has held a series of regional meetings on confidence-building and security, with participation from governments, research institutes, the mass media and non-governmental organizations from around Asia Pacific. The meetings provide an opportunity for participants to review continuing changes in the international and regional security environment and to consider the implications for peace and disarmament. Canada has been represented at these meetings by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. Below are excerpts from Ambassador Mason's address to the Sixth UN Meeting on Peace and Disarmament in the Asia Pacific Region, held from January 31 to February 2 in Katmandu.

I have been asked to discuss the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1993....

The very fact that we have consensus guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament de-

Disarmament lies at the heart of the cooperative security-building process.

veloped in a global forum...is dramatic testimony to the post-Cold War disarmament agenda of which the heightened regional dimension is perhaps one of the most striking features....

Disarmament at its core is concerned with creating the conditions under which countries will place less reliance on armaments and more reliance on alternative processes for ensuring their viability and well-being against all manner of threats, however defined. During the post-Cold War era of interdependence, integration and globalization at the macro level, as against increasing tribalization and fragmentation at the local level, it seems clear that the tools for building such alternative mechanisms will be increasingly regionally and cooperatively based.

The UN has both a "top down" or global/normative/framework role to play and a "bottom up" or operational role to play, the latter at the regional, sub-regional and local levels. Arms control and disarmament — both in the strict sense of negotiating agreements to limit/control/manage armaments and in the broader sense of building confidence among nations by promoting greater openness in military matters — are tools in the process of building collective/cooperative security, just as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are tools to this end. All aspects along this continuum need to be addressed if the goal of collective/cooperative security is to be reached.

Countries must be encouraged to develop concrete mechanisms to prevent and to resolve disputes peacefully. For such mechanisms to work, there must be an ever-enlarging consensus on the proper roles of power, armaments, the use of force and, above all, on the limits of the use of force. From this perspective, arms control and disarmament relate to cooperative efforts (at every level from local to global) to control the use of force and to promote collective security based on agreed rules of interstate behaviour, including on the use of force. Increasingly, too, intrastate behaviour will be involved, including the specific issue of disarming both irregular and regular forces within the boundaries of one country.

There is an obvious role for the UN in respect of global agreements aimed at eliminating weapons of mass destruction or, at minimum, at limiting their spread.... Regarding conventional arms, the objectives are far less clear since it is not a matter of eliminating them but of encouraging barriers to excessive transfers and accumulations. Above all, a

greater common understanding must be developed with respect to what is legitimate and what is excessive, together with agreed parameters for the transfer of such armaments. To develop such an understanding, efforts must take place both at the global and regional levels. At the global level, the UN Arms Register is the main vehicle for stimulating such a discussion. Equally important is the UN's work in promoting transparency, confidence building and openness in military matters on a regional basis, particularly through the UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament.

Since 1990, Asia Pacific has seen a multitude of efforts at promoting a cooperative security dialogue process. The ASEAN Regional Forum is the tangible result of these many interlocking efforts....

Disarmament — both in the narrow and broad senses — has not diminished in importance but rather lies at the heart of the new collective/cooperative security-building process.

The [new UNDC guidelines] should be viewed as our common asset. Their applicability and their elaboration in specific regional and sub-regional contexts must now be worked out.

Canadians Help Demine Cambodia

Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet and Minister of National Defence David Collonette announced on February 24 that Canada will send 12 Canadian Forces personnel to Cambodia to provide training and administrative support to the Cambodia Mine Action Centre. The personnel will be provided through the United Nations Development Program, which is co-ordinating international support for demining operations in Cambodia. The Canadians will constitute half of the 25-member international technical advisory group to the Centre.

"Cambodia has the worst problem of uncleared landmines in the world. Agriculture is impossible because of mines littered in farmland. Trade is being strangled by mined roads. I'm proud of this Canadian effort to train Cambodians so that they can overcome this most serious obstacle to the country's development," said Mr. Ouellet.

Summit Adapts NATO to New Circumstances

PWO photo



Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (right) with British Prime Minister John Major.

The NATO Summit in Brussels on January 10 and 11 marked an important step in the evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the other NATO leaders took a number of key decisions enabling NATO to better respond to the new challenges confronting the Euro-Atlantic region.

Canada clearly affirmed that NATO should expand as the community of values that NATO represents extends to the East. The enlargement of the Alliance will be

an evolutionary process. Canada supported the proposal — adopted at the Summit — for a "Partnership for Peace" that will permit former Warsaw Pact states and other European countries to forge closer political and military relationships with NATO. The Partnership program provides a framework for joint military exercises and makes it possible for other European states to cooperate with NATO in peacekeeping operations.

In discussions about the situation in

Bosnia, Canada expressed its views on the use of air strikes, emphasizing the need for prudence given the strong negative effects such strikes could have on the security of troops on the ground and on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Canada also reaffirmed the essential role that the UN and the CSCE play in conflict prevention and management. NATO should continue to respond to the requests of these two organizations in the area of peacekeeping.

The concept of "combined joint task forces" was endorsed at the Summit. Thanks to this new approach, NATO's military structure will be more flexible and better able to support peacekeeping operations in which the Alliance might become involved. The concept will also permit the Western European Union to use NATO resources, with the Alliance's agreement.

Canada was pleased with the Summit's outcome, which met several Canadian objectives: the US reaffirmed its engagement in Europe; increased European responsibility for security was acknowledged in the reaffirmation of the European Security and Defence Identity; relations between the UN, the CSCE and NATO were strengthened; NATO showed its openness to new members; and NATO improved its capacity to operate in peacekeeping operations.

Despite the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, there remains a great deal of insecurity in Europe. NATO continues to play an essential, stabilizing role — which is highlighted by the fact that several countries want to join the Alliance.

NATO Summit Declaration

Following is the text of the declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on January 10-11.

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels to renew our Alliance in light of the historic transformations affecting the entire continent of Europe. We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the pe-

riod of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War.

However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe. It rests, as

also reflected in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, upon close collaboration in all fields.

Building on our decisions in London and Rome and on our new Strategic Concept, we are undertaking initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been our Alliance's fundamental goal.

We have agreed:

- to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both

- the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces;
- we reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;
 - to launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance;
 - to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Transatlantic Link

2. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link. All our countries wish to continue the direct involvement of the United States and Canada in the security of Europe. We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

3. Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defence matters. We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies. We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

ESDI

4. We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term per-

spective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.

5. We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organization and resources will be adjusted to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.

6. We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.

Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence and other tasks.

Peacekeeping

7. In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its

members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

8. Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations, and assist participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.

9. Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity.

NATO to improve capability to participate in UN, CSCE and WEU operations.

As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Ses-

Defence Policy Review

On February 17, Defence Minister David Collenette launched the parliamentary phase of Canada's defence policy review by tabling a guidance document in the House of Commons. This document will provide the policy framework intended to assist a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons in focusing their deliberations and their consultations with Canadians. "We need to have a clear, realistic and affordable policy that spells out what we expect of the Canadian Forces," said Mr. Collenette while leading off the debate on a government motion to create the Committee. "The government wants to hear the views of Canadians on the future of Canadian defence. I urge them to take part in the process and to make their views known."

The Committee will be composed of 16 members (11 MPs and five Senators) empowered to hold public hearings in Canada and consultations abroad. The Committee's report will be tabled by the end of September and will form an important component of the policy development process. Following review of the Committee's report, the government will publish a white paper on defence.

sion will report on the implementation of these decisions to Ministers at their next regular meeting in June 1994.

10. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.

We remain deeply committed to further strengthening the CSCE, which is the only organization comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management.

11. As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, will contribute to its elaboration, and look forward to the opening conference, which will take place in Paris in the spring.

Partnership for Peace

12. Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing our security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our east. We reaffirm that

the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our east, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

13. We have decided to launch an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership — a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this program, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

14. The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities.

The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

15. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programs.

16. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build coop-

Partnership program will expand and intensify cooperation between NATO and other European countries.

erative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

Arms Control

17. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institutions. In this regard, we direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

18. We attach crucial importance to the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament, such as:

- the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime;
- the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;
- the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- issues on the agenda of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;
- ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions.

19. We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress the scourge.

20. We reaffirm our support for political and economic reform in Russia and welcome the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections by the people of the Russian Federation. This is a major step forward in the establishment of a framework for the development of durable democratic institutions. We further welcome the Russian government's firm commitment to democratic and market reform and to a reformist foreign policy. These

are important for security and stability in Europe.

We believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapon-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability. We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the use of force for territorial gains. Respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We call upon

building between the countries in the region. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the overall situation, and we encourage all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability.

Former Yugoslavia

23. As members of the Alliance, we deplore the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that the conflict in Bosnia must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield. Only the parties can bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Only they can agree to lay down their arms and end the violence which for these many months has only served to demonstrate that no side

Canadian Forces photo



A CFE reduction inspection.

all states to join international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE aimed at solving existing problems.

22. We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. We strongly welcome the agreements recently concluded in the Middle East peace process, which offer an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the area. This much-awaited breakthrough has had a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, thus opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence

can prevail in its pursuit of military victory.

24. We are united in supporting the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to all parties, and we commend the European Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith. We commend the front-line states for their key role in enforcing sanctions against those who continue to promote violence

and aggression. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union in maintaining sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.

25. We denounce the violations by the parties of the agreements they have already signed to implement a ceasefire and to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the victims of this terrible conflict. This situation cannot be tolerated. We urge all the parties to respect their agreements. We are determined to eliminate obstacles

NATO reaffirms its readiness, under UN Security Council authority, to carry out air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other threatened areas.

to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate. We will continue operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. We call for the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, we urge the UNPROFOR authorities to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes.

26. The past five years have brought historic opportunities as well as new uncertainties and instabilities to Europe. Our Alliance has moved to adapt itself to the new circumstances, and today we have taken decisions in key areas. We have given our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We have endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to adapt the Alliance to its future tasks. We have opened a new perspective of progressively closer relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In doing all this, we have renewed our Alliance as a joint endeavour of a North America and Europe permanently committed to their common and indivisible security. The challenges we face are many and serious. The decisions we have taken today will better enable us to meet them.

Canada Welcomes Ukrainian Ratification of START I

Canada welcomed the unconditional ratification by the Ukrainian parliament of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, which commits Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

"The government and parliament of Ukraine have acted courageously," said Foreign Minister André Ouellet of the February 3 decision. "They have recognized that denuclearization is the best way to ensure Ukraine's stability and promote security in the region."

The ratification follows a trilateral agreement announced January 14 by US President Bill Clinton, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, under which Ukraine will return all nuclear weapons from its territory to Russia for dismantling over the next seven years. Ukraine had been procrastinating on the fulfilment of its Lisbon Protocol obligations due to mistrust of Russia and a lack of resources to pay for the dismantling and removal process.

Mr. Ouellet noted that he will discuss Lisbon Protocol implementation and the prospects for increased Canada-Ukraine cooperation when he visits Ukraine in the near future. Canada has an extensive program of technical assistance in Ukraine and early NPT accession will open the door to full cooperation in the nuclear field, especially in the area of safety.

CSCE Missions Update

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has made conflict prevention and crisis management a central focus of its role in European cooperative security. To this end, over the past 18 months it has deployed a variety of missions to areas of potential or current conflict. These missions have had widely differing mandates, budgets and sizes. Their relationships with host authorities, other parties to conflicts and international organizations have also differed greatly.

The following long-term CSCE missions are currently in the field:

Skopje (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

The "Spillover Monitor Mission" is to monitor developments along the Macedonia-Serbia border and in other parts of Macedonia susceptible to spillover of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The aim is to promote respect for territorial integrity and the maintenance of peace, and to help prevent possible conflict in the region. This requires very close coordination with the UNPROFOR-Macedonia Command. The eight-member CSCE mission reports that there are no immediate symptoms of spillover but the deteriorating economic situation is of serious concern. Canada has participated in this mission.

Georgia

The objective of this mission is to promote negotiations between the parties to the conflict in Georgia. Although its mandate covers both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts, the CSCE mission focuses on South Ossetia, while the UN takes the lead in Abkhazia. The CSCE mission, with eight members, has been instructed to develop a proposal for cooperation with the joint (Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian) peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, which could see the CSCE playing a more concerted role in overseeing peacekeeping in the former USSR.

Moldova

The objective of this eight-member mission is to facilitate the achievement of a political settlement to the conflict in the

Left-Bank Dniester areas of Moldova. Forces in the Trans-Dniester are pressing for separation from the Republic of Moldova. The CSCE mission has developed a proposal for an autonomous status for the Trans-Dniester region within the Republic of Moldova. To date, however, there has been little tangible progress in bringing the sides closer to a settlement. Canada headed this mission for its first six months and a Canadian diplomat currently serves with the mission.

Estonia

The mission's objective is to promote understanding and dialogue between the "communities" of Estonia, widely understood to mean the Estonian majority and the Russian minority. The key issue is monitoring the treatment accorded the Russophones, given their status as a "national minority." Although the mission does not have a mandate to oversee the withdrawal of Russian troops, the CSCE has made it clear to Russia that it should not use the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia as a pretext for delaying the withdrawal of its troops. The mission has six members. Canada has served on it.

Latvia

The objectives of the four-person mission in Latvia are similar to those of the Estonian mission, namely to advise local authorities and relevant organizations on matters such as citizenship. As in Estonia, the key issue is the status of the Russophone minority.

Tajikistan

Established by the CSCE in December, this mission will attempt to facilitate dialogue and confidence building between the various parties in conflict, and to promote respect for human rights, democracy and other CSCE norms and principles. The four-person mission is the first CSCE presence of its kind in Central Asia.

Sanctions Assistance Missions

Although not designed for conflict prevention, the CSCE has established sanctions assistance missions in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine. These missions are mandated to advise host governments on the implementation of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. Canada heads the mission in Macedonia. ■

Canada Hopes for Pragmatism in CTBT Negotiations

The following are excerpts from a speech by Ambassador Gerald Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered on January 25 in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, the Conference on Disarmament once again has the opportunity to serve the global non-proliferation effort, this time by means of the negotiation of a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. A CTBT will provide an important element to the global security and non-proliferation architecture.

It is my hope that we will act with the utmost flexibility and pragmatism in order that a CTBT may soon become a reality. It is important, as we search for the parameters of the treaty, to bear in mind the expectation by the global community that we pursue our work expeditiously. We must avoid the temptation to become bogged down in needless procedural wrangles. As the 1995 Review Conference for the NPT approaches, we must remember that substantive progress towards a CTBT or, better, the conclusion of our work, will have an important salutary effect on the prospects for the indefinite extension of that Treaty.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is a long-standing Canadian objective. We welcomed the announcement last August by President Clinton which opened the way for negotiations to begin. All the nuclear-weapon states have indicated their support for a CTBT and this support was reflected in the resolution adopted by consensus at the 48th General Assembly last fall. Four of the five nuclear-weapon states are currently observing testing moratoria and it is important to our work that all five nuclear-weapon states continue not to test. If this is the case, the world will have seen its last nuclear test.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline the principles that will guide the Canadian delegation during the negotiation of a CTBT.

- The treaty should ban all nuclear explosive testing in all environments for all time.
- The treaty should be non-discriminatory and universal, that is, open to signature by all states.



Mr. Gerald Shannon, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

- The verification regime should be international in character and have a baseline capacity to monitor compliance on a global basis using seismic methods of anomaly detection, reinforced by other systems and technologies, e.g., imagery and radionuclide sensing. These methods of verification would be supported, as required, by an on-site inspection process.
 - The International Seismic Monitoring System should receive standardized data from a network of existing and proposed seismic stations. Management and resource responsibilities will require resolution. In this regard, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and the third global seismic exchange experiment will support our efforts in a practical and pragmatic fashion.
 - An independent, modestly staffed, international agency should be established to collect, analyze and distribute data and to conduct on-site inspections to determine if a violation of the treaty has occurred. It will be important to bear in mind the requirement that the system be cost-effective.
 - It is our view that the UN Security Council would determine the response of the international community as a whole in the event of a confirmed violation of the treaty.
- As for the structure of our work, I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassador

Tanaka, which have led to the generally accepted position that we should move quickly to establish two working groups: one on legal and institutional issues and the other on verification and compliance.

Mr. Chairman, while the comprehensive test ban treaty should remain the focus of our work in this session, we also have an opportunity to expand the global non-proliferation effort in yet another fashion and to enhance global security. The UN General Assembly also produced a consensus resolution on the "Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." That text welcomed the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding the disposition of their fissile material.

The effect of that resolution, however, is to express the wish of the community of nations for a non-discriminatory, multilateral

and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Despite having been proposed in one form or another for many years, this is a relatively new issue for the CD to consider. A period of reflection and consultation is therefore required to ascertain the best way to move ahead.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate that Canada will shortly be tabling a compendium of CD documentation on the nuclear test ban issue, as well as a separate volume compiling treaty and draft treaty texts relating to nuclear test bans. Many of you will be familiar with similar compendiums we provided for the chemical weapons negotiations and on which I have received many favourable comments. It is our hope that this compendium will prove a useful reference tool for delegations in the coming months as we turn our attention to the negotiation of a CTBT. ■

CD to Negotiate Fissionable Material Cut-off

The Conference on Disarmament established in January an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The treaty is to be non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable. The decision to negotiate a treaty is the result of a Canadian-initiated resolution adopted by consensus at last fall's UN General Assembly. The resolution also requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for a treaty.

Consideration of a ban or "cut-off" of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes has been before the CD and its predecessors since it was first raised in embryonic form by US President Eisenhower in his 1953 "Atoms for Peace" proposal. In 1978, at the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I), then Prime Minister Trudeau proposed such a ban, in his strategy of suffocation, as a disarmament measure. Since then, there have been various proposals for a cut-off, none of which had the real prospect of leading to negotiations until this past September, when US President Bill Clinton announced his administration's commitment to a ban as part of the US nuclear non-proliferation program.

Fissionable (the US tends to use the term "fissile") material generally refers to highly enriched uranium (HEU), i.e., uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope U-235, and to plutonium. A modern warhead carries approximately 3-4 kilograms of plutonium and about 15 kilograms of HEU. Crude devices require slightly more. The US stopped producing HEU for weapons purposes in 1964. In July 1992, Washington announced that it had permanently ended production of fissionable material for weapons, having determined that existing stocks are necessary to meet any conceivable need. The US is estimated to currently possess about 550 tons of HEU and 110 tons of plutonium. Russia continues to produce weapons-grade plutonium in three dual-purpose reactors, but has stated that it will stop completely by the year 2000. The dismantlement of warheads under START I and II will add about 750 tons of HEU and 150 tons of plutonium to the stockpiles of the US and Russia over the next decade.

The arguments in favour of a cut-off are that it would cap the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states, halt the build-up of stockpiles of unsafeguarded fissionable materials by threshold states (assuming they signed the treaty) and, by universalizing safeguards commitments, strengthen non-proliferation efforts. However, a cut-off would not touch existing fissionable material stockpiles. In the nuclear-weapon states, these are large enough to make additional production unnecessary, regardless of a treaty. In the threshold states, stockpiles will continue to be the cause of great concern.

In Canada's view, a cut-off treaty should be open to signature by all states and all of its provisions should apply to all states. This would mean applying NPT-type safeguards to all of the fissionable material in the nuclear-weapon states parties. As the nuclear-weapon states will undoubtedly retain significant reserves of fissionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes, their tendency to violate the treaty is likely to be minimal. Verification — in the form of application of IAEA safeguards — should focus on

Proposed ban would stop the production of fissionable materials but leave existing stockpiles — being bolstered by nuclear disarmament — untouched.

the most sensitive facilities, namely those used for enrichment and reprocessing.

As all non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty have already made a "cut-off" commitment and accepted fullscope safeguards, no additional verification would be required for them. All non-NPT parties that sign a cut-off convention should be required to accept IAEA safeguards on all existing fissionable material and on all nuclear facilities, including explicit arrangements to deal with possible clandestine facilities. In other words, they should have to accept NPT-type fullscope safeguards. ■

Canada Increases Commitment in Golan Heights

In November, the United Nations restructured the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights as a result of Finland's decision to withdraw its battalion of infantry. Poland committed an infantry battalion to replace the Finnish contingent but withdrew the logistics personnel it had been providing. Some logistics functions were contracted out to local companies and the infantry battalions were asked to have a higher level of self-sufficiency. To make up the shortfall, Canada increased its commitment to UNDOF by 31 personnel to take over the remaining logistics functions.

This restructuring left a smaller and more efficient UNDOF operation. Prior to this restructuring, two separate logistics units were necessary because the parties would not let the units operate on both sides of the ceasefire line. This led to an overlap in functions. In the current operation, Canadians are providing logistic support on both sides of the ceasefire line to the entire UNDOF force. This has created an operationally and economically more efficient operation.

The UN has not been able to deploy its peacekeeping mission to Haiti because of the refusal of the Haitian military and police authorities to abide by the Governor's Island agreement signed by President Aristide and General Cedras. Under the terms of this agreement, the Haitian military agreed to turn control of the government back to President Aristide by October 30, 1993. The UN continues its attempts to mediate a solution to this problem. ■

Canadian Forces photo



Peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia.

Canada's Peacekeeping Activities (as of February 1, 1994)

United Nations Operations

1. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR — Former Yugoslavia)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,206
	Croatia	783
	RCMP	45
2. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF — Golan Heights)		211
3. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)		30
4. United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)		15
5. United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO — Middle East)		13
6. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)		7
7. United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)		6
8. United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)		5
9. United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda/ United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNOMUR/UNAMIR)		2
10. United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador (UNOSAL)		2
Total Canadian Forces Personnel		2,280
Total RCMP Personnel		45

Non-United Nations Operations

1. Multinational Force And Observers (MFO — Sinai: monitoring Camp David accords)	28
2. European Community Monitoring Mission in the Former Yugoslavia (ECMM)	12
Total	40

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 48 (1993)

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER <i>(Lead sponsor or sponsors)</i>	RESOLUTION	VOTE <i>Yes-No-Abstain</i>
48/61* (Belarus)	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament	Consensus
48/62 (Germany/Romania)	Transparency of military expenditures	Consensus
48/63* (US)	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	Consensus
48/64* (Costa Rica)	Education and information for disarmament	Consensus
48/65* (Hungary)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	Consensus
48/67* (Germany)	The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields	161-0-5
48/68* (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	145-0-22
48/70* (Australia)	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	Consensus
48/71 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
48/72 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	153-3-12
48/73 (Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	166-0-4
48/74 A (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	169-0-1
48/74 B (Argentina)	Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space	Consensus
48/75 A (Indonesia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
48/75 B (Indonesia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	Consensus
48/75 C (Mexico)	General and complete disarmament	114-6-45
48/75 D (Algeria)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Consensus
48/75 E* (Netherlands)	Transparency in armaments	Consensus
48/75 F* (Colombia)	International arms transfers	Consensus
48/75 G* (Germany)	Regional disarmament	Consensus
48/75 I* (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	170-0-1
48/75 J (India)	Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels	156-0-11
48/75 K (US)	Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines	Consensus
48/75 L* (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	Consensus
48/76 A (Cameroon)	Regional confidence-building measures	160-1-2
48/76 C (Nigeria)	United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Program	Consensus
48/76 D (Mexico)	United Nations Disarmament Information Program	Consensus
48/76 E (Nepal)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada.

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION	VOTE
<i>(Lead sponsor or sponsors)</i>		Yes-No-Abstain
48/77 A (Brazil)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
48/77 B (Egypt)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Consensus
48/79* (Sweden)	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	162-0-3
48/80	Question of Antarctica	96-0-7
48/81 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus
48/82 (Indonesia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	130-4-36
48/84 A (Russia)	Maintenance of international security	84-0-83
48/84 B (FYR Macedonia)	Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States	Consensus
48/85 (Latin America and Caribbean)	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	Consensus
48/86 (Algeria)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa	Consensus
48/87 (Chairman)	Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee)	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

48/76 B (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	120-23-24
48/78 (Arab League)	Israeli nuclear armament	53-45-65

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

48/66 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	126-4-35
48/69 (Indonesia)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water	118-3-45
48/75 H (Afghanistan)	Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional weapons	146-0-22
48/83 (Indonesia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	122-1-45

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada.

Halfway to CWC Implementation

January 13 marked the first anniversary of the signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At the midway point in the implementation process, the Provisional Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continues its efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Convention, anticipated in January 1995. Djibouti, Guyana, Maldives and Turkmenistan have recently signed the Convention, bringing the total number of signatories to 154.

Expert groups are continuing their work in the following areas: industrial chemical manufacturing facilities, chemical weapons manufacturing facilities, training, materials, security procedures, chemical weapons storage facilities, and technical cooperation and assistance. The Chair of the group on chemical weapons storage facilities is a Canadian, Lieutenant-Colonel James Knapp of the Department of National Defence.

The staff of the OPCW's Provisional Secretariat will be augmented during the coming year from the present 78 to more than

120 for Phase 1 (1994). When the Convention has been ratified by 65 or more countries, Phase 2 will begin with a staff of 225 and a team of 140 inspectors. The budget of the OPCW, adopted in the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, is C\$24,097,500. Canada's share has been determined in accordance with the UN scale, namely 3.11124 percent of the total budget, in this case, \$749,740.

National Authority being constituted in Ottawa.

Canada's OPCW delegation has been enlarged with the appointment of Mr. Ian Marrs as Scientific Advisor. Mr. Marrs had over 20 years experience in the chemical industry before joining the Department of Industry in 1981. His appointment demonstrates the importance placed by Canada on the work of the

OPCW Preparatory Commission. The National Authority in Ottawa will begin hiring its staff in late March.

In concert with the Department of Justice, DFAIT will begin a series of interdepartmental consultations on drafting a bill to ban chemical weapons. A number of departments along with various Canadian chemical and pharmaceutical associations will be involved in this process. The bill will lead to Canada ratifying the CWC during 1994.

January's Moscow Summit enabled presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to sign co-operation agreements for the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. Beginning in March, information will be exchanged on chemical weapons and on inspections of the sites where such weapons are stored. A contribution of US\$30 million will be made for the construction of an analytical laboratory in Moscow by the Americans. An agreement also exists for a conceptual plan to destroy Russia's chemical weapons. The US administration will seek additional funds to support Russian efforts in this field.

MTCR Members Consider Regime's Future

Canada and other members of the Missile Technology Control Regime met in Interlaken, Switzerland from November 29 to December 2 to discuss the Regime's future direction. Partners agreed to build on their achievements in controlling the export of missile-related technologies by giving emphasis to dealing directly with the missile proliferation threat emanating from those outside the MTCR. Efforts will be redoubled to persuade potential exporters to abide by MTCR guidelines. In addition, MTCR countries will take steps to encourage proliferating countries to act more responsibly. At the same time, partners were pleased to note an increase in the number of countries outside the regime that have declared their intention to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Partner countries welcomed Argentina and Hungary to the Interlaken meeting, bringing to 25 the number of MTCR members. The next MTCR plenary will be held in Sweden in October.

Focus: On Canada in Asia Pacific

With its rich history and experience of multilateralism, it is not surprising that Canada was one of the first Asia Pacific countries to actively promote the idea of a more regularized security dialogue in the region. Canada's 1990 initiative to establish a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) embracing Canada, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States reflected worries that the progressive reduction of tensions in Europe (notwithstanding crises in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) had not prompted a similar trend in Asia Pacific. This was of direct concern to Canada given our growing links with the region.

Canada has long been militarily involved in Asia Pacific, through our participation in World War II and the Korean conflict, our contributions to the various Indochina truce and supervisory commissions, and participation in all United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region. Over the last decade, economic and demographic trends have broadened Canadian engagement in Asia Pacific and heightened our stake in regional security.

Economics

Asia ranks as Canada's second most important trading region, after the United States. In 1992, 11 of Canada's top 25 markets were Asia Pacific economies and (not counting the US) the region was a market for over \$16 billion of Canadian exports — some 10 percent of Canada's total exports. Two-way trade with Asia Pacific states (again excluding the US) was worth \$37.8 billion, compared to our \$26 billion in trade with the European Union.

The Asia Pacific region is also becoming a vital source of foreign direct investment and new technology for Canada. Over the past decade, Japan moved from being the eighth-largest foreign investor in Canada to the third-largest, behind the US and the UK. Japanese direct investment in Canada has doubled since 1985 to \$5.7 billion, while portfolio investments, mainly in federal and provincial government bonds, are substantial. Other Asian economies, such as Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore and South Korea, have also become major foreign investors in Canada.

Canada and APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded in 1989, is the principal intergovernmental vehicle for cooperation in the region. In addition to Canada, APEC's members include the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei. It is the only international organization in which all three "Chinas" (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) are represented at the ministerial level.

APEC holds annual meetings of foreign and trade ministers and periodic meetings of senior officials. The organization has two trade and economic policy groups and 10 sectoral groups cooperating on projects in areas such as fisheries, transportation, energy and marine resource conservation. Canada chairs APEC's Economic Trends and Issues working group and is co-leader of the Human Resource Development and Marine Resources Conservation groups.

APEC is evolving into a key agenda-setting body, helping to define priorities for member countries. In 1993, APEC's focus was a trade and investment "action" agenda to increase transparency and regional cooperation, involving trade facilitation, expansion and liberalization. In November 1993, the first APEC summit was held in Seattle. Canada is scheduled to host the ninth ministerial meeting in 1997.

Participation in APEC gives Canada an opportunity to affirm its commitment to the region and helps to strengthen trans-Pacific ties. It ensures Canada's interests are taken into account and enables Canada to pursue a range of specific regional and bilateral objectives, such as expanding trade, promoting investment and protecting the marine environment. Equally important, APEC participation makes Canadians more informed about opportunities in the region and prompts citizens of other countries to consider Canada when making decisions about everything from business to tourism. It provides an opportunity to match the region's needs to Canadian capabilities. Participation in APEC com-



Secretary of State for Asia Pacific, Mr. Raymond Chan, with Canada World Youth participants in Phichit, Thailand. Mr. Chan visited Hong Kong, China, Thailand and Japan in January to discuss a range of bilateral issues and trade opportunities.

plements work in other regional and international bodies such as the OECD, GATT and the G7, and will become increasingly important as the Asia Pacific region itself takes on greater weight in global affairs.

Environment

Several Asia Pacific countries are important players in global environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity cooperation. Canada cooperates with regional states on environmental issues through Canadian International Development Agency programs; through APEC's working groups on marine resource conservation, fisheries, energy and tourism; and through policy discussions and cooperative arrangements on issues like environmental protection, forestry management, water management, energy efficiency, science and technology.

The APEC focus on economic cooperation and trade liberalization would be enriched by incorporating the broader question of sustainable development. Canada has invited APEC environment ministers to meet in Vancouver March 24-25, on the margins of the *Globe 94* exhibition and conference. The focus will be to assess opportunities for cooperation among APEC members, to discuss regional priorities and implementation of Agenda 21 follow-up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, and to consider how to promote the integration of sustainable development in the APEC agenda.

Senior Officials Meeting that precedes it, provide opportunities for exchanges on regional and global issues, such as APEC, GATT, human rights and regional security. The 1993 PMC in Singapore endorsed the launching of an ASEAN Regional Forum for the discussion of security issues. The first meeting will be in Bangkok in July. Participants will include not only ASEAN countries and dialogue partners, but also China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea (see p. 2 for details).

A Canada-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1981 to promote closer industrial, commercial and development cooperation between the parties. A revised Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed in July 1993. The new agreement will foster greater private sector cooperation, assist in the liberalization and expansion of trade relations, and target development to the mutual benefit of both Canada and ASEAN.

Human Rights

The Asia Pacific region has a mixed record on human rights, reflecting its political and cultural diversity. All Asian governments joined in the Vienna Declaration (1993) that human rights everywhere are the legitimate concern of the international community. Canada continues to monitor the situation in the region closely and has been active in making representations on general human rights situations and individual cases. An important aspect of Canada's development cooperation programs in Asia Pacific involves working with governments and non-governmental organizations to strengthen institutions for human rights and democratic development.


Canada and ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Founded in 1967, it is the most successful organization in Asia Pacific, with an effective program of consultation and political cooperation. ASEAN began establishing "dialogue partnerships" with selected countries in 1972. Canada became a dialogue partner in 1977. Other such partners are Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the US and the European Union.

Political links between Canada and ASEAN have developed through the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) of ASEAN and dialogue partner foreign ministers that is held following the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting each year. The PMC, and the

Forum on International Relations

University of Toronto professor Janice Gross Stein and Montreal business executive Pierre S. Pettigrew will act as co-chairs of the first National Forum on Canada's International Relations to be held March 21-22 in Ottawa. The purpose of the Forum is to provide an opportunity for Canadians to consider the implications of the rapidly changing international and domestic environments as they affect foreign affairs, and to offer views on the impact these changes should have on Canada's policy priorities. Some 120 people from a number of backgrounds and with involvement in business, labour, universities, non-governmental organizations, aboriginal affairs and the media are expected to participate in this first Forum. They have been invited in a personal capacity on the basis of their knowledge and experience. The National Forum, which will be held annually, is an important dimension of the foreign policy review process initiated by the government.



Prime Minister Chrétien with Japan's Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa at the APEC Summit in Seattle in November.

Cooperative Security

Canada's multi-faceted involvement in Asia Pacific stems from and promotes direct Canadian interests in specific issues, such as trade, the environment, immigration and human rights. It also, however, underscores the complex nature of security. Proliferation and armed conflict in Asia Pacific can adversely affect a range of economic, environmental and demographic interests for all states in the region. Yet it is from problems related to these very interests — pollution, overfishing, illegal migration and so on — that the disputes or insecurities that lead to the spread of weapons and conflict can arise. To successfully prevent conflict, it is necessary to deal with these root causes of insecurity.

Inter-state problems in Asia Pacific have traditionally been dealt with bilaterally. Only now is Asia Pacific beginning to develop the fora and mechanisms necessary to promote region-wide cooperation and raise the level of mutual trust. In Canada's view, one of the major achievements of the NPCSD was its contribution to building confidence in multilateral dialogue in the region.

One of the assets Canada brings to the region is experience in making multilateralism work. There is no substitute for the network of bilateral security arrangements which have guaranteed stability in Asia Pacific. But there are ways of complementing these arrangements so that security and stability are offered to all regional countries in an inclusive, rather than exclusive, setting. Through our activity in APEC, the ASEAN PMC, the new ASEAN Regional Forum and a variety of sub-regional cooperative arrangements, Canada will continue to help make multilateralism a credible, legitimate and workable instrument for fostering cooperative security in the Asia Pacific region.

Forecast

International security activities involving Canada, April through July.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

April 11-15: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Preparatory Committee, Geneva

April 18 - May 9: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 16-19: Australia Group meeting, Paris

May 16 - July 1: CD in session, Geneva

June 5-11: Organization of American States General Assembly, Belem (Brazil)

June 21-22: Chemical and Biological Export Control Seminar, Buenos Aires

July 15 - September 7: CD in session, Geneva

July 25: ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok

Acronyms

APEC — Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF — ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN (PMC) — Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Post Ministerial Conference)

CANCAPS — Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security

CBM — confidence-building measure

CD — Conference on Disarmament

CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CSCAP — Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty

CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention

DFAIT — Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

ESDI — European Security and Defence Identity

HEU — highly enriched uranium

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime

NACC — North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NPCSD — North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue

NPT — Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

SOM — Senior Officials Meeting

START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UNDOF — UN Disengagement Force (Golan Heights)

UNGA — UN General Assembly

UNPROFOR — UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)

UNTAC — UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

WEU — Western European Union

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