

APRIL 1889.

The
Theological Monthly

PARTIAL EXEGESIS.

PROBABLY all human exposition of Holy Scripture is one-sided. If the Bible be indeed God's Word, it is hard to see how this can be otherwise. "We know in part, and we prophesy in part." Until "that which is perfect is come," that which is partial and one-sided cannot pass away.

Modern divines would readily allow the one-sidedness of those expositions of Scripture which were accepted in former days. But perhaps we hardly admit our own partiality of vision to the same extent. It is only another illustration of the mote and the beam.

No doubt I shall myself exemplify the same parable before I have done. There is no escape for him who ventures to find fault. But, as a one-sided and partial student, I desire to improve, and would not willingly ignore anything of which I ought to take note. Having made this confession I venture to charge the received divinity of the day with great one-sidedness in the treatment of Holy Scripture, and I proceed to establish the charge.

It appears to me that far too much time and thought are

expended in the endeavour to dissect the human authorship of separate books of the Bible ; and that its organic unity is too persistently overlooked. Our forefathers may have been too prone to interpret passages in one writer by passages in another, without allowing for differences of use and style. But this is no reason why we should err in the opposite extreme.

At present the chief end of critical exegesis of Scripture seems to be to place the reader in the exact standpoint of the writer. Really to do this is impossible. Only by the most exact and careful study of antiquity can we make any approximation to the mental position and the surroundings of men, the last of whom wrote some eighteen centuries ago ; and the first, some fifteen centuries earlier still. If certainty as to the meaning of Holy Scripture can only be obtained by reverting to the condition of its human authors, we must simply wait for the resurrection of the dead. But is this the best way to reach the meaning ? The very persons who pursue the search most ardently are the first to tell us that it is not. When we ask them for the spiritual teaching of that which they have dissected, they are as helpless as ourselves. We are in the case described by Isaiah (ch. xxix. 11, &c.), with but slight difference. "The vision of all has become unto you as the words of a book that is sealed." Deliver it to the learned, and after all their critical analysis, when asked to give *the meaning*, they say, "I cannot, for it is sealed." But if the rest of us are asked to interpret it, without the aid of historical criticism, we are expected to say, "I am not learned." The critics too often reject the received Christian interpretation. We, in turn, reject their verbal dissection. Between us both, what are the multitude of plain and simple folk to do ?

I cannot but feel that the destructive one-sidedness of modern criticism is largely responsible for this state of things. And in particular I refer to the practice of resting the authority and interpretation of Scripture on the human authorship ; and making the authorship itself depend almost entirely upon the vocabulary of the books.

Yet even the vocabulary itself is but partially examined. And when the evidence furnished by the vocabulary happens to point in the conservative direction, the vocabulary is at once abandoned, and the argument transferred to the style. One familiar instance (not perhaps of any vital importance in itself) is furnished by the epistle to the Hebrews. To maintain the Pauline authorship of that epistle in the present day, is to confess oneself an ignoramus. But on what grounds? If the discussion proceeds on the evidence of the vocabulary, the Pauline authorship is established beyond all dispute. I need only refer to the learned introduction to that epistle in the "Speaker's Commentary." The proof is exhaustive, but it is still repeated that the epistle was not written by St. Paul. If we ask, Why not? we are told the style is not his. One might venture to reply, Show me the non-Pauline style, after deducting the Pauline arguments and the Pauline vocabulary. We should wait long enough for an answer to the request. In the end it must come to this, that the style is not precisely that of St. Paul's other epistles. In other words, a member of the Sanhedrin, and an Hebrew of the Hebrews, the passion of whose life it was to convert his countrymen, is expected to write to them in the same style in which he was wont to address certain Gentile churches, whose knowledge of Scripture and revealed religion was a thing of yesterday! How *could* the style be the same, if the writer were a man of any grasp or education? He was, in fact, a person of remarkable versatility. Personally, I believe the chief reason why men deny that St. Paul wrote the epistle is that one or two prominent writers have spoken contemptuously of that view. It does not look well to set up one's own opinion against theirs, whom all sermondom and the press worshipping. "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!"

The real difficulties lie rather in the question, If St. Paul wrote the epistle, when, where, and to what Church was it written? These are matters worthy of patient discussion. It would be beside the point were I to discuss them now. They are by no means inexplicable. And if we cannot solve

these difficulties by the somewhat scanty records of St. Paul's life in the New Testament, there is certainly no other life which touches them at all. Apart from St. Paul, the few personal touches in the epistle are left isolated, with no earthly bearing whatever. Reject the Pauline authorship, and besides destroying all exact exegesis of St. Peter's allusion to an epistle by St. Paul *not written to Gentiles* (2 Peter iii. 15), you have absolutely no alternative in its place. All other claims to have written the epistle can only pile conjecture on conjecture, without a scrap of *evidence* of any kind.

I am reminded at this point that there are expressions common to this epistle and St. Luke, found nowhere else in the Greek Testament. So there are expressions common to St. Luke and St. Paul's other epistles. But it is utterly illogical to maintain St. Luke's authorship, as opposed to St. Paul, on such slender grounds as these. The coincidences between St. Luke and Hebrews may be counted by tens at most, the coincidences between St. Paul and Hebrews by hundreds; therefore, it is more likely that St. Luke wrote to the Hebrews, than that St. Paul did! What sort of reasoning is this? But the same generation which is expected to receive this reasoning has also been burdened with a book to prove that St. Paul was the author of the Acts and the Third Gospel. Of course the evidence is the same; namely, the verbal coincidences between St. Paul and St. Luke.

Behold, then, a syllogism furnished by modern arguments from the use of language. On the ground of similarity of language, St. Luke is the author of the epistle to the Hebrews. But, on the same ground, St. Paul is the author of the two writings universally ascribed to St. Luke. Therefore, St. Paul must also be the author of the epistle to the Hebrews. In other words, St. Paul is only another name for St. Luke!

The contemplation of reasonings like this, where the premises of the argument are *published books*, supposed to be put forth in all earnestness and sobriety, may well make us

ask what is the real value of this modern reasoning from style and language, and whither is it likely to lead? If it can yield such absurdities when applied to the New Testament, of which most of us know something; how can we trust it with the Old Testament, where, beyond the Sunday lessons, few people know anything at all?

Not long ago, I heard an argument on the book of Judges in relation to the Pentateuch. The argument was constructed to prove,—I am really not sure what, *positively*; but *negatively*,—that the relation between Judges and the preceding books is anything but what it professes to be on the face of the narrative. But the only proofs were drawn from these parts of the book which touch the question of *worship*. The Pentateuch, or, at least, Deuteronomy, ordains a single place of sacrifice. In Judges, sacrifices are accepted at Bochim, at Ophrah, and at the place of Samson's birth. The same book makes mention of Baalim and Ashtaroth, which Deuteronomy does not name, and so on. Therefore, the loose practices of Israel, as described in Judges, are wholly incompatible with the view that the strict legislation of the Deuteronomy was then extant. All the way through, the argument was based upon one limited set of words concerning religious worship. Nothing else was allowed a place in the evidence at all. I do not think there was any intentional unfairness, or reluctance to be convinced; but the more I think of it, the more I am impressed with the intense *one-sidedness* of the whole method. Why should the broad features of the history of Israel be so entirely overlooked in discussing the relation between their legislation and their national life?

Take a parallel from our own times. Look at our colonies. It not unfrequently happens that men whose early days have been spent in the Christian atmosphere of this favoured country, and in homes where the religious observances are even Puritanically strict, find themselves in the thinly-inhabited districts,—I might say, trackless wastes,—of some new country. What becomes of the Sunday, of the church-going and Bible-reading, or even of the prayers? Suppose one were to write the history of some half-dozen colonial

families, or groups of settlers, whose grandfathers were rigid Scotch Presbyterians or simple English country folk, and compare it with the prescribed rules of daily life observed by the preceding generation in the old country; what sort of parallel would be furnished by the two? Would it be reasonable to argue from the actual life of the colonial grandchildren, that the religion of the grand-parents could only be the development of a later and more civilized age?

It seems to me to be forgotten in this kind of comparison between Deuteronomy and the later history, that the Israel of the Exodus lay, so to say, under the shadow of a single hand. The area of a second-rate English city would have comprised them all. Their organization was perfect; their government centralized and strong; the Divine presence openly manifested; at least, this is the picture which contemporary records have presented to our view. Every transgression and disobedience received condign punishment at once. There was no difficulty in this. But two generations later this small handful of people, or, rather, their grand-children, were dispersed over the whole of Palestine,—a country, I will not say partially civilized, but very partially cleared. The very seat of Joshua's government was seriously menaced by wild beasts as much as *seven centuries later* (2 Kings xvii. 24, 25).

Now, what should we naturally expect under such a condition of affairs? What *could* we expect but a relapse into something like barbarism? Without churches or schools, or anything that could be called education; a few persons, who were supposed to teach, scattered in forty-eight places at uneven distances throughout the country, themselves colonists like the rest; with numerous idols and shrines still standing, and idolatrous worship continued by the natives in every part; what else *could* happen in the nature of things, *except* a loss of the religion of Sinai and of Moses' life? It would have been a moral miracle had it happened otherwise.

What else is the actual record of the book of Judges, taken as it stands? The seed sown in Canaan, sparsely and sparingly, is at first choked by the rank vegetation of the half-cultivated wild. But when it begins to spring up here and

there, what appearance does it present? However imperfect and poor the crop may be, it always recalls the features of the original plant. It is not a new religion that meets us, but vague recollections of the old religion. Single precepts are pushed to extremities, as the extermination of the idolaters, like Eglon and his followers, or Sisera, or the inhabitants of Laish; but *not* the considerate immunity of the rest of the Deuteronomic code. In the war of Benjamin, the harsher features of the Mosaic legislation are reproduced to the letter. But the religion of Micah,—“Now I know that the Lord will do me good, seeing I have a Levite to my priest,”—is just the vague recollection that we should expect in a matter of the kind.

Now, why is this historical and moral *vraisemblance* to be ignored, while minute verbal differences between the practice of Judges and the legislation of the Pentateuch are pressed, as though they could override every other consideration? Is not this one-sided and partial exegesis?

No less one-sided is the accepted modern theory of what people call “the book Genesis.” The beautiful ground-plan of the work furnished by the “eleven generations” of which it is composed receives no consideration. To this I can testify, having repeatedly called attention to it in the course of the last twenty years, but with no result, except where I could teach it in the lecture-room. The word “generations” itself critics take no pains to interpret. Whereas, if it received half the attention that Asherah, or Bamoth, or Chushan-rishathaim have had bestowed upon them, it would tell a very plain and yet a most interesting tale. Instead of this, the Jahvist and Elohist alone are listened to.

The best constructed portion of the Old Testament is described as the result of patchwork, and candidates for Orders are examined as to the effect upon divinity if the early part were Chaldæan legends sifted by Abraham through a monotheistic sieve (a fact).

I have before me an interesting example of the absurdities resulting from the Jahvist and Elohist theories, when applied to the narrative of the flood.

The writer of a certain Old Testament handbook has presented the narrative, in Genesis vi. 5 to ix. 17, in two parallel columns. On the left hand he has placed those portions which are characterized by the mention of the name JEHOVAH. On the right he places the other verses, where God is called ELOHIM. This column he calls Elohistic; the other he terms Jahvistic. They are supposed to be by different authors. Some editor has combined them into one.

A hint supplied by the late Dean Burgon, in his treatise on the Pastoral Office, long ago set me upon the task of examining the dates in the flood by the light of the Jewish calendar of twelve lunar months. The result cannot possibly be accidental. Every one knows that in certain places of that narrative, the *weekly* division of time appears. In other places the *day of the month* is given, and the year of Noah's life. By an intelligible conjecture, the writer of these tables of Elohistic and Jahvistic fragments has assigned all the week-dates to one writer, and all the month-dates to another. Thus :—

JAHVISTIC.

"Yet seven days and I will cause it to rain."—Gen. vii. 4.

"After seven days."—vii. 10.

"Yet other seven days."—viii. 10.

"Yet other seven days."—viii. 12.

Also,

"At the end of 40 days."—viii. 6.

ELOHISTIC.

"In the 600th year of Noah's life, in the 2nd month, the 17th day."—Gen. vii. 11.

"In the 7th month on the 17th day."—viii. 3.

"In the 10th month on the 1st day."—viii. 5.

"In the 601st year, in the 1st month, the 1st day."—viii. 14.

"In the 2nd month, the 27th day."—viii. 14.

As soon as I saw that the narrative of the flood had been dissected in this fashion, I suspected what the result would be; but I confess I did not think the thing would have been done to suit *my* purpose so exactly as it has been. The Elohistic *month-dates* referred to are all *seventh days* according to the weekly reckoning furnished by the other column; as the following table will show.

NOAH'S 600TH YEAR.		TABLE OF SEVENTH DAYS.										NOAH'S 601ST YEAR.	
Months, 2nd.	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th	1st	2nd	
The figures in [] are referred to in Scripture.	3	2	7	6	4	3	1	7	5	4	2	[1]	6
	[10]	9	14	13	11	10	8	14	12	[11]	9	8	13
	[17]	16	21	20	18	[17]	15	21	19	[18]	16	15	20
	24	23	28	27	25	24	22	28	26	[25]	23	22	[27]
	...	30	29	29	...
	29 days	30 days	29 days	30 days	29 days	30 days	29 days	30 days	29 days	30 days	29 days	30 days	29 days

According to the Elohist and Jahvistic analysis, the fact that the rain began "after seven days" is Jahvistic. The fact that it began on the seventeenth day of the second month of Noah's six-hundredth year is Elohist. Similarly with the subsequent dates, as I have shown above. The *week-dates* are *Jahvistic*, the month-dates *Elohist*, according to the analysis. Now apply the Jewish calendar as above. The months have alternately thirty and twenty-nine days; and the year being lunar, consists of $(6 \times 30 + 6 \times 29 =)$ 354 days. Take the month-date of the commencement of the flood as a *seventh day* (putting the two records together), and proceed to write down all the other seventh days in the year of the flood. These days in the third month will be 2, 9, 16, 23, 30; in the fourth, 7, 14, 21, 28; and so on. In the seventh month they will be 3, 10, 17, 24. Thus *the seventeenth day of the seventh month, on which the ark rested, comes out as a seventh day!*

Again, taking up the so-called Elohist narrative, we find that on the first day of the tenth month the tops of the mountains were seen. The Jahvistic narrative tells us that after forty days Noah opened his window and sent out two birds. But the fortieth day after the first day of the tenth month is the eleventh day of the eleventh month. Again, our table shows us that this is *one of the seventh days* from the beginning of the flood.

Continuing the same plan, we find that the day on which the Elohist says Noah uncovered the ark, and the day on which he left it, are also *seventh days* from the beginning of the whole catastrophe.

Now suppose the Elohist and Jahvistic analysis to be correct, as the critic makes it,—the week-dates Jahvistic, the month-dates Elohist; the Elohist never once referring to the weeks, and in fact being ignorant of weeks altogether; and the Jahvist never mentioning a month or a year—by what means has it come to pass that the week-dates of the one narrative coincide with the month-dates of the other, and vice versa?

The agreement is so striking that if the two narratives had come down to us independently, only a very miracle of exactness could produce such harmony. It is enough to prove the unity of the two witnesses, *supposing them to be two*.

But what are the actual facts? The so-called Jahvistic and Elohist fragments are actually parts of one book. The Sabbath, on which depend the weeks assigned by our modern critic to the Jahvist, is really *Elohist* in Gen. ii. 1-3. The month-dates, classed with the Elohist portions of the narrative of the deluge, bear silent testimony to the same fact. One golden thread, picked out for the first time by a most devout believer in Genesis as the inspired work of *Moses*, is here displayed by a disciple of that believer, as holding every fragment of the narrative together in a single line. The pearls cannot be taken off the one string. It is one string of pearls, not two, that we have in our hands. The argument, moreover, is one of arithmetical agreement, which no fancies about style and language can avail to overthrow. While the Jewish (and I may add the Assyrian) calendar stands on record, the Elohist and Jahvistic analysis cannot reasonably be applied to the narrative of Noah's flood.

I shall lay myself open to the charge of great assumption by what I am going to say next. My friend Canon Cheyne must really allow me to take an illustration of one-sided exegesis from his interesting work on Isaiah. It is quite too good to be lost. I want to show how linguistic criticism of details sometimes leads a man to ignore those aspects of truth which larger study of Scripture brings to light. The moral is, that to isolate the sacred writers from each other is not the best way to understand them.

The illustration is taken from Isaiah vi., p. 38, in Canon Cheyne's first volume (edition 1880). In verse 6 he reads, "There flew unto me one of the seraphim, with a *stone* in his hand, which he had taken with the tongs from off the altar." What the *stone* may be, one is so curious to know that one immediately consults the note. It reads thus: "One of the seraphs brings a stone from the never-extinguished fire of the altar of incense." Why "the altar of incense?" one asks. Why "never-extinguished?" Where are we? In "the palace," by verse 1, not "the temple;" and a note informs us that it is "Jehovah's heavenly palace." To find an altar in heaven the learned writer is obliged to cite Rev. viii. 3, ix. 13. Surely Isaiah wrote before St. John! Overlooking the fact that it is there described as "the *golden altar*" (like the "altar of incense." to which he himself has referred,—see Exodus xxx. 1-3, which speaks of *shittim-wood* overlaid with *pure gold*), he writes thus: "*A stone*, for the heavenly altar is formed on the model of the earthly one. [Moses puts it in the opposite way,—Exod. xxvii. 8.] Ewald rightly sees an allusion to the law in the 'Book of the Covenant,' that altars should be constructed of earth, or of unhewn stones (Exodus xx. 25),—a law which evidently arose in the nomadic period *before tools were common.*"

So runs the note. The way in which mistakes are piled on one another is positively bewildering. To begin with the last. *Tools are expressly mentioned and forbidden* in the law referred to: "If thou lift up thy tool upon it, thou hast polluted it." So far as this text proves anything, "evidently" tools were just as common as altars then. Next, "the heavenly altar," *golden* by the testimony of the only places where we hear of it, is built on the model of the earthly one; that is to say, the golden altar of incense is formed on the model of an altar of unhewn stones. And "a stone" is brought from it to the prophet's lips. Why? Because, our note informs us, "Fire is the sacramental sign of moral purification" (Matt. iii. 12, Comp. Num. xxxi. 23). This is excellent doctrine. And if the seraph had brought a coal, "a live coal," as we have been accustomed to read, the exposi-

tion would be thoroughly appropriate. But *a stone*, a stone from the altar, is all that Canon Cheyne allows us. And on reference to his critical note, we find that whereas Gesenius and others translate the Hebrew word "*ritspah*" in this place by "*hot stone*," Canon Cheyne takes all the fire out of his exposition by the statement that "*ritspah* is not necessarily a hot stone," see Esther i. 6, &c. [where it means a *pavement*], and he adds, Vulg. rightly, *calculus*.

So that the golden altar of incense was built of *calculi*! It is more than doubtful whether the *calculus* of the Vulgate in this place has anything whatever to do with the materials of the altar. In ch. xxvii. 9, the word for stones of the altar is *lapides*, Hebrew *abanim*, a very different word. *Calculus* means a *pebble*, a small stone used for voting, a weight. To build an altar of loose *pebbles* is impossible; and to suggest that the altar of incense was a heap of pebbles, is absurd. The effect of a never-extinguished fire on pebbles would be to burst and pulverize them. Having come so far, one is moved to inquire further why the translation "live coal" has been exchanged for "stone" in this place by Canon Cheyne. To understand this we turn to the Hebrew Lexicon and Concordance. In the Concordance we find that the word *ritspah* appears altogether seven times. Here only, in Isaiah vi. 6, is it associated with fire. Everywhere else,—viz., in Esther i. 6, 2 Chron. vii. 3, and four times in Ezekiel's vision of the temple,—it is translated "*pavement*." All these instances, however, are later than the *exile*; Isaiah's vision is "in the year that King Uzziah died." Parallel to this expression in Isaiah vi. is the only earlier instance we can compare, where the substantive *retzeph* is used in connection with the food prepared for Elijah, a cake *baken on the coals* (1 Kings xix. 6). Instead of coals the revisers give us "hot stones" in their margin, anxious to maintain the connection between the fire and the pavement. Solomon's chariot *paved* (*râtzâph*) with love completes the list.

Thus at least it stands in the *Englishman's* Hebrew Concordance. I must confess to some little surprise when, on turning to Fürst's large Hebrew Concordance, I found

ritzpah, a pavement, and *ritzpah*, a coal, derived from entirely differently roots, spelt with the same letters, but having different etymological affinities.

Why this view should be ignored without notice by a modern scholar, I cannot understand. So far as the requirements of the passages under discussion are concerned, it seems clear that for Elijah's "cake" and Isaiah's lips we need *fire*. The pavement in the other passages may do very well with *stones*. Now there is a word *resheph* compared by Fierst with *ratsaph* (the root of *ritzpah* in Isaiah vi.), that unquestionably bears the required meaning (see Cant. viii. 6). Why should there not be (as Fierst says) a word *ritzpah* with the same meaning as *rispah*, i.e., a live coal; and another word *ritzpah*, meaning a *pavement*? What is the real value of the criticism that insists on giving to two words identical in sound or spelling, the same meaning, in the face of common sense? I have heard a foreigner pronounce *use* and *juice* so that one could not distinguish useless from juiceless; and the two meanings of the Latin *jus* are familiar to every schoolboy. Why, then, are we bound to suppose that the seraph brought to Isaiah's lips a cold paving-stone from the golden altar? Or was it a *calculus* after all?

But is there any reason to suppose the said altar was the *altar of incense*? Is it correct to speak of "the never-extinguished fire" of that altar, in the exposition of the Old Testament? "The fire shall ever be burning," was said of *the altar of burnt offering*, not the altar of incense (Levit. vi. 13). No such thing is said of the *incense altar*. There was no provision for it. Incense was burnt there for a few moments in the morning and evening, a sort of memorial *within* the temple of the burnt offering then offered *without*. But there is nothing whatever to show that the fire was kept up during the interval; in fact, it could not be.

And so far as Isaiah is concerned, he could not have seen the seraph take a stone, or anything else, from the incense altar, for "*the house was*" at that time "*filled with smoke*." Moreover, Isaiah was not, like Ezekiel, a *priest*, to be brought within the temple. It is morally certain that he never saw the altar of incense during his whole life.

But it was no uncommon thing to take a live coal from the brazen altar, which Isaiah must have constantly seen. Live coals from that altar were used to burn the daily incense, as we learn directly from the Talmud, and indirectly from the rule against strange fire. The purification of Isaiah's lips with a coal from the fire of the burnt sacrifice is a most just and beautiful conception. For the service of that altar was a constant type of His atonement, who "loved us, and gave Himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour." By no other sacrifice could Isaiah's "iniquity be taken away, and his sin purged."

I have exposed the weakness of this piece of exegesis somewhat ruthlessly, because it affords such a perfect example of the failure of purely linguistic considerations, combined with a devout spirit, to explain the Holy Scriptures, unless the expositor also takes account of their general teaching. Six times is the sixth chapter of Isaiah cited in the New Testament. In Canon Cheyne's notes on the chapter there is absolutely no reference to the fact.

Holy Scripture is far more really the work of *one* author than of many scribes; far more one volume than a collection of separate books. It is so far systematic that our thorough knowledge of any individual portion must be in proportion to our grasp of the whole. This is not the case to anything like the same extent with human writings. You can *sample* them. A good slice of Thucydides, or Virgil, or Homer, or Plato, or any ancient classic, will give the reader a very fair notion of what the writer is. There is no very serious risk of misinterpreting the first book of the Republic of Plato, in the fact that you have not yet read the last. Not so with Holy Scripture. You cannot *sample* it. You cannot isolate the prophet Isaiah and make sure of a sound interpretation, while you refuse to consider the law of Moses, or St. Paul's quotations from the book itself. If it be asked, Why not? the answer is no modern one. "For no prophecy of Scripture is of any *private interpretation*. For the prophecy came not in the old time by the will of man. *But Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.*" C. H. WALLER.

THE QUESTION OF INSPIRATION.

IT is held by some writers on this subject that the Scriptures do not furnish the materials necessary to the framing of any doctrine in regard to it. One need not be surprised at this, for there are some writers who allege that the Scriptures do not furnish sufficient *data* for framing a definite doctrine on any subject within the analogy of the faith,—if we may speak of faith or analogy in such connection at all. Professor Jowett, for example, in his commentary on Paul's Epistles, considers logic to be out of place in matters of religion. "Definite statements respecting the relation of Christ either to God or man are (he says) but human figures transferred to a subject beyond thought. . . . Mystery is the nearest approach we can make to truth ; only by indefiniteness can we avoid putting words in the place of things." He had come much nearer stating a truth if he had said, "Only by indefiniteness can we manage to put words in the place of things."

This theory of doctrinal indefiniteness Professor Jowett applies to the question regarding the reconciliation of the world to God. "We know nothing (he affirms) of the objective act on God's part, by which He reconciled the world unto Himself, the very description of it as an act being only a figure of speech ; and we seem to know that we never can know anything. While clinging to the ground of fact, we feel also that there is more in the fact than we see or understand." Certainly, we may well feel this if we can only "know that we never can know anything." If we can never know anything, of course there must be more in the fact contemplated than we can understand. "There is hope and peace (he says) in what we see ; yet more as we believe in possibilities of which we are ignorant." How it is that anything of which we can never know anything except that we cannot know anything

about it, can inspire us with peace or hope, is certainly as mysterious as any doctrine which Professor Jowett rejects because of its mystery.

The fact is, this advocate of doctrinal agnosticism seems to have reached, in his theology, the same state of mental bewilderment at which the Chian sceptic Metrodorus arrived, in his philosophical speculations, when he came to the conclusion that he did not know that he did not know. The principle on which he proceeds is precisely the same, and when applied to the contents of the Bible must land its votaries in the hopeless maze of universal theological scepticism. This goal, or gulf, Professor Jowett has reached in regard to the central doctrine of Christianity, and teaches that we can formulate no theory of the Atonement made by Christ when His soul was made an offering for sin! Isaiah might formulate a doctrine on this subject, 700 years before the offering was made, and John the Baptist might expound it when introducing the atoning victim, but our friends of the New Theology, with all the light of the New Testament Revelation, cannot frame one now!

There is, of course, a difference between rejecting all definite doctrinal statements in matters of religion and rejecting a definite doctrinal statement in regard to a particular subject. However, when the bearing of the subject, in regard to which no definitely formulated theory will be allowed, on all the doctrines of Revelation, is taken into account, the positional difference is greatly modified. He who denies the possibility of formulating a definite doctrinal statement in regard to the relation of the Holy Spirit to the utterance, or record, of the contents of the Bible, does, *ipse facto*, deny the possibility of ascertaining to what extent the sacred writings express the mind of the Spirit. Let the concession be made that the Spirit of God, after informing the agents He employed, left them to the exercise of their own judgments in conveying this information to others, and our faith must rest upon the trustworthiness of these agents. Indeed, we have the open avowal, on the part of those who take exception to definite doctrinal statements on the subject of inspiration,

that all that was needed in the case of the sacred writers, was that they should be intelligent, honest, faithful men. This is all one with saying that, in the communication of the truths they were commissioned to convey to men inspiration, in any admissible sense of the term, was altogether unnecessary. On this theory the Scriptures are not inspired at all,—the record is not an inspired record, and the infallible accuracy of its report of what was entrusted to its human authors is placed outside the pale of proof, while the faith which assumed its Divine infallibility is shaken to its foundations.

In opposition to all such unworthy conceptions of the Holy Scriptures it is proposed to state, as briefly as possible, the views of inspiration presented in the Bible itself. This is not a very difficult undertaking, for the material is abundant and unequivocal, consisting very largely of the direct testimony of our Saviour and His Apostles.

I. The Old Testament. There is no room left for doubt in regard to Christ's estimate of the writings of Moses and the Prophets. In His sermon on the Mount He informs His auditors of His relation to both, and proclaims their infallibility even to the smallest letter or horn of the record. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil; for verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot, or one tittle, shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled" (Matt. v. 17, 18). In our Saviour's estimate the sacred record, even to its minutest detail, was more stable and enduring than the universe itself.

Equally significant and comprehensive is His testimony (John x. 34-36), in reply to the charge of blasphemy preferred against Him by the Jews, because of His claiming to be the Son of God. "Is it not written in your law, I said, ye are gods? If He called them gods, to whom the word of God came (and the Scripture cannot be broken), say ye of Him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said I am the Son of God?"

This is certainly a very comprehensive testimony. It is a testimony in regard to all that the Jews recognized as Scrip-

ture. Of all their sacred writings it affirms that they are unbreakable. It will be observed that our Saviour is basing His argument upon the fact that the Scriptures applied the term "gods" to men. The argument, therefore, depended for its cogency and force upon the infallibility of the record in which the expression occurs. To the infallibility of that record He sets to His seal. His argument, cast into logical form, stands thus :

Major : "The Scripture cannot be broken."

Minor : "I said ye are gods," is Scripture.

Conclusion : "I said ye are gods," is an infallibly correct report of a Divine utterance.

Our Lord does not select a sentence out of the Old Testament, and, by His own authority, pronounce it infallibly correct. On the contrary, He argues the infallibility of the clause He selects, from the infallibility of the record in which it occurs. His testimony, therefore, is a testimony to the entire Old Testament as it existed in His days.

Now the only question to be settled is, whether the Scripture to which Christ bore this testimony is the same as that which Protestant Christendom accepts as the Old Testament? This is the sole question, and it admits of no debate. The Old Testament, which Protestants accept as the Word of God, is the same as the Old Testament accepted by the Jews. Our Saviour charged the Jews with making the Word of God void through their traditions, but He never charged them with falsifying the record itself. And as it was up to the time of Christ, so has it been ever since. The Christian Church has never charged the Jews with tampering with, or corrupting their Scriptures. The Jews have woefully failed in their expositions of them, but they have sedulously guarded the sacred oracles against textual corruption. On the other hand, the Jews make no complaint against Protestants regarding their treatment of the Old Testament text. They join with us in a common remonstrance against the Church of Rome for adding to the Old Testament, and treating, as Scripture, the books of the Apocrypha. The Old Testament as handed down to us, therefore, is the same infallible record as that to which our

Saviour bore testimony as more stable than the fabric of the heavens and the earth, and on which he relied, in the detail of its language, in defending Himself against the gravest charges preferred against Him by His enemies. Whether the adversary were Satan or Satan's servants, He invariably appeals to the Jewish Scriptures, and asserts, or assumes, their infallibility.

No less explicit is the testimony of the Apostles. We find the Apostle Paul (Gal. iii. 15-17) basing an argument in regard to the covenant of redemption upon the distinction between the singular and the plural of a noun. The points embraced in the argument are :—1. Even among men covenants once ratified are held to be binding. 2. God entered into covenant with Abraham and his seed. 3. In the original record of this federal transaction the singular "seed," and not the plural "seeds," was employed. 4. This "seed," to which the promises were made, the Apostle informs us, was Christ. It is manifest that the whole force and validity of the argument must depend upon the assumption that the writer of the record to which the Apostle alludes was Divinely guided in using the singular term "seed," and not the plural "seeds." Equally manifest must be the principle on which this reference is made to the history of God's intercourse with Abraham. The assumption on which the Apostle proceeds is that he is entitled to argue from any portion of the Old Testament Scriptures, including the history of the Patriarchs, and to base his argument upon their minutest verbal distinctions. This position he could not take unless he regarded the entire record as fully, literally, and in all its parts equally inspired.

The opponents of the doctrine that the agency of the Spirit extended to the *form* as well as to the *matter* of the sacred record, to the *language* as well as to the *thought*, endeavour to invalidate the argument based upon this passage. Dr. Farrar, for example, denies that the Apostle could by any possibility, as a Hebraist, and a master of Hellenistic Greek usage, have argued as verbalists allege. The reason he assigns for this allegation is that Paul must have known that the plural of the Hebrew and Greek terms for "seed" is never

used by Hebrew or Greek writers as a designation of human offspring. In the plural, he says, it means various kinds of grain. To this critique the reply is obvious. 1. Dr. Farrar's estimate of the Apostle's knowledge of Hebrew and Hellenistic Greek is accepted. He was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, and was deeply read in the law and prophets, and well acquainted with Rabinical lore. He was, besides, a citizen by birth "of no mean Greek city," and, as the Roman Captain found out in the castle at Jerusalem, could speak Greek. Moreover, he showed, on the occasion of his visit to Athens, that he was not only able to speak that language, but was able to quote what suited his purpose from the Greek poets. 2. As all this is conceded and accepted, Dr. Farrar may be fairly called upon to say whether a lexicographer, in searching Hellenistic writers for the meanings they were wont to attach to the Greek term *σπέρματα*, would hesitate, after reading this passage (Gal. iii. 15-17), to enter in his list of meanings "human offspring?" 3. Dr. Farrar may also be asked to tell us whether it would be possible to render the passage so as to make sense, if the meaning he gives to *σπέρματα* were adopted. The passage would then read as follows: "He saith not to various kinds of grain as of many, but as of one, and to thy grain, which is Christ." In a word, the passage will not yield any intelligible sense if any other meaning than the one rejected by Dr. Farrar be given to *σπέρματα*; and if the meaning he ascribes to it be accepted, the passage becomes absolutely unintelligible. Granting, then, what we thank no man for granting, that *σπέρματα* means human offspring, it is claimed that, despite all the assaults of the anti-verbalists, this passage sustains the doctrine of a plenary inspiration; that is, an inspiration extending to the language of the entire sacred record.

This same Apostle bears a similar testimony in his Second Epistle to Timothy, chap. iii. 16, 17. Having reminded his son in the Gospel of his early acquaintance with the sacred writings, which "are able to make wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus," he immediately assigns a reason for their possessing this high prerogative;

and this reason he finds in the fact that every one of them is (Θεόπνευστος καὶ ὠφέλιμος πρὸς διδασκαλίαν) God-inspired and profitable for teaching, &c. The revisers have rendered this passage as follows: "Every Scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching," &c. By this treatment of the passage they have separated two terms descriptive of the qualities of every one of the Scriptures referred to, which are linked together by the *copula* καί. They have inserted the verb "is" after Θεόπνευστος, and have thus thrown it into the subject, and ὠφέλιμος into the predicate. For such separation there is no authority, either grammatical or exegetical. Both these terms, so closely bound together, belong to the same category, and must both be enrolled either as subject or as predicate. As subject they cannot both be treated, for the sentence would then be left without a predicate. No such difficulty will arise if both be embraced in the predicate, as the passage will then read: "Every Scripture is inspired of God, and profitable for teaching," &c.

It cannot be objected to this rendering that it makes the Apostle endorse, as inspired, other writings besides the Jewish Scriptures, for it is of the writings in which Timothy had been instructed from his childhood he is speaking. Of these alone, therefore, can he be regarded as affirming that every one of them is Divinely-breathed, God-inspired.

In favour of this rendering there is the further consideration that the rendering adopted by the revisers is of a most unsettling tendency, as it suggests the possibility of some portions of the Scriptures not being God-inspired, thus throwing upon the student of the Holy Scriptures the responsibility of determining what parts of them are, and what parts are not, the Word of God. Such was certainly not the Apostle's object in pronouncing this eulogium upon the Scriptures in which Timothy had been trained from his earliest years. It would be a singular procedure to proclaim them the fountain of wisdom and salvation, and then insinuate that this was true only of some portions of them. However viewed, therefore, whether grammatically, contextually, or theologically, this passage abides as an Apostolic testimony to the historic faith

of the Church, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, in all its parts, are inspired of God.

Nor is it to be conceded that the revisers are justified in substituting for the Authorized Version, "all Scripture," the rendering, "every Scripture." The law of the Greek article fully warrants adherence to the old version, "all Scripture." It is not unfrequent with Greek writers to omit the article where either the substantive has acquired the character of a proper name, or where the context is so clear as to prevent mistake (see Winer's Gram., p. 131). But whether we accept the new, or hold by the old, *θεόπνευστος* cannot be separated from *ῥηθίμιος* and thrown into the subject. These two terms are too closely linked together to permit such disjunctive treatment.

Equally explicit is the testimony of the Apostle Peter in both his epistles. In his first epistle (chap. I. 10-12), we have the following: "Concerning which salvation the prophets sought and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you ; searching what time or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did point unto, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glories that should follow them. To whom it was revealed that not unto themselves, but unto you, did they minister these things, which now have been announced unto you through them that preached the Gospel unto you by the Holy Ghost sent forth from heaven ; which things angels desire to look into."

Here we have the two great themes of the Old Testament,—"the sufferings of Christ, and the glories that should follow them." These are the outstanding topics of the Jewish Scriptures, as read by the Apostle Peter ; and they are just the great facts and features of Moses and the prophets, as expounded by Christ Himself to the two desponding disciples on their way to Emmaus. After rebuking them for their slowness of heart and their unbelief, He points out to them, in the writings of Moses, and all the prophets, and all the Scriptures, the things concerning Himself ; and the things He pointed out were His own sufferings and the glory which should follow (Luke xxiv. 25-28).

Such was the task assigned to all the sacred writers, from Moses to Malachi ; and the question raised by the nature of the subject, the darkness of the dispensation, and the confessed ignorance of the men in regard to the import of what they were commissioned to place on record is, what species, or measure, of inspiration would they need to qualify them for the execution of it? Is it not manifest that no agency or action of the Spirit which did not extend to the language could meet the requirements of the case? The men employed confessed the imperfection of their knowledge in regard to the subjects they were moved to commit to writing, asked for further information respecting them, and were denied their request. What reliance, it may well be asked, could be placed in a record produced under such circumstances if the inspiring Spirit, as the Newer Criticism would have us believe, left the writers to the exercise of their own judgment in selecting the terms in which the revelation made to them was to be expressed to others? The response of the Spirit to the earnest inquiry of the agents He was employing, proves that He took upon Himself the whole responsibility of the work in which they were engaged ; and that, in the exercise of His sovereign prerogatives, He had the right to determine the amount of information to be communicated at any particular time, and the form into which it should be cast. The men of the Newer Criticism may imagine that all that was needed on the part of the agents was intelligence and fidelity, but common sense says that no amount of intelligence or fidelity will enable a man to write infallibly on subjects beyond his comprehension. Such, certainly, were these subjects. They were elements of an economy designed to make known to principalities and powers in the heavenly places the manifold wisdom of God, subjects which even angels desire to look into. To write consistently or infallibly on such themes, while but partially instructed in regard to them, was a task beyond the capacity of man or angel. "The things of God knoweth no one (*οὐδείς*) save the Spirit of God." There is no authority for limiting the affirmation to man as is done in the authorized version. The context proves that the Apostle means to

exclude all classes of finite intelligence, whether human or angelic, and to claim for the Holy Spirit alone the knowledge of the mysteries he was commissioned to preach. If the principle here avowed by the Apostle is to rule us in our attempts to formulate a doctrine of inspiration, all theories which leave the record of the Revelation to the human agent's intelligence and fidelity must be discarded.

In his Second Epistle (chap. i. 16-21) this same Apostle bears a most remarkable testimony to the infallibility of the Old Testament Scriptures. After bearing witness to the New Testament Revelation, referring to its authentication by a voice from the excellent glory, on the occasion of the Transfiguration, he does not hesitate to compare with the revelation made by this audible voice the word of prophecy, pronouncing it *βεβαιοτέρον*, more durable, assigning as his reason for this verdict that no prophecy of Scripture is of private interpretation; for no prophecy ever came by the will of man, but men (commissioned) from God spake (as) they were moved by the Holy Ghost. The Apostle certainly does not, by this comparison, intend to shake confidence in his own witness-bearing when he "made known the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." So far is this from being his design, that he refers, in confirmation of it, to the testimony of God the Father, uttered audibly from the excellent glory, to the Sonship and work of His own beloved. This testimony, however, was transient and momentary, passing away with the cloud from which it came forth; and, lest his readers might think that he was relying on this voice as the sole proof of the Divine origin of the Gospel he preached, he refers them to a word that was not transient, but more durable, viz., the word of prophecy, placed on record by men commissioned from God and moved by the Holy Ghost. The term "moved" does not give full expression to the Greek word *φερόμενοι*. An English reader might think that the Apostle meant simply to teach that the agents were merely moved to begin writing, and were left to the exercise of their own unaided and undirected powers in prosecuting their task. This, however, is not the idea conveyed by the Greek

term *φερόμενοι*. It asserts a fact fatal to all theories of inspiration save that which ascribes to the Spirit the language as well as the ideas of the resultant record. This fact is, that the writers were borne along by the Spirit, as a vessel at sea is borne along by the wind. He moved them to begin to write, and he moved them along throughout the entire process. When He moved them to speak or write, they began to speak or write ; as long as He moved them, they continued to speak or write ; and when He ceased to move them, they ceased to speak or write. In a word, He who alone knows the mind of God took charge of the entire process through which that mind was to be infallibly communicated to mankind. This infallible communication He could effect only through an infallibly correct utterance or record ; and to secure this result, it was indispensable that the fallible instrument of human agency should not be left to mar or thwart, by its imperfection, the Divine purpose.

If, then, we accept the testimony of Christ and His Apostles, we must regard the Scriptures of the Old Testament as inspired of God ; that is, we must believe that the language of the record was determined by the Holy Ghost. This position is the Ehrenbreitstein, not only of the Old Testament Revelation, but also of the New. The two Testaments must stand or fall together. Apart from the Verbal Inspiration of the Old Testament it is impossible to defend the Citadel of Christianity itself. Within this position, as we have seen, Christ took His stand, as within an impregnable fortress, in all His conflicts with His adversaries. Whether dealing with the arch enemy, or with the Scribes, or Pharisees, or Sadducees, His ultimate appeal was to Moses and the Prophets. In this line of defence He was followed by His Apostles. Both He and they relied upon the verbal accuracy of the Old Testament Scriptures.

Rejecting, therefore, the unhallowed dogmatism of the Newer Criticism, it is to be hoped that the Church, for which the Redeemer gave Himself up that He might sanctify it, having cleansed it by the washing of water with the *word*, will give heed to the authoritative example set by these high precedents.

ROBERT WATTS.

THE PROBLEM OF THE WORLDS.

THE grandest achievements of our century are its scientific advances. Startling, comprehensive, beneficent, fascinating, they commanded attention and dominated thought. As one fact after another came into prominence, the claim for verification brought into discredit and denial the principles of Faith: men forgetting that science must know the grounds of Faith's great principle, the confident expectation of things hoped for, before science can deny.

The lessons of history,—that faith, not logic, intelligent faith growing by experience into knowledge, rules the world,—are only just now beginning to have renewed attention. Thought descends once more to the roots of our intellectual growth, and again ascends the heights of speculation; finds everywhere that Faith is a power that conquers, and, as Max Müller says, "conquers even those who think they have conquered it."

We have talked of the credulous vulgar, and of the religious as superstitious; while many yielded to a gross incredulity that indulged the flesh, and flattered the self-conceit which finds it easier to doubt than inquire. Incredulity, passing to atheism, counts it an advantage to be rid of God; easier and pleasanter to think and act without fear of Judgment to come.

Men, afflicted with this atheistic credulity, imagine that they are original thinkers,—a great mistake; they adopt all preceding errors. Their minds, having nothing to confer, find little in faith to perceive; and not rising upward to the angel, they soon sink lower than the common level of man. We are not surprised that they are guilty of violence, theft, unclean living; and that their evil principles, descending to the masses, work lawlessness and wrongdoing.

Want of pure principle and morality, the reference of

everything to self-will and present self-interest, enfeeble intelligence, ingenuousness, and love of truth ; lessen intuitiveness of right and aversion to wrong. Not perceiving Divine purpose in the world ; nor that the probational character of our present state is to know, to believe, to do ; profane persons lose those intellectual aids and that spiritual consciousness which render the demands of faith less severe, and its emulation with science that victory for God which gives to man spiritual guidance, personal and characteristic halo.

We need not further account for those fond efforts, the fussiness of minds perverted from true science, to explain the worlds apart from a Maker. Minds not aware that the height, depth, and extent of conviction in truest Christians, are transformed by manifold experience into knowledge. Christians, like scientific men, go beyond mere physics to make their greatest discoveries. Pure aspirations, lofty anticipations, high feelings Godward, verified by conscious communion with Him, give present possession of those mighty realities which, though beyond the logic of formal proof to other men, are within the experimental grasp of sanctified consciousness.

The hypothesis of evolution accepted, in a modified form, by some religious scientific men as a partial mode of Divine process, is universally hailed by the irreligious as that theory of nature which, logically applied, renders God an impertinence and Holy Scripture a fable. Not the slightest valid argument has been established against our faith ; but the splendour of true science is abused by incompetent professors, who vainly resist Moses as did the ancient Egyptian magicians. God, delivering us from the error, is now again giving to the people the use of all their mind ; and many see the falsity of those scientific assumptions which endanger faith and set law at naught.

We are not willing to regard the early portion of Genesis, recognized by Jesus, as grossly false ; nor to pervert the use of knowledge by allowing that man was not Divinely made in the Divine image ; that there was no Fall, and is no

Redemption ; no Judgment to come, nor any Heaven. The Ogs of Basan are not to prevail with a false science, making all students of one measure to lie on their bed. The chilling ascendancy of mistaken theories of the world and of man denotes the absence of highest moral and intellectual qualities, and renders excellence impossible. To be always doubting, denying God, who is highest excellence, and then to spend ourselves in gathering cockle-shells, pebbles, and telling sands on the sea-shores, making a man of beast, and science of a cloud, maddens as Saul was mad, but hardly raises a David with sacred music to quell the evil spirit.

Truth before all things : whatever the cost, follow it to the end. If evolution be the true cosmic principle, accurately and fully explaining the universal problem, accept it. If not, discard it. For our part, we maintain that it is a delusion, the great folly of our day ; hypothesis having a form of science, yet denying the power : its conclusions would overthrow those sacred truths which make for man's moral elevation. A correct theory will cover every worldly process, material and immaterial ; rationally account for origin, continuance, ending ; give an intelligible statement concerning life, sensation, emotion, free-will, responsibility. This evolution does not.

Evolution, as admitted by the chief expounders, is imperfect, gives no explanation of matter nor of force. Atheistic promoters assume that matter and force are eternal ; that nature is an ever-changing, yet everlasting compendium of phenomena ; that there is, and always was, the same amount of matter and of force—with which can be no interference, Divine or otherwise ; that worlds and systems of worlds, death and life, succeed one another as the leaves and trees of a forest ; the universe, as a whole, undergoes no loss, and is incapable of decay. These assumptions are unscientific and incapable of truth.

If our statement be inaccurate, opponents may amend it. Meanwhile, we exhibit some of the blunders and impossibilities which prove the unwarrantable nature of the assumptions on which evolution is based.

- I. It is a principle of science that all statements be proved.

In mathematics, a few axioms being accepted, every step afterwards is demonstrated. Theologians are told,—the difference separating religious from scientific teaching is verification, of which science is capable, and theology is not; consequently, science is certainly true; and theology, probably false. We, in reply, challenge any man to prove that life, sensation, thought, are material products; that nature is an everlasting compendium of ever-changing, ever-during phenomena. Proof is impossible; nevertheless men who profess not to accept any unproven thing, base evolution on these unprovable hypotheses, and then require that we give up our God, and accept their little gods. The mania of unbelief cannot go further.

2. Evolution, incapable of proof, is demonstrably false. Science regards the existing state of things as having sprung from a former state in which they did not exist, and with which they had no connection; consequently they could not be evolved from that former state. Life, such as we know, was not possible in the molten state of the earth; nor could it have been brought in by meteoric stones, nor by any merely mechanical process. Further, physical science knows nothing about matter evolving itself from matter, or that which is not matter, except that it is impossible; nor of force from that which is not force; nor of life from that which is not life.

3. Nature is not an everlasting compendium of ever-changing, yet ever-during phenomena. It is certain, so far as anything is certain as known by finite intelligence, that the universe is not for ever and ever the same. Every planet will converge to its sun, and suns burn out, then every force will be diffused. When temperature is everywhere the same, and force everywhere in equilibrium, there could not have been in the past, nor can there be in the future—unless our reason is put to confusion—any differentiation in that temperature, or in that equilibrium; no formation of any universe like that in which we live: except by Eternal Power, who, as the Absolute, is independent of the universe. Evolution, then, does not solve the problem of the worlds. We must dismiss all that is

scientifically known, if we scientifically accept it; science will oppose science—which is absurd. The original atoms did not evolve the mist, the mist did not evolve the earth, the earth did not evolve man, man did not evolve God.

4. We shall be told—evolution does not profess to explain the origin of worlds. It aims at a scientific explanation of the rise, relationship, and continuance of species. Then, why do these men require God to be given up, and talk of Christianity as exploded? Doubtless, they are honest; but their theory cannot be so limited; even if limited, it is inaccurate, as may be seen.

Does any one actually and precisely know that life primarily originated in dead matter, apart from God, by purely natural process? If not, all the talk is wind, not science. Are we sure that, from the first life, or the many first lives, without any reasonable guidance, grew all existing varieties, and the numberless special individualities? If we do not know, we have no science about it. Research into the past and furthest conducted experiment furnish no instance, nor time, nor arrangement, by or in which life originated apart from previous life—the Divine Life.

Indeed, science shows that no germ, no seed, no adult individual life, exists, or has ever been made, apart from former life; nor does any finite being contain, in itself, all the other beings which are to come after it. We, though Adam was our father, were not contained in him. He was that original which, acted upon by the forces of the universe, passed away: the reproduction of his own likeness was by means of those forces. Creative process gave the power of life, whatever it is, to the earth; and the earth brought forth by what is called organic process; the organic process not making life, but life starting and continuing the organic process by the power of God. Man, a more special life, being more specially formed. All life is from the Great Life, the Divine Life; not from mud, nor any other slime, that we may lie down in it, wallow in it, and call it "god."

To talk of some hypothetical monad evolved from molecules, not knowing what they were about; and of this monad

not knowing how to do it, evolving from within itself some other monad a little more and a little more unlike itself, until the monad was not itself; and then, this becoming some other thing which became a man,—is not science, but silliness. Burns very well wrote,

“Oh wad some power the giftie gie us
To see ourselves as ithers see us,
It wad frae mony a blunder free us
And foolish notion.”

SUBSTITUTION, NOT EVOLUTION, PREVAILS.

One atom is not evolved from another atom, but atom takes the place of atom, molecule of molecule, force of force, life of life. The universal process does not bring one thing out of another, as were the first self-made, and the maker of all that follow; but Eternal Power ever and ever replaces the used, the past, by the not used and present, and the present by the future.

Science, in part, traces the process. The ultimate atoms, so small that magnified a thousand times no human eye can see them, are thought to remain, so far as we can trace, unchangeable and unaffected, except as they are acted upon by substitution of other forces. In combination as molecules, and molecules as masses—say one part oxygen and two parts hydrogen in every molecule of water—other properties are conveyed which present, or represent, differences and powers great as those distinguishing water from its constituents. Water, duly heated, becomes steam; and the steam contains force, not latent in the atoms of oxygen and hydrogen, but derived, in part, from the influence which converted the atoms into water, and, in part, from the influence which converted the water into steam. In every transmutation the substituted working force brings its own qualities to produce its own special effects. The things worked upon are made to be a stone, or a tree, or a man, by an energy co-efficient with all the forces and substances of the universe. As to life, inorganic matters being com-

pounded into bioplasm by some unknown force ; the bioplasm by the force called Life is built up, according to speciality of the force, into a nettle, or tree, or mouse, or man. No evolution anywhere : an imparting, or differentiation everywhere, effected by forces coming from the whole universe for every work.

The substance, bioplasm, seems the same ; but is really differentiated for every variety of organism, vegetable or animal. Possibly the same particles, though in the same proportions, are made of different shape. If the atoms, or particles, are unchangeable ; they, probably, are differently arranged by some speciality of force. This seems likely, every sort of life from lowest to highest, infinite as is the variety, being considered by biologists as a variation of one Divine thought, of one Divine act. Hence the fins of a fish, the paddles of a whale, the wings of a bat, the arms of a man, are different forms or enlargements of one plan. The human embryo is as a worm in its origin and advance ; but never a worm, nor fish, nor reptile ; and, like a dewdrop, represents the universe ; the life of man, a figure of all life, was never any other than its own life. Things and life always remain the same : except as they are acted upon by some new force. Every thing and life, small or great, the moss or the man, is an exhibition in part of one design, of one power. The whole design and the whole power having greatest exemplification in the universe of things visible and things invisible.

If we are not to accept evolution as an explanation of the worlds' problem, can any other principle be proved adequate ? To seek is not presumptuous : take up the search.

THE CHRISTIAN SCHEME OF CREATION.

We start with an axiom. Nature, and whatsoever is in nature, represent Eternal Power.

Our wants, our dangers, our ceaseless desires and efforts for something better,—being in nature, are also representative of something in that Power, and exist because of the Power. When we endeavour to win from nature the keys of strength and wisdom, the strength and the wisdom mirror in our own

life the strength and the wisdom which make nature what it is. That further intellectual process which apprehends the future, and desires life in it ; holiness, and longs for possession of it ; not less takes knowledge of the Eternal than does a dewdrop infinitesimally, according to its degree, represent the infinite. We are sure so far, as thought and research carry us, that the forces in the universe acting in the distribution and redistribution of matter, in the passing and renewal of life, in the creative processes of human thought, are unerring indications of creative process by Eternal Power.

Regard the worlds' powers as acting by irresistible energy within a comprehending infinitude. Philosophy shows that the worlds' changes are due to, and only possible by, the Eternally Permanent. The worlds, then, and their changes are an effect by the Permanent working through a succession of causes differentiated in infinitude ; so that the finite always depends upon the infinite. The process is not an evolution of the great from the little, of life from no life, of reason from unreason ; it is by differentiation, in time and space, for some vast teleological purpose of that Eternal Power who effects all things according to His own Will. If Will did not act with purpose, there might be chaos, not cosmos ; there might be continuance, disturbed everywhere, but no rational order ; the rational order is proof of Intelligence and Will acting in creation by means of adequate Power.

Whether the Eternal put Himself first into relation with finite spirit, angels, by creation of spirit ; or with matter, such as our senses perceive ; we do not now ask. Whichever it was, beyond the spirit, beyond the matter, there was He who made and differentiated angel from angel, and matter from matter. The primal force was varied in every force, the primal substance in all the forms and conditions of matter. Hence we have that universal static ability which a finite geometer could neither give nor find ; and in which men of science, artists, poets, theologians delight as a display of variety comprehensive by the Infinite only ; and a display of that wisdom which, reflected in the reason of man, is a symbol and proof of God in creation.

The potentialities were not self-existent in the atoms, not in the cloud : all power is of God. That nothing stands by itself, or evolves from itself, is scientifically, is philosophically certain. Everything and every act is by conjoint operation of all that the universe contains, that universe held in the hollow of God's hand. The thoughtful man is now probably able to present—

SOLUTION OF THE WHOLE CREATIVE PROBLEM.

Time was begun at the beginning of creation, and space defines the locality of things. In Time and Space the Eternal differentiated His power in the spirits, substances, forces of the worlds ; creating, distributing, and redistributing them.

This gives an approximately intelligent conception of the Absolute bringing Himself into relation with the conditioned, the Eternal with the temporal, the Infinite with the finite, the Omniscient with all things intelligent and unintelligent. The mental understanding and elaboration of it is a reasonable advance towards solution of the worlds' problem.¹ There is not a stone nor fossil unaccounted for. We know why laws are permanent, as due to the Eternal ; why they are adapted to further and further conditioning of things ; why natural and spiritual purposes ripen in display with the suns. The first page of "the life-dawn animal" and the perfected man who is named with inscription of God, we intelligently read. Cold and heat, summer and winter, the gossamer-winged insect, innumerable forms of tree and flower, in ever-varying, never-ceasing transformation by the Infinite, make Him very near to us. We intelligently, reverently, gladly worship and praise ; our religious and moral sense being satisfied.

Thus, we rid ourselves of evolution, that central lie of materialism and atheism which some theologians and Christian men of science have in part unwisely adopted. Nature and revelation are two differentiated editions of works by

¹ The argument is worked out with manifold detail, illustration, and appliance to Christianity in *The Mystery of the Universe*. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co.

which we know the Almighty's will. The two books agree according to the measure of a right understanding, science and philosophy proving themselves children of faith. Differentiation of the energy, put forth by Eternal Power in the forces and substances of the universe dynamically unifies those forces and substances, and is the link between the create and uncreate, the organic and inorganic, science and religion. By it we are able to arrange all principles, first and last; the ultimate secrets of physics, biology, and sociology. We account for the persistence of energy, the diffusion of force, the conservation and disintegration of worlds. We go beyond visible finite forms to the universal. As Christians, our faith in God is not less certain than that in our own bodily substance and personal identity as men. Spiritual truths are inseparable from facts, are the greatest facts. They are shrined in the earliest centuries' evidence, and in the deepest moral convictions of all ages. There is nothing in science to make John and Paul, Athanasius and Ambrose, Augustine and Anselm, Luther and Pascal, Newton and Faraday, stand aside or be silent on the greatest and most ennobling truths. It ought to be a sufficient answer to every caviller,—Jesus Christ lived and died believing in God, by whose power, wisdom, mercy, we have those wonderful differentiations—Creation, Revelation, Redemption.

We wait, it is the genius of patience, for the grand explanation of all things and the reward of life. Our spirit is filled with gladness by the Holy Ghost. We slake our thirst for holiness by communion with the Lord Jesus. The pains of a nature where sin and evil are assure us, nothing being in vain, that the discipline tends to a greater good. The physical process, the mental process, the moral process, are made to convert the natural into a spiritual man, the spiritual man into a Christly man. The worlds' problem will be fully and finally solved when the old worlds differentiated into the new, man stands in those worlds beholding their beauty and, satisfied with his own likeness, speaks to the God who was Incarnate, face to face, heart to heart, as a man speaketh unto a friend.

JOSEPH W. REYNOLDS.

THE DÖLLINGER-REUSCH HISTORY
OF THE INTESTINE CONFLICT ON MORALS
IN THE CHURCH OF ROME.

PART III.

THIS concluding paper we propose to devote to the romantic history of Gonzalez's book. Thrice did he appeal for leave to print. Thrice was he refused by the unanimous advice of the Revisers. He begged to have his book corrected, the substance being preserved, and to have it as so corrected allowed to appear. Not even this would be granted. As professor, now in a higher chair, he published four volumes of *Selectæ Disputationes*, and wished in this work to give a few propositions containing his views upon Probabilism. Revisers and General denied the liberty. He prayed the General to state in a circular that the Society did not recognize as official the doctrine of the Probabilists, but left professors free either to teach it or oppose it. Oliva thought this needless, seeing no decree existed adopting the doctrine as that of the Society. Gonzalez declared that he would consent to the suppression of all his own writings if only in the colleges of the Society it were allowed to teach the Anti-Probabilist doctrine, or if that doctrine were allowed to appear in the books of others.

In 1679 some one in Madrid said to the Nuncio Cardinal Mellini, these lax propositions, now condemned by Innocent XI., or, at least, some of them, are the same against which a professor in Salamanca wrote years ago. The Pope told the Nuncio to send him a copy of the book. The letter of Gonzalez accompanying that copy was, by the Pope, read aloud to several, with praise of the zeal shown by the professor against "the ruinous laxity of opinions by which, to the hurt of souls, our age is diseased." Of two theologians commanded by the Pope to read the manuscript, one, Cardinal Laurea, approved

of it thoroughly; and the other saying that no Jesuit had ever written anything on the question better, thought it was a pity that some points were not treated with greater particularity. Now came to light the censures and inhibitions which Gonzalez had endured from the Order. Thereupon were the Holy Office and the Collegio Romano set at odds. On June 26, 1680, the Inquisition adopted a protocol directing that the Secretary of State should write to the Nuncio in Spain, informing him that the Pope has favourably received the letter of Father Gonzalez; also that he commands Gonzalez freely and fearlessly to preach More-Probabilism (*Probabiliorismus*, or *opinionem magis probabilem*); to teach it and defend it with his pen, and vigorously to war against the view that it is lawful to follow a less probable opinion, even though we recognize the opposite one as more probable. All that he could do and write in favour of More-Probabilism would be agreeable to His Holiness. So much for the offending professor. Next, as to his superiors. On the Jesuit General it was enjoined not in anywise to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favour of the Less-Probable opinion, or to combat the view of those who assert that it is not lawful to follow a less probable opinion, if we recognize the opposite opinion as more probable. As to the Universities of the Society, the protocol went on to say, "It is the will of His Holiness that every one shall be free at pleasure to write in support of More-Probabilism, and in opposition to the adverse view. The General shall command them to thoroughly submit themselves to the order of His Holiness."

Twelve days later the Inquisition records that the command of His Holiness has been by the Assessor intimated to the General, who answered that he would at once obey in all points, although it had never, by him or his predecessors, been forbidden to write or teach in favour of the More-Probable opinion.

The General did not obey, is the short and simple record of our authors. He took the course which La Quintinye had told the Pope was a usual one with the Chiefs of the Society,—that is, he kept from the knowledge of his subordinates

what the Pontiff had commanded, and what he himself had promised. Although at the time Gonzalez filled the "first chair" in Salamanca, it was not till thirteen years afterwards (1693) that the decree of the Inquisition came to his knowledge. Nine years later, still as General, he expressly stated in writing to Clement XI. that the mandate of Innocent XI., as also the decree of the Holy Office, had not been brought to the knowledge of the Society. In a note the Dominican Patuzzi is quoted as saying that a certain circular, partially stating what had taken place, was probably prepared, laid before the Cardinals of the Inquisition, and never sent. Thereupon our authors recall another fact. The Portuguese, Urbano Tossetti, when in Rome writing his *Riflessione*,¹ was allowed by Cardinal Marefoschi the use of certain documents from the archives of the Propaganda. These showed that when Oliva was General the instructions as to rites and ceremonies actually sent to the Jesuits in China were in direct contradiction to those which were placed in the archives.

The Nuncio of Spain requested Gonzalez to print his book. He replied that he was not prepared to do so without leave from his Order. Could not the Pope procure it? That the Pope declined to do. Gonzalez set to work to re-write and expand it. After de Noyelle had succeeded Oliva a fresh application for license to print had no success with the new General. Later Gonzalez was sent up by his Province to Rome as Elector in the general congregation of the Order called to choose a successor to de Noyelle. When, before the election, the Jesuit notables waited on the Pontiff, he received Gonzalez with distinction, and, when they had taken leave, said that they should cast their eye on that man. The desire to recover favour with the Pope so operated that Gonzalez was elected, although only on the third voting, and then only by a majority of ten out of eighty-six.

At his first official audience the Pope said to him, "Thou hast been made General in order to turn back the Society from the precipice down which it seemed ready to plunge by

¹ Published in Lisbon, 1758. Vol. i. p. 129.

erecting the laxer views into an official doctrine of the Order."² The Secretary of State, Cardinal Cybo, asked the new General, with six of the principal officers of the Order, to meet him, and said that he was commissioned by the Pope to tell them that His Holiness wished it might be permitted to the Theologians of the Society to teach from their chairs, and to advocate in their writings the doctrine that we should follow the more probable and safer opinion, not the less probable and less safe. All that Gonzalez succeeded in inducing the General Congregation to do was to pass the following decree: "It having been represented to the Congregation as being by some believed that the Society has taken in hand by common consent to uphold the doctrine of those theologians who teach that we may act upon a less probable opinion favouring freedom, to the setting aside of a more probable one standing by the commandment,³ the Congregation declares that the Society neither has forbidden, nor does it now forbid, the maintaining of the opposite view by those who hold it as the more correct" (vol. i. p. 134). The Pope had looked for more, Gonzalez had sought for more, yet this was too much for his brethren to pass in good temper. It had the fault of turning into a formal declaration what they had received as a useful private diplomatic formula, the statement, namely, that the view opposed to the one favouring freedom rather than the commandment had never been forbidden *by the Society* as such,—a statement adroitly used by Oliva, and all who acted with him, when privately insisting that no other view should be put forward.

The Pope commanded Gonzalez to bring from Spain to the Collegio Romano a distinguished theologian, there to teach the better doctrine. Probabilism, he said, which the Jesuits

² Me factum fuisse generalem in illum finem ut Societatem averterem a præcipitio, in quod ruere videbatur, de amplectenda scilicet ut propria ejusdem Societatis sententia laxiore circa usum opinionum probabilium.—*A Memorial by Gonzalez*, vol. i. p. 132.

³ Licere sequi opinionem minus probabilem faventem libertati relicta probaliore, stante pro præcepto. Vol. ii. p. 196, quoted by Segneri in an Italian attack on Gonzalez.

almost unanimously cherish, is by many men of consideration regarded as the root of lax moral theology, and as the source of those 110 propositions which he and his predecessors had to condemn. Joseph Alfaro of Salamanca was the new professor.

According to Ortiz, it was Alfaro who prompted the General to ask the Revisers to license Elizalde. Another says that, in so doing, the General was clearing a passage for his own book. Four years passed under the Anti-Probabilist General, and no writer of the Society appeared arguing for his view. Then it was that he resolved on himself writing. Passing by both the Revisers and the Assistants, he submitted his manuscript to Alfaro and Estrix, who is believed by our authors to be the writer of the critique on Elizalde, already described. Besides these, two theologians not of his own Order, passed it ; but, as we have seen, he did not present it to the Official Censor of the Pope ; and yet worse, he sent it to a foreign printer. For any resident in Rome to do this, without permission, was an offence. The book was a new prelude to his long-arrested work.

We already know what took place as soon as Ortiz, once himself a Reviser, learned that the book was in the press. Our friend Diaz also wrote an urgent letter in Spanish. The Assistants singly came and prayed the General not to publish. His own Confessor, who was the Spanish Assistant, on his knees and weeping, urged the same request. When all this failed the five Assistants sent in a formal protest, detailing objections to the proposed publication. He then offered to publish it, not under his own name. The Assistants replied in writing that this did not suffice ; and as to his offer to have two or three copies brought to Rome for them to examine, that would be useless ; for their views would not be altered. He then authorized the Secretary to tell the French Assistant that he would give up the publication of the book. "Does he renounce absolutely and for ever?" asked the Assistant. "I have no commission to say yea or nay," replied the Secretary ; "but I think not. New circumstances might arise. The Pope might command the publication."

The Assistants did not believe in the General's sincerity in giving up the publication. He apologized to the Master of the Sacred Palace, told him he would not publish without the permission of the Roman authority, and sent him a copy, with the offer to alter anything to which he might take objection. Fearing that it might be handed over to a few Cardinals to inspect, and so might be brought out in spite of the Revisers of the Society, the Assistants prayed the Pope not to allow the book to be published. The Pope, as we know, ordered the entire edition to be sent to Rome, and to be provisionally committed to the Master of the Sacred Palace. One of its dissertations survives, printed by the Dominican Patuzzi. It assigns eight grounds in support of the mild conclusion that it would be advisable for the Society to allow its members freedom to maintain in lectures and writings the views of the *Probabiliorists* against those of the Probabilists.

The poor Provincial Benedict Paintner now had to feel the effects of conflicting counsels. First he received orders to send the book to the Master of the Sacred Palace, and next from the General orders to send it to him. These were followed by orders to delay sending it,—the last came from Truchsess, the German Assistant, from whom evidently the first had proceeded. Twice (so wrote poor Benedict Paintner to the Assistants) had the General asked him who it was that ordered him to send the book to the Master of the Palace, and he had answered, "One commissioned by the Master of the Sacred Palace." The General would be sure to repeat his question. What then was he to say? As to delay he could arrange for that; he could send the book slowly to Munich, and not to Rome, till he had fresh instructions from the Assistants. So if Oliva as General had secretly set aside the authority of the Pope, now the Jesuit Assistants set aside that of the General.

This football-book was eventually ordered to be kept in Dillingen under lock and key. Whence came the last orders as to its fate seems to rest unknown, as also what those orders were, but the fate itself is manifest. The poor offender had

to depart in peace out of this world. Who, asked Truchsess, of the provincial Paintner, had given a copy to Menangati, the Confessor of the Austrian Emperor. Again, Father Rasseler, an irrepressible *Anti-Probabiliorist*, said to Truchsess, "You may judge how greatly is curiosity to see a book sharpened by its suppression (that hard fate was coming upon his own), when I tell you that here in Dillingen, lately, a man of note from the neighbouring town of Dinkelsbühl, came to the Rector urging him with importunate prayers to get him a copy of Gonzalez's book, because one from his town, who had long been detained as a hostage in Paris, had been told by the Archbishop of that city that if he would, instead of a ransom, procure him one copy of the work, he would promise him release and freedom.⁴ Evidently the book had disappeared by this time, four years from the day when Padre Ortiz took his journey from Frascati to the Collegio Romano. Its ghost may reappear and walk the world yet, as in the romantic case of the *Liber Diurnus*. Let no one object to the term romance in the corporeal history of a book until he has read the life-story of the *Liber Diurnus*, as told by M. de Roziere.⁵

Father Segneri, a popular orator and writer, was called to Rome as preacher to the Pope, with whom he became a great favourite. He was a Jesuit, and heart and soul with the Society against Gonzalez. He soon wrote to the General a letter, which would seem to show that, like many orators, his forte did not lie in judgment or real knowledge. "You say," he cried, "that in bringing out this book you wish to set yourself against the lax moral theology of our authors." "In so saying, you cease to be our Father, and take your place among the ranks of our opponents and accusers, seeing that you admit the Laxism, which, when closely examined, turns out to be a calumny, invented by the Jansenists and other adversaries. The charge of Laxism is one which, when ad-

⁴ Si modo in lytri vicem obtinuerit sibi Dilinga exemplar unum dicti libri. Vol. ii. p. 186.

⁵ *Liber Diurnus Romanorum Pontificum*, edited by Eugène de Roziere, Inspecteur Général des Archives. Paris, 1869.

vanced by enemies, our Society has always repudiated, and in which, even from you, it will not acquiesce. Your sons will write against you, and what a spectacle: war betwixt father and son! Your proper mode of checking lax morals is to inculcate upon writers that they shall not advocate the Less-Probable opinion, and to make the Censors refuse to books which do so liberty to print. Then, do not think that the effect of your intervention will be that the old view, which has prevailed for so many centuries, will be condemned to make way for the new one which has only just come up." Here Döllinger and Reusch put in a quiet "(?)" Very warm does Father Segneri wax in upholding the freedom of the Society put in jeopardy by the action of the General. He writes in Italian, and, instead of the term Society, constantly says, "the Religion," calling other orders than the Jesuits "other religions," a usage prevalent in Italy, but little observed by English students, though here also it was common in the middle ages.⁶ "According to you," he cries, "the reasons why the religion should not erect into an official doctrine the opinion of the Probabilists, as the Jansenists, and you after them call the benign opinion, are these, because that view makes broad the way to heaven which Christ made narrow; hence it foments and fortifies (literal) relaxation of conscience in those who have little of the fear of God, because it unnerves divine preaching, and robs it of its most effective weapons for vanquishing abuses, because it is the occasion to Christian people of innumerable sins." Points these strikingly similar to those urged by La Quintinye. I did not, however, tell of what that complainant said about being not only discouraged from preaching against specific sins, but being silenced in the midst of a course of sermons because he would not desist from so doing.

One point made by Segneri deserves mention, as illustrating the lowering influence, under whatever theory of morals, of minutely anatomizing cases of conscience, and authorizing a priest to give judgment on each point. "In our

⁶ Vol. ii. pp. 195-201.

religion we have so many great doctors who have maintained the benign view, and yet what lax doctrines have they taught? For instance, Azore, Valenza, Vasquez, Suarez. . . . On the other hand, lately there have been many writers of other religions (*i.e.*, orders) who in general terms repudiate the benign view and maintain the severe one, and who nevertheless, when they come down to particular cases, in practice admit doctrines not merely lax, but pernicious in the last degree." Father Segneri was more correct in the last assertion, than in what he said of Suarez and other Jesuits.

This odd assertion, that no lax doctrine had been taught by Jesuit Probabilists is what in his own oratorical fashion Segneri calls a demonstration *à posteriori* of his own sapient proposition, that the question whether we may or may not act upon a Less-Probable opinion against a More-Probable one has nothing to do with laxity of moral doctrine in the Company. Of the same proposition he gives a demonstration *à priori* which consists in this, that no lax opinion can be a Probable one. All lax opinions are very Improbable. If we say we may follow a Less-Probable opinion, we do not therefore say that we may follow an *Improbable* one.

So far as I recollect, no one had formulated the last doctrine; the degrees were: An opinion unfavourable to the law, but favouring liberty, even though neither reputedly certain, nor certainly probable, may nevertheless be followed if Probable, if Less-Probable, or if Probably-Probable, but to the length of saying if Improbable, they hardly went in *general terms*. Yet were Father Segneri here, one with Gury in hand might ask him whether or not some opinions upon particular cases of that recent light of Jesuit moral theology were not Improbable or Anti-Probable? Now that light it is by which at this hour youths in seminaries are learning how hereafter they shall in many nations, through the Confessional, shape the morals of men and women, of servants and masters, of traders and practitioners, of subjects and rulers. Not improbable! Read Gury's *Casus Conscientiæ*, and then quietly think over the question, whether just as Probable led to Less-

Probable, and that to Probably-Probable, the last has not led on through Improbable to Anti-Probable?

Father Segneri's history was as naïve as his logic. The Jansenists were the first who brought out the Anti-Probabilist doctrines. And again when properly searched out, the usage throughout all countries, perpetual in the Church, has been this, that from among opinions held by doctors as certainly Probable, every one might lawfully adhere to what pleased him.⁷ And this is the "perpetual usage" which a famous preacher to the Pope could *demonstrate à posteriori* and *à priori*, had nothing to do with any lax doctrine on morals. It is well to give his very words: *Che a da fare dunque il tenere che LICEAT SEQUI OPINIONEM MINUS PROBABLEM IN CONSPECTU PROBABILIORIS con l'insegnare dottrine larghe.*⁸

So in this strange birth-history of a book "the windings and byways" are steadily traced by Döllinger and Reusch, till instead of the infant of Dillingen that never saw the light, at last appeared another. How the Provincial Congregations sent up Procurators to the Procurator's Congregation; how the latter voted on the question of calling a General Congregation desired by the opponents of Gonzalez, not desired by him; how the vote was 16 to 17, and the Probabilists thought they had won; how the General showed that the rule was "more than half of the votes," arguing that though "17 were more than 16, they were not one more than half of 33, seeing it would take 16½ to make half of 33, and therefore 17½ to make one more;" and how this point of law prevailed are all well told.

So is also told how one diplomatic move of the Assistants was frustrated by another diplomatic move of the General; how letter outwitted letter, memorandum contradicted memorandum, flysheet combated flysheet; how one high personage cried shame upon the Society, another upon the Assistants, and yet another upon the General; how the Assistants

⁷ Chiascuno potesse lecitamente aderire a quella che gli piacesse. Vol. ii. p. 199.

⁸ What has holding that it is lawful to follow an opinion Less-Probable in comparison with one More-Probable, to do with the teaching of lax doctrines?

charged Gonzalez with calling secular princes to aid in the fight ; how Gonzalez proved that the Assistants themselves were the first to do so ; how the Emperor first wrote *pro* and then wrote *con*. Also how the King of Spain sent forth a decree making mention of the persecution suffered by the General from the Assistants ; how France was on the other side ; how Segneri, the Pope's preacher, plied His Holiness with personal representations, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany with letters ; and how Acquirre, the Cardinal, primed the King of Spain on the "great number of writers, especially Jesuits, who with unmeasured liberty, print, teach, and in practice apply very lax views," telling that they branded as Jansenists numbers of learned and pious prelates, doctors, and authors who wrote against their lax morals, and even called Innocent XI. a Jansenist because he had condemned certain of their lax propositions. Also how the Confessor of the King of Spain was for Gonzalez, and the Confessor of the Queen-mother, a Jesuit, was for the Society ; and how one pulled court wires this way and the other that way ; and how it was alleged that if the strict view of the General should prevail, the power of the Society would be lost, for then Jesuits would no longer be the confessors of kings, queens, princes, and nobles of every degree ; how the Jesuits were threatened with the Inquisition ; and how the General was denounced by Padre Palazol and others as tyrannical, untruthful, and all that was unlovely ; and how others replied that his reputation daily rose in Rome. Then how the Cardinals of the Holy Office, at a sitting on June 24, 1693, declared that the postponement of the publication of a book written in the sense of former Popes against lax morals was a scandal to the Roman Curia and the Church ; how, in a search made by order of Cardinal Cybo, Secretary of State, the decree of Innocent XI., long kept out of sight was disinterred from the archives of the Inquisition, instructing the Jesuit General in nowise to permit his Fathers to write in favour of the Less-Probable opinion, or to combat the views of those who contend that it is not allowed to follow the Less-Probable, when we recognize as More-Probable the opposite

opinion; and, finally, how this decree was not even then issued as it was found, but was altered to take a form less unfavourable to the Probabilists, only authorizing the General to permit his Fathers to write in favour of the More-Probable opinion, and to combat that of the followers of the Less-Probable.⁹

Finally, it is told how the Pope named three Jesuit Revisers, who with criticisms passed the book; and then two outside Revisers, a Carmelite and a Cistercian, who gave it "unmeasured and sometimes tasteless praise;" how to the last the Assistants plagued the Master of the Sacred Palace with requests to have this, that, or the other erased or modified; and how, in 1694, the end of the long struggle was signaled by the appearance of the book. Just twenty-one years had passed since Gonzalez sent in his first manuscript for approbation.

It would be in the episode of Liguori that the shadings of Probabilism would most clearly come out, but these papers already written will suffice to indicate the mine contained in the Döllinger-Reusch *History*, and to stimulate a desire to see it published in our own language.

These facts show the natural history of morals formed by tradition:—first a mere opinion, next a probably probable opinion, then a slightly probable opinion, and in succession a certainly probable opinion, a highly probable opinion, a certain opinion, an indubitable opinion, an ancient opinion, one that always has been of the teaching of the Church, and therefore always will be. Watching these formations in shifting sand, how deep is our sense of rest in looking off to a building of holy law, reposing immovable on the Rock out of which it was hewn—law in no wise fashioned by our subjective states; then steady shall we be as the stars by which we must steer, and like them infinitely benign.

WILLIAM ARTHUR.

⁹ This alteration bears an analogy to that made in the decree of the Council of Trent on the Interpretation of Holy Scripture, as professedly reproduced in the Creed of Pius IV. See *The Pope, the Kings, and the People*, vol. i. p. 192.

A CRITIQUE ON DR. HAYMAN'S
TRANSLATION OF ST. PAUL'S EPISTLE TO
THE EPHESIANS.

IN response to the Editor's invitation to his readers to criticize the free translation of the Epistle of St. Paul to the Ephesians which appears from the pen of Dr. Hayman in the current number of this *Monthly*, I have a few observations to offer.

Dr. Hayman is to be congratulated in the first place on his courage in beginning the work of which his article in the January number seemed to contain a promise, with perhaps the most difficult of all St. Paul's Epistles; and in the second place on the success, generally speaking, of the attempt. It is of course the duty of a reviewer to find fault! Nevertheless praise must predominate now. One cannot but admire the freshness of tone and fulness of vocabulary which characterize this version, while as to the sense to be conveyed it is for the most part set forth with accuracy, lucidity, and force. If indeed he does not find among his critics that "omne tulit punctum," that is simply a matter of course. Of the thousands—the many thousands—of men competent to form a judgment, who in successive ages have directed their attention to this Epistle and hazarded their interpretations of it, one might affirm with confidence that no two have thought alike on all points; but no less confidently one might assert that a very large majority would endorse Dr. Hayman's view as to almost every passage.

Referring first to the Greek text which Dr. Hayman has adopted we may observe that he differs from all modern editors in retaining the words "in Ephesus" (c. i. 1) as of unquestioned authority, while almost all—Tregelles (marg.), Tischendorf, Ellicott, Alford, Westcott and Hort, Segond—bracket them or in some other way intimate their conviction that this Epistle was in fact a circular letter to certain Churches, Bishop Lightfoot maintaining the view

that it is identical¹ with the Epistle to the Laodiceans. We notice also *διανοίας* for *καρδίας* (see below) in c. i. 18; and Dr. Hayman reads with the Textus Receptus *ἐγνώρισε* in c. iii. 3, where *ἐγνωρίσθη* is the reading of all the modern editors and even of Stephens in his margin; and retains *λοιπά* in c. iv. 17, where the evidence of MSS. and of the early Fathers and Versions seems greatly to preponderate in favour of the idea that St. Paul here intended to teach (as also in 1 Thess. iv. 5) that believers from among the Gentiles are now Gentiles no longer but fully naturalized in the spiritual Israel. But for the most part Dr. Hayman's text is that in which all the recent editions are agreed, as in the insertion of *ὑμῶν* in c. ii. 1, in reading *οἰκονομία* rather than *κοινωνία* in c. iii. 9, in omitting *τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* in c. iii. 14, in inserting *καί* in c. iii. 21, in omitting *ὑμῶν* in c. iv. 6, in reading *φωτός* instead of *πνεύματος* in c. v. 9, and *Χριστοῦ* rather than *Θεοῦ* in c. v. 21, &c.; there being in fact more deviations from the Textus Receptus than are pointed out in the foot notes.

Having formed his text, Dr. Hayman proceeds to translate. Now there are widely different styles of translation. Compare for example Herodotus as exhibited in English dress by Cary and by Rawlinson, or Thucydides by Dale and by Jowitt. Rawlinson and Jowitt are more to Dr. Hayman's mind, giving—not a paraphrase, which would imply an *ad libitum* addition or suppression of phrases or even clauses, but—a free translation that disregards the precise *form* of the original provided the exact *sense* be as fully and exactly as possible set before the English reader.

Now the earnest and painstaking student of any work in a foreign language with which he is not familiar will usually derive benefit from the use of two translations which he can continually compare; as for instance one who is beginning to study Plato with or without the Greek may with much advantage use both Burges's more literal and Jowett's freer renderings. And so the unlettered student of the New Testament

¹ It is fair to add that in a *foot note* at the end Dr. Hayman admits the possible justness of this view.

cannot but be profited by reading a free but conscientious and scholarly translation like this before us, as well as the closely literal Revised Version of 1881; for this latter will never lose its value unless it be superseded by a further Revision carried out on much the same principles but more successfully.

Turning now to Dr. Hayman's translation of this Epistle, the first thing that strikes one is its possession of one marked merit in that he has not allowed himself to be shackled by the rule (which it was perhaps wise for the Revisers of 1881 to impose upon themselves) that the same Greek word must always, if by any means possible, be represented by the same English word. It is true that in the Authorized Version this licence is often assumed with too little caution. But surely we must not forget the existence of those "*certi fines quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.*" Every word more or less possesses the quality attributed to the chameleon, —it takes a colouring from its surroundings. And in translating from one language into another an endeavour must be made to reproduce if possible all these shades of meaning. Translators of classical authors make this their aim. For instance in Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* *νόσος* occurs six times, and is rendered by Jebb in four different ways (pest, disease, plague, sickness); and *λόγος* in the singular in eighteen places, which he renders by nine different words (word, words, story, tale, rumour, seeming, talk, speech, report), once he omits it, and in four passages translates more freely. See again how Kennedy deals with the particle *οὖν*. In translating seven of the shorter speeches of Demosthenes in which this particle occurs in sixty-two places in all, in twenty of these Kennedy uses the illative "therefore," "then," or "so"; he uses "and" in one, "but" in three, "however" in one, "well" in one, and in thirty-six leaves it untranslated. Would there have been any high merit in rendering these words invariably by "disease," "word," and "therefore" respectively? or did these eminent scholars fail to understand their business? Far from it: they know perfectly that the mere "*verbum verbo reddere*" is *not* translating, and they aimed at something far more difficult, and succeeded admirably.

In like manner Dr. Hayman renders *θέλημα* by "appointment," "will," "bidding," and "as (God) requires." He varies the translation of *μέτρον* by using "proportion" as well as "measure"; *οἰκονομία* with "stewardship" as well as "dispensation"; *χάρις* with "blessing" (c. iv. 29) as well as "grace." And as to particles, in dealing with which there is greater need of variety if the true sense is to be preserved, one example will suffice. *Κατά* occurs twenty-four times in the Epistle, and is translated by Dr. Hayman not even once by the familiar "according to," but in eighteen different ways, none of them repeated (one or two of them questionable perhaps), besides dealing more freely still with the six remaining passages. And the converse of this may be stated. He has used the same English word to represent more than one—even several—of the Greek. For instance our word "with" in this short Epistle stands for sixteen different words or constructions of the original. Is this a fault? I think by no means so, *if* in all sixteen cases the *true* sense is in the *best* way set before the English reader. And I think it is so in most if not all of the sixteen.

Moreover even a Fourth Form boy is taught when reading Thucydides or Livy that the longer sentences must in English be broken up into shorter ones, and in this particular to take Gibbon or Hume or Robertson or Macaulay as his model for English style rather than the classical author. Dr. Hayman has so treated the longer sentences of St. Paul. Thus the twelve verses 3-14 of c. i., which in the original are all one sentence, he has divided into five, as Dr. Louis Segond has done in his excellent French version.

Here however an important question arises. Is the train of thought in these twelve verses, as they are commonly exhibited, and even with Dr. Hayman's modification of the arrangement, just such as the inspired writer intended? Others before now have pointed out the poetical character of the Epistle as a whole. Thus the Rev. Ll. Davies² writes: "It would be hardly extravagant to regard this work as a hymn.

² *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philemon, with Introduction and Notes.* Macmillan 1866.

Though the form of the composition is that of a letter, the mood of the writer is lyrical rather than hortatory. From time to time the eucharistic strain which pervades the whole Epistle rises into rhythmic solemnity; and the diction is throughout somewhat more poetical than in the other writings of St Paul." In like manner Archdeacon Farrar characterizes the Epistle as "lyrical and Asiatic," and the doctrinal portion of it as "a creed soaring into the loftiest of Evangelic Psalms." But even Mr. Davies and Dr. Farrar have overlooked the remarkable structure of this particular passage, as pointed out by an anonymous writer (J. C. W.), in *Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature* for July 1850, pp. 190, 191. He connects "holy and blameless before him" (v. 4) with *two* dependent phrases—"in love" immediately following and "in all wisdom and intelligence" (v. 8); and he shows that each of these phrases is then expanded with a subordinate parenthetical sentence of *five* clauses. Moreover these subordinate sentences have a curious resemblance to each other: the *first* clause in each begins with an aorist participle (*προορίσας*, v. 5, and *γνωρίσας*, v. 8), and adduces an illustration of the perfection, first in love, secondly in wisdom, that God chooses to confer upon His people; the *second* in each begins with *κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν*, to make it plainer still that this was the fixed purpose of His grace; the *third* with *εἰς*, to point out the yet remoter purpose, that (1) in the *love* we should extol the marvellous "grace which He has freely bestowed on us in the Beloved One," and (2) in the *wisdom* we should understand how the Father is controlling all the ages with a view to establishing His Anointed as Head over all Creation; the *fourth* with "in Whom we," the thought here reverting to ourselves, on whom this "redemption" (v. 7), this "inheritance" as fellow-heirs³ with Christ (v. 11), is to

³ I agree with Dr. Hayman here in taking *ἐκληρώθημεν* to mean, not "we were constituted an inheritance," as it is interpreted by Olshausen, Ellicott, and others, but "we were made heirs," with Harless, Meyer, and many more. This sense far better suits the context as a whole, and the analogy of *πολεμῶ* fully justifies the rendering. As this verb signifies "I bring into contact with a *πόλεμος*" (for it is from *πόλεμος*, not *πολέμιος*, that it is formed), so *κληρῶ* may fairly be "I bring into contact with a *κληῖρος*."

be bestowed ; and the *fifth* with *κατά*, pointing to the standard by which (1) the *love* and (2) the *wisdom* of the perfected saints may be measured—"the wealth of His grace," and our understanding of the deep counsels of the Almighty.

It is inconceivable that all this curious and intricate parallelism should be merely accidental. Besides, after the strophe and antistrophe thus carefully symmetrical comes—still a part of the same sentence—an epode also of like Dædalean construction. After four words of introduction (*εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς*, v. 12) come four phrases or clauses of which the first and last are identical, with two relative clauses intervening, each enlarged with a participial addition, three quasi-appositive phrases or clauses following numbers 1, 2, and 3.

The whole Ode, translated more literally than by Dr. Hayman, runs as follows :—

Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ
Who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing treasured up for us
in the highest heavens in Christ,
Even as He elected us in Him before the foundation of the world
To be holy and blameless in His presence

In love,

(For he has pre-ordained us to adoption as His own sons through
Jesus Christ,

As seemed good to Him and was His sovereign will,
With a view to the extolling of the glorious fulness of His grace
freely bestowed on us in the Beloved One,

In Whom we have redemption through His blood, even the pardon
of our transgressions,

According to the measure of His wealth of grace which He hath
lavished upon us),

And in perfect wisdom and intelligence,

(For He has made known to us the secret counsel of His will,
As seemed good to Him and He had purposed in Himself,
With a view to His plan for the consummation of the ages, to give
all Creation its Head in Christ—creatures celestial and terrestrial
in Him—

In Whom also we have been made heirs, being pre-ordained to this
According to His purpose Who doeth all things after His own
wisdom and sovereign will),

That we should live
 To the extolling of His glorious perfections—
 We of the Jews who first hoped in Christ—
 In Whom ye of the Gentiles also, after having heard the word of
 truth,
 The glad tidings of salvation for you,
 In Whom ye after having believed were sealed with the Spirit of
 promise, the Holy Spirit,
 Who is the earnest of our inheritance in view of our full
 redemption who are His own special people,
 To the extolling of His glorious perfections.⁴

This Ode is followed by one of those sublime prayers springing out of thanksgiving in which the Apostle delights to pour out His soul before God on behalf of the saints whom he loves.

Here Dr. Hayman has employed some felicitous expressions giving, as I venture to think, a just representation

⁴ At the suggestion of the Editor I append the Greek text, quoting—as to words, not arrangement or punctuation or contractions—from my own edition, the *Resultant Greek Testament*.

Εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
 ὁ εὐλογήσας ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν τοῖς ἔπουρ. ἐν Χριστῷ,
 καθὼς ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου
 εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἁγίους καὶ ἀμώμους κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ
 ἐν ἀγάπῃ,
 (προορίσας ἡμᾶς εἰς υἰοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς αὐτὸν
 κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ
 εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ ἧς ἐχαρίτωσεν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ Ἁγαπημένῳ,
 ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵμ. αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἀφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων,
 κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ ἧς ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς ἡμᾶς),
 ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ καὶ φρονήσει,
 (γνωρίσας ἡμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ
 κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ, ἣν προέθετο ἐν αὐτῷ
 εἰς οἰκ. τοῦ πληρ. τῶν καιρ., ἀν. τὰ πάντα ἐν τ. Χρ., τὰ ἐ. τ. οὐρ. κ. τὰ ἐ. τ. γῆς ἐν αὐ.,
 ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἐκληρώθημεν, προορισθέντες
 κατὰ πρόθ. τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργούντος κατὰ τ. βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ),
 εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς
 εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης αὐτοῦ
 τοὺς προηλπικότας ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ·
 ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἀκούσαντες τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας,
 τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας ὑμῶν,—
 ἐν ᾧ καὶ πιστεύσαντες ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ Πνεύματι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ Ἁγίῳ,
 ὃ ἐστὶν ἄρραβὼν τῆς κληρονομίας ἡμῶν εἰς ἀπολ. τ. περιποιήσεως
 εἰς ἔπαινον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ.

of the Apostle's meaning. Such are "insight into mysteries" (ἀποκάλυψις, "revelation," A.V.), "wealth of glory" (πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης, "riches of the glory," A.V.,—"wealth" in A.V. occurring only twice in the N.T. and being limited to the sense of *welfare*, which it has now long outgrown), "energy of omnipotent might" (v. 19), "high over the hierarchy of angelic potentates in all their ranks" (v. 21), and, *if* this is the true meaning, which however I gravely doubt, "full recipient" (πλήρωμα, v. 23, rather than "fulness," A.V., or "the filled up receptacle," with Eadie).

But, as has just been intimated, it may be questioned whether the passage as a whole is correctly given. First, the accuracy of one or two single words may be disputed. Thus there can be little doubt that καρδίας, not διανοίας, ought to be read in v. 18: even the Complutensian Polyglot reads καρδίας, and Stephens in his margin, as well as in modern times every editor from Griesbach and Scholz to Westcott and Hort and Segond. For Dr. Hayman can never have intended to render καρδίας by "intellect." Surely the inspired writer used the phrase "the eyes of your heart" deliberately, to intimate the vast influence which a man's moral condition—the aggregate of his affections and desires, his "inner man"—exercises upon his creed. And again in v. 19, does "*due to that energy,*" for κατά, hit the mark? Is it not rather "as measured by," "as judged by the standard of"?

But the sense of the prayer as a whole, has Dr. Hayman given that? I think not, and mainly owing to a misapprehension as to that κατά. Is not the Apostle's petition something like this? He prays that God will bestow on his readers heavenly wisdom and insight (in accordance with vv. 8-12) to know in all its splendour the hope that shines before them: to know (1) the "wealth of glory" of that super-celestial realm where Christ will dwell among His fellow-heirs; and (2) what is the greatness, surpassing all our grasp of intellect, of that power by which God will effect His purpose. Of this He has given an example in the resurrection and exaltation of His Son, and all the true Church is to be raised and exalted *in like manner*; for the Head, though

swaying the sceptre of the universe, is yet incomplete without the Body. In that body (v. 23) He will find—or in the counsels of God has found—His completeness (or complement, *πλήρωμα*), He whom the Father is perfectly (*τὰ πάντα*, cf. c. iv. 15) completing with every possible augmentation of His majesty and glory (*ἐν πᾶσι*). (Lightfoot's comment on this passage seems to me far from satisfactory.)

It will be remembered how our Lord, when questioned by the Sadducees about the resurrection of the dead, replied charging them with error, as being ignorant of the Scriptures and of "the power of God." In the passage before us the Apostle insists on God's power not only to raise the dead, but to exalt His chosen ones to the topmost pinnacle of all creation. The Head is already so set on high; but He cannot remain incomplete: the Body must be with Him even there.

Already in writing to the Roman Christians (c. viii. 29, 30) St. Paul had given expression to the same thought in a varied form. In the counsels of the Father believers are already glorified, and whatever may be the ineffable beauty and dignity with which Christ is invested, His people are to be modelled after the same pattern, and though He be Lord of the whole Creation, they, a multitude that no man can number, are to be the "brethren" among whom He is "the First-born."

A kindred thought to that expressed in the closing verses of c. i. has seemed to many expositors to be conveyed by the words (c. iii. 15)—*τὸν Πατέρα ἐξ οὗ πάντα πατρὶὰ ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς ὀνομάζονται*. Scott for instance comments thus: "'of whom the whole family' of believers on earth and saints and angels in heaven are named and considered as the children of God, being gathered together in one in Christ." Dr. Hayman renders—unhappily, I think—"that Father from whom all relationship in heaven and on earth takes its name." These words would appear to signify that if I have an uncle, a cousin, a guardian, an employer, the implied uncleship, cousinship, &c., as well as the correlation in each case, is so named from the great Father in heaven! If we suppose Dr. Hayman to have written "all *fatherly* relationship," and that the adjective has accidentally

dropped out; or if we render with Mr. Davies "every stock owning a common father," or with Alford, R.V., and others, "every family"; a like difficulty occurs. *Is it true* that in this sense every *gens* or family, as *named* among the Chinese or the Maoris or the Patagonians, in Turkish or in Swedish, in Sichuana or in Eskimo, is so named from the Father in Whom *we* believe and Whom *we* adore? Moreover "every family" in heaven: have the angels families? and fathers of families? What says our great Teacher? "But when the dead have risen, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels in the heavens" (Mark xii. 25). There exist therefore no angelic families. But is not the idea of paternity in heaven, asks Dean Alford, "necessarily involved in *any* explanation of this passage?" Yes, if we are bound to translate *πάσα* here by "every," as we should translate it in classical Greek. But are we so bound?

Before answering that question let me observe that there is another objection to "every family." When we speak of earthly matters, there is some meaning in the phrase "all the families of the earth," as signifying all that exist at any one time side by side and independent of one another, each owning a more or less distant father of its own, their common remoter origin forgotten. But when that grand panegyris and church of the first-born shall have assembled, the common origin will not be forgotten, and all will be manifestly one family of Adam's children, one and indivisible, recognizing God as the one true Head and Father of the whole race. And so far as the redeemed have already met together in heaven, this is true of them. Therefore, speaking of them, "every family" is a phrase without meaning.

Returning now to *πάσα*, we find a similar use of the word in Col. i. 15, *πάσης κτίσεως*, which, says Alford, "is not denied by most commentators to bear the sense 'of all creation.'" So Lightfoot. And just similar are the words *ἐν πάσῃ κτίσει* in Col. i. 23. And in the Epistle before us, c. ii. 21, we read *πάσα οἰκοδομή*, where Alford justly remarks, "to a *classical Greek ear* any other rendering of *πάσα οἰκ.* than 'every build-

ing' seems preposterous enough. But 'every building' here is quite out of place, inasmuch as the Apostle is clearly speaking of but one vast building, the mystical Body of Christ." Would that the learned Dean had so reasoned on c. iii. 15! Dr. Hayman is bold enough to obey the dictates of common sense rather than the rules of Greek classical syntax, and to write "the whole structure"; and quite rightly.

For there is yet another of these *πᾶς* puzzles, which we shall find exceedingly instructive. In Acts ii. 36 we have the words *ἀσφαλῶς οὖν γινωσκέτω πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ κτλ.* Here the Revisers have partly thrown off the yoke of classical syntax and actually render in their text "Let all the house of Israel therefore," &c.; though they could not forbear putting in the margin "every house." But this phrase *πᾶς οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ* is simply borrowed from the Septuagint, as in Num. xx. 29, 1 Sam. vii. 2, 3, &c. Does, then, the Hebrew usage throw any light on this? The common rule for the use of the Hebrew בְּ is the same in respect to the article as that for *πᾶς*, "nisi nomen proprium est, quod determinatione non eget," says Gesenius. But Gesenius, so far as I have seen, omits to state, though unquestionably the fact was familiar to him, that a phrase like "the house of Israel," "the house of Saul," &c., was regarded as a proper name, and בְּ in such a connexion is therefore not followed by the article, as in וּבְכֹל בַּיִת יוֹסֵף ("and the whole house of Joseph," Gen. i. 8.), כָּל-בַּיִת יִשְׂרָאֵל ("the whole house of Israel," Lev. x. 6, &c.). In like manner "all the congregation of Israel" omits the article כָּל-קְהַל יִשְׂרָאֵל (Lev. xvi. 17), כָּל-עַמִּי יִשְׂרָאֵל (Josh. xxii. 20). Yet in, I believe, all these cases the O. T. Company of Revisers have rendered by "all the" or "the whole," and indeed in many cases to translate "every separate household" would be a patent absurdity.

Besides, what scholar does not know that there are even in classical Greek many monadic nouns which are often used without the article? Such are *πατήρ, μήτηρ, ἥλιος, σελήνη, ἄστυ, πόλις, πατρίς*. What then was more natural than that Greek-speaking Christians, when forming for themselves to a certain extent a new vocabulary, should be influenced by this

precedent and use some other nouns as anarthrous besides those that were so used by the true Greeks?

It is admitted that *ἐκκλησία* is thus anarthrous in nine passages (1 Cor. xi. 18, xiv. 4, 19, 28, 35; 1 Tim. iii. 5, 15; Heb. ii. 12; 3 John 6.), what can be more reasonable than to expect similar or other monadic words to be similarly used? Then we can understand at once how *Κτίσις*, as the whole Creation, can be used as though it were a proper name; and how the whole Church on earth may be spoken of as *Οἰκοδομή*, the Building, and the vast Assembly of all God's redeemed people together with the angelic host be called the Family. Surely this is a magnificent conception and truly worthy of the greatest of the Apostles, and one not to be set aside as an idle fantasy unless Grammar—whose authority must be paramount—puts in her veto in loud clear tones that cannot be misunderstood. This she certainly does not do here. It is unfortunate that we cannot find in our language a pair of cognate words equivalent to the *πατήρ* and *πατριά* of the verse we are here considering; but the sense nevertheless is in my humble judgment as clear as it is sublime.

If indeed St. Paul alludes to "the Family" in this sense, as assuming that he would be readily understood, we must not forget that he is writing to Churches at least one of which he had personally visited and fed with much oral instruction, and that he justly expected (see 2 Thess. ii. 5) that his teaching would be retained in careful remembrance. And that teaching would include the sublime truth, which, as I dare to believe, *πάσα πατριά* was intended here to reproduce, that all holy beings, angelic and human, in heaven and on earth, are one Family with one adorable "Father of an infinite majesty"; and it was as for children in that Family and to the Father of that Family that the incense of that glowing prayer arose.

Among Dr. Hayman's numerous excellent renderings which it would be a pleasure to quote if space permitted, his treatment of *εὐτραπελία* (c. v. 4), one of the *ἄπαξ λεγόμενα* of this Epistle, deserves notice. Dr. Farrar renders this by "worldly polish." But are the refinement and polish which

characterize the higher circles of the *beau monde* in themselves unchristian? Does Dr. Farrar himself eschew them? He has not the credit of so doing. His view is based on the passage of Aristotle referred to by Trench (*Syn. of N. T.*, p. 135), in which the *εὐτράπελος* is placed midway between the *ἄγροικος* or boor and the *βωμόλοχος* or low flatterer. But surely it is easily conceivable that a word which by its derivation (undoubtedly from *εὖ τρέπεσθαι*, as *Etym. Magn.*) signified only the faculty of easily turning one's mind or changing the direction of a thought, but had already in the time of Aristotle degenerated so far as to mean impertinent wit (or, as Dr. Farrar expresses it, "cultivated impertinence") may nearly four centuries later have become still more debased—yet still within the limits fixed by its etymology—so as to indicate that kind of jesting which we often call in bad French a *double entendre*. Dr. Hayman's rendering, "prurient jests," seems pretty exactly to express the Apostle's meaning.

On the other hand I think that in verse 12 of this chapter the two phrases beginning with *εἰς* were intended to be co-ordinate (a point however which I have not room to discuss), and that in vv. 8-10 the same word should have been used in the text as in the margin—"re-ascended." V. 9 is given thus: "What else can this ascending of His imply than that He first came down to earth beneath?" But ascending does *not* of necessity imply a previous descent. Many people probably will go to Paris this summer and ascend the Eiffel tower: does that imply that they will have descended first? The fact is *ἀνά* has at times the double sensé of *up* + *again*: not *again* in the sense of repetition, but of reversing or *un*-doing a previous action or process. (See an article by Professor Key on *ἀνά* in the *Philological Society's Transactions* for 1854.) Here are a few N. T. examples. Joseph's brethren had quite forgotten him, but their recovery from that forgetfulness is indicated by the *ἀνεγνωρίσθη* of Acts vii. 13. The officers who in charge of a troop of cavalry conducted St. Paul to Cæsarea *reddiderunt* to Felix the letter of Claudius Lysias: *ἀναδόντες*, Acts xxiii. 33. The returning Prodigal in the parable *νεκρὸς*

ἦν καὶ ἀνέζησεν, Luke xv. 24 ; with which compare Rom. vii. 8, 9, ἁμαρτία νεκρὰ . . . ἀνέζησεν. The son of the widow of Nain when restored to life ἀνεκάθισεν, Luke vii. 15 ; and so Dorcas, Acts ix. 40. The awful condition of some backsliders is such that it is impossible to reverse their backsliding and ἀνακαινίζειν them to repentance, Heb. vi. 6—the πάλιν here enforcing by iteration an idea already conveyed by the ἀνά ; and ἀνακαινώω is somewhat similarly used in 2 Cor. iv. 16, and Col. iii. 10. So God declares (Acts xv. 16) that he will rebuild (ἀνοικοδομήσω) and set upright again (ἀνορθώσω) David's tent which is fallen and overthrown. In some of these passages the *again* even outweighs the *up*, but taken all together their collective authority fully justifies our speaking in this passage of the "re-ascension" of Christ, which does as "ascension" does not, do justice to the Apostle's argument.

There are several other points that clamour for notice, but my space is exhausted. An especially tempting topic is the rendering of the Greek aorist. In c. iv. 32 for example ἐχαρίσατο is rendered by Dr. Hayman (as also by Alford and in R.V.) by "forgave" rather than "hath forgiven" as in A.V. and even by Scholefield. That there is some peculiar merit, a high degree of philological virtue, in translating ἤκουσα by "I heard" rather than "I have heard" or "I had heard," as often as is any way possible, is believed and taught by many scholars, whom therefore almost all others follow, simply on the sheep-through-the-gap principle. I venture to differ, though somewhat painfully conscious of being in a very small minority on this question. There is however a dictum of Sir Thomas Browne which is singularly encouraging to those who attempt with a cautious boldness to exercise an independent judgment : "The mortallest enemy unto knowledge, and that which hath done the greatest execution upon truth, hath been a peremptory adhesion unto authority." Thus reassured I hope to have the opportunity some day of arguing this aorist question, though it cannot be done now.

RICHARD FRANCIS WEYMOUTH, D.LIT. LOND.

CURRENT POINTS AT ISSUE.

RITUALISM.

Is there any human imagination brilliant enough to picture the astonishment of St. Peter, for example, could he have the opportunity of reading a modern *Directorium Anglicanum*? He, who sat in that upper chamber by the side of the Master as He instituted that Last Supper, with a pathos and a simplicity that was touching and beautiful. Compare that with the complicated, gaudy, and distracting ceremonial of modern Romanism or Ritualism; how startling and how sad the contrast! No *Ceremonarius*, or Master of the Ceremonies, was needed there; and what was not needed there should remain unneeded still.

Our attention has been called to this subject by an article on English Ceremonial, in the *Church Quarterly Review* for the past quarter, in which a new Ritualist Directory is somewhat severely criticized, and most justly condemned. Not, however, on the ground of any objection to an elaborate, if correct, ceremonial, but because this work "chooses a purely ultramontane book as the basis of an English ritual directory." The writer tells our clergy that a better book would have been Martinucci's *Manuale Sacrarum Cæremoniarum*. But as this is a work in six volumes, it is just possible that the most ardent Ritualist might scarcely find time to study it with sufficient accuracy and frequency to enable him to recollect at the right moment the infinite detail it contains. The writer does not seem to be an advocate for a tedious and fussy ceremonial; indeed, he condemns it, and rightly tells us that "with the post-Tridentine reform of 1570 a different spirit from the earlier simplicity made itself dominant. The era of detailed and minute ceremonial set in." He also condemns severely "the custom of encasing the Anglican Consecration Prayer in a number of *formulae*, translated from the Gregorian Canon, as

if our own *formulae* were not good and valid." We are quite at one with him here, and also when he says, "the Book of Common Prayer would be a better guide for the priest than any number of directories." Why then not honestly leave it to speak for itself, so that all things may be done simply, while decently and in order. A certain amount of ritual is necessary, and a certain amount of reverence is still more necessary, but true reverence seems scarcely compatible with a distracting service. We have only a limited amount of attention at our disposal, and if we dispose of that in the arrangement of our bodies, there is none left for the arrangement of our souls. This danger is plainly indicated in the approval he gives to the saying of Mr. Beresford Hope, that "the science of ecclesiology was the science of worship." We had thought the science of worship was a broken and a contrite spirit, that is if the word "science" can be applied at all to worship. To the "worship" of Le Vavasour or Martinucci it may be applied, but not to that of the Apostles. It must be disastrous to all growth in grace when decoration is more studied than devotion, when ritual takes a higher place than righteousness, and when the order of worship supplants the object of worship.

That Ritualism should be popular is natural, as it appeals to the sensuous, the refined and the cultured sensuous, no doubt, but still the sensuous; it also calls forth emotions that are good, and that may be easily mistaken for piety; it appears to wing the spirit for the time into a higher air. In all this, however, lies one of its greatest dangers, for it lulls the soul to sleep the pleasant dream that it is penitent when it is only sentimental, that it is converted when it is only charmed, that it is holy when it is only æsthetic. There is no greater error than to mistake emotion for conviction; the former is only a feeling that arises apart from the will, the latter is the willed concentration of knowledge and conscience on our sin and its relation to Christ and God, and this alone is the way to pardon, peace, and Heaven. We may be perfectly conversant with "that most difficult of subjects, the study of Liturgy," we may take the utmost care that no "lay person" touches "the corporal, the pall, and the purificator," before being

washed by "a clerk in holy orders;" we may avoid the blunders of "the gentleman who does the notes in the Kalendar of the English Church," about the "holy oils," and yet we may not be Christians. But, on the other hand, the Ritualist may add to Ritualism that which it does not contain, and be a devoted servant of a much-loved Christ.

ROMAN PERVERTS.

It is no easy thing to think. Calmly, earnestly, and honestly to think, requires more determination than most men possess. If we could only get the results of thought without the labour it would be so much pleasanter. "Certainly it would," says the Church of Rome; "I shall think for you, especially on religious matters, and save you all further trouble. Cast your eye on all Christendom outside this united family, and see what thinking has done for men—divisions, and schisms on every side. Come, therefore, into this ark and rest, believe what I believe, and be at peace. I shall not tell you why I believe, for that would be to make you think, and so do you no good at all." The Rev. S. Rivington listened to the siren song, believed it, and flung himself into the embrace of Rome. Indifferent or careless men would escape the snare, but the danger is to those who really wish to know what is true, but think themselves incompetent to solve the problem. They imagine it almost presumption to dare to think for themselves on subjects that have engaged the attention of the greatest minds. And when they turn their gaze on the Church to which they belong, or on others called Protestant, they find such a variety of views that the task of personal investigation seems hopeless. Romanism having long since discovered this fact, adapted herself to the need, and with her almost super-human subtlety offered to supply the want. No more cunningly devised system ever existed on our earth, for there is not a failing of human nature, as it exists, that is not met on the easiest terms.

Mr. Rivington thought, for example, that the Church of England "was wavering even on the subject of hell," and so to be certain about this pleasant topic, he joined a Church

where he imagined there was no wavering. No doubt, in all sincerity and singleness of heart, but we fear there is disappointment in store for him; for as the *Church Quarterly* points out, even Roman Catholic divinity has been touched by the questions which concern *eschatology*, as may be seen in the volume by the Abbé le Noir, entitled, *Dictionnaire des Harmonies de la Raison et de la Foi*. Therefore he leaves the Church of England "for a communion in which for these thirty years past the above waverings have been taught and published (we believe, without the slightest rebuke,) in what is put forward as a Manual of Orthodoxy." We fear, therefore, or rather we are glad, that even in Rome he will have to think. We say we are "glad," because no man ought to neglect any endowment from God, and surely reason is one of the noblest. Mr. Rivington imagines "authority" a plain reason for joining the Church of Rome. The correction shall come from Cardinal Newman, who writes, "There will be, in spite of you, unbelief and immorality to the end of the world, and you must be prepared for immorality more odious, and unbelief more astute, more subtle, more bitter, and more resentful, in proportion as it is obliged to dissemble," by authority. We shall look anxiously on Mr. Rivington's return to our Church, for another book entitled, *Roman Authority a Delusion and a Snare*.

CREDIBILITY OF THE MIRACULOUS.

Professor Huxley must have been working hard at his own peculiar studies, and so is resting himself by a little indulgence in theological fun. He gives the readers of *The Nineteenth Century* a somewhat detailed account of the experiences of Eginhard,—in the matter of miracles wrought by the dead bodies of saints, &c. It is the usual record of superstitious nonsense and ridiculous absurdities. But now comes the Professor's reason for the story. He asks, "If you do not believe in these miracles, recounted by a witness whose character and competency are firmly established, whose sincerity cannot be doubted, &c., why do you profess to believe in stories of a like character which are found" in the Gospels and the Acts? Surely our friend cannot be

serious when he classes the miracles of Christ and those of these dry bones together as "stories of a like character." If Professor Huxley, and others of his school, would sometimes divert their attention from the witness *for* miracles and study the witness *of* miracles, they would arrive at different results. What do those so-called miracles of Eginhard prove? Nothing whatever. They have no antecedent reason, they have no permanent resultant. The miracles of Christ, on the other hand, fit grandly in with the whole plan of man's salvation. They are beautifully placed in the temple of a restored humanity. We should naturally have anticipated from the miracle of the Incarnation that others would follow. They did follow, and have as their resultant—Christendom.

"THE NEW REFORMATION."

We are entertained in the pages of the same magazine to a dialogue written by Mrs. Ward, a sort of overflow from *Robert Elsmere*. There are two beautiful characters, one with "an attractive and vigorous individuality," and "broad-shouldered power," this of course was the new reformer; the other with "aspect singularly refined," this was the high-church priest. The former talks nineteen pages, the latter only four. The former is a German scholar, the latter is not. The scepticism was produced by the "Higher Criticism," specially of Germany, so that on the whole we can scarcely wonder if the sceptic seems to have the best of it. The cleric does not say much, but one sentence of his is not answered by the other, and contains the pith of the whole matter,—"*Religious* action," said Ronald bitterly, "what religion is possible to men who regard Christ as a good man with mistaken notions on many points, and God as an open question?" What, indeed! The "Higher Criticism" must be dumb before a convicted conscience in presence of a holy God. In these pages there is much that is beautifully expressed and scholarly, much that is suggestive, much that is stimulating, but there is nothing about *sin*, and there cannot be any "reformation" of character that ignores that vital fact, and its relation to God.

JAMES MCCANN.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

Preachers' Helps. THE Editors of the *Homilist* (1) tell us that "the growth of preaching ability does not seem to be on the advance. There are multitudes of professed expounders, but there is a growth of mental laziness and bodily languor in the pulpit. A parson who can run like an antelope after a cricket ball or dance like a flying windmill at tennis,—when he gets into the pulpit dwarfs down into a poor sickly-looking, inanimate dummy, who has neither muscles, nor vigour or lungs. It seems as if one would almost long to have a sharp instrument as a goad to make the sluggish, semi-animate marionettes show that they are alive. This is a strong accusation, but it is true. The reason is evident. There has not been sufficient preparation, and the preacher's time and talents are engrossed in finding out *what* he has got to say instead of how he shall say it." This, is indeed, strong language; and we suppose that the editors of the *Homilist* have reason for saying it. But without being "cricketing antelopes or dancing windmills," parsons may have scant leisure for sermon making after going through all that is expected of a clergyman nowadays. And if preaching gets worse, it is in spite of innumerable aids and assistances, such as our forefathers did not possess. The *Homilist* has a large circulation, and we suppose that the editors intend it as a palliative of what they so vigorously deplore. There cannot be a doubt that there is a good deal in what the *Homilist* says that is suggestive; and if a preacher knows how to clothe a skeleton with life, there are the bones of many a good sermon in the volume before us. But this same volume shows need of more careful supervision. "*Pharoah*" and "*Modoc*" look strange and uncanny, and "ritualistic Benson" is hardly the way to speak of the Primate of all England. This volume contains a homiletical commentary on the Epistles of St. Peter, and to the Romans. There are also some prize competitions in the way of sermon skeletons; and a series of what are called "Leading Homilies," by the Rev. J. J. Bird.

THE *Homiletic Magazine* (2) is more carefully edited; and also contains some very good sermon notes; rather fuller than is often the case. The theological section contains some useful papers; that on Gnosticism appears in the Index as upon Agnosticism, but possibly there is a reason for that. The expository section furnishes commentaries on some of our Lord's miracles, on the books of Amos,

Obadiah, and Jonah; and on the Epistle to the Galatians; all of which are suggestive, if not exhaustive; and there is also a life of St. John continued. This volume may worthily find a place along with its predecessors upon the clergyman's shelves, and will be a book for handy reference "many a time and oft."

The Biblical Illustrator (3) furnishes a commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, which is a sort of reference library for the use not only of the preacher, but of the lay reader as well. It forms not at all dry or uninteresting reading, and consists of remarks and quotations, made with considerable skill, from all kinds of sources. There is a very useful introduction, and if the volume had an index it would be more valuable.

(4) "THE discovery of the important place once occupied by the Hittites," says Professor Sayce, "has been termed the 'romance of ancient history.'" It is marvellous to think that only ten years ago the "romance" could not have been written, and that the part played by the Hittite nations in the history of the world was still unsuspected. Yet now we have become, as it were, familiar with the friends of Abraham and the race to which Uriah belonged. The references to the Hittites in the Scriptures, which formerly were accounted an unhistorical weakness, are now seen to be very genuine supporters of the accuracy of Biblical history. The remains of the Hittites have, by no means been all discovered; nor have those that are already brought to light been fully deciphered; but the key has probably been found, and no doubt the patient research of paleographers will ere long be richly rewarded. It was among the Hittites, apparently, that the Amazons, armed priestesses of their goddess, were found; and to them succeeding generations owed the arts of making inlaid furniture and other things, which showed them to be greatly advanced in civilization. Professor Sayce gives an interesting account of his journey to the Pass of Karabel, in Asia Minor, to see some rock-cut figures and inscriptions, on the ancient road from Ephesus to Smyrna; altogether the work is extremely valuable. The book is nicely illustrated, and has a good index.

(1) *The Homilist*. Popular Series. Vol. iii. Houlston & Sons, Paternoster Row, 1888.

(2) *The Homiletic Magazine*. Vol. xix. July to December, 1888. J. Nisbet & Co.

(3) *Biblical Illustrator: Galatians*. J. Nisbet & Co.

(4) *The Hittites,—the story of a forgotten Empire*. A. H. Sayce, LL.D. Religious Tract Society. 1888.

Some American Magazines. FOUR Magazines of religious subjects have been forwarded to us from their American publishers, and we have pleasure in commending them for their excellence. They are ably edited, beautifully printed, and altogether got up in a manner which leaves nothing to be desired.

The *Bibliotheca Sacra* (5) now begins its fifty-ninth year, and is a good index to the vigorous life of Oberlin College, Ohio, whence it issues. The number before us contains an interesting account of Dr. Nathaniel Taylor, who has been called "the last of the great masters in the distinctive theology of New England," meaning by the great masters, "those who have contributed to the progress of thought by more exact definitions and distinctions in theology." But we believe that this is not the case, for there are many signs that profound thought has by no means died out of New England. The "Limits of Ministerial Responsibility" is a useful article; and that on "Future Punishment and Recent Exegesis" shows that at any rate the last word has not been said on the older side of this subject. Professor Stevens traverses the conclusions of Prebendary Row and Canon Farrar in several ways, which are worth thinking over. We are pleased also with a short article on "Divine Human Names" in which Mr. Laurie points out a weak spot in the arguments of Professor Sayce. The magazine has a good article on German Literature, and one on Recent Publications, which is admirable in its condensed statements. The *Bibliotheca Sacra* deserves to be more widely known in this country.

The *Baptist Quarterly* (6) clearly proves that that denomination of Christians possesses some learned and thoughtful members. The "Preacher as Pastor" is the title of a very useful article; and that on the art and genius of Tennyson is almost exhaustive of that very fruitful subject. Mr. Parsons, the author of the article, is of opinion that Tennyson "is not so sublime a poet as Milton, or even Shelley; he is deficient in ideality, which can form a new world of its own, as in 'Midsummer Night's Dream' or 'Fairy Queen.' Nature did not endow him with the pure, fresh, joyous, imagination of Homer. Tennyson's conceptions do not have the spirit and boldness, the freedom and distinctness of Collins' and Byron's, or of Wordsworth's and Coleridge's. In penetrative imagination he is inferior to Scott, Byron, and Wordsworth; he has not the boundless vision and universal sweep of Dante and Shakespeare. With all his elegant word-painting and brilliant jewellery he has produced nothing equal to

Gray's Elegy; in spontaneous expression of sorrow he is not so successful as Virgil or many a lesser poet; and yet, withal he is a great poet. He is the exponent of the domestic and social life of the fashionable and middle classes, as Trollope was in fiction. But his poetry is not so much a mirror of the outward appearance and complexion of society as of its heart and its speculative, questioning moods." The Homiletic department of this review is somewhat peculiar, but it may be useful. The review of Current Literature is up to date, and is well done.

The Presbyterian Review (7) is also a vigorous and learned number. There is an interesting article on "A Hundred Years Ago and Now," and one "On the Right of the Poor," in which Dr. Yeomans attempts to advance the study of that difficult subject. Dr. Orr writes on Assyrian and Hebrew Chronology, in order to solve as best he may the discrepancies between the two systems; and there is a thoughtful article on the "Idealism of Spinoza." Altogether this review must be pronounced a valuable addition to the course of modern thought.

The *Missionary Review of the World* (8) is indeed an extensive title; but we must admit that the contents of the magazine fairly support it. The missionary efforts everywhere are noted, and commented upon in a hopeful spirit which does one good to read after all that the pessimistic party have to urge in this respect. There is an especially good article entitled "The Miracles of Missions," in which the idea is thrown out of having a Missionary Exhibition, which should set before the public in a striking way the results of the last century of missionary effort, and we cannot but think that there is a good deal in this notion; for it is unquestionable that missionaries, considering the money and means at their command, have done wonders, whatever may be said. It would, therefore, be a great benefit if this review could be more widely circulated. It would open the eyes, and probably also the hearts and purses, of many who are now at the best but hesitating supporters of what should be one of the first objects of a Christian's interests.

(5) *Bibliotheca Sacra*. January, 1889. Oberlin, Ohio: E. J. Goodrich. London: Trübner & Co.

(6) *The Baptist Quarterly Review*. January, 1889. New York: Baptist Review Association. London: Trübner & Co.

(7) *The Presbyterian Review*. January, 1889. New York: Presbyterian Review Association. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

(8) *Missionary Review of the World*. March, 1889. Funk & Wagnalls, New York and London

(1) THE series of articles commenced by Archdeacon Farrar upon Prophecy, and evidently intended for future publication in some work upon the Minor Prophets, is sure to attract considerable attention. The aim of the first paper is to correct what the writer calls "The Vulgar and Traditional Notions about Prophecy," and to practically eliminate the supernatural element (as the idea is usually understood) from the Old Testament prophecies, as the following specimens will show:—"The burdens' or 'oracles' of the prophets on heathen nations, and the denunciation of their own countrymen, are based, not on any definite vision of the future, but on the unchangeable verities of the Divine government. They were always fulfilled in the spirit, is the general idea, because they were based on moral certainties; but in the letter, and in minor details, they are often falsified." "Inspiration is neither infallibility . . . nor abnormal miracle . . . ; it is the inmost harmony of the spirit of man with the Spirit of God within the sphere of human limitations."

IN the *Morality of Nations* (2) Mr. Hugh Taylor applies the doctrine of evolution to the theory of ethics. He says it is "from studying actual phenomena that the sociologist sees the failure alike of theory and religion to affect (*sic*) any change in the general course of the world's movement, and is hence led to infer the operation of other causes than the hope of heaven, conformity to a moral law, or the reasoned and conscious pursuit of happiness itself." These are the principles Mr. Taylor strives to prove in his work, but although there is some acute reasoning, a good breadth of thought, and a considerable amount of learning noticeable in the work, we cannot say that he is successful. The work is constructed more on popular than scientific lines; and yet is too scientific to be popular, and far too vague to be convincing.

THE *Flashes from the Welsh Pulpit* (3) are neither very bright nor far reaching, they consist mainly of illustrations which show no great amount of wit, learning, or research. The introduction gives a fair *résumé* of the theological aspect of Wales, and there is an interesting account of a sermon by John Jones, of Talysarn, which gives the idea that manner is more powerful than matter in respect of Welsh preaching.

(1) *The Homiletic Magazine*. March Number. James Nisbet & Co.

(2) *Morality of Nations*. Hugh Taylor. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1888.

(3) *Flashes from the Welsh Pulpit*. Edited by Rev. J. Gwynoro Davies, with an introductory paper by Rev. T. C. Edwards, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. 1889.

Whitelaw on St. John. It is only some seven or eight years since Dr. Whitelaw all at once obtained a foremost place among living exegetes by the publication of the *Pulpit Commentary on Genesis*, to which he contributed two introductions, the exposition, the homiletics, and indeed the bulk of the work. That valuable book has already passed through eight editions, and has commanded a larger sale than any of the other volumes of the ponderous series to which it belongs. And now the author himself has furnished conclusive evidence of the justice of the commendations which have been so liberally bestowed upon his former work by giving us this *Exposition of the Gospel of St. John* (1), constructed upon the same plan, and marked by all the diligence, erudition, and judicial thinking which characterize his *Genesis*.

In the "Prolegomena," which embrace fifty-eight pages, Dr. Whitelaw discusses with marked ability, candour, and logical acumen, the usual questions of the authenticity, authorship, composition, purpose, and plan of the Gospel. This introductory section, in common with the entire book, is a marvel of condensation.

The exposition proper reflects on its every page untiring industry, grammatical scholarship, exegetical skill, sound judgment, and independence of thought. Dr. Whitelaw has spared no pains; he has consciously evaded no difficulty; he has read and digested the leading commentaries on John that have preceded his own; and he can give a reason for every interpretation which he prefers.

The sermon outlines, which constitute the remaining department of the book, frequently exhibit remarkable felicity of textual division. Always devout, they are not pious exhortations merely, but popular expositions which are well fitted to make a congregation acquainted with the teaching of the Evangelist. While the treatment is uniformly logical, it is often also striking and memorable. No clergyman who undertakes to expound from the pulpit any part of the Fourth Gospel will consult Dr. Whitelaw's Homiletics in vain.

Taking this handsome volume as a whole its author is to be congratulated upon having provided both preacher and student with one of the most excellent and serviceable commentaries for practical use which have yet been written on this important and difficult book of Holy Scripture. We trust that Dr. Whitelaw will continue his labours in this field of scholarly activity.

(1) *The Gospel of St. John: an Exposition, Exegetical and Homiletical.* For the use of Clergymen, Students, and Teachers. By the Rev. Thomas Whitelaw, M.A., D.D. Glasgow: James MacLehose & Sons.