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

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
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A
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
OF THE
BRITISH COLONIES

VOL. IV

SOUTH AFRICA—NEW EDITION

PART I. HISTORY TO 1895

BY

SIR CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

WITH MAPS

University of New Brunswick
Geography Department

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

FOR help in the compilation of the earlier history of South Africa I am indebted to Mr. R. L. Antrobus of the Colonial Office. In connexion with the geographical chapters in the South African section of the second part of the book, I have to acknowledge assistance from various friends with special knowledge, including Mr. Walter Peace, C.M.G., Agent-General for Natal, and Mr. Spencer Brydges Todd, C.M.G., Secretary to the Agent-General for the Cape. Some statistics relating to Matabeleland and Mashonaland have been kindly furnished from the office of the British South Africa Company. The chapters relating to British Central Africa and British East Africa have been mainly written by Mr. H. Lambert of the Colonial Office, revised and supplemented by myself; and Mr. Johnston, K.C.B., has very kindly read through the Introduction and the chapter on British Central Africa.

Readers may be reminded that the object of this book, as of the other books of the series, is simply and solely to try to give a connected and accurate account of British colonisation, its methods, agencies, and results, and of the various provinces of the British empire, recording facts and avoiding, as far as it is possible to do so, controversial topics. The book has been written and should be read from that point of view. Where any views are expressed, they are my own alone.

C. P. LUCAS.

Dec. 1, 1896.

PREFACE TO NEW EDITION

IN the first issue of *The Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, two volumes were devoted to Africa. Volume III, first published in 1894, dealt with West Africa. A second edition of this volume, revised by Professor Egerton, appeared in 1900, and there was a subsequent reprint. Volume IV, first published in 1897, included South, Central, and East Africa. This second volume contained two parts. The first part dealt with the history of South Africa down to the time of the Jameson Raid; the second part, a new edition of which, revised by Professor Egerton, appeared in 1904, contained the geography of South Africa and the geography and history of Central and East Africa.

So much history has been made of late years in Africa, and so much has been added to geographical knowledge, that it has been found necessary wholly to recast the African volumes of the series. A new and enlarged edition of West Africa, revised by Mr. A. B. Keith, is now in the press. South Africa is being dealt with in three separate parts. The first part, now in the press, is a reprint, with corrections and new maps, of the history of South Africa down to the year 1895, omitting the last few pages of the old edition. The second part, in course of preparation by the Editor, will carry on the history of South Africa to the present day. The third part will deal with the geography and statistics, etc., of South Africa, including the two Rhodesias, the reviser being Mr. A. B. Keith. A wholly new volume (Volume VII) will in due course be devoted to Central and East Africa.

C. P. LUCAS.

January, 1913.

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DATES OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA

- 1487 Cape of Good Hope sighted by Bartholomew Diaz.
- 1497 South Africa circumnavigated by Vasco da Gama.
- 1620 British sovereignty proclaimed over South Africa by Shilling and FitzHerbert.
- 1652 First Dutch Settlement at the Cape.
- 1679 Settlement at Stellenbosch.
- 1688 Huguenot immigration.
- 1720-30 Dutch Station at Delagoa Bay.
- 1779 Orange River named.
- 1786 District of Graaf Reinet constituted.
- 1795 The Cape taken by the English for the first time.
- ✓ 1806 The Cape taken by the English for the second time.
- 1820-1 The Albany Settlement.
- 1824 First British settlers at Port Natal.
- 1834 Slave emancipation.
- ✓ 1834-5 The great Kaffir War.
- 1835 Foundation of Durban.
- 1836 Beginning of the Great Trek.
- 1837 The Matabele defeated by the Boers.
- 1838 The Zulus defeated by the Boers (Dingaan's Day).
- 1837-40 Boer Republics founded north and south of the Vaal and in Natal.
- 1843 Natal declared to be a British colony.
- 1847 Extension of Cape Colony and creation of the province of British Kaffraria.
- 1848 Annexation of Orange River Territory. Fight at Boomplatz.
- 1849 Antitransportation movement at the Cape.
- 1851-2 Basuto War. Fights at Viervoet and Berea.
- 1852 Sand River Convention. Independence of Transvaal Boers recognized.

- 1853 Representative institutions given to the Cape Colony.
- 1854 Convention of Bloemfontein—British sovereignty withdrawn from Orange River Territory.
- 1867 First discovery of diamonds
- 1868 British sovereignty proclaimed over Basutoland.
- 1871 Keate award. Griqualand West proclaimed British territory. Basutoland annexed to the Cape Colony.
- 1872 Responsible government given to the Cape Colony. Beginning of railway extension.
- 1873 Rising of Langibalele.
- 1875 Delagoa Bay award.
- 1877 Annexation of the Transvaal.
- 1878 Annexation of Walvis Bay.
- 1879 Zulu War.
- 1880 Griqualand West incorporated in Cape Colony.
- 1881 Boer War and Convention of Pretoria giving back modified independence to the Transvaal.
- 1884 Convention of London. The Transvaal becomes the South African Republic. German Protectorate declared in South-West Africa.
- 1884 Basutoland separated from the Cape Colony.
- 1885 British Bechuanaland annexed and Bechuanaland Protectorate proclaimed.
- 1885 Railway opened to Kimberley
- 1886 The Rand proclaimed a goldfield.
- 1887 Annexation of Zululand. Treaty with Amatongaland.
- 1889 Charter given to British South Africa Company. Beginning of South African Customs Union.
- 1890 Occupation of Mashonaland. Anglo-German agreement. Railway completed from Cape Town to Bloemfontein.
- 1891 Anglo-Portuguese agreement. Extension of charter of British South Africa Company to north of Zambesi.
- 1892 Railway completed from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg.
- 1893 Matabele war and conquest of Matabeleland. Responsible government given to Natal.
- 1894 Swaziland Convention placing Swaziland under protection of South African Republic. Pondoland incorporated in Cape Colony, making Cape Colony and Natal coterminous. Railway opened to Mafeking.

viii *DATES OF SOME PRINCIPAL EVENTS*

- 1894-5 Railway communication completed from the Transvaal to Delagoa Bay and to Durban.
- 1895 British Bechuanaland incorporated in Cape Colony. Trans-Pongola districts annexed. British Protectorate proclaimed over Amatongaland.
- 1895-6 Jameson Raid.
- 1896 Native Rising in Matabeleland.
- 1897 Zululand and Amatongaland incorporated in Natal. Railway completed from the South to Buluwayo.
- 1899 Petition from Uitlanders in the South African Republic to Queen Victoria. Bloemfontein Conference. Beginning of South African War.
- 1899-1902 South African War.
- 1902 Close of the War. British sovereignty recognized over the Orange Free State and South African Republic.
- 1904 Railway carried up to Victoria Falls.
- 1906 Responsible government given to the Transvaal.
- 1907 Responsible government given to the Orange Free State.
- 1909 Union Act passed.
- 1910 Inauguration of the Union of South Africa.

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Directorate
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HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
OF
THE BRITISH COLONIES.

—♦—
VOL. IV.

SOUTH AND EAST AFRICA.

PART I. HISTORICAL.

—
CHAPTER I.

THE CAPE 1487-1652.

THE story of South Africa is unique in the chronicles of European colonisation. For a century and a half it is the barren record of a landmark—the Cape. For another century and a half it is little more than the story of a port of call, round which a small settlement gathered. It is now the unfinished tale of a wide dominion.

CH. I.
—♦—
The three stages in the history of South Africa.

In the days when the Portuguese were lords of the sea, the Cape was a point on the route to and from the East, to be sighted and gladly passed by. Under the Dutch it was a trading station, subsidiary to and maintained in the interests of the Netherlands Indies. In British keeping it has been the nucleus of a great European colony, the home and abiding place of a large white population.

The two main streams of European discovery and European colonisation have flowed from West to East and from

PART I. East to West. It was not until the 19th century that a steady current set to the South, carrying with it the emigrants who have made the South African and Australasian colonies. The flow has been, strictly speaking, in a south-easterly rather than a southerly direction, starting with and diverging from the main current towards the East. The Cape is the meeting place and the dividing point of the East and South, the southernmost land on the old Eastern route; and, as the Southern world has risen higher on the horizon of civilisation, as it has gradually claimed and been given a distinct place in geography and history, South Africa, from having been but a corner on the way to the East, has become what it never was in old days, a great separate sphere of European settlement.

In 1869, less than half a century ago, the Suez Canal was opened, bringing back to the Red Sea the trade between Europe and the East. During these years the work of opening up Africa, and especially South Africa, has gone on apace. It is no mere fancy to suggest that here there has been some connexion of cause and effect. Africa has been severed from the Eastern world. She has been thrown back on her own resources. Men's eyes have been turned inland, instead of gazing over the Indian seas in the wake of Da Gama's ships. The more they have looked, the more they have found in a land long undervalued and long misunderstood. Africa was for centuries the handmaid of other continents. She now takes rank and station in her own acknowledged right.

The Cape Peninsula.

The promontory, which forms the Cape of Good Hope, is situated between 33.53 and 34.22 south latitude, and between 18.18 and 18.30 east longitude. It runs into the sea for thirty miles to the south and south-east, and has an average breadth of five to eight miles. On the north is Table Bay, and on its eastern side is False Bay, the low neck of land which divides the two bays and connects the peninsula with

the continent being about eleven miles across. On the western and southern shores of Table Bay stands Capetown, and immediately behind it Table Mountain rises to a height of 3,500 feet. The peninsula begins with the Table Mountain range; it ends in cliffs with two peaks, the higher of which is known as Vasco da Gama peak.

Table Bay was originally called Saldanha Bay, named after Antonio de Saldanha, who visited it in 1503¹. In the account of the first voyage, undertaken in 1601 for the newly formed English East India Company, we read, 'Over the bay of Saldania standeth a very high hill, flat like a table, and is called the Table; such another plain mark to find a harbour in is not in all that coast².' In 1601 the Dutch admiral Spilbergen transferred the name to the present Saldanha Bay, on the south-west coast of the Cape Colony; but for years afterwards the old name of Saldanha still clung to the bay under Table Mountain, and was only gradually supplanted by that of Table Bay³.

*Table Bay
originally
called Sal-
danha Bay*

False Bay is much larger than Table Bay, extending for some eighteen miles inland. On its western side, Simons Bay runs into the Cape peninsula, forming a harbour where there is now a coaling-station and dockyard for the Imperial fleet. The entrance to False Bay is sixteen miles wide, between the Cape of Good Hope on the west, and Cape

False Bay.

¹ The received account is that Saldanha landed in Table Bay on the way out from Europe in 1503; but, according to the Commentaries of Albuquerque (Hakluyt Soc. Ed., pt. i. p. 33), he discovered it on his way home in 1506 or 1507. The words are: 'When he was on his course doubling the Cape of Good Hope, he discovered a very favourable watering-place for the ships, before the island of St. Helena had been noticed. To this he gave the name of the watering-station of Saldanha; and it was here that the Cafres of the land murdered the Viceroy D. Francisco D'Almeida, when he touched there to take water on his way from India to Portugal.'

² From Purchas' narrative of the voyage, reprinted in The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Kt., to the East Indies, edited by Sir Clements Markham for the Hakluyt Society (p. 65).

³ Reference to the Calendar of State Papers will show that, at any rate down to the year 1634, the English always spoke of Table Bay as Saldanha Bay, and called the natives 'Saldanians.'

PART I. Hangklip on the east. This latter cape used to be known as 'False Cape'—'the false Cape de Bona Speranza,' as Linschoten calls it, giving the following explanation of the name. 'This hook is called the false or unright Cape, because the ships that sail from India to Portugal do first discover a great corner or hook of land called delli Agughe, and after that this smaller hook, and therefore call it the false cape, being separated from the right and great cape¹.'

*Cape
Agulhas.*

The Cape of Good Hope is the south-western end of Africa. The southernmost point is about ninety miles further to the south-east, at Cape Agulhas—the Needles². Off this cape the warm Mozambique current, flowing to the south-west, meets a cold counter-stream from the Antarctic regions; and the strife between warm and cold water and warm and cold air gives rise to the gales, which, at certain times of the year, still make the passage round South Africa difficult and dangerous. The name Stormy Cape is perhaps even more applicable to Cape Agulhas than to the Cape of Good Hope itself.

*Early
notices of*

In a preceding volume of this Series³, a sketch has been

¹ From Linschoten's Discourse of Voyages to the East and West Indies, bk. ii.; The True and Perfect Description of the whole coast of Guinea, Manicongo, Angola, Monomotapa, &c. (Eng. Tr. 1598), p. 211. Similarly Purchas says The Cape of Good Hope 'hath three headlands, the westernmost beareth the name of Good Hope, the middlemost Cabo Falso, because they have sometimes in their return from the Indies mistaken this for the former The third and easternmost is that of Agulhas or Needles.' (Purchas' Pilgrimage, 1617 ed. bk. vii. chap. viii. sec. 2, p. 865.)

² For the origin of the name, see Linschoten (as above), bk. iii.; The Navigation of the Portugales into the East Indies, chap. ii. p. 310: 'Also by this Cape (Agulhas) the needle of the compass is right and even.' See also the Voyage of Pyrard de Laval, edited for the Hakluyt Society by Mr. Albert Gray, vol. i. chap. ii. p. 22: 'It is named the Cape of the Needles, because at this place the compasses or needles remain fixed, pointing directly to the north, without any declination to the east or west; when it is doubled, they begin to decline to the north-east.' Mr. Gray, in his note to this passage, quotes John Davis as also mentioning that off Cape Agulhas 'the compass hath no variation.'

³ Vol. iii. sec. 1, chap. ii

given of the early Portuguese voyages down the African coast. It has been seen how, in 1487, Bartholomew Diaz was carried by wind and storm into the southern seas beyond and out of sight of the Cape; how he beat up to the shores of Africa, and sailed as far as Algoa Bay; and how on his return voyage he sighted the headland, whose name has since become a household word. *Cape of Storms* he called it, in bitter memory of the dangers he had passed; *Cape of Good Hope* his king re-christened it, brightly looking to the future; for round it lay the long sought road to the Indies. That road was traversed in November, 1497, by Vasco da Gama. Even in fine weather Da Gama found that off the Cape the seas ran high, and for many long years to come, the south coast of Africa maintained its evil reputation. In a letter written from Goa in 1579, and preserved for us in Hakluyt's collection¹, the Jesuit, Thomas Stephens, gives a vivid picture of the dangers of the voyage round the Cape. He had sailed from Lisbon for the Indies in a Portuguese ship and 'we came at length,' he writes, 'unto the point so famous and feared of all men.' Finding 'no tempest, only great waves,' the pilot kept too near the land, a south wind sprang up, blowing towards the shore, and Stephens and his companions were in imminent danger of shipwreck. 'The ship stood in less than fourteen fathoms of water, no more than five miles from the Cape which is called *das Agulias*, and there we stood as utterly castaway; for under us were rocks of mainstone so sharp and close, that no anchor could hold the ship, the shore so evil that nothing could take land, and the land itself so full of tigers and people that are savage and killers of all strangers, that we had no hope of life nor comfort but only in God and a good conscience.'

Four years later, in 1583, another and more famous *Linschoten*.

CH. I.

→ ←
the 'stormy'
Cape.
Diaz.

Vasco da
Gama.

Thomas
Stephens

¹ Hakluyt. vol. ii. (1810-11 ed.), p. 583.

PART I. traveller, the young Dutchman, Johr. Huygen van Linschoten, left Lisbon for the East, having taken service under the Archbishop of Goa. He started for home early in 1589 on board a Portuguese vessel, and so bad was the weather, so contrary the winds, that the ship, sailing direct from Cochin, took three months and three days before she was able to double the Cape. He writes of the Cape as 'the greatest hook or cape, and that reacheth furthest into the sea of any cape whatsoever in all the world'; he comments on the strength of the winds and the roughness of the noisy sea, 'whereby so many Portugal ships have there been cast away,' and he adds a new explanation of the name 'Cape of Good Hope' in the following words: 'This head is called the Cape de Bona Speranza, that is head of Good Hope, for that all the ships that sail to India or from India to Portugal do fear the passing of this Cape, thinking if they pass it to have passed all danger¹.'

*Pyrrard de
Laval.*

One more old traveller may be quoted to the same effect. Returning, like Linschoten, in a Portuguese ship from his wanderings in the East Indies, the Frenchman Pyrrard de Laval sighted the Cape of Good Hope on April 8, 1610. With six hours more of fair wind, the Cape would have been doubled; but heavy gales sprang up, and it was not till the last day of May that the dreaded promontory was passed. Indeed, if the captain and some of the passengers had had their way, they would have attempted to retrace their steps to India rather than face the perils of the Stormy Cape. More than 120 years had passed since Diaz first sighted these shores, but experience had not given courage, and familiarity had not bred contempt. 'This Cape of Good Hope,' says the writer, 'is called the Lion of the sea, because it is so

¹ From the same passage as has been quoted above. See p. 4, note. Linschoten spent a long time in the Azores, and did not come back to Europe till 1592. He published his book in 1596. The English translation is dated 1598.

furious¹. He speaks, like other travellers, of the signs of land which told that the Cape was near, the floating reeds, the sea wolves, and the birds, 'the sentinels which God has been pleased to place there.' He notes the currents, the contrary winds, the 'great and high mountains all of bare rock, with precipices and lofty peaks which seem to touch the clouds,' the savage natives who lined the beach and who seemed to his excited imagination to be waiting to devour any castaways.

Such was the witness borne to the perils of the Stormy Cape by an Englishman, a Dutchman, and a Frenchman, each of whom was a passenger on a Portuguese ship. If we turn to an account derived from an Englishman on board an English ship we have a different picture presented to us. Traditional dangers and superstitions were not wont to trouble English sailors of the days of Elizabeth, and thirty years before the date of Pyrrard's voyage, on June 18, 1580, Sir Francis Drake, returning from his voyage round the world, passed the Cape in fair weather. He did not land, but 'ran hard aboard the Cape, finding the report of the Portugals to be most false, who affirm that it is the most dangerous cape of the world, never without intolerable storms and present danger to travellers which come near the same.' Drake testified on the contrary that 'the Cape is a most stately thing, and the fairest cape we saw in the whole

*Francis
Drake.*

¹ See the voyage of Pyrrard de Laval, edited for the Hakluyt Society by Mr. Albert Gray, 1887-90, vol. ii. pt. ii. chap. xxiii. The passage continues: 'This Cape, or rather that of the Needles (Aiguilles), which projects still farther, is at 35 degrees from the equinoctial line towards the Antarctic Pole; that which is properly called the Cape of Good Hope is at 34½ degrees.' John Davis ascribes the term 'Lion of the Sea' to Cape Agulhas. 'The Portugals,' he writes, 'call this place the Lion of the Sea by reason of the extreme fury and danger which they find in doubling of this Cape' (Voyages and Works of John Davis, edited by Mr. A. H. Markham for the Hakluyt Society, 1880, p. 164). For the Trombas or floating reeds off the Cape, and the sea-birds known as Mangas de velludo or 'velvet s. eves,' see Mr. Gray's Notes to Pyrrard, vol. i. pp. 20-21.

PART I. — circumference of the earth¹. His words would doubtless not have been so bright, had the winds been contrary and the sea been high: but the difference between his view and commonly accepted accounts meant more than the difference between fair and foul weather. It was not merely that the Portuguese sailors were more superstitious than the English, or that for political reasons the Portuguese had exaggerated the dangers of the only road which led into their eastern domain. It was that the English were beginning to know and love the ocean, that what had been the Cape of Storms to the voyagers of Southern Europe was becoming the Cape of Good Hope to the adventurers of the north. The year 1580, in which Drake came sailing in triumph round the world, was the year in which Portugal became subject to the Spanish Crown, while on the other hand the Dutchmen of the Seven Provinces declared themselves independent of Spain. Thenceforward Portugal lost her spirit and her strength, and Dutch and English drove her from the sea.

*The decline
of the Por-
tuguese.*

Linschoten tells us that the Portuguese captain of the ship in which he came back round the Cape in 1589 ' marvelled at nothing so much as why our Lord God suffered them (being so good Christians and Catholics as they were) to pass the Cape with so great torments and dangerous weather, having so great and strong ships, and that the Englishmen being (as he said) heretics and blasphemers of God, with so small and weak vessels, passed the Cape so easily; for they had received news in India that an English ship had passed the Cape with very great ease.' The English ship in question was the one in which Thomas Cavendish repeated Drake's exploit of sailing round the world, and it passed by the Cape without danger or difficulty in May, 1588. The reason why the English and the Dutch fared better on the sea than the Portuguese is not far to seek. Linschoten notes how badly

¹ Hakluyt (1811 ed.), vol. iv. p. 246.

provided was the ship in which he took his passage home; when storm came on no ropes could be found, and the officers threw the blame on one another. Large, cumbrous, dirty, ill prepared, overladen with cargo and with passengers, badly commanded, badly manned, the Portuguese carracks which sailed to and from India, like the huge ships which composed the Spanish Armada, were good neither for sailing nor for fighting. They were at the mercy of the waves in time of storm; they could offer little resistance to foreign foes. Englishmen and Dutchmen, on the contrary, sailed safely onward in small, trim, well-found vessels, manned by expert seamen. Their ships were the ships of the coming people and of the coming time. The Portuguese fleets, like those to whom they belonged, were out of date and overweighted with the past¹.

The power of Portugal, however, did not begin definitely to wane much before 1580; and the quotations which have been given above refer to the later years of the sixteenth and the early years of the seventeenth century. Before that time the Portuguese were strong, and the Cape was within their own exclusive sphere. It might have been supposed therefore that here, at the turning point in their voyages to and from the East, they would have formed some kind of station; and one of their commanders, early in the sixteenth century, is said to have recommended that a post should be established on the shores of South Africa, somewhere to the east of the Cape. As a matter of fact no step of the kind was taken; the passing ships in most cases kept well away from the land; and, if they touched, remained only long enough to take in fresh water. The watering places appear to have been

*The Cape
in Portu-
guese times.*

¹ See Pyrard (as above) vol. ii. pt. i. chap. xiv. p. 18c, and Mr. Gray's Introduction to that volume, pp. xxxiii-iv. It is, however, fair to add, as showing that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the Portuguese had not yet lost all their seamanship, that Purchas in his *Pilgrimage* (1617 ed. bk. vii. chap. viii. sec. 2) speaks of a Portuguese having sailed round the Cape from India in a very small boat.

PART I. Table Bay, known as Agoada de Saldanha, or Saldanha's watering place¹, and False Bay, where a freshwater stream, Rio Dulce, ran into the sea, fabled to have taken its rise from a lake situated in the Mountains of the Moon². Early in the seventeenth century, in the year 1608, a report reached England that the Spanish government, then rulers of Portugal, intended to form a military settlement at the Cape, hoping to stop en route the Dutch and English traders, who were by this time making themselves felt in the East Indies³; but, whether or not anything of the kind was ever seriously contemplated, it is certain that nothing was done, and it is equally certain that after the beginning of the seventeenth century it was far too late for Spain and Portugal to attempt to hold the Cape.

In their voyages round South Africa it was not only wind, waves, and rocks that the Portuguese feared. The natives of that coast, the Cape Hottentots, as can be gathered from the passages already quoted, also contributed to make it unattractive. These 'killers of all strangers,' as Stephens called them, had early done something to justify their ill repute. On the occasion of Saldanha's first visit to Table Bay, t¹ Hottentots attacked the white men; and a few years later a more serious disaster occurred. On his voyage home from India, in 1510, Francisco de Almeida, the first viceroy of the Portuguese Indies, anchored in Table Bay; a party of sailors landed to traffic with the natives, and ended by quarrelling with them. On the following day the viceroy led an armed party to attack the native village where the quarrel had occurred, with the result that he himself was killed and sixty-five of his followers. From that date onward Portuguese ships rarely touched at the Cape.

Francisco de Almeida killed by the Hottentots.

¹ See above, p. 3 and note.

² See Linschoten, as above, bk. ii. p. 211, and Purchas' Pilgrimage, as above, p. 865.

³ See the Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, 1513-1616, Extract No. 419, p. 177.

In a word, to the Portuguese the Cape was nothing but a landmark. They discovered it; they went round it to and fro for a century and more; but they merely came and looked on it and passed by on the other side, leaving to later comers to turn it to account. Were it not for records in prose and verse¹, for old maps, and for names such as Agulhas, Algoa, Saldanha, and the like, which tell the nationality of the Europeans who first visited these shores, there would be nothing to show that this people, who elsewhere by race, language, and religion left such a strong impress upon the history of colonisation, had ever found their way to the southernmost parts of Africa.

Three years after Thomas Cavendish sailed past the Cape, the first Englishmen set foot on South African soil. On April 10, 1591, 'three tall ships' left Plymouth. They were the *Penelope*, the *Royal Merchant*, and the *Edward Bonaventure*. The last-named was in command of James Lancaster, and two accounts of the voyage by men on board his ship have been preserved by Hakluyt². By the time the Cape peninsula was sighted, the crews were weak and ill with scurvy, and, anxious to recruit them, the captains bore up to land. 'Going along the shore,' says the narrative, 'we espied a goodly bay, with an island lying to seawards of it, into which we did bear and found it very commodious for our ships to ride in. This bay is called Agoada de Saldanha, lying fifteen leagues northward on the hither side of the Cape.' The bay was Table Bay, the island was Robben Island. The ships stayed for about a month in Table Bay, and then, having sent the *Royal Merchant* home with the

Lancaster's first voyage.

¹ e.g. Camoens.

² These two accounts, one by Edmund Barker, the other by Henry May, are reprinted in *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Kt., to the East Indies* (edited for the Hakluyt Society by Sir Clements Markham, 1877). They give us one of the earliest notices of St. Helena, which Lancaster visited on his return voyage (see vol. iii. of this work, pp. 254-5), and of the Bermudas, on which Henry May was wrecked (see vol. ii. of this work, p. 7).

PART I. sailing seamen, Raymond, the admiral of the expedition, in the *Penelope*, and Lancaster in the *Bonaventure*, went their way to the East. They found no difficulty in doubling the Cape; but off Cape Corrientes, Raymond and his ship were lost in a storm, and Lancaster alone reached the Straits of Malacca and Ceylon. On his return voyage he did not land at the Cape, but passed it in March, 1593, after being detained for a month or five weeks by adverse winds: and finally, after touching at St. Helena, he lost his ship in the West Indies, and came back on board a Dieppe vessel, reaching home in May, 1594.

The voyage of Houtman and John Davis.

The name of the next Englishman who visited the Cape is better known even than that of Lancaster. In 1598 John Davis sailed from Flushing for the East as chief pilot to two Dutch ships, the *Lion* and *Lioness*, commanded by Cornelius Houtman. This was not the first Dutch voyage round the Cape, for in the years 1595-7 Houtman had already found his way to the East by this route¹. In November the ships anchored in Table Bay, which is described (more accurately than in the account of Lancaster's voyage) as being ten leagues short of the Cape. They stayed a little over a fortnight, sailed on to the East, where Houtman was murdered at Acheen, and came back in storm round the Cape in March, 1600, arriving in Holland in July of that year.

Formation of the English East India Company.

The sixteenth century passed away in giving birth to the greatest of all chartered companies. On December 31, 1600, Queen Elizabeth granted a Royal Charter to the English East India Company, under the title of 'The Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies.' The Directors lost no time in starting their first venture; and in the following February five ships sailed from Woolwich for the East, commanded by Lancaster and piloted by John Davis. As before, Lancaster put into Table

The first voyage commanded by Lancaster.

¹ Between the dates of Houtman's two voyages another expedition was sent out from the Netherlands under James Van Neck.

Bay to heal his scurvy-stricken company, and stayed there from September 9 to the end of October; and again, when homeward bound in May, 1603, he encountered bad weather off the Cape, driven hopelessly by wind and wave 'in such a tempestuous sea and so stormy a place so that, I think, there be few worse in all the world'.¹ He reached home in September, 1603, and his ships were almost immediately fitted out for the second of the Company's voyages to the East. This time the commander was Sir Henry Middleton, who started from Gravesend on March 25, and in the middle of July came to anchor in Table Bay. His instructions had been to pass on to Madagascar without touching at the Cape, but his seamen were so ailing, that he was compelled to land on the shores of Table Bay in the middle of July and to stay there till the middle of August. On his voyage home also he stopped again to refit from the middle of December, 1605, to the middle of January, 1606.

The second voyage commanded by Middleton.

Contemporaneous with this voyage was that of a private adventurer, Sir Edward Mitchelborne. He had been an original member of the East India Company, but was for some reason or other expelled from it. Being, however, high in favour with King James I, he obtained a licence to sail to the East, where, by plundering and freebooting, he damaged the prospects of British trade. His voyage is chiefly memorable as being the last voyage of John Davis, who went out as Mitchelborne's pilot, and was killed off the Malay peninsula at the end of 1605. On his way out from England, Mitchelborne, like the voyagers who came before and after him, stayed for some time at Table Bay.

Mitchelborne's voyage.

During these years the Dutch were no less active than the English in pressing on to the East. Houtman's expeditions were followed by two voyages, one in 1599 under Pieter Both² and Van Caerden, and another in 1601 under Spil-

Dutch voyages to the East.

¹ Lancaster's *Voyages to the East Indies* (Hakluyt Soc.), p. 103.

² Pieter Both, afterwards Governor of Batavia, was lost off Mauritius

PART I. bergem; and in March, 1602, the States-General consolidated the various companies, which had been formed in the Netherlands for trading in the East, into the Dutch East India Company.

Formation
of the
Dutch East
India
Company.

French and
Danish
East India
Companies.

Two years later, in 1604, the first French East India Company was established; and in 1612 the Danes followed suit. Thus, before the seventeenth century was many years old, all the trading nations of Northern Europe had entered the race for the Indies.

Early
notices of
Table Bay.

The various notices of Table Bay contained in the accounts of the old voyages bear a family resemblance to each other. We read in them of a place of 'royal refreshing¹,' where, in life-giving air, supplied with fresh water and fresh meat, sailors recovered their health and strength. Mention is made of the infinite number of penguins and seals on the island, which thence derived its old name of Penguin and its later name of Robben² Island; and the varieties of animal life on the mainland are duly recorded, including antelopes, baboons, ostriches, birds of various kinds, oxen, and sheep which 'have great tails like the sheep in Syria.' 'In this place,' writes the chronicler of Davis' last voyage, 'we had excellent good refreshing, in so much that I think the like place is not to be found among savage people.' It was, he says, 'a goodly country, inhabited by a most savage and beastly people as ever I think God created³.'

Description
of the
Hottentots.

Very lifelike are the descriptions given of the Hottentots at the Cape, who are usually referred to under the name of

in 1616. The famous rock over the harbour of Port Louis in Mauritius is named after him.

¹ From Lancaster's Voyages, page 64. See also Davis' Voyages.

² Robben Island, about five miles north of the entrance of Table Bay, is called from the Dutch *rob*, 'a seal.' Thus Leguat, who visited the Cape in 1691, writes: 'The isle was in truth so called from certain fish named in Flemish *robben*. They are a sort of sea dogs found in great abundance about this island.' (See the Voyage of François Leguat, edited by Capt. Pasfield Oliver for the Hakluyt Society, 1891.)

³ See Davis' Voyages (Hakluyt Society), p. 162.

Saldanians. 'The people of this place,' says one of the earliest accounts, 'are all of a tawny colour, of a reasonable stature, swift of foot, and much given to pick and steal; their speech is wholly uttered through the throat, and they cluck with their tongues in such sort, that in seven weeks which we remained here in this place, the sharpest wit among us could not learn a word of their language¹.' Savages of a low type, filthy and revolting in their habits, they were, when kindly handled, ready to barter sheep and oxen for knives and pieces of old iron; and, if they were suspicious of strangers, moving away on the slightest sign of the white men taking up their residence on shore, they had at least just grounds for suspicion. When Davis visited the Cape with Houtman's expedition, the natives came down with their cattle and sheep for sale, but were turned from friends to foes in consequence of 'the Flemings offering them some rude wrong²'; and the account of the sixth voyage of the English East India Company, in 1610, suggests that the difficulty which was then found in procuring cattle may have been due to the Dutchmen having spoiled the trade 'by their overmuch libertys³,' or to the wrongdoing of French whalers. The English sailors, it is true, also at times fell foul of the Hottentots; but their instructions were to keep peace with the natives of the places which they visited⁴, and on the whole their dealings appear to have contrasted favourably with those of the Dutch.

*Treatment
of the
natives by
Europeans.*

¹ From the narrative of the first voyage for the East India Company under Lancaster (Lancaster's Voyages, Hakluyt Soc. p. 64). Similarly Davis, in his account of his voyage to the East Indies with Houtman, writes of the Hottentots that 'in speaking they cluck with the tongue like a brood hen, which clucking and the word are both pronounced together very strangely' (Davis' Voyages, Hakluyt Soc. p. 135).

² Davis' Voyages, p. 135.

³ Journal of the sixth voyage kept by Nicholas Downton (Lancaster's Voyages, Hakluyt Soc. p. 155).

⁴ See the East India Company's instructions to Sir Henry Middleton in 1604, given on p. 10 of the Appendix to the Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton (Hakluyt Soc. 1855).

PART I. In June, 1615, some English ships bound for the East
 anchored in Table Bay. They were taking out Sir Thomas
 Roe on a mission from King James I to the Court of the
 Mogul, and a pillar was set up on the shore to com-
 memorate the object of the voyage. On this occasion the
 Hottentots received their visitors with the greatest cordiality;
 they kept their hands from picking and stealing, they showed
 no timidity or suspicion, and some of them expressed readi-
 ness to go to England when the fleet returned. The reason
 was, that one of their number had lately been taken to Eng-
 land, hospitably treated, and sent back to the Cape with
 various presents, including a much-prized suit of copper
 armour. His fellow tribesmen were in consequence well
 disposed towards the English, but at the same time had
 learnt from his experience among white men a lesson in
 trade. 'Time was,' says the narrative, 'when iron hoops
 and nails would have served the turn, but the humour altered
 from that to copper; now they are come from copper to
 brass, and they say they must have pieces of a foot square
 or more¹. Thus good treatment produced much the same
 result as bad—a scarcity of beef and mutton at Table Bay.

The ships which were escorting Sir Thomas Roe had on
 board some Japanese and Indians, returning to their own
 lands. They carried also 'a load of the choice drugs of our
 own country, which the law having swept out of doors at
 home, were to be disposed of up and down in foreign parts
 at discretion.' The East India Company, it seems, had
 interceded for a certain number of condemned criminals and
 obtained their pardon 'that they might be sent over in these

¹ From the Second Voyage into the East Indies performed by Captain Peyton with the Expedition, together with the *Dragon*, *Lion*, and *Peppercorn*, under the command of Captain Keeling. (Harris' Collection of Voyages, 1705, vol. i. p. 149.) Some reference to this voyage is also given in Churchill's Collection, 3rd ed. 1744, vol. i. p. 626, Sir Thomas Roe's Diary. It is there said of the Hottentots, 'They have left off their custom of stealing, but know no God or religion.'

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 Visit of Sir
 Thomas
 Roe.

Landing of
 convicts at
 the Cape.

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ships to make discoveries in those places where they should be left.' So Spanish criminals had been sent to America in the train of Columbus; so Angola and Brazil had been settled by the gaolbirds of Portugal; so Frobisher had sailed to explore the Arctic regions with a company recruited from English prisons. Some of these 'lewd malefactors' were turned loose at the Cape, and left to their fate, each being given a weapon to defend himself. The chronicler of the voyage, who evidently was alive to the immorality of scattering English felons broadcast through the world, consoles himself by reflecting that the Hottentots were such expert thieves that 'at least our men and the Soldanians could not well debauch one another,' and that in fact 'to bring thieves to Soldania is but carrying coals to Newcastle, or rats and mice into a house that swarmed with vermin before.'

But the Cape was not destined to become a receptacle for convicts from England either in the seventeenth or in the nineteenth century. No trace was subsequently found of the men who were thus cast away, and other 'condemned men' who were left in the following year disappeared also. They no doubt exchanged the gallows in their own country for a violent death at the hands of the savages of South Africa.

From the date when the East India Companies were formed, Table Bay gradually became a regular stopping-place for ships bound for the East. Some vessels called there also on the way home, but the majority passed by and touched instead at St. Helena. The English and the Dutch were the most constant visitors, but French and Danish ships came as well. It became the custom for the captains of each expedition to inscribe on the rocks the fact of their arrival and departure, to look for letters which had been deposited by former comers under stones or in the earth, and in turn to leave their own letters for other ships to pick up. Constant reference to this practice is made in the old records of the East India Company, and a graphic account of finding

Table Bay becomes a regular stopping-place for ships bound for the East.

Custom of leaving letters on the shore.

PART I. some buried letters is given in the memoir of an early French voyage to the East. The commander of the expedition in question was Admiral Beaulieu, who sailed from Honfleur in October, 1619, and reached Table Bay in March, 1620. There he and his companions found corpses of men and clothes, and a small earthen fortification, which they took to have been built by the Danes. Moreover, the narrative continues, 'some of our men going ashore happened to light upon a great stone, with two little packs of pitched canvas underneath, which we afterwards found to be Dutch letters.' The letters were wrapped up in various coverings which kept them as they had been left by the careful Hollanders, 'very safe and dry.' When opened, they were found to contain accounts of various ships which had passed, and especially of an English boat sent home to warn the Company of the conduct of the Dutch in the East Indies. 'They likewise gave notice to all ships that passed that way to take care of the natives, who had murdered several of their crew and stole some of their water-casks'. Two or three months later we read of Dutch and English ships at Table Bay agreeing to interchange their letters and accounts, and carry them out and home; but, what with the jealousies of rival nations, the uncertainty of the ships' visits, and the certainty of the Hottentots laying their hands on anything they might find, the fate of any letters left at the Cape in the early years of the seventeenth century must have been most precarious.

Reasons why no settlement was formed at the Cape in the early days of the East India Companies.

Why was it that in these years no European settlement was formed at the Cape? Here was a spot half-way to the Indies, with wholesome air, with fresh water, with fruits of the earth, with fish, flesh, and fowl, and with prospects of seal and whale fishing. It was a place well worth taking and keeping, yet till the middle of the seventeenth century it was

¹ From the Memoirs of Admiral Beaulieu's Voyages to the East Indies drawn up by himself, translated from Monsieur Thevenot's large collection of Voyages (Harris' Collection of Voyages and Travels, 1705, vol. i. p. 230).

not permanently taken and kept. The Dutch and English East India Companies repeatedly considered the matter; at one time they even contemplated establishing a joint station; and, in default of a fortified post on land, the Directors of the English Company had it in their minds to send out a provision-ship yearly to Table Bay to supply the East Indiamen with necessaries. Nothing practical however seems to have come of their deliberations. The truth was that these trading Companies were in their infancy. Their resources were limited. They wished to concentrate all their energies on and to devote all their available capital to the one main object of trade with the East, and to spend, if possible, nothing on the way. They did not relish the prospect of an annual outlay on an isolated station in stormy seas, at a place where there would be constant collision with savages¹, and which it might be difficult to defend against the fleets of rival nations.

Yet the English very nearly secured the Cape, for on one occasion two English captains actually and formally annexed it to the British Crown. On June 24, 1620, Andrew Shilling and Humphrey Fitz-Herbert, commanding expeditions of the East India Company bound for Surat and Bantam respectively, anchored together in Table Bay, Shilling having among his company the great Arctic explorer, William Baffin. The English found nine Dutch ships lying in the Bay, *en route* for Bantam, and also a British vessel, the *Lion*, which was homeward bound. The Dutch fleet sailed the following day; but, before they left, they gave the English to under-

Proclamation of British sovereignty over South Africa by Shilling and Fitz-Herbert.

¹ This was probably the main reason why Middleton, commander of the second voyage of the East India Company, was, as already stated (above, p. 13), instructed not to touch at Table Bay. The words of the instructions were: 'For the place of your referring, we wish it to be the island of St. Lawrence (Madagascar), but not at Saldania in any wise; for the inconveniences of that island [bay] have been noted unto us by men of good experience, and their caution given us to beware of the danger of that place; wherefore we require you to shun this place as our express order and will herein.' (The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton, Hakluyt. Soc. App., p. 11.)

PART I.

stand that the States-General intended in the next year to take possession of Table Bay. Thereupon the two English commanders took counsel together, and fearing that in future their countrymen 'should be frustrated of watering but by license,' they determined to lose no time in registering a prior claim. On July 3, in the presence of Dutch as well as English, for another Dutch ship had in the meantime arrived, by solemn proclamation they took 'quiet and peaceable possession of the Bay of Saldania,' and of the whole continent adjoining so far as it was not occupied by any Christian power, in the name of their sovereign King James. For a memorial they raised a cairn on a hill lying west-south-west from the anchorage, calling it King James's Mount; and they gave a small flag to the natives to be kept in honour of the event¹.

Shilling's attempt to annex the Cape compared with Gilbert's annexation of Newfoundland.

The description of the proceedings on this occasion recalls what had taken place nearly forty years before on the coast of Newfoundland. Like Table Bay, the harbour of St. John's had been neutral ground for the ships of all nations, and, when Humphrey Gilbert came there in 1583, he found thirty-six vessels lying at anchor. He took possession of the land by ceremony of rod and turf, in the name of Queen Elizabeth. He set up the arms of England on the shore; and the foreigners, outwardly at any rate, acquiesced in his action, just as the Dutch at Table Bay 'seemed likewise much to approve the same.' Possibly in both cases acquiescence was not merely due to fear, but also to a feeling that all would gain by the recognition of some definite authority. At any


¹ There is a manuscript copy of the Proclamation at the India Office; and a copy, though not quite word for word, is printed in the first edition (1801) of Barrow's Travels in Southern Africa, vol. i. pp. 2-5. Reference should also be made to two letters, of which an abstract is given in the Calendar of State Papers, one from Eustace Man to the East India Company, dated October 13, 1620; the other from Joseph Hopkinson to the East India Company, dated December 2, 1620.

rate there is no record that on either occasion a protest was made at the time and on the spot.

Neither at Newfoundland nor at the Cape was the proclamation of sovereignty immediately followed by British occupation. But the English never lost the title to Newfoundland which Gilbert gave them, and from his visit to St. John's Harbour we date our oldest colony. Shilling's and Fitz-Herbert's proclamation bore no such fruit. The king, whose subjects they were, 'the high and mighty Prince James, by the grace of God King of Great Britain,' was not a man to whom a spirited policy would commend itself; and the Company which employed them shrank from the task of founding a settlement in the Southern seas. In vain the captains pleaded the convenience of the bay for the purposes of the East Indian trade, the fruitfulness of the soil, the salubrity of the air, and the profits to be expected from the whale fishery. Their proclamation was stillborn; their advice was rejected; and nearly two centuries passed before the English became owners of the Cape.

So ends the first period in the story of South Africa. The curtain falls upon a Southern peninsula, well known to European sailors bound to and from the East; not dreaded as once it was, but not loved; a No-man's land, as far as white men were concerned; a land of doubtful promise for the future. On the west and on the east of Africa, at Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese held sway, and their claims vaguely extended into the interior, where below the Zambesi were the lands of Manica and Monomotapa. But the South, stormbound and unalluring, was not for them. It was to be in times to come for peoples more prosaic but more steadfast, slow, but very sure.

To the Dutch and English too the Cape was for many long years a place of little worth. Their minds were intent on the East and all the East had to give. Their object was to leave Africa behind. They could not tell that on the

PART I.  shores of a desolate bay, by the side of a rocky promontory, at the uttermost end of the Old World, a settlement would rise, which should be a Metropolis in the true Greek sense of the word, a mother of European states in South Africa. They could not foresee that the point of Africa, which was furthest from Europe, would be the main inlet of European colonisation into the continent, and that great territories would be peopled and planted by Europeans coming up from the south. All this was in the womb of the future. Meanwhile sailors looked for letters under stones upon the beach, and Hottentots grazed their flocks and herds by Table Bay.

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CHAPTER II.

THE FOUNDING OF THE DUTCH SETTLEMENT AT THE CAPE.

IN the year 1648, the *Haarlem*, a ship belonging to the Netherlands East India Company, was wrecked at Table Bay. The crew landed and encamped where Capetown now stands. They sowed seeds and grew vegetables, they procured game and fish, and they trafficked peaceably with the natives for cattle and sheep. For five months they lived in comfort and plenty, until other Dutch vessels arrived and carried them home.

CII. II.

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*The wreck
of the
Haarlem
at Table
Bay.*

On their return to the Netherlands, two of their number, in July, 1649, made a representation to the Company, pointing out, as others had already pointed out, the desirability of forming a settlement at the Cape. They contrasted it favourably as a place of refreshment with St. Helena, of which island the Dutch had taken possession in or about 1645; they gave a good character to the natives, of whom they could speak with some experience, laying stress on the point that the Hottentot children might be trained as servants and educated in the Christian religion; and they expressed their surprise that the 'public enemies' of the Netherlands, the Spaniards and Portuguese, had not already made Table Bay a basis for attacking the Dutch ships which passed year after year bringing back to Europe the merchandise of the Indies.

*Suggestions
made to the
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pany for the
establish-
ment of a
station at
Table Bay.*

PART I.

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*The suggestions
 carried out
 under Jan
 Van
 Riebeeck in
 1652.*

*The Dutch,
 their pros-
 perity and
 greatness.*

The Directors of the Company took time to consider the memorial, but at length resolved to act upon the suggestions which it contained. They selected to take charge of the enterprise Jan Van Riebeeck, who had been a surgeon in their service, and had lately visited the Cape on board the fleet which rescued the crew of the *Haarlem*; and under his command they despatched two ships and a smaller vessel, with orders to build and garrison a fort on the shores of Table Bay. The little expedition left the Texel on Christmas Eve in 1651. On April 6, 1652, it reached its destination. Thus, 165 years after Diaz first sighted the Cape of Good Hope, Europeans began permanently to settle in South Africa.

At the time when Van Riebeeck was sent to the Cape, the Dutch were nearly if not quite the first nation in Europe. In 1648, while the shipwrecked seamen of the *Haarlem* were sowing seeds on the site of Capetown, the Peace of Westphalia was signed, putting an end for ever to the claims of Spain to be sovereign over the Netherlands. Independent in name, as they had long been in fact, Dutchmen went on from strength to strength, giving year by year new honour and wealth to the small, unattractive, lowlying corner of Europe, which they loved so dearly and served so well. To the sea they owed their salvation. They held their land as a fief from the ocean, ready, as they had already shown and were to show again, to give it back to the waste of waters rather than let it pay tribute to a foreign foe. Liberty hardly won, brought empire in its train. The Netherlanders had learnt to be free. They were learning each year to conquer and to annex. They had yet to learn, perhaps they never did fully learn, how to rule.

In the East, they broke up the Portuguese dominion with terrible thoroughness. They founded Batavia in 1619; and, while the trade of the East Indian archipelago was from first to last their main object, they took and held nearly all the Eastern strongholds of Portugal. Malacca fell into their

hands in 1640. Ceylon became wholly theirs by 1658; and in the last forty years of the seventeenth century the Portuguese were practically obliterated in the Eastern seas, and the sturdy Hollanders reigned in their stead.

One rival they had, like themselves a Protestant people, a sea-going and trading race, and of kindred Teuton blood; but the time of the English had hardly yet come. Dutch history had hitherto been more whole-hearted than English. The Dutchmen coveted no doubt the Eastern trade; but, if they had not coveted it, they would have been driven into it by political necessity—by the war with Spain. The Dutch had greatness thrust upon them, the English grew to it. The Dutch were perpetually confronted by a deadly and powerful enemy, and pressure from without held them together within. Their only road to safety was the road to empire. They depended on their ships; they could attack the Spaniards and Portuguese with effect only on the water; they could break the Spanish-Portuguese power only by cutting off the feeders of that power in East and West; and in doing so they acquired a colonial dominion. The English had no such prolonged struggle for national existence, and therefore did not rise so quickly to national greatness. They had leisure to fall out amongst themselves, and in the Stuarts they had rulers alien to and out of sympathy with the people and the time. The Civil Wars were useful as a period of training; but, while they lasted, England as a whole could not make herself felt abroad. With Cromwell there came a short interval of comparative union and strength, and in that interval commercial rivalry, embodied in the Navigation Acts, brought English and Dutch into conflict. But, if the English held their own in home waters, in the Indian seas, after the massacre of Amboyna in 1622-3, they lagged behind the Dutch; and even off the shores of England, in 1652, the year when the first European settlement was formed at the Cape, Van Tromp drove the British admiral Blake back

*The rise of
the Dutch
compared
with that
of the
English.*

PART I. into the Thames, and sailed the Channel in triumph with a broom at his masthead.

It fell then to the leading naval power of the day, to the European people which was strongest in the East, to control the fortunes of South Africa; and for a century and a half the Cape was a Dutch dependency.

*Criticisms
of Dutch
colonisation
in
South
Africa.*

Writers have been at pains to show how little progress was made during all these years in colonising South Africa, and have blamed the Dutch, or rather the Netherlands East India Company, for not having made more of their opportunities. It is easy, looking back upon the past, to call nations to account for their shortcomings. But a truer and a juster estimate is formed by appreciating what has been achieved than by criticising what has been badly done or left undone. Commenting on the fall of the Roman Empire in the West, Gibbon writes, 'Instead of enquiring why the Roman Empire was destroyed, we should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long¹.' In like manner, instead of asking why the Dutch did not do more, we should rather wonder that they did so much. There are natural limits to the amount and to the kind of work which a nation can do in the world, and healthy nations instinctively recognise those limits. No healthier or sounder people than the Dutch ever played a part in history. None ever took their own measure more accurately, or showed more steadiness and self-control.

*Reasons
why the
Dutch were
not great
colonisers.*

The Dutchman's home is a very small land. Its area is little more than one-tenth of that of the British Isles. It is not highly favoured by nature. It is not placed in a central position, inviting the incoming and the outgoing of men. It is not well situated for commerce with the East; and Great Britain lies like a barrier between Holland and the New World. Even the sea has been less kind to the Dutch than

¹ Chap. 38, end—General observations on the fall of the Roman Empire in the West.

to the English, for from the Netherlands has been withheld the crowning gift of severance from the continent and continental strife.

In the days of their strength the Dutch did not number as many as the present population of London. They could move the world, but they could not colonise and people it. The Netherlands were thickly populated, but not overpopulated; and, if there were any surplus, they found their homes on the sea. Moreover, even if the country could have supplied emigrants, the motive for emigration was wanting. Emigrants leave their fatherland to better themselves, but the Dutchmen were conspicuously well off at home. There was no poverty among the Netherlanders. There was little social or political uneasiness. They had no class in their midst of restless dissatisfied men, eager for change of scene and life. They had foreign wars, but not civil wars. Foreign wars bind men to their country and to each other, civil strife sends them to other lands.

In the seventeenth century many Englishmen went to America, some for conscience' sake, others for political reasons and the like. They went out, meaning not to come back again; purposing to found new Englands in the wilderness. When Dutchmen, on the contrary, sailed from Amsterdam or Flushing, they fully intended to come back, and to come back richer than they went. Their object was to trade—by force if necessary, to carry from place to place, to be always coming and going, but they knew one home only, their old home by the North Sea. So they went down to the sea in ships, and occupied their business in great waters; they fought, they carried, they bargained and grew rich; they formed trading stations, they acquired dependencies; their name was great in every land and on every ocean, but the world was not made Dutch.

The Dutch Republic was not one undivided community. It was a federation of communities. It consisted of the Seven *Nether-lands were*

PART I.
 ———
 a federal
 state.

United Provinces. William the Silent, like George Washington, did not fight with a single people at his back. He had to hold together several states; and, like Washington, he held them together only by his personal influence, coupled with the ever-present sense of common danger. In the Conclusion to the 'United Netherlands,' Motley points out that 'the great misfortune of the Commonwealth of the United Provinces, next to the slenderness of its geographical proportions, was the fact that it was without a centre and without a head, and therefore not a nation capable of unlimited vitality. There were seven states. Each claimed to be sovereign¹.' And in an earlier passage, writing of the year 1590, he says, 'It cannot be denied that the inherent vice of the Netherland polity was already a tendency to decentralisation and provincialism².' At one time, in 1608, Zeeland, the second state in importance in the Union, threatened to secede³; and at no time was the republic free from the dangers which attend a confederacy. It was in truth not so much a country as a collection of towns. There was vigorous citizen life in the Netherlands, there was unbounded courage and enterprise, there was indomitable patriotism. But there was no perpetual widening of view from generation to generation, no gradual development into a different and higher class of power. At bottom the greatness of the Dutch was municipal rather than national. They reproduced and bettered the greatness of the Greek states, but they did not reach the level of the Romans.

This may have been their misfortune, but it was not their fault. Their numbers were too few, their land was too small. If ever a history was artificially made, in other words made by man more than by nature, that was the case with the Dutch. They may be counted, in a sense, as one of the peoples who, in the words of Aristotle, found salvation in

¹ United Netherlands, chap. liii.

² Ibid. chap. xxii.

³ Ibid. chap. li.

war¹. The United Netherlands were the outcome of the war with Spain. They were the product of stress of circumstances acting upon a very strong race. In defence of their lives, their liberties, and their religion, the Dutch made almost superhuman efforts, and were rewarded by greatness absurdly out of proportion to their population and the size of their land. That their greatness endured so long, that they are still so healthy and sound, that they still keep the Netherlands Indies, which were from the first their aim, is due to the fact that they knew their strength and used it, and also that they knew what they could not do and did not attempt it. The Carthaginians, whom in some respects the Dutch resembled, flourished as a commercial people, owning trading stations on the coasts of the Mediterranean and Atlantic. When in later days they tried to outbid Rome by building up a land dominion in Spain, their end soon came. The Dutch were too level-headed to make such a mistake². They began as traders, and traders they remained. In a word, they were the embodiment of common sense.

*The Dutch
and the
Cartha-
ginians
compared.*

Less state-ridden, as they were less priest-ridden, than the Spaniards or Portuguese, the nations of North Europe developed their foreign trade through the medium of Chartered Companies. The Dutch had two such Companies, one for the East, and another for the West. One was incorporated in 1602, the other in 1621. The earlier and greater of the two was the Netherlands East India Company, in which were merged all the existing companies in the Netherlands that traded with the East. The object of its incorporation was, in the words of the preamble to the charter, 'that the said companies should be united in a firm and certain union, and in such manner that all the subjects of the United

*The
Nether-
lands East
India
Company.*

¹ Ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, Politics 2. 9. 34. Aristotle was referring to the Spartans.

² The attempt to conquer Brazil from the Portuguese in the seventeenth century is perhaps an instance to the contrary, and there the Dutch failed.

PART I.

It represented the Dutch nation in the East.

Provinces may participate in the profits thereof.' In name a private company, the East India Company was in its essence a national concern. It represented, or rather it embodied, the Dutch people in all their dealings in the Indies. It was empowered 'to enter into treaties with princes and potentates, and to contract, in the name of the United Netherlands and its government, . . . to build fortifications and to appoint governors, to establish garrisons, and create officers of justice, and erect other offices needful for preservation, for the maintenance of good order and the due administration of justice—provided however that these officers and those in the civil and military service shall take the oath of allegiance to the States-General'.¹ This was no mere grant of a trade monopoly. It was formally delegating to a national association the charge of national interests in the East. The East India Companies of other peoples were not entrusted with such extensive powers, and consequently they were not in early days so strong. They were in fact, as in name, private companies, exposed to jealous rivalry at home as well as to foreign competition. The Dutch East India Company, on the contrary, was as wide as the Dutch nation. It was, in its origin at any rate, as inclusive towards Dutchmen as it was exclusive towards foreigners.

Constitution of the Netherlands East India Company.

As the commonwealth of the Netherlands was a federal commonwealth, so the Netherlands East India Company was a commercial federation. Four Chambers subscribed the capital—the Chamber of Amsterdam, the Chamber of Middleburg or Zeeland, the Chambers of the Meuse, in other words the cities of Delft and Rotterdam, and the Chambers

¹ From the 34th section of the charter as quoted on page 7 of Watermeyer's lectures on the Cape of Good Hope under the government of the Dutch East India Company (Capetown, 1857). The charter of the East India Company however did not contain such a clause as was inserted in the West India Company's charter, empowering the Company in so many words to *colonise* any fertile and uninhabited lands within the limits of the charter. [See Moodie's Record, Capetown, 1838, p. 199 note.]

of the North Quarter, namely Hoorn and Enkhuysen. Amsterdam contributed one-half of the capital, Zeeland a fourth, Delft and Rotterdam an eighth, and the North Quarter a eighth. The new Company paid a certain sum to the States-General for the privileges conferred upon them by the charter; and the amount thus paid the Government subscribed to the original capital, becoming to that extent partners in the undertaking. Every inhabitant of the United Provinces was originally at liberty to take up shares; and, as years went on, various cities and provinces, not at first mentioned, were specially represented in one or other of the Chambers. The general management was vested in a Federal Assembly, the Assembly or Chamber of Seventeen. This body was composed of eight representatives from the Amsterdam Chamber, four from that of Zeeland, two from the Chambers of the Meuse and the North Quarter respectively, while the seventeenth was selected in turn from three out of the four Chambers, Amsterdam being excluded.

Such was the constitution of this great company, faithfully reflecting the political organisation of the United Netherlands. All companies tend to rise or fall with the growth or the decline of the country in which they are domiciled; but the Netherlands East India Company was identified with the nation itself; its fortunes were one with the fortunes of the land which brought it into existence. It was empowered to fight, to conquer, and to rule, but always with a view to controlling the commerce of the East. Colonisation had no place in its programme. It cannot therefore be fairly blamed for not having been a colonising agency.

The sphere of the Company was from the Straits of Magellan on the east to the Cape of Good Hope on the west; and in 1652, as we have seen, possession was taken of the Cape—the point at which ships coming from Europe entered this Eastern hemisphere. To the Dutch Company and to the Dutch people the settlement at the Cape was

The Cape was within the sphere of the East India Company and was treated as an outpost

PART I. simply the westernmost outpost of the East Indies; it was, like all other Dutch possessions in the Eastern seas, subordinate to the Governor-General and Council of India, whose headquarters were at Batavia. It was not intended to be a South African colony; it was intended to minister to an East Indian trade¹.

Special
difficulties
of colonisa-
tion in
South
Africa.

But, even if the Dutch had been a colonising people, even if the Netherlands East India Company had wished to form settlements, the colonisation of South Africa must in any case have been the work of many long years. In North America Dutch settlers spread inland along the banks of the Hudson. In Guiana Dutch planters were attracted to a low-lying seaboard with alluvial soil, a second Netherlands in the tropics. But at the Cape there were no river highways into the continent, there was no rich foreshore. There was a mountainous peninsula with a bay beside it, suited for a station for passing ships, but giving no clue to the interior. A long broken line of accessible shores; navigable rivers, flowing down with full volume and easy gradients to the sea; nearness to places which or peoples who have outward signs of wealth; discovery of gold, silver, or precious stones—these are the natural advantages which attract colonists, and make them exchange new homes for old. South Africa had

¹ It was not the Dutch only who looked upon the Cape as purely subservient to the East. The conclusion of Barrow's two volumes of *Travels in Southern Africa*, published in 1801-4, is as follows: 'Having thus endeavoured to state the different points of view in which the Cape of Good Hope may be considered of importance to the British nation, from materials faithfully collected and of unquestionable authority, the result of the whole will, I think, bear me out in this conclusion. That as a naval and military station, connected with the protection and the defence of our trade and possessions in India, the advantages of the Cape are invaluable; that the policy, if practicable, of making it the seat of a free and unrestrained commerce is doubtful, even in the hands of England; that it holds out considerable facilities for the encouragement and extension of the Southern Whale Fishery; but that, as a mere territorial possession, it is not in its present state and probably never could become by any regulations a colony worthy of the consideration either of Great Britain or of any other power.'

none of them to offer. Sailors scanned its coasts in vain for easy bays and estuaries; no great river carried the trader up towards its source, or bade the farmer till the lands which it watered. No thriving centres of native industry were near at hand: and behind the mountains, which barred progress inland, and which, cutting off district from district, forbade a continuous line of settlement, the diamonds of Griqualand and the gold of the Transvaal were for two centuries unknown.

Colonisation, as opposed to conquest, the settlement of white men in a savage land, is, unless the unforeseen occurs, in its early stages a very slow process. Many years elapse before the immigrants become planted in the new soil; and it is not until they have taken root that they begin to multiply to any appreciable extent, and to deserve the name of a people. The record of the first fifty years in the history of a colony usually and necessarily shows much smaller outward results than the second half-century. The earlier years are a time of training, of acclimatising, of learning much and perhaps unlearning more. Hardships must be encountered, disappointments must be borne, home ties must become weaker and local interests stronger, before the colony can have vigorous life within itself, and begin to draw men unto it. Colonisation consists in parting from a centre and in time forming a new centre; but there must be an interval, often of many years, before the new centre is fully formed. When the Dutch first occupied the Cape, the Netherlands had nearly, if not quite, reached the summit of their power; and by the time when the settlement had grown out of infancy, the strength of the mother-country was stationary, if not beginning to decline. Had South Africa been settled fifty years earlier, it is conceivable that its fortunes as a Dutch colony would have been greater. Its years of childhood would have coincided with the rise of the Netherlands, and in its adult stage its growth might have been aided and

The Cape was colonised by the Dutch too late in their history.

PART I.
 sustained by a still growing mother-land. As it was, when the natural time for expansion came at the Cape, the Netherlands were already, so to speak, advanced in years. The strain of perpetual wars had told on the Dutch nation. It was all that and more than they could do to hold their own. Hence, even if the numbers of the Dutchmen had been greater than they were, even if their policy had been other than it was, they came too late in their history to South Africa to make it a New Netherlands.

If then the question is asked, Why was the Dutch colonisation of South Africa so limited and incomplete? the answer is that the Dutch never intended to people the Cape, and that, if they had had any such intention, they could not have carried it out. Yet not a little was done, and what was done has stood the test of time. The strong Dutch race, their simple Puritan religion, their language, their laws, and their customs, all took firm root in this land of the South. The seed was sown in stony ground, and sown with a sparing hand, but after many days and under new conditions it brought forth abundantly. The Cape has passed out of the keeping of the Netherlands, but the Dutch race has been fruitful and multiplied in South Africa.

The story of the Cape under the rule of the Netherlands East India Company is quiet and uneventful. It is the story of a very small community in a remote corner of the world, living away from the main stream of history. It contains no picturesque incidents of fighting for life and liberty, no record of heroic defence against European invaders or savage hordes. Foreign nations did not covet this little Dutch dependency, and left it alone; and both settlers and Hottentots were too weak to organise war against each other on any considerable scale. All the dramatic episodes in South African history were reserved for the nineteenth century and after. While the Dutch occupation lasted, native troubles were mainly confined to looting and reprisals, and the

squabbles between rulers and ruled hardly rose to the level of civil war. CII. II.

Van Riebeeck, the leader of the colonists, or rather the commander of the garrison, was a man of wide experience. He had been ten years in the company's service. He had served in the East Indies. He had visited the island of Formosa in the China seas. He had been west to the Caribbean islands; and north to Greenland, where he had picked up knowledge of whale and seal fishing, likely to be of use in Table Bay. He had considerable force of character and a keen eye to the promotion of his employers' interests, upon which he was well aware that his own promotion depended. The instructions given to him were plain and simple. No high-sounding proclamation was to be issued, declaring the States-General to be sovereign over South Africa. A fort was to be built, according to an approved plan, large enough to hold seventy to eighty persons; sufficient ground was to be appropriated for purposes of gardening and pasturage; but no offence was to be given to the natives, and, if any European nation, other than the Portuguese, wished to form a settlement which did not interfere with the company, the company's representatives were not to interfere with them. In short, the object of the enterprise was simply and solely to ensure that Dutch ships should not be excluded from Table Bay, and that the Cape should in future be used as a place of call instead of St. Helena. That island was soon afterwards abandoned by the Dutch, and passed into the hands of the English.

*V²
Riebeeck.*

His instructions with regard to building a fort at Table Bay

St. Helena abandoned by the Dutch.

The garrison at Table Bay.

The original band of settlers numbered rather over a hundred. Among them were one or more gardeners and probably some artisans; but the majority were soldiers and sailors, who came out to do duty for a while at the Cape, with the prospect of being moved in due course elsewhere. Only a few, including the commander, brought their families with them, and they did not do so with the intention of

PART I. making their home in South Africa. Before he sailed, Van Riebeeck gave the directors to understand that he hoped soon to be sent on to India, and, when he had been at the Cape only one year, he begged that his abilities might not be thrown away upon the 'dull, stupid, lazy, stinking' natives of South Africa, but might find a more suitable sphere among the quick-witted East Indians. As a matter of fact, he was kept at the Cape for ten years, being subsequently placed in charge of the important settlement of Malacca¹. In the following century one of his sons, who had been born at the Cape, rose to be Governor-general of the Netherlands Indies.

Fort Good Hope.

Meanwhile he carried out his orders to the letter. A rude square fort was slowly built, and named Good Hope. A garden was laid out, which was in after years to become the great attraction of Capetown, and vegetables were grown to supply the garrison and passing ships. Sickness and winter weather retarded the work. For many weeks no supplies were procured from the natives beyond one lean cow and calf; but gradually the first trials and difficulties were surmounted, and Dutch settlement in South Africa became an accomplished fact. In the midst of tribulation an Africander was born in the world, for we read in Van Riebeeck's journal, that, on June 5, 1652, exactly two months after the arrival of the settlers, the chaplain's wife was delivered of the first child born within the Fort Good Hope.

Views of the Dutch East India Company.

Thus a Dutch company established a station at Table Bay. Intended to serve the trade of the East, the station was at the same time to be made, if possible, self-supporting

¹ Time has wrought considerable change in the value as in the ownership of European Colonies and dependencies. Both the Cape and Malacca are now included in the British Empire; and while Malacca, which is merged in the Straits Settlements, has no longer the importance which it once possessed, the appointment of Governor-General of the Union of South Africa is one of the highest posts in the English Imperial service.

and not to be a drain on the company's resources. The way to make it self-supporting was to encourage trade with the natives, and to promote settlement and cultivation of the ground. But, if freedom were given to the settlers, if they were allowed to go where they would, to live where and as they liked, and to deal with whom they pleased, native wars and possibly collisions with other European nations might arise; and, if the station developed into a colony, the control of the company might be weakened, and the interests of a New Netherlands in South Africa might conflict with the interests of the Netherlands Indies. How far the dependency could be strengthened, without making it too strong; how far it could be allowed to grow, without losing its original character; how far liabilities could be converted into assets, without incurring fresh and unlimited liabilities: these were the problems which faced the Netherlands East India Company.

At the beginning, Fort Good Hope was not unlike a Hudson's Bay factory in a kindlier climate than that of the Arctic regions. It was a depôt, unvisited for many months by the company's ships, the inmates of which were busy in keeping life together, waiting for the natives to come and trade. When some two or three years had passed, and more was known of the place and people, a proposal was made to cut a canal across the isthmus between Table Bay and False Bay, and thus convert the Cape promontory into an island. Had such a project been feasible, the limits of the settlement would have been clearly defined; and, while a large amount of useful land would have been placed in undisputed occupation of the Dutch, the tendency for good or evil would have been to concentrate the settlers, to emphasise the object for which the fort had been originally founded, to appropriate the Cape to the Europeans and leave South Africa to the natives. But a canal was soon found to be impracticable, and even a chain of redoubts, which was suggested in its

Fort Good Hope was originally not unlike a Hudson's Bay factory.

PART I. *stead, was for reasons of economy never fully carried out.*
 Thus in course of years a certain amount of expansion took
 place, resulting in something more than a trading station,
 but, as long as the company's rule lasted, something less than
 a colony.

—♦—
*The Native
 Races of
 South
 Africa.
 The
 Bantus or
 Kaffirs.*

There are three native races in South Africa, the Bantus, the Hottentots, and the Bushmen. The many tribes of the great Bantu family have a wide range, extending from beyond the Equator to the south-eastern shores of the Cape Colony. Their history really belongs to the nineteenth century. The southern offshoots of their stock, commonly known as Kaffirs, the Zulus and Matabele, the Bechuanas and Basutos, the Pondos, the Tembus and others, are all now familiar to Europeans; but in the seventeenth century and in southernmost Africa they had not crossed the white man's path. They were moving down from the north and east, while Dutchmen were slowly coming in from the south, and the meeting and conflict of races was not to be for many long years. From the sailors of coasting ships and from rescued castaways some knowledge was gleaned of the outskirts of Kaffirland and the manners and language of the tribes by the sea, but it was left to modern times to gauge the full strength of the strongest natives in South Africa.

*The
 Bushmen.*

The sphere of the Hottentots was and is the south-west corner of Africa, including the Cape peninsula. Between and among the Hottentots and the Kaffirs, mainly in the desert regions, roamed the Bushmen, a diminutive aboriginal race, supposed to be allied in origin to the Hottentots. They were the outcasts of South Africa, untameable savages, dwelling in holes and corners of the land. They lived by hunting and plunder. Their hand was against every man, and every man's hand was against them. Hottentots and Kaffirs alike killed them out when they came within their reach, and in the eyes of the white men they were mischievous vermin that literally poisoned the soil.

It was with the Hottentots that the Dutch had to deal. They were, it would seem, higher up in the scale of humanity than the natives whom English settlers found in after years in Australia. On the other hand they were distinctly below the level of the North American Indians. They were divided into various clans. At one end of the scale were comparatively strong tribes like the Namaquas, at the other were beggarly specimens of mankind like the starving Beach-rangers, who hung about the Dutchmen's fort. Taken as a whole they were a pastoral nomad race, moving, according to the season, from pasture to pasture, knowing little or nothing of agriculture, but living on the produce of their flocks and herds, supplemented by the game which they killed, and whatever the soil yielded of its own free will. In South Africa, as in other parts of the world, the character and the mode of life of the incoming colonists were largely influenced by the character and mode of life of the natives into whose land they came. The Hottentots were not good fighters, and were not good workers. They were a desultory race, with little capacity except for loafing and for minding cattle. The English settlers in North America were braced and strengthened by their surroundings. They were perpetually confronted with warlike foes, bold, irreconcilable, capable of organisation, possessing some political insight, men who must either conquer or be conquered. There could be nothing in common between the Englishman and the North American Indian; there was no real meeting-ground between the races. They had to live outside each other, and, in a sense, they kept each other up to the mark. The result was that the stronger race grew stronger and eventually crushed out the weaker race. There was no gradual assimilation of the two races to each other, involving deterioration on either side. Widely different was the case of the Dutch and Hottentots in South Africa. There were from time to time border forays, lifting of cattle, murders and reprisals, but there was no real war

CH. II.

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The
Hottentots.

The
character
of the
Dutch
colonists
suffered
from their
being
brought
into contact
with the
Hottentots.

The
Hottentots
were not a
warlike
race

PART I. because there was no real fighting spirit in the natives. If, when the Dutchmen landed, Kaffirs had been on the spot instead of Hottentots, the chronicles of the Dutch at the Cape would have told either very much smaller or very much greater results. Possibly the Europeans would have been kept cooped up in their fort or even driven out altogether. If not, in fighting for their lives in Africa, as in fighting for their lives at home, the Hollanders would have put out their strength and grown great with the greatness of their need. Then, we may imagine, at first sympathy with friends in deadly danger, afterwards desire to share in good things to come, might have brought fresh adventurers from Europe. They would have come in to make new homes and to defend them, to win a land not for a company but for themselves, to take and to keep a growing area, not by haggling and barter with shiftless nomads, but by the clearly defined right of the sword.

*Nor a
working
race.*

*They were
neither
bond nor
free.*

But the Hottentots were not men of war. Nor were they, on the other hand, in any true sense men of peace. They were not labourers, not tillers of the ground. They belonged to a lower grade of human beings, incapable of systematic effort, living from hand to mouth and from day to day. Had they been as the negroes, they might have been trained to work, and, losing their freedom, have gained instead some measure of usefulness. As it was, they were in many cases virtually enslaved; but the servitude was with little profit to their masters or to themselves, and slaves were imported from other lands to supply the labour market. Brought into contact with such a race, the Dutch settlers of necessity deteriorated in course of time. They acquired the vices of slave owners, but, as far as the natives of the country were concerned, they made little out of their slaves. They tended to become the sluggish masters of sluggish servants, living somewhat aimless lives. In the New World a social system was built up on the basis of negro slavery, unsound, it is true,

from every point of view, but still great in a sense while it lasted, and very far from being unproductive or useless. In South Africa the slave system was never so fully developed, and one reason was that there were black men already on the spot, who were dependents but not workers, who were for practical purposes neither bond nor free. They formed an intermediate element; they were not strong enough to make the Cape Colony a home of free men alone, whether white or black, but they were perpetually in evidence to suggest a half-hearted mode of life, in which there should be servitude without work and slave owning without profit. If the Hottentots served the Dutchmen, they served them in their own spasmodic way; if the Dutchmen ruled the Hottentots, they ruled them in a native rather than in European fashion. 'Every family centering, as it were, within itself approaches in time and in proportion as they are at a greater distance from the Cape to the simplicity of nature . . . the farthest settlers, who reside thirty or forty days' journey from Capetown, more resemble Hottentots than the posterity of Europeans.' Such is a Dutch account of the outlying farmers in the Cape Colony towards the end of the eighteenth century¹. It was an inevitable result, due to various causes, not the least of which was the kind of natives among whom the Dutchmen's lot was cast.

It has been said that Fort Good Hope in its earliest days was not unlike a Hudson's Bay factory. Similarly the descriptions given of the Hottentots in Van Riebeeck's diary and despatches rather suggest a dishonest and unfriendly kind of Esquimaux. These South African savages bartered with the white men, and were cunning in barter. Brass, copper, and tobacco they wanted in exchange for their cattle, and they knew the difference between good and bad tobacco. They maintained to the full their old reputation for stealing. They stole tobacco, and one of their clans was christened

The dealings between the Dutchmen and the Hottentots

¹ From Admiral Stavorinus' *Voyages to the East Indies* (Eng. Tr. 1798), vol. iii. p. 444.

PART I. by the Dutch the Tobacco thieves. They ran off with the
 →→→ sailors' clothes drying on the shore. They took the iron
 chain from the plough lying for repairs before the black-
 smith's shop. They laid hold of the children in order to
 tear the brass buttons from their clothes; and the com-
 mander found it necessary to issue more than one proclama-
 tion warning the workmen to keep a watchful eye over their
 arms and their picks and shovels. His patience was sorely
 tried; but his instructions were to keep on good terms with
 the natives, and those instructions he faithfully observed.
 Not merely was ill-treatment of the black men prohibited
 under severe penalties, but no traffic or intercourse whatever
 between the two races was, as a rule, allowed except on
 behalf of the company and through the medium of the
 authorised representatives of the company. Thus it was
 hoped at once to prevent any quarrels between settlers and
 natives, and to safeguard the company's monopoly of trade.
 The main difficulty arose when the Hottentots realised that
 the Europeans were permanently occupying the Cape penin-
 sula and taking up land for cultivation. It meant to them
 the loss of so much pasturage. Where they had brought
 their herds from time to time in former years, they would
 be able to bring them no longer. Savages as they were,
 they resented the appropriation of their lands by an alien
 race. 'They dwelt long,' says Van Riebeeck in his journal
 for April, 1660, 'upon our taking every day for our own use
 more of the land which had belonged to them from all ages
 . . . they also asked whether, if they were to come into
 Holland, they would be permitted to act in a similar manner'.
 It was an awkward question—one to which no answer could
 or can be given, except the answer, which natives know well,
 that might is right and the fittest must survive. If outside

*The
 Hottentots
 resent the
 permanent
 occupation
 of their
 land by
 Europeans.*

¹ See 'The Record, or a Series of Official Papers Relative to the Condition and treatment of the Native Tribes of South Africa, by Lieut. D. Mccodie, Capetown, 1838, pt. 1. p. 205.

Europe the coloured men's title to the lands of their birth had been held good, there would have been no history of European colonisation. CH. II.
—♦—

The conference, at which the Hottentots thus pleaded their rights, followed on what was called the war of 1659. It was no war. One white man only and two or three black men were killed, and some of the settlers' cattle were carried off. The disturbance, however, was sufficiently marked to give the Dutch commander an excuse for claiming that the land which his countrymen occupied had now been 'justly won by the sword in defensive warfare'.¹ On the other hand his superiors both at Amsterdam and at Batavia were fair-minded enough to recognise that the natives had ground for complaint, and some years afterwards, in 1672, the form was gone through of buying the Cape peninsula from the Hottentots. Two agreements were signed with Hottentot chiefs, grandiloquently styled hereditary sovereigns of the Cape district and Hottentots Holland respectively, by which the Dutch became recognised owners of the south-west corner of South Africa from Saldanha Bay to False Bay. The documents were most explicit and business-like, containing an acknowledgement by the native vendors that they had received the stipulated price. Unfortunately belief in the good faith of the transaction is shaken by reading the despatch in which the governor reports that the goods delivered to the chiefs, in either case, only represented an infinitesimal fraction of the sum named in the document. It was an illustration of the trading instincts of the Dutch. They evidently did not feel comfortable in South Africa without a receipted bill. They were averse to taking and holding land by force, but they could not resist the opportunity of a little sharp practice in the way of business. At the same time it must be admitted that on the whole they

The 'war' of 1659.

The Cape bought from the Hottentots by the Dutch.

¹ See Moodie's Record, as above, pt. I. p. 205.

PART I. treated the natives in these early days with humanity and forbearance. Perhaps it would have been better in the end if their dealings had been stronger and more high-handed, if open war and well-defined conquest had taken the place of a long series of desultory and irritating encroachments.

*Relations
of the
Dutch in
South
Africa
to other
European
nations.*

By these deeds of sale the Hottentot chiefs were bound over to 'endeavour to drive away and expel by force of arms any foreign European power which may, in the course of time, try to settle' in the ceded districts. As a matter of fact, until in 1780 the United Provinces were dragged into the vortex of the war between England and France, no foreign power interfered with the Dutch at the Cape. Their nearest European neighbours were the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the English at St. Helena, and the French in Madagascar and at the island of Bourbon. The Portuguese were a broken people before ever the Dutch fort at the Cape was founded, and the French and English were the only powers who might have been dangerous to the Netherlands East India Company. Fortunately war with the one usually meant peace with the other. Of the two, the French at first showed more signs of contemplating a settlement in South Africa. French sealers were, the Dutch found on arrival, in the habit of frequenting Saldanha Bay, and twice, in 1666 and in 1670, on the latter occasion by force of arms, marks of French sovereignty were set up at the same place. During these years Louis XIV had Colbert for his minister, and Colbert for the time regenerated the French East India Company. But he died, the company died too, and nothing came of these French demonstrations on the coast of South Africa.

*To the
French.*

*To the
English.*

The first two years of the Cape Colony were years of war between the English and the Dutch, brought on by Cromwell's Navigation Act. Fighting began in the latter part of

¹ See Moodie's Record, pt. 1. p. 318.

1652, and lasted till 1654. There was a second war in Charles II's time, in the years 1665-7, and a third during the same reign, from 1672 to 1674. This last war was the most dangerous to Holland, for the English and French combined against her in an unnatural league. It was the doing of the English king and his ministers, not of the English people; and in 1674 the English withdrew from it, and made peace with their old allies—the peace of Westminster. Not long afterwards the Stuarts, with their French sympathies, were driven from England, and the Dutchman who had defended his country against France, as his great grandfather William the Silent had held it against Spain, was called as William III to the English throne. Thenceforward there was peace between Great Britain and the Netherlands for a hundred years.

These wars did not seriously affect the Cape colonists. They caused of course anxiety and alarm. They led to the building of a castle, more defensible against European foes than was Van Riebeeck's fort; and they diminished for the time being the number of merchant vessels which called at Table Bay. But there was no substantial gain or loss, no attack or defence colouring the story and shaping the future fortunes of the colony. News travelled slowly in old days, and ships in distant waters and colonists in distant lands often did not know whether there was war or peace in Europe. Sometimes the settlers were better informed than their foreign visitors. We read, for instance, of an English ship in 1665, and two French ships in 1689, putting into Table Bay as a friendly port and being attacked by the garrison, unsuccessfully in the first case, successfully in the second. Moreover, in outlying nooks of the world war or peace depended very much on the people on the spot, and it did not at all follow that the relations between two European peoples were at a given time one and the same in all quarters of the globe. Still the Cape lay on or near

The Dutch settlement at Table Bay was not molested by other European nations.

PART I. a well-known trade route; and, as far as distance allowed, it was kept in close contact with Europe, with European politics, and with European interests in the East. It seems, therefore, at first sight strange that the Dutch in South Africa were hardly ever touched by the fringe of war. The reason was twofo'ld. In the first place the settlement was so small as not to be worth powder and shot. Foreign nations had no reason to fear it and little reason for wishing to possess it.

Reasons for its immunity from attack.

1. *It was not dangerous to other peoples.*

Cautious treatment of foreigners at the Cape.

They were glad that their ships should be able now and again to put into Table Bay, but this could be done as long as there was peace with the Netherlands. The English had St. Helena. The French looked to Madagascar. It was not worth while to try to dislodge the Dutch at Fort Good Hope, when the existence of the settlement was not only not a danger but a positive convenience. Give offence to no one, whether Europeans or natives, such were in effect the instructions of the Chamber of Seventeen to their Commanders at the Cape. Be courteous, but not too courteous. Give as little as you can, take as much as you can, but above all do not involve us in the expense of war. The appointment of Commander at the Cape was no bed of roses. He had to make bricks without straw. He had to conciliate without conceding. Far removed from support, he was expected on all occasions to find the golden mean between aggressiveness and subservience, to know instinctively the exact line of conduct which would pay the best. The ordinary rule with regard to foreign ships at the Cape was to allow the crews to take in fresh water, to catch fish, and to buy vegetables and poultry from the settlers, but to prohibit the purchase of cattle, and to give or sell nothing from the company's stores. On one occasion, at the end of 1666, a French fleet, which visited Table Bay, was treated with unusual hospitality, being refitted and provisioned from the company's stores. The commander of the garrison, Van Quaelberg, even went so far as to visit the French admiral

on board his own ship, and to lodge some of the Frenchmen within the walls of the fort. This was too much for the directors at Amsterdam, and the unfortunate commander was at once dismissed. 'That you may know,' they wrote in November, 1667, to his successor and his council, 'how to conduct yourselves in future upon the arrival of Europeans, we have now to direct you not to refuse them water; but as to refreshments, to give them as little as may be in any way possible, giving them in particular no provisions, ships' stores, or the like, but declining all under the plea of your own wants and of necessity, and thus allowing them, as we have often directed, to drift upon their own fins¹.'

Churlish, however, and parsimonious as the Dutch were to their visitors, they hardly treated them worse than they were treated themselves in foreign parts; and it was obvious then, as it is obvious now, that, if the company wished to ensure being always able to provision their own ships, they could not afford to be open-handed to foreigners.

But there was a second reason, akin to the first, for the immunity from invasion which the Cape colonists enjoyed. Of the two nations who were possible invaders, the French were as a rule not strong enough on the sea, and too much involved in European wars, to attack colonial settlements, unless such settlements were near to possessions of their own, and their capture formed part of a larger scheme of

2. The French were hardly in a position to attack the Cape, and the English, being the

¹ Moodie, pt. 1. p. 299. Van Qnaelberg, who was on this occasion dismissed for being too hospitable to the French, was subsequently re-employed in the East by the Netherlands Company. An amusing instance of Dutch hospitality at the Cape will be found in Moodie's Record, p. 90. note. In 1656 some English ships arrived at Table Bay, and Van Riebeeck's diary was as follows: 'The Commander invited the English captains to dinner, and presented each with half an ox (which had been killed in consequence of some weakness) in return for a cask of beer and a keg of distilled water. . . . A young ox which seemed likely to die was killed and given to the English captain (who knew not what ailed it) for his sick, it was the same case with the other ox and the sheep; not that they were unwholesome, but it was necessary to kill them; but to save our character, and as it were to act the braggart, they were bestowed upon them by way of liberality.'

PART I. annexation. Further, when the time came for the French to strike hard for a colonial empire, they found that the English stood in their way much more than the Netherlanders. They looked to the eastern and western continents more than to the eastern and western islands; and their sphere of actual or prospective conquest and colonisation was in the main outside the sphere of the Dutch.

English
East India
Company,
did not find
it to their
interest to
do so.

It was the English whom the Dutch had to fear. They were the foreigners, if any, who would take the Cape. Not only, however, were the two peoples as a rule in friendship with each other; not only had they by the peace of Breda in 1667, as confirmed by the later peace of Westminster, carefully provided for international courtesy in each other's ports; but, as far as the Cape was concerned, it was a case of dealings between two companies rather than between two nations. Neither company probably wanted in ordinary times to incur the expense of occupying both St. Helena and the Cape. The two stations were alternative; and, after the Dutch had occupied the latter, they gave up the former, which sufficed for the English. Rival trading companies are at least as jealous of each other as are rival nations; but their standard is one of pounds, shillings, and pence. War to a syndicate of traders always means expenditure and sometimes means ruin; companies therefore are loth to make war; and, when they make it, they localise it as much as possible. They fight either in self-defence, or because there is some definite object to be readily secured, promising an immediate profit with little future liability. The English company for many long years was not as strong as the Dutch; and even if they had been as strong, or stronger, they had little to gain by attacking the Cape. There was no South African trade to fight for. There was nothing to excite cupidity. The settlement did not pay its way, and was maintained only for the sake of the Netherlands Indies. If it had been taken by the English and kept,

they, instead of the Dutch, would have borne the cost of maintenance, and their ships would have reaped but slight advantage from touching at an English instead of a friendly port. If it had been taken, destroyed, and left desolate, the destroyers, in common with all traders to the East, would have felt the want of an European station at Table Bay. In either case necessity, as well as sense of injury, would have driven the Dutch into reprisals, for the safety of the Netherlands Indies depended upon their holding some position in or near South Africa. The only possible motives for an English attack on the Cape were either temporarily to cripple the power of the Netherlanders, or to prevent the station from falling into the hands of a third and unfriendly power. The first motive could only be gratified at the expense of a world-wide war. The second motive did not operate as long as the Dutch were strong, though ultimately it decided the fate of the Cape Colony.

So the Dutch went their way in peace at the Cape, unmolested by Europeans, not seriously threatened by natives. No real danger came to them from either sea or land. Their security was not all gain. The manhood of the colony was to some extent stunted from want of that training in infancy, which comes from enduring and attempting much. The settlers needed troubles, such as those in which their own native Netherlands were cradled, to bid them burst their leading strings, to stimulate individual energy, and to quicken the sense of common life. But their difficulties were not definite enough to become opportunities, their trials were too few to foster public spirit. The Cape Colony remained a comparatively unimportant settlement, under the rule of a money-loving company, not intended to be great, not forced into greatness by pressure from outside.

The security of the Dutch at the Cape was not wholly favourable to the colony.

The island of St. Helena has always been, and still is, closely connected with the Cape. Both the one and the other were in the hands of East India companies, and both

PART I. were occupied for the same reason, the convenience of the Eastern trade. First the one and then the other belonged to the Dutch, and now both are included in the British Empire. For a short time after Fort Good Hope was founded, the Dutch do not appear to have given up all claims to St. Helena¹, but the island was in full possession of the English some years before Great Britain and the Netherlands went to war in 1664. Taken again by the Dutch in 1665, it was in the same year recovered by the English, and was in their hands when the next war broke out in 1672. The Netherlanders then once more determined to attack the island, and Table Bay was selected as the base of operations. Four ships, carrying 600 men, sailed from the bay in December, 1672, and in the following month drove the English garrison out of St. Helena. The Dutch held the island, however, only till the month of May, when they were in turn surprised by an English fleet and forced to surrender². From that date onward St. Helena remained an undisputed British possession. This was almost the only occasion on which the Cape played any part in the earlier wars of the

¹ For instance, we find the Governor-general of Batavia writing to Van Riebeeck on the 25th of December, 1655: 'Your proposal to strip the island of St. Helena of everything now on it, and to lay it entirely waste, is somewhat opposed to our ideas, as this would be quite as inconvenient for ourselves as it could be for the English and French. For whenever any homeward-bound ships may be driven past the Cape by bad weather, where should they look for refreshments? and where also could the fleet, if once separated, be collected so conveniently as at St. Helena? Again, supposing the English should find no refreshment there, they would have a plea and an inducement to touch at the Cape, where they would always plague us for one thing or other, and, being our friends and allies, could not be entirely refused. . . . We are therefore of opinion, that we should allow the island of St. Helena to remain in esse, so that we may resort to it in case of need' (Moodie, pt. 1. p. 80 note). This passage illustrates what has been said above, as to the advantages of these stations on the Eastern route to other peoples than their owners. The Dutch had a reputation for injuring places which they visited in the course of their voyages. See above, p. 15, and see also vol. iii. of this Series, 2d Ed., p. 271 note. When they gave up Mauritius they destroyed everything they could.

² See vol. iii. of this Series, 2d Ed., pp. 273-4.

mother-country, and in this instance it comes before us not as a beleaguered settlement, struggling for existence, but as a starting-point for attack upon another little dependency. Fortunately for all concerned, the enterprise was a failure. Had the English lost St. Helena, they would have bid very high to be masters of the Cape.

Further from the Cape on the east than St. Helena is on the west lies an island in the Indian Ocean, whose fortunes in early days of European colonisation were closely allied to those of South Africa. Its old Dutch name of Mauritius, which has outlived the later title of Isle of France, dates from the year 1598, when a Dutch fleet first visited and claimed the island; but it was not until about the year 1639 that the claim was made good by some kind of occupation. The station, such as it was, was withdrawn shortly after the Cape settlement was founded, but in the year 1664 it was revived and strengthened. The French at the time were taking steps to colonise the neighbouring island of Bourbon, and the directors of the Netherlands East India Company had reason to fear that they might take Mauritius also. 'We must not allow other nations,' they wrote, 'to anticipate us there¹,' and a small garrison was accordingly sent to resume possession. On the shores of the south-east port, now Grand Port, a little fort was built, named Frederic Henry.

¹ Moodie, p. 282. The note to that page says: 'The company ordered Mauritius to be abandoned Dec. 26, 1657, to be re-occupied August 24, 1663; and to be again abandoned July 23, 1716.' It is very difficult to find out what were the exact dates in connexion with the Dutch occupation of Mauritius. Capt. Oliver, in his edition of François Leguat (Hakluyt Soc. 1891, vol. ii. p. 148 note), gives 1639 as the date of the first occupation, adding that the station was abandoned in 1650, re-established in the same year till 1654, then abandoned for five years, and at the end of that time again re-established. D'Unienville's *Statistique de l'Isle Maurice* and other books give 1644 as the date at which a regular Dutch settlement was formed in the island, but the list of Dutch governors begins in 1638, and the British East India Company records show that there was Dutch occupation by 1639. It is clear from the Cape records that the island was re-occupied in 1664, and 1710 or 1712 seems to have been the date of its final abandonment by the Dutch.

PART I. A still smaller outpost was maintained at the north-west harbour, where the town of Port Louis now stands. At Flacq, towards the eastern coast, the company had a garden; and a few settlers were to be found in the south-west, in the valley of the Black River. At the end of the seventeenth century the garrison consisted of some fifty men, and there were thirty to forty Dutch families scattered through the island¹. The interior was covered with forests, which sheltered runaway slaves, and ebony wood was almost the only article of export. In later times, as a French possession and under the fostering care of Labourdonnais, Mauritius became a flourishing and important colony, but under the Dutch it never thrived. They occupied it merely to forestall other possible occupants, they turned its fine harbours to little or no account, and in or about 1710 the settlement was broken up, and the garrison was withdrawn after destroying everything that could not be carried away. During the whole period of Dutch occupation, with a very short interval, the island was subordinate to the Cape, and appeals from the Mauritius Court of Justice were heard in South Africa. Once a year a ship left Table Bay for Grand Port carrying provisions, and returned with a cargo of timber; and the island was looked upon as a convenient place of banishment for inconvenient settlers who had given trouble at the Cape, as well as for convicts from Batavia. It was the little dependency of a little dependency, and its record while attached to the Cape tells the same story as the chronicles of the Cape itself, that colonisation was not the mission of the Dutch people, nor the object of the Netherlands East India Company.

*System of
adminis-
tration*

As Mauritius was subordinate to the Cape, so the Cape, together with all the Dutch dependencies in the Eastern half

¹ See Capt. Oliver's edition of François Leguat, vol. ii. p. 195. Leguat was kept at Mauritius as a prisoner for three years from 1693 to 1696. For an account of Mauritius, see vol. i. of this Series, 2nd Ed., sec. 4, and see also the first two volumes of Mr. Theal's History of South Africa.

—◆—
*followed
 by the
 Nether-
 lands East
 India
 Company.*

of the world, was subordinate to Batavia. The British Empire at the present day comprises self-governing colonies, Crown colonies, and colonies which stand half way between the one class and the other. The Crown colonies are all under the direct control of the Colonial Office in London, and their governors take instructions from the Secretary of State for the Colonies alone. But, speaking generally, each colony is distinct and separate from the others, and has a distinct and separate local administration. The Governor of a Crown colony is in nearly all cases advised by an Executive Council, consisting of the principal officers of his government; and in most Crown colonies there is a Legislative Council, some members of which are unofficial residents, either elected by the people or nominated by the Crown. In some instances the local legislative power is vested in the Governor alone, who legislates either in the form of ordinances or by means of proclamations. The Dutch dependencies in South Africa and the East were the very opposite of self-governing colonies. They did not even reach the level of Crown colonies. They were not indeed colonies at all. They were the depôts or the stations of a trading company, and were looked upon and treated as such. For administrative purposes, they were regarded as one whole rather than as a series of separate communities. The company had a certain number of ships and a certain number of men widely scattered through the Eastern hemisphere. All the officers on the ships and all the officers at the stations formed a single body of men carrying out one uniform system¹. Of necessity, as years went on, local circumstances made themselves felt. For instance, in the earlier years of the Cape settlement, the officer in charge was called Commander, unless he happened to be of specially high rank in the company's service, in which case he was styled Governor; at a later date, when

¹ This is well pointed out in the first volume of Mr. Theal's *History of South Africa*, p. 44.

PART I. → the settlement became more important, the title attached to the place rather than to the man, and the appointment of chief officer at the Cape was what would now be called a colonial government. But the tendency of the company was to treat places as items in a trading concern, not as homes of human beings. The directors and their officers were not devoid of the instincts of justice and humanity, but governing for the sake of the governed was not part of their business and hardly entered into their calculations. It was their policy to centralise, to group the Eastern world, so far as they had dealings with it, round the Chamber of Seventeen at Amsterdam and their representatives at Batavia; to work down from above, not to build up from below; to fit localities to the system, not to adapt the system to the needs of the localities. In their eyes any particular station represented a certain proportion of the total trade, and a certain proportion of the total number of employés; while in theory, and to a great extent in practice also, all the stations formed a dependency, to be administered in one way, serving one purpose only—the profit of the company.

*Position of
the Com-
mander at
the Cape.*

This was the system under which European colonisation in South Africa began, and it lasted with little modification as long as the Netherlands East India Company ruled the Cape. The Commander at the Cape took orders both from Amsterdam and from Batavia; and, when officers of a rank than himself visited Table Bay, on their way from the Indies, they superseded him for the time being, and framed instructions for his guidance. In his management of masters there was not much wisdom. The Commander was over-governed himself, and in turn he over-governed those committed to his charge. He was advised by a council, consisting of his chief officers and answering to the Executive Council of a British Crown colony, and he legislated by means of proclamations and resolutions of council. No representative element entered the execution of the Dutch

*Want of a
representa-
tive element*

settlement at the Cape, no legislators were chosen by the community. The government was a despotic government, and the despot was himself the slave of the company. The system seems to us a faulty one, when viewed in the light of after ages and from an English point of view; and it seems the more faulty, because it suggests contrast with the present self-government of the Union of South Africa. But the Dutch were judged by a different standard. The Dutch were not the home of freedom, but they were not the home of despotic government. Parliaments¹ were not convened, though such a step; and, as long as their lives were not in danger, their liberties were secure, the citizens of the Dutch provinces troubled their heads little about constitution. They were often face to face with a national emergency requiring a dictator, and they became accustomed to trusting their public affairs to one or to a few, so long as the one or the few were good Dutchmen. The Netherlanders, therefore, who went out to foreign lands did not take with them any longing for popular representation, and the Netherlanders who stayed at home did not insist that Dutch colonists should enjoy institutions which they did not possess and did not wish to possess themselves. If, too, we come in mind that the object was to establish trading depots, not to found colonies, it must be admitted that the form of government was well designed to secure the end in view. The evil came from the fact that the Cape settlement was not in the East Indies but in South Africa, whereas it was always treated as though it had been in the East. Despotism is indigenous to the tropical lands of the East, and their teeming populations know nothing of systems under which rulers and ruled continually change places. Europeans went there not to make new homes, not to till the ground, but to govern and to trade. Their subjects were coloured native races, and the

in the government of the colony.

The Cape was treated to a great extent by the Dutch company as if it had been a dependency in the East Indies.

¹ Carlyle, in his *Oliver Cromwell*, pt. 7, reminds us of the literal meaning of Parliament, 'speaking apparatus.'

PART I. wealth which they sought and found was not produced by the white man's toil. The conditions of South Africa were exactly the reverse. In respect of climate no better dwelling-place could be found. Rulers were not wanted there, for administration can hardly be devised for scattered tribes of wandering savages. Traders were not wanted, for there was no trade in existence other than the simplest form of barter. White colonists were the one thing needful, men who would live in the land and work it with their own hands, and who, living and working in European fashion, would necessarily reproduce in South Africa the vigour and freedom of European citizenship. There was nothing in common between the Cape and the East, yet the same system was applied to both¹. It was a fatal mistake, and would have been found out earlier, if the Cape colonists had been more numerous, and if trading had not blunted the political sense of the Dutch.

*The
burgher
councillors
at the Cape.*

But, though the South African settlers had no voice whatever in the government under which they lived, they had a voice in the tribunals by which their cases were decided. Very early in the history of the colony, in the year 1657, it was provided that one of the colonists should sit and vote in the Council of Justice on any occasion on which a fellow colonist was tried. In the following year the number was increased to two, and in the later days of the company's régime half of the High Court of Justice was composed of these Burgerraden or burgher councillors. Chosen by the governor and his council from a list of names presented by the whole body of free settlers, they figured to some extent as representatives of the people, and, with the Heemraden, or

¹ Stavorinus writes of the Cape towards the end of the eighteenth century (vol. iii. p. 451): 'The administration of the government of this colony ought not to be put upon the same footing as that of the company's Asiatic possessions, where the greatest part of their subjects consists of a servile and enslaved people, who must be compelled by violence to cultivate their country and to deliver the produce to the company.'

local councillors of the outlying districts, preserved some semblance of public spirit in a colony whose traditions and training were antagonistic to political freedom.

It will be remembered that the men whom Van Riebeeck took to the Cape were all servants of the company. They were, we read in his instructions, 'sworn to the general articles of the company¹,' to be employed in its service, each according to his capacity. Whatever land was occupied belonged to the company, and free colonists had no place in the original scheme. In less than three years' time there came a change of view, and we find the commander writing to the Chamber of Seventeen in April, 1655, 'we now perceive that your Honours seem inclined to establish a colony².' The change came from the desire of the directors to encourage the breeding of cattle and the cultivation of grain. The garden produce at the station was enough and to spare; but the supply of live stock depended on the good will of the natives, and grain was imported from Batavia. It was evident that without farms and farmers the settlement would never become self-supporting. As a trade depôt pure and simple it would not pay its way, as a colony it might. 'I once more recommend you to attend above all to the support of the cultivation of grain. We shall never become noblemen here until we shall first have been good farmers³.' So wrote the Dutch commissioner, who visited the Cape in 1657, and who revised the terms upon which certain of the company's servants were given their discharge and permitted to take up land. Corn did not thrive close to the walls of the fort, for the south-east winds in the summer months came up in gales past cloud-capped Table Mountain and laid low the ripening crops; but round the corner of the range, where a circle of thorn trees suggested the name of Rondebosch, 'the wind would scarce have moved a straw⁴.' On this sheltered land

The free colonists.

Extension of the settlement. Rondebosch.

¹ Moodie, p. 8.

² Ibid., p. 97 note.

³ Ibid., p. 61.

⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

PART I. the corn grew well, and, as cultivation spread onward and southward at the back of the mountains, vine-growing gave Wynberg its name, and Commander Simon Van der Stel made himself a home at Constantia. Rondebosch is now a suburb of Capetown¹, but in old days the fact that men lived and worked a few miles from the fort made the difference between a station and a colony. The outlying settlers were the first Boers or farmers, and the first burghers or citizens in South Africa. They were the men of the country as opposed to the inmates of the fort², the free men of the community as opposed to the white bond servants of the company. Unhappily their farming was sadly restricted, and their citizenship was little more than a name. The idea was to diminish expenditure by substituting freemen for salaried servants, and by encouraging agriculture. Only married men were to be given land, the colonists were to be all of Dutch or German birth, and the grain which they grew was to be sold to the company at a fixed price. For a very short time they were permitted to buy cattle from the natives, but the permission was soon withdrawn, and with the exception that they were allowed to sell to the ships' crews such vegetables as were not required by the garrison, they were bound over to buy from and sell to the company alone. They became, in short, unpaid instead of paid servants of the company³, and the advances which they received in order to enable them to start their holdings placed them in the position of debtors to hard task-masters. Under these conditions the so-called free farmers of South Africa reaped little benefit from their nominal freedom. The new system was initiated in 1657, and, in the following year, a protest

Restrictions placed on the free colonists.

¹ Rondebosch is five miles from Capetown, Wynberg eight.

² There soon, however, grew up also a class of town burghers, i.e. of free colonists who did not farm but lived at the fort as gardeners, handicraftsmen, and shopkeepers. In 1678 they numbered one-third of the total number of free men. (Moodie, p. 363.)

³ See Watermeyer's Lectures, p. 20.

was presented to the Commander by the burgher councillors on behalf of their fellow burghers. They complained of not being allowed to deal with the Hottentots, and they complained too that the price at which they were to deliver their corn had not been fixed. 'Therefore,' ran the petition, 'let a price be soon fixed, for till that is done we will not cultivate any ground, for we will not be slaves to the company!'¹ These were brave words, but, in spite of concessions which were made from time to time, the farmers remained little more than slaves. Monopoly was the mainspring of the company, monopoly controlled the port which was the inlet and outlet of trade, and the colonists were too few to make headway against the system. No wonder that we read of some of these free men becoming stowaways on homeward-bound ships², that others, restless and discontented, were sent to Mauritius, and that the Commanders at the Cape often reported unfavourably of a body of men who were neither bond nor free. 'It is to be lamented,' wrote Van Quaelberg in January, 1668, before he had received his letter of dismissal, 'that your Honours' colonies formed by our countrymen, not here alone but in general, do not advance, because the colonists and other freemen, as soon as they find that they are not allowed their head or to attain in their own way their object of enriching themselves, always turn their head and ears towards fatherland³;' and later, in 1676, one of the Dutch commissioners who paid periodical visits to the Cape, notes that 'the Dutch colonists here bear the name of freemen, but they are so limited and restrained in everything that the absence of freedom is rendered only too evident'⁴.

Working under artificial restrictions which crippled their industry, the Dutch farmers had none the less to face the ordinary trials which await settlers in a new country. They lived away from the shelter of the fort, and were therefore

¹ Moodie, p. 151 note.

² *Ibid.*, p. 300.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 340.

PART I. constantly liable to depredations from the Hottentots, with whom they were forbidden to barter. On the other hand, the farms languished for want of labour. Some few unmarried men were given their discharge on condition of taking service with their married countrymen; but the wages of Dutch servants were too high to make white labour profitable to those who employed it, and from the first moment that farming was suggested Van Riebeeck urged the necessity of introducing slaves. The earliest experiment in slave labour was made with negroes from Angola and Guinea, two cargoes of whom were landed in Table Bay in 1658. It was not a success. The slaves ran away, and gave so much trouble that the farmers were in most cases glad to be rid of them by handing them back to the company. In after years the chief sources of the labour supply were Madagascar and Malaya. Slavery is unsound in any land, at any time, and under any circumstances; but nowhere was it more out of place than in South Africa. In the tropics, where white men cannot work in the field, on sugar or cotton plantations, where large bodies of unskilled labourers can be continuously employed, it is not wonderful that the slave system came into being; but no such excuses could be pleaded in the South African climate and on South African farms. It was for years an open question whether slavery would take root at the Cape. If the Dutch settlers had been more numerous, if the Hottentots had been more serviceable, if the constant traffic with the East had not suggested forced labour, slaves would not have been imported, whatever might have been the treatment of the natives of the land. It was not until the eighteenth century was well advanced that the Cape became a distinctively slave-owning colony, and as late as the year 1754, when a new slave code was passed, the number of slaves hardly exceeded that of the free colonists¹. Subse-

*Slave
labour at
the Cape.*

¹ The numbers given for 1754 are free colonists 5,510, slaves 6,279; for 1756, free colonists 5,123, slaves 5,787.

quently, the bondsmen greatly outnumbered the free, but to the end there was no such enormous excess of slaves over freemen as was proved to be the case in the plantation colonies of the West Indies¹.

It is pleasant, too, to record that slaves in South Africa were on the whole treated with comparative kindness. The first introduction of negroes from the West Coast of Africa was immediately followed by the opening of a school in which the slaves might be taught the doctrines of Christianity; and baptism was held to be preliminary to freedom. Emancipation, indeed, became so common, that it was found necessary to lay down more than once² that no slave should be set free without adequate security being given that he would not become a charge upon the public funds. Still the evils which are inherent in slavery made themselves felt at the Cape. Proclamations in restraint of cruelty told of the inhumanity of masters and of the sufferings of servants, and constant enactments against placing arms within the reach of slaves proved that the community was divided against itself, that it contained an element to be feared and to be ruled by fear. One of the many curses of slavery in all lands was that, the longer it lasted, the more it seemed to deaden the human sympathies of those who held others in bondage. Slave-owning was inherited from generation to generation, until it came to be regarded not as an accidental circumstance but as a law of life. What was originally a device for procuring much needed labour became in time a fundamental article of a creed; and, as the eighteenth century ran its course, the belief gained ground amongst

*Treatment
of slaves at
the Cape.*

¹ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, according to Barrow, the adult male slaves in the Cape Colony exceeded the adult male whites in the proportion of 5 to 1, but the excess of the whole slave population over the whole free population was very much less. In Jamaica at the same period the proportion of slaves to whites was 10 to 1. The total number of slaves at the Cape on Oct. 31, 1829—shortly before emancipation—was nearly 36,000.

² In 1708, and apparently again in 1722 and 1777.

PART I. slave-holders that slaves were made by nature not by man, that black men were cast in a wholly different mould from white. Even in South Africa it would seem that, as years went on, the views of the colonists became more distorted, and that the idea of training bond-servants for Christian brotherhood and for liberty yielded to the ever-growing sense of absolute mastery over lower beings. Yet the lot of the slave in the Cape Colony was at all times better than the fate of his fellow in the West Indies, and Hottentots in their semi-servitude to Dutch farmers fared worse than the better workmen enslaved from beyond the seas¹.

Statistics of population.

In April, 1657, when the Cape settlement had been in existence for five years, the total European population in South Africa amounted only to 134, of whom 100 were paid servants of the company. In 1672, when the colony was twenty years old, the Europeans did not exceed 600 in all, 64 of whom were burgher colonists. Ten years later, in 1682, the returns showed 663 Europeans, 300 of whom belonged to the garrison, while 162 were children.

Slow extension of the settlement.

Nearly all the colonists lived in the Cape peninsula, at Table Bay or round the slopes of Table Mountain; but there were small outposts at Saldanha Bay and Hottentots Holland, and in 1679 and 1680 farmers began to till the land at Stellenbosch. Little or nothing was known for many years

Ignorance of the interior of Africa.

of the interior behind the mountain buttresses which fronted the peninsula, and in whose keeping were the secrets of the continent. The maps of Africa were strewn with legendary or half-legendary names, and explorers went out into desert

¹ Barrow writes under the date 1801-4 (vol. ii. p. 95): 'The field slaves belonging to the farmers are not however nearly so well treated as those of the town; yet infinitely better than the Hottentots, who are in their employ. The farmer, indeed, having a life interest in the one and only five and twenty years in the other, is a circumstance that may explain the difference of treatment.' Similarly the white bond-servants in the West Indies, being only bound for a term of years, are said to have been worse treated than the negro slaves. (See vol. ii. of this Series, 2nd Ed., pp. 46-7.

lands to look for cities which no man had built. 'I see little difficulty in penetrating from this quarter to the river of Spirito Santo and the city of Monomotapa: see if anything is to be done for the company there.' wrote Commissioner Rykloff Van Goens, who visited the Cape in 1657. He served as Governor-general of the Netherlands Indies, and when, on his way home in 1682, he called once more at Table Bay, he spoke of 'the river named on the coast Rio de Infante, but called in the interior Camissa or Cumissa, a very large river, the discovery of which will be a great point, and a step towards the subsequent discovery of the river of Monomotapa².' The river of Cumissa, the river and town of Vigiti Magna, and other creations of mediaeval geographers, have long since melted into space, and a spurious island of St. Helena Nova, created by the unusually lively imagination of a fraudulent Dutch carpenter, was searched for in vain³; but, in looking for the unreal, the early settlers in South Africa by very slow degrees enlarged the actual bounds of knowledge, and gradually began to realise the great extent of the land, on the outskirts of which they had made their new home. It was in the year 1657 that a river was found flowing at the foot of the Drakenstein mountains, whence it gained its Dutch name of the Great Berg or mountain river. Near it two granite peaks, which glistened in the sunshine, were christened Diamandt and Paarl. Further to the north, in December, 1660, an exploring party came to a river, on whose banks

*Discovery
of the Great
Berg
River.*

¹ Moodie, p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 387.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 242. The Dutch carpenter's story was that half a degree south of St. Helena there was a low island producing all manner of supplies, which belonged to the Portuguese, and on which he had twice landed himself. On the ground of 'the absolute necessity of another rendezvous to the north of the Cape' the homeward Dutch fleet was in 1662 ordered to search for and to take possession of the island, and a Dutch officer was actually named as its commandant. The island was of course never found, but the fact that it was looked for shows that the Dutch company at this time regretted having allowed the real St. Helena to pass out of their hands.

PART I.

*Olifants
River.**Namaqua-
land.**Purchase
of the Bay
of Natal by
the Nether-
lands East
India
Company.*

they saw a herd of 200 to 300 elephants; and thenceforward the Great Olifants River appeared on the maps. Exploration lost itself in the desolate country of the Namaquas, whose copper gave an incentive to search, and Van der Stel's visit to Namaqualand in 1685 brought him only within hearsay of the Orange River, which was not actually reached and crossed by Europeans for another seventy-five years. The coast line of South Africa from the mouth of the Olifants River on the west to that of the Tugela on the east was fairly well known before the seventeenth century ended, and in 1689 the Netherlands company formally bought the shores of the bay of Natal from the leading chief of the place. No attempt, however, was made to utilise the purchase, and the ship which was carrying back to the Cape the evidence of ownership was lost in Algoa Bay.

These expeditions by land or sea led to no new colonies. Only a few shipwrecked sailors here and there threw in their lot with the natives. Very late were Europeans in settling in South Africa. Very few were the settlers when they came. Very slow were they to move inland from Table Bay. It was as when a long dark winter has been succeeded by a stubborn spring, and the earth gives no sign of a fuller time to come.

CHAPTER III.

THE CAPE COLONY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE Dutch Commander¹ at the Cape during the twenty years from 1679 to 1699 was Simon Van der Stel. His birthplace was the island of Mauritius, where his father commanded the garrison, and he was promoted to the appointment at the Cape from a subordinate position in the East India Company's service. He differed from his predecessors in that he made South Africa his home. After retirement from office, he passed the remainder of his days on his farm at Constantia, where he died in 1712. The wish of his heart was to make the Cape a great Dutch colony, and, among other places, Stellenbosch and Simons-town recall the name of a governor who deserved well of the Dutch in South Africa.

CH. III.

—
Simon Van
der Stel.

Soon after his arrival, he went out to inspect the farm station at Hottentots Holland at the head of False Bay, where nothing he thought was wanted to advance agriculture except 'industrious fatherland farmers'. From thence he rode inland for three or four hours, and at some thirty miles' distance from Capetown came to a valley, well watered, well wooded, comprising many acres fit for pasture and cultivation. 'He also discovered there a small island en-

*The settle-
ment at
Stellen-
bosch*

¹ In 1691 he was raised to the rank of Governor. All his successors bore the higher rank.

² Moodie, p. 371.

PART I. circled by a running stream of fresh water, and thickly
 →→→ studded with lofty trees. Here the Commander passed the
 night, and, as the spot had never before been visited by any
 chief authority, it was named Stellenbosch¹. The tone of
 this description, which is quoted from the official diary,
 indicated that a man had come who looked on South Africa
 and South African scenery with a favouring eye, and who
 wished to people the land with his own countrymen. The
 difficulty was to procure colonists. 'We see very little
 chance of being able to provide you from this quarter with
 industrious farmers, because people who will work can at
 present earn a very good livelihood here, and there is no
 want of land to work upon².' This was the answer of the
 Chamber of Seventeen in June, 1680, to Van der Stel's
 report on his discovery of Stellenbosch, and to his appli-
 cation for emigrants from home. The farmers already in
 South Africa, however, were not slow in accepting the
 Commander's invitation to take up land. In less than four
 years' time the community of Stellenbosch was large enough
 to be given a local council of four burgher Heemraden for
 the settlement of all disputes among themselves³; while in
 1685 there were ninety-nine families farming in the valley,
 and the increase of population led to the appointment of
 an officer, who was to be at once president of the council
 and travelling inspector, and who was given the now familiar
 title of Landdrost⁴.

and
 Draken-
 stein.

Two years later, in 1687, another settlement was formed.
 A little further inland than Stellenbosch, in the valley of the
 Berg River, ground was allotted to twenty-three farmers, and
 the district was given the name of Drakenstein, in honour
 of a Dutch High Commissioner, Van Rheeде tot Draken-
 stein, who had lately visited the Cape. Thus colonisation
 and agriculture were making way. In 1684 a little grain

¹ Moodie, p. 372.

² Ibid., p. 376.

³ Ibid., p. 390.

⁴ Ibid., p. 397. The English of Landdrost is high-bailiff.

was exported to the Indies, and in 1688 some Cape wine was sent to Ceylon. CH. III.

As is always the case with a young colony, there was at this time a great lack of marriageable women in South Africa. 'Our colonists,' wrote Van der Stel to Amsterdam in 1685, 'chiefly consist of strong, gallant, and industrious bachelors, who, for the solace of their cares and for the managing of their domestic concerns, would most gladly be married: and, as such bonds would establish the colony upon an immovable basis and much increase the zeal of the freemen for agriculture, we have deemed it proper most respectfully to request your Honours that, for the attainment of those desirable objects, thirty or forty young girls may be sent to us as soon as possible, all of whom will be well disposed of at this place ¹.'

The want of women among the settlers.

The directors made every effort to supply the want, and to send out eligible Dutch maidens who should be helps meet for the gallant bachelors at the Cape. They applied to the orphan homes of the Netherlands, model institutions in the kindly care given to fatherless and motherless children; and, though the supply of those who were ready to leave their native towns was not equal to the demand, small parties of healthy, well-trained young women went out one year and another to be the wives and mothers of farmers in South Africa, to 'establish the colony upon an immovable basis.' At the end of 1687 the free burghers, their wives and children, amounted to nearly 600 all told, in addition to thirty-nine European servants and some 400 paid employés of the company.

In November of this year the directors wrote that they were about to send out to the Cape, 'among other freemen, some French and Piedmontese fugitives, all of the reformed religion ².' The persecution of the Huguenots culminated

The Huguenot immigration.

¹ Moodie, p. 394.

² Ibid., p. 422.

PART I. in 1685 in the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. For years Louis XIV had laid his hand heavily on the Protestants of France, and numbers had gone out to other countries, where they might worship the God of their fathers in their own simple way. Not content with cancelling the edict which had given them civil and religious freedom, the French king prohibited their emigration; for he knew well that he dealt with a class of men who preferred faith to home, and who would suffer in exile rather than be untrue to their strong, pure creed. In spite of threatened pains and penalties, thousands still crossed the borders, secretly, separately, in loneliness and distress, taking from France of the best of her citizens, the most skilful, the most industrious, such men as make and save a state. Scattered abroad for conscience' sake, they brought a blessing to every land that took them in. To Germany, to the Netherlands, to England, they contributed a new strain of healthy Protestantism, higher knowledge of arts and manufactures, better modes of husbandry. As artisans and vinegrowers they had given industrial prosperity to France; that prosperity was now transferred to the countries of their adoption. In past years they had taken the lead in colonial enterprise, in carrying the French name and the French race beyond the seas. The French colonies were now closed to them, and their exclusion went far to ruin the colonial empire of France.

Some of the refugees found their way from the Netherlands to South Africa, being given free passages and grants of land by the directors of the East India Company. The first party started from Holland at the end of 1687, and during the two following years from 150 to 200 French emigrants were landed at the Cape. Farms were allotted to them at the new settlements, chiefly at Drakenstein and Fransche Hoek (the French Corner); provisions were supplied to meet their immediate wants; transport waggons carried them free of charge to their new homes; and

a considerable sum of money was distributed among them, which had been collected for the purpose at Batavia. At the same time the Dutch authorities had no intention of allowing the Cape to become a French colony. The new immigrants were, against their will, not allowed to form a separate community, but were interspersed among the Dutch settlers; their children were taught Dutch; and it was only with difficulty that they obtained permission to form a church body and have a church building of their own. The result was that they became rapidly absorbed; and, after a few years' time, no divisions of race or language disturbed the slumbering restfulness of the settlers in the Cape Colony.

When François Leguat, himself a Huguenot, visited the Cape in 1698, he wrote that the settlement at Drakenstein 'has been frequently augmented, and is almost every day, by a considerable number of French Protestants'.¹ As a matter of fact, however, after the first shiploads of emigrants had landed at the Cape, only a few Huguenot families came out afterwards, and at no time did the French number more than one-eighth of the total European population in South Africa.² Still, few as they were both relatively and actually, they were a strong leaven in the community. They came out with their wives and families and made their homes. They came out with their love of liberty and planted it in the land. Of a higher class socially and intellectually than the ex-soldiers and sailors of the Dutch company's service, they taught them to grow corn and wine,³ to turn to good account sheltered valleys and sunny hillsides. They gave strength where strength was needed, for they added

¹ The Voyage of François Leguat (Basklyt Soc.), vol. ii. p. 282.

² See Theal's South Africa, vol. i. pp. 340-1.

³ In announcing that they were sending out Huguenot emigrants, the directors wrote: 'Among those persons you will find wine farmers and brandy distillers, and may thus supply the wants so much complained of.' (Moodie, p. 422.)

PART I. to the number and raised the standard of the country men, the colonists, as opposed to the members of the garrison and the sojourners by the seashore. At the present day French names are borne by many leading families in South Africa¹, and preserve the memory of the Huguenot refugees who found peace and rest in a small Dutch colony.

'Tis certain the Cape is an extraordinary refuge for the poor French Protestants. They there peaceably enjoy their happiness and live in good correspondence with the Hollanders, who, as every one knows, are of a frank and downright humour². So Leguat sums up the condition of his compatriots and fellow Protestants at the Cape, after being an eyewitness of their condition in the year 1698. His testimony is the more valuable, as he had no cause personally to love the Dutch, having suffered much at the hands of a truculent Dutch governor of Mauritius. A pleasant picture he draws of the Cape Colony. It was small, but thriving and prosperous. Inland were the Dutch and French farmers on their homesteads, among gardens and vineyards, living healthy lives in health-giving air, tilling a soil which well repaid their labour. By the sea stood the fort, faced with stone and strongly garrisoned; and 'about seven or eight hundred paces from the fort, and near the sea, there is a little town with about 300 houses in it. The streets are straight and drawn by line. The houses are built with white stones, and at a distance it promises much more than you find when you come near; nevertheless it has wherewithal to content anybody, and you observe the Holland neatness enough in it³.' Such was the appearance of Capetown at the end

Leguat's description of the Cape Colony at the end of the seventeenth century.

¹ Stavorinus writes in the latter years of the eighteenth century: 'Two-thirds of the farmers that live in the country bear names which prove their French origin. Among others there are a great many of the names of Villiers and Retif' (vol. i. p. 564). The governor of the Cape from 1714 to 1724 was Mauritz Pasques de Chavonnes, and from 1730 to 1737 Jan de la Fontaine—both apparently French names.

² Leguat (as above), vol. ii. p. 287.

³ Leguat, p. 275. Three hundred houses was probably an exaggeration.

of the seventeenth century. The writer goes on to tell of the company's garden, laid out anew by Governor Van der Stel and by the botanist Oldenland¹; and he notes, in passing, the colonists' houses nestling in groves and gardens round the slopes of the Table Mountain range. Whatever blame attached to the Dutch for damaging places which they visited and left, there is no doubt that when once they made a home, they loved to beautify it. Ardent tree-planters they were², and skilful gardeners; coming from a land of dykes and canals, they knew the science of irrigation. At the present time the botanic garden at Buitenzorg in Java is one of the sights of the Netherlands Indies, and in the days of the Dutch East India Company the garden at Capetown delighted alike unlearned travellers and scientific botanists.

So the eighteenth century opened brightly for the Cape Colony. The European population was increasing steadily though slowly, and between one and two thousand Dutch and French colonists were permanently settled in the land. Colonisation had spread beyond the peninsula, though not yet over the mountains. The vines were bearing, the trees were growing, corn and cattle were plentiful, and year by year more vessels called at the Table Bay³. Slave labour was available, and even the Hottentots were learning to make themselves of use. 'In the busiest of the harvest or the ploughing season,' wrote Van der Stel in 1688, 'they come down among us like the Westphalians in the Netherlands,'

¹ Leguat says however (p. 275) that he did not find the garden at Capetown 'so magnificent as I have seen it described.'

² Under the government of the Van der Stels large numbers of oaks were planted in the Cape peninsula and at Stellenbosch and Drakenstein. 'There was a regulation under which any one felling a tree on his own ground was to plant an oak in its stead, but it was generally neglected.' (Theal's South Africa, vol. ii. p. 54.)

³ There was a large increase in the ten years following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.

⁴ Moodie, p. 423.

PART I. and the French refugees found them work to do in their vineyards and on their corn fields¹. For offensive purposes they were hopelessly disabled by constant intertribal wars; and a few years later, in 1713, whole clans were exterminated by small-pox. In the Cape Colony they were a doomed race, doomed alike by character and by circumstances: they began as friends of the Dutchmen, courted and humoured; they ended as outcasts in their own country, occasionally utilised, constantly maltreated, always despised.

Stagnation of the colony in the eighteenth century. Relative decline of the Dutch.

Promising in a quiet way was the outlook of the colony, but the promise was not fulfilled. It was not that any catastrophe overtook the settlement, or the mother country from which the settlers came. Nor was it a case of premature decay. It was rather that, as the century went on, the world grew too fast for the Dutch. Their resources were not equal to a prolonged struggle for empire; they kept the views and the system of a past time; they could not, and they did not, recast their policy or fall into line with stronger peoples. England and France went on, the Dutch stood still, rich enough to be envied, not strong enough to be feared.

Decline of the Netherlands East India Company.

As the Netherlands became relatively weaker, when compared with their own past and with other European nations, so the Dutch East India Company declined and ultimately fell. Up to the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, its trade was flourishing and its profits were large. After that date it prospered less and less, and ended in bankruptcy. It suffered from English and French competition in the East, but its downfall was due as much to internal as to external causes. A company's rule cannot last. As a governing body it is doing work which belongs not to a private body but to a nation. It does the work for


¹ 'Our refugees made the Hottentots work in their harvests, vintages, and whatever else they please, for a little bread or tobacco.' (Leguat, vol. ii p. 286.)

a time, and often does it well; but there comes a point at which, if the work is to last, it must be taken over by the State. The reason is that men do not live by bread alone, and that there are ends to be achieved and objects to be safeguarded outside and beyond the dividends of shareholders. The life of a company is a trading life; its territories and subjects are assets or liabilities as the case may be; but government cannot be measured simply by profit and loss, and human beings cannot be treated merely as so many items in a merchant's ledger.

The process by which companies lapse and become absorbed in peoples went on in the past and is going on at the present time. The English East India Company had a long life, but its existence as a governing corporation was protracted only by placing it more and more under State control. The Dutch East India Company, from the first, was, as we have seen, more nearly than any other company a national association, and its connexion with the State was drawn closer when, in 1749, the Stadtholder of the Netherlands was appointed to the office of chief director¹. But the nation was assimilated to the company rather than the company to the nation. The Dutch became more and more a community of merchants, and government was more and more subordinated to trade. A declining company was linked to a declining political power, and the failings inherent in the one were enhanced by the growing weakness of the other. The officers of the company were badly paid, and supplemented their insufficient salaries by private traffic. The evil was not peculiar to the Dutch. It was the same with the French in Canada. It was the same with the English in India. It was the evil against which Clive fought with so much courage and determination during his last term of service in Bengal. It seems transparently obvious that, if

*Its officers
engage in
private
trade.*

¹ In 1747 the office of Stadtholder had been revived and made hereditary in the House of Orange.

PART I.  employers are to be honestly served, they must pay good wages; yet the history of colonial administration abundantly shows that no lesson has been so imperfectly learnt and so constantly forgotten. Have few officers, work them hard, pay them well, hold them responsible, and trust them—this is the only way to secure capable and honest administration. In the latter part of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, no government acted on these lines, and companies could hardly be expected to do so. Their business was not to train just and wise rulers, but to buy the services of their staff as cheaply as possible. They paid salaries on which men could hardly live, and the subject races had to make good the deficiency.

In South Africa, however, there were not the same facilities for trade and extortion as existed in the East, and therefore the officers who were sent to the Cape were naturally in a hurry to move on to the Netherlands Indies and share in the spoil. In order to improve their position, without raising their salaries, the company, towards the end of the seventeenth century, gave them grants of land and allowed them to farm on the same conditions as the free burghers. Thus it was that, among others, the governor himself, Simon Van der Stel, became possessor of a fine property, a farm at Constantia. It was a vicious system, and soon bore evil fruit. Those who were entrusted with the work of government neglected their duties, and the colonists found themselves competing with the company's servants in a market which the servants controlled in the name of the company. Public discontent culminated in the time of William Van der Stel, who succeeded his father as governor in 1699, and ruled till 1707. He held a large estate at Hottentots Holland, and there he busied himself in making money, using for his private gain, so the colonists contended, the paid servants of the company, the slaves of the company, and the stores of the company. As governor, he regulated prices in his

*Oppression
of William
Van der
Stel.*

own interest, buying for little, selling for much, oppressing the people who were committed to his charge, defrauding the masters whom he was paid to serve. The end of it was an uprising of the farmers: some were arrested and imprisoned by the governor, some were exiled. But a memorial which was sent to Amsterdam answered its purpose, Van der Stel was removed from office, and the officials at the Cape were for the time strictly forbidden to own land or to engage in trade.

Some years before the date of this outbreak, the Dutch company had recourse to a well-known device of employers who mistrust their servants, the plan of dividing authority and appointing in every dependency an officer who should be independent of and in a position to check the governor. The new official was called the Independent Fiscal. He was not only entrusted with the regulation of justice, but was also given control of the accounts and the expenditure, being held responsible to the directors alone. A similar system prevailed in the French colonies, where the Intendant, who was a financial officer of the French king, with certain judicial powers, was at perpetual variance with the governor¹. Like all his colleagues in the company's service, the Independent Fiscal was underpaid; he made his living by fees; and his appointment was useful only on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief².

The Independent Fiscal.

¹ For the position of the Intendant in the French colonies and his relations to the Governor, reference should be made to Mr. Parkman's book, *The Old Régime in Canada*.

² The following comments on the Independent Fiscal in the years 1772-3 are given in Thunberg's account of the Cape of Good Hope. (See Pinkerton's *Collection of Voyages*, vol. xvi. p. 63.) 'The fiscal is independent in his office, not being subordinate to the governor, and accountable only to the directors in Holland. When disputes and contentions arise between burghers or others he fines them. The fine here is not proportioned to the crime of the offenders, but for the most part suited to their circumstances. The fiscal, therefore, to whom these fines furnish a considerable revenue, treats turbulent and offending persons as a physician does a plethoric patient, of whom he always draws blood in proportion as the strength of his habit will permit.'

PART I.

Faulty, however, as was the Dutch company's administration, it must not be supposed that oppression in any acute form was as a rule rife at the Cape, or that the governors and the co-ordinate or subordinate officials made life entirely miserable. There were upright men among them, like Pasques de Chavonnes, governor from 1714 to 1724, and like Governor Tulbagh, whose twenty years of rule from 1751 to 1771 were twenty years of quietness and confidence, of even-handed and clean-handed justice. Nor were the directors by any means deaf to all complaints, or blind to all abuses. Given a certain system, they meant to govern well, but the system had never been suited to the place, and became more and more unsuited to the time.

*Governor
Tulbagh.*

*Finances
of the
Dutch
East India
Company.*

The Cape Colony under the Dutch company never paid its way. Had the settlers always been left to live their lives in their own manner, exchanging their own produce freely with natives and strangers, governing themselves, taxing themselves, paying only for a very simple form of administration suited to a primitive community, the colony would have been solvent, and there would have been modest prosperity, sober content, and gradual progress. But, on the contrary, the colonists were tied up with monopolies, devised by men who were managing a large and losing concern, in which South Africa was only a subordinate factor. Licences to retail wine and spirits, tithes of grain, taxes on wine, rents of cattle farms, were among the sources of revenue; but, if the receipts increased, the expenditure increased also, for it was expenditure designed not merely to meet the needs of South Africa but also the requirements of an outpost of the East. The older the settlement grew, the more evident it became that there was a double thread running through its existence, that there were two discordant elements making up its history. It was a dependency of the East, but it was also a South African colony. Each year the division grew wider between what might by courtesy be called town and country,

*Division of
interests at
the Cape.
Contrast
between the
port and
the country
districts.*

between the life which centred round Table Bay, and the life of the dwellers and the wanderers inland. Almost from the first there had been a certain number of town burghers, of freemen whose houses and gardens were near the fort, and who earned their money as retail traders, as handicraftsmen, or as market gardeners. More shipping came to the fort, and their numbers grew in proportion; shopmen and innkeepers¹ multiplied, and townspeople of various callings. Their interests were all bound up in the passing trade; they made their living out of the ships which called on the way to and from the East: they had little in common with the farmers of Stellenbosch, still less with the graziers of Graaf Reinet: they were in, but not of, South Africa. The farmers, on the other hand, sent, it is true, their grain and their wine to the fort and to the storehouses of the company; but distances were great and roads were few: further and further they went from the sea: weaker and weaker became the link between the town at Table Bay and the scattered homesteads and far-off cattle runs of the interior.

—◆—
The town burghers.

The country farmers.

The main feature in South African colonisation has been 'Trekking'², perpetual emigration from settled to unsettled districts. In all new countries the area of settlement widens as the number of settlers grows, but in South Africa, without any pressure of population, families have been constantly moving on far into the wilderness, leaving blank spaces behind them. For this geography has been partly responsible. The formation of the land and the unequal distribution of the water supply made continuity almost impossible. The habitable districts are cut off from each other by mountain ranges. The beginning is a peninsula quite distinct from the main land, and the interior rises in terraces to be reached

'Trekking' in South Africa.

¹ 'Most families at the Cape are maintained by the trade which they carry on with the seafaring people who touch there, or by keeping houses for the ships' officers.' (Stavorinus, vol. i. p. 565.)

² The Dutch verb *trekken* means 'to pull, draw,' and is eminently suggestive of moving off in waggons.

PART I. only by crossing successive mountain ranges. Watered valleys, shut in by the hills, alternate with dusty and almost treeless plains, the one offering permanence of tenure but permanence in solitude, the other suggesting life in a waggon, the life of nomads in the desert. In such a land it was almost inevitable that Europeans should disperse and wander far and wide; but the evil, for an evil it was, was fostered by the action of the government. The rule of the company was at once weak and irritating; it fettered freedom of action without giving adequate protection. Men lost little or nothing by wandering far from headquarters, and they gained the advantage of living in semi-savage freedom. Thus a race of farmers grew up, accustomed to isolation, impatient of control; and the origin of the Treks and the Boer wars of the present century may be traced back to the character which was formed and the mode of life which prevailed under the *régime* of the Netherlands East India Company.

*Dispersion
of the popu-
lation
fostered by
the com-
pany's rule.*

*Cattle
farming.*

*Land regu-
lations.*

In the earlier days of the colony, there was a standing order¹, oftentimes repeated, which prohibited trade between the settlers and the natives. In 1700 this order was cancelled under instructions from the Chamber of Seventeen, and thenceforward for some years² the farmers had full liberty to buy cattle from the Hottentots. A great impetus was thereby given to cattle-farming, and the population were scattered more widely than before. The land regulations of the company tended to produce the same result. Leasehold was the most common form of land tenure; and in leasing land to the farmers at a yearly rent, the company laid down that a clear space of about three miles should intervene between one homestead and the next³. In short, nature

¹ See above, p. 42.

² The prohibition was subsequently revived.

³ See Barrow's *South Africa* (2nd ed.), vol. ii. pp. 84-5. The distance was measured from the centre of one farm to the centre of the next. Barrow suggests that the framers of the regulation may have had in view the principle *Divide et impera*.

and man conspired to produce a colony which should not be a community, a Dutch dependency lacking the spirit of citizenship which had created the United Netherlands. In Holland and Zeeland the Dutch lived close together in a very small space. The main features of their life were the towns and the sea. In South Africa there was but one small town, and the majority of the colonists were widely spread through a very large extent of inland territory. At home the population was large and the land was small. In South Africa the population was very small and the country was unbounded in area. The compactness of the Netherlands, the briskness of its commercial life, were wanting in the Cape Colony. 'However extensive the colony is,' wrote the Swedish naturalist Sparrman, 'yet it cannot be considered at present in any other light than that of a proportionably large but weakly, consumptive body, in which the circulation of trade is very slow and sluggish'. 'It is certain,' wrote Captain Cook about the same date, 'that, were it not for the continued importation of slaves, this settlement would be thinner of people than any other inhabited part of the world'. Transplanted to a new soil and climate, placed in wholly new conditions, the race became of necessity modified in course of generations. The difference between the citizen of the Netherlands and the South African Boer was the difference between a strong plant, trimmed and pruned, in a carefully ordered garden, and the same plant growing at will in a desert place, trailing its full length along the ground. The Dutchman in the country districts of the Cape Colony became a Dutchman run wild. He kept the strength, the tenacity, the independence of his race,

*Contrast
between
Dutchmen
at home
and Dutch-
men in
South
Africa.*

¹ Sparrman's *Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, &c.*, 1772-6 (Engl. Transl.), London, 1785, vol. ii. p. 262. He visited the Cape in 1772, and again in 1775-6.

² From *A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, &c.* (ed. of 1785), vol. i. p. 41. On this, which was Capt. Cook's last voyage, he was at the Cape in October and November, 1776. He had visited the colony three times before.

PART I. but he lived more or less by himself and for himself; he lost in great measure the power of cohesion for political and social purposes; and his love of liberty degenerated into antagonism to those rules and restraints without which civilisation and progress are absolutely impossible.

*The lie of
the land in
the Cape
Colony.*

The continent of Africa, taken as a whole, is a great plateau, fringed by mountain ranges which run parallel to the sea. Between the outer edge of the mountains and the ocean there is a strip of coast line, varying in width, unhealthy on the eastern and western sides of the continent, where the tropical sun and tropical rains combine to make swamp and jungle a breeding-place of malaria; healthy where beyond the tropics the land narrows into the southern seas. East of Cape Agulhas, the coast runs for many miles nearly due east and west, and from east to west in regular order are successive lines of hills or mountains, by which the ground rises towards the north in ever-widening terraces. The range which is nearest the coast-line is marked on the maps as the Langebergen. The next barrier to be surmounted is that of the Zwartebergen. On the inland side of the Zwartebergen is the plateau of the Great Karroo, and this plateau is in turn bounded on the north by the range of the Roggeveld, Nieuwveld, and Sneeuwberg mountains. Such is the lie of the land, as it faces due north and south; but where the coast turns the mountains turn also, and the heights which run along the eastern and western sides of the continent intersect the ranges which front the south. Directly over against the Cape peninsula, in the extreme south-west of Africa, the transverse ridges meet, forming the group of the Drakenstein mountains, over which is the direct route from Capetown to the interior; and for many years these mountains formed the natural boundary of the Cape colony. On their outer slopes, at Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, and in the Paarl and Malmesbury districts, Dutchmen and Huguenots lived and farmed, content to make and keep

their homes within easy distance of the sea. As the seventeenth century ended, they began to cross the mountains; and in the year 1700 some land was taken up and an outstation was formed, where the headwaters of the Little Berg and the Breede rivers nearly meet, in what is now known as the Tulbagh division, but was then named the Land of Waveren. Here, some forty years later, a church was built, reached by a mountain road over the Roodezand pass, and round it a village grew up, which is now the little country town of Tulbagh.

CH. III.
 ———
Extension of European settlement in South Africa.
The Land of Waveren or Tulbagh.

From Waveren settlers followed the course of the Breede River in a south-easterly direction, while other colonists moved due east from Hottentots Holland along the valley of the Zonder End. A little below the point where the latter stream joins the Breede, the village of Swellendam was founded in 1746, to be the administrative centre of a new district of the colony carved out of the Stellenbosch division. At a later date, in 1770, the line of the Zwartbergen mountains was taken to be its northern boundary; on the south it was bounded by the sea. It began on the west near where the town of Worcester now stands, and its eastern limit was fixed at the Gamtoos River, a little short of Algoa Bay and Port Elizabeth¹.

Swellendam.

In the opposite direction, due north of Capetown, farmers found that wheat grew well in what was known as the Zwartland district, between the mountains and the sea; and here, about the same time that the village of Swellendam was founded, a church was built to meet the spiritual wants of a growing number of colonists. This church, the Zwartlands' Kerk, was the nucleus of what is now the town of Malmesbury. Further north again, following the line of the






Zwartland now Malmesbury.

¹ In 1775 the eastern boundary of the Swellendam district was moved forward to the Bushman's River; but, when ten years later the new district of Graaf Reinet was formed, the country between the Gamtoos and the Bushman's Rivers was cut off from Swellendam and included in Graaf Reinet.



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PART I.

—♦—
Piquet-
berg.

The
Orange
River.

western coast, the pioneers of settlement crossed the Berg River into the Piquetberg district, grazing their cattle as far afield as the mouth of the Olifants River; and, before the eighteenth century ended, the fringe of colonisation touched what is now known as the Calvinia district, and the part of Namaqualand which lies to the south of the Orange River. The Orange River—the Great River—still for many miles the northern boundary of the Cape Colony, was first crossed by an European in 1760; and in 1779 Captain Gordon, a Scotchman in the service of the Netherlands East India Company, reached its mouth, and named it after the Stadtholder of the United Provinces.

The colony
divided
into four
districts.

1. The
Cape
district.

2. Swellen-
dam.

3. Stellen-
bosch.

4. Graaf
Reinet.

The
eastern
boundary

The Cape peninsula and the land to the north, stretching along the coast as far as Saldanha Bay and inland as far as Malmesbury, formed the Cape district. The boundaries of the Swellendam district have already been described. All the rest of the colony, including the Overberg—the land beyond the mountains, the plateau of the Great Karroo—was for many years included in the administrative division of Stellenbosch and Drakenstein. In 1785, however, in order to exercise some control over the cattle farmers of the frontier and to meet their convenience, the directors at Amsterdam consented to the creation of a fourth district, the district of Graaf Reinet¹. Its western boundary was near the twenty-second meridian of east longitude, and on the east it extended to the Great Fish River, taking in Algoa Bay and the present divisions of Albany and Bathurst, then known as the Zuurveld.

The Great Fish River was the easternmost limit of the colony in Dutch times². On the north no frontier line was

¹ Called after Van de Graaf, governor from 1785 to 1791.

² The boundaries were not territorial boundaries. In other words, the Dutch would presumably not have admitted the right of other Europeans to settle beyond them. They were rather limits within which colonial jurisdiction ran, and were fixed in the hope of preventing illicit barter between the settlers and the Kaffir tribes. (See Moccie's Record, pt. 2, p. 50 note.)

drawn, but the Boers trekked on to the Upper Karroo beyond the Nieuwveld and the Sneeuwberg mountains, and in 1778 Governor Van Plettenberg placed a beacon on the banks of the Zeekoe River, a few miles to the west of the present town of Colesberg, to mark the boundary on the north-east.

Early in the century an attempt had been made by the company to gain a footing in south-east Africa. In 1720, a few years after the abandonment of Mauritius, an expedition was sent from the Cape to form a station at Delagoa Bay. The Portuguese always claimed the bay, but seem to have given up their factory or factories upon its shores nearly thirty years before, and the fine natural harbour invited occupation by other Europeans, especially by the owners of the Cape. A small Dutch fort was built, named Fort Lagoa, which was subsequently reconstructed and enlarged under the name of Lydzaamheid. A little exploring was done in the supposed direction of Monomotapa. Some gold-dust was obtained by barter with the natives, just enough to excite a wish for more; copper was procured, a little ivory, and a few slaves. But, then as now, fever laid low the white men on these deadly shores, and when, after ten years' time, there was little to show but loss of life, the fort was at the end of 1730 dismantled and the garrison withdrawn.

The further the colonists went afield, the more they came into collision with the Bosjesmen, or Bushmen, and on the east with the Kaffir tribes. Of the Bushmen, in their relations to the European immigrants, there is little to be said. No one district held them. No people, black or white, as a rule, befriended them or won their friendship. Year after year they murdered outlying settlers and their families, and carried off their stock. Year after year the Dutchmen formed commandos and shot them down. It was otherwise with the Kaffirs. In physique and intellect, in strength of

CH. III.
 —♦—
of the colony was the Great Fish River. Plettenberg's beacon, on the north-east of the colony. The Dutch at Delagoa Bay.

The Bushmen.

The Kaffirs.

PART I. head and hand, far superior to other South African natives, they were, like the Dutchmen, constantly pressing forward, exterminating the Bushmen as they went, crushing or assimilating the Hottentots. Their advance was roughly parallel to the south-eastern coast. Before the eighteenth century began they had reached the Great Kei River, and by the middle of that century they had mastered the country as far as the Keiskamma, and bid fair to thrust the Hottentots back behind the Great Fish River. The van of these coast Kaffirs was led by the Kosa or Amakosa tribes, and they faced the Dutch colonists, as the latter moved eastward past Mossel Bay to the Gamtoos River, and on to Algoa Bay and the Zuurveld. In 1778 Governor Van Plettenberg agreed with some Kaffir chiefs that the Great Fish River should be the dividing line between the two races, and in 1780 that river was formally declared to be the eastern boundary of the colony. But rivers are easy to cross, and both white and black men strayed beyond the line. In 1779 the Kosas advanced into the Zuurveld and began raiding the Dutchmen's herds. A counter-attack was organised, and in 1781 the first of many Kaffir wars ended successfully for the colonists; the invaders being completely defeated by a strong Dutch commando and driven back across the Fish River into their own territory.

Their advance towards the South.

The first Kaffir War.

Statistics of the colony in 1770.

In the year 1770 there were nearly 10,000 Europeans in the Cape Colony. Some 1,700 of the total were servants of the company, and the free colonists numbered more than 8,000, the majority of whom were children. A few male European servants were still enumerated in the census returns, but, in the face of a growing slave population, free white labour can hardly have been in demand. Wheat, wine, and live stock formed the wealth of the country colonists. The products were increasing, and the revenue too was increasing, though it lagged far behind the expenditure. The days of the Dutch company, however, were rapidly

being numbered, and after a few more years the South African colony, which they had never learnt to rule, was to begin a new life under the guidance of a stronger power. Time was when the Dutch carried all before them in the East, but by the middle of the eighteenth century their sun was sinking below the horizon, and the twilight of their fortunes was beginning, giving forth but the shadows of former greatness. The leadership in India and in the Indian seas was now vested in the countrymen of Clive; the second place was held by the French; and the Netherlanders could but wait on events, finding some security in the constant jealousy and strife between Great Britain and France.

CH. III.

Decay of the Dutch power in the East.

It has been seen that in the early days of the Cape Colony the Dutch in South Africa were fortunate in immunity at once from foreign invasion and from attack by natives of the soil; that the colonists were few, living in a compact area, controlled by a strong company, and not in a position to engage in any serious quarrels with their masters or among themselves. In the last twenty years of the eighteenth century all this was changed. We come in the history of the colony to a time when capture by foreigners was imminent, when border wars were frequent and dangerous, when the colonists were at daggers drawn with the company, when the mother country, to which their appeal lay, was divided against itself. The signs of the times were wars and rumours of wars. At home, abroad, was nothing but unrest. Since 1674 the English and Dutch had been at peace. Once only, in 1759, shortly after the battle of Plassey, there had been an open rupture in India between the two nations; an expedition, which had been sent from Batavia to reinforce the Dutch factory at Chinsurah on the Hoogly and to make a demonstration against the English in Bengal, having been opposed and crushed by Clive. No war, however, between Great Britain and the Netherlands resulted from the incident, which served only to prove the impotence of the Dutch East

The last twenty years of the eighteenth century.

PART I.

—♦—
*War
 between
 Great
 Britain
 and the
 Nether-
 lands in
 1780.*

India Company and the growing strength of the English; and it was not until the year 1780 that the century of peace between the two old rivals and old allies came to an end. It was a time of danger and difficulty for England. Her colonists in North America were making good their independence by force of arms. France had declared war against her; Spain had joined with France; and Catherine of Russia was banding the northern nations of Europe in an armed neutrality, directed against English claims to right of search on the high seas. The British Government suspected that the Netherlands would become a party to this league of neutral powers, contrary to the old but still standing treaties, under which it was contended that in any European war the English might count on Dutch support. There was reason to think that Dutch traders were furnishing supplies to the French and to the Americans, and evidence came to light that the city of Amsterdam had, in the year 1778, actually negotiated a treaty with the United States, in the name of the States-General of the Netherlands¹. The truth was that there were then and for years afterwards two parties in Holland. The Stadtholder favoured the old English alliance; but the republican sympathies of the Dutch people in general, and of Amsterdam in particular, coupled with jealousy of British trade, turned the scale of public feeling in favour of America and France.

*British
 expedition
 against the
 Cape fore-
 stalled by
 the French
 admiral
 Suffren.*

The end of it was that Great Britain declared war against the Netherlands in December, 1780, and in the following March a British fleet set sail with secret orders to take possession of the Cape. The ships were forty-six in number, all told, under the command of Comynodore Johnstone, and they carried 3,000 troops—a force more than sufficient to overpower the Dutch in South Africa, if the latter were left to their own resources. News of the expedition, however, had

¹ See the Annual Register for 1780 and Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. iv. chap. xiv.

reached the French Government. Admiral Suffren sailed in haste from Brest with a small squadron, and, after surprising the British fleet at the Cape Verde Islands, contrived to reach Table Bay in time to prevent the colony from falling into Johnstone's hands. From that date until after the peace of 1783 had been concluded, a French regiment helped to garrison Capetown.

The war proved, if proof were needed, that the Dutch could no longer stand alone; that in time of war they must follow the lead of either England or France, and that to either England or France would be assigned, by force of circumstances more than by the chance of war, some portion of the Dutchmen's colonial heritage. Weak as the Netherlanders were at home, they were weaker still in their dependencies; and among those dependencies the English especially had reason to covet the harbours and stations at Table Bay and Trincomalee. Table Bay was now needed in addition to St. Helena for the growing East India trade of Great Britain, and Trincomalee was perilously near to British India, if used with hostile intent. In the war, which ended with the treaty of 1783, the Cape was nearly taken by the English, and Trincomalee actually was occupied by them for a short time. It was a war in which England was single-handed against the world; and it could hardly have been doubted that, if another and more favourable occasion were to arise, she would strain every nerve to protect her commercial interests in the East by taking and keeping these two points of vantage. Meanwhile, however, Suffren had checkmated Johnstone, and for the time being the Cape Colony was preserved to the Netherlands.

*Weakness
of the
Dutch.*

The war of American Independence had indirectly a great effect upon the fortunes of the Cape and the Dutch residents at the Cape. Not only did it lead to war between England and Holland, but it intensified the discontent which existed among the settlers in South Africa against the rule of the

*Discontent
among the
Cape
colonists
with the
rule of the
Dutch.*

PART I. Netherlands East India Company. They heard of colonists, like themselves, making good their claims to freedom, rising in arms not merely against a company, but against a nation. America proved that colonial independence might be more than a dream, and from the New World came a new lesson that Europeans out of Europe need not necessarily be subordinated to their countrymen at home. But, though in point of fact the Dutchmer South Africa suffered more at the hands of their rule than the New Englanders and Virginians, their quarrel was not with the mother country or the States-General, but with the East India Company, or rather with the representatives of that company at Capetown and Batavia. They were in the main loyal to the United Netherlands, and, like their forefathers who founded and held together the United Netherlands, they were not so much concerned to assert abstract principles or to recast a system, as to procure the removal of certain definite restrictions which caused practical inconvenience, and to prevent undue interference by those in authority with their mode of life and their business relations. Their complaints were not all well founded, one of them being that they were not allowed to punish their slaves at will; but most of the grievances which four delegates, acting on behalf of four hundred burghers of the Cape Colony, carried in 1779 to Amsterdam, were such as reasonable men could not gainsay and right-thinking men would be earnest to redress. They asked to be safeguarded against arbitrary actions and arbitrary exactions; they asked that the laws under which they lived, and the taxes and dues which they were called upon to pay, should be clearly defined; they demanded right of appeal to the courts of the Netherlands instead of to Batavia; they proposed that the number of burgher members in the High Court of Justice should be increased, and that burgher members should sit in Council of Government; and once more they laid bare the two old sores, which, never cured, had drained the life-blood

—♦—
East India
Company.

*Delegates
of the
colonists
sent to
Amster-
dam.
Nature of
their
complaints.*

of the colony, that townsmen and farmers were prohibited from trading freely, while on the other hand the officers of the Government were allowed to grow rich by trade. Had these two evils been adequately remedied at an earlier date, by Dutch colonists, though not by English, the want of representative institutions might possibly not have been felt. If the Government had been strong and just, it might have remained absolute. But in rulers who were weak and irritating, who took more than was due and gave little or nothing in return, no confidence was felt. Hence the burghers asked that a representative element might be introduced into the Council of Government.

The burgher members of the High Court of Justice had gradually become recognised as spokesmen of the community on matters of local interest. It had long been the practice of the governors of the Cape to consult them, whenever any new measures were contemplated relating to the domestic affairs of the colony. It was, therefore, not unreasonable to ask that a certain number of such popular representatives should be appointed to the governing body, that they should be entitled to speak and vote on the laws and regulations which controlled the life of the people. But the concession was never made, and, if it had been made, it would have come too late to regenerate the colony. All that was done in the way of constitutional reform was to increase the number of burgher members in the High Court of Justice, and, after the receipt of further memorials, to appoint in 1786, by way of experiment, a mixed board consisting of six members of the Court of Justice, three officials and three burghers, with power to fix the prices at which the produce of the farmers should be bought by the company, to recommend the best modes of taxation, and to undertake such duties as are usually entrusted to a municipal council. The board proved a failure, and perished almost as soon as it had been called into being.

*Action
of the
directors*

PART I. In truth the colony was rotten to the core, and every year confusion was becoming worse confounded. During the late war, while Holland was in alliance with France, and French troops were quartered at Capetown, trade had been abnormally brisk, and prices had been unusually high. But the goods were being imported in French and Danish ships more than in Dutch; and the Netherlands company, which used to carry for the world, was now hardly first in its own ports. The restoration of peace in 1783 did not bring back sound economy. Frightened at having nearly lost their South African colony, the directors of the company determined to fortify Capetown, to largely increase its garrison, to make it more than ever a depôt for the East Indies, and to place it in charge of a military governor. The governor in question, Colone' Van de Graaf, came out early in 1785; batteries and forts were built or repaired; and Swiss and German mercenaries swelled the number of the troops. For five years public and private extravagance was rife at Capetown, and paper money circulated as though it were gold. But out in the country were struggling farmers, left to take care of themselves, living a hand to mouth existence, while Bushmen troubled them on the north and Kaffirs on the east.

Fresh troubles with the Kaffirs.

Nearly eight years had passed since the close of the first Kaffir War, when a horde of Kaffirs again crossed the Fish River and raided the Zuurveld. The burghers who suffered were ready and willing to undertake the work of defence and reprisal; but the Government, which had failed to protect them, counter-ordered their commandos. The official policy was not to punish but to conciliate the invaders, to buy them off, not to quell them by force of arms. In the case of border wars it is always difficult to ascertain the truth, to decide what justice requires and what is due to humanity. Men who live at a distance see with different eyes from those who are face to face with savages, and wider motives influence a government than the one thought of what is

strictly owing in a particular case to the white men or the black. But it must be confessed that the policy of repelling force by force has rarely answered with barbarous tribes. Forbearance after subjugation is understood by coloured races, concession in the face of provocation is attributed to weakness. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is not Christian dealing, but it is the dealing which fair unbiassed history proves to have been in the end most productive of good and least productive of evil, when communities of white men have conterminous frontiers with tribes of blacks. In the case in point the disturbance ended by Kaffirs being left on the Dutch side of the Fish River; and the border farmers, more exposed than before, and deprived of redress, added to their store of bitterness against the authorities at Capetown.

This was in the year 1789. In the following year the crash began to come. The company was by this time hopelessly bankrupt. Its credit was gone like its ready money. The fortifications at the Cape were left unfinished; the garrison was reduced; the governor was recalled and returned to Europe in 1791; and the close of that year saw a colony in which, exclusive of soldiers and sailors, there were 14,600 Europeans owning over 17,000 slaves, left to financial and administrative chaos, with divided interests of town and country, with citizens disaffected to their rulers, with insecure frontiers, and with an insufficiently guarded port.

The States-General appointed a commission, to inquire into the affairs of the East India Company. The result of the inquiry was that a board, consisting of four commissioners-general, was appointed to restore, if possible, order and good government to the mismanaged dependencies of the company in South Africa and the East Indies. Two of these gentlemen, Nederburgh and Frykenius by name, arrived at the Cape in June, 1792, took over the government,

Bankruptcy of the company

Nederburgh and Frykenius visit the Cape as commissioners-general.

PART I. and set to work to reform and to economise. They remained in the colony for rather more than a year, and by rigorous retrenchments, coupled with additional taxation, greatly reduced the excess of expenditure over revenue. They failed however to gain the confidence of the colonists. One of their new taxes—an auction tax—caused special resentment; and, while they relaxed the restrictions on trade in various directions, they prohibited trade with foreigners more strictly than before. The Boers of Graaf Reinet were exasperated by the appointment of a Landdrost whom they mistrusted. On the eastern frontier there were fresh troubles with the Kaffirs, with no more satisfactory issue than before; and on the north of the Karroo the Bushmen were more than usually aggressive, being eventually shot down in larger numbers than usual. Such were the conditions when the two commissioners left Capetown for Batavia in September, 1793, placing the government in the hands of Mr. Sluysken, an old officer of the company, who was at the time on his way home from India. Within the next two years the burghers of Graaf Reinet and of Swellendam openly threw off the rule of the East India Company, expelled their respective Landdrosts, and took the administration of their districts into their own hands.

Sluysken placed in charge of the government. The burghers of Graaf Reinet and Swellendam rise in open rebellion. The Netherlands over-run by the French.

The insurgents called themselves 'Nationals,' echoing the phrases of the French Revolution; and Nationals they were, in that they rose not against the Dutch nation but against the East India Company. Meanwhile a revolution on a larger scale had been taking place at home. Political dissension had long been rife in the Netherlands. On the one side was the republican party, whose eyes were turned to France; on the other was the conservative or Government party, with the Stadtholder at their head, steadily adhering to the English. In 1788 the governments of Great Britain, Prussia, and the Netherlands formed a triple alliance, and in 1793 the English and the Dutch were drawn into the world-wide war with

France. The old days of single-minded patriotism had passed away from the Netherlands, and the very element which had more than once saved their country now betrayed it. The winter of 1794-5 was one of great severity. The rivers and canals were frozen. The Zuyder Zee was frozen; and a Dutch fleet lay ice-bound and helpless at the Texel. A French army under Pichegru marched over the ice as on dry ground, and at Amsterdam and in other towns the invaders were welcomed by the populace as fellow republicans. In a few weeks the whole of the Dutch provinces were brought under French domination, and the United Netherlands bloomed out in the spring under the new Latinised name of the Batavian Republic.

The Prince of Orange, hereditary Stadtholder of the Netherlands, had taken refuge in England, when his country was overrun by the French; and from Kew he wrote to the governor of the Cape, ordering him to admit into the colony any forces which should be sent by the British Government, 'to consider them as troops and ships of a power in friendship and alliance with their High Mightinesses the States-General, and who come to protect the colony against an invasion of the French.' The letter was dated February 7, 1795, and it reached the Cape in the middle of the following June, brought by a British fleet. The fleet was in charge of Admiral Elphinstone, and carried a body of British troops, commanded by General Craig.

It is difficult to imagine a more difficult position than that in which Sluysken was placed. He was ignorant of the exact state of affairs in the Netherlands. Two districts of the colony were in revolt against his authority, while in the other districts there was a large number of disaffected residents. The finances were at the lowest ebb. The garrison consisted in great measure of mercenaries of all nationalities. Among the Dutchmen under arms the officers mainly favoured the party of the Stadtholder, while those

The Stadtholder sends instructions to the Cape to admit British troops.

British expedition to the Cape under Elphinstone and Craig.

PART I. whom they commanded were rather on the democratic side. It seemed, and was, hopeless to refuse to accept the offer of British protection, or in other words to decline to place the port and the colony in British hands. Yet Sluysken, though he personally sympathised with the Orange party, felt and rightly felt that his first duty was to the Netherlands. There was no immediate prospect of French invasion, and there was therefore no immediate reason for admitting a British garrison into Capetown. Instructions had reached him from the company in the previous autumn, enjoining watchfulness against any foreign power; and, subsequently to the arrival of the English squadron, he learnt that his country, in its new republican guise, was in alliance with France. Under these circumstances he and his council rejected the proposals of the British commanders, and made what poor preparations could be made to defend Capetown. The burgher forces were called out to support the garrison, and even from the revolted district of Swellendam there came, after some demur, and under promise of amnesty, a detachment of 'Nationals.' It was on June 11, 1795, that the English squadron entered False Bay, and about a month was spent in negotiations and in planning stronger measures. On July 14 a detachment of British troops occupied Simons-town, and on August 7 the Dutch were driven from the position which they had taken up at Muizenberg. Early in September the invading force was strengthened by some 3,000 men under General Clarke, and on the fourteenth of that month they marched by Wynberg on Capetown. Two days later terms of capitulation were finally arranged, the garrison and burghers laid down their arms, and for the time the English became masters of the Cape Colony.

Capitulation of the colony.

Neither the attack nor the defence which preceded the surrender had been very vigorous. The English had no real quarrel with the Dutch. They came to the Cape in the name of the Stadtholder. Their object was not so much to

take the colony for themselves as to prevent its falling into the hands of the French. Their commanders did their utmost to avoid bloodshed; and, even after the fighting had begun, they continued to offer terms. The Dutch settlers, on the other hand, had long been disaffected, unsettled, and insecure. They had little to lose and possibly much to gain by a change of masters. Patriotism forbade them to place themselves willingly in charge of a foreign nation; but the mother-land, like the colony, was in a state of dissolution, and they hardly knew to whom or to what their allegiance was due. One fact alone was clear—that the rule of the East India Company in South Africa had proved a failure; and now, after 143 years, it came to an ignominious end. It had long been time to break with the past, to remove old-world restrictions, to pull down a worn-out structure, which gave no shelter or protection, but only cumbered and confined. Temporary submission to an alien government was hardly too heavy a price to pay for getting rid of the Netherlands East India Company.

The rule of the Netherlands East India Company brought to an end.

✕ For nearly a century and a half the Dutch had enjoyed uninterrupted possession of the Cape. The story of the colony now enters on a short period of transition, lasting from September, 1795, when British forces first occupied Capetown, till August, 1814, when the Dutch possessions in South Africa were finally ceded to Great Britain. ✕ From September, 1795, till February, 1803, the English were in occupation. From February, 1803, under the provisions of the Peace of Amiens, concluded in the previous year, the Dutch—though not the East India Company—resumed possession for three years. In January, 1806, Capetown was again compelled to surrender to an English force, which held it until the treaty of 1814, at the close of the great war, confirmed in perpetuity British sovereignty over the Cape Colony.

Period of transition at the Cape.

The seven years and a half, during which the first British

PART I. occupation lasted, were a somewhat troubled time. It could not well be otherwise. Foreign rule, however just, must for a while be distasteful; and in the case in point the incoming rulers had to deal with a people backward when tried by an English standard, and from past experience with good reason suspicious of all who were set over them. There was a change of policy too in these few years, and constant changes in the personnel of the Government. At first it was understood that the English were holding the Cape as trustees, not as absolute owners; and the oath of allegiance to the King of Great Britain was 'for so long a time as His Majesty shall remain in possession of the colony.' As it was a case of temporary military occupation, the first governor was a military officer, General Craig, who governed justly and well. Within a year, however, the British Government intimated that the occupation would be permanent; and then, treating their new possession as a Crown Colony, they sent out a civilian governor, Lord Macartney¹, who exacted from the colonists a further oath of allegiance to the British Crown. After a year and a half Lord Macartney retired, leaving General Dundas, who was in command of the troops, to administer the government. A year later, another civilian, Sir George Yonge, arrived to take charge of the colony. Under his rule corruption and favouritism were rife; and in less than a year and a half's time he was recalled to England to give an account of his stewardship. General Dundas then again administered, until the colony was given back to the Dutch.

Want of a strong government in the Cape Colony.

These changes had a bad effect. It would have been better if the Cape had remained for a few years under military tenure. The great want was law and order. In the frontier districts there had long been no security for life

¹ Lord Macartney had visited the Cape before. He had served in India and had been on a special mission to China in 1792-4. Sir John Barrow, the author of *Travels in South Africa, &c.*, went with him to the Cape as private secretary.

and property. In the neighbourhood of Capetown life and property had been safe, but the community had not been well ordered in the sense of living under definite, reasonable, and intelligible laws. A strong government obeyed by all alike, understood by all alike, protecting all alike, allowing all, within well-defined limits and subject to such rules as commend themselves to common sense, to buy and sell freely, and to come and go safely, would have been the greatest boon to the colony. When in old days the Romans occupied a country, they made roads from one end of it to another, and encamped their legionaries along the frontiers. They had no thought of turning back, and they governed as for all time. They governed as military men, but they did not as a rule worry their subjects or needlessly interfere with local rights and customs; and under their control lands and peoples which had never been tamed or had run wild, learnt the meaning of law, security, and peace. A few Roman roads, a line of Roman frontier garrisons, and a large unswerving Roman policy would have done much for South Africa.

Both before and after the capitulation, the English commanders had held out to the colonists the prospect of free trade and an open market, and that promise was in great measure redeemed. Import and export duties were, it is true, levied, except in the case of British goods imported in British ships direct from the United Kingdom; and the English East India Company was given the monopoly of importing goods from the East. But the settlers were now at liberty to trade with whom they pleased, and exchanged their goods freely in open market. Additional relief was given by modifying the auction tax, and by fixing a rate of exchange for the paper money; and, in lieu of the still-born committee of the High Court of Justice, a 'Burgher Senate' of six members was appointed to discharge the advisory and municipal duties which the old board or committee had

Internal reforms.

The 'Burgher Senate.'

PART I. — been intended to perform. These measures, coupled with the impulse given to trade by the presence of a large English garrison, tended to reconcile the burghers of Capetown and Stellenbosch to the new order of things; and even in the district of Swellendam the national party gave no trouble.

*Difficulties
with the
Graaf
Reinet
farmers*

The farmers of Graaf Reinet, however, were not inclined to submit. They had done with the Dutch East India Company and its rule, and had no mind lightly to give up their independence. Two motives influenced them, their Dutch nationality, and their mistrust of government from Capetown. They were willing, if left to themselves, to be friends with the English, but they were not willing to acknowledge British sovereignty. For more than a year they held aloof, and a military force was actually on its way to Graaf Reinet, before the malcontent settlers, cut off from supplies and ammunition, accepted the inevitable and gave a sullen adherence to the existing Government. An attempt, which miscarried, had in the meantime been made to supply them with arms and powder from Batavia, and a Dutch fleet of nine ships, with 2,000 men on board, had been compelled by Elphinstone and Craig to surrender at Saldanha Bay without firing a shot.

*and with
the
natives.*

Thus in May, 1797, when Lord Macartney arrived at Capetown, the colony was outwardly at peace; but what has always been a great difficulty in South Africa, the native question in the frontier districts, was still outstanding. The Kaffirs were invited and warned to leave the Zuurveld and return to their own side of the Fish River; but the invitations and warnings, not backed by force, were disregarded. Nor was it the Kaffirs alone who gave trouble. A Hottentot corps, enlisted by the English Government, was sent to serve in the eastern districts; and their coming led to a rising among the Hottentot servants of the Dutch farmers. In 1799, and again in 1802, Kaffirs and Hottentots laid waste the country as far as the present district of George, and

detachments of troops at Graaf Reinet and Algoa Bay were insufficient to protect the white men's herds and homes. In 1799, moreover, and again in 1801, the Graaf Reinet farmers, or some of them, were up in arms against the Government; while, on the opposite side of the colony, a band of Namaqua marauders¹, whose home was on the Orange River, raided the farmers of the north and north-west. It was a time of great trouble and distress; and, before confidence could be restored, the British Government agreed to give back the colony to the Batavian Republic.

The Peace of Amiens was signed in March, 1802. At the time the English were in possession of Ceylon as well as the Cape, both being Dutch dependencies. Ceylon, with the coveted harbour of Trincomalee, was formally and finally transferred to Great Britain; but the Dutch recovered the Cape, with the proviso that ships belonging to those nations which were parties to the treaty should be admitted to and pay no higher duties in the harbours of the colony than the ships of the Batavian Republic. This clause secured free access to Table Bay and False Bay for the ships of the English East India Company.

The Peace of Amiens.

The Cape restored to the Batavian Republic.

Before the days of quick steamers and telegraphs, when

¹ Among those who suffered much from these Namaquas, under their chief Afrikaner, was a band of half-breed Hottentots, who had been gathered together by one Adam Kok, and to whom the Cape Government had granted a reserve in the Kamiesberg. This band was among the earliest of the Griquas or 'Bastards,' afterwards well known in South African history. The Bastards took the name of Griquas after the visit of Mr. Campbell of the London Missionary Society to the Griqua Mission in 1813. In his *Travels in South Africa*, published in 1815, he writes as follows (pp. 252-3): 'The people in this part, being a mixed race, went by the name of Bastards. But, having represented to the principal persons the offensiveness of the word to an English or Dutch ear, they resolved to assume some other name. On consulting among themselves they found the majority were descended from a person of the name of Griqua, and they resolved hereafter to be called Griquas. . . . The whole people likewise resolved that henceforth they should be called Griquas instead of Bastard Hottentots, and the place called Griquatown instead of Kiaarwater.' Griquatown is north of the Orange River, not far from its junction with the Vaal, and nearly due west of Kimberley.

PART I. a treaty was in course of making in Europe, and after it had been finally concluded, there necessarily supervened an interval of uncertainty and suspense in a distant colony. Rumours came over the sea of what might be done; then the colonial government and the colonists learnt what would be done; later on came the news of what had been done; and at length instructions followed, detailing how and when the convention or treaty which had been signed was to be carried out. From first to last there was much delay, mischievous to the colonies concerned, for it kept them in a state of tension and unrest. Schemes for better government were often suspended while the future was doubtful, and the partisans of one nation or another, of one system or another, were elated or discouraged, as it seemed that the side with which they had cast in their lot would or would not prevail. Sometimes so long a time elapsed before a settlement was carried into effect out of Europe, that in Europe in the meantime public opinion had already begun to change. The preliminaries of the Peace of Amiens were arranged in October, 1801; the peace itself was signed in the following March. The English did not evacuate Capetown till February, 1803; and in May, 1803, Great Britain was again at war with France, involving war with the Batavian Republic.

*De Mist
and
Janssens.*

For nearly three years the Dutch still kept the Cape. At least they ended well. The mother-country was powerless to defend the colony if attacked in any force; and, when war broke out, the best troops in the Capetown garrison were ordered to Batavia. Yet the local administration was sound and respected, the sense of coming danger was not allowed to check progress and reform, and men contrasted, and still contrast, the beneficent rule of De Mist and Janssens with the previous misgovernment of the Netherlands East India Company. For the company was now no more. The Chamber of Seventeen had gone for ever. The Cape was

not even left any longer subordinate to Batavia, but was placed under the direct control of the States-General, the executive and legislative powers on the spot being entrusted to a Governor who was also commander of the troops, and to a Council of four salaried members, one of whom was to be a colonist. No restrictions were placed on the trade between South Africa and the other Dutch possessions, beyond a uniform *ad valorem* duty of three per cent.

A civilian, Mr. de Mist, was appointed Commissioner-general to inaugurate the new constitution, and with him went out General Janssens as Governor. For a year and a half the former exercised his authority conjointly with the governor; he then laid down his office, and Janssens ruled alone. Working in harmony with each other, and with a single eye to the public good, these two zealous and capable men spared no pains to promote the interests of the residents in the colony, white and coloured alike. They travelled through the districts, seeing with their own eyes and hearing with their own ears, gaining and giving confidence by personal knowledge and experience. Their views were in some respects in advance of the place if not of the time, for the French Revolution, with all its faults and in spite of all its horrors, had broadened the views and quickened the wits of thinking men in Europe. Civil equality was granted to the adherents of every creed. Provision was made for establishing unsectarian government schools¹. The importation of slaves was nearly brought to an end, and, on the other hand, European immigration was encouraged. The

Their reforms.

¹ Regulations dealing with public worship and education were passed on July 25, 1804. Two of them are quoted, to show the liberal spirit in which they were conceived. 'All communities worshipping a Supreme Being for the promotion of virtue and good morals shall enjoy in this colony an equal protection of the laws'; and 'The public schools tending for the instruction of youth do not belong to any particular community. They are seminaries for the purpose of forming good citizens for the State, and as such they are under the immediate superintendence and direction of God.'

PART I. district administration and the district courts of justice were reorganised, the duties of the Landdrosts and of the Field-cornets¹ being more clearly defined. Regular postal communication was instituted between the out-stations and Capetown; and a commission was set on foot to improve the breeds of cattle and sheep, and to stimulate the wool industry of the colony. In Graaf Riet and on the eastern frontier there was once more comparative tranquillity and peace, and the Kaffir chiefs again acknowledged the Fish River as the boundary line, though the Kaffirs who were in the Zuurveld on the Dutch side of the river continued to hold their ground. Lastly, full inquiry was made into the grievances of the Hottentots within the colony; locations were assigned to those who had left their masters and were wandering and homeless; and it was enacted that in future Hottentot servants should be safeguarded by written contracts of service.

*The second
British
invasion
of the Cape.*

Intent as he was on internal reforms, Jansse made less preparations to place the colony in a state of defence. His regular troops were few in number and poor in quality, including a battalion of German mercenaries. The other available forces were composed of burgher levies, Hottentot infantry, Malay artillerymen, and, when the actual crisis came, the crews of two French ships. On January 4, 1806, a British squadron was sighted at the entrance of Table Bay. It was a fleet in charge of Commodore Home Popham, carrying General David Baird and 6,000 to 7,000 troops. The expedition had been sent by Pitt and Castlereagh in the late summer of the previous year, secretly destined for the Cape. It attracted but little notice, for great events were passing in Europe. In October Trafalgar was fought, in December Austerlitz, and before this same month

¹ The Field-cornets, originally purely military officers, had also civil duties assigned to them. By the ordinance of 1805, each district was left in charge of a Landdrost, but, under the Landdrost, each ward or subdivision of a district was assigned to a Field-cornet.

of January ended Pitt was dead. The wind blew strong, the surf ran high, and Baird laid his plans to move back to the safer landing at Saldanha Bay. On the 6th, however, calmer weather prevailed, and six regiments, including a Highland brigade, were set ashore on the Blueberg beach, some 18 miles north of Capetown. Janssens led out his motley force to meet them. His following amounted to little more than 2,000 in all, facing double the number of picked British troops. Early in the morning of Wednesday, January 8, the two forces met, and the defenders were soon driven from their position, demoralised by the speedy flight of the hired German soldiers. On the following day Baird marched on Capetown, which offered no resistance, but surrendered on the afternoon of the 10th; while Janssens, with the bulk of his small army, fell back on the hill country of Hottentots Holland, in the vague hope, it would seem, of holding out for a time in the eastern districts of the colony. It was evident, however, that there was nothing to be gained by prolonging a struggle against an overwhelming force. Stellenbosch was promptly occupied by British troops, a regiment was ordered to Mossel Bay, and the farmers who still remained in arms were threatened with confiscation of their property. All that was left was to secure honourable terms of surrender, and such terms the British general was perfectly ready to give. On January 18 a capitulation was signed, by which the whole colony was at once given up to the English, the Dutch officers and their soldiers being guaranteed a safe return to the Netherlands at the expense of the British Government. This condition was faithfully carried out, and on March 6 the last of the Dutch Commanders, the kindly, honest Janssens, sailed for Europe, commending, as he left, to General Baird the colonists whose interests he had tried so hard to serve.

The fight on the Blueberg beach.

General Baird occupies Capetown.

Janssens capitulates.

Thus for the second and last time the English took the Cape Colony. In 1795 the attack and defence had been on

Comparison of the first and

PART I.
 —◆—
*second
 British
 attack on
 the Cape.*

the southern side of Capetown, in 1806 the invaders landed on the north. On the first occasion fighting and negotiations lasted for three months, on the second all was finished in a fortnight. Baird brought with him a stronger force than General Craig commanded, and, having already served in South Africa, he was well able to choose his ground. Janssens on the other hand, though the burghers were with him heart and soul, had practically no material for fighting against disciplined troops. But there was another cause at work to make the second invasion short and decisive. Baird and the government which sent him out knew their own minds thoroughly. The English realised by this time that they were fighting for life and death with France and Napoleon, and were no longer inclined to leave their enemy any possible foothold in any part of the world. The small nations of Europe, and most of the great, had practically become French dependencies, and the day was past for drawing scrupulous distinctions between what actually belonged to France and what was nominally independent though really under her control. A year later the English bombarded Copenhagen and took the Danish fleet. Dutch, and Danes, and many others suffered because of Napoleon. This people and that were losers through the war; but mankind as a whole gained when England gave stroke for stroke, and by timely aggression forestalled a scheme of world-wide despotism.

—
*The peace
 of 1814.
 The Cape
 finally
 becomes a
 British
 possession
 by right of
 purchase.*

In 1814, after many years of fighting, the nations settled up their accounts, and in the course of the settlement the Cape was finally ceded to Great Britain. The cession formed part of a general bargain, involving transfer of land and change of ownership in all quarters of the world. The Prince of Orange returned to his native land to be 'Prince Sovereign of the United Netherlands,' and to rule Belgium as well as the Netherlands. 'In consideration of the incorporation of the Belgic provinces with Holland,' the Dutch were required to find a certain sum of money, and this

money was paid up by Great Britain as the price or part of the price of the Cape and of the settlements of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, now forming the colony of British Guiana¹. The English already held these Dutch possessions by right of conquest, they kept them by right of cession or rather by right of purchase, six millions sterling being the sum named in the convention of August 13, 1814, which is the British title deed to Demerara and the Cape.

There was a certain fitness in this ending to Dutch supremacy in South Africa. The dependency of a trading people and a Chartered Company, which had always been regarded and handled as an item in a trading account, was finally bought and sold. Yet English writers and readers may well appreciate another point of view. A nation that had once been very great lost the making of a colony which had the elements of future greatness. The Dutch lost the Cape Colony partly, it is true, through their own mistakes, but far more in obedience to the iron law of destiny. It was inevitable that such a commanding position on the trade route to the East as the Cape of Good Hope should no

¹ The following is a very general account of the complicated transaction which ended in the English keeping the Cape. On March 3, 1813, the British Government made a treaty with the Swedish Government, agreeing to transfer to Sweden the West Indian island of Guadaloupe, which the English had taken from the French, in consideration of certain trading privileges to be given to British ships in specified Swedish ports. In the following year, however, by the general Peace of Paris, signed on May 30, 1814, it was agreed that Guadaloupe should be given back to France. Compensation was due to Sweden, and it was agreed that such compensation, to the amount of one million sterling, should be made good by Holland out of her colonies then in possession of the English, 'in consideration of the incorporation of the Belgic provinces with Holland.' This compensation Great Britain agreed to pay on behalf of Holland, and in addition to advance two millions sterling towards improving the defences of the Netherlands, and to bear further charges not exceeding three millions sterling towards the general expenses of setting up the new Dutch-Belgian kingdom. In return the Cape and what is now British Gambia were finally ceded to Great Britain, being practically bought for the sum of six millions. The convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands was signed on August 13, 1814, and the corresponding convention between Great Britain and Sweden on the same day.

PART I. longer be held by any power merely on sufferance. It was inevitable that a people with longer arms, with greater resources, and with more citizens than the Netherlands possessed, should control and protect South Africa, if South Africa was to be enabled in time to work out its own salvation.

The Dutch guaranteed free access to the ports of the Cape Colony.

One of the articles in the convention of 1814 ran as follows: 'It is also agreed between the two high contracting parties that the ships of every kind belonging to Holland shall have permission to resort freely to the Cape of Good Hope for the purposes of refreshment and repairs, without being liable to other charges than such as British subjects are required to pay.' Why did the Dutch originally go to the Cape? They went there 'for the purposes of refreshment and repairs.' They formed their station at Table Bay, and built and garrisoned their fort, with no intention whatever of owning and colonising South Africa, but simply and solely to ensure that the refreshment and repairs might always be forthcoming. They never lost sight of this one main object. Never, as long as the Netherlands were the Netherlands and not the Batavian Republic, did they forget that refreshment and repairs for ships trading with the Netherlands Indies constituted the real reason for keeping the Cape. To them the colonising of South Africa was but an incident, a doubtful and dangerous incident, in that it involved expenditure of men and money. In the end they lost South Africa, but what they sought at the Cape a century and a half before the treaty of 1814 still secured. The Spice Islands of the East remained the property of the Netherlands; and, if they come or go by the South Sea route, Dutch ships can still refresh and repair at Table Bay, as freely as when its shores were owned by the Netherlands East India Company.

*Retrospect.
The Cape
under the
Nether-
lands East*

The story of the Cape Colony under the rule of the Dutch company seems to teach three lessons, which will perhaps bear repetition in a very few words. It is men who make

states¹—that is the first lesson. The Netherlands could never spare men and women enough to South Africa. Had the number of Dutchmen who emigrated to the Cape been multiplied four or fivefold, a strong community would have been formed, and the colonists would soon have shaken off the mischievous restrictions imposed by the company. The story is a warning, in the second place, that trading companies are meant to trade and not to rule. Companies may with advantage plant a settlement and take charge of it in its infancy, but after a while company rule is out of place and out of time. This applies to all kinds of dependencies, but most of all to those colonial communities where the ruled, or many of them, are of the same race as the rulers. A country where European settlers have made a permanent home cannot, after a certain time, be healthily governed on the principle of furnishing a regular dividend to shareholders in Europe. The third lesson is that it is impossible to govern aright one part of the world, when the governors' eyes and minds are perpetually fixed on another. 'Where your treasure is there will your heart be also.' The treasure of the Netherlands East India Company was in the East. Their hearts, if they had any, their heads, while they had any, were there also.

CH. III.

Indic
Company

¹ "Ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλεις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κινεαί.—Thuc. 7. 77.

CHAPTER IV.


THE MISSIONARY MOVEMENT AND BRITISH IMMIGRATION.

PART I. IN 1806, when the Cape Colony came under British control, its eastern boundary followed the course of the Great Fish River upwards from the sea to its junction with the Baviaans River, not far from Somerset East. Thence the frontier line ran east and north, including the greater part of the Tarka River district, until it reached the Stormberg range, an eastern continuation of the Sneeuwbergen. Crossing these mountains, it was carried to the north-west as far as Plettenberg's Beacon on the Zeekoe River, in what is now the Colesberg division; and from Plettenberg's Beacon it ran in a straight line due south-west as far as the source of the Zak River on the northern slopes of the Nieuwveld mountains, over against the site on their southern side, where the town of Beaufort West now stands. The course of the Zak River, flowing to the north-west, was then taken, until it joined the Riet River on the frontiers of the present Fraserburg and Calvinia divisions; and from the junction of these two streams the hills were followed in a more or less straight line to the north-west, until the source of the Buffalo River was reached. That river then formed the boundary down to the sea. Nowhere did the colony, as officially recognised, reach the Orange River, Plettenberg's Beacon being the nearest point. On the western side it stretched much further to the north than on the east; and, dipping down midway in its


—♦—
*Boundaries
of the Cape
Colony in
1806.*

SOUTH A

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


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


B. V. C. Arbuckle, C

SOUTH AFRICA IN 1786.





SOUTH AFRICA IN 1806.



B. V. Barbishire, Oxford, 1919

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course, the northern boundary touched a point below the thirty-second degree of south latitude.

The four districts into which the colony had previously been divided, viz. the Cape, Stellenbosch, Swellendam, and Graaf Reinet, were, in 1804, increased to six. Out of Stellenbosch was carved a new district, the district of Tulbagh, including all the northern and far the greater part of the old district of Stellenbosch; while the southern part of Graaf Reinet and the eastern part of Swellendam were formed into the district of Uitenhage, including the troubled territory which was acknowledged to belong to the Dutch, but was, notwithstanding, in part occupied by Kaffirs. Each district, outside Capetown¹, had its Landdrost, and board of Heemraden; each ward or subdivision of the district was in charge of a Field-cornet.

Creation of the Tulbagh and Uitenhage districts.

The civil European population of the colony in 1805 amounted in round numbers to 26,000, 6,000 of whom lived in Capetown. They owned nearly 30,000 slaves, and their Hottentot and half-breed servants numbered 20,000. Barrow, who wrote in the years 1801-4, classes the colonists into townspeople, vine-growers, grain-farmers, and graziers. The corn and the wine were produced within easy reach of Capetown, in the Cape district, including the Zwartland (now Malmesbury) to the north of the peninsula, and on the southern fringe of the Stellenbosch district from the Paarl to Hottentots Holland and False Bay. The vine-growers were in great measure the descendants of French families, preserving the hereditary skill of their Huguenot forefathers.

Population and products.

¹ The Cape district was not given a Landdrost and court of Heemraden till 1809; and then their authority did not extend to Capetown and Simonstown. The functions of the Landdrosts, Field-cornets, and Heemraden are fully described by Mr. Theal in the third volume of his History of South Africa, pp. 104-6. The Landdrost was the chief administrative and revenue officer of a district, and president of the court or board of Heemraden. The Heemraden adjudicated on minor civil cases, and managed what would be called in England county business. The Field-cornets were deputies of the Landdrosts.

PART I. The most noted vineyards were within the peninsula, on the farms of Constantia. Cultivation was in the main bounded by the nearest mountain range¹, and the settlers who lived beyond the mountains were pastoral rather than agricultural, belonging to the class of graziers. Exports were in their infancy. The colonists hardly produced more than enough to supply their own wants and the requirements of the garrison and the passing ships. A little wine and brandy was sent out of the colony occasionally, a little grain, and, as half-breed hunters multiplied, hides and skins gradually became an article of export. De Mist and Janssens took measures to improve the breed of sheep and to introduce merinos, but the wool industry was as yet in the experimental stage. Ostrich farming was practically unknown. Whale fishing had always been pointed out as likely to be a source of wealth to the colony, but little had been made of it, and the whaling ships were principally foreign vessels following their calling off the western shores of South Africa, as evidenced by the name of Walfish Bay². The resources of the Cape Colony were in short quite undeveloped. A scanty population was scattered through a great and almost roadless land, wanting means of communication with the civilised world and the moral and intellectual stimulus which such communication gives. To organise or reorganise such a colony, and to bring it into line with modern life was no easy matter; for the Boer character was fully formed, and the South African colonist had become a distinct species of mankind.

The religion of

The Dutch settlers in the Cape Colony were cast in a

¹ There was some cultivation, however, in the Tulbagh valley or Land of Waveren.

² Walfish Bay is a corruption of Walvisch Bay, the Dutch translation of the old Portuguese name Bahia das Baleas (see the third volume of Theal's History of South Africa, p. 31, note). Formal possession of the bay was taken by the Dutch East India Company in 1793, and again by the first English Government of the Cape in 1795. It was finally annexed to the Cape Colony in 1884. Barrow, in his book on South Africa, urged that Table Bay should be made a central depôt for the South Sea whale fisheries.

Puritan mould. Calvinists of the Dutch Reformed Church, they were deeply and sternly religious. The Bible was their literature—their only literature as years went on. The French Huguenots, who joined them, were Calvinists also, and thus South Africa became the home of Protestants of an unbending type, slow to modify their thoughts and ways, modelled on the Old Testament more than the New. Wherever a few houses were grouped together, there was a church in their centre, to which the farmers and their families gathered at stated times from many miles round. 'In the country,' writes Barrow rather unfairly, 'the Boers carry their devotion to an excess of inconvenience that looks very like hypocrisy. From some parts of the colony it requires a week or ten days to go to the nearest church, yet the whole family seldom fails in its attendance twice or thrice in the year¹.'

CH. IV.

—♦—
*the Dutch
 and
 Huguenot
 settlers.*

However indifferent the directors of the Netherlands East India Company may have been to the temporal welfare of the colonists, they were at any rate not unmindful of their spiritual wants. Calvinism was established and endowed as the State religion of the colony. The clergy, duly ordained and duly appointed, were paid from the revenues of the Company or the State, and not left to depend upon voluntary offerings of the congregations. They took precedence next to the Landdrosts, and, with assistants styled visitors or comforters of the sick, they carried on religious, charitable, and to some extent educational work, and occasionally meddled in matters which, if not too high for them, were at least outside their province. In Capetown there was a Consistory or Ecclesiastical Court, subordinate to the Council of Government. Its constituent members were appointed or approved, and its functions were controlled, by the secular authorities of the colony. 'Other sects were tolerated, but they were

¹ Barrow's South Africa (2nd ed.), vol. ii. p. 147.

PART I. neither countenanced nor paid nor preferred by the Dutch¹.

—♦— We read of services of the Church of England being occasionally held by permission in the Dutch church at Capetown, when English ships visited Table Bay, but until 1780 the rule of the colony was that all public worship must be in accordance with the rites of the Dutch reformed religion. In that year the Lutherans in Capetown were for the first time permitted to have a church and clergyman of their own, all the expenses being met by voluntary contributions. There was by this time, indeed there had always been, a considerable German element in the population, and it was from among the Germans that the Lutheran congregation was principally recruited, though their minister was required to be a Dutchman, and was selected by the Lutheran church of Amsterdam². Under the enlightened rule of De Mist and Janssens all religious denominations found protection, and even Roman Catholic services were allowed to be held in the castle of Capetown for the benefit of the soldiers who professed that creed. The permission was withdrawn in 1806, when the English took the colony, but after 1820 complete freedom of public worship was conceded to all sects and to all religions.

*The
Lutherans.*

At the time when it was suggested to the Dutch company to form a station at the Cape, one of the inducements held out was the possibility of converting the heathen³, and in the early days of the settlement praiseworthy efforts were made to give religious and secular instruction to Hottentot and slave children. The annals of the Cape Colony, however, before the closing years of the eighteenth century, give but little indication of missionary enterprise. As the colonists

¹ Barrow, as above, p. 146.

² 'The Germans, who are equally numerous with the Dutch and mostly Lutherans, had great difficulty in obtaining permission to build a church, in which, however, they at length succeeded, but they were neither suffered to erect a steeple nor to hang a bell.' Barrow, as above.

³ See above, p. 23.

were few in number, so the ministers of religion were few, and their time must have been fully occupied in watching over the very scattered constituents of their respective congregations. The community, too, was not progressive. Intellectual activity was wanting. The wheels of life ran heavily in well-known grooves; and religion was neither quickening nor quickened. To maintain and reassert hard and stereotyped doctrines in uncompromising tones and in the ears of men of the same faith and temper, to practise very real charity among compatriots and fellow-worshippers, but not to diffuse it abroad, to resent the intrusion of other Christians however Christ-like, was characteristic of the Middle Ages of the Cape Colony.

When worlds were first discovered beyond the seas, religious enthusiasm knew no bounds. The Reformation soon followed, stimulating spiritual competition among the various Christian sects. Generations passed away, faith grew cold, and in the eighteenth century, except where John Wesley's influence was felt, men ceased to compass sea and land to make proselytes. Yet one small band of Protestants, the United Brethren, never forgot the Divine command to go into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature. Hunted out from their old home in Moravia and Bohemia, about the year 1722 they found a refuge and renewed their brotherhood at Herrnhut in Saxony. The trials they had known seemed to nerve them for more; and from this small centre in a Lutheran land, missionaries went out to the uttermost parts of the earth. In the tropical heat of the West Indies they laboured among the slaves. They founded mission stations in Greenland and on the ice-bound coast of Labrador. Self-denying, uncomplaining, very practical in their goodness, backed by no powerful Church, working with no pomp or show, wherever there is love of God or man the Moravian missionaries should be held in honour. One of them, by name George Schmidt, went to

The beginnings of Protestant missionary enterprise.

The Moravians.

George Schmidt.

PART I. South Africa. His Protestant principles had lately earned him six years' imprisonment in a Bohemian dungeon, and might have ensured a warm welcome in a Protestant land. Welcomed he was, when he first arrived in 1737, and began mission work among the Hottentots on the Zonderend River to the east of Stellenbosch. For five years he taught the natives religion and industry, 'setting them the example, and working at their side in the gardens and fields¹,' but offence was given when he administered the rite of baptism, and he found himself regarded as an interloper and a heretic. Early in 1744 he sailed for Europe, hoping to return with full authority from Amsterdam, but the representations made on his behalf were made in vain, and South Africa saw him no more. It was the old story of monopoly. His was not the Company's form of worship. His ministry was not duly authorised. It was much the same all the world over. The missionary was a little in front of his time.

Nearly fifty years passed before any other Moravian Brethren went out to the Cape. At length permission was obtained from the directors of the East India Company to take up again the work which Schmidt had begun, and at the end of 1792 three missionaries arrived in South Africa, duly authorised to convert the heathen, and to administer the Sacraments. They made their way to the spot where Schmidt had laboured, and found that his name and his teaching were not yet wholly forgotten. The Hottentots gathered round them; a village grew up, outnumbering any settlement in the colony except Capetown; and in spite of some jealousy and friction the mission prospered, respected

¹ From the very interesting Brief Sketch of the Origin, Progress, and Present State of the Missions of the United Brethren in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, by Mr. H. P. Hallbeck, given on pages 23-7 of a Parliamentary paper of 1835, Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, Part I. A description of the Moravian settlements at Genadendal and Groenekloof is given in A Journal of a Visit to South Africa, with some account of the Missionary Settlements of the United Brethren near the Cape of Good Hope, by the Rev. C. I. Latrobe, 2nd ed. 1821.

and protected by the governors, English and Dutch alike. The site of the station had been known as Baviaanskloof, 'the glen of apes'; on January 1, 1806, it was re-named Genadendal, 'the valley of grace.' Noting the good work which had been done at Genadendal, the Cape Government in 1807 offered the Moravians land for a new mission station at Groenekloof, about thirty miles to the north of Capetown; the invitation was accepted, and the new settlement was named Mamre. A few years later the brotherhood established themselves in the eastern districts of the colony, at Enon in Uitenhage; another station was Elim, not far from Cape Agulhas; and yet again, a Moravian missionary and his wife took charge of the government leper institution at Hemel en Aarde, in what is now the division of Caledon. It was almost exclusively among the Hottentots that the Moravians laboured in the early days of their missic. Like the Jesuits in America, they dealt with the natives under their charge as with children, and the Hottentots were no more than children in their want of steadiness and perseverance, in their incapacity to stand alone. Holding aloof from party strife, in no way interfering in politics, the brethren and their wives worked soberly and sensibly, supplementing religious by secular work, teaching the children to read, the women to sew, the men to build houses and till gardens, to use their heads and their hands. None could say of the Moravians that they did not know their own business, and few could say that they did not mind it.

The United Brethren were the precursors of other missionaries in South Africa. First among them in order of time, and foremost in importance, were the representatives of the London Missionary Society, whose connexion with the Cape Colony dates from 1799. The Wesleyans began their labours in South Africa in 1816, the Glasgow Missionary Society in 1821, and the Paris Evangelical

Genadendal.

Other Protestant missions in South Africa.

PART I.

—♦— Society in 1829. Widely spread were these and other mission agencies, both within and beyond the colony the agents worked. In Kaffraria were Wesleyan and Glasgow mission stations. Basutoland was the principal sphere of the French missionaries. But no one tribe and no one district was assigned to or monopolised by any particular society. There was, in a word, a great outburst of Protestant mission energy in the first half of the present century, and the full force of the movement was felt through the length and breadth of South Africa.

*The
London
Missionary
Society.*

In November, 1894, the London Missionary Society celebrated its centenary. One hundred years before, on November 4, 1794, its founders held their first preliminary meeting in the City of London, at Baker's Coffee House in Change Alley. In the following year the society was duly constituted, its one object being to preach the Gospel to the heathen. The basis of the society was, and still is, wholly unsectarian. Churchmen and Protestant Nonconformists of all persuasions supported it; and, though London was its birthplace, various nationalities contributed missionaries to its ranks. The first head of the mission in South Africa was Dr. Vanderkemp, a Dutchman who had studied at Edinburgh University, and among his coadjutors and successors were other Dutchmen, Germans, English, and above all Scotchmen. A mission ship left for the South Sea islands in 1796, and in 1798 Dr. Vanderkemp and three other missionaries left for South Africa, landing at the Cape in March, 1799. Two of them went to the Kaffir country, and two went north to form a station among the Bushmen on the Zak River. After dwelling for a year and a half among the Kaffirs, Dr. Vanderkemp returned into the colony, and in 1803 was given by the government a grant of land for mission purposes not far from the shores of Algoa Bay, near the site of the present town of Port Elizabeth. Here he founded a station for the benefit of the Hottentots,

and named it Bethelsdorp. Bethelsdorp was the first of many missionary centres formed by the London society. Among them were Pacaltsdorp near Mossel Bay, Theopolis in the eastern borderland of the Zuurveld, Pella on the Orange River, Griquatown, and, farther yet to the north, Kuruman in the country of the Bechuanas. Hottentots, Kaffirs, Bushmen, Bastards, all came within the scope of missionary influence; a new spirit was abroad in the land; a new strain entered into South African history. The Gospel was preached by determined men, and the preachers directly or indirectly worked something like a revolution.

How bitter was the feeling between the colonists and the missionaries is recorded and illustrated in many pages of many books. The missionaries asserted that the colonists treated the natives with inhumanity; the colonists maintained that they were libelled. It would serve no useful purpose to gather up the mud which was thrown on either side, to examine the charges and countercharges, to try to assign just praise and blame. The bitterness is in the past and may rest there; and, where opposing advocates have been strong, it may be safely assumed that the truth lies between the two extremes.


There has never been a time in any land, when white men settled in frontier districts, side by side and face to face with savages, without becoming hardened in the process. It is absurd to suppose that colonists, alone among men, pass their lives untouched by what surrounds them, that the European in the backwoods remains year after year the same in thought and feeling as the European at home. When, even at the present day, young men emigrate to some land beyond or on the fringe of civilisation, they go out, as the phrase is, prepared to rough it. They go out, as a rule, because they are readier with their hands than with their heads, because study is less to their taste than adventure, because the freedom of a wild life is to them more attractive

Ch. 17.

Bethelsdorp.

Kuruman.

*Bad feeling between the missionaries and the colonists.**The colonists.*

PART I.  than the refinements and restraints of European society. It is no reproach, it is but common sense to assume that the pioneers of settlement who go beyond the seas are of somewhat rougher fibre than those who stay at home; and when men's lives are lived in the wilds, they cannot always be lived up to the most advanced standard of the most civilised people. Moreover, in the country districts of the Cape Colony, nature and man combined to isolate the Dutch farmers. They were left to protect themselves. They dwelt among slaves and Hottentots; and their neighbours were Bushmen and Kaffirs. The life of the great world flowed on in ever fuller stream, rooting up old and worn-out views, sweeping into the sea of time the debris of the past. It brought from above new soil to overlay the old, and carried into new channels the moving thoughts of men. But the Cape colonists lived on a backwater untouched by the tide; or, if the tide flowed in, as occasionally it did, it but ruffled the surface, and left no freshening under-current to circulate below. There had been no constant incoming of settlers from Europe, no perpetual contact with men from more civilised and more progressive parts of the world. Many of the farmers met each other only at intervals; or, if they met from day to day, it was always a meeting of the same men with the same unchanging modes of thought. The human beings, other than their wives and children, with whom they had most to do, were obviously lower than themselves. Is it conceivable that, under these conditions, men of a very conservative type, in an age when slavery was recognised, should all of them have preserved a lively sense of humanity, that their instincts should not have become dull, that their mental and moral vision should not have been to some extent blurred and overcast?

*The
mission-
aries.*

Among them came the missionaries, stirring and zealous. Their message was more to black men than to white. They came to preach the Gospel of liberty, to proclaim the brotherhood of men. Those who see one object very clearly and

very strongly, inevitably overlook others. The perspective of enthusiasts, especially religious enthusiasts, is usually at fault. They are not all discriminating or discreet. They are inclined to exaggerate, to magnify, and to multiply, to father on a class or a community the occasional wrong-doing of individual men. They are advocates, and being human have the failings of advocates, they emphasise their own case, and are at pains to make it striking and picturesque, leaving to their opponents to state the points of defence. It would be unreasonable to accept without reserve all the charges made by missionaries; for, however good the accusers may be, they are, after all, not angels but men.

Every movement which takes place in the world must disturb somebody or something, and the missionary movement in South Africa caused great disturbance. What were the causes which gave it so much strength? and what were its effects upon South African history?

The Protestant missionaries who, at the end of the last and in the earlier years of the present century, went out to the colonies or to foreign lands were strongly backed at home. It was not merely that they had many friends and admirers in England and elsewhere who sympathised with their aims and with their work, but the work itself represented and embodied a great and growing force not confined to one sect or class or to a single people. There was a deepening conviction that Protestant Christians had been too much engaged in fighting popery at home or in disputing among themselves, and that they had neglected the bounden duty of Christians, to spread abroad the Gospel of Christ. Protestants felt that they had gained and received much, and asked themselves what they had given in return. The answer left them dissatisfied. They began to look out over the fields which lay beyond their shores. Little had been done, they were bound to confess, the harvest was ready but the labourers were few. They combined to found 'the

CH. IV.

*Causes of
the strength
of the
missionary
movement.*

*Religious
revival in
Protestant
Europe.*

PART I. missionary society usually called the London Missionary Society; they laid down that its 'sole object is to spread the knowledge of Christ among heathen and other unenlightened nations¹,' and soon each denomination in turn sent out its own band of missionaries, and gave men and money without stint to carry light and life into the dark places of the world

The growth of philanthropy.

Hand in hand with the purely religious feeling, and inspired by it, went secular philanthropy. What had colonisation, what at least had British colonisation hitherto meant? It had meant finding new homes over the seas for political and religious refugees. It had meant annexing new provinces to an empire. It had meant taking the lands of the heathen, carrying off their produce, enslaving their inhabitants. War, commerce, slavery, all came with colonisation, but where was justice and where was humanity? Why was Europe always to take and never to give? What was the law under which white men were always to make profit out of black? Europeans, and Englishmen in particular, began to awake like men out of sleep. They began to sicken of a world in which, as in a cock-pit, rival races and religions had torn each other to pieces. They reasoned of righteousness and of judgement, they convinced one another and slowly persuaded their rulers. A moral law was proclaimed and upheld, over and above material interests. The slave trade was attacked and fell, slavery in time was abolished too, war became less fashionable than it had been, and annexation was considered matter for apology.

The missions to the heathen were the outcome of this new spirit, and the missionaries were the vanguard in the onward march of philanthropy. They gave and received the first blows in the foreign campaign. Bold and active themselves, they were strengthened by the knowledge that

¹ From the Plan and Constitution of the London Missionary Society.

there was a powerful and organised force behind them. In South Africa, moreover, they must have found many supporters for the kind of Christianity which they preached was the same kind which was already planted in the land. It was not a case of Roman Catholics coming among Protestants, or of High Churchmen trying to undermine Evangelical teaching. The antagonism which arose was not a religious antagonism, the grounds of dispute had little to do with forms or creeds. Bible Christians were the missionaries, Bible Christians were the colonists. The religious tenets of the two parties, if not always the same, were always closely allied, and moderate men on either side had therefore much in common.

It is impossible to read accounts by and of the African missionaries, without being struck with the intensity of their religious convictions. They went out from home and took with them the Bible, the Book which had wrought deliverance for England and the Netherlands, which the Reformation had given straight back, as from God Himself, to the hearts and the hands of men. They read their own lives into its pages, they translated their African experiences into its words. A little mission-church, with a cluster of native huts around it, was to them a veritable Bethel, and any small addition to a band of converts made them see in their mind's eye rivers run in the wilderness and the desert rejoice and blossom as the rose. Such men counted not their lives dear to themselves; some of them, as was inevitable, courted unpopularity as being a test of truth. Vanderkemp, the first of the London missionaries, would seem on the showing of his own friends to have been eccentric and impracticable, and Dr. Philip, at a later date the most determined champion of native rights, was at no pains to conciliate opposition or to disarm prejudice. But such men were the exceptions, and the large majority of the missionaries were practical and sensible as well as religious men.

CH. IV

—♦—
Puritanism in South Africa.

Missionary enthusiasm.

Their practical ability.

PART I.

—♦—
*Description by a
 contemporary of
 the colonists
 and of the
 missionaries.*

A book published in London in 1827, and entitled *Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa*, gives a fair and unbiassed account of colonists and missionaries alike, by one who was himself neither a colonist nor a missionary. The writer, George Thompson, lived for eight years in South Africa, and in the years 1821 to 1824 travelled through almost every part of the country, as far as it was then known. 'After having visited every district of the colony,' he writes, 'and mingled familiarly with all classes of the population, and with the rudest and remotest of the back settlers, I do not hesitate to characterise them generally as a shrewd, prudent, persevering, good-humoured, hospitable, and respectable class of men. . . . I am satisfied that there is a great deal of hearty kindness and substantial worth in the character of the Cape Dutch colonists. Notwithstanding the evil influence of slavery, and of their rancorous hostilities with the Bushmen and Caffres, they are not generally a depraved or inhuman race of men;' and again, in the same chapter¹, 'the very rudest class of the Cape Boers seem to be in many respects superior to the half-savage back settlers in almost every quarter of the Spanish or Anglo-American colonies.' Equally fair and friendly is his testimony to the missionaries and their work. He notes that 'the missionaries labouring among the tribes of the interior are generally persons of limited education, most of them having originally been common mechanics,' but he adds that they were none the less on that account fitted for their special calling, being most of them 'men of good plain understanding and industrious habits.' 'At every missionary station, I have visited,' he continues, 'instruction in the arts of civilised life and in the knowledge of pure and practical religion go hand in hand.' The missionaries 'have without question been in this country not only the devoted teachers

¹ Part III. chap. i.

of our holy religion to the heathen tribes, but also the indefatigable pioneers of discovery and civilisation¹.

CH. IV.



It has been noted above that a large proportion of the missionaries, who were sent out by the London Missionary Society, were Scotchmen, and also that a purely Scotch society—the Glasgow Missionary Society—early took up mission work in South Africa. The annals of the dark continent are rich with Scotch names. From Mungo Park who lost his life on the Niger to Gordon who fell at Khartoum, one Scotchman after another has given himself to Africa. Among travellers, Bruce of Abyssinian fame, Park, Clapperton and Laing, Moffat and Livingstone, Grant and Cameron were all of Scotch descent. It was a Scotchman, Macgregor Laird, who half a century ago organised and promoted British trade on the Niger. It was a Scotchman, Sir William Mackinnon, who a few years back founded the Imperial British East Africa Company, and carried British influence to the headwaters of the Nile. The first British commandant of the Cape was General Craig, his successor in command of the forces was General Dundas, The second and final expedition against the colony was led by Sir David Baird. All three were Scotchmen. In the long list of Scotch missionaries to South and Central Africa Moffat and Livingstone are the best-known names; but Campbell, Read, Philip, Hamilton, Hepburn, and many more, came from the north of the Tweed. There is no doubt that the strength of the missionary movement was in great measure due to the infusion of Scotch blood and to the effects of Scotch training. We trace to this source enterprise and tenacity, endurance and shrewdness, capacity for hard practical work, zeal in controversy. Difficulties, whether physical, social, or intellectual, have always acted as a stimulus to the northern character, and the qualities which

*Scotchmen
in Africa.*

¹ Part II. chap. viii.

PART I. are inherent in Scotchmen were tested and strengthened by the trials and dangers of missionary enterprise. Men of this type put their hands to the plough and looked not back. Strong in themselves and in their religious convictions, warmly supported at home, not without support in the colony, they did a work, the results of which have been beyond question great, though how far the good was mixed with ill is difficult to determine.

*Results of
missionary
enterprise.
Trekking
of the
Boers.*

To the missionaries and their influence has been attributed the trekking or emigration which took place among the Dutch Boers, principally between the years 1834 and 1854, and which resulted in the formation of independent European communities outside the limits of the Cape Colony. The farmers, it is contended, emigrated because they were maligned and ill-treated in their old homes, because the government, under which they had lived, inspired by missionary prejudice, dealt with them unjustly and inflicted upon them unmerited hardship. 'We complain,' wrote one of their leaders, Pieter Retief, in January, 1837, 'of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons, under the name of religion, whose testimony is believed in England to the exclusion of all evidence in our favour¹;' and the farmers who went out with him from the colony, and established themselves at Winburg in what is now the Orange Free State, bound themselves by an oath to have no dealings with the London Missionary Society².

Trekking, it must be remembered, was no new feature in South African history. Under the Dutch Company's rule the aggrieved farmer moved off into the wilds, and in the last days of that rule the Graaf Reinet settlers, like the emigrants to the Orange River Territory and the Transvaal in later

¹ Quoted by Mr. Theal in his *History of South Africa*, 1834-54, p. 90.

² The ' as above, p. III.

years, openly declared their independence. Under the Company, however, there was no instance of wholesale emigration from one part of South Africa to another. The trekkers were simply roving graziers, moving occasionally from place to place; and their wanderings rarely took them outside the nominal limits of the Cape Colony. Moreover, when the Graaf Reinet settlers combined to cast off their allegiance to the company, they still professed loyalty to the Dutch nation. It was otherwise with the farmers who seventy or eighty years ago emigrated to Natal, beyond the Orange River, or beyond the Vaal. They went out in organised parties, numbering several thousands in all. They went out avowedly with the view of leaving the Cape Colony for ever, with the intention of no longer being subject in any way whatever either to the colonial authorities or to the Government of Great Britain. They emigrated in order to form republics, in order to become absolutely separate communities. Still it may be doubted whether there ever would have been so great an exodus, if the scene had not been laid in South Africa, and if the actors had not been South African Boers. South Africa was a land, of all others, where men could hope, if so they wished, to live apart from each other. The area was boundless and communication was difficult. At the same time the trials and dangers involved in moving, if great, were at least familiar. The conditions of one district were as a rule not very unlike those of another. It was not a question of going over the sea. It was not in most cases a matter of entering upon a new mode of life. Emigration implied uprooting, no doubt, and a great uprooting for those whose homes had been in the best-settled parts of the colony. But the process of moving on in a waggon, with all its trials and discomforts, was, after all, a well-known process in South Africa. Thus, for evils which were thought to be intolerable, there was in a sense a remedy ready to hand.

PART I.

Nor would perhaps the grievances which led to the Boer emigration have been so deeply felt, and so keenly resented, but for the teaching of past history in the Cape Colony and the evil influence of former misrule upon the Boer character. The traditions of government in South Africa were bad traditions. The colonists never learnt to trust their rulers, but inherited from their fathers and their forefathers suspicion of authority. Government to them meant irritating interference, and laws seemed to be restrictions ignorantly imposed from outside rather than the intelligent expression of the will of the community. Colonists of different temper might have held their ground and waited for better times to come; but, remembering and moulded by the past, the Cape Dutch felt that the cup of bitterness was full, and went out from the colony as from a land of bondage.

How far were the Boer treks the result of the missionary movement?

How far should the missionaries, and what they said and did, be held responsible for the emigration? and how far was the emigration an evil to South Africa? To the first of these two questions the answer seems to be, that missionary influence can only be held partly responsible for the events which took place. The missionaries were, as has been pointed out, but the representatives and exponents of progressive public opinion in England and in Northern Europe. They were the men on the spot, but the force behind them was the spirit of the time in the civilised world. Europe had moved further and was moving faster than South Africa, and the European nation which had charge of the Cape Colony was busily engaged in pouring new wine into old bottles. The movement was inevitable. In itself it was sound and healthy. To abolish slavery, to recognise native rights and redress native wrongs, are worthy objects, but good work may be hurried on and clumsily executed. Englishmen are apt to see men and things from a purely English point of view, and make mistakes in consequence. Their own ideas, their own

institutions, at any given time, they imagine to be good for all places and for all times. They overlook differences of race and local peculiarities. They make mistakes, too, because, being of all men least state-ridden themselves, they have a tendency to prefer unofficial and irresponsible evidence and advice to the guidance of officers appointed by the government. Thus they dealt with South African problems as though South Africa had been England and the Dutch Boers Englishmen, and occasionally they gave more heed to the representations of missionaries and philanthropists than to the despatches of governors. The missionaries bore witness, the philanthropists pleaded for the natives. Their advocacy was powerful and gained credence; but the main responsibility for all that followed lay not on them but on the people and the government who decided and who carried the decision into effect.

Was the net result of the Boer emigration a loss or a gain? Did it hinder or promote the European colonisation of South Africa? It widened greatly the area of colonisation. It carried European settlement and European influence far inland. It led to the founding of new colonies, to the occupation of fresh territories. On the other hand, it took away from the Cape Colony, already scantily peopled, a large proportion and a valuable element of its population. The Cape had never been properly colonised. It had always wanted more settlers; and its weakness had been due to the paucity and the dispersion of its European inhabitants. The colony was now further weakened, and the development of its resources was retarded by the loss of a large number of experienced colonists. It is possible that the Boer treks may have accelerated the rate at which South Africa was colonised, but they certainly made the colonisation less thorough, and created new difficulties before those which already existed had been fully mastered. The area of disturbance was enlarged as much as the area of settlement.

CH. IV.



Were the results of the Boer treks good or evil?

Spread of colonisation.

Dispersion of the colonists.

PART I. Fresh complications arose with native races. Much was subsequently undone, because it had been badly or imperfectly done; and, instead of slow and steady consolidation, a centrifugal force was set in motion which could not be laid to rest. Instead of being united and held together, South Africa was needlessly broken up; war came where there should have been peace; and distance in space increased diversity of feeling.

*Ill-feeling
which led
to and
resulted
from the
Boer emi-
gration.*

The emigration was in itself probably an evil, but a far greater evil was the sentiment which was at once its cause and its effect. Whatever benefits accrued to the Cape Colony from the substitution of British for Dutch rule, the colonists were, after all, most of them Dutchmen, warmly attached to their own nation and their old traditions. It was no easy task for them to transfer their allegiance; and only time and gentle handling could reconcile them to the change. Before they could be fully reconciled, the events took place which led to the Boer treks, and among the emigrant farmers the antipathy of race was aroused as it had not been aroused before. They went out as Dutchmen, as Dutchmen they held together in isolation; and, instead of a wholesome admixture of races, there came into being an animosity between Dutch and English which has worked mischief down to the present day. Nor was this all. The same train of circumstances led to bad feeling between the colony and the mother country, not bounded entirely by the lines of race. English settlers, as well as Dutch, resented the policy of the Imperial Government as laid down by Lord Glenelg¹. Whatever charges were brought against the colonists in their dealings with the natives irritated British residents in the Cape Colony as well as those of Dutch descent. The time for self-government had not yet come; but from the day when the Colonial Secretary at home, in

¹ An account of Lord Glenelg, his policy and despatches, is given in the next chapter. pp. 159-63.

high-handed in high-minded fashion, reversed the acts of the Governor and crowded the convictions of the colonists, there grew up a body of feeling in South Africa not unreasonably antagonistic to Imperial control.

These were some of the harmful results which have been traced, rightly or wrongly, to the missionary movement. But there is very much to be said on the other side. If blame must be imputed to the missionaries, it must not be set down to all of them, nor even to the majority, but only to the few who spoke and wrote while many more worked in silence. And of them all it may and should be said that, over and above their religious teaching, they wrought in many respects untold good. In plain words they awakened South Africa, and they advertised South Africa. At the present day, when among the great provinces of the British Empire South Africa attracts conspicuous public attention, when events move faster there than in most parts of the world, it is difficult to realise a time not so very long ago when the Cape Colony was little known and less valued, when its sole interest in English eyes consisted in its long-standing connexion with the East. As a sphere of European settlement it had slumbered and slept, with a dull heavy sleepiness which blighted the land. It was well, men thought, that England should own it, but not for its intrinsic worth, only because it was on the way to the East. Who were the Cape colonists? A handful of Dutchmen. Who were the Hottentots and Kaffirs? Black savages, degraded or dangerous, interesting it might be to students, as being specimens of the human race, but not to be taken into account in practical politics. The preachers from Europe changed all this. In Africa and in Europe they opened men's eyes. They stirred up the lethargic, if only by rousing the spirit of resistance; they changed indifference into curiosity; they made the heedless and the ignorant care and know. If they created difficulties, they created also the

The missionaries attracted attention to South Africa.

PART I. spirit which rmounts them. If they infused bitterness, as their enemies said, it was at least the pain and the bitterness of living, better than the pleasant torpor of unending sleep. In a few years after the first missionaries appeared upon the scene, there was more vitality in South Africa, and more knowledge about South Africa, than in all the years which had gone before.

The missionaries were the pioneers of discovery.

To these same men was due the progress of discovery. The missionaries were explorers, constantly pushing on to the north, constantly entering new lands and establishing relations with new tribes. They were the pioneers on the present trade route to the Zambesi, through the land of the Bechuanas, to whom they ministered; they began the movement by which the history of the Cape Colony widened into that of South Africa; and eventually the missionary traveller, David Livingstone, passed on into Central Africa, and linked the story of the southern peninsula to the record of an opening continent. To use a now well-known term, the expansion of the Cape Colony and the expansion of South Africa, or of European civilisation in South Africa, was in great measure the work of the missionaries.

They taught white and black men to live together.

But they did not discover merely. They settled, lived, and worked among the natives. Religion and philanthropy inspired them to do so, and it was not at the time seen, as clearly as it can be seen now, how important, politically, was the work which they began. South Africa had long been, and was to be in the future to a far greater extent, an European dwelling-place, but it still remained and always will remain a home for black men also. In North America, in Australia, the race difficulty has been solved by the substitution of white settlers for coloured aborigines; but in South Africa there was and is no question of extinction of natives. The problem then was, the problem still is, to teach white men and black to live side by side in harmony and peace, and this problem the missionaries half unconsciously set

themselves to solve. There were natives inside the colony and natives beyond its borders. The majority of the former were in a state of dependence, the latter it was the constant aim of the government to prevent from entering the colony and from having any intercourse with the colonists. In neither case had a permanent solution of the native question been found. Any system of apprenticeship, of service by contract, if applied to a particular race, was certain, like slavery undisguised, to break down in time, and it was obviously useless to tell white men to remain on one side of a river and black men on the other. The missionaries worked on wholly different principles. They looked to real as well as nominal freedom, to equality and citizenship, for the Cape Hottentots; they promoted friendly coming and going, and living among the Kaffirs. Their views and their dealings may have been in some cases premature, but they were at least the views and the dealings of the coming time.

Once more, missionary enterprise ennobled South African history by contributing to it an element of the picturesque, a spice of chivalry and romance. That history had hitherto been somewhat uninspiring and uneventful; few names of note were connected with it; few bright or stirring episodes enlivened its pages. Happy, it is said, are the people that have no history; they may be happy, but they do little work for the world; they leave it much as they find it, no better and no worse. Greatness and nobility come with struggle and endurance, and it is only through much tribulation that communities of men and women, like the individual men and women themselves, enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. The courage and the self-sacrifice of the missionaries were evident to all, and those qualities became associated with the land of their labours. Africa became attractive as a scene of adventure, where among wild beasts and wild men noble lives were lived and sometimes lost. Here, as the world was growing older, there was something to seek and something

They brought an element of romance into South African history.

PART I. to find, something which savoured of the days when to
 ———— awakening Europe the lands beyond the seas seemed bright
 and young. Names to be revered in England were made in
 Africa and by Africa. The record of a man like Moffat will
 not lightly be forgotten ; and schoolboys turn from old-
 world romance to the heroism of later days, and dream to
 mould their lives on that of Livingstone.

*British
 immigration
 and
 the Albany
 settlement.*

While missionary work in South Africa was still in its
 infancy, and before the full effects of the movement had been
 felt and known, a large body of British immigrants was
 introduced into the Cape Colony. Philanthropy, which had
 given birth to the mission agencies, was responsible also, at
 any rate indirectly, for this immigration. Long years of
 war had at length come to an end, and in England a time
 of reaction followed, of distress and want of employment.
 Emigration was then, as often before and often afterwards,
 suggested to relieve the unemployed. The Cape was known
 to be in want of colonists, and, being a new acquisition, its
 merits as a field for settlement were extolled, while its dis-
 advantages were minimised or unknown. The Colonial
 Government had a special object for wishing to secure
 a reasonable number of suitable emigrants, as it was emi-
 nently desirable to fill up with Europeans the frontier districts
 on the East, in order to provide a permanent living barrier
 against the incursions of the Kaffir tribes. Artisans were
 at the time in question in great demand at the Cape. In
 1817 some two hundred Scotch mechanics, who were
 brought into the colony by Mr. Benjamin Moodie, under
 terms of three years' apprenticeship, were easily disposed of,
 with profit at once to the contractor and to themselves ; and
 at the same time several hundred soldiers and sailors took
 their discharges in South Africa, and had no difficulty in
 finding employment. Accordingly the Imperial Government
 determined to encourage emigration to the Cape, and thereby
 at once to relieve the labour market at home, and by an

*Demand
 for Euro-
 pean
 artisans at
 the Cape.*

infusion of British blood to strengthen their hold upon their lately acquired dependency. In 1819, Mr. Vansittart, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to the House of Commons that a sum of £50,000 should be voted for the purpose; the proposal was supported by Mr. Hume, and adopted with little criticism; and in 1820 a large number of emigrants arrived in South Africa. Colonisation, rather than emigration pure and simple, was the object of the scheme. In other words, the government wished not so much to send out to the Cape a number of isolated individuals who should on landing be left to their own devices, as to despatch, in charge of responsible directors, parties of men or of families who should be associated together on the voyage and be located together after arrival. The sum voted by Parliament was intended to defray the cost of passage; free grants of land were to be made at the rate of 100 acres for each head of a family, titles to which were to be issued after three years' occupation; and deposits at the rate of £10 per head were required on behalf of each adult male before leaving England, which sums were to be refunded after the emigrants had reached South Africa, one third on landing, one third on taking up their holdings, and the balance three months afterwards.

Schemes of colonisation rarely, if ever, succeed on the exact lines which are laid down beforehand. They imply settlement in a new country, and therefore settlement under conditions which cannot all be foreseen. It is hopeless to attempt to fix emigrants on certain spots, to map out for them their mode of life, to forecast what they will earn, to determine what they shall pay or repay. The unexpected happens; a township springs up in another district; a mine is discovered; a rich harvest elsewhere in the same colony, or beyond the borders in a neighbouring country, attracts the new comers away from the sites of their intended homes; numberless are the causes which undermine a preconceived plan, however well thought out and elaborated in detail.

CH. IV.

Terms on
which the
Albany
settlers
were sent
out.

Defects of
the scheme.

PART I. Mistakes too are often made in the selection of emigrants, and in the terms upon which they are selected. It is, in a word, absolutely impossible to take a body of men from one country to another, and set them out like so many plants, in well ordered rows, at equal distances from one another. What usually happens is that the original scheme breaks down, but the colony, or the territory of which the colony forms a part, keeps all or most of the settlers. They live in the land, but they live where and as they please. The work of colonisation is carried out, but not in the way which had been intended.

The number of British settlers who landed in South Africa in 1820 and 1821 was nearly 5,000—too many for the Cape Colony to absorb healthily at one and the same time. There were Scotchmen among them, and Irish, and a few Welsh, but the majority were English. The Irish emigrants, or most of them, were landed at Saldanha Bay, and located near Clanwilliam, in what was then the Tulbagh district. This settlement proved a complete failure. The others, not far short of 4,000 in number, were carried on by sea from Capetown to Algoa Bay, and thence transported 100 miles inland to the Zuurveld, which had been in 1814 renamed Albany, and where the village of Bathurst, called after the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was now laid out to be the centre of the new colony.

The settlers were of various callings, and little forethought had been shown in their selection. It happened then, as it usually happens, that the people whom the old country could spare were in great measure not the people whom the new country needed. There were men among them who had capital; some were retired professional men, who brought their savings to invest in South African farms; others had had a commercial training; the largest number were mechanics. Few, if any, were skilled agriculturists, and knowledge of English farming after all gave little insight

into the conditions of agricultural or pastoral life in the Cape Colony. Difficulties at once arose. The cost of land transport, which the emigrants were intended to defray themselves, proved to be very heavy; and, though this expenditure was eventually met from public funds, little of the deposited money was returned to the depositors, as for a long time it was found necessary to supply them with rations of food, while they were engaged in a sore struggle for existence. There was squabbling and discontent among the settlers. The limit of 100 acres was far too low for a holding in a district like the Zuurveld—a pastoral rather than an agricultural district, where large sheep or cattle runs paid better than cultivation of the soil. The first three years were years of blight which killed the growing grain, and there followed a season of floods, washing away houses and soil. So great became the distress that a relief society was formed at Capetown, and large subscriptions were raised within and without the colony to meet the needs of the penniless and almost homeless settlers. In the end, a large number, especially of the mechanics, left their locations and moved off to Grahams-town, then a young and thriving centre, and to the other towns of the colony, in all of which wages were high and artisan labour was wanted. The remainder, who held their ground, saw the dawning of better days, and on enlarged holdings, with experience gained through suffering, made their way at last to comfort and content, and became in time prosperous citizens of the Cape Colony¹.

The years 1820 and 1821, when these British immigrants arrived, form a distinct land-mark in the history of the Cape. From this time onward there was a strong and growing British element in the population. Henceforward the colony

CH. I

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Misfortunes of the
settlers.

Political
results of
the Albany
settlement.

¹ Some account of the Albany settlement will be found in the State of the Cape of Good Hope in 1822, by a 'Civil servant' [London, 1823], and in George Thompson's Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa.

PART I. was no longer merely a Dutch and German community governed by English rulers, but a dependency belonging to Great Britain in virtue of settlement as well as by right of cession. The immigrants were placed in the Eastern districts, and those districts became and remain to this day the most English part of the colony. Always more or less cut off from the old Dutch station in the Cape peninsula and from its earlier off-shoots—a border-land, where a few white men lived from hand to mouth in the neighbourhood of savage tribes, these districts gradually became more or less self-centred, settled and civilised by incomers of British race. For a long time it was a question whether the Eastern province or provinces should not, for administrative purposes, be entirely separated from the Western, and be, like Natal, constituted a separate colony; and, though separation was never fully carried out, the difference was clearly marked between the older and Western settlements whose nucleus was Capetown, and the younger settlements in the East whose outlet was Port Elizabeth on Algoa Bay. It was like the difference between Upper and Lower Canada, the English speaking province of Ontario and the older French province of Quebec; but happily the distinction never developed into such strong antagonism as for a while embittered the history of Canada. After all, the Dutch and English settlers were near akin in race; they were practically one in religion; their traditions were traditions of rivalry, but of rivalry between members of the same family; they lived in and out among one another on their farms and homesteads; and Capetown, the one town of any size in the colony, was a meeting place for all sorts and conditions of men. Any ill-feeling which grew up in after years within the colony was not due to the presence of English colonists among the Dutch. It was due to the fact that European views, the views of the rulers, did not always harmonise with South African views, the views of the ruled.

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*The
 Eastern
 province
 became an
 English
 colony.*

The weak point of the Cape Colony was the paucity of its European population. This weakness the introduction of 5,000 British settlers, the forerunners of many more, did much to remedy; and the fact that they were placed mainly in the Eastern districts, away from Capetown, was important in at least two respects. In the first place it was a long step forward in the direction of colonial expansion, in the great though gradual movement by which the Cape peninsula was being merged in the Cape Colony, and the Cape Colony widening into South Africa. As the emigrant ships moved on from Capetown to Algoa Bay, moving still east, they yet seemed to be carrying away the vestiges of the time when there was nothing but the trading station and the port of call, they seemed to be bringing life and light along the southern coast of Africa, into its bays and estuaries, as the missionaries were carrying life and light into the interior. Colonisation was beginning as it had hardly begun before, and men began to realise that South Africa was more than the Cape. In the second place the scene of the Albany settlement was on the border of the Kaffir country, and therefore the British settlers were directly confronted with the Kaffirs. It was the most practical way that could have been devised of making the English for good or ill take over the difficulties with which the Dutch had had to contend. Thenceforward the native question was one in which Englishmen were interested, not as a matter of state policy merely, but as affecting English homes and English lives. Thenceforward it could not be fairly said that an alien government legislated and regulated for colonists of another race, who alone felt the burden of the laws and the regulations: the strain came on Englishmen as well as on Dutch, both were exposed to the same dangers and to much the same criticisms, their difficulties were one and the same, they shared a common resentment, and community of feeling and interest tended to some extent to obliterate distinctions of race.

CH. IV.

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The Albany settlement greatly strengthened the European population in the Cape Colony.

PART I.

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*Slavery
 prohibited
 in the
 Albany
 district.*

Slavery was still in force in the Cape Colony when the British immigrants arrived, but free labour was made the rule in the Albany settlement. Here too was a step in the right direction, the undoing not merely of a moral wrong but of a great economic mistake. A land, where British workmen could and would work, was sure to become a land of freedom. Forced labour was doomed as soon as free labour from a free country came pouring in. And with the freedom came the sense of responsibility, and the jealous spirit of independence, not resenting that there should be law and government, but gradually insisting that the law should be home-made and that the government should reflect the wishes of the governed. Half a century was yet to pass before the Cape became in the fullest sense a self-governing colony, but the seeds of self-government were sown, when a strong body of Englishmen came out, trained, as Dutchmen never had been trained, to value representative institutions, law abiding because law to Englishmen meant liberty, carrying into South Africa the spirit and the traditions which had moved and are still moving the world¹.

*Beginning
 of modern
 history in
 South
 Africa.*

The modern history of South Africa dates from the time when the Cape Colony was taken under the protection of Great Britain. A new era then began: the colony entered on a new life, with a future opening out before it greater and stronger than had been its past. Of the causes or events which influenced the coming age, which regenerated and revolutionised an old-world settlement, the most important

¹ 'The introduction, however, of the English settlers, and the right of free discussion which they have claimed and exercised, together with the bold defiance they have given to the suspicions entertained of their disloyalty and disaffection to the government, have had the effect of exciting in the Dutch and native population a spirit of vigilance and attention that never existed before, to the acts of the government, and which may render all future exertion of authority objectionable that is not founded upon the law.' From the Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry upon the Administration of the government at the Cape of Good Hope, dated September 1826. Printed for the House of Commons in 1827.

were those to which the present chapter has been devoted, the missionary movement and the introduction of British immigrants; and therefore they have been noticed first, not strictly in order of time. There is rarely, if ever, a sudden break with the past. Men live their lives in continuity from day to day and from year to year. But we can trace landmarks in the stories of communities, standing out more distinctly after the lapse of time; and forces or occurrences, not necessarily in themselves very great or very noticeable, are found under special conditions to have coloured a history and to have changed a people.



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CHAPTER V.

THE KAFFIR WARS.

PART I.

FOR some years, from 1806 onward, the government of the Cape Colony was a pure despotism. All the legislative and executive power was vested in the Governor. The Burgher Senate, it is true, remained in existence at Capetown charged with municipal duties, some of them, as for instance the regulation of prices, by no means unimportant; and the districts still retained their Landdroos's and Heemraden; but even in judicial matters the Governor was supreme, responsible for his actions to the British Government alone.

Constitutional changes.

In 1825 this system was slightly modified. A council of Advice was then appointed, answering to the Executive Council of an ordinary Crown colony at the present day. It consisted of six members, all civil or military officers of the government, and to it were submitted in the first instance any ordinances which the Governor proposed to enact and any proclamations which he intended to publish. He was required to consult his council on such matters, but he was not bound to take the advice offered to him, if he saw good reason to the contrary. Three years later, in 1828, two colonists were nominated to the council in place of two of the officials. This council only lasted for a short time; for, on October 23, 1833, letters patent were issued, giving to the Cape a regular constitution as a Crown colony. An Executive Council was created, composed of four high officers of the government in addition to the Governor; and

a Legislative Council was added, consisting of the Governor and not less than ten nor more than twelve other members, five of whom were salaried officers holding their seats *ex officio*, while the others represented the unofficial element, being nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the Crown. Thus the colonists first began to have a voice in making the laws under which they lived.

More sweeping judicial reforms had already been carried out. Lord Caledon governed the colony from May 1807 till July 1811, and shortly before he laid down his office he issued a proclamation ordaining that Judges of the High Court should occasionally go on circuit through the country, trying important cases and supervising the local jurisdiction of the Landdrosts. It was a step in the right direction, a measure tending to secure expert and honest administration of justice; but in the main the judicial system of the colony was unchanged until the year 1827. In August of that year a new charter of justice was issued, taking effect from the following first of January. A Supreme Court was established consisting of a Chief Justice and three, afterwards two, puisne Judges, all appointed by the Crown and wholly independent of the Executive. The lower courts were at the same time remodelled, the Burgher Senate was swept away, the Landdrosts and Heemraden disappeared, and their place in the various districts was taken by Civil Commissioners and Resident Magistrates. English procedure was followed, and the English language became the language of the law-courts. It was beyond question a great reform. The Cape colonists gained the security, which Englishmen knew and valued, of law and justice clearly defined and fearlessly administered, uncontrolled by the will or caprice of the governor for the time being; yet it was a novelty, and therefore to some extent a disturbing element, and it involved the abolition of certain forms and institutions to which the colonists had been for many years accustomed. Most of all.

*Judicial
reforms.*

PART I. the substitution of the English language for the Dutch in all official and legal matters caused not unnaturally some irritation and alarm.

*The Cape
and the
East India
trade.*

Various Orders in Council and statutes were passed in Great Britain between the years 1806 and 1835, regulating or affecting the trade of the colony. Among them was the Imperial Act of December 17, 1813¹. By the third section of this Act the Cape of Good Hope was, as to the Indian trade but not for other purposes, deemed to be within the limits of the charter of the British East India Company. The colonists were thereby given for a while the privilege of unrestricted trade with the East Indies exclusive of China, provided that the merchandise was carried in British ships; and, though no great benefit appears to have resulted in consequence, the provision is historically interesting as an illustration that the Cape was still considered to be specially connected with the East and with the Chartered Company which held the East in fee.

*The Cape
and St.
Helena.*

The great war ended with the banishment of Napoleon to St. Helena. As long as his life lasted, that island was strongly garrisoned, and the supplies for the garrison came in great measure from the Cape. A temporary impetus was thus given to agriculture in the colony, and the farmers found a ready market for their grain, their stock, and their wine. Unfortunately for them the demand was not long lived, no longer than the life of the captive emperor. When he died, the St. Helena garrison was speedily reduced, and the colony which had fed them found one great source of profit at once cut off. A period of commercial depression at once followed, coinciding with unfavourable seasons, and the paper currency was so depreciated in value that at

¹ 54 Geo. III, cap. 34, sec. 3. The marginal note to the section runs as follows: 'Cape of Good Hope as to India trade deemed within Company's limits but not for other purposes.' This Act supplemented an Act passed in July of the same year continuing the charter of the East India Company [53 Geo. III, cap. 155].

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length in 1826 it was partially redeemed by the government, at 1s. 6d. to the rix dollar which was nominally worth four shillings.

CH. V.



In 1808 the total population of the colony was taken to be 74,000, and in 1815 over 83,000. In 1818 the total estimate was nearly 100,000. Of this number about 43,000 were free citizens in the ordinary sense, including 2,000 black men; the Hottentots numbered 23,000, and the slaves 32,000, while between 1,300 and 1,400 were returned as apprentices. In 1822, after the introduction of the Albany settlers, the population was in round numbers estimated to be not far short of 120,000.

Population returns.

During the first thirty years of British rule wine continued to be the principal export of the colony, the industry being greatly stimulated by a system of differential duties in England, which favoured Cape wine as against the wines of foreign countries. In 1831, however, the duties were modified; and, though still given some preference over foreign competitors, the Cape wine growers were unable to maintain their position, and the export fell off in consequence. Wool, on the other hand, about the same date became a growing article of trade: hides and skins were second only to wine in the list of exports; and the production of grain from 1831 onward showed for some years an increase.

Products.

With the foundation of the Albany settlement the Eastern division of the colony grew in importance, and a considerable proportion of the colonial produce was shipped from Port Elizabeth. In 1828 the colony was divided into the Western and Eastern provinces. Both were still subordinate to one and the same government, whose headquarters were at Cape-town, but the Eastern province was for a few years given a special officer, styled Commissioner-general, who was intended to exercise under the Governor more immediate and local control over the outlying districts on the eastern frontier, and especially to watch over the relations between

The districts of the colony.

PART I. the Kaffir tribes and the border colonists¹. The Eastern province contained the districts of Beaufort, Graaf Reinet, Somerset, Albany, Uitenhage, and George. Of these, the district of George, formed in 1811, included that part of the old division of Swellendam which lay to the east of the Gauritz River having Mossel Bay and the Knysna within its border. The district of Beaufort was created in 1811. Geographically the most central district in the colony, it comprised the eastern part of the old Tulbagh division and the western part of Graaf Reinet. On the extreme east of the colony were the two border districts of Somerset and Albany, the former dating from 1825 and including a portion of Graaf Reinet, together with some land ceded by the Kaffirs in 1819, the latter formed in 1820 and coinciding in the main with the Zuurveld². In the Western province were the districts of the Cape, Simonstown, Stellenbosch, Swellendam, and Worcester. The Simonstown district, including the southern half of the Cape peninsula, was, in virtue of the growing importance of Simons Bay and the town upon its shores, separated from the Cape district in 1814, but twenty years later was again re-annexed to the Cape. Worcester was the old Tulbagh division, renamed in 1822, and in 1824 deprived of the tract of land known as Piquetberg, which was added to the district of the Cape.

*Extension
of the
colony.*

On the north and north-east the limits of the colony were by the year 1824 considerably extended. The Beaufort district stretched far beyond the Zak River up to the Prinsberg: while, on the north-east, Pottenberg's beach was left behind, and the Orange River formed the boundary for many miles, from the Stormberg Spruit past the confluence of the Caledon, and again of the Zeekoe River, as far as

¹ The office of Commissioner-general for the Eastern province was abolished from January 1, 1834, but was revived in the form of a Lieutenant-governor from 1836 to 1841.

² The name Albany was given to the tract in 1814, but the tract in question was not created a separate district till 1820.

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24 20 degrees of east longitude. On the east, after the Kaffir war of 1818-19 the Colonial Government declared that the Kaffirama, instead of the Great Fish River, should in future be the boundary between the white and the Kaffir races.

The acquisition of the Cape gave to the British Govern-
ment a new dependency in which slavery was recognised by
the law. The law of slaves in the Cape Colony was, on
the one hand, less severe than in the other colonies, and on the other hand more out
of place than in the other colonies. It was not in
the Cape Colony, as in the West Indies and Mauritius,
the basis of the system of Orders in Council
and for the protection of slaves on the sugar plantations
were found. It was adapted to the very different conditions of
South Africa. The connexion of the Cape with the East
had much to do with the introduction of slavery,
many of the slaves, and the most valuable among them,
being Malays brought over from the Dutch islands in the
Eastern seas. In the year after the Cape was taken by
the English the Imperial Government passed the Act for the
abolition of the slave trade. The importation of slaves
ceased, and instead there came into the colony a large
number of free black men, rescued year by year from slave
ships and landed in South Africa. Though the slave market
was no longer recruited from beyond the seas, and though
emancipation was by no means uncommon, the slave popu-
lation of the colony still continued to increase—a proof, if
proof were needed, that humane treatment was the rule and
not the exception. In 1808 the number of slaves in the
colony was under 30,000, in 1818 it was 32,000, in 1822
33,000, in 1834, when slavery was abolished, 39,000. But,
in spite of this growth of numbers, there can be little doubt
that, even if there had been no pressure from outside,
slavery would in no long time have become extinct. As
the deathblow to the transportation system in the case of

*Slave
emancipa-
tion.*

PART I. Australia was given by the discovery of gold and the consequent influx of free English miners, so it is difficult to believe that slavery in British South Africa would have long survived the foundation of the Albany settlement, where slavery was forbidden and unknown, and the gradual leavening of the population by a strong admixture of European wage-earners. But the question was, rightly or wrongly, probably rightly, not left to settle itself. Wherever British rule held good, there it was ordained that slaves should be set free. The tentative measures which were passed restricting slavery, before the final Act of Emancipation took place, had the effect at the Cape, as elsewhere, of causing a considerable amount of friction which might perhaps have been avoided, and it may fairly be argued that too little attention was paid to local conditions, that slavery was assumed to be uniform all the world over, the same on the plantations of Jamaica as in the towns or on the farms at the Cape. But, whatever might have been done or left undone, so great a change could not possibly have been carried into effect, without causing much ill-feeling and some distress; and, looking back on history, it is impossible to regret that a decisive step was taken once for all, stamping out even in high-handed fashion and with mistakes in detail an evil with which no compromise could be wished. What mainly angered the Cape colonists was the inadequacy of the compensation which was awarded in their case. The value of the slaves on Dec. 1, 1834, when the Emancipation Act came into effect, was estimated by commissioners specially appointed for the purpose at three million sterling. The sum allotted by the Imperial Government was no more than one and a quarter million, payable, not in South Africa, but in London, and with a deduction of any expenses incurred in carrying out the work of emancipation. The result was to impoverish the former slave owners, and to awaken in them a bitter feeling of resentment against the government which had deprived them of their

*Inadequacy
of the com-
pensation
made to the
slave
owners.*

property, and against the philanthropists by whom the policy of emancipation had been inspired. Their bitterness and disappointment was not unreasonable. Wherever slave emancipation took place, the existing slave holders were to some extent punished for the sins of their fathers; and at the Cape there was the knowledge that the system had led to comparatively little abuse, justifying a hope that the terms of abolition would at least be fair and might be liberal.

It was sought to supplement the Emancipation Act by a local law against vagrancy, in order to ensure that the newly freed slaves should not wander at large through the colony and swell the number of the unemployed. An ordinance to that effect was actually passed by the colonial legislature, but, being represented as an attempt to revive slavery by compelling the coloured population to work, it was disallowed by the Imperial Government. Vagrancy was the normal condition of a large proportion of the Hottentots in the Cape Colony. They had ever been a race of wanderers, wandering, it is true, in earlier days, in parties or clans, but rarely, if ever, making a settled home. They were difficult to deal with for this reason, and, the more disorganised they became in course of years, the greater the difficulty became. In tracing out the relations between white men and black in South Africa, it is necessary always to bear in mind that the natives were themselves largely responsible for the misfortunes which befell them. The Kaffirs exterminated one another wholesale. The Hottentots suffered far more from their own shortcomings than from the force or policy of the European colonist. There was no system existing among the Hottentots which could be utilised to give them protection and strength. Their chieftains, when they had any, were leaders of banditti rather than heads of tribes. They had customs but not laws. Their normal condition was one of anarchy, not because they had been definitely broken up, but rather because they had never really learnt to rule and

*Vagrancy
in the Cape
Colony.*

*The
Hottentots.*

PART I.
—♦—

be ruled. Men often misinterpret history by talking and thinking of a collection of tribes as if it were a nation, but even the tribal unit hardly existed in the case of the Hottentots. They were simply a race, and a race which, as years went on, became less and less definite. Attempts were made to assign them locations and reserves, but the only effective settlements were under European guidance and missionary control. In the eye of the law they had always been a free people, but they were not members of the community in the same sense as the white men; they were not amenable, so far as their dealings with one another were concerned, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the colony; they paid no taxes; they were not citizens in the ordinary meaning of the word.

In 1809 a change was made in their position. Lord Caledon issued a proclamation laying down that every Hottentot in the colony should have a fixed place of abode, and that none should change their residence from one district to another, or move about the country, without written permission. In this way it was hoped to check their vagrant habits and attach them to the soil; they were treated henceforth as resident citizens subject to the ordinary law, and any remains of chieftains' authority or of tribal customs were finally swept away. Many Hottentots were in service to farmers, and in 1812 it was enacted that the children of such servants, if born while the period of service continued, should be themselves apprenticed for a term of years. It was an enactment which savoured of serfdom, but the object was again the worthy object of encouraging settled life and industrial habits among the members of a vagrant race. As years went on, however, the spirit of the time resented the restrictions which the proclamations of 1809 and 1812 had imposed, and in 1828 an ordinance was passed by the colonial legislature—afterwards well known as the fiftieth ordinance—by which the system of passes and certificates, and the system of apprenticeship of children, were alike

abolished. Thenceforward all free coloured persons within the colony were free to live, free to come and go, in the same manner as Europeans; and with the freedom came unlimited vagrancy.

Kaffir wars recurred in the history of the Cape Colony, like so many epidemics. When the English took the Cape, they found Kaffir clans established far within the colonial borders, and in 1808 a Kosa chief built a kraal to the west of the Gamtoos River, occupying or raiding the coast country nearly as far as Plettenberg Bay. As matters stood, it was necessary for the white men either to give up to the black the whole district of Uitenhage—a district which formed an integral part of the colony, or to drive the Kosas back behind the Fish River, the long-established and little-regarded boundary between the two races. The latter alternative was adopted. Burgher levies were called out, supplemented by the Cape regiment—a regiment of Hottentots—and by a few European soldiers; and a short campaign at the end of 1811 and the beginning of 1812 ended in clearing the colony of some twenty thousand Kosas. To prevent their return, a line of military posts was established along the frontier, the headquarters of the troops being named after their commander, Colonel Graham; and in a few years' time, after the foundation of the Albany settlement, Grahamstown became one of the growing towns of the colony.

Still the Kaffirs trespassed over the line, and in 1817 the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, went in person into their country. On the banks of the Kat River he held a conference with Gaika, the reputed chief of the border tribes, at which an agreement was made, designed to prevent future roads and causes of dispute. In treating with savages, it is difficult to ascertain who has a right to speak on their behalf, and how far his words are binding; and the recognition of one chief usually brings in its train the necessity of supporting his authority by force of arms. Gaika's promises

Kaffir wars.

The campaign of 1811-12.

Grahamstown.

PART I. bore little fruit. The depredations went on, encouraged by a reduction in the number of soldiers on the frontier. A rival leader of the same Kosa race, Ndlambe by name, gained strength, and backed by Makana, one of the native seers or preachers, who from time to time have roused the Kafir tribes, in 1818 broke up Gaika's power and nearly exterminated his personal following. Gaika's appeal for help to the colonial government brought on the Kaffir war of 1818-19. The soldiers crossed the Fish River and advanced into Kaffraria. In turn the Kosas invaded the colony and besieged Grahamstown, but were beaten off with heavy loss, broken, and driven back as far as the Kei. When the fighting was over, the English officers, anxious from a military point of view for a scientific frontier, urged that the Kosas should no longer be allowed to hold the pathless jungles which lined the banks of the Fish River; and, acting on their advice, the governor moved the boundary further to the east, taking from the Kaffirs the territory between the Fish River and the Keiskamma, as far up as the junction of the latter river with the Tyumie or Chumie.

*The war
of 1818-19.*

*The eastern
boundary
of the
colony
moved
forward
from the
Fish River
to the Keis-
kamma.*


On the coast, the distance between the mouths of the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers is from 25 to 30 miles. Further inland, the two rivers at one point run within ten miles of each other; but higher up again their courses widely diverge, the Fish River coming down from the north-west and the Keiskamma from the north-east, and between their upper waters are the valleys of subsidiary streams, the Koonap, the Kat, the Chumie, and others. Leaving the Keiskamma River on the east, the new boundary followed the course of the Chumie, until it reached the spurs of the Winterberg and Amatola mountains. Here Gaika was left in possession of the Upper Chumie valley, on fertile pastures encircled by the hills; while the rest of the territory in question, though ceded to the colony, was intended to be kept as neutral ground, occupied neither by white men nor by black, but

constantly patrolled by soldiers, whose headquarters were to be a new fort, Fort Willshire, built on the western bank of the Keiskamma, at the point where that river and the Fish River come nearest to each other.

Before the campaign of 1812, it had been a question which of two races, each advancing in the face of the other, should give way, and the Kaffir intruders into European territory had been far more numerous than Dutch or English emigrants into Kaffraria. That campaign effected a real clearance within the colonial borders, and the later war of 1819 marked the turning-point when, strengthened and almost forced to move by the feuds of their adversaries, the Europeans began to annex territory, the Kosa title to which had not hitherto been disputed. The building of Grahams-town and the introduction of British colonists into the Albany district brought the line of European colonisation, of definite and active occupation, well up to the Fish River. Beyond it there now lay a neutral belt designed for protection, but destined to give rise to further troubles.

It cannot be too often repeated that no fair judgment can be passed upon the border wars between the colonists and the Kaffirs, without constantly bearing in mind that the latter like the former had ever been moving forward. It was not a case of unprovoked invasion by aggressive newcomers from Europe of a land which from time immemorial had belonged to the existing occupants. What was now constituted neutral territory had once been the home of Hottentot tribes¹. The Kaffirs had dispossessed them, as

¹ Thus Colonel Collins in his *Journal of a Tour to the North-eastern Boundary of the colony*, dated August 6, 1800, writes: 'In concluding a treaty with the Kaffir people, it would be very advisable to stipulate that their kraals should be withdrawn to their ancient territory, which is beyond the Keiskamma, and to require that, although the country situated between this stream and the colonial boundary should be considered and respected as their territory, yet that they should not enter it except for the purposes of hunting.' (*Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, Part I*, printed for the House of Commons in 1835, p. 47.) Again Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in his despatch of June 19, 1835, enclosed

PART I.  the English and Dutch now dispossessed the Kaffirs. Moreover, throughout the south-east of Africa, as will be told more fully hereafter, the Kaffir clans were pressing forward one on another, raiding, exterminating, clearing the ground of its human products, planting themselves in, to be in turn uprooted by others. As Goths, Vandals, or Huns swept through central Europe in the Dark Ages, acquiring by their swords a title to this or that land, a title not born of the soil but the fruit of recent and forcible occupation, so the ownership which the Bantu tribes could claim had no deep roots in the past. It was won by force, it was upheld by force, and as it was won and as it was upheld, so it could with no glaring injustice be swept away. Still for some forty years past a nominal line had been recognised, the line of the Fish River, and the annexation of land beyond that line was regarded by the Kaffirs themselves, and by Europeans who supported the cause of the native races, as a high-handed act, illustrating the aggressiveness of the white man, the helplessness of the black. The chief Gaika was held to have ceded the territory; but his consent to the cession was nominal, and his authority to make the cession was nominal also. Criticising the transaction at a later date, in his celebrated despatch of December 26, 1835, Lord Glenelg wrote as follows: 'We commenced by ascribing to the chieftain Gaika an authority which he did not possess, and then proceeded to punish him and his tribes because he failed to exercise that imaginary power for our benefit. We held him responsible for the acts of his and our own common enemy, and exacted from him and his people a forfeiture of their lands, as a penalty for the retalia-

a minute containing the following words: 'That the country between the Keiskamma and the Kei was formerly in the possession of the Hottentots is fully proved by the names which the latter river and others to the westward of it, as well as those of the mountains and other striking natural objects, still bear, these being all of the Hottentots' language; the right, therefore, by which the Kaffirs held it, it may fairly be assumed, is that of conquest.' (Papers relating to Cape of Good Hope, Kaffir war, and death of Hintsa, 1836, p. 44.)

tion made by the chief Ndlambe, after the invasion of his country by Gaika and ourselves. We forced on our ally a treaty which, according to the usages of the Kaffir nation, he had no authority to conclude, and, proceeding to that treaty, we ejected the other Kaffir chiefs, who were not parties to it, from their country¹. There was a certain amount of truth in these bitter words, but the writer should have gone further back and denounced the original landing of Europeans in South Africa, or he should have looked forward, and in the light of the coming time condemned wholesale the theory that white men and black can make any treaties whatever on equal terms, marking out bounds of exclusive possession. True statesmanship recognises, if it regrets, inequality, and no great measure of foresight is required to discern that the coloured races and the lands which they hold can be saved from European aggression only by being brought under European control. At this time, and for years afterwards, the old and the new ideas were struggling for the mastery. There was the old impracticable view that the white man and the black could be held asunder, each respecting the other's territory. There was the new view, not yet expressed, but gradually taking shape in the minds of men, that the two races must overlap and learn to live together, in which case none could doubt in whose hands the dominion would be. The missionaries, the strongest and most fearless champions of native rights, were yet the men whose work and whose lives did indirectly most to break down the old barriers and bring the Kaffir tribes within the limits of European influence. On the other hand the confiscation, if confiscation it was, of the strip of Kaffir territory between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers was really an attempt to still carry out the old policy and keep the two races apart.

¹ Parliamentary Paper relating to the Cape of Good Hope, Kaffir war, and death of Hintsu, No. 279, 1836, p. 61.

PART I. The land in question was to be British territory, but, as far as occupation went, it was to be no man's land. Such was the intention, but it was never actually carried out. Part of the ceded territory between the Fish and the Koonap Rivers was in 1825 included in the colonial districts of Somerset and Albany. Further east, on the Kat River, a strong settlement of half-breeds and Hottentots was formed in 1829. Elsewhere Kaffirs came in on one side and white settlers on the other; they were allowed and disallowed, moved and removed, until the tenure of the country, like the objects of the government, was hard to define. Fairs were established on the border line, where colonists and Kaffirs bartered their wares; as years went on, traders and missionaries multiplied in Kaffraria. At all points the races were meeting; for good or for evil the policy of mutual exclusion was gradually giving way.

—♦—
*Settlement
 in the ceded
 territory.*

The ministers in charge of the Colonial Office in England naturally encouraged any measures which seemed to tend to peaceful intercourse. In 1831 Lord Goderich gave his formal assent to grants of land in the ceded territory to 'respectable settlers'; but in the same despatch he drew an invidious distinction between Englishmen and Hottentots on the one hand and the Boers of the colony on the other, refusing to admit the latter to the new frontier district, and thereby excluding them by obvious implication from the category of respectable settlers¹. His successor, Mr. Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, disallowed an ordinance passed by the colonial legislature to enforce the commando system. 'The system,' he wrote, 'has been a fearful scourge to the native population²,' and in place of it he called the Governor's attention 'to the propriety of cultivating an intercourse with the chiefs of the Kaffir tribes by stationing prudent and

¹ Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, Part II. House of Commons paper, No. 252, 1835, p. 57.

² Ibid. pp. 64-5.



intelligent men among them as agents of your government.' They were well meant these phrases as to 'respectable settlers' and 'prudent and intelligent men'; but they were written by men living at a distance, who viewed the world on paper. Meanwhile the Kaffir did not change his skin nor become regenerate, and the frontier colonist, whether Englishman or Dutchman, lived a hard life, whose natural conditions scarcely attained to the Downing Street standard of civilised respectability.

The chief Gaika died in 1828, leaving as his heir a boy Sandile. The regent was another son, Makoma, a determined restless border chieftain. Allowed to remain in the ceded territory in the upper valleys of the Kat River, he had raided the colonists more than once, and more than once commandos had been sent against him. In 1829 he attacked a clan of Tembu emigrants, who had taken up ground on the eastern frontier of the colony, and drove them within the border. He was dislodged in consequence from his holding, which became the scene of the Hottentot location already noticed¹, and three or four years later he was again permitted to settle himself upon the neutral ground and again removed. Irritated by the changing policy of the colonial government, dispossessed of the lands of his fathers, he nursed his resentment in secret, until in 1834 the time seemed ripe for open warfare.

*Sandile
and
Makoma*

At the beginning of that year a new Governor came out to the Cape, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, whose name is still borne by the seaport of Natal. A military officer, who had seen service in the Peninsular War, he had also acquired experience of civil administration as Governor of British Guiana, which, like the Cape, had once been a dependency of the Netherlands. He was a kindly as well as an able man, and he brought with him instructions, congenial to his

*Sir
Benjamin
D'Urban*

¹ See above, p. 154.

PART I. disposition, to conciliate the natives and make terms with their chiefs, to carry out slave emancipation, to cut down the public expenditure which had for years exceeded the revenue, and to effect certain changes in the system of government which had already been determined upon, and which included the establishment of a Legislative Council¹. His work kept him for some months at Capetown; but he promised an early visit to the eastern frontier of the colony, and meanwhile he sent friendly messages to the Kaffir chiefs through Dr. Philip, the principal representative in South Africa of the London Missionary Society². The projected tour of reconciliation was never carried out. Instead, the Governor was summoned in haste to repel a Kaffir invasion, and to organise border war as it had never yet been organised in South Africa.

Outbreak of the Kaffir war of 1834-5. Kaffir invasion of the colony. On Sunday evening, December 21, 1834, more than 12,000 armed Kaffirs began to cross the frontier into the colony. The invasion took place along the whole border line from the Winterberg mountains to the sea. The foremost leaders were Makoma and his half-brother Tyali, but various clans moved forward under their respective chiefs, No raid had hitherto taken place on so large a scale, or had been so skilfully and so secretly planned. The missionaries and traders who were living among the Kaffirs were wholly ignorant that any hostile movement was contemplated, yet the war was no mere foray but amounted to an uprising of all the Kosa tribes against the Europeans. For nearly a fortnight the invaders laid waste the colony, from Somerset East to Algoa Bay, white men's lives were taken though not in large numbers, houses were burnt, property was destroyed or carried off, and the farmers and their families took refuge at the nearest military stations. 'This fertile and beautiful

¹ See above, p. 141.

² It was subsequently a matter of dispute whether or not Dr. Philip had acted as the Governor's agent.

province' wrote the Governor from Grahamstown on January 21, 'is almost a desert, and the murders, which have gone hand in hand with all this work of pillage and rapine, have deeply aggravated its atrocity'.¹ As soon as the news reached Capetown, no time was lost in taking measures to meet the crisis. Martial law was proclaimed in the eastern districts, troops were moved up, and Colonel Smith, a Peninsular veteran, afterwards well known in South African history as Sir Harry Smith, rode in haste to Grahamstown and took command, until, in the third week of January, the Governor himself arrived on the scene of action. By the middle of February the Kaffir marauders were driven beyond the Keiskamma, and by the middle of March preparations were complete for a counter invasion.

The land of the Kosas extended from the Fish River, after the recent annexation from the Keiskamma, past the Buffalo and past the Kei River, as far as the Bashee. By the coast line the distance from the Keiskamma to the Kei River is about 80 miles, and from the Kei River to the Bashee is a further distance of 50 miles. Behind the Kosas, in the direction of the present colony of Natal, were other tribes of the Bantu race, Tembus and Pundos; and among the Kosas were living, little better than serfs, the Fingos, a remnant of broken clans, refugees from north and east. The paramount chief of the Kosas was a man by name Hintsá, the clan under his own immediate chieftainship being the Galekas, whose country was eastward of the Kei, and who were therefore the furthest removed of all the Kosas

*Counter
invasion of
Kaffirland.*

¹ Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, Part II, p. 132, June, 1835. In a later despatch dated November 7, 1835, the Governor enclosed a map which is contained in the Parliamentary Paper of 1836 relating to the Cape of Good Hope, Kaffir war, and death of Hintsá. On this map is printed the following strongly worded note: 'The part of this map which is shaded and marked with assegais shows the extent of the invasion which covered the country with blood and ashes, and the unshaded part . . . shows the territory added to the colony as a security against recurrence of such disaster for the future.'

PART I. from the frontier of the colony. Hintsä himself had taken no active part in the late inroad; but some of his followers had joined the invading bands, and the cattle which had been carried off from the colonists had been taken into his territory. It seemed certain that, if he had not actually instigated the war, he had at least countenanced and supported it, and the Governor determined to bring him to account as well as the border chiefs who had so long troubled the land. The war was with the Kosas alone. With the Tembus and the Pondos at their rear the English were in friendly negotiation, and on the north the Basuto tribes plundered Hintsä's people, as the latter had plundered the colonists.

*Extension
of the
boundary
of the colony
to the Kei
River.*

At the end of March the British forces crossed the Keiskamma. In the middle of April they crossed the Kei. At the end of April Hintsä came to terms, giving himself up as a hostage, and on May 10 the Governor issued a proclamation declaring that 'the eastern boundary of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope is henceforward extended eastward to the right bank of the Kei River.' In the following October the north-eastern boundary was also extended, and taken to be a line from the source of the Kei in the Stormberg range to the source of the Kraai, a tributary of the Orange River on the northern side of the same mountains, and thence the left bank of the Kraai to its junction with the Orange River near the site of the present town of Aliwal North. The new territory was christened the province of Queen Adelaide. Forts were built and garrisoned in it to secure possession, among them being King Williamstown on the Buffalo River. The Fingos, who, when the British forces crossed the Kei, came to the Governor and claimed protection against their Kosa oppressors, were transplanted to the number of nearly 17,000, including women and children, and located in the old ceded territory between the Fish River and the Keiskamma; some Kaffir clans who had

*The pro-
vince of
Queen
Adelaide.*


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SOUTH

To face page 152



B. V. Barbistore,

SOUTH AFRICA IN 1835.

Chaka's grant to Lieut. Farewell (Aug. 1824).

Chaka's grant to Fyna.

Andries Waterboer's Territory (as described in Sir Benjamin Durban's Report, 1835).

Province of Queen Adelaide—

Annexed by Sir Benjamin Durban in 1835.

Retrocaded by order of Lord Glenelg in 1836.

British Territory.

KALAHARI DESERT



B. V. Darbishire, Oxford, 1919

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remained friendly were confirmed in their locations with additional tracts of ground ; and the insurgent chiefs, having at length laid down their arms, were permitted to remain in or near their old homes, but as British subjects living on British territory. At the Kei River the colony ended, and beyond it Kreli, the son and heir of Hintsá, was recognised as ruler of the Galeka branch of the Kosas. In the new province European officers were placed with the Kaffir chiefs to be their advisers and friends, and missionaries were encouraged to return to their work in the hope of future security and peace.

It was the broadest settlement of the border question which had yet taken place, statesmanlike, and with fair promise for the future. The difficulty always had been, and still was to some extent, the want of natural boundaries. Rivers of no great size and volume never have been and never will be dividing lines between races. It was the merit of Sir Benjamin D'Urban that he recognised facts, and saw that security for white men and for black alike could be won only by an extension of British rule. The new province he described in June, 1835, as being not only 'an invaluable acquisition of beautiful and fertile territory,' but also 'a compact and easily defended barrier district of the most perfect description'.¹ To strengthen the hold of the government over the territory, he proposed to move the centre of administration eastward from Capetown to Uitenhage, within twenty miles of Port Elizabeth on Algoa Bay.

He had counted the cost in South Africa, but had still to reckon with the Imperial Government. In April, 1835, Lord Melbourne became prime minister for the second time, and his colonial secretary was Charles Grant, Lord Glenelg. Like other Whig statesmen, Lord Glenelg was strongly opposed to any extension of the bounds of the empire. 'The great evil

*Lord
Glenelg
reverses the
Governor's
policy.*

¹ Papers relating to Cape of Good Hope, Kaffir war, &c., 1836, p. 20.

PART I. of the Cape Colony,' he wrote, 'consists in its magnitude'.¹ Yet no man was indirectly more responsible for the events which in after years enlarged the colony and carried British interference into the interior. But he was not merely a politician of the Whig school. He was an ardent philanthropist, whose heart was stronger than his head. The policy of the Governor was warmly supported by the great majority of the colonists. Address after address was presented to him, recognising the firmness and determination which had been shown in his dealings, and the wisdom and humanity which had dictated his settlement of the frontier. The Wesleyan missionaries in Albany and Kaffirland added their acknowledgements, and representatives of other missions in South Africa bore similar testimony. Still there was a small but influential party which took the opposite view, and maintained in season and out of season that the right was on the side of the Kaffirs. They found a ready hearing in England, and their evidence given before a House of Commons committee carried undue weight, because it harmonised with the general spirit of the time. Their statements convinced the mind of the Colonial Secretary, and an incident in the late war, the killing of the chief Hintsu while attempting to escape from voluntary captivity, confirmed him in the impression that the blood which had been spilt and the misery which had been caused must be laid to the charge of the white men in South Africa and of the Governor who had been chosen to rule over them. Writing as an eye-witness of the horrors of the late Kaffir inroad into the colony, Sir Benjamin D'Urban characterised the invaders as 'irreclaimable savages' and 'merciless barbarians.' In Lord Glenelg's eyes, on the other hand, they were the victims of 'systematic injustice,' driven by desperation into the attempt to 'extort by force that redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain.'

¹ Papers relating to Cape of Good Hope, Kaffir war, &c., 1836, p. 69.



The Colonial Secretary's sympathies were all with the coloured men. The Governor had fresh in his mind the carefully planned attack 'by which 7,000 of His Majesty's subjects were in one week driven to utter destitution'; he had seen the desolation caused by savage warfare, and had heard the cries of distress which came from unoffending colonists, ruined and homeless through no fault of their own. In summing up the defence of his measures, he wrote, 'your lordship in England and I upon the spot have seen all these African matters under different views, and it would be now useless to pursue the subject further'. This was in truth the conclusion of the whole matter. On the one side were preconceived ideas, ignorance of local conditions, preference of irresponsible to responsible information. On the other side was local knowledge, possibly some bias caused by sights and sounds of distress, but sober judgment and no small measure of foresight. The Governor warned his employers in England that, if his settlement were reversed, 'this will be speedily followed by an extensive abandonment of Albany and Somerset on the part of the farmers.' His prediction proved true; his work was undone; and the Boers went out into the wilds of Africa.

Lord Glenelg's decision involved the absolute retrocession to the Kaffirs of the province of Queen Adelaide, and moving back the colonial boundary to the Keiskamma River. The district behind the Keiskamma and between that river and the Fish River, which Lord Charles Somerset had annexed in 1819, was reluctantly retained, but even here European settlement was prohibited, and the land was to be given up to Kaffir occupation. Separate treaties were to be made with the various Kosa chiefs, treating them as political equals with the Europeans; and a Lieutenant-governor was appointed

The retrocession of the province of Queen Adelaide and

¹ The quotations given are mainly from Lord Glenelg's despatch of Dec. 26, 1835, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban's reply of June 9, 1836, both included in Parliamentary Papers.

PART I. for the Eastern districts of the colony, who was specially charged with carrying out the new policy. That policy was duly brought into operation, and Sir Benjamin D'Urban was recalled.

—♦—
recall of Sir Benjamin D'Urban.

Results of Lord Glenelg's decision.

Few decisions have had more far-reaching results than that which was embodied in Lord Glenelg's despatch. It would be foolish and unjust not to credit the author of the despatch with courage and high principle, but it is impossible on the other hand to acquit him of wrong-headed obstinacy. In many ways, direct and indirect, the course of action which he prescribed worked mischief, not least in the precedent which it furnished for after times. It was the beginning of undoing in South Africa. It may well be questioned whether greater misery has not been caused in the world by going back than by going forward, especially where native races are concerned; and it is certain that men are more easily persuaded to move forward, if the impression gains ground that their steps can be lightly retraced. The Romans of old, as long as their political system was healthy and sound, rarely went back; and among all the nations of the world few, if any, have stood higher as rulers. Men ask to be sure of those with whom they have to deal, to be confident that what has been done to-day will be upheld to-morrow. A lower race forgives much to a higher race, if it is strong, consistent, and unswerving; but when the white man perpetually shifts his course, blown about by every wind of doctrine, then for a generation and more nothing is forgiven and nothing is forgotten. 'What can be more detestable than to be perpetually changing our minds? we forget that a state in which the laws, though imperfect, are unalterable, is better off than one in which the laws are good but powerless.' So said, and said truly, an Athenian orator, and he began his speech with the reflection 'I have remarked again and again that a democracy cannot manage an empire¹.'

¹ Thucydides, bk. III. chap. xxxvii, Jowett's translation. It may,

The officer who was appointed Lieutenant-governor of the Eastern districts was a colonist, Andries Stockenstrom. He was in sympathy with Lord Glenelg's policy, and had given evidence on that side in England. In consequence he was regarded in the colony with suspicion and dislike. Yet he was a strong and able administrator, and carried the Secretary of State's instructions into effect with courage and skill. But a system of treaties, based on the false hypothesis that the contracting parties were on an equal footing, was doomed to failure, and a solution of the border troubles was further off than ever. Lord Glenelg resigned early in 1839. Stockenstrom was honourably removed from his post later in the same year; and Sir George Napier, who had succeeded Sir Benjamin D'Urban as Governor, modified the terms of the treaties in a direction favourable to the colonists. Raids and robberies still went on, and again in 1844-5 a new series of engagements was entered into with the Kosa chiefs by Sir George Napier's successor, Sir Peregrine Maitland; but the promises were not worth the paper on which they were written, and were but the prelude to another Kaffir war.

In March 1846, a Kaffir, who had stolen an axe within colonial territory, was sent for trial to Grahamstown. On the road his guard was overpowered, and he himself was rescued by a party of Kaffirs, who made their escape over the frontier. His surrender was demanded in vain, and the result was open war. An early reverse to the British and colonial troops brought on an invasion of the colony; and, though the disaster and ruin was not so widespread as it had been eleven years before, history to a great extent repeated itself. Again martial law was proclaimed; again burgher levies were called out and troops hurried up to the front; again boards of relief were established to succour the victims of the Kaffir inroad; and again there was a long desultory

perhaps, be not unfairly retorted that on the occasion in question Cleon was speaking in favour of putting a whole community to death.

CH. V.

—♦—
*Sir Andries
 Stocken-
 strom made
 Lieutenant-
 governor of
 the Eastern
 districts.*

*The Kaffir
 war of
 1846.*

PART I. campaign against a scattered foe in a difficult country, with
 → occasional success and occasional failure. One noteworthy
 feature of the war was that the colonial contingent was led
 and well led by Stockenstrom, no longer an advocate of
 a reactionary policy. A provisional treaty made in August
 with Kreli, the paramount chief of the Kosas, came to
 nothing, and for yet another year and more the war went on.
 Maitland had in the meantime been succeeded as Governor
 by Sir Henry Pottinger¹, and the latter in turn made way
 for Sir Harry Smith, who came back to South Africa, with
 honours lately won against the Sikhs².

*Sir Harry
Smith.*

*Extension
of the
boundary
of the Cape
Colony and
creation of
the pro-
vince of
British
Kaffraria.
See map
p. 212.*

The war was virtually over when he reached Capetown on
 December 1, 1847, and little remained for him but to carry
 out the resolution, which both the preceding Governors had
 formed, to extend the area of British rule, as Sir Benjamin
 D'Urban had extended it. On December 17 he proclaimed
 the boundary of the colony to be the Keiskamma and Chumie
 Rivers, from the source of the Chumie a line which crossed the
 mountains and followed the course of sundry small streams
 as far as the source of the Kraai, the Kraai from its source to
 its junction with the Orange River, and thence the Orange
 River as far as the Atlantic Ocean. The old neutral territory
 between the Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers was thus finally
 absorbed into the Cape Colony, and was given the name of
 Victoria. A few days later the district between the Keiskamma

¹ It is noteworthy that Sir H. Pottinger was the first Governor of the Cape who was also formally appointed High Commissioner. The instrument which created the appointment was dated October 10, 1846, and was worded as follows: 'Whereas the inhabitants of the territories immediately adjoining the eastern and the north-eastern frontier of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope have at divers times made hostile irruptions into our said colony . . . we do by these presents constitute and appoint you to be our High Commissioner for the settling and adjustment of the affairs of the territories in Southern Africa adjacent or contiguous to the eastern and north-eastern frontier of our said colony.'

² The victory of Aliwal over the Sikhs in January 1846, in which Sir Harry Smith commanded the British troops, gave its name to the town and district of Aliwal North in the Cape Colony.

—the eastern boundary of the colony—and the Kei River, was declared to be vested in the Queen, and to be held from her by the Kaffir chiefs and people, under the control of the High Commissioner, whom the natives were to regard as their Great Chief. It was not annexed to the Cape Colony, but was constituted a separate province and placed for the time being under military rule. Thus Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy was vindicated by the man who had shared with him the praise and blame; and the province of Queen Adelaide, which he had created, and which Lord Glenelg had undone, was brought again, with a new name and under slightly altered conditions, within the circle of the British dominions.

The land between the Keiskamma and the Kei, to which the name of British Kaffraria was now given, is not more than from 60 to 80 miles in length between the two rivers. Parallel to the sea, at a distance of about 50 miles, lies the range of the Amatola mountains, in which are the headwaters of the Keiskamma River, and whose southern slopes cover a large tract of broken difficult country, well suited to be the stronghold of a savage race. Between this mountain region and the sea is a healthy and fertile district, now rich alike in grain and in flocks and herds. At the time when British sovereignty was proclaimed over the territory, the tribes near the sea were Kosa Kaffirs, the 'Tsiambies and others, mostly well affected to the English; more inland, on the slopes of the Amatolas, was another clan or group of clans of the same Kosa race, the Gaikas, who under their chief Sandile had already given and were again to give trouble. North of the Amatolas were Tembu tribes, distinct from though akin to the Kosas. Kveli, the paramount chief of all the Kosas, with his own special clan, the Galekas, was located beyond the Kei and outside the limits of British Kaffraria. The chief river of the territory is the Buffalo; on its banks, rather more than 40 miles from the sea, stands King Williamstown, where were the headquarters of the

*Organisa-
tion of
British
Kaffraria.*

*King
Williams-
town.*

PART I. troops in the district, and where the officer resided who was styled Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria. At the mouth of the Buffalo there rose a flourishing sea port, which, under the name of East London, was, for revenue and commercial purposes, annexed to the Cape Colony¹. In other parts of the territory military posts were established; while within the colonial border, between the Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers, steps were taken to form a line of military villages, the settlers being army pensioners liable to be called out for the defence of the frontier².

*East
London.*

*The Kaffir
war of
1850-3.*

For between two and three years there was peace in these eastern districts, and the new arrangements seemed to be working well; but in 1850 a time of drought in Kaffraria brought suffering and distress; a native prophet or witch-doctor, Umlanjani by name, roused the fanaticism of his countrymen; and the chiefs, discontented with the loss of their power, fomented rebellion. Prominent among them was the Gaika, Sandile, who was formally deposed from his position at the end of October, 1850. To overawe him, a patrol of troops was sent into the Amatola region, and on Christmas Eve in the same year, when passing up the valley of the Keiskamma, in a rocky gorge known as the Boomah Pass, the soldiers were attacked and roughly handled by the Gaikas. A long disastrous war followed, the frontier villages were laid waste, and the Governor himself was for a while cut off and isolated in one of the new forts. The coast tribes remained loyal for the most part; enmity to the Kosas kept the Fingos faithful to the English; but the Gaikas were all in arms, the Galeka chieftain Kreli from beyond the Kei gave them help and encouragement; north of the Amatolas some of the Tembus joined in the rising; and even the

*The fight
at Boomah
Pass.*

¹ By proclamation dated January 14, 1848. By an Order in Council dated December 16, 1848, it was declared to be a port of import and export, and a free warehousing port.

² The scheme of military villages did not prove a success.

Hottentot settlers on the Kat River made common cause with the insurgent Kaffirs. The colonists, when called upon for active service, showed little readiness to answer to the appeal. They were growing tired of frontier raids and shifting frontier policy, and their sympathies were with their countrymen and kinsmen far away to the north, working out their own salvation and achieving their independence. For the later Kaffir wars differed from their predecessors, in that they coincided with other troubles and difficulties, which divided the attention of the Governors in South Africa and of the Secretaries of State in Downing Street. The history of South Africa had widened in the last few years, the complications had greatly increased, and to Kaffir wars were superadded conflict and treaty with the emigrant farmers, and with the fighting tribes of mountainous Basutoland.

The war went on till the beginning of 1853; lives were lost on land; and at sea, off Simons Bay, the troopship *Birkenhead*, while bringing reinforcements, went down with four hundred men standing to their arms¹. Sir Harry Smith was succeeded by General Cathcart; and in the end the mountain fastnesses were cleared, Sandile and his Gaika followers were driven from their strongholds and planted in open country to the east of the Amatolas, further away from the colonial boundary and nearer to the Kei, while beyond the Kei Kreli and the Galekas were brought to terms. The real seat of war, the real difficulty, had been the Amatola mountains. This district, from which the Gaikas had at length been dislodged, was kept as a Crown Reserve, in military occupation and under military control, land being allotted to settlers in small amounts within easy reach of the forts and military posts, the maintenance of which in this particular locality was the primary object of the government.




*Readjustment of the frontier.
The Amatola district constituted a Crown Reserve.*

¹ The loss of the *Birkenhead* and the discipline and heroism of the troops on board has been commemorated in Sir Francis Doyle's well-known poem. Over 400 soldiers and seamen were drowned.



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PART I. Beyond the reserve and beyond the Amatola range, the northern part of the territory which had been included by Sir Harry Smith in British Kaffraria marched with the northern district of the new colonial division of Victoria. In this region the Tembu tribes, or some of them, had risen simultaneously with the Kaffirs, and here, as further south, some rearrangement of the native locations was found necessary. A large extent of land was declared to be forfeited by the natives, and on it was planted a number of farmers, Dutch and English alike, many of them trekkers returning from the interior. They were given farms on condition of maintaining among themselves, as in the oldest time of the Cape Colony, an organisation for self-defence, and the frontier was protected by these means without the aid of regular troops. The centre of this new settlement was a village called Queens-
 town, round which a strong and thriving band of colonists took root. Roads were opened to King Williamstown, and thence to the sea at East London. The Amatolas henceforth formed the inland boundary of British Kaffraria, and the country to the north of that range, except a narrow strip along the Kei River, was annexed to and incorporated in the Cape Colony.

*Queens-
town.*

General Cathcart, the author of these measures, to judge from his actions and his despatches, a man of foresight and statesmanship, was followed in 1854¹ by Sir George Grey. By this time, slowly but surely, civilised man was asserting his influence over Kaffir life and Kaffir land, slowly the eastern frontier of the colony was being pacified. The end was not yet, but to those who read the signs of the times it was in view. No longer rivals and competitors with the European colonists, the Kosas were becoming a vassal and protected race, even where Great Britain did not yet claim any sovereignty over the soil. Partly by the arts of war,

*Sir George
Grey.*

¹ Sir George Cathcart went on to the Crimea and was killed at Inkerman.

partly by the arts of peace, they were being subdued. Long contact with, long friction with, a higher race worked the inevitable result that the black man was worn down in time, and the white man, perpetually recruiting his strength from beyond the seas, in the end prevailed.

Confused as is the story of border wars in South Africa, the results are more interesting, more helpful to students of history, than the records of similar strife at other times and in other parts of the British Empire. The outcome was not purely negative, it was not extermination. Where there was extermination, it was the work of the savages themselves, not of the colonial governors and generals who, humane themselves and acting in the strong light of philanthropic criticism, were at pains to minimise bloodshed, to protect and to control without undue loss of life. There was a good deal of the Roman element in the frontier policy in South Africa. The unbending sternness of the Romans was wanting, it is true. More scrupulous but more changeable, less despotic but less consistent, the English in the middle of the nineteenth century, in their dealings with native races were not so successful, because not so thorough, as the men who conquered and ruled the provinces of Imperial Rome. But in the border country of the Cape Colony and Kaffirland British officers were after all working out on a small scale the same problems, in the same spirit, as Roman officers many centuries ago had worked out in the frontier districts of Gaul and Britain. The policy in either case was to govern by dividing and breaking up, to hold in military strength positions of vantage, to make and maintain good roads, to bring in settlers, especially settlers trained to arms, to turn the eyes and minds of the residents on the soil back to the soil, and to accustom them to the routine of agriculture, to accumulating modest wealth by regular labour under peaceful conditions, as a preferable alternative to the risks and chances of border forays. Within and on the frontiers of the colony

*British and
Roman
frontier
policy com-
pared.*

PART I. were located Fingo tribes, bound to the European cause by interest and friendship, forming a kind of native buffer state between the colonial settlements and the malcontent Kaffirs who had so long kept those settlements in alarm and unrest. In Kaffraria, under British rule, the clans were redistributed, and the paramount power of chieftainship was vested in the High Commissioner. Where in mountainous ravines, time after time, the Gaika clans had defied the British forces, a Crown Reserve was constituted with forts and roads, emptied of marauding natives and secured by garrisons. Its former inhabitants, moved to more accessible country, began to handle spades instead of assegais, to plough with their own oxen instead of plundering their neighbours'. They hired themselves to the government and worked on the roads. 'The Kaffirs,' wrote Sir George Grey in January, 1856, 'are themselves conquering their country by opening up, through their fastnesses, available roads, which will be of equal use to us either in peace or war'.² The chiefs, with

¹ On October 15, 1853, Sir George Cathcart writes to the Secretary of State: 'The Gaikas in their new location appear to be particularly diligent in this respect [gardening], and I have taken measures to supply them liberally with spades, which they seek for eagerly, and for which they are very thankful. This mode of cultivation with spades is somewhat new, and, I think, should be encouraged, for it is an implement requiring to be used by men, whereas their old habits of cultivation were confined almost entirely to the use of the hoe in the hands of the women, whilst the men remained idle.' [Parl. Paper, July 1855, pp. 23-4.] Three months later he writes (p. 26): 'In Kaffraria the late rebels... have taken to agriculture with a degree of enterprise never before known. They purchased ploughs, sent oxen to be taught to work, and hired people to plough for them.' Compare with this what Sir Bartle Frere writes on October 17, 1877 [Mr. Martineau's Life of Sir Bartle Frere, vol. ii. p. 198]: 'Many of the Kaffirs, finding no room for their old pastoral habits in keeping cattle, turned to agriculture and sheep farming, both civilising changes. You cannot drive sheep as you drive cattle, and, sheep-stealing being a less warlike occupation than cattle lifting, sheep farming tended to peace. But the great change was effected by the introduction of light cheap Scotch and American ploughs. A Kaffir man may not hoe—that is woman's work; but no woman may tend cattle, that is man's privilege, so that Kaffir milkmaids are all the young warriors of the Kraal.'

² Parl. Paper, June 1856, p. 34.

British officers and magistrates in their midst, learnt to exercise authority in accordance with rule, and to look for small stipends and pensions as the settled accompaniment of civilisation. Most of all, in contradistinction to the policy of by-gone days, the Governors, who were responsible for the peace of South Africa, sought to secure it not so much by isolating white men in one district and black men in another, or by keeping a tract of border country permanently clear of inhabitants, as by filling up the vacant spaces with European settlers and planting in the midst of the Kaffirs a white population able to hold their own, if necessary, by force of arms, sufficiently numerous to assimilate the natives, and wean them by example from savagery to industrial life.

Military colonisation was a leading feature in the political system of the Roman Empire. Soldiers were converted into colonists, but remained liable for garrison duty. The frontiers were lined with colonies of time expired legionaries, who were given land partly as a reward for past services, partly as a condition of keeping the border line of the provinces in security and peace. The plan worked well, for the basis of the Roman power was a purely military basis, and the soldier settlers were grouped in towns, not dispersed on backwood farms and holdings over a long and broken area. In modern times, when similar experiments have been tried, they have not been so successful. No nation of our day has been a nation of soldiers to the same extent as the Romans, and in the colonies the old soldier takes to town life or to country life as the case may be, but, whether in town or country, he loses his identity and becomes absorbed in the ordinary population. One governor and another proposed the establishment of military colonists on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony. Sir Harry Smith placed some military villages between the Fish River and the Keiskamma¹, which were shortly afterwards swept away in

*Military
colonisation
and
the German
legion.*

¹ See above, p. 166.

PART I. the Kaffir war. The next governor, General Cathcart, had
 —♦— in view the double object of bringing in soldier immigrants from Europe, and forming the border farmers into a species of militia. The latter experiment was carried out in the Queenstown district¹, 'north of the Amatolas in an open plain, where a commando of 400 mounted burghers is capable of maintaining their position and keeping the native tribes at a distance².' The former was designed to meet the special needs of the hilly Amatola region. Here the Governor proposed to plant two Swiss regiments, of 700 to 1,000 men each, deeming them preferable to British pensioners as more accustomed to mountain districts, more thrifty, and more likely to hold together, being bound by the tie of a separate nationality³. This identical scheme was not carried into effect, but Cathcart's successor, Sir George Grey, was no less minded than himself to make British Kaffraria the scene of military settlements. He had been Governor of New Zealand, where similar experiments had been tried with success, and, after his arrival at the Cape at the end of 1854, he lost no time in urging the Government at home to send out a strong body of enrolled pensioners, for whom allotments were already being laid out and houses built, so as to form villages in the neighbourhood of existing military posts. It was the time of the Crimean War, not a time for transferring from England to a distant colony men who were trained to arms, or for interesting the Imperial Government in projects of colonisation. In answer to an advertisement for emigrants of the class required only 107 pensioners offered themselves, whereas 1,000 had been asked for at once, to be followed in due course by four times the number. It seemed useless to equip and despatch this

¹ See above, p. 168.

² Sir G. Cathcart to Sec. of State, February 11, 1853. Parl. Paper of May 1853, p. 223.

³ Parl. Paper as above, pp. 91, 110.

handful of men, and for some months Sir George Grey's plans were in abeyance. Shortly afterwards, however, a more favourable opportunity occurred of meeting his views. Under stress of the war, Great Britain had recruited soldiers in foreign parts, and in her pay were German, Swiss, and Italian legions¹. The Germans numbered between 9,000 and 10,000 in all, and of this total number over 2,300 offered themselves as emigrants for South Africa. For seven years they were to be liable to military service, and for the first three years of this term they were to receive daily pay. For one year they were given free rations or the equivalent in money; each man was provided with an allotment of land rent free, to become his freehold property at the end of the seven years, if the terms of the agreement had been duly complied with; and advances were made to cover the first cost of tools and other necessary articles of equipment. The Cape Government contributed to the cost, cordially recognising that the establishment of a large body of military settlers upon the frontier of the colony would contribute to its safety. At the beginning of 1857 the German soldiers arrived, and were settled, some at existing towns or stations, such as East London and King Williamstown, some on selected sites, where villages were yet to be built. Distributed through the Eastern districts of the colony and through British Kaffraria, they held the lines of communication, as garrisons attached to and having an interest in the soil; and the division of Stutterheim still bears the name of the officer², in whose charge the soldiers

¹ According to a parliamentary return dated July 1857, the full numbers and cost of the foreign legions in the pay of Great Britain were—

	<i>Numbers.</i>	<i>Cost.</i>
German legion	9,682	£687,800
Swiss	3,296	235,486
Italian	3,581	195,655

² Major-General Baron Stutterheim, styled Chief Commissioner of German military settlers.

PART I. came, and under whose immediate guidance they were settled on the land. The chief drawback to the scheme was that only a few of the emigrants brought wives with them. This defect Sir George Grey sought to remedy by proposing to import a large number of German families, to be located with and to supplement the military settlers. Some were brought over; but the total expenditure which was contemplated was too large to win the assent of the Imperial Government, and to subsidise an exclusively German emigration seemed to the Secretaries of State less politic than to provide the existing German settlers with English or Irish wives. The Governor therefore sent on a thousand of the unmarried soldiers to India, and those who remained behind developed into Cape colonists and fell into line with the civil population.

The cattle-killing delusion among the Kaffirs.

While the Europeans were at pains to strengthen their numbers, the Kaffirs were committing suicide. Just at the time when the soldiers of the German legion came to South Africa, a delusion took root and gained ground among the Kosa tribes, which was little short of suicidal mania. In the years 1855 and 1856 a virulent epidemic of cattle disease killed out many thousands of horned cattle in the Cape Colony and Kaffraria. The misery which was thus caused was greatly intensified by the preaching of a Kaffir prophet, who held forth in the Galeka country beyond the Kei. This madman or impostor foretold that the Kaffir chiefs of past times, long dead and gone, were about to return to earth with their followers and with a new race of cattle, no longer liable to sickness or pestilence, and that this resurrection would result in the final triumph of the black men over the white. The Crimean War was worked into the prophecy, for the dead chiefs were to bring in their train a Russian host. A necessary prelude to the Kaffir kingdom upon earth, the prophet went on, was that all existing cattle and corn should be destroyed. Kreli and the Galekas living



outside British territory listened to the seer's word, which was no doubt in a measure inspired by the chiefs, anxious to recover their former power and to unite the Kosa race against the British Government. The delusion spread into British Kaffraria, but there European training and influence had weight. Sandile and most of the Gaikas were among the 'unbelievers,' and in consequence the immediate result of the teaching was not to unite but to break up the Kaffir tribes. The 'believers' busily slaughtered their oxen and made away with all means of subsistence; and when on the great day of deliverance, which had been fixed for Wednesday February 18, 1857, the sun rose and set in the usual manner and the earth did not give forth her dead, the imposture melted away, leaving nothing behind but wide-spread destitution.

It was estimated that about 25,000 Kaffirs died of starvation, and that nearly 100,000 wandered forth to find means of living beyond their own borders. A return of the population in British Kaffraria alone ¹ showed that, whereas on January 1, 1857, the natives in the territory numbered nearly 105,000, on the following July 31 little more than 37,000 were left;

¹ in Krel's country beyond the Kei, the loss of life and dispersion of starving savages was as great or greater.

The chiefs were beggared; women and children dug for wild roots to assuage the pains of hunger; robberies were plentiful, for those who had killed their own herds laid hands on the property of others. The Government did what could be done to meet the crisis, relief works were multiplied, 40,000 Kaffirs were taken into service in various parts of the colony, and police and soldiers were busy in breaking up bands of marauders.

Meanwhile news of the Indian Mutiny had reached the Cape, and the military force in South Africa was reduced, to

Krel and the Gaikas driven behind the Bashee River.

¹ Exclusive of the Crown Reserve, and, of course, exclusive of Independent Kaffraria.

PART I. strengthen the English army in India. It was feared that
 —→ in consequence Kreli and his Galekas, enfeebled though they were by famine, were meditating an outbreak, and in February 1858 Sir George Grey sent a force against them, consisting of a few regulars, and a larger number of mounted police and burgher and native militia, which drove them from their country eastward behind the Bashee River. The Kosa clans in fact were by this time utterly disorganised and broken in pieces. When the Dutchmen first came face to face with the Bantu race, the men whom they met were these Kosa Kaffirs, the vanguard of a great black immigration, intruders like the European colonists into a Hottentot land. For generations the two races barred each other's progress, for generations officials on one side and chiefs on the other made treaties, and drew lines, and took rivers to be boundaries—but all in vain. The white men grew in numbers, they grew in strength and skill, the black men helped the white men by killing one another, there was going back and going forward and needless loss of life, but at length the end came, and the European held the field. But be it remembered that the so-called Kaffir wars were, in the main, wars against one section only of the Kaffir or Bantu race; they were wars of white colonists against black men who were immigrants like themselves; and they were wars in which the injury done by Europeans was as nothing compared with the wholesale destruction which the savages wrought among one another.

*Rearrange-
ment of
tribes and
locations in
Kaffraria.
See map
p. 248.*

The sequel of the story may be told in few words. From 1858 to 1865 the Transkei—the land between the Kei and the Bashee Rivers, which had belonged to Kreli and the Galekas, and from which they had been expelled—remained a neutral territory, for the most part empty of inhabitants. Only in one district, on the north-east, was land allotted to friendly Kaffirs, in what was known as the Idutywa Reserve. Neither the Imperial nor the Colonial Government were

ready to bear the expense and undertake the responsibility of settlement and administration. At length, in 1865, the Galekas were allowed to return into part of the territory, the part nearest the sea, which thenceforward for some years appeared on the maps as Galekaland, while on their inland borders was placed a strong colony of some 40,000 Fingos, again transplanted from the homes which had been in past years found for them in the Eastern districts of the colony. British Kaffraria was annexed to the Cape Colony, whose border thus extended to the Kei; and the Transkeian territories, further east, Fingoland, Galekaland, and other districts, remained in a state of semi-independence, all being under British protection, and some being nominally British possessions. The peoples lived under the rule of their respective chieftains, who were in most cases advised by British agents.

As years went on, the Galekas, once more a strong and fighting clan, cooped up in one corner only of their ancient territory, fell foul of their neighbours and hereditary foes, the Fingos; and Kreli, urged on, it would seem, by his followers, and mindful of his past position as hereditary paramount chief of the Kosa race, measured his strength yet once more, and for the last time, against the white man. In 1877-8 the rising took place. The struggle was hopeless. The Kosas were circled in by other rival tribes. Yet there was danger in the movement, for other and darker clouds were gathering on the horizon, and in Zululand greater numbers of a still stronger Kaffir race were mustering to arms. Sir Bartle Frere was then High Commissioner, and in October 1877 he issued a proclamation deposing Kreli and annexing his territory. For some months fighting went on, not without loss to the colonial levies and the small force of British troops which was available for the war. The outbreak spread into the colony, where Sandile and the Gaikas, who had long known peace under British rule, once more threw

*The Kaffir
war of
1877-8.*

PART I. in their lot with Kreli's men; but by the end of June 1878
the war was practically over, Sandile had been shot, and
Kreli was a fugitive, and there was an end to the long series
of border fights, which for a hundred years had been waged
between Dutch and English settlers on the one side and the
Kosa Kaffirs on the other.

—♦—
*Final
defeat of the
Kosas.*




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Map to illustrate the
KAFFIR WARS
from 1811-1878.

SCALE

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B.V. Darbishire, Oxford, 1913



CHAPTER VI.

THE BEGINNINGS OF NATAL AND THE BOER REPUBLICS.

THE connexion between the missionary movement and the great Boer emigration from the Cape Colony has already been noticed. Reference has also been made to the various subsidiary causes, which bred restlessness and discontent among the Dutch settlers. The Dutchmen had changed their masters and come under foreign rule, better rule, it is true, than their fathers or themselves had known, but still the rule of aliens. English supplanted Dutch as the language of the governors and the judges. Old boards and offices were swept away. British justice was administered, even-handed to black and white men alike, and therefore distasteful to those, not a few in number, who ignored the claims of the coloured races. Commandos against the natives were discouraged or forbidden. The system of land tenure was changed. Pecuniary loss was inflicted by the redemption of the paper currency below its nominal value, and by the emancipation of the slaves. The Governors at first were all powerful, and their personal character affected the lives and fortunes of their subjects. Lord Charles Somerset, for instance, who ruled from April 1814 to January 1820, and again from November 1821 to March 1826, able and public spirited as he was, was by nature a despot. He left his mark in many ways on the colony, and the names of Worcester, of Somerset, of Beaufort, still

CH. VI.

—
*Causes of
Dutch dis-
content.*

*Lord
Charles
Somerset.*

PART I.

*Slachter's
Nek.*

tell the tale of his family. His reign began with an uprising of border farmers in 1815, irritated by government interference with their treatment of the blacks. At a place named Slachter's Nek most of them laid down their arms, but five were afterwards hung for high treason, a stern sentence and one which alienated Dutch sympathies. The later years of his government were embittered by quarrels with the colonial press, not yet set free, and in the end he returned to England to answer charges which were brought against him in the House of Commons, and resigned his appointment.

One cause and another embittered the colonists, especially the Dutchmen; and at the end, when Sir Benjamin D'Urban's policy was rudely reversed by Lord Glenelg, many of the Boers felt their position to be intolerable. Their remedy was in trekking, and they trekked. In the present chapter it is proposed to give some account of the lands to which they went, of the peoples with whom they came into conflict, and of the communities which they founded.

*Geography
of Africa
South of
the Zam-
besi.*

From the southernmost point of South Africa to the Zambesi in the latitude of the Victoria Falls is, in a straight line on the map, a distance of some 1,200 miles. East of the falls, the Zambesi flows to the north, encircling Mashonaland, much of which is in a more northerly latitude than the falls themselves. The Zambesi may be taken as the northern limit of South Africa, as bounding a great peninsula, the main geographical features of which are not difficult to trace. The land rises, as has already been pointed out, from the sea towards the interior, and the main lines of mountains run parallel to the sea. The interior is everywhere an elevated plateau, high above the level of the coast. But the ground rises also from the west to the east, and on the east not only are the mountain-tops as a rule higher than on the west, but the plains as a whole

attain a greater general elevation. The east too is the side which nature has favoured. The rainfall there is heavier; the rivers are more numerous; the resources are richer. It is from the south or the east that men come into southern Africa, not from the west, where stretch the dreary wastes of Damara and Namaqualand.

Beyond the third line of mountains in the Cape of Good Hope province is the Upper Karroo, extending north to the Orange River, and not in fact bounded by that river, for the main plateau of the continent is now reached. There is a slight slope towards the river, but, standing on its banks, Hopetown is 3,600 feet above the sea, and Aliwal North, further up the river, to the south-east, has an altitude of 4,300 feet. Beyond the river the town of Kimberley stands 4,000 feet above sea level, while in the province of the Orange Free State, to the east of and in a slightly more southerly latitude than Kimberley, Bloemfontein is 4,500 feet high. To the north, in the district of Bechuanaland, the level of the ground is somewhat lower, the height of Kuruman above the sea being given at about 3,500 feet, and of Vryburg at rather less than 3,900 feet. Mafeking, however, on the northern boundary of the district, has an altitude of nearly 4,200 feet. In the Transvaal, due east of Bechuanaland, the land again rises. Pretoria, which is in the same latitude as Mafeking, is nearly 4,500 feet high; and Johannesburg, standing on the Witwatersrand ridge, about thirty-five miles south-west of Pretoria, has a level of over 5,600 feet. Farther north again, in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and in the northern districts of the Transvaal, the course of the rivers indicates a fall of the ground towards the north-east. The Bakwena town of Molepolole is given an altitude of 4,000 feet, and Khama's capital Palapye stands on a level of 3,150 feet. Far off in the desert to the north-west, the altitude of desolate Lake Ngami has been variously estimated, but may be taken to be about 3,000 feet. The Tati gold

CH. VI.

*Height of
the South
African
plateau.*

PART I. fields, on the borders of Khama's country and Matabeleland, are on a lower level, about 2,600 feet above the sea. Finally, there is a definite rise to the north-east up to the plateau of Mashonaland, where the ground on which the township of Salisbury stands is 5,000 feet high.

These figures, though in some cases only approximately correct, indicate sufficiently for the purpose how high the interior of South Africa is above sea level. The height of Snowdon, and of the Table Mountain at the Cape, is under 3,600 feet; the height of Ben Nevis is 4,400. The ordinary level therefore of the South African plateau may be taken to be as high as the tops of the first two mountains, and residents at Johannesburg and Salisbury are living at a considerably greater altitude than the summit of Ben Nevis. The height of the ground modifies to some extent the heat of the climate, for the north of the Transvaal, the northern part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and the whole of Rhodesia are in the tropics. On the eastern coast, great rivers open out into the sea amid tropical swamps, where white men sicken and die. In the same latitudes inland Europeans work and thrive, they replenish the earth and subdue it.

The Kalahari. The central tract of the South African plateau is or used to be known as the Kalahari desert. On the maps the Kalahari lies between the German Protectorate on the west and the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia on the east, but the dry zone, the so-called desert region, has a far larger area. On the west it begins many miles south of the Orange River, and extends into Portuguese territory. In the centre it includes Griqualand West, Bechuanaland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate; and east of these territories it embraces much of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. It stretches across the continent, in short, from the Atlantic to the line of mountain ranges which look down upon the eastern coast. Desert it is called, and in parts desert it is,

but it has earned the name rather from scarcity than from absence of water. Rain falls but seldom, it falls in thunder showers which sink into the sandy soil, and in most places no water runs off in rivers to the sea. Springs and fountains are few and far between, though wells are found by boring; and, owing to the high level of the ground, evaporation is rapid. The country is undulating and open, mostly bare of trees, but after rains tall grasses shoot up and cover the ground. The land becomes more fertile towards the mountains on the east, and here lasting rivers give certainty of life. Taking Capetown and Table Bay as the historic starting-point for the interior, the line of life and the line of European colonisation has run north-east.

Deserts are the homes of wandering beasts and wandering men, the refuge of outcasts from more favoured lands. In old days the Kalahari, taken in its widest sense, was in the main inhabited only by nomad bands of Bushmen and a few Korannas of Hottentot origin. In later times immigrants of other races found their way into its eastern districts. The many tribes which are included in the Bechuana division of the Bantu race came down from the north, while on the south the frontier Boers of the Cape Colony sent their cattle over the border in times of drought for better pasturage.

On the northern boundary of the colony, in the region of the Orange River, was a number of half-breeds, the result of Dutch and Hottentot intermixture, but more Hottentot than Dutch, and supplemented by many blacks of pure Hottentot race. They were known at first as the Bastards, but subsequently took the better sounding name of Griquas¹. In their wanderings they came into contact with the missionaries, and under missionary guidance, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they established themselves north of the

¹ See above, p. 99, note.

latitude, and from $22\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ to 25° east longitude.' His influence had, so the Governor wrote, a still wider extent, and thus the Colonial Government secured a useful ally against the freebooters who raided the Boers' flocks and herds. This treaty, one of the first formal documents of the kind between the English in South Africa and a native chieftain, was warmly approved by the Secretary of State, as embodying the pacific views of the Imperial Government; and its conclusion, it should be noted, was due to missionary influence¹.

Meanwhile the other two bands of Griquas had moved further off. Barends and his company led a career of plundering until 1831, when many of them were cut off by the Matabele. The survivors were transplanted by Wesleyan missionaries to the western bank of the Caledon, within what are now the limits of the Orange Free State Province, on the borders of Basutoland. There they held together till about the year 1846, but shortly afterwards dispersed and disappeared. The other and stronger party, who were *The Koks* led by the Koks, had more of a history. One of two brothers, Adam Kok, wandered off to the east, and in 1826, established himself with his following at the mission station of Philippolis², now in the southern district of the Orange Free State. His son, also named Adam Kok, became the recognised leader of the eastern group of Griquas, as Waterboer was of the western: and in 1835, the two chiefs made a treaty, defining a boundary between their respective lands or rather, to use a modern term, their respective Spheres of Influence. Thus it was that Waterboer's territory came in time to bear the name of Griqualand West, as distinguished from Adam Kok's land, the land of the Eastern Griquas. Both chiefs were recognised by the British Government, but a different fate befel the one and the other.

¹ Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, pt. ii. 1835, p. 114.

² Called after Dr. Philip, the eminent head of the London Mission in South Africa, on whose invitation Adam Kok came to the place.

PART I. Waterboer's territory and people remained independent, until, in 1871, after the discovery of the diamond fields, Griqualand West, was, at the request of the Griquas themselves, annexed to the British Crown. Adam Kok's land, on the other hand, became merged in the Orange Free State, and in 1862 its old owners were removed by the Governor of the Cape far away beyond the Drakensberg mountains to an empty ceded district, whose name of No-man's land was thenceforward exchanged for that of Griqualand East.

Griqualand West

Griqualand East.

Divisions of the Bantus.

1. *The coast Kaffirs.*

2. *The Basutos.*

3. *The Bechuanas.*

Behind the border country, where these Griqua half-breeds roamed and dwelt, were many tribes of the widely extended Bantu race¹. In South Africa the Bantus have been classed in three main divisions. There are the Kaffirs of the coast region, the mountain tribes of Basutoland, and the Bechuana tribes of the central plateau, the Basutos and Bechuanas being more nearly allied to each other than to the coast Kaffirs. This last section included and includes various clans or groups of clans, the Kosas, to whom the preceding chapter was devoted, the Fingos, the Tembus, the Pondos, the Zulus, the Tongas, the Swazis, and other tribes whose names are now almost forgotten. The present inhabitants of Basutoland, the mountaineers of South Africa, comprise the remains of several more or less distinct tribes, whom it is unnecessary to specify by name. Of the Bechuanas the southernmost tribe was the Batlapin, Bantus but with some intermixture of Hottentot blood, and north of the Batlapin were the Baralong, the Bangwaketse, the Bakwena and others, the best known Bechuana chief at the present day being Khama, whose people bear the name of Bamangwato. The fertile well-watered lands of the coast region nourished the finest and strongest natives, physically and morally superior to their kinsmen of the interior, though

¹ For a masterly account of the Bantu tribes of South Africa reference should be made to the thirty-fourth chapter of Mr. Theal's history.

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more aggressive and less easy to tame. The mountains of Basutoland gave strength and security to the tribes who took refuge there from the open country; at the same time the valleys are rich, the soil brings forth abundantly; it is a land suited to be the home of a more or less settled population of native agriculturists. On the central plains, on the other hand, the Bechuanas followed a purely pastoral life, wandering, unwarlike, the prey of stronger men.

It is not easy to take true stock of the Bantu race, as it came gradually into full view before European eyes less than a hundred years ago. How did these natives compare with the natives of other lands? Were they more or less organised? Had they greater or smaller capabilities? On what level did they stand? By what standard should they be tried? Any comparison is difficult, for it must probably be a comparison, not merely of one native race with another, but of one native race in one century with another native race in another. Africa, as a whole, has been many years and many generations behind other parts of the world, and the events which have taken place in South Africa in our own days find their true counterpart in other continents in the history of times long past. If we look back to the story of North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there is a record of Indian tribes who had already taken distinct form and shape, each of whom had their own country and hunting grounds, each of whom had their tribal organisation, their hereditary friends, and their hereditary foes. In one instance at least there was a trace of some higher political instinct, for the five nations of the Iroquois were banded together in a confederacy of no small strength. These North American Indians were savages, but they had a sense of patriotism, of ownership of the soil: they held together to some extent in peace and war; their homes in the borderland between French and English in North America were not the

CH. VI.

*The
Bantus
compared
with the
North
American
Indians.*

PART I. temporary shelters of wanderers, but the abiding places of the children of the land. It was their land and the land of their fathers, given them by the Almighty; they knew it, and they clung to their heritage with the grim fierce determination of fighting men, who had rights to be respected and homes to keep. One place was not to them as good as another. They might be exterminated, but they could not be cast out.

The Bantus of South Africa were in the main nomads.

Turning from North America to South Africa, we find at a much later period a picture of more primitive life. In the earlier years of the nineteenth century—to some extent throughout that century—the South African peoples were in a fluid state; the land with its inhabitants was in the melting-pot of history. White men and black alike were constantly in motion, locations were being changed, tribes were passing in and out of existence. Where the Kosas met the colonists, pressure on either side tended to produce solidity, and the Kosa chiefs asserted their title to the soil with some distinctness of utterance and some clearness of perception. Yet their clans were shifted with little difficulty by the Government from one district to another, Fingos were transplanted with equal ease, Griquas were moved in the same manner. No feature, in fact, in South African history is more striking than the comparative facility with which, under British direction, the border tribes were sorted out and rearranged. In like manner, where the white man's presence was not yet felt, one tribe displaced another in quick succession. The Kaffirs went up and down through South Africa, and none could claim possession of any one district or territory by immemorial right.

Weakness of the tribal bond among the Bantus.

And not only were the peoples not attached to the soil, but the tribal bond, the tie which held one family to another, was weak and easily dissolved. The smaller clans became incorporated in the stronger, and the remnants of broken tribes united in new combinations. Thus it was that the strong man, as opposed to the hereditary chieftain, played

so prominent a part in the native history of South Africa. CH. VI.
 Before the beginning of the present century the Zulus were
 a small and insignificant tribe, owing a kind of feudal *Rise of the*
 allegiance to a stronger people. A younger son of their *Zulus.*
 chief, with no claim to succeed to his father's position,
 quarrelled with his father and took refuge with the head
 of the clan to whom the Zulus were subordinate. This
 paramount chief, Dingiswayo, developed a military organisa- *Chaka.*
 tion among his people; the refugee, Chaka, rose to be one
 of his generals; he was, on a vacancy, installed as chief of
 the Zulus; and, when Dingiswayo died, the soldiers chose
 him for their leader. Thus a member of a subordinate clan,
 who could not rightly claim the headship of that clan, was
 eventually elected to be paramount chief of the dominant
 people. Chaka went on as he had begun. He created
 a strong and rigidly disciplined army, and under his sway
 a union of various clans, drilled and organised, attained
 something like the proportions of a nation. Such was the
 origin of the Zulu power. It was formed not so much by
 a hereditary chieftain as by a successful warrior. Its basis
 was not the tie of kinsmanship so much as the bond of
 military discipline. Its units were not clans but regiments.
 The Zulu warriors were perhaps more nearly allied to the
 Turkish Janissaries than to the clansmen who two hundred
 years ago formed the following of a Highland chief.

The chieftain of one of the small tribes which was *Rise of the*
 absorbed in this Zulu empire had a son named Umsilikasi *Matabele.*
 or Moselekatsé. He became one of Chaka's favourite *Mosele-*
 generals, but eventually incurred his wrath, and, with the *katsé.*
 division of the army under his command, he crossed the
 mountains into the territory now included within the borders
 of the Transvaal province, where, about the year 1817,
 he established a new military dominion on the Zulu pattern.
 This was the beginning of the Matabele, like the Zulus, from
 whom they parted, not a single tribe but a collection of

PART I. regiments. Raiding and depopulating wherever they went, they were in 1837 driven by the emigrant farmers far away to the north, and for half a century, under Moselekatse and his son Lobengula, were the strongest native power between the Limpopo and Zambesi.

Rise of the Basutos. Chaka and Moselekatse, with all their courage and ability, were ruffianly savages of the worst type; but a better account can be given of a third strong man who rose to eminence among the natives of South Africa, Moshesh, the Basuto leader. He too owed little or nothing to family or hereditary prestige, but by strength of body and force of character achieved greatness. Among the shattered remnants of various tribes, he collected a number of personal followers, and established himself in the mountain fastness of Thaba Bosigo on the eastern side of the Caledon River. There he maintained himself against all comers, the mountaineers gathered round him, and refugees from the plains placed themselves under his protection. His rule, as compared with Zulu or Matabele tyranny, was mild and merciful. In his land the ministers of the Paris Evangelical Society were warmly welcomed. On its borders Wesleyan missionaries placed wandering clans, for a time in comparative security and peace. He lived to hold his own with the white men in peace and in arms, and Basutoland at the present day, well organised and administered as a British colony, owes its existence to the native warrior and statesman who from various discordant elements created a people.

Moshesh. Such were the Bantus when Europeans first came among them, unformed politically and socially, little inspired by love of country or love of race, living in groups which could not be called communities. Yet for this very reason there was and is hope for them in the future. Because they were so plastic, they could be more easily moulded than tribes and races which had been stereotyped in higher but imperfect forms. From what they heard or saw of white men, it

would seem that the Zulus conceived their military system. When conquered they did not pine away or die out, they exchanged masters, and learnt the arts of peace as readily as in old times the science of war. There is natural strength in the Kaffir race, a strength which does not exhaust itself in sullen isolation, capable of development on new lines and under new rules, a strength which means vitality and promise of progress. They were fortunate in that, at an early stage in their own history, they came under the rule or influence of Europeans, they were no less fortunate in that the Europeans who overpowered them were not the Europeans of two hundred years ago. Much has been done, no doubt, even in our own days, which might have been left undone, and much has been done which might have been better done; but after all the white men, under whose control the native races of South Africa have passed and are passing, have reached a higher level of humanity than their forefathers.

'The interior of Africa, at no great distance from this settlement, appears to be in a state of great commotion, and for some years past various powerful tribes have been pressing to the southward, driving the weaker ones before them, from whom many fugitives, under different appellations, have obtained refuge in the colony¹.' So wrote the acting Governor of the Cape, General Bourke, to the Secretary of State in October, 1827. *The Zulu conquests.*

The native history of South Africa fills but a small and obscure place in the history of the world, but it may be doubted whether at any time or in any place could be found a record of such wholesale extermination as was wrought, directly or indirectly, by Chaka and his Zulu warriors in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. Tribe after tribe was overpowered and massacred. Those who fled

¹ Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, pt. ii. 1835, p. 22.

PART I. before the invaders hurled themselves on other peoples. The fertile, thickly peopled districts of Natal were desolated, and the hand of the destroyer was felt, from the country of the Kosas on the south, to the wild territory on the north where the Swazis could not be subdued. Even over the Drakensberg mountains the Zulus followed their prey, and where they stopped their kinsmen the Matabele took up the tale of slaughter. Not far short of a million human beings are supposed to have been blotted out, partly in the mere lust of bloodshed, partly in the instinct of self-preservation.

An irruption of flying tribes over the north-eastern boundary of the colony, and news that Chaka was preparing to invade the Kosas, gave to the Colonial Government some indication of what had been taking place, though the horrible thoroughness of this savage revolution was only fully appreciated in after times. That it should be so appreciated is of no small importance to those who would read aright South African history. We are told much of European aggressiveness, but hear little of European protection. We have highly drawn pictures of white men taking the black men's lives and lands in greed of gain and lust of conquest. Yet beyond the reach of Dutch or English influence and control, natives butchered one another in hundreds of thousands, and the land was left bare without inhabitants.

*Early
British
settlers in
Natal.*

As far back as the year 1689 the Dutch Company went through the form of buying from the natives the shores of the Bay of Natal¹. They never utilised their purchase even to the extent of forming a station there, as for a few years one was formed at Delagoa Bay², and nothing is heard of Natal in connexion with European colonisation until the year 1823. In that year a scheme for establishing trade with the natives in south-eastern Africa was started at

¹ See above, p. 64.

² See above, p. 83.

Capetown, and a brig was sent to Natal. The first voyage was unsuccessful, principally owing to difficulties in landing; but in the following year another voyage was undertaken, with better results. The leaders of the enterprise had from the first been two men of the name of Farewell and King, both at one time officers in the Royal Navy¹, and among other names which occur in the narrative are those of Fynn, Ogle, and a man called John Cane. They made friends with Chaka, and from that chief Farewell obtained in August, 1824, a grant of the port of Natal with the surrounding country for 100 miles inland, and a coast-line of ten miles to the south and twenty-five miles to the north. This territory the owner proclaimed to be a British possession. Subsequently, Fynn obtained another grant from the Zulu king of the southern portion of the present province of Natal as far as the Umzimkulu River. The districts which were nominally ceded were, owing to the Zulu wars, almost depopulated, but gradually native fugitives gathered round the white men, who became in some sort leaders of clans under the paramount rule of Chaka. The position of the adventurers was dangerous to the last degree. They depended on Chaka's personal friendship, they traded with him alone, they had on occasions to act as emissaries from him to the Governor of the Cape, and appearing with his armies they incurred the displeasure of the Imperial Government. Chaka was assassinated in 1828, and succeeded by his half-brother Dingaan, more treacherous and hardly if at all less bloodthirsty. Twice the Europeans fled for their lives, but twice returned, and in 1834 Dingaan

*Chaka's
grant to
Lieut.
Farewell.*

*Chaka suc-
ceeded by
Dingaan.*

¹ In 1828 Lieut. Farewell was regarded as still on leave from the Royal Navy, for the Secretary of State wrote that in view of 'Englishmen having been seen fighting in the ranks of the Zoolas against the Kaffirs' . . . a letter was to be sent to him 'for the purpose of intimating to him that if he should be found to have given his countenance to Chaka in this chief's projects against the Kaffirs, his leave of absence will be recalled.' Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, pt. ii. 1835, p. 33.

PART I. withdrew his warriors from the coast district to give encouragement and confidence to the white traders. Two years before it had been contemplated to place a responsible officer of the British Government at Natal, and in June 1834, the Governor of the Cape, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, forwarded to Downing Street a petition from a large number of Cape merchants praying 'for the formation of a government establishment at Port Natal, with an adequate military force for the protection of the trade with that place¹.' The answer was a polite refusal on the grounds of expense. From the correspondence on the subject it appears that an impression had gained ground that the government of the United States, anxious to find footholds for American trade in the Southern seas, was likely to take possession of Natal. There came, however, from America not soldiers nor sailors, but missionaries, who in 1835 established themselves in Dingaan's land. In the same year Captain Allen Gardiner, author of *A Narrative of a Journey to the Zulu Country*, arrived as a pioneer of missionary enterprise on behalf of the Church of England. Thus the trader and the missionary were preparing the ground for colonisation, and in the worst stronghold of savagery civilised man was setting foot. The little band of Europeans at the port drew up plans of a regular township, they subscribed for a church, they christened their territory Victoria, and their prospective town Durban. They petitioned to be adopted as a colony², but again the Imperial Government held its hand. Meanwhile Dutch immigrants, the trekkers from the south-west,

*Captain
Allen Gardiner.*

¹ Papers relative to Cape of Good Hope, pt. ii. 1835, p. 95.

² The petition of 1835 from 'the householders of the town of D'urban, Port Natal' ran as follows:—'That it may please His Majesty to recognise the country intervening between the Umzimkulu and Tugela rivers, which we have named Victoria in honour of our august princess, as a colony of the British Empire, and to appoint a Governor and Council with power to enact such laws and regulations as may be deemed expedient by them in concert with a body of representatives chosen by ourselves to constitute a House of Assembly.'

were beginning to find their way over the mountains, and in sorrow and suffering the land of Natal was yet to be won. CH. VI.

In 1836 began the great Boer trek from the eastern and northern districts of the Cape Colony. The farmers went out in groups of families, taking with them in their ox waggons their wives and children and their worldly goods¹. North and north-east they went, into the lands which are now the provinces of the Orange Free State, the Transvaal, and Natal; and the names of various places tell of what they did, of what they suffered, and of the men who led them. The village of Winburg, in the Orange Free State, takes its name from a victory over the Matabele; Weenen in Natal, the place of weeping, was the scene of a massacre by Dingaan's Zulu warriors; Lydenburg in the east of the Transvaal recalls sufferings endured by an advanced party of emigrants in 1845; Hendrik Potgieter gave his name to Potchefstroom, Pretorius to Pretoria, Pieter Retief and Gerrit Maritz to Pietermaritzburg. Anxious to move beyond the reach of the British Government, the emigrants were at the same time practical farmers, seeking for the best land whereon to make their new homes. Delagoa Bay was known by repute; a party of Cape farmers had lately prospected in Natal; and pioneer bands of trekkers made their way to the Zoutpansberg in the north of the Transvaal, finding new vegetation and traces of iron and gold. To the east, they knew, was the land of promise; to the east was the outlet to the sea; but, as the direct route was barred by the Kosa Kaffirs and the mountain heights of Basutoland, they started north over the Orange River, and made their first foothold in the Orange Free State. Whichever way they went, unless they faced starvation in the Kalahari desert, there was fighting to be done. On the

¹ The number of emigrants has been vaguely estimated at from 5,000 to 10,000.

PART I. plateau were the Matabele. On the seaward side of the mountains were the Zulus.

*The Trek-
kers in the
Orange
Free State.* One of the earliest parties, led by Potgieter, took up ground which now forms the northern portion of the Orange Free State, lying between the Vet and the Vaal Rivers.

*Defeat of
the Matabele.*

The territory was ceded by a native chief, who was promised in return protection against the Matabele. Some of the emigrants strayed on further to the north, and some were cut off by Moselekatse; but more and more farmers kept coming in from the colony, and by the end of 1837, the Matabele, weakened in the meantime by a defeat at the hands of the Zulus, were hunted out of the land which they had made desolate, and fled far to the north beyond the Limpopo. Thus the north of the Orange Free State, most if not all of the Transvaal, and Bechuanaland, lay open to the emigrants, who proclaimed it to be theirs by the right of the sword.

*Settlement
at Win-
burg.*

Before the Matabele had been finally driven out, the beginning of a permanent settlement was made at Winburg. In June, 1837, a Volksraad was elected to enact what simple laws might be necessary, and Pieter Retief, a colonist of Huguenot descent, who had been one of the leading men in the Albany district of the Cape Colony, was chosen to be Commandant-general. But Winburg was the beginning not the end of wandering, jealousy and dissension between one leader and another led to dispersion, and bands went off in different directions to encounter new perils and colonise new lands.

*The Boer
emigrants
in Natal.*

Retief himself, in October, 1837, crossed the Drakensberg mountains into Natal, to examine the country with a view to occupation, and to procure permission from the Zulu king to form a settlement. Warmly welcomed by the Englishmen at the port, and received by Dingaan with outward friendliness, he returned to the main body of his followers and brought them over the mountains. On the

southern side of the Tugela River the farmers waited, scattered here and there, while their leader, with some sixty companions, paid a second visit to Dingaan. He never came back, but was massacred with the whole of his company, and in a second massacre at the emigrants' halting place, since known as Weenen, white men, women, and children were slaughtered to the number of nearly three hundred. From beyond the Drakensberg more Dutchmen came down to aid the survivors, and the Englishmen at Port Natal with their black adherents made common cause against the common foe. But Boers and Englishmen alike fell out amongst themselves, and at first little headway was made against the Zulus. A Dutch commando was roughly handled, and one of its leaders Pieter Uys was killed; the settlement at the port was overrun and broken up; and when some of the English traders ventured back to the place, few in number, they ceded their rights to the Dutchmen, who now styled themselves the 'Association of South African Emigrants.'

Doggedly the Boers held their ground against Dingaan, though suffering from distress and want of proper food; fresh numbers of their countrymen joined them from time to time; and towards the end of 1838 a capable man took command, Andries Pretorius. Then came the day of reckoning with the crafty ruffian who ruled the Zulus. In December, 1838, a body of determined Dutchmen crossed the Tugela, and on the banks of a stream, since known as the Blood River, laid low some three thousand savages. Marching on the king's kraal they found it in flames and Dingaan a fugitive, though still strong enough to be dangerous. Less than a year later, a younger brother of Dingaan, Panda by name, rose against him and secured the Boers' support. Dingaan was utterly defeated and eventually assassinated, and Panda was installed as king of the Zulus north of the Tugela River, owing allegiance

CH. VI.

—♦—
The massacre at Weenen.

Andries Pretorius.

Defeat of Dingaan and the Zulus.

Dingaan succeeded by Panda as king of the Zulus.

PART I. to the emigrant farmers, who claimed to be supreme from
 —♦—♦— St. Lucia Bay on the north to where the Umzimvubu River
 pours itself into the sea through the gates of St. John.

*Successes of
the Boers.* Thus, between 1836 and 1840, the Boers who had
 trekked from the Cape Colony had driven out the Matabele
 and broken the Zulus. They had established a claim to
 a great extent of inland territory north of the Orange
 River, and on the eastern coast to a district comparing in
 size with the present province of Natal. They had done
 much fighting and done it well, for they had fought in their
 own old-fashioned way. The commando system was well
 suited to South African warfare. The farmers came out,
 each with his horse and gun, well mounted, expert marks-
 men, led by one of themselves. Their fortresses were
 waggons, they fought as hunters of men. While disciplined
 British troops moved slowly forward in orthodox fashion,
 obeying out of season the rules learnt in European cam-
 paigns, the Cape Boer carried into war the habits and
 customs of his own irregular border life. Few against many
 they faced the savages, they had fire-arms and could use
 them, they had horses and could ride them. The wild
 free life of South Africa was to their liking, they fought
 for their wives and their children, as their fathers and fore-
 fathers had fought, their stern Puritan minds were not
 troubled with misgivings, they entered in and took the land
 of the heathen in possession.

*The Boer
Republic
in Natal.*

The Dutchmen were not politicians—and never had been.
 They knew little and cared little for constitutions. Personal
 freedom they valued, the absence of restraint rather than
 the power to discipline and organise themselves and others.
 In Natal they set up a republic with a very simple form of
 government, which practically amounted to no government at
 all. They could co-operate for offence and defence. Other-
 wise, they had practically little bond of union beyond the tie
 of common blood and common speech. Pietermaritzburg

was their chief settlement, and their other stations were Weenen and Port Natal. On the western side of the Drakensberg mountains two districts were formed, the district of Winburg south of the Vaal, the district of Potchefstroom to the north of that river. Potgieter was in chief command over both these districts, Pretorius was leader in Natal. There was a Volksraad for Winburg and Potchefstroom, and a larger Volksraad for Natal: and, for matters which concerned the whole of the emigrants, it was arranged that the two assemblies should combine and take counsel at Pietermaritzburg.

While these events were taking place, the British Government at home and the Government of the Cape Colony were in doubt and difficulty. A large number of British subjects had left the colony. They claimed to have renounced their allegiance. They claimed to have founded independent communities. Was this claim to be allowed? Was the European power, which since 1806 had been unchallenged in South Africa, to recognise in men who had seceded, and in a sense revolted, independent co-partners in the work of colonising South Africa? They were the men the accounts of whose dealings towards the natives had inspired the policy of the Secretaries of State. Were they to carry those dealings into the interior and on to the east coast, and outside English rule to work their will upon the black men? On the other hand, the old note of weariness, almost of despair, was ever ringing in the ears of English statesmen. The empire is too large already, its burden is too great, there must be no more annexation, no more lands or peoples to rule. As has usually resulted in English history, matters settled themselves in blundering fashion, not wholly as might have been wished, yet not altogether as badly as might have been expected. So far as there was any foresight or policy, it was probably created by the fact that the emigrants reached the sea and obtained

CH. VI.

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*The Republics
 north and
 south of the
 Vaal.*

*Attitude of
 the British
 Govern-
 ment
 towards the
 Trekkers.*

PART I. possession of Port Natal; and what actually took place was that the British Government regained and kept Natal, while in the interior the Boers eventually secured their independence. The reason is obvious. The keepers of the sea are the keepers of South Africa. A Boer republic in the interior was more or less isolated and self-contained, a Boer republic on the seaboard might have invited the interference of other nations rivals of the English.

Durban, the port of Natal, bears the name of an English governor of the Cape. The inland town of Pietermaritzburg is called after two Dutchmen. The beginning of English colonisation came in from the sea. The Dutch element came over the mountains. The English had priority in time, but they were only a handful; the British Government refused to recognise them as a colony, and the scanty remnant of a very small band of traders threw in their lot with the Dutch. In July, 1838, General Napier, who had succeeded Sir Benjamin D'Urban at the Cape, issued a proclamation, referring to the emigrants as being British subjects¹, inviting them to return to the Cape Colony with a promise that their grievances should be redressed, and intimating that at his convenience he would take possession of the port of Natal. In the following November he sent a small detachment of troops to keep command of the port, and in vain he pressed the home government to declare Natal to be a British Colony. Temporary and military occupation of the harbour was approved by Lord Glenelg and his successor Lord Normanby, but their consent could not be won to the extension of British dominion in South Africa. Under these circumstances the Governor considered the presence of the soldiers in Natal to be useless

*A British
garrison
placed at
Durban in
1838*

¹ As British subjects they came within the terms of an Imperial Act of 1836 [6 and 7 Will. 4, cap. 57] by which the criminal law of the Cape Colony was made applicable to all His Majesty's subjects 'within any territory adjacent to the said colony and being to the southward of the twenty-fifth degree of south latitude.'

and possibly misleading; and at the end of 1839 the detachment was withdrawn. Some months passed, the Boers gave outward form and shape to their republic, and began to negotiate with the Governor for formal recognition of their independence, asking in September 1840 to be acknowledged as a free and independent people, but with the privileges of British subjects, and in the following January, in bolder and more explicit terms, to be recognised as a republic in close alliance with Great Britain. In the meantime, however, the colonisation of Natal under the British flag was urged both in England and at the Cape. Lord John Russell, now Secretary of State, began to yield to pressure, and the farmers damaged their cause by their dealings with the natives.

CH. VI.
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*but with-
 drawn in
 1839.*

The territory which they claimed south of the Umzimkulu River was claimed also, in whole or part, by Faku the leading chieftain of the Pondo tribe, who had been for some years in alliance with the Cape Government, and who was held to that alliance by the influence of Wesleyan missionaries. A cattle raid by a neighbouring and rival clan led to reprisals on the part of the farmers, and a commando, headed by Pretorius, killed some of the natives and carried off captives and plunder. The Pondo chief, fearing that his own turn would come next, appealed for protection to the Governor of the Cape Colony, and his appeal was answered by the despatch of a party of troops, early in 1841, to take up a station in his country. Meanwhile, relieved from fear of the Zulus, the remnants of broken tribes were finding their way back to Natal; and, as their number grew, the farmers' Volksraad resolved to locate them in this same border-land—the debateable district south of the Umzimkulu. Such a resolution was, in the eyes of the Cape Government, an infringement of the Pondo territory, and fraught with danger for the future; for it gave ground for fear that pressure from the side of Natal would drive the Kaffir

*The Boers
 raid the
 natives.*

PART I. clans one on another, until the Cape Colony was again overrun¹. At the same time, a new source of anxiety was discovered in an American trading ship, which came to Natal and did some business at the harbour. It was the beginning, so it appeared to the Cape merchants, of foreign traffic with and foreign interference in South Africa, by a port and a route over which their government had no control. It seemed clear that some decided action must be taken, and in April 1842 the troops from Faku's country were marched on into Natal to resume occupation of the port.

Durban again garrisoned by British troops in 1842.

Fighting between the garrison and the Boers.

Submission of the Boers.

A few weeks before they arrived, a Dutch vessel had appeared on the scene. She had been sent out by a firm of merchants in the Netherlands, fired by sympathy with their countrymen in South Africa, and by the hope of establishing a new branch of trade. The farmers interpreted the visit as an indication that they would receive support and protection from the Netherlands Government, and, strong in this belief, they sent protests to the commander of the British troops, who had taken up his position at the head of the port. The protests were followed by open warfare; and, defeated in a night attack upon the Boer forces, the Englishmen were closely besieged in their camp. Before they could be starved out, however, reinforcements arrived by sea, the siege was speedily raised, the farmers broke up, and in July 1842 their representatives tendered submission to the authority of the Queen. The final issue was still uncertain, and remained so for some

¹ Before the date of this Boer commando, and before this resolution of the Volksraad, Major Charters, who had commanded the first detachment of troops which occupied Port Natal in 1838-9, writing in the United Service Journal in November, 1839, enumerated the tribes between Natal and the Cape Colony, and added:—'It does not appear to me to be beyond the chances of possibility that, in the course of one or two generations, the emigrants who are now settling in the Natal country may be the nucleus of a power capable of moving this host against the colony and besieging the English in Cape Castle.'

months, while the Governor and the Secretary of State were interchanging views. At length, in April 1843, Lord Stanley being then Secretary of State, a despatch arrived at the Cape which intimated that Natal and the settlers in Natal should be taken under British protection and placed under British law, though the wishes of the Boers were to be consulted as far as possible in regard to such local institutions as might be required. Their wishes were to be ascertained by a special Commissioner, any bonâ-fide land claims were to be respected, and Natal was to be constituted in some sort a self-governing colony, provided that British law and British sovereignty was maintained, that no distinction was made between black or white in the eye of the law, that no slavery was tolerated, and no unauthorised aggression permitted upon natives residing beyond the limits of the colony.

The Commissioner arrived in June, 1843, and found all in confusion. The Netherlands Government had disowned the intrigues of its subjects, but those intrigues were still proceeding. Native refugees from Zululand were flocking into the country. The Boer Government had collapsed, and the scene was one of anarchy. Yet the mass of the farmers were still antagonistic to British rule, and large numbers came down from the plateau to stiffen their resistance. They debated, they squabbled, the men threatened and the women talked; but, when the Commissioner announced that the Drakensberg would be recommended as the boundary of the future colony, the fighting Boers from the interior went back over the mountains, and left their comrades to take care of themselves. Eventually, the terms which the Governor offered were accepted, the farmers asking that Natal should be kept distinct from the Cape, having its own elected Legislative Council and such simple machinery of government as they could trust and understand. By agreement with the Zulu king, Panda, the

*Final
annexation
of Natal
and rectifi-
cation of its
frontiers.*

PART I. Umzimyati or Buffalo River, from its source to its meeting with the Tugela, and the Tugela to the sea, was constituted the northern boundary of the colony, giving to Natal a large piece of territory between the Buffalo and the Upper Tugela, and St. Lucia Bay was also ceded to the British Crown. On the other hand, no pretence was made of any longer treating Zululand and its king as under the suzerainty of the Natal Government. On the south, the frontier of the colony was moved back to the Umzimkulu River, and up to that river the territory which the Boers had previously claimed was assigned to Faku, the Pondo chief.

Thus Natal became a British Colony, and a British Colony it has remained. The story, of which a scanty outline has been given above, is not a pleasant one for an Englishman to read or record. There must have been mismanagement and needless misunderstanding to inspire the South African Dutchmen who trekked to Natal with such deeply rooted mistrust of British rule. They protested against it, they fought against it, and, when the end came, they most of them left the country. That such animosity should have grown up and taken root speaks little for the tact and wisdom of the politicians who handled South African matters. Some bad feeling was inevitable, as the outcome of the conflict and contrast between different views of life. The difference was not so much between Dutch and English, as between men who were modelled on the lines of the seventeenth or eighteenth century, and those who were inspired by the progressive, humanitarian, but withal wavering spirit of the nineteenth century. Yet true statesmanship finds ways of compromise and reconciliation, of healing breaches, before the iron enters into the soul and the bitterness of the fathers is inherited by the children. The golden mean was not discovered in South Africa, or rather it was not discovered in England for South Africa; and rough, untutored, obstinate men were perpetually perplexed

Causes of the animosity of the Boers against the British Government.


SOUTH A

To face page 204

The Colony of Natal is
the Commission of
St. Lucia Bay annexed

British Territory

Territory occupied by
still claimed as Brit



B. V. Barbishire, Calif

SOUTH AFRICA IN 1845.

The Colony of Natal is shown as constituted by the Commission of 1843.

St. Lucia Bay annexed 1843.

British Territory.



Territory occupied by emigrant farmers still claimed as British subjects.



B. V. Barbishire, Oxford, 1913

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by dealings which varied with shifting public opinion at the other end of the world. They might have obeyed, if they could have understood. They might have trusted, if one year and another had not brought new proofs of doubt and hesitation on the part of the rulers. To proclaim but not to enforce, to advance and again to withdraw, to be strong one day and to be weak another, is to alienate the understandings and the affections of men.

For some years after the English became masters of the Cape, the difficulties which South Africa presented as a field of European colonisation were considerable, but from 1835 onward they were enormously increased. What had been comparatively simple became complex. Instead of one colony under one government, different European states came into being, varying in their institutions, their views, and their dealings towards the native races and one another. South Africa became the scene of diplomacy and civil war. Foreign interference was talked of, Kaffir chiefs learnt to play one section of white men against another. All was changed from the time when Great Britain took over a small Dutch dependency with few outlying liabilities beyond those which the acts of frontier settlers imposed upon the Government. In part it was inevitable. Growth and extension could not take place without variety and complication. But in great measure the difficulties were artificially created by not appreciating the time and not knowing the place.

*Growing
complica-
tion of
South
African
politics.*

When the wandering Dutch farmers looked down from the mountains on the land of Natal, it seemed to them a place of smiling beauty. They won it from the Zulus, and suffering endeared it to them, for friends and wives and children lay butchered beneath its soil. Yet no such ties availed against their love of independence or dislike of British rule, and the greater number soon retraced their steps to the dusty plains of the interior. The Boers who lived or roamed beyond

PART I.

—♦—
*The Boers
 north of
 the Vaal,*

*and south
 of that
 river.*

the Vaal, at a secure distance from the colony, had taken no part in resistance to the English in Natal. Potgieter was their leader and held them back, a clear-headed and moderate man. His policy and that of his followers was to keep beyond reach of interference from the colonial government, and between 1843 and 1847 many of this section of the emigrant farmers moved north-east from Potchefstroom in the direction of Delagoa Bay, founding in 1845 and 1846 the villages of Ohristad and Lydenburg. Still they maintained a connexion with their brethren south of the Vaal. In the territory between the Vaal and the Orange Rivers law and order were at a discount. In the northern part of the district the Boer assembly at Winburg held nominal authority, though not recognised by the Cape Government, while further south, in the districts watered by the Modder, the Riet, the Caledon, and the Orange Rivers, were numbers of farmers, some of whom had not disowned or were ready to resume allegiance to the British Crown, while others were bitter partisans of Boer independence. Here was the land of Adam Kok, the Griqua chief, and eastward of his territory Moshesh the Basuto chief was consolidating his power and extending his influence and his claims outside and beyond his mountain home.

*The
 Governor
 forbids
 Boer en-
 croach-
 ments on
 the lands
 of the
 Griquas
 and the
 Basutos.*

Temporising and vacillating as ever was the policy of the Government. In September, 1842, Sir George Napier issued a proclamation forbidding encroachments by British subjects—and British subjects the Boer emigrants were still held to be—upon the Griquas, the Basutos, or other native tribes. A few weeks later a colonial judge, who was on circuit in the north of the Cape Colony, crossed the Orange River, and on his own responsibility proclaimed British sovereignty over the whole territory, from the Orange River northward to the twenty-fifth parallel of latitude, and from the twenty-second degree of longitude to the eastern ocean. The proclamation covered the present Orange Free State province, the southern half of the Transvaal, Griqualand and Bechuanaland on the west, Natal

on the east. It was a bold move, too bold for the Government to adopt. The proclamation was disallowed, the land was not claimed as British territory, but its white inhabitants were still claimed as British subjects. These same British subjects quarrelled with the natives and with one another, and the next step taken by the Government was, in 1843, to make treaties with the Griqua Adam Kok and the Basuto Moshesh, by which they were given the advantages of British alliance and protection, and acknowledged as owners and rulers of the border territory north of the Orange River, the Griqua on the west, the Basuto on the east. Excluded from the terms of these treaties the emigrants were further embittered. What was to them the rule or the pretension of a leader of half-breeds or a native chieftain? Black men were treated as allies of the Government, white men as rebellious subjects. For the former was friendship, protection, and independence, for the latter wordy proclamations and empty exhortations to obedience. 'Are we then worse' wrote Pretorius at a little later date, 'are we more contemptible than the coloured population? To them are acknowledged and secured the lands they have inherited; to them are allowed the privileges of self-government and their own laws; but as soon as we whites are on the same lands, which we have justly obtained from them, these privileges are immediately taken from us, so that we may justly say that we do not even share equally with the coloured tribes; but that now, though all other creatures enjoy rights and liberties, we are constantly constrained to be in fetters.' And again, 'We will rather await the merciful settlement of the great Creator than longer to wrestle under the feet of every petty coloured people¹.' Quarrels broke out between the Griquas and the farmers who were in their land, the

*Adam Kok
and
Moshesh
formally
acknowledged by
the British
Government.*

¹ Pretorius and about 900 others to Sir Harry Smith July 18, 1848, and Pretorius and other commandants to the same August 10, 1848:—Correspondence relative to the settlement of Natal and the recent rebellion of the Boers, May, 1849, pp. 24, 27.

PART I. Boers took up arms, and a small force of troops was moved up from the colony to support Adam Kok. At a place named Zwartkopjes a slight skirmish took place, and the farmers were without difficulty dispersed. The Governor, Sir Peregrine Maitland, then modified the terms of the Griqua treaty, dividing Adam Kok's land into two parts, one of which was to remain the inalienable property of the Griqua people, while in the other, under the dominion of the Griqua chief, supported by a British resident, who was stationed at Bloemfontein¹, European settlement was to be freely allowed. This arrangement was made in June, 1845, and similar negotiations were entered into with the Basutos, though without any definite result.

—♦—
*The
 skirmish
 at Zwart-
 kopjes.*

*Mission of
 Pretorius
 to the Cape
 Colony on
 behalf of
 the Boer
 farmers in
 Natal.*

*Arrival of
 Sir Harry
 Smith.*

Meanwhile delay was taking place in the permanent settlement of Natal as a British colony, claims of farmers were outstanding, large numbers of natives were coming into the country and obtaining locations, and the Dutchmen who had not yet left were becoming more and more restless and discontented. At length, in 1847, they sent Pretorius as their spokesman to the Cape Colony to lay in person their grievances before the Governor. He went but was not received, and came back with popular sympathy and with bitterness of heart. More emigrants followed him over the Orange River, and the wave of disaffection gathered strength.

Pretorius had hardly come and gone when a new Governor, Sir Harry Smith, landed at the Cape. Of all men he was most likely to reconcile the Dutch farmers to British rule, to confirm those who wavered in their allegiance, and to win back others who had already renounced it. Had he been on the spot some years earlier, it is possible that his dealings might have been entirely successful. As it was, at first he nearly achieved success. The Boers remembered his bold

¹ Bloemfontein was then a farm and was handed over to be the headquarters of the British resident. From this date, 1845, it took its rise as the future capital of the Orange Free State.

and skilful defence of the colony in the great Kaffir war of 1835, how he had been the right hand of Sir Benjamin D'Urban in carrying out the settlement of the Eastern frontier, which they had approved and which Lord Glenelg had reversed. That he understood the colonists and their views, and sympathised with them, they could not doubt. He knew them and they knew him. Unconventional in speech and action, arbitrary but kind-hearted, prompt in doing and fearless in responsibility, ever using the Bible language of the Puritan soldier, he was not merely an official but a man who could deal with men. Strange and grotesque as some of his despatches and proclamations appear to be, when read at the present day, his utterances not only expressed the real feelings of a deeply religious man, but were well calculated to carry conviction to the minds of native chiefs and wandering Boers. In a manifesto, which concludes with a prayer, he addressed the farmers as 'half-lost friends and wavering Christians,' and appealed to their feelings 'as men, as fathers of families, as reasoning human beings possessing immortal souls'.¹ His language to Moshesh was in this strain: 'The creed of all good men is that there is one God over all, white and black'.² Thus, in words which Dutchmen had known and revered from time immemorial, and which missionaries were ever making familiar to the ears of natives, he strove to win back the affections of both races.

He had left the colony at the end of one Kaffir war. He came back to it at the end of another; and one of his first acts, as has been told³, was to enlarge British territory to the north and to the east, so that on the north the Orange River became the boundary of the Cape Colony from the Atlantic Ocean to the outskirts of Basutoland.

¹ Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, &c., July, 1848, p. 78.

² Correspondence relative to the establishment of the settlement of Natal and the recent rebellion of the Boers, May, 1849, p. 64.

³ See above, p. 164.

PART I.

◆◆◆
*His visit
 to the
 Trans-
 Orange
 territories
 and Natal.*

*He re-
 assures the
 disaffected
 farmers of
 Natal.*

Within a few weeks after his arrival at the Cape, having in the mean time visited and re-arranged the frontier, he crossed, towards the end of January, 1848, into the disturbed territory north of the Orange River. There he had a conference with Adam Kok, confining that chieftain's jurisdiction and authority to the inalienable Griqua reserve; he also met Moshesh, the Basuto chief, and obtained his consent to a future proclamation of sovereignty over his land. Passing, as was afterwards described, 'like a meteor'¹ through the country, and hearing only the views of those who were in favour of British rule, he hurried on to Natal to stem, if possible, the tide of emigration from that country which was then taking place, and on the banks of the Tugela he met the farmers. 'On my arrival at the foot of the Drakensberg mountains,' he wrote, 'I was almost paralysed to witness the whole population, with few exceptions, trekking. Rains on this side of the mountains are tropical, and now prevail; the country is intersected by considerable streams, frequently impassable; and these families were exposed to a state of misery which I never before saw equalled, except in Massena's invasion of Portugal².' He listened to their complaints, which were many, 'but all expressive of a want of confidence and liberality as to land on the part of the Government,' and he appointed at once a Land Commission for Natal, with the avowed object of securing good and extensive farms to the settlers who were on the point of leaving the country. Pretorius, their leader, he named as a member of the Commission, holding him to be 'a shrewd, sensible man.' Within two or three months he saw cause to alter this opinion, and Pretorius was written down a 'rebel' and 'arch agitator,' for whose apprehension was offered the sum of one thousand pounds.

¹ Further correspondence relative to the state of the Orange River Territory, May, 1853, p. 51.

² Correspondence relative to the establishment of the settlement of Natal, July, 1848, p. 212.

While still by the Tugela, interviewing the Natal Boers, Sir Harry Smith put forth a memorable proclamation, dated February 3, 1848, and declaring the whole territory between the Orange and the Vaal Rivers, as far east as the Drakensberg mountains, to be under the sovereignty of the Queen. It would seem that he communicated his intention of doing so to Pretorius, who warned him that the farmers would not submit. That the Governor under-estimated the number of possible opponents, and over-estimated his own personal influence, there can be little doubt. Had he been longer in the country, he would have known how deeply rooted in the minds of the majority of the Boers was antipathy to British rule. The proclamation covered the district of Winburg, where for some ten years past there had been a semblance of republican government. A British Resident in charge of the whole territory was stationed at Bloemfontein, and two Assistant Commissioners were appointed, one for Winburg, one for the Caledon River. Resenting the measure, the farmers took up arms, and before the end of July, Pretorius, at the head of a strong burgher commando, was master of the whole territory, and encamped on its southern border, the bank of the Orange River.

CH. VI.

British
sovereignty
proclaimed
over the
territory
between the
Orange
and the
Vaal
Rivers.

The Boers
take up
arms,

On hearing the news, Sir Harry Smith acted with prompt decision. He moved up a sufficient body of troops from Cape-town, crossed the Orange River, the farmers falling back before him, and joined by a party of Griquas and some of the Dutchmen who had not followed Pretorius, he came into collision with the latter and his party on August 29, 1848. The scene of the fight was Boomplatz, to the south-west of Bloemfontein, halfway between that place and the Orange River. Here the road ran over broken ground, between ridges of stony hills, giving shelter behind the boulders to men who fought in irregular fashion, depending not on drill or on military evolution, but on the straightness of their aim and the skill of their hand. A heavy fire was poured on the

and are
defeated at
Boom-
platz.

PART I.

advancing troops, causing some confusion and loss of life, but they were led by an old soldier, experienced in guerilla warfare. The guns were brought up, one hill after another was carried, and a fight, described as 'one of the most severe skirmishes ever witnessed', ended in the defeat and dispersion of the farmers. No further resistance was made. The most determined enemies of the Government fled over the Vaal; others who had been concerned in the rebellion were fined. A fort was built at Bloemfontein and garrisoned; and at Winburg on September 7, the Queen's dominion over the whole country between the Orange River and the Vaal was again proclaimed.

*The
Orange
River
Sovereignty.*

The Governor had triumphed, but a rude shock had been given to the policy of conciliation. The fight at Boomplatz, coming after the hostilities which had taken place in Natal, showed that at least a large section of the Boers would yield only to superior force, and were not to be won back to their allegiance by friendly words and fatherly proclamations. The Orange River Territory, or the Orange River Sovereignty, as it was officially termed, was now divided into four instead of three districts, the northernmost part of the territory, which had previously been included in the Winburg district, being constituted a separate district, under the title of the district of Vaal River. The appointment of Landdrost or Civil Commissioner in this district was offered to Hendrik Potgieter, the Transvaal leader, who had studiously held aloof from taking arms against the British Government. But he declined the appointment, as Pretorius had before refused to serve on the Land Commission of Natal, and stayed at a safe distance from the border. Pretorius, too, was in the Transvaal, biding his time. In the following year, 1849, a kind of constitution was given to the territory, two burgher members from each

¹ From Sir H. Smith's account of the engagement in a despatch, printed at p. 44, of Correspondence relative to the establishment of the settlement of Natal and the recent rebellion of the Boers, July, 1848.

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
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
SOUTH

CAPE COLON

To face page 212




SOUTH AFRICA IN 1850.



Sir Harry Smith's Proclamation
Orange River becomes north
The territory between the Keiska
constituted a separate provin
rule.
'Orange River Sovereignty' procl
Queen's Dominions (Sept. 7, 1

British Territory.

Territory occupied by emigrant f
still claimed as British subject



Proclamation (Dec. 17, 1847).

defines northern boundary.

The Keiskamma and the Kei
state province under military

Authority' proclaimed part of the
(Sept. 7, 1848).

migrant farmers
British subjects.



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of the four districts, who were nominated by the Governor, being associated with the British Resident and the four magistrates or Civil Commissioners to form a Legislative Council. New settlers, many of them English, came in from the Cape Colony; the European population grew in numbers; 'flourishing villages suddenly sprang up, and the apparently waste lands of a year or two previous became studded with substantial homesteads'.¹ Still there was an undercurrent of discontent, which grew stronger while the months went on; and, as a new Kaffir war distracted the attention and absorbed the forces of the Government of the Cape, British authority beyond the Orange River became perceptibly weakened.

Various causes tended to undermine it. After no long interval, the English settlers, as well as the Dutch, began to feel the want of some measure of self-government, and to ask for an elective element in their council. They were dominated by the British Resident, who on the other hand had not sufficient force at his back to ensure obedience and to give security of life and property. When the Sovereignty was first proclaimed, a system was contemplated which should be based not on force but on voluntary adherence, inexpensive, self-supporting, not needing to be subsidised with men or money. The white colonists in the territory were to provide for self-defence, and by the original proclamation their tenure of land was guaranteed 'upon the condition that every able-bodied man turns out in the defence of Her Majesty and her allies either with arms or as special constables, as may be required by the British Resident and Magistrate.' The condition would have been reasonable, had the territory been the home of white men alone; but this was not the case. It included large native reserves, the clans in which were constantly taking up arms against one another. In any outbreak of the kind, one party or

CII. VI.
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*Growing
weakness
of British
authority
beyond the
Orange
River.*

¹ Further correspondence relative to the state of the Orange River Territory, May, 1853, p. 53.

PART I.

*Troubles
with the
Basutos.**The fight
at Vier-
voet.**Lord
Grey's
policy*

the other was necessarily supported by the Government and treated as an ally of the Queen, and the Burghers were in consequence perpetually under orders to take part in a native quarrel in which they had no concern.

In the region of the Caledon River were various Bechuana clans, located on the borders of Basutoland. Between one and another, and between most of them and the Basutos, there were constant feuds. There were chiefs and missionaries on different sides. The Basuto Moshesh was guided by the advice of French Protestant missionaries. Among the minor rival clans Wesleyan influence predominated. Reserves were marked out, and frontier lines demarcated, the Basuto country, to the disgust of its chief and people, was contracted in its extent; but no moral authority sufficed to keep the peace between savage marauders. At length the British Resident collected an inadequate force consisting of a few British regulars, a few farmers, and a larger number of natives, in the hope of restoring law and order; and, coming into conflict with the Basutos at a hill named Viervoet on June 30, 1851, his troops were defeated and beaten back. The check came at a bad time, for Sir Harry Smith was in straits in the Kaffir war, and, though reinforcements came up from Natal, no active step could be taken to retrieve the disaster.

During these troubled years Lord Grey was Secretary of State for the Colonies. He had assented to the establishment of the Orange River Sovereignty on condition that 'the management of their own concerns, with the duty of providing for their own defence and for the payment of the expense of that system of government which is established among them, should be thrown entirely on the emigrant Boers and on the native tribes among whom they are settled'.¹ Three years had now passed, and there seemed

¹ Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, July, 1848, p. 68.

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no prospect of the condition being fulfilled. The despatches from England began to hint at a change of policy and a change of officers; and the first step taken was to appoint, in May 1851, two Assistant Commissioners for the special purpose of dealing with matters beyond the actual frontier of the Cape Colony¹. The news of the Viervoet fight came home, and plainer than before were the Secretary of State's words. Writing in September 1851, he blamed the British Resident at Bloemfontein for interfering too much in the government of the territory. To permanently govern it by military power he considered to be out of the question. 'If the majority of the inhabitants will not support the authority of the Resident, he must be withdrawn.' 'The relinquishment of the territory would be a necessity to be greatly lamented,' but it must rest with the Boers and with the native chiefs to decide whether or not such a step should be taken². The words were those of a strong advocate of colonial self-government and colonial self-defence, of a policy which was being carried out in other parts of the British Empire. It was and is a great policy, but the spirit which first inspired it was not so much the love of freedom and the desire to confer independence, as a passionate longing to set a bound to the responsibilities of the mother country and to save her expense. The number and variety of colonies and dependencies, which Great Britain has possessed in all parts of the world, has provided her statesmen at home with an unrivalled storehouse of experience, but on the other hand it has given them precedents for any and every course of action, and has encouraged them from time to time to guide themselves by incorrect and misleading analogies.

¹ By the terms of the Government notice, published at the Cape on July 30, 1851, these officers were 'to be Assistant Commissioners to His Excellency, Sir H. G. W. Smith, in his capacity of High Commissioner for settling and adjusting the affairs on the frontier of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.'

² Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, February, 1852, p. 243.

PART I. Where the inhabitants of a territory are nearly all of one white race, especially if it is the Anglo-Saxon race, the problem of self-government is easily solved. Where, as was the case beyond the Orange River, white men and black are intermixed, and the white men are not all of one blood or of one way of thinking, there is a danger that self-governing institutions may be perverted into tyranny or degenerate into anarchy. If given in such cases, self-government, one would think, should be gradually given, for more often than not men who have fought to be free need to be trained to rule.

When Sir Harry Smith first reported to Lord Grey the proclamation of British sovereignty over the Orange River Territory, he wrote, 'My position has been analogous to that of every Governor-general, who proceeded to India. All have been fully impressed with the weakness of that policy which extended the Company's possessions, and yet few, if any, especially the men of more gifted talents, have ever resigned their government without having done that, which, however greatly to be condemned by the theory of policy, circumstances demanded and imperatively imposed upon them. Such has been my case¹.' Before he left, he wrote, in view of a possible reversal of his policy, 'The relinquishment of power, territory, and authority once acquired is a measure fraught with difficulties and numerous evils; while a contrary course, however embarrassing for the moment, must prove of future benefit².' This was one view. Another will be found in Lord Grey's despatches. 'The ultimate abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty should be a settled point in our policy³.' Shortly after

¹ Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, July, 1848, p. 61.

² Further correspondence relative to the state of the Orange River Territory, May, 1853, p. 17.

³ Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, &c., Feb. 1852, p. 245.

these words were written, Sir Harry was, early in 1852, recalled. He was not the first Governor to be recalled from South Africa, and was not the last. The wars and annexations of the impetuous old soldier, it must be admitted, gave reasonable grounds for supersession. The disasters in the Kaffir war had been serious and many. Yet events of bygone years were in the main responsible for the failure and the suffering. The Kaffirs might by this time have learnt obedience to unswerving rulers, the Dutch farmers might have been loyal subjects to the Queen, there might have been no new native uprisings, no treks, no rebellions, if Sir Benjamin D'Urban's work had not been undone.

CH. VI.

Recall of Sir Harry Smith.

The difficulties of the British Government were the opportunities of the Transvaal Boers. No attempt had been made seriously to interfere with them, or to exercise authority over their land, yet they were still nominally British subjects, still, so far as they lived to the southward of the twenty-fifth degree of south latitude, amenable to the criminal law of the Cape Colony. The only source of practical difficulty, which seemed likely to arise, was on the western frontier. Here the London missionaries were at work among the Bechuana tribes, and of their number, far away in the interior at the mission station of Kolobeng, was David Livingstone. There was no love lost between him and the Boers. An outspoken and fearless champion of native rights and native interests, he resented the Dutchmen's rough dealings with the coloured races, and as an explorer also he crossed their path. In 1849, with Oswell and Murray, he set out from Kolobeng for the north, and discovered Lake Ngami; and in the following year the Governor reported that the Boers were intercepting parties of travellers who were following in his footsteps. It was the beginning of a trouble which became more acute in after years, the first attempt by the Boers to block the trade route to Central

The Transvaal Boers.

David Livingstone in Bechuana-land.

Discovery of Lake Ngami.

The Boers try to block the trade route to

PART I.
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 Central
 Africa.

Africa. At this time no Boer republic had yet been recognised. 'The Boers' wrote the Secretary of State 'have not the slightest claim to the territory which they occupy beyond the Vaal River';¹ and their interference with British subjects as well as with the native tribes could not be overlooked. Yet it was difficult to know what steps to take. To march a large force to the north was impossible. To extend British sovereignty over an almost unlimited area could not be entertained; and only partial remedies suggested themselves, such as friendly negotiation with the native chiefs with the view of inducing them to combine for purposes of self-defence, and the possible widening of the powers conferred by the statute of 1836², so as to make the limit of criminal jurisdiction over British subjects not the twenty-fifth degree of south latitude but the Equator.

The independence of the Transvaal Boers recognised by the Sand River Convention.

It seems strange that in little more than a year³ after these measures were contemplated, the independence of the Transvaal Boers was formally recognised. Yet so it was. Pretorius, since the fight at Boomplatz, had remained beyond the Vaal, a proscribed refugee. The uprising of the Kaffirs, the successes of the Basutos, the dangers which on all sides threatened the British cause, enabled him to come out in a new character. In September and October 1851, he wrote offering to treat with the British Government on behalf of the emigrant Boers, claiming moreover to have been called upon by the Basuto chief and by many of the white inhabitants of the Orange River Territory to act as mediator and peacemaker. The Assistant Commissioners made a virtue of necessity, and prevented interference in matters south of

¹ Correspondence relative to the assumption of sovereignty over the territory between the Vaal and Orange Rivers, May, 1851, p. 97.

² See above, p. 200, note.

³ Lord Grey's despatch on the subject, an extract from which is quoted above, was dated Nov. 29, 1850. The Sand River Convention was signed Jan. 17, 1851.

the Vaal by consenting to negotiate with regard to the Transvaal and its inhabitants. To recognise the virtual independence of the Transvaal Boers was only to acknowledge existing facts. Consequently, the sentence of outlawry on Pretorius was reversed; on January 16, 1852, at the Sand River within the borders of the Orange River Territory, the Transvaal delegates, with Pretorius at their head, met the representatives of the British Government; and on the following day the famous Sand River Convention was signed, by which the 'emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River' were conceded 'the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves, without any interference on the part of Her Majesty the Queen's Government.' In April, 1852, the Convention was confirmed by Sir Harry Smith's successor, General Cathcart, and in the following June it received the approval of Sir John Pakington, Secretary of State for the Colonies.

One clause in the Convention laid down that 'no slavery is or shall be permitted or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the emigrant farmers.' Otherwise the British Government disclaimed all alliance with the coloured races in the Transvaal territory, and provision was made to prevent traders and travellers from the south from supplying the natives with arms and ammunition. Yet, as soon as the Convention was signed, charges and counter-charges arose. The western frontier of the republic was not defined, and along the Bechuanaland trade route, marked by a line of mission stations, English traders came and went. The Boers accused them of importing arms, and in turn took strong measures against the border clans. It was the old story over again with the old result; comandos were called out; the natives were shot down or put to flight; captives were carried off; Livingstone's house at Kolobeng was, in the absence of the owner, broken open and looted. The Boers had won their independence, but,

The Boers charged with evading the provisions of the Convention against slavery.

PART I. as tales, perhaps highly coloured, came home of their later exploits, philanthropic Englishmen grudged them their freedom, for liberty in their case seemed to be licence to oppress and to enslave in South Africa the people of the soil.

Events in the Orange River Territory. It was hoped that the Sand River Convention would restore good feeling between the Boers and the British Government, and that south of the Vaal the Dutch would become reconciled to living under British rule. Yet Lord Grey's words as to the ultimate abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty remained on record, and General Cathcart in his despatches expressed similar views. A public meeting of delegates from the inhabitants of the Sovereignty, called by the Assistant Commissioner at Bloemfontein in June, 1852, passed resolutions in favour of popular government, but by no means repudiated allegiance to the Queen; and, had the wishes then expressed been carried out, the Orange River Territory would have been constituted a self-governing British Colony. The president of the meeting, however, was a Scotchman, and it may be questioned how far the disaffected Dutch farmers gave free utterance to their heart's desire. But the first and most pressing practical difficulty was the outstanding dispute with the Basutos. A year had passed since the fight at Viervoet, and Moshesh had shown no signs of submission. As soon, therefore, as General Cathcart had dealt with the Kosa Kaffirs, he determined to bring the Basuto chief to terms. At the beginning of December, 1852, he concentrated a force of 2,000 regular troops in the Caledon River district, and summoned Moshesh to meet him. The meeting took place at Platberg, a ruined Hottentot village near the western bank of the Caledon, and in plain words the Governor demanded prompt compensation for the robberies committed by the Basutos. The alternative he said was war. 'Do not talk of war,' replied Moshesh, 'for, however anxious I may be to avoid

The Basuto war of 1852.

it, you know that a dog when beaten will show his teeth¹. Three days were allowed for the terms to be complied with, only partial restitution was made at the end of that time, and war was the result. Over against Platberg, beyond the river, lay Thaba Bosigo, the Basuto chieftain's stronghold. Between the two points, lining the eastern bank of the Caledon, was the Berea mountain with rocky sides. Here on December 20, 1852, the fight took place. The troops, commanded by the General in person, crossed the river and advanced in three columns, two of which were to march round the mountain on either side, while the third was sent to clear the top. All three were to meet on the plain beyond the mountain, and march in force on the Basuto town. The plan miscarried. Two of the columns, fighting on broken ground, against active and well-armed foes, cumbered, moreover, with the cattle which they carried off, suffered severely. One fell back to the camp on the Caledon, while the other late in the day joined the third and main column at the appointed meeting place, only in time to enable them to hold their ground with difficulty against outnumbering troops of Basuto horsemen, whom the English General in his account of the engagement likened to irregular Cossacks or Circassians². There was fighting at one point or another from morning to night, in the end the English were nominally victors, but the honours were as much with the vanquished. The Basuto chief had been as good as his word. The dog, may be, had been beaten but he had shown his teeth. Moshesh was something of a statesman as well as a general. On the night of the battle he sent in his submission to the English commander and sued for peace. His submission was accepted, though many of the English officers pleaded

CH. VI.

*The fight
at the
Berea
mountain.*

¹ Further correspondence relative to the state of the Orange River Territory, May, 1853, p. 97.

² Ibid., p. 95.

PART I. for further fighting and a more decisive victory, and Cathcart led his troops back into the colony.

*Mission of
Sir George
Clerk.*

The battle of Berea decided the fate of the Orange River Territory. It was evident that the land must be indefinitely occupied by a strong body of troops or must be given up entirely. The ministry chose the second alternative, and, at General Cathcart's own request, sent out a Special Commissioner to carry their decision into effect. The Commissioner was Sir George Clerk, an East Indian officer of high standing who for a time had been Governor of Bombay¹. In August, 1853, he reached Bloemfontein. The withdrawal of English sovereignty was no easy matter. It was unpopular in the Cape Colony, as evidenced by numerous petitions against the step. It was strongly opposed by many in the territory itself, and the opponents were not Englishmen alone. The missionaries of South Africa and their supporters viewed it with dismay. In the case of the Transvaal the concession of independence had been little more than a formal confirmation of what was already in existence. The country beyond the Vaal had never belonged to the Queen, its inhabitants were all, or nearly all, Dutchmen who had already organised some kind of government. But the Orange River Territory had been definitely included in the British dominions, Englishmen had settled there and taken up land, vested interests had been created, treaties and engagements of various kinds were still supposed to be binding. To withdraw was a confession of weakness, a sign of weariness, of shrinking from responsibility and rule. Yet neither the Government nor their representative on the spot wavered in their decision. Protests were unheeded, difficulties smoothed or set aside. By Royal Order in Council Her Majesty abandoned and

*The Con-
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¹ It is interesting to note that Sir George Clerk was an intimate friend of Sir Bartle Frere. See the life of Sir Bartle Frere, vol. I. p. 307, note.

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renounced all dominion and sovereignty of the Crown over the Orange River Territory and its inhabitants; and on February 23, 1854—the year of the Crimean war—Sir George Clerk signed a convention at Bloemfontein, by which the British Government guaranteed the future independence of the country and its government. The Convention included a provision against slavery, and safeguarded the long-standing British alliance with the Griqua chief, Adriaan Kok, and added that otherwise 'the British Government had all to do whatever with any native chief or tribes to the north of the Orange River.'

CH. VI.
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*British
 sovereignty
 from the
 Orange
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This convention, together with the Sand River Treaty, secured for the first time to the British the boundary to British rule along the coast-line in South Africa. The coast-line was to be British, the land to the south as far as the Orange River, and to the east between the mountains and the sea. The great 'treary plateau of the interior, with its mineral wealth yet all unknown, was left to the Dutch; and if missionaries or traders went that way, no British aid seemed, could they hope for British protection or respect under the name of the British name. Such was the outlook for years to come. At the present day, far beyond the Zambezi River, in Central Africa, stretches the line of British domination.

The emigrant farmers secured their independence. In

A comparison of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions will show that the later treaty granted independence in more explicit terms than the earlier. The Sand River Convention guaranteed 'in the fullest manner on the part of the British Government, to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves, without any interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government.' The Bloemfontein Convention guaranteed 'on the part of Her Majesty's Government the future independence' of the Orange River Territory and its government, and promised that the independence should be confirmed by an instrument 'finally freeing' the inhabitants of the territory 'from their allegiance to the British Crown, and declaring them, to all intents and purposes a free and independent people, and their government to be treated and considered thenceforth a free and independent government.'


PART I. substance they had freedom already, but not in name. They wanted a land to call their own; they wanted to be recognised as no longer subject to the British Crown; nominal as well as real independence was their aim; they achieved it, and none could doubt they had earned it. They had earned it by leaving for ever their old homes in the Cape Colony, by all their sufferings and all their ventures; but most of all they had earned it as having been, when all was told, rough pioneers of civilisation, as having faced and broken the two savage hordes which had been the pest and scourge of South Africa, as having dealt destruction to Dingaan's Zulus and chased the Matabele out of the land.

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
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B.V. GARDNER

SOUTH AFRICA IN 1855.

CAPE COLONY EASTERN FRONTIER



Sand River Convention (Jan. 17, 1852)


Independence of Transvaal Boers recognized

Bloemfontein Convention (Feb. 23, 1854)

Withdrawal of British sovereignty from the Orange River Territory.

British Territory.

Boer Republics.



B. V. Garbithaire, Oxford, 1915

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CHAPTER VII.

THE GROWTH OF THE CAPE COLONY AND NATAL.

SOUTH African history consists largely of wars and treaties with Boers and natives. Still there was time and space for peaceful progress, for the social and political development of the Cape Colony and, after Natal became a British possession, of Natal also. Kaffir wars kept the eastern frontier of the Cape in alarm and unrest, confusion reigned beyond the Orange River, discontented farmers moved off into the interior. Yet the vacant places within the colony were filled by natural increase or by emigration from Europe, population grew, resources grew, means of communication were multiplied and improved, and the Cape colonists as a whole became year by year more of a community, more of a nation. CH. VII.

War brought with it a certain amount of trade. There was coming and going at the seaports. There were soldiers to be fed. There was expenditure on the spot of Imperial funds. There was traffic for the South African merchants and contractors, legitimate traffic and possibly illicit also. The British tax payer and the frontier settler felt the strain of war, but the resident at Capetown or Port Elizabeth, and the farmer whose home was at a secure distance from unruly Kaffirs, bore little of the burden and shared in the profit.

The twenty years from 1834 to 1854 were years of constant fighting. Then came a lull, and for more than twenty years there was an interval of comparative peace, prelude to a new upheaval, new conflicts and conventions with black

PART I. and white men, more confusion, more reversal, and in the end a great extension of colonisation and empire. This intermediate time, less eventful than the years which had gone before or which followed, contained the fruits of what had passed and the seeds of what was to come. Self-government was perfected in the Cape Colony, and men talked of South African confederation. Railways came into being. The mineral wealth of South Africa began to be disclosed, and one of the more immediate results of the discovery was a second—this time a permanent—advance of British dominion beyond the Orange River. There was widening of territory and widening of views, and meanwhile the cutting of the Suez Canal finally severed the old connexion which in past times had caused the Cape of Good Hope to be overshadowed by the East Indies.

Constitutional changes in the Cape Colony.

The municipal councils ordinance of 1836.

The form of government which was given to the Cape Colony in 1833 contained no elective element. There were unofficial members in the Legislative Council, but they were nominated by the Governor, not chosen by the people. Such a system could not be permanent. It was inevitable that a colony, in which there was a large and growing number of Englishmen, should demand, and in due course be granted, the privilege of popular representation. Self-government began, as it often does begin, and as in fact under the Dutch East India Company it had already to a small extent begun, in the sphere of local administration. In 1836 an ordinance was passed providing for the establishment of elected Municipal Councils in the colony, Beaufort West being the first town or village to which the Act was applied. Capetown was specially excepted from the terms of the ordinance, but became a municipality in 1840; and in 1841 we find the Board of Commissioners petitioning the Queen for a representative Legislative Assembly for the colony, on the ground 'that no man who has paid attention to the working of the municipalities graciously granted by your Majesty but must

allow that the colony is fully prepared for the boon of self-government¹. Two years afterwards, in 1843, further recognition was given to the principle of popular election in connexion with Road Boards for the colony. An ordinance was passed creating a Central Board of Road Commissioners, who were appointed by the Governor, and Divisional Boards, in which the majority of the members were elected every three years by the landed proprietors. These boards were given power to levy rates, and under the new system road making was carried on with great vigour and with marked success.

The petition from the Capetown municipality for Representative Government for the colony was forwarded by Sir George Napier to the Secretary of State at the end of 1841. He enclosed, at the same time, a petition to a similar effect, which was the result of a public meeting of the inhabitants of Capetown. Free representation, the petitioners urged in sober and temperate terms, would tend to the development of the colony, and would encourage immigration from the mother country, by placing incoming settlers under such political institutions as they had known and trusted in their old homes. Stress was laid on the practical and material advantages which might be expected to result from self-government, and sentimental grievances were kept in the background. Sir George Napier cordially supported the petitions. He lamented the ignorance, the misunderstanding, the helplessness on the part of the colonists, which were due to the want of popular representation, and he pointed, as the petitioners had pointed, to the good fruit which had already been borne by municipal institutions.

The Dutch system, as has been abundantly shown, had been a repressive system. Its object was to discourage freedom and sense of responsibility among the colonists,

¹ Return to an Address of the House of Commons on the subject of Representative Government, June, 1846, p. 4.

PART I. except in purely local matters. Its result was twofold. As far as the arm of the government reached, there was perpetual tutelage. Beyond its reach there was anarchy. Capetown, where the movement in favour of popular representation originated, had always been the seat of administration and consequently directly under the eye of the government. At the same time it was the chief town of the colony—before the rise of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth, the only town worthy of the name; and, more than any other place in South Africa, it was in constant contact with the outer world. Here the full effects of despotism had been felt, and yet here, if anywhere, was an urban community, likely to imbibe democratic views and importing those views perpetually from beyond the seas. The citizens of Capetown therefore, as was natural, took the lead in petitioning for an elected legislature. But Capetown was not the Cape Colony, and ‘the interests or the supposed interests of the metropolitan population,’ wrote Lord Stanley in answer to the Governor, ‘may be often at variance with those of the remote country districts’¹. In his closely reasoned but not unsympathetic despatch, Lord Stanley pointed out two main practical objections to granting parliamentary representation, the first being the difficulty and expense of communication between Capetown and the country districts and in those districts themselves, the second being the multiplicity of races who inhabited the colony, and whose interests all deserved attention. The despatch gave an opening for further consideration of the question, but no reply came, and for more than four years the matter rested, until in November, 1846, Lord Grey, who was then Colonial Secretary, took it up.

Lord Stanley's despatch of April, 1842.

Lord Grey and colonial self-government.

By Lord Grey and his colleagues colonial self-government was regarded as a panacea for the evils of empire. They had ever in their minds the blundering interference which

¹ *Parl. Paper of June, 1846 (as above), p. 6. The despatch was dated April 15, 1842.*

had resulted in the loss of the United States, and not many years had passed since Lord Durham had written his celebrated report on Canada, and the Government of Canada had been remodelled on liberal and democratic lines. On February 8, 1850, the Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, in the House of Commons, laid down what he held to be the true principles of colonial policy, basing them on justice to, confidence in, and sympathy with the colonists, and repudiating the idea that England had no need of her colonies, and was not bound to give them protection and defence. Yet the feeling grew up, and gained ground, that English politicians set little store by the colonies; that they were anxious to grant self-government as a burden as much as a boon; that they were studying the interests of the mother country rather more than those of her dependencies; that they wished to set England free from the cares and responsibilities of a large family. England is old, empire is a delusion, colonies are an expense, such was the popular interpretation of the colonial policy which the Whigs and Liberals took in hand. It was a strained interpretation, but not wholly without foundation. The Whig statesmen were logical, they were good political economists, they saw clearly for a very little distance ahead, but they were inclined to ignore and eschew sentiment as though it had no existence. The policy which they advocated was wholesome and sound, but they were not at pains to make it gracious. The result was that the colonies took their gift of freedom, but did not thank the givers. They took it as children of England who felt that they were no longer wanted. On the basis of truth and justice, wrote Lord Grey to Sir Harry Smith at the Cape, 'rests the policy of entrusting the remote dependencies of a metropolitan state with the largest powers of self-government in whatever relates to their internal and local affairs'.

CH. VII.
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The colonial policy of the Whigs.

¹ Correspondence relative to the establishment of a Representative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope, February, 1850, p. 93.

PART I. He gave another side of the same policy in the book in which he reviewed his colonial administration. There he lamented the responsibilities which the British Government had incurred in South Africa, regretted that British emigrants had been sent to the Cape, and wrote, 'few persons would probably dissent from the opinion that it would be far better for this country if the British territory in South Africa were confined to Capetown and to Simons Bay¹.'

A Whig by conviction, a firm believer in the value of free institutions, Lord Grey was none the less an autocrat in his instincts. There was no graceful yielding in his composition, no lightness of touch in his words and dealings. The blessings which he ordered could not be said to flow, and freedom came but sullenly when summoned by an imperious official. In 1846 he began to press self-government on the Cape, but left office before a Parliament was actually established. Local squabbles and the Kaffir war delayed the work in hand, and it was not till 1853 that the Cape Colony finally obtained representative institutions, the first parliament meeting in 1854.

To trace out the petty and tortuous details of the constitutional movement at the Cape would be to weary and confuse, but one or two of its leading features may be shortly noticed. Lord Stanley had pointed out two great difficulties, distance from the seat of government and variety of races. The former difficulty was likely to decrease as years went on, as roads were made inland, and as communication by sea between Capetown and the ports of the Eastern districts

Difficulties in the way of granting self-government to the Cape.

1. *Distances and want of communication.*

¹ The Colonial policy of Lord John Russell's administration, by Earl Grey, 2nd ed. (1853), vol. ii. p. 248. Similarly, in his instructions to Sir G. Cathcart upon his appointment as Governor of the Cape, dated February 2, 1852, Lord Grey wrote: 'You are aware that beyond the very limited extent of territory required for the security of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station, the British Crown and nation have no interest whatever in maintaining any territorial dominion in South Africa.' Correspondence relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, &c., February, 1852, p. 259.

became quicker and more constant. Moreover the Dutch settlers had been wont from earliest times to travel many miles periodically to religious gatherings, and every five years at Capetown the Synod of the Reformed Church attracted ministers and elders from the remotest part of the colony¹. Yet railways, the great bond of communication, were not known in South Africa, and no rivers made easy the going and coming of men. In no country, in short, fifty years ago, was distance a more real obstacle to union under one representative government than it was in the Cape Colony. The variety of races, and the difference between races, hardly tended to diminish. The feeling between English and Dutch was perhaps more strained than it had been earlier in the century. The number of black men who could fairly claim the rights of citizenship was growing. They too differed from one another. Malays, Negroes, Kaffirs, Hottentots, all were elements to be considered. How far could they be trusted as citizens? How far, if not citizens, could they be left to the control of the white voter?

Thus the problem of self-government for the Cape Colony was not easy to solve. In Canada, as at the Cape, the Europeans were divided by the line of race, but there the farther difficulty of a large native population did not arise. In Australia the population was practically homogeneous, and the difficulty caused by distance was met by multiplying the number of colonies. In New Zealand, as at the Cape, the natives were an important factor, but there again the white settlers were in the main of one blood. In no colonial possession of Great Britain, which could rightly be styled a colony, were the conditions quite so complex as they were in South Africa. In Canada the province of Quebec was French, the province of Ontario was English, but the result

¹ See what is said on this point in 'Correspondence relative to the establishment of a Representative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope,' February, 1850, p. 15, Mr. Montagu's Memorandum.

CH. V''

2. Variety of races.

The Cape compared with Canada and the Australian colonies as regards the problem of self-government.

PART I. of Lord Durham's mission had been to federate them under one legislature and one administration. In the Cape Colony the Western districts were mainly Dutch, the Eastern districts were mainly English, but, fortunately for the interests of the colony as a whole, neither division belonged exclusively to one race. Nor had there ever been distinct legislatures for the two divisions, as there had been in the two Canadian provinces. There was for a time a Lieutenant-Governor for the Eastern districts, but none the less those districts always remained an integral part of the Cape Colony. No true analogy from Canada could be drawn for the Cape, but, if Canada taught any lesson, it was that of the advantage of union. From Australia came other and conflicting experience. There the settlers at Port Phillip, now Melbourne, felt it a grievance to be subordinated to a legislature which met at Sydney, and the result of their representations was the complete severance of the province of Victoria from the present colony of New South Wales. The example of New Zealand, where there was no one centre of European colonisation, where various distinct settlements had come into being, and where a native race was strongly in evidence, seemed to point to a system of separate Provincial Councils to be federated or united in due time under a Central Legislature.

*Local
jealousies
in the Cape
Colony.*

In the Cape Colony itself there was wide difference of opinion. There was jealousy between the East and the West, and the Eastern province, or a large proportion of its residents, demanded a separate and independent government. The constitution of the second chamber, the position of the Executive in relation to the legislature, the scale of the franchise all were burning questions. The champions of the natives dreaded on their behalf the advent of a popular legislature, in which the voice of the black man might not be heard or, if heard, be unheeded. The men of property were inclined to limit the franchise. It was to the credit of the Imperial Government that, amid confusion of tongues and

a flood of contradictory petitions, it held to its course and gave to the colony a wise and liberal measure of parliamentary representation.

One legislature was constituted for the whole colony, discretion being left to the Governor to fix the place and time at which the Parliament should assemble. It consisted of three estates, the Governor, a Legislative Council, and a House of Assembly; but the second chamber—the Legislative Council—was made an elective body, instead of being, as in some other colonies, composed of members nominated by the Crown. The basis of the franchise was occupancy of a building valued at £25, that qualification entitling its holders to vote for members of both chambers. An attempt, which was made in the colony, to substitute a more restricted franchise was rejected by the Imperial Government in the interests of the coloured population, and in rejecting it the Duke of Newcastle wrote, 'It is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that all her subjects at the Cape, without distinction of class or colour, should be united by one bond of loyalty and a common interest¹.'

Very liberal was the constitution in the matter of representation, yet the coping stone of free institutions, the subordination of the executive officers to the popular legislature, was wanting. The payment of the high officers of the government was provided in a separate Civil list ordinance, and the highest among them were allowed to sit and speak in either house, but were not allowed to vote. A parliament was conceded, but not parliamentary government; the final boon was withheld, until the newly organised colonial community had grown a little older and a little stronger².

¹ Further papers relative to the establishment of a Representative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope, May, 1853, p. 25.

² The following passage in the Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council on the question of giving representative institutions to the

Ch. VII.

Grant of
representa-
tive govern-
ment, 1853.

PART I.

Representative Government: which is not Responsible Government is a somewhat illogical compromise. It had failed in Canada, failed so completely that it seems strange that the system should have been revived elsewhere. It is only as a temporary expedient that it admits of justification. It should be regarded from the point of view that popular institutions are a form of education, in which there are more elementary and more advanced stages. The grant of such institutions to the Cape colonists was an experiment. What the final outcome would be was in the highest degree doubtful. None could tell whether the East and West would sever from each other, whether the future of South Africa would be one of federalism, what would be in after time the boundaries of the Cape Colony, what would be the relations between the white and coloured races. In the meantime it seemed well that the Executive should be kept clear of local prejudices and party strife, and that the policy of the government of the colony should not be wholly identified with the views of a small majority in a new and untried legislature.

*Grant of
Responsible
government,
1872.*

The experiment ran its course with the inevitable amount of friction, but, up to the last, opinion was divided in the colony as to whether or not Responsible Government would be a benefit. The responsibility promised to be greater at the Cape than in other and more homogeneous colonies, the future liabilities were more indefinite, the end was less clearly in view. For constitutional changes in South Africa, it was recognised, would not be perfected with the completion of parliamentary government in the Cape Colony as it was

Cape Colony, refers to this point: 'This system of administration (responsible or party government) we regard as altogether unsuited to the present circumstances of the Cape Colony, because we believe it to be one which can never work with advantage, except in countries which have made such progress in wealth and population that there are to be found in them a considerable number of persons who can devote a large proportion of their time to public affairs.' Correspondence relative to the establishment of a Representative Assembly at the Cape of Good Hope, February, 1850, p. 106.

PART I. the convicts there was and is much to be said on behalf of a system, whereby those who have committed crime but are not irreclaimable are given an opportunity of working out a new life in a new country, removed from the scene of their misconduct and disgrace. But where there is a settled population with children growing up who can be contaminated, where there are native races not easy to rule, slow to be civilised, prompt to follow examples of lawlessness, there the importation of men who have broken the law is a danger to society.

Transportation involved exercise of authority by the mother country.

The political side of the question, however, as far as colonial history is concerned, is more interesting than its social or moral aspect. In transporting criminals to Australia, in proposing to transport them to the Cape, the Imperial Government was making a convenience of the colonies. England was giving her worst to her dependencies, treating them as receptacles for her refuse, taking out the weeds from her own garden and planting them in a new and virgin soil. This assumption of authority and ownership, the implication that what the mother country rejected was good enough for the colonies, roused the wrath of Englishmen beyond the seas and gave a strong impetus to the desire for colonial independence. The colonists lost sight of the arguments which might be urged on the other side, they forgot that convict labour had been useful, and that criminals had been converted into honest citizens, they overlooked Imperial claims¹, they saw only the actual and possible defects of the system, and most of all they resented the

¹ In his despatch to the Governor of the Cape of Nov. 30, 1849, Lord Grey put the Imperial point of view as follows: 'I still believe that in refusing to receive in very moderate numbers convicts whose conduct under a preliminary system of punishment has been such as to entitle them to the indulgence of tickets of leave, and whose best chance of being reformed consists in their being dispersed as widely as possible, the inhabitants of the Cape were declining the share of the common burthens of the empire which they might fairly be called upon to undertake.' (Despatches relative to the reception of convicts at the Cape of Good Hope, January, 1850, p. 149.)

system itself as an impertinent interference. Though it gained strong support at home, the anti-transportation movement was in its essence a colonial movement, an assertion of the rights of the colonists against the supposed pretensions of the mother country. As such, it was a distinct land-mark in the story of the rise of the self-governing colonies; more especially it marked the coming manhood of the Southern colonies. The lands and the peoples of the South were beginning to make history, and the Cape, no longer an outpost of the East, was in some sense joining hands with Australia.

The Cape colonists knew well the value of convict labour. Nowhere had it been turned to better account. Under the provisions of the Road Boards Act of 1843¹, and under the skilful guidance of Mr. Montagu, Secretary to the Government, gangs of convicts were set to work at the points where communication had been most difficult, crooked places were made straight and rough places plain. Between the Cape peninsula and the mainland was an isthmus of shifting sand, and, when the mainland was reached, there were mountain barriers in all directions. By the end of 1845 a hard road over the Cape Flats was open for public traffic. By the end of 1847 the completion of the Montagu Pass through the Cradock Mountain overcame 'the great and almost insurmountable barrier to any communication inland between the Eastern and Western districts of the colony²,' and removed 'the natural boundary which had hitherto divided the two provinces.' A year later a new line of road was opened through the Michell pass in the Worcester division, and the Worcester farmers began to drive their waggons to Capetown instead of trekking beyond the border. The greatest public want in the Cape Colony was easy access to markets, and

CH. VII.
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*Convict
labour at
the Cape.*

¹ See above, p. 227.

² Parl. Paper relative to Convict discipline at the Cape, March, 1850, pp. 27, 29, 63.

PART I. this want was to a great extent supplied definitely and distinctly by forced labour. But the labour was already on the spot. The criminals, whose industry enured at once to their own benefit and to that of the public, were home grown not imported; most of them were coloured men; and the success which attended their employment on the roads did not cause the colonists to fall in love with the Transportation system. It is true that labour was constantly in demand, and, even after the Cape colonists had refused to allow criminals from the United Kingdom to be landed on their shores, there were some persons who advocated their introduction into British Kaffraria¹. But the general public opinion on this point was strong and unmistakeable. The Cape should not be made a penal settlement of the empire.

*Proposals
to transport
criminals
to the Cape.*

One of the earliest petitions against transportation to the Cape stated that 'the colony of the Cape of Good Hope has never at any time, from its first settlement, received from Europe or elsewhere any portion of its population out of prisons or penal establishments²'; and the colonists spoke proudly of their home as a 'free and unpolluted country,' a 'hitherto pure, happy land.' In the days of the Dutch East India Company political offenders from the Malay Indies had been sent to the Cape, but neither the Company nor the Netherlands Government had colonised South Africa with criminals, as Australia was colonised. After the English came into possession, suggestions were made from time to time by the Imperial Government that offenders of one kind or another should be transported to the Cape. In 1841 Lord John Russell proposed that European convicts from India, who had in former times been sent to Australia, should in future be taken to Robben Island, a natural prison within easy reach of Capetown; but in the interests of the people

¹ Further papers relative to the state of the Kaffir tribes, July, 1855, p. 63.

² Parl. Paper of April, 1849, on Transportation to the Cape of Good Hope, p. 13.

whom he governed Sir George Napier discouraged the scheme. This proposal was almost immediately followed by another to the effect that Robben Island should be utilised for the reception of juvenile criminals from the United Kingdom, who should after a term of probation be apprenticed to employers in the colony. Again the same Governor deprecated the course which the Secretary of State favoured, the colonists memorialised against it, and the home Government stayed its hand. Four years later, Mr. Gladstone, then Secretary of State, suggested that convicts from England might be usefully employed in building a breakwater and erecting lighthouses at Table Bay, and also on public works at Natal. At first the colonial authorities were disposed to entertain the offer, but, before it could be carried into effect, it was swept away by the storm of popular indignation which a larger scheme of transportation aroused.

In August, 1848, Lord Grey addressed a circular despatch to various colonies, including the Cape, inviting them to receive prisoners who, after separate confinement in England and employment on public works either in the United Kingdom or in Gibraltar or Bermuda, had earned by good conduct and industry conditional freedom under ticket of leave. No longer were they to be known as convicts or criminals, but as 'exiles' whose liberty was temporarily restricted. They were offered as a boon, to be accepted or declined as the colonists thought fit. By the same post it was intimated to Sir Harry Smith, then Governor of the Cape, that in any case some Irish political and agrarian offenders would be sent out to the colony. In September an Order in Council was passed, including the Cape in the list of authorised penal settlements, and in December Lord Grey announced that a ship had been chartered to carry out the prisoners. Nor was this all. A year earlier, in 1847, the same Secretary of State had written intimating that British soldiers in Mauritius, sentenced by Court-martial

Lord Grey's attempt to make the Cape a penal settlement.

PART I. to transportation, would be sent to the Cape as ordinary criminals, and not on ticket of leave; and in 1848 and 1849 there came further intimations that the Cape would be required to receive also military offenders from India, from Ceylon, and from Hongkong.

Indignation at the Cape.

The resentment of the Cape colonists knew no bounds. They suddenly found their land advertised to the world as a convict settlement, and their wishes ignored at the very moment when they were asked to express them. It was a crisis of no ordinary kind. The colonists had lately been invited to take up parliamentary rights, yet the very statesmen who preached the goodness of self-government, outraged, by an arbitrary act, the unanimous feeling of the community. If British subjects at the Cape were fit for an elected legislature, they deserved to be consulted on a matter which nearly concerned their social welfare; they had been told that their wishes would be respected, and yet behind their backs a policy was being put into force, which they honestly loathed and condemned. One of the Governor's despatches enclosed thirty-seven memorials against transportation, the next eighteen. All spoke with one voice, Dutch and English, municipalities and congregations, townspeople, agriculturists sorely in want of labour but refusing to draw it from a tainted source. Women petitioned, coloured men petitioned, the Mohammedan Malays of Capetown uttered the same prayer as their Christian fellow subjects. 'The past and present uniform and unchangeable feeling of all the inhabitants, both Dutch and English, excepting only rebels, rogues, and rascals, who would of course hail an influx of congenial spirits with delight, is extremely adverse to the introduction of any convicts¹,' so ran a petition from the Colesberg division; and later the Governor wrote in warning tone. 'This is the first occasion in which the Dutch and English

¹ Despatches relative to the reception of convicts at the Cape of Good Hope, January, 1850, p. 18.

inhabitants have coalesced in opposition to government¹. To the argument that the Imperial Parliament had paid large sums on behalf of the colony, and that the colony should in turn be prepared to share the burdens of the empire, the colonists retorted bitterly that the expenditure had been incurred through a policy towards the Kaffir tribes, which they had not originated and did not approve, and through which they had sustained loss of life and property². Nor were they soothed by learning that a vote had been taken in Parliament to send free emigrants to the Cape equal in number to the convicts, seeing that part of the vote was to be expended in providing passages for the convicts' wives and families. It seemed to Lord Grey no great matter to disperse through the country a limited number of ex-criminals, for whom work could easily be found, and who would no longer associate with men of bad character, or breathe the atmosphere of crime; but it was in the dispersion that danger was foreseen. The bushranger would find a paradise in the Cape Colony, with its isolated farms and scattered homesteads, with coloured vagrants ready to be turned into banditti, and Kaffir tribes on the frontier offering a refuge to broken men. A fine field for lawlessness might South Africa have become, had a little of the convict leaven entered into its complex social system; and right and true were the instincts of the colonists, when neither at the Cape nor yet at Natal would they listen to specious arguments in favour of receiving a few 'exiles' from the mother-land.

Sixty or seventy years ago news travelled slowly. While despatches were being written, the ship *Neptune* left England for Bermuda, was there freighted with ticket-of-leave men, and sailed for the Cape. In September, 1849, she anchored in Simons Bay. The colonists had expected her coming.

*Arrival of
the convict
ship
'Neptune.'*

¹ Despatches relative to the reception of convicts at the Cape of Good Hope, January, 1850, p. 95.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 59.

PART I.



*The opposi-
tion of the
colonists.*

They were ready, as were the men of Massachusetts, when the tea-ships arrived in Boston Harbour. Once more the English Government attempted to impose upon a colony an unpopular measure; once more the measure was resisted, and with complete success. As the New Englanders bound themselves to use no imported tea, while the obnoxious duties lasted, so the Cape colonists took a pledge—a solemn covenant—to have no dealings with the convicts, with any who employed them, or with the Government which countenanced and protected them. An anti-convict association had been formed, and a vigilance committee. Supplies were refused to the soldiers, to the sailors, and to the police. The banks notified that they would deal with no one who in any way favoured the reception of the convicts. Members of the Legislative Council resigned, and those who took their places were mobbed and forced to resign also. Business was at a stand-still, trade was out of gear, and the Government of the colony was face to face with an opposition which would only yield to force of arms. The Governor, Sir Harry Smith, was placed in a difficult position, and one unfair to himself. Trained as an old soldier in habits of loyal obedience, he was called upon to carry out a policy against which he had protested, and of which he strongly disapproved. In one point he deviated from his instructions. He delayed the landing of the convicts, and kept them on ship-board in the harbour, until his representations and the numberless memorials which from time to time he had forwarded to the Secretary of State had been duly considered and acknowledged. At length, in February 1850, a despatch from Lord Grey, written at the end of the previous November, reached the colony, directing that the convicts should be sent on to Van Diemen's Land, and intimating that the Order in Council which authorised transportation to the Cape would be immediately revoked.

*The con-
victs with-
drawn.*

Political

Thus the Cape colonists stood up against the Imperial

Government and prevailed. South Africa was saved from whatever evils transportation might have brought in its train, and a far wider principle was established, a far greater object was indirectly attained. A precedent was made that, on a question which specially concerned South Africa, and with regard to which the people of South Africa were at one, their will must be obeyed. The colonists had tried their strength and won the day. They had won it by presenting an united front to the demands and the claims of the mother country. It was a long step forward in the training for independence. It was a notable lesson in combination. Thenceforward the line of difference between Great Britain and her colony may have been more distinctly drawn, but at any rate it crossed and tended to obliterate the dividing line of race in South Africa itself. Once more in history it was demonstrated that internal unity and patriotic sentiment is promoted by pressure from outside; and when the *Neptune* sailed off to Australia, she left behind a people who had gained a new sense of life.

CH. VII.
—♦—
effect of the
success of
the anti-
convict
agitation.

In comparing the statistics of population of the Cape Colony in different years, it is necessary to bear in mind the various additions which have been made to its territory. Moreover, until within comparatively recent times, the figures given were little more than rough estimates. Still returns which are to be found in books and papers furnish abundant evidence of a steadily growing people. In 1830 the total population of the colony, including all classes, white and coloured alike, was estimated at 125,000, and in 1840, though the great Boer emigration had in the meantime taken place, at 156,000. In 1849, according to a Parliamentary return published in 1852, the total population of the colony (excluding British Kaffraria but including the frontier districts on the east and north-east annexed by Sir Harry Smith) was estimated at 218,000. To this total the Western province contributed 115,000, and the Eastern

Statistics of
population
in the Cape
Colony.

PART I. province 103,000. Capetown contained 24,000 residents of all races, and outside it the white population of the Western province numbered 42,000 against 49,000 coloured inhabitants. In the Eastern province there were 34,000 white citizens against 69,000 coloured, Port Elizabeth being a town of some 4,000 inhabitants. In 1855 the population of the colony was returned at 268,000; while the census of 1865 gave a total of 496,000, 182,000 of whom were whites; the large increase in numbers shown in the ten years being due, it would seem, to more careful calculation as well as to natural increase and immigration from Europe, and to the settlement of natives within the colonial border. In 1875, British Kaffraria having in the meantime been incorporated in the Cape Colony, the population returns amounted to 721,000, the white population numbering 237,000. The number of inhabitants in Capetown had risen to 32,000, in addition to 12,000 in its suburbs: Port Elizabeth was credited with 13,000 residents, and Grahams-town with 7,000. There were in that year throughout the colony 3.60 inhabitants to the square mile, as against 2.52 in 1865. It has been stated above¹ that in 1805, after the settlement of the Cape had been in existence for a century and a half, the civil European population of the Cape Colony numbered 26,000, which number fairly represented the total European population of South Africa. Seventy years later the white population of the Cape Colony numbered not far short of a quarter of a million, and, in addition, very many Dutch and English colonists had settled in Natal and the Boer republics.

*Growth of
revenue,
trade, &c.*

As population grew, the resources of the colony were steadily developed. The revenue in 1835 was £133,000. In 1855 it was £306,000, in 1875 £1,603,000², customs

¹ See above, p. 109.

² The authorised return of revenue for 1875 was in round numbers £2,246,000, but this included 'loans in aid of revenue' to the amount of £643,000.

duties being year by year more remunerative. In 1835 the exports were valued at £362,000; in 1855 the colonial produce exported was valued at £971,000; and in 1875 at more than four million sterling. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened to public traffic. On St. Helena the effect was disastrous. Revenue, trade, shipping, all fell away. But with the Cape it was otherwise. Once, like St. Helena, a stopping-place for ships that sailed to and from the East, it had long since passed into a new and far wider stage, and it may be questioned whether the severance of the ties which had bound it to another continent did not give a new impetus to its internal growth. Such at least is the conclusion to be drawn from the returns of trade and revenue, which rose by leaps and bounds.

Effect on the Cape of the opening of the Suez Canal.

Of the products of the colony, wine was no longer so prominent as once it had been, and the export of grain fell off, but any diminution under these heads was far more than counter-balanced by the growing export of wool. In the years 1836-40 wool represented less than 12 per cent. of the total value of exports from the colony, in 1841-5 32 per cent., in 1846-50 53 per cent. In 1875 the wool exported was valued at considerably more than two and three-quarter million pounds sterling, or in other words at nearly eight times the value of the total exports of the colony forty years before. Sheep's wool was supplemented by angora hair, and ostrich feathers became an important article of export.

Products.

Wool.

Ostrich feathers.

Copper was for many years the only mineral product of the colony. Its existence in Namaqualand had been known almost from the earliest days of European settlement at the Cape, but it was not till 1852 that it appeared in the list of exports. In 1875 the copper ore exported was valued at a quarter of a million sterling. The Ookiep mine is situated on the Western side of South Africa, in a desert region far removed from the main centres of population, and copper

Mineral products. Copper.



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PART I.

mining, while adding to the wealth of the colony, has never affected its history to any appreciable extent, or played a part in changing its political or social conditions. It was far otherwise when diamonds were discovered in the Griquas' territory, on the direct route from Capetown to the interior. In 1867 news came that a diamond had been picked up in the Hopetown district of the Cape Colony near the Orange River, and prospectors searched the banks of that river and of the Vaal, finding traces of diamonds along their course. They followed the Vaal upwards, past Klipdrift (now Barkly West), as far as Hebron; and, while the river diggings were being carried on, a great find was made in 1870 of diamonds in 'dry diggings' some twenty miles further south, on farms between the Vaal and the Modder Rivers. Here the town of Kimberley has become one of the mining centres of the world. In a pastoral and agricultural community the sudden discovery of great mineral wealth works something like a revolution. It brings in a stream of adventurers from other lands, men of strength and enterprise, rough and ready in their ways and thoughts, with democratic and cosmopolitan tendencies, hardworking, hardliving, making money and spending it. It concentrates population at particular points, and towns spring up, as it were in a night, instinct with restless life. So it was in Victoria when gold was found at Ballarat, and so it was in later years in the Transvaal, where, on the gold-bearing ridge of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg speedily became a city of many thousand inhabitants. A new strain entered into South African history, when diamonds came to light at Kimberley. The digger, the capitalist, the company promoter, jostled the slow moving Dutch farmer and quickened the pace of life. The dusty land where the stones were found was not a greater contrast to the glittering diamond, than were the conditions which mining brought to the stolid sobriety of a scattered pastoral people.

*Political
effect of the
discovery of
diamonds.*

The political effect of the find was greater in that the mines were opened beyond the Orange River, which English statesmen had fondly hoped would remain the northern boundary of British territory. Already that line had been passed on the north-east by the Proclamation of British sovereignty over Basutoland in March, 1868. By the terms of the treaty of 1854, which recognised the independence of the Orange Free State, the British Government retained no alliance with any native chief to the north of the Orange River, with the exception of the Griqua Adam Kok. Moshesh and the Basutos were left to live side by side with the Boers, in war or peace as the case might be. Border raids recurred, almost as a matter of course. There was fighting from 1856 to 1858, then an inconclusive treaty, and again intermittent war. In 1861 the Basuto chieftain asked for British protection. In 1864 the Governor of the Cape arbitrated between him and the Boers; but in the following year and in 1866 Boers and Basutos were at war again. Several of the mountain strongholds were taken by the Dutchmen, the best of the cornland fell into their hands, and beaten and dispirited, in April, 1866, Moshesh ceded part of his territory and signed his submission to the Orange Free State. The Dutch commando withdrew, and the Basutos promptly rose again, but were starved out by the destruction of their crops, and in despair offered themselves and their country to the British Government. The appeal was received, in spite of remonstrances from the Orange Free State, the Basutos became British subjects, and were safeguarded by a body of frontier police; and on February 12, 1869, the treaty of Aliwal North was signed between the High Commissioner and representatives of the Orange Free State, by which a part of what had originally been Basutoland was finally incorporated in the Free State, and the rest of the country was recognised as forming part of the British Empire.

CH. VII.

—♦—
Proclamation of British sovereignty over Basutoland, 1868.

Treaty of Aliwal North, 1869.

✓

PART I. *Annexation of Griqualand West, 1871.* Hardly had the Basuto difficulty been settled, when the rush of diamond seekers into Griqualand began. The diggers went over the Orange River in thousands, and a large population soon congregated at spots which a few months before had been little better than an unheeded wilderness. The land where the diamonds were found was claimed by the Griqua chief Waterboer, the head of the Western Griquas. He claimed it in virtue of an arrangement which his father had made many years before with Adam Kok, the leader of the Eastern Griqua clans¹. It was claimed, on the other hand, by the Orange Free State, in which Adam Kok's land had been absorbed. The Transvaal republic also put in a claim to the northern part of the disputed territory, lying between the Vaal and the Harts Rivers. This last claim was eventually submitted to the arbitration of Mr. Keate, Lieutenant-governor of Natal; and by his award, given on October 17, 1871, a boundary line was drawn between the Transvaal republic and the lands of Waterboer and the Bechuana chiefs to the north, which in effect debarred the republic from the territory which it had hoped to gain. The Volksraad tried to repudiate the decision, on the ground that the President of the State had no authority to enter into the negotiation, and, up to the date when the Transvaal was first annexed by the British Government, the Keate award remained, as far as the Boers were concerned, an open sore.


The Keate award, 1871.

More pressing was the question at issue between Waterboer and the Orange Free State, as the land which both parties claimed included the bulk of the diamond diggings. In the interests of South Africa generally it was necessary that the territory, with its large and growing European population, should be brought as soon as possible under recognised authority with adequate guarantees for law and order, and the fact that the great majority of the diggers were British



¹ See above, p. 185.

SOUTH

To face page 248



SOUTH AFRICA IN 1871

1858 to 1866. Transkei neutral territory.	1869 (Feb. 12). Treaty of Ali Orange Free State.
1866. British Kaffraria annexed to Cape Colony. Galekas and Fingoes allowed to settle in the Transkei.	1868-69. British sovereignty Basutoland.
1867. British possession of Guano Islands confirmed.	Line of 'Keate Award' (Oct. Arbitration by Lieut.-Gov. Mr. R. W. Keate, betw and the Western Native
1856. Natal finally separated from Cape Colony.	Griqualand West proclaimed Territory (Oct. 27, 1871)
1866. Alfred County annexed to Natal.	KALAHARI DESER
British Territory. 	
Boer Republics. 	



B.V. Ch. Archibute, Oxford, 1913

...ty of Aliwal North with
...ate.


...sovereignty proclaimed over

...rd' (Oct. 17, 1871) ◆◆◆◆◆

...lieut.-Governor of Natal,
...eate, between Transvaal
...ern Natives.

...proclaimed British
...27, 1871)

DESERT



100 200 300 English Miles



subjects, pointed obviously to British rule. Sir Henry Barkly, the High Commissioner, suggested settlement by arbitration, but the terms which were proffered were not accepted by the Orange Free State. Meanwhile Waterboer, like Moshesh, invited the sovereignty of the Queen over his land and people, and, as the best solution of a pressing difficulty, that sovereignty was proclaimed. Under date of October 27, 1871, a proclamation was issued by the High Commissioner, accepting the allegiance of Waterboer and the Griquas as British subjects, and declaring their territory to be British territory; and a line was drawn which cut off the diamond district from the Orange Free State, and included it in the new British Province of Griqualand West. This step was not taken without strong protest on the part of the Government of the Free State, but the dispute was finally closed in July 1876, when President Brand and Lord Carnarvon, then Secretary of State, signed a convention in London, awarding to the Free State a sum of £90,000 in consideration of the abandonment of their claim.

Very complicated were these boundary questions, fruitful in despatches and protests; but their interest does not consist in the arguments which were used and in the correspondence which passed; it lies in the event and in what it implied. The Sand River Convention, and the Free State treaty of 1854, were the low-water mark of the ebbing tide of British influence in South Africa. Withdrawal behind the Orange River, no interference to the north of that river, was the policy which the British Government gave to the world. The Boers and the natives were to settle their own disputes, the English were to look on, and the Cape Colony was to be unmoved. Not many years passed before this policy was reversed. The annexation of Basutoland, the Keate award, the proclamation of British sovereignty over Griqualand West proved in unmistakable fashion that the tide had turned, and that a strong current

Claim of the Orange Free State in regard to the diamond fields

finally compromised in 1876.

Extension of British territory in South Africa.

PART I. was setting northward. It is never wise to lay down a hard and fast policy with regard to a land whose conditions and possibilities are unknown or imperfectly known. Year after year brings some new fact to light, and what had been confidently proclaimed becomes impossible to carry out. It might well have been foreseen, that, however much the Imperial Government might disavow responsibilities, however strict might be the injunctions against interference, disturbances on the frontier of the Cape Colony must concern the government of that colony; the paramount power in South Africa, the keeper of its seaboard, must be the referee in disputes between Boers and natives, and its decisions must be enforced. It was not as conquerors, but as arbitrators, that the English went forward once more, as judges between peoples with conflicting claims, as holding the balance even between the black and the white. The actual discovery of mineral wealth in Griqualand was unexpected, yet it may fairly be argued that the possibility of some such contingency occurring in the future might have been borne in mind. The resources of Africa were in no way developed, any day might disclose some new fount of wealth, and, wherever it came to the surface, there Englishmen were sure to congregate. As it was, the discovery of diamonds exploded the theory that the only value of South Africa to England consisted in the naval station at Simons Bay. Whatever Secretaries of State may have thought and said, Englishmen now knew better, and their government had to follow their lead. What had been done was to a great extent undone, what had been said was modified or unsaid, and the net result was British advance, coupled with not unnatural irritation on the part of the Boers in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal republic. Circumscribed in their limits, the Boer republics were, by being circumscribed, to some extent consolidated. There was an awakening of national sentiment, and

a widening of the breach between the Dutch and English in South Africa. CH. VII.

In the period to which this chapter is devoted, one great force was wanting which has since played an all-important part in South African colonisation. Railways were as yet hardly in existence. The first railway worked in South Africa is said to have been a little line at Durban in Natal, from the landing place to the town, which was opened in 1860. By an Act of 1872, the Cape Government took over the railways of the Cape Colony, which then consisted of a line from Capetown to Stellenbosch and Wellington in the Paarl district, with a branch line to Wynberg, the total length being between 63 and 64 miles. In 1874 an expenditure on railway extension of nearly five millions sterling was authorised; and now the iron road runs far north to the Congo Free State, and there is unbroken railway connexion between Capetown and Delagoa Bay. The difficulties of South Africa in past times were, in great measure, perhaps in the main, geographical difficulties. Peoples dispersed and remained severed from one another, because the distances were so great, the means of access so inadequate, and the power of control in consequence so limited. These difficulties railways are fast surmounting, and, as each new line is opened, one more link is forged to hold together a great dominion, which should not be divided.

The beginning of railways in South Africa.

Natal has long been spanned by a line which, branching beyond the Tugela, crosses the Drakensberg mountains into the Orange Free State on the north-west, into the Transvaal on the north. Seventy years ago, in the year 1843, when the territory became a British colony, its horizon was bounded by the mountains and the sea, and for many years subsequently the history of Natal was, on the whole, one of steady but not striking progress. For two years after British sovereignty was proclaimed, no regular forms of government were instituted. At Durban Major Smith com-

Progress of Natal.

PART I.
 —◆—
*Constitutional
 changes in
 Natal.*

manded the troops, and acted as Governor; in the country the Boer Volksraad still remained in existence. At length, in August 1845, Natal was annexed to the Cape Colony, and ordinances were passed by the legislature of the Cape, declaring the Roman Dutch law to be the law of the land, and providing for the administration of justice. In November of the same year the colony was given a separate administration, consisting of a Lieutenant-governor and an Executive Council, but its laws were still made at Capetown. In 1848 a further step forward was taken, and a local Legislative Council was created, though consisting only of official members. Finally, in 1856, the colony was entirely severed from the Cape, and started on its own career with a Legislative Council consisting of four official members and twelve elected representatives. The Governor still bore the title of Lieutenant-governor, but within the limits of the colony he was no longer subordinate to the Governor of the Cape, though outside those limits the latter was supreme in virtue of his position as High Commissioner for South Africa. Many constitutional changes were subsequently made, including, in 1869, the introduction into the Executive Council of two of the elected members of the Legislative Council; and finally, in 1893, fifty years after it first became a British possession, Natal received the gift of Responsible Government.

*Extension
 of the colony
 of Natal
 to the
 south.*

The boundaries of the Cape Colony were ever changing. It was otherwise in the case of Natal. The Drakensberg and the Indian Ocean were bounds fixed by nature, and on the north-east the Buffalo and the Lower Tugela continued to mark the line between the colony on one side, the Transvaal republic and Zululand on the other. Only on the south was there any extension of territory. The land between the Umzimkulu and the Umtamvuna Rivers, which now forms the county of Alfred¹, was annexed in 1866. It had been

¹ So called in honour of the visit of Prince Alfred to Natal in 1860.

part of the debateable border territory, considered by the emigrant farmers as within the limits of the Natal republic, but handed over by the British Government to Faku the Pondo chief. Faku in turn subsequently relinquished his claims, the inland portion of the territory became Griqualand East, and the coast country adjoining Natal was incorporated in that colony.

CH. VII.

In Natal the European settlers were few; the Kaffirs were many, and constantly growing in numbers. Alarmed by the multitude of the black men, whose rights were recognised by the Colonial Government, irritated by a land settlement which they considered illiberal, the Dutch farmers had in great measure left the country. The exodus was in part checked by the visit of Sir Harry Smith in 1848 and his appointment of a Land Commission, and up country many of the Boers settled down peaceably on their farms. Still a large proportion of the Dutchmen had gone and did not return, and the population of Natal, other than the Kaffirs, was mainly recruited by immigrants from over the seas. In 1852 the total population of the colony was estimated at nearly 121,000 persons, of whom under 8,000 were of European descent, against some 113,000 natives. Of the white inhabitants 1,500 lived in Pietermaritzburg, and 1,100 at Durban. Colonists of Dutch origin constituted from one-third to one-half of the white population, the remainder being mainly immigrants from the United Kingdom or the Cape, with an admixture of Germans. Between the years 1848 and 1852 about 5,000 immigrants arrived in the colony, the majority of whom were assisted from public funds. Among the new comers were a few German families, imported from Bremen by a German firm, and established at a settlement some miles inland from Durban, which was christened New Germany. A few Yorkshire immigrants were also introduced under favourable auspices; but the main scheme of immigration, which was tried in these years, was an ill-advised and

*Immigra-
tion into
Natal.*

*Byrne's
immi-
grants.*

PART I. impracticable enterprise, under which Mr. Byrne brought in
 ——— more than 2,000 settlers from the United Kingdom. The basis of his scheme was that each adult immigrant should, on arrival in Natal, receive an allotment of twenty acres; and experience proved, as it had proved in the case of the Albany settlement, that small grants of land were wholly inadequate. Byrne's colonists too, like many of the Albany settlers, instead of being skilled agriculturists possessed of some capital, were in great measure mechanics and small tradesmen, ill qualified to make a living as South African farmers. The lots were not properly surveyed, the immigrants found no suitable accommodation, and no means of transport to their allotted homes. On its original lines the undertaking was a complete failure, causing much misery and distress; many of the immigrants drifted off to the Australian gold fields; and, though the scheme, like other unsuccessful ventures of the same kind, resulted in the survival of the fittest and in the end contributed to Natal a number of thriving citizens, it tended to create a prejudice against the colony as a field of British immigration.

*Growth of
revenue
and trade.*

Notwithstanding, a rising revenue testified to growing prosperity, the main items being customs duties, quit rents, stamp duties, and native hut tax. The exports too rose steadily from year to year. In 1853 ivory headed the list, procured mainly in the Zulus' country; butter came next, and sheep's wool showed a large increase. In 1851 the value of the wool exported was only £300, in 1853 it was over £3,000, in 1862 it was £38,000, in 1872 it was £274,000. In 1853 the sub-tropical products, for which the low-lying coast district of Natal is so well suited, had not been developed. A Natal cotton company was formed in 1847, but met with little success, and the first sugar canes were only planted in 1852. Ten years later, in 1862, the sugar export was valued at £21,000, and after another ten years, in 1872, at £154,000. Sugar growing brought in its

*Coolie im-
migration.*

train a new class of immigrant, the East Indian coolie. In 1860 indentured coolie immigration began, and by the end of 1875 more than 12,000 East Indians had been brought over. A fresh leaven was thus infused into the population of the colony, and while the Cape was losing its connexion with the East, Natal began to send to India for its labour supply.

CH. VII.
—♦—

'The civilisation and improvement of the inhabitants of this part of Africa are the main objects to which I look from the maintenance of this colony'¹. Thus Lord Grey summed up his reasons for keeping the territory of Natal under British rule. The Kaffirs formed an overwhelming majority of the population. European settlement was on a very small scale and of recent date. It was but equitable, as well as consistent with facts and common sense, that native interests should form a first charge upon the concern of a government, which professed to hold sway in South Africa on moral at least as much as on material grounds. To maintain peace, to promote civilisation, but to avoid as far as possible interference with the tribal system and with native laws and customs, when not contrary to humanity, was the sum and substance of the instructions which came from home. Locations were set aside for the Kaffir clans. In 1851 seven such reserves had already been constituted, mainly in the wilder districts of the territory, the average size of each reserve being 180,000 acres. Within the limits of these locations, subject to European supervision and to the paramount authority of the Lieutenant-governor of Natal, who was constituted Supreme Chief, the tribal system prevailed, and the Kaffirs lived under native law, as in the days before the English were masters of the land. It was the most convenient and least expensive method of administration, but it

¹ Lord Grey to Sir H. Pottinger, December 4, 1846. Correspondence relative to the establishment of the settlement of Natal, July, 1848, pp. 93-4.

PART I.



The rebellion of Langalibalele.

tended to keep white men and black apart, and to maintain, if not to strengthen, the power of the native chiefs, a power which contained the elements of danger

On the head-waters of the Bushman River, and on the fringe of the Drakensberg mountains, where rising to over ten thousand feet they form the western frontier of Natal, separating the colony from Basutoland, was located the Hlubi clan of Kaffirs, refugees from Zululand, under a chief of long descent and great personal influence, Langalibalele. His young men had been to work in the diamond fields, and brought back guns into Natal, where the possession of firearms, unless duly registered, was strictly prohibited. Notice was taken of the matter in 1873, and the chief was summoned to Pietermaritzburg to answer for the breach of the law. Twice and three times he was summoned, but failed to come, and prepared for flight over the mountains into Basutoland. A small mixed force was sent against him, but he made his escape, and in the Bushman River Pass his followers attacked the advanced guard of the pursuers and took two or three lives. It was such an affray as had in former times precluded in South Africa a serious native war; but the Basutos gave the fugitive chief no support, the Cape police cut off his retreat, and in little more than a month from the fight at the Bushman River Pass he was arrested at a Basuto village, and brought back to Pietermaritzburg to be tried as a rebel against the Supreme Chief. The trial took place before a special court, whose proceedings were subsequently closely criticised, and the sentence was banishment for life. The old chief was accordingly sent as a prisoner to Robben Island, and his clan was, with some loss of life, utterly broken up. Langalibalele, however, was not without friends among the white men, and his cause was warmly espoused by Colenso, Bishop of Natal. By his unwearied pleading the Bishop procured a modification of the sentence, and Langalibalele was removed from Robben Island to a

location in the Cape Colony, and finally returned to Natal in 1886 to close his life. CH. VII.

This rebellion, or rather disturbance, for so small an outbreak could hardly be dignified by the name of rebellion, drew attention to the position of the natives in Natal, and to the influence which was exercised by the chiefs. The civil administration of the colony seemed to require reform, and the policy which had hitherto upheld the tribal system among the Kaffir subjects of the Queen was called in question. In 1875 Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent out to Natal on a mission, which lasted but five months, to replace the former Lieutenant-governor, to make inquiry, and to initiate certain changes. The constitution was modified in the direction of giving more power to the Executive, the power of the chiefs was greatly limited by placing them under the more direct superintendence of European officers, the Kaffirs in the locations were made amenable to the ordinary criminal law of the colony, and for the trial of civil cases a Native High Court was instituted. Thus civilised law began to replace native custom, and the Kaffir tribesman advanced a stage towards the level of the white citizen.

*Mission of
Sir Garnet
Wolseley in
1875.*

Most of the Kaffir clans in Natal had once been subordinate to the Zulu power. Since Panda took the place of Dingaan, that power had been quiescent, and the limits assigned to Zululand had been faithfully observed. But the military system, which Chaka had perfected, was still in existence; and, consolidated within narrower boundaries than before, the Zulus had still no equals among the fighting tribes of Africa. A leader they wanted, and a leader they found in Cetewayo, Panda's eldest son. King Panda was a man of peace, a firm ally of the white men, who had helped him in bygone days; but he ruled a people mindful of their past, whose hearts were in warring and bloodshed. As years went on, unwieldy in body, enfeebled in mind, he lost his hold over the young men of his nation,

*Zululand.
The rise of
Cetewayo.*

PART I. and his power passed into the able hands of his son, a man of the type of the Zulu chieftains who had gone before. For a time there were two factions in Zululand, led by two sons of the old King, Cetewayo and his younger brother Umbulazi; and at the end of 1856 the rival parties met and fought on the banks of the Tugela, when Umbulazi was killed, and large numbers of his followers were massacred. In the following year, at a great meeting of the Zulu people, Cetewayo was associated with his father in the government, becoming the virtual though not the nominal ruler of the Zulus; and in 1861, in the presence of a Natal officer, Mr. Shepstone, he was formally installed as Panda's rightful heir, the future king of Zululand. Panda died in 1872; and in 1873, at Cetewayo's own request, Shepstone again went to Zululand as the representative of the Natal Government, and by the Umfolosi River took part in the ceremony which answered to the coronation of the new king. The occasion was marked by every sign of respect and friendship towards the white men, and proclamations were issued to the effect that indiscriminate blood-shedding was to cease, that no life was to be taken without fair trial, and that death should no longer be the penalty for minor offences. So Cetewayo's reign opened with fair professions; Shepstone's mission returned to Natal; and a warrior people under a warrior king spoke of peace but made ready for war.

*The move-
ment to-
wards
South
African
confedera-
tion.*

Through the tangled maze of South African politics, there ran, as a golden thread, the hope and the possibility of some form of confederation. Not many years since there had been but one European Government in South Africa, and thinking men still looked for union or re-union of the several states or provinces, divided for the time by political differences or special local needs, but linked none the less by the lasting ties of kindred blood and common traditions. The British colonies owned the coast-line, the ports of entry and exit, and thus could control in great measure the customs revenue

of the inland states: it seemed, therefore, that the financial interests of those states would be best consulted by the establishment of a federal system, under which the dues collected at Capetown, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban would not merely enrich the governments of the Cape Colony and Natal, but contribute to the benefit of the whole of South Africa. A common policy towards the natives was clearly wanted. There would be more security, more respect for the white man, were the Kaffir clans to realise that there was one uniform system through the length and breadth of the land, one strong administration putting an end to the local jealousies, petty intrigues, and shifty dealings which, now in one territory, now in another, caused the native races to be alternately courted and oppressed. There was also another side to the question. Confederation might bring in its train further subdivision, and, provided that a central government was once firmly established, local governments might with advantage be multiplied. We have noted the strong feeling of antagonism between East and West, which for some years threatened to dismember the Cape Colony. An obvious solution appeared to be the partition of the colony into provinces, each with a local administration, but all subordinate, with other parts of South Africa, to one supreme authority.

When Sir George Grey was Governor of the Cape, the question of South African confederation came into prominence. As governor of New Zealand, he had dealt with problems not dissimilar to those which required handling in South Africa. In New Zealand there was a native difficulty, which he faced and faced successfully; and in that colony he carried out a federal system, consisting of Provincial Councils under a Central Legislature. He found in South Africa three British possessions, the Cape Colony, British Kaffraria, and Natal, and behind them the two Boer Republics. Twenty years before there had been the Cape

*Policy
advocated
by Sir
George
Grey.*

PART I. Colony alone. He looked to the incorporation of British Kaffraria in the Cape Colony, and to wider union and consolidation, as the true policy to be pursued, and from time to time he gave indications of his views to the Imperial Government. In September, 1858, the Secretary of State for the time, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, invited a more definite expression of opinion than had yet been given. How far, he asked, might it be deemed practicable to combine in federal union all the British possessions in South Africa, and what permanent line of policy should be adopted, consistent with existent treaties, towards the two Boer states. The despatch was explicit, but carefully guarded, and no hint was given of any scheme of confederation which would include the republics. Meanwhile, however, from the Orange Free State had come signs of a growing wish for reunion with the Cape Colony. The Basuto wars had sorely tried the slender resources of the territory, and a memorial was circulating among its leading residents in favour of 'federal union with the parent colony¹.' Later, the Volksraad passed a formal resolution to the effect that 'a union or alliance with the Cape Colony either on the plan of federation or otherwise is desirable²,' and this resolution Sir George Grey undertook to submit to the Cape Parliament. Before he had received it, he had already, in a despatch dated November 19, 1858, set out in full his views upon the political future of South Africa. Clearly and forcibly he laid before the Queen's Government the mistakes which in his opinion had been made in the past, and with equal clearness and equal force he sketched out a policy for the future. The dismemberment of South Africa, he contended, had taken place under the mistaken impression, that no part of the South African continent was valuable to England beyond

¹ Correspondence respecting the recall of Sir George Grey and his subsequent reappointment, April, 1860, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

the sea-port of Simons Bay; and in their hurry to be rid of trouble, responsibility, and expenditure, the Imperial Government had ceded territories, and alienated subjects, without waiting to ascertain the true wishes of the people, and 'before any free form of government had been introduced into or tried in any part of South Africa¹.' Based on misconception, the policy had failed, resulting in weak unstable European communities, and in widespread and dangerous ill feeling on the part of the natives. For a remedy he looked to a federal union, in which the separate colonies and states, each with its own local government and legislature, should be combined under a general representative legislature, led by a responsible ministry, and specially charged with the duty of providing for common defence. 'The constitution of New Zealand,' he wrote, 'embodies the model which I should propose for adoption, and that form of government could easily be so altered as to suit in every particular the circumstances of South Africa².'

Perplexing it must have been at the time to the home Government, perplexing it is to readers now, to find what contradictory accounts were given by trusted and competent advisers, in the space of very few years, of the feelings and the wishes of the people of South Africa. Sir George Clerk said one thing in 1853, in 1858 Sir George Grey said another. Where did the truth lie? it may well have been asked. Which were the counsels of wisdom? Sir George Grey was probably right, when he argued that it was unwise to withdraw British sovereignty from lands and peoples over which it had been proclaimed, 'before any free form of government had been introduced into or tried in any part of South Africa.' The sovereignty might have been nominal for a time, the actual exercise of rule and authority might have remained in abeyance, but it would have been well to retain if only the shadow of Imperial control, and under it

¹ Correspondence as above, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10

PART I. gradually to build up a series of self-governing communities. The truth was that the principles of colonial self-government had not taken root in South Africa in time to forestall separation. Even in other colonies Responsible Government was, when Sir George Grey wrote, still in the experimental stage. It was a new light when there came to the Cape a Governor who saw clearly, and stated clearly, how freedom and empire might be harmonised, who set equal value on the one and on the other, who discerned how in course of time the rebel to a despotic government might become the loyal citizen of a self-governing South African state, where local liberties would be secure, and where the British flag would mean protection, but not interference.

*Recall and
reinstatement
of
Sir George
Grey.*

Sir George Grey was ahead of his time, or at least in front of his employers in England. His views were broader than theirs, his proposals too large for their liking. They asked for information, and he gave them a scheme. They contemplated the possibility of federating the British possessions in South Africa; he openly advocated federal union, which should include the republics also. They took alarm, and said word that in no shape could British sovereignty be resumed over the Orange Free State; but, before their instructions reached the Governor, he had already laid before the Cape Parliament the overtures which the Free State had made for federal union. He had gone too fast, if not too far; he had exceeded his authority; and on other and different matters he was held to have disregarded instructions. Once more a South African Governor was punished for being too strong by the sentence of recall, and once more the sympathy of South Africa was enlisted on the side of the culprit. The sentence was not carried out. A change of government occurred in England. The Duke of Newcastle succeeded Bulwer Lytton at the Colonial Office, and while disavowing, as his predecessor had disavowed, Sir George Grey's policy, on public as well as private grounds he retained his services.

The Governor came home on leave, and returned for a while to his government at the Cape, but not to carry out the far-reaching policy which he had boldly and wisely conceived. 'I much fear,' he sadly wrote before leaving Capetown for the first time, 'that the opportunity of establishing such a federation as I had proposed has now been lost for ever'.¹

An opportunity, possibly, was lost, but none the less from that time onward by statesmen and thinkers the one solution of South African difficulties was held to be federation. The conditions varied from time to time. Local sentiment varied; but union or re-union continued to be more than a dream. The Canadian Dominion, consolidated in 1867, was held up as a model to South Africa, and Lord Carnarvon, who carried out the confederation of the British North American provinces, looked to completing a similar work in South Africa. Various causes, however, were operating in a different direction. The proclamation of British sovereignty over Basutoland had the effect of relieving the Orange Free State of a native difficulty which had tended to draw the burghers closer to their brethren in the Cape Colony, and at the same time was regarded by the Dutchmen as an act of British aggression; while the annexation of the Diamond Fields still further embittered the feeling in the two republics against the Imperial Government. In the Cape Colony itself, where a federation commission was appointed in 1872, the question immediately at issue was the subdivision of the colony and the creation of provincial governments within its limits; the grant of Responsible Government followed shortly afterwards, and, while the new system was young, colonial politicians were content to carve out electoral districts, and little inclined to embark upon a new sea of troubles, or to put their hands to further and wider experiments. The impulse towards federation came rather from

*Federation
pressed on
South
Africa
from with-
out.*

¹ Copies of further papers with reference to the recall of Governor Sir George Grey, June, 1860, p. 1.

PART I. without than from within, and, instead of holding back their representatives in South Africa, the Secretaries of State at home now urged them on.

Lord Carnarvon at the Colonial Office.

Proposed South African conference.

In 1874 Lord Carnarvon came back to the Colonial Office, and in May 1875 he wrote to the Governor of the Cape, proposing that delegates of the various South African states should be invited to meet in conference at some place in the colony, to discuss native policy and other points of common interest, prepared, if opportunity offered, to ventilate 'the all-important question of a possible union of South Africa in some form of confederation'.¹ As the English representative at such a conference he nominated Mr. Froude. Cordially made, his invitation was not received with equal cordiality by the responsible ministers of the Cape Colony. The proposals they considered to be premature, and to the details of the despatch which contained them they took exception. Their attitude was intelligible. They had but lately taken up the reins of government over an undivided colony, and feared that a movement towards confederation might involve renewal of schemes for provincial separation. Moreover, like young men lately come to manhood, they resented advice and guidance from the mother country. In South Africa not in England, they contended, must originate any proposals for South African union. It was not for a minister in Downing Street to point out to self-governing colonists the way in which they should walk, and the goal to which they should strive to attain. Mr. Froude's visit intensified their opposition. He came clothed with authority, but not with official authority. He gained support in the press and at public meetings, but his position was rather that of an exponent of Lord Carnarvon's views than the position of an accredited delegate to a formal conference. The conference never took place, but was superseded by a proposal for another

Mr. Froude's visit to the Cape.

¹ Correspondence respecting the proposed conference of delegates on affairs of South Africa (C. 1399), February, 1876, p. 3.

conference in London, at which leading men connected with South Africa might discuss South African difficulties personally with the Secretary of State. In August, 1876, it was held, but had little of a representative character. The Prime Minister of the Cape, who was in London at the time, declined to attend; no delegate was present from the Transvaal Republic; and, though the President of the Orange Free State came to the meetings, he did so bound by a resolution of his Volksraad not to take part in a negotiation with respect to a confederation of the colonies and states of South Africa, by which the independence of the Orange Free State could be endangered¹. Only Natal was fully represented, by Sir Theophilus Shepstone and two unofficial members of the legislature. On the borders of Natal trouble was brewing, which threatened that colony in particular, though it menaced also the peace and security of all South Africa. The members of the conference deliberated on questions of common policy and interest, mainly affecting dealings with the native races: friendly discussion and interchange of views was the object of the meetings, and their result.

In the following December Lord Carnarvon sent out to South Africa the draft of a Bill for the Union under one government and under the British Crown of such of the South African colonies and states as might wish to avail themselves of its provisions; and in the spring of 1877 the Bill in an amended form was introduced into the House of Lords. Before the session ended, it passed through both houses of Parliament and became law: its passage through the House of Commons being rendered memorable by an outbreak of Irish obstruction and an all night sitting. The Act was in effect, as it was styled by its author, a Permissive Confederation Act, a law in outline, the details of which were

*The Per-
missive
Federation
Act.*

¹ Further correspondence relative to the affairs of South Africa (C. 1631), August, 1876, p. 47.

PART I. to be filled up afterwards at the free will of the South African communities. Machinery was provided, if they wished to avail themselves of it; if any two or more colonies or states in South Africa agreed to confederate, such confederation could under the law be carried out by the Crown by means of Order in Council, the period within which such powers could be exercised being, on Mr. Forster's suggestion, limited to five years. A federal Government and Legislature, consisting of two houses, was provided, Provincial Governments and Legislatures were created and defined, the powers of the Union Parliament and the powers of the Provincial Councils respectively were duly adjusted, on paper and in anticipation South Africa was laid out as a federal Dominion. The skeleton was carefully constructed, but the problem was still outstanding how to make the dry bones live. English Secretaries of State could give help and encouragement; they could remove technical obstacles and provide legislative facilities, but from South Africa alone could come the breath of life.

*Appoint-
ment of
Sir Bartle
Frere to be
Governor of
the Cape.*

In South Africa there was at least one man ready, and specially selected for the work. On March 31, 1877, Sir Bartle Frere had landed at the Cape. He had been chosen by Lord Carnarvon, in the previous October, as the statesman who seemed to him most capable of carrying his scheme of confederation into effect, and within two years, it was hoped, he would be 'the first Governor-general of the South African Dominion'.¹ He went out in harmony with the aims and the enthusiasm of his chief, hoping to crown by one great constructive effort the work of a bright and noble life. How the hopes were disappointed and the brightness dimmed will be told in the coming chapter, and in all the annals of South African history there is no more striking illustration of perverse fortune than the record of Sir Bartle Frere's

¹ Lord Carnarvon to Sir Bartle Frere, October, 1876. Martineau's *Life of Sir Bartle Frere*, vol. ii. pp. 161-2.

administration. With it we take up the tale of our own days. CH. VII.
He had but newly come to the Cape, when he learnt that the
Transvaal Republic had been annexed by Sir Theophilus
Shepstone; and, while the South Africa Bill, with all the
peaceful plans which it embodied, was still before the Impe-
rial Parliament, Members heard, some in amaze, a few in
dismay, most in ignorance of what it all implied, that a
territory nearly as large as the United Kingdom had been
added to the Queen's dominions.

CHAPTER VIII.

DOING AND UNDOING.

PART I.

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*The
Transvaal
Republic
prior to
1877.*

FOR many years after the Sand River Convention the country beyond the Vaal River remained the borderland of South African colonisation, the scene of the remotest European settlements. The settlers, if settlers the half nomad Boers could be called, were the most determined of the trekkers from the Cape Colony, the men who were most resolved to go away and to keep away from British rule. They went so far that their independence was assured, for the simple reason that the Government could hardly, even if it had wished to do so, have followed them up. Thinly scattered through a very large area, they lived from the first under simple democratic forms of government, and, as may be supposed, in ordinary times the majority of the farmers did not trouble their heads very much about any government whatever. As a state, as a community, the Transvaal Republic was a failure. It had no organisation, little or no cohesion, and, as years went on, it threatened to fall to pieces. Its weakness was a danger to South Africa generally, its anarchy gave rise to scandal, for no effective control was exercised by the Boer Government over the doings of the broken men, such as are always to be found on the confines of barbarism. In and round this border territory, which has now become a central state on the South African map, the main acts in the modern drama of South Africa have taken place.

The Boers were constantly on the verge of war, if not actually fighting, with their coloured neighbours. There was bad blood between them and the Zulu King Cetewayo; and, but for the influence of the Natal Government, there would have been open warfare. The chief causes of the ill feeling were twofold. First and foremost, there was a land dispute of long standing, the disputed territory being to the east of the Blood River, on the north-western side of Zululand, where it touched the extreme south-east of the Transvaal. Here the Dutchmen had encroached on ground which the Zulus claimed to be an integral part of their territory, and in May 1875, the acting President of the Republic had gone so far as to issue a proclamation formally annexing the land. In the second place, irritation was caused by Boer intrigues with the Swazi tribes who lived to the north of Zululand. The Zulu King claimed to be the Swazis' overlord, whereas the Transvaal Republic was by way of claiming the rights of protectorate, if not of actual sovereignty, over Swaziland.

CH. VIII.

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*The Boers
 and the
 Zulus.*

Their main difficulties were with Cetewayo, but on all sides the Boers made themselves enemies. They asserted dominion over a native potentate named Sekukuni, whose location was near the Lydenburg gold-fields on the north-eastern side of the republic, and a commando was sent against him in 1876 with disastrous results. On the western side of the Transvaal complaints of Boer aggression and wrongdoing came from Bechuanaland. Khama, King of the far off Bamangwato, sent, in fear of a Dutch invasion, to ask for the protection of the Queen. 'There are three things,' he wrote, 'which distress me very much, war, selling people, and drink. All these I shall find in the Boers, and it is these things which destroy people to make an end of them in the country¹.' Even from the Matabele Chief Lobengula

¹ Correspondence respecting the war between the Transvaal Republic and neighbouring native tribes. C. 1748. 1877, p. 251.

PART I. there came a message to the High Commissioner, enclosing a copy of a warning letter which he had addressed to the President of the Transvaal Republic on hearing that a trek from the Transvaal to Matabeleland was in contemplation.

By civilised men, most of all by philanthropists, the Transvaal Boers at this time were held in low estimation. When their independence was guaranteed by the Sand River Treaty, a clause was inserted in the convention prohibiting slavery. 'It is agreed that no slavery is or shall be permitted or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the emigrant farmers.' The words were clear enough; no loophole was left for black apprenticeship or servitude of any kind; yet there was ample evidence to prove that in one form or another slavery was rife in the state. As the war with Sekukuni went on, sickening stories were circulated, and could not be disbelieved, of outrages and atrocities committed by white men, of women slaughtered, of prisoners massacred in cold blood, until in his disgust the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Barkly, wrote of 'the scenes of injustice, cruelty, and rapine, which abundant evidence is every day forthcoming to prove, have rarely ceased to disgrace the republics beyond the Vaal ever since they first sprang into existence¹.'

*The Boer
war with
Sekukuni.*

The war with Sekukuni began about June 1876, and in August intelligence was received in the Cape Colony and Natal that the Boer attack, though directed by the President in person, had been repulsed and that the commando had dispersed. The fighting subsequently dragged on, conducted on the Boer side mainly by a gang of adventurers or, as the South African press styled them, Filibusters, prominent among whom was an ex-Prussian officer named Von Schlick-

¹ To Lord Carnarvon, Dec. 18, 1876. Further correspondence respecting the war between the Transvaal Republic and neighbouring native tribes. C. 1776. 1877, p. 12.

mann. It was against the doings of this band of scoundrels that the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State sent repeated protests and remonstrances, but with little or no effect. It was not only a question of humanity. The Boers by their reckless proceedings were compromising all the other European communities in South Africa. So much Lord Carnarvon saw and said plainly, and he saw too that 'the safety and prosperity of the Republic would be best assured by its union with the British Colonies, when no occasion for local wars would continue to exist¹.' That the natives could as a rule discern between the English and the Boers between the dealings of a stable colonial government and the lawlessness of a bankrupt republic, was clear enough; but the longer war and raiding went on, the greater likelihood there was that the sins of one section of the white men in South Africa would be visited upon the whole European population. There was evidence that the Swazis had joined hands with the Boers, under the impression that they were really co-operating with the Government of Natal; while Cetewayo, who was face to face with Natal on one border and with the Transvaal on another, and in whose mind no confusion could exist, was storing up a grudge against the Colony because it restrained him from attacking the Republic. In the Republic itself there were many Europeans, who felt the full effects of the prevailing anarchy. Especially in the Lydenburg gold-fields, near the scene of fighting, were men, women, and children, British subjects, living day by day in fear of their lives. The Government, if government it could be called, under which they lived, was powerless to protect them; and they appealed in urgent terms for the protection which the Queen's Government alone could give.

Such were the difficulties which Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State, was called upon to solve. He had by

CH. VIII.

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*The danger
 caused by
 it to South
 Africa
 generally.*

*Lord
 Carnarvon*

¹ C. 1748. 1877, p. 103.

PART I. his side at the time a man who, after more than forty years
 of public life in South Africa, was perhaps unrivalled in his
 knowledge of native questions, and whose name was a house-
 hold word in Zululand, Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Holding
 the position of Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, he had
 come to London in 1876 as one of the representatives of
 that Colony at the South African Conference, and in the
 autumn of the year he was sent out by Lord Carnarvon,
 as a Special Commissioner 'to inquire respecting certain
 disturbances which have taken place in the territories ad-
 joining the Colony of Natal,' in plain words, to visit the
 Transvaal Republic, and make inquiry into its condition
 and into the causes, the circumstances, and the results of
 the war. But something more than inquiry was contem-
 plated. The Queen's Commission¹ empowered him, if he
 thought that the circumstances required such a course to
 be taken, to annex to the British dominions all or part of
 the territories which formed the scene of his inquiry, and
 to take over the administration, provided he was satisfied
 that a sufficient number of the inhabitants desired to become
 British subjects.

and Sir
 Theophilus
 Shepstone.

Shepstone's
 mission
 to the
 Transvaal.

In the closing days of December he set out from Pietermaritzburg, with a staff of seven or eight military officers, and escorted by twenty-five men of the Natal mounted police: and on January 22, 1877, he entered Pretoria amid the enthusiastic cheers of the residents. For between two and three months after his arrival he held his hand, taking stock of the situation, and becoming day by day more convinced that nothing short of British sovereignty could save the State from utter ruin. Formal and informal conferences took place: the opinions of all classes were as far as possible ascertained: and the longer the inquiry lasted, the more hopeless seemed the outlook under existing conditions.

¹ Dated Oct. 5, 1876. C. 1776. 1877, pp. 1, 2.

President Burgers called a special meeting of the Volksraad, CH. VIII. he laid before them a scheme for a revised constitution, and also Lord Carnarvon's Confederation Bill. He delivered *President Burgers and the Volksraad.* speeches to the assembled councillors after the manner of the speeches in Thucydides. 'Anarchy is a worse oppression than any foreign power can be thought, and cannot be borne long by any nation. A nation does not stand or fall with its government or its charter but with its people. No state can exist without faithful subjects.' And again, 'If the people remained independent and yet lost their honour, they lost everything, but though they lost their independence, yet if they retained their honour, they would remain a free people'. Amid these classic platitudes he seemed to indicate that the Volksraad must choose between radical reform of their government and confederation under the British flag. They consented to a reform and to measures for enforcing collection of taxes, and dispersed to their homes, in difficulties because the treasury was empty and there was no money to pay their travelling expenses.

The President was a shrewd man, and knew that no constitutional reform could cure the evils of the State. Shepstone had known it from the first, and had said plainly that the only effective remedy was the Government of the Queen. The country was absolutely bankrupt. Trade was at a stand-still. The white men were divided into factions, aggravated by the near prospect of a contest for the post of President. The natives in and out of the Republic were watching their opportunity, and Cetewayo in particular had massed his Zulu forces with the avowed intention of driving the Dutchmen south of the Vaal. Longer delay seemed but to invite a crisis, and on April 12, 1877, in the Church Square at Pretoria, two proclamations were read, each signed by Shepstone; the first *Annexation of the Transvaal. Shepstone's proclamations.* declaring that the Transvaal Republic had become British

¹ C. 1776. 1877, pp. 119, 121.

PART I. territory, the second notifying that Shepstone himself had taken over the administration of the Government. The former proclamation contained a clause that 'the Transvaal will remain a separate government with its own laws and legislature, and that it is the wish of Her Most Gracious Majesty that it shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people ¹.' President Burgers made a formal protest against the annexation, and retired to the Cape Colony on a pension. His Executive Council also protested against what they designated an 'act of violence,' and sent their Vice-President Paul Kruger and their Attorney-general as delegates to England to plead their cause. The delegates came to London in July 1877, they laid their case before Lord Carnarvon, who declined to reconsider in any way the annexation of the country, but promised that under British sovereignty the wishes and the interests of the Dutch population should be fully consulted: and they left expressing satisfaction at the courteous manner in which they had been received, and at the pledges which the Secretary of State had given to promote the happiness and prosperity of their fellow countrymen in the Transvaal.

British intervention between Boers and natives was made inevitable by antecedent circumstances.

The Proclamation of British sovereignty over the Transvaal Republic, as an act of wisdom or unwisdom, has mainly been judged in the light of what came afterwards. It ought to be judged rather in the light of what had gone before. It was not an isolated act, it was one link in a chain of events. Less than half a century before, South Africa had been one, and the Boers had all been British subjects. The Boer Republics were a latter day product. Their independence was not a time-honoured growth, whose roots were deep down in the past. Nor was the independence wholly unconditional. It was conditioned at any rate by the provision against slavery. It was known to all the world, when

¹ C. 1776. 1877, p. 159.

the world thought about it at all, it was well known to all South Africa, most of all to the native races in South Africa, that throughout the great peninsula the ultimate responsibility rested with England.

Non-intervention is a sound principle, but it is subordinate to the dictates of humanity and common sense. A strong power, which can enforce order and prevent loss of life, must sooner or later intervene to prevent outrage and bloodshed on its borders. It is obliged to do so, not merely in its own interests but by the common demand of mankind. No nation can sit still and watch its near and weaker neighbours destroying one another, when it is a patent fact that its intervention would be effectual. If England had never had any connexion with either Boers or natives, it would have been a moral impossibility for her, being the guardian of the Cape Colony and Natal, to remain a mere spectator of strife. But, as a matter of fact, she had, by force of circumstances and by her own action in the past, incurred special responsibility, and her interests were vitally affected. The white men who were in trouble and were causing trouble were children of the Cape Colony, sharing traditions, race, language, and religion, but lately severed from the mother state. They were not aliens in the land, but an integral part of its white population. The evil they did, or the evil they suffered, was of common concern to South Africa. They had renounced allegiance, they could not claim protection, but none the less, in a matter of life and death, none could doubt that they must be protected. And, if their ultimate security lay in the strength of the sovereign power in South Africa, that power was equally bound to safeguard their native adversaries from aggression and misrule. It was a far greater stretch of authority to try to crush out the slave-trade on foreign and distant shores than to protect the native tribes, who lived hard by British colonies, and who, rightly or wrongly, had learnt to heed British advice and in most cases

PART I. to submit to British commands¹. Duty pointed to intervention, policy and interest coincided with duty. It was Lord Carnarvon's great merit to see how nearly linked together were all South African questions and all South African difficulties, and especially how easily a local war might develop into a great uprising of the black man against the white. Sekukuni was countenanced and encouraged by Cetwayo. The Zulus heard of and magnified the doings of the Kaffirs in the Transkei. The longer disturbances went on, the greater tendency there was in native minds not to discriminate between this white man and that, to visit on the English the evil done by the Boers, to involve even missionary upholders of the black man's cause in one common ruin. There was too a growing possibility that if England remained inactive, some other European power might intervene, and by creating new claims and new interests make confusion in South Africa worse confounded. That some action on the part of England, beyond unheeded protests, was inevitable cannot be doubted, but whether what was done was the only practicable alternative, whether it was done at the right moment and in the right way, will always be matter of dispute. Disasters subsequently befell the English arms; they followed the annexation of the Transvaal, though they were by no means its necessary consequence; and they coloured and will to all times colour the views which have been formed on the subject.

*Later
South
African
history
has been
strongly*


The history of a colony or of a group of colonies is a two-fold history, formed at any given time not only by the events which take place and the state of feeling which arises on the spot, but also by the events which take place and the state of

¹ On the eve of the Zulu war, on September 30, 1878, Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieutenant-governor of Natal, wrote: The English Government 'has long since come to be looked up to by all the Kaffir tribes inhabiting the countries beyond our border, and as far as the Zambesi, as the paramount European power in the country, and as a paternal friendly government to be honoured and conciliated.' C. 2222. 1879, p. 35.

SOUTH

Page 278

1876 (July) 1
Delagoa
1877 (April 12)
proclaim
Kaffraria ann
Walfish Bay s



8 V 40 miles

SOUTH AFRICA IN 1878.

1875 (July). Marshal MacMahon's Award.
Delagoa Bay Portuguese.
1877 (April 12). Sir Theophilus Shepstone
proclaims Annexation of Transvaal.
Kaffraria annexed to Cape Colony (1877).
Walfish Bay annexed (March 12, 1878).

British Territory.



Boer Republic.



B.V. Burbshire, Oxford, 1913

SCALE 0 100



100 200 300 Eng. Miles



feeling which arises at the same time in the mother country. CH. VIII.
It is this double element of the warp and the woof, this combination of two not always, not usually harmonious strains, which makes colonial history so often discordant, uneven, difficult to comprehend. The history of South Africa would have been different, if local circumstances had been other than they were; but it would have been different too, if those circumstances had not been contemporaneous with certain wholly unconnected events in Europe and with special phases of English public opinion. It was a time when party feeling ran unusually high. It was a time when England was coming within measurable distance of a great European war. It was a time when Imperialism was a watchword to one half of England, and a bugbear to the other. It was a time, therefore, when every incident in any British possession was judged not on its own merits but in the light of a policy with which it had no necessary connexion whatever. In important points of detail too English politics at the moment specially affected South African matters. Disagreement with his colleagues on the Eastern question led in 1878 to the resignation of Lord Carnarvon, who of leading statesmen in England had most nearly grasped the South African problem. Imminent danger of a great war made it difficult to reinforce the English garrison in South Africa at a time when strength and the appearance of strength was specially needed. The time when votes of credit were being taken for possible contingencies in the East, was not a favourable time for financing the penniless administration of the Transvaal. It seemed as if the stars in their courses were fighting against any solution of South African difficulties; and, when the tale of unforeseen military reverses was brought over the seas, the English public, which had heard of the Cape and Natal and dimly heard of the Transvaal, suddenly and irritably awoke to a half knowledge rather more dangerous than absolute ignorance.

PART I.

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The annexation of the Transvaal destroyed the balance of power in South Africa.

But, confining attention to what actually happened in South Africa, apart from the feeling which was aroused outside, let us ask what was the immediate effect produced on the English position by taking over the Transvaal. It was well summed up by Sir Henry Bulwer, then Lieutenant-governor of Natal, in the following words, written in September, 1878, shortly before the outbreak of the Zulu war. Pointing out that there had previously been a balance of power, with the English Government holding the scales, he wrote: 'The annexation of the Transvaal last year has destroyed the conditions which created the balance to which I have referred. It has substituted one power for two powers, one government for two governments, in all this portion of South Africa, and it has brought English authority into direct contact with native races to the north, to whom it was previously known only from a distance. More especially, and more seriously, it has affected our relations with the Zulu king and people, who look with great suspicion upon the new state of things¹. For good or for evil the conditions were vitally changed, the Boer Republic was eliminated, and the English no longer held the balance between Dutchmen and natives, but for peace or war directly faced the Zulus.

Cetewayo.

On the one side the central figure was the Zulu king, with a large standing army hard to hold, ruling as a tyrant, dependent, like other tyrants, upon the fear which he inspired, irritated for years past by Boer dealings, and with his friendship to the English clouded by suspicion, now that the English had taken the place of the Dutch. He could no longer go to war in any direction without coming into collision with the English or those whom the English protected. In his mind there grew up the idea that he was being surrounded like a wild beast in its lair, and like a wild beast he prepared for the last fight. On the other side the central figure was

¹ From the minute quoted above. C. 2222. 1879, p. 36.

the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere. Frere had no voice in the annexation of the Transvaal. He landed at the Cape on March 31, 1877, and the formal act of annexation took place twelve days subsequently, before he had time even to communicate with Shepstone. In so far, then, as the annexation may be held to have been the cause of subsequent disasters, to that extent he was in no way responsible. Trained in the school of Anglo-Indian statesmen and administrators, Frere, before coming to Africa, had dealt with men and things on a large scale. He had taken part, and no small part, in the crisis of the Indian Mutiny; he had lived his life in stirring scenes, where great interests were involved, and where, in the time of trouble, the men on the spot were forced to decide and act without waiting for counsel and guidance from home. When he went to the Cape, he went to a land not yet connected with England by telegraphic cable, and he reached it at the moment when a step had been taken which beyond question quickened the current of events, and made them flow in a new channel. He went out specially selected to bring peace and make a union, he found friction and war; he took his own line, as he had taken it before; and, if there were errors in his judgment on points of detail, as may have been; if he incurred censure and obloquy, and paid the penalty of having been strong; at least his policy was the policy of the coming time; he sketched out in advance the South Africa that should be; he believed and he proclaimed his belief in the good to be done by British rule, and his whole life was one long tribute to the honour of the British name.

The annexation of the Transvaal left the question of the boundary between that country and Zululand still outstanding; but, towards the end of 1877, Cetewayo, on the invitation of the Lieutenant-governor of Natal, agreed to submit it to arbitration. Three Commissioners were appointed to report, and reported in the summer of 1878. They summed up

CH. VIII.

—♦—
*Sir Bartle
 Frere.*

*The Zulu
 boundary
 question.*

PART I. greatly in favour of the Zulus, and the final award was left in the hands of Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner.

*Growing
enmity of
the Zulus.*

Meanwhile the Zulu king was at no pains to conceal his growing unfriendliness to the white men. The missionaries left Zululand for fear of their lives, and many of their converts were killed. Outside Zululand, in Transvaal territory, the German settlers at Luneberg were given notice to quit. A party of Zulus crossed into Natal, and carried off two native refugees to the slaughter; and, over and above this or that act of insolence and provocation, there was evidence of Zulu intrigues far beyond the borders of their own land. Peace, safety of hearth and home, depended on the caprice of a truculent savage. It was impossible that such conditions could last.

*Frere's
award and
ulti-
matum.*

On December 11, 1878, the High Commissioner's award on the land dispute was communicated to Cetewayo's messengers on the banks of the Tugela River. A pleasing communication it was to the Zulus, for it largely recognised their claims. Less pleasing was a further message which accompanied it. The Zulu king was required to make good, by fine or surrender, the outrages which his people had committed, to disband his army and give his celibate soldiers freedom to marry, to allow his subjects fair trial when accused, to receive back and protect the missionaries and their followers, and to accept a British Resident in his land. He had broken the promises made at the time of his coronation, his system was oppressive to his subjects and a menace to his neighbours. It was time that a change should be made. 'So will it be well with the Zulu people.' The words of the ultimatum were very plain and decisive¹, they were addressed as much to the Zulu people as to the Zulu king, and an answer was required within thirty days. No

¹ The ultimatum will be found at pp. 201-9 of C. 2222. It was signed by Sir Henry Bulwer as Lieutenant-governor of Natal, but embodied 'the words of Her Majesty's High Commissioner.'

answer was sent, and to enforce the demands a British force entered Zululand. CH. VIII.

On January 10 and 11, 1879, the campaign began. The British Commander, Lord Chelmsford, had no overwhelming force at his back; but, wishing to cover the Natal frontier as far as possible and to prevent a Zulu inroad into the colony, he laid his plans to march into Zululand with troops converging from three different points. Nearest the sea, the right column under Colonel Pearson crossed the lower Tugela and advanced to the mission station of Eshowe. On the side of the Transvaal was the left column under Colonel Evelyn Wood. The main line of advance was in the centre, where the Buffalo River was crossed at the ford known as Rorke's Drift. *The Zulu war.*

About ten miles due east of Rorke's Drift, on the line of march to the king's kraal at Ulundi, is the solitary hill of Isandhlwana, steep and precipitous on three sides out of the four. Here, on January 20, the centre column encamped, the camp being on the south side of the hill. At daybreak on January 22, about half the troops, commanded by the General in person, moved out some miles away to support a reconnoitring party, and late in the day they heard that behind them the camp had been taken. Marching back, they reached it after dark and found it desolate. The forces left to guard it had, as it afterwards appeared, not remained, in accordance with instructions, strictly on the defensive; but, moving out in counter attack, when threatened by the Zulus, had been cut off in the open, encircled by many thousands, and massacred almost to a man. Eight hundred white soldiers fell on this memorable day, and nearly five hundred natives; and in the darkness, under the grim hill, the returning column halted amid the litter of the plundered camp and the bodies of the slain. *Isandhlwana.*

While they were resting, expectant of attack, the men who held the post at Rorke's Drift were fighting for their *Rorke's Drift.*

PART I. lives. The post was on the Natal bank of the Buffalo River, over which a pontoon bridge had been thrown, and it included a hospital where were between thirty and forty sick men. The sound men of the garrison numbered ninety-six, under command of Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead. Fresh from their victory at Isandhlwana, some three thousand Zulus later in the same day pushed on to the Drift, crossed the river, and attacked the post in most determined fashion. From half-past four in the afternoon till four o'clock the next morning fighting went on. The burning hospital was defended room by room, and behind redoubts of mealy bags and biscuit boxes the Englishmen stubbornly held their own. About dawn the Zulus drew off, but a little later were threatening a fresh attack, when Lord Chelmsford's column came in sight, having marched on from Isandhlwana before daybreak.

Effect on public feeling in England of the disaster at Isandhlwana.

A loss of eight hundred lives is a heavy loss in any warfare. In proportion to the number of white troops in South Africa it was heavy indeed. Occurring at the very outset of the campaign, the disaster in its terrible completeness was more than usually dramatic; and, by contrast, the brilliant defence at Rorke's Drift tended to make the events of January 22 exceptionally striking to the imagination. There was then no telegraph station nearer to South Africa than the Cape Verde islands, and a fortnight passed before the news reached England. It came at last, reinforcements were sent, and in due course the Zulu war was successfully ended; but the men who were concerned in the war, the policy which it embodied, and the incidents which it contained, were all clouded by the shadow cast by Isandhlwana Hill.

Panic in Natal.

In Natal, where but lately there had been brightness and more than confidence, there was now mourning and panic. Many colonists had fallen, and a Zulu invasion was feared. Pietermaritzburg was placed in a state of defence, and to

Sir Bartle Frere the anxious days of the Indian Mutiny were forcibly recalled. Yet of the final issue there could be no doubt, and even at the moment there were sure grounds for encouragement. The numbers of the Zulus were by no means unlimited, and already many of their finest warriors had fallen. Pearson's column had defeated the savages who tried to check its advance, and was safely entrenched at Eshowe. Wood was holding his own on the Transvaal frontier. Before long reinforcements began to come in, from the Cape Colony, from St. Helena, from Ceylon, and on March 17, from England. On April 2, Lord Chelmsford won a battle at Gingihlovo, and relieved the garrison at Eshowe. A few days previously Wood, after a dangerous engagement at the Hlobane mountain, on March 29 repulsed a powerful Zulu force from his camp at Kambula, inflicting upon them heavy loss and turning the balance of the campaign. In June a second general advance into Zululand was made, and on July 4, the main force under Lord Chelmsford, moving on Ulundi in hollow square, gained a complete victory and practically finished the war. Before the end of August Cetewayo was hunted down in his hiding place, and sent into captivity in the Cape Colony, and the military power of the Zulus was broken for ever.

CH. VIII.

Relief of
the garrison
at
Eshowe.

The fight
at Kam-
bula.

Battle of
Ulundi
and end of
the war

The Zulu war was an unlucky war. In its later stage, on June 1, an untoward incident occurred, the death of the Prince Imperial. He had gone out to South Africa to see service in the active field, and when reconnoitring with a small party was cut off and killed. His life, like other lives, paid forfeit in the game of war; but the public argued that his safety had been in British keeping, their sympathy went out to the widowed Empress with her last hope gone: again the touch of tragedy was felt, and people longed for some one to blame.

Death
of the
Prince
Imperial.

'The Zulu war was in its immediate origin a Transvaal

PART I.

Attitude
of the
Boers
at the
time of
the Zulu
war.

quarrel¹, but the English who were fighting the Dutchmen's battle received little help from them. The staunch old burgher Piet Uys, whose father and brother had fallen many years ago at the hands of Dingaan's warriors, came with his sons to the war, joined Evelyn Wood's force, and was killed at the Hlobane Hill; but few of his countrymen followed his example. The Boers, who were opposed to British rule, saw in the disasters in Zululand an opportunity for regaining their independence, and many who were well content to be British subjects were deterred from giving active aid by fear of their noisier brethren. Writing from Standerton in the Transvaal on April 4, 1879, Sir Bartle Frere reported 'Ali accounts from Pretoria represent that the great body of the Boer population is still under the belief that the Zulus are more than a match for us, that our difficulties in Europe and Asia are more than we can surmount, and that the present is a favourable opportunity for demanding their independence².' In 1878, before the war began, a second Boer deputation had gone to England and negotiated with Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the new Secretary of State. They were informed in the plainest terms that the withdrawal of British sovereignty from the Transvaal was out of the question, but were given promise of some form of provincial self-government, under which their country would retain its individuality, while linked to the neighbouring colonies by the bond of federation³.

¹ Article by Sir Bartle Frere in the 'Nineteenth Century,' February, 1881.

² Similarly Sir T. Shepstone wrote to Sir Bartle Frere: 'It is represented to the ignorant and unthinking mass that now that Her Majesty's troops are beaten and your Excellency's hands full is the time for the Boers to take up arms and fight for their independence.' C. 2260. 1879, p. 76.

³ Sir M. Hicks-Beach's letter to the delegates dated September 16, 1878, ran as follows: 'It is the object of Her Majesty's Government that the Transvaal should remain an integral and separate state, united with the neighbouring colonies, for purposes which are common to all, into a South African Confederation, the centre of which would be the

A similar pledge had been contained in Shepstone's initial proclamation¹, but many months had passed and no step had as yet been taken to give the country a constitution. Returning at the end of 1878, the delegates had an interview at Pietermaritzburg with the High Commissioner, and at length, in the following April, Sir Bartle Frere found time to visit the Transvaal. The Isandhlwana disaster had happened in the meantime, inspiring the malcontents with confidence, and Shepstone had been succeeded as Administrator by Colonel Lanyon. A few miles from Pretoria the Boers held a mass meeting, to receive their delegates' report on their late visit to England; and there in their camp, and subsequently at a further meeting at Erasmus Farm, Frere heard their representations and patiently argued the case. He held out no hope that what had been done would be undone, or that British sovereignty would be withdrawn, but neither did he succeed in persuading the Boers to accept the accomplished fact and cease to demand their independence. 'Your Majesty cannot desire to rule over unwilling subjects,' so ran their petition to the Queen which Frere sent home, 'unwilling subjects but faithful neighbours we will be. We beseech you, put an end to this unbearable state of things, and charge your High Commissioner in South Africa to give us back our State².' The Boer leaders claimed to represent the people. When their followers gathered in the camp of protest, they were obviously strong in numbers, and they challenged a *plébiscite* on the subject of the annexation. Yet, beyond all question, there were many who were well satisfied with British rule, and not a few whose patriotism was the result of intimidation. It was the delay in giving a liberal constitution, and the

CH. VIII.

*Sir Bartle
Frere
in the
Transvaal.*

*Boer
protests
against
the an-
nexation.*

Cape Colony, but possessing a constitution securing, to the utmost practicable extent, its individuality and powers of self-government under the sovereignty of the Queen.' C. 2220. 1879, p. 366.

¹ See above, p. 274.

² April 16, 1879. C. 2367. 1879, p. 99.

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 uncertainty that what had been done would be upheld, that gave strength to the Boer cause. If the Dutchmen had been sure that what they desired would not come to pass, they might have ceased to long for it; if, while the rest and security brought by annexation was still sweet in the minds of many, they had been given their Volksraad and such powers as a self-governing colony enjoys, they might in no long time have learnt to prefer a British Colony to a Boer Republic. But months went on, and years, bitterness grew and uncertainty, and on their visits to England the Boer delegates learnt that here a plea for liberty will always find support, and that one political party has not been slow to reverse the acts of the other. They reasoned too from South African history, with its precedents for giving back; and the more High Commissioners and Secretaries of State protested that such a thing was impossible, the more convinced they became of its possibility. 'I find,' wrote Frere in 1879, 'that this idea that the English will give up the Transvaal, as it formerly did the Orange Free State, has been industriously propagated, and has taken a great hold on the minds of the well-disposed Boers, and is one main cause of their reluctance to support the Government actively. They argue that what was done before may be done again¹.' It was a bad day when the English began going back in South Africa.

*Sir Garnet
 Wolseley
 and the
 Boers.*

Before Frere left Pretoria in May, 1879, he had formed his conclusions as to the future government of the Transvaal under the British flag²; but no opportunity was given him to carry out reforms, for, immediately after his visit, Sir Garnet Wolseley took over civil and military command in South Eastern Africa³. Wolseley reached Capetown at

¹ C. 2367. 1879, p. 19.

² They are given in his article in the 'Nineteenth Century' of February, 1881, quoted in Mr. Martineau's *Life of Sir Bartle Frere*, p. 309, note.

³ Sir Garnet Wolseley's commissions, dated May 28, 1879, appointed

the end of June, and a few days later, while the surf forbade his landing on the Zululand coast, the battle of Ulundi was fought and won. At the end of September he came to Pretoria, and shortly afterwards a Crown Colony constitution was given to the Transvaal. But a nominated Executive Council and Legislative Assembly was not what the Boers wanted. They looked for their republican Volksraad; and at a mass meeting, held towards the end of 1879, they repeated their declaration that they would not be subjects of the Queen. The Zulu war was over, and Cetewayo a prisoner. Sekukuni, whose successes against the Boer levies had brought about the downfall of the republic, was, in a few days at the end of November, skilfully overmastered by a sufficient British force with Swazi allies, his stronghold taken, his caves cleared, and himself sent into captivity. 'As you have beaten me,' he said to his captors, 'you have conquered everything. I was the only chief in the country, there is no other black chief will raise an assegai against you now!'. No native difficulty was for the time left outstanding, which, though in some sense an opportunity to the Dutchmen, might well have made British protection of value even to malcontent Boers, and, on the principle that blood is thicker than water, have conciliated white man to white man by joint opposition to black. The field was clear for resistance to the policy of the British Government, and the Boer leaders took advantage of the situation. Two of them were arrested on charges of high treason, but were not brought to trial; two others in May, 1880, visited the Cape Colony to enlist the sympathies of the Cape Dutch, urging them to take no steps

CH. VIII.

A Crown Colony constitution given to the Transvaal.

Defeat of Sekukuni.

Boer intrigues with the Cape Dutch.

him Governor of Natal, Governor of the Transvaal, and Special High Commissioner for the territories of South Eastern Africa to the North and East of the Transvaal and Natal. The sphere of Sir Bartle Frere's High Commissionership was to this extent curtailed.

¹ C. 2505. 1830, p. 42. Sekukuni stated also that it was on the advice of the Boers that he had resisted the English.

PART I. towards federation as long as the alleged wrongs of the Transvaal remained unredressed.

*Change of
government in
England.*

In the preceding month of April a general election had taken place in England, and Mr. Gladstone had been returned to power by a large majority. His sympathetic utterances towards the Boers, made in the Midlothian speeches, coupled with the support which the Boer cause had received from some of his prominent followers, gave the republicans ground for hope. Over and over again they had been officially told that the act of annexation could not be reversed, that, as long as the sun shone in the heaven or the Vaal River flowed down from the mountains to the sea, British rule over the territory would be maintained. In March once more a message had come from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and had been gazetted by Sir Garnet Wolseley, that the Queen's Government could not entertain any proposal for the withdrawal of her sovereignty. Yet with reason, as later events proved, the shrewd Dutchmen, remembering what had gone before in South Africa, judged that their liberties might yet be restored. When they learnt that the new ministers intended to uphold their predecessors' policy, their disappointment was deep. For a few months there was a lull before the storm, and then came open war.

*Declara-
tion of
Boer Inde-
pendence.*

On December 16, 1880, being the anniversary of the memorable defeat of Dingaan the Zulu by the Dutch trekkers in Natal¹, a proclamation was issued at Heidelberg in the south of the Transvaal, declaring the republic to be re-established, under the provisional leadership of a triumvirate, Messrs. Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert. In moderate terms the leaders communicated a copy of the proclamation to the English administrator at Pretoria, declaring that they had no desire to spill blood, that they would take up arms only in self-defence, and that, if driven to fight, they would fight

¹ See above, p. 197.

'with the deepest reverence for Her Majesty the Queen of England and her flag!'. Yet they lost no time in pressing on the war. CH. VIII. ←

Few in all, the English troops in the Transvaal were widely dispersed on garrison duty, holding one and another of the little country towns or villages. To concentrate the forces and strengthen the garrison at the seat of government, instructions had been sent for a detachment to march into Pretoria from Lydenburg, some 150 miles to the north-east. When within forty miles of Pretoria, on December 20, marching without due circumspection, the party was stopped by a much stronger Boer force near stream named Bronker's Spruit. Joubert, the Boer commander, sent a flag of truce forbidding further advance, and at the same time his troops closed in. The summons to halt was rejected, and immediately, from rising ground behind a cover of thorn trees, the Dutchmen at short range poured in a deadly fire upon the straggling line of march. The English numbered over 260 in all, most of them soldiers of the 94th regiment. In less than a quarter of an hour 157 were killed or wounded, the remainder perforce surrendered, and in Puritan-wise the Boers set down their cheaply won success to the help of the God of their fathers.

Sir George Colley had been appointed in the spring of 1880 to succeed Sir Garnet Wolseley, and in July he arrived at Natal. An officer of high reputation, with African and Indian experience, brave and chivalrous, he was prone, like other English officers in South Africa, to underrate the power of resistance by natives or Boers to the English army. He had, it is true, some grounds for confidence. Before the crisis actually occurred, it was a matter of complete uncertainty how many Boers would be prepared to take up arms, and tried soldiers were slow to

¹ C. 2866. 1881, p. 16.

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believe that even a large number would stand their ground when faced by disciplined troops. It was but a very short time since that, in the campaign against Sekukuni, the Transvaal levies had miserably failed; and, having held aloof in the Zulu war, the large majority had given no clue to their fighting qualities. Yet they were well known to be expert marksmen, and fighting on ground of their own choosing, not in the open in battle array, but disposed in loose order behind trees or rocks, they were in truth more formidable antagonists than the same number of regular soldiers. The English commander had a difficult task. Of the small English force upon the spot a considerable proportion was locked up in the beleaguered garrisons at Pretoria, at Potchefstroom, Standerton, Wakkerstroom, and other places; and, when the war broke out, the troops which were immediately available numbered little more than 1,000 men. But a greater difficulty even than the want of soldiers was the public feeling which it was his duty to conciliate. At home there was a government deeply pledged against war and aggression in any form, the avowed friends of the oppressed or of those who seemed to be oppressed. The image, which took form in men's minds, of the might of England ranged against a handful of patriots fighting for their liberties, was distasteful to many liberty-loving Englishmen, and not a few had long since convinced themselves of the righteousness of the Boer cause. The Boers themselves either defined or confused the issue by protesting that they fought not against the Queen or the people of England, but rather against the Queen's officers who had prevented the facts from being known; they would pay all honour to the British Crown, they would co-operate with the British Government, only let them receive back their independence which had been filched from them under false pretences. A strong and growing sympathy with their contention sprang up among the Dutch population in South

*Difficulties
of his
position.
Smallness
of his
forces.*

*Feeling in
England
and South
Africa.*


Africa; they were men who had been misunderstood, what they asked was reasonable, their prayer should be granted. Under these conditions it was Colley's aim to limit the war as far as possible. To enlist natives against white men was out of the question; and no help was sought from the loyal colonists of Natal, lest the feeling between the two white races in South Africa might be further embittered. What was most to be desired was some initial success, which would suffice to disperse the Boer encampment and relieve the besieged towns. Then a campaign with all its misery and loss of life might be avoided, and the outbreak die away in the conviction that further fighting would be useless. It was in the strong hope of sparing Boers and English alike that Sir George Colley entered on the campaign and the disasters which followed, if partly ascribed to over confidence and errors of judgment, should also be in justice set down to humanity and kindly feeling.

The Boers' headquarters were at Heidelberg, the scene of the war was the southernmost district of the Transvaal and the borderland between that territory and Natal. At its northern extremity, the colony of Natal, in 1881, tapered almost to a point, jutting out between the Orange Free State on the west, the Transvaal on the east. On the west the Drakensberg range lined the frontier, on the east was the valley of the Buffalo River. There was a constantly narrowing strip of colonial territory, along which the present railway from Durban to Johannesburg and Pretoria was subsequently carried, the Transvaal being reached just beyond the border township of Charlestown. The northernmost town in Natal was Newcastle, which is between thirty and forty miles south of Charlestown. At the time of the Boer war three roads led from Newcastle into the Transvaal, a right hand road to Utrecht, a centre road to Wakkerstroom, and a third road, rather more to the left, direct to Standerton. This last road is traversed by the valley of the Ingogo River,

CH. VIII.



*Scene of
the Boer
war.*

PART I.  a tributary of the Buffalo, and, about twenty miles north of Newcastle, crosses the Drakensberg range by a pass known as Lang's Nek, between 4,000 and 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. On the eastern side of the pass is the deep gorge of the Buffalo River, on the west is a rough semicircle of hills, culminating in the steep, flat-topped Majuba mountain, nearly 7,000 feet high, round the foot of which the road runs, commanded, when the Nek itself is reached, by hills on either side. On this pass, though in Natal territory, the Boers took up their position to block Sir George Colley's advance, and here the general determined to bring matters to an issue.

*The fight
at Lang's
Nek.*

The declaration of independence had been made on Dec. 16, 1880, the fight at Bronker's Spruit took place on the 20th, but two or three weeks were necessarily spent in making arrangements and providing transport, and it was not till Jan. 11, 1881, that Colley arrived at Newcastle. There he stayed for a fortnight to concentrate his small forces, but, fearing that further delay might involve the loss of Pretoria and Potchefstroom, he began his advance on January 24 without waiting for adequate reinforcements. At the head of less than 1,400 men, he crossed the Ingogo valley and encamped on a ridge, now known as Mount Prospect, about four miles from Lang's Nek, and on the morning of the 28th he moved out with the bulk of his force to attack the Boers. Their position was a strong one, some rude defences had been constructed, and sheltered behind rocks or in ravines the Dutch marksmen were fighting at an advantage. On the right of the Nek, between the road and the river, is a table hill commanding the pass, accessible by a steep grassy spur up which the main body of the British troops advanced. The 58th regiment almost gained and held the crown of the hill, but their charge and that of the mounted infantry who supported them was exposed to a deadly fire in front and on the flank, and the hillside was strewn with dead and wounded. Slowly and in order the English fell

back, and in the afternoon returned to the camp, having CH. VIII.
lost by wounds and death some 190 men. —♦—


Encouraged by their success, the Boers after an interval of a few days began to operate in the rear of the English, and to threaten communications between the camp and Newcastle. On February 7 the post and its escort was fired upon near the Ingogo River, five miles south of the camp, and prevented from reaching Newcastle; and on the following day the general, with between 300 and 400 men, moved out to clear the road. On the north side the hills run steeply down to the river, on the south is a plain slanting upwards towards a mountain ridge. On the slopes of this ridge another severe fight took place, and again, under better cover than their adversaries could find, the Boers inflicted heavy loss. Notwithstanding, the English held their ground through the heat of the day till evening fell. Then they drew back to the camp, in a night of darkness and rain, over a stream which was now a raging torrent. The fight had cost them nearly 160 men.

Reinforcements were by this time being rapidly pushed up the country, and, had General Colley held his hand for a very few weeks, he would have moved onward with overwhelming strength. The checks which he had received had been entirely due to want of sufficient numbers, and that deficiency would soon have been supplied. But it may be that reverses had made him impatient of delay, or that he dreaded the effect of inaction on the loyalist cause. Whatever motive influenced him, he determined, while his forces were still inadequate, to make one more attempt to dislodge the Boers, and carry the mountain pass which they had so stubbornly held.

His earlier advance had been made on the eastern side of the road. He now laid his plans to attack from the west, *and at Majuba Hill.* where the Majuba Hill, rising 2,000 feet above the pass, commands the whole position. On the night of Saturday,

PART I. February 26, a body of between 500 and 600 men marched out from the camp, commanded by the general in person. The troops were picked from the 58th and 60th regiments, the Naval Brigade, and the 92nd Highlanders, who had lately come up to the front. Three companies were stationed on the connecting ridges to keep open communication with the camp, and the remainder, less than 400 in all, climbed the mountain side. The route was slippery and precipitous, the men were heavily laden, they reached the top about 4 o'clock in the morning, but tired and exhausted were in no case for fighting, much less for constructing suitable entrenchments. At dawn they looked down on the Boer encampment with its waggon-laagers growing clear in the daylight. The sun rose, and they themselves were seen as plainly as they saw. The first impulse of the Dutchmen was to inspan their oxen and retreat; then gathering courage, as no artillery molested them, they began the attack. The ascent on the northern side of the hill, the side towards the Nek, is shorter and less steep than the southern route which the English had taken. At the same time the slopes were not sufficiently gradual to expose the assailants to fire from the heights above. Working up under cover, the Boers shot down the English as they went, and gaining the brow about the middle of the day poured in a volley which carried all before it. More than half of the English soldiers, who a few hours before had toiled up the mountain, lay dead or wounded, and the survivors were driven in headlong retreat from ridge to ridge and from boulder to boulder. Not often in war, it is said, an enterprise undertaken at dead of night succeeds. The most conspicuous instance of success, the night march up the heights of Abraham, ended in the taking of Quebec, but in the loss of General Wolfe¹. At Majuba too the English commander


¹ The battle of Tel El Kebir is another and more modern instance of a successful enterprise at night.



B.V. Darbishire,

Map to illustrate the
ZULU & BOER WARS
from 1879 - 1881.

SCALE.
0 10 20 30 40 50 Eng. Miles



B.V. Darbishire, Oxford, 1913





fell. Unlucky in life, General Colley met a soldier's death, CH. VIII.
laid low, as the rout began, by a Dutchman's bullet.

The disaster on the Majuba mountain, like the overthrow *Feeling caused by the defeat at Majuba Hill.*
at Isandhlwana, was essentially dramatic. The attempt which General Colley made was bold to audacity, it nearly succeeded, but ended in complete failure. The night march, the defence and attack of the rugged, rocky mountain, the death of the Commander-in-chief, all made up a striking picture. Therein lay its historical importance. What had happened hitherto in the war had been serious but not very serious, and was most easily explained. Three times a far from unskilful but over-chivalrous and over-confident general had, with very few regular troops, faced a larger number of expert marksmen, fighting on ground and in a manner which suited irregular warfare. He had hoped to strike a decisive blow without risking too many lives either of his own men or of his opponents. His plans had miscarried, but the English had not yet really put out their strength, and their losses, heavy as they had been, were, all told, when tried by the standard of campaigning, such as result from no more than severe skirmishes. Every week was adding to the British forces. Colley's death had left the command for the time being in the able hands of Sir Evelyn Wood, who of all English officers best knew the Dutchmen and their mode of fighting; and he was in a position to take the field with several thousand men at his back. What had actually befallen could speedily be retrieved, but what could not be made good was the effect which had been produced upon the minds of the public. It seemed as though the Boers had justified their cause, as though David had slain Goliath, as though fighting for liberty the Dutchmen had proved irresistible. In South Africa the sympathies of their fellow countrymen grew with the tale of each success, everywhere their resistance extorted admiration, and won that liking which

PART I. the weaker side, whether right or wrong, invariably attracts to itself.


*Convention
of Pretoria
and retro-
cession
of the
Transvaal.*

In England there was at first no doubt that steps would at once be taken to press on the campaign and ensure decisive victory. Lord Roberts, then Sir Frederick Roberts, was sent out as General Colley's successor, but reached Capetown only to find that an armistice had been concluded and that his services were no longer required. After various meetings between Sir Evelyn Wood and the Boer Commanders, an agreement was signed upon March 23, by which the Boers consented to disperse their forces and return to their homes, having been guaranteed the right to complete self-government under the Suzerainty of the Queen. The final settlement in matters of detail was left to a Royal Commission, the result of whose labours was embodied, in the following August, in the Convention of Pretoria. The administration of the Transvaal passed again into Boer hands, and the British troops were withdrawn. Nominally the State was left in a position not widely different from that of a self-governing colony. The Queen of England was its recognised Suzerain. The control of its foreign affairs was reserved to the British Government. That same Government was empowered to move troops through the territory in time of war; and careful guarantees of native interests were provided. The appointment, however, of a British Resident at Pretoria, to 'perform duties and functions analogous to those discharged by a Chargé d'affaires and Consul-general,' indicated that, while falling short of a completely independent Republic, the Transvaal State would be something more than a colony with Responsible Government; men read between the lines of the Convention, each according to his views and prejudices, some approved, and others interpreted the treaty to be a skilfully worded surrender.

There was much to be said in its favour. The war

SOUTH

To face page 296



B.V. Barbisch Miles

SOUTH AFRICA AT THE END OF 1881.

Transvaal Boers declare their independence
(Dec. 16, 1880).

Convention of Pretoria (Aug. 3, 1881).
Transvaal granted self-government
under suzerainty of the Queen.


British Territory. 


Boer Republics. 



R.V. Barkshire, Oxford, 1912

SCALE 0 100 200





partook of the nature of a civil war. The future of South Africa depended and depends upon harmony between Dutch and English, and the longer fighting went on, the deeper grew the rift between the two races. Such was the view, for instance, of the President of the Orange Free State, unwearied in attempts to mediate between the two contending parties. Many petitions from the Cape Colony had indicated how strong was the feeling of kinship, how great the possibility that bloodshed, if persisted in, would leave a future heritage of bitterness. In the Netherlands a Transvaal colonist was named, who petitioned the Queen of England, in view of their own historical struggle for freedom, to grant liberty to South African Boers. More and more as the war appeared to be a fratricidal strife which had originated in a misunderstanding, the object of which, self-government, had already almost been virtually conceded. Humanity spoke strongly on the same side. All those who thought knew that England could crush out the rising, but her victory would involve more loss of life. Was it worth while, was it moral, thus many argued, because already so much fighting and slaughter, to kill more and make more widows and more children fatherless, to send into the wilderness new bands of treacherously inspired and undying hatred of British rule, for an end which, if it were of any value, might be in great measure attained by peaceful means?

On the other hand, it was maintained that the British Government had been faced by open rebellion, it had refused in the plainest terms, often repeated, the demands which the Boers made, it had incurred engagements to white men and black alike, who trusted its word, it had required obedience, it had outwardly been strong until disaster

CH. VIII.

Arguments
for and
against
the Con-
vention.

PART I. occurred. Its adversaries, before they fought so well, had of late years but an ignoble record, their country had been a scene of lawlessness and anarchy, a land where liberty had been abused, and where wrong-doers were unrestrained. It was, moreover, a land of ignorance, where humane concession would readily be interpreted as weakness, as an indication that the Boer was a better man than the Englishman. Was it not wiser to follow the old sound rule to be masters first and to be generous afterwards? Would not such a course conduce in the end to firmer peace, cemented by the conviction that Englishmen were as good as their word? These were in outline the views urged on either side; the Government declared for peace, the Dutchmen gained their point, and once more, for good or ill, there was undoing in South Africa.

*Sir Bartle
Frere
and his
policy.*

In the autumn of 1880, before the Boer war broke out, Sir Bartle Frere had left the Cape. He had been censured: he had been superseded in his High Commissionership, as far as South Eastern Africa was concerned; the special allowance made to him had been curtailed; finally he had been recalled. Both parties in the State had found fault with his conduct of affairs, he had left England in good repute with all men, he came back blamed and set aside. Yet, like his distinguished predecessors, who had been recalled, like Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Sir George Grey, if he had lost the confidence of Secretaries of State, he had won that of the colonists in South Africa. He left a name behind him which was honoured and loved; English, Dutchmen, and natives alike trusted his actions and believed his words.

Years enough have now gone by to make clear the leading features in Sir Bartle Frere's South African career. None can now doubt that at the time he bore the blame of much in which he had no hand. The annexation of the Transvaal, with all its results, was none of his handiwork.

It was his misfortune, not his fault, that at the time when he was High Commissioner in South Africa a forward policy in foreign and colonial matters was for good or bad reason widely distrusted in England. It was his misfortune, not his fault, that the Zulu war opened with the massacre at Isandhlwana. A slight change of public opinion, a slight turn of events, in no way connected with his merits or his demerits, might have brought him back in triumph not in disgrace, and the policy for which he was discredited might well have earned him thanks and honours. His policy was that throughout South Africa the British power should be paramount; that the way to deal with European colonists is to trust them, and to give them suitable institutions; and that in a continent where white men are colonising, and on the fringe of their colonisation, there can be and there should be no place for armed savages. These were the main lines on which Sir Bartle Frere worked, and history has abundantly proved that on these lines alone could salvation be found for South Africa.

CH. VIII.

Like many other peoples, ancient and modern alike, the Boers could fight but could not govern. Having regained their country, they relapsed very much into their old ways, became embroiled with the natives, and, trekking as ever, took up ground alike on the eastern and on the western frontier of the Transvaal territory. It will be well to trace very briefly the course of events which took place on the eastern side, before turning to the West where the English in no long time pressed onward once more through Bechuanaland. 'The Zulu military organisation is an excrescence quite alien to the natural habit of the people.' The Zulus are 'men very capable of being moulded in the ways of civilisation and, when not actually trained to manslaughter, not naturally bloodthirsty nor incurably barbarous¹.'

*Zululand
after the
war.*¹ C. 2260. 1879, p. 27.

PART I. The words were Sir Bartle Frere's, written while Cetewayo's regiments were still in existence. Their truth is fully proved

Subdivision of Zululand.

Restoration of Cetewayo.

His death.

Boer Trekkers in Zululand.

→→→ at the present day, for year by year Zululand with its people prospers in quietness and peace. Such a result, however, could not in the nature of things be at once produced, and the so-called settlement of Zululand after the war was hardly likely to produce it. The country was broken up into subdivisions, under thirteen chiefs all independent of one another, and two of them not even of Zulu blood, one of them, Hlubi, being a Basuto and the other, John Dunn, an Englishman. In three years a state of anarchy ensued, and at length, in 1882, the British Government determined to restore Cetewayo, though not to the whole of his original kingdom. About two-thirds of the territory was assigned to him, and of the remainder part was left under the rule of Usibebu, a chief of the royal house but a strong opponent of the old king, and part was constituted a Reserve under British protection, being intended to be a dwelling-place for those chiefs and their followers who might not be content to submit to Cetewayo's authority. Cetewayo himself paid a visit to England before returning to Zululand, and in January, 1883, was formally reinstated at Ulundi. For a year only his life lasted, and a troubled year it was. He wished to exercise and extend his authority as in the days when his word was law to a large and disciplined army. Hostilities broke out between his party and Usibebu's clan, with the result that the king was driven to take refuge in the Reserve, and on the advance of a small British force surrendered at Eshowe. At Eshowe he died in February, 1884.

By this time a new element of confusion was making itself felt. In 1882 Dutch farmers from the Transvaal began crossing the frontier and taking up ground for farming purposes in Zululand. Some came in, and brought others in their train, until gradually a considerable extent of Zulu

country was more or less in Boer occupation. After Cetewayo's death the Dutch interlopers proclaimed his son Dinizulu King of Zululand, and siding with his party completely defeated his hereditary foe Usibebu. The price of their assistance was a title from the king they had set up to a Boer State in Zululand, which was christened the 'New Republic,' and whose formal existence dated from August, 1884. Fearing to add to their responsibilities in South Africa, twice bitten, in the Zulu and Boer wars, and three or four times shy, the British Government had hitherto steadily rejected the only satisfactory solution of Zulu difficulties, the declaration of British sovereignty over Zululand. But it now became clear that, if not annexed by the English, the whole country would be taken by the Boers. To safeguard the sea-board, the British flag was in December, 1884, hoisted at St. Lucia Bay, and very soon little but the sea-board would have been left, for by the end of 1885 Dutch claims extended over three-quarters of the Zulu territory. At length decisive steps were taken, the new republic was in 1886 formally recognised but narrowed in limits, being subsequently incorporated in the South African Republic¹, and in the following year the remainder of Zululand was proclaimed to be a British possession.

CH. VIII.

*The 'New Republic.'**British sovereignty proclaimed in Zululand.*

British sovereignty did not at once bring peace in its train. Intertribal feuds continued, the chief offenders being Dinizulu and his followers, known as the Usutu party, between whom and Usibebu there was endless war. Through 1887 and 1888 the troubles went on, engaging a considerable number of soldiers and police, but towards the end of the latter year the malcontent chiefs were caught, tried by a

¹ In a district which was cut off from it, and included in the British Colony of Zululand, the Dutch farmers were by a special proviso allowed to retain their farms at a nominal quit rent. The district was hence known as Proviso B. The New Republic subsequently formed the Vryheid district of the South African Republic, having been incorporated with it in July, 1888.

PART I. special commission, and eventually sent into banishment. The record of Zululand after that date was in the main one of peace, and indications of mineral wealth attracted a growing white population. Its northern frontier, extended in 1888, was subsequently carried inland up to the Portuguese boundary, including certain native territories situated between the Lebombo mountains¹ and the Pongola River, which were annexed in 1895; while on the north-east it bordered on Amatongaland, which was in 1895 definitely placed under British Protectorate.

*Events in
Bechuana-
land.*

The Bechuana tribes on the western frontier of the Transvaal Republic suffered much at the hands of the Boers. Their grievances were heard of in England, for Bechuanaland was a favourite mission field, and men like Livingstone, where native wrongs were concerned, did not mince their words. Nor were traders, who went by the western route into the interior, inclined to let the Dutchmen stop their way. Before the Pretoria Convention was concluded in 1881, the boundary line was ill-defined or not defined at all, and the Keate award, which limited the Republic on the south-west, the Boers never fully accepted. That difficulties would constantly recur in this region was certain, and Sir Bartle Frere proposed to strengthen British authority by establishing agents of the government with the native chiefs, at such centres for instance as Kuruman in the south of the Kalahari and Khama's town of Shoshong in the far north². During the Zulu war the Boers tried to gain a footing in Bechuana territory, but the police of Griqualand West, with the help of volunteer levies, proved strong enough to hold them in check. Then came the Boer war and the Pretoria Convention. That Convention defined in detail the boundaries

¹ The Lebombo mountains form the eastern boundary of Swaziland, which by a Convention of December, 1894, was placed under the administrative control of the South African Republic.

² C. 2,220. December, 1878, p. 351.

of the Transvaal, and left to the Queen's Government, as the Suzerain, the control of all dealings with natives beyond its borders. Notwithstanding, Boer marauders soon began again to make trouble among the Bechuanas, and, adopting the same policy as their countrymen adopted in Zululand, obtained grants of land as the price of aiding one or other of contending chiefs. The result was the establishment of two petty republics, one called Stellaland whose centre was Vryburg, the other further north, bearing the name of Land of Goshen. Thus on the west as on the east of the Transvaal, unrestrained by treaty obligations, which the Boer Government was hardly able, even if willing, to enforce, Dutch occupation was spreading, to the detriment of native rights and to the exclusion of British influence. Fortunately the cause of two Bechuana chiefs, who were the immediate sufferers, the headmen of the Batlapin and Baralong clans respectively, found strong champions in England, among them Mr. W. E. Forster, bound by Quaker traditions to the cause of humanity. British interference was demanded and could not be refused, and action, when it came, was justified by success.

CH. VIII.

Stellaland
and
Goshen.

In 1884 a new treaty took the place of the Pretoria Convention, the Convention of London, signed on February 27 in that year.

The Con-
vention of
London.

It amended the former treaty in important particulars, and the 'Transvaal State' was formally accorded the title of the South African Republic. One of the specified objects of the second Convention was a modification of the southwestern boundary of the Republic, and the Government of the Republic renewed the pledge given at Pretoria to adhere strictly to the prescribed limits, and as far as possible prevent encroachment beyond its borders. In the following May a representative of the High Commissioner concluded treaties with the Batlapins and Baralongs, by which the administration of their country was vested in the British Crown; but shortly

PART I. afterwards fighting broke out between the Baralongs and the Dutch freebooters of Goshen, and the Government of the South African Republic intervened, proposing to take over the Baralong country. The time had come for strong measures, if the boundaries fixed by the lately signed Convention were to be upheld, and if Bechuanaland with its native population was not to be 'eaten up' by the Boers. Sir Charles Warren, who had successfully administered Griqualand West in 1879-80, was sent out as Special Commissioner, and, landing at Capetown in December, 1884, marched up country with a force of 4,000 men, including a large proportion of irregular troops. The expedition was completely successful, no open opposition was attempted. Stellaland and Goshen were swept away, the boundary between Bechuanaland and the South African Republic was beaconsed off, west of the Republic a British Protectorate was proclaimed as far north as the twenty-second parallel of South latitude, and the southern part of Bechuanaland below the Molopo River, the scene of the late difficulties, was on September 30, 1885, constituted a British colony.

Sir Charles Warren's expedition into Bechuanaland.

The Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Thus the territory to the west of the South African Republic, as far north as its northernmost border, was brought definitely and exclusively under British control, and the way was made clear for the English towards the Zambesi and Central Africa. The event was achieved in a short time and with comparatively little difficulty. It was almost a surprising success, when contrasted with previous reverses suffered at the hands of natives and Boers alike. The agents were well chosen, a determined leader backed from the first by a strong force, and a force composed in great measure of men accustomed to the conditions of South African warfare. But there were other circumstances which favoured the outcome of Sir Charles Warren's expedition. The London Treaty had but lately been made, and the advantages which it gave to the South African Republic

were too obvious to be jeopardised by persistently infringing its conditions. Weak and impoverished, the Boer Government could at the time hardly hold its own; and when, within a year, the de Kaap gold-fields disclosed all their wealth, and Barberton rose at once to be a miner's town, while immediately afterwards the Witwatersrand reefs were discovered, and Johannesburg eclipsed Barberton, the great resources, present and prospective, of the South African Republic tended to keep its citizens more than before within its borders, and the difficulties caused by a growing population on the spot not of Boer blood rivalled the enterprises of trekkers and freebooters in the attention of its government. A new element had in the meantime entered into South African history, which quickened the movements of the English, the appearance of European rivals on the south-west coast of Africa.

South of the Portuguese dominions, no European nation, other than the Dutch and the English, had till thirty years ago ever owned territory in South Africa. On the eastern coast the Portuguese held nominal sway as far south as the region of Delagoa Bay, but the exact limit of their territory was matter of dispute. It was a question of importance, for the bay is a natural outlet of the Transvaal, and has in modern days been connected by railway with Pretoria and Johannesburg. The Dutch, it will be remembered¹, in the eighteenth century, planted a factory on its shores, which was abandoned after a few years of ill success; and not long afterwards the Portuguese appear to have built a fort by the bay, with a view to making good their claims of ownership. The bay narrows into an estuary, one of whose names is or was English River, and on its northern bank stands the Portuguese town of Lorenzo

CH. VIII.

Discovery
of gold
in the
Transvaal

The
Delagoa
Bay arbitration.

¹ See above, p. 83. The old history of Delagoa Bay from a Portuguese point of view is given in the Blue Book on the subject of the arbitration. C. 1361. 1875.

PART I. Marquez. The Portuguese right to the northern shores of the estuary and the territory beyond was uncontested; but, in virtue of a treaty made with a native chief in 1823, Great Britain claimed all the southern side. The Portuguese, on the other hand, claimed both shores of the bay and estuary, together with a considerable amount of territory to the south, extending on the coast-line as far as $26^{\circ} 30'$ South latitude. In 1872 the two Powers agreed to submit the question at issue to the arbitration of Marshal Macmahon, President of the French Republic, who delivered his award in July, 1875. He decided wholly in favour of the Portuguese; and Great Britain, the unsuccessful claimant, was at the time fain to be content with a pledge already given by Portugal, that the territory in question should not in any case be parted with to a third Power. Subsequently, by the third article of the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of June, 1891, the frontier of the Portuguese sphere was moved yet a little further south, 'as far as a line following the parallel of the confluence of the River Pongola with the River Maputa to the sea-coast¹.' Up to that point British territory or Protectorate extends, and no room is left on the eastern side of South Africa for the intervention of any other European nation. Moreover, by the mutual concession embodied in the seventh article of the same treaty, Great Britain acquired the right of preemption of any territories south of the Zambesi, which were within the Portuguese Sphere of Influence.

*The
Macmahon
award.*

*The Anglo-
Portuguese
boundary
in South-
east Africa.*

*The
German
Protec-
torate in
South-west
Africa.*

On the western side of the continent, in the same latitudes, there is now a German Protectorate. In 1867, the Governor of the Cape Colony had urged the Home Government to extend British territory northward along this coast as far as the twenty-second degree of south latitude; in 1877 Sir Bartle Frere recommended that the whole coast-line

¹ C. 6370. 1891, p. 2.

should be annexed up to the Portuguese boundary; but in neither case was the advice taken. All that was done was, by Letters Patent in 1867, to confirm British possession of certain islets off the coast, which were valued for the sake of Guano deposits; and, on March 12, 1878, at Frere's urgent instance, to proclaim the Queen's Sovereignty and dominion over Walfish Bay and a small strip of adjoining territory.

The coast is desolate and harbourless. Almost the only natural inlet of actual or prospective value is Walfish Bay, which is just north of the tropic of Capricorn, in about twenty-three degrees of south latitude. The country behind, Great Namaqualand and, further north, Herero or Damara-land, is in many parts little more than a desert, which neither Great Britain nor the Cape Colony was anxious to formally possess, though it was generally regarded as being within what would now be called the Sphere of British Influence. The only Europeans to be found in this region were a very few traders and some missionaries. The latter were for the most part Germans, belonging to the Rhenish Missionary Society, whose work north of the Orange River began in the year 1842, and who within a little more than twenty years established at various points a dozen mission stations. Intertribal feuds between the Namaquas and the Damaras¹ endangered the missionaries and their work, and in 1868 they appealed to the British Government for protection, suggesting in their memorial that the whole of Damaraland might with advantage be declared to be British territory. The Prussian Government commended their case to the good offices of the English Foreign Office, as though recognising that the matter was one in which the British Government was alone concerned. Reference was made through the usual official channels to the Governor of the

CH. VIII.

*Walfish Bay.**The Rhenish missionaries in Damara and Namaqualand*

¹ The Namaquas are Hottentots, the Damaras are of Bantu race.

PART I. Cape, and a Commissioner was sent from the colony to Namaqualand, through whose efforts peace was for a while restored. No part of the territory, however, was then or subsequently annexed, with the exception of Walfish Bay; and in 1880, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, definitely negated any schemes for the extension of British authority over the Namaqua and Damara country.

German views on colonisation in South Africa.

In the same year an article in the Berlin Geographical Journal attracted some attention in the Cape Colony. Its writer, Ernst von Weber, argued in favour of German colonisation in South Africa, laying stress on the kinship between the Germans and the Dutch Boers, advocating the Boer cause against the English, and suggesting among other points that Matabeleland might be a suitable scene for a German settlement, to which the Transvaal Dutchmen would flee from British oppression, and where, among natives of somewhat intractable character, German colonists 'by their greater pliancy' would be more likely to live at peace than 'the more inflexible and stiff-necked English'.¹ No signs at the moment indicated that the German Government shared or approved the views expressed in the article, but Germany had now reached the stage at which the acquisition of foreign territory is not distasteful to a great nation, and when colonisation furnishes a natural outlet for its energies. It had fought and won its great war against France, its union had been accomplished. Strong in consolidation and in the sense of work done and victory gained, its people were ready to compete in other fields, to take up waste places outside of Europe and credit them to the Fatherland.

German traders in South-west Africa.

Early in 1883 the German Ambassador notified to the Foreign Office that a German merchant intended to establish a factory north of the Orange River, and inquired whether the British Government exercised any authority in the district

¹ C. 4190. 1884, p. 8.

in question, and, if so, whether British protection could be given to the proposed station; otherwise, such protection as the German Government could grant would be afforded to the undertaking, but not with a view to acquiring any footing for Germany in South Africa. In reply Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, asked for further particulars with a view to consulting the Cape Government. Some months later the Daily Papers contained the news that a Bremen firm had acquired from the natives the bay of Angra Pequena, lying in $26^{\circ}38$ degrees South latitude. Their claims conflicted with the prior claims of a British Company, who lost no time in pressing their side of the case. The question being raised by the German Government whether the English claimed rights of sovereignty over the bay and the adjacent territory, the answer which was given was to the effect that only Walfish Bay and the Guano Islands were actual British territory, but that any claim by a foreign power to sovereignty or jurisdiction between Portuguese territory and the frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe legitimate British rights. Correspondence followed, and considerable delay; the English Government began to realise that the Germans no longer aimed merely at security for a commercial undertaking, but had in view territorial sovereignty; the Government of the Cape Colony began to dread the neighbourhood of a strong foreign power, and to press for a declaration of British authority over the whole area in question. It was too late, the opportunity had gone by for ever, the English were estopped by their recent declarations from pleading old claims to ownership: and, before the year 1884 ended, a German Protectorate over the coast of South-west Africa north of the Orange River, with the exception of the Guano Islets and the Walfish Bay district, was an accomplished fact¹. The inland boundaries of the Protectorate and Sphere

Angra
Pequena.

Declara-
tion of
German
Protec-
torate in
South-west
Africa.

¹ A good summary of the subject is given in Lord Derby's despatch of December 4, 1884. C. 4625. 1884, pp. 3-7.

PART I. of Influence were at a later date defined by the third article of the Anglo-German Agreement of July, 1890, by which access was given from the German territory to the Zambesi River¹.

*Results of
German
intervention in
South
Africa.*

The year 1884 saw the German flag hoisted elsewhere in Africa, and Germany taking keen part in the international competition which has parcelled out among various claimants the long neglected continent. Complications might have been avoided, and a considerable amount of friction, if the advice of far-seeing men had been taken in time, and the South African coast-line on the west side, as on the east, kept exclusively in British hands. But German intrusion into what the English had sleepily considered to be their preserve had at least the advantage of making Englishmen at home and in the Cape Colony more wide awake, and German competition gave a new and strong impulse to British colonisation in South Africa.

*South
Africa in
1887.*

By the end of 1887 the Transvaal was, as it had been at the beginning of 1877, a self-governing republic, subject to certain conditions, the most important of which was the restriction on its foreign relations embodied in the fourth article of the London Convention. The character of its population was rapidly becoming modified, and it was no longer merely the home of a small number of Dutch farmers living among a much larger number of natives; but by the side of the Boers was springing up a constantly increasing community of European and Australian miners and owners of mines.

¹ By this article the inland boundary from the Orange River northwards is the twentieth degree of East longitude as far as its intersection with the twenty-second parallel of South latitude, that parallel eastward as far as its intersection with the twenty-first degree of East longitude, that degree northward as far as its intersection with the eighteenth parallel of South latitude, that parallel eastward to the river Chobe, and the centre of the main channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi, where it terminates. 'It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall have free access from her Protectorate to the Zambesi by a strip of territory which shall at no point be less than twenty English miles in width.' C. 6046. 1890, p. 6.

SOUTH AF

To face page 310

Convention of London —

The Transvaal Boer Republic
 African Republic 1886 and subsequently
 British Bechuanaland with South African Republic,
 (Sept. 30, 1885). Zululand district (July 1888).
 British Protectorate over
 Bechuanaland to 22° south



B.V. Bunbire, Oxford, 6.

SOUTH AFRICA IN 1887.

Convention of London (Feb. 27, 1884).


The Transvaal becomes the South African Republic.

British Bechuanaland constituted a Colony (Sept. 30, 1885).

British Protectorate over Northern Bechuanaland to 22° south latitude.

German Protectorate in South- (1884).

Walvisch Bay annexed to Cape Colony (1884).
Basutoland separated from Cape Colony (1884).



By G. B. Burbidge, Oxford 1913

SCALE 0 100 200

in South-West Africa
to Cape Colony (1884).
d from Cape Colony

The 'New Republic'—
Formed by Transvaal settlers in Zululand.
Formally recognized 1886, and subsequently
incorporated with South African Republic,
forming the Vryheid district (July 1888).



7

The State, which had been abjectly poor, was fast becoming rich. Its boundaries had been defined, and it had gained additional territory. On the other hand the English held Bechuanaland along the whole of its western frontier; on the east, the coast country of Zululand had been constituted a British colony, and the first step had been taken towards a British Protectorate over Amatongaland by a treaty of 1887, under which the Amatonga people agreed not to cede any part of their territory to a foreign power without the sanction of the High Commissioner. On the north, the Republic was bounded by the Limpopo or Crocodile River, beyond which is the Matabele and Mashona country. It must now be told in very brief outline how, through the agency of a Chartered Company, this northern land became a field for British colonisation.

Most of the country in question was under the supremacy of Lobengula, the king of the Matabele, son of that Moselekatze whom the Boer trekkers had driven before them as they went north. Lobengula's realm extended roughly from the country of the Bamangwato on the west to the eastern watershed, and from the Limpopo on the south as far as the Zambesi. He claimed as his subjects weaker tribes, such as the Mashonas, the Makalaka, and the Banyai. His power was, as Cetewayo's power had been, that of a ruler of armed and disciplined savages. In 1887 he was the most formidable native chieftain south of the Zambesi. Reputed to be rich in mineral, dimly identified by vague report with the fabled land of Ophir, this far-off territory was known to none but the few adventurous hunters and traders, whom the Matabele king admitted within its borders. Only in the extreme south-west, by the Tati River, were gold-fields opened in intermittent fashion about the year 1869. The great find of gold in the Transvaal in 1885 and 1886 recalled attention to Mashonaland, speculation was rife, and visions of wealth to be amassed beyond the Limpopo turned men's eyes to the north. Lobengula, as his

*Matabele-
land
and Ma-
shonaland.
Loben-
gula's
dominion.*

PART I. father before him¹, had always professed friendliness to the English, and when it seemed as though his country would become infested by white adventurers, whose claims would give trouble in the future, it was deemed advisable, in his own interests and in those of Great Britain, to send up a responsible agent to his Kraal at Bulawayo. Mr. Moffat, Assistant British Commissioner in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, was despatched on the mission, and in February, 1888, he concluded an agreement with the king, by which the latter undertook not to make any treaty with a foreign power, nor to sell or cede to foreign nations any part of his territory, without the sanction of the High Commissioner. From this date, as against Germany, Portugal, and the South African Republic, Matabeleland and Mashonaland were held to be under British protection. Subsequently the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890, defined German limits to the west; the Anglo-Portuguese Convention of June, 1891, defined Portuguese limits to the east; and by the tenth article of the Convention of 1890 between Great Britain and the South African Republic, respecting Swaziland, the Transvaal Government withdrew all claim to extend its territory or influence beyond its existing northern boundary, the Limpopo River. Thus safeguarded against foreign claims, this northern section of the South African peninsula was opened to British trade and British settlement.

*British
treaty with
Lobengula.*

*New birth
of Char-
tered Com-
panies.*

Between the years 1880 and 1890 there was a new birth of Chartered Companies, and a fresh impetus was thereby given to the onward movement of British colonisation. Of four great companies which received Royal Charters in this period, one, the eldest of the four, found its field in Borneo; the sphere of the other three, the Niger Company, the Imperial British East Africa Company, and the British

¹ In 1836 Moselekatze made a treaty of friendship with the Governor of the Cape.

South Africa Company was Africa. Youngest of the four, CH. VIII. the last-named company has made most history, the scene of its operations has been most favourable in point of climate for British enterprise, and, whatever may have been its merits or demerits, its vigour in war and peace has commanded admiration from friends and foes alike.

—
The
British
South
Africa
Company.

Eighteen months and more passed from the date of Moffat's treaty with Lobengula, before the British South Africa Company received its charter. There were rival concessionaires with conflicting claims, but the two main groups of rivals came to terms, and combined their forces; and in October, 1889, the charter was granted. Well-known names appeared in the preamble, among them the name of C. J. Rhodes, the originating and guiding spirit of the enterprise. The 'principal field' of the company's operations was defined to be 'the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions.'

Its charter.

No northern limit to its sphere was fixed, and beyond the Zambesi into Central Africa that sphere extends. The construction of railways and telegraphs, the promotion of trade and colonisation, the development of mineral and other concessions with due regard to native interests, such were the objects which the founders of the company had set forward in their letters to the Government. These objects the charter empowered them to carry out, but any monopoly of trade was definitely negatived, and over the political and administrative dealings of the company the Government reserved a general control.

The extension of the railway northward from Kimberley into Bechuanaland, and the enrolment of police, at once occupied the attention of the newly-formed company; but, early in 1890, preparations were made to ensure the occupation of Mashonaland, and to forestall possible and

The first
expedition
into Ma-
shonaland.

PART I. rumoured competitors. A pioneer expedition was determined upon; but, before it set out, care was taken to soothe the Matabele king, suspicious with good reason of white intruders, and a route was prescribed, avoiding as far as possible the Matabele kraals. Guided by Mr. Selous, of hunting fame, a party of 170 picked pioneers, with 400 native drivers, and under the escort of 500 police, left their camp on the Macloutsie River on June 28, 1890, and marching east and north for 400 miles reached Fort Salisbury high on the Mashonaland plateau on the following September 12. Along the route a road was made; and at four points, Tuli, Victoria, Charter, and Salisbury, forts were established and garrisoned. Not a single life was lost on the expedition, and the Matabele, though evidently irritated and alarmed, made no opposition.

*Difficulties
with the
Portu-
guese.*

The shortest route to Mashonaland, however, is not from the south, but from the east where the starting-point is the estuary of the Pungwe River in the Portuguese province of Sofala. Immediately after the arrival of the expedition at Fort Salisbury, the representatives of the Chartered Company began to enter into relations with native chiefs to the east and south-east, whose territory the Portuguese claimed to be within their Sphere of Influence. Collisions ensued between the Company's police and Portuguese forces, notably at a place named Massi Kessi, where was a depôt of the Mozambique Company. The Portuguese commandant at Beira, at the mouth of the Pungwe River, closed that route; a British steamer on the Limpopo was seized by the Portuguese Customs Officers; and for a short time open war between Great Britain and Portugal appeared to be imminent. The irritation of the Portuguese was intelligible. Though fallen from their high estate, they inherited the traditions of empire; and, if their dominion on the eastern coast of Africa was greater in name than in fact, they cherished the claims which in days long past their ancestors had made good, and resented

the threatening advance of private adventurers under cover of British protection. Their very weakness was their strength, and it had ill beseeemed the Government of Great Britain to take high-handed advantage of a smaller power. The Chartered Company's movements were held in check, correspondence passed between London and Lisbon, and in June, 1891, a comprehensive treaty was signed between the two nations, defining their respective Spheres of Influence in Africa. By this treaty the Company were guaranteed freedom of access to their territories from the eastern coast, and under its provisions, a railway was in due course constructed across the low-lying country, infested by the deadly tsetse fly, which lies between the Pungwe River and the plateau of Mashonaland.

CH. VIII.
—♦—
The Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 1891.

While in difficulties with the Portuguese on the east, the Company were at the same time threatened with Dutch invasion from the south. In 1890, before the pioneer expedition started, schemes of Boer migration beyond the Limpopo were in the air, and in 1891 rumours of a trek, organised on a large scale, took form and shape and attracted serious attention. To the entry of Dutch agriculturists, who would take up land under the Company and throw in their lot with the new enterprise, no objection could be or was likely to be made, but the danger was that a large body of armed Boers might attempt to rush the territory and proclaim a new republic. For a few weeks it was a real danger; but the Government of the South African Republic stood by the promises which it had made, and by proclamation and threats of fine and imprisonment discouraged the supporters of the trek; a detachment of the Queen's troops was moved up into Bechuanaland, the Bechuanaland police and the Company's police patrolled the frontier, the fords of the Limpopo were watched, and when at length, in June, 1891, a small body of trekkers made their appearance at the river, their leader was arrested and his followers were

Rumours of Treks from the South African Republic.

PART I. dispersed. Thus relieved from any immediate danger of
 → Dutch interference, and no longer in conflict with the Portuguese, the Chartered Company were free to deal in war or peace, as the case might be, with Lobengula and his Matabele warriors.

The Matabele war.

That war would come must long have been foreseen. To the Matabele power the British South Africa Company was a standing menace; to the Company the neighbourhood of savage regiments was a constant and deadly peril. Mashonaland, where the white men were established, where English settlements were growing up, and English administration was being organised, was claimed by the king as part of his dominions, and the Europeans had entered it with his permission. Savage despots, like the Matabele or Zulu kings, are despots only within limits. They find in existence or call into existence a trained fighting force which lives by war, and their young men, scenting blood from afar, will kill and be killed to order, but ever strain at the leash which holds them in. The chief himself befriends awhile and protects the trader or the missionary, he knows and dreads the strength of the white man, he learns, it may be, to discern between the European adventurer seeking what he may devour and the friendly government of the great white Queen, policy and not seldom some touch of kindly feeling holds him back, until troubled and perplexed by the growing numbers of self-seeking visitors, and called to account for such raids and murders as have been the custom of his people, he makes a last stand for savagery.

Beginning of hostilities.

Three years passed before the inevitable struggle came. The Matabele warriors murdered and enslaved the natives of Mashonaland as in the time before the Europeans came. White men too were threatened and robbed, life was unsafe, and property was taken. At length, in July, 1893, a Matabele impi entered the township of Victoria, butchering Mashona servants or refugees; and, refusing to leave the

neighbourhood of the town, were driven out with loss of life by the Company's mounted police. Communications with the Matabele king gave little hope of peace. He claimed the Mashonas as his subjects, and denied them the right of protection from the white men. The Company in consequence made ready for war, and forces of police and volunteers gathered to march on Bulawayo.

It was no light matter this Matabele campaign. Organised in regiments, like their Zulu kinsfolk, the Matabele fighting men were considerable in numbers, brave, trained, disciplined soldiers. Against them were irregular troops, a very few hundreds in all. The route was long, the rainy season was coming on, not a few in England predicted some such disasters as had too often before been known in South African warfare. At three points the Company's troops were mustered. At Tuli on the frontier, about 140 miles due south of Bulawayo, was a party of 250 white men; at Victoria, 200 miles north-east of Tuli and lying due east of Bulawayo, a second column was formed, including 400 Europeans; at Salisbury, north-east of Bulawayo and 190 miles due north of Victoria, the third column numbered 260 white men. In all, the European forces at the Company's disposal were, when the march began, not 1,000 strong, but well armed and provided with ample ammunition and Maxim guns. The plan of campaign was for the Victoria and Salisbury columns to meet and march on Bulawayo from the east, while a simultaneous advance was to be made by the Tuli troopers from the south. Before, however, the scheme could be carried out in its entirety, the Imperial police in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, owing to the threatening attitude of the Matabele, became involved in the war, with the result that the Tuli detachment of the Company's forces was diverted westward to combine with the Bechuanaland police. Between Fort Salisbury and Fort Victoria stood Fort Charter, 65 miles due south of Salisbury, 120 miles due

*The
advance on
Bulawayo*

PART I. north of Victoria. On September 5, 1893, the Salisbury column left for Fort Charter, and, after a halt at that post, began its south-westerly march on Bulawayo on October 2. On the 16th it met the advancing Victoria column; and, after crossing the range of the Matoppo mountains, on the 24th the combined force reached the Shangani River. Forming a double laager on a slope beyond the river, the troops were attacked before daylight on the following morning by a strong body of Matabele, about 5,000 in number. Three times the Matabele advanced on the camp, and three times were repulsed with loss, until by 9 o'clock in the morning the fighting was over, and the field was clear for the onward march. The next day further skirmishes took place, but the column still advanced, and early on November 1 passed the headwaters of the Imbembesi River within two days' march of the king's kraal. Here, hastily laagered on open ground, the Europeans were attacked at midday on November 1 by 7,000 Matabele, including the royal regiments, the pick of Lobengula's army. Coming up through the bush the savages charged with unswerving bravery, but the murderous fire of the machine guns laid them low in hundreds, and the fight was soon over. Two days later the victorious troops marched into Bulawayo, finding it in flames and deserted by its native inhabitants, but still tenanted by two white traders, whose lives and property the old king had with chivalrous good faith protected to the last.

*The fight
at the
Shangani
River,*

*and at the
Imbembesi
River.*

*Occupation
of Bulawa-
wayo.*

*The
advance of
Colonel
Gould
Adams'
force.*

The western force had in the meantime been making its way up from the Macloutsie River. Its first object was to occupy the Tati district, lying at a little distance to the north-west, and to protect the mining settlement which had been established there on the borders of Lobengula's country. From Tati to Bulawayo, a distance of about 140 miles, the main route runs due north-east, rising ever towards the high veldt or plateau, on which Bulawayo stands, and passing over a Nek in the range of hills which forms the southern

buttress of Matabeleland. On October 19, the force left Tati, including 440 Europeans and nearly 2,000 of Khama's Bamangwato followers, friends of the English, sworn foes of the Matabele. The officer in command, Colonel Goold Adams, planned to advance west and north of the direct road and, skirting round the western spurs of the dividing range, to turn the mountain passes. Driven back by want of water he took the direct route; and on November 2, near the foot of the hills, the waggons in the rear of his column were attacked by the Matabele. The attack was repulsed with some loss on either side, and again the troops moved on, weakened by the withdrawal of Khama and his men, among whom a rumoured outbreak of smallpox had created a scare. The position was difficult and dangerous, for the Matabele held strong positions on the line of march, but, while arrangements were being made to force the onward way, news came of the taking of Bulawayo, and the road was left open. On November 12, Goold Adams reached Bulawayo, meeting there Major Forbes, the successful leader of the Company's troops, and Dr. Jameson the Administrator of Mashonaland.


The Matabele were now dispersed, and Lobengula a fugitive, in the country to the north of his old home. A patrol was sent out to overtake him, if possible, and to break up the remains of his army; and for three weeks there was skirmishing in the bush on the line of the Shangani River. One sad incident marred the success of the campaign, but added to the record roll of fighting heroism. A small reconnoitring party, under Captain Allan Wilson, was sent on in advance, tracking Lobengula to his hiding-place. Attacked by overwhelming numbers, and cut off by a flooded river from the main body of troops, the Englishmen, thirty in number, fought in a ring, their only barricade being the dead bodies of their horses. Defending themselves till their ammunition failed, they fell, as they stood, side by side; none

*The
pursuit of
Lobengula
and loss of
Captain
Wilson's
party.*



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PART I.
 —♦—
*End of the
 war and
 death of
 Lobengula.*

lived to tell the tale; but natives bore ungrudging witness to the white men's dauntless death. The rainy season had now come on, further fighting in the jungle was useless, and the troops withdrew to Bulawayo; but the campaign was over, the Matabele on all sides came back to their kraals, and early in 1894 Lobengula died.

Thus ended the Matabele war. It ended with the breaking up of the military system which Chaka the Zulu had perfected in years gone by. As the Dutchmen, with their fire-arms, fighting in guerilla fashion, in old times overmatched Zulus and Matabele alike, so in later days it was left to an irregular force, with the modern appliances of Maxim guns, to conquer and disperse Lobengula's army. It was the work of a private company, into whose hands the Administration of Matabeleland passed, their powers being regulated by the Matabeleland Order in Council of July 18, 1894; under the new system, which replaced a savage despotism, the number of white colonists increased day by day; and in a very few months Bulawayo became the scene of a thriving English settlement.

The present chapter, which opened with the first British annexation of the Transvaal, an act which was undone, may appropriately close with the British acquisition of Rhodesia, an act which embodied finality. It is hardly too much to say that of all the landmarks in South African history the one to which most substantial importance attaches, as pointing to the end of the old order, the beginning of the new, is this great feat of northern expansion, coupled with the fact that it was achieved by British citizens, mainly by one great British citizen, not by the British Government, which had hitherto signally failed in its handling of South Africa. The acquisition of Rhodesia marked the end of militant savagery. Lobengula was the last heir of the Chakas, Dingaans, Cetewayos, Moselekatses, the last representative of definitely organised military barbarism among the coloured races of

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South Africa. It marked the end of trekking, for the Dutchmen, whose record had been one of movement, were now hemmed in on the side of the interior by effective British occupation. It defined by facts and men, and not merely by the terms of lightly regarded Conventions, the limits of the South African Republic, and thereby it circumscribed and proportionately emphasised the storm-centre in South Africa. But it pointed above all to the coming time. The trading station period had long passed out of remembrance. The story of the Cape Colony had been merged in the wider tale of South Africa. Now the development of the peninsula was to be linked on to that of the great Central African regions, for in February, 1891, the charter of the British South Africa Company was definitely recognised as extending 'over the territory under British influence north of the Zambesi and south of the territories of the Congo Free State and the German Sphere,' with the exception of Nyasaland. The historian of the future will record that the British occupation of Rhodesia was the beginning of the continental history of South Africa.



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