

CANADIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS



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Canadian Position on Safeguards  
for Atomic Reactors

Text of statement exercising right of reply  
made in the First Committee by the Canadian  
Representative, General E. L. M. Burns, on  
Tuesday, November 2, 1965

In his statement on October 29th, in this Committee the distinguished representative of Pakistan made some remarks about the role of Canada in India's atomic energy programme. Although a number of points were presented in terms which could have left a misleading impression, I shall not attempt to discuss them in detail. To do so would inevitably lead to argument about highly technical matters which would be out of place here. Instead I shall deal only with the two principal matters raised which were that the bilateral safeguards arrangements for the Rajasthan power station are inadequate and that there is a serious risk of diversion of nuclear material to atomic weapons.

There can surely be no misunderstanding about the general Canadian position on safeguards. Canada was one of the pioneers in the development of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since the founding of the Agency, Canada has persistently devoted much effort to developing the system. The revised safeguards system only came into effect recently. During the period when the Agency's safeguards did not extend to large reactors, Canada was among those countries leading the way to acceptance of safeguards by concluding a number of bilateral agreements embodying strict safeguards provisions. Now that large reactors can be covered by the IAEA system we have started the process of transferring to the Agency the administration of safeguards under these bilaterals. The first such transfer (under our agreement with Japan) was announced at the IAEA Conference in Tokyo in September and there is reason to hope that others will follow soon.

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This background should suffice to demonstrate an abiding Canadian concern about safeguards. This Committee may rest assured that the Canadian Government will not fail to meet its full responsibilities with respect to any of the bilateral atomic energy agreements it has entered into.

Something was said the other day about the 200 megawatt reactor being built with Canadian cooperation at Rajasthan in India which will only be operational in 1968 or 1969. In the first place the agreement of December 1963 between Canada and India contains an unequivocal undertaking that the reactor will be used for peaceful purposes only. This agreement has been registered with the United Nations so that its terms are public knowledge and it has presumably been studied by the IAEA. Perhaps the matter will be clarified further if I read the essential portions of Article XIII of the Agreement. "The two Governments agree that ... to ensure that the provisions of this Agreement are being observed ... whenever the designated technical representatives ... so request they shall thereupon be accorded access to all parts of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station ...; (and) to all other places where fuel or fissionable material used in or produced by the Station ... is being used, stored or located; ..." In other words Canadian inspectors may enter Rajasthan Station forthwith upon request, at any time, and without prior notice. When the station is operational, they may also go anywhere else where the fissionable material is located in order to assure themselves that the plutonium produced in the reactor and processed in the separation plant is not diverted to military use. Moreover Canadian inspectors may examine all the products of the reactor regardless of the source of the fuel. Inspectors from IAEA could do no more and would be no more rigorous in carrying out their duties.

It is perhaps worth saying something further about the transfer of the administration of safeguards to the Agency. This policy objective is reflected in the fact that all Canadian agreements made since 1957 contemplate such a transfer, including the Rajasthan agreement with India just cited. We hope and expect that all our various bilateral partners will cooperate with us and the Agency to this end. Certainly the intentions of Canada and Pakistan are clear on this score in connection with the Karachi nuclear power project regarding which negotiations are proceeding between our two countries. It was agreed in principle nearly a year ago that IAEA safeguards would

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Dear Mr. [Name],

I have your letter of the 10th and am glad to hear that you are interested in the [Project Name]. I am sure that you will find the information I have enclosed of interest to you.

The [Project Name] is a very important one and I am sure that you will find it of great value. I am sure that you will find the information I have enclosed of interest to you.

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apply to this project. As those negotiations approach completion our two countries have an opportunity to reinforce the position of the Agency's safeguards system and to set an example for other countries to follow.

This brings me to the experimental reactor known as the CIR. I should like to recall that the agreement to provide this reactor to India under the Colombo Plan was made prior to the date when the IAEA came into existence and at a time when the concept of safeguards was much less highly developed than it is today. The Indian Government nevertheless gave an unconditional undertaking to use the reactor for peaceful purposes only. This undertaking has been reaffirmed and publicly acknowledged in statements by Indian Ministers during the past year. Moreover, on June 14, in a communiqué issued by the Prime Minister of Canada and Prime Minister Shastri during the latter's visit to Canada, the Prime Minister of Canada expressed particular satisfaction at India's decision not to use nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes, despite India's technical capability to produce nuclear weapons. The Canadian Government has been pleased to note that only a few weeks ago Prime Minister Shastri again declared that his Government was not planning to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Finally, I should like to say that it is Canada's conviction that production of truly cheap atomic power will be a great boon to all mankind and not least to the developing countries. Since every peaceful release of atomic energy produces also the material for weapons production, surely the dictates of reason and the interest of their own survival require all countries to give their full support to the IAEA safeguards system.

