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GENOA PLUS 51: THE SOVIET UNION AT THE  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

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## SUMMARY

Foreign and domestic policy in the USSR are depicted in terms of the interaction of two principal tendencies, neo-Stalinist and reform. The neo-Stalinist trend is seen in the use of détente and limited agreements with Western powers for offensive political purposes, and in limited de-Stalinization internally and in Eastern Europe. The reform trend is observed in Soviet endeavours to obtain politically stabilizing agreements that permit a reallocation of resources to favour more rapid economic development and liberalization in the USSR and bloc countries. Both trends are reflected in the Soviet approach to the CSCE. The reform trend has gained influence since 1969, and the current military, political, and economic situation indicates it may be still more evident in Soviet behaviour at the Conference later this year. Though precise forms of Soviet conduct cannot be predicted, intra-Party discussions concerning Soviet activity prior to the Genoa Economic Conference of 1922, indicate that Moscow may appear at the CSCE with a set of proposals for East-West cooperation considerably more comprehensive and reasonable than anything they have recently produced. Against this background of attractive and possibly even workable measures, they would make political concessions in the pursuit of economic objectives and a stabilization of East-West relations conducive to internal reform in the USSR. Soviet behaviour would not be free of offensive political ambition, and the Conference will not itself solve the problems of a divided Europe. The forthcoming period is nevertheless a propitious one for action designed to tilt Moscow into a posture of long-term East-West accommodation that increasingly restricts the neo-Stalinist orientation in Kremlin policies toward the West, Eastern Europe, and its own population.

GENOA PLUS 51: THE SOVIET UNION AT THE  
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Franklyn Griffiths

The Soviets are quite reticent about their intentions toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which now seems likely to take place in Helsinki this summer. And yet it is they and their Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) allies that are chiefly responsible for the convocation of this meeting, having urged it on a reluctant West in a series of general declarations and bilateral consultations since 1966. All manner of objectives may consequently be attributed to the Soviet Union. For example, it could be argued that Moscow's interests in a CSCE are still "to isolate the United States from Europe, to split the Western allies in NATO, to destroy the EEC, and eventually to draw East and Western Europe together in a Soviet hegemonic security sphere without United States influence or presence."<sup>1</sup> More likely, however, the Soviets do not have clearly defined intentions, much less a coherent strategy for the future of Europe and East-West relations as a whole. Given the unusual fluidity of world politics in recent times, Moscow could well enter the CSCE with several broad options, each a somewhat different variant of the general foreign policy line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In the course of

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the Conference they would take whatever they could get, depending on the conduct of the Western powers. Foreign observers are relatively familiar with variations in the Soviet pursuit of offensive political and military goals, as Moscow's actions shift back and forth between an emphasis on threats and propaganda and conciliation and agreements in order to extract concessions, divide, and demobilize the Western powers. In fact we are inclined to expect little else from Moscow. Should the Soviets choose to inject new elements into their European policy at the CSCE, we might therefore fail to recognize the innovation, or to provide an adequate response.

It is the argument of this report that the Soviet Union is considering a new orientation for its European policy. One of the reasons that Moscow continues to veil its intentions may be that it wishes to preserve the opportunity for maximum political effect should it decide to drop a bombshell at the CSCE. This would represent the opening salvo in a campaign to achieve new levels of accommodation with the West. The initial démarche at the CSCE could consist of an elaborate programme of East-West reconciliation, far more reasonable and comprehensive than anything recently suggested by the Soviet Union. The appearance of such a programme together with an array of practical proposals and conciliatory negotiating behaviour might again be explained

by reference to the offensive political purposes usually associated with Soviet actions in the European theatre. More appropriately, an initiative of this kind could be attributed to a growing commitment to obtain an extended period of crisis-free relations with the West as a necessary background for intensified economic and technological development in the USSR. The assertion of this latter orientation over the long-standing tendency to seek unilateral political advantage would be based upon a three-fold recognition: that the USSR now experiences a sufficient degree of security in relation to the United States and other Western powers; that major political objectives advocated by the Soviet Union in connection with the CSCE have already been achieved with Western acceptance of existing boundaries in Europe, the achievement of diplomatic recognition for the East German regime, and the regulation of the Berlin problem; and that the outstanding Soviet requirement in the West lies not so much in power-political transformations as in the elaboration of reliable long-term commercial, scientific, and technological ties necessary for more rapid economic progress in the Soviet Union under present conditions. The matrix of opportunities and constraints posed by the military-strategic, political-diplomatic, and economic situations can be seen to favour but not necessarily ensure such a recognition in Moscow. Accordingly, an opportunity may arise at the CSCE to reinforce a significant and desirable

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change of emphasis in Soviet policy toward the West.

The Soviet system has reached a juncture similar in many respects to that which it faced before the Genoa Economic Conference of 1922. At that time a very much weaker regime that had recently improved its security position somewhat was forced to choose more clearly between offensive foreign political objectives and the internal requirements of the Soviet state for greater economic collaboration with its Western adversaries. The choice they made required a long-term effort to reduce the perceived threat of Soviet Communism in the West, and to utilize European interests in security as a means of acquiring much-needed economic and technical assistance for Russia. This decision was the result of sharp debate within the Party. What with Lenin's incapacitation later in 1922, and the ensuing succession struggle, the opposition was able to prevent the regime from following through with the new foreign policy trend as might otherwise have been done. Nevertheless for those who preferred policies of collaboration with democratic societies in the West, the Genoa experience remained a model for Soviet diplomatic behaviour. Today, participants in the intra-Party debate on foreign policy assert that Moscow's preparations for the Genoa meeting are of direct relevance to current Soviet tasks. For example in a January 1973 review of a recent volume of Brezhnev's foreign policy speeches in



the Party's main theoretical journal, A.A. Gromyko finds it appropriate to quote Lenin's statement of 1922 that "Genoa is now the most burning question of policy."<sup>2</sup> A one-to-one equivalence between Genoa in 1922 and Helsinki in 1973 is of course to be avoided. Nevertheless an understanding of the Kremlin's behaviour on the occasion of its first appearance at a multilateral European negotiation may help us to decode current internal Soviet communications about policy toward the CSCE. It may sensitize us to the possibility of inner movement in Soviet conduct on European matters, which otherwise could go unnoticed. And it may tell us something about Soviet tactics at Helsinki. In a word, Genoa provides an opportunity to penetrate the veil that surrounds current Soviet thinking about policy in Europe.

In what follows I intend to consider the principal opposing trends in postwar Soviet conduct toward the West in Europe, and to define nuanced changes in the Soviet approach to the question of a CSCE since 1966 in terms of shifts in the relative influence of these underlying tendencies. It will be suggested that Soviet policies are internally contradictory, consisting principally of two trends, neo-Stalinist and reform, whose role in the totality of Soviet behaviour varies under the pressure of changing situational factors. In order to gain insight into the reform trend as it might be manifested at the CSCE, attention will be given first to

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reform strategy and tactics as they were developed in Soviet preparations for the Genoa Conference, and then to the ways in which they might be displayed at Helsinki if the neo-Stalinist orientation is not predominant in Soviet policy. Situational variables will thereafter be considered as they seem likely to affect the influence of the reform trend in Moscow's European policy as of mid-March 1973, and in the months to come. In conclusion, the policy implications of a Soviet decision to approach the CSCE in a spirit of reform will be discussed as they concern Canada in particular.

I. Opposing Tendencies in Soviet Policy

In speaking of Soviet objectives or intentions we usually assume that policy is the product of more or less rational deliberation among a limited group of decision-makers who have certain broad goals in mind, who analyze situations in terms of these aims, then resolving on practical action. To understand Soviet foreign policy change is to appreciate changes in leadership thinking as they respond to new situations. From this perspective foreign policy is a unilinear and sequential process that occurs in stages as one set of perceptions and actions gives way to another in the course of deliberation among decision-makers. Such a view of Soviet conduct is of undoubted utility in that it readily lends meaning to the large volume of policy-relevant data generated

by the USSR. On the other hand, we have very little reliable information about the thinking of Soviet leaders, even though this is the central consideration in most Western interpretations of Soviet behaviour. Moreover it can be suggested that Soviet policy-making is less centralized and "rational" than is usually thought, and that non-logical interaction among officials, organizations, and informal groups is sufficiently prominent to require attention in the analysis of Soviet conduct.<sup>3</sup>

My own preference in these matters is to regard Soviet objectives as the goals of a political system, rather than the concrete aims of a group of officials who effectively monopolize all phases of policy. Since we have little information about Soviet decision-making, it is desirable to work with a concept of policy that minimizes the significance of decision-making variables and maximizes the utility of the available data. The latter consist essentially of the pronouncements and actions of the Party and state, and the moves of a whole series of subsystem actors in the USSR. Is there a pattern to this behaviour, and can we offer explanations for pattern changes, thereby gaining some ability to predict future Soviet actions?

In Soviet policy on a given issue over a period of years certain uniformities may be observed in the actions of officials and lesser political participants as the regime responds

to its pertinent environments. These uniformities may be termed "tendencies," or regularities in the total volume of communication through which Soviet policies are formed, decided upon, and implemented.<sup>4</sup> They represent inner preferences or alternate programmes of the Soviet system, which it seeks to act out in dealing with a specific set of issues such as problems of security and cooperation in Europe. As indicated, this concept of Soviet policy sees it as being internally inconsistent and composed of a series of diverging trends whose relative influence alters in response to situational variables, thereby causing subtle and not-so-subtle changes in the outward behaviour of the regime. Soviet foreign policy change is accordingly to be understood in terms of shifts in the relationship among persisting tendencies of the political system as a whole, rather than in terms of a sequence of decisions by the leadership group. The leaders of course seek to convey the impression that they are fully in command. But I would argue they are in high degree captives of the situation in which they find themselves, caught between the conflicting needs of the Soviet system and the countervailing pressures of its domestic and international environments. The interpretation of Soviet conduct on questions of European security and cooperation should therefore begin with an identification of the underlying trends in Soviet policy.

Three principal tendencies may be discerned in the

overall behaviour of the Soviet system as it concerns relations with the West. These may be termed the sectarian, neo-Stalinist, and reform trends, and are outlined in Table 1. They consist of composite directions of policy on a series of related issues: dealings with the West, domestic political development, the future general line of the CPSU in foreign and domestic affairs, and policy toward security and cooperation in Europe. Attention is given to domestic politics, since in the relatively highly centralized Soviet system the international situation and the foreign policy of the regime are reciprocally related to the goals, prestige, missions, roles, and therefore interests of diverse segments of Soviet society. Foreign policy and domestic politics may of course be out of kilter at a given moment, as may Soviet policy on different issues in external affairs. But over a lengthy time period, the variations in Soviet behaviour sort out into three underlying trends.

It should be emphasized that we are dealing here with massive trends in system behaviour, and not with the orientations of individuals except insofar as the latter act as the bearers of a given tendency. Individuals may entertain views on domestic and foreign policy, for example, that are logically incompatible.<sup>5</sup> Where leaders are concerned, they may also be of more than one mind as they seek to reconcile conflicting trends in Soviet policy. In addition it is quite

Table 1. Three Tendencies in Soviet Policy

Trends in Soviet Policy

Trends on Separate Issues	Sectarian	Neo-Stalinist	Reform
Policy toward the West	Passive, masking two-camp Cold War stability with militant anti-imperialist propaganda	Activist, utilizing <u>détente</u> and limited <u>agreements</u> to exploit differences between Western powers	Collaborative, seeking to encourage reform trends in Western policy, especially the United States
Domestic Affairs	Stalinism	Limited de-Stalinization	Greater liberalization
Future Policy Foreign & Domestic	Consolidation of socialist camp, including China; maintain tightly controlled societies	Limited East-West <u>détente</u> , tactical <u>agreements</u> with Washington and especially Western Europe; slow decompression in USSR and East Europe	Extensive East-West <u>détente</u> based on cooperation with Washington; faster movement to economic and political reform in USSR and East Europe
CSCE	Avoid CSCE; if unavoidable, make anti-imperialist propaganda	Use CSCE to split and weaken Western powers, turning West European economic potential to the East	Employ CSCE to stabilize East-West relations and promote long-term economic cooperation

possible that a person's stated attitudes toward current foreign and domestic affairs may contradict his preferences for the future development of policy, owing to the demands of his role or the prevailing political mood. The effective reformer, for instance, may owe much of his success to an ability not to appear as an advocate of reform. For these and other reasons it makes little sense to look for "hawks" and "doves" on policy issues in the Soviet Union. Though the Soviet system persists in displaying dovish behaviour on occasion, there can be no really satisfactory answer to the question, "Well, who are the doves?" But when systematic rather than individual or group behaviour is considered, it is possible to differentiate between alternate directions of policy and to identify tendencies that might merit support.

In surveying postwar Soviet behaviour we may initially identify a tendency to adopt sectarian solutions. Rather than move out in search of voluntary commitment to and co-operation with the regime, the bearers of this trend display a preference for hierarchical patterns of control and coerced support in external as well as internal affairs. In foreign policy this entails a vigorous Soviet effort to solidify and strengthen the socialist camp and the influence of the most militant detachments of the world Communist movement. This necessitates counterposing the forces of peace and socialism to the capitalist world in black-and-white terms on all

issues. Unwilling to make the political compromises necessary to attract support from gray areas within capitalist society and in the Third World as well, the exponents of a two-camp foreign policy evidently prefer to maintain a sense of dedication to a sacred revolutionary mission. Operationally, these attitudes are expressed in strident slogans that emphasize a very energetic defense effort, sustained political vigilance, and the exposure of imperialism, particularly American and West German imperialism, to the peoples of the world. In conducting this political trench warfare, no deviation is to be tolerated in Eastern Europe.<sup>6</sup> Moscow is to have little or nothing to do with Western governments, for fraternization of any kind only serves to blur the fundamental distinctions that exist between socialism and capitalism at every point. In no way should the Soviet Union become dependent upon Western behaviour for its own security. Taken as a whole, these views on foreign policy are sectarian in that if implemented they would entail a self-isolation of the Soviet regime, masked by the triumphalist revolutionary propaganda of a militant political sect. Western observers frequently err in reading this as a prescription for an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy. In reality it represents a passive acceptance of a hostile international status quo. As such it appears to be calculated in part to retrieve and justify the practices and priorities of Soviet internal politics during the Stalin era. As such it also



constitutes the optimum variant in Soviet policy for those in the West who favour order as opposed to movement in domestic and foreign affairs.

The internal political corrolaries of the passive and sectarian trend in foreign policy are well described in the Western literature on totalitarianism. They require the development in the USSR of a very highly centralized and tightly controlled social system ruled with great zeal by a small leadership group in accordance with dogmatic ideological precepts. In this system of rule power is by definition dictatorial, and coercion and terror are deemed appropriate to achieve the goals advanced in the name of the working class. A strenuous effort is required to eradicate all forms of opposition and dissent, and to achieve an unmediated relationship between the individual and the state, so that the former is powerless to resist the latter's demands for absolute personal loyalty and commitment. Similarly the media of communication are very closely controlled in an endeavour to stimulate enthusiasm, to legitimize individual sacrifice in the name of defense against external and internal threats, and to strengthen the "moral-political unity" of Soviet society. As for the economy, it is directed according to the dictates of a crude system of central planning that very clearly favours defense and the production of producer's goods at the expense of agriculture, light industry,

and the consumer. Stalin and his works are of course highly esteemed by the supporters of this trend in Soviet political development, as they endeavour to steel the population against internal deviations, and military, political, and ideological subversion by the imperialist states.

Since the early 'fifties, the trends favouring a passive two-camp foreign policy of confrontation and a totalitarian development internally have waned in influence despite a reassertion that occurred in the period between Khrushchev's removal and the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in 1971. They continue however to be seen in the more virulent propaganda attacks on the Western powers, in repressive policies in Eastern Europe, in celebrations of the role of the Soviet military and internal security forces, in the suppression of national minority spokesmen and political and artistic dissidents, and in repeated campaigns for political vigilance and ideological uniformity. Should the sectarian trend acquire increased influence in Soviet behaviour, it would be exhibited in an effort to recapture the practices and mood of the late 'forties. In domestic affairs this would mean greater emphasis on the goals and techniques of totalitarianism. In foreign policy it would ultimately consist of an attempt to come to terms with China in an effort to reconstitute the socialist camp as it stood at the time of the Korean war. Chinese demands for a revision of Soviet internal and foreign

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policy would presumably be met, since sectarian elements in the Soviet Union concur with Chinese criticism of Soviet domestic practice and have insisted even after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, that imperialism is the "sole source" of the danger of war.<sup>7</sup> With regard to the West, the sectarian trend would be displayed in vituperative propaganda and in the encouragement of Western communist parties to adopt policies of extreme militance. The post-Stalin trend to détente and collaboration with capitalist states would be reversed. Arms racing and political warfare would be resumed in earnest, and as sharp a division as possible would be drawn between the socialist and capitalist camps. In this the United States would be treated with especial severity, and in dealing with the governments of Western Europe Moscow would in no way jeopardize its positions to the East. Viewed from this perspective, a CSCE, if it occurred, should be employed to make anti-imperialist propaganda. Soviet security would be assured unilaterally and through WTO defence efforts. And any extensive East-West economic and technical cooperation would be ruled out on the grounds of avoiding dependence on the West and averting the unfavourable effects of collaboration with the adversary.

Somewhat more flexible system responses are to be found in the trend I have called neo-Stalinist although its post-war antecedents reach back into the Stalin period. In

relations with the West neo-Stalinism consists of a rejection of passivity in favour of a policy of movement or activism, in which unilateral political objectives are to be gained rapidly and at the expense of the capitalist class through a varying blend of détente and pressure tactics.<sup>8</sup> Rather than seeing the contest in terms of a two-camp confrontation, the actions of the Soviet state and the subsystem bearers of the neo-Stalinist tendency display a heightened interest in the exploitation of differences between the United States and its NATO allies. Tension-reducing diplomacy and a degree of propaganda restraint are employed to promote an effective expression of anti-American, neutralist, pacifist, and pro-Soviet sentiment in Western Europe. In this setting, centrifugal tendencies in the Western alliance are strengthened, NATO capacities for coherent action are reduced, Western military preparedness declines, and opportunities are created for Soviet diplomatic gains through the use of bilateral agreements with American allies or sudden political demands as occurred in the case of Berlin. At the same time the activist orientation reflects a keen awareness of the destructiveness of modern weapons, and thus displays a readiness to reduce tensions with Washington. Should limited agreements with the United States also prove unavoidable for balance of power or possibly economic reasons, they are also employed for tactical advantage to weaken the American military effort and erode the credibility of the American

commitment to the defense of Western Europe. Though it may exist, an interest in what might be called "nefarious collaboration" or condominium with the United States is not readily discerned. On the contrary, American capabilities are seen to be declining to an extent that obviates the necessity for the Soviet Union to acquiesce in American spheres of influence in Western Europe or elsewhere. In shifting the European balance of forces in particular, Communist parties are urged to avoid sectarian isolation and to lead broad-front popular movements to effect favourable changes in the policy of NATO and neutral governments. The activist inflection in Soviet policy thus envisages international relations as a vigorous zero sum game in which Moscow has no acknowledged common interests with the West as it strives for global power and influence. This goal is pursued in a way that reduces the risk of nuclear war, but it also requires very substantial and possibly superior military forces, as well as a minimization of contacts with the United States. A divisive use of détente and limited agreements seems particularly well suited to a policy of activism, and it is this trend that has on the whole been predominant in post-Stalin Soviet policy toward the West.

The domestic political corollaries of foreign policy activism are summed up by the term limited de-Stalinization. This trend in internal affairs seems to be based upon an

awareness that continued economic development of the Soviet system necessitates qualitative as well as quantitative improvements in production. Where a highly centralized economy and polity was suitable to the forced-pace, extensive economic growth of the Stalin years, somewhat more loosely structured economic and political regimes are necessary for effective social contributions to intensive growth. Accordingly there is a tendency to relax the command system of economic planning and management, and to modify Stalinist budgetary priorities to provide greater incentives for productivity. Similarly, within the political system a degree of ideological and institutional diversity is permitted as theoretical and practical debate occurs within prescribed limits, and as experts are encouraged to play a larger role in policy formation. Simultaneously, terror is virtually eliminated, and the Soviet citizen finds it comparatively easy to predict the use of coercion by the regime. Repression is directed against dissidents and others active outside the boundaries of permissible political activity. A continued intensive effort is made to block the spread of bourgeois ideas. The propaganda apparatus continues to depict Western societies, if not all Western governments, in an unfavourable light. And the Soviet defense and police establishments continue to be the subjects of campaigns of praise.

Activism in policy toward the West and limited internal

de-Stalinization go hand in hand. A perceptible reduction in the overall level of international tension serves not only offensive foreign policy goals, but also a degree of internal relaxation. Conversely, the political and economic adjustments required to harness local and individual initiative serve the regime's internal goals and also provide a firmer foundation for the projection of Soviet influence abroad. Nevertheless a sense of limitation is most apparent here. The external situation vis-à-vis the West cannot be relaxed to an extent that throws into doubt the ideological justification for a single party system as ruled by the leaders. On the other hand, the internal situation must not be permitted to escape central control to a degree that leaves the USSR open either to its own centrifugal and disintegrative forces, or to successful political-military pressure tactics by the West. As was true of activism in foreign affairs, limited de-Stalinization has been the predominant trend in post-1953 domestic politics.

Looking ahead, a continuing emphasis on neo-Stalinist trends in Soviet policy would be accompanied by further slow departures from Stalinism in internal affairs, and by a steady use of divisive conciliation to advance offensive foreign political objectives. Limited tactical agreements with the United States could be allowed, but Soviet foreign policy would be directed primarily at the exploitation of

differences between Washington and other Western governments in order to reduce American political influence and the American military presence in Western Europe, and to promote neutralist trends possibly to the extent of "Finlandizing" the present allies of the United States. A degree of diversity within Eastern Europe would continue to be permitted insofar as it remained consonant with Soviet security interests and internal development. WTO and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) would persist primarily as instruments of Soviet political and economic control. They would be used to obtain the maximum of unity both in responding to the West under conditions of détente, and in pursuing economic cooperation with Western Europe to make up for the deficiencies of the neo-Stalinist economic system. As regards the Common Market, Soviet interests in weakening NATO, securing West European investment and technology, and in preventing EEC political and military integration, would together suggest an attempt to undermine European unity and divert West German, French, and Italian economic potential toward the East. Being unwilling to make the internal political changes required for a rapprochement with the current Chinese leadership, continued hostility toward the Chinese Communist Party would be in order, together with efforts to moderate the conflict at the state-to-state level. Correspondingly a preference would be displayed for improved relations with Japan as a means of restricting China, reducing



American influence in Asia, and obtaining assistance for Siberian economic development. A projection of the neo-Stalinist trend into the future thus envisages the best of possible worlds: a politically and militarily weaker United States and NATO, a Western Europe increasingly tied to and dependent upon the Soviet Union, an East Europe intact, a China contained, and a capacity to carry Soviet influence into distant areas of the Third World. But all of this is to be gained at the cost of accepting a still highly inefficient economic system and avoiding economic and political reform within the USSR.

From this perspective the CSCE would be employed to extrude the United States from Europe, to blunt offsetting West European defense efforts, to inhibit the development of the EEC and increase its responsiveness to Soviet interests, to secure the Soviet flank in Europe as insurance against further escalation of the conflict with Peking, and to obtain those economic benefits that might be expected to follow from less tense relations with Western Europe as a whole. Opportunities to appeal to leftist public opinion in Europe might be exploited, as would any policy differences between the United States on the one hand, and France, West Germany, and the neutrals on the other. Simultaneous requirements of stability in Eastern Europe would however set limits on what could be accomplished at the CSCE and subsequently:

though the Czech invasion of 1968 and the explicit and tacit recognition of existing European frontiers by the West assure Soviet security interests in a setting of increased European cooperation, they do not assure the internal status quo in Eastern Europe. The CSCE would thus represent an opportunity for cautious movement forward in a continuing quest for unilateral advantage.

A more definite transformation of East-West relations is suggested by the reform trend in Soviet policy. In this case the responses of the Soviet system to its various environments reflect a marked interest in collaboration among adversaries in order to enhance Soviet well-being and security more rapidly. Where the neo-Stalinist and activist tendency is guided by an interest in the exploitation of differences between capitalist states, the reform and collaborative trend is accompanied by a preoccupation with the use of differences within Western political elites, the United States included, for purposes of stabilizing agreement and détente. Neo-Stalinist observers are aware of conflicting trends within Western elites, but they usually paint a pessimistic picture of the balance of forces, arguing that the aggressive and reactionary elements have predominant if not always overwhelming power. The advocate of increased collaboration, however, tends to emphasize the capacity of Western political systems to make realistic adaptations of

policy. They also attribute to liberal and progressive public opinion an ability to influence policy in favour of restraint and cooperation vis-à-vis the socialist countries. This tendency in Soviet thinking and action also reflects a keen understanding of the consequences of a war fought with modern weapons, and of the economic burden of defense spending in the USSR (a point that neo-Stalinist commentaries are loath to make). Accordingly, the foreign policy prescription in collaborative argument has been one of adopting a diplomatic, propaganda, and defense posture that strengthens the influence of liberal, reformist, and anti-war elements in Western ruling classes. Moreover, this trend is based on the view that increased cooperation with the United States is of primary importance to the USSR. Accordingly an effort is to be made to avoid exacerbating bilateral Soviet-American relations as a result of offensive action on other issues where American interests are engaged. The element of tactical advantage is recognized in the disorienting effects of East-West agreements on Western political and military preparedness, and in the sharpening of intra-NATO differences that may result from cooperation among adversaries. But basically the collaborative trend seems to arise not so much from a desire to gain unilateral political advantage, as from an interest in the impact of a more stable East-West relationship on Soviet internal affairs.<sup>9</sup>

The advocacy of a foreign policy emphasizing collaboration

is accompanied by an interest in internal liberalization that seeks to move the Soviet Union beyond the limited adjustments of neo-Stalinism. It is here that we find demands for greater democracy in inner-party life, a more active political role for the Soviets as organs of popular representation, and for the transfer of greater responsibilities to the Union Republics. A reduction in the influence of bureaucracy in Soviet life is sought through enlarged and more genuine mass participation in governmental affairs at all levels. Greater freedom of political and cultural expression is also advocated, as evinced for example in discussions of the need to broaden the scope of legitimate political conflict or "non-antagonistic contradictions of socialism." These relatively liberal policy preferences arise from a value system that stresses the need for a more rapid transition to the freedoms of Communism. They also reflect an awareness that the Soviet economy cannot function properly if the population continues to be excluded from participation in central policy formation. In economic planning and management, further decentralization and a qualified reliance on market forces are considered appropriate, as is a greater effort to respond to popular pressure for increased living standards. On this latter point there is a clear preference for a restructuring of the USSR budget in favour of greater spending on consumer goods, public services, and agriculture. Also it seems to be recognized that without foreign assistance the Soviet economy

is itself unable to provide the necessary flow of consumer goods, or to generate and apply the high technology required for advanced economic development. The bearers of the tendency toward liberalization in internal affairs note that the capacity of the USSR to undertake significant forward economic and political movement toward Communism is dependent upon the level of international tension: the higher it is, the more social development is frozen in the Soviet Union. As might be expected, it is from this region in the spectrum of Soviet political opinion that some of the sharpest criticism of Stalin originates.

A foreign policy orientation emphasizing the desirability of collaboration with the United States and other Western powers meshes readily with preferences for domestic reform. The greater the influence of liberal and less belligerent trends in the policy of capitalist states, the more readily the work of reform may be carried on in the Soviet Union. And to the extent that reform trends are influential in Soviet policy, Moscow is able to take action that supports counterpart tendencies in Western policy formation. This orientation to foreign and domestic policy surfaced initially at the Twenty-first Party Congress in 1959, and since then its influence has on the whole increased in proportion to the decline of sectarian responses. Moreover, by the early 'seventies a more thoroughgoing and properly reformist

tendency was taking shape in inner-party discussions. This fourth tendency, which indicates little or no interest in the unilateral tactical advantages of collaboration and a sharper desire for rapid social transformations in the USSR, has yet to influence policy directly. As a school of thought, it is not far removed from the illicit views of Academicians Sakharov and Varga.<sup>10</sup>

Should the reform trend acquire more marked influence over Soviet policy, the reformist movement could also be expected to increase in strength. Together they could move the Soviet Union into a phase of democratic isolationism quite distinct from sectarian self-isolation. Arbatov has argued that a policy seeking to stabilize the international environment so as to permit more rapid internal development does not constitute isolationism.<sup>11</sup> Certainly he and other exponents of the reform trend do not suggest the Soviet Union should turn its back on world affairs. But they appear to be more interested in internal development than in the expansion of Soviet power abroad. They also seem to believe that more can be done to promote evolutionary change of the capitalist system by a policy of agreements that will loosen the restraints on social progress in the West and allow the Soviet Union a better opportunity to influence the course of historical development by force of "socialist example." In the meanwhile, Moscow would be taking practical action to reduce

the danger of nuclear war and further the political and economic renovation of the Soviet system. Again, the emphasis is on a reorientation of goals and energies to favour internal reform rather than foreign expansion.

To the extent that the reform trend appreciates in future Soviet policy, Moscow can be expected to seek an overall settlement of issues in dispute with the West. Movement in this direction would be based on increasing cooperation with the United States, aimed not at the preservation of the status quo in the form of spheres of influence, but at the construction of regions of security and cooperation in which East-West tensions would gradually be dissipated. In the European context,<sup>12</sup> this would entail a substantial increase in collaboration and interdependence between states with different social systems. Although such a process would offer many opportunities for action to further the disintegration of the Western alliance, it would not be pursued in this manner so long as the West refrained from exploiting the inevitable dislocation among the WTO powers. Thus, where the neo-Stalinist trend would favour proposals for the dissolution of military alliances as a means of exploiting NATO vulnerabilities, the reform trend would be reflected in an acceptance of NATO and WTO for the time being. Against a background of continuing Soviet-American nuclear parity, talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central

Europe (MBFR) would produce certain results, and the political and military functions of WTO would be appropriately deemphasized in an era of developing European cooperation. The EEC would be accepted as a separate entity having direct ties to the United States, insofar as it was not pursuing military objectives in Eastern Europe and also permitted an improvement of relations with Moscow. As for Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union would seek to disengage, permitting controlled reform consonant with the degree of relaxation achieved within the USSR. In the Far East, continuing attempts would be made to reach economic and political agreements with Japan, and to deter and isolate China. Since the reform trend bears the brunt of Chinese ideological criticism, and since stability is valued more highly than the expansion of Soviet power globally, an attempt to induce Washington into joint measures in Asia would be indicated, with limited concessions in Europe possibly being offered in return for American cooperation in the establishment of an Asian security system. Thus, as distinct from the future envisaged by the neo-Stalinist trend, the international situation would become increasingly stable, the United States would retain substantial influence in Europe and Asia, NATO and the WTO would persist, the EEC could remain linked primarily to the United States, reform trends in Eastern Europe would be permitted to a degree that did not threaten the overall process of détente, China would be isolated, and



East-West relations would be overlaid with an increasingly dense web of political, economic and military agreements. The result would be a situation more favourable to Soviet internal development and, it should be emphasized, to evolutionary transformations in the capitalist system as well. No illusions would be entertained about the rapidity or ease of these processes. Nevertheless, Moscow would tend to avoid moves prompting Western hostility as it pursued a long-term strategy of strengthening the more moderate trends in the policy of its Western adversaries.

From a reform standpoint, the CSCE might conceivably be regarded as the symbolic equivalent of a Versailles. It would legitimize the status quo in Europe, open the way to the end of the postwar period, and therefore mark the onset of a new era in East-West relations. The participating states would be urged to undertake a series of obligations guaranteeing the present situation in Europe against the use of force. Within this framework of juridical limitations on state behaviour, an accelerated movement toward political, economic, and eventually military cooperation could occur. The USSR would acquire an enhanced sense of security in a region of traditional vulnerability, and the rationale for sectarian viewpoints in Soviet society would be further undermined. The West would experience a heightened sense of security vis-à-vis Soviet Communism, and the negotiation of

specific measures of economic and technological cooperation would be facilitated. In practical terms, the CSCE would be viewed primarily as a test of the Soviet-American cooperation that is vital to the success of reform objectives. Consequently, Moscow would avoid playing to America's allies, the EEC, or to the neutrals, and would endeavour to base its public negotiating actions on prior consultation with Washington. Soviet representatives would behave in business-like fashion, refraining from propaganda and patently unacceptable proposals. Moscow would also display a readiness to make concessions on the practical measures of cooperation that would principally occupy the CSCE and subsequent Soviet diplomacy. Though Moscow would be confronted with opportunities for tactical and unilateral gain, it would exercise substantial restraint and view the solution of immediate tasks in the long-term perspective of developing stable and cooperative relations between states with different social systems.

Given the foregoing interpretation of Soviet policy in terms of three countervailing tendencies, we may briefly consider recent Soviet behaviour on the question of a CSCE to see whether a tendency analysis is of use in accounting for certain shifts of emphasis that have occurred. Three phases may be identified: 1966-1969, 1969-1972, and 1972 to the present. During the first phase, from the resurrection

of the Conference proposal at the Budapest meeting of the WTO in 1966 to the latter part of 1969, Moscow was clearly guided by the neo-Stalinist orientation, with strong support from the sectarian trend where the invasion of Czechoslovakia was concerned. In this period the call for a Conference was accompanied by divisive and propagandistic demands for the rapid dissolution of NATO and WTO; and the United States and Canada were not included among the participants in the proposed gathering.<sup>13</sup> Simultaneously, as Moscow held relations with Washington in a state of suspended animation during the escalation of the Vietnam war, efforts were made to cultivate the lesser Western powers, especially France. Internally, the reform trend suffered a setback after appreciating considerably during Khrushchev's last years, and sectarian influence increased to a point that permitted considering the rehabilitation of Stalin just prior to the Twenty-third CPSU Congress in 1966.

By the end of 1969 the situation had altered significantly. The end of the Cultural Revolution in China and the resumption of diplomatic activity by Peking in the spring of that year had raised the possibility of a Chinese-American rapprochement directed against the USSR.<sup>14</sup> Simultaneously the continuing Sino-Soviet border clashes had reached a new level of intensity in March. To the West of Moscow, Soviet control had unquestionably been reestablished in Eastern

Europe, the Brandt Government had come into office with a new variant of the Ostpolitik promising substantial concessions, economic stresses were growing within the Western alliance, and the United States showed an increasing tendency to reduce its military presence in Western Europe. For its part, Moscow had finally agreed to begin the strategic arms limitation (SALT) talks with the United States. Internally a renewed effort was being made to reallocate scarce economic resources in a manner inconsistent with the interests of the heavy industrial and defense establishments, while the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum also acknowledged the existence of serious economic difficulties, particularly in the sphere of productivity. In this setting WTO appeals on European security laid increasing stress on the utility of East-West economic and scientific-technological cooperation, and the United States was explicitly invited to take part in the proposed Conference.<sup>15</sup>

A neo-Stalinist preference for divisive conciliation could be discerned in these outward changes in the Soviet approach to a CSCE. And yet Moscow now began to make substantive as well as purely atmospheric concessions in the period that followed to the Brezhnev-Nixon summit of May 1972. In the Moscow treaty of August 1970 with West Germany the Soviets moved toward an acceptance of the status quo in Europe and divested themselves of the right under the United

Nations Charter to intervene in West German affairs. Similarly, in the Four-Power Berlin agreement of September 1971 and in pressing East Germany into bilateral negotiations with Bonn and West Berlin, Moscow accepted the permanent existence of West Berlin and circumscribed its ability to utilize the German and Berlin questions for offensive political purposes. Parallel to these innovations, the Soviet Union continued to pursue a programme of increasingly ambitious economic cooperation with West Germany, France, and Italy. Internally, the Twenty-fourth Congress in the spring of 1971 marked a reorientation of economic policy to give greater emphasis to higher living standards and intensified technological development in the USSR. In sum, the neo-Stalinist trend had declined appreciably by the time of the May 1972 Summit and the series of Soviet-American arms control, economic, and technical agreements that were reached at that time. Though it would be incorrect to say that the reform trend acquired predominance in Soviet European policy between 1969 and 1972, the new rapprochement with Washington was accompanied by an agreement to move ahead with the CSCE, and European security was also discussed during Henry Kissinger's Moscow visit of September 1972. As of November, Brezhnev could state that "considerable changes for the better" had occurred in Soviet-American relations.<sup>16</sup> The overall trend of events suggests that reform may have approached a position of parity with neo-Stalinism in the determination

of Soviet behaviour by mid-1972.

Situational variables affecting the balance of trends in current Soviet policy will be considered more closely at a later point in this study. Here we may note that Soviet conduct in the 34-power CSCE preparatory talks since November 1972 has conformed to the reform trend quite clearly. In the first place, the Soviets have been making concessions. On the question of the nature of the proposed Conference, Soviet policy-makers have yielded to Western demands for thorough preparation. Initially they seem to have envisaged a very brief preparatory session that would produce a general statement of agenda items, leaving several months in which detailed negotiating positions could be developed for presentation at the CSCE in the summer of 1973. Thus when the NATO countries indicated they were ready to present extensive agenda proposals the Soviets were quite unprepared. Nevertheless they accepted in principle the necessity to elaborate detailed assignments for a CSCE that is to proceed in three stages -- an opening session at the Ministerial level, a series of committees that would then negotiate specific measures of security and cooperation, and a concluding session possibly attended by Heads of State. In the discussion of committee assignments, moreover, the Soviet Union has given qualified acceptance to Western proposals for negotiations on the exchange of persons and ideas, and for

the consideration of confidence-building military measures. Needless to say, a willingness to consider a greater influx of Western ideas as was announced by Brezhnev on December 21, 1972, is anathema to Soviet sectarians and only slightly less incompatible with the neo-Stalinist trend.

Throughout the Helsinki preliminaries Soviet representatives have conveyed the impression that the CSCE has very high priority in current Soviet policy, that a Conference must definitely be held this summer, and that further compromises may well be in store. At the same time Moscow has made no apparent effort to divide the Western powers, no doubt in part because NATO has thus far displayed remarkable unity. Moreover, Soviet insensitivity to the proposals of neutral countries has had the effect of driving them into the arms of NATO on many issues. In all of this, the Soviet Union has spoken frequently and vigorously, while Eastern Europe has said relatively little following an initial burst of Rumanian activity. Conversely, the United States has been most taciturn, whereas the French have been highly active on behalf of the NATO powers. Indeed, the Soviets appear to be irritated with the United States for not playing a more decisive role in bringing the preparatory talks to a speedy conclusion. Whether or not there is a basic understanding on the CSCE between Moscow and Washington cannot of course be said. Soviet frustration suggests there may be, as does

the fact that Moscow is informing the Americans of what it intends to say in advance. It should also be noted that Soviet press commentary tends to go out on a limb in predicting success for the CSCE, as though they had some assurance in the regard.<sup>17</sup> On the face of it, neo-Stalinist and activist trends appear to be suffering an eclipse as Moscow strives to bring off a CSCE more consistent with reform approaches to foreign and domestic affairs.

To summarize the argument thus far, the responses of the Soviet system to issues of European security and cooperation are internally inconsistent. They are the reflection of massive underlying trends that are only partially subject to leadership control. Although the influence of the reform tendency has increased considerably since 1966, the propensity to seek neo-Stalinist solutions remains very much in force. The future relationship between these two trends will depend substantially upon Western and particularly American actions. A good deal may therefore hinge on a proper anticipation of Soviet conduct at the CSCE. Western governments are doubtless prepared to deal with the behaviour patterns here called neo-Stalinist. But if it is assumed for the moment that situational variables will serve to tilt the Soviet system still further in the direction of reform responses, how might Moscow be expected to behave? Can anything more be said about the perceptions and procedures



that would inform Soviet actions at the Conference itself? Answers to these questions take us back to the Genoa Economic Conference of 1922.

## II. The Genoa Precedent

An excursion into Soviet diplomatic history might well seem inappropriate in a study of Moscow's intentions toward the CSCE. However, it was at the time of the Genoa Conference that the reform trend in Soviet policy first took shape. Subsequently, at moments when the reform trend acquired greater influence, the frequency of references to the Genoa policy increased in internal Soviet communications. This was particularly the case in the Khrushchev period, when new documentation on Soviet strategy and tactics at Genoa was released during the Soviet-American détentes of 1959-1960 and 1963-1964. What with the reassertion of conservative tendencies after Khrushchev's removal, allusions to Genoa became less frequent and more elliptical. Nevertheless they continued to be made by officials and lesser figures.<sup>18</sup> For example, in a typically indirect reference to what went on in 1922, the readers of the main CPSU theoretical journal were told last September that the makers of Soviet foreign policy were seeking "attentively to follow the development, first analyzed by V.I. Lenin, of the contradiction between the 'war party' and the 'party of peace' in the capitalist countries."<sup>19</sup>

That this remark had more significance than met the eye is indicated by reports that its author, V. Zagladin, is currently one of Brezhnev's personal foreign policy advisors.

In fact, the word "Genoa" and certain key phrases from the Genoa period are like microdots. They can be enlarged to reveal a substantial amount of information on reform preferences for current Soviet policy. It is also the case that intra-Party opposition to the reform trend in Soviet behaviour today is broadly similar to that which arose in 1922. Thus we are informed that, "When you familiarize yourself with the discussions in Soviet Russia that were connected with the preparations for Genoa, it seems that you are dealing with events of the present day...."<sup>20</sup> An inquiry into Soviet policy at Genoa should therefore tell us something about the practical intentions of those who favour the reform trend in responding to questions of security and cooperation in Europe. In addition it should begin to provide us with information on current alignments in the intra-Party debate over policy toward the CSCE.

We may begin by noting that the failure of socialist regimes to appear in the leading capitalist countries after the October revolution confronted the Bolsheviks with unexpected foreign policy problems. Among them were the termination and prevention of Western military interventions, the securing of trade and economic assistance from these same

Western powers as the Intervention waned in 1920-1921, and the further stabilization of the régime's position through diplomatic recognition. Since the working classes in the West had not gained state power they were by definition unable alone to assure the adoption of those policies of military restraint and economic collaboration which the Bolsheviks desired. As a result, the makers of Soviet foreign policy were compelled to scrutinize the various capitalist countries closely in order to identify other foreign policy actors whose behaviour might prove sympathetic to Soviet interests, and whose influence might be enhanced by Soviet diplomacy. The upshot was a comparatively discriminating view of the foreign policy process of the capitalist states, and a strenuous endeavour to penetrate these polities in order to promote foreign policy outcomes favourable to Soviet Russia.

By 1921, these efforts seemed to have paid off, as Moscow achieved a degree of equilibrium in its relations with the West, and introduced the New Economic Policy at home. In this setting the Soviet leadership became increasingly concerned with the task of obtaining trade, credits, technology, and foreign investment to restore Russia's war-ravaged economy and to promote industrial growth. Early in 1922, Moscow was invited by the principal Western powers to take part in a Conference at Genoa that was to speed up the

postwar recovery of Europe, in part by reintroducing Russia into the world economy. This gathering, which occurred in April 1922, was the first occasion on which the Soviets participated in high-level multilateral negotiations with the leading capitalist states. It therefore required an overall assessment of Western policy, and a generalized approach to the problem of prolonging the "breathing-space" and encouraging economic cooperation. The Soviets resolved to go to Genoa "as merchants," and prepared very carefully. Their perceptions of Western behaviour, the strategy and tactics they adopted, and the internal debate that arose all deserve brief consideration.<sup>21</sup>

In their previous bilateral dealings with capitalist countries Soviet policy-makers had paid close attention to conflicting tendencies and groups on the issue of relations with Russia. Distinguishing between "adventurist" and "reactionary militarist" elements on the one hand, and "far-sighted," "reasonable" representatives of "moderate liberal currents" on the other, Moscow had sought to "calm" the Western ruling classes by manipulating elite attitudes and public opinion so as to deprive the militants of an opportunity to exploit the Soviet threat. And as a pacifist reaction to the War set in, the Soviets also resorted increasingly to the tactic of the peace offensive as a way of increasing popular sympathy for Russia and undermining the

case for military moves against the Bolshevik regime. Public opinion and mass pressure proved insufficient however, and Moscow had become accustomed to making the compromises necessary to influence elite-level differences. Since economic relations served to stabilize Soviet Russia internationally as well as internally, particular emphasis had been laid on appeals to the cupidity of the Western ruling class: gold flowed, lucrative concessions were held out, and promises of extensive trade were made. These measures and the growing emphasis on the peace issue in Soviet diplomacy were based on detailed familiarity with the opponent, and were aimed to strike at specific groups and trends so as to alter the politics of policy formation to Soviet advantage.

Looking to the West prior to Genoa, Lenin expressed concern over the activities of unspecified political parties in Western Europe, which he said were favouring a new military intervention and threatened to come to power in impending elections. He also identified three main tendencies in the foreign policy of the countries that had been invited to Genoa. The first, which reflected an underlying intention to intervene militarily, consisted of an effort to prevent the Conference from occurring in the first place. The second, connected with a desire for expanded trade, favoured convening the Conference, and for the moment had gained the upper hand. Finally, in all the Western countries a pacifist

tendency, associated with liberal elements of the ruling class and with social democratic political parties, was also singled out. Given this summary assessment of foreign policy trends in the West, Lenin went on to say,

Of course when we go to Genoa as merchants, it is not a matter of indifference to us whether we have to deal with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who are pressing for a military solution to the problem, or with those representatives of the bourgeois camp who are attracted to pacifism of the feeblest kind and which from the Communist point of view will not stand up to the slightest criticism. It would still be a poor merchant who could not master this difference, and, adapting his tactics to this end, achieve his practical objectives.<sup>22</sup>

In effect, Soviet diplomacy was now to be aimed at strengthening the influence of liberal and reformist elements in Western societies. Through the use of pacifist appeals Moscow would increase the leverage of the "party of peace" at the expense of the "war party," thereby allowing the advocates of increased economic cooperation to prevail in current policy-making and in forthcoming electoral contests as well.

Thus, in drafting a Politburo resolution on Soviet policy for the Genoa meeting, Lenin placed special emphasis on the existence of the "pacifist section" of the bourgeois class. It was seen to consist of the advocates of "petty-bourgeois, pacifist, and semi-pacifist democracy," and was represented by J.M. Keynes and the English socialist Arthur Henderson. One of the main political tasks at Genoa, Lenin wrote, was to detach this pacifist wing from the rest of the bourgeoisie,

to "flatter" it, and to make it understand that Moscow sought not only trade but also political agreements with it.<sup>23</sup> In addition, everything possible "and even the impossible" was to be done to increase the power of this grouping, and to improve its future electoral showing. This was a recipe for a more effective intervention by progressive elements of the middle or intermediate strata into Western politics and policy-making. In later years, when Ramsay MacDonald led the first Labour Government in Britain and Aristide Briand governed France, these would be referred to as "governments of the intermediate type," in which "intermediate political groups" had gained state power.<sup>24</sup> As early as 1922, however, Lenin had attributed to European capitalism a capacity for substantial progressive social transformation short of socialist revolution, and was willing to commit Soviet foreign policy to this end, while pursuing immediate economic objectives through a policy of reduced tension and agreements. Moreover, at the Genoa Conference itself, Lenin hoped not merely for an accelerated development of economic cooperation, but also for "a general treaty that settled the main, if not all, the disputes and claims of both sides."<sup>25</sup> It was also Lenin's intention to divert resources away from the defense sector of the Soviet economy, should Genoa prove successful.<sup>26</sup>

In terms of foreign policy strategy, Genoa represented a commitment to an extended period of cooperative coexistence

with the West. By emphasizing the peace issue as well as economic collaboration, Moscow would do what it could to encourage the internal reform rather than the rapid revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system, thereby creating a situation in which the socialist reform of Russia could most readily occur. The militant, anti-Soviet tendencies of Western policy would be blunted, and trends favouring agreements between states with different social systems would be encouraged. The formation of a united front of the capitalist powers against Russia would be inhibited; and if "pacifist" trends gained influence, the occurrence of war between capitalist states, into which Russia might be drawn, would also be rendered less likely.<sup>27</sup> Moscow thus sought a generation of peace, or, as it was later put, a generation of crisis-free international relations, during which Soviet energies could be concentrated on internal economic tasks. This orientation to foreign and domestic policy represents both the antecedent of and a justification for the reform trend in contemporary Soviet affairs.

The tactics that flowed from this strategic assessment required Moscow to concentrate on courting the bourgeois "pacifists" and liberals rather than the economic interests. However, in order to draw the reformist wing closer to the Soviet view of things, it was necessary for Moscow itself to approximate reformist and liberal behaviour. Accordingly,



the Soviet delegation to Genoa was instructed to present "a very broad pacifist programme," that would have maximum favourable impact on European opinion. In a remarkable memorandum to Lenin, G.V. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, outlined such a programme. It constituted a substantial departure from anything Moscow had previously proposed, and called for negotiated disarmament and arms regulations, a parity arbitration commission to resolve disputes between the Soviet and capitalist governments, the internationalization of transportation routes and the construction of a London-Peking railway that would open the riches of Siberia "for general use," the systematic distribution of fuel resources and hydroelectric energy, equal participation by African and other colonial peoples in international conferences, and so on.<sup>28</sup> These measures Chicherin regarded as being "theoretically possible under the bourgeois order." But he anticipated that they would in fact run aground on the reef of national differences and the rapacity of "capitalist oligarchies." Lenin in turn endorsed this "pacifist programme," and instructed that it be presented together with the "merchant's proposals" that were also being readied. Such proposals were "both good and inadmissible" for the Western ruling class, he said, "both nasty and 'nice'," and they would help to split and humiliate the bourgeoisie.<sup>29</sup>

At other points in the decision-making process, Lenin

insisted that the Soviet delegation at Genoa refrain from presenting "frightening" Communist viewpoints, and he opposed Chicherin's selection of "terrible words" such as "inevitable violent revolution," "bloody struggle," or "the inevitability of new world wars."<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, all the Soviet delegates were to have an excellent working knowledge of Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace and "similar bourgeois-pacifist books and parts of books."<sup>31</sup> Not only were the Soviets to become publicly committed to a "pacifist" position on current world problems, and to avoid raising the Communist menace, but they were also to learn to speak the language of the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie in order the better to flatter and draw it into a posture of accommodation toward Soviet Russia.

By playing back to the reformist public in the West a variant of its own views, the Soviet regime would cast itself in a more favourable light, and provide support for those who were calling for policies of unilateral restraint and collaboration vis-à-vis Russia. Conversely, the image of a Soviet regime striving for peace and commercial relations would serve to subvert the notion of a Soviet threat, the policy arguments based upon this conception, and ultimately the political power of those who advocated uncompromising hostility toward Moscow. In the face of a Russia that was committed to relatively attractive solutions to European

problems, conservatives in the West would be confronted with the choice of modifying their public positions or exposing themselves as the unreasoning advocates of antagonism. At a minimum, the combined effect of these processes would be to further the achievement of immediate Soviet objectives, and to reduce the capacity of the European powers to wage war against Russia and one another as well. In sum, Moscow's tactics at Genoa consisted of an attempt to increase European security as a means of creating political and economic pre-conditions for a more rapid internal evolution of Soviet Russia.

And yet Moscow was also preparing to exploit another and more conventional set of differences in the West. In order to obtain military-technical and economic assistance, and to prevent a united Western front, military and commercial discussions with isolated Germany had been undertaken in 1921. The German Government refrained from accepting a treaty establishing diplomatic and economic relations prior to Genoa, persisting in the hope that its reparations could be renegotiated with the other Western powers. For the Soviets, too, the question of timing must also have been of significance. If a Soviet-German treaty were suddenly announced, it could well have impeded the broader economic objectives that Moscow hoped to achieve at Genoa. Though primary evidence is lacking on this point, disagreements

apparently arose within the Soviet leadership over who to contact and "in what order."<sup>32</sup> Conceivably these disagreements reflected an awareness not merely of the tactical options involved, but also of the strategic choice that was being made: between playing the traditional game of balance of power politics, and conducting a New Diplomacy aimed at creating a balance of forces within Western societies that would consolidate European peace over a lengthy time period.

In any event, Genoa produced little in the way of material benefits for Moscow, and the Soviets came away with the Rapallo treaty with Germany. Soon thereafter Lenin was disabled with the first of a series of strokes, and the historic maneuvering for the succession to his leadership began in earnest. The policy line laid down at Genoa continued to inform Soviet conduct, as, for example, in the "pacifist" proposals for total disarmament and arms limitation that were made in 1927. But without Lenin's support, the vulnerability of the Genoa policy to doctrinaire criticism increased very considerably. Thus Stalin eventually found it expedient to criticize Kamenev for "valuing the good opinion of the reactionary, liberal, pacifist circles more than the good opinion of the vast proletarian masses in the West."<sup>33</sup> Stalin's position was that "all the liberal pacifist philosophers with their 'sympathy' for the USSR can go to the devil."

Even in 1922, however, there was opposition to the Genoa

policy, as questions of principle were sharply debated within the Politburo and the delegation appointed to represent Moscow at the Conference. The debate is said to have revolved around "the old sacramental questions: the character and limits of concessions and compromises with the bourgeoisie, the connection of these concessions with the task of supporting world revolution...."<sup>34</sup> According to the fragmentary account that has recently been made available, some policy-makers insisted on the need to "put propaganda factors exclusively at the centre of Soviet tactics at Genoa," and did not attach great importance to economic objectives. This viewpoint was stated most clearly by A.A. Ioffe, who repeatedly drew attention to similarities between the situation in 1922 and the problems confronting the regime at Brest-Litovsk in 1918. In the light of the 1918 debate and subsequent Soviet controversy, Ioffe's was a sectarian response that called for anti-imperialist propaganda and an effort to stimulate the mass revolutionary movements that offered the only guarantee of security and economic assistance from the developed countries. Instead of raising false hopes of lasting peace that served to dissipate the revolutionary energy of the proletariat, Soviet diplomacy should evidently have been seeking to explode all pacifist illusions and sharpen the inner contradictions of the capitalist system.

Chicherin on the other hand apparently failed to see how

it was possible to "combine the course to world revolution with compromise agreements with the bourgeoisie." In view of his well-known frustration at the activities of the Comintern and his defense of the Genoa line in internal debate in later years, Chicherin probably favoured agreements as opposed to revolutionary propaganda at the forthcoming Conference. Similarly, M.M. Litvinov and L.B. Krasin emphasized the need to pursue important economic tasks at Genoa, to approach the negotiations in a business-like manner, and to avoid "any action that would complicate the Conference." From this quarter, then, Soviet Russia was being urged to get on with the business at hand, which concerned primarily the economic interests of the Soviet state.

Lenin is said to have occupied the centre ground in this controversy.<sup>35</sup> His draft resolution on Soviet tasks at Genoa, which called for an intensive effort to increase the influence of the pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie, is reported to have shown how revolutionary goals could be combined with the negotiation of agreements with Western governments. He apparently argued that the tactic of presenting a "pacifist programme" would simultaneously advance Soviet interests and weaken the imperialist bourgeoisie by helping to construct an "alliance" between Soviet Russia and the working masses on the one hand, and the liberal, pacifist, and radical elements of the bourgeoisie together with broad strata in the colonial

world. The endeavour to increase the influence of the reformist wing of the bourgeoisie could therefore be portrayed as "a form of class struggle, a tactic in the struggle with the imperialist bourgeoisie." Relying heavily on the Central Committee, Lenin eventually succeeded in overcoming sectarian opposition within the Politburo, and secured support for a policy designed to improve the position of liberals and reformists within capitalist societies.

I suspect that Lenin actually stood to the right of centre in this debate. After all, the Soviets were going to Genoa "as merchants." References to the tactics of class struggle and the like would seem to have been intended in part to blunt sectarian opposition, and to justify and gain support for a reform policy that favoured the realization of immediate Soviet objectives. Alternatively, it could be that Lenin and some of his associates were unconsciously rationalizing their own behaviour by depicting a policy of increased collaboration with capitalist states as a form of revolutionary struggle. Either way, the goal of world revolution remained valid, but it was seen in terms of an increasingly lengthy historical process. In the meanwhile Moscow would adapt itself to the realities of the existing situation by promoting Soviet economic development and encouraging feasible evolutionary transformations of the capitalist system.

Three tendencies may therefore be identified in the

Soviet approach to the Genoa Economic Conference. A trend to sectarian isolation, which called for a propaganda assault on the Western governments and envisaged the failure of negotiations, was rebuffed. An activist trend, which called for the exploitation of interimperialist contradictions by means of a rapprochement with Germany, and which was not very costly in terms of ideological and political compromises, existed in the form of a fallback position. A collaborative tendency, which required comparatively large concessions, and which was accompanied by revolutionary phraseology in the inner-Party debate, was uppermost for the moment. Its reformist implications for the overall strategy of Soviet foreign policy were not however emphasized, and it was presented essentially as a tactical matter, possibly to overcome internal resistance. Moreover, the preparations for Genoa were kept secret, and no authoritative formulation of the new policy line was communicated to the Party at large. This kept the West in the dark as to Soviet intentions. But it also meant that the Genoa decisions were not given the benefit of doctrinal sanction and support. Consequently, the persistence with which Moscow pursued a reform policy depended heavily upon developments in Soviet leadership politics and the responsiveness of Western societies. Lenin's illness, the lengthy leadership struggle that then began, and the failure of Western governments to reinforce the reform policy served on the whole to strengthen the influence of



less experimental and more conservative tendencies in subsequent Soviet behaviour.

The Genoa policy was thus to a degree an ambiguous one which could lend itself to diverging interpretations in later years. A number of points are however certain. No one at the decision-making level conceived of multilateral European negotiations as a matter of statesmen and diplomats thrashing out the issues over a bargaining table or in intergovernmental consultation. Lower-echelon officials may have regarded the obtaining of Western credits and technology, for example, as technical objectives that could be dealt with directly through a process of discussion among official representatives. But where policy-makers were concerned, negotiation was seen in terms of penetrating capitalist societies and manipulating the social forces there to produce Western policies more consistent with Soviet interests. For those who favoured the predominant reform variation of policy toward the West, penetration was to be accomplished by exercising propaganda restraint and by attuning Soviet diplomatic behaviour to the task of strengthening reformist tendencies in the policy of capitalist countries generally, to a point where electoral processes would produce governments more favourably disposed toward Moscow. These tendencies were to be manipulated by veiling the image of Russia as a threatening Communist power, and by making attractive and

comprehensive proposals for peace and cooperation that stopped short of what Western governments as then constituted could accept. Creating an atmosphere that favoured agreements within Western countries and internationally, Moscow would pursue its practical goals which were primarily economic in nature. The Western observer might well have recoiled at Soviet intentions to flatter, split, and humiliate different sections of the predominant classes. Certainly Lenin did not share any sense of common identity with the liberals, socialists, and pacifists whose influence he sought to increase in the long as well as short term. But his readiness to push revolutionary and offensive political considerations to the background and to encourage reformism in the capitalist world did offer a practical basis for stable political-military relations and increased economic cooperation between states with different social systems. For Moscow could strengthen reformism and seek agreements with the West only by adopting increasingly reformist policies itself.

On the other hand, the inconclusiveness of the Genoa experiment, Lenin's manipulative and still fundamentally hostile attitude toward capitalist society, and the explicit emphasis on the tactical element, all allow Genoa to be interpreted as a transitory and expedient phase in Soviet diplomatic behaviour. In my estimation this would be a misreading of the decisions that were made in 1922. Nevertheless, it

can be argued that Genoa in no way foreclosed the option of reverting to the political offensive at a later date when Soviet Russia had acquired greater strength with Western assistance, or when new revolutionary situations emerged in Western Europe. Soviet offensive political interests in the Rapallo Treaty could also be emphasized more strongly than has been done here, as could the fact that the Soviets knew they were making unworkable proposals when they presented their "pacifist programme" to the West. The Genoa policy could thus be interpreted as being merely a set of measures designed to disorient Moscow's opponents and to throw them off balance through the use of détente tactics and demobilizing agreements. Viewed in such a light, the Genoa experience would be fully in accordance with the neo-Stalinist trend in recent Soviet behaviour.

But this would be to slight the incipient strategic dimension of Soviet policy in 1922, which committed Moscow to strive for a lengthy period of stable international relations and intensified economic cooperation with as many of its adversaries as possible. And while the Western observer might conclude that Moscow was still animated by a high degree of antagonism and did not intend to yield anything of substance at Genoa, from a militant Communist viewpoint the political strategy and tactics of 1922 marked a surrender of the socialist perspective that verged on appeasement. Of

course there was nothing to guarantee that Moscow would not eventually resume a more vigorous anti-imperialist foreign policy. The more important point, however, is that Moscow was setting itself up for a degree of cooperation that, if realized, would have made it difficult and costly to revert to offensive tactics. Thus, while the Genoa experience lends itself to diverging interpretations, and has moreover been utilized by the exponents of neo-Stalinist policies in recent times, a proper reading of the decisions of 1922 requires the recognition that a trend favouring long-term stability and agreements for purposes of internal reform was uppermost in Soviet behaviour.

### III. Genoa Plus 51

The translation from 1922 to 1973 is not readily made. The Genoa policy was elaborated by a weak and backward state. The enormous increase in Soviet military and economic power raises the question of whether Genoa can still be seen as relevant to current Soviet diplomatic practice. Secondly, the contemporary Soviet state is sufficiently bureaucratized and Soviet ideology is apparently so routinized and formalistic, as to pose the question of whether there is any continued operational significance to a concept of negotiation that relies on an acute sensitivity to and manipulation of social forces within opposing social systems. Furthermore, assuming

that the Genoa precedent is not simply regarded as a device or symbol to legitimize a policy of propaganda restraint and agreements with capitalist states, the practices developed by 1922 might still be viewed as tactical and subordinate to an offensive political strategy, rather than as a strategy and tactics of stabilization and agreements with the Western powers. Many other distinctions might be made between Soviet policy and the global environment now and half a century ago. But a consideration of the questions already raised should allow a decision as to whether the Genoa experience is of relevance to an understanding of Soviet policy toward the CSCE in 1973.

Despite the vast accretion of Soviet military and economic capabilities, the USSR shares with other great powers the qualitatively new insecurity and opportunity costs of foreign relations in the thermonuclear era. It still suffers from relative economic backwardness, now compounded by the deformations of the Stalin era. In principle, the strategic objectives and techniques worked out by the time of Genoa may be said to represent valid responses for the Soviet system as it deals with its external and internal environments. In practice, as we have seen, leading officials have asserted that Genoa is in fact relevant to contemporary Soviet policies. Furthermore, the increase in Soviet military power offers an increased opportunity to penetrate Western societies

and secure the attention of policy-makers and publics alike to an extent that was impossible in 1922. But can it be shown that the Genoa precedent does have operational significance?

Certainly it is used for legitimizing purposes. Khrushchev's endeavour to reduce Soviet conventional forces in 1959-1960, for instance, was justified by citing Lenin's intention to cut the Red Army in the event Genoa produced positive results.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, the emphasis in Soviet policy on questions of disarmament and more practical measures of arms control could be justified by asserting that, "Surely it is evident that the act of bringing forward...a plan for general and complete disarmament was a direct continuation of the cause initiated by Lenin in 1922?"<sup>37</sup> References to Genoa by Brezhnev's foreign policy advisor, the Foreign Minister, and many others presumably have an equivalent function in legitimizing Soviet unilateral restraint and moves toward agreement with the Western powers.

It can also be suggested that current Soviet policies are informed by perceptions of Western behaviour similar to those that prevailed at the time of Genoa. A.N. Yakovlev, Deputy Chief of the Propaganda Department in the Central Committee Secretariat, has cited Lenin prior to Genoa in stating that the CPSU in evaluating its foreign policy tasks "carefully analyzes the processes occurring in the camp of

imperialism, the contradictions and tendencies that influence the relations between capitalist countries and within the ruling class."<sup>38</sup> In addition we are informed that, "In party and state organs concerned with Soviet foreign policy the most fixed attention is given to the study of political leaders both within the ruling and also the opposition forces in the capitalist countries."<sup>39</sup> Evidently the question of who might come to power in the West is "not a matter of indifference" to Soviet policy-makers. These observations, and also the fact that in the Soviet academic world an increasingly discriminating and sophisticated analysis of political life in the West has made substantial inroads into the influence of Stalinist dogma since 1960, indicate that Genoa-type perceptions of Western behaviour are indeed employed in the consideration of Soviet policy today.

It is more difficult to go on to show that the strategy and tactics formulated at Genoa play a part in present Soviet efforts to influence Western conduct. Presumably there are Soviet specialists -- diplomats, military men, international lawyers, scientists and so on -- who regard negotiations with the West as a relatively straightforward diplomatic exercise, and who have neither the competence nor the authority to pass opinions on the political dimension of East-West bargaining. For example, should Moscow propose the establishment of an all-European meteorological service at the CSCE, there would

doubtless be some who saw this measure simply as desirable in its own right. These persons would have little interest in the utilization of such proposals in order to influence the balance of forces in Western policy-making. But if Soviet decision-makers behaved in a similarly pragmatic way, why would some of them bother to make their case by provoking a discussion of the politically vulnerable example of Soviet policy at Genoa? Surely it would be safer to avoid Genoa altogether and pose the question of agreements in the practical language of the lower-echelon specialist. We are led to the conclusion that at the leadership level, measures of East-West collaboration are viewed in a political and instrumental light and not primarily as ends in themselves. What the Soviet leadership seeks through negotiation and agreements is a balance of forces within the capitalist countries and internationally that creates and maintains a basis for desirable forms of behaviour toward the USSR.

The exponent of reform policy options at home and abroad is not going to state in so many words that Soviet actions should be attuned primarily to the task of supporting the reformist wing of the bourgeoisie. Controls over political communication do not permit this kind of directness, even if an individual or spokesman were willing to take the risk of clearly identifying himself in public as a reformist. But Arbatov has distinguished himself by saying as much on more



than one occasion.<sup>40</sup> Khrushchev also claimed to have had a hand in President Kennedy's election in 1960.<sup>41</sup> Brezhnev claimed for the Soviet Union a role in promoting a degree of realism in American foreign policy that helped Nixon's reelection in 1972.<sup>42</sup> And Soviet concessions to West Germany, even the release of Volga Germans, seem to have been intended to support Brandt and the reformist trends in the election of November 1972. These and other instances of Soviet activity in support of collaborative and "realistic" tendencies in Western foreign policy indicate that the Genoa precedent is not only relevant to current Soviet needs and a device to justify policies of détente and agreement, but also a system of perceptions and practices that is to some extent reflected in the outward behaviour of the regime.

I say to some extent, not simply because Soviet policy is never unilinear or guided by one tendency only, but also because neo-Stalinists have sought to appropriate Genoa for their own purposes. From the perspective of reform policy, cooperation with the United States on European matters is essential. A limitation of détente and agreements to America's allies would serve to reduce East-West tensions and instabilities only partially, thereby denying the diversion of substantial political and economic resources to tasks of internal development in the USSR. Hence the necessity not merely to include the United States in all-European negotiations, but

also to reach a modus vivendi with Washington as the basis for European negotiations lending greater stability to the East-West relationship as a whole. Hence also the use of the Genoa precedent primarily in Soviet internal discussions about policy toward the United States in recent years, as Moscow has displayed a reversible but on the whole a growing interest in accommodation with Washington on the basis of arms control agreements.

From the neo-Stalinist perspective, on the other hand, Europe remains primarily an arena of political-military competition with the United States, one in which offensive goals prevail on either side. If a Soviet objective is to increase West European dependence upon and cooperation with the East in order to loosen and eventually sever the American connection, the purely tactical aspects of the Genoa policy may be utilized not only to justify divisive détente and agreements in Europe against sectarian criticism within the CPSU, but also as a guide to practical action. For instance, late in 1970 the influential political commentator, Yuri Zhukov cited Genoa favourably in calling for broad all-European cooperation that by implication excluded the United States.<sup>43</sup> Defining "Europe" as stretching from the Urals to the Atlantic, he drew attention to the activity of Europeanists who urged the creation of a third force between the United States and the Soviet Union, and who to some extent favoured

greater cooperation with the socialist countries as a means of bolstering their independence in the face of American economic penetration. Accordingly he suggested it was appropriate to take a "merchant's approach" to European matters, putting forward a programme of political and economic cooperation of the kind advocated by Lenin. In effect, by patterning their behaviour on selected aspects of the Genoa precedent, Moscow and its allies could further reduce the myth of socialist "aggressiveness," undermine the influence of "Atlanticist hard-liners" in Western Europe, and ultimately convert Europe from an American to a Soviet sphere of influence after an initial phase of encouraging West European independence of the United States.

The element of ambiguity in Soviet policy on European questions in 1922 is thus replicated in the early 1970s. But while some in the CPSU twist the Genoa precedent to serve the offensive purposes of neo-Stalinism, the essential point for our purposes here is that a full and proper construction of the Genoa policy is also employed for purposes of long-term East-West stability and cooperation consonant with the reform trend in Soviet behaviour. It would of course be a mistake to suggest that contemporary European issues are viewed primarily through the prism of Genoa. Circumstantial evidence does however indicate that a knowledge of what happened in 1922 can be applied in the interpretation of the

options currently available to Moscow as it plans for the CSCE. If the reform trend acquired predominance in Soviet policy, what specific forms of behaviour would we expect from Moscow at the CSCE?

To begin with, the comments of officials such as Zagladin and Yakovlev suggest that in analyzing Western conduct as it related to the CSCE, Moscow should differentiate between several alternate tendencies. Foreign policy professionals in the USSR presumably have detailed and realistic (if varying) perceptions of the politics and European policy within the various Western countries and between them. The published Soviet commentary that is available to the Western analyst is however comparatively primitive. Nevertheless, three trends that correspond broadly to those observed in 1922 can readily be identified in published Soviet views of current Western policy. The first consists of an "Atlantist" tendency that is manifested in attempts to delay and sabotage the CSCE, and that corresponds to the trend to seek "military solutions" and prevent the convocation of the Genoa Conference. A second tendency exists in the form of an interest in economic cooperation with socialist countries, and is expressed in a desire to get on with the CSCE. And then there is a "realist" trend that looks to productive political negotiations at the CSCE, and resembles the activity of the "pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie" in 1922. Each of these

trends will be described briefly as it appears in the published Soviet literature in general, and attention will then be given to reform perceptions in particular. To avoid the awkwardness of presenting Soviet views in indirect discourse, I will take the liberty of stating them directly and without expurgation of the obvious pejoratives.

The "Atlanticist" trend arises from an effort to maintain NATO and everything it stands for -- the global policy of U.S. imperialism, arms racing, subversion of socialist societies, etc. It originates in the United States, where it is supported by the powerful military-industrial complex, aggressive political and military circles, and generally by individuals with professional careers tied to concepts of policy from positions of strength, such as Melvin Laird, George Ball, and Alexis Johnson. The American "Atlanticists" require international tension, a Europe divided into two camps, and a constant fear of Soviet aggression in order (1) to strengthen ties with their counterparts in Western Europe, (2) to obtain a more favourable sharing of burdens within NATO, and (3) to restrict the movement toward autonomy in West European foreign policies and military strategy.<sup>44</sup> Conversely, they and the European "Atlanticists" oppose any movement toward détente and security in Europe on the grounds that it would (1) weaken the American position in Western Europe and NATO, (2) complicate the effort to obtain desired

NATO political and military decisions, (3) turn Western Europe eastward, and (4) ultimately allow the Soviet Union to gain mastery not only in Europe but globally as well.<sup>45</sup> In Western Europe, the Conservative Government in Great Britain is most vehemently committed to these views, as are "Bavarian ultras," "West German revanchists," "aggressive NATO political and military circles," and so on. In addition, certain unspecified West European integrationists, while favouring the creation of a political and military union independent of the United States, have a similarly hostile attitude toward European détente.

Since a successful CSCE would exert an adverse influence on the European situation from the "Atlanticist" viewpoint, their tactics have been designed to delay the holding of a Conference as long as possible, and, once it proved unavoidable, to sabotage the gathering. Tactics of delay are to be seen especially in the American insistence on "prior conditions" such as successful four-power negotiations on Berlin, bilateral talks between the two Germanies, and, at one time, MBFR as well. The United States has also employed delaying tactics as a means of extracting concessions from the Soviet Union and its allies, and possibly even from its own allies as well in return for consent to move ahead.<sup>46</sup> As the CSCE became increasingly inevitable, however, "Atlanticist" tactics have shifted toward the prevention of a successful outcome. MBFR,

for example, is now to be considered "parallel" to the CSCE, in effect making force reductions in Central Europe once again a precondition for agreements on security and cooperation. Also it is urged that the duration of the CSCE be dependent upon the maintenance of a certain degree of unity within NATO, thereby allowing any one government the option to hold the entire negotiation up. More important, however, the "Atlanticists" have been trying to spike the Conference by proposing impossible agenda items and generally trying to overload the negotiations. They favour the insertion of exchanges of information and people into the agenda in order to focus the attention of the Conference on issues where "basic and irreconcilable differences exist," and to develop subversive activities against the socialist countries.<sup>47</sup> For similar reasons there is also an interest in this quarter in discussing "guarantees of sovereignty" for Eastern Europe at the CSCE. These and other proposals represent unacceptable demands on the Soviet Union and its partners to reject proletarian internationalism and the class approach to peaceful coexistence.<sup>48</sup> They also reveal an interest in "the disruption of the socialist community and a restoration of capitalism in the European socialist countries."<sup>49</sup>

A second trend in Western policy as it relates to the CSCE concerns East-West economic relations. The Genoa precedent suggests that in going to the CSCE "as merchants," the

Soviets would be primarily if not exclusively interested in opportunities for expanded trade, technological borrowing, and foreign investment posed by a Western desire to seek economic cooperation with the USSR. Soviet commentary on this aspect of Western behaviour is however relatively sparse, possibly because they do not wish to reveal their interests in this area, and possibly because Western interests have been comparatively sparse as well. With regard to the United States, certain regional and family groupings of finance capital (particularly the Morgan, Ford, Chicago-Cleveland, and Rocky Mountain groupings) have long sought expanded commercial relations with the Soviet Union. This trend in American foreign economic policy arises from a larger view that high levels of military spending, including the maintenance of forces in Europe, serve to stimulate inflation, weaken the balance of payments situation, reduce the competitiveness of American goods on the world market, and generally undermine financial and monetary stability.<sup>50</sup> Throughout the 'sixties these views remained in the background of American policy, even though the West Europeans were reaping considerable advantages from their growing economic relations with socialist countries. By 1973, however, a "more sober approach" had surfaced in American economic relations with the Soviet Union following the Nixon-Brezhnev talks, the agreements on trade, lend-lease, credits, shipping, and the development of negotiations for the purchase



of Soviet natural gas and other undertakings. On the other hand, there were "still significant forces" who though they greeted these shifts in economic policy, saw the Soviet Union as having the greater stake and therefore sought to exploit the situation by introducing extraneous demands (evidently the elimination of the Jewish emigration tax).<sup>51</sup>

In Western Europe, more marked trends to economic cooperation are present. Trade, scientific and technological collaboration is an "objective economic necessity" engendered by underlying developmental processes that pose practical economic problems no longer soluble by individual countries or groups of countries. At the same time, there is an element of anti-Americanism in West European economic policy. As United States corporations take up European markets for investment goods and consumer durables, West Europeans are inclined to look to the large markets in the East.<sup>52</sup> And as the technological gap grows between the United States and Western Europe, the latter is moved to look eastward again.<sup>53</sup> Simultaneously, there is a growing West European interest in Soviet energy resources and raw materials, particularly in the case of France, West Germany, Italy, and Austria.

Finally, a third set of trends exists in the form of increased "realism" in Western approaches to the problem of security in Europe. In the case of the United States, domestic and external developments increasingly favour an evolution

of its European policy toward a more realistic acceptance of the need to cooperate with the East in ensuring a durable peace. Internally, there is the opposition of Senator Mansfield and other members of Congress to the traditional postulates of "Atlanticism," and to the maintenance of American forces in Europe. Internationally, the new strategic military balance, the deterioration of American relations with Western Europe, particularly in the economic realm, and the growing difficulties in NATO all prompt a fundamental review of American policy. The Nixon Doctrine and the notion of the "mature partnership" with Western Europe have as their logical corollaries an acceptance of a greater degree of independence in the foreign policy of the West European allies, a reduction in the American conventional but not necessarily nuclear presence, and a recognition of the utility of a regional as opposed to a bloc-to-bloc policy in Europe.<sup>54</sup> Similar directions in future American conduct are suggested by the incipient concept of multipolar diplomacy, which reduces the significance of socio-economic and ideological factors in the pursuit of a foreign policy of balance and maneuver.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, the United States would prefer to deal directly with the Soviet Union on European matters, rather than having to cope with a CSCE.<sup>56</sup> In effect, Washington might be interested in a stabilizing arrangement with Moscow as a means of reducing the risks and costs of a renegotiation of its relationships with Western Europe. Although the

adaptive processes occurring in American foreign policy may ultimately prove to be only tactical in nature, Washington's attitudes toward the CSCE have evolved from the suspiciousness of 1966 to a rapprochement with and qualified acceptance of Soviet positions by the time of the Moscow summit and the Brezhnev-Kissinger conversations in September 1972. Differences continue to exist, but by the beginning of 1973 the two governments could no longer be said to "speak different languages" on the matters to be pursued at the CSCE.<sup>57</sup>

In Western Europe there is a widespread and substantial interest in cooperating with the Soviet Union on security matters. The development of an equilibrium in Soviet and American strategic military power has increased West European scepticism about the guarantees of security provided by Washington.<sup>58</sup> Of the NATO governments, France and West Germany in particular, and also Italy, Belgium, Norway and Denmark are displaying "realism" and a "sober approach" to the CSCE.<sup>59</sup> "Healthy trends" of this kind are the result of a heightened awareness of the consequences of nuclear war, a desire for greater independence from the United States, an unwillingness to shoulder new economic burdens of defense, and the "peace initiatives" of the socialist countries in their dealings with the Brandt Government. The December 1969 NATO Council decision lowering the threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe has also stimulated interest in

cooperation with the East on matters of European security.<sup>60</sup> Thus, public opinion in Western Europe broadly favours a productive Conference, which is also supported by "religious and pacifist circles, holders of liberal bourgeois views, trade union activists, social democrats," as well as a significant portion of the "ruling circles" and "bourgeois political parties."<sup>61</sup> A "definite identity of standpoints" is being worked out with the socialist states on the need for all-European solutions to the security problem.<sup>62</sup>

Up to this point we have been considering Soviet views of the situation to the West, as though they were an undifferentiated whole. When looked at more closely, the literature yields differences of emphasis between relatively militant neo-Stalinist and more moderate reform perceptions of Western behaviour. As might be expected, the "Atlanticist" trend and simultaneous contradictions between the United States and its allies are more salient in neo-Stalinist commentary, which is also inclined to limit to Western Europe the manifestation of interests in economic cooperation and "realistic" solutions to security problems. The neo-Stalinist thus defines the balance of forces in the West in a way that favours the exploitation of interimperialist contradictions, a weakening of NATO, and an effort to turn Western Europe politically and economically to the East by means of détente diplomacy and the manipulation of European public opinion.

Reform perceptions, on the other hand, are less convinced of the persistence of "Atlanticism," and include the United States in the analysis of trends to economic cooperation and foreign policy realism. For the exponent of reform in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, the situation lends itself to increasingly comprehensive stabilization and cooperation in European affairs, based on a growing Soviet-American collaboration. So far as the reform viewpoint is concerned, there is a reasonably good fit between the three broad tendencies presently observed, and those acknowledged by Lenin in 1922. Assuming that the overall situation in which the Soviet Union currently finds itself favours a reform perception of the complex setting to the West, we may proceed to look at the action implications of the Genoa precedent in an effort to predict how Moscow may behave at the CSCE.

In terms of strategy, Soviet policy-makers would envisage a long-term endeavour to attune policy to the task of strengthening the "realist" trend at the expense of "Atlanticism," thereby creating an increasingly secure situation in which trends toward comprehensive East-West economic cooperation could flourish. Acting systematically to reduce the perceived threat of Communist aggression in the West, Moscow would champion reasonable proposals for a durable peace in Europe, while entering into immediate practical agreements

to this end. Through a successful effort to stabilize East-West relations, the Soviets would expect gradually to deprive the "Atlanticists" of the opportunity to justify militant foreign and defense policies by referring to Moscow's behaviour. In order to reduce the perception of risk to the West that would inevitably arise with further movement toward détente and cooperation in Europe, Moscow would have to display a readiness to stabilize the military environment by taking steps toward agreement at the SALT and MBFR talks, presumably before the CSCE commenced. It would also have to convey that it was not seeking to oust the Americans from Europe, to disintegrate NATO or the EEC, or to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in Europe. Words would count for little here, and it would be necessary to signal Soviet intentions by exercising unilateral restraint and entering into agreements at some cost at least to its existing policies. At the same time, in order to prevent an escalation in Western negotiating demands, Moscow would have to avoid creating the impression it was caving in. Thus, the CSCE would not in itself bring about dramatic changes either in substantive Soviet policies or in the character of East-West relations. It would however mark an acceleration in a continuing process of transformation in East-West expectations concerning the probability of war and collaboration among adversaries.

In such a setting, liberal and anti-war elements of the

ruling class and general population would find mounting justification for their policy views, and those whose political and official careers were tied to policies from situations of strength would be faced with the choice of ending their careers or modifying their approach to foreign and military affairs. In time, "realists" who recognized the need for cooperative coexistence with the USSR would stand a better chance in Western elections, bringing into power capitalist governments less antagonistic to the Soviet Union. The Ostpolitik of the social democratic government in West Germany has presumably reinforced this assessment, and an increase in the power of the reformist wing of the French bourgeoisie may have a similar effect. Rather than persisting in a more sophisticated continuation of Cold War behaviour patterns, Moscow would endeavour to create a realistic acceptance of the status quo in Europe as a framework for greater economic collaboration between states with different social systems. The CSCE would represent an exceptional opportunity to launch this new campaign to penetrate Western societies and manipulate the balance of political forces in the direction of greater East-West accommodation.

As far as tactics are concerned, Moscow would appear at the CSCE with a sweeping "pacifist programme" envisaging a very high degree of East-West economic as well as political cooperation in Europe. This Declaration would definitely

have to accord the United States and Canada a substantial role in future European affairs. If it failed to do so, it would be a clear indication that the Soviet Union was guided by offensive ambitions. Precisely what a Declaration on security and cooperation in Europe might look like cannot of course be predicted. A number of general indications are however already available. For example, in Kosygin's report on the Ninth Five Year Plan at the Twenty-fourth Congress, the CSCE was depicted as building confidence in Europe and opening the way for extensive economic, scientific, and technological cooperation in the development of transcontinental transportation and hydroelectric nets, the resolution of environmental problems, and in dealing with cancer and cardiovascular disease.<sup>63</sup> Considerably more specific indications of the possible content of an opening Soviet statement at the CSCE are to be found in a recent article in Foreign Affairs written by Evgeny Chussudovsky, a Soviet citizen and senior United Nations official.<sup>63</sup>

Entitled "Genoa Revisited: Russia and Coexistence," Chussudovsky's essay was at once an account of Soviet policy at Genoa, a proposal for a "far-reaching accommodation between the East and the West," and an attempt to implement Lenin's instructions to support the more moderate trends in Western policy toward Soviet Russia. That it was placed in a journal read by the American foreign policy elite and



not in a European publication, that it was concerned with East-West rather than purely European reconciliation, suggests an underlying interest, consonant with with reform tendency, in encouraging United States participation in an overall stabilization of East-West relations. That its moderate tone and unusually pragmatic approach succeeded in creating something of a stir among the attentive American public may also have indicated to Moscow a potential responsiveness to a new initiative for "a lasting normalization of the East-West relationship."

As might be expected, Chussudovsky's account of the Genoa policy is to some extent a tendentious one. It plays down the residual element of anti-imperialist "struggle" in Soviet actions. It says nothing about the Rapallo fallback position. And it takes the Soviet "pacifist programme" largely at face value as a set of practical proposals intended for implementation rather than to gain influence over the politics of foreign policy-making in the West. Indeed, it could be that Chussudovsky is one of those who take a legal-institutional view of negotiation as a matter of pragmatic bargaining to achieve national interests. In any event, his discussion of the need for "bold and comprehensive...schemes of East-West cooperation of the kind which Chicherin adumbrated at Genoa" includes proposals for a concerted attack on problems of production and trade, transport and

communications, resource development and management, protection of health and the environment, strengthening of common cultural values, and East-West cooperation in overcoming the gap between the developed and developing countries. Chussudovsky asks whether the West mightn't be better advised to avoid the political risks of increased cooperation, continuing instead with "the present, piecemeal, limited dealings with the East, mainly in the field of trade, while relying on the nuclear deterrent and a superior economic potential?" His answer is that only through wide-ranging but realistic accommodation between East and West can political-military security, social progress, and stable access to the world market be guaranteed now and for coming generations. In Chussudovsky's view there is no rational alternative to the elaboration of peaceful coexistence and cooperation, if we are to avoid recurring and possibly catastrophic deteriorations in international relations, and also secure a significant reduction in military spending. As for East-West ideological and economic competition, it would continue within a framework of cooperation. While the USSR could be expected to support national liberation movements, they would "hopefully" not be violent, and the world's social evolution would be left largely to the verdict of history.

Chussudovsky's essay may be regarded as a trial balloon, a preview of a "pacifist programme" that would be made at the

CSCE in conformance with the reform trend in Soviet policy. To see his presentation in perspective, it should be compared with the stilted neo-Stalinist "Declaration of Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe," in Prague by the WTO Political Consultative Committee.<sup>65</sup> In the Prague Declaration the CSCE is seen very much as an affair of the European countries, and the United States and Canada are mentioned but twice. For Chussudovsky, however, the problem is one of creating an overall atmosphere of trust and exploring "the modalities of a lasting collaborative arrangement between East and West." Already one of his proposals has surfaced in official Soviet positions. Thus, despite intra-Party opposition that will be mentioned in a moment, his call for the promotion of "movement of persons" involved in the collaborative process, and for "human contacts" as an essential aspect of the coexistence process, is reflected in Brezhnev's speech of December 21, 1972, and was put forward at Helsinki on January 22, 1973 as a proposed CSCE agenda item on "human contacts."<sup>66</sup> Insofar as the remainder of a reform programme is presented at the CSCE, it would represent a tactical effort to stimulate "realist" responses at the expense of "Atlanticist" preferences, thereby creating a situation in which existing Western interests in trade, scientific, and technological cooperation could come to the fore. In effect this would be a replay of the Genoa tactic of making sweeping and attractive proposals that stop just

short of what Western governments are willing to accept, thus "flattering" liberals and reformists, and promoting a rearrangement of influence patterns within Western societies to favour increased collaboration with the USSR.

Moscow presumably recognizes that the CSCE would not be an appropriate forum for the negotiation of multilateral trade and monetary agreements. It would therefore seek general statements of principle on East-West trade and financial relations, leaving a detailed discussion of most-favoured-nation treatment, quantitative restrictions, and related matters to bilateral negotiations or to institutions such as the Economic Commission for Europe. The main practical tasks at Helsinki would be to negotiate political, industrial, technological, scientific, cultural, and environmental arrangements that would lend new stability to East-West relations and also create favourable conditions for trade and financial measures that would be pressed forward elsewhere. In the political sphere, Moscow would seek Western recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence, an affirmation of existing European frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, renunciation of the use of and threat to use force, and preservation of the sovereign independence and equality of the participating states. Certain confidence-building measures might also be pursued, including exchanges of military personnel and the positioning of military observers

in Central Europe. In economic and cultural matters Soviet diplomats would be likely to accept limited exchanges of persons and ideas, broader cultural contacts, cooperation in the preservation of the environment, and joint East-West projects in the development of mineral resources, hydro-electric power, transportation networks, computer technology, peaceful uses of atomic energy, and so on. The negotiation of these varied measures would be approached in a business-like manner, and preferably with a minimum of recrimination and propaganda. Obvious attempts to play Western powers against one another would be avoided, as would any attempt to give clearly favourable treatment to West Germany, France, or the EEC. Moscow would continue to refrain from singling the European neutrals out for special cultivation. Nor would it appeal directly to the United States, given the American reluctance to appear to be bargaining over the head of its allies. Throughout, the Soviets could be expected to behave in an evenhanded and unexpectedly conciliatory fashion, making reasonable compromises in order to reach a series of limited agreements that would further the evolution of an East-West setting more conducive to rapid Soviet internal development.

It should be emphasized that we have been outlining a tendency in Soviet behaviour on the matter of East-West relations in Europe. We have not been attempting to describe

the entirety of possible Soviet conduct at Helsinki. Intra-Party discussions of the kind that developed at Genoa, and that were acknowledged to recur in 1970,<sup>67</sup> will affect the vigour and persistence with which the reform trend is displayed in the months to come. And as was the case with the Genoa policy, Moscow's actions can be expected to depend heavily upon the stability of the Soviet leadership, and on the degree to which Western conduct either validates or undermines the commitment to reform solutions. It may therefore be useful to consider some of the current issues and possible alignments within the Party as it prepares for the opening of the CSCE this summer.

The parallel between decision-making for Genoa and contemporary discussions within the CPSU suggest the broad outlines of debate over the Conference. The existence of a sectarian grouping that favours the CSCE as a forum for anti-imperialist propaganda is suggested by the statements of Soviet military representatives and by certain harsh press commentaries that continue to be made despite Brezhnev's assurances that progress has occurred in discussions with leading Western powers.<sup>68</sup> This grouping seeks to utilize the formal commitment of the CPSU to anti-imperialism as a means of undermining arguments for comprehensive détente and East-West cooperation, and in order to secure a foreign policy consistent with sectarian attitudes and roles in Soviet

internal politics. Within the Politburo this viewpoint is represented by Shelest and possibly Shelepin and Voronov. On the other hand there are those whose primary concern is with the practical interests of the Soviet state in rapid economic and technological development. The heirs of Krasin and Litvinov, they favour a business-like approach to the CSCE that is reflected in Soviet behaviour at the Helsinki preparatory talks. This orientation would be advocated primarily by Kosygin, who is the Politburo member charged with foreign economic relations.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, there is the question of "who to contact and in what order," as Moscow surveys the opportunities presented by the CSCE. Suslov, whose areas of responsibility include foreign policy, evidently favours the neo-Stalinist approach according to which Moscow would seek to develop relations with France, West Germany, and the EEC at the expense of the United States.<sup>70</sup> Again it is Kosygin who would be most clearly identified with the option of working directly with the United States in conformance with the reform trend in Soviet policies. As the principal leader, Brezhnev presumably occupies Lenin's position to the right of centre in the debate, coping with "sacramental questions" of reconciling anti-imperialism and the requirements of collaboration, and dealing with the opposition to his policy of concessions to the West in Europe.

*Does this mean  
more reformist  
or more conservative  
Marxist?*

A key point on which Brezhnev is being challenged concerns

the freer movement of ideas and persons between East and West. As previously indicated, he has given his approval to CSCE negotiations on this item, by acknowledging the possibility of "cooperation in the field of culture, especially the exchange of ideas and the expansion of information and contacts between peoples."<sup>71</sup> He stipulated that such measures should conform to principles of non-interference in internal affairs, an avoidance of the Cold War spirit, and "respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country and...the mutual spiritual enrichment of the peoples." Nevertheless, he made a concession on a point of cardinal importance to the NATO powers, presented it as such, and opened up an issue that brings into focus many sources of opposition to increasingly intimate East-West cooperation.

The military has been arguing that concessions and compromises in the sphere of ideology are "objectively impossible" and "inadmissible."<sup>72</sup> In their view, Western governments will seek to exploit modern means of communication to carry out "ideological diversions" among the Soviet armed forces and general population, promoting bourgeois views on war, revisionist political ideas, non-Russian nationalism, and the like.<sup>73</sup> Presumably the Soviet internal security forces have similar apprehensions regarding their ability to carry out effective political control and counterintelligence operations, should the flow of persons and ideas from



the West be increased. From the standpoint of the heavy industrial and defense production establishments, the propaganda apparatus, and old-guard Stalinists, the moral-political unity of Soviet society would be impaired, and with it their claims to resources, prestige, and relevance. The wedge of ideological coexistence would be driven deeper into the Soviet system, with the result that reformism, disorder, and vulnerability to imperialist penetration and disruption could all be expected to increase. And in Eastern Europe these problems would be posed even more sharply. Accordingly, as Suslov put it shortly before Brezhnev's concession on exchanges, there must be no reconciliation between socialism and capitalism; it is necessary to remain hostile to reformism; and the ideological and political intrigues of the imperialists must be frustrated.<sup>74</sup>

The principal spear-carrier for the conservative coalition on the question of exchanges is Yuri Zhukov who, as we have seen, favours a neo-Stalinist adaptation of Genoa tactics to promote limited cooperation with Western Europe only. On the last day of Kissinger's discussions with Brezhnev in September 1972, he published an attack on the activities of "NATO wreckers," "cold warriors," and Chinese enemies of cooperation in Europe.<sup>75</sup> Stating imperiously that hostile forces retained powerful positions in determining Western policy toward the CSCE, he implied that no concessions should

be made to Kissinger. The communique on the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks the next day recorded that progress had been made on European matters.<sup>76</sup> Then, a fortnight after the announcement of Brezhnev's new position on the exchange of ideas, information, and contacts, Zhukov aimed a blistering attack against American advocates of freer movement of persons and ideas.<sup>77</sup> Arguing that it was the American "hawks" who were pushing this proposal, he stated that their aim was the ideological disarmament and subversion of the socialist countries, particularly in Eastern Europe. The Americans were not pursuing exchanges in a spirit of mutual respect and non-interference, and Brezhnev, he all but stated, was clearly mistaken in thinking that anything but disaster could come from concessions in this area. Moscow should have nothing to do with a Washington that was bent on securing an ideological "thaw" in the socialist countries, he inferred. Instead it should move ahead with its tried and tested policy of limited détente and divisive conciliation.

Whether Brezhnev intends to tilt Soviet decisions more definitely in a reform direction cannot of course be ascertained. But as he determines how far to go at the CSCE, much will depend on his ability to utilize the Central Committee and Secretariat to bolster his Politburo support and outmaneuver the opposition. The voting membership of the

Central Committee has been relatively stable in recent years. The fact that in 1970 Lenin was described approvingly as having given the Central Committee "a decisive role"<sup>78</sup> in the Genoa policy decision, suggests that Brezhnev has something to gain here. As for the Secretariat, Brezhnev has been assembling his own foreign office there, and has indicated that certain foreign leaders may deal directly with the International Department rather than working through regular channels such as Kosygin's office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>79</sup> Over and above Zagladin, the key figure in Brezhnev's personal foreign policy apparatus is B.N. Ponomarev, the Department head. Ponomarev was promoted to the position of candidate member of the Politburo on May 19, 1972, shortly before Shelest's removal from the leadership of the Ukrainian Party as a result of his opposition to Soviet-American agreements. A critic of Stalin, Ponomarev is a moderate on foreign policy matters, and has been publicly associated with the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, a leading source of reform argumentation. Insofar as Brezhnev's leadership as such is not called into question, his growing operational control over foreign policy should permit increasingly flexible and rapid responses.

On the question of leadership stability, the Politburo appears to be operating on the basis of an understanding

not to upset a finely balanced status quo. Within this framework, several changes have occurred in recent months that slightly favour Brezhnev and policies of moderate innovation. Thus, Shelest's demotion was accompanied by Ponomarev's rise; but Shelest retained his seat as a voting member of the Politburo, while Ponomarev became a candidate only. Shelest's replacement in the Ukraine was however a protege of Brezhnev's. The accession of Dolgikh to the Secretaryship in charge of heavy industry may presage a policy change, as he was most active in implementing the 1965 economic reform. Finally, Polyanskiy's removal from the Politburo in February 1973 could favour a loosening of foreign policy, if reports that he was in favour of the invasion of Czechoslovakia are correct. The opposition of Suslov and others to extensive East-West collaboration may therefore constitute a vigorous attempt to alter Brezhnev's policy preferences, rather than a challenge to his leadership. As of November 1972, East Europeans reported that Soviet moderates were riding high, and that the political atmosphere had rarely been as favourable.

On balance, Brezhnev and his entourage seem able at least to consider the possibility of a new approach to East-West relations that escapes the confines of neo-Stalinism and begins to conform to the Genoa precedent. Thus in a letter to Nixon in February 1973, Brezhnev observed that

*The XXIV CPSU position as reported by*

conform to the Genoa precedent.

the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement would improve Soviet-American relations and raise new possibilities for cooperation presumably in the European context as well as others.<sup>80</sup> Certainly Brezhnev is heavily committed to the CSCE, and as of March 1973 Soviet representatives at Helsinki were willing to state there was heavy pressure on them to move forward rapidly. There is no doubt that public opinion in the USSR would cheer the man who <sup>convinced</sup> laid to rest the threat of a new European war in the foreseeable future. It is also the case that a policy including concessions and a degree of propaganda restraint has produced positive results for the Soviet Union since 1969. Brezhnev may accordingly seek to move further in a reform direction in the belief that the risks are outweighed both by the probability of new success and by the needs of the USSR. That such a calculation might be made is suggested by the larger situation in which the Soviet system currently finds itself.

*(No doubt about this)*

#### IV. The Outlook from Moscow

As it prepares for the opening of the CSCE, Moscow is faced with an overall situation that is both novel and fluid. The character of the current policy setting is itself doubtless a subject of debate, as individuals and organizations seek to secure acceptance of perceptions that favour their own preferences for Soviet policy and undermine

the opponents' arguments. To what extent is the United States still relying on its traditional alliances as opposed to multipolar balancing? How great are the opportunities for unilateral gain by the USSR in Europe? Are Washington, Peking, and Tokyo moving toward a triple entente in Asia? How large is the opening for economic and technological collaboration with the West? How important are agreements in this area, and what political price might the Soviet Union properly pay for them? On these and many other interrelated questions of importance to the determination of Moscow's conduct in Europe there are no clear answers for the Soviets, much less for the Western analyst of Soviet calculations. Nevertheless it is possible to fit various bits of evidence on Soviet perceptions and judgments into a larger framework of situational factors that may serve to influence Moscow's actions in a reform direction at the CSCE and in the subsequent period.

Military security has traditionally been an overriding concern of Soviet policy-makers. The current situation is quite novel in that the USSR has achieved an unparalleled invulnerability to attack. As the result of a massive build-up in its strategic nuclear forces, it has now achieved a position that is broadly described as "parity" with the United States. Both sides may be expected to continue developing their strategic capabilities, emphasizing qualitative

improvements and the implementation of still diverging military doctrines. Realism suggests however that neither will accept anything less than parity throughout the 'seventies,<sup>81</sup> and that Moscow will continue to experience an enhanced sense of invulnerability. Accordingly, military relations with Washington will increasingly be concerned with the pace and opportunity costs of a continuing defense effort. SALT I has already established a degree of common interest in checking the arms race, and SALT II will in all probability yield added limitations and possibly a modest reduction of offensive forces. Moreover SALT I has had significant psycho-political reassurance effects, adding substantially to the sense of security engendered by the more marginal arms control arrangements of previous years. So long as an "adventurer" does not come into the White House, and so long as there is a continuing effort to avoid confrontations and reduce the likelihood of accidental war, the Soviets have little to fear militarily from the United States.<sup>82</sup> As Soviet fears decline, so does the need for military and foreign political action to offset the American threat. So also does the possibility that Washington will interpret Soviet negotiating concessions as a sign of weakness. Insofar as Moscow wishes to reduce the economic costs of defense and to avoid the emergence of an unstable structure of forces on both sides, the situation favours a policy of collaboration with Washington in further measures of arms control.

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Looking to Western Europe, the picture is also on the whole a reassuring one from the security viewpoint. West Germany, the principal European danger to Russia, has undertaken not to acquire nuclear weapons in the non-proliferation pact and the Soviet-German treaty of August 1970. The latter measure, combined with the Polish-German pact, the four-power agreement on Berlin, and the arrangements between the two Germanies have removed a variety of territorial and political threats to the WTO powers and reduced the danger of a military confrontation in Europe. The EEC seems unlikely to achieve the degree of unification necessary to pose the threat of either a European nuclear force or an adjunct Franco-British capability. The NATO-WTO military balance clearly favours the USSR, and NATO is itself increasingly divided. On the other hand, the American attempt to shift more of the burden of defense to its allies, the qualitative improvements being made in NATO conventional forces, British attempts to obtain the Poseidon missile from the United States, and the NATO move toward early reliance on tactical nuclear weapons,<sup>83</sup> all presumably give concern. These problems and the long term issue of permanent German demilitarization and containment, can best be approached by encouraging a continued American military presence in Western Europe through MBFR, and by enlarging the scope of East-West détente and agreements as means of reducing West German and European tendencies toward a greater military



effort. Such action is now increasingly practical owing to the effects of Soviet-American strategic parity on European military relationships: where Moscow previously sought to employ Western Europe as a hostage against attack by the United States, an enhanced sense of security vis-à-vis Washington reduces the need to mount a clear threat to America's allies.

Assuming that Japan does not pose a danger to the Soviet Union in the context of the 'seventies, and that Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe are more political than military, we are left with the question of the Chinese impact on Soviet security. Western analysts usually attach considerable importance to the China factor as a source of Soviet efforts to improve relations with the West. However, it can be argued that Soviet anxiety concerning the Chinese military threat is insufficient to exert a substantial influence on policy in the European theatre. Chinese intermediate range missiles are targeted against Soviet cities in increasing numbers. Chinese command and control may leave much to be desired. And a ground war, if it were not rapidly resolved with nuclear weapons, would certainly weaken the Soviet military posture in Europe. Moscow can nonetheless expect to deter the Chinese much as it has deterred the more powerful Western alliance. It can handle border clashes without great difficulty, also using its military power in

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support of tacit and formal negotiating demands. On the other hand, even if the CSCE and MBFR together produce a reduction of forces in Central Europe, Moscow will retain and improve a substantial portion of its western forces.<sup>84</sup> Thus the creation of a credible offensive capability to deter Peking will occur in large part without direct reference to the state of East-West affairs. And relations with the West will not affect the likelihood of an accidental missile firing from China, unless conceivably the United States were persuaded to provide Peking with improved command and control.

It is nevertheless advantageous for the Soviets to convince the West that their moves to improve relations are motivated by fear of China. By stressing the China factor, Moscow reduces Western apprehension that détente is being sought for offensive, tactical purposes. Alternatively, an emphasis on the China threat allows Moscow to reduce the impression that it is seeking agreements out of a sense of economic weakness. This seems to be the real meaning of the officially inspired rumours in Moscow late in 1969, according to which the USSR was considering a preemptive first strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. By telling Washington what it wanted to hear about the state of Sino-Soviet relations as SALT was beginning, Moscow was able to communicate an interest in agreement at no cost to its bargaining

position. Similar considerations doubtless influence the way Moscow depicts its relations with Peking as it pursues its current policies in Europe.

If the Soviet security outlook is on the whole a good one, the political-diplomatic situation is both novel and threatening. The maintenance of traditional alliance relationships in Europe continues to be vital. It constitutes the framework within which increasing East-West cooperation can occur with a minimum of setbacks. Nevertheless, the old signposts are less and less able to provide policy with a sense of direction, owing largely to the successful American effort to bring China into play in a multipolar balance of power. Washington clearly has the advantage here, and can utilize its relative freedom of action to create combinations that threaten to isolate the USSR. Moscow, on the other hand, is at a disadvantage in not being able to play China or Japan against Washington. As a result, the Soviet Union is confronted with an increasingly clear choice. It can base its actions on the belief that the main action is still occurring in the two-camp confrontation moderated by a degree of détente, and therefore employ conciliatory splitting tactics to acquire increased influence over Western Europe. Or it can seek to reduce its vulnerability in the emerging multi-lateral balance by pursuing an overall settlement with the Western powers. The two options cannot readily be combined.

Splitting tactics give the Soviets comparatively few immediate advantages in Europe, and will cause Washington to respond with increased hostility in bilateral Soviet-American relations and in making common cause with China and Japan, if not Western Europe as well. Conversely, an entente with Washington can be obtained only if Moscow refrains from active exploitation of American differences with Western Europe. While the American commitment to a policy of multi-polar maneuver is uncertain and the subject of debate within the United States, it is clear that economic differences between the Western powers are becoming increasingly important, and that Washington may have an interest in stabilizing East-West relations in order to acquire greater freedom of action in pursuing its foreign economic objectives. Moscow accordingly has to decide in which direction to encourage American conduct: to tilt Washington into greater collaboration with the USSR; or to secure power-political transformations of questionable value in its relations with Western Europe at the expense of reduced influence in other areas of the globe. Providing that the United States exercises a degree of restraint in exploiting its political and diplomatic advantages, and continues to display a readiness to consider stabilizing agreements, the logic of the situation suggests that Moscow has an increased interest in making the concessions necessary to reach a new level of East-West accommodation in Europe.

Even if it is assumed that global power balance considerations do not promote a new Soviet willingness to forego offensive foreign policy objectives in Western Europe, a realistic assessment of the opportunities shows there are definite limits to what can be achieved by a continued emphasis on tactical conciliation in Soviet policy. Given the overall improvement in the security picture, there is only little military advantage to be had in a further endeavour to sharpen differences in NATO. West European trends toward independence of the United States in foreign and military policy may readily be encouraged to reduce or possibly even eliminate the American military presence after a longish period. Soviet influence in Western Europe could thus be expected to increase, as would economic cooperation between COMECON and the EEC. But a sober assessment would show that political and economic differences within NATO are constrained by substantial common interests, and also by a continuing antipathy to the USSR in Western Europe. Barring the advent of Communist parties to power, the most likely result of a Soviet policy of détente and limited concessions confined to Europe will be not the "Finlandization" of Western Europe but the achievement of only marginal gains. While West Germany in particular might be encouraged to look to the East for economic advantage and political-military reassurance, and while European integration might be checked, the underlying hostility of the EEC will remain intact. It

will continue many of its discriminatory trade practices, and may also move toward more intensive military cooperation to make up for any reduction of the American presence. It makes more sense therefore to acknowledge the EEC as a fact of life,<sup>85</sup> and to make it increasingly clear that disruptive goals have moved into the background of <sup>high</sup> Soviet policy. By pursuing extensive East-West détente and agreements in Western Europe Moscow stands to encourage more favourable European attitudes toward the USSR, thereby gaining an acceptance of the territorial status quo and the increased economic cooperation that is of immediate practical concern to the COMECON countries. NB.

Until recently Moscow's interest in military security and hence the internal political status quo within the East European countries has worked to prevent more intimate cooperation with the West. But with the improvement in the Soviet security position in Europe and vis-à-vis the United States, the fear of political and economic change in Eastern Europe loses some of its significance in Soviet defense and foreign policy calculations.<sup>86</sup> The lessons of the Czechoslovakian invasion and the reduction in the threat from the West lower the necessity to vaccinate the East European populations against Western ideas, and to carry on anti-Western foreign policies consistent with internal propaganda needs.<sup>87</sup> Accordingly, it now becomes possible to consider a relaxation

of internal political controls in Eastern Europe in a manner consonant with a greater degree of East-West rapprochement. Moreover, if the Western powers undertake to exercise restraint in the penetration of East European societies, and if there is a matching military withdrawal or reduction in Western Europe, the Soviet Union can reduce its reliance on the political and military control functions of the WTO,<sup>88</sup> and move in the direction of military disengagement from Eastern Europe.<sup>89</sup> At a minimum, formal Western endorsement of the status quo will allow Moscow to reduce the political costs of renewed interventions in Eastern Europe, should they become necessary. And ultimately issues that have been suppressed within Eastern Europe and between it and Moscow may be allowed to come out into the open, to be discussed and resolved, thereby removing some of the underlying causes of instability.<sup>90</sup> Thus, by permitting a controlled liberalization in Eastern Europe in conjunction with negotiated controls on Western behaviour, the Soviet Union stands to make the East European regimes simultaneously more secure and capable of coping with the stresses of a deepening East-West détente.

As regards China, the outlook is one of continued high levels of tension. Sino-Soviet border negotiations appear to be frozen, and ideological attacks are destined to continue as each side challenges the foundations of the other's

policies. The evolution of Peking's relations with Tokyo, Kissinger's recent visit to China and the normalizing agreements that were reached may also cause concern. Chinese attempts to sabotage the CSCE, and to establish closer relations with East Europe and conservative elements in Western Europe all point to an outflanking maneuver that will continue to cause great annoyance in Moscow. Thus, while China may not be seen as a significant military threat affecting Soviet decisions in Europe, its potential as an actor in diplomatic combinations hostile to the USSR seems likely to provoke Moscow into greater displays of conciliatory behaviour toward the West. However, in the event that multilateral balancing activities prove consistently damaging to Soviet interests, Moscow would inevitably be driven to reconsider its relations with Peking. As indicated, this would entail a substantial appreciation of the sectarian trend in Soviet internal policies. The vision of a socialist camp restored seems most unlikely, but then so also was a Nixon visit to China not so long ago.

The overall political-diplomatic setting can thus be interpreted as favouring a new departure in Soviet European policy owing primarily to multilateral balance of power considerations. Offensive splitting tactics through the use of détente may have been suited to a two-camp, bipolar confrontation, but in the emerging constellation of world power

style



centres, divisive conciliation is less appropriate. It alienates the United States, promises only slight gains in Western Europe, and has potentially disruptive consequences for Eastern Europe without commensurate offsetting gains. Conversely, more is to be had from an emphasis on intensified collaboration with the United States, Western Europe and Canada. It assures Moscow of a larger say in world affairs, promises a reduction in Western hostility and a comparable increase in economic cooperation, and justifies the risks of controlled instability in Eastern Europe. Either the Soviet Union decides on a campaign for global predominance, or it accepts the realities of the existing situation and opts for intensified collaboration with the West in Europe. Moscow might be expected to evade this choice. But internal economic considerations provide further reason to opt for increased cooperation.

*Is there any indication previous may think like this?*

In the difficult process of working out the Ninth Five Year Plan (FYP) which was presented after considerable delay at the Twenty-fourth Congress in April 1971, the Soviet leadership evidently came to the realization that a change of emphasis in economic development was required. The annual rate of growth in GNP had been declining steadily from 6.0% during the 'fifties to 5.4% for the period 1961-1970.<sup>91</sup> Simultaneously, labour resources had gradually been exhausted, with the result that increases in the work force could no

longer be expected to support growth. At the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum Brezhnev also drew attention to serious shortcomings in productivity. While he emphasized labour discipline as the principal solution, the previous annual budget had already marked a decision to provide a somewhat larger quantity of acceptable consumer goods as an incentive to greater productivity. The necessary funds for consumer production were apparently obtained at the expense of investment in heavy industry, for expenditures on agriculture were not cut and there was no challenge to the clear priority given to defense production since Khrushchev's removal. Further economic problems arose from an inability to convert substantial investments in science and technology into practical applications, owing in part to the widespread and perennial inadequacy of business communications in the USSR, and partly to the unwillingness of managers in a system of central planning to risk underfulfilling production targets while breaking in new equipment. In general the Soviet Union was suffering from an inability to make the qualitative improvements in production necessary for the continued growth of an advanced economy. Technological development was lagging. Growth-stimulating investment funds were not available in sufficient quantity. The work force was neither increasing in size nor getting the quality goods that would prompt it to greater productivity. And the USSR was falling behind in crucial sectors of the economic competition with

the West.

The results of the reassessment were seen in the Ninth FYP, which takes the Soviet economy to 1975 and projects an increase in the growth rate to nearly 6.0% without significant cuts in defense spending or the resumption of economic reform. Accelerated growth is to be achieved primarily by a technological renewal of industry, and by increases in productivity stimulated largely through substantial increases in personal consumption. Individual income is to rise by some 30%, and over the plan period as a whole the production of consumer items is to increase more rapidly than the output of heavy industry. Energy utilization, particularly petroleum and natural gas, is also to be substantially improved as a means of increasing efficiency. Western and Japanese capital, technology, and expertise play a considerable role in the implementation of the Plan, for Moscow has evidently recognized that it is unable alone to develop, finance, and apply the technological and industrial innovations now required. It is also unable to generate a sufficient flow of quality consumer goods, and requires the import of machinery and products from the West and Japan in this area as well. The current FYP therefore points to a sustained interest in a stable international climate as a necessary precondition for Western economic assistance. At the time of its announcement, however, Soviet-American

relations were still strained, and Kosygin's presentation indicated a preference for cooperation with Western Europe.<sup>92</sup>

Since the spring of 1971 several developments have occurred which together indicate increased Soviet interests in an overall stabilization of East-West relations for purposes of long-term and increasingly intensive economic cooperation. Soviet economic growth has continued to suffer, declining to 3.3% in 1971, and then reportedly rising to 4.0% in 1972 despite a catastrophically bad harvest and an enormous expenditure of foreign exchange reserves to finance agricultural imports.<sup>93</sup> As a result expenditures on consumer goods have been cut back, undermining the material incentives programme that is vital to productivity and growth. The current harvest appears to be faring better. But nevertheless the Plan is in danger of underfulfillment. The response of the leadership includes a shift to long-term economic planning and a greater reliance on long-term foreign investment programmes. Brezhnev has let it be known that a fifteen year plan is now being prepared for the period 1975-1990.<sup>94</sup> Massive and carefully integrated investment outlays are required over increasingly lengthy time periods for the development of projects such as the West Siberian petroleum-natural gas complex and other ventures in which the United States as well as leading Western powers are being invited to participate. The Siberian project has been called a

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desperate gamble, for if it fails significantly there could be a loss of up to 75% of the planned increase in Soviet petroleum supplies that are destined to fuel the programme of economic modernization. Clearly the USSR has an interest in an increasingly predictable and cooperative relationship with the West.

If only for security reasons, the Soviets are not going to make future economic development depend primarily upon foreign trade, investment, and technology. Growth-stimulating investment can to some extent be derived from annual increases in GNP. This seems however to be an inadequate source of investment funds, and the leadership is presumably considering its ability to reduce defense spending as a means of furthering modernization and growth, and possibly of liberating much-needed manpower as well. It is at this point that the new-found sense of security enters the picture again. So long as the USSR was deemed vulnerable to blackmail and attack, high levels of military spending could not readily be questioned. But in a setting of parity with the United States and enhanced security in Europe, continued heavy outlays for defense must be justified by reference either to an American or NATO military build-up, or to the purely political advantages that might be derived from a further Soviet build-up. Assuming that the United States and its allies do not convey the impression of trying to undo either the parity

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arrangement of SALT I or the military balance in Europe, the Soviet defense establishment becomes vulnerable to the argument that offensive political objectives do not justify current levels of defense spending when military security is great and the needs of the economy are so pressing. In conditions of East-West military equilibrium, economic considerations that would otherwise be of marginal importance serve to weaken the activist and neo-Stalinist trend in Soviet policy toward the West.

A variety of economic factors therefore move the Soviet system in the direction of a comprehensive stabilization of East-West relations in a manner consistent with the reform trend in Soviet conduct. Long-term planning considerations require increasing stability and a minimal expectation of crises with the West. The shortage of internal investment funds to stimulate growth and provide against inevitable agricultural setbacks can in principle be reduced by re-allocating resources away from defense. But in practice this requires a more profound and enduring détente and the negotiation of East-West military and political agreements that unmistakably reduce the external threat to the Soviet Union. Even general statements of principle are of use here, for the Soviets themselves tell us that tacit bargains cut no ice with planning officials, who must have a piece of paper in their hands that formally commits the Western powers

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to exercise restraint. Similarly, arguments in favour of alleviating manpower shortages through force reductions can only become effective in a pronounced setting of European détente and agreements that effectively throws doubt onto the <sup>||</sup> worst case <sup>||</sup> assumptions of Soviet officials. <sup>mil planners</sup> Furthermore, a substantial Soviet reliance on Western technology, investment, credits, and trade can only be contemplated if the Western powers have committed themselves to policies of cooperation that reduce the risk of sudden withdrawals of Western cooperation as a means of reinforcing political demands on Moscow.<sup>95</sup> It is also likely that effective economic reform will not occur in the Soviet Union so long as threats from the West continue to reinforce internal pressure to maintain central controls. Conversely, the encouragement of Western economic assistance, and the involvement of the West and Japan in Siberia as a means of reducing Chinese political pressure, require Moscow to seek a further reduction of East-West tensions and the negotiation of political agreements that reassure the West about Soviet intentions. The fact that Soviet-American relations have noticeably improved since the Twenty-fourth Congress, with large-scale joint ventures now under discussion, suggests a definite Soviet interest in including the United States in a new effort to stabilize East-West relations for purposes of long-term economic development.

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In sum, the view from Moscow as presented here is not

greatly different from the outlook that prevailed in Soviet policy in 1922. Moscow has just achieved a marked improvement in its security position, and as security increases it becomes possible to emphasize the internal economic dimension of policy, approaching the Western powers as "merchants" interested in protracted as well as immediate agreements. Moreover, the Genoa precedent involved an attempt to come to terms with the principal Soviet adversary, Britain, as was suggested by Lenin's choice of Keynes and Henderson as the typical representatives of the "pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie." Moscow now has clear multilateral power balance and economic interests in utilizing the CSCE as an instrument for reconciliation with the United States as well as other Western powers. Situational variables thus cause the Soviet system to stress collaboration and stability as opposed to offensive political objectives in its approach to the West in Europe. The current leadership seems sufficiently stable to permit a shift of emphasis to favour the reform trend in Soviet foreign and internal policies, although this would be accomplished only after intense intra-Party conflict. Should this orientation gain predominance, the Soviets may be expected to behave at the CSCE in a manner consistent with the Genoa policy. The fallback position will however be a neo-Stalinist one in which Moscow takes whatever it can get from Western Europe, and responds to substantial internal pressure for an offensive and divisive policy based on an assessment

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of the situation doubtless quite different from the one outlined here.

#### V. Shaking the Dice in Europe

Throughout this paper I have attempted to emphasize the fact that Soviet policy is internally contradictory, and that the Western powers as well are pushing and pulling in different directions as we approach the CSCE. The impression may nevertheless have been created that the dice are loaded in favour of a new and more promising atmosphere, if not new institutional arrangements, in East-West relations in Europe. The reader who is accustomed to thinking of Soviet policy as a unilinear phenomenon may also infer I am arguing that Moscow is now motivated exclusively by a desire to meet pressing economic needs in a setting of comparative military security and political-diplomatic vulnerability. In concluding it may therefore be useful to emphasize a more cautious and balanced view of the CSCE and Soviet policy, keeping it in mind that the Conference may produce very little.

In Moscow, for example, the continuing intra-Party debate over policy toward the West could bring to the fore or maintain a preëxisting official assessment that SALT I is merely a tactical pause allowing the USSR to eliminate the qualitative lead of the Americans in offensive weapons. The view might also prevail that the United States is a declining

factor in world politics, and is alienating its allies and the neutrals at a rapid rate. The West Europeans are beginning to recognize this, the argument would go, and by pressing for détante and agreements on the European continent we stand to increase their sense of confidence in us. Their behaviour will become increasingly dependent upon our good will, and we will be able to exploit the complementarities? between EEC and COMECON economies. Continued heavy spending on strategic nuclear weapons can be tolerated by the Soviet economy, particularly if its effects are offset by growth-intensive cooperation with Western Europe and Japan. Although the risks of internal reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe place definite limits on all-European cooperation, American isolationism and interimperialist economic conflict will drive Western Europe toward us even if we make a nominal appeal for American involvement in European affairs at the CSCE. In Washington, on the other hand, the parallel debate could favour an equally sceptical view of Soviet actions at the CSCE, MBFR, and especially SALT II. Pressure from the more conservative NATO allies could strengthen American resistance to premature cooperation and the encouragement of euphoria in Western Europe. France and West Germany would however be more favourably disposed to political and economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc, and the Soviets would thus be presented with a divided NATO at the CSCE. This fact and the propensity of conservative elements

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in the West to press proposals that are unacceptable to the USSR, could provide support for neo-Stalinist reactions from the Soviets at the Conference. With some luck, the following limited East-West bargains might therefore emerge at Helsinki: the West explicitly recognizes the inviolability (but not the validity) of the territorial status quo in Europe, including the Baltic frontiers of the Soviet Union, and the Soviets provide the West with a balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe and with stabilizing political agreements at one or more CSCEs; the West gives the Soviets part of the economic and technological assistance they need, and the USSR yields a bit of the freedom of movement of people and ideas that the West wishes to see in the Soviet bloc. If this proves to be the outcome, underlying East-West relationships and expectations will remain very largely intact, and the CSCE will represent merely an episode in the slow waning of the confrontation in Europe.

It is therefore all the more important to be prepared to exploit any opportunity to move ahead more rapidly. Should the Soviets approach the CSCE in a frame of mind that inclines toward long-term stability and economic cooperation, the Western powers should be ready to fasten them into this attitude with a set of agreements that create permanent constraints on the neo-Stalinist trend in Soviet policies. Nothing is altogether certain in politics, and it is

unrealistic to look for ironclad guarantees against a resumption of offensive political conciliation and demands in relations with the West. But by creating an increasingly dense web of joint political undertakings and functional cooperation in economic, scientific-technological, cultural, and environmental affairs we stand to make it increasingly costly and difficult for Moscow to act out its inner preferences for neo-Stalinist policies toward the West, Eastern Europe, and its own population. That there is some basis in current developments for an effort to strengthen the reform trend in Soviet behaviour is suggested by the fact that internal NATO differences over the Conference do not pit the United States against its European allies, and that the Soviets have not thus far been acting in a manner consistent with neo-Stalinist preferences at the Helsinki preparatory talks. *Zorn vs Mendelwitsch* *wh?*

Two things are required. The first, which I have been attempting to provide here, is an ability to discriminate between forms of Soviet behaviour that deserve to be rebuffed, and those that merit encouragement. The second is an endeavour to penetrate the Soviet foreign policy process, doing for the bearers of the reform trend what they are seeking to do to the West: strengthen the advocacy of collaboration, and weaken the influence of antagonistic arguments. The Western governments, including a substantial proportion

of the NATO powers, have implicitly been doing this in insisting on the need for thorough multilateral preparations before the CSCE can move ahead. The preparatory talks have had the effect of stymieing the neo-Stalinist and sectarian tendency to present "a clear alternative" to the existing arrangements in Europe. They have forced the Soviets to take a "businesslike" approach to the Conference even before it opens, and have thus played into the tendency in the USSR to employ the CSCE for serious negotiations on matters of practical interest. As such, the preparatory talks have doubtless had a beneficial impact on Soviet decision-making. To a lesser extent this may also be true of the NATO proposal for an agenda item on increased East-West human contacts and exchange of ideas. This is an extremely sensitive matter, and if handled improperly it could bring the entire Conference down. But by and large it has been treated with restraint, and provides supporting external pressure for existing tendencies toward internal reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Should Moscow raise new objections on grounds of non-intervention in internal affairs, certain Western governments are in a position to reply that fruitful negotiations on European security and cooperation will give the Soviet Union the benefits of strengthened reform trends in Western societies generally.

Several additional measures can be taken to influence

the relationship of tendencies in Soviet policy at the CSCE. Of primary importance is the maintenance of a degree of unity within NATO. Unanimity is not necessary. But should the United States become separated from its European allies, the invitation to Moscow to emphasize neo-Stalinist responses would be difficult to resist, and the Soviet advocates of serious negotiation would have a much harder time of it. It would also be useful to follow current internal Soviet discussions on the CSCE and European affairs in order to acquire language and proposals to be used whenever possible in drafting Western negotiating positions that substantiate reform arguments within the USSR. In this connection it might be advantageous to go back to the Chussudovsky essay, since it is the clearest manifestation of the reform trend to date. Additional action could be taken to reinforce the reform perception of politics and foreign policy in the West. Here it might be helpful to provide the Soviets with additional evidence that might be employed to demonstrate the existence of a "realist" tendency in the United States and Canada, as well as Western Europe. For example, harsh views of Soviet intentions in Europe, such as the assessment by Kurt L. London quoted at the outset of this study, could be attacked as one-sided, simplistic, and implicit rationalizations for policies of continued East-West confrontation.<sup>96</sup> In effect, we would be writing and speaking for Soviet as well as Western audiences. Although the constraints are very

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much greater, officials might also find ways of attuning their statements to the requirement of influencing internal Soviet debate in a positive direction.

Should the Soviets appear at the CSCE with a "pacifist programme" on the Genoa model, the West might well look at it carefully. Although it would be produced primarily for atmospheric effect, it could include many views prevalent in the West, while also representing the furthest point Moscow could go toward Western social and political conceptions. Accordingly, in the ensuing negotiations an effort ought to be made to secure additional Soviet commitments to those propositions that seem viable. In negotiations on specific issues we should give nothing away, but also be willing to enter ultimately into long-term political and especially economic agreements. For the CSCE is in some degree an all-or-nothing affair. If we are unwilling to go very far, if we are unduly guarded, we will conform to neo-Stalinist expectations and provide the USSR with opportunities for disruptive political activity. And by committing ourselves to only limited short-term economic undertakings, we will in effect be providing support for a vigorous Soviet defense effort, while also inhibiting the transition to economic and hence political reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Canadian interests in the CSCE are probably quite similar to those of most of the allies of the United States. While

the Soviet Union poses a remote threat to the lives of Canadians, the United States directly threatens their livelihood and political independence. From this it follows that we do not have an interest in a high degree of Soviet-American cooperation. In such a setting Canada would become less interesting to the United States as an ally, it would lose additional diplomatic influence in Washington, and it would be even less able to resist American economic demands. Similarly we would lose the opportunity to acquire a sense of autonomy from the United States by developing relations with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets would drive harder economic bargains in the knowledge there was little political advantage in their relations with Canada. It can therefore be said that we have an interest in supporting the neo-Stalinist trend in Soviet policies, for it works to keep Washington and Moscow apart and creates an international context in which both capitals are rather more responsive to our economic and foreign policy preferences.

In reality, however, it is the reform trend that merits our assistance. In the first place, the superpowers are not likely to establish a condominium now or in the foreseeable future. Their differences are simply too great. The operative question is therefore one of the direction in which we would like to see Soviet-American and East-West relations evolve during the remainder of the decade. Quite apart from

*Good*



the increased security that might accompany a greater emphasis on the collaborative element in the superpower relationship, there is the fact that it will be considerably more difficult for us to develop our economic relations with Europe in a residual Cold War setting. Far more extensive economic and political ties between Canada and Western Europe are vital to a reduction of our dependence on the United States.<sup>97</sup> But the neo-Stalinist trend in Soviet policy inhibits the development of these ties. It sees the CSCE as "a Conference of Europeans" rather than "a Conference on Europe." It envisages an exclusion of North America from the affairs of Europe. And it seeks to turn the EEC eastwards into an increasingly intimate relationship with COMECON. Insofar as neo-Stalinism is uppermost and Soviet-American collaboration limited, we may find it difficult to balance our present heavy reliance on the United States by entering into a more vigorous relationship with Western Europe. Thus while in principle there might come a day when we will oppose Soviet-American collaboration, at present we have a clear and pressing interest in opposing the neo-Stalinist trend and joining with like-minded countries in Europe in a common endeavour to increase our political and economic independence.

Although there is continuing uncertainty about the outcome of the CSCE, it does offer a number of important opportunities. For humanitarian, political, and economic reasons

we can act to support the reform tendency in Soviet policy along the lines previously suggested. In addition to a diplomatic effort, we may gain influence over the situation by developing an accurate and hence politically effective perception of Soviet objectives and activities, thereby making up for our inability to affect the views of others by virtue of military power. At the CSCE we could also begin a new phase in our involvement with Europe. Since the economic decisions of the Conference are likely to be implemented in part by the Economic Commission for Europe, it is desirable for this reason alone to request membership in this body and thereafter to seek some form of association with the EEC. Finally, the CSCE presents the political leadership in this country with an ideal opportunity to explain to the Canadian people the nature of our growing interest in Europe, and to start mobilizing the requisite public support.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Kurt L. London, "The Soviet Union and West Europe," Current History, October 1970, p. 200. For comprehensive discussions of Soviet policy and the CSCE, see Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace in Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); Michael Palmer, The Prospects for a European Security Conference (London: Chatham House, 1971); and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

<sup>2</sup>A. Gromyko, "Leninskii revoliutsionnyi kurs vneshnei politiki" [The Leninist Revolutionary Course in Foreign Policy], Kommunist, No. 1, 1973, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup>See, for example, the essays in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

<sup>4</sup>Franklyn Griffiths, "A Tendency Analysis of Soviet Policy-making," ibid., pp. 335-377.

<sup>5</sup>Inconsistency of this kind may however be risky: two promising leaders who favoured internal reforms and an external policy of militant anti-imperialism ran into trouble (N.N. Voznesensky and N.G. Yegorychev).

<sup>6</sup>Sh. Sanakoev, who customarily takes a very harsh and propagandistic view of Western policies in Europe, has

provided the East Europeans with a recent reminder on this point: for a socialist country to "ignore" Soviet requirements for globally effective foreign policy and the consolidation of the socialist system could lead to "consequences for it that were very serious indeed." "Socialist Countries' Struggle for European Security," International Affairs, No. 4, 1972, p. 7.

<sup>7</sup>"In the contemporary epoch the sole source of the war danger is imperialism." Lt.-Col. D. Kazakov, "Imperializm -- istochnik voennoi opasnosti" [Imperialism: the Source of the War Danger], Kommunist vooruzhannykh sil, No. 15, 1969, p. 11. See also S. Barentev, "Imperializm -- istochnik voyn" [Imperialism: the Source of Wars], ibid., No. 21, 1972, p. 73. This journal is hereafter cited as KVS. It has been suggested that Shelepin favours the Chinese view of things. Gerald Segal, "Personalities and Issues," Survey, No. 2, 1971, pp. 60-62. An implicit acceptance of Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev is to be found in V. Golikov, "Vazhnyi printsip leninskoi vneshnei politiki" [An Important Principle of Leninist Foreign Policy], Kommunist, No. 18, 1965, pp. 91-99. Golikov was identified as one of Brezhnev's personal assistants in the proceedings of the Twenty-third CPSU Congress (but not at the Twenty-fourth), and was the subject of a samizdat attack by Roy Medvedev, Faut-il réhabiliter Staline? (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969),

pp. 36-72. On the other hand, he was cited favourably by a certain V.I. Popov, who went on to criticize "a pacifist treatment of the principle of peaceful coexistence" in the work of unnamed Soviet authors. "Vneshnyaya politika SSSR" [The Foreign Policy of the USSR], Voprosy istorii, No. 10, 1966, p. 157. In 1972, Popov reappeared as the editor of a volume on the European security question, the spirit of which is suggested by its concluding passage, entitled "Relentlessly expose the falsifiers!" Sovetskaya vneshnyaya politika i evropeiskaya bezopasnost [Soviet Foreign Policy and European Security] (Moscow: 'Meshdunarodnye otnosheniya', 1972).

<sup>8</sup> Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

<sup>9</sup> The principal exponents of this policy orientation are F.M. Burlatskii, G.A. Arbatov, and N.N. Inozemtsev. See, for example, Burlatskii's Gosudarstvo i kommunizm [The State and Communism] (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1963), and Lenin, gosudarstvo i politika [Lenin, the State, and Politics] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970).

<sup>10</sup> Andrei D. Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (New York: Norton, 1968); and Eugen Varga, "Political Testament," New Left Review, No. 62 (July-August 1970), pp. 31-43.

<sup>11</sup>Iu. Arbatov, "Lenin and the Revolutionary Force of Socialist Example," World Marxist Review, No. 4, 1962, p. 26. Arbatov argued that, "the emphasis laid by the Communist Parties of the socialist countries on promoting economy and culture and on perfecting domestic procedures is proof not of 'isolationist' or 'egoistic' tendencies, but of a correct understanding of the interests both of their own people and the world socialist revolution."

<sup>12</sup>The following is derived in part from N.N. Inozemtsev, "Une Etude soviétique de perspective européenne," Le Monde, November 18, 1972.

<sup>13</sup>Palmer, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>14</sup>See, for example, V. Matveyev, Izvestia, February 1, 1969: "It is precisely those circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie who do not wish to accept that the correlation of forces in the world has changed over the last twenty years to the disfavour of the imperialists, who are ready to seize onto Mao Tse-tung as onto a lifebelt."

<sup>15</sup>Lawrence L. Whetten, "Recent Changes in East European Approaches to European Security," The World Today, July 1970, pp. 283-284. Washington was informed of the new Soviet attitude toward its participation in December 1969 prior to the Brussels NATO Council session. "Press Conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry," New Times, No. 4, 1970, p. 16.

<sup>16</sup>Moscow Radio Home Service, 1900 GMT, November 15, 1972.

<sup>17</sup>For example, the comment that "common viewpoints have been reached on all fundamental positions for the agenda." Moscow Radio Home Service, 0900 GMT, February 11, 1973. Contrasting assessments of the CSCE in the Soviet media will be considered below.

<sup>18</sup>For example, L.I. Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom [In the Leninist Way] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), Vol. II, p. 123 and, elliptically, pp. 412-413; Gromyko, loc. cit.; A. Gromyko, Pravda, November 24, 1972; or N. Inozemtsev, "Imperialist Strategy Today," World Marxist Review, No. 3, 1969, p. 46.

<sup>19</sup>V. Zagladin, "Revoliutsionnyi protses i mezhdunarodnaya politika SSSR" [The Revolutionary Process and the International Policy of the USSR], Kommunist, No. 13, 1972, pp. 22-23.

<sup>20</sup>A.O. Chubaryan, "V.I. Lenin i Genua" [V.I. Lenin and Genoa], Istoriya SSSR, No. 2, 1970, p. 36.

<sup>21</sup>A discussion of Soviet policy in this period is available in Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament," Slavic Review, XXIII (1964), No. 3, pp. 504-525; and much more briefly in Franklyn Griffiths, "Origins of Peaceful Coexistence: A Historical Note," Survey, No. 50 (January 1964), pp. 195-201.

<sup>22</sup>V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya [Works], 4th ed., Vol. 37, pp. 225-226.

<sup>23</sup>pravda, April 12, 1964.

<sup>24</sup>G.V. Chicherin, Stati i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoi politiki [Articles and Speeches on Questions of International Politics] (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1961), pp. 292-293.

<sup>25</sup>B.E. Shtein, "V.I. Lenin i Genuezskaya konferentsiya 1922 goda" [V.I. Lenin and the Genoa Conference of 1922], Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, Seriya IX: Istoricheskie nauki, No. 2, 1960, p. 17. Shtein was a member of the Genoa delegation. See also an essay on the fiftieth anniversary of Genoa, by V. Buryakov, "Lenin's Diplomacy in Action," International Affairs, No. 5, 1972, p. 97.

<sup>26</sup>Clemens, op. cit., p. 514.

<sup>27</sup>That the Soviet peace effort was directed to the prevention of war between capitalist states was later recorded by Stalin. See I.V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, p. 329.

<sup>28</sup>V.I. Lenin, Leninskii sbornik [Lenin Miscellany], Vol. 36, pp. 451-454.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 455.

<sup>30</sup>pravda, April 22, 1964.



<sup>31</sup>Chubaryan, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>33</sup>Stalin, Works, Vol. 10, pp. 48-49.

<sup>34</sup>Chubaryan, op. cit., p. 39 and ff, which is also the source of the following commentary on the intra-Party debate of 1922.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>36</sup>I. Kulkov and V. Trepalkov, "Novye dokumenty o vnesheii politiki Sovetskogo gosudarstva" [New Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State], Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, No. 4, 1960, p. 147. This periodical will hereafter be cited as MEMO.

<sup>37</sup>Val. Zorin, "Marksizm-Leninizm i problema razoruzheniya" [Marxism-Leninism and the Problem of Disarmament], ibid., No. 9, 1963, p. 28.

<sup>38</sup>A.N. Yakovlev, Ideologiya amerikanskoi 'imperii' [The Ideology of the American 'Empire'] (Moscow: Mysl, 1967), p. 191. Yakovlev then goes on to quote Lenin's words that, "It is not a matter of indifference...."

<sup>39</sup>Burlatskii, Lenin, gosudarstvo, politika, p. 110.

<sup>40</sup>Iu. Arbatov, Pravda, January 5, 1965, and May 5, 1971.

<sup>41</sup>Television interview with N.S. Khrushchev, National Broadcasting Company, July 12, 1967. Cited in James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 1.

<sup>42</sup>Moscow Radio Home Service, 1900 GMT, November 13, 1972.

<sup>43</sup>Yuri Zhukov, "The Destinies of Europe," World Marxist Review, No. 10, 1970, pp. 16-21.

<sup>44</sup>For example, O. Bykov in "Zadachi i perspektivy evropeiskoi bezopasnosti" [The Tasks and Prospects of European Security], MEMO, No. 5, 1972, p. 101.

<sup>45</sup>B. Khalosha in ibid., No. 6, 1972, p. 85; Anat. Gromyko, "U.S. Heavyweight in the European Ring," International Affairs, No. 2, 1971, pp. 19 and 23; Iu. Kostko, "Voennaya konfrontatsiya i problema bezopasnosti v Evrope" [Military Confrontation and the Problem of Security in Europe], MEMO, No. 9, 1972, p. 24; and D. Proektor, "Na puti k evropeiskoi bezopasnosti" [On the Way to European Security], Kommunist, No. 3, 1970, p. 81.

<sup>46</sup>Bykov, loc. cit.

<sup>47</sup>M. Abakov, "Sovetskii Siouz i evropeiskaya bezopasnost" [The Soviet Union and European Security], KVS, No. 18, 1972, p. 88; F.N. Novoseltsev, "Sovetsko-amerikanskie peregovory v verkhakh i evropeiskaya bezopasnost" [The Soviet-

American Summit Talks and European Security<sup>7</sup>, SShA, No. 12, 1972, p. 53; and A. Zholkover on Radio Moscow in Czech to Czechoslovakia, 1800 GMT, December 14, 1972.

<sup>48</sup>O. Bykov, "Detente and the Stance of Western Politologists," World Marxist Review, No. 6, 1971, pp. 98-99.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>See, for example, V.S. Zorin, Monopolii i politika SShA [The Monopolies and Politics in the USA] (Moscow: 'Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya', 1960), pp. 61-72; and Zorin, Nekoronovannyya koroli Ameriki [The Uncrowned Kings of America] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), esp. pp. 45-47.

<sup>51</sup>E.S. Shershnev, "Sovetsko-amerikanskije ekonomicheskie otnosheniya: ikh perspektivy" [Soviet-American Economic Relations: Prospects], SShA, No. 1, 1973, pp. 18-28. See also V. Matveyev, Izvestia, January 22, 1972.

<sup>52</sup>Iu. Shishkov in "Zadachi i perspektivy...", MEMO, No. 6, 1972, p. 90.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>54</sup>The preceding is largely from Novoseltsev, op. cit., pp. 43-54.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>56</sup>V. Matveyev, "Washington's New Doctrines," International Affairs, No. 4, 1971, p. 30.

<sup>57</sup>Novoseltsev, op. cit., p. 45. See also Anat. Gromyko, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>58</sup>Khalosha, loc. cit.

<sup>59</sup>For example, G. Ponomarev, "Novyi etap borby za evropeiskoe soveshchanie" [A New Stage in the Struggle for a European Conference], MEMO, No. 4, 1972, pp. 8-10.

<sup>60</sup>Khalosha, op. cit., p. 86; and Proektor, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>61</sup>Proektor, op. cit., p. 84; T. Timoveyev, "The Role of Social Forces in Action for European Security," International Affairs, No. 2, 1972, p. 30; and V. Zagladin and V. Shaposhnikov, "Evropeiskaya obshchestvennost i mir v Evrope" [The European Public and Peace in Europe], Kommunist, No. 16, 1972, p. 83ff.

<sup>62</sup>Editorial, "All-European Conference, An Important Stage in the Elaboration of a Security System in Europe," International Affairs, No. 5, 1972, p. 69.

<sup>63</sup>*Novoseltsev*  
pravda, April 7, 1971.

<sup>64</sup>The article appeared in the April 1972 issue.

<sup>65</sup>Pravda, January 27, 1972.

<sup>66</sup>Chussudovsky, op. cit., p. 576.

<sup>67</sup>Chubaryan, op. cit.

<sup>68</sup>Col. V. Aleksseyev, "Razoblachanie burzhuaznoi ideologii -- vazhnyi uchastok ideologicheskoi borby" [The Exposure of Bourgeois Ideology: An Important Component of Ideological Struggle], KVS, No. 10, 1972, p. 14; S. Beglov, Sovetskaya Rossiya, February 9, 1973; and Col. E. Rybkin, "V poiskakh vykhoda iz tupika" [Searching for an Out], KVS, No. 1, 1973, p. 26.

<sup>69</sup>The New York Times, October 26, 1971.

<sup>70</sup>See Suslov's speech to the Twentieth Congress of the French Communist Party, as reported in Pravda, December 15, 1972.

<sup>71</sup>Pravda, December 22, 1972. Brezhnev's proposal had previously been aired by Zagladin and Shaposhnikov, op. cit., pp. 92-93. These authors also took the trouble to point out that the East was sending out ten times the "artistic literature" it was receiving from the West. Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>72</sup>Col. V. Serebryannikov and Col. M. Yasiukov, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i zashchita sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [Peaceful Coexistence and the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland], KVS, No. 16, 1972, p. 14.

<sup>73</sup>Alekseyev, loc. cit., and Rybkin, loc. cit.

<sup>74</sup>Pravda, December 15, 1972.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., September 14, 1972.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid., September 15, 1972.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., January 5, 1973.

<sup>78</sup>Chubaryan, op. cit., p. 48.

<sup>79</sup>The New York Times, October 26, 1971. The Foreign Ministry official in charge of the CSCE is V.V. Kuznetsov, a Deputy Minister, Central Committee member, and well-known executor of priority assignments.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., February 22, 1973. Since then the Soviets have evidently surprised Washington by proposing a limitation on multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. Le Devoir, March 9, 1973.

<sup>81</sup>This is Inozemtsev's forecast. "Une Etude sovietique...."

<sup>82</sup>That Soviet leaders are capable of an assessment which flies in the face of official propaganda on the danger of war is indicated by Khrushchev's comments: "[we] have a good situation. They frighten us with war, and we frighten them back bit by bit. They threaten us with nuclear arms and we tell them: 'Listen, now only fools can do this, because we

have them too....So why do foolish things and try to frighten us?' This is the situation, and this is why we consider the situation to be good." Speech of May 15, 1962, quoted in Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 107.

<sup>83</sup>Kulish, loc. cit.

<sup>84</sup>Cf Inozemtsev, "Une Etude Sovietique...."

<sup>85</sup>Cf Brezhnev's comment to this effect. Pravda, March 21, 1972.

<sup>86</sup>David Holloway, "The Warsaw Pact in the Era of Negotiation," Survival, November-December 1972, p. 277.

<sup>87</sup>On this last point see Karl E. Birnbaum, "Pan-European Perspectives after the Berlin Agreement," International Journal, XXVII (1971-1972), No. 1, p. 43.

<sup>88</sup>Inozemtsev, "Une Etude sovietique...."

<sup>89</sup>Richard Davy, "The European Security Conference and the Politics of Eastern Europe," The World Today, July 1972, p. 289.

<sup>90</sup>Cf the observation that in coordinating foreign policy "the essence of the problem consists in skillfully combining the national interests of the socialist states with one

another and also with general, international interests." In calling for a "free exchange of opinions," the author quotes Brezhnev's remark that "Sovereign socialist states, which experience uneven conditions, may possibly have different approaches to the solution of various individual problems and different interests on particular questions of either domestic or foreign policy." A. Bovin, Izvestia, August 17, 1972. Cf Sanakoev in note 6 above.

<sup>91</sup>Peter G. Peterson, "U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era," U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., August 1972, p. 28. The following analysis of Soviet economic policy also owes something to an unpublished paper on Soviet priorities by Dr. John P. Hardt of the U.S. Library of Congress. In addition, see the papers by Hardt and others in Norton P. Dodge, ed., "Analysis of the USSR's 24th Party Congress and the 9th Five Year Plan," published for the Washington Chapter of the AAASS by the Cremonia Foundation, Mechanicsville, Md., 1971.

<sup>92</sup>Pravda, April 7, 1971.

<sup>93</sup>The figure for growth in 1971 is from Peterson, loc. cit. The 1972 figure was released in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, March 7, 1973.

<sup>94</sup>Pravda, March 21, 1972, and December 21, 1972.



<sup>95</sup>The fear of political vulnerability as a result of economic dependence is expressed by Iu. Kormnov, "Problema obshcheevropeiskogo khozyaistvennogo sotrudnichestva" [The Problem of All-European Economic Cooperation], MEMO, No. 5, 1972, p. 11.

<sup>96</sup>See p. 1 above. The following evaluations of Soviet conduct also fall into this category: "to bring about the eventual withdrawal of American military power, to encourage the European nations to lose interest in NATO, to keep them weak and divided, and to bring them to an impotent and controlled neutral status"; and "(1) to hasten American withdrawal from Europe; (2) to gain final acceptance of the status quo in East Europe; (3) once again to inhibit further European integration, especially in the field of defense." See, respectively, John C. Campbell, "Soviet-American Relations," Current History, October 1971, p. 195; and Antony Hartley, "Europe Between the Superpowers," Foreign Affairs, No. 2, 1971, p. 277.

<sup>97</sup>Peter G. Dobell, "Europe: Canada's Last Chance?" International Journal, XXVII (1971-1972), No. 1, pp. 113-133. See also the statement of the Hon. Mitchell Sharp, "Canada, the EEC and the United States," Statements and Speeches, No. 72/73, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.



