

External Affairs  
Supplementary Paper

No. 65/3

ADDRESS BY MR. ARNOLD SMITH  
ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CANADA  
TO THE CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN  
LONDON, MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1965.

CANADA, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE WORLD

It is the kind of understatement to be expected from a diplomat asked to talk about Canada's place in international affairs, to say that it is a pleasure to be in London, and an honour to be asked to speak to you this evening at the Canadian Universities Society. But I must make it clear that I am not, tonight, speaking as a diplomat: I speak not at all as a representative of my government -- merely as an individual, expressing personal views about our country's role in the world. In addressing so distinguished a group of Canadians in this capital of the Commonwealth, I am moved to make a patriotic speech, though I realise that nothing could be more old-fashioned. Instead of understatement I shall simplify and generalise to the point of appearing to exaggerate, since I want to suggest factors which seem to me basic and recurrent, and shall not take up your time with the obvious qualifying shadings needed to round out accounts of particular events.

I am glad to see so many Canadian students here this evening. I hope you are enjoying your years here as much as I enjoyed mine, at Oxford and Gray's Inn, in the 1930's. I also hope that some of you, afterwards, may decide to go into domestic political life in Canada, and some into my own profession of world politics, or the Foreign Service. There is a lot to be done in these fields - enormous scope and challenge. And I can promise that you will not find it boring.

Until recently many Canadians tended to think that their politics were somehow duller than those of many other countries. I doubt if this was ever true, but Canadians have sometimes thought that colourlessness was a national characteristic, or even a virtue. Mackenzie King even developed a conscious political technique of trying to avoid saying anything memorable, lest it be recalled later and in changed circumstances quoted damagingly against him. It was not until long afterwards that most Canadians realized how astonishingly colourful, under his protective coating of grey, that incredible Canadian was. I often think of an observation he once made to a few civil servants on his staff:

"In a democracy the ship of state is a sailing ship:

It has no steam. It is subject to all the winds of

opinion. You have to tack a lot, but if you know how

to navigate, you can get where you wish."

Mackenzie King was very far from being superficial or ordinary, though he sometimes liked to seem so. Personally I prefer the Churchill style. But King's technique of seeking the protective colouration of the common man is a refreshing contrast to the more common modern technique of little politicians in so many

countries, carefully cultivating an artificial image of creativity and significance that isn't really there.

In any case, few Canadians think that their politics are dull today. Many wish they were a little duller. I do not want to boast about the superior excitements of current Canadian politics. If one must have a scandal, Miss Keeler is doubtless more attractive than Lucien Rivard. But if people here think it is precarious governing with a majority of only four, it is worth remembering that in Ottawa the government has had to get along lately with a majority of minus three.

I do not intend to discuss our domestic politics of the moment, however, exciting though they are. I want to talk about certain aspects of our attitudes and policies towards our neighbours, which seem to me of long-term significance.

Two thousand years ago, one young Jew asked another, "Who is my neighbour?" The response, instead of a definition, was the story of the Good Samaritan and the reformulation of the question itself into "Who was more neighbourly?" This question has come ringing down the ages, transforming and inspiring new patterns of behaviour and institutions. The point is that the scale of neighbourhood is merely a fact, measured I suppose by how far men can conveniently communicate or visit or trade or throw things. As time goes on, technological developments increase this scale. Today, in the age of shortwave radio and Telstar television, jet planes and inter-continental missiles, the scale of neighbourhood and interdependence is already global. But though neighbourhood itself is merely a fact, good neighbourliness is a

moral and political achievement. The problem is how to make our progress in this moral and political field keep pace with that of technology.

I believe that Canadians have helped significantly here, and can help more.

I suppose that the oldest and most continuing element in the attitudes which have shaped Canadians' external policies has been an awareness that we are not enough by ourselves: We are far from self-sufficient, either economically or for defence. This awareness of our own inadequacy has had as an immediate corollary a reaching out for contacts and associations, in order to overcome it. It has meant from the beginning a refusal, for example, to turn our backs on Europe, and a determination to retain and nourish our association with Britain and the other democracies of this older continent. This attitude is not to be explained merely as the piety of sentiment natural to immigrants. The United States, like Canada, was settled by immigrants from across the water. Their first and instinctive reaction was precisely to turn their backs on the old lands, and to avoid entangling alliances. The opposite Canadian reaction led to the invention of the Commonwealth of Nations and more recently of NATO.

In a real sense the Commonwealth is a product of the desire and determination of Canadians to have things both ways. In politics the desire to have it both ways is not necessarily shabby; it can be one of the most creative of political forces. The desire of Canadians not to cut our links with Europe can be

explained in part by the fact that Canada, unlike the United States, had been settled mainly by fishermen and fur-traders, who exported to Europe and wished to retain commercial links: but more I think by the fact that as a smaller and weaker group than our American neighbours, we had been concerned about possible dangers to our own independence if in the early stages we were to be left alone with them, in a huge and remote continent.

Canadians have always had the same desire for freedom and self-determination as the Americans, but since for these reasons of prudence we did not wish to cut right through the umbilical cord of colonialism in 1867, we found it necessary, in order to have things both ways, to pull and stretch that umbilical cord out of all recognition, into a quite new shape of political association between equals.

A couple of years ago, in Moscow at the beginning of July, I was invited to make a speech as Canadian Ambassador to a large gathering of Russians - professors, editors, scientists, and a sprinkling of officials, about Canada's National Day. All Russians are brought up by compulsory courses in Marxism-Leninism at their schools and universities to be much concerned about roads to national independence and freedom; so it seemed to me too good an opportunity to miss. These people were not political leaders, but they were more or less prominent members of the intelligentsia, and I was happy to have the opportunity of telling them about our particular road to independence. In our colonial days there had been quite a lot of political struggle over a prolonged period and a bit of fighting in 1837; but the fighting

was called off well short of a clear-cut decision either way. I explained why the Canadians of the last century had wished to avoid a complete severance of association with Britain: the fear of a stronger neighbour was a consideration which my Russian audience found it easy to understand. Basically, I pointed out, Canadians got their independence from the imperial power not by violence but by a gradual process of pressure and persuasion and dialogue, leading to a series of agreements and precedents used in turn as a basis for further political development. This particular road to independence by dialogue and agreement was I admitted by no means always possible for all colonial people: whether it proved possible in any particular case depended in part on willingness by the imperial power to be persuaded and to accept changes and make concessions. But I emphasized that in cases where it did prove possible, it had tremendous advantages for both sides. When it was feasible, it was a much better road than the alternative, which some political philosophers had claimed is inevitable or even desirable, of violent revolution. As I told my Soviet friends, the road which we Canadians pioneered has since been followed not only by other ex-European settlers overseas in Australia and New Zealand, but also by the peoples of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, of Nigeria and Kenya, of Jamaica and Trinidad and many other territories in every continent.

The implications of this particular path to independence, by persuasion and dialogue, were I suggested tremendous, not only for doctrines of political science -- they are directly contrary to the theses of classical Marxism and Leninism, for example,

though I did not need to rub this in to that audience --- but for the future, since they can leave a heritage not of bitterness and resentment and misunderstanding, but rather of friendship and cooperation and mutual aid, which can prove of value if we are ever to achieve peaceful co-existence and, transcending that, a truly civilized world in which nations cooperate in the common interest of mankind.

I was not surprised that despite indications beforehand the tape recording of my little Russian speech was not in fact broadcast on the Soviet radio. The implications of these political facts of life are too disturbing for classical, orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

Now the main point I want to make is that Canada's historic invention of and attachment to the Commonwealth association, though it sprang in part from our concern about being left alone on an isolated continent with a much more powerful neighbour, and was largely a reaction to real or apprehended American pressure, was also in part based I think on a genuine and constructive vision that in the long term a satisfactory international environment for us must be more than continental. It was not merely defensive, but creative. That reaching out for overseas friends was a sound instinct. Ultimately, as we now know more clearly than earlier generations, our community of friendship must become global if humanity is not someday to blow itself up.

This search for, and cherishing of overseas links is, I think, the deepest continuing element in Canadians' attitude

to international affairs. It is much older than 1867. It explains, and justifies for me, the refusal of Canadians to join in the American revolution in the 18th century. It explains our successful search for a new road to independence without severing links with Europe, to which I referred a moment ago.

Apprehensions about American pressure also played a part in the decision of Canadian colonials a century ago to confederate into a great nation spanning half a continent. You will remember/that during the years just before 1867 the Yankees had won a tremendous civil war, and many of them were imbued with the idea that it was the manifest destiny of Americans to harness the whole continent for their particular version of freedom. You will recall the American election slogan of "Fifty-four forty or fight". These things, and the fear that they engendered among many nineteenth century Canadians, played a real part in impelling the disparate colonies of British North America, including particularly the French-speaking Canadians of Lower Canada, to join together for greater security, greater borrowing capacity, and a more confident future in independence. A distinguished historian has suggested that our French-speaking compatriots were determined in the last century to remain British precisely because they were French and planned to stay that way. They feared that if incorporated within the great American Republic their culture would be swamped in the melting pot.

More recently, I remember myself being involved, in the years just after World War II, in periods of concern in Ottawa



about the danger of neo-isolationism, or theories of continentalism, fired by exasperated impatience with allies, which could lead to the development of a "Fortress America" strategy and a policy limited to our own continent. Tomorrow this concept could again become serious, particularly if Europeans were to adopt an essentially continentalist outlook. The development of very long-range aircraft and of ICBM's and earth satellites, and polaris submarines, make continental isolation more conceivable, for the western hemisphere: but they make it no less undesirable and inadequate as we see it. We Canadians certainly want good continental defences, and we try to play a full part in developing them. But we have always felt deeply that they are not enough, because we want to see our friends also safe, not ourselves alone.

This deep Canadian instinct to reach out for overseas connections and partnership may have begun as a function of sentimental attachment to parent races and of commercial interest in trading relations with Western Europe, and an instinct for self-protection as a relatively small power sharing a continent with a vastly more populous and powerful neighbour. But it has merged and by today I think has become indistinguishable from our sense of realism, our recognition of larger interdependence, and our idealism. It is part of our striving, together with idealists and realists in other parts of the globe, for the establishment of one world, for the development of a community that will be global in scale. One expression of this instinct is the Commonwealth; another is the United Nations which from its inception has been supported very strongly by all Canadian parties and virtually all

sections of our people; a third is NATO.

I want to say a few things about each of these institutions.

The Commonwealth, unlike Venus, did not spring full-grown from anyone's forehead. It has been a gradual evolution, which is still of course going on. The first stage was the determination of Canadians a century ago, to acquire independence while retaining the benefits, and the protection, of association and cooperation with Britain. The second crucial development I think was that led by the Winnipeg Editor Dafoe during World War I and after, in which the legalistic theories of diplomatic unity of the Empire were decisively rejected, and Canada and the other so-called Dominions successfully asserted the claim to independent representation at conferences, beginning with Versailles, and to diplomatic representation in foreign countries.

The Statute of Westminster, with its reference to equality of status, recognized this development but still spoke of a difference of function which seemed to hark back to older theories. But if these other theories had not in fact been gradually discarded, they would have made further development quite impossible. In the 1930's, and indeed during World War II, there were still many advocates, particularly in Britain and Australia, of the opposite concept of an imperial cabinet and a centralization of policy around Downing Street. Mackenzie King led the successful opposition to that concept. He did so for good Canadian reasons, but had he not been successful there would of course have been no conceivable chance of Asians and Africans and others deciding

once they attained independence after World War II, to remain in the family.

Again Canadian leaders built wisely and well, for constructive purposes beyond their own country's immediate needs. And again the French element in Canada was an important factor in our determination to shape the Commonwealth in a way acceptable to peoples of non-Anglo Saxon origin.

Another crucial development which worried some of the constitutional logicians at the time, was the courageous decision of Mr. Nehru that India, when it became a Republic, would like to remain in the Commonwealth: and the equally courageous and by no means obvious decision of the rest of us, in which again Canadians played a key part, that the sovereignty of the crown was not an essential feature of the Commonwealth, and that an independent Republic should be allowed and indeed be encouraged to retain Commonwealth membership when all those involved desired it. By that decision it seems to me that the true majesty of our Queen has been enhanced. Her position as Head of the Commonwealth symbolises and points to a brotherhood which transcends mankind's divisions of sovereignty and race and thereby performs in modern conditions a role subtler but no less creative and I think more durable than tangible empire.

Another key stage in the evolution of the Commonwealth, and here again it was a matter of conscious and agonizing and I think very clear-headed vision, is the firm stand on the principles of racial equality. As my friend John Holmes put it, it has recently come to be recognized that the Commonwealth philosophy

now embraces not only elements of constitutional and legal principles inherited from the British, but also the teachings of Ghandi and Nehru and Julius Nyerere. A few years ago, because of the unanimous abhorrence of racial discrimination by all the other Commonwealth members, South Africa was allowed or forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth because of her policy of apartheid and her denial of racial equality.

Last July the Commonwealth Prime Ministers applied these principles to the constitutionally different and politically very explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia, a territory that is not independent, but is internally self-governing. Here again agreement was by no means easy to reach, nor the decision at all obvious or inevitable.

Some people thought that the situation in Southern Rhodesia should not be discussed at a Commonwealth meeting on the grounds it was in some sense the internal affair of a member country, that is Britain itself. Personally this argument, applied to a dependent territory, has never seemed to me very convincing, particularly so in this case since at the United Nations and elsewhere Britain understandably disclaims responsibility for the racial policy of the government of Southern Rhodesia on the grounds that that territory is self-governing in internal matters. In any case all the Prime Ministers agreed that it should be discussed, and it certainly was.

A more plausible consideration was the danger that discussion of the racial policies and political situation in Southern

Rhodesia might precipitate a unilateral declaration of independence there, which all Commonwealth member governments naturally wish to avoid. Such a unilateral declaration of independence would undoubtedly create a great deal of trouble throughout Africa, and particularly for the people of Southern Rhodesia, white and black. It could lead to the establishment of an African Government in exile, which many countries might recognize, and to commercial and financial and other difficulties of very serious order. It would probably lead to a United Nations demand for the imposition of sanctions.

As against this consideration that talk in London might precipitate rash action in Rhodesia, however, was the opposite one that frank discussion of the subject by the heads of Commonwealth governments, and a firm expression of their views in the public communiqué, might serve to deter such an illegal and unconstitutional unilateral act, by making the dire consequences known in advance to the public of the territory. Moreover, if the Commonwealth meeting failed to discuss a matter of such far-reaching importance, and of such understandable and justifiable concern to Commonwealth members, including particularly of course the African members, then serious doubt would inevitably be cast on the value of political consultation at Commonwealth meetings, and the association itself would inevitably be weakened rather than strengthened. The whole issue gained added point from the fact that in Britain and several other countries, general elections were in the offing at the time, and that several of the heads of government present planned to attend an African Summit Meeting in Cairo shortly after the Commonwealth Meeting.

In the Rhodesian issue in 1964, the Prime Minister of Canada played an extremely important part, as his predecessor had done on the South African issue a few years earlier. Mr. Pearson took the line that it was desirable to face up frankly to the implications of the subject. He put forward a declaration of principle on racial equality, which was approved by all the Prime Ministers and became the first substantive paragraph in the communiqué. He went on to suggest how these principles should be applied to Southern Rhodesia and British Guiana. He suggested that all Commonwealth Governments make it clear in advance that they would not be able to recognize the validity of any unilateral declaration of independence by a Government of Southern Rhodesia elected by only a small minority of its population, largely those of European descent. He suggested that it might strengthen the hand of the British Government and might support moderate elements among Southern Rhodesian voters, if a public stand on this matter were taken, and if an appeal were issued that an independence conference should be convened which the leaders of all parties in Southern Rhodesia should be free to attend - including the leaders of the African parties, who at the time were imprisoned. He also offered, on behalf of the Canadian Government, to provide technical facilities or resources to help speed the training of Africans from Southern Rhodesia to take on new responsibilities of administration, if that should be desired and if those concerned wished to make arrangements to this effect with the Canadian Government.

The Canadian stand last July surprised some of our friends. Yet it seems to me deeply consistent with our history

and traditional outlook. Canadians understand and sympathise with the fears of the European settlers in South Africa, and with their desire to protect the productive heritage which they have developed in their adopted homelands. We too are settlers or the descendants of settlers. But we also have profound sympathy and understanding for the aspirations of Africans who seek full recognition -- political, social, and economic -- of their dignity as human beings, of their inherent claim to equality with any other peoples, of their rights to self-determination. We too are former colonials. We are trying to help the new African states by technical assistance, economic aid, and in some cases by military training for internal security. But these things are not enough. There is a political problem also.

There is danger that a vicious circle of reciprocally increasing fear, frustration, and extremism on both sides could lead to tragedy, in this inter-racial problem in Southern Africa, of significance far beyond that region, affecting the attitudes of whole races and continents. There are third parties anxious to exacerbate and exploit the tension and hostilities between Africans and whites, for ulterior purposes of their own. To avoid deepening the divisions of humanity, moderation, generosity of vision, and moral courage will be needed on all sides. The posture and policies of the régimes South of the Zambesi, and the attitudes of the independent leaders of Africa, inevitably react on each other, for good or evil. The postures and policies adopted by western democracies toward these racial problems inevitably influence both, one way or the other. In this sort of problem, where so much is at stake, frank consultation and the search for mutual under-

standing can be invaluable. This is one of the situations, it seems to me, in which Commonwealth associations can be used in a way to help significantly. We will need all the help we can get in dealing with the problems of inter-race relations. They will not be quickly or easily resolved.

I think it is not too much to say that the Canadian stand at the Conference last July proved decisive in the difficult decision to grasp the nettle of race relations, and that this marked an important stage in strengthening the Commonwealth association itself as well as in assisting those concerned in dealing with the difficult and complicated problem of Southern Rhodesia. You will recall that last October the British Government itself issued a strong public warning about the dangers of a unilateral declaration of independence, basing itself on the Communiqué of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting a few months previously and reaffirming the line there decided upon.

I wish I could suggest that the Commonwealth Meeting succeeded in solving the difficult problem in Southern Rhodesia. It did not. It did, I think help significantly to avoid the drastic deterioration there which at the time seemed imminent. It improved the prospects at least for the time being, of an eventual moderate and agreed solution. It also undoubtedly played a major part in giving the African leaders, many of whom were attending their first Commonwealth meeting since their countries had only recently become independent, a favourable and positive assessment of the potential value of Commonwealth membership and consultations.



This appreciation of the value of political consultation, on the part of the newer members, was important, I think, in leading to the proposal put forward by President Nkrumah of Ghana, and strongly supported by the Prime Minister of Ceylon and the heads of other African and Southeast Asian governments present, for the establishment of a small central Commonwealth Secretariat to facilitate and service more consultation. This can mark the beginning of a new stage in the evolution of our multi-racial association. In the development of this new stage it will be important to proceed cautiously, pragmatically, gradually, but with vision, as in the past.

An English wit once suggested that his country had acquired the British Empire in a prolonged fit of absence of mind. This was never very true, I think, even of the Empire. But certainly the Commonwealth has been the product of a great deal of presence of mind, the result of a whole series of conscious, courageous, and not always easy decisions, a sequence of acts of faith of which the common thread, it seems to me, has been a creative determination to have things both ways.

Another political creation worth considering is NATO. The proposal that, in order to meet the threat of Soviet expansion into Western Europe, Canada, the United States, Britain, France and other West European countries should get together to establish a collective security organization independent of the veto-ridden United Nations--in other words the first proposal to establish NATC-- also came from Canada. The idea was first put forward publicly by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, in 1948.

It developed out of a great deal of hard thinking in the Canadian External Affairs Department, and at our National Defence College, during the preceding year. It was prompted by precisely the same sort of considerations which had given rise earlier to Canada's interest in the development of the Commonwealth concept; our concern to keep our trans-Atlantic links flourishing: our concern to find international security in numbers and in broad associations: our desire to react constructively to danger. It was a logical expression of Canada's most fundamental attitudes to international affairs.

A couple of years ago I had occasion to try to explain this point to Mr. Khrushchev, to warn him off anti-American gambits.

The Russians, until the end of 1962, tended to work on a theory laid down by Lenin that capitalist countries could not in the long run cooperate among themselves. In their own effort to expand the area of Communist influence and control, they tried to encourage a maximum division in non-Communist parts of the world. They did this by trying to stimulate conflicts not only of class and nation and people, but by seeking to drive wedges wherever possible among non-Communist groupings of any sort. I do not know whether many of you have read a book by Minifie called "Canada - Powder-Monkey or Peacemaker" but when I was Ambassador in Moscow, from 1961 until the end of 1963, I found that several Russian officials had. It made them salivate. Anti-American or neutralist feeling in Canada, if it could be carried to the extent that we would leave NATO, could be important not only in itself, but because, in their view, it might encourage similar developments

elsewhere. The Russians obviously realized that if Canada should become neutralist then in addition to the effect this would have on North American defence, and therefore on the defence of the main deterrent of the West, it would encourage similar neutralist tendencies in Scandinavia, and in Italy, and elsewhere; and that it would encourage anti-Americanism also in Latin America. It could, therefore, be of tremendous political and strategic advantage to them. This seemed to me one good reason for Canada not becoming neutralist.

So once in a conversation with Mr. Kurushchev, I told him that I was tired of the repeated attempts by Soviet officials to drive wedges between Canadians and the Americans, and that they were very counterproductive from his country's point of view since they served merely to make us suspicious of their real long-range intentions. To drive my point home, I told him that it was Canada that had first suggested the organization of a North Atlantic alliance. I told him why we had done so, and why this was a logical development of our whole outlook on international affairs. I told him something of the facts that I have been mentioning about Canada's interest in overseas connections, and reminded him that in 1914 and again in 1939, Canadians had joined in World Wars I and II within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, because we had assessed that the aggression of German imperialism against the democracies of Western Europe involved a vital threat also to democracy in North America. In each case it had taken about 2½ years, until 1917 and 1941, until the American people had come around to sharing Canada's assessment of the common danger to our common freedom.

I suggested to Mr. Khrushchev that in view of this history it was not surprising that Canada should have been the first to suggest the establishment of NATO. We had felt that if there were ever to be a third World War, precipitated by Soviet moves against Western Europe, we might not be able to afford another thirty-month wait for the Americans to join us! And we believed too that the best chance of deterring and preventing such a war would be to ensure that both North American democracies were publicly and formally engaged ahead of time in a cooperative and collective defence commitment with the West European democracies.

I suggested to Mr. Khrushchev that this collective approach by Canada was fundamental to our whole outlook on world politics, and that in his dealing with us, he should recognize that while we did not hesitate when it seemed right to take a different assessment of a common interest from that of our American or British or other friends, as our actions in 1914, 1939, 1956 and various other occasions had shown, nevertheless we did recognize that our basic interests were common and shared with them. Any attempt by outsiders to drive wedges between us merely made us suspicious and were doomed to failure.

I am glad to say that Khrushchev, who was an extremely intelligent man, took this point, unlike many of his officials and colleagues. This was the last attempt at wedge-driving which the Russians tried on me.

NATO was founded as a military alliance. It has the potentiality of being much more than that: to a significant extent it already is much more. General de Gaulle, as you know, is in the habit of drawing a sharp distinction between the Alliance, whose continuing necessity he recognizes, and the Organization, and the present appropriateness

Many of our French friends want to of which he expresses his doubts. retain the Alliance, but apparently in a more old-fashioned form as something that would become operative in war, and they want to have less peacetime international or potentially supra-national organization. Some of us, on the other hand, want more consultative and cooperative peace-time machinery, not less. Certainly the shape of the organization needs periodic up-dating to match changed circumstances. But that is a different question.

The point is that the North Atlantic community, as a community, is a very old concept in Canadian thinking. The North Atlantic triangle was a basic concept in Canadians' attitude towards world politics, long before NATO became a twinkle even in Canadian eyes. From what I have already said it will be clear to you that Canadians have always tended to see the Atlantic Ocean as a link, rather than a dividing element, between North America and Europe. It has facilitated cheap transport, for trade, for immigration, for cultural and linguistic contacts, for tourism and educational cooperation, from the beginning of the modern period of history. As I suggested some years ago in a lecture at the Collège d'Europe in Bruges, in speaking against the there popular concept of a separate European continentalism, it seems to me that North America and Western Europe have, for centuries, indeed from the first discovery of our new hemisphere, been closer together in almost every way, than Western Europe and Eastern Europe have ever been. This goes for languages, for culture, for the movement and contact of peoples, for kinship of populations, as well as for political and commercial and strategic relations. It seems to me that the North Atlantic today and in recent centuries, like the Mediterranean in earlier millennia, has been a unifying rather than a dividing

...22

element for those who live around its shores. One could almost say the unifying element. This belief is, I think, fundamental to the deepest Canadian instincts and outlooks and policies.

It is therefore not surprising that Canada supplied one of the three Wise Men who advocated some years ago the development of the North Atlantic Council into a forum for consultation on all sorts of political matters. Even earlier on, it is not surprising that it was Canada which pressed for the inclusion of Article 2 in the North Atlantic Treaty, providing for cooperation between the signatory governments in all sorts of economic and other non-military areas.

This Canadian attitude to NATO is not unchallenged, nor has it been a complete success. The question is still a live one, the future still to be shaped. The point I want to make is that the Canadian attitude flows logically out of our deepest historical instincts and attitudes to world affairs.

It is a question, whether with the tremendous and very welcome increase in Western Europe's economic productivity and general political, financial and potential military strength, NATO should be re-organized into a so-called dumb-bell involving a separate European grouping on one side of the Atlantic, and a North American grouping on the other, the two linked by a relatively thin connecting tissue: or whether, with the increasing strength of various members of the community, the adaptation which is in any case necessary should retain and deepen the institutions of community on a transatlantic basis. My own preference is certainly for the latter.

The cardinal point is not, I think one of military need, but of where we want to end up. As I see it, the art of creative statesmanship is so to shape the response to an external danger as to develop institutions which can not only ward off the present threat

but can serve a useful and creative purpose also later on, long after the external danger has passed into limbo, and the former enemies have become reliable and valued friends. One instance of this type of creative statesmanship in response to external fear was the establishment of the United States of America. The Cooperation of the thirteen colonies, in the latter part of the 18th century, was I think made possible only by their common fear of England. Without that fear, the establishment of the union would not have been practical politics. A similar Canadian example, nearly a century later, was the decision of the French-speaking and English-speaking colonies in the northern part of North America to confederate, impelled in significant part, as I have already suggested, by the fear of American neighbours. The Fathers of Canadian Confederation created something which is constructive in its own right, and goes on giving warmth and creative scope to its children long after the Americans have not only ceased to threaten us, but indeed have become our close friends and allies. I have suggested that the establishment and evolution of the Commonwealth has been a similar example of creative statesmanship, developing institutions and associations which serve constructive purposes for many peoples far beyond the immediate areas and issues which gave originally its shape.

NATC, it seems to me, is another instance of creative statesmanship of this order. It has involved the development, at least on an embryonic scale, of some of the institutions for consultation and decision-making, and thus of an effective political community among the democracies of the North Atlantic: the beginning of the re-establishment, if you like, of the political cohesion and unity of Western Christendom. I know, of course, that not all NATO countries are Christian: I welcome Turkey's adherence. I know, too, that a number of important countries in

Western Christendom, notably those in Latin America, are not members. These facts qualify, but to my mind do not negate, the point I have suggested. Personally I have never considered NATO primarily anti-Russian, though its defensive role has been vital, and still for a time is so. Personally, I hope that NATO will continue in appropriately revised form long after the Russians, a people whom I know and greatly like, have become fast and reliable friends of the West.

It seems to me that humanity needs to move toward more effectively articulated community, on a larger scale. Toynbee suggested that the real units of history have been not nations but the various civilizations. I agree with him. Today, it seems to me --- and the more I see in my professional work, the more convinced I become of this --- that the real unit of effective foreign policy is not the nation-state. Even the very great ones, such as the USA, or the USSR, are too small today for effective independent foreign policies. The real unit of effective foreign policy is, I think, the large coalition.

But we are already transcending that period where even the civilization-wide coalition is adequate as the unit of policy: we are rapidly approaching the stage where we need to think, and to act, in terms of the world community as a whole. That is why I prefer to call my own field of work world politics: the concept of national foreign policy is not enough. It would be a tragedy if we should miss the opportunities for creative statesmanship in moving toward the development of these broader institutions of community. We should continue to use the temporary impulses of fear, the needs of defence, men's willingness to improvise in periods of crisis, to help nudge humanity forward towards the new and broader institutions which are for their own sake desirable as steps toward an effective one-world community.



That brings me to the subject of the United Nations, on which I would like to say a few words.

From its inception Canadians have tended to take the United Nations very seriously, and to attach importance to seizing such opportunities as we can find for strengthening it, for preserving and enhancing its authority, and in general for developing it as an instrument to broaden and deepen the organization of world-wide community. Many of our friends in this and other European countries have thought from time to time, when policies have differed, that Canadians were rather naively idealistic about the U.N. Perhaps so. Most Canadians think, however, that we have been realistic, and that measured idealism and disciplined vision are essential ingredients of constructive realism.

At the San Francisco Conference, Canadians opposed the grant of what we considered excessive privilege to the so-called great powers. We thought that unrealistic. We tried to modify what seemed to us the arbitrary and artificial constitutional device of dividing the nations of the world into great powers on the one hand, and the rest of us on the other; we urged instead a more flexible recognition that countries were of all sizes and shapes and range of capacities, and we had to supplement, if we could not supplant, the tacit assertion of a sort of divine right of great powers by a general recognition of what we called the "functional" principle. We urged that committees of selected nations, charged with particular responsibilities in particular fields, should not automatically be the five so-called "great powers", but rather should include those countries which seemed capable of contributing most, functionally, to the particular problems involved in the particular case. This viewpoint, which we considered more realistic than the traditional

great-power-small-power dichotomy, tended to give a good bit more scope to countries (such as Canada) which would, we felt, be able and expected to contribute significantly in certain areas. We were not willing to have our cooperation taken for granted while leaving the discretion to our elders and betters in those early days of the U.N. I often used to sit on the Economic and Social Council and at the General Assembly, and the Canadian attitude to the exclusivist pretensions of the big five reminded me of the Americans in the 18th century, who took a stand on the slogan "no taxation without representation". We tried to put the point positively -- "representation, if you expect contributions". We were trying to insist on an adequate voice on the boards of management, if our support was to be expected.

Our attitude to the United Nations was not merely realistic, or merely idealistic. It clearly involved a recognition of where our own best interest lay. The development of a constitutional and quasi-parliamentary framework for international affairs has given far more scope to the so-called middle powers (a concept and term which I believe Canada invented) than the earlier diplomatic traditions ever could have provided. In the early days in the United Nations and other conference situations, countries such as Canada proved able to develop a degree of diplomatic influence which would have been quite impossible without this type of framework.

I remember a series of articles by Sir Yvon Kirkpatrick shortly after he retired as permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs here in Britain, in which he contrasted the United Nations unfavourably with its predecessor, the League of Nations, mainly on the ground that the latter had been made up chiefly of experienced European powers.

This little-Europe nostalgia for the pre-war era struck no favourable chord in Canadian minds. The differences between the League and the U.N. did not seem to most Canadians to discredit the latter. If the Asian and African countries were lacking in diplomatic experience, all the more important to give them some! We too were non-Europeans, fairly new on the international stage, and not perhaps overly-reverent.

It is I think no coincidence, in view of Canada's long-standing attitudes to international affairs, that it was the Canadian delegation, led by Paul Martin, now our Secretary of State for External Affairs, which took the lead in pushing through, in 1955, arrangements which broke the log-jam on membership. The new members thereby admitted were mainly non-European, non-white, ex-colonial and economically underdeveloped. This has changed the character of the U.N. all right. It has eliminated the former almost automatic voting majority at the disposal of the West. That has complicated life for Canada too. But the enlarged UN seems to us essentially healthier. The United Nations today is much more a reflection of the real world in which we live. Some day we must face up to a difficult constitutional problem about responsible voting. But dis-franchisement seems no satisfactory cure, or preventive, for unbalanced or badly weighted voting.

Some 23 centuries ago Aristotle observed that once a society adopts a democratic form of constitution, it becomes inevitable that sooner or later the majority, who are poor, will use their voting strength to get economic benefits from the few, who are rich. The societies of which he was speaking were cities, but his observation was profound, and applies also on our present global scale.

Nationally, the political law which Aristotle pointed out has led to the development of the welfare state in the democracies of the

West. Internationally, that same process is beginning to lead to an emphasis on the problems of economic development, and a need for aid not only through technical assistance and capital grants and loans, but through adjustment of the terms of trade.

These things, it seems to me, are not only inevitable but reasonable and desirable from the point of view of humanity as a whole. If pushed irresponsibly too far or too fast, by voting majorities which do not include the significant trading and donor nations, they might not be effective except in weakening or destroying the international framework. On the other hand, if the legitimate aspirations of the underdeveloped nations are ignored they could prove even more dangerous. I have seen no disposition among Canadians to regret the role which we played in 1955 in broadening the membership of the United Nations toward the goal of universality. The problems ahead of us, in this area, are admittedly difficult. They are also important. The problems of underdevelopment and population explosion would be with us whether or not the U.N. dealt with them. It seems to me good that the world organization should get its teeth into these tasks too.

Canada's main concern thus far, however, in the United Nations -- and we make no apology for this -- has been in the field of peacekeeping. Here too we have seen an opportunity to use situations of danger and international crisis, to get acceptance of creative responses for the development of institutions and habits which can prove useful in themselves things which should have been developed irrespective of the immediate dangers which alone made their establishment politically acceptable by the powers that be. Korea was one example. We played a minor part in that, but we did what we could to help, and welcomed American leadership in the action for collective security.

Canada's role in the development of peacekeeping methods was more prominent in the Suez crisis. Here we took a lead, in an agonizing situation, where there were important differences of opinion between us and our closest friends, in order to accomplish a series of purposes. Our proposal to set up the United Nations Emergency Force was designed to, and did in practice, provide our friends in Britain and France with a face-saving and politically feasible way out of an untenable position into which they had got themselves. It hereby also saved Egypt from further hostilities. It prevented a chain reaction of resignations from the Commonwealth. It preserved the United Nations and respect for international law. Indeed it greatly strengthened the UN by harnessing the political flexibility and willingness of governments to innovate, which the crisis alone made possible, in order to get approval for the development of international peacekeeping machinery. The crisis was thus used to establish a precedent which has been built on since then, in succeeding crises, to strengthen and develop the United Nations, and to limit the risk of these various problem situations spreading out of control.

The United Nations peacekeeping activities in the Congo, the Yemen, and Cyprus are cases in point. In all of these Canadian forces have played a major part. Last autumn we played host to a conference of countries with UN peacekeeping experience, designed to help improve methods and readiness for such operations in the future.

Canada has also been active in international peacekeeping activities in Indochina. The success of these Indochina Commissions is limited. Quite a lot was accomplished in the early period: prisoners were exchanged, refugees, resettled, a Cambodian election supervised and authenticated. Without the international machinery, the situation would clearly have been far worse: for one thing French withdrawal in 1954

would have been politically impossible, and you may recall that the world came very close to the use of nuclear weapons at the time of Dien Bien Phu. But of recent years the effectiveness of the international commissions has been slight. We are hoping that it can be improved. This will depend in part on our two other partners in the Commissions, which are set up on the troika principle, but above all on the intentions of the rulers in Hanoi (and perhaps of their Chinese allies). A key question is whether the attempt to overthrow the regime of South Vietnam by the infiltration of guerilla forces and arms from North Vietnam, will be abandoned, or whether it will not. Whether the Communists can be induced to abandon that attempt, and whether negotiations for a settlement can be started, remains to be seen. I do not propose to comment further on that problem tonight.

I hope I have said enough about peacekeeping problems to suggest to you that Canadian attitudes to these international problems, and to the development of international machinery, involves a certain thread which goes back to the earliest periods in our history. Recognizing that self-sufficiency was for us impossible, whether for security or prosperity or the other key elements of the good life, we have from the beginning sought the solution of our problems in the development of a greater community, which will protect and fulfill but not limit or submerge our national identity: which will give us a fair voice in the decisions that shape our international environment.

We do not think we have always been right by any means. I have seen our policy fairly close up, during the last 25 years, and am all too aware of instances when I think we have been wrong. I am conscious, in particular, of opportunities missed. As a good civil servant I do not intend to discuss those instances here, but I assure you they are

sufficient to prevent any complacency.

On the other hand, we are also aware that our more powerful friends are equally capable of error, and that power is no guarantee that one is always right. This is one of the reasons why we attach great value to the machinery for consultation and persuasion provided by such institutions as the United Nations, NATO, and the Commonwealth.

I have suggested a rather Canada-centric picture of these institutions in the development of which Canada has, I think, played a creditable part. But I would be sorry if you thought I was not very aware that there were other viewpoints no less valid. I will give only one example. I suggested that the Commonwealth was in a sense a Canadian invention. This is, of course, only part of the truth. There is also a view from London which is valid, though it too is partial. It is well symbolized by a huge Rubens-like mural in the main hall of the Foreign Office, showing a buxom mother nursing one child, as I recall it, and surrounded by several others. It is labelled "Britannia Nutrix". I have always delighted in it, and wondered which child was Canada.

I remember at the last meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, which I was fortunate enough to attend as an adviser, that when our discussion turned to the question of prospective further development of the Commonwealth, and the plans for further devolution of self-government and independence for various British colonies, a British spokesman gave a very impressive outline of the Commonwealth, by way of introduction of future prospects. He recalled that to date some 16 or 17 countries which had been governed as colonies from London, had attained independence and Commonwealth membership. He said that this development, which had brought freedom to some 500 million people or more, had not been due to inability on the part of Britain to retain colonial control, but

rather to a voluntary encouragement of self-government and independence, because the British people themselves believe in freedom for all.

Now this statement is on the whole true. It is fair enough. But I was fascinated to hear one of the African Heads of Government interrupt by saying "Now come, Mr. Chairman, let's be frank with each other. It wasn't entirely voluntary. The real point is that you British have not been as pig-headed as most other imperialists, and you have recognized in time what is inevitable, and you have accepted it gracefully. That is your greatness, and we honour you for it. It is a rare quality. But it has not been all voluntary, there has been a significant element of persuasion, and we here have been among the persuaders. I was in one of your gaols for only some 'x' months, but old so-and-so there was inside for some 'y' years, and so-and-so for 'w' years, and Mr. Nehru, whom we were speaking of a few moments ago, for some 12 years or more off and on." and so he went around the room summarizing the periods in gaol of most of those present. He ended up by conceding that in part, nevertheless, it had been voluntary, and said there were no hard feelings, "we give you credit for recognizing the inevitable, and the desirable, in good time to retain friendship. But I wanted to make my point frankly. Frankness is the basis of our association".

All this seemed to me a healthy breath of fresh air. It was said in great good humour and received with delighted laughter by the others present, black, brown and white. It was an intervention I shall never forget.

The Commonwealth, which I began to discuss, I want to refer to again in closing. With or without formal Commonwealth ties, relations between Ottawa and London would be intimate, just as are those between Ottawa and Washington. One great value of the Commonwealth association, it seems to me, lies precisely in the fact that it includes nations



of all continents, and races, in all stages of economic development. The division of humanity between the white and the other races, which coincides not completely, but too closely for comfort, with the division between the affluent industrialized peoples and the poor underdeveloped peoples, is I think the most difficult and potentially dangerous problem in the world. Our Commonwealth cuts across the associations based on geography, and race, and religion, or on ideology or on economic similarity. It is not exclusive. If most of the African members had to choose between their Commonwealth association and their membership in the Organization of African Unity, they might doubtless choose the latter. If India had to choose between its Commonwealth membership and its non-aligned policies, it might choose the latter. If Canada had to choose between its links with this or that African country and its regional association with the United States, few Canadians would give priority to our African ties, greatly though we value these. But we do not have to make these choices. The great feature about the Commonwealth association is precisely that it is not exclusive, that it complements and transcends rather than attempts to supersede these other more limited groupings. In this way it helps us all blur the edges of division, reconcile some differences, and increase understanding between these various regional and racial and ideological blocs. It thus promises to help humanity forward towards that global community which we must before too long develop, if we are to survive this age of proliferating atoms.

In stressing the great value which I, and my government, attach to the multi-racial aspect of our Commonwealth, let no-one find implied any diminution of the values we place on links with Britain and the other old Commonwealth members, Australia and New Zealand. The contrary is the case. Nothing would be stupider than to weaken --- by taking them

for granted, or otherwise -- links with those with whom we have most in common, with whom our ties are most intimate in political and military traditions, diplomatic consultations, language, culture, commerce, education, and virtually every other field you can think of. Our old friendships are the reliable basis for our very being and our growth.

We must proceed with the broadening and deepening of the habits and institutions of effective community, until they become as wide as mankind and as deep as the mature soul. The future of mankind demands no less. The multi-racial Commonwealth can, I believe, contribute greatly to the achievement of this task.

But it would be no service to the world community, or the Commonwealth or ourselves, if in concentrating on broadening our associations with other races we weakened the cohesion, or the depth of intimacy and trust and cooperation among ourselves. Cooperation, like charity, begins closest to home.

In conclusion I want to make two points, both about what is called the "French fact" in Canada. A distinguished political scientist recently said that hitherto the main problem of every Canadian Prime Minister had been to ensure that there should continue to be two sovereign states in North America, rather than one. Now, he said, the Prime Minister's main problem is to ensure that there should be two sovereign states rather than three. I don't know where Mexico got lost in the learned professor's arithmetic, but one sees his point.

Among the boldest acts of creative statesmanship in Canadian history, was the original and basic decision to establish a bilingual state. Today there are many such bilingual and multi-lingual, among the newly independent nations of the world. If Canada, for all our prosperity and material blessings, and our heritage of cultural and political experience from the two greatest peoples in Europe, cannot make a go of it, may God help the others! But I feel quite confident in any future. It seems obvious that man's real need today is to create effective articulated communities which transcend present national frontiers and even continents. I do not think that we in

Canada are really going to reverse the trend and go backwards towards smaller separatisms.

Certainly, however, the most exciting single development in Canada these days is the surging renaissance, cultural, educational, industrial and political, in Quebec. This renaissance, like any basic change, naturally creates problems. But essentially it is bringing tremendous opportunities, and enriching the lives not only of our French-speaking compatriots but of all Canadians.

French-speaking Canadians are no longer feeling on the defensive, hard-pressed to preserve their culture. On the contrary: they are feeling their oats, bursting with new energy and ideas and the joy of creativity. In my own field of international politics, not all that many years ago, the pressures from Quebec on Ottawa were largely negative -- to avoid this entanglement and spurn that commitment. Today these pressures are very different. They are positive, and impatient. Why do we not have more diplomatic missions in the many French-speaking countries in Southeast Asia and Africa? Why do we not have more active cultural relations? Why do we not join the Organization of American States? Why have Canadian aid programmes been so largely concentrated on English-speaking countries? These are good questions. Speaking personally, I welcome these pressures.

Admittedly some of our French-speaking compatriots have tended to regard Canada's Commonwealth links with indifference and a few with distaste, as reminiscent of the conquest and colonialism, or as involving some sort of subservience to London. I understand this viewpoint, but I do not agree with it. It is not hard to understand, since not a few Canadians of Anglo-Saxon origin have tended to regard the Commonwealth sentimentally in much the same light. This is, as I have been suggesting, a misunderstanding of the true nature of the Commonwealth, which has been so largely a Canadian invention, developed for our own national purposes, and offering us one of several valuable windows of the world. Certainly today the multi-racial Commonwealth, with its vast majority of non-Anglo-Saxon members speaking many languages, of many cultures and civilizations and racial backgrounds, realistically viewed should involve no such attitude. On the contrary, our Commonwealth association can prove a source of enrichment, intellectual and spiritual and political, to all of us.

However, I think that we Canadians who did not have the benefit of absorbing French culture and traditions at our mother's breast, have been lacking in generosity and vision and imagination in making use of the openings which our common language and cultural heritage can give us with what I would call the commonwealth of French-speaking countries. This French-speaking commonwealth is more cultural than constitutional, but it is none the less a fact for all that. It is, I think, quite understandable that many of our French-speaking compatriots feel that the proportion of Canadian aid which has in the past gone to French-speaking countries has been less than it might have been considering the proportion of Canadians of French culture and the amount which they contribute to our economy. It is also reasonable that many of them feel that we have less than sufficient diplomatic missions in French-speaking countries. I hope and believe that both these complaints will be met as we develop our external relations.

All Canadians will benefit from the added contacts and the wider understanding and friendships available to us, by making full use of both these series of potential links, and it is not unreasonable to hope that in the exciting new continent of Africa, Canadians, being both French and English speaking, can contribute something to the training in cooperation of the French and English speaking elites of new African countries.

Meanwhile it is good to know that men of initiative and vision in Quebec, that land whose renaissance is so exciting and so essentially promising an aspect of modern Canada, have reached out to develop international associations of French-speaking universities and periodicals. The task of implementing the vision of Commonwealth is not a monopoly of governments, or of those whose mother tongue is English.

There are many challenging tasks in the world, for our generation. And there is every reason to believe, on the basis of sober analysis as well as in the light of faith, that Canadians -- of both languages, and all national origins -- will continue to play a creative part in meeting them. The future is full of problems, but it will not be dull.

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01047547 6