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Canada, Southern Africa, and the
1990s, nourishing the roots of
democracy.

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
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CANADA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THE 1990s

NOURISHING THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY



Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade

Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights

Walter McLean, P.C., M.P.
Chairman of the Sub-Committee

June 1992

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CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

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Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee

Development and
Human Rights

Développement et des
Droits de la personne

of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade

du Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce international

CANADA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THE 1990s

RESPECTING:

Pursuant to Standing Order 102
First report on South Africa

En vertu de l'Article 102 du Règlement, étude de
l'Assemblée de travail sur l'Afrique du Sud et
l'Afrique australe

INCLUDING:

The First Report to the House

Y COMPRIS:

Le Premier Rapport à la Chambre

NOURISHING THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade

Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights

Walter McLean, P.C., M.P.
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HOUSE OF COMMONS

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Issue No. 27

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Chairperson: Walter McLean

Président: Walter McLean

Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on

Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité du

Development and Human Rights

Développement et des Droits de la personne

of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade

du Comité permanent des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur

RESPECTING:

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), consideration of a draft report on South and Southern Africa

CONCERNANT:

Conformément à l'article 108(2) du Règlement, étude de l'ébauche de rapport concernant l'Afrique du Sud et l'Afrique australe

INCLUDING:

The First Report to the House

Y COMPRIS:

Le Premier Rapport à la Chambre

Third Session of the Thirty-fourth Parliament,
1991-92

Troisième session de la trente-quatrième législature,
1991-1992

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Report to the House of Commons
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Report to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade

The Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade as the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT

In accordance with its general mandate under Standing Order 108(2), the Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade has examined the subject of South and Southern Africa. The Sub-Committee has heard evidence from a range of experts witnesses and reports its findings and recommendations.

Our report indicates that there are many troubling and enduring political, economic, and social legacies of apartheid that urgently need the attention of Southern African citizens and their global partners. The Sub-Committee, therefore, urges Canada to continue to show strong leadership as a global African voice. The focus of Canadian assistance should be on: (a) economic development, (b) growth in human resources capacity, and (c) reinforcing civil society. The Sub-Committee proposes a number of specific recommendations to help ensure sustained Canadian interest and involvement through the 1990s. The seeds of democracy have been planted; the challenge is now to nurture them.

There is a unique legacy of goodwill in Southern Africa owed to Canada. Our efforts in the 1970s can build on this legacy. Introduce our support to a new era, not one betraying the energy and efforts of millions of Canadians who provided public support for the struggle against apartheid. But, most importantly, do not let our attention away from Southern Africa put at risk the hopes of the region for its full and unimpeded benefits of democracy.

CHAIRMAN'S FOREWORD

June 15, 1992

This first report of the Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights was inspired by the staunch support of Canadians for the struggle against apartheid, and the events unfolding in South and Southern Africa. We are deeply concerned that the international community's efforts to encourage democracy and human rights will lose momentum with the recent end of "legal" apartheid, and the ongoing constitutional negotiations in South Africa.

We affirm that there is reason for hope in the region. But optimism should not be misplaced. Apartheid's legal collapse movement toward pluralism throughout the region, and heightened peace and security in many Southern African states are encouraging first steps toward regional transformation. We believe lasting change must go much further.

Our report indicates that there are many troubling and enduring political, economic, and social legacies of apartheid. These urgently need the attention of Southern African citizens and their global partners. The Sub-Committee, therefore, urges Canada to continue to show strong leadership on Southern African issues. The focus of Canadian assistance should be on: (a) economic development, (b) growth in human resource capacity, and (c) reinforcing civil society. The Sub-Committee proposes a number of specific recommendations to help ensure sustained Canadian interest and involvement through the 1990s. The seeds of democracy have been planted; the challenge is now to nourish its roots.

There is a unique legacy of goodwill in Southern Africa toward Canada. Our efforts in the 1990s can build on this legacy. To reduce our support and presence now risks betraying the energy and efforts of millions of Canadians who mobilized public support for the struggle against apartheid. But, most importantly, to turn our attention away from Southern Africa puts at risk the hopes of the region for the full and comprehensive benefits of democracy.

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The genesis of this Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights, and the work on its initial report, owe much to the combined efforts and interests of all three political parties, and the valued research staff at the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Bob Miller and Karen McBride. Mention must also be made of the contribution of Svend Robinson, M.P. (NDP—Burnaby—Kingsway, British Columbia). Throughout the last eight months, we have benefited from the contribution and cooperation of CIDA and the Department of External Affairs. As always, appreciation also goes to the many helpful House of Commons staff, including our Clerk, Ellen Savage. Final thanks are given to our witnesses — many of whom are from Southern Africa or spent extensive time in the region — without whom there would be no report.

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CANADA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THE NINETIES

NOURISHING THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY

"Among the great political transitions of this decade, the crumbling of apartheid in South Africa ranks as one of the most stunning."¹

INTRODUCTION

Events in South Africa have triggered worldwide attention. There is a widespread belief that the country has passed through a watershed in its history. Apartheid opponents' hope is that recent reforms are irreversible, and that democracy in South Africa will be a crucial element in rejuvenation throughout the region. The Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights is compelled by Canada's staunch support for the struggle against apartheid to assess the changing situation in South and Southern Africa to determine if this hope is well-founded.

This growing regional momentum is set against a backdrop of pivotal changes on the international scene. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a climate of hope in many parts of the world. Democracy is enjoying an inspiring resurgence of popularity, but it also faces a multitude of challenges.

Recent history has also witnessed an increased marginalization of Africa as a whole, and mounting problems on the continent, including cyclical famine and drought. Despite the unprecedented existence of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) from 1986-1990, economic and social conditions actually worsened over the past five years. UN-PAAERD represented an agreement which required African countries to put structural adjustment programmes in place in return for increased financial assistance from wealthier nations, but this commitment to Africa was weakened by global recession and growing needs elsewhere. This precedent raises the question of whether at the very time meaningful change is possible in Southern Africa, the attention of the world community will turn toward other challenges to development and democracy.

Members of the Sub-Committee believe that this must not happen. The struggle against apartheid, Canada's major purpose in the region, is entering a new and hopefully constructive era, one which presents us with a unique opportunity to build on the promising regional momentum being released by apartheid's weakening. Whereas the focus of international attention over the past generation has been forcing the hand of constitutional reform in South

¹ Pauline Baker, "South Africa: Old Myths and New Realities," in *Current History*, (May 1991), p. 197.

Africa, the task now shifts to securing lasting political, economic, and social change throughout the region. Having planted the seeds of democracy, the challenge is now to nourish its roots.

The abiding Canadian interest

The purpose of this report is therefore to review the human rights, political, and economic developments in South and Southern Africa in order to help determine an appropriate Canadian response to a fluid situation filled with hope and dilemmas. The principal question facing Canadians is with victory against legal and constitutional apartheid close at hand, does our interest in the region diminish? Have we achieved our objectives? Clearly the answer is no.

The Sub-Committee believes there is an abiding Canadian interest in close relations with South and Southern Africa. To scale back our involvement because of the legal collapse of apartheid and ongoing constitutional negotiations risks betraying the energy and efforts of millions of Canadians who mobilized this country for the struggle, and the investment of Canada's talent and resources. But most importantly, abandoning the struggle means betraying the hopes of the region for the benefits of democracy in the fullest sense of the word.

Canada occupies a unique role in Africa as a whole. A member of the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, and a country without colonial ties to the continent, Canada is a distinctive and trusted player in African development. But these characteristics are all the more evident in the case of Southern Africa, where Canada has earned a great deal of respect among Southern Africans for its leadership within the Commonwealth and the United Nations in the struggle against apartheid. Equally important has been Canada's determined support of the front-line states in our common cause, both bilaterally and through the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Partnerships between Canadians and Southern Africans have also flourished at the non-governmental level, linking the grassroots of the different societies. And the overall result of this Canadian action has been a relationship with Southern Africans based on confidence. Now they value our commitment as a partner for change. Canada must help the region seize the momentum of transformation and rebuild.

In turn, Canada has an opportunity to build on this legacy of goodwill to advance its own fundamental foreign policy objectives. Chief among these objectives is support for democratic development and human rights, and in this area of policy, there is a large reservoir of public knowledge and support for our commitment to the black majority in South Africa. Canadians expect our long involvement in the struggle against apartheid to produce tangible results, results that our study shows are far from secure.

Continuing involvement in Southern Africa ensures that Canada's voice is heard on the crucial issue of promoting peace and regional cooperation. In an era of intense interdependence, security threats in any one region can easily have a global impact, and Canada would not be insulated from the resulting instability. Enhancing our involvement also

gives Canada the chance to forge even stronger ties with states of the region through a number of means, including mutually-beneficial trade linkages. These ties can heighten the region's steadiness and promote peace.

Finally, continuing to champion the Southern African cause will allow Canada to build on its established leadership role on these issues in the United Nations and the Commonwealth. Southern Africa is a region that has called for more pro-active international intervention, presenting an opportunity to advance multilateralism.

Like no other region, Southern Africa is the embodiment of Canada's foreign policy interests; like no other region on the continent, Southern Africa is poised to be a success story. It has all the building-blocks. Canadians can share in true and lasting success against apartheid by helping to create and reinforce new pillars of the region's system: democracy, human rights, and economic development, objectives that correspond to Canadian goals.

of the international community to the Southern African... and with Canada's allies in the G-7, La Francophonie, the United Nations, and the Commonwealth. Canadian leadership has been vital in providing moral and political support for a strong sanctions policy on the part of the Commonwealth, an issue that has sustained a level of energy in the struggle against apartheid... against the devastating impact of South African policies on many Commonwealth members on the "continent".

Now the international community of pressure and support for change is poised to come up against the greatest obstacle of racial victory. The expectations of the black majority in South Africa and of the people here in the Pacific.

Steps toward reform

In February, 1990, South African President F.W. de Klerk started the country on the path of reform when he announced the release of 27 political prisoners of African National Congress (ANC) Deputy President Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and legalized anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa. The release of Mr. Mandela, waiting out of prison after 27 years is heralded on many continents.

A year later, Mr. De Klerk opened a new session of South Africa's parliament with the bold announcement that the three remaining "pillars" of apartheid law, the *Land Act*, the *Group Areas Act*, and the *Population Registration Act*, would be repealed by his government, a promise that has been fulfilled, marking the end of "legal" apartheid in South Africa.

Tentative constitutional change

This legal end to apartheid was an important first step, but a more meaningful dismantling of the system must take place in other areas, including on the constitutional front. During this period of change, a political mechanism for continued transition, the

... have been... The Human Rights Commission, a non-partisan... in August 1990, states that 375 political prisoners are still being held.

PART I

THE CHALLENGE OF ENDING APARTHEID

South Africa's racist policy of apartheid has been an enduring focus of international condemnation and, tragically, a major force shaping the region. This international outrage has been expressed most forcefully through the United Nations and the Commonwealth; their package of arms, trade, financial, and cultural embargoes against the South African regime hit a peak of support in the mid-1980s. The aim was simple: to pressure the government of South Africa to enter into negotiations with the black majority.

Canada was among the most vocal opponents of apartheid, raising its voice on the issue of this institutional abuse of human rights with white South Africans, and with Canada's allies in the G-7, La Francophonie, the United Nations, and the Commonwealth. Canadian leadership has been widely seen as instrumental in bolstering support for a strong sanctions policy on the part of the Commonwealth, an arena that has sustained a keen sense of energy for the struggle against apartheid, particularly given the horrendous impact of South African policies on many Commonwealth members on the "front-line".

Now this international momentum of pressure and support for change is poised to come up against its greatest challenge: partial victory. The expectations of the black majority in South Africa and of the region hang in the balance.

First steps toward reform

In February, 1990, South African President F.W. De Klerk started the country on the path of reform when he announced the release from prison of African National Congress (ANC) deputy president Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners², and legalized anti-apartheid opposition in South Africa. The image of Mr. Mandela walking out of prison after 27 years is imprinted on many memories.

A year later, Mr. De Klerk opened a new session of South Africa's parliament with the bold announcement that the three remaining "pillars" of apartheid law, the *Land Act*, the *Group Areas Act*, and the *Population Registration Act*, would be repealed by his government, a promise that has been fulfilled, marking the end of "legal" apartheid in South Africa.

Tentative constitutional change

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² There is still some controversy as to whether all political prisoners have been released. The Human Rights Commission, a non-governmental monitoring organization based in Johannesburg, claims that 395 political prisoners are still being held.

Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was established. A negotiating forum of some 19 organizations, including all centrist political parties, CODESA was launched amidst high hopes on December 20, 1991. Its major objectives are to reach agreement on general constitutional principles and on the process of constitution-making itself, and to devise appropriate transitional mechanisms for governing the country.

Reports on CODESA's progress fluctuate between elation and despair. Particularly disturbing to us are the criticisms of the negotiations raised by South African women's groups. They point to the fact that fewer than 7 per cent of the some 400 politicians at CODESA are women, and that no women sit on the influential CODESA management committee. Understandably, South African women believe that they have virtually no voice in the debate over their country's future.³

Nevertheless, most media reports overlook this problem, and generally leave the impression that the major parties to the negotiations will be able to secure an agreement. This speculation was bolstered by the positive outcome of a whites-only referendum held on March 17 of this year. White South Africans were asked if they supported "the continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990, and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiations". Sixty-nine per cent responded favourably.⁴

Despite these positive signals, Sub-Committee members were repeatedly warned that the changes in South Africa over the past few years alone do not warrant the degree of optimism often expressed by the international community. Though significant, what has been accomplished by repealing discriminatory laws and establishing CODESA is simply a means to the end of democratic and non-racial rule in South Africa. The process and implementation of practical change will be long, arduous, and wrought with difficulties.

Primary among the divergent views of the governing National Party and its principal negotiating partner, the ANC, is the issue of an "ethnic veto". Whereas the ANC supports enshrining a bill of rights in a new constitution to protect individuals of all races, the National Party of President De Klerk favours a new constitutional system featuring "checks and balances", and power-sharing mechanisms. In the opinion of the majority of the witnesses before the Sub-Committee, these features threaten to undermine the very goal of a non-racial democracy by effectively giving the white minority a veto over any reform program of a black-majority government. As the focus of negotiations falls increasingly on these substantive issues of power, in the words of Professor Dan O'Meara, "the major actors in the process are coming closer and closer and closer together to their respective edges of a very narrow but very deep chasm."⁵

³ *Globe and Mail*, May 27, 1992.

⁴ It is important to note that some of our witnesses questioned President De Klerk's objectives in calling for the referendum. Professor Dan O'Meara argued that reducing the influence of the Conservative Party and the security forces were his principal goals. (*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 15:35).

⁵ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 15:39.

It is this image that we would urge Canadians to recall when they think of events in South Africa. Numerous political difficulties must still be overcome in bringing the process of democratic change in South Africa to fruition. Canada must continue to make effective use of its positive and negative leverage, "carrots and sticks", to facilitate a successful outcome to the constitutional end-game.

Positive Canadian initiatives can strengthen CODESA generally by providing technical and administrative support for the negotiations. But Canadian assistance at this crucial phase should also focus more decidedly on providing human resource support to the parties representing the black majority. Canada's "Dialogue Fund", administered through our embassy in South Africa, has undertaken these types of initiatives in the past, and we urge that more be done. Over the coming months, measures aimed at levelling the constitutional playing field in South Africa are appropriate and timely interventions. Therefore, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada augment the assistance and expertise provided to parties representing the black majority and women in CODESA as a positive step toward democracy.**

Sanctions

Using "sticks" as incentives for change means continuing Canada's policy of sanctions against South Africa. While we acknowledge that some groups advocate lifting all sanctions in order to promote economic growth in South Africa and avoid disadvantaging Canadian business, members of the Sub-Committee believe that Canada and like-minded countries must maintain meaningful pressure on the South African government in order to hasten movement through potential constitutional quagmires.

We applaud the cautious and measured "programmed management approach" to sanctions adopted by Commonwealth Heads of Government in October, 1991. The approach clearly links further change on the application of sanctions to concrete, practical steps toward ending constitutional apartheid.⁶ Accordingly, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada follow the Commonwealth guidelines set down in the "programmed management approach", and that Canadian diplomatic energy work toward sustaining international pressure on the South African regime.**

Violence

Peaceful change cannot be achieved in a climate of brutality. We are deeply concerned at the desperate situation of escalating inter-group violence in South Africa, and disturbed by recurring reports of the state's and ultra-right white groups' role in fomenting or perpetrating this violence. The South African justice system also leaves the impression of being unwilling

⁶ It stipulates that trade and investment measures should be lifted only when transitional governing mechanisms are agreed upon, that financial sanctions should be removed only when agreement on the text of a new democratic constitution is reached (unless a contrary recommendation is made by CODESA or an interim government), and finally, that the arms embargo applied by the United Nations and supported by Commonwealth measures should remain intact until a new post-apartheid government is firmly established in South Africa.

to send a strong signal to those involved in the violence about the seriousness of their crimes. Recent reports of the early release from prison of two policemen convicted of murder and attempted murder, and the revelation of state involvement in the 1985 murder of prominent anti-apartheid activist Matthew Goniwe and his colleagues create a perception of indemnity for human rights violators.⁷

It is not only human lives at stake. As the groups and individuals consulted in the study repeatedly pointed out, all the positive, hard-fought gains in dismantling apartheid are jeopardized by the chaos, chaos that plays into the hands of opponents of reform. Beyers Naudé, a prominent leader of the anti-apartheid movement spoke before the Sub-Committee of the urgent need for international involvement if this violence is to subside:

It is our conviction, and that conviction grows more and more, that unless there is international monitoring of violence in South Africa, demanded or requested by the Commonwealth or the United Nations, we will not have any meaningful process toward successful negotiation in our country. The International Commission of Jurists, in their investigation into violence in Natal last year, suggested that this should take place. In light of what is happening in South Africa, I would make an urgent plea that for the sake of creating a climate of peace in South Africa, the possibility of meaningful progress, that very serious attention should be given to this.⁸

We believe that Canada can and should actively promote confidence-building measures to deal with the immediate threat of violence, and with its legacy of fear and distrust in a post-apartheid era. Accordingly, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada use its good offices in South Africa, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and elsewhere to strongly encourage the presence of third party observers in conflict areas of South Africa. Upon the establishment of an acceptable interim government, the Sub-Committee also recommends that Canada offer to cooperate with the South African police and military by discussing the training procedures and experiences of Canadian police forces, the RCMP, and the peacekeeping training of the Canadian military.** These types of activities have already begun. The Southern Africa Education Trust Fund is sponsoring research, and in conjunction with the Halton Regional Police in Ontario, has explored the feasibility of providing community-based training programs to the South African police. Two senior South African police officials also visited Canada in early May of this year to discuss community policing approaches and the "911" emergency system with the RCMP and Canadian police forces across the country. The Sub-Committee believes that these are encouraging first steps.

⁷ Khetani Shange, a KwaZulu policeman was released on parole in February of this year after serving just nine months of a 27-year sentence; earlier this year, South African Police Constable Thulani Philip Choeni was released after serving 17 months of an 18-year jail term. On May 8, 1992, the *New Nation* published a secret "Signal Message" that linked a former member of the State Security Council and one of the country's presently most senior generals, C.P. van der Westhuizen, to the 1985 murder. State President F.W. de Klerk has ordered that the inquest into the deaths be re-opened, and stated in Parliament that at no stage did either the State Security Council or the Cabinet plan any misdeeds or contraventions of the law at meetings attended by him or any of his colleagues.

⁸ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 21:7.

PART II

THE CHALLENGES OF ENDURING CHANGE

Looking beyond these immediate concerns for holding the ground gained in this battle, Canadians must be aware of the abiding political, economic, and social legacies of apartheid for the black majority in South Africa and for the front-line states. They point to a deeper agenda in the effort to throw off apartheid's chains and unlock regional dynamism.

Deeper challenges to democracy

It is hard to exaggerate the human and economic disaster of apartheid. And unfortunately, despite the desire of some members of the international community and media to accept reform as a *fait accompli*, the Sub-Committee believes otherwise. On balance, even though the legal and political pillars of apartheid are falling, change in South Africa and in the region remains largely superficial. The challenge for Southern Africans in the coming decades in overcoming these legacies is ensuring that democracy, respect for human rights and economic transformation go forward together. The imperative for the region's partners is to recognize the interconnectedness of these strands of the social fabric in looking for new avenues for promoting democratic development.

Not all the news is bad, however. There is concrete reason for hope. In spite of these horrific legacies, the winding down of South African aggression and destabilization has already ushered in a measure of renewed peace and security. Namibia finally gained independence on March 21, 1990, and a democratic government was chosen in free and fair elections. The government has emphasized national reconciliation, particularly between SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) and the formerly pro-South African DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance).

In Angola, the May 1991 peace accord (and the subsequent departure of the last Cuban soldiers from Angolan territory) has led to the establishment of a more democratic regime. Opposition parties now operate openly in this former Marxist-Leninist state, including the former rebel group, UNITA. Multiparty elections are scheduled for the fall of 1992 under UN supervision, but it should be noted that some observers expect delays in this timetable. Meanwhile, Angola has to implement an intricate demobilization process with the help of the UN, and we were struck by the worrisome potential for destabilization as this process unfolds. **The Sub-Committee therefore recommends that Canada augment its support for the demobilization process, ensure that there are sufficient observers for the scheduled election, and continue to support the efforts of Canadian NGOs working with partners in Angola.**

There has also been a blossoming of another kind. Civil society, peoples' involvement in their own political development at the grassroots, is gaining new strength. Members were given a measure of this phenomenon by regional leaders. Dr. Simbarashi Herbert Stanley

Makoni, Executive Secretary of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), noted the “greater opening up of the political systems”⁹ generally, though at different stages in different countries. The Hon. Peter S. Mmusi, Chairman of the SADCC Council of Ministers and Vice-President of Botswana, reported,

We are talking of democracy in the various countries. We have a typical example of what has happened recently in Zambia, where there were multi-party elections . . . In all our countries, even where it has not really started working, there are discussions on these matters and we believe that is the way we are going within our region.¹⁰

A change of seas is underway. With successes on the constitutional front close at hand, attention must now turn to building on other fundamental requirements of democratic change in order to fully harness the energy and resources being released by apartheid’s weakening. And in the medium-term, the most formidable foes to continued democratic development will be economic stagnation and economic disparities. As testimony given by Professor Douglas Anglin so poignantly stressed, “democratic constitutions cannot take root in an economic wasteland”.¹¹

Struggling for justice in South Africa

Black South Africans have been adversely affected by the systemic racism on a number of fronts, racism that has produced the most extreme societal inequalities in the world. Housing is inequitably distributed, with more than seven million urban dwellers living in shanty-towns. Land reform is a pressing concern. Before the repeal of the *Land Acts* last year, blacks were permitted to own land in only 13 per cent of the country (the “homelands”), and much of this has become environmentally damaged through overgrazing and erosion. With black South Africans (three-quarters of the population) earning just one-quarter of a declining national income, and with the unemployment rate now at over 40 per cent, few will automatically benefit from less systemic discrimination.¹²

Another enduring legacy of apartheid, but one which is of particular concern to the Sub-Committee, is the loss of human potential resulting from grossly unequal systems of education for black and white South African children and youths. In 1985, educational spending per person for the African population was just one-fifth the level for whites.¹³ More disturbing still, approximately a fifth of South Africans over the age of 16 have never been to school. We fear that an entire generation of young blacks, denied the opportunities stemming from education and training, will be unable to better their quality of life or to play a role in rebuilding society; we believe that intense frustration over countless social and economic disparities can only fuel the violence if expectations remain unaddressed. As Pierre Beaudet

⁹ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 7:10.

¹⁰ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 7:6.

¹¹ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 15:10.

¹² UN Africa Recovery Brief No. 4 (December 1991), p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*

from *le Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe* noted, "many people, . . . without wanting to be prophets of doom, say that it is five minutes to midnight in South Africa."¹⁴

In South Africa, there is a moral imperative to seek means of improving the quality of life for millions of blacks who have been left in poverty by past racist policies. The gross disparities resulting from the apartheid system outlined above will require, in Professor Gerry Helleiner's estimation, "one of the most major structural adjustments, using the term appropriately, of any likely to be attempted in the next few years, including eastern Europe."¹⁵ But the implications of this enormous structural crisis pose a whole set of policy dilemmas for a future democratic government.

On the one hand, economic restructuring and redistribution of resources between the white and black communities are seen by many analysts as politically and ethically necessary for change to endure. On the other hand, many commentators maintain that any large-scale attempt to redistribute wealth among the black and white communities in South Africa in a short span of time would be self-defeating, wrecking the economy and undermining the basis for wealth creation in the future. This school-of-thought believes that the most promising engine for change in South Africa and in the entire region will be economic growth in the Republic, but many analysts and ANC representatives themselves question this assumption.

Nevertheless, the ANC also recognizes that economic growth is absolutely central to a promising future in South Africa. Its past policy calling for nationalization is being re-examined given the collapse of centrally-planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nelson Mandela now emphasizes that the ANC is not ideologically wedded to this path. "Optimally," he states, "we envision a mixed economy where state intervention is no greater than in Italy, France or Germany".¹⁶

Obviously, however, the ANC remains deeply concerned over the radical maldistribution of wealth in a country it may soon be governing. Particularly troublesome to the party is the fact that 87 per cent of the land and 90 per cent of all industrial property are owned by whites. There is also the South African phenomenon of corporate concentration, with more than 75 per cent of shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange held by white-owned conglomerates. Mr. Mandela has challenged South African businessmen to come up with alternatives to nationalization that are effective in correcting this imbalance;¹⁷ he himself has mentioned the model of American combines legislation, and changes to tax policies as possible elements in a new approach.¹⁸ The Sub-Committee is pleased to see Canadian expertise playing a supportive role in this crucial task. The International Development Research Centre's "Economic Mission" to South Africa in August 1991 was partly responsible for the establishment of a macroeconomic research group, or MERG, which brings together the efforts of the ANC, the trade union movement COSATU, and four universities for the purposes of economic research and analysis.

¹⁴ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 17:11.

¹⁵ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 6:29.

¹⁶ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa: Whites-only referendum a big mistake," *Montreal Gazette*, February 27, 1992.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 6:30.

A new government must nonetheless walk an economic tightrope between what is just and what is feasible, both in terms of the need for economic growth, and in terms of abiding by the economic approaches favoured by international financial institutions (IFIs). The dilemma was stated succinctly by Professor Linda Freeman:

In short, to what extent will the deformities of the South African case impinge on the universal truth put forward these days by international financial institutions? There will be social, political, and security costs if those great inequalities aren't dealt with.¹⁹

Chief among the costs, as Professor Manfred Bienefeld argued, may well be democracy:

It seems to me almost grotesque that people should be celebrating the arrival of democracy under these kinds of conditions, when in fact we know from our own history that democracy doesn't work very well in societies that are excessively polarized, that are excessively unstable.²⁰

Rebuilding the region

The situation in neighbouring countries as the region emerges from the mantle of apartheid is no better. South African military and economic destabilization policies have ravaged Namibia, Angola and, some observers would argue, continue to play a role in the devastating conflict in Mozambique. Giving some measure to the scope of damage inflicted on the region, UNICEF estimates that 1.5 million people died due to apartheid-sponsored wars. A further 4 million people have been displaced. Economic losses in the region as a whole are placed at some \$60 billion between 1980 and 1988, three times the total foreign assistance received.²¹

A more potentially menacing problem is the history of militarism in the region resulting from South African aggression. We fear that the legacy of violent attitudes may be the most difficult to overcome, and we urge that this phenomenon be addressed in order to ensure the growth of peace and security region-wide.

One immediate requirement for heightened regional security is peace in Mozambique. A process of negotiations between the government of Mozambique and the guerilla movement, RENAMO, began in July 1990 under Italian auspices. A partial ceasefire covering key transport corridors was signed in December of that year, and the Joint Verification Commission was established in Maputo to monitor the agreements.²² Unfortunately, this international presence has not had a moderating influence throughout the country. The Mozambican Foreign Minister, Pascoal Mocumbi, reported to us that RENAMO's violent tactics of attacking villages, and destroying crucial road and rail networks are unabated. He also expressed concern that support for this continuing destabilization is coming through unofficial South African channels.

¹⁹ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 15:34.

²⁰ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 17:25.

²¹ UN Africa Recovery Brief No. 4, p. 4.

²² The Joint Verification Commission is composed of RENAMO, the Mozambican government, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Congo, Italy, Portugal, Britain, United States, the former Soviet Union, and France.

The "Rome talks" are now entering their eleventh round, and most observers agree that RENAMO is the party responsible for stalling discussions. This pace is unacceptably slow. The war's estimated costs already stand at US\$10 billion, the loss of 600,000 Mozambican lives, and the dislocation of 2,700,000 refugees. We urge Canada to continue to do its part to alleviate this tragic situation. Over the past decade, Canada has demonstrated its commitment to Mozambique by making it one of the largest recipients of Canada's foreign aid in Africa; the grassroots involvement of Canadian NGOs despite the ongoing war has given the country a high profile among Mozambicans. We believe Canada can now use this credibility to help bring the benefits of peace and security to all of Mozambique. Therefore, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada use all diplomatic means possible to pressure RENAMO into negotiating in good faith. This includes sending a strong message to the government of South Africa about continued indirect South African support for RENAMO, and encouraging the parties of the Joint Verification Commission to act as third parties in facilitating RENAMO's seriousness at the negotiating table.**

Though aggravated by destabilization, not all of the economic troubles faced in the region are a result of apartheid. Some are endemic to Africa. Low or stagnant capital investment, low formal employment coupled with high population growth, and low or negative economic growth rates have meant increased misery on the continent throughout the 1980s. The level of human suffering makes it all the more disturbing to us that there is a net transfer of resources out of Africa to industrialized countries, a fact that is not effectively communicated to Canadians.

One of the biggest causes of this ironic phenomenon is debt. In Southern Africa, the case in point, most states, including South Africa, are heavily indebted. Regional totals are estimated at \$50 billion, with South Africa accounting for nearly half. This may be a small proportion of world debt totals, but it is a heavy burden when compared to the countries' economic capacity to pay, especially given the other economic difficulties mentioned above.

The many linkages between debt and development are in fact increasingly evident. For instance, despite the urgent need for investment in human capacity for future prosperity, debt-ridden countries are often forced to jeopardize their long-term interests in educational, social, and health-care fields in order to meet payment demands. This is a debilitating, vicious circle which preoccupies members of this Sub-Committee as it did the earlier Sub-Committee on International Debt.

Unfortunately, the predicament is an economic feature of the entire African continent, carrying with it political and social consequences. We believe that the case of Southern Africa is instructive. It points to a clear contradiction in international priorities: a global emphasis on the value of democracy, and an attitude of inaction when it comes to the onerous limitations of debt to economic development. One of our witnesses, Professor Manfred Bienefeld, put it very clearly:

It seems very strange that people should have these very high hopes and expectations of countries whose economic problems make our economic problems look non-existent.²³

Reinforcing this widespread African decline are problems specific to the Southern African region. Large income disparities also exist within these states, with 5 to 10 per cent of the population earning up to one hundred times the average rural income. This highlights once again in our minds the pressing need to thoroughly review the impact of structural adjustment programmes imposed on the region by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. With so many African nations struggling with both extreme poverty and severe economic imbalances, we must be certain that these approaches do not simply worsen the problems. The Hon. Peter Mmusi reported to the Sub-Committee that "it might take some time before we realize the fruits of what is being undertaken in the region as a whole."²⁴ Canada should ensure that Southern Africans, and all Africans, are not waiting in vain.

This reality of internal disparities mirrors the economic inequalities on a larger scale – between states in the region. SADCC is presently comprised of ten economies, diverse in size, strength, and potential.²⁵ Yet each economy is much too small on a number of fronts to be successful independently. This predicament has been the driving impulse behind SADCC's embrace of regionalism for the coming decades.

Having focused on infrastructure development throughout the 1980s to counter South Africa's economic leverage in the region, SADCC members are now turning their attention toward finding ways to more effectively combine energy and scarce resources to increase overall regional economic capacity. Their plans for the 1990s revolve around the twin imperatives of "enterprise, skills, and productivity", and regional integration, the elements SADCC believes are fundamental to sustainable development. What is particularly different about this type of "regionalism", however, is SADCC's desire to **balance** regional growth. Labelled "development integration", SADCC's brand of regionalism is an equitable approach to economic integration that stresses both production and trade. The hope is that through coordination rather than competition, all members can benefit in some measure from overall success despite the regional disparities. SADCC's underlying premise, as Dr. Makoni observed, is that "the market is a good servant, although quite clearly a bad master".²⁶

Many aspects of the approach must still be worked out, especially SADCC's relationship to other existing economic building-blocks such as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), but we applaud this attention to poverty alleviation throughout the region concurrent with overall economic growth. Clearly there are several obstacles to overcome, not least of which is changing attitudes and building

²³ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 17:25.

²⁴ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 7:6.

²⁵ SADCC's members and their 1980 per capita GNP in US\$ are as follows: Mozambique (80), Tanzania (120), Malawi (180), Zambia (390), Lesotho (470), Angola (620), Zimbabwe (650), Swaziland (900), Namibia (1030), Botswana (1600). By way of comparison, South Africa's GNP per capita was \$2470. Sources: Africa Recovery from UN, World Bank, IMF, FAO, UNICEF and South African Reserve Bank data.

²⁶ UN Africa Recovery Brief No. 4, p. 12.

confidence, but the freeing of energy and resources with the progressive dismantling of apartheid has generated excitement and anticipation. SADCC members are poised to redesign the future of the organization and the region.

Reintegrating South Africa

The most potentially explosive factor in this new design will be a democratic South Africa. The South African economy, despite its deep flaws, is still three times the size of all SADCC members' economies combined. It singularly accounts for three-quarters of the region's GDP, and creates four-fifths of the manufacturing value-added. Moreover, with a full third of the total Southern African population, it is the largest national market in the region. Without question, SADCC is sleeping with the proverbial elephant.

The coming explosion, however, could be either a destructive or motivating force in the region. On the one hand, there is valid concern that South Africa may spark a "brain drain": with the relatively high standard of living, and the shortages of skilled personnel, South Africa threatens to absorb badly-needed human resource talent from other states in the region. There is also the very real potential for South Africa to become a "resource sponge", soaking up new financial investment.

On the other hand, many analysts argue that a democratic South Africa can be the locus of future economic growth in the region, not only through a potential "overflow" of investment from South Africa into the rest of the region, but also through enhanced cooperation. A new South African government, like other SADCC members, will eventually be fully engaged in collective regional planning, a bargaining process in which other SADCC states hold cards that are vitally important to South Africa, hydroelectric power and water being chief among them. As alluded to earlier, however, the ANC warns against undue optimism. As Dr. Marcia Burdette related to us:

Walter Sisulu, the deputy president of the ANC, spoke to the SADCC meeting to remind the participants that South Africa will not be an active member of SADCC in the near future, and when it is, it cannot be assumed to supply vast amounts of investment or goods as its own leadership will be directing production at the home market for the time being to lessen inequities at home.²⁷

The challenge of integrating South Africa is therefore attempting to ensure that the explosion has a positive impact. It will be important to support regional coordination, and to encourage South Africa to play a responsible and constructive economic role. All actors are aware of the difficulties ahead, but as Dr. Makoni pointed out,

We start from the premise that the solution to this problem of disparities will best be found in cooperation and in community rather than in separation...

²⁷ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 15:8.

Fortunately, this is the position of the majority of the people of South Africa as well.²⁸

And for the sake of a positive outcome, and a “made in Southern Africa” brand of regionalism, testimony repeatedly stressed that the region’s friends must beware of formulas for economic management that do not sufficiently take into account these characteristic inequities. This is as true of the region as a whole as it is of South Africa and other countries individually. In helping South and Southern Africa to address their agendas for change, the international community must avoid heightening the risks that democracy’s roots will be torn up by economic despair.

²⁸ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Issue 7:13.*

PART III

POLICY DIRECTIONS AND PRIORITIES IN THE 1990s

To this point in the report we have offered a number of suggestions as to how Canada can assist the immediate transition in South and Southern Africa. We now turn our attention to longer-term Canadian policy.

Over the past 20 years, Canadian policy in the region has had three main expressions: the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, support for individual front-line states through bilateral relations, and support for SADCC. And we believe that these main policy elements should continue to some degree during this period of transition. In fact, given that the struggle against apartheid is far from over in South Africa, either on the constitutional front, or for the lives of millions of black South Africans, members of the Sub-Committee argue that despite its relative economic wealth, it is appropriate and timely for Canada to financially assist first the parties representing the black majority in South Africa, and later, a democratic government. We acknowledge that this should not be a long-term Canadian aid commitment, but the initial need for international support will be crucial to the viability of democratic change in South Africa.

During the nineties, however, Canadian policy should shift increasingly towards an integrated regional orientation. This corresponds to the emerging preoccupation of the countries of the region, and offers Canada the opportunity to maximize the impact of its policies by promoting a culture of linkages, networks, and fundamentally, cooperation. The regional fabric will be stronger if the strands are tightly woven together.

In pursuing these objectives, Canada has available to it a variety of foreign policy channels including government-to-government relations, partnerships with non-governmental organizations, universities, churches, Canadian business, labour organizations, and its participation in multilateral organizations. Despite that fact that Canada has not been a principal donor, supplying only about 2.5 per cent of ODA going into the region²⁹, the Sub-Committee believes that the bridges Canada and its partners have built to governments, enterprise, regional institutions, and local and community organizations give us a unique, multifaceted influence and many points-of-entry for carrying out our policies.

Therefore, always with a view to using our support in a regional framework, and recognizing the need to focus on key tasks, the Sub-Committee recommends that Canadian policy concentrate increasingly on the following major priorities.

²⁹ *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, Issue 14:12.

Economic development

Without question, all actors in the region stress the urgent need for economic development. The next decade must not be one of further decline in the quality of life of millions of Southern Africans. Their sense of optimism and the roots of democracy are too fragile.

Canada can make an important contribution to this critical imperative on a number of levels. First, **the Sub-Committee recommends that, as a donor, Canada should support regionally-oriented development projects that focus foremost on poverty alleviation.** Fulfilling basic human needs such as adequate health care, housing, safe water, and sanitation is not a new priority, but one that we fear will be increasingly overlooked as the challenges of the region become more complex. In selecting or designing initiatives for our support, Canadian policy should ensure that regional cooperation, popular participation, and mechanisms for evaluation are essential elements. We believe that going back to the basics will not only be humanitarian, but will also strengthen a culture of participation, foster a regional outlook, and, as the World Bank 1992 Development Report argues, promote a sustainable environment.

A second critical challenge to economic development is the AIDS pandemic that is severely affecting many countries of the region. AIDS primarily strikes down men and women in the prime of life who are the main contributors to the economic survival of their families, and ultimately, their states. It is also undermining the strength of future generations, as an increasingly large number of children are becoming tragic victims of the disease. The results could be catastrophic. For example, some analyses of the scope of the problem in the South African case predict that some 60 per cent of the work force could be dead or dying of AIDS by the year 2004. We are deeply concerned at these ongoing and potential human, social and economic costs of AIDS. Accordingly, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada increase its support for AIDS-related programs in Southern Africa.**

At a third, increasingly important level of macroeconomic management in the region, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada continue to support the SADCC organization in a host of practical ways as it confronts the complexities of planning for regional integration.** This does not mean dictating economic agendas, but rather assisting and advising economic planners as they develop Southern Africa's own brand of regionalism. This is obviously an equally important task in South Africa, where key economic decisions must be made by a new democratic government. Accordingly, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada continue to support research and policy-planning efforts of the parties representing the black majority in South Africa.** Further, as a means of promoting mutually-beneficial economic ties to the region, **the Sub-Committee recommends that the Department of External Affairs reconsider its decision to withdraw all trade commissioners from Sub-Saharan Africa.**

This support for revitalized regionalism can also be carried into Canada's policy dialogue with other nations, and **the Sub-Committee recommends that as an advocate, Canada make full use of its membership in multilateral institutions, particularly the IFIs, to urge that their policies of structural adjustment recognize the variety of regional**

circumstances in Africa and elsewhere. In South and Southern Africa in particular, it is crucial that the IFIs understand the fundamental need to address gross economic disparities, and design structural adjustment programmes that take this reality into account. Further, the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada urge its colleagues in these and other organizations to move quickly on debt relief for the poorest countries in the region.

These recommendations apply equally to Canadian policy in all of Africa.

Human resource development

The development of human capacity is the basis of both poverty alleviation and economic growth. This is particularly true when it comes to the role of women in development. On a more human level, support for training programs, and primary, technical, and university education responds to a widespread desire for hope in the future on the part of the Southern African women and men upon whom the future will depend. We cannot stress enough the importance of education for the black population. Further, attending to the need for senior management level training throughout the region in the present will help ensure that the Southern African future has a productive beginning.

This policy goal also lends itself well to addressing the problem of demilitarization. In many countries of the region – Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique in particular – warfare has been the only way of life of an entire generation. If human resource development programs are specifically geared to ex-soldiers' needs, retraining efforts may help overcome a pervasive attitude of militarism, and ensure that a potentially destabilizing group can constructively engage in rebuilding their society.

Canada is well positioned to assist in these crucial tasks. Over the past decades, Canadian partners have forged strong linkages with universities, church organizations, and community groups committed to improving the future for young people in tangible ways. These established partnerships are perfect conduits to promote human resource development at the grassroots.

Academic and sporting contacts are other crucial levers of policy. In the struggle against apartheid, for example, their prohibition served as effective sanctions against the South African regime. In a more positive sense, linkages between universities and sporting organizations permit Canadians and Southern Africans to share knowledge, experiences, and to build upon each other's areas of expertise. Equally important, these contacts and exchanges expose countless Canadians to the benefits of international cooperation and our involvement in Southern Africa, an exposure they may otherwise miss.

Canadian efforts have also promoted the growth of regionally-oriented institutions and networks for human resource development; we believe that there is a longer-term benefit in supporting these instruments as channels for Canadian assistance to the extent possible. Neighbours helping neighbours, particularly if existing regional institutions are able to assist and re-engage South African society, will work to enhance goodwill and mutual confidence.

Therefore, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canadian support focus on human resource development, a critical investment for the future of the region. In pursuing this goal, the Government should take full advantage of the position of its Canadian partners, and also**

try to ensure that training programs draw upon the regionally-oriented institutions and networks already existing. A special emphasis should be placed on the needs of women, former military personnel, and training for senior level management, perhaps making use of established institutions such as the Canadian Centre for Management Development. Further, the Sub-Committee recommends that the Minister for External Affairs revisit the recent decision to transfer responsibility for academic and sporting relations from the Department of External Affairs to Fitness and Amateur Sport and the Canada Council. We believe that this seemingly bureaucratic shuffle will have significant implications for policy, especially in a field such as human resource development. Moreover, the transfer will mean the loss of an effective channel for sanctions against governments that abuse human rights. It is unfortunate that this signal is being sent to the South African and other governments at a time when instruments for exerting Canadian pressure on intransigent regimes should be readily available.

Civil society

Canada must actively reinforce the growth of civil society, the heart of political pluralism and a human rights culture. We believe that the growth of democracy depends not only on economic nourishment, but also on spreading its roots. We must dispel the notion that democratic development is simply a matter of elections monitoring, however important a phase in the growth process that may be. Canadian policy must strive to promote a broader democratic and human rights consciousness throughout Southern Africa. This can be done at various levels.

In our bilateral relations with governments of the region, the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada should make effective use of both the positive and negative leverage resulting from our diplomatic and ODA resources to condemn human rights abuses and the suppression of political pluralism. Perhaps more importantly, the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada be a strong motivating force for similar action on the part of other countries. The multiparty election which took place in Zambia in November 1991 illustrates the extent of donors' influence when they work in tandem. We urge that the same pressure be exerted on the present government of Malawi, which is moving against the will of its people, and on any oppressors of human rights and political participation.

This is obviously an issue that goes beyond the realm of Southern Africa, and presents an overarching challenge to the donor community committed to change. The Sub-Committee also heard compelling testimony regarding the continued intransigence of the regimes in Kenya and Zaire.

Mr. Gitobu Imanyara and Mr. Raila Odinga of the Kenyan opposition "Forum for the Restoration of Democracy" reported to us that President Moi is using all possible means – including inciting violence and abusing human rights – to suppress the forces in support of multiparty elections and democratic government. This goes on despite the fact that Moi has promised the donor community that free and fair elections will be held in Kenya before March of next year.

Likewise, Mr. Beaudoin Hamuli-Kabarhuza from the National Council of Development NGOs of Zaire gave testimony that the Mobutu regime is exacerbating the social and economic disintegration of his country by blocking the efforts of the democratic movement, expressed through the National Conference led by Archbishop Monsegwo Pasinya. The regime's abuse of human rights also continues unabated.

In these and other countries, the international community has an obligation to help remove obstacles to democratic growth. **The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada work bilaterally and multilaterally to support the democratic forces in Kenya and Zaire, and ultimately, to help bring the transition to democracy in these countries to a successful conclusion.**

Pushing for movement on the political front is, however, only the most visible means of reinforcing civil society. There is a host of grassroots initiatives that can and should benefit from Canadian support. In South Africa in particular, members of the Sub-Committee were favourably impressed by organizations such as the South African Legal Defence Fund which defends human rights and advocates democratization in the legal realm; support for the law faculties of black universities is another important channel for promoting a human rights legal culture. On the Canadian end, groups such as Canada-South Africa Cooperation and the Southern Africa Education Trust Fund are working in Canada in conjunction with their partners in the region to provide support for the democratization of society.

Throughout the region, there is an urgent need to engage people in the growth of civil society. But we also believe that this phenomenon must develop a regional orientation in order to promote a root system that is mutually-reinforcing. Therefore, **the Sub-Committee recommends that Canada support initiatives that reinforce groups and organizations struggling to give popular expression to a democratic and human rights culture, particularly if they foster regional cooperation.** At the end of the day, it is the Southern African people themselves who must sustain democracy and peace. A vigorous civil society is critical to this political sustainability.

CONCLUSION

SUSTAINING CANADIAN MOMENTUM

In conclusion, we wish to return to a point with which we began this report, namely, our disquiet at the possibility that as victory against apartheid is seemingly won, and often portrayed by the media as a *fait accompli*, Canadians may now consider the job done. The danger of this perception is that Canadian interest in Africa will diminish and die, particularly at a time when the needs of the post-Cold War era loom large. We believe that there are enduring aspects of apartheid yet to be overcome, and Canada's continuing interest in the struggle must be effectively communicated to Canadians by the media, the Government, and the array of Canadian groups engaged in Southern Africa's transformation.

Successes in the struggle against apartheid must not mark an ironic beginning to another tragic chapter in the history of this part of the world. For the past generation, Southern Africans and the international community have been united in pursuit of justice in South Africa, and a politically and economically robust region. Now crucial pieces of the puzzle are falling into place. Apartheid structures in South Africa are starting to crumble. Civil society is blossoming throughout the region. Peace is gaining momentum, and an ethic of regional cooperation is taking hold. There is great promise in Southern Africa, but a successful transformation will require continued stamina.

Canadian efforts have been a source of strength in the past. Our leadership in the United Nations and the Commonwealth has helped to focus the spotlight of international attention on the gross injustices of the South African regime. Our support for the front-line states and regional organizations has equally demonstrated Canada's resolve in promoting democracy, human rights, and economic development. Canadian groups and individuals have also given of themselves generously in this struggle. We applaud the commitment they continue to exhibit, and are thankful for the goodwill their efforts earn for Canada in the region.

Canada must continue to be this source of energy for South and Southern Africa as we enter the next decades. To this end, the Sub-Committee makes three recommendations, two short-term and one longer-term. **First, the Sub-Committee recommends that before the end of the year, the Government hold a two-day consultation of interested Canadian players in Southern Africa, including NGOs, churches, human rights organizations, labour groups, trade and investment representatives, government officials, and parliamentarians. Participants from the region should also be included.** We believe that such a sustained consultation will promote cooperation, and provide an opportunity for these groups to develop strategies for policy, and for fostering public support. Ensuring that the Canadian approach benefits from the range of expertise available in the country will make the Canadian effort in Southern Africa a true and coordinated partnership.

Second, with a view to building bridges to the democratic forces in the region, and to further strengthening Canadian public interest, we reiterate the need for an official visit to South and Southern Africa by an all-party parliamentary delegation. This has been a priority

of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) for several years, and has been encouraged by the current and previous Secretaries of State for External Affairs. We believe that involving Canada's politicians at this critical juncture in the region's history will demonstrate Canada's firm commitment to change, and open more lines of communication with future Southern African leaders. Accordingly, **the Sub-Committee recommends that the Government assist in facilitating a trip to the region by an official parliamentary delegation in the near future.**

Lastly, we believe that there needs to be a national focal point for Canadian interest in Africa. There is a precedent for this type of action. When Canada was concerned about elevating its interest in Asia through such means as research, trade promotion, exchange programs, and language training, it created the Asia Pacific Foundation. Some of the possibilities for an African centre might include a similar foundation, a major program or institute affiliated with IDRC or another existing institution, or a "co-ordinating body". Whatever the form, the goal is to establish a mechanism that would serve to sustain and enhance Canadian government and grassroots attention to Africa, and to build on earlier initiatives in the struggles against apartheid and famine. While we recognize that this is a period of financial restraint, the structural changes within External Affairs and the non-governmental community allow for some redirection of resources. Using those resources to focus Canadian efforts throughout Africa would be an effective means of addressing the longer-term needs of the continent in general, and Southern Africa specifically. In short, the struggle goes on. Accordingly, **the Sub-Committee recommends that the Government establish an "institutional mechanism" that will concentrate and focus energy on Africa, and engage many Canadian sources.**

As our report has demonstrated, Canada and Africa share a unique relationship. In Southern Africa in particular, Canadian efforts have been partly responsible for the stunning events we are witnessing. By assisting Southern Africans to address deeper political and economic needs in the region, we can share in a lasting transformation. The seeds of change have been sowed. Canadian support can now help ensure that the roots of democracy take hold, spread, and give rise to a higher quality of life for all Southern Africans.

The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada use all diplomatic means possible to pressure RENAMO into negotiating in good faith. This includes sending a strong message to the government of South Africa about continued indirect South African support for RENAMO, and encouraging the parties of the Joint Verification Commission to act as third parties in facilitating RENAMO's return to the negotiating table.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANADIAN POLICY IN THE NINETIES

Economic Development

The Sub-Committee recommends that, as a direct result, Canada should support regionally-oriented development projects that focus foremost on poverty alleviation.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

IMMEDIATE CONCERNS

1. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada augment assistance and expertise provided to parties representing the black majority and women in CODESA as a positive step toward democracy.
2. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada follow the Commonwealth guidelines set down in the "programmed management approach", and that Canadian diplomatic energy work toward sustaining international pressure on the South African regime.
3. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada use its good offices in South Africa, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and elsewhere to strongly encourage the presence of third party observers in conflict areas of South Africa.
4. The Sub-Committee recommends that upon the establishment of an interim government, Canada offer to cooperate with the South African police and military by discussing the training procedures and experiences of Canadian police forces, the RCMP, and the peacekeeping training of the Canadian military.
5. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada augment its support for the demobilization process, ensure that there are sufficient observers for the scheduled Angolan election, and continue to support the efforts of Canadian NGOs working with partners in Angola.
6. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada use all diplomatic means possible to pressure RENAMO into negotiating in good faith. This includes sending a strong message to the government of South Africa about continued indirect South African support for RENAMO, and encouraging the parties of the Joint Verification Commission to act as third parties in facilitating RENAMO's seriousness at the negotiating table.

DIRECTIONS FOR CANADIAN POLICY IN THE NINETIES

Economic Development

7. The Sub-Committee recommends that, as a donor, Canada should support regionally-oriented development projects that focus foremost on poverty alleviation.

8. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada increase its support for AIDS-related programs in Southern Africa.
9. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada continue to support the SADCC organization in a host of practical ways as it confronts the complexities of planning for regional integration.
10. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada continue to support research and policy-planning efforts of the parties representing the black majority in South Africa.
11. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Department of External Affairs reconsider its decision to withdraw all trade commissioners from Sub-Saharan Africa.
12. The Sub-Committee recommends that as an advocate, Canada make full use of its membership in multilateral institutions, particularly the IFIs, to urge that their policies of structural adjustment recognize the variety of regional circumstances in Africa and elsewhere. In South and Southern Africa in particular, it is crucial that the IFIs understand the fundamental need to address gross economic disparities, and design structural adjustment programmes that take this reality into account.
13. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada urge its colleagues in these and other organizations to move quickly on debt relief for the poorest countries in the region.

Human Resource Development

14. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canadian support focus on human resource development, a critical investment for the future of the region. In pursuing this goal, the government should take full advantage of the position of its Canadian partners, and also try to ensure that training programs draw upon the regionally-oriented institutions and networks already existing. A special emphasis should be placed on the needs of women, former military personnel, and training for senior level management, perhaps making use of established institutions such as the Canadian Centre for Management Development.
15. The Sub-Committee urges that the Minister for External Affairs revisit the recent decision to transfer responsibility for academic and sporting relations from the Department of External Affairs to Fitness and Amateur Sport and the Canada Council.

Civil Society

16. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada should make effective use of both the positive and negative leverage resulting from our diplomatic and ODA resources to condemn human rights abuses and the suppression of political pluralism.

17. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada be a strong motivating force for similar action on the part of other countries.
18. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada work bilaterally and multilaterally to support the democratic forces in Kenya and Zaire, and ultimately, to help bring the transition to democracy in these countries to a successful conclusion.
19. The Sub-Committee recommends that Canada support initiatives that reinforce groups and organizations struggling to give popular expression to a democratic and human rights culture, particularly if they foster regional cooperation.

SUSTAINING CANADIAN MOMENTUM

20. The Sub-Committee recommends that before the end of the year, the Government hold a two-day consultation of interested Canadian players in Southern Africa, including NGOs, churches, human rights organizations, labour groups, trade and investment representatives, government officials, and parliamentarians. Participants from the region should also be included.
21. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Government assist in facilitating a trip to the region by an official parliamentary delegation in the near future.
22. The Sub-Committee recommends that the Government establish an "institutional mechanism" that will concentrate and focus energy on Africa, and engage many Canadian sources.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF WITNESSES

Organizations and Individuals	Issue	Date
Canadian Exporters Association		
James Taylor President	17	March 30, 1992
Carleton University		
Professor Douglas Anglin Department of Political Science	15	March 23, 1992
Professor Linda Freeman Department of Political Science	15	March 23, 1992
Professor Manfred Bienefeld School of Public Administration	17	March 30, 1992
Centre d'information et de documentation sur le Mozambique et l'Afrique australe		
Pierre Beaudet Researcher	17	March 30, 1992
CIDA		
John Copland Director General Anglophone Africa		
Archie Book Deputy Director Canadian Operations Africa and Middle East Branch	14	March 9, 1992
Don McMaster Director General Institutional Cooperation and Development Services Division	1	September 30, 1991
Cooperation Canada-Mozambique		
Michael O'Connor Manager	1	September 30, 1991

Organizations and Individuals	Issue	Date
CUSO		
John van Mossel Program Development Officer	21	April 27, 1992
Lise Blanchard Executive Director	6	November 27, 1991
Department of External Affairs and International Trade		
Marc Perron Assistant Deputy Minister Africa and Middle East	14	March 9, 1992
Verona Edelstein Director Anglophone Africa Relations Division	14	March 9, 1992
Lucie Edwards Chairperson Southern Africa Taskforce	6	November 27, 1991
Richard Chapple Anglophone Africa Relations Division	20	April 9, 1992
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy		
Raila Odinga Vice-Chair General Purposes Committee	20	April 9, 1992
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development		
Iris Almeida Head Africa and Asia Programmes	21	April 27, 1992
International Development Research Centre		
Keith Bezanson President	6	November 27, 1991
Mark Van Ameringen Senior Advisor	6	November 27, 1991
International Labour Office		
John Harker Director	21	April 27, 1992
McGill University		
Professor John Shingler Department of Political Science	15	March 23, 1992

Organizations and Individuals**Issue****Date**

Mocumbi, Pascoal Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of Mozambique	1	September 30, 1991
Nairobi Law Monthly Gitobu Imanyara Editor in Chief	20	April 9, 1992
National Council of Development NGOs of Zaire Beaudoin Hamuli-Kabarhuza General Secretary	19	April 6, 1992
Naudé, Beyers Leader in the anti-apartheid movement	21	April 27, 1992
OXFAM Canada John Graham Program Development Officer for Southern Africa	1	September 30, 1991
Partnership Africa-Canada Marc Laporte Executive Director	15	March 23, 1992
Southern African Development Coordination Conference Hon. Peter S. Mmusi Vice-President of the Republic of Botswana and Chairman of SADCC Council of Ministers	7	November 28, 1991
Dr. Simbarashi Herbert Stanley Makoni Executive Secretary	7	November 28, 1991
South African Legal Defense Fund Ntobeko Maqubela National Director	21	April 27, 1992
University of Ottawa Dr. Marcia Burdette Visiting Professor Institute for International Development and Cooperation	15	March 23, 1992
University of Quebec (Montreal) Professor Dan O'Meara Department of Political Science	15	March 23, 1992

University of Toronto

Professor Gerry Helleiner
Department of Economics

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November 27, 1991

Request for Government Response

Pursuant to Standing Order 109, your Committee requests that the Government table a comprehensive response to the Report within 150 days.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on Development and Human Rights (Issues No. 1, 6, 7, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN BOSLEY, P.C., M.P.
Chairman

WALTER MCLEAN, P.C., M.P.
Chairman
Sub-Committee on Development and Human
Rights