




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


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
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A
Political ANALYSIS
OF THE
WAR:
THE
PRINCIPLES of the present
political Parties examined;
AND
A just, natural and perfect Coalition propos'd
between Two GREAT MEN, whose
Conduct is particularly consider'd.

What shame, what woe is this to Greece! what joy
To Troy's proud monarch, and the friends of Troy!
That adverse Gods commit to stern debate
The best, the bravest of the Grecian state.

POPE'S HOMER.

No might nor greatness, in mortality
Can censure 'scape; back-wounding calumny
The whitest virtue strikes: what king so strong,
Can tie the gall up in the sland'rous tongue.

SHAKESPEAR.

Now join your hands; and with your hands, your hearts:
That no dissention hinder government.

IBID.

LONDON:

Printed for THO. PAYNE, Bookseller, next the Mews
Gate, St. Martin's. 1762.

(Price One Shilling.)

Journal of the

of the

W. A. H.

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1850

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A

Political ANALYSIS

OF THE

WAR, &c.

NO evil appears greater, or to have been attended with heavier calamities and distress through all the records of time, than that distraction generated in the most free and magnanimous states, from the mutual rage of discord, party, and dissention within themselves. No nation exists at this day, that ought for her own sake to avoid, with so much care and attention, the fatal effects of that evil, as this nation of Great Britain. Whilst discordant and divided among ourselves, no people have been more harsh and severe upon one another,

or more expos'd themselves to the contempt, ridicule, and scorn of Europe: but whilst united and unanimous, we have always above every other people, been not only happy and prosperous at home, but esteem'd and honour'd abroad. Instances and proofs of this will naturally and necessarily occur to every one, who has the least knowledge of his own country, or has had the smallest opportunity of becoming acquainted with foreign states. There will not therefore be any occasion at present to recur to distant times, or even to go back to the last war. We may confine ourselves to what has happen'd lately, and within our own knowledge; to what we have seen, to what we have heard, and to what we have felt. For from thence it will appear, how weak or wicked those spirits are, who would involve us in discord, hatred, and contention; and how absolutely necessary it is, for our common safety and happiness, to unite in one national view, and act with one spirit, for supporting the government, and maintaining the glory, honour and felicity of our king and country.

In one thousand seven hundred and fifty-five; the remnant of an unpopular and timid m—— were with reluctance drawn on, by the voice of the nation, to assume the form of vigour and unanimity in making reprisals at sea, for the insults, encroachments and hostilities, committed by the French on the subjects

jects and dominions of Great Britain in North America. The leaders in the A——— were at that time supported by their own family connections, the influences necessarily derived from the possession of G——t, and the countenance of the k——, which by compulsion, or persuasion, they had kept constantly attach'd to their side. Under these circumstances they saw their power permanent and irresistible, as long as the nation continued in an amicable disposition towards her neighbours: for their natural and acquired influence was sufficient to raise the ordinary and annual supplies of government, which easily enabled them to guide the helm of state, whilst the vessel moved gently on in a quiet sea, fanned by the moderate gales of peace and tranquillity. But the prospect of a war alarm'd them with insurmountable apprehensions. Here the ordinary supplies must of course be utterly inadequate to the necessary exigencies of the state. Here the trimmed voice of a managed legislature might not have influence enough upon a free but disgusted people, animated by the superior genius of those who opposed the A———, to advance and hazard sums adequate to those exigencies, and the unavoidable demands of war. War itself was full of contingencies. By every untoward stroke of fortune, by every unsuccessful event however occasioned, they saw their reputation must suffer, the odium of

the people increase, and their own plenitude of power shrink, and at length give way to national resentment.

Thus the motives of conduct became poised in opposite scales. War and national interest, as well as honour and justice, lay in one of them: peace, with the security and felicity of the A——, rested in the other. In this dilemma, public benefit gave way to private utility. A temporising and negotiating spirit took the lead; a spirit which although it had been always baffled and ridiculed both at home and abroad, as having been only conspicuous for its most unparalleled futility, for thirty years past, was yet on this occasion as confident of ability and success as ever. It temporised with the nation, and assumed, as hath already been observed, the form of vigour and magnanimity in making reprisals on the French at sea. This had the appearance of war; expectation became big upon it, and for some time lulled in repose the animosity of the people. At the same time the court of France was plied with expedients, to renounce the violent occupation of a few posts in North America, which had been seized upon without any shadow of right; to disapprove of the conduct of its generals in Canada, and apologize for the hostilities committed on the subjects of Great Britain; seem to have been all that the A——n wanted to gratify the nation

tion in point of satisfaction, and cement themselves more firmly than ever with France, by committing the disputes of the two crowns concerning their respective limits and boundaries, to the endless cavils and tricks of negotiation.

These principles may account for their not declaring war; yet, forcibly carried along with the genius of the nation, they absurdly acted as if war had been already declar'd. They seized all the French ships and property that were to be met with on the high seas. These ships and this property they would not condemn, lest this step should have stop't up the channels of pacification by obstructing their return into France: hence the cargoes were permitted to perish, and the vessels to decay. Rapine, theft and embazlement absorb'd a great part; and the expences of commissioners, agents, officers, and men to look after what remain'd, greatly augmented the general waste. —By these means France suffered very much in the loss of property, and Great Britain much more in that of fame, honour, and public reputation. For France not only submitted, with an apparent apostolical patience and resignation, to these open hostilities, insults, and depredations; but when a small cruizer of ours was taken and carried into one of his ports, his Most Christian Majesty, in the spirit of masked meekness, disavowed the proceedings

of his officer, cashier'd him for his offence, treated the British commander and his people in the politest manner, ornamented the ship, and dismissed her with a primitive christian detestation of being capable to give the least countenance or protection to any such piracy and robbery, as that of laying hold of any ship, belonging to a nation with whom he was in a state of most profound peace and friendship. — By this system of conduct he made a deep impression on all the courts of Europe, creating or inflaming their jealousy of our exorbitant power as a maritime nation, which had stimulated our natural pride and ferocity to trample under foot all the sacred forms of justice and order established among civilized nations, and imperiously to reign by plunder over that element which we pretended to command. On the other side, he displayed his own moderation, and the strong attachment he had for the peace and felicity of all the christian powers, by manifesting his reluctance to war, and bearing so patiently the losses and affronts we daily inflicted upon him; whilst he nobly endeavour'd to reclaim us by the magnanimity of his own conduct, so strongly exhibited in the declarations he had made, and the delivering up of our frigate so soon as she came within his power. Whilst thus he attracted to himself the confidence, affection, and esteem of almost all the courts
of

of Europe, he gave no less attention to the state of parties in Great Britain. This circumstance was then, what it always had been, and what it always will be, a most choice and desirable object to the court of France; as from thence it can best take advantage of us in commerce or in arms, in peace or in war. Comprehending perfectly the dilemma of our A——, the attachment of its leaders towards peace, and from this cause the unprepared state of the nation for an active and vigorous exertion of its power; he encouraged the expedients propounded for an amicable adjustment of differences, whilst he silently and secretly made preparation to employ his whole force for atchieving the conquest of North America, revenging the losses and insults he had sustained on the high seas, and depriving us of every powerful ally to aid us in our accumulated distress. The good fortune and vigorous measures of Admiral Boscawen, joined to the French indiscretion in giving up the superiority by calling off their convoy too soon, rendered the first of these abortive; but the year 1756, displayed the most perfect completion of the other two.—Our Squadron much inferior to the enemy at parting from England, and afterwards augmented only by an accident, impossible to be foreseen here, and not to be accounted for there at the time it happened, met the French Squadron in battle,

and left it in full possession of the Mediterranean Sea. — Our little garrison, unsupported, and uninformed of any relief, was, through length of time, and despair of succour, driven to a surrender of Minorca. — The house of Austria, (for which we had expended so much blood and treasure) and with it the whole German Empire, the Empire of Russia, and the King of Poland, were intimately contracted and combined with our enemy; the rest of the courts of Europe put on at best but a cold face of indifference towards us, all but the single King of Prussia, at whose destruction that tremendous combination of powers was pointed: this was our situation abroad. At home the people, inflamed and enraged at our national disgraces and losses, accused one to another the temporising and procrastinating measures of the A——. The A—— threw the blame of all upon the inability and cowardice of the admiral of our squadron. The people were sufficiently enraged against this admiral from the events happening under his command. But without attempting to exculpate his conduct, or find fault with any for accusing him; justice prompts me to point out one horrid and deplorable consequence of national party and dissention in this very gentleman's case. For, from whatever quarter it arose, a most infernal spirit of cruelty broke forth, in exhibiting over the kingdom portraits
of

of this admiral, cloathed in his uniform, to expose him in effigy to the insults and mock trial of the lowest and basest of the people; who were spirited up, by sums expended on purpose, to rear piles of fire, that after having gibbeted him, they might throw him into the flames. By so illegal, tyrannical, and cruel a practice, a rage may be inspired into the best of common people, and the most generous and sentimental nation on earth may be roused into a brutal fury, fatal to the bravest and best of its commanders, the worthiest and ablest of its statesmen. I am far from saying this was the character of the man I have mentioned, but this might be the effect of such a conduct, in the case of any man; and by its being practised upon him, he received most violent marks of cruelty and injustice, in being thus publicly condemned and executed in effigy by the mob, before he had an opportunity of making a defence. The laws were insulted, and the mind of the nation preoccupied, as much as it was possible, against receiving any impression in his favour. But from whatever detestable source this unconstitutional and tyrannical spirit arose, the sentiments of the nation grew stronger and stronger in its aversion to the conduct of the A———.

Great Britain was then like a ship labouring in the sea at the mercy of the waves, and urg'd on at random before the fury of a destructive

destructive tempest. Within, her pilots were dismay'd, irresolute, and uncertain what course to steer; without, the united powers of all the elements appeared combin'd for her ruin. The brittle chain of expedients broken; the leaders discordant with one another, destitute of any fix'd system of conduct, had the farther mortification to know, that they stood by themselves, without the confidence, affection, and purse of the people; whilst the enemy, having disgraced us on our own element, had gathered the laurels of victory and triumph by sea and land; and had almost all the powers of Europe united on his side, or beholding our fate with the calmest unconcern. For from the impressions made on them, and the recent events that had followed, they conceived that there existed no where, in all the northern hemisphere, such boisterous, blustering, proud, overbearing, tyrannical, yet puny and insignificant animals, as were those of the growth and produce of Great Britain. The first part of this picture will sufficiently strike such, as at that time resided at home; and the latter will by no means appear overcharged to those who happened then to be abroad. Indeed at that time our country was enwrapt in a cloud of misfortunes. We appeared to have the least to hope for at home, and the most to dread from abroad; and all this proceeded

ceeded solely from our disunion, dissention, and the spirit of party.

In this critical conjuncture, in this forlorn state of hope, the voice of the nation pointed out, and the necessity of affairs called into action, a few men on whom the people reposed their safety, and in whom they placed their confidence. Mr. P—— was conspicuous in this illustrious class, and took the lead in the administration of the war. The genius of Britain seemed to rise on his elevation, and a new soul diffused itself through all ranks of persons. From diffident, disconsolate, and desponding, they became easy, chearful, and assured. Their hearts burn'd with resentment to wipe out past disgraces, to restore the glory, the honour, the true character of their country; and their purses opened equal to the benevolence of their hearts. But party, that blasting contagion of Great Britain, tho' weaken'd, still had force. Regret for lost power, emulation for fame, ambition for rule; these, or other motives, impelled the late leaders of the A——, to assume again the reins of government: and altho' they could not hold them for any great length of time, but restored them to Mr. P——; and those they had dispossest; yet discord and party-opposition embarrassed, retarded, and rendered ineffectual all our plans of operation in the year 1757.

In the year 1758 commenced an Æra, resplen-

resplendent with the return of British valour and success, under the auspices of a settled administration, wherein the ability of Mr. P——'s genius had full room to display itself. Here his high and vigorous energy, seconded by divine providence, molded party into concord, and rais'd that tide of victory, conquest, and national felicity, which carried the arms and character of Great Britain to the brightest summit of glory, moving her on, crowned with honour, in a rapid and unintermitting series of success to the first and highest feat of dignity and fame.

Needless would it be for me to recapitulate our victories and conquests, commencing from the Æra mentioned. They are imprinted in indelible characters on every mind, and will remain co-æval with the existence of our country. Let it suffice to say, that from the time we recovered the town of Embden, from about 4000 French and Germans, by no greater force than the Sea Horse and Strombolo, under the direction and management of the late Admiral Holmes; and took the Foudrient of 84 guns, by the intrepid gallantry of the Monmouth of 60, commanded by Capt. Gardiner; our arms continued to spread shame and terror on the coasts of France, and extending to North America, Africa, the East and West Indies, trampled down or occupied, by land and sea, the power and commerce of
that

that haughty state, wherever they dar'd to show themselves,

The battles, the sieges, the naval engagements, by which all this was effected, were not locally operated and atchieved by Mr. P—. The seamen, the soldiers, the commanders of ships and corps, the admirals, the generals, had all of them their great and respective shares of merit. But as much as the applause due to officers, is above that due to the men whom they animate, conduct, and lead on to action; or of generals and admirals, above that of the officers, or the armies and squadrons they command, and by their genius and skill move and guide in their first dispositions, and afterwards according to the nice emergencies of the doubtful conflict, point and direct to sustain or be sustained, in the critical and almost imperceptible moments of advantage: so much transcendently elevated is the applause, honour, and fame due to Mr. P—, above what can be due to any, or all the rest. His capacity, his integrity, the vigorous powers of his mind, attracted the hearts, the confidence, the hopes of the nation; captivated the esteem and favour of that sovereign, who was at first prejudiced against him, and reluctant to receive his services: raised cheerful and constant supplies, equal to his great and extensive views; formed, encouraged, and adopted plans big with glory and public utility; called merit from

obscurity,

obscurity, and setting aside the accidental circumstances of rank, exhibited geniuses equal to the arduous enterprizes to be accomplished; made the standard of fame and honour to consist, not in success, but in doing what was best, and what was possible; gave a certain assurance that all such actions would be approved; a circumstance no less conducive to success, than genius and ability in the general who commands: and inspired the nation with the same sentiments; a singular instance of which appeared most conspicuously, when the news arrived that our general had despair'd of being able to take Quebec. It was a matter of most important consequence, had occasioned great expence, and created high expectation; yet not a murmur ensued. The ministry and the nation were equally firm; satisfied that every thing possible had been, and would be done, they waited with a truly Roman fortitude, the stroke of fortune. Under these influences the arms of Great Britain prospered; her people and her forces mutually encouraged and animated one another; merit of every kind had its proper sphere of action; and the divine providence, in cases of the most desperate and improbable crisis, blessed our unanimity with astonishing success.

Four years had almost passed away in this uninterrupted state of felicity, when the good old king, our late illustrious sovereign, slept
with

with his fathers, having seen his latter days crowned with superlative and unexpected glory. The power, the grandeur, and magnanimity of Great Britain were acknowledged over the whole earth. Our present most amiable sovereign next held the reins of government; and the highest hopes were most justly conceived of a continuation of all these blessings, from the goodness of his heart, the purity of his manners, and his other excellent qualifications and accomplishments. In this situation a resignation took place, and a bright star from the north shone with superior influence at court. Mr. P— resigned in October last; and L— B— had, or was supposed to have, the lead in the A—. Here recommenced and broke forth that discord which has since increased, and is at this time every day augmenting.

An attempt to develop the cause of this discord; to separate the case of the two principal persons who are the objects of it, from that of our insidious enemy, his hirelings, and the misguided partizans on both sides, who inadvertently, or with design, aid and assist the enemy in wid'ning the breach of union, which must be of the highest utility to him, and of the most destructive consequence to us; to offer with the greatest submission a plan of coalition, and point out the fatal effects

effects that may attend the progress of party ; will be the subject of what remains.

I have said that on Mr. P—'s resignation, and L—— B——'s real or supposed lead in the A——; that discord broke forth, which has since increased, and is every day augmenting; but to have a clear view of its cause, we must go back to a remoter period. Our German connections had been an old and popular complaint, and our career of glory and success had furnished us with acquisitions, not only sufficient to accomplish the end for which the war was undertaken, but to gratify us with the prospect of large and additional advantages. In this situation it was no unnatural event, that minds of the best and noblest disposition should be inclined towards establishing the peace and repose of Europe; far less unnatural was it, that this inclination should receive accumulated force and vigour from the prospect of national felicity to arise from the calm repose of our ancient sovereign in his latter days, and the introduction to government of a young Prince his heir and successor, whose good and benevolent dispositions might be less obstructed by the hurry and accidents of a turbulent incertain state of war, and more extensively diffuse themselves, and endear the growing affections of his people, by easing them of the burthens and taxes they

so

To cheerfully complied with, enlarging their commerce, and giving them all the blessings of a prosperous peace, under the influence of public virtue, and the advancement of the elegant and polite arts. And it is evident, that the more deeply the minds of men were impressed with a conviction that peace was the only means for attaining the blessings in view, so much the more strongly would they be impelled to look after, and attain it by the method of immediate negotiation, and thereby preclude every cross accident that might happen in the course of the war to procrastinate the desir'd event, or change the present state of things into worse. To soften and bend the mind of the nation towards this object, seems to have been the aim of some pieces published about the time I am speaking of; performances of ingenuity, address and spirit, but in their application to the conduct of the present war, refuted by every event that has happen'd, as they likewise are by what has been the practice and fate of almost every state and country ancient or modern. From the time of these publications, peace became by degrees more and more a topic of discourse and debate. In the mean time the decease of his late majesty having introduced our present august sovereign to the throne, and our fresh acquisitions upon the enemy in all parts of the world giving a specious pretext

to the French court to desire the opening of conferences between the two nations; they applied for this, and their application was well received. But we are warranted to say, from the event, that the object of the French court, at that time, was not to obtain an equitable peace for itself, but either to impose upon us a shameful and dishonourable one, and frighten us into it by the appearance of a new enemy; or, united with that enemy, to try their fortune in the future contingencies of a fresh war. It was not to settle things amicably that they sent their minister; but to sow deep into our bosom the fatal seeds of discord and dissention, to corrode and blast every noble enterprize with infinite more success, than their keenest efforts could make them hope for in the premeditated future war.

Monf. Buffy on his arrival in Great Britain, early perceived amongst us a diversity of disposition as to the object of peace: the one more flexible, earnest and gentle; the other more firm, indifferent and blunt. If I might be permitted, I would rank the first of these under the name of L—— B——, and the last under that of Mr. P—; as these two names have been lately made use of as a sort of shiboleth, to discriminate the parties who create and occasion our present dissention and animosity. The principles influencing the first of these spirits have been already described;

it remains that we attempt to delineate those of the last.

Mr. P—, and those comprehended in his system of conduct, were not averse to peace. In the midst of our glory and conquest, the British court generously manifested its equity and humanity for preventing the farther ravages of war, by making overtures to that of France for coming to an accommodation: but those overtures were rejected by that petulant and haughty court, with the scorn and contempt of conquerors. From this recent event, from the duplicity and insincerity of that court in all its transactions, from its movements and machinations at all the other courts of Europe from its unintermitting approaches towards the most intimate coalition and union of interests and fortune with the court of Spain; and from the retrospective view of failure and disappointment in all our negotiations and expedients where the acquisitions of the sword had been defaced by the deeds of the pen, our allies deserted for private and temporary advantages, our honour lost in giving hostages as a vanquish'd and enslaved people, our interest neglected or defeated in a future endless discussion of our boundaries of dominion; from all these, or such like views, it was not unnatural for minds of the most exalted greatness to think, that as they had

conducted the war with unexampled vigour, which had been followed with unparalleled success, they should improve this success, and continue the exertion of this vigour, till the enemy should be brought to relent, and become sincere in their desires after peace: not indulged in negociations to amuse and relax our spirit, whilst they were drawing breath, improving by our inattention, and looking out for auxiliaries and fresh associates to renew the war; but pushed in every strong and attainable port, till reduced to fix at once the capital terms of peace, in clear and well executed preliminaries.

In the course of this opposition of sentiments, Mons. Buffy arrived in England: and, from the principles influencing the two great leaders of our A——, became at first, we may presume, acceptable to L—— B——, as conceived to come with a sincere desire and inclination of negotiating a peace; but obnoxious to Mr. P——, who distrusted the sincerity of his intentions, and the integrity of his court. Buffy improved upon the spirits of the time, and while he rendered himself agreeable by his courtesy and address to the speculators of negotiation, dexterously threw into a sarcastical light every virtue of those who were for pushing on our advantages with unremitting vigour. Resolution, firmness, and intrepidity

dity were converted into quixotism, obstinacy, and insolence; dignity into pride; manly boldness into haughty presumption.

Having thus raised his masqu'd batteries, and pointed his artillery, he opened his grand fire by that memorable memorial delivered to Mr. P—, on the 23d of July 1761. From this and the Duc de Choiseul's declaration about the same time, it appears, that the courts of France and Spain had combined together, and entered into deliberate, strong, and intimate engagements, by which the crown of Spain was to direct and guaranty our peace with France, and the French king adjust our differences with Spain. But vigour animated the court of Britain. Mr. P—, by order of the king, returned to Mr. Buffy his memorial, as totally inadmissible; communicated his Majesty's order to Lord Bristol at Madrid, to "remonstrate with energy and
 "firmness, the unexampled irregularity of
 "that court; to desire a proper explanation
 "with regard to the naval armaments that
 "had been so long preparing in the various
 "ports of Spain, and to come to some explicit and categorical eclaircissement with
 "regard to the destination of her fleets, as
 "well as with respect to her dispositions to
 "maintain and cultivate friendship and good
 "correspondence with Great Britain;" and broke off the conferences, by intimating the

recall of Mr. Stanley, and the dismissal of M. Buffy. Expectation hung upon the wing, respecting the conduct of Spain, till Lord Bristol's dispatches arrived on the 11th of September, transmitting a paper of Mr. Wall's, containing the sentiments of that court, which fully, amply and affectionately owns and vindicates her whole proceedings with France, and intimates the warmest attachment and adherence to the interests of that court.—Mr. P— seems to have seen clearly at this time, the ultimate and secret views of Spain, and in this prospect he stood recollected in all his innate vigour and firmness. He considered this explanation of the Catholic King's sentiments, as a full declaration of his engagements and resolutions to support the crown of France with all his power; and the interspersed faint compliments of regard to Great Britain, as so many thin blinds and weak devices to put this kingdom off from its guard, till he should be sufficiently enabled, by receiving his treasure from the West Indies, to commence war with a greater certainty of success. To disappoint the effects of this plan, to precipitate this proud and unprovoked enemy into his own snare, to cut off from him his nerves and sinews of war, and hurl the calamities of his own duplicity and fines upon the heads of himself and his people; Mr. P— moved for the most vigorous measures to be instantly taken

taken and executed, by intercepting his treasures, and carrying the terrors and mischiefs of hostile enmity into his wide extended dominions, under the sanction of an open and declared war, unless, without farther negotiation, he instantly gave the fullest security and satisfaction of his friendship and neutrality to the requisition to be made thereof, not by the tardy and cautious steps of an ambassador, but by our commanders in chief at the head of the British power, tendering the acceptance of sincere friendship or inveterate enmity, and armed in the might of the nation to save or destroy.

In this grand and leading motion finding himself over-ruled, nay unsupported by any but one noble L—— his fellow compatriot and coadjutor in the measures proposed; he saw his influence in the state at an end. And therefore, as he knew himself able to answer and account for his course of administration hitherto, this appeared to him the properest time to resign his trust, when he could no longer be useful in the execution of it; but must either obstruct and embarrass the measures carried on by others, if he opposed them; or sacrifice his own fame and honour, if he concurred in them, contrary to his own conviction, and what he apprehended to be the interest of his country. These, or such like fair and honest motives,

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might

might be, or rather certainly were the cause of Mr. P——'s resignation.

No less fair and honest might be, or rather certainly were, the motives of L—— B——, and those who joined with him, in the discussion of this capital point. A tedious, bloody and expensive war, with so powerful an enemy as France, might well induce their attention and caution, how they involved their young Sovereign and country in a new war with a powerful King, rich in his resources of treasure, and formidable by a numerous fleet of capital ships; or threw this King into the arms and intire interest of an enemy, whom they might thereby enable to rise with renewed vigour. Spain had not only shewed no open enmity towards us, but had at times so persevered in professions of friendship, that even our Ambassador was led to think she desired to be upon the best terms with us. It was not the interest of the crown of Spain to embarrass itself with the broken fortunes of France: and altho' the friendship of nature and consanguinity might be strong between these two crowns, it was not reasonable to think it would so far mislead a new King, that he should involve his new subjects, and his own interests, in those calamities and ruins of war, which might be supposed to be unavoidable, in taking part against a victorious powerful and triumphant nation, flushed with
 success,

success, and skilled in the arts of conquest. Under these circumstances it appeared neither just nor politic to be the aggressors, in hurrying on hostilities, and making an enemy; when by delay, and farther negotiation, we might preserve a friend, and obtain the blessings of a good peace with the whole world. But at the same time it was thought necessary, nor to relax in vigour, or be unprepared for the worst; which, if it should happen in this way, would clear us from the aspersions thrown out upon us at the commencement of our war with France: and our moderation and equity obtain us the esteem and approbation of all Europe, when they beheld with how much reluctance we entered upon a new war.

From this investigation of the principles influencing the conduct of those two great men, L— B—— and Mr. P——; we may be able to develop the cause of the present discord: especially if we add to these principles, that generous and noble emulation for glory, which has always animated in all ages the greatest and most accomplished men in free states, and which has been and always will be of the highest advantage and service whilst confined within the terms and boundaries of the constitution and government. And by comprehending exactly the case of these two principal persons, we may also be enabled

enabled to separate it from that of our insidious enemy, his hirelings, and those misguided partizans on both sides, who aid and assist him in widening the breach of union and national harmony. For from all that has been premised it will clearly appear,

First, That L— B— and Mr. P— agree in their aim, which is to advance and establish the glory, interest and felicity of their country.

Second, That they likewise agree in this, that peace is the means of accomplishing that aim.

Third, That they differ only in the manner or method by which they may best obtain this peace. L— B— inclines to negotiation; Mr. P— to the decision of the sword: in which difference the personal, moral and state character of each is unimpeachable.

Fourth, That it is equally uncertain, and intirely a matter of contingency, which of these methods, occasioning this difference, is the best. A reverse of fortune might give the preference to L— B—'s measure; a continuance of success, compelling the enemy to sue for and accept of our terms, would sanctify Mr. P—'s.

From all which we may conclude, that the original and primary cause of the present discord, was no other than a difference of opinion, arising from the difference of genius and temper

temper in those two great men, about the measures to be followed for acquiring peace, as the means of obtaining what was equally the principal object of both, the felicity and prosperity of their country: and that from the time of deciding the great and capital point respecting our conduct with Spain, when Mr. P——— resigned and L—— B——— took up the lead in the administration, they have had a generous contention for fame, superadded to their mutual attachments to their country: Mr. P——— resting upon the unequal'd advantages and glory obtained thro' the whole course of his influence in the administration, and the grateful affections of the nation for his vigorous, successful and upright conduct; L—— B——— upon the integrity of his public affections, the consciousness of his own abilities, the esteem and approbation of his S———, and the attachment and love of those to whom his virtues and capacity are known; by means of all which he aspires and hopes to rear his fame upon the blessings and happiness to be obtained and secured to the nation, by an honourable and advantageous peace.

In all this contest, there appears nothing to prevent our respect for both these great men; nothing to hinder their mutual esteem of one another: and whilst their ultimate object is one and the same, and terminates in
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endeavouring to accomplish the public good, we may derive the highest benefits from both of them.

Very different is the case of our insidious enemy, and the unnatural and bribed hirelings who would promote his cause; as also of the bigotted partizans of these two great men, who aid and assist the common enemy in widening the breach of union, and driving us into all the horrors of discord and party rage. The design of these is to divide us. It matters not whether we hate or esteem; or who be the object of either, L— B— or Mr. P—. They represent both of them in the most unfavourable and even criminal lights; and would have us scorn and detest each other, because we have been born in different parts of the same island, country and soil: a division, which were it to take place, is infinitely bigger with mischief and calamity than all the factions of Whig and Tory, all the abortive attempts of Jacobitism, and all the distinctions and parties that were ever attempted before. We will touch lightly upon the artifices of this sort, both as they respect Mr. P— and L— B—.

Mr. P— having resigned the seals, has been branded as a pensioner; and as having all along acted in expectation of this pension, and of the honours conferred on his family: that these being his ultimate views, when they were

were offered him he meanly accepted them, and deserted the service of his country.— He has been accused as haughty, insolent and seditious; as throwing up his office with a view to distress government, and embarrass his S——, unless he were permitted to rule with an absolute sway, and Vizir-like to controul the K—— and his whole council.— He has been charged with acting inconsistently with himself, in adhering to German connections, paying tribute to the K—— of P——, and exhausting by a series of prodigality, extravagance, profusion and dissipation the treasures of his country, by which the national debt is enormously augmented.

Malice, armed in all her power of enmity and falsehood, has only been able, in all these accusations, to utter gross contradictions and absurdities.

To suppose the K—— bestowing, and Mr. P—— receiving the pension and honours mentioned, in the way of bargain for his resignation; is to contradict and destroy the other supposition, of his resigning with the insolent and seditious view of distressing government, and embarrassing his S——. And to suppose the last case to be true, the first must evidently be false. For 'tis impossible that the K—— reigning over his free people, not only without any competitor, but without the remnant of any faction to oppose him,
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and having the universal love and affection of his subjects, should stoop to reward and honour a man for affronting his Majesty, and attempting to distress his government. The prerogative of the King is, to dismiss his servants when he has no farther use for them; the liberty of the subject, to resign when he can no longer serve. The resignation of Mr. P—— has been already mentioned, and it appears neither insolent nor seditious. The presents and honours given to his family upon that occasion, were given with so much princely grace, and accepted of with so much independent freedom, as to be with every sensible and unprejudiced mind beyond the power of calumny to stain. Had he refused the benevolence and bounty of his Prince, so nobly and kindly pressed on him; well might those enemies of Britain have said, he was haughty and insulted his S——, would not receive any mark of his favour and esteem, and by that sufficiently indicated his seditious intention of obstructing his government. But what demonstrates these slanders to be as absurd as they are false, is, the equal even uniform conduct of this great man ever since his resignation. The same measures have been recommended, the same vigorous efforts pressed upon parliament and ministers, and the same attention shewn towards the interest and glory of his Prince and country, as when he had the

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direction of the war as a minister himself. Neither meanly truckling to those he left behind him in the state, nor raising opposition or embarrassment to the course of government, he aided and powerfully recommended the expediency, the necessity of giving full and ample supplies for the exigencies of the war in every quarter of the world, not only to Germany, but likewise to Portugal. The exalted appearance he made in the close of the last session of parliament, on the subject of a vote of credit, exhibits his character in the purest light, as a most faithful servant to his Prince, and a most steady and invariable friend to his country. The presents and family honours are not therefore the bribed hire of venal service, or treacherous desertion of the public cause; but marks of royal esteem upon the one hand, and free dutiful attachment on the other, such as a good Prince may confer, and an honest subject ought to receive.

The charge brought against Mr. P— of having inconsistently with himself adhered to German connections, and payed tribute to the K— of P—, is no less inconclusive and absurd. Because Mr. P— had disapproved and opposed German connections before he was a minister, is that a reason when called into the administration, and finding it impracticable to break them, that he should not turn those connections to the best advantage

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tage for the service of this country, and distress of the enemy. Because he had opposed German connections when made the chief and capital object of view, and occasioning a relaxation of attention to what was our real grand interest; or an impotency of force to accomplish any great point in our own province as a naval power; is that a reason why he should not have made them a secondary consideration, and adopted them in a manner to be highly conducive and subservient to what was our main object, distressing the enemy at sea, and reducing and possessing his foreign dominions, colonies and settlements? — Had Mr. P— relaxed in vigour towards this main point of interest and service to his country, for the sake of the German connections; he would then have done what he blamed in others, and been inconsistent with himself. But he enlarged and strengthened our naval power, multiplied our expeditions, attacked the enemy in all his vulnerable parts, and made those very German connections instrumental to our main and true interest, naval and foreign conquests. — To connect Great Britain with Germany, or any other country or state, where her interest, her honour, or good faith are not concerned; is certainly both practically and theoretically wrong. But Great Britain, both as one of the chief powers of Europe, and as a naval and commercial power may,

and must at times, as her interest, her honour, or good faith directs, be connected with Germany, and all countries and states of Europe: and to neglect such connections, would be to neglect her own real importance, her commerce, and all the means by which her power has been attained, and must be supported.—Let us see what would have been the natural and probable consequence of giving up all connections with Germany. Would not Hanover have fallen into the possession of the French? Would not France have been thereby, not only freed from the diversion the British, Hanoverian, and Hessian troops have caused her in that quarter, but enlarged and augmented in her strength by the whole and entire force of that electorate, and the country of Hesse? Is it not natural and probable to think that this united force, added to and combined with the powers of Germany, Russia, and the Polish sovereign, would have soon oppressed and conquered Prussia, and all his countries? In the division of these conquests, may we not with probability think, that a branch of the house of Bourbon would have been an Elector of Hanover, and of the house of Austria of Prussia; and that large parcels of the Prussian dominions would have been assign'd to reward and gratify the Empress of Russia and the Polish King? May we not conclude that France, united with Ger-

many, and intimate with Spain, would have improved her interest and situation to our disadvantage as a maritime power, in the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Atlantic seas? — But we will suppose for the sake of argument, that by some extraordinary and happy fate, Prussia, Hanover and Hesse would have been given up again at the end of the war, only weakened, impoverish'd and impair'd. Would not France have been, by having these countries thus subdued and occupied during the war, at perfect rest within herself, and had only her sea coasts to guard against any descents from us? Must she not then, in these circumstances, have been able, before her fleet was so much destroyed as it is now, to have supplied Canada with a force far superior to what we could have sent, either to attack her territories there, or to defend our own in North America? Is it not likewise highly probable, that in the height of this superior situation, Spain might have been induced to have join'd her early with her whole maritime power; or to have sold us her neutrality at the expence of our interest and honour? With what difficulty did we obtain our conquests in Canada, where but a very few French troops appear'd: what then must have been the case, had the enemy been at liberty to have sent whatever supplies he pleased, not only thither, but to the East and West Indies? when all these circumstances

cumstances are duly considered, I doubt not but they will carry along with them the clearest conviction, that our connections with Germany this war were not only honourable, but of the highest advantage; that by this means the enemy was wholly occupied, and rendered unable to give any adequate assistance to his dominions abroad; and that our forces having been so judiciously employed, so excellently commanded, and so distinguishedly successful, give the highest propriety to those energetic expressions, "That America was conquered in Germany."— And "that the millstone of a continental war was formerly about the neck of a British ministry, but now is put about the neck of the French." Rome was saved in Africa in just such a manner, as America was conquered in Germany. The Romans compelled the Carthaginians, to evacuate Italy to defend Carthage; Britain's connections in Germany compelled the French to employ their whole force there, and to lose America.

The other accusation which imputes to Mr. P— prodigality, extravagance, profusion and dissipation of the public money, by which the national debt hath been so enormously increased, exhibits the most lively instance of French effrontery, in the agents of Mons. Bussy; or of the immeasurable height to which injustice and malevolence, when in-

creased by partial attachments and party bigotry may arrive sometimes even amongst ourselves. Had Mr. P— lavish'd this public money on objects inconsistent or unconnected with the war, objects that were useless or cumbersome to its success; had he paid for troops that never came into the field, or when they came never fought, or when they fought caused no interruption to the progress and conquests of the enemy, no embarrassment to the exertion of his powers, no prevention of his attention to the capital and chief seat of the war, no compulsion upon him to exert his greatest force in the worst manner for his own service, in the best for ours; in short, upon objects and towards purposes, no ways conducive to the honour, interest, and success of Great Britain; it might then have been said he was guilty of prodigality and dissipation. Had he lavished this money in seducing and corrupting the manners and minds of the people, in bribing and jobbing for elections, in influencing or buying off the leaders of an opposition, or trimming to his own purposes a pensionary house of commons; then might it have been said he was guilty of prodigality and dissipation. Or had he lavish'd this public money in acquiring a ministerial fortune to himself, in agrandizing his relations, friends and dependents; the accusation might have then been justly laid. But when none of all

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this can be affirm'd, when, on the contrary, this public money has been employed to promote the honour, and advance the interest of Great Britain, in maintaining her influence, dignity and character as a great and principal power in Europe, in supporting heroic, injured, and oppressed majesty, in vindicating the civil as well as the religious rights of Germany; and in making all these essentially coincide with, accelerate and accomplish the security and welfare of Great Britain itself, by exercising, wasting, harrassing, and defeating the whole internal force of the enemy, and incapacitating him by this means from exerting any powerful efforts in behalf of his foreign dominions and settlements: this is not prodigality and dissipation, but an application of the public money to the best and truest advantage and interest of the nation. — When this public money has been employed in building ships, levying troops, fitting out expeditions, and wasting the British thunder to every quarter of the world, to the joy of our friends, the dismay of the enemy, and the surprize and astonishment of all Europe; this is so far from prodigality and dissipation, that it is the genuine and masterly application of the public money to the highest public use and service. — When the fruits and effects of this application of the public money is seen and felt in our conquest and possession of almost every

settlement and territory the enemy held abroad, in the extensive acquisition and enlargement of our trade and commerce, and in the riches flowing in upon us by our captures made at sea. This cannot possibly be prodigality and dissipation, but economy and ability of the noblest kind.—The national debt is very great: the taxes, imposts and duties, adequate to raising the necessary annual supplies for supporting and carrying on the war, are very heavy: and what are our returns for all this immense expence? Here they are; let us examine them thoroughly, and judge for ourselves. In the ravages of a long and bloody war, we have not only enjoyed every where at home the sweets and pleasures of the most profound peace, but our trade, our commerce, our riches have been immensely extended; that of the enemy totally ruined; his merchants bankrupts; his people miserable in poverty; and himself without credit, reduced to beg a pitiful alms of his nobility and clergy.—Our settlements in America have been not only secured, and the boundaries extended to the utmost limits we could have wished to carry them; but almost all the enemy's countries, possessions and settlements are added to them. We have been put into the entire possession of the fish trade, fur trade, African trade; most of the sugar trade, and all the enemy's trade and possessions in the East Indies,

Indies, the Muritias only excepted. These articles of commerce raised and agrandized the French to the dignity and importance of a maritime power ; in these they were our formidable rivals ; and by means of these exalted their naval force almost to an equality with ours. Stript of these it now depends upon the government of Great Britain how far, or whether ever France, shall be a naval state of importance sufficient to give us any future disturbance. These conquests, these possessions, this increase of trade, commerce, and felicity, are what have enabled us to raise such immense supplies annually, as far exceed those of any former period. So that if much has been taken from the nation in the expence of the war, much more has been added to it than the amount of that expence: Weighing these returns, viewing this plain state of our affairs, which is founded upon indubitable facts, and within the comprehension of every capacity ; we shall find that the enormous public debt of the nation, the aids given to the King of Prussia, the sums expended upon our troops and connections in Germany, have not been raised out of the treasure of this nation as it stood before the war : but that the war has supplied that treasure, and the nation itself been enriched. We shall find that the enemy himself has paid the expences of the war, and that the poverty and misery

of the French subjects have been the enrichment of the British. We shall find that our conquests are more than a sufficient mortgage for the whole capital debt of the nation, by the future acquisitions arising from commerce; and should it be necessary to give part of them back, yet much more may be kept than will correspond to the capital debt of the present war. With this state of our affairs before us, permit me to ask, whence ought we to conjecture these false, inflammatory and treacherous charges proceed, that Mr. P—— has prodigally wasted and dissipated the public money, and loaded the nation with insurmountable debt; that the accumulation of our conquests, is but the accumulation of our distress; that our connections with Germany have been ruinous to our interests; that our treaty with Prussia had neither our preservation, our interest or honour in view? Are these the sensations of truth, the suggestions of patriotic virtue, the feelings of the sons of freedom, liberty and Britain? Or do they not carry in their very phrase and meaning, their french original? Are they not the blossoms and flowers of that seductive seed so plentifully sown by Mons. Buffy; when his whole deportment and ambassy was to embroil, divide and destroy the harmony, concord and felicity of our country? To him, and to the detestably corrupted engines and tools of his
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faction, let them only be imputed. Far be it from the true friends of L— B—, far from the friends of liberty and Britain, to conspire in such combinations of falsehood, absurdity and detraction.

The same malevolence of spirit hath exerted itself against L— B—, with as much absurdity, and with infinitely more audacious indecency.

He has been charged as a man unacquainted with public business; and therefore, except he could lay claim to inspiration, unqualified for the employment he holds in the government. — He has been calumniated on account of the spot of his birth; and reproached and vilified as a Scotchman, in contradistinction to an Englishman: and it has been alledged, that in consequence of this accident, all places of government must needs be occupied by Scotchmen. — He has been revil'd as assuming power by means of his favour with his S—; and the records of past times have been ransack'd, and invention tortur'd, to bring to public view the crimes and villanies of men and women who have had influence at courts, and the misrule, oppression and perfidy of weak or bad Princes.

One thing is very remarkable; that in all this torrent of abuse, not one fact has been produced to support or give the least credit or probability to any part of the calumnies so

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illiberally utter'd. If by public business is meant a knowledge of the detail and manner of passing business through the public offices; then the constant clerks and servants of these offices are the greatest proficients: and it is from them that all Ministers have learn'd, and must learn, the formalities, punctillios and minutia of business in their respective departments. But if by public business be meant, a knowledge of the constitution and interest of Great Britain and its dominions, and the application and exertion of that knowledge to whatever respects the felicity and advantage of the state, either internally, or in the tenor of conduct to be observ'd externally with foreign powers; then will L— B— appear from his education as a scholar and a gentleman, from his rank of life as a nobleman and a member of the legislature, from his acquaintance with men of the first eminence in public business, from his natural habit and temper of mind towards study and observation, and from his œconomy, justice, integrity and ability in private life, to stand in as fair a light as any Minister that has been before him.

L— B— has been charged with being a Scotchman, in contradistinction to an Englishman; and, as a necessary deduction from this accidental circumstance, it has been inferred, that Scotchmen must needs now occupy

copy all places of government. Time was when such a description and contra-distinction had just place. Then this island was divided into two distinct kingdoms; which had each of them their own laws, their own interests, and stood absolutely independent of one another. The union broke down this barrier; and, happily for both, formed the whole island into one kingdom, having but one people, one interest, one legislature. This kingdom is neither that of England, nor Scotland, but the kingdom of Great Britain; this people are neither Scotch, nor English, but Britons, and the people of Great Britain. This is a fundamental law of the kingdom, by which the former description and distinction, marking two separate kingdoms and people, are abrogated and annul'd. To object therefore to L— B— that he comes from the North, is equally ridiculous and capricious, as it would be to object to Mr. P— or to any other Minister or officer of the crown, that he came from the West, or any other quarter of the kingdom. To think or surmise that the former will only employ and recommend North Britons, is equally absurd as to imagine of the latter, that he or they would only make use of West, East or South Britons. In this kingdom the subjects have naturally all the same right. A man from the North has as good a title to be called to civil or military

tary employments and operations, as a man from the South, or any other quarter. And until it can be ascertain'd that some particular village, town, county, or district of Great Britain, is specially productive of genius, ability, merit and integrity, above all the rest; there is no spot in the kingdom can, or should, give any natural just preference to one man, more than another, to be employed in the service of his country. —The seat of government must necessarily attract candidates for preferment from all parts of the kingdom. Move it from London to Edinburgh, and the bridge over the Tweed would be as useful to transport the people from the South to the North, as it is now to transport them from the North to the South. Remove it to Radnor, and we should then find it expedient to make roads for preferment over the mountains of Wales. —In what kingdom on earth were the offices and employments of government ever distributed in proportion to the numbers possessing the several districts it might be divided into, or the taxes they might pay? If there never were any such, and if this never was the case in Great Britain; why that invidious contrast, so elaborately endeavour'd to be drawn, between the North and the South Britons, as to the former being employed more than the latter? Admitting this invidious suggestion to be true,
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it has not happened under L— B—, but under Mr. P—, and all the Ministers before them. And the reason is obvious why it might happen, and why it is expedient and fit that it should happen. The trade and commerce of South Britain is incomparably greater than that of North Britain, and the gentlemen vastly more affluent and rich. By this means they are enabled not only to leave their eldest sons in a state of ease and independency, but to settle their younger in business and commerce, which sufficiently employs their attention, and gains them fresh affluence and fortune. This state of wealth and independency puts them above the necessity, as the consciousness of their own importance raises them above the desire, of traversing all the rugged thorny tracts of court solicitation. On the other hand, commerce was later introduced into North Britain, longer held in contempt, and is at present but in its infancy, in respect of the progress and growth of it in the South. Gentlemen not being so rich in that part of the kingdom as they are in this, and being fonder too of renown in arms than in business, as well as not having the means of establishing their sons in a high rank of commerce at home, are thence naturally led to solicit employment at court, or lay out their little fortunes in purchasing commissions in the army, or becoming adventurers
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in trade at London, or abroad in the colonies. This I apprehend is the true reason and cause that North Britons may be seen in the army, and in the service of the government, in numbers perhaps exceeding the proportion of people in the one part of the kingdom to that in the other. But this is not a case of favour, but arises from nature, necessity and good policy; and redounds to the utility and benefit of the whole nation. Every sensible man amongst us must comprehend the advantage arising to his country from employing the Highlanders as officers and soldiers in our armies against the common enemy, by which the schemes of a foreign faction are entirely broken, the interest of a Pretender left without hope, and a very considerable force not only taken from the French service, but added to our own: whilst thus all the subjects of the nation are united in one and the same view, to support our common constitution and government, and repel and crush every foreign enemy. He will likewise with equal clearness perceive, from what has been said, that it is the advantage and happiness of the South country gentlemen to be in such affluent circumstances, as not to put them under the necessity of appearing candidates in such numbers for employments from the government, as the North country gentlemen are obliged to do; and that this situation which the French
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faction would represent as a grievance, is in fact a very high and distinguishing blessing in favour of the South Britons. — Justice and candour would have requir'd, that L— B— should have at least introduced some remarkably greater number of North Britons into employments than former Ministers had done, and that South Britons and the interest of the kingdom in general were thereby really hurt; before so much as the shadow of a charge should have been laid against him: but justice and candour are strangers to French councils, and much more to frenchified Britons, when they have become the minions and tools of a faction, whose design in all this is not to lay open any real grievance, but to mislead and divide us, by detaching us from our only true interest, that of mutual affection, esteem and union, in order that we may foolishly embrace an absurd, ideal and fictitious system, of there being two kingdoms, two people, and two interests, in one and the same kingdom of Great Britain, separate foreign and oppos'd the one to the other. Permit them but to effect this, by giving up implicitly your understandings, affections and feelings to their absolute management and direction, and they have gain'd their point. They will then have established faction upon a more extensive and pernicious bottom, than ever was attempted heretofore. Our importance, influence and power, as a nation, will then be effectually broken,

broken, by the introduction of mutual antipathy, rage and sedition in every sphere of government, in every order and rank of men; in place of our being actuated, as we have been hitherto, with one mind and one spirit, against the enemies of our country.

L— B— has been accused of assuming power by means of his favour with his S—. Could any accusation be more absurd, or more insolently laid than this? Because L— B— has the honour of being esteem'd by the K—, shall his Majesty for that reason not employ him in his service? Let us apply this case to our selves. Whom do we chuse to confide in? Whom to manage our business and act in our affairs? Are they not those whom we most esteem? Those whose ability, probity and attachment to us, endear them most to our affection? Or, should we rather employ those whom we don't know; or of whom we have a mean or bad opinion? And yet this we should do, if this charge have any meaning in it. His M—, agreeably to the constitution, is vested with the executive power of the nation. In virtue of this essential and constitutional prerogative, he employs whom he pleases in the execution and discharge of all the offices and duties of state. Hard indeed would it be, should the K— not have the liberty of choosing his own servants, whilst his subjects

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have that of declining his service. Our constitution has likewise provided a regular channel, for laying before his M—— the sentiments of his people, respecting the ill conduct of his Ministers; and the crown has seldom been known to slight such solemn applications. But, in the present case, has there been the smallest room for public complaint during the short space of L—B——'s administration? Have those outrageous accusers been able to produce one article against him, as a man, or a Minister? — Destitute as they are of all decency, they have been reduced to this single article, that his M—— has an esteem and regard for him; a circumstance which ought naturally to recommend him to the esteem and regard of the people. — Had those detractors gone no farther, the petulance and impotency of their charge would have hardly merited notice; but they have exceeded the bounds of the most profligate writers in the most profligate times. Unable to discover any crime, they have endeavoured in their invention of prints, and in their history of favourites, to taint our imaginations with ideas of bad women, of wicked Ministers, and of weak Princes, who have been infamous for misrule in this and other countries. To apply these odious and detestable characters to the present time, would be as

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unjust as criminal. Yet who are so blind as not to discover the intention of exhibiting such pictures? Or who so hardy, as not to dread their ill effects upon weak minds, stimulated by French emissaries, who may be employed in every part of the kingdom to enforce and heighten them with the most wicked implications.

Permit me here to sum up the opposition between the characters of these two great men, who divide our sentiments and opinions, and that of the French faction and its adherents, who take advantage of this division.

In delineating the principles influencing L— B— and Mr. P— we have seen nothing but what is amiable, patriotic and national. Their ultimate object is one and the same, the glory, honour and felicity of Great Britain. The means of obtaining this object is peace, in which they are likewise both agreed; but have differed with respect to the means by which it should be brought about. Mr. P— would accomplish it, by a vigorous unrelenting prosecution of the war; L— B—, by the gentle, equitable and candid discussions of negotiation. L— B—, while he continues open to the method of negotiation, has, during the course of his administration, employed the whole force of the nation in distressing the enemy, and enlarging its conquests. Mr. P—, since

since his resignation, has steadily and invariably exerted himself, as a member of the legislature, in recommending the support of our allies, the faithful accomplishment and continuance of our plan of connections on the continent, the pushing of the enemy on all sides, and the liberal supply of whatever sums may be found requisite for enabling his Majesty and his Ministers to effect all these purposes. Here we see, not only the point wherein these two great men differ; but we see each of them, in his own proper character, not only blameless, but abounding in merit and the strongest public affections; desiring, intending and advancing the interest and good of their country.

In delineating the motion and progress of the French faction, in their shameful outrageous and groundless charges against both these gentlemen; and of the partial bigotted friends or dependents of each, who may have been misled into the same foul course; we have seen, and can see, nothing but what directly, necessarily, and immediately tends to the interest and service of the enemy, the prejudice and ruin of their country. Not balancing themselves upon any principles, not concern'd about any fair disquisitions respecting the merit or demerit of either party, or how Great Britain may be best serv'd by the respective abilities and virtues of both; they

have drained to the lowest bottom the blackest sources of calumny and invention, to raise our contempt and hatred not only against each of these respectable characters, but against the memory of our late glorious S——, and against the most amiable qualities of our present illustrious m——. Even the most sacred recesses of the R—— H—— have not escaped their enormous pollution. Not satisfied in their attempts to alienate our affections from the proper objects of their attachment at home, they have extended their plan, and exerted their keenest efforts, to raise our contempt and hatred against our allies and confederates in the war; against that virtue, that heroism, that military skill, which has so powerfully operated towards the acquisition and accomplishment of all our riches, success and felicity. The K—— of P—— has been described to us, as a royal free booter; and P—— F——, as fleecing this nation of its money, and despising her soldiers. Solemn engagements and public faith, under the management of these frenchified politicians become dissolv'd or are annihilated, on the smallest specious appearance of convenience. Not contented with this, they have aspired, in the utmost outrage of treason against their country, to alienate our affections and esteem from one another; to make us suspect, hate, and oppose ourselves; to raise the

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the absurd imagination, that one part of the kingdom is only a foreign appendage and appurtenance of the other; and to cause the natives and inhabitants of one place, to be held and treated as aliens and foreigners in another; representing them as having different views, different interests, and opposite motives of action. Thus have they exerted, and still continue to exert, their utmost endeavours, to throw us into the most destructive convulsions; to render the measures of government wholly ineffectual; to check and overthrow the progress of our arms, by raising jealousies, enmities, and seditions in our councils, in our armies, in our fleets. — No matter under what leader they range themselves, or which side or interest they pretend to embrace; their writings, their fictions, their calumnies, tend all to one point: to inspire hope, and give success to our despairing enemies, to divide us into opposite and virulent parties, and thereby bring disgrace and ruin on our constitution and country. The aim and end of all these compositions perfectly distinguish and characterise the case of the French faction exerting itself so indefatigably at this time, and those who aid and abet it; from that of L—— B—— and Mr. P——, whose interest they would be thought to espouse. They are acts of violence, not reason; suggestions of falshood, not facts; and

display in the most conspicuous light, the unboundedness and implacability of that vengeance plann'd by Mons. Buffy against this nation, in alienating the warmest affections of an united people, from the best and most deservedly beloved sovereign; and involving us, one with another, in mortal hatred and enmity.

It now depends upon ourselves; how far we will be imposed upon; how far this faction shall prevail: whether we will desert our country, relinquish our own interests, and serve the views and purposes of a distressed, desponding, inveterate enemy, by suffering ourselves to be divided under false and absurd distinctions, by withdrawing our natural and moral obligations and affections from our Prince, the constitution, and one another; or gloriously act the reverse.

Holding the case of L—— B—— and Mr. P—— to differ from that of the French faction and its abettors, in the extremest degree of opposition; the next point of consideration will be, what motives offer to effect a perfect coalition and union between those two great men.

Time seems now to present the opportunity which no reasoning could have brought about before, of according the systems of both in one and the same tenor of conduct. Mr. P—— at the time of his resignation, conceived a war
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with Spain to be unavoidable; but the same degree of conviction had not then appear'd to L— B—. No sooner however had Spain received the expected treasure from the West Indies, than the court of Madrid discovered to our ambassador her open contempt and enmity towards Great Britain. L— B— and the administration, became soon after, in consequence of Lord Bristol's dispatches, convinced of the impracticability of avoiding a Spanish war; and immediately began, with vigour, to prepare for the event. Had this been conceived a short time before, there had been no cause for Mr. P—'s resignation; and being apprehended now, there remained no longer between them, any real difference of sentiment upon this matter. The point of honour, concerning the advances to be made on the one side or the other, seems at this time, and ever since, to be the only obstruction to a perfect reconciliation. Now as the continuance of this breach for so long a time, has given and still gives, an opportunity to the enemy, of abusing the minds and sentiments of the people, and carrying on, with too much success, the most pernicious system of defection, animosity and illiberal rage, that ever was practis'd; it seems high time to get the better of all kind of punctillios, and accomplish a speedy and perfect co-alition between them. For this purpose, all that seems

requisite, is only the reinstating Mr. P— in the same department and management of the war he occupied before his resignation. His ability and integrity may be said completely to fit him for so important a place. The attachment the nation bears him, and the prosperity and success enjoyed under the influence of his administration, may perhaps make it appear not unworthy of his M——'s wisdom, to invite him anew. Such testimony of honour and regard, from a beloved S——, could not but meet with the highest respect, and most faithful acceptance from a man, whose past principles and conduct has given the strongest assurances of his being devoted to the service of his king and his country. I know it has been thrown out, among the absurdities daily emerging from our present disputes, that Mr. P— is overbearing in council, and will not act but as a vizir and first minister. This is only an instance of the malice and rancour of the times. Great Britain knows no first minister, no grand vizir, unless the K—— be such, who is intrusted by the constitution, with the whole executive power of government; and in this respect may be said to be the first minister, or, if you will, grand vizir, of a free people. In discharging this royal prerogative, he must necessarily employ many under him. Whether therefore the business of one department
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be executed by one, or more persons, it approaches neither more nor less, on that account, towards despotism, or exorbitant power. But if any one man be of merit and worth, equal to the business of any one department; that business will be better executed by that one man singly, than if he were clogg'd and tramel'd in by the association of many others of different degrees of temper, genius, and extent of spirit: in the same manner, and for the same reason that a fleet, or an army, is better conducted by one commander in chief, than by many vested with equal power; or that the armies of any Prince in Europe, are of more service, than those of the States of Holland, shackled as they are with the deputies of the States. It was Mr. P—'s ability in the management of the war, and the extraordinary success that attended it, which gave him the ear, the confidence, and distinguished trust of his late Majesty, in conducting the business of that department; which, so far from laying on him the stigma of a first minister, is naturally the highest and best recommendation a man can have to the esteem and regard of our present accomplished sovereign.

Let us indulge ourselves a little in contemplating the agreeable prospect, arising from this happy co-alition. — With what dignity must the paternal care and attention of his

his Majesty exert itself, whilst he employs in the service of himself and his people, that genius and ability which has been already so well tried, so signally successful, and so universally admir'd.—What an impression must it give, both at home and abroad, of the virtue and integrity of our leaders and patriots, when such as L— B— and Mr. P—, are as ready to be reconcil'd, when the interest of their country calls for it; as to assert their different opinions, when each imagines his own the best: and renewing with the renewal of sentiments, that friendship and esteem which they formerly entertained for each other; cement this fresh union, by the most vigorous exertion of their joint powers, for humbling the pride and punishing the duplicity of the common enemy, until a just and advantageous peace can be obtain'd.—Hence might we see war, should it still be necessary to continue it, crowned with victory and conquest, extending, enriching and securing the greatness of a free and happy people, under the bold and enterprising genius of P—: and the national finances applied, with the highest integrity, œconomy and judgement, to their true and national uses; virtue, genius, and the polite arts, encouraged and diffus'd amongst the people; and a British parliament, in all its genuine and constitutional height of glory, unsolicited, un-

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pensioned and unbiaſſed in its operations, under the candid, honeſt and diſcerning ſpirit of B——. Above all, how pleaſing would it be to obſerve, as the happy effect of this fair and natural coalition, the furious factions, artfully rais'd amongſt us by the enemy, intirely broken and diſſolv'd; and a generous ſentimental noble-hearted and united people, bluſhing at their having been decoy'd, return to their duty with redoubled ardour, full of eſteem and love for one another; and, actuated by one mind and one principle, whiſt they freely ſupport the exigencies of the ſtate by their ſupplies, vanquiſh and overthrow every enemy by their united irrefiſtible bravery.—And thus might we behold our King, the greateſt and happieſt Monarch upon earth, reigning in the hearts of that free, mighty and united people, whoſe love and affections are the impregnable pillars of his throne: behold him as the head and chief of this glorious co-alition, animating and invigorating every part; diffuſing his benign influence on all his ſervants, with the judgment of a wiſe maſter, and the kindly affection of a princely father of his people; capable of what perhaps no other Monarch feels, the ineffable delights of private friendship, yet ſo ſuperlatively great, as never to permit this leſſer and ſecondary affection, to interrupt his royal functions, and tarniſh or obſtruct the intereſt,

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glory and happiness of himself and his kingdoms.

On this high and natural coalition taking place, and the return of this universal spirit of concord and national unanimity, we may justly hope and expect that the war will terminate in a good, an honourable, and lasting peace: that the dominions, commerce, and naval power of Great Britain will be sufficiently increas'd and secur'd: the expences of the war fully and amply indemnified and paid, out of the conquests we have made; the commerce and maritime importance of France bounded and circumscrib'd, within such impervious limits, as may prevent her from extending any more her illimitable strides of power and injustice over the ocean, as she has done over the land; the commercial connections and interests of Great Britain with Spain, restored and fixed upon as high, advantageous and friendly a footing, as those of France or any other the most favour'd nation; the bonds and ties of the family compact, that threaten or are destructive of the peace or liberty of Europe, broken or dissolv'd; our pretensions and rights in the bays of Campeachy and Honduras, maintain'd, clear'd and settled on indisputable foundations; and our trade to the Spanish West Indies opened and extended upon the footing it was heretofore. — What conquests are to
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be made, or what part of those conquests we have made are to be given up, in order to facilitate this peace; are subjects to be discussed in a higher circle, and make up no part of our present enquiry: we may be permitted however to hope, that whatever be returned to the enemy, the island of Minorca, our central port in the Mediterranean, will again return to us.

With reluctance I leave this delightful prospect, to survey the reverse of all this felicity, should any unlucky accident prevent this coalition. In such a case, we may justly dread the advantages the enemy will derive from it, by using every artifice and seducement to fascinate the imaginations, and deceive the understandings of individuals, into a disposition and temper of mind fitted to irritate, insult and injure one another; to widen the breaches already made, and urge on the rage and antipathy of the parties, that are now but too eagerly forming amongst us, into the most extravagant fury and national distraction. Whether the war be continued, or peace restored, it is much to be feared, that the one, or the other, will but ill serve the interest of Great Britain. In the prosecution of the war, and after such a series of uninterrupted success, whatever disasters may arise, and however unavoidably they may fall out, they will probably be imputed as a crime to the ad-
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ministration; and be thought to have fallen out, only from not employing the abilities of that great man, whose influence and conduct was always successful. A people rendered diffident and distrustful, and whose minds are soured by losses and disappointments, will soon regret the expences of the war, refuse farther supplies, and believe at length, what has been with so much pains inculcated upon them, that the nation, in a state of unprecedented affluence and power, is already brought to the brink of ruin, and left destitute both of treasure and of strength. Should the kind influences of providence continue to be still favourable to our arms, effects, of as mischievous and dangerous a tendency, may be produced, from that mutual spirit of rage, jealousy and antipathy one against another, which hath so unhappily been rais'd amongst us of late. — Peace, in this case, will as little accomplish our happiness, or remain fixed upon any certain or sure foundations. What peace can be made, that will give satisfaction, in our present situation of parties, who so fiercely oppose and contend with one another? Should we retain all our conquests in North America, it will nevertheless be alledg'd, that we have not obtain'd a proper boundary and security to our dominions, whilst the French remain possessed of Louisiana, and can attach the
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Indians to themselves, and foment and excite their hostilities against us; whilst they can collect troops there, and from thence, at a proper season, recommence the war, and pour them in upon our best, but unprepared and defenceless colonies.—Should the fish trade of Newfoundland, under any restrictions, be allowed them; it will be said, that this is giving them the surest and best nursery for seamen, and enabling them to rear again, with facility, a rival naval power, which it has been one of the greatest advantages reaped by this war to have ruin'd and destroyed: that they will not only acquire by it this invaluable benefit, but thereby carry on and enjoy the profits of a superior trade to us in this article, as they have done formerly.—Give them up our conquests in the West Indies, and it will be asserted, that this not only augments their trade as a maritime power; but gives them the balance against us in the sugar trade, and restores to them those islands greatly enriched and improved, not only by their having carried on a free, uninterrupted, advantageous trade under the protection of the British flag, but a sure dead gain of all the money expended upon our troops during the time we have had possession of them. Restore them to their possessions in the East Indies, and it will be urged, that they are
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thereby restored to the full possession of all their former influence and power in those parts; that this trade, added to their sugar trade and fish trade, will suddenly enable them to extend their naval power to what desirable heights they please; and that by uniting with our good friends the Dutch, in their inveterate and enterprising plans against us, they may even effect our expulsion in the time of profound peace, and leave us as destitute of any importance there, as they themselves now are before the signing of this peace. In short, we may expect to hear that the laurels gather'd under one administration, have been torn and blasted under another; that a glorious, successful, and advantageous war has been wound up in an inglorious, unprofitable, and disadvantageous peace; and that the nation from being enriched by the war, is ruin'd under the burthen of an insupportable debt by the peace.— Notwithstanding all this, a peace may take place; but it is to be dreaded, that it will be a peace, attended with such a national discord and ferment of spirits, as will enfeeble and weaken the British government, and reduce it to the same placid, timid, temporizing conduct, that rendered the Walpolean system so odious at home, and ridiculous abroad, whilst the morals and spirit of the people suffered an almost total dissolution under universal corruption.

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To conclude therefore, the first and highest point to be gained is, the accomplishment of the co-alition propos'd ; by that, to unite the minds and sentiments of the people; and then, whether peace or war shall ensue, the whole power and energy of the nation will have its full effect, to give respect and sufficient influence to the former, or crown the latter with accumulated honour, glory, and advantage to His Majesty and his kingdoms.

F I N I S.

