




IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)



13 128 125
14 134 122
15 120
16 118

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**

11 11
10 01
9 01



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions

Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

1980

Technical Notes / Notes techniques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Physical features of this copy which may alter any of the images in the reproduction are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Certains défauts susceptibles de nuire à la qualité de la reproduction sont notés ci-dessous.

Coloured covers/
Couvertures de couleur

Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur

Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur

Coloured plates/
Planches en couleur

Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées

Show through/
Transparence

Tight binding (may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin)/
Reliure serrée (peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intérieure)

Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées

Additional comments/
Commentaires supplémentaires

Bibliographic Notes / Notes bibliographiques

Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible

Pagination incorrect/
Erreurs de pagination

Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents

Pages missing/
Des pages manquent

Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque

Maps missing/
Des cartes géographiques manquent

Plates missing/
Des planches manquent

Additional comments/
Commentaires supplémentaires




The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol → (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ▽ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

The original copy was borrowed from, and filmed with, the kind consent of the following institution:

National Library of Canada

Maps or plates too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole → signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ▽ signifie "FIN".

L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de l'établissement prêteur suivant :

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les cartes ou les planches trop grandes pour être reproduites en un seul cliché sont filmées à partir de l'angle supérieure gauche, de gauche à droite et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Le diagramme suivant illustre la méthode :

July - 1886

TORYISM IN THE CANADIAN CONFEDERATION

He who essays to write history should respect facts. To obscure them by half-statements or by making assertions based on insufficient evidence is in effect direct misstatement. Mr. Griffin, in his article on "The Consolidation of Canada," published in the April number of this Magazine, tells us, "Many citizens of the Young Dominion had no faith in its future. They predicted all kinds of disasters and declared that the consolidation of Canada could never be anything more than a name." The writer might fairly have stopped here. But when he proceeds to indicate that these "doubting Thomases" were all Reformers, while the Confederationists were Conservatives, he belies the party record of the past twenty-five years. The paragraph to which I take special exception is as follows: "So the people formed themselves into two parties, the Dominionists and Provincialists, the one having unbounded confidence in the future of enlarged Canada, and holding that where the interests of one of the provinces conflicted in any matter with those of the country at large, the province must give way to the Dominion; the other taking a most gloomy view of the future of the Confederation, and insisting that the autonomy of the provinces should be restored in part, at least. Most of the Dominionists allied themselves with the Conservatives, while the Provincialists joined the Reformers, and thus, while the names Dominionist and Provincialist have never been used to designate the two parties, the distinguishing characteristic of the one is nationalism and that of the other provincialism. No review of Canadian history since the Confederation that ignores this distinction can satisfactorily explain the present situation, and no forecast of the future is reliable unless it takes this into account." Now, if this means anything it is that to the Tories Canada owes Confederation, and that the Reformers were, and yet are, ranged in opposition to the scheme and its principles. I propose to elucidate some facts bearing on this statement.

That there is a marked difference between the Tory and Liberal views of Confederation I grant. The Liberals hold and always have argued that the less the federal authority intermeddles with affairs of purely local concern the better; that the interests of the nation would be best conserved by recognizing the fullest degree of provincial autonomy consistent with the letter and spirit of the Act of Confederation; that, within their

sph
pow
that
lativ
forg
mer
nati
ince
aske
autl
fede
obje
tion
N. 2
prop
A b
the
Refo
blan
coal
exis
in oi
on a
lead
A. M
Mr.
Refo
to n
how
cons
Que
zie, l
his v
can
adop
that
mak
mon
to th

spheres, the peoples of the provinces should be clothed with full legislative powers, and that the Federal Government should not encroach upon them; that the veto power should be sparingly exercised and that the less legislative friction produced the better for the general good. They did not forget the fact that each of these provinces were supplied with an equipment of legislative machinery, and they pointed out that the confederated nation would become, as it were, the multiple of which the several provinces were the units—not the unit of which they were the factors—and asked that in matters which were of purely provincial interest the federal authorities be completely isolated. They appreciated the fact that the federal system always presupposes the existence of an autonomy, and they objected to sinking it in a legislative union. They advocated Confederation and were content to give up, and a majority of the people, in the B. N. A. Act, agreed with them in giving up to the Central Government that proportion of authority necessary to the smooth working of Confederation. A brief *résumé* of the events leading to, and subsequent to the passage of, the Act of Confederation may be of value in determining the position of Reformers on the question and of estimating what measure of praise or blame attaches to their action in that regard.

The Government under which Confederation was accomplished was a coalition. A series of Parliamentary deadlocks had threatened the very existence of government, and a temporary union of forces was resorted to in order to carry some scheme which might once more put the legislature on a working basis. Of that government Hon. George Brown, the then leader of the Liberal Party, was President of the Council; and Hon. John A. Macdonald, now the Rt. Hon. Sir John, was Attorney-General West. Mr. A. Mackenzie, Member for Lambton, and subsequently premier in the Reform Administration from 1873 to 1878, was then in the Assembly, and to note the part taken by them may be pertinent to the issue. Here, however, I may say that a union of the provinces was not at all a new consideration when it was discussed by the Conference of Delegates, at Quebec, in 1864. I find that as far back as 1831, Mr. Wm. Lyon Mackenzie, leader of the Upper Canada Radicals, declared that he wished with his whole heart that there could be a union of all the British North American provinces. In the year 1837, both Houses of the Imperial Parliament adopted a resolution setting forth that for reasons given, "It is expedient that the Legislatures of the said provinces respectively be authorized to make provision for the joint regulation and adjustment of such their common interests." Thus, it seems, that a very early official directory impulse to the movement emanated from Britain. In the year following (1838) I

find the Colonial Office thus expressing itself: ". . . It will be for your Lordship, in conjunction with the Committee to consider . . . some joint legislative authority, which should preside over all questions of common interest to the two provinces, and which might be appealed to in extraordinary cases to arbitrate between contending parties in either, preserving, however, to each province its distinct Legislature, with an authority in all matter of an exclusively domestic concern." (*Vide* Lord Durham's Instructions, 1838.) In the following year (1839) Lord Durham recommended a scheme for a union of Upper and Lower Canada, to which, by mutual consent, the other provinces might be admitted. He recommended the appointment of a commission charged with the arrangement of the constituencies and representation on a basis of population; the establishment of local legislatures with *exclusive* domestic control, and protected by Imperial Act from federal encroachment, and a Supreme Court of Appeal. (*Vide* his report, 1839.) In the same year, Lord John Russell introduced a bill, based on these recommendations, into the Imperial House, but on the second reading, it met with much opposition and was withdrawn. In 1849 (a year made memorable by the issue of the celebrated Annexation Manifesto, signed by so many of the leading Tory politicians of the federated Canada of to-day), the British American League, in a manifesto, expressed its advocacy of union, with increased powers of self-government, but did not define the system. In that year some such union was felt to be a necessity, and that "peace and prosperity were endangered" for lack of it, the official statement of the basis, on which the Brown-Dorion government was formed, expressing it in so many words. Thus it will be seen that there had been a long period of constitutional unrest out of which our politicians looked for some such solution as we obtained in Confederation. I come now to some evidence more clearly indicative of the parts played by Toryism and Liberalism in the great constitutional drama.

In 1859 the Lower Canada Liberal members issued a manifesto, in which it was asserted that "the true, the statesmanlike solution is to be sought in the substitution of a *purely federative* for the present so-called Legislative Union. . . . The proposal to federalize the Canadian Union is not new. . . . It was no doubt suggested by the example of the neighboring States where the admirable adaptation of the federal system to the government of an extensive territory, inhabited by people of divers origins, creeds, laws, and customs, has been amply demonstrated; but shape and consistency were first imparted to it when it was formally submitted to Parliament by the Lower Canada Opposition (Reform), as offering in their

judg
syst
the
tion
Wes
form
the
auth
sect
to tl
repr
whic
thes
feate
I
com
by M
the
Bro
serv
don:
of t
the
ing,
alth
accl
emp
thei
Cha
only
fede
Asse
man
wou
quot
extr
bod
crisi
conf
beer

judgment the true corrective of the abuses generated under the present system." We get a fairly representative expression of Reform opinion in the resolutions unanimously adopted by the National Liberal Convention, consisting of five hundred and seventy delegates from all parts of Western Canada, which met in Toronto in 1859. They declared for "the formation of two or more local governments, to which shall be committed the control of all matters of a local or sectional character, and some joint authority charged with such matters as are necessarily common to both sections of the province," and that "no government would be satisfactory to the people of Upper Canada which is not based on the principle of representation by population." During the following session of Parliament which opened at Quebec, on February 28, 1860, Mr. Geo. Brown moved these resolutions on the floor of the House, and on May 8, they were defeated by large majorities. (*Vide Journals of the House, 1860.*)

In conformity with the resolution of a large Parliamentary Committee, composed of most of the members of the House, and which was moved for by Mr. Brown, to consider methods for the extrication of the country from the grave situation in which the deadlock in legislation placed it, Messrs. Brown, McDougall and Mowat entered into coalition with their Conservative opponents for the express purpose (*vide* Mr. John A. Macdonald's speech, *Confed. Deb.*, 1865, page 26) of bringing about a union of the provinces, a perfect understanding to that effect being precedent to the compromise. They went before their constituents on this understanding, with the result that Messrs. Brown and Mowat were unopposed, and although Mr. McDougall was defeated he was immediately after elected by acclamation for another constituency. Nor was public sentiment less emphatically expressed in the elections of the members who went before their constituents after the disclosure of the Government's policy at Charlottetown. Thirteen elections for the Legislative Council took place; only three candidates declared themselves opposed to the scheme of Confederation, and of these but one was returned. Eleven elections for the Assembly were held and not an opponent of the scheme was returned. A man of less temerity than Mr. Griffin, with these facts accessible to him, would have been deterred from making such a statement as I have just quoted. The fact is, the country was ripe for the scheme, and "though extreme parties here and there grumbled at these arrangements, the great body of the people of all shades of opinion, thankful that the dangerous crisis had been safely passed, gladly accepted the situation and calmly and confidently waited the progress of events. Never before had coalition been more opportune." (*McMullen's History of Canada, chap. xxvi.*)

While participating in the canvass in favor of the scheme, Hon. Mr. Brown and a number of his colleagues attended the meeting of a Conference of Delegates from the Maritime Provinces, held at Charlottetown, P. E. I., with a view to bringing about a Confederation of those provinces, and so ably did they present their views that the conference abandoned the lesser scheme and agreed upon a meeting of delegates from all the provinces, to be held at Quebec, on the 10th of October, 1864. In the interval, Hon. Mr. Brown and several of his colleagues canvassed New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and did much to press on the people the merits of the scheme of federal union. Of Mr. Brown's devoted and disinterested patriotism and the earnestness, vigor and persuasiveness of his advocacy of Confederation, at the Quebec Conference, supporter and opponent alike testify. To his broad statesmanship and keen perception is due in a marked degree the measure of perfection attained in the resolutions agreed to by that body. It is not too much to say, that the spirit of forbearance and generosity manifested by him and his Reform colleagues—their willingness to waive minor points and meet as far as possible the views of representatives of all sections of the country in the promotion of the general good—was indispensable to the success attending the undertaking.

The series of resolutions adopted at the Quebec Conference were introduced simultaneously into the Legislative Assembly and Council of Canada, on the 3d of February, 1865. On February 20th, they received the approval of the Legislative Council by a vote of 45 to 15 and, on the 23d, that House waited on His Excellency, the Governor-General, with an address, praying that a measure based on these resolutions be submitted to the Home Government. In the Assembly the debate was of great interest, being confined to the main motion, owing to Hon. Attorney-General Macdonald moving the previous question, the resolutions being adopted on March 10, by a vote of 33 to 13, and on the 14th of the same month this House also presented His Excellency with an address. Having shown how evenly parties were balanced, I might confidently submit my case to the judgment of the intelligent reader. But I have a much better case made out for me in the public records of the utterances of representative Liberals on the subject. They show that while, for reasons which I will have occasion to refer to subsequently, individual Reformers felt constrained to vote against the scheme at that juncture, there were not lacking Tories similarly disposed. They show also, that the Reform leaders went heart and soul into the work of Confederation, accepting the scheme as embodying in the greatest measure then attainable the principles which a generation of Reform had advocated; and that with some, at least, of the Tory leaders,

acquies
office ;
the rete
consiste
On Ap
were n
found
voted t
House,
that he
commit
He was
opposit
promis
accept.
of the
Tenure
Counci
then, u
of their
record
" Now
Union,
against
would
have o
people
strong
that a
. . . .
was a
Provin
. . . se
Union
Federe
ment t
prior t
Legisl
situati
federa

acquiescence in its provisions was but a *sine qua non* to the retention of office; in short, that when their acceptance was found to be coupled with the retention of power the principles to which they had hitherto given a consistent and strenuous opposition suddenly found favor in their eyes. On April 14, 1864, Hon. Attorney-General Macdonald voted that there were no constitutional changes necessary; but on the following day he found his government defeated, promptly reconsidered the matter and voted that there was urgent need for such changes (*vide Journals of the House*, 1864). When Hon. Mr. Brown's committee was asked for, I find that he voted against it, and again, when he became a member of that committee, he recorded his vote against the principles of Confederation. He was consistent in so doing, as he strongly advocated legislative union in opposition to the federal system; although when the adoption of the latter promised the renewal of an expiring lease of office he did not hesitate to accept. It was an action quite in keeping with his course on the questions of the Secularization of the Clergy Reserves, the abolition of the Seigniorial Tenure and the introduction of the elective principle into the Legislative Council, to all of which he gave ten years of consistent opposition and then, under similar circumstances, Saul-like, became as suddenly convinced of their desirability as he temporarily did of Confederation. In the official record of the *Confederation Debates*, page 29, we find him quoted as follows: "Now as regards the comparative advantages of a Legislative and a Federal Union, I have never hesitated to state my own opinions. I have again and again stated in the House, that, if practicable, I thought a Legislative Union would be preferable. I have always contended that if we could agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could adopt. . . . It was found that any proposition which involved the absorption of the individuality . . . would not be received with favor by her people. . . . There was as great a disinclination on the part of the various Maritime Provinces to lose their individuality, as separate political organizations, . . . so that those who were, like myself, in favor of a Legislative Union, were obliged to modify their views and accept the project of a Federal Union as the only scheme practicable." How different this sentiment to that desire for Confederation expressed by the Liberals for years prior to the decisive discussion! No clearer expression of preference for Legislative Union, or candid admission that he unwillingly accepted the situation, could be adduced. He had been a consistent opponent of Confederation up to the defeat of his Government in April, 1864, and his

inconsistency in supporting the terms agreed upon at the Quebec Conference extended over but a brief period, since which he has persistently worked toward a realization of his ideal of a Legislative Union by a series of systematic unconstitutional attacks upon the rights of the Provincial Legislatures, which, happily, owing to the fact that the court of final resort—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—is beyond his influence, have thus far failed in producing the desired disintegration or modification of our system.

Hon. Mr. Brown and Mr. A. Mackenzie gave no uncertain sound on the question. In the case of the Reform leader I refer the reader to the official record of his utterances in *Confederation Debates*. His splendid orations, particularly those found on pp. 84-115, 709-710, and 989-995, are the expressions of a vigorous and well-informed mind fired with the devotion of true patriotism and conscious that the realization of the aims of a lifetime was about to receive its consummation. Mr. Mackenzie's views similarly expressed will be found on pp. 421-434, and at various other stages of the debate. The Reform leaders rejoiced in the success of the measure and they did so with the approval of the great mass of their followers. Individual members strongly advocated the submission of the scheme to the people, but the government felt that however constitutionally correct might be their contention it was likely to imperil the success of the undertaking and cause a lapse into that very condition from which the coalition had been formed to extricate the country. I am not prepared at this day to indorse their view or to sit in judgment on those who, upon this ground, cast their votes against the measure. They were not confined to one party, but included prominent members of both, and in their contention they were supported by the chief Tory organ in Upper Canada, the *Toronto Leader*.

Reformers did not accept the terms as incapable of improvement. They did not regard it as did Attorney-General Macdonald, who, in his new-born fervor for Confederation (p. 32 *Confed. Deb.*), said: "I think and believe that it is one of the most skillful works which human intelligence ever created." They looked upon it, in the words of Hon. Mr. Brown (p. 995, *Confed. Deb.*), as "an admirable compromise," considering the vast and varied interests involved. Hon. Mr. Brown saw in it the foundations for a Dominion stretching from ocean to ocean (p. 86 *Confed. Deb.*), but he was not unconscious of the elements of danger it contained. With Mr. Mackenzie and the rest of his colleagues he appreciated the fact (pp. 108 and 427, *Confed. Deb.*), that great intelligence and political knowledge on the part of the people and honesty on the part of those intrusted with the

administration of government would be necessary to realize the full benefits of the principle involved in Federal Union. He joined Mr. Mackenzie in his advocacy of the abolition of the Second Chamber, but waived the point rather than jeopardize the general result. To quote Mr. Brown's exact words (p. 87 *Confed. Deb.*): "It was necessarily the work of concession; not one of the thirty-three framers but had, on some points, to yield his opinions; and for myself, I freely admit that I struggled earnestly, for days together, to have portions of the scheme amended." He opposed the Provincial Subsidies clause and advocated instead, that the expenses of the local governments be defrayed by direct taxation. Had it been so arranged I believe the people would have obtained cheaper and better government, both Dominion and Provincial, and that what promises to become a very grave source of difficulty would have been avoided. With a single chamber the travesty on legislation annually enacted by our Senate would have been impossible. But these aims could not be realized; concessions had to be made by all in order to arrive at any agreement and they were a part of the Reform sacrifice. But the Tory leader's hostility to Confederation was exerted in more than one direction while the final arrangements were being made, and there are not lacking reasons for suspecting him of attempting to influence, at least one of the deputation of four who went over to confer with the Imperial Government, in order to seduce him from his allegiance to the scheme. I am aware that great credit is claimed for Sir John A. Macdonald in the bringing in of the North-west Territory, but the basis is purely hypothetical—an instance of his application of the doctrine of expediency. Mr. Macdougall (who was then a member of Sir John's cabinet) in his famous pamphlet, says: "I am disclosing no secret of the Council-room when I affirm that in September, 1868, except Mr. Tilley and myself, every member of the Government was either indifferent or hostile to the acquisition of the North-west Territory. When they discovered that a ministerial crisis . . . could only be avoided by an immediate agreement (and immediate action) to secure the transfer of these territories to the Dominion, they were ready to act."

Imperfect as the Confederation Act is, the only difficulties experienced in operating it are of a kind directly traceable to the hostility to the federal system entertained by those intrusted with the administration of the affairs of State. It is impossible, in the space of a single article, to do more than mention in passing a few of the evidences on the part of Toryism to trench on the reserved prerogatives of the legislatures, which have occasioned so much friction in Confederation. The principal attacks have been made upon Ontario, and a few specimens may be cited. The settle-

ment of the northerly and westerly boundaries of the province, referred to a Board of Arbitrators during the term of Mr. Mackenzie's administration and adjudicated upon in 1878, the award of the arbitrators being made on August 3d of that year—just one month and fourteen days before the Reform defeat—was repudiated by the Macdonald government on its accession to power. The award involved (in round numbers) 100,000 square miles of territory, much of which is valuable for its timber and minerals, and, under the decision of the arbitrators, was declared to be a part of Ontario. The Dominion Government disputed the claim for years, the premier, Sir John A. Macdonald, declaring that "not one stick of timber, not one pound of ore," would ever belong to Ontario. Strangely enough, he was sustained, in the effort to plunder the province, by its Tory representatives in the House! Negotiations for the submission of the case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council proved, for a long time, abortive, the Dominion refusing, in the interim, to recognize the right of Ontario to exercise her powers in the maintenance of law and order in the territory of which it was desired to despoil her. The case had been further complicated by the Federal Government arbitrarily handing over a portion of the territory to Manitoba. Ultimately the case was carried before the Privy Council, the Dominion, notwithstanding an expressed willingness to have the whole difficulty finally settled, declining to join to have the north-easterly boundary defined. The result was eminently satisfactory to Ontario, the judgment of their lordships being on the line of the award, and almost in its precise language. The Federal Government still resists the award, however, by refusing to make restitution to the province of the vast quantities of valuable timber sold therefrom and parceled out among their supporters while the case was pending. Within the past few months a test case has been entered, and already the Chancery Court and Court of Appeals have given judgments in favor of the province, and I do not doubt the issue. The Streams Bill, an Ontario measure, frequently disallowed by the Dominion Government, was another source of difficulty, and, like the Boundary Award case, was carried to the highest court in the realm, and the right of the province to enact such legislation triumphantly vindicated. The Hodge case, the Insurance case, the Escheats case, each in turn were struggled over, in every instance the Tory Government at Ottawa being the aggressor, and the decisions invariably justifying the contention of the province. Recently great demoralization threatened the liquor traffic, owing to a conflict of authority precipitated by Sir John A. Macdonald. The licensing function, specifically and *exclusively* reserved for the provinces by the B. N. A. Act, he deter-

mined to seize upon, informing a gathering of his followers at Yorkville that he would "humble that little tyrant, Mowat," by taking from the province the control of the licenses. He declared the excellent provincial enactment, familiar as the "Crooks Act," was "not worth the paper it was written on," and staked his reputation as an authority on constitutional law upon the result. He passed his Act, and, after some delay, appointed inspectors and commissioners, who proceeded to collect fees and issue licenses, and at once a case to test the question was submitted. The Canadian Supreme Court was against him, but he did not allow it to rest there. It was carried to the Privy Council, and with the usual result of affirming the right of the provinces to exclusive control within their spheres, to which it was decided to have been relegated. At this session of Parliament, in progress as I write, it is proposed to appropriate a large sum to pay the expenses of the attempted enforcement of the unconstitutional License Act, and to recoup those from whom money was extorted for worthless licenses. The policy of interfering with the Provincial Legislatures in matters amply within their competence, and disallowing acts of great local importance, thus necessitating vexatious strife and costly appeals to the Privy Council, the expenses of which fall upon the province attacked, both as plaintiff and defendant, is pursued in conformity with the well-known desire for legislative union and contempt for local authority which mark the course of the present Tory premier, and it has not tended toward the consolidation of which Mr. Griffin writes. It is the merest obscuration to call Reformers "Provincialists." They are the true friends of Confederation who scrupulously respect the authority of the provinces and of the Dominion, each within its sphere. The indisputable fact that in each of six consecutive contests of authority, brought up through the courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the federal authorities were decided to be the aggressors, ought at once to settle the question as to responsibility for the friction engendered in the Confederation machinery. In none of these cases has the fault been one inherent in the federal system. They were purely of administrative origin, and sprung from the present premier's centralization policy and the supineness of his Ontario following. No law has a fair trial when its administration is intrusted to hostile hands.

In 1872 government pledged the country to the construction, within ten years, of the Canada Pacific Railway. Mr. Griffin says the Provincialists—which term he applies to Reformers—opposed the building of it from the first. They did protest against undertaking such an engagement on such terms. I do not think the result discredits their foresight,

as—after an expenditure of money, enormous for our population and resources, and after giving away the road, paying a company many millions of dollars, and 25,000,000 acres of land to bribe it to own and operate it, and giving it an absolute twenty years' monopoly of the North-west, together with perpetual exemption from taxes—we are likely to have the road opened during the present month. The policy of the Reformers was to build the road as speedily as the resources of the country justified and the needs of settlement required; and on that principle Mr. Mackenzie proceeded, with the approbation of no less a Tory authority than Dr. Tupper, Minister of Public Works in the Conservative Government, now High Commissioner to England. He said: "I feel that the Ministry of the day are entitled to the support of this House, and especially of those gentlemen on the opposition benches, in any measure which is required to carry out the pledge—perhaps a somewhat imprudent pledge—that was given by their predecessors in relation to this work; and I feel that they may look to this side of the House for their most energetic support of the measures they have taken—I believe wisely taken—for the redemption of that pledge." That was his opinion of the Reform policy as recorded in *Hansard*, 1875. One circumstance in the history of this work seems to have been overlooked by Mr. Griffin, "without which no review of it will be complete." I allude to the celebrated scandal growing out of the sale by Sir John A. Macdonald of the charter of the C. P. R.'s, his acceptance of a sum approximating \$360,000, to be used, and which was proven to have been used, as a huge bribery fund, and his consequent fall in disgrace. The report of the Royal Commission, which investigated the matter, and Lord Dufferin's dispatch to the Home Government on the subject, will convince the most incredulous, and give an insight into Tory methods more clear than any other single Canadian public document of which I am aware.

A few of the more important measures passed by the Reform Government, 1874-1878, may be mentioned: The Controverted Elections act, placing the trial of elections in the courts; the Insolvent act; the Supreme Court act; the Ballot act; the Farmers' Sons' Franchise act; the Petition of Right act, by which citizens' claims against the government may be enforced; the New Postal act; the Maritime Court act; Improvements to the Election Law; the Independence of Parliament act; the Public Accounts Audit act, which places the auditor beyond the control of the ministry of the day; the Canada Temperance act, giving local option; the Homestead Exemption act; Criminal and Railway Statistics acts; the General Insurance act; the acts organizing the North-west Terri-

tori
and
betv
Lor
repr
men
coul
sent
led
succ
I
of p
denc
imp
has
size
the
they
real
Riel
gove
ties
tract
pani
grac
they
ous
whe
they
virtu
the
whe
izati
that
is no
by t
appo
with
yet
I


tories; Improvements to the Extradition Laws, and many others of great and permanent importance. During its term much correspondence passed between the Canadian and Home Governments on the instructions given Lord Dufferin, which directed him to "extend or to withhold a pardon or reprieve according to (his) your own deliberate judgment, whether the members of our said Privy Council concur therein or otherwise." Nothing could be more odious to a Liberal Government or subversive of the representative principle, and vigorous action on the part of Reform statesmen led to the omission of the offensive paragraphs from the instructions of his successor, Lord Lorne.

Mr. Mackenzie's government fell on September 17, 1878, on the question of protection, upon which the Tories appealed to the country, after bitterly denouncing the Reform Administration for an increase of 2½ per cent., imposed for the purpose of stimulating a declining revenue. The policy has been in force seven years, and no remark I could make could emphasize its disastrous failure or its influence for evil on the Government and on the country. Of Mr. Griffin's remarks anent the Metis chief, Riel, I submit they only serve to obscure the main question by raising a side issue. The real question is the government's treatment of the half-breeds, of whom Riel was the chosen leader. For years they had been asking redress, and government, Mr. Griffin admits, did not regard their prayers and entreaties until it became "wearied by their importunity." In the meantime tracts of land on which they were settled were given to speculating companies empowered to eject the unfortunates. Their treatment was a disgrace to Canada. To quote the chief Tory organ, the *Toronto Mail*, "Had they had votes, like white men, or, if like Indians, they had been numerous enough to command respect and overawe red tape, without doubt the wheels of office would have revolved for them; but, being only half-breeds, they were put off with an eternal promise, until patience ceased to be a virtue." For years petitions had been received and pigeon-holed, and, for the hundredth time, government had promised to "consider the request," when suddenly the rattle of musketry at Duck Lake awoke them to a realization of their folly. Mr. Griffin's remarks would lead to the inference that a commission had been appointed before the trouble developed. Such is not the case. The battle of Duck Lake took place on March 26, 1885; by the report of the commissioners before me I learn that they were appointed on March 30, just four days afterwards. I find that they dealt with 1,815 claims, 1,710 of which were proven, and that a very large number yet remain to be adjusted. The inference is plain.

In the first year of Confederation, 1867-8, our expenditure was \$13,486,-

092; in 1873-4, the year the Pacific Scandal Government was expelled from power, it had risen to \$23,316,316. In 1878-9, when the Reform Government was defeated, it was \$24,455,381, an increase of but \$1,129,065, although the retiring government, in 1873, had contracted for considerable increases. In 1884-5, after six years of Tory rule, it is \$35,037,060, with many large items of expenditure properly chargeable to current account charged to capital. The gross liabilities on July 1, 1867, were \$93,046,051; assets, \$17,317,410; in 1874, four months of which fiscal year the Tories were in power, they were \$141,163,551; assets, \$32,838,586; in 1878, when the Liberals went out, \$174,957,268; assets, \$34,595,199. Since then we have had a Tory Government, with Sir John A. Macdonald as premier, and on July 1, 1885, our liabilities were \$264,703,607; assets, \$68,295,915. Our gross debt now is probably close upon \$300,000,000. Much is made by Mr. Griffin of the proposal to give the North-west representation in the Dominion Parliament. Any one who cares to examine *Hansard* for some sessions past will find that the matter has been brought before the House several times by the Reform members, and that motions recognizing the propriety of granting such representation were defeated by strict party votes. The general charge of annexation tendencies launched at Liberals scarcely merits refutation; but if it did, it already has it in the honors heaped, by the present Tory Government, upon gentlemen who were but recently prime agitators in such a movement. But, I submit, it is not for an apologist for the present Canadian Government to hurl such a taunt. History will, I venture to say, class as true patriots many who are thus stigmatized. For the destiny of Canada I have no forebodings, however dark may be her political horizon or overcast her sky. Our troubles are not inseparable from our system; they are purely administrative, and the remedy is always available. I have a strong faith in the character of the Canadian people. They will yet shake off the incubus of debt and misrule which afflicts them, and, whether as an important part of federated Britain, a more closely welded Confederation of provinces, an independent nation, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or a part of one great Anglo-Saxon-speaking America, their status is assured; and there will not be wanting in time of need men of "high heart and strong endeavor," who have the courage and patriotism to fight the battle of principle, though it doom them to perpetual opposition; and whose resolution will neither be seduced by the temptations of office nor coerced by taunts of political heresy.

CHATHAM, ONTARIO, May 6, 1886.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John Barwick". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned at the bottom right of the page, below the typed name and date.

elled from
rm Govern-
129,065, al-
onsiderable
17,060, with
ent account
93,046,051;
the Tories
1878, when
ce then we
as premier,
\$68,295,915.
ch is made
ation in the
rd for some
the House
gnizing the
strict party
at Liberals
the honors
ho were but
it is not for
ch a taunt.
no are thus
gs, however
bles are not
e, and the
acter of the
and misrule
ted Britain,
lent nation,
reat Anglo-
will not be
avor," who
s, though it
neither be
of political

Ke

