





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

© 1986

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge intérieure
- Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplémentaires:

- Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached/
Pages détachées
- Showthrough/
Transparence
- Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	14X	18X	22X	26X	30X
			✓		
12X	16X	20X	24X	28X	32X

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:




Douglas Library
Queen's University

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

P

THE

Q257

11

PHILOSOPHY OF KANT

IN EXTRACTS.

SELECTED BY

JOHN WATSON, LL.D.,

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
IN QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, CANADA.

KINGSTON:
WILLIAM BAILIE, PRINTER.
1892.

L.P.

B2755.W3 1882 c.2

11

11

3174186

no
F
It
sic
ad
m
w
tin

bu
to
kn
an
of
pr
to
pir
rio

I
nit
exp
per
nit
exp

THE KRITIK OF PURE REASON.

INTRODUCTION.

Of the Difference between Pure and Empirical Cognition.

Though all our knowledge begins *with* experience, it does not follow that therefore it all derives *from* experience. For it is just possible that experience is itself a compound. It is just possible, that is, that there is in experience, besides what is due to the impression of sense, something in addition that comes from our faculties themselves (when merely acting because of impression); and in that case, it would take long practice, it may be, to enable us to distinguish the latter, and separate it from the former.

It is at least not a question to be summarily dismissed, but one that demands more particular consideration, this, to wit: whether there really be such component part of knowledge as is independent of experience and, indeed, of any impression of sense whatever? Such component part of knowledge, did it exist, were alone to be truly termed *a priori*; and it would evidently stand in contradistinction to what other component part of knowledge is called empirical: the latter, namely, having its source only *a posteriori*, or in experience.

In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by cognitions *a priori*, not such as are independent of this or that experience, but such as are totally independent of any experience whatsoever. Opposed to these are empirical cognitions, or such as are only possible *a posteriori*, or from experience.

We do possess certain *a priori* Cognitions, and even Common Sense is never without such.

It is easy to show that there actually are in our knowledge necessary and, in the strictest sense, universal (consequently pure *a priori*) judgments. Would we have an example from science, we have only to turn to any proposition in mathematics; while, as for the most ordinary common sense, there is obviously to hand, by way of instance, the proposition that every change must have a cause, where the very notion cause so manifestly implies necessity (of connexion with an effect) and strict universality (of rule), that it would be altogether lost did we derive it, like Hume, from our conjoining what simply follows with what simply precedes, through the mere habit of the experience, and the consequent simple custom of connecting ideas (where the necessity could be only subjective).

Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Limits of all *a priori* Cognition.

But, to go still further, it is a fact that there are cognitions which even quit the bounds of all possible experience, and actually, by means of ideas for which, so far as experience goes, no correspondent object can be found, assume to extend the range of our judgments beyond any experience whatever.

And just in these latter cognitions, transcending as they do the world of sense, and unaccompanied by experience to guide and correct them, there lie interests of reason which we hold to be of far greater consequence and loftier aim than anything or all that understanding can teach us in the domain of experience. In these cognitions, indeed, even at the risk of failure, we rather venture everything than, for any reason of doubt, or carelessness and indifference, consent to forego what is of such an import. Such unavoidable problems of pure reason's own are God, Free Will, and Immortality. The science, again, which, as well in the end it contemplates, as in all its complement of means, is alone

Common

our know-
ersal (con-
e have an
any propo-
inary com-
f instance,
use, where
ecessity (of
(of rule),
ke Hume,
at simply
e, and the
where the

etermine the
Cognition.

e are cog-
perience,
r as expe-
l, assume
perience

g as they
erience to
on which
ftier aim
us in the
l, even at
than, for
nce, con-
avoidable
and Im-
he end it
is alone



dire
scien
icall
suffi
an e
N
left
proc
first
more
ciple
know
spec
only
or no

Of

In
predi
cations
possi
the su
it ; o
posse
judgr
judgr
the co
throu
nexio
also, t
ments
dicat
ate th
alread
the ot
not at
been e

directed to the solution of these, we name metaphysic—a science that, in its procedure, starts as yet only dogmatically; that is, having instituted no previous inquiry into sufficiency or insufficiency on the part of reason for so great an enterprise, it yet confidently undertakes completion of it.

Now, it seems no more than natural that, once we have left the solid ground of experience, we should not forthwith proceed to build, without having carefully assured ourselves, first of all, in regard to a foundation, and that, too, all the more, should we find ourselves provided only with principles which are unauthenticated, and have come to us we know not whence. It is, however, an ordinary fate of speculative reason, to complete its edifice at the soonest, and only then to examine whether the foundations are well laid or not.

Of the difference between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments.

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to a predicate is thought (affirmatives alone considered—application to negatives being afterwards easy) this relation is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that (covertly) is contained in it; or B lies completely outside of the notion A, though possessing connexion with it. In the first case I call the judgment *analytic*; in the second *synthetic*. Analytic judgments (the affirmative ones) are therefore those in which the connexion of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity; synthetic, again, those in which this connexion is thought without identity. We might name them also, the former, judgments of explication; the latter, judgments of extension. The former, namely, add, in the predicate, nothing to the notion of the subject, but only separate this notion into its subnotional parts, which parts are already (obscurely) thought *in* the notion. The latter, on the other hand, add to the subject a predicate which was not at all thought in it, and could not by any analysis have been extracted from it. For example, if I say, All bodies

are extended, this is an analytic judgment. For, in order that I may find extension as connected with it, I need not leave what notion itself I attach to *body*. I have only to analyze it, or open my eyes to what complex I think in it, to become aware of this predicate as contained in it. The judgment, therefore, is analytic. On the other hand, if I say, All bodies are heavy, in that case the predicate is something quite different from anything I think in the mere notion of a body as such. The addition of such a predicate produces, therefore, a synthetic judgment.

Judgments of experience, as such, are all synthetic. For it were absurd to have recourse to experience for an analytic judgment, seeing that I need not go out of my notion itself to get the judgment, nor require, therefore, any testimony of experience in the case. I know the notion body already analytically, say, through the characters extension, impenetrability, figure, etc., which the notion simply implies. But now I extend my knowledge, and in once more consulting experience (from which I had derived this notion of body), I find, always conjoined with the said characters, that also of weight, which, as a predicate, therefore, I add synthetically to the notion in question. It is, therefore, on experience that the possibility is founded of the synthesis of the predicate heavy with the subject body.

But, in the case of *a priori* synthetic judgments, this expedient (of experience) is altogether inapplicable. If, in such reference, I am to go beyond the notion A in order to recognise another B, as connected with it, on what do I support myself, and by what is the synthesis made possible, seeing that I have not the advantage in this case of looking about me for it in the field of experience? Let us take the proposition, All that happens has a cause. In the notion of something that happens (an effect), I think something come to be, which therefore, had a certain time before it, etc., and from this something, as it is there before me, it is possible for me to deduce various analytic judgments. But the notion cause lies quite out of this notion. Denoting

or, in order
, I need not
ave only to
think in it,
in it. The
r hand, if I
ate is some-
n the mere
a predicate

thetic. For
an analytic
notion itself
y testimony
notion body
extension,
simply im-
once more
this notion
characters,
efore, I add
erefore, on
ynthesis of

nts, this ex-
ble. If, in
in order to
what do I
de possible,
of looking
us take the
the notion
something
e before it,
re me, it is
ents. But
Denoting

some
effect
to s
the n
cont
that
unde
cove
it ju
be ex
ter t
expe
cessi
notic
lativ
or ju

1.
We
7 +
from
of co
the n
uniti
at the
comp
this,
may
pleas
these
assist
corre
the fi
ber p
thoug

something quite different from that which happens (the effect), it is not at all implied in it. How do I come, then, to say of any fact in event something quite different from the fact itself, and to recognise the notion cause, though not contained in said fact, nevertheless as belonging to it, and that, too, necessarily? What is the unknown x on which the understanding supports itself, when it believes itself to discover from the notion A a predicate B, alien to it, but which it judges, nevertheless, to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because the relative proposition adds the latter to the former, not only with a greater universality than experience can supply, but even with the expression of necessity, and consequently wholly *a priori* or through mere notions. Well now, the entire end and aim of our speculative cognition *a priori* concern such synthetic principles, or judgments of extension.

In all the Rational Theoretic Sciences, Synthetic *a priori*
Judgments are present as Principles.

1. Mathematical judgments are all synthetic.....
We might be apt to think at first that the proposition $7 + 5 = 12$ is merely an analytic proposition, which follows from the notion of a sum of 7 and 5, according to the principle of contradiction. But if we look closer, we shall find that the notion of the sum of 7 and 5 implies nothing but the uniting of the two numbers into one, there being no thought, at the same time, of what this one number itself is which comprehends the two. The notion of 12 is not thought in this, that I think to myself the uniting of 7 and 5; and I may analyze my notion of such possible sum as long as I please without finding the 12 in it. We must go out of these notions, and take help from perception. We must assist ourselves, that is, by such objective representation as corresponds to one of the two numbers (say five points or the five fingers), and, so assisted, add the units of the number perceived (5), one by one, to the notion of the number thought (7). I take first the number 7; next, for the no-

tion of the 5, I refer to my fingers as perceived; and then I add the units (which together constitute the number 5), one by one, in guidance of the representation perceived, to the number 7. In this way, for result, I see the number 12 emerge. That 7 should be added to 5, I have indeed thought in the notion of a sum $7 + 5$, but not that this sum is equal to the number 12. An arithmetical proposition is, therefore, always synthetic, as we may more distinctly discern, should we assume somewhat larger numbers; in which case it will clearly appear that, let us turn and twist our notions as we may, we never can, by mere analysis of notions, and unassisted by perception, discover their sum.

Just as little is any proposition of pure geometry analytic. That the straight line between any two points is the shortest, is a synthetic proposition. For my notion of straight includes in it, nothing of quantity, but only a quality. The notion shortest is wholly something adscititious, something added to it, and cannot by any analysis be derived from the notion straight line. Perception, then, must be here called in to assist, and only by its intervention is the synthesis possible.

2. Natural philosophy possesses synthetic *a priori* judgments as principles. I will only adduce a couple of propositions in example; as that in all changes of the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains the same, or that in all communication of motion, action and reaction are always alike. In both, not only the necessity is clear, and by consequence their *a priori* origin, but also the fact that they are synthetic propositions. For in the notion of matter I do not think its permanence, but only its presence in space as filling it. That is, I actually go beyond the notion of matter in order to think *a priori* to it something that I did not think *in* it. The proposition, therefore, is not analytic, but synthetic, and yet *a priori*; so it is with the other propositions of the pure part of the science.

3. In metaphysic synthetic cognitions *a priori* simply *must* be. For it is not its business merely to unravel no-

1; and then
number 5),
perceived, to
the number
have indeed
that this sum
position is,
distinctly dis-
s; in which
d twist our
alysis of no-
ir sum.

ry analytic.
s the short-
of straight
ality. The
something
d from the
here called
e synthesis

a priori judg-
e of propo-
e corporeal
or that in
are always
nd by con-
that they
f matter I
e in space
notion of
that I did
t analytic,
the other

a priori simply
travel no-

tion
the
to
on
tain
jud
self
siti
An
sist

T
que
I
sam
in f
any
that
poss
O
may
for r
tual
capa
itsel
of a
be p
tain
of th
of r
poss
limit
eral
as a
A
to sc

tions which we *a priori* form of things. On the contrary, the business here is to extend our *a priori* cognition; and to that we must avail ourselves of such propositions as add on something beyond the given notion, something not contained in it; and in this way, by means of synthetic *a priori* judgments alone, advance indeed so far that experience itself is unable to follow us. For example, there is the proposition, among others, that the world must have a beginning. And by this we see that metaphysic, at least in its aim, consists of pure *a priori* synthetic propositions.

General Problem of Pure Reason.

The problem proper of pure reason is comprised in the question, How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible?

In the solution of this problem there is involved, at the same time, the possibility of an application of pure reason in foundation and completion of all the sciences in which any theoretical *a priori* cognition of objects is concerned; that is, an answer to the questions, How is pure mathematic possible? How is pure natural philosophy possible?

Of these sciences, inasmuch as they once for all are, we may certainly with propriety ask, how they are possible; for that they must be possible is demonstrated by their actuality. . . . We cannot remain satisfied with a mere natural capability for metaphysic, or with the mere faculty of reason itself, in possession of which there is always that necessity of a metaphysic of some kind, be it what it may. It must be possible, rather, to bring matters relatively to some certainty as concerns either the knowing or the not knowing of the objects in question, either the ability or the inability of reason to judge in their regard. That is, it must be possible for us either confidently to extend, or else duly limit, reason. This last question, which flows from the general problem, were rightly put thus: How is metaphysic as a science possible?

A criticism of reason leads, therefore, at last necessarily to science; while, without criticism, dogmatically to set to

work with reason, results only in groundless allegations, to which others equally specious may be opposed, and the end, consequently, is scepticism.

Idea and Division of a Special Science under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.

There results from all this, now, the idea of a special science, which may be named critique of pure reason. Only in such critique as basis have we a sure and certain touchstone whereby to try the philosophical worth of earlier or later works in this department; otherwise, we have only an unaccredited historian and judge pronouncing on the groundless opinions of others solely through opinions of his own which are equally groundless.

As concerns division, then, this our science will, on the usual general principles of such, consist of a theory, firstly, of the elements, and secondly, of the method of pure reason. Each of these parts, again, will have its own sub-parts, the conditions of which, however, we do not discuss here. Only, it may be of advantage, perhaps, to be, introductorily, or prefatorily, reminded, that there are two stems of human cognition, sprung, both, it may be, from a common but unknown root, namely, sense and understanding, by the former of which objects are given to us, and by the latter thought. Even sense, then, if it be found to possess for us intimations *a priori*, which constitute conditions under which alone objects can be perceived by us, will, for that reason, enter as a constituent into a philosophy that is transcendental. And, accordingly, the transcendental sense-elements will necessarily constitute the first part of our theory of elements, inasmuch as the conditions under which objects are given precede those under which they are thought.

legations, to
and the end,

of a Critique

special sci-
son.
and certain
th of earlier
ve have only
eing on the
inions of his

will, on the
eory, firstly,
pure reason.
b-parts, the
here. Only,
uctorily, or
of human
ommon but
ng, by the
y the latter
ssess for us
ions under
ill, for that
hat is tran-
ental sense-
part of our
nder which
a they are

I
wh
pur
wit
are
or
leg
dra
ele
for
to s
of
thin
pur
wit
min
A
Tra
scie
enta
part
ing,
In
first,
into
draw
rema
shall
that
sensi
gatio
nitio
name
we sh

TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.

§ 1.

I call all intimations pure (in transcendental sense) in which there is nothing found that belongs to sensation. The pure *form* of sensuous perception, consequently, will be met with *a priori* in the mind, wherein all units of impression are perceived in certain relations. This pure form of sense or sensibility, accordingly (as without sensation), may be legitimately named *pure perception*. Thus, when I withdraw from what makes up my consciousness of a body, what elements in it belong to the understanding, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and again what elements in it belong to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc., still, of this empirically perceived object, there remains something over, namely, extension and figure. These belong to pure perception which, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any actual object of sense or sensation, exists in the mind *a priori*.

A science of all the *a priori* principles of sense, I call Transcendental Æsthetic. There must, therefore, be such science which, constituting the first part of the transcendental theory of elements, will oppose itself to the second part, which is devoted to the principles of pure understanding, and is named Transcendental Logic.

In the transcendental æsthetic, we shall isolate sense, first, by withdrawal of all that the understanding thinks into it through its notions, and second, by further withdrawal, from the bare empirical sense-presentation that then remains, of all that belongs to sensation. For result we shall have nothing but pure perception and the mere form that adds itself to sense-matter; and that is all that the sensibility can *a priori* yield. But, through such investigation, it will be found that, as principles of *a priori* cognition, there are two pure forms of sensuous perception, namely Space and Time, with the consideration of which we shall now occupy ourselves.

SECTION I.—OF SPACE.

§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Notion.

I understand by discussion or exposition the distinct statement (if not at full) of what belongs to a notion. Such exposition is metaphysical, moreover, when it demonstrates the notion to be given *a priori*.

1. Space is not an empirical notion which has been derived from external experience. For, that certain sensations are referred to something out of me (that is, to something in another part of space than that in which I am), and further, that I can perceive them as out of and near each other, consequently, then, not merely as different themselves, but as in different places: to that the perception of space must be already presupposed. Accordingly the cognition space cannot be derived from the relations of external impression, through experience; but contrariwise, this external experience is itself only possible through said cognition.

2. Space is a necessary perception *a priori*, which is presupposed by, and underlies, all external perceptions. We can never realize to ourselves the conception of there being no space, though we can perfectly well think of no objects being found in space. It is taken for granted, therefore, as condition of the possibility of the appearance of objects to external sense, and not as an affection or form dependent upon objects: it is an *a priori* perception, which is necessarily presupposed as ground (or canvas) for the reception of all external consciousness.

3. Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general notion of the relations of things, but a pure perception. For, firstly, we can conceive only a single space, and when we speak of spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same sole space. These parts cannot precede, either, the one all-comprehending space as though they were the particulars from which it is generalized: but, on the contrary, they are only thought *in* it. It is essentially one; any plurality of parts or units

a.
distinct state-
tion. Such
emonstrates

as been de-
rtain sensa-
is, to some-
hich I am),
f and near
erent them-
erception of
ly the cog-
of external
se, this ex-
h said cog-

which is pre-
ions. We
here being
no objects
herefore, as
objects to
dependent
is necess-
eception of

eral notion
For, firstly,
e speak of
sole space.
mprehend-
rom which
ly thought
ts or units



in it
solel
perc
reasc
that
the t
mere
tion,
4.
fore
mon
(it is
holds
thoug
But i
are a
Const
and n

By
strati
or fro
nition
1, the
notio
suppe
the g
Ge
space
itself
must
is the
more
tion.
us be
non-e

in it (consequently, also, the general notion of spaces) rests solely on limitations of itself. From this it follows that a perception *a priori* underlies all notions of it. This is the reason why every geometrical proposition, as, for example, that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side, is never by any possibility to be deduced from mere general notions of triangle, line, etc., but from perception, and *a priori*, with apodictic certainty.

4. Space is conceived as an infinite magnitude there before us. Now a notion must be conceived, indeed, as common to an infinite number of different possible individuals (it is their common type), which individuals, therefore, it holds under it; but no notion as such can be so thought as though it contained an infinite number of individuals *in it*. But it is thus that space is thought (for all the parts of space are at one and the same time together in it *ad infinitum*). Consequently the original of space is perception *a priori*, and not notion.

§ 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Notion of Space.

By transcendental exposition I understand the demonstration of any notion as a principle such, that through it or from it, the possibility of other *a priori* synthetic cognitions may be understood. The requisites here, then, are: 1, that such cognitions actually do derive from the given notion; 2, that these cognitions are only possible on presupposition of a certain mode of interpreting or explaining the given notion.

Geometry is a science determinative of the properties of space, synthetically, but yet *a priori*. What must space itself be, then, that such cognition is possible of it? It must be originally perception; for no propositions that, as is the case in geometry (see Introduction), exceed (contain more than) a notion, can possibly be derived from that notion. The perception, again, must be *a priori*, or found in us before any special sense-perception; pure, therefore, or non-empirical. For geometrical propositions are all apo-

dictic; that is, they bring with them their own necessity; as the proposition, for example, that space has only three dimensions. But such propositions cannot be empirical judgments (judgments of experience); neither can they be inferred from these (see Introd.)

How, now, can there be in the mind an external perception, which yet precedes any perception of objects, and in which (from *its* nature, namely) the *notion* of these may be *a priori* determined? In no other way, plainly, than that this perception has its seat only in the subject, as mere form of general external sense, or as mere formal susceptibility of the subject in assumption of objects when affected by them; through (and with) which, then, there is obtained *immediate cognition*, that is, *perception*, of these objects.

Inferences from these Ideas.

a. Space exhibits no property of things in themselves, nor yet themselves in their own mutual relations. For neither absolute nor relative attributes can *a priori* be perceived, that is, before existence of the things themselves in which they are found.

b. Space is nothing else than merely the form of all presentations in external sense. It is that subjective condition, under which alone external perception is possible for us.

Only, then, from the point of view of a human being is it that we can speak of space, of extended substances, etc. Directly we discount the subjective condition under which alone external perception is possible to us (so far, namely, as we may happen to be affected by objects), the expression space is without meaning. This term is referred to things only in so far as they appear to us, only in so far as they are objects of sense. Inasmuch as we cannot make the peculiar conditions of sense, conditions as well of the very *possibility* of things, but only of their *appearance to sense*, it is impossible for us to say that space contains all things *as they are in themselves*, no matter what subject perceives them, and no matter whether they are perceived

own necessity ;
as only three
be empirical
can they be

ernal percep-
jects, and in
these may be
ly, than that
as mere form
susceptivity of
ted by them ;
ained *imme-*
jects.

themselves,
ations. For
priori be per-
emselves in

m of all pre-
re condition,
e for us.

an being is
stances, etc.

nder which

far, namely,

e expression

ed to things

far as they

annot make

well of the

pearance to

contains all

hat subject

e perceived

or u
thin
us.
bein
the
univ
ther
may
idea
thin
by r
sens
of sp
also
noth
poss
be se
in th

1.
rived
woul
not t
time
same
(after

2.
perce
thing
to tin
is all
bodil
canno

or unperceived by any subject, but only that it contains all things so far as, externally, they *sensuously appear*, and to us. For, as regards the perceptions of other thinking beings, we cannot at all judge whether they are confined to the same conditions which limit our perception and are universally binding for us. Our exposition asserts, therefore, the *reality* of space in regard to everything that may come externally before us as an object, but no less the *ideality* of this same space in regard to things when these things mean things *in themselves* as taken up in their truth by reason and without reference to the special nature of our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the *empirical reality* of space in regard of all possible external experience, but also its *transcendental ideality*, in this respect, that it is nothing so soon as we cease to regard it as condition of the possibility of all experience for us, and assume it, rather, to be something that is involved in the very nature of things in themselves.

SECTION II.—OF TIME.

§ 4. Metaphysical Exposition of the Notion of Time.

1. Time is not an empirical notion which has been derived from any experience. For co-existence and succession would not themselves be found in the things perceived, were not time *a priori* implied. Only on the presupposition of time is it conceivable that some things are at one and the same time (together) or that others are in different times (after one another).

2. Time is a necessary cognition which is implied in all perceptions. We cannot suppress time as in regard to things, but we may very well suppress things as in regard to time. Time, therefore, is a datum *a priori*. Only in it is all actuality of things possible. These may fall away bodily, but it (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be dispensed with.

3. On this *a priori* necessity, the possibility of apodictic propositions in regard to relations of time, or axioms in regard to time generally, is established. It has only one dimension: different times are not together, but after one another (just as different spaces are not after one another, but together). These propositions cannot be derived from experience, for experience would yield neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty. Were experience the source, we should only be able to say: That is what common observation tells us; but not: That is what, of necessity, must be. These propositions are binding as rules, under which experience, generally, is possible, and advise us before it, not through it.

4. Time is not a discursive or, as we say, general notion, but a pure form of sense-perception. Different times are only parts of precisely the same time. The cognition which can be yielded only by a single object is perception. The proposition, also, that different times are never co-existent cannot be deduced from a general notion. It is a synthetic proposition, and not dependent on mere notions. It is directly implied, therefore, in the simple perception and conception of time.

5. The infinitude of time amounts to no more than that every particular magnitude of time is possible only through limitations of a one universal underlying time. Hence the original cognition time must be given as unlimited. That object, however, the parts and every magnitude of which can be conceived as determined only through limitations, cannot, as a totality, be given through notions (for notions only contain subnotions which, as particulars, precede their principals), but must involve a direct perception.

§ 5. Transcendental Exposition of the Notion of Time.

I may refer in this connexion to § 4, No. 3, where, for the sake of brevity, I have introduced into the metaphysical exposition, what, properly, is transcendental.

y of apodictic
axioms in re-
s only one di-
but after one
r one another,
derived from
strict univer-
ce the source,
common ob-
ecessity, must
under which
before it, not

eneral notion,
ent times are
gnition which
ception. The
er co-existent
is a synthetic
ons. It is di-
tion and con-

ore than that
only through
Hence the
nited. That
ade of which
limitations,
s (for notions
precede their
on.

of Time.

, where, for
metaphysical

.....

a.
of pe
as so
an ob
the fi
objec
case,
longi
diti
prior

b.
of the
For ti
it is r
etc. ;
in our

c.
perce
tion, i
to ext
nition
so far
affecti
cause
of inn
a prio
intern
nal pe
All ex
mined
referen
objects
relatio
Tim
(huma

§ 6. Inferences from these Ideas.

a. Were abstraction made from all subjective conditions of perception, time would not be found to remain, whether as something self-subsistent and on its own account, or as an objective quality inherent in things themselves. For, in the first case, it would be something which, without actual object, were, nevertheless, itself actual. And, in the second case, it would be impossible for it, as a quality or order belonging to things, to precede these things, as their very condition indeed, and be, through synthetic propositions, *a priori* cognised and perceived.

b. Time is nothing but the form of internal sense, that is of the perception of our own self and of our own inner state. For time results not from any determination of outer objects; it is not referred to anything that has bodily shape or place, etc.; on the contrary, it is time that, for all presentations in our inner consciousness, determines their relation.

c. Time is the formal condition *a priori* of all sense-perceptions. Space, as the pure form of all outer perception, is limited, in its function of *a priori* condition, merely to external objects. On the other hand, because all cognitions, whether due to external things or not so due, do, so far as they themselves are concerned (in that they are affections of mind), belong to our inner state—further, because this inner state must come under the formal condition of inner perception which is time—it follows that time is an *a priori* condition of all sense-perception, immediately of internal (the soul) and mediately (*i.e.*, through it) of external perception. As, in the external reference, I can say, All external perceptions are in space and *a priori* determined according to the relations of space; so, in the internal reference, I can equally say, All perceptions whatever (all objects of the senses) are in time, and fall necessarily under relations of time.

Time, therefore, is solely a subjective condition of our (human) perception (which is in every case sensuous, objects

being conceived to act on us); and *in itself*, apart from the subject, nothing. In regard of all perceptions, however, consequently of all things which may appear in experience, time is no less necessarily objective. We cannot say, All things are in time; for such expression bears to consider things as they are in themselves, and apart from the mode and conditions of the perception of them; whereas it is precisely the mode and conditions of perception from which it follows that time adds itself to all objects in consciousness. But subjoin now the *mode* to the proposition, and say, All things are, as objects of sense-perception, in time; then the judgment has its own good objective truth and universality *a priori*.

Our doctrine asserts, then, the *empirical reality* of time; that is, its objective validity in regard of all objects which may, on any occasion, be offered to our senses. And as our perception is at all times one of sense, there never can be given us an object in experience which is not submitted to the condition of time. But, again, we deny time all claim to *absolute reality*, if regarded as intrinsic condition inherent in things themselves, irrespective of the form of our sensuous perception. Such attributes as belong to things in themselves can never be made known to us by the senses. In this, then, consists the *transcendental ideality* of time.

§ 7. Further Explanations.

Against this theory, which grants empirical but denies absolute or transcendental reality to time, I have heard an objection so common on the part of intelligent men, that I infer it must occur naturally to every reader, to whom such speculations are unusual. It runs thus: Changes are actual, as is demonstrated by the vicissitude of our own mental states, even should we leave out of view all external perceptions (together with their changes). But changes are only possible in time. Therefore time is something actual. The reply has no difficulty. I grant the entire argument. Time is undoubtedly something actual; it is the actual form,

part from the
ns, however,
n experience,
not say, All
s to consider
om the mode
reas it is pre-
rom which it
onsciousness.
and say, All
e; then the
universality

ity of time;
bjects which
And as our
ever can be
submitted to
e all claim to
ion inherent
of our sen-
to things in
y the senses.
ity of time.

al but denies
ve heard an
men, that I
whom such
es are actual,
own mental
ernal percep-
ges are only
actual. The
nent. Time
actual form,

nam
real
the o
It is
of m
othe
the s
cogn
chan
its e
Only
said,

By
the p
again
absol
to de
actu
Whe
(my
sciou
whil
actu
sumi
thele
sides

Th
from
deriv
with
gethe
cepti
possi
their
ditio
so far
thing

namely, of internal perception. It has therefore subjective reality in regard of inner experience; *i.e.*, I have actually the consciousness of time, and of my determinations in time. It is actual, consequently, not as an object, but as the mode of my perception of myself as an object. But if I (or another) could perceive myself without this condition of sense, the same states, which we now call changes, would yield a cognition into which no idea of time, or consequently of change, would at all enter. There remains to it, therefore, its empirical reality as condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality, in accordance with what has been said, cannot be allowed it.

But the reason why this objection is so universal, and on the part of those, too, who have nothing decided to advance against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this. The absolute reality of space they could not hope apodictically to demonstrate in view of *idealism*, according to which the actuality of external things is incapable of rigorous proof. Whereas the actuality of the object of our internal senses (my own self, my own state) is immediately clear in consciousness. The former may, possibly, be a mere show, while the latter is, in their opinion, something undeniably actual. They do not consider that both, without our presuming to deny their actuality in consciousness, are nevertheless, only appearances to sense, which has always two sides.

Time and space, accordingly, are two sources of cognition, from which, *a priori*, various synthetic propositions may be derived, as is especially exemplified in pure mathematic with regard to space and the relations of space. Taken together, namely, they are both pure forms of all sense-perception, and thereby render synthetic propositions *a priori* possible. But these cognitive sources *a priori* determine their own limits just by this reference to their being conditions (forms) of sense: they concern objects, that is, only so far as objects are considered perceptions of sense, and not things in themselves. Valid only for the former, they at

nce cease to have objective application directly we go beyond them. Such reality of space and time leaves, for the rest, the certainty of our empirical knowledge unaffected; for in its regard we have an equal certainty, whether these forms are of things in themselves, or only of our perception. Whereas they who maintain the absolute reality of space and time must, whether they assume subsistence or only inherence, be at variance with the principles of experience itself. For, say they assume the former, as the mathematical inquirers mostly do, then they have before them two eternal, infinite, and self-subsistent non-entities (space and time) which, without being themselves anything actual, are there, for all that, for no other purpose than just to embrace all that is actual! Or say they assume the latter (inherence), as is, in effect, the case with certain metaphysical dogmatists, then, inasmuch as space and time are for them relations of things (the *beside* one another, the *after* one another) derived from experience, but necessarily only confusedly so, they (these dogmatists) must impugn the validity, or at least the apodictic certainty, of any mathematical assignments *a priori* in regard of actual things (*e.g.*, in space). For such certainty is not possibly to be obtained from experience; and any *a priori* notions of space and time can, under such suppositions, be no more than creations of imagination.

Lastly, that the transcendental æsthetic cannot include more than these two elements, is evident from this, that all other notions which hold of sense (even motion, which is a union of both) presuppose something empirical (as subjects or objects of them). Motion, for example, presupposes perception of something that is movable. In space, however, taken by itself, there is not anything that is movable. Therefore what is movable must be something that is only found in space by experience, or that is only an empirical datum. For the same reason also, the transcendental æsthetic cannot count among its *a priori* data the notion of change; for time itself undergoes no change; only what is in time undergoes change. For that notion there is re-

ectly we go be-
leaves, for the
dge unaffected ;
whether these
our perception.
eality of space
nce or only in-
perience itself.
athematical in-
m two eternal,
ace and time)
tual, are there,
mbrace all that
erence), as is,
gmatists, then,
itions of things
) derived from
so, they (these
least the apo-
nents *a priori*
For such cer-
perience ; and
nder such sup-
nation.

cannot include
n this, that all
n, which is a
l (as subjects
esupposes per-
ace, however,
is movable.
that is only
an empirical
anscendental
the notion of
only what is
there is re-

11

12

sc air
and

In
for u
own
remo
tion
shou
and
woul
these
as co
be co
to ma
nothi
own
of per
for th
tion,
objec
we se
as ou
to, th
that t

It i
ceptic
be th
cessar
much
such a
still b
not or
be an
appea
is dep

quired, therefore, the observation of some actual existence and of the succession of its states, *i.e.*, of experience.

§ 8. General Remarks on the Transcendental *Æsthetic*.

In natural theology where what is thought is not only for us no object of perception, but never can be even to its own self an object of *sensuous* perception, we are careful to remove the conditions of time and space from all perception on the part of such object. But with what right should we do this, if we have first of all assumed both time and space as forms of things in themselves, and such as would continue to be *a priori* conditions of things, even if these things themselves were once for all annihilated; for, as conditions of existence as a whole, they must necessarily be conditions of the existence of God? But if we are not to make them objective forms of all things, then there is nothing left us but to make them subjective forms of our own mode of perception, whether outer or inner—a mode of perception, further, which is to be recognized as *sensuous* for the reason that it is not *original*. An original perception, namely, is such that through it the very being of its object is given; and this is a perception which, so far as we see, can only belong to God. A sense-perception, such as ours, on the contrary, is dependent on, and subservient to, the object, and is consequently only possible by this, that the perceptivity of the subject is by said object affected.

It is not necessary, either, that we should confine a perception in space and time to the sensibility of man. It may be that all finite thinking beings must, in that respect, necessarily be identical with us (though we cannot decide as much); but it would not follow, from this universality, that such a mode of perception were not still sense. It would still be a derivative perception (*intuitus derivativus*), and not original (*intuitus originarius*). That is, it would not be an intellectual perception, such as, for the reason alleged, appears to belong to God only, and never to a being that is dependent as well in its existence as in its perception.

Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic.

In resolution of the general problem of our transcendental philosophy (How are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible?), we now possess here one of the required resources. We have now, namely, pure *a priori* perception, as such resource, the forms of which are space and time. In these, when, in an *a priori* judgment, we would go beyond a given notion, we have the means of finding what can be *a priori* discovered (not, indeed in the notion, but very certainly in the perception correspondent to it), and may be synthetically united with it (the notion). That, however, amounts to certain judgments; which judgments can, at the same time, never extend further than to objects of the senses, nor possess validity for any others than those of possible experience.

 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

I. Of Logic in General.

1. As *general* logic, it abstracts from all diversity of objects in cognition, and from these themselves; it has to do with nothing but the mere form in thinking.

2. As *pure*, it has no empirical principles, and consequently, does not (as has been sometimes supposed) take anything from psychology, which, in reality, has no influence upon a canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated doctrine, and every thing in it must be quite *a priori* certain.

II. Of Transcendental Logic.

General logic abstracts, as we have shown, wholly from the matter of cognition, that is, from any reference of cognition to an object of it; and regards alone the logical form in the relation of the cognitions the one to the other, or the

netic.

r transcenden-
tions *a priori*
required resour-
perception, as
and time. In
uld go beyond
g what can be
, but very cer-
, and may be
hat, however,
ments can, at
objects of the
than those of

iversity of ob-
it has to do

s, and conse-
pposed) take
has no influ-
is a demon-
quite *a priori*

wholly from
ence of cog-
logical form
other, or the

form
are
as e
may
of o
logi
wou
clud
coul
in re
Such
actu
rienc
obje
In
a pr
tions
thou
origi
idea
sivel
to th
A sc
actua
name
name
and
not i
whet

Ge
derst
as th
part
at lea

form of thought quite generally. Inasmuch, now, as there are (according to the transcendental æsthetic) as well pure as empirical perceptions, it is possible that a like difference may be found between the pure and the empirical *thinking* of objects. In that case we should have the possibility of a logic in which abstraction from all matter of cognition would not be necessary. For there might be a logic, excluding, indeed, empirical matter, but admitting all that could be *a priori* cognised (through perceptions or notions) in reference to objects even as experienced in actual fact. Such logic would relate, consequently, to the origin of our actual perception and other cognition of objects of experience, so far as that origin did not, or could not, lie in these objects themselves.

In the expectation, then, that there are possibly notions *a priori*, entrant into objects, not in the manner of perceptions, indeed, whether pure or sensible, but merely as pure thought functions— notions, consequently, which are in origin neither empirical nor æsthetic—we prefigure the idea of a science of pure cognition which, though exclusively holding of understanding and reason, will enable us to think facts of actual experience even wholly *a priori*. A science, determinative of the origin, limits and objective actuality of such cognitions, would necessarily take the name of *Transcendental Logic*. It would have to do, namely, only with the laws of understanding and reason, and this expressly in an *objective* application *a priori*; and not indifferently, like general logic, in reference to interests whether empirical or pure.

III. Of the division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.

General logic resolves the whole formal business of understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits these as the principles of all logical judgment in cognition. This part of logic may be called an *Analytic*, therefore, and is, at least the negative touchstone of truth In respect

of objects, no one with mere logic can venture to pronounce, or maintain anything. Nevertheless, however poorly off, or quite void, we may be as regards matter, the possession of such plausible art to bestow on all our cognitions the form of the understanding proves so seductive that said general logic, though a simple canon in judging, has, at least for the mere blind show of objective affirmations, been used, or, in effect, misused, as an organon of actual production. Now, general logic, as such supposititious organon, is what we name *Dialectic*.

IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into the Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic.

In a transcendental logic, we isolate the understanding, as already in the æsthetic, sense, and make prominent merely the share of thought in our perceptive experience, which is alone derived thence. The necessary condition for action of such principles is, that objects be given us in sense-perception, to which then they may be applied. For without such perception, experience, as wanting objects, remains altogether void. That part of transcendental logic therefore, which propounds the elements of pure understanding in experience, and the principles without which no object can anywhere be thought into perception, is the *transcendental analytic*, and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition in experience can contradict it, without losing at the same time all its matter, that is, all its conjunction into an object, and consequently its truth. It is, however, very tempting and misleading to make use of these pure principles by themselves, and even beyond the limits of experience, which can alone furnish the matter or objects whereon to apply them. In this way, consequently, understanding runs risk of making, through mere cobwebs of reason, a *material* use of its own simply *formal* principles, and without discrimination judging of objects which are neither given us, nor in any way, perhaps, can be given us. Specially calculated to yield only a canon of

e to pronounce,
however poorly
ter, the possess-
r cognitions the
e that said gen-
g, has, at least
ons, been used,
al production.
ganon, is what

c into the
ic.

understanding,
ke prominent
ve experience,
sary condition
oe given us in
applied. For
nting objects,
cendental logic
f pure under-
without which
ception, is the
me a logic of
contradict it,
er, that is, all
ntly its truth.
g to make use
even beyond
nish the mat-
is way, conse-
through mere
simply *formal*
ng of objects
perhaps, *can*
ly a canon of

judg
apply
ture,
ing a
Such
secon
of a c
scend
an art
very c
on the
reason
false s

This
the one
as the

Section

The
describ
from se
The un
tion pro
but that
human,
but disc
tions ; n
understa

judgment in experience, they are merely misused, when, applying them universally and without restriction, we venture, in respect of objects generally, with pure understanding alone, *synthetically* to judge, pronounce, and decide. Such use of pure understanding were *dialectical*. The second part of transcendental logic, therefore, must consist of a critique of this dialectical show, and be named *Transcendental Dialectic*. We are not to expect in it, however, an art dogmatically to produce such show, which, alas! is a very current art of manifold metaphysical juggleries. Quite on the contrary, it shall be a critique of understanding and reason in their hyperphysical use, in order to detect the false show of their groundless pretensions.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.

This part of transcendental logic will consist of two books, the one appropriated to the *notions* of pure understanding, as the other to its *judgments*.

BOOK I.—THE ANALYTIC OF NOTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

Section 1. Of Understanding in its Logical Function Generally.

The understanding has been already merely negatively described as a non-sensuous intellectual faculty. Now, apart from sense, we are insusceptible of any perception proper. The understanding, consequently, is no faculty of perception proper. But perception apart, there is no cognition but that through notions. Cognition of all, more especially human, understanding, is, as through notions, not intuitive, but discursive. All perceptions, as of sense, rest on affections; notions, therefore, on functions. But by function I understand that unity of act whereby the various units in a

cognition are ordered into a single common one. Notions found, therefore, on the spontaneity (self-action) of thought ; as sense-perceptions on the receptivity of impressions. Notions, now, can be used by understanding only in so far as it *judges* by them.... . . . *Judgment*, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, and consequently the cognition of a cognition of it..... But all acts of understanding may be reduced to judgments, and understanding itself, therefore, may be defined a *faculty to judge*..... The functions of the understanding, accordingly, will be capable of being exhaustively discovered, if we can but exhaustively enumerate the functions of unity in judgments.

Section 2 (§ 9). Of the Logical Function of Understanding in Judging.

If we abstract from all matter of a judgment, and consider only the precise form of the understanding that is manifested in it, we readily find that the functions of thought, in any such, may be reduced to four *titles*, with three *moments* under each. This may, not inaptly, be exhibited in the following table:—

1. Quantity of Judgments : Universal, Particular, Singular.
2. Quality : Affirmative, Negative, Infinite.
3. Relation : Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive.
4. Modality : Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic.

1. When I consider, a singular proposition, not merely in its inner validity, but also, as simply a cognition, in the magnitude which it possesses as compared with others, then certainly it is different from universal propositions, and deserves a place of its own in a complete table of the moments of thought as such (though not, naturally, in a logic that is merely addressed to the functions of judgments in their mutual relations).

2. Just in the same way, infinite propositions must, in a

one. Notions
(on) of thought ;
pressions. No-
only in so far as
fore, is the me-
y the cognition
understanding
standing itself,
ge.....The
will be capable
ut exhaustively
nts.

understanding in

ment, and con-
ng that is man-
ons of thought,
with three *mo*-
be exhibited in

Particular, Sin-

te.
Disjunctive.
odictic.

on, not merely
gnition, in the
l with others,
l propositions,
te table of the
naturally, in a
s of judgments

ons must, in a

tra
the
the
3
a,
the
ber
two
sev
hyp
ene
tion
and
both
und
mer
not
cons
tual
rath
prop
spher
cons
nitic
that
spher
of th
ists
exte
sent
poss
To
place
thes
fore,
term
the f

transcendental logic, be distinguished from affirmative ones, though, in general logic, they are rightly reckoned with these, and constitute no special member of distribution.

3. All the relations of thought in judgments are these : *a*, of the predicate to the subject ; *b*, of the antecedent to the consequent ; *c*, of a disjunctive cognition and its members mutually. Of these, there are considered, in the first, two notions, in the second, two judgments, and in the third, several judgments relatively the one to the other. The hypothetical proposition, If perfect justice exists, the hardened criminal will be punished, involves properly the relation of two propositions, namely, that perfect justice exists, and that the hardened criminal gets punished. Whether both of these propositions be in themselves true, remains undetermined. What is thought in such a form of judgment is alone the consequence (between the members of it, not the truth of these). Finally the disjunctive judgment considers also a relation of two or more propositions mutually—not that of the consequence, however, but that, rather, of logical contraposition. That is, it considers such propositions so far as the sphere of the one excludes the sphere of the other, and yet so that both, or all together, constitute in common the whole sphere of the special cognition in question. The relation in point, therefore, is one that concerns the parts of the sphere of a cognition, where the sphere of the one part is (towards the whole) complementary of the other or others. We say, for example, The world exists either through blind chance, or internal necessity, or an external cause. Now, here, each of these propositions represents a part, and all together the whole, of the sphere of all possible cognition in reference to the existence of the world. To exclude the truth from any one of these spheres is to place it in one of the others ; while to place it in any one of these latter is to exclude it from all the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgment a certain community of the terms of the cognition involved. This community consists in the fact that said terms reciprocally exclude each other, at

the same time that they determine the truth as a whole, inasmuch as collectively they constitute the entire import of the single given position.

4. Modality in judgments is quite a special function of these. What distinguishes it is, that it contributes nothing to the matter of the judgment (for besides quantity, quality, and relation, there are no other constituents of the matter of a judgment), but only concerns the value of the copula in relation to thought as such. Problematic judgments are those where we assume the affirmation or negation as merely possible (we may take either as we please). Assertoric are those where we consider the one or the other alternative as actual (true). Apodictic, lastly, are those where the alternative is regarded as necessary.

Section 3 (§ 10). Of the Pure Notions of the Understanding
(the Categories).

General logic, as frequently said already, abstracts from all matter of knowledge, and looks for perceptions to be given to it from elsewhere, in order to convert these into notions; and this process proceeds analytically. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, already has the matter offered it by the transcendental æsthetic (the composites, namely, of time and space in *a priori* sensibility), as a material for the notions *a priori* in understanding; and without it, plainly, these would be devoid of all contents and, consequently, altogether blank. But the native energy (spontaneity) of our thought demands that this *a priori* perceptive or objective matter (laid into imagination) should, first of all, be run over, taken up, and conjoined, in order that a cognition (or, so far, a perception) should be made of it. This process (of imagination), now, I term synthesis.

By synthesis, in its most general sense, I understand the uniting of the various units in a consciousness the one to the other, and the combining of their complex into a single cognition (perception). Such synthesis is pure when the

3.
s a whole, inas-
tire import of

al function of
tributes nothing
ntity, quality,
of the matter
of the copula
judgments are
tion as merely
Assertoric are
alternative as
ere the alter-

derstanding

stracts from
ptions to be
these into no-
Transcend-
matter offered
ites, namely,
material for
without it,
s and, conse-
tive energy
a priori per-
ion) should,
ed, in order
be made of
synthesis.
erstand the
the one to
nto a single
e when the



ma
pr
unc
pun
stan
gro

T
seve
the
The
noti
func
the
judg
unit
dent
tion.
sequ
stanc
prior
of ge

No
as ma
prior
logica
table.
under
facult
follow
origin
will b

1. C
2. C

materials in it are furnished for it, not empirically, but *a priori* (as those that are furnished by time and space).

Pure synthesis, quite generally conceived, is to be further understood as implied in, or exemplified by, each of the pure or *a priori* notions of the understanding. I understand by this (pure) synthesis, a synthesis that rests on a ground of synthetic unity *a priori*.

The same functions which variously give unity to the several terms in judgments, extend a various unity also to the mere syntheses of the different units in perceptions. These latter unities, or sources of unity, are the *a priori* notions of the understanding (the categories). The same functions of understanding, therefore, which, by means of the analytic unity, brought about the logical form of a judgment in notions, do also, by means of the synthetic unity (which they likewise involve), bring about a transcendental objectivity (of union) in the complexions of perception. These functions, in this latter application, may, consequently, be intelligibly named pure notions of the understanding (categories): they have, intelligibly also, said *a priori* action on objects; and that, plainly, is not an affair of general logic.

Now, just in this way we may conceive to arise exactly as many pure notions of understanding (with necessary *a priori* action on the objects of perception) as there are logical functions of all possible judgments in the preceding table. For, through said functions, the understanding as understanding is completely exhausted, and its powers as a faculty duly gauged. We call these notions categories, as following Aristotle, seeing that our intention with them is originally the same as his, however widely different it will be found in the carrying of it out.

TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES.

1. Quantity: Unity, Plurality, Totality.
2. Quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation.

3. Relation : Inherence and Subsistence (Substance and Accident), Causality and Dependence (Cause and Effect), Communion (Reciprocity of Action and Passion).
4. Modality : Possibility—Impossibility, Existence (Actuality)—Non-existence, Necessity—Contingency.

This, now, is the catalogue of all the primitive pure notions of synthesis which understanding *a priori* possesses, and only by reason of which, too, it is a pure understanding, seeing that it is by them alone that it can understand something on occasion of a complex of perception, that is, think an object of perception (or, simply, perceive). The classification is systematically constructed in obedience to a common principle, namely, the faculty to judge (which just means the faculty to think). To ask after such primitive notions was, on the part of Aristotle, an idea worthy of an acute-minded man. As he had no guiding principle, however, he could only pick them up as they came in his way. In this manner he got together at first ten of them, and these he called categories (predicaments). In the end, however, he believed himself to have discovered other five, which were consequently named post-predicaments. Nevertheless his table still remained defective and incomplete. Thus some of its articles (*quando, ubi, situs, prius, simul*) are *modi* of sense, as another (*motus*) is empirical, and these ought to have no place in a genealogical tree of pure understanding. Others, again, are mere derivatives (*actio, passio*), while of the primitives themselves there are several wanting.

§ 11.

1. The four classes in our table may be thrown into two divisions: one directed to objects of perception (no matter whether pure or empirical), and the other to the existence of these objects, (so far as they are referred to the understanding, or the one to the other).

Substance and
Cause and
Action and

Existence (Ac-
contingency.

itive pure no-
riori possesses,
re understand-
an understand
ption, that is,
rceive). The
obedience to
judge (which
To ask after
stotle, an idea
d no guiding
a up as they
gether at first
redicaments).
ave dicovered
post-predica-
defective and
do, ubi, situs,
motus) is em-
genealogical
re mere deri-
es themselves

own into two
n (no matter
the existence
o the under-

I
and
also
enc
nat
2
sub
all
diel
owe
T
uni
pro
last

I
an a
ded
W
how
jects
time
form
thes
natu
with
idea
A
of a
the p
their
sions
of ex

I would call the classes in the first division *mathematical*, and those in the second *dynamical* categories. The latter alone have correlates, the former have none; and the difference must, presumably, have its sufficient reason in the nature of the understanding.

2. Each of the four classes of categories has under it three sub-classes; and this gives to think, the rather, indeed, that all other division *a priori* through notions is necessarily a dichotomy. Again, under each class, the third category owes its origin to the union of the second with the first.

Thus *totality* is nothing else than *plurality* regarded as *unity*; *limitation* is *reality* in union with *negation*; *reciprocity* is *substances* exchangeably *causal*; and *necessity*, lastly, is *actuality* given, as it were, by *possibility* itself.

CHAPTER II.—DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.

Section 1 (§ 13). Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General.

I call the explanation of how *a priori* notions can have an application to objects of experience the *transcendental deduction*.

We have now found two quite diverse elements, which, however, agree in being both *a priori* constituents of objects of experience; namely, on the one hand, space and time as forms of sense, and, on the other, the categories as forms of intellect. To require an empirical deduction of these would be a futile want; for what is distinctive of their nature lies precisely in this, that they connect themselves with objects without owing anything to experience for the idea of these objects.

At the same time, in the case of these notions, as in that of all cognitions, we can rightly enough inquire, not for the principle of their possibility, but for the occasions of their appearance in experience. It is certainly the impressions of the senses which give the first stir to the production of experience, and the movement of cognition in every re-

ference. Still, experience, or cognition generally, includes in itself two very dissimilar factors, namely, a *matter* derived from the senses (sensation), and a certain *form* (for the ordering and arranging of this matter) which is due to the inner source of understanding and *pure* perception. Now, it is on occasion of the former element (sensation) that the latter faculties of form are moved to bring forward and introduce their *a priori* contributions.

We have, with little difficulty, made intelligible above how space and time, though cognitions *a priori*, join themselves, nevertheless, necessarily to objects, and render, in independence of all experience, a synthetic cognition or perception of objects possible.

The categories of understanding, on the other hand, have nothing to do with conditions of perception (in the strict sense), and there certainly may very well be presentations of objects so far as sense is concerned, without there being any necessity to refer them to functions of the understanding at all. Understanding, so far, need not involve, in formation of objects, any *a priori* influence whatever. In this relation, indeed, there shows a difficulty which we did not find when employed on sense. How, namely, can subjective conditions of *thought* conceivably at all exert an *objective* function—that is, how can they furnish conditions of the very possibility of all perception and experience of objects? I take, for example, the notion of cause, which implies a particular sort of synthesis, where on something, A, there ensues, by necessity of a law, a something else, B, that is quite different from A. It is useless to refer to experience in proof of any such notion, which, as containing necessity, can be proved objectively valid only *a priori*.

Did we think to rid ourselves of the difficulty of such inquiries by saying, Experience affords continual examples of such submission to law in the objects of sense, which examples furnish abundant occasion for abstracting the notion, cause, and thereby ratifying at the same time the objective

ally, includes
a *matter* de-
form (for the
is due to the
otion. Now,
ion) that the
ward and in-

ligible above
i, join them-
d render, in
ition or per-

r hand, have
n the strict
resentations
there being
understand-
involve, in
atever. In
hich we did
y, *can* sub-
ll exert an
conditions
perience of
n of cause,
re on some-
something
ess to refer
h, as con-
lid only *a*

of such in-
amples of
which ex-
he notion,
objective

val
not
eith
or e
tion
natt
and
cert
fer a
saric
caus
press
caus
univ
piric
than
appli
pletel
empir

§ 14. 7

The
theref
namel
dition
or of u
ground
reason
in whi
but, as
only th
possibl
the ap
could n

I beg
notious
these o

validity of such a notion, then we forget to observe that the notion, cause, cannot arise in this way, but that it must either be based completely *a priori* in the understanding, or else utterly abandoned as a mere chimera. For this notion demands absolutely that something, A, be of such a nature that something else, B, ensues from it, necessarily, and by virtue of an *unconditionally universal law*. Sense certainly, however, gives examples from which we may infer a rule of what usually happens, but never of what *necessarily* happens. Hence there belongs to the synthesis of cause and effect a dignity which can never be empirically expressed; namely, that the effect not merely comes after the cause, but is given by it, and ensues from it. The rigorous universality of the rule, too, is not at all a possession of empirical rules which, as through induction, can have no more than comparative universality, that is, a certain extended application. The validity of the categories would be completely changed, then, were we to regard them as merely empirical products.

§ 14. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

The transcendental deduction of all *a priori* elements has, therefore, a principle directive of the whole enquiry, this, namely, that they must be recognised to be *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience (whether as of sense or of understanding). Elements which furnish the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for that very reason necessary. An analysis, however, of the experiences in which they occur, would not constitute their deduction, but, as in that way they would still remain contingent, only their illustration. Without this primary reference to possible experience, which holds of all objects in perception, the application of these *a priori* elements to any object could not be possibly understood.

I begin with the definition of the categories. They are notions of objects generally, by which the sense-elements of these objects are conceived to be determined in respect of

one or more of the various logical functions of judgment But by the category of substance, now, it is determined of the notion body, when subjected to it, that its empirical perception in experience must be always regarded only as subject, and never as predicate. And so of all the other categories.

Section 2. Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

§ 15. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction in General.

The constitutive units may be given in a perception which is merely sensuous, or nothing but receptivity, and the form of this perception may lie *a priori* in our faculty, without being anything else, however, than how the subject is passively affected. But the *conjunction* of these or any units is not possibly an affair of *sense*, and can, therefore, not be found as an element or action involved even in the pure form of sense-perception (space, etc.) For it is an *actus* of the mind's own faculty, and as in contradistinction to sense we must name this faculty understanding, it follows that all conjunction, conscious or unconscious, in perceptions or in notions, in elements pure or in elements empirical, is an act of the understanding to which we would give the general appellation of *synthesis* It is easy to be understood here that this *actus* must be originally *monome* (strictly *one*), and of force for all conjunction, as also that the resolution (*analysis*) which seems to be opposed to it, does yet, for all that, always presuppose it; for where understanding has not already conjoined, neither can it disjoin, inasmuch as only through it can anything, as conjoined, be offered to our perception.

But the notion of conjunction carries with it, besides those of the complex of sense-units and their synthesis, that of their unity as well. Conjunction is synthetic unity of a complex. The cognition of this unity can, therefore, not arise from the conjunction; rather, by adding itself to the cognition of the complex, it first makes the notion itself of

judgment....
determined of
its empirical
arded only as
all the other

categories.

General.

ception which
and the form
ulty, without
subject is pass-
or any units
efore, not be
in the pure
s an *actus* of
tion to sense
llows that all
ceptions or in
pirical, is an
give the gen-
to be under-
nome (strictly
at the resolu-
it, does yet,
nderstanding
n, inasmuch
be offered to

it, besides
ynthesis, that
c unity of a
erefore, not
itself to the
ion itself of

co
all
of
un
it,
me
of

T
per
in r
is a
be i
fore
the
is an
sens
it fr
(Prin
scion
ever-
by a
scend
indic
prior
lectiv
long
that I
consc
of con
alytic
positio
units
ingly,
them,

conjunction possible. This unity, which precedes *a priori* all notions of conjunction, is not possibly said category of unity (§ 10); We must, therefore, seek this unity (as qualitative, § 12) still further back; we must seek it, namely, in what is the ground of that unity in the judgments themselves, or in what, consequently, is the ground of the understanding itself in its very logical function.

§ 16. Of the Original or Primary Synthetic Unity of Apperception.

The *I think* must be capable of accompanying all my perceptions; for otherwise there would be something placed in my consciousness which could not be thought; and that is as much as to say that the perception itself would either be impossible or else nothing for me. All the units, therefore, of a perceptive complex is necessarily conjoined with the *I think* of the subject holding them. This, however, is an act of spontaneity, and cannot be thought as due to sense. I call this the Pure Apperception, to distinguish it from the empirical. It may be named also the Original (Primary) Apperception, inasmuch as it is that self-consciousness which, while it produces the all-attendant and ever-identical consciousness *I think*, cannot be accompanied by any further one. I call also the unity in it the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in consideration (or indication) of its being a source of possible cognition *a priori*. For the units in any perception would not be collectively *my* perceptive units, did they not collectively belong to a single self-consciousness. Only by this, therefore, that I can conjoin the units of given intimations in a single consciousness, is it possible for me to conceive the *identity of consciousness* in these *intimations* themselves. The *analytic* unity of apperception is only possible under presupposition of a certain synthetic one. The thought, These units given in perception are collectively mine, is, accordingly, as much as to say, I unite them, or at least can unite them, in a single consciousness, and though this thought is

not yet itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the units, it yet presupposes the possibility of this. That is, only by comprehending the complex of units in a single consciousness, do I make them singly and collectively mine. Otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have units in consciousness. Synthetic unity of the complex of perceptions as given *a priori*, is the ground, therefore, of that identity of apperception itself which *a priori* precedes any definite act of thinking on my part. Synthesis, however, is not in the objects, and cannot possibly be borrowed from them, or only first of all taken up into consciousness, through perception: it is an act of understanding alone, which itself, indeed, is nothing but the faculty whose single function it is, *a priori* to conjoin, and to bring the complex of given perceptions under the unity of apperception. This principle is the ultimate principle in all human cognition.

§ 17. The Axiom of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception is the Ultimate Principle of the Understanding.

The ultimate principle of the possibility of all perception *in relation to sense*, was, according to the transcendental aesthetic, this, That the units of every such complex must stand under the formal conditions of space and time. The ultimate principle of the possibility of all perception, *in relation to the understanding*, is, That the units of every perceptive complex must stand under conditions of the original-synthetic unity of apperception. All units of perception stand under the former, so far as they are given to us; and under the latter, so far as they must be capable of being conjoined in a single consciousness. For without such conjunction there would be nothing thinkingly cognised or recognised (as in experience), inasmuch as the units given by sense would not have the *actus* of apperception, *I think*, in common, and would not be brought together thereby into a single consciousness. It is on the unity of consciousness, consequently, that the possibility of the understanding itself rests.

of the units,
that is, only by
the conscious-
ness. Other-
wise a self as
of the com-
pound, there-
fore *a priori*
Synthesis,
possibly be bor-
rowed into con-
sciousness
understanding
of a faculty whose
function is to bring the
elements of appercep-
tion into all human

ception is the

of perception
transcendental
complex must
be time. The
relation, *in re-*
ference to every per-
ception, the original-
perception
is due to us; and
the idea of being
that such con-
sciousness is recognised or
of the units given
in, *I think*,
thereby into
the unity of con-
sciousness the under-

The
is not
a prio
ception
I must
tain pa
given),
the sam
line).
for an
synthet
conditi
Not on
but, just
it. In
of the p
gether i

§

The t
through
are unit
For that
distingui
This latt
percepti
Whether
complex
to the ot
ditions.
associatio
quite con
ception in
consequer
original u
necessary
one single
it so stand

Thus the mere form of external sense-perception, space, is not yet a finished perception : so far, it only supplies the *a priori* perceptive complex towards a possible finished perception. But actually to discern *something* in space, a line, I must *draw* it. That is, I must synthetically effect a certain particular conjunction of the space-units (as yet only given), and in such manner that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the idea of a line). Only in this way, plainly, is it first of all possible for an object (a marked off space) to be discerned. The synthetic unity of consciousness, therefore, is an objective condition of all formed or finished perception in experience. Not only is it necessary to enable me to perceive an object ; but, just to *be* object every sense-perception must stand under it. In any other way, or without this synthesis, the units of the perceptive complex would not unite themselves together in a single consciousness.

§ 18. What Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness is.

The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the complex units given in a perception are united into a notion of the object constituted by them. For that reason this unity is called objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness. This latter is only the inner affection of sense whereby a perceptive complex is (for such union) empirically given. Whether I shall be empirically conscious of the units in the complex as given together, or as given the one in succession to the other, depends on *circumstances*, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness (through association of the units) is itself a sense-appearance, and quite contingent. On the other hand, the pure form of perception in time, merely as such perception, and involving, consequently, a given complex of units, stands under the original unity of consciousness, solely in consequence of the necessary conjunction of the units of perception into the one single *I think* (or, *it is I that am thinking*). That is, it so stands, solely in consequence of the pure synthesis of

understanding, which synthesis (as relating only to an *a priori* complex), is evidently presupposed *a priori* to underlie any empirical synthesis.

§ 19. The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Notions they contain.

I find that a judgment is nothing else than the method of bringing given ideas into the objective unity of apperception Take, for example, the proposition, Bodies are heavy. Here, I do not mean to say that these ideas belong in the empirical perception *necessarily* the one to the other, but that they belong the one to the other by virtue of the *necessary unity* of apperception in the synthesis of sense-perceptions. That is, they belong the one to the other according to principles of the objective determination of all cognitive elements, so far as they are competent to yield an objective perception; which principles derive all of them from that of the transcendental unity of apperception.

§ 20. All Perceptions of Sense stand under the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the Units of their Complex can unite together and coalesce into a single Consciousness.

The complex of units given in a perception of sense, falls necessarily under the original synthetic unity of apperception, inasmuch as through this unity alone is the unity of the perception possible (§ 17). But that act of the understanding through which the units of a complex (whether perceptive or notional) becomes reduced into a single apperception, is the logical function of the technical judgments (§ 19). Every complex, therefore, so far as it is given in a single empirical perception, has been *determined* by one of the logical functions of judgment, or by this function of judgment it has been brought into a single consciousness. But now the categories are nothing else than precisely these functions to judge, so far as some given complex of perception comes to be determined of them (§ 13). Hence all given perceptive complexions stand necessarily under categories.

to an *a*
to under-

Objective

method of
percep-
Bodies
se ideas
e one to
by vir-
ynthesis
e to the
mination
tent to
ve all of
ception.

as Con-
an unite

se, falls
percep-
nity of
under-
hether
le ap-
gments
en in a
one of
ion of
sness.
y these
ercep-
ce all
cate-

To th
and the
factors.
object i
sense-ele
correspo
would b
sequentl
cognition
so far as
thing, w
tion poss
an object
come for
gory is b
of sense i
is perceiv
and time
tain (in
only in th
are possib
such form
quently n
less there
being rea
said pure
however,
tion, or se
companies
in applica
afford per
far as th
through t
to empiric

§ 22. The Categories have no other Application in Cognition than to Objects of Experience.

To think an object, and to perceive an object, are not one and the same thing. There are, namely, in perception two factors. There is, first, the notion (category) whereby an object is *thinkingly* perceived; and there is, second, the sense-elements whereby it is given. For if to the notion no corresponding sense-presentation could be given, the former would be only a formal thought without an object, and consequently, not possibly capable of affording perceptive recognition of anything whatever. There might be, indeed, so far as I could know, not anything, not even possibly anything, whereto my thought might apply. Now, all perception possible for us is sensuous (*Æsthetic*); the thinking of an object, therefore, by means of a category, can only become for us a perceptive recognition in so far as this category is brought to bear on objects of the senses. Perception of sense is either pure (space and time), or empirical (what is perceived, through sensation, as directly actual in space and time). Through determination of the former, we obtain (in mathematic) *a priori* perceptions of objects, but only in their *form* as presentations to sense; whether there are possibly also actual things which are to be perceived in such form, remains, so far, still undetermined. Consequently no mathematical notion is in itself perception, unless there be presupposed things, also, which are capable of being realized by us only as in accordance with the form of said pure sensuous perception. *Things in space and time*, however, are only realized by us *through* empirical perception, or so far as they are sense-perceptions, perceptions accompanied by sensation. The categories, consequently, even in application to *a priori* perceptions (as in mathematic), afford perceptive cognition or recognition, strictly, only so far as these *a priori* perceptions, and consequently also through them the categories, are capable of being applied to empirical objects.

The above proposition is of the greatest importance; for it just as much determines the limits of the share of the categories in objects, as the *Æsthetic* similarly determined in regard to the pure form of our sense-perception. Space and time function, as conditions of the possibility of how objects can be given us, no further than as regards objects of sense, or no further than as regards experience. Beyond these limits they stand for nothing; for they are only in the senses and have no reality apart from them. The categories are free from this restriction, and apply to objects of perception as such, if only sensuous and not intellectual, let it be like to ours or not like. This extension beyond *our* sense helps us, however, as on their part, to nothing. For they are then void notions of objects, of which objects, whether they are even possible or impossible, these notions themselves cannot possibly enable us to judge.

Let us suppose ourselves to assume, for example, an object that is an object of a perception which is *non-sensuous*. Such an object we may determine, of course, by all the predicates which the assumption itself involves—the assumption *that it has nothing of a sense-perception in it*. It is not, therefore, extended or in space; its duration is not a time; there is no time-succession of *modi*, no such thing as change, in it, etc. But that is not an objective cognition proper, in regard to which I only name how the perception of the object is *not*, and remain unable to say anything that it positively is. I have not then done anything to indicate the possibility of an object for my category; or I have not been able to assign a perception which should correspond to it. Nay, the most important distinction here yet is this: that to any such supposed object, there cannot be applied even any one single category.

§ 24. Of the Application of the Categories to the Objects of Sense.

The categories bear, through the mere understanding, on

nce; for
the cat-
ained in
pace and
objects
of sense,
d these
e senses
ries are
ception
be like
ee helps
ey are
er they
nselves

an ob-
nsuous.
he pre-
ssump-

It is
not a
hing as
gnition
ception
ng that
ndicate
ve not
ond to
s this:
plied

Sense.

ng, on

objects
ter ours
thought
actual o
however
rests on
sensibili
is to e
units of
with the
standing
appercep
the cond
ception
that the
ive reali
may be g

But, a
as bearin
or on the
the categ
merely in
of imagi
of sponta
merely d
priori ac
action of
of the for
the direct

§

We can
not cognis
which co
tions are
of it is *giv*


objects of perception as perception, if only sensuous, no matter ours or another; but are, for that very reason, mere *thought-forms*, through which (as such) there is not any actual object cognised. There is basally presupposed in us, however, a certain form of sense-perception *a priori* which rests on the receptivity or susceptibility of impressions (a *sensibility* as such). Now, understanding, as spontaneity, is to be conceived capable of determinatively acting on the units of complex in inner sense, under and in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception. That is, understanding may be conceived to think synthetic unity of the apperception of the complex of *a priori sense-perception*, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) perception must necessarily stand. In this wise, then, it is that the categories, though mere thought-forms, get *objective reality*, or actual presence as factors in objects which may be given us in sense.



But, again, the figural synthesis must, when considered as bearing on the original synthetic unity of apperception, or on the transcendental unity, that is, which functions in the categories, be named, as in contradistinction to the merely intellectual conjunction, the *transcendental synthesis of imagination*. So far, again, as its synthesis is an action of spontaneity, which is determinant, and not, like sense, merely determinable—imagination is a faculty which *a priori* acts upon sense. This synthesis is the result of an action of understanding on sense, and is the first application of the former (ground, too, of all its other applications) in the direction of objects of what perception is possible to us.

§ 27. Result of this Deduction of the Categories.





We cannot think an object without categories; we cannot cognise any object thought, unless through perceptions which correspond to these notions. Now all our perceptions are in sense, and such cognition, so far as the object of it is *given*, is empirical. But empirical cognition (or re-







**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

LS 2.8
LS 3.2
LS 3.6
LS 4.0
LS 4.5
LS 5.0
LS 5.6
LS 6.3
LS 7.1
LS 8.0
LS 9.0
LS 10.0
LS 11.2
LS 12.5
LS 14.0
LS 16.0
LS 18.0
LS 20.0
LS 22.4
LS 25.0
LS 28.0
LS 31.5
LS 35.5
LS 40.0
LS 45.0
LS 50.0
LS 56.0
LS 63.0
LS 71.0
LS 80.0
LS 90.0
LS 100.0
LS 112.0
LS 125.0
LS 140.0
LS 160.0
LS 180.0
LS 200.0
LS 224.0
LS 250.0
LS 280.0
LS 315.0
LS 355.0
LS 400.0
LS 450.0
LS 500.0
LS 560.0
LS 630.0
LS 710.0
LS 800.0
LS 900.0
LS 1000.0

10
01

cognition—perception) is experience. Consequently there is no objective cognition *a priori* possible to us, but one solely of objects of possible experience.

But such cognition, though confined merely to objects of experience, is not *therefore* all borrowed from experience. On the contrary, even such cognition has elements which originate *a priori* within ourselves; firstly, the pure perceptions (time and space), namely, and, secondly, the pure notions of understanding (the categories). Now, there are only two ways in which we can think a necessary agreement of experience with notions of objects in it: either experience makes these notions, or these notions make experience possible. The one alternative is not true of the categories (*pure perception* apart); for they are *a priori* notions, and consequently independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio æquivoca*). There remains, therefore, only the second alternative (as it were a system of the *Epigenesis* of pure reason): that the categories, on the part of the understanding, namely, possess the grounds of the possibility of all our experience.

A Brief Idea of this Deduction.


It is the exposition of the pure notions of the understanding (and with them of all *a priori* theoretical objective cognition) as principles of the possibility of experience,—of these, again, as *determination* of sense-appearances in space and time *generally*,—of these, lastly, from the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception as form of the understanding in a connecting reference to space and time, and to them, for their parts, as original forms of sense.

* * * * *

y there
ut one

ects of
rience,
which
re per-
e pure
ere are
agree-
er ex-
epe-
e cat-
i no-
(the
eratio
nd al-
pure
stand-
ll our

stand-
cog-
,—of
pace
le of
f the
ime,



BOOK II.—THE ANALYTIC OF JUDGMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.—OF TRANSCENDENTAL JUDGMENT GENERALLY.

If understanding be considered the faculty of rules, judgment will be the faculty that *subsumes* under rules, the faculty that distinguishes whether something stand (*casus datæ legis*) under a given rule or not. General logic neither has, nor can have, any prescripts for judgment. For, abstracting from all matter of cognition, there can remain to it no business but the setting out analytically of the mere *form* of cognition in terms, propositions, and syllogisms, and the production, consequently, of rules in the general use of the understanding that are simply formal.

But, though general logic has no prescripts for judgment, transcendental logic is quite otherwise. Nay, it would seem the precise business of the latter just, through rules, to guide and safe-guard judgment in its intrusions with the pure understanding.

Now this is the peculiarity of the transcendental philosophy, that, besides the rule (or rather the universal condition to rules) which the category represents, said philosophy can at the same time *a priori* notify the case on which the rule is to be applied. The reason of this advantage over all the other theoretical sciences (mathematics alone excepted) lies in this, that the notions on which transcendental philosophy is engaged are such as to connect themselves *a priori* with objects. It is not *a posteriori*, then, that such notions can have their objective applicability proved; for they possess a dignity beyond that standard.

This transcendental *doctrine* of judgment, now, will comprise two chapters: the first treating of the sense-conditions under which the categories can be alone applied (of the schematism, therefore, of pure understanding); and the second of the synthetic propositions (judgments) which *a priori* result from the categories under these conditions and underlie all other *a priori* cognitions; that is, of the ground-propositions of the pure understanding.

CHAPTER I.—THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES.

How, now, is the subsumption of these under those—how is application of categories to mere affections of sense possible? for nobody will say that the categories (*e.g.*, causality) can be sensuously seen or felt and are included in the sense-affection.

In this reference, now, it is evident that what is wanted is a *tertium quid*, which, homogeneous on this side with the category and on the other with sense, will mediate the connexion of the one with the other. This mediating agent, in a word, while wholly pure or non-empirical, must, on one side, be intellectual, and on the other, sensuous. Such an agent we shall name *transcendental schema*.

The category is a principle of the pure synthetic unity of a complex, no matter what. Time, as formal condition of any complex in internal sense, and consequently of all connexions in consciousness, implies, represents, or is *an a priori complex of pure or non-empirical perception*. A transcendental determination of time, then, is, with regard to the *category* which may be supposed to act in determination of its unity, so far homogeneous: like the latter, namely, it is universal and depends on *a priori* law. But, on the other side, again, it is so far homogeneous with *sense*, as time is an element in every actual empirical complex. Application of category to ingredients of sense, therefore, will be possible through that transcendental determination of time which, as schema of category, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former.

The schema is always in itself only a product of imagination; but, as the synthesis of the latter then has not in view any single perception, but only the unity of a general process in determination of sense, the schema is not to be confounded with the *figure* or *image*. If I set down five points the one after the other thus,, what I have is a picture or representation (figure, image) of the number five. But if I think just *a number*, any number at all, let it be

3.


—how
sense
, caus-
in the

ed is a
e cate-
nexion
word,
de, be
nt we

ity of
on of
con-
an a
. A
gard
ermi-
tter,
But,
ense,
Ap-
will
n of
mp-

ina-
iew
pro-
on-
nts
ic-
ve.
be





f
e
u
in
e
e
P

t
a
F
th
li
th
an
th
sp
ca
th
ge
an
ce
to
so
po

se
tin
tic
is
ho
no
ge
era

an
its

five or let it be a hundred, then this thinking is rather the conception of a method towards the picture of some sum under a certain notion that this picture itself, which picture, in this latter case, it would hardly be possible to realize and compare with the notion. This idea now of a general process of imagination for providing a notion with its correspondent picture or image, I call the schema to this notion.

In effect there underlie our pure sense-notions not pictures of the objects, but schemata. There can never be an adequate picture for the notion of a triangle in general. For it would never attain to that *generality* which enables the notion to hold good of any triangle, right-angled, oblique-angled, etc., but would be limited always to a part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere but in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of imagination in regard of certain pure figures in space. The schema of a category, again, is something that cannot be brought into any image, but is only the pure synthesis, in agreement with a rule of unity through notions generally (which notions are expressed in the categories), and is a transcendental product of imagination, which concerns the determination of inner sense generally according to conditions of its form (time) in regard of all cognitions, so far as these, under the unity of apperception, are supposed *a priori* to cohere into one notion.

The pure picture of all magnitudes (*quantorum*) in outer sense is space; but that of all objects of sense generally, time. The pure *schema* of magnitude (*quantitatis*), as notion of the understanding, again, is *number*; and number is a cognition which represents the successive addition of homogeneous unit to homogeneous unit. Number, then, is nothing else than unity of synthesis in a complex of homogeneous perception in general—by this, namely, that I generate time itself in the apprehension of the perception.

Reality in the category is what corresponds to sensation; any sensation, as such: that, then, the notion of which in itself indicates a beingness or fact of some kind or other in

time. *Negation* is that the notion of which represents a non-being in time. The distinction of the one from the other, therefore, lies in the difference of a time filled from the same time void. Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude, whereby it fills more or less the same time (that is, inner sense in regard of one and the same perception of an object), till it disappears in nullity (nothing, or negation). There is, therefore, a relation or connexion between reality and negation, or a transition, rather, from the one to the other, which transition exhibits every reality as a quantum. Accordingly, the schema of reality (as quantity of something so far as it fills time) is just this same continuous and uniform generation of filling in time, whether we suppose a certain degree of sensation progressively to ascend from nothing in time or regressively to descend to it.

The *schema of substance* is the persistence of the *reale* in time; that is, the conception of this *reale* as a substratum of empirical determination in time taken quite generally, which substratum persists, therefore, while all else changes.

The schema of cause and the causality of anything generally is the *reale* on which, whenever it is, something else always ensues. It consists, therefore, in the succession of the elements in the complex, so far as this succession is subjected to a rule.

The schema of community (reciprocity), or of the mutual causality of substances in regard of their accidents, is the co-existence of the determinations of the one with those of the other according to a universal rule.

The schema of possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of several ideas with the conditions of time generally (as, for example, in the reference that a thing and its reverse, or contrary, cannot both be at one and the same time): it is the determination of a thing as conceivable at any time.

The schema of actuality is existence in a determinate time.

nts a
a the
from
ee or
time
reep-
g, or
n be-
n the
y, as
man-
ame
ime,
res.
o de-

le in
tum
ally,
ges.
gen-
else
n of
sub-

tual
the
e of

yn-
ally
re-
me
e at

ate

a

f

s

o

p

t

i

w

o

a

a

t

t

a

s

i

p

d

ta

r

t

t

m

d

(s

it

si

n

p

d

cl

The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times.

We see here, then, that the schema of every category refers to time: as that of quantity to the bringing to pass synthesis of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object; that of quality to the synthesis of sensation (sense-perception) with the conception of time, or to the filling of time; that of relation to the connexions of the sense-units in each other's regard at any time (that is, as in accordance with a rule of the determination in time); and, lastly, those of the three modalities to time itself, in regard of whether and how an object belongs to it. The schemata, therefore, are nothing but *a priori* time-determinations on rules: these, in the order of the categories, successively refer to time-range, time-filling, time-order, and time-complexion, as in regard of all possible objects.

From this it is clear that the schematism of the understanding as produced by the transcendental synthesis of the imagination has no other end than the unity of every complex of perception in the inner sense, and, in this way, indirectly, consequently, the unity of apperception as *function* correspondent to inner sense (which, for its part, is receptivity or *affection*). The schemata of the categories, therefore, are the true and only conditions for providing these with an application to objects, and, consequently, with meaning.

CHAPTER II.—SYSTEM OF THE GROUND-JUDGMENTS OF PURE UNDERSTANDING.

We have considered, in the preceding chapter, transcendental judgment only as in respect of the general conditions (schemata of sense) under which alone it is competent for it to apply the categories in production of synthetic propositions. Our business now is to exhibit, in systematic connexion, what judgments understanding, under such critical proviso, actually *a priori* creates; and hereto, without doubt, our categorical table will supply the natural and sure clew.

Accordingly all the ground-propositions of pure understanding are—

1. Axioms of Pure Perception.
2. Anticipations of Sense-Perception.
3. Analogies of Experience.
4. Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General.

1. Axioms of Pure Perception.

The principle of these is: All perceptions are extensive magnitudes.

Proof.

All objects involve in form a perception in space and time; and this influence of space and time is presupposed as *a priori* universal condition that precedes and underlies all objects. These, therefore, cannot be otherwise apprehended (taken up, that is, into empirical consciousness) than through synthesis of the complex of constitutive units, by which synthesis there are brought about perceptions of a determinate space or a determinate time. This synthesis, then, is a putting together of homogeneous elements, and results in a consciousness of the synthetic unity of just such complex. Now consciousness of any homogeneous complex in perception, so far as it is conceived necessary for rendering possible the idea of an object, is the notion of magnitude (*quantum*). Consequently even the perception of an object, as phenomenon in our sense, is only possible through the same synthetic unity of the given sensuously perceptive complex, by means of which the unity of homogeneous synthesis is, in the notion of quantity, *thought*. That is, the phenomena of our sense are all quantities—all *extensive magnitudes*, indeed—because, as perceptions in space and time, they must come before us in or through precisely the same synthesis as is determinative of space and time themselves.

der-

sive

and
sed
lies
re-
an
by
f a
sis,
nd
ch
ex
er-
ni-
an
gh
ve
n-
he
ve
nd
ne
n-

in
si
co
or
pe
or
ch
to

m
Fe
its
lat
ev
ce
pe
W
tru
tha
com
an
ive
to
lon
app
and
per
pir
rier
hol
is m

T
reat
that

It is on this successive synthesis of productive imagination in the generation of figures that the mathematic of extension (geometry) founds. Its axioms express the *a priori* conditions of sense-perception; and under these conditions only is a schema possible of any pure notion of external perception: as, for example, between any two points only one straight line is possible, two straight lines cannot include a space, etc. These are axioms which apply properly to magnitudes (*quanta*) as such.

This transcendental ground-proposition of the mathematics of sense greatly enlarges our *a priori* knowledge. For it, and it alone, renders pure mathematic applicable in its complete precision to objects of experience. And this latter fact without it, indeed, is so far from being of itself evident, that it has given rise to much controversy. Perceptions of sense are not things in themselves. Empirical perception is only possible through pure (space and time). What geometry says of the latter, therefore, is necessarily true of the former; and such allegations in resistance as that objects of sense need not be submitted to the laws of construction in space (the infinite divisibility of lines and angles, for example), must sink of themselves. For objective truth were thereby denied to space, and along with it to all mathematics, so that it would be impossible for us any longer to know why and how far the latter were to be held applicable of the objects of sense. The synthesis of spaces and times it is, that, as synthesis of the essential form of all perception, is what renders possible at the same time empirical apprehension, and consequently all external experience and all perception of any of its objects; and what holds of mathematics in application to the former synthesis is necessarily true also of this latter.

2. Anticipations of Sense.

The principle of these is, In all perceptions of sense, the *reale* that is matter of sensation has intensive magnitude—that is, degree.

Proof.

Sense-perception is empirical consciousness, or such that it has at the same time sensation in it. Sense-affectations, as objects of sense-perception, are not pure (merely formal) perceptions, like space and time (which, for their parts, can, in themselves, not be perceived of sense). They contain, therefore, over and above the element of pure perception, the *material* elements towards an object (that element or those elements whereby *something* is cognised as existent *in* space or time). These material elements are constituted by the *reale* of sensation, as mere subjective feeling of which there can only be the consciousness that the subject is so affected, and which is then referred to some object. Now, from empirical to pure consciousness there is a gradual transition possible, in the course of which the *reale* that is present in it at first may, in the end, completely disappear, and there will remain at last a merely formal consciousness (now *a priori*) of the complex proper to space and time alone. Contrariwise, consequently, there is the possibility of a *synthesis* in the amount of a sensation, up from its beginning, as nothing in pure perception, until it reaches any conceivable magnitude of feeling in consciousness. Sensation, now, being in itself not an objective consciousness, and involving, as such, neither the perception of space nor of time, is incapable of constituting an extensive magnitude. Still it is a magnitude, and a magnitude such that, in the apprehension of it, empirical consciousness increases, from the nothing of it in a certain time, up to the given actual amount. This, then, is intensive magnitude; and such magnitude, degree, that is, of influence on sense, must be correspondingly attributed to all perceptive objects so far as they involve sensation.

that
ns, as
per-
an, in
here-
, the
those
space
y the
there
cted,
a em-
ition
nt in
there
ow *a*
done.
syn-
ing,
ceiv-
now,
ving,
s in-
it is
hen-
hing
This,
gree,
y at-
sen-

t
e

th
p
th
to
si
w
to
an
is
th
re
ed
in
B
te
du
tin
th
fo
al
on
ne

ces
of
inc
for
un
be,

3. Analogies of Experience.

The principle of these is, That experience is only possible through consciousness of a necessary connexion in the perceptions (objects) of sense.

Proof.

Experience is empirical cognition, *i.e.*, cognition that, through perceptions of sense, determines an object. Experience, therefore, is *synthesis* of said perceptions, a synthesis that is not given *by* perception, but that rather gives *to* its implied sense-complex, the synthetic unity of a certain single act of consciousness. This synthetic unity constitutes what is essential to a perceptive recognition of objects, *i.e.*, *to experience*. Experience, now, is a completed cognition and recognition of objects through perceptions of sense. It is on sense-perception becoming *experience*, therefore, that there is effected a relation of the units of the complex in regard of their existence mutually. The complex is regarded now, that is, not as it merely presents itself at first hand in time, but as at last it is *experienced objectively* in time. But time, again, is not itself perceived; the ultimate determination of existential objects in time, then, is no product of time itself, but must result from the *synthesis* in time. But such synthesis, so placed, can only take place through *a priori notions* of connexion. These notions, now, for their part, lastly, must, as such, or being *a priori*, bring always *necessity* along with them. *Experience*, then, can only possibly result from a recognition of necessary connexion in our various perceptions.

The three *modi* of time are *persistence*, *sequence* or *succession*, and *simultaneity*. Hence three laws of all relations of objects in time will precede experience, and as conditions, indeed, of its very possibility. These laws will determine for every object its relative existential place in regard of unity (connexion) always or at any time (A being, B will be, etc).

These analogies have this peculiarity, that they do not have in regard the objects or the synthesis of their empirical perception as it is in space, but merely their existence, or rather their relation mutually in regard of their existence. But the existence of objects (not their mere perceptive form as due *a priori* to that of space) cannot be determined or cannot come to be known *a priori*; and, though we might in this way (*a priori*) be able to reason or infer in regard to some certain existence, we should be quite unable, nevertheless, literally to cognise or perceive that existence. We should be quite unable, that is, to anticipate that whereby, as an actual empirical object, said existence were distinguishable from others.

A. FIRST ANALOGY.

Primary Proposition of the Permanence of Substance.

In all mutation of the objects of sense, substance remains (is permanent), and the quantum of these objects is, in nature, neither increased nor lessened.


Proof.


All objects of sense are in time, in which, a substrate (permanent form of inner sense), *simultaneity* as well as *sequence* can alone be conceived or represented. Time, therefore, in which all vicissitude of objects is to be thought, remains and does not itself alter, because it is that in which succession or simultaneity can be conceived or represented only as determinations of itself. Time, now, can, *per se*, not be perceived—strictly and properly *perceived* as though it were an object *per se*. Consequently, in the elements of sense must lie that substrate which is to relieve (exhibit) time, and by reference to which, through the relation of objects to it, all alternation or all simultaneity can be recognised. But *substance*, now, is the substrate of all that, as real, constitutes the existence of things, and in such manner that whatever takes place in existence, or comes to exist,

not
rical
e, or
nce.
per-
de-
and,
n or
uite
that
oate
nce

ains
na-

ate
as
me,
ght,
ich
ted
se,
gh
s of
bit)
a of
og-
as
ner
ist,





C
R
i
s
n
o
e

o
r
P
a
b
a
v
r
P
e
t
i
p
is
o
d
th
m
a
V
re
T
se
su
b
p
ce
m

can only be thought as a determination of it. That permanent element, consequently, in relation to which all time-relations of objects can alone be determined, is the substance in all the shows of sense; it is that *reale* of these which, as substrate of all alteration, ever remains the same. Inasmuch, therefore, as substance enters not into the alteration of existence, neither can the quantum of it in nature be either lessened or increased.

Our *apprehension* of any sensible complex is always successive, and, consequently, always in alteration. We can never determine in this way alone, then, whether this complex (that is, the units in it), *as object of experience*, exhibits a case of co-existence or of sequence. For that there must be presupposed to lie under the all of things, something that always is, something permanent and persistent, in regard of which all alteration and all simultaneity are but so many modes (time-modes) in which it itself—this that is always permanent and persistent—exists. Only in this permanent element, therefore, are time-relations possible (for simultaneity and succession constitute all the relations in time); *i.e.*, this permanent element is the substratum of the empirical perception of time itself, and only by reference to it is any determination as in time at all possible. By reason of a permanent element alone does existence, necessarily in different and only successive parts of time, acquire, nevertheless, a *magnitude*, which we name *duration*. For in the mere succession existence is always only going and coming, and cannot be said to possess even the smallest magnitude. Without this permanent element, therefore, there is not any relation of time. Now time cannot in itself be perceived. This permanent element, consequently, is, for the objects of sense, the substrate of all their determinations in time. This substrate, further, therefore, is the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity in our perceptions, *i.e.*, in experience; and, by reference to this permanent element, all co-existence or alteration in time can be regarded as mere *modus* of the existence of that which remains and persists.

The permanent element in all intimations to sense is thus the object itself, *i.e.*, substance (phænomenon); while all that alters or can alter holds only of the mode in which this substance or these substances exist, only, consequently, of their mere determinations.

Permanency, then, is a necessary condition under which alone affections of sense are determinable as things or objects in a possible experience.

B. SECOND ANALOGY.

Primary Proposition of Time-Sequence on the Law of Causality.

All changes follow from the law of the connexion of cause and effect.

Proof.

I perceive that perceptions of sense follow one another, *i.e.*, that there is a state of things at one time, the opposite of which preceded. I connect, properly, therefore, two perceptions in time. Connexion, now, is no deed of sense or the perception (general) of sense, but is the product of a synthetic act of imagination in that it determines inner-sense in regard of the time-relation. But imagination can connect said two states in two ways, either as that this shall precede that, or that this; for time cannot itself be perceived, or so, therefore, that, in its reference, as it were empirically, what precedes and what follows may, *in the object*, be determined. I am thus only conscious that my imagination puts the one first and the other second, not that *in the object* the one precedes and the other follows. In other words, the mere perception of sense leaves the objective relation of the consecutive affections of sense undetermined. In order, now, that this relation should be perceived as determined, the relation between the two states must be so thought that it necessarily determines which state shall be

thus
that
sub-
neir

ich
ob-

y.
nse

er,
site
er-
or
f a
er-
can
all
er-
ere
the
ny
at
ner
re-
ed.
de-
so
be

ne
W
th
el
is
fo
no
(o
th
qu
ita
T
ob

pe
ev
of
ho
fr
an
th
A
I
ce
of
ap
se
th
fo
In
pr
th
T
th
ag
th
pr

necessarily set first, and which second ; and not reverse-wise. What notion, however, brings with it a necessity of synthetic unity can only be a category, and a category is no element of the perception of sense as such. That here, now, is the notion of the relation of cause and effect, in which the former determines the latter in time as its consequent, and not as something that in imagination merely might precede (or even, indeed, not at all be). Only by this, therefore, that we subject the sequence of perceptions (and consequently all change) to the law of causality, is experience itself (empirical recognition of these perceptions) possible. These perceptions are themselves, then, only possible as objects of experience by virtue of this very law.

Said apprehension of an event, then, is an empirical perception such that it ensues on another. Inasmuch, however, as this, so far, is but a succession, or, with all synthesis of apprehension, only so situated as the complex of a house is, there is no distinction so far of the one thing from the other. But I perceive also that if, in the case of an event, I call the first state empirically perceived A, and the subsequent one B, B can in the apprehension only follow A, while, for its part, A cannot follow, but only precede B. I see, for example, a ship driving down stream. My perception of its position down stream follows my perception of its position up stream ; and it is impossible that, in the apprehension of these appearances, the ship should be first seen down stream, and afterwards again up. The order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is here, therefore, fixed, and to this order these perceptions are bound. In the example of the house, my perceptions in the apprehension of it could begin with the top and end with the bottom, or, equally well also, begin here and end there. They might, for that matter, quite as well also, apprehend the complex of the empirical object from right to left, or, again, from left to right. In the series of these perceptions, then, there was no fixed order—no order which necessarily prescribed where, in the apprehension, I should make my

beginning, in order to convert its complex into the due empirical synthesis. Such necessity of rule, however, is always present in any case of an event, and the order of the consecutive perceptions (in the apprehension of the sensible facts) is thereby rendered *necessary*.

When we experience, then, something that happens, we always presuppose something to precede from which it follows according to a rule. For without this I should be unable to say of the *object* that it follows, inasmuch as the mere succession in my apprehension, if undetermined in connexion with something that precedes, through a rule, is no warrant for a consecution *in the object*. Consequently, therefore, it is always by reason of a rule that I make my subjective synthesis (as in mere apprehension) objective; and wholly under this presupposition alone is there even the possibility of the experience of something that happens.

It is important, then, to demonstrate that, never even in experience, do we attribute (in the case of an event, where something comes to be which previously was not) the sequence to the object, and accordingly distinguish it from the subjective sequence of our mere apprehension, unless there be presupposed an underlying rule which compels us to observe *this* order in our perceptions rather than another. Nay, it is properly that compulsion (necessity) which alone makes possible the perception of a succession in the object.

For all experience and its very possibility, understanding is necessary, and its first respective action is, not to make the perception of an object *clear*, but simply *possible*. It effects this in this way, that it assigns the time-order to things and their existence, even in assigning to each of them, as a consequent, an *a priori* determinate place in time (it must *follow*) in regard of what (relatively) precedes.

That something happens, therefore, is a perception belonging to a possible experience, which experience becomes actual when what happens is regarded as determinately placed in time, and, consequently, as an object which can

e em-
ways
con-
sible

, we
ch it
d be
the
d in
le, is
ntly,
my
ive;
even
ens.
even
ent,
(not)
nish
ion,
om-
han
ity)
sion

ling
ake
It
to
em,
(it

be-
nes
ely
can

c
a
w
n
t
t
i
is
re
th
o
is
st
of
ti
in
th
ro
is
th

always be found in the context of perceptions as in accordance with a rule. This rule, now, determinative of something consequentially in time, is, that, in what precedes the condition is to be found, by virtue of which the effect always (*i.e.*, necessarily) follows. And so the proposition of a sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience, namely, of the objective recognition of events as regards their relation, consequentially, in the series of time.

C. THIRD ANALOGY.

Primary Proposition of Simultaneity in accordance with the Law of Reciprocity or Community.

All substances, so far as they may simultaneously be perceived in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity.

Proof.

Things are simultaneous when, in empirical fact, the perception of the one can follow on the perception of the other, and *vice versa*. Simultaneity, now, is the existence of the whole of a complex at one and the same time. But it is not possible to perceive time itself, in order to infer from the fact of things being in the same time, that the perceptions of these may reciprocally follow one another. There is consequently required a notion of understanding for the reciprocal series of the determinations of things existent there, apart from each other, and yet simultaneously, in order to say that the reciprocal succession of the perceptions is one that takes place in the object, and thereby demonstrate the simultaneity as objective. But now that relation of substances, in which the one is the subject of determinations that have their ground in the other, is the relation of *influence*—a relation that, where this determines that and that this, is known as the relation of community or reciprocity. The simultaneity of substances in space, therefore, is not capable of being otherwise cognised in experience than under presupposition of their reciprocal influence the

one on the other, and, consequently, just such reciprocal influence is the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience.

Let us suppose now, that, in a complex of substances as units of sense, each were absolutely isolated, and not one among them the subject of action and reaction in regard of the others, then I say that the simultaneity of these would be no object of a possible perception, and that the existence of the one could not by any path of empirical synthesis conduct to the existence of the other. For, when it is considered that they would, in effect, be subjects of a separation absolute, it will be understood also that perception, still conceived capable of passing from the one to the other in time, would successively, indeed, determine the existence of each, but be wholly unable to distinguish whether the one were objectively *after* the other or objectively *along with* it.

There must, therefore, be something besides mere existence that enables A to determine for B its place in time, and as well, at the same time, B so to determine A; for only under such a condition is it possible to conceive of substances as empirically co-existent. Now, only that determines for something else its place in time which for this latter is cause, or cause of its modes. Every substance, therefore, must (as it is a consequent only on account of what is determined in it) be the subject at once of the causality of certain determinations in the other, and of the effects of that other's causality in determination of its own self, *i.e.*, they must (directly or indirectly) stand in dynamical unity, if ever the fact of their co-existence is to be possibly perceived in experience. Now, in regard of the objects of experience, every condition is necessary without which experience of these objects themselves would be impossible. It is necessary, then, for all substances in perception, so far as they are simultaneous, to stand, one with the other, in a thoroughgoing community of reciprocity.


* * * * *

These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They

l in-
em-

s as
one
d of
ould
nce
con-
con-
ara-
still
r in
e of
one
/ it.
rist-
me,
for
sub-
ter-
this
nce,
t of
aus-
ects
i.e.,
ity,
per-
ex-
ex-
ble.
far
n a

hey



are nothing but principles determinative in regard to the existence of objects in time, of which they follow the three *modi*: the relation to time itself as a magnitude (the magnitude of existence, *i.e.*, duration); the relation in time as a consecution; and lastly, the relation of time as a sum of all existence at once. This unity of time-determination is altogether dynamical, *i.e.*, time is not regarded as something in which experience directly determines for each existence its own place, which is impossible, inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of the perception of sense, whereby things might, as it were, be kept together; but the rule of understanding, by which alone it is possible for the existence of objects to get synthetic unity in accordance with the relations of time, determines for each of these objects its relative place in time, and that, too, *a priori* and as valid always.

By *Nature* (in an empirical sense) we understand the context of existent objects as submitted to necessary rules or laws. There are, therefore, certain laws, *a priori*, which alone render a nature possible. Empirical laws can only be found (or exist) by means of experience, and that, too, as submitted to said primary laws which alone render it possible. Our analogies, therefore, exhibit, properly, the unity of nature in the connexion of all things under certain exponents, which exponents express nothing else than the relation of time (so far as it is sum of all existence) to the unity of apperception, which unity can exist only in a synthesis on rules. They collectively say, then, All things are, and must be, in a one nature, for without such *a priori* unity there would be no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience.

4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General.

1. That is *possible*, which coincides with the *formal* conditions of experience (in pure perception and categories).
2. That is *actual*, which is in the context of the *material* conditions of experience (sensation).

3. That is *necessary*, or necessarily exists, the connexion of which with actuality is determined in accordance with the *universal* conditions of experience.

Exposition.


The categories of modality have this peculiarity, that they do not in the least increase the notion to which they are predicatively annexed, as determination of the object, but only express the relation to the cognising faculty. Thus, there is no contradiction in the notion of a figure which is inclosed by two straight lines, for the notion of two straight lines and the meeting together of them involve no negation of a figure. The impossibility does not depend on the notion in itself, but on the construction of it in space, *i.e.*, on the conditions of space and the determinations of space. But these, again, have their own objective reality, *i.e.*, they relate to possible things, because they *a priori* imply the form of experience.


The postulate that bears on the *actuality* of things, demands *perception of sense*, and that is *sensation*, of which we must have a consciousness, not indeed necessarily immediately with reference to the object itself, the existence of which is to be recognised; but still we must be aware of its connexion with some actual perception, as in obedience to the analogies of experience which exhibit, generally, every real connexion in experience. Whereas the perception of sense which adds matter to the notion is the sole and single character of actuality. Still, even before perception of a thing, and thus comparatively *a priori*, we may come to know the existence of this thing, should it but connect itself with actual perceptions, and in accordance with the principles of the empirical conjunction of these—that is, in accordance with the analogies. For then the existence of the thing really coheres with our perceptions in a possible experience, and, led by the analogies we may get from our actual perception to the thing itself in the series of possible

on
ith

ey
are
out
ns,
is
ht
on
no-
on
ce.
ey
he

le-
ch
ae-
of
its
to
ry
of
le
a
to
ct
he
is,
ce
le
ur
le





c
f
i
s
a
c
t
P
i
c
o
e

t
n
a
s
b

perceptions. Thus, we know the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all things, from the perception of the attracted filings of iron, although any direct perception of this matter is, from the nature of our organs, impossible to us. For, following the laws of sense and the context of our perceptions, we should hit, even in experience, on the direct empirical perception of it, if only our senses were fine enough, the consideration of their coarseness nowise concerning the form of possible experience.

As concerns the third postulate, lastly, its business is with the material necessity in existence, and not with the merely formal and logical necessity that lies in the connecting of notions. As, now, no existence of the objects of the senses can be recognised fully *a priori*; so, necessity of existence can be cognised, never from notions, but always only from the connexion, according to general laws of experience, with that which has been perceived. Now, there is no existence which, under condition of other given perceptions, might be cognised as necessary, except, according to laws of causality, the existence of effects from given causes. Consequently it is not the existence of things (substances), but that of their state, in regard to which we can alone recognise necessity; and that, too, only according to the laws of causality, from other states which are given in perception. It follows from this, that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible experience, according to which every event has from its cause a determination of an *a priori* force. Hence we cognise the necessity only of those effects in nature, the causes of which are given us, and the character of necessity in existence extends no farther than the field of possible experience.

General Remark on the System of Primary Propositions.

The final result, therefore, of this whole section is: All the primary propositions of pure understanding are nothing more than principles *a priori* of the possibility of experience, and to experience alone do all *a priori* synthetic propositions refer; nay, on this reference rests wholly the possibility of these.

CHAPTER III.

THE GROUND OF DISTINCTION OF PHÆNOMENA AND NOUMENA.

That the understanding cannot make any but an empirical, and never a transcendental, use of all its principles *a priori*, nay, of all its notions, is a proposition which, if thoroughly understood, leads indeed to most important consequences. What we call the transcendental use of a notion in any proposition is its being referred to things in general and to things by themselves, while its empirical use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a possible experience. . . . What is required for every notion is, first, the logical form of a notion (of thought) in general; and, secondly, the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without the latter, it has no sense, and is entirely empty, though it may still contain the logical function by which a notion can be formed out of any data. The only way in which an object can be given to a notion is in perception, and though a pure perception is possible *a priori* and before the object, yet even that pure perception can receive its object, and with it objective validity, by an empirical perception only, of which it is itself nothing but the form. All notions, therefore, and with them all principles, though they may be possible *a priori*, refer nevertheless to empirical perceptions, that is, to data of a possible experience. Without this, they can claim no objective validity, but are a mere play, whether of the imagination or of the understanding with their respective representations.

That this is the case with all categories and with all the principles drawn from them, becomes evident from the fact that we could not define any one of them, without at once having recourse to the conditions of sensibility or the form of phenomena, to which, as their only possible objects, these categories must necessarily be restricted, it being impossible, if we take away these conditions, to assign to them any meaning, that is, any relation to an object, or to make it

NA.

cal,
ori,
hly
ees.
ny
to
he-
...
rm
ssi-
er,
till
ed
be
er-
ren
ob-
ich
nd
e a
is,
can
her
re-

the
act
nce
rm
ese
le,
ny
it.

C
C
r
a
P
P
C
a
P
g
J
e
C
d
b
m
a

se
le
o
w
o
u
u
ce
al
ce

ntelligible to ourselves by any example what kind of thing could be intended by such notions.

Of the notion of cause also (if I leave out time, in which something follows on something else by rule) I should find no more in the pure category than that it is something which enables us to conclude the existence of something else.

From this it follows incontestably, that the pure notions of the understanding never admit of a transcendental, but only of an empirical use, and that the principles of the pure understanding can only be referred, as general conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, never to things by themselves (without regard to the manner in which we have to look at them).

Transcendental Analytic has therefore yielded us this important result, that the understanding *a priori* can never do more than anticipate *the form* of a possible experience; and as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are principles for the exhibition of phenomena only; and the proud name of Ontology, which presumes to supply in a systematic form different kinds of synthetical knowledge *a priori* of things by themselves (*for instance the principle of causality*), must be replaced by the more modest name of a mere Analytic of the pure understanding.

A pure category therefore, in which every condition of sensuous perception, the only one that is possible for us, is left out, cannot determine an object, but only the thought of an object in general according to different modes. If we want to use a notion, we require in addition some function of the faculty of judgment, by which an object is subsumed under a notion, consequently the *at least* formal condition under which something can be given in perception. If this condition of the faculty of judgment (schema) is wanting, all subsumption is impossible, because nothing is given that could be subsumed under the notion. The purely transcen-

dental use of the categories therefore is in reality of no use at all, and has no definite or *even, with regard to its form only*, definable object. Hence it follows that a pure category is not fit for any synthetical *a priori* principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding admit of empirical only, never of transcendental application, nay, that no synthetical principles *a priori* are possible beyond the field of possible experience.

If all thought (by means of categories) is taken away from empirical knowledge, *no knowledge of any object remains, because nothing can be thought by mere perception*, and the mere fact that there is within me an affection of my sensibility, establishes in no way any relation of such a representation to any object. If, on the contrary, all perception is taken away, there always remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of a possible perception. In this sense the categories may be said to extend further than sensuous perception, because they can think objects in general without any regard to the special mode of sensibility in which they may be given; but they do not thus prove a larger sphere of objects, because we cannot admit that such objects can be given, without admitting the possibility of some other but sensuous perception, for which we have no right whatever.

Now the notion of a noumenon, that is of a thing which can never be thought as an object of the senses, but only as a thing by itself (by the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, because we cannot maintain that sensibility is the only form of perception. That notion is also necessary, to prevent sensuous perception from extending to things by themselves. But, after all, we cannot understand the possibility of such noumena, and whatever lies beyond the sphere of phenomena is (to us) empty; that is, we have an understanding which *problematically* extends beyond that sphere, but no perception, nay not even the conception of a possible perception, by which, outside the field of sensibility, objects could be given to us, and our

to use
form
cate-
and
em-
that
the

from
ins,
the
ensi-
pre-
tion
ght,
fold
may
ause
the
ren ;
be-
with-
ous

which
y as
self-
lity
ces-
to
un-
lies
t is,
nds
the
the
our

n
s
i
c
s
d
t
g
t

in
en
st
tic
he
in

understanding could extend beyond that sensibility in its assertory use. The notion of a noumenon is therefore merely *limitative*, and intended to keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, therefore of negative use only. But it is not a mere arbitrary fiction, but closely connected with the limitation of sensibility, though incapable of adding anything positive to the sphere of the senses.

A real division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world, is therefore quite inadmissible, although notions may very well be divided into sensuous and intellectual. No objects can be assigned for intellectual notions, nor can they be represented as objectively valid. With all this the notion of a noumenon, if taken as problematical only, remains not only admissible, but, as a notion to limit the sphere of sensibility, indispensable Our understanding thus acquires a kind of negative extension, that is, it does not become itself limited by sensibility, but, on the contrary, limits it, by calling things by themselves (not considered as phenomena) noumena. In doing this, it immediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself, by admitting that it cannot know these noumena by means of the categories, but can only think of them under the name of something unknown.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Of Transcendental Appearance (illusion).

It is not at present our business to treat of empirical, for instance, optical appearance or illusion, which occurs in the empirical use of the otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and by which, owing to the influence of imagination, the faculty of judgment is misled. We have to deal here with nothing but the *transcendental illusion*, which involves principles never even intended to be applied to

experience, which might give us a test of their correctness,—an illusion which, in spite of all the warnings of criticism, tempts us far beyond the empirical use of the categories, and deludes us with the mere dream of an extension of the pure understanding. All principles the application of which is entirely confined within the limits of possible experience, we shall call *immanent*; those, on the contrary, which tend to transgress those limits, *transcendent*. I do not mean by this the transcendental use or abuse of the categories, which is a mere fault of the faculty of the judgment, not being as yet sufficiently subdued by criticism nor sufficiently attentive to the limits of the sphere within which alone the pure understanding has full play, but real principles which call upon us to break down all those barriers, and to claim a perfectly new territory, which nowhere recognises any demarcation at all. Hence *transcendental* and *transcendent* do not mean the same thing. The principles of the pure understanding, which we explained before, are meant to be only of empirical, and not of transcendental application, that is, they cannot transcend the limits of experience. A principle, on the contrary, which removes these landmarks, nay, insists on our transcending them, is called *transcendent*.

Logical illusion, which consists in a mere imitation of the forms of reason (the illusion of sophistic syllogisms), arises entirely from want of attention to logical rules. It disappears at once, when our attention is roused. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not disappear, although it has been shown up, and its worthlessness rendered clear by means of transcendental criticism, as, for instance, the illusion inherent in the proposition that the world must have a beginning in time. The cause of this is, that there exists in our reason (considered subjectively as a faculty of human knowledge) principles and maxims of its use, which have the appearance of objective principles, and lead us to mistake the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our notions in favour of the understanding for an objective necessity in the determination of things by themselves.

ess,—
icism,
ories,
of the
which
ience,
n tend
an by
which
ng as
atten-
pure
h call
im a
y de-
ndent
pure
to be
ation,
e. A
arks,
dent.
of the
arises
lisap-
scen-
ough
clear
e, the
have
exists
nman
have
mis-
f our
e ne-

t
t
e
s
k
a
d
in
k
is
en
an
fo
ac
re
in
ifo
un
ca

Transcendental Dialectic must, therefore, be content to lay bare the illusion of transcendental judgments and guard against its deceptions—but it will never succeed in removing the transcendental illusion (like the logical), and putting an end to it altogether. There exists, therefore, a natural and inevitable Dialectic of pure reason, that is inherent in, and inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its illusion has been exposed, will never cease to fascinate our reason, and to precipitate it into momentary errors, such as require to be removed again and again.

2. Pure Reason as the seat of Transcendental Illusion.

REASON IN GENERAL.

In the first part of our transcendental logic we defined the understanding as the *faculty of rules*, and we now distinguish reason from it, by calling it the *faculty of principles*.

It is impossible for the understanding to supply us with synthetical knowledge from notions, and it is really that kind of knowledge which I call principles absolutely; while all general propositions may be called principles relatively.

Knowledge from principles (by itself) is something totally different from mere knowledge of the understanding, which, in the form of a principle, may no doubt precede other knowledge, but which by itself (in so far as it is synthetical) is not based on mere thought, nor contains anything general, according to notions.

If the understanding is a faculty for producing unity among phenomena, according to rules, reason is the faculty for producing unity among the rules of the understanding, according to principles. Reason therefore never looks directly to experience, or to any object, but to the understanding, in order to impart *a priori* through notions to its manifold kinds of knowledge a unity that may be called the unity of reason, and is very different from the unity which can be produced by the understanding.

THE PURE USE OF REASON.

The question is, whether reason in itself, that is pure reason, contains synthetical principles and rules *a priori*, and what those principles are?

It is easy to see that it is the peculiar principle of reason (in its logical use) to find for every conditioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, whereby the unity of that knowledge may be completed.

This logical maxim, however, cannot become a principle of *pure reason*, unless we admit that, whenever the condition is given, the whole series of conditions, subordinated to one another, a series, which consequently is unconditioned, is likewise given (that is, is contained in the object and its connection).

Such a principle of pure reason, however, is evidently synthetical; for analytically the conditioned refers no doubt to some condition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle several other synthetical propositions also must arise of which of which the pure understanding knows nothing; because it has to deal with objects of a possible experience only, the knowledge and synthesis of which are always conditioned. The unconditioned, if it is really to be admitted, has to be especially considered with regard to all the determinations which distinguish it from whatever is conditioned, and will thus supply material for many a synthetical proposition *a priori*.

The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will however be *transcendent*, with regard to all phenomena; that is to say, it will be impossible ever to make any adequate empirical use of such a principle. It will thus be completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use of which is entirely *immanent* and directed to the possibility of experience only. The task that is now before us in the transcendental Dialectic which has to be developed from sources deeply hidden in the human reason, is this: to discover the correctness or otherwise


pure
ori,

son
dge
nity

ple
on-
ted
on-
and

tly
ubt
om
also
ows
ble
are
be.
all
is
yn-

of
to
to
It
the
nd
ask
ch
u-
ise



n
ti
se
it
to
an
ov
sy

ea
wa
tra
A

of the principle that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena, or of objective thought in general) extends to the unconditioned, and what consequences result therefrom with regard to the empirical use of the understanding:—whether, by some misconception, a mere tendency of reason has not been mistaken for a transcendental principle of pure reason, postulating, without sufficient reflection, absolute completeness in the series of conditions in the objects themselves, and what kind of misconceptions and illusions may in that case have crept into the syllogisms of reason, the major proposition of which has been taken over from pure reason, (being perhaps a *petitio* rather than a *postulatum*) and which ascend from experience to its conditions. We shall divide it into two parts, of which the first will treat of the *transcendent notions* of pure reason, the second of *transcendent and dialectical syllogisms*.

BOOK 1.—THE NOTIONS OF PURE REASON.

Notions of reason serve for conceiving or comprehending; notions of the understanding for understanding (perceptions). If they contain the unconditioned, they refer to something to which all experience may belong, but which itself can never become an object of experience:—something to which reason in its conclusions from experience leads up, and by which it estimates and measures the degree of its own empirical use, but which never forms part of empirical synthesis.

FIRST SECTION.—IDEAS IN GENERAL.

From the way in which Plato uses the term idea, it is easy to see that he meant by it something which not only was never borrowed from the senses, but which even far transcends the notions of the understanding, with which Aristotle occupied himself, there being nothing in experi-

ence corresponding to them. According to his opinion they flowed out from the highest reason, and were imparted thence to human reason, which however exists no longer in its original state, but has to recall, with difficulty, the old but now very obscure ideas, which it does by means of reminiscence, commonly called philosophy.

SECOND SECTION.—TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

Reason is only concerned with the use of the understanding, not so far as it contains the basis of possible experience (for the absolute totality of conditions is not a notion that can be used in experience, because no experience is unconditioned), but in order to impart to it a direction towards a certain unity of which the understanding knows nothing, and which is meant to comprehend all acts of the understanding, with regard to any object, into an absolute whole. On this account the objective use of the pure notions of reason must always be *transcendent*: while that of the pure notions of the understanding must always be *immanent*, being by its very nature restricted to possible experience.

By idea I understand the necessary notion of reason, to which the senses can supply no corresponding object. The notions of reason, therefore, are *transcendental ideas*. They are notions of pure reason, so far as it regards all empirical knowledge as determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fancies, but supplied to us by the very nature of reason, and referring by necessity to the whole use of the understanding. They are, lastly, transcendent, as overstepping the limits of all experience which can never supply an object adequate to the transcendental idea. If we speak of an idea, we say a great deal with respect to the object (an object of the pure understanding) but very little with respect to the subject, that is, with respect to its reality under empirical conditions, because an idea, being the notion of a maximum, can never be ad-

nion
part-
nger
the
s of

and-
ence
that
con-
ards
ing,
der-
ole.
s of
oure
ent,
e.
, to
The
hey
ical
con-
s by
the
ran-
hich
ntal
re-
ng)
re-
an
ad-

t
c
L
i

equately given *in concreto*. In the practical use of the understanding, on the contrary, where we are only concerned with practice, according to rules, the idea of practical reason can always be realised *in concreto*, although partially only; nay, it is the indispensable condition of all practical use of reason. The practical idea is therefore in this case truly fruitful, and, with regard to practical conduct, indispensable and necessary. In it pure reason becomes a cause and active power, capable of realising what is contained in its notion.

Although we must say that all transcendental notions of reason are ideas only, they are not therefore to be considered as superfluous and useless. For although we cannot by them determine any object, they may nevertheless, even unobserved, supply the understanding with a canon or rule of its extended and consistent use, by which, though no object can be better known than it is according to its notions yet the understanding may be better guided onwards in its knowledge, not to mention that they may possibly render practicable a transition from physical to practical notions, and thus impart to moral ideas a certain strength and connection with the speculative knowledge of reason.

THIRD SECTION.—SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

All transcendental ideas can be arranged in three classes: the *first* containing the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject*; the *second* the absolute *unity of the series of conditions of phenomena*; the *third* the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general*.

The thinking subject is the object-matter of *psychology*, the system of all phenomena (the world) the object-matter of *cosmology*, and the being which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the Being of all Beings), the object-matter of *theology*. Thus it is pure reason which supplies the idea of a transcendental

science of the soul (*psychologia rationalis*), of a transcendental science of the world (*cosmologia rationalis*), and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God (*theologia transcendentalis*).

We can easily perceive that pure reason has no other aim but the absolute totality of synthesis *on the side of conditions* (whether of inherence, dependence or concurrence), and that it has nothing to do with the absolute completeness *on the part of the conditioned*. It is the former only which is required for presupposing the whole series of conditions, and thus presenting it *a priori* to the understanding.

Finally, we can perceive, that there is among the transcendental ideas themselves a certain connection and unity by which pure reason brings all its knowledge into one system. There is in the progression from our knowledge of ourselves (the soul) to a knowledge of the world, and through it to a knowledge of the Supreme Being, something so natural that it looks like the logical progression of reason from premisses to a conclusion.

BOOK II.—THE DIALECTICAL CONCLUSIONS OF PURE REASON.

One might say that the object of a purely transcendental idea is something of which we have no notion, although the idea is produced with necessity according to the original laws of reason. It would be better, however, and less liable to misunderstandings, to say that we can have no knowledge of an object corresponding to an idea, but a problematic notion only.

The transcendental (subjective) reality at least of pure notions of reason, depends on our being led to such ideas by a necessary syllogism of reason.

Of these dialectical syllogisms of reason there are three classes only, that is as many as the ideas to which these syllogisms lead. In the syllogism of the *first* class, I con-

scen-
and,
tran-

r aim
con-
ence),
eness
which
ions,


tran-
nity
e sys-
ge of
ough
nat-
from

SON.

ental
the
ginal
and
have
ut a

pure
deas

hree
hese
con-



clude from the transcendental notion of the subject, *which contains nothing manifold*, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which however I have no notion. This dialectical syllogism I shall call the transcendental *paralogism*.

The *second* class of the so-called sophistical syllogisms aims at the transcendental notion of an absolute totality in the series of conditions to any given phenomenon ; and I conclude from the fact that my notion of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series is always self-contradictory on one side, the correctness of the opposite unity, of which nevertheless I have no notion either. The state of reason in this class of dialectical syllogisms, I shall call the *antimony* of pure reason.

Lastly, according to the *third* class of sophistical syllogisms, I conclude from the totality of conditions, under which objects in general, so far as they can be given to me, must be thought, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general ; that is to say, I conclude from things which I do not know according to their mere transcendental notion, a Being of all beings, which I know still less through a transcendent notion, and of the unconditioned necessity of which I can form no notion whatever. This dialectical syllogism of reason I shall call the *ideal* of pure reason.

CHAPTER I.—THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON.

The logical Paralogism consists in the formal faultiness of a conclusion, without any reference to its contents. But a transcendental paralogism arises from a transcendental cause, which drives us to a formally false conclusion. Such a paralogism, therefore, depends most likely on the very nature of human reason, and produces an illusion which is inevitable, though not insoluble.

There is a pretended science founded on the single proposition of *I think*, and the soundness or unsoundness of which may well be examined in this place, according to the principles of transcendental philosophy.

I think is the only text of rational psychology, out of which it must evolve all its wisdom. It is easily seen that this thought, if it is to be applied to an object (my self), cannot contain any but transcendental predicates, because the smallest empirical predicate would spoil the rational purity of the science, and its independence of all experience.

We shall therefore follow the thread of the categories, with this difference, however, that as here the first thing which is given is a thing, the I, a thinking being, we must begin with the category of substance, by which a thing in itself is represented, and then proceed backwards, though without changing the respective order of the categories, as given before in our table. The topic of the rational science of the soul, from which has to be derived whatever else that science may contain, is therefore the following.

I.

The Soul is *substance*.

II.

As regards its quality, *simple*.

III.

As regards the different times in which it exists, numerically identical, that is *unity* (not plurality).

IV.

It is in relation to possible objects in space.


To these notions refer four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology, which is falsely supposed to be a science of pure reason, concerning the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, use as the foundation of such a science nothing but the single, and in itself perfectly empty, representation of the *I*, of which we cannot even say that it is a

opo-
hich
orin-

t of
that
elf),
ause
onal
nce.
ries,
hing
must
g in
ough
e, as
ence
that

erent
xists,
that
).

den-
e of
ing.
ence
pre-
is a



notion, but merely a consciousness that accompanies all notions. By this *I*, or *he*, or *it*, that is the thing which thinks, nothing is represented beyond a transcendental subject of thoughts = x , which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest notion, so that we are really turning round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its representation, before we can form any judgment about it. And this inconvenience is really inevitable, because consciousness in itself is not so much a representation, distinguishing a particular object, but really a form of representation in general, in so far as it is to be called knowledge, of which alone I can say that I think something by it.

As the proposition *I think* (taken problematically) contains the form of every possible judgment of the understanding, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it must be clear that the conclusions to be drawn from it can only contain a transcendental use of the understanding, which declines all admixture of experience, and of the achievements of which, after what has been said before, we cannot form any very favourable anticipations. We shall therefore follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology.

1. In all judgments I am always the *determining subject* only of the relation which constitutes the judgment. That I, who think, can be considered in thinking as *subject* only, and as something not simply inherent in the thinking, as predicate, is an apodictical and even *identical* proposition; but it does not mean that, as an object, I am a *self-dependent being* or a *substance*.

2. That the Ego of apperception, and therefore the Ego in every act of thought, is a *singular* which cannot be dissolved into a plurality of subjects, and that it therefore signifies a logically simple subject, follows from the very notion of thinking, and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this does not mean that a thinking Ego is a simple *substance*, which would indeed be a synthetical proposition.

The notion of substance always relates to perceptions which, with me, cannot be other but sensuous, and which therefore lie completely outside the field of the understanding and its thinking, which alone is intended here, when we say that the Ego, in thinking, is simple.

3. The proposition of the identity of myself amidst the manifold of which I am conscious, likewise follows from the notions themselves, and is therefore analytical; but the identity of the subject of which, in all its representations, I may become conscious, does not refer to the perception by which it is given as an object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all the changes of circumstances. In order to prove this, the mere analysis of the proposition, I think, would avail nothing; but different synthetical judgments would be required, which are based on the given perception.

4. To say that I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (one of them being my body) is likewise an analytical proposition; for *other* things are things which I conceive as *different* from myself. But, whether such a consciousness of myself is even possible without things outside me, whereby representations are given to me, and whether I could exist merely as a thinking being (without being a man), I do not know at all by that proposition.

Nothing therefore is gained by the analysis of the consciousness of myself, in thought in general, towards the knowledge of myself as an object. The-logical analysis of thinking in general is simply mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object.


It would be a great, nay, even the only objection to the whole of our critique, if there were a possibility of proving *a priori* that all thinking beings are by themselves simple substances, that as such (as a consequence of the same argument) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as distinct from all matter.

ich,
efore
d its
that

the
the
den-
may
nich
the
con-
ink-
er to
ink,
ents
ion.
t of
nem
for
rom
f is
sen-
rely
now

con-
the
s of
ical

the
ring
ple
ar-
hey
ter.





For we should thus have made a step beyond the world of sense and entered into the field of *noumena*, and after that no one could dare to question our right of advancing further, of settling in it, and, as each of us is favoured by luck, taking possession of it. Hence synthetical propositions *a priori* would be not only admissible, as we maintained, in reference to objects of possible experience, and then only as principles of the possibility of that experience, but could be extended to things in general and to things by themselves, a result which would put an end to the whole of our critique, and bid us to leave everything as we found it.

In this process of rational psychology, there lurks a paralogism, which may be represented by the following syllogism.

That which cannot be conceived otherwise than as a subject, does not exist otherwise than as a subject, and is therefore a substance.

A thinking being, considered as such, cannot be conceived otherwise than as a subject.

Therefore it exists also as such only, that is, as a substance.

In the major they speak of a being that can be conceived in every respect, and therefore also as it may be given in perception. In the minor, however, they speak of it only so far as it considers itself as a subject, with respect to the thinking and the unity of consciousness only, but not at the same time in respect to the perception whereby it is given as an object of thinking. The conclusion, therefore, has been drawn by a sophism, that is, by *sophisma figuræ dictionis*.

If now we take the above propositions in *synthetical* connection, as indeed they must be taken in a system of rational psychology, as valid for all thinking beings, and proceed from the category of relation, with the proposition, all thinking beings, as such, are substances, backwards through the series till the circle is completed, we arrive in the end at their existence, and this, according to that system, they are

not at all conscious of, independently of external things, but are supposed to be able to determine it even of themselves (with respect to that permanence which necessarily belongs to the character of substance). Hence it follows, that in this rationalistic system *idealism* is inevitable, at least problematic idealism, because, if the existence of external things is not required at all for the determination of one's own existence in time, their existence is really a gratuitous assumption of which no proof can ever be given.

If, on the contrary, we proceed *analytically*, taking the proposition, I think, which involves existence (according to the category of *modality*) as given, and analyse it, in order to find out whether, and how, the Ego determines its existence in space and time by it alone, the propositions of rational psychology would not start from the notion of a thinking being, in general, but from a reality, and the inference would consist in determining from the manner in which that reality is thought, after everything that is empirical in it has been removed, what belongs to a thinking being in general. This may be shown by the following Table.

I.

I think.

II.

as Subject.

III.

as simple Subject.

IV.

as identical Subject,
in every state of my thought.

As it has not been determined in the second proposition, whether I can exist and be conceived to exist as a subject only, and not also as a predicate of something else, the notion of subject is here taken as logical only, and it remains undetermined whether we are to understand by it a substance or not. In the third proposition, however, the absolute unity of apperception, the simple I, being the representation to which all connection or separation (which con-

but
lves
ongs
t in
east
rnal
ne's
tous

the
g to
rder.
tist-
s of
of a
in-
in
em-
ing
ble.

on,
ect
o-
ns
b-
b-
re-
n-

stitute thought) relate, assumes its own importance, although nothing is determined as yet with regard to the nature of the subject, or its subsistence. The apperception is something real, and it is only possible, if it is simple. In space, however, there is nothing real that is simple, for points (the only simple in space) are limits only, and not themselves something which, as a part, serves to constitute space. From this follows the impossibility of explaining the nature of my self, as merely a thinking subject, from the *materialistic* point of view. As, however, in the first proposition, my existence is taken for granted, for it is not said in it that every thinking being exists (this would predicate too much, namely, absolute necessity of them), but only, *I exist*, as thinking, the proposition itself is empirical, and contains only the determinability of my existence, in reference to my representations in time. But as for that purpose again I require, first of all, something permanent, such as is not given to me at all in internal perception, so far as I think myself, it is really impossible by that simple self-consciousness to determine the manner in which I exist, whether as a substance or as an accident. Thus, if *materialism* was inadequate to explain my existence, *spiritualism* is equally insufficient for that purpose, and the conclusion is, that, in no way whatsoever can we know anything of the nature of our soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned.

There is, therefore, no rational psychology, as a *doctrine*, furnishing any addition to our self-knowledge, but only as a *discipline*, fixing unpassable limits to speculative reason in this field, partly to keep us from throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism, partly to warn us against losing ourselves in a vague, and, for this life, baseless spiritualism.

We see from all this, that rational psychology owes its origin to a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, on which the categories are founded, is mistaken for a perception of the subject as object, and the category of

substance applied to it. But that unity is only the unity in *thought*, by which alone no object is given, and to which therefore the category of substance, which always presupposes a given *perception*, cannot be applied, and therefore the subject cannot be known. The subject of the categories, therefore, cannot, by thinking them, receive a notion of itself, as an object of the categories; for in order to think the categories, it must presuppose its pure self-consciousness, the very thing that had to be explained. In like manner the subject, in which the representation of time has its original source, cannot determine by it its own existence in time; and if the latter is impossible, the former, as a determination of oneself (as of a thinking being in general) by means of the categories is equally so.

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an idea of reason (that of a pure intelligence) with the altogether indefinite notion of a thinking being in general. What we are doing is, that we conceive ourselves for the sake of a possible experience, taking no account, as yet, of any real experience, and thence conclude that we are able to become conscious of our existence, independently of experience and of its empirical conditions. We are, therefore, confounding the possible *abstraction* of our own empirically determined existence with the imagined consciousness of a possible *separate* existence of our thinking self, and we bring ourselves to believe that we know the substantial within us as the transcendental subject, while what we have in our thoughts is only the unity of consciousness, on which all determination, as the mere form of knowledge, is based.

nity in
which
resup-
refore
gories,
of it-
nk the
sness,
anner
as its
nce in
deter-
l) by

from
telli-
king
ceive
g no
clude
e, in-
ions.
m of
im-
our
we
sub-
nity
nere

C
R
t
t
r
C
a
r
i

CHAPTER II.—THE ANTI-NOMY OF PURE REASON.

The second class of the dialectical arguments in analogy with the *hypothetical* syllogisms, takes for its object the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in phenomenal appearance.

It should be remarked, however, that a transcendental paralogism caused a one-sided illusion only, with regard to our idea of the subject of our thought. The case is totally different when we apply reason to the *objective synthesis* of phenomena; for here we are met by a new phenomenon in human reason, namely, a perfectly natural Antithetic, which is not produced by any artificial efforts, but into which reason falls by itself, and inevitably.

I shall call all transcendental ideas, so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, *cosmical notions*, partly, because of the unconditioned totality on which the notion of the cosmical universe also rests (which is itself an idea only), partly, because they refer to the synthesis of phenomena only, which is empirical, while the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things must produce an ideal of pure reason, totally different from the cosmical notion, although in a certain sense related to it. As therefore the paralogisms of pure reason formed the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will place before our eyes the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, not in order to show that it is valid and can be accepted, but, as may be guessed from the very name of the antinomy of reason, in order to expose it as an idea surrounded by deceptive and false appearances, and utterly irreconcilable with phenomena.

SECTION I.—SYSTEM OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS.

Before we are able to enumerate these ideas according to

a principle and with systematic precision, we must bear in mind,

1st, That pure and transcendental notions arise from the understanding only, and that reason does not in reality produce any notion, but only *frees*, it may be, the *notion of the understanding* of the inevitable limitation of a possible experience, and thus tries to enlarge it, beyond the limits of experience, yet in connection with it. Reason does this by demanding for something that is given as conditioned, absolute totality on the side of the conditions (under which the understanding subjects all phenomena of a synthetical unity). It thus changes the category into a transcendental idea, in order to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it as far as the unconditioned (which can never be met with in experience, but in the idea only). In doing this, reason follows the principle that, *if the conditioned is given, the whole sum of conditions, and therefore the absolutely unconditioned must be given likewise*, the former being impossible without the latter. Hence the transcendental ideas are in reality nothing but categories, enlarged till they reach the unconditioned, and those ideas must admit of being arranged in a table, according to the titles of the categories.

2ndly, Not all categories will lend themselves to this, but those only in which the synthesis constitutes a *series*, and a series of subordinated (not of co-ordinated) conditions. Absolute totality is demanded by reason, with regard to an ascending series of conditions only, not therefore when we have to deal with a descending line of consequences, or with an aggregate of co-ordinated conditions.

Thus we necessarily conceive time past up to a given moment, as given, even if not determinable by us. But with regard to time future, which is not a condition of arriving at time present, it is entirely indifferent, if we want to conceive the latter, what we may think about the former, whether we take it, as coming to an end somewhere, or as going on to infinity.

ear in
n the
y pro-
n of
ssible
its of
is by
l, ab-
which
etical
ental
rical
which
nly).
con-
here-
wise,
e the
ries,
deas
the

but
nd a
Ab-
o an
we
with

iven
But
ar-
vant
ner,
r as

a
t
v
e
t
i
h
u

la
su
sc
p
de
co
an
su
sta
wh


I shall call the synthesis of a series on the side of the conditions, beginning with the one nearest to a given phenomenon, and advancing to the more remote conditions, *regressive*; the other, which on the side of the conditioned advances from the nearest effect to the more remote ones, *progressive*. The former proceeds in *antecedentia*, the second in *consequentia*. Cosmological ideas therefore, being occupied with the totality of regressive synthesis, proceed in *antecedentia*, not in *consequentia*. If the latter should take place, it would be a gratuitous, not a necessary problem of pure reason, because for a complete comprehension of what is given us in experience we want to know the causes, but not the effects.



In order to arrange a table of ideas in accordance with the table of the categories, we must take, *first*, the two original *quanta* of all our perception, time and space.

Secondly, reality in space, that is, matter, is something conditioned, the parts of which are its internal conditions, and the parts of its parts, its remoter conditions. We have therefore here a regressive synthesis the absolute totality of which is demanded by reason, but which cannot take place except by a complete division, whereby the reality of matter dwindles away into nothing, or into that at least which is no longer matter, namely, the simple; consequently we have here also a series of conditions, and a progress to the unconditioned.





Thirdly, when we come to the categories of the real relation between phenomena, we find that the category of substance with its accidents does not lend itself to a transcendental idea; that is, reason has here no inducement to proceed regressively to conditions. We know that accidents, so far as they inhere in one and the same substance, are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series; and with reference to the substance, they are not properly subordinate to it, but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The same applies to substances in community, which are aggregates only, without having an exponent of







**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

0
E 1.8
E 2.0
E 2.2
E 2.5
E 2.8
E 3.2
E 3.6

10
11
12

a series. There remains therefore only the category of *causality*, which offers a series of causes to a given effect, enabling us to ascend from the latter, as the conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus to answer the question of reason.

Fourthly, the notions of the possible, the real, and the necessary, do not lead to any series, except so far as the *accidental* in existence must always be considered as conditioned, and point, according to a rule of the understanding, to a condition which makes it necessary to ascend to a higher condition, till reason finds at last, only, in the totality of that series, the unconditioned *necessity* which it requires.

If therefore we select those categories which necessarily imply a series in the synthesis of the manifold, we shall have no more than four cosmological ideas, according to the four titles of the categories.

I.

Absolute completeness
of composition
in the given whole of all phenomena.

II.

Absolute completeness
of division
in a given whole
in phenomenal appearance.

III.

Absolute completeness
of origination
in a phenomenon
in general.

IV.

Absolute completeness
of the dependence of existence
in the changeable in phenomenal appearance.


We have two expressions, *world* and *nature*, which frequently run into each other. The first denotes the mathematical total of all phenomena and the totality of their synthesis, whether by composition or division. That world, however, is called nature if we look upon it as a dynamical whole, and consider not the aggregation in space and time, which produces quantity, but the unity in the *existence* of


ory of
effect,
ned, to
ques-


ad the
he ac-
con-
stand-
l to a
tality
quires.
sarily
have
four

ess

fre-
the-
syn-
rld,
ical
me,
e of







phenomena. That of which the existence is conditioned is called *contingent*, that of which it is unconditioned *necessary*. The unconditioned necessity of phenomena may be called *natural necessity*.

SECTION II.—ANTITHETIC OF PURE REASON.

If every collection of dogmatical doctrines is called *Thetic*, I may denote by *Antithetic*, not indeed dogmatical assertions of the opposite, but the conflict between different kinds of apparently dogmatical knowledge (*thesis cum antithesi*), to none of which we can ascribe a superior claim to our assent. The transcendental antithetic is in fact an investigation of the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and its results. If we apply our reason, not only to objects of experience, according to the principles of the understanding, but venture to extend it beyond the limit of experience, there arise rationalising or sophistical propositions, which can neither hope for confirmation nor need fear refutation from experience. Every one of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but can point to conditions of its necessity in the nature of reason itself, only that unfortunately, its opposite can produce equally valid and necessary grounds for its support.

Transcendental reason admits of no other criterion but an attempt to combine conflicting assertions, and therefore, previous to this, unrestrained conflict between them.

The antinomies follow each other, according to the order of the transcendental ideas mentioned before (p. 84).

THE ANTIMONY OF PURE REASON.

FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

THESIS.

The world has a beginning in time, and is limited also with regard to space.

Proof.

For if we assumed that the world has no beginning in time, then an eternity must have elapsed up to every given point of time, and therefore an infinite series of successive states of things must have passed in the world. The infinity of a series, however, consists in this, that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. Hence an infinite series of past worlds is impossible, and the beginning of the world a necessary condition of its existence. This was what had to be proved first.

With regard to the second, let us assume again the opposite. In that case the world would be given as an infinite whole of co-existing things. Now we cannot conceive in any way the extension of a quantum, which is not given within certain limits to every perception, except through the synthesis of its parts, nor the total of such a quantum in any way, except through a completed synthesis, or by the repeated addition of unity to itself. In order therefore to conceive the world, which fills all space, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be looked upon as completed; that is, an infinite time would have to be looked upon as

ANTITHESIS.

The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect both to time and space.

Proof.

For let us assume that it has a beginning. Then, as beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently there was a time in which the world was not, that is, an empty time. In an empty time, however, it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition of existence or non-existence to distinguish it from another (whether produced by itself or through another cause). Hence though many a series of things may take its beginning in the world, the world itself can have no beginning, and in reference to time past is infinite.

With regard to the second, let us assume again the opposite, namely, that the world is finite and limited in space. In that case the world would exist in an empty space without limits. We should therefore have not only a relation of things *in space*, but also of things *to space*. As however the world is an absolute whole, outside of which no object of perception, and therefore no correlate of the world can be found, the relation of the world to empty space would be a relation to *no object*.

ing and
nité, in
ce.

has a
ing is
ed by
not, it
lently
h the
empty
ever,
thing
cause
esses
non-
from
by it-
use).
es of
g in
can
refer-

d, let
site,
inite
case
pty
ould
tion
o of
the
out.
cep-
e of
ela-
nce
ect.

e
o
in
g
r
a
F
n
in
T
b

th
an
th
of

su
pa
re
be
no
sin
we
all
po
the
the
ex
the
con
of
con
rel
sta
sub

THESIS.

elapsed, during the enumeration of all co-existing things. This is impossible. Hence an infinite aggregate of real things cannot be regarded as a given whole, nor as a whole given at the same time. Hence it follows that the world is not infinite, as regards extension in space, but enclosed in limits. This was the second that had to be proved.

ANTITHESIS.

Such a relation, and with it the limitation of the world by empty space, is nothing, and therefore the world is not limited with regard to space, that is, it is unlimited in extension.

SECOND CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.**THESIS.**

Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple, or what is composed of it.

Proof.

For let us assume that compound substances did not consist of simple parts, then, if all composition is removed in thought, there would be no compound part, and (as no simple parts are admitted) no simple part either, that is, there would remain nothing, and there would therefore be no substance at all. Either, therefore, we cannot possibly remove all composition in thought, or, after its removal, there must remain something that exists without composition, that is the simple. In the former case the compound could not itself consist of substances (because with them composition is only an accidental relation of substances, which substances, as permanent beings, must subsist without it). As this con-

ANTITHESIS.

No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything simple.

Proof.

Assume that a compound thing, a substance, consists of simple parts. Then as all external relation, and therefore all composition of substances also, is possible in space only, it follows that space must consist of as many parts as the parts of the compound that occupies the space. Space, however, does not consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Every part of a compound, therefore, must occupy a space. Now the absolutely primary parts of every compound are simple. It follows therefore that the simple occupies a space. But as everything real, which occupies a space, contains a manifold, the parts of which are by the side of each other, and which therefore is compounded, and com-

THESES.

tradicts the supposition, there remains only the second view, namely, that the substantial compounds in the world consist of simple parts.

It follows as an immediate consequence that all things in the world are simple beings, that their composition is only an external condition, and that, though we are unable to remove these elementary substances from their state of composition and isolate them, reason must conceive them as the first subjects of all composition, and therefore, antecedently to it, as simple beings.

ANTITHESIS.

pounded not of accidents (for these could not exist by the side of each other, without a substance), but of substances, it would follow that the simple is a substantial compound, which is self-contradictory.

The second proposition of the antithesis, that there exists nowhere in the world anything simple, is not intended to mean more than that the existence of the absolutely simple cannot be proved from any experience or perception, whether external or internal, and that the absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can never be shown in any possible experience, so that in the explanation of phenomena it is without any application or object. For, if we assumed that an object of this transcendental idea might be found in experience, the empirical perception of some one object would have, to be such as to contain absolutely nothing manifold by the side of each other, and combined to a unity. But as, from our not being conscious of such a manifold, we cannot form any valid conclusion as to the entire impossibility of it in any objective perception, and as without this no absolute simplicity can be established, it follows that such simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever. As therefore an absolutely simple object can never be given in any possible experience, while the world of sense must be looked upon as the sum total of all possible experience, it follows that nothing simple exists in it.

(for these
side of each
stance), but
follow that
mutual com-
tradiictory.
on of the
exists no-
thing sim-
mean more
of the ab-
be proved
perception,
eternal, and
ple is a
reality of
own in any
that in the
ena it is
or object.
an object
ea might
the empir-
ne object
as to con-
manifold
and com-
from our
ch a man-
ny valid
re impos-
ective per-
this no
be estab-
h simpli-
rom any
As there-
e object
possible
world of
n as the
erience,
mple ex-

THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

THESIS.

Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena it is necessary also to admit another causality, that of freedom.

Proof.

Let us assume that there is no other causality but that according to the laws of nature. In that case everything that *takes place*, presupposes an anterior state, on which it follows inevitably according to a rule. But that anterior state must itself be something which has taken place (which has come to be in time, and did not exist before), because, if it had always existed, its effect too would not have only just arisen, but have existed always. The causality, therefore, of a cause, through which something takes place, is itself an *event*, which again, according to the law of nature, presupposes an anterior state and its causality, and this again an anterior state, and so on. If, therefore, everything takes place according to mere laws of nature, there will always be a secondary only, but never a primary beginning, and therefore no completeness of the series, on the side of successive causes. But the law of nature consists in this, that nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined *a priori*. Therefore the proposition that all causality is possible according to the laws of

ANTITHESIS.

There is no freedom, but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature.

Proof.

If we admit that there is *freedom*, in the transcendental sense, as a particular kind of causality, according to which the events in the world could take place, that is a faculty of absolutely originating a state, and with it a series of consequences, it would follow that not only a series would have its absolute beginning through this spontaneity, but the determination of that spontaneity itself to produce the series, that is, the causality, would have an absolute beginning, nothing preceding it by which this act is determined according to permanent laws. Every beginning of an act, however, presupposes a state in which the cause is not yet active, and a dynamically primary beginning of an act presupposes a state which has no causal connection with the preceding state of that cause, that is, in no wise follows from it. Transcendental freedom is therefore opposed to the law of causality, and represents such a connection of successive states of effective causes, that no unity of experience is possible with it. It is therefore an empty fiction of the mind, and not to be met with in any experience.

We have, therefore, nothing but *nature*, in which we must try to find the connection and order of

THESIS.

nature only, contradicts itself, if taken in unlimited generality, and it is impossible, therefore, to admit that causality as the only one.

We must therefore admit another causality, through which something takes place, without its cause being further determined according to necessary laws by a preceding cause, that is an *absolute spontaneity* of causes, by which a series of phenomena, proceeding according to natural laws, begins by itself; we must consequently admit transcendental freedom, without which, even in the course of nature, the succession of phenomena on the side of causes, can never be perfect.

ANTITHESIS.

cosmical events. Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature is no doubt a *deliverance* from restraint, but also from the *guidance* of all rules. For we cannot say that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may enter into the causality of the course of the world, because, if determined by laws, it would not be freedom, but nothing else but nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom differ from each other like legality and lawlessness. The former, no doubt, imposes upon the understanding the difficult task of looking higher and higher for the origin of events in the series of causes, because their causality is always conditioned. In return for this, however, it promises a complete and well-ordered unity of experience; while, on the other side, the fiction of freedom promises, no doubt, to the enquiring mind, rest in the chain of causes, leading him up to an unconditioned causality, which begins to act by itself, but which, as it is blind itself, tears the thread of rules by which alone a complete and coherent experience is possible.

n (inde-
f nature
from re-
uidance
not say
nature,
ter into
e of the
ined by
om, but
Nature,
tal free-
like le-
The for-
pon the
task of
for the
eries of
ality is
turn for
a com-
y of ex-
er side,
aises, no
nd, rest
ing him
usality,
elf, but
ears the
alone a
erience:

FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.

THESIS.

There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as the cause of it.

Proof.

The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a series of changes without which even the representation of a series of time, which forms the condition of the possibility of the world of sense, would not be given us. But every change has its condition which precedes it in time, and renders it necessary. Everything that is given as conditioned presupposes, with regard to its existence, a complete series of conditions, leading up to that which is entirely unconditioned, and alone absolutely necessary. Something absolutely necessary therefore must exist, if there exists a change as its consequence. And this absolutely necessary belongs itself to the world of sense. For if we supposed that it existed outside that world, then the series of changes in the world would derive its origin from it, while the necessary cause itself would not belong to the world of sense. But this is impossible. For as the beginning of a temporal series can be determined only by that which precedes it in time, it follows that the highest condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time when that series was not yet (because the beginning is an existence, preceded by a time in

ANTITHESIS.

There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being, either within or without the world, as the cause of it.

Proof.

If we supposed that the world itself is a necessary being, or that a necessary being exists in it, there would then be in the series of changes either a beginning, unconditionally necessary, and therefore without a cause, which contradicts the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena in time; or the series itself would be without any beginning, and though contingent and conditioned in all its parts, yet entirely necessary and unconditioned as a whole. This would be self-contradictory, because the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.

If we supposed, on the contrary, that there exists an absolutely necessary cause of the world, outside the world, then that cause, as the highest member in the series of causes of cosmical changes, would begin the existence of the latter and their series. In that case, however, that cause would have to begin to act, and its causality would belong to time, and therefore to the sum total of phenomena. It would belong to the world, and would therefore not be outside the world, which is contrary to our supposition. Therefore, neither in the world, nor out-

THESIS.

which the thing which begins was not yet). Hence the causality of the necessary cause of changes and that cause itself belong to time and to phenomena (in which alone time, as their form, is possible), and it cannot therefore be conceived as separated from the world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena. It follows therefore that something absolutely necessary is contained in the world, whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a part of it.

ANTITHESIS.

side the world (yet in causal connection with it) does there exist anywhere an absolutely necessary Being.

SECTION IV.—THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROBLEMS OF PURE REASON, AND THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF THEIR SOLUTION.

Transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity among all speculative knowledge, that no question, referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble for the same human reason; and that no excuse of inevitable ignorance on our side, or of unfathomable depth on the side of the problem, can release us from the obligation to answer it thoroughly and completely; because the same notion, which enables us to ask the question, must qualify us to answer it, considering that, as in the case of right and wrong, the object itself does not exist, except in the notion.

The cosmological ideas alone possess this peculiarity that they may presuppose their object, and the empirical synthesis required for the object, as given, and the question which they suggest refers only to the progress of that synthesis, so far as it is to contain absolute totality, such absolute totality being no longer empirical, because it cannot be given in any experience. As we are here concerned solely with a thing, as an object of possible experience, not as a thing


sal con-
re exist
ecessary

**PURE
TION.**

mong
to an
uman
on our
blem,
ughly
nables
, con-
object

y that
nthe-
which
hesis,
te to-
given
with
thing





by itself, it is impossible that the answer of the transcendent cosmological question can be anywhere but *in the idea*, because it refers to no object by itself.

SECTION VII.—CRITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OF REASON WITH REGARD TO THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

The whole antinomy of pure reason rests on the dialectical argument that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions also is given. As therefore the objects of the senses are given us as conditioned, it follows, etc. Before however we show what is deceptive in this sophistical argument, we must prepare ourselves for it by correcting and defining certain notions occurring in it.

First, the following proposition is clear and admits of no doubt, that if the conditioned is given, it imposes on us the regressus in the series of all conditions of it.

Further, if the conditioned as well as its conditions are things by themselves, then, if the former be given, the regressus to the latter is not only *required*, but is really *given*; and as this applies to all the members of the series, the complete series of conditions and with it the unconditioned also is given, or rather it is assumed that the conditioned, which was possible through that series only, is given. Here the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is a synthesis of the understanding only, which represents things *as they are*, without asking whether and how we can arrive at the knowledge of them. But if I have to deal with phenomena, which, as mere representations, are not given at all, unless I attain to a knowledge of them (that is, to the phenomena themselves, for they are nothing but empirical knowledge), then I cannot say in the same sense that, if the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as phenomena) are also given, and can therefore by no means conclude the absolute totality of the series. For *phenomena* in their apprehension are themselves nothing but an empirical synthesis (in space and

time), and are given therefore in *that synthesis* only. Now it follows by no means that, if the conditioned (as phenomenal) is given, the synthesis also that constitutes its empirical condition should thereby be given at the same time and presupposed; for this takes place in the regressus only, and never without it. What we may say in such a case is this, that a *regressus* to the conditions, that is, a continued empirical synthesis in that direction is required, and that conditions cannot be wanting that are given through that regressus.

Hence we see that the major of the cosmological argument takes the conditioned in the transcendental sense of a pure category, while the minor takes it in the empirical sense of a notion of the understanding, referring to mere phenomena, so that it contains that dialectical deceit which called *Sophisma figuræ dictionis*. Nor does there exist in the connection of the conditioned with its condition any order of time, but they are presupposed in themselves as given *together*. It is equally natural also in the minor to look on phenomena as things by themselves and as objects given to the understanding only in the same manner as in the major, as no account was taken of all the conditions of perception under which alone objects can be given. But there is an important distinction between these notions, which has been overlooked. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, and the whole series of conditions in the major, was in no way limited by time, and was free from any notion of succession. The empirical synthesis, on the contrary, and the series of conditions in phenomena, which was subsumed in the minor, is necessarily successive and given as such in time only. Therefore I had no right to assume the absolute *totality* of the synthesis and of the series represented by it in this case as well as in the former. Nothing remains therefore in order to settle the quarrel once for all, and to the satisfaction of both parties, but to convince them that, though they can refute each other so eloquently, they are really quarrelling about nothing, and

. Now
phenom-
empir-
me and
ly, and
is this,
ed em-
at con-
hat re-

l argu-
se of a
pirical
o mere
which
xist in
on any
lves as
inor to
objects
r as in
ions of
. But
otions,
dition-
ons in
as free
esis, on
omena,
cessive
o right
of the
ormer.
quarrel
but to
her so
g, and

that a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality where no reality exists.

Of two judgments opposed to each other dialectically both may be false, because the one does not only contradict the other, but says something more than is requisite for a contradiction.

If we regard the two statements that the world is infinite in extension, and that the world is finite in extension, as contradictory opposites, we assume that the world (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself; for it remains, whether I remove the infinite or the finite regressus in the series of its phenomena. But if we remove this supposition, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing by itself, then the contradictory opposition of the two statements becomes purely dialectical, and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole *by itself infinite*, nor as a whole *by itself finite*. It exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it can never exist as complete, and the world is therefore not a conditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either with infinite or finite extension.

What has here been said of the first cosmological idea, namely, that of the absolute totality of extension in phenomena, applies to the others also. The series of conditions is to be found only in the regressive synthesis itself, never as a phenomenon or as an independent thing, existing prior to every regressus. Hence I shall have to say that the number of parts in any given phenomenon is by itself neither finite or infinite, because a phenomenon does not exist by itself, and its parts are only found through the regressus of the decomposing synthesis through and in the regressus, and that regressus can never be given as absolutely complete, whether as finite or as infinite. The same applies to the series of causes, one being prior to the other, and to the series leading from conditioned to unconditioned necessary

existence, which can never be regarded either by itself finite in its totality or infinite, because, as a series of subordinated representations, it forms a dynamical regressus only, and cannot exist prior to it, as a self-subsistent series of things, or by itself.

The antinomy of pure reason with regard to its cosmological ideas is removed by showing that it is dialectical only, and a conflict of an illusion produced by our applying the idea of absolute totality, which exists only as a condition of things by themselves, to phenomena, which exist in our representation only, and if they form a series, in the successive regressus, but nowhere else. We may, however, on the other side, derive from that antinomy a true, if not dogmatical, at least critical and doctrinal advantage, namely, by proving through it indirectly the transcendental ideality of phenomena, in case anybody should not have been satisfied by the direct proof given in the transcendental *Æsthetic*.

SECTION VIII.—THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF PURE REASON WITH REGARD TO THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS.


As through the cosmological principle of totality no real maximum is *given* of the series of conditions in the world of sense, as a thing by itself, but can only be *required* in the regressus of that series, that principle of pure reason, if thus amended, still retains its validity, not indeed as an *axiom*, requiring us to think the totality in the object as real, but as a *problem* of the understanding, and therefore for the subject, encouraging us to undertake and to continue, according to the completeness in the idea, the regressus in the series of conditions of anything given as conditioned. The principle of reason is therefore properly a *rule only*, which in the series of conditions of given phenomena postulates a regressus which is never allowed to stop at anything absolutely unconditioned. It is merely a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension

lf finite
linated
y, and
things,

cosmo-
lectical
plying
dition
in our
uccess-
on the
ogmat-
ely, by
lity of
atisfied
etic.

URE
S.

no real
world
red in
son, if
as an
ject as
erefore
o con-
the re-
as con-
erly *a*
n phe-
wed to
rely a
ension



of our experience, allowing no empirical limit to be taken as an absolute limit. I therefore call it a *regulative* principle of reason, while, on the contrary, the principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, as given in the object (the phenomena) by itself, would be a constitutive cosmological principle, the hollowness of which I have tried to indicate by this very distinction, thus preventing an idea, which is to serve as a rule only, being invested with objective reality.

SECTION IX.—THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE OF REASON WITH REGARD TO ALL COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS.

No transcendental use, as we have shown on several occasions, can be made of *the notions either of the understanding or of reason*; and the absolute totality of the series of conditions in the world of sense is due entirely to a transcendental use of reason, which demands this unconditioned completeness from what it presupposes as a thing by itself. *As no such thing by itself is contained in the world of sense*, we can never speak again of the absolute quantity of different series in it, whether they be limited or in themselves unlimited; but the question can only be, how far, in the empirical regressus, we may go back in tracing experience to its conditions, in order to stop, according to the rule of reason, at no other answer of its questions but such as is in accordance with the object.

What therefore remains to us is only the *validity of the principle of reason*, as a rule for the continuation and for the extent of a possible experience, after its invalidity, as a constitutive principle of phenomena by themselves, has been sufficiently established. If we have clearly established that invalidity, the conflict of reason with itself will be entirely finished, because not only has the illusion which led to that conflict been removed through critical analysis, but in its

place the sense in which reason agrees with itself and the misapprehension of which was the only cause of conflict, has been clearly exhibited, and a principle formerly *dialectical* changed into a *doctrinal* one.

I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the totality of the composition of phenomena in an universe.

For the solution of the first cosmological problem, nothing more is wanted than to determine whether, in the regressus to the unconditioned extension of the universe (in time and in space), this nowhere limited ascent is to be called a regressus in infinitum, or a regressus in indefinitum.

The mere general representation of the series of all past states of the world, and of the things which exist together in space, is itself nothing but a possible empirical regressus, which I represent to myself, though as yet as indefinite, and through which alone the notion of such a series of conditions of the perception given to me can arise. Now the universe exists for me as a notion only, and never (as a whole) as a perception. Hence the quantity of the whole of phenomena is not absolutely determined, and we cannot say therefore that it is a regressus in infinitum, because this would anticipate the members which the regressus has not yet reached, and represent its number as so large that no empirical synthesis could ever reach it.

To the cosmological question, therefore, respecting the quantity of the world, the first and negative answer is, that the world has no first beginning in time, and no extreme limit in space.

From this follows at the same time the affirmative answer, that the regressus in the series of the phenomena of the world, intended as a determination of the quantity of the world, goes on in indefinitum, which is the same, as if we say, that the world of sense has no absolute quantity.

Every beginning is in time, and every limit of extension in space. Space and time, however, exist in the world of

and the
conflict,
rily *di-*

he

nothing
gressus
ne and
d a re-

all past
together
gressus,
efinite,
of con-
ow the
r (as a
whole
cannot
use this
as not
hat no

ng the
is, that
xtreme

nswer,
of the
of the
if we
.
ension
orld of

sense only. Hence phenomena only are limited *in the world* conditionally, the *world* itself, however, is limited neither conditionally nor unconditionally.

For the same reason, and because the world can never be given *complete*, and even the series of conditions of something given as conditioned cannot, as a cosmical series, be given as *complete*, the notion of the quantity of the world can be given through the regressus only, and not before it in any collective perception. That regressus, however, consists only in the *determining* of the quantity, and does not give, therefore, any *definite* notion, nor the notion of any quantity which, with regard to a certain measure, could be called infinite. It does not therefore proceed to the infinite (as if given), but only into an indefinite distance, in order to give a quantity (of experience) which has first to be realised by that very regressus.

II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the totality of the division of a whole given in perception.

If I divide a whole, given in perception, I proceed from the conditioned to the conditions of its possibility. The division of the parts (*subdivisio* or *decompositio*) is a regressus in the series of those conditions. The absolute totality of *this series* could only be given, if the regressus could reach the *simple* parts. The regressus must therefore not be called a regressus in *indefinitum*, such as was alone allowed by the former cosmological idea, where from the conditioned we had to proceed to conditions outside it, and therefore not given at the same time through it, but first to be added in the empirical regressus. It is not allowed, however, even in the case of a whole that is divisible in *indefinitum*, to say, *that it consists of infinitely many parts*. For although all parts are contained in the perception of the whole, yet the *whole division* is not contained in it, because it consists in the continuous decomposition, or in the regressus itself, which first makes that series real.

It is easy to apply this remark to space. Every space, perceived within its limits, is such a whole the parts of which, in spite of all decomposition, are always spaces again, and therefore divisible in infinitum.

From this follows, quite naturally, the second application to an external phenomenon, enclosed within its limits (body). The divisibility of this is founded on the divisibility of space, which constitutes the possibility of the body, as an extended whole. This is therefore divisible in infinitum, without consisting of an infinite number of parts.

What applies to a *thing by itself*, represented by a *pure notion of the understanding*, does not apply to what is called substance, as a phenomenon. This is not an absolute subject, but only a permanent image of sensibility, nothing in fact but perception, in which nothing unconditioned can ever be met with.

Remarks on the Solution of the Transcendental-mathematical Ideas.

When exhibiting in a tabular form the antinomy of pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, and indicating the ground of the conflict and the only means of removing it, by declaring both contradictory statements as false, we always represented the conditions as belonging to that which they conditioned, according to relations of space and time, this being the ordinary supposition of the common understanding, and in fact the source from which that conflict arose. In that respect all dialectical representations of the totality in a series of conditions of something given as conditioned, were always of the *same character*. It was always a series in which the condition was connected with the conditioned, as members of the same series, both being thus *homogeneous*. If not always the object, that is, the conditioned, yet the series of its conditions was always considered according to quantity only, and then the difficulty arose, which could not be removed by any compromise, but only by cutting the knot, that reason made it either *too long or*

space,
parts of
again,

ication
(body).
space,
tended
without

a pure
called
the sub-
ing in
ed can

l Ideas.

of pure
eating
moving
se, we
which
time,
under-
onflict
of the
as con-
always
e con-
g thus
e con-
onsid-
arose,
only
ng or



a
v

e
m
se
a
o
a
b
se
or
sta

of

too short for the understanding, which could in neither case come up to the idea.

But in this we have overlooked an essential distinction between the objects, that is, the notions of the understanding, which reason tries to raise into ideas. Two of them, according to the above table of the categories, imply a *mathematical*, the remaining two a *dynamical* synthesis of phenomena. Now, however, as we have come to consider the *dynamical* notions of the understanding, so far as they should be rendered adequate to the idea of reason, that distinction becomes important, and opens to us an entirely new insight into the character of the suit in which reason is implicated.

If we merely look to the extension of the series of conditions, and whether they are adequate to the idea, or whether the idea is too large or too small for them, the series are no doubt homogeneous. But the notion of the understanding on which these ideas are founded, contains either a *synthesis* of the *homogeneous* only (which is presupposed in the composition as well as the decomposition of every quantity) or of the *heterogeneous* also, which must at least be admitted as possible in the dynamical synthesis, both in a causal connection, and in the connection of the necessary with the contingent.

Thus it happens that none but sensuous conditions can enter into the mathematical connection of the series of phenomena, that is, conditions which themselves are part of the series; while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits also of a heterogeneous condition, which is not a part of the series, but, as merely intelligible, outside it; so that a certain satisfaction is given to reason by the unconditioned being placed before the phenomena, which must always be conditioned, or breaking it off, contrary to the principles of the understanding.

Owing to the dynamical ideas admitting of a condition of the phenomena *outside their series*, that is, a *condition*

which itself is not a phenomenon, something arises, which is totally different from the result of the mathematical antinomy. The result of that antinomy was, that both the contradictory dialectical statements had to be declared false. The throughout conditioned character, however, of the dynamical series, which is inseparable from them as phenomena, if connected with the empirically unconditioned, but at the same time *not sensuous* condition, may give satisfaction to the *understanding* on one, and the *reason* on the other side, because the dialectical arguments which, in some way or other, required unconditioned totality in mere phenomena, vanish; while the propositions of reason, if thus amended, may *both be true*. This cannot be the case with the cosmological ideas, which refer only to a mathematically unconditioned unity, because with them no condition can be found in the series of phenomena which is not itself a phenomenon, and as such constitutes one of the links of the series.

III. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas with regard to the totality of the derivation of Cosmical Events from their cause.

The law of nature, that everything which happens has a cause,—that the causality of that cause, that is, its *activity*, as it is anterior in time, and, with regard to an effect which has *arisen*, cannot itself have always existed, but must have *happened* at some time) must have its cause among the phenomena by which it is determined, and that therefore all events in the order of nature are empirically determined, this law, I say, through which alone phenomena become *nature* and objects of experience, is a law of the understanding, which can on no account be surrendered, and from which no single phenomenon can be exempted; because in doing this we should place it outside all possible experience, separate from all objects of possible experience, and change it into a mere fiction of the mind or a cobweb of the brain.

But although this looks merely like a chain of causes, which in the regressus to its conditions admits of no *abso-*

, which
ical an-
oth the
ed false.
the dy-
henom-
ed, but
atisfac-
on the
in some
ere phe-
if thus
se with
atically
ion can
itself a
s of the

totality
.

s has a
ctivity,
t which
ust have
he phe-
fore all
rmined,
become
erstand-
nd from
cause in
erience,
change
e brain.
causes,
o *abso-*

lute totality, this difficulty does not detain us in the least, because it has already been removed in the general criticism of the antinomy of reason, when, starting from the series of phenomena, it aims at the unconditioned. Were we to yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, we should have neither nature nor freedom. The question therefore is, whether, if we recognise in the whole series of events nothing but natural necessity, we may yet regard the same event which on one side is an effect of nature only, on the other side, as an effect of freedom; or whether there is a direct contradiction between these two kinds of causality?

There can certainly be nothing among phenomenal causes that could originate a series absolutely and by itself. Every action, as a phenomenon, so far as it produces an event, is itself an event, presupposing another state, in which its cause can be discovered; and thus everything that happens is only a continuation of the series, and no beginning, happening by itself, is possible in it. A *spontaneous* action by which something takes place, which did not exist before, cannot be expected from the causal nexus of phenomena.

But is it really necessary that, if effects are phenomena, the *causality* of their cause, which cause itself is phenomenal, could be nothing but empirical: or is it not possible, although for every phenomenal effect a connection with its cause, according to the laws of empirical causality, is certainly required, that empirical causality itself could nevertheless, without breaking in the least its connection with the natural causes, represent an effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality, that is, of the action of a cause which, with respect to phenomena, is original, and in so far not phenomenal, but, with respect to this faculty, intelligible, although, as a link in the chain of nature, it must be regarded as entirely belonging to the world of sense?

We require the principle of the causality of phenomena among themselves, in order to be able to look for and to produce natural conditions, that is, phenomenal causes of

natural events. If this is admitted and not weakened by any exceptions, the understanding, which in its empirical employment recognises in all events nothing but nature, and is quite justified in doing so, has really all that it can demand, and the explanations of physical phenomena may proceed without let or hindrance. The understanding would not be wrouged in the least, if we assumed, though it be a mere fiction, that *some among the natural causes* have a faculty which is intelligible only, and whose determination to activity does not rest on empirical conditions, but on mere grounds of the intellect, if only the *phenomenal activity* of that cause is in accordance with all the laws of empirical causality. . . . This intelligible ground does not touch the empirical questions, but concerns only, as it would seem, the thought in the pure understanding; and although the effects of that thought and action of the pure understanding may be discovered in the phenomena, these have nevertheless to be completely explained from their phenomenal cause, according to the laws of nature, by taking their empirical character as the highest ground of explanation, and passing by the intelligible character, which is the transcendental cause of the other, as entirely unknown, except so far as it is indicated by the empirical, as its sensuous sign. Let us apply this to experience. Man is one among the phenomena of the world of sense, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must be subject to empirical laws. As such he must therefore have an empirical character, like all other objects of nature. We perceive it through the forces and faculties which he shows in his actions and effects. In the lifeless or merely animal nature we see no ground for admitting any faculty, except as sensuously conditioned. Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature through his senses only, *knows himself through mere apperception also*, and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot ascribe to the impressions of the senses. Man is thus to himself partly a phenomenon, partly, however, namely with reference to

rened by
empirical
nature,
but it can
em may
ng would
n it be a
s have a
mination
but on
genal ac-
ys of em-
ot touch
uld seem,
ugh the
standing
everthe-
nomenal
their em-
ion, and
ranscen-
cept so
ous sign.
ong the
e of the
bjeet to
an em-
We per-
hows in
animal
, except
hows all
himself
and in-
the in-
partly a
ence to

v
c
i
r
i
n
i
t
ic
ce
th
tu

certain faculties, a purely intelligible object, because his actions cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of the senses. We call these faculties understanding and reason.

That our reason possesses causality, or that we at least represent to ourselves such a causality in it, is clear from the *imperatives* which, in all practical matters, we impose as rules on our executive powers. The *ought* expresses a kind of necessity and connection with causes, which we do not find elsewhere in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is present, past, or future. It is impossible that anything in it *ought to be* different from what it is in reality, in all these relations of time. Nay, if we only look at the course of nature, the *ought* has no meaning whatever.

This *ought* expresses a possible action, the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere notion; while in every merely natural action the ground must always be a phenomenon. Now it is quite true that the action to which the *ought* applies must be possible under natural conditions, but these natural conditions do not affect the determination of the will itself, but only its effects and results among phenomena. There may be ever so many natural grounds which impel me to *will*, and ever so many sensuous temptations, but they can never produce the *ought*, but only a willing which is always conditioned, but by no means necessary, and to which the *ought*, pronounced by reason, opposes measure, nay, prohibition and authority. Whether it be an object of the senses merely (pleasure), or of pure reason (the good), reason does not yield to the impulse that is given empirically, and does not follow the order of things, as they present themselves as phenomena, but frames for itself, with perfect spontaneity, a new order according to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even though they *have not taken place*, and, may be, never will take place. Yet it is presupposed that reason may have

causality with respect to them, for otherwise no effects in experience could be expected to result from these ideas.

Now let us take our stand here and admit it at least as possible, that reason really possesses causality with reference to phenomena. In that case, reason though it be, it must show nevertheless an empirical character, because every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain phenomena follow as effects, and every rule requires in the effects a homogeneity, on which the notion of cause (as a faculty) is founded. This, so far as it is derived from mere phenomena, may be called the empirical character, which is *permanent*, while the effects, according to a diversity of concomitant, and in part, restraining conditions, appear in *changeable* forms.

Every man therefore has an empirical character of his (arbitrary) will, which is nothing but a certain causality of his reason, exhibiting in its phenomenal actions and effects a rule, according to which one may infer the motives of reason and its actions, both in kind and in degree, and judge of the subjective principles of his will. If we could investigate all the manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would be not a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and recognise from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no freedom therefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet it is only with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are merely *observing*, and, as is the case in anthropology, trying to investigate the motive causes of his actions physiologically.

If, however, we consider the same actions with reference to reason, not with reference to speculative reason, in order to *explain* their origin, but solely so far as reason is the cause which *produces* them; in one word, if we compare actions with reason, with reference to *practical* purposes, we find a rule and order, totally different from the order of nature. For, from this point of view, everything, it may be, *ought not to have happened*, which according to the

effects in
ideas.

least as
th refer-
it be, it
because
a certain
es in the
cause (as
red from
character,
a diver-
ions, ap-

er of his
sality of
d effects
otives of
nd judge
d invest-
bottom,
ve could
ceeding
ore with
nly with
we are
gy, try-
physio-

ference
in order
n is the
compare
urposes,
e order
, it may
g to the

course of nature *has happened*, and according to its empirical grounds, was inevitable. And sometimes we find, or believe at least that we find, that the ideas of reason have really proved their causality with reference to human actions as phenomena, and that these actions have taken place, not because they were determined by empirical causes, but by the causes of reason.

Now supposing one could say that reason possesses causality in reference to phenomena, could the action of reason be called free in that case, as it is accurately determined by the empirical character (the disposition) and rendered necessary by it? That character again is determined in the intelligible character (way of thinking). The latter, however, we do not know, but determine only through phenomena, which in reality give us immediately a knowledge of the disposition (empirical character) only. An action, so far as it is to be attributed to the way of thinking as its cause, does nevertheless not result from it according to empirical laws, that is, it is not *preceded* by the conditions of pure reason, but only by its effects in the phenomenal form of the internal sense. Pure reason, as a simple intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, or to the conditions of the succession of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character does *not arise* or begin at a certain time in order to produce an effect; for in that case it would be subject to the natural law of phenomena, which determines all causal series in time, and its causality would then be nature and not freedom. What therefore we can say is, that if reason can possess causality with reference to phenomena, it is a faculty *through which* the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensuous, and therefore does itself not begin. Thus we get, what we missed in all empirical series, namely that the *condition* of a successive series of events should itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is really *outside* the series of phenomena (in the intelligible), and therefore not subject to

any sensuous condition and temporal determination through any preceding cause.

Nevertheless the same cause belongs also, in another respect, to the series of phenomena. Man himself is a phenomenon. His will has an empirical character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is no condition, determining man according to this character, that is not contained in the series of natural effects and subject to their law, according to which there can be no empirically unconditioned causality of anything that happens in time.

Reason is therefore the constant condition of all free actions by which man takes his place in the phenomenal world. With regard to the intelligible character, however, of which the empirical is only the sensuous schema, there is neither *before* nor *after*; and every action, without regard to the temporal relation which connects it with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason. That reason therefore acts freely, without being determined dynamically, in the chain of natural causes, by external or internal conditions, anterior in time. That freedom must then not only be regarded negatively, as independence of empirical conditions (for in that case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena), but should be determined positively also, as the faculty of beginning spontaneously a series of events.


In order to illustrate the regulative principle of reason by an example of its empirical application, not in order to confirm it (for such arguments are useless for transcendental propositions), let us take a voluntary action, for example, a malicious lie, by which a man has produced a certain confusion in society, and of which we first try to find out the motives, and afterwards try to determine, how far it and its consequences may be imputed to the offender. With regard to the first point, one has first to follow up his empirical character to its very sources, which are to be found in wrong education, bad society, in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition, and a nature insensible to shame,

through

other re-
is a phe-
which is
no con-
, that is
subject to
empirically
time.

free ac-
phenomena
however,
a, there
without re-
other
character-
freely,
of nat-
erior in
ed neg-
in that
of phe-
as the
s.

reason by
to con-
ontental
mple, a
in con-
out the
and its
with re-
empir-
und in
ousness
shame,



or ascribed to frivolity and heedlessness, not omitting the occasioning causes at the time. In all this the procedure is exactly the same as in the investigation of a series of determining causes of a given natural effect. But although one believes that the act was thus determined, one nevertheless blames the offender, and not on account of his unhappy natural disposition, not on account of influencing circumstances, not even on account of his former course of life, because one supposes one might leave entirely out of account what that course of life may have been, and consider the past series of conditions as having never existed, and the act itself as totally unconditioned by previous states, as if the offender had begun with it a new series of effects, quite by himself. This blame is founded on a law of reason, reason being considered as a cause which, independent of all the before-mentioned empirical conditions, would and should have determined the behaviour of the man otherwise. Nay, we do not regard the causality of reason as a concurrent agency only, but as complete in itself, even though the sensuous motives did not favour, but even oppose it. The action is imputed to a man's intelligible character. At the moment when he tells the lie, the guilt is entirely his; that is, we regard reason, in spite of all empirical conditions of the act, as completely free, and the act has to be imputed entirely to a fault of reason.

Reason, it is supposed, is present in all the actions of man, in all circumstances of time, and always the same; but it is itself never in time, never in a new state in which it was not before; it is *determining*, never *determined*. We cannot ask, therefore, why reason has not determined itself differently, but only why it has not differently determined the *phenomena* by its causality. And here no answer is really possible. For a different intelligible character would have given a different empirical character, and if we say that, in spite of the whole of his previous course of life, the offender could have avoided the lie, this only means that it was in the power of reason, and that reason, in its causality,

is subject to no phenomenal and temporal conditions, and lastly, that the difference of time, though it makes a great difference in phenomena and their relation to each other, can, as these are neither things nor causes by themselves, produce no difference of action in reference to reason.

It should be clearly understood that, in what we have said, we had no intention of establishing the *reality* of freedom, as one of the faculties which contain the cause of the phenomenal appearances in our world of sense. We have here treated freedom as a transcendental idea only, which makes reason imagine that it can absolutely begin the series of phenomenal conditions through what is sensuously unconditioned, but by which reason becomes involved in an antinomy with its own laws, which it had prescribed to the empirical use of the understanding. That this antinomy rests on a mere illusion, and that nature does *not contradict* the causality of freedom, that was the only thing which we could prove, and cared to prove.

IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the totality of the dependence of phenomena.

We are concerned here, not with the unconditioned causality, but with the unconditioned existence of the substance itself.

It is easy to see, however, that as everything comprehended under phenomena is changeable, and therefore conditioned in its existence, there cannot be, in the whole series of dependent existence, any unconditioned link the existence of which might be considered as absolutely necessary, and that therefore, if phenomena were things by themselves, and their condition accordingly belonged with the conditioned always to one and the same series of perceptions, a necessary being, as the condition of the existence of the phenomena of the world of sense could never exist.

The dynamical regressus has this peculiar distinction, as compared with the mathematical, that, as the latter is only

s, and
a great
other,
selves,

have
of free-
of the
e have
which
series
y un-
in an
to the
nomy
radict
h we

ne

cau-
tance

npre-
con-
eries
ence
and
lves,
ondi-
ns, a
the

, as
only

concerned with the composition of parts in forming a whole, or the division of a whole into its parts, the conditions of that series must always be considered as parts of it, and therefore as homogeneous and as phenomena, while in the dynamical regressus, where we are concerned, not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole, consisting of a number of given parts, or of an unconditioned part belonging to a given whole, but with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of the substance itself from the necessary substance, it is not required that the condition should form one and the same empirical series with the conditioned.

There remains therefore to us another escape from this apparent antinomy; because both conflicting propositions might, under different aspects, be true at the same time. That is, all things of the world of sense might be entirely contingent, and have therefore an empirically conditioned existence only, though there might nevertheless be a non-empirical condition of the whole series, that is, an unconditionally necessary being. For this, as an intelligible condition, would not belong to the series, as a link of it (not even as the highest link), nor would it render any link of that series empirically unconditioned, but would leave the whole world of sense, in all its members, in its empirically conditioned existence. This manner of admitting an unconditioned existence as the ground of phenomena would differ from the empirically conditioned causality (freedom), treated of in the preceding article, because, with respect to freedom, the thing itself, as cause (*substantia phænomenon*), belonged to the series of conditions, and its causality only was represented as intelligible, while here, on the contrary, the necessary being has to be conceived as lying outside the series of the world of sense (as *ens extramundanum*), and as purely intelligible, by which alone it could be guarded against itself becoming subject to the law of contingency and dependence applying to all phenomena.

The *regulative principle* of reason, with regard to our present problem, is therefore this, that everything in the

world of sense has an empirically conditioned existence, and that in it there is never any unconditioned necessity with reference to any quality; that there is no member in the series of conditions of which one ought not to expect, and as far as possible to seek, the empirical condition in some possible experience; and that we are never justified in deriving any existence from a condition outside the empirical series, or in considering it as independent and self-subsistent in the series itself; without however denying in the least that the whole series may depend on some intelligible being, which is free therefore from all empirical conditions, and itself contains rather the ground of the possibility of all those phenomena.

Concluding Remark on the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason.

So long as it is only the totality of the conditions in the world of sense and the interest it can have to reason, that form the object of the notions of our reason, our ideas are no doubt transcendental, but yet *cosmological*. If, however, we place the unconditioned (with which we are chiefly concerned) in that which is entirely outside the world of sense, therefore beyond all possible experience, our ideas become *transcendent*: for they serve not only for the completion of the empirical use of the understanding (which always remains an idea that must be obeyed, though it can never be fully carried out), but they separate themselves entirely from it, and create to themselves objects the material of which is not taken from experience, and the objective reality of which does not rest on the completion of the empirical series, but on pure notions *a priori*. Nevertheless that cosmological idea which owes its origin to the fourth antinomy, urges us on to take that step. For the conditioned existence of all phenomena, not being founded in itself, requires us to look out for something different from all phenomena, that is, for an intelligible object in which there should be no more contingency. Thus the first step

existence,
necessity
number in
to expect,
dition in
justified
the em-
and self-
aying in
intelli-
cal con-
e possi-

ason.

s in the
on, that
leas are
owever,
fly con-
of sense,
become
mpletion
ways re-
ever be
entirely
erial of
tive re-
the en-
rtheless
fourth
condi-
ded in
t from
which
rst step

which we take outside the world of sense, obliges us to begin our new knowledge with the investigation of the absolutely necessary Being, and to derive from its notions the notions of all things, so far as they are intelligible only.

CHAPTER III.—THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON.

Section I.—The Ideal in general.

Ideas are still further removed from objective reality than the *categories*, because they can meet with no phenomenon in which they could be represented in concreto.

Still further removed from objective reality than the Idea, would seem to be what I call the *Ideal*, by which I mean the idea, not only in concreto, but in individuo, that is, an individual thing determinable or even determined by the idea alone.

Virtue and human wisdom in its perfect purity are ideas, while the wise man (of the Stoics) is an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete agreement with the idea of wisdom. While the idea gives *rules*, the ideal serves as the *archetype* for the permanent determination of the copy; and we have no other rule of our actions but the conduct of that divine man within us, with which we compare ourselves, and by which we judge and better ourselves, though we can never reach it. These ideals, though they cannot claim objective reality (existence), are not therefore to be considered as mere chimeras, but supply reason with an indispensable standard, because it requires the notion of that which is perfect of its kind, in order to estimate and measure by it the degree and the number of the defects in the imperfect. To attempt to realise the ideal in an example, is impossible.

In its ideal reason aims at a perfect determination, according to rules *a priori*, and it conceives an object through-

out determinable according to principles, though without the sufficient conditions of experience, so that the notion itself is transcendent.

SECTION II.—THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAL
(PROTOTYPON TRANSCENDENTIALE).

Every notion is, with regard to that which is not contained in it, undetermined and subject to the principle of *determinability*, according to which of *every two* contradictorily opposite predicates, one only can belong to it. This rests on the principle of contradiction, and is therefore a purely logical principle, taking no account of any of the contents of our knowledge, and looking only to its logical form.

Besides this, everything is subject, in its possibility, to the principle of complete determination, according to which one of all the possible predicates of things, as compared with their opposites, must be applicable to it. This does not rest only on the principle of contradiction, for it regards everything, not only in relation to two contradictory predicates, but in relation to the *whole possibility*, that is, to the whole of all predicates of things, and, presupposing these as a condition *a priori*, it represents everything as deriving its own possibility from the share which it possesses in that whole possibility.

The proposition, that *everything which exists is completely determined*, does not signify only that one of every pair of *given* contradictory predicates, but that one of all possible predicates must always belong to a thing, so that by this proposition predicates are not only compared with each other logically, but the thing itself is compared transcendently with the sum total of all possible predicates. The proposition really means that, in order to know a thing completely, we must know everything that is possible, and thereby determine it either affirmatively or negatively. This

h without
the notion

AL

ot contain-
le of *deter-*
radiatorily
This rests
re a purely
e contents
form.

sibility, to
g to which
pared with
es not rest
rds every-
predicates,
the whole
se as a con-
ng its own
that whole

ts is com-
ne of every
one of all
ng, so that
pared with
pared tran-
predicates.
ow a thing
ossible, and
vely. This

complete determination is therefore a notion which in concreto can never be represented in its totality, and is founded therefore on an idea which belongs to reason only, reason prescribing to the understanding the rule of its complete application.

Now although this idea of the *sum total of all possibility*, so far as it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything, is itself still undetermined with regard to its predicates, and is conceived by us merely as a sum total of all possible predicates, we find nevertheless on closer examination that this idea, as a fundamental notion, excludes a number of predicates which, being derivative, are given by others, or cannot stand one by the side of the other, and that it is raised to a completely *a priori* determined notion, thus becoming the notion of an individual object which is completely determined by the mere idea, and must therefore be called an ideal of pure reason.

If we consider all possible predicates not only logically, but transcendently, that is, according to their content, which may be thought in them *a priori*, we find that through some we represent being, through others a mere not-being. A transcendental negation signifies not-being by itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, or a something the notion of which in itself expresses being. It is called, therefore, reality (from *res*, a thing), because through it alone, and so far only as it reaches, are objects something, while the opposite negation indicates a mere want, and, if it stands by itself, represents the absence of everything.

All negative notions are therefore derivative, and it is the realities which contain the data and, so to speak, the material, or the transcendental content, by which a complete determination of all things becomes possible.

If, therefore, our reason postulates a transcendental substratum for all determinations, a substratum which contains, as it were, the whole store of material whence all possible predicates of things may be taken, we shall find that such

a substratum is nothing but the idea of the sum total of reality (*omnitude realitatis*). In that case all true negations are nothing but *limitations*, which they could not be unless there were the substratum of the unlimited (the All).

By this complete possession of all reality we represent the notion of a *thing by itself* as completely determined; and the notion of an *ens realissimum* is the notion of an individual being, because of all possible opposite predicates one, namely that which absolutely belongs to being, is found in its determination. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal*, which forms the foundation of the complete determination which is necessary for all that exists, and which constitutes at the same time the highest and complete condition of its possibility, to which all thought of objects, with regard to their content, must be traced back. It is at the same time the only true ideal of which human reason is capable, because it is in this case alone that a notion of a thing, which in itself is general, is completely determined by itself, and recognised as the representation of an individual.

The transcendental major of the complete determination of all things is nothing but a representation of the sum total of all reality, and not only a notion which comprehends all predicates, according to their transcendental content, *under itself*, but *within itself*; and the complete determination of everything depends on the limitation of this total of reality, of which some part is ascribed to the thing, while the rest is excluded from it, a procedure which agrees with the *aut aut* of a disjunctive major, and with the determination of the object through one of the members of that division in the minor.


It is self-evident that for that purpose, namely, in order simply to represent the necessary and complete determination of things, reason does not presuppose the existence of a being that should correspond to the ideal, but its idea only, in order to derive from an unconditioned totality of complete determination the conditioned one, that is the totality of something limited. Reason therefore sees in the

total of re-
negations
be unless
All).

resent the
ned, and
f an indi-
cates one,
found in
tal *ideal*,
mination
onstitutes
ion of its
regard to
ame time
pable, be-
g, which
tself, and

mination
sum total
hends all
nt, *under*
mination
tal of re-
while the
with the
mination
division

in order
etermina-
istence of
its idea
tality of
is the to-
es in the



ideal the prototypon of all things which, as imperfect copies (ectypa), derive the material of their possibility from it, approaching more or less nearly to it, yet remaining always far from reaching it.

Thus all the possibility of things (or of the synthesis of the manifold according to their content), is considered as derivative, and the possibility of that only which includes in itself all reality as original. For all negations (which really are the only predicates by which everything else is distinguished from the truly real being), are limitations only of a greater and, in the last instance, of the highest reality, presupposing it, and, according to their content, derived from it. All the manifoldness of things consists only of so many modes of limiting the notion of the highest reality that forms their common substratum, in the same way as all figures are only different modes of limiting endless space. Hence the object of its ideal which exists in reason only is called the *original Being* (ens originarium), and so far as it has nothing above it, the *highest Being* (ens summum), and so far as everything as conditioned is subject to it, the Being of all beings (ens entium). All this however does not mean the objective relation of any real thing to other things, but of the *idea to notions*, and leaves us in perfect ignorance as to the existence of a being of such superlative excellence.

Again, as we cannot say that an original being consists of so many derivative beings, because these in reality presuppose the former, and cannot therefore constitute it, it follows that the ideal of the original being must be conceived as simple.

The derivation of all other possibility from that original being cannot therefore, if we speak accurately, be considered as a *limitation* of its highest reality, and, as it were, a *division* of it—for in that case the original being would become to us a mere aggregate of derivative beings, which, according to what we have just explained, is impossible, though we represented it so in our first rough sketch. On the contrary, the highest reality would form the basis of the possibility of all things as a *cause*, and not as a *sum total*.

The manifoldness of things would not depend on the limitation of the original being, but on its complete effect, and to this also would belong all our sensibility, together with all reality in phenomenal appearance, which could not, as an ingredient, belong to the idea of a supreme being.

If we follow up this idea of ours and hypostasise it, we shall be able to determine the original being by means of the notion of the highest reality as one, simple, all sufficient, eternal, &c., in one word, determine it in its unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. The notion of such a being is the notion of *God* in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental *theology*.

By such an employment of the transcendental idea, however, we should be overstepping the limits of its purpose and admissibility. Reason used it only, as being the *notion* of all reality, for a foundation of the complete determination of things, without requiring that all this reality should be given objectively and constitute itself a thing. This is a mere fiction by which we comprehend and realise the manifold of our idea in one ideal, as a particular being. We have no right to do this, not even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis; nor do all the consequences which flow from such an ideal concern the complete determination of things in general, for the sake of which alone the idea was necessary, or influence it in the least.

It is not enough to describe the procedure of our reason and its dialectic, we must try also to discover its sources, in order to be able to explain that illusion itself as a phenomenon of the understanding. The ideal of which we are speaking is founded on a natural, not on a purely arbitrary idea. I ask, therefore, how does it happen that reason considers all the possibility of things as derived from one fundamental possibility, namely, that of the highest reality, and then presupposes it as contained in a particular original being?

n the lim-
effect, and
ther with
uld not, as
ing.

isise it, we
means of
sufficient,
nditioned
on of such
tal sense,
of a tran-

idea, how.
urpose and
notion of
rmination
should be
This is a
the man-
ing. We
possibility
ces which
rmination
e the idea

our reason
sources, in
phenom-
h we are
arbitrary
eason con-
n one fun-
st reality,
ar original

The answer is easily found in the discussions of the transcendental Analytic. The possibility of the objects of our senses is their relation to our thought, by which something (namely the empirical form) can be thought *a priori*, while what constitutes the matter, the reality in the phenomena (all that corresponds to sensation) must be given, because without it it could not even be thought, nor its possibility be represented. An object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by them either affirmatively or negatively. As however that which constitutes the thing itself (as a phenomenon) namely the real, must be given, and as, without this, the thing could not be conceived at all, and as that in which the real of all phenomena is given is what we call the one and all comprehending experience, it is necessary that the material for the possibility of all objects of our senses should be presupposed as given in one whole, on the limitation of which alone the possibility of all empirical objects, their difference from each other, and their complete determination can be founded. And since no other objects can be given us but those of the senses, and nowhere but in the context of a possible experience, nothing can be an object to us, if it does not presuppose that whole of all empirical reality, as the condition of its possibility. Owing to a natural illusion, we are led to consider a principle which applies only to the objects of *our* senses, as a principle valid for all things, and thus to take the empirical principle of our notions of the possibility of things as phenomena, by omitting this limitation, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.

If afterwards we hypostasise this idea of the whole of all reality, this is owing to our changing dialectically the distributive unity of the empirical use of our understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole, and then represent to ourselves this whole of phenomena as an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality. Afterwards, by means of the aforementioned transcendental

subreption, this is taken for the notion of a thing standing at the head of the possibility of all things, and supplying the real conditions for their complete determination.

SECTION III.—THE ARGUMENTS OF SPECULATIVE REASON
IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SUPREME BEING.

If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by *necessity*. For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument on which reason founds its progress towards an original being.

Now reason looks out for the notion of a being worthy of such a distinction as the unconditioned necessity of its existence, not in order to conclude *a priori* its existence from its notion, (for if it ventured to do this, it might confine itself altogether to mere notions, without looking for a given existence as their foundation), but only in order to find among all notions of possible things one which has nothing incompatible with absolute necessity. For, that something absolutely necessary must exist, is regarded as certain after the first conclusion. And after discarding everything else, as incompatible with that necessity, reason takes the one being that remains for the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity can be comprehended, that is, derived from its notion alone, or not. Now the being the notion of which contains a therefore for every wherefore, which is in no point and no respect defective, and is sufficient as a condition everywhere, seems, on that account, to be most compatible with absolute necessity, because, being in possession of all conditions of all that is possible, it does not require, nay is not capable of any condition, and satisfies at

standing
supplying
on.

REASON
EING.

er it may
necessity.
of some-
conclusion
contingent,
the argu-
ds an or-

worthy of
of its ex-
ence from
at confine
or a given
r to find
s nothing
omething
tain after
ing else,
the one
y being,
, derived
e notion
which is
cient as a
be most
n possess-
s not re-
tisfies at

least in this one respect the notion of unconditioned necessity more than any other notion which, because it is deficient and in need of completion, does not exhibit any such characteristic of independence from all further conditions. It is true that we ought not to conclude that what does not contain the highest and in every respect complete condition, must therefore be conditioned even in its existence; yet it does not exhibit the only characteristic of unconditioned existence, by which reason is able to know any being as unconditioned by means of a notion *a priori*.

The notion of a being of the highest reality (ens realissimum) would therefore seem of all notions of all possible things to be the most compatible with the notion of an unconditionally necessary being, and though it may not satisfy that notion altogether, yet no choice is left to us, and we are forced to keep to it, because we must not risk the existence of a necessary being, and, if we admit it, can, in the whole field of possibility, find nothing that could produce better founded claims on such a distinction in existence.

This therefore is the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it recognises unconditioned existence. It then seeks for the notion of that which is independent of all condition, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition of all other things, that is, in that which contains all reality. Now as the unlimited all is absolute unity, and implies the notion of a being, one and supreme, reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the original cause of all things, must exist by absolute necessity.

If we accept everything as here stated, namely, *first*, that we may infer rightly from any given existence (perhaps even my own only) the existence of an unconditionally necessary being, *secondly*, that I must consider a being which contains all reality and therefore also all condition, as absolutely unconditioned, and that therefore the notion of the thing which is compatible with absolute necessity has thus been found, it follows by no means from this, that a notion

of a limited being, which does not possess the highest reality, is therefore contradictory to absolute necessity. For, though I do not find in its notion the unconditioned which carries the whole of conditions with it, this does not prove that, for the same reason, its existence must be conditioned; for I cannot say in a hypothetical argument, that if a certain condition is absent (here the completeness according to notions), the conditioned also is absent. On the contrary, it will be open to us to consider all the rest of limited beings as equally unconditioned, although we cannot from the general notion which we have of them deduce their necessity. Thus this argument would not have given us the least notion of the qualities of a necessary being, in fact it would not have helped us in the least.

This argument, though it is no doubt transcendental, as based on the internal insufficiency of the contingent, is nevertheless so simple and natural, that the commonest understanding accepts it, if once led up to it. We see things change, arise and perish, and these, or at least their state, must therefore have a cause. Of every cause, however, that is given in experience, the same question must be asked. Where, therefore, could we more fairly place the *last* causality, except where there exists also the *supreme* causality, that is in that Being, which originally contains in itself the sufficient cause for every possible effect, and the notion of which can easily be realised by the one trait of an all-comprehending perfection? That supreme cause we afterwards consider as absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to ascend to it, while there is no ground for going beyond it.

There are only three kinds of proofs of the existence of God, from speculative reason.

All the paths that can be followed to this end begin either from definite experience and the peculiar nature of the world of sense, known to us through experience, and ascend from it, according to the laws of causality, to the highest cause, existing outside the world; or they rest on indefinite

highest re-
sult. For,
and which
cannot prove
conditioned ;
but if a cer-
tain according
to the con-
dition of limited
cannot from
produce their
given us
ing, in fact

idental, as
ingent, is
nonest un-
see things
their state,
never, that
be asked.
last caus-
causality,
in itself the
notion of
in all-com-
afterwards
t absolute-
ground for
existence of

begin either
ure of the
and ascend
the highest
indefinite

experience only, that is, on any existence which is empirically given; or lastly, they leave all experience out of account, and conclude, entirely *a priori*, from mere notions, the existence of a supreme cause. The first proof is the *physico-theological*, the second the *cosmological*, the third the *ontological* proof. There are no more, and there can be no more.

With regard to the order in which these three arguments should be examined, it will be the opposite of that, followed by reason in its gradual development, in which we place them ourselves. For we shall be able to show that, although experience gives the first impulse, it is the transcendental notion only which guides reason in its endeavours, and fixes the last goal which reason wishes to retain. I shall therefore begin with the examination of the transcendental proof, and see afterwards how far it may be strengthened by the addition of empirical elements.

SECTION IV.—THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The notion of an absolutely necessary being is a notion of pure reason, that is, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it.

People have at all times been talking of an *absolutely necessary* Being, but they have tried, not so much to understand whether and how a thing of that kind could even be conceived, as rather to prove its existence. No doubt a verbal definition of that notion is quite easy, if we say that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible. This, however, does not make us much wiser with reference to the conditions that make it necessary to consider the non-existence of a thing as absolutely inconceivable. It is these conditions which we want to know, and whether by that

notion we are thinking anything or not. For to use the word *unconditioned*, in order to get rid of all the conditions which the understanding always requires, when wishing to conceive something as necessary, does not render it clear to us in the least whether, after that, we are still thinking anything or perhaps nothing, by the notion of the unconditionally necessary.

Nay, more than this, people have imagined that by a number of examples they had explained this notion, at first risked at haphazard, and afterwards become quite familiar, and that therefore all further inquiry regarding its intelligibility were unnecessary. It was said that every proposition of geometry, such as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, and people began to talk of an object entirely outside the sphere of our understanding, as if they understood perfectly well what, by that notion, they wished to predicate of it.

Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things. The above proposition did not say that three angles were absolutely necessary, but that under the condition of the existence of a triangle, three angles are given (in it) by necessity. Nevertheless, this pure logical necessity has exerted so powerful an illusion, that, after having formed of a thing a notion *a priori* so constituted that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people thought they could conclude with certainty that, because existence necessarily belongs to the object of that notion, provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing), its existence also must necessarily be accepted (according to the rule of identity), and that the Being therefore must itself be absolutely necessary, because its existence is implied in a notion, which is accepted voluntarily only, and always under condition that I accept the object of it as given.

If in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arises a contradiction, and hence, I say, that the former belongs to the latter necessarily. But

to use the
conditions
wishing to
it clear to
aking any-
condition-



that by a
on, at first
e familiar,
its intelli-
ry propo-
iangle has
began to
ur under-
t, by that

is not the
The above
absolutely
istence of
. Never-
powerful
notion *a*
istence in
with cer-
to the ob-
the thing
sarily be
that the
y, because
epted vol-
cept the





te and re-
l hence, I
ily. But







**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction, because there is nothing left that can be contradicted. To accept a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradiction at all in admitting the non-existence of the triangle and of its three angles. The same applies to the notion of an absolutely necessary being. Remove its existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible. There is nothing external to which the contradiction could apply, because the thing is not meant to be externally necessary; nor is there anything internal that could be contradicted, for in removing the thing out of existence, you have removed at the same time all its internal qualities. If you say, God is almighty, that is a necessary judgment, because almightiness cannot be removed, if you accept a deity, that is, an infinite Being, with the notion of which that other notion is identical. But if you say, God is not, then neither his almightiness, nor any other of his predicates is given; they are all, together with the subject, removed out of existence, and therefore there is not the slightest contradiction in that sentence.

Against all these general arguments (which no one can object to) you challenge me with a case, which you represent as a proof by a fact, namely, that there is one, and this one notion only, in which the non-existence or the removal of its object would be self-contradictory, namely, the notion of the most real Being (*ens realissimum*). You say that it possesses all reality, and you are no doubt justified in accepting such a Being as possible. Now reality comprehends existence, and therefore existence is contained in the notion of a thing possible. If that thing is removed, the internal possibility of the thing would be removed, and this is self-contradictory.

I ask you, whether the proposition, that *this or that thing* (which, whatever it may be, I grant you as possible) *exists*, is an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, then by its existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but in that case, either the thought within you

would be the thing itself, or you have admitted existence, as belonging to possibility, and have thus apparently deduced existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The mere word reality, which in the notion of a thing sounds different from existence in the notion of the predicate, can make no difference. For if you call all accepting or positing (without determining what it is) reality, you have placed a thing, with all its predicates, within the notion of the subject, and accepted it as real, and you do nothing but repeat it in the predicate. If, on the contrary, you admit, as every sensible man must do, that every proposition involving existence is synthetical, how can you say that the predicate of existence does not admit of removal without contradiction, a distinguishing property which is peculiar to analytical propositions only, the very character of which depends on it?

The illusion, in mistaking a logical predicate for a real one (that is the predicate which determines a thing), resists all correction. *Determination*, however, is a predicate, added to the notion of the subject, and enlarging it, and it must not therefore be contained in it.

Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a notion of something that can be added to the notion of a thing. It is merely the admission of a thing, and of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, *God is almighty*, contains two notions, each having its object, namely God, and almightiness. The small word *is*, is not an additional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate *in relation* to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and say, *God is*, or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the notion of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my notion, as its object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been added to the notion, which expresses possibility only, by my thinking its object as simply given and saying, it is.

existence,
rently de-
is nothing
ity, which
istence in
ce. For if
ning what
predicates,
s real, and
If, on the
st do, that
tical, how
not admit
g property
the very

for a real
(ng), resists
predicate,
it, and it

notion of
thing. It
n determi-
of a judg-
ns two no-
rightness.
, but only
bject. If,
icates (in-
there is a
f God, but
icates, in
st contain
have been
only, by
ving, it is.

And thus the real does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify the notion, the former the object and its position by itself, it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my notion would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate notion. In my financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars, than by their notion only (that is their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained analytically in my notion, but is added to my notion (which is a determination of my state), synthetically; but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my notion.

By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing, (even in completely determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. If, then, I try to conceive a being, as the highest reality (without any defect), the question still remains, whether it exists or not. For though in my notion there may be wanting nothing of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is wanting in its relation to my whole state of thinking, namely, that the knowledge of that object should be possible *a posteriori* also. And here we perceive the cause of our difficulty. If we were concerned with an object of our senses, I could not mistake the existence of a thing for the mere notion of it; for by the notion the object is thought as only in harmony with the general conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its existence it is thought as contained in the whole content of experience. Through this connection with the content of the whole experience, the notion of an object is not in the least increased; our thought has only received through it one more possible perception. If, however, we are thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder that we cannot find any characteristic to distinguish it from mere possibility.

The notion of a Supreme Being is, in many respects a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite incapable of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with regard to what exists. It cannot even inform us further as to its possibility. Thus we see that the celebrated Leibniz is far from having achieved what he thought he had, namely, to understand *a priori* the possibility of so sublime an ideal Being.

Time and labour therefore are lost on the famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from mere notions; and a man might as well imagine that he could become richer in knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to improve his position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash account.

SECTION V.—THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

The *cosmological proof* retains the connection of absolute necessity with the highest reality, but instead of concluding, like the former, from the highest reality necessity in existence, it concludes from the given and unconditioned necessity of any being, its unlimited reality. We shall now proceed to exhibit and to examine this cosmological proof which Leibniz calls also the proof *a contingentia mundi*.

It runs as follows: If there exists anything, there must exist an absolutely necessary Being also. Now I, at least, exist; therefore there exists an absolutely necessary Being. The minor contains an experience, the major the conclusion from experience in general to the existence of the necessary. This proof therefore begins with experience, and is not entirely *a priori*, or ontological; and, as the object of all possible experience is called the world, this proof is called the *cosmological proof*. As it takes no account of any peculiar property of the objects of experience, by which

pects a
te incap-
with re-
urther as
l Leibniz
namely,
an ideal

us onto-
Supreme
imagine
re ideas,
position,

I. PROOF

absolute
cluding,
in exist-
ned ne-
all now
al proof
undi.
re must
at least,
Being.
conclu-
of the
nce, and
e object
proof is
ount of
y which

this world of ours may differ from any other possible world, it is distinguished, in its name also, from the physico-theological proof, which employs as arguments, observations of the peculiar property of this our world of sense.

The proof then proceeds as follows: The necessary being can be determined in one way only, that is, by one only of all possible opposite predicates; it must therefore be determined completely by its own notion. There is only one notion of a thing possible, which *a priori*, completely determines it, namely, that of the ens realissimum. It follows, therefore, that the notion of the ens realissimum is the only one by which a necessary Being can be thought, and therefore it is concluded that a Highest Being exists by necessity.

There are so many sophistical propositions in this cosmological argument, that it really seems as if speculative reason had spent all her dialectical skill in order to produce the greatest possible transcendental illusion. Before examining it, we shall draw up a list of them, by which reason has put forward an old argument disguised as a new one, in order to appeal to the agreement of two witnesses, one supplied by pure reason, the other by experience, while in reality there is only one, namely, the first, who changes his dress and voice, in order to be taken for a second. In order to have a secure foundation, this proof takes its stand on experience, and pretends to be different from the ontological proof, which places its whole confidence in pure notions *a priori* only. The cosmological proof, however, uses that experience only in order to make one step, namely, to the existence of a necessary Being in general. What properties that Being may have, can never be learnt from the empirical argument, and for that purpose reason takes leave of it altogether, and tries to find out, from among notions only, what properties an absolutely necessary Being ought to possess, i. e. which among all possible things contains in itself the requisite conditions (*requisita*) of absolute necessity. This requisite is believed by reason to exist in the notion of an ens realissimum only, and reason concludes at

once, that this must be the absolutely necessary Being. In this conclusion it is simply assumed that a notion of a being of the highest reality is perfectly adequate to the notion of absolute necessity in existence; so that the former might be concluded from the latter. This is the same proposition as that maintained in the ontological argument, and is simply taken over into the cosmological proof, nay made its foundation, although the intention was to avoid it. It is clear that absolute necessity is an existence from mere notions. If then I say that the notion of the ens realissimum is such a notion, and is the only notion adequate to necessary existence, I am bound to admit that the latter may be deduced from the former. The whole conclusive strength of the so-called cosmological proof rests therefore in reality on the ontological proof from mere notions, while the appeal to experience is quite superfluous, and, though it may lead us on to the notion of absolute necessity, it cannot demonstrate it with any definite object.


If the proposition is right, that every absolutely necessary Being is, at the same time, the most real Being, (and this is the *nervus probandi* of the cosmological proof), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conversion, at least per accidens. This would give us the proposition that some entia realissima are at the same time absolutely necessary beings. One ens realissimum, however, does not differ from any other on any point, and what applies to one, applies also to all. In this case, therefore, I may employ absolute conversion, and say, that every ens realissimum is a necessary being. As this proposition is determined by its notions *a priori* only, it follows that the mere notion of the ens realissimum must carry with it its absolute necessity; and this, which was maintained by the ontological proof, and not recognised by the cosmological, forms really the foundation of the conclusions of the latter, though in a disguised form.

We thus see that the second road, taken by speculative reason, in order to prove the existence of the highest Being,

being. In
of a being
notion of
might be
position as
is simply
its founda-
clear that
tions. If
is such a
ary exist-
e deduced
of the so-
ty on the
appeal to
y lead us
monstrate

necessary
(and this
it must,
ersion, at
ition that
lutely ne-
does not
ies to one,
y employ
ssimum is
mined by
notion of
te necess-
ntological
rms really
ough in a

speculative
est Being,



is not only as illusory as the first, but commits in addition an *ignoratio elenchi*, promising to lead us by a new path, but after a short circuit bringing us back to the old one, which we had abandoned for its sake.

I said before, that a whole nest of dialectical assumptions was hidden in that cosmological proof, and that transcendental criticism might easily detect and destroy it. I shall here enumerate them only, leaving it to the experience of the reader to follow up the fallacies and remove them.

We find, first, the transcendental principle of inferring a cause from the accidental. This principle, that everything contingent must have a cause, is valid in the world of sense only, and has not even a meaning outside it. For the purely intellectual notion of the contingent cannot produce a synthetical proposition like that of causality, and the principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion of its use, except in the world of sense, while here it is meant to help us beyond the world of sense.

Secondly. The inference of a first cause, based on the impossibility of an infinite ascending series of given causes in this world of sense,—an inference which the principles of the use of reason do not allow us to draw even in experience, while here we extend that principle beyond experience, whither that series can never be prolonged.

Thirdly. The false self-satisfaction of reason with regard to the completion of that series, brought about by removing in the end every kind of condition, without which nevertheless no notion of necessity is possible, and by then, when any definite notions have become impossible, accepting this as a completion of our notion.

Fourthly. The mistaking the logical possibility of a notion of all united reality (without any internal contradiction) for the transcendental, which requires a principle for the practicability of such a synthesis, such principle however being applicable to the field of possible experience only, &c.

Discovery and Explanation of the dialectical illusion in all transcendental proofs of the existence of a Necessary Being.

Both proofs, hitherto attempted, were transcendental, that is, independent of empirical principles. What then in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical, but natural, illusion which connects the notions of necessity and of the highest reality, and realises and hypostasises that which can only be an idea?

If I am obliged to think something necessary for all existing things, and at the same time am not justified in thinking of anything as in itself necessary, the conclusion is inevitable: that necessity and contingency do not concern things themselves, for otherwise there would be a contradiction, and that therefore neither of the two principles can be objective; but that they may possibly be subjective principles of reason only, according to which, on one side, we have to find for all that is given as existing, something that is necessary, and thus never to stop except when we have reached an *a priori* complete explanation; while on the other we must never hope for that completion, that is, never admit anything empirical as unconditioned, and thus dispense with its further derivation. In that sense both principles as purely heuristic and *regulative*, and affecting the formal interests of reason only, may well stand side by side. For the one tells us that we ought to philosophise on nature as if there was a necessary first cause for everything that exists, if only in order to introduce systematical unity into our knowledge, by always looking for such an idea as an imagined highest cause. The other warns us against mistaking any single determination concerning the existence of things for such a highest cause, i. e. for something absolutely necessary, and bids us to keep the way always open for further derivation, and to treat it always as conditioned.

It follows from this that the absolutely necessary must be accepted as *outside the world*, because it is only meant to serve as a principle of the greatest possible unity of phen-

in all
being.

ndental,
then in
lectical,
necessity
ises that

or all ex-
tified in
nclusion
concern
a contra-
iples can
bjective
one side,
omething
when we
while on
, that is,
and thus
se both
affecting
l side by
pphise on
everything
al unity
n idea as
against
existence
ng abso-
ays open
ditioned.
ry must
y meant
of phen-

Telling here is in identifying: (a) No thing unrelated is necessary
with (b) . . . at all unrelated.

i. e. not = any particular thing or change. Right but the
'outside the world' is Intelligence which encompasses the world.



omena, of which it is the highest cause, and that it can never be reached *in the world*, because the second rule bids you always to consider all empirical causes of that unity as derived.

The ideal of the Supreme Being is therefore, according to these remarks, nothing but a *regulative principle* of reason, which obliges us to consider all composition in the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order to found on it the rule of a systematical unity necessary according to general laws for the explanation of the world; it does not involve the assertion of an existence necessary by itself. It is the same here, and as this systematical unity of nature can in no wise become the principle of the empirical use of our reason, unless we base it on the idea of an ens realissimum as the highest cause, it happens quite naturally that we thus represent that idea as a real object, and that object again, as it is the highest condition, as necessary. Thus a *regulative* principle has been changed into a *constitutive* principle, which substitution becomes evident at once because, as soon as I consider that highest Being, which with regard to the world was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing by itself, that necessity cannot be conceived, and can therefore have existed in my reason as a formal condition of thought only, and not as a material and substantial condition of existence.

SECTION VI.—THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PHYSICO-
THEOLOGICAL PROOF.

If, then, neither the notion of things in general, nor the experience of any *existence in general* can satisfy our demands, there still remains one way open, namely, to try whether any *definite experience*, and consequently that of things in the world as it is, their constitution and disposition, may not supply a proof which could give us the certain

conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being. Such a proof we should call *physico-theological*.

After what has been said already, it will be easily understood that we may expect an easy and complete answer to this question. For how could there ever be an experience that should be adequate to an idea? It is the very nature of an idea that no experience can ever be adequate to it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all sufficient original Being is so overwhelming, so high above everything empirical, which is always conditioned, that we can never find in experience enough material to fill such a notion, but can only grope about among things conditioned, looking in vain for the unconditioned, of which no rule of any empirical synthesis can ever give us an example, or even show the way towards it.

This proof will always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and most in conformity with human reason. It gives life to the study of nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly acquiring new vigour.

But although we have nothing to say against the reasonableness and utility of this line of argument, but wish, on the contrary, to commend and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this proof advances to apodictic certainty, and to an approval on its own merits, requiring no favour, and no help from any other quarter. I therefore maintain that the physico-theological proof can never establish by itself alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but must always leave it to the ontological proof (to which it serves only as an introduction), to supply its deficiency; so that, after all, it is the ontological proof which contains the *only possible argument* (supposing always that any speculative proof is possible), and human reason can never do without it.

The principal points of the physico-theological proof are the following. 1st. There are everywhere in the world clear indications of an intentional arrangement carried out

Such a

ly under-
answer to
experience
y nature
ate to it.
sufficient
everything
an never
otion, but
ooking in
y empir-
show the

n respect.
nity with
e, deriv-
acquiring

e reason-
wish, on
e cannot
apodictic
requiring
therefore
never es-
eing, but
which it
ency; so
tains the
specula-
ever do

roof are
e world
ried out

with great wisdom, and forming a whole indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent.

2ndly. The fitness of this arrangement is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world, and belongs to them contingently only; that is, the nature of different things could never spontaneously, by the combination of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims, if these means had not been selected and arranged on purpose by a rational disposing principle, according to certain fundamental ideas.

3rdly. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or many), which must be the cause of the world, not only as a blind and all-powerful nature, by means of unconscious *fecundity*, but as an intelligence, by *freedom*.

4thly. The unity of that cause may be inferred with certainty from the unity of the reciprocal relation of the parts of the world, as portions of a skilful edifice, so far as our experience reaches, and beyond it, with plausibility, according to the principles of analogy.

According to this argument the fitness and harmony existing in so many works of nature might prove the contingency of the form, but not of the matter, that is, the substance in the world, because, for the latter purpose, it would be necessary to prove in addition, that the things of the world were in themselves incapable of such order and harmony, according to general laws, unless there existed, even in their *substance*, the product of a supreme wisdom. For this purpose, very different arguments would be required from those derived from the analogy of human art. The utmost, therefore, that could be established by such a proof, would be an *architect of the world*, always very much hampered by the quality of the material with which he has to work, not a *creator*, to whose idea everything is subject. This would by no means suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-sufficient original Being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter itself, we must have recourse to a transcendental argument, and this is the very thing which was to be avoided.

The inference, therefore, really proceeds from the order and design that can everywhere be observed in the world, as an entirely contingent arrangement, to the existence of a cause, *proportionate to it*. The notion of that cause must therefore teach us something quite *definite* about it, and can therefore be no other notion but that of a Being which possesses all might, wisdom, &c., in one word, all perfection of an all-sufficient Being.

Now I hope that no one would dare to comprehend the relation of that part of the world which he has observed (in its extent as well as in its contents) to omnipotence, the relation of the order of the world to the highest wisdom, and the relation of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of its author, &c. Physico-theology, therefore, can never give a definite notion of the highest cause of the world, and is insufficient, therefore, as a principle of theology, which is itself to form the basis of religion.

The fact is that, after having reached the stage of admiration of the greatness, the wisdom, the power, &c., of the author of the world, and seeing no further advance possible, one suddenly leaves the argument carried on by empirical proofs, and lays hold of that contingency which, from the very first, was inferred from the order and design of the world. The next step from that contingency leads, by means of transcendental notions only, to the existence of something absolutely necessary, and another step from the absolute necessity of the first cause to its completely determined or determining notion, namely, that of an all-embracing reality. Thus we see that the physico-theological proof, baffled in its own undertaking, takes suddenly refuge in the cosmological proof; and as this is only the ontological proof in disguise, it really carries out its original intention by means of pure reason only; though it so strongly disclaimed in the beginning all connection with it, and professed to base everything on clear proofs from experience.

Thus we have seen that the physico-theological proof rests on the cosmological, and the cosmological on the

ontological proof of the existence of one original Being as the Supreme Being; and, as besides these three, there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, based exclusively on pure notions of reason, is the only possible one, always supposing that any proof of a proposition, so far transcending the empirical use of the understanding, is possible at all.

SECTION VII.—CRITICISM OF ALL THEOLOGY BASED ON SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES OF REASON.

Transcendental questions admit of transcendental answers only, that is, of such which consist of mere notions *a priori*, without any empirical admixture. Our question, however, is clearly synthetical, and requires an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience, till it reaches the existence of a Being which is to correspond to our pure idea, though no experience can ever be adequate to it. According to our former proofs, all synthetical knowledge *a priori* is possible only, if it conforms to the formal conditions of a possible experience. All these principles therefore are of immanent validity only, that is, they must remain within the sphere of objects of empirical knowledge, or of phenomena. Nothing, therefore, can be achieved by a transcendental procedure with reference to the theology of a purely speculative reason.

Although then reason, in its purely speculative application, is utterly insufficient for this great undertaking, namely, to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, it has nevertheless this great advantage of being able to *correct* our knowledge of it, if it can be acquired from elsewhere, to make it consistent with itself and every intelligible view, and to purify it from everything incompatible with the notion of an Original Being, and from all admixture of empirical limitations.

In spite of its insufficiency, therefore, transcendental theology has a very important negative use, as a constant test of our reason, when occupied with pure ideas only, which, as such, admit of a transcendental standard only.

For the purely speculative use of reason, therefore, the Supreme Being remains, no doubt, an ideal only, but an ideal *without a flaw*, a notion which finishes and crowns the whole of human knowledge, and the objective reality of which, though it cannot be proved, can neither be disproved in that way. If then there should be an Ethico-theology to supply that deficiency, transcendental theology, which before was problematical only, would prove itself indispensable in determining its notion, and in constantly testing reason, which is so often deceived by sensibility, and not even always in harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, extra-mundane existence (not as a world-soul), eternity, free from conditions of time, omnipresence, free from conditions of space, omnipotence, &c., all these are transcendental predicates, and their purified notions, which are required for every theology, can be derived from transcendental theology only.

ental the-
stant test
y, which,

efore, the
y, but an
d crowns
reality of
disproved
eology to
ch before
nsable in
g reason,
even al-
infinity,
ul), eter-
free from
are tran-
which are
transcend-

KRITIK OF PRACTICAL REASON.

PREFACE.

If reason is actually practical, it proves its own reality and that of its notions by fact, and all disputation against the possibility of its being real futile. With this faculty, transcendental *freedom* is also established; freedom, namely, in that absolute sense in which speculative reason required it in its use of the notion of causality in order to escape the antinomy into which it inevitably falls, when in the chain of cause and effect it tries to think the *unconditioned*. Speculative reason could only exhibit this notion (of freedom) problematically as not impossible to thought.

Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative reason of which we *know* the possibility *a priori* (without, however, understanding it), because it is the condition of the moral law which we know. Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, while the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom. For had not the moral law been previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in *assuming* such a thing as freedom, although it be not contradictory. But were there no freedom it would be *impossible to trace* the moral law in ourselves at all. The ideas of *God* and *Immortality*, however, are not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions of the necessary object of a will determined by this law; that is to say, conditions of the practical use of our pure reason. Hence with respect to these ideas we cannot affirm that we *know* and *understand*, I will not say the actuality, but even the possibility of them. However they are the conditions of the application of the

morally determined will to its object, which is given to it *a priori*, viz., the summum bonum. Consequently in this practical point of view their possibility must be *assumed*, although we cannot theoretically know and understand it. To justify this assumption it is sufficient in a practical point of view that they contain no intrinsic impossibility (contradiction). Here we have what, as far as speculative Reason is concerned, is a merely *subjective* principle of assent, which, however, is *objectively* valid for a Reason equally pure but practical, and this principle, by means of the notion of freedom, assures objective validity and authority to the ideas of God and immortality. Nevertheless the theoretical knowledge of reason is not hereby enlarged, but only the possibility is given, which heretofore was merely a *problem*, and now becomes *assertion*, and thus the practical use of reason is connected with the elements of theoretical reason.

BOOK I.—ANALYTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

CHAPTER I.—THE PRINCIPLES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

§ 1.

Practical *Principles* are propositions which contain a general determination of the will, having under it several practical rules. They are subjective, or *Maxims*, when the condition is regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will, but are objective, or practical *laws*, when the condition is recognised as objective, that is, valid for the will of every rational being.

§ 2. Theorem 1.

All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will, are empirical, and can furnish no practical laws. By the matter of the faculty of desire I mean an object the actual existence of which is desired. Now if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule, and is the condition

given to it
ly in this
assumed,
erstand it.
tical point
y (contra-
ve Reason
nt, which,
pure but
on of free-
e ideas of
cal know-
the possi-
blem, and
of reason
on.

ASON.

REASON.

contain a
it several
when the
ly for his
n the con-
r the will

ject (mat-
rmination
tical laws.
bject the
desire for
condition

of our making it a principle, then I say, *in the first place*, this principle is in that case wholly empirical, for then what determines the choice is the idea of an object, and that relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called the *pleasure* in the existence of an object. This then must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of determination of the will. But it is impossible to know *a priori* of any idea of an object whether it will be connected with *pleasure* or *pain*, or be indifferent. In such cases, therefore, the determining principle of the choice must be empirical, and, therefore, also the practical material principle which presupposed it as a condition.

In the second place, since susceptibility to a pleasure or pain can be known only empirically, and cannot hold in the same degree for all rational beings, a principle which is based on this subjective condition may serve indeed as a *maxim* for the subject which possesses this susceptibility, but not as a *law* even to him, (because it is wanting in objective necessity, which must be recognised *a priori*); it follows, therefore, that such a principle can never furnish a practical law.

§ 3. Theorem 2.

All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind, and come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness.

Pleasure arising from the idea of the existence of a thing, in so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is founded on the *susceptibility* of the subject, since it *depends* on the presence of an object; hence it belongs to sense (feeling), and not to understanding, which expresses a relation of the idea *to an object* according to notions, not to the subject according to feelings. It is then practical only in so far as the faculty of desire is determined by the sensation of agreeableness which the subject expects from the actual existence of the object. Now a rational being's conscious-

ness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence is happiness, and the principle which makes this the supreme ground of determination of the will is the principle of self-love.

Corollary.

All *material* practical rules place the determining principle of the will in the *lower desires*, and if there were no *purely formal* laws of the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit *any higher desire* at all.

§ 4. Theorem 3.

A rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by their matter, but by their form only.

By the matter of a practical principle I mean the object of the will. This object is either the determining ground of the will or it is not. In the former case the rule of the will is subjected to an empirical condition (*viz.*, the relation of the determining idea to the feeling of pleasure and pain), consequently it cannot be a practical law. Now, when we abstract from a law all matter, *i.e.*, every object of the will (as a determining principle) nothing is left but the mere *form* of a universal legislation. Therefore either a rational being cannot conceive his subjective practical principles, that is, his maxims as being at the same time universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere form by which they are fitted for universal legislation is alone what makes them practical laws.

§ 5. Problem 1.

Supposing that the mere legislative form of maxims is alone the sufficient determining principle of a will, to find the nature of the will which can be determined by it alone.

Since the bare form of the law can only be conceived by

company-
able which
the will

ng prin-
were no
rmine it,

practical
es which
eir form

ne object
ground
e of the
relation
nd pain),
when we
the will
ne mere
rational
inciples,
al laws,
they are
es them

axims is
to find
it alone.
ived by

reason, and is therefore not an object of the senses, and consequently does not belong to the class of phenomena, it follows that the idea of it, which determines the will, is distinct from all the principles that determine events in nature according to the law of causality, because in their case the determining principles must themselves be phenomena. Now, if no other determining principle can serve as a law for the will except that universal legislative form, such a will must be conceived as quite independent on the natural law of phenomena in their mutual relation, namely, the law of causality; such independence is called *freedom* in the strictest, that is in the transcendental sense; consequently, a will which can have its law in nothing but the mere legislative form of the maxim is a free will.

§ 6. Problem 2.

Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is competent to determine it necessarily.

Since the matter of the practical law, *i.e.*, an object of the maxim, can never be given otherwise than empirically, and the free will is independent on empirical conditions (that is conditions belonging to the world of sense) and yet is determinable, consequently a free will must find its principle of determination in the law, and yet independently of the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing is contained in it except the legislative form. It is the legislative form, then, contained in the maxim, which can alone constitute a principle of determination of the will.

Fundamental law of the pure Practical Reason.

Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

Corollary.

Pure reason is practical of itself alone, and gives (to man) a universal law which we call the *Moral Law*.

§ 8. Theorem 4.

The *Autonomy* of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them ; on the other hand, *heteronomy* of the will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof, and to the morality of the will. In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independence on all matter of the law (namely, a desired object), and in the determination of the will by the mere universal legislative form of which its maxim must be capable. Now this *independence* is *freedom* in the *negative* sense, and this *self-legislation* of the pure, and, therefore, practical reason, is freedom in the *positive* sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing else than the *autonomy* of the pure practical reason, that is, of freedom ; and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and on this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law. If therefore the matter of the volition, which can be nothing else than the object of a desire that is connected with the law, enters into the practical law, *as the condition of its possibility*, there results heteronomy of choice, namely, dependence on the physical law that we should follow some impulse or inclination. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but only the precept how rationally to follow pathological laws ; and the maxim, which, in such a case, never contains the universally legislative form, not only produces no obligation, but is itself opposed to the principle of a pure practical reason, and, therefore, also, to the moral disposition, even though the resulting action may be conformable to the law.

Deduction of the fundamental principles of the pure
Practical Reason.

This Analytic shows that pure reason can be practical, that is, can of itself determine the will independently of anything empirical ; and this it proves by a fact in which pure reason in us proves itself actually practical, namely,

ple of all
them ; on
cannot be
, opposed
will. In
independ-
ject), and
rsal legis-
Now this
at this *self*-
reason, is
expresses
al reason,
condition
they agree
matter of
bject of a
the prac-
re results
physical
tion. In
only the
; and the
e univer-
ation, but
al reason,
n though
w.

re

practical,
lently of
n which
namely,

the autonomy shewn in the fundamental principle of morality, by which Reason determines the will to action.

It shows at the same time that this fact is inseparably connected with the consciousness of freedom of the will; nay, is identical with it; and by this the will of a rational being, although as belonging to the world of sense it recognises itself as necessarily subject to the laws of causality like other efficient causes, yet, at the same time, on another side, namely, as a being in itself, is conscious of existing in and being determined by an intelligible order of things; conscious not by virtue of a special perception of itself, but by virtue of certain dynamical laws which determine its causality in the sensible world; for it has been elsewhere proved that if freedom is predicated of us, it transports us into an intelligible order of things.

The moral law gives to the world of sense, which is a sensible system of nature, the form of a world of the understanding, that is, of a *supersensible system of nature*, without interfering with its mechanism. Now, a system of nature, in the most general sense, is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of rational beings in general is their existence under laws empirically conditioned, which, from the point of view of reason, is *heteronomy*. The supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws which are independent on every empirical condition, and, therefore, belong to the *autonomy* of pure reason. And, since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition are practical, supersensible nature, so far as we can form any notion of it, is nothing else than a *system of nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason*. For the moral law, in fact, transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with adequate physical power, would produce the *summum bonum*, and it determines our will to give the sensible world the form of a system of rational beings.

Hence the distinction between the laws of a natural sys-

tem to which the *will is subject*, and of a natural system which is *subject to a will* rests on this, that in the former the objects must be causes of the ideas which determine the will; whereas, in the latter the will is the cause of the objects; so that its causality has its determining principle solely in the pure faculty of reason, which may therefore be called a pure practical reason.

The *Exposition* of the supreme principle of practical reason is now finished. The objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, whether speculative or empirically supported, and, therefore, even if we renounced its apodictic certainty, it could not be proved *a posteriori* by experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself.

But instead of this vainly sought deduction of the moral principle, something else is found which was quite unexpected, namely, that this moral principle serves conversely as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, but of which speculative reason was compelled at least to assume the possibility (in order to find amongst its cosmological ideas the unconditioned in the chain of causality, so as not to contradict itself),—I mean the faculty of freedom. The moral law which itself does not require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognise this law as binding on themselves. The moral law is in fact a law of the causality of free agents, and therefore of the possibility of a supersensible system of nature, just as the metaphysical law of events in the world of sense was a law of causality of the sensible system of nature; and it therefore determines what speculative philosophy was compelled to leave undetermined, namely, the law for a causality, the notion of which in the latter was only negative; and therefore for the first time gives this notion objective reality.

al system
ne former
rmine the
f the ob-
principle
therefore

actical rea-
ty of the
ny efforts
npirically
apodictic
perience,

he moral
ite unex-
onversely
e faculty
eculative
bility (in
e uncon-
ontradict
moral law
oves not
y belongs
emselves.
ee agents,
system of
he world
system of
tive phil-
nely, the
atter was
gives this

CHAPTER II.—THE NOTION OF AN OBJECT OF PURE
PRACTICAL REASON.

The judgment, whether a thing is an object of pure practical Reason or not, does not depend at all on the comparison with our physical power; and the question is only whether we should *will* an action that is directed to the existence of an object, if the object were in our power; hence the previous question is only as to the *moral possibility* of the action, for in this case it is not the object, but the law of the will, that is the determining principle of the action. The only objects of practical Reason are therefore those of *good* and *evil*. For by the former it meant an object necessarily desired according to a principle of Reason; by the latter one necessarily shunned, also according to a principle of Reason.

Since pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an object *a priori*, the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his moral judgments would call that *good* which is a *means* to the pleasant, and *evil* what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain. The practical maxims which would follow from the aforesaid principle of the good being merely a means, would never contain as the object of the will anything good in itself, but only something *good for something*; the good would always be merely the useful, and that for which it is useful must always lie outside the will, in sensation.

Well or *ill* always implies only a reference to our condition, as *pleasant* or *unpleasant*, as one of pleasure or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object on this account, it is only so far as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain that it produces. But *good* or *evil* always implies a reference to the *will*, as determined by the *law of reason*, to make something its object. Good and evil therefore are properly referred to actions, not to the sensations of the person, and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely, or is to be so esteemed, it can only be the

manner of acting, the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man that can be so called, and not a thing.


Either a rational principle is already conceived, as of itself the determining principle of the will, without regard to possible objects of desire (and therefore by the mere legislative form of the maxim), and in that case that principle is a practical *a priori* law, and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself. The law in that case determines the will directly; the action conformed to it is *good in itself*; a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is *good absolutely in every respect*, and is the *supreme condition of all good*. Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain, something therefore that *pleases* or *displeases*, and the maxim of reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter, determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination, that is, good indirectly (*i.e.*, relatively to a different end to which they are means), and in that case these maxims can never be called laws, but may be called rational practical precepts.

The notions of good and evil, as consequences of the *a priori* determination of the will, imply also a pure practical principle, and therefore a causality of pure reason; they are all modes (*modi*) of a single category, namely, that of causality, the determining principle of which consists in the rational conception of a law, which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself, thereby *a priori* proving itself practical. However as the actions *on the one side* come under a law which is not a physical law, but a law of freedom, and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in the world of intelligence, yet on the *other side* as events in the world of sense they belong to phenomena; hence the determinations of a practical reason are only possible in reference to the latter, and therefore in accordance with the categories of the understanding; not indeed with a view to any theoretical employment of it, *i.e.*, so as to bring the manifold of

quently
t can be

as of it-
egard to
re legis-
principle
posed to
ines the
itself;
good ab-
n of all
a deter-
ject of
or *dis-*
rsue the
as good
ly (*i.e.*,
s), and
ut may

f the *a*
ractical
hey are
of caus-
in the
freedom
lf prac-
e under
om, and
e world
e world
ermina-
ence to
egories
ny the-
ifold of



(sensible) perception under one consciousness *a priori*; but only to subject the manifold of *desires* to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason, giving its commands in the moral law, *i.e.*, to a pure will *a priori*.

Type of the Pure Practical Judgment.

It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the will. They themselves, however, are subject to a practical rule of reason, which, if it is pure reason, determines the will *a priori* relatively to its object. Now, whether an action which is possible to us in the world of sense, comes under the rule or not, is a question to be decided by the practical Judgment, by which what is said in the rule universally (*in abstracto*) is applied to an action *in concreto*.

The moral law has no faculty but the understanding to aid its application to physical objects (not the imagination); and the understanding for the purposes of the Judgment can provide for an idea of the reason, not a *schema* of the sensibility, but a law, though only as to its forms as law; such a law, however, as can be exhibited *in concreto* in objects of the senses, and, therefore, a law of nature. We can therefore call this law the *Type* of the moral law.

The rule of the Judgment according to laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the system of nature of which you were yourself a part, you could regard it as possible by your own will. Everyone does, in fact, decide by this rule whether actions are good or evil.

It is therefore allowable to use the *system of the world of sense* as the *type* of a *supersensible system of things*, provided I do not transfer to the latter the perceptions, and what depends on them, but merely refer to it the *form of law* in general. For laws, as such, are so far identical, no matter from what they derive their determining principles.

CHAPTER III.—THE MOTIVES OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

What is essential in the moral worth of actions is *that the moral law should directly determine the will*. If the determination of the will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral law, but only by means of a feeling, no matter of what kind, which has to be presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not *for the sake of the law*, then the action will possess *legality* but not *morality*. Now, if we understand by *motive* the subjective ground of determination of the will of a being whose Reason does not necessarily conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature, then it will follow, first, that no motives can be attributed to the Divine will, and that the motives of the human will (as well as that of every created rational being) can never be anything else than the moral law, and consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of the action, if this is not merely to fulfil the *letter* of the law without containing its *spirit*.


Pure practical reason only *checks* selfishness, looking on it as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law, so far as to limit it to the condition of agreement with this law, and then it is called *rational self-love*. But vanity Reason *strikes down* altogether, since all claims to self-esteem which precede agreement with the moral law are vain and unjustifiable. Therefore, the moral law breaks down self-conceit. But as this law is something positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect; for by opposing the subjective antagonisms of the inclinations it *weakens* self-conceit, and since it even *breaks down*, that is, humiliates vanity, it is an object of the highest respect, and consequently is the foundation of a positive feeling which is not of empirical origin, but is known *a priori*. Therefore, respect for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by

REASON.

that the
the de-
deed to
matter of
that the
erefore
essess le-
motive
a being
jective
y, first,
ill, and
f every
an the
iple of
subject-
f this is
taining

ing on
al law,
th this
vanity
to self-
aw are
breaks
itive in
that is,
posing
eakens
numili-
d con-
hich is
efore,
ced by

[The text on this page is extremely faint and illegible.]



an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite *a priori*, and the necessity of which we can perceive.

While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining principle of action by practical pure reason, and is moreover a material though only objective determining principle of the objects of action as called good and evil, it is also a subjective determining principle, that is, a motive to this action, inasmuch as it has influence on the morality of the subject, and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on the will. The respect for the law is not a motive to morality, but is morality itself subjectively considered as a motive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the rival pretensions of self-love, gives authority to the law which now alone has influence. Now it is to be observed that as respect is an effect on feeling, and therefore on the sensibility of a rational being, it presupposes this sensibility, and therefore also the finiteness of such beings on whom the moral law imposes respect; and that respect for the *law* cannot be attributed to a supreme being or to any being free from all sensibility, and in whom therefore this sensibility cannot be an obstacle to practical reason.

Respect for the moral law is therefore the only and the undoubted moral motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, except on the ground of this law.

Critical examination of the analytic of Pure Practical Reason.

In order to remove the apparent contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and the same action, we must remember what was said in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, or what follows therefrom; viz., that the necessity of nature, which cannot co-exist with the freedom of the subject, appertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to time-conditions, consequently only to those of the acting subject as a phenomenon; that therefore in this respect the determining principles of every action of

the same reside in what belongs to past time, and *is no longer in his power* (in which must be included his own past actions and the character that these may determine for him in his own eyes as a phenomenon). But the very same subject being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself, considers his existence also *in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions*, and regards himself, as only determinable by laws which he gives himself through reason; and in this his existence nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will, but every action, and in general every modification of his existence varying according to his internal sense, even the whole series of his existence as a sensible being, is in the consciousness of his supersensible existence nothing but the result, and never to be regarded as the determining principle, of his causality as a noumenon. In this view now the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he performs, that he could very well have left it undone; although as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past, and in this respect is absolutely necessary; for it, with all the past which determines it, belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character which he makes for himself, in consequence of which he imputes the causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent on sensibility.

There still remains a difficulty in the combination of freedom with the mechanism of nature in a being belonging to the world of sense.

The difficulty is as follows:—Even if it is admitted that the supersensible subject can be free with respect to a given action, although as a subject also belonging to the world of sense, he is under mechanical conditions with respect to the same action, still, as soon as we allow that God as universal first cause is also *the cause of the existence of substance* it seems as if we must admit that a man's actions have their determining principle in something *which is wholly out of his power*—namely, in the causality of a Supreme Being distinct from himself, and on whom his own existence and

and is no
his own
termine
ne very
myself as
far as
myself, as
through
dent to
in gen-
ording
istence
persen-
to be re-
ity as a
n justly
e could
nce it is
pect is
n deter-
is char-
which
myself as

of free-
ging to

and that
a given
world of
to the
iversal
nance it
e their
out of
Being
ce and

n
i
a
c
e
n

si
re
gi
th

the whole determination of his causality are absolutely dependent.

The difficulty is resolved briefly and clearly as follows:— If existence *in time* is a mere sensible mode of representation belonging to thinking beings in the world, and consequently does not apply to them as things in themselves, then the creation of these beings is a creation of things in themselves, since the notion of creation does not belong to the sensible form of representation of existence or to causality, but can only be referred to noumena. Consequently, when I say of beings in the world of sense that they are created, I so far regard them as noumena. As it would be a contradiction, therefore, to say that God is a creator of appearances, so also it is a contradiction to say that as creator He is the cause of actions in the world of sense, and, therefore as appearances, although He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (which are noumena). If now it is possible to affirm freedom in spite of the natural mechanism of actions as appearances (by regarding existence in time as something that belongs only to appearances, not to things in themselves), then the circumstance that the acting beings are creatures cannot make the slightest difference, since creation concerns their supersensible and not their sensible existence, and therefore cannot be regarded as the determining principle of the appearances.

DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON.

CHAPTER I.—DIALECTIC OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON GENERALLY.

Pure reason always has its dialectic, whether it is considered in its speculative or its practical employment, for it requires the absolute totality of the conditions of what is given conditioned, and this can only be found in things in themselves.

It may be seen in detail in the *Kritik of Pure Reason* how

in its speculative employment this natural dialectic is to be solved, and how the error which arises from a very natural illusion may be guarded against. But reason in its practical use is not a whit better off. As pure practical reason it likewise seeks to find the unconditioned for the practically conditioned (which rests on inclinations and natural wants), and this not as the determining principle of the will, but even when this is given (in the moral law) it seeks the unconditioned totality of the *object* of pure practical reason under the name of the *Summum Bonum*.

The moral law is the sole determining principle of a pure will. But since this is merely formal (viz: as prescribing only the form of the maxim as universally legislative) it abstracts as a determining principle from all matter, that is to say, from every object of volition. Hence though the *summum bonum* may be the whole *object* of a pure practical reason, *i.e.*, a pure will, yet it is not on that account to be regarded as its *determining principle*; and the moral law alone must be regarded as the principle on which that and its realization or promotion are aimed at. If we assume any object under the name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the moral law, and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, this would always introduce heteronomy and crush out the moral principle.

CHAPTER II.—THE DIALECTIC OF PURE REASON IN DEFINING
THE CONCEPTION OF THE SUMMUM BONUM.

The conception of the *summum* itself contains an ambiguity which might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it. The *summum* may mean either the supreme (*supremum*) or the perfect (*consummatum*). The former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, *i.e.*, is not subordinate to any other (*originarium*): the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind (*perfectissimum*). It has been shown in the An-

to be
natural
prac-
reason
tically
wants),
ill, but
he un-
reason

a pure
ribing
) it ab-
at is to
e sum-
actical
t to be
al law
at and
assume
g prin-
deduce
always
iple.

DEFINING

an am-
we did
the su-
) The
ed, *i.e.*,
second
e of the
the An-

o
l
i
l
f
n
e
b
i
c
t
i
p
h
o
s

be
ne
pu
to
th
m
lu
m
in
no
im
eff
wi

alytic that *virtue* (as worthiness to be happy) is the *supreme condition* of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the *supreme good*. But it does not follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires of rational finite beings: for this requires happiness also, and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end; but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which regards persons in general as ends in themselves. Now inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the *summum bonum* in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the *summum bonum* of a possible world; hence this *summum bonum* expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition.

I. The Antinomy of Practical Reason.

In the *summum bonum* which is practical for us, *i.e.*, to be realised by our will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined, so that the one cannot be assumed by pure practical reason without the other also being attached to it; consequently either the desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. The first is *absolutely impossible*, because (as was proved in the Analytic) maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire of personal happiness are not moral at all, and no virtue can be founded on them. But the second is *also impossible*, because the practical connexion of causes and effects in the world as the result of the determination of the will, does not depend upon the moral dispositions of the

will, but on the knowledge of the laws of nature and the physical power to use them for one's purposes.

II. Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason.

The first of the two propositions: That the endeavour after happiness produces a virtuous mind, is *absolutely false*; but the second: That a virtuous mind necessarily produces happiness, is *not absolutely false*, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a rational being; it is then only *conditionally false*. But as I am not only justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding, but even have in the moral law a purely intellectual determining principle of my causality (in the sensible world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a connexion as cause with happiness (as an effect in the sensible world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz: through an intelligent author of nature), and moreover necessary.

IV. The Immortality of the Soul as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.

The realization of the summum bonum in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law. But in this will the *perfect accordance* of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition of the summum bonum. This then must be possible, as well as its object, since it is contained in the command to promote the latter. Now the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a *progress in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.

the

your

else;

duces

virtue

world,

the

only

think-

the un-

y in-

sen-

mind

as an

diate

more-

ld is

moral

mind

mum

object,

atter.

l law

f the


ence.

sary,

wards

prac-

pro-



Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum then practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality being inseparably connected with the moral law is a Postulate of pure practical reason: (by which I mean a *theoretical* proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an unconditioned *a priori* practical law).

V. The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason.

The moral law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the summum bonum, viz., Happiness proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect, in other words it must postulate the *existence of God*; as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason.)

Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom *everything goes according to his wish and will*; it rests therefore on the harmony of physical nature with his whole end, and likewise with the essential determining principle of his will. Now the moral law as a law of freedom commands by determining principles which ought to be quite independent on nature and on its harmony with our faculty of desire (as springs). But the acting rational being in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground therefore in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thor-

oughly harmonise, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, *i.e.*, the necessary pursuit of the summum bonum, such a connexion is postulated as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum, which therefore must be possible. Accordingly the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this connexion, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also *postulated*. Now this supreme cause must contain the principle of the harmony of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this *law* in so far as they make it the *supreme determining principle of the will*, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral character. Therefore the summum bonum is possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme Nature having a causality corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the conception of laws, is an *intelligence* (a rational being) and the causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his *will*; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum, is a being which is the cause of nature by *intelligence* and *will*, consequently its author, that is God.

VI. The Postulates of Pure Practical Reason in General.

These postulates are not theoretical dogmas, but suppositions practically necessary; while then they do not extend our speculative knowledge, they give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their reference to what is practical), and give it a right to notions, the possibility even of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm.

These postulates are those of *immortality, freedom* positively considered (as the causality of a being so far as he

with
tical
of the
eces-
mum
y the
re it-
mely,
s also
n the
a law
of this
rmin-
erely
their
efore
on the
sality
hat is
ntelli-
being
efore
sed as
is the
tly its

l.

ppos-
ot ex-
reality
ans of
ght to
erwise

n pos-
as he

b
T
a
la
e
o
is
th
w
th

th
o
c
th
in
re
fo
th
n
P
th
P
fe

belongs to the intelligible world), and the *existence of God*. The *first* results from the practically necessary condition of a duration adequate to the complete fulfilment of the moral law; the *second* from the necessary supposition of independence on the sensible world and of the faculty of determining one's will according to the law of an intelligible world, that is, of freedom; the *third* from the necessary condition of the existence of the summum bonum in such an intelligible world, by the supposition of the supreme independent good, that is, the existence of God.

VIII. Belief from a Requirement of Pure Reason.

A requirement of pure *practical* reason is based on a *duty*, that of making something (the summum bonum) the object of my will so as to promote it with all my powers; in which case I must suppose its possibility, and consequently also the conditions necessary thereto, namely, God, freedom, and immortality; since I cannot prove these by my speculative reason, although neither can I refute them. This duty is founded on something that is indeed quite independent on these suppositions, and is of itself apodictically certain, namely, the moral law; and so far it needs no further support by theoretical views as to the inner constitution of things, the secret final aim of the order of the world, or a presiding ruler thereof, in order to bind me in the most perfect manner to act in unconditional conformity to the law.

KRITIK OF JUDGMENT.

PREFACE.

The object of this work is to make a critical examination of Judgment, the faculty which forms the connecting link between Understanding and Reason. The questions to be considered are these: Are there *a priori* principles of Judgment? Are these constitutive or merely regulative? Does Judgment give rules *a priori* to the feeling of pleasure and pain, as Understanding prescribes laws to knowledge and Reason to desire?

From the nature of the case it is easy to see how very difficult it must be to show that there is any principle peculiar to judgment. For such a principle cannot be derived *a priori* from notions of the understanding, since judgment does not originate such notions, but merely applies them. Judgment must rather supply a notion which serves as a rule for its own guidance, without adding anything to our knowledge of things.

The difficulty of finding any principle of judgment, whether it be subjective or objective, is felt most keenly in the case of aesthetic judgments,—those, namely, which are concerned with the beautiful and the sublime, either in nature or in art. And indeed the critical search for the principle of aesthetic judgment is the main object of the Kritik of Judgment. The case is different with the logical judgment in its application to nature. Here experience shows that things are under law, and yet cannot be adequately understood or explained by the general notions of the understanding. Judgment, however, can find in itself a principle by which the sensible world may be brought

ation
link
to be
Judg-
Does
e and
and

very
e pe-
rived
ment
them.
as a
o our

ment,
ly in
n are
n na-
prin-
ritik
gical
ence
ade-
ns of
itself
ught

in
a
In
a
of
pe

in
the
con
qu
osc
jec
cif
tin
on
I
res
of
sib
the
pri
wh
pra
The
Pra
cati
the
bee
tur
iden
phil
sinc

into relation with the unknowable supersensible, but only as a means to the knowledge of nature needed for its own ends. In this way that principle may, and indeed must, be applied *a priori* in the knowledge of the world, and so applied it is of service to the practical reason in opening up a wider prospect.

INTRODUCTION.

I. Division of Philosophy.

Formal Logic deals only with the principles of thought in general, apart from any distinction of the objects of thought. Philosophy, on the other hand, in so far as it contains principles of the rational knowledge of things, is quite correctly divided into Theoretical and Practical philosophy. At the same time the notions which assign an object to these principles of rational knowledge, must be specifically distinct, for there can be no authority for the distinction of a science into different parts unless the principles on which each rests are themselves opposed.

Now there are two kinds of notions making possible their respective objects, namely, notions of nature and the notion of freedom. The former make theoretical knowledge possible in accordance with principles, the latter in regard to theoretical knowledge is merely the condition of a negative principle, but is yet the source of fundamental propositions which enlarge the sphere of the will, and are therefore called practical. Philosophy is therefore properly divided into Theoretical philosophy or the Philosophy of Nature, and Practical or Moral philosophy. Hitherto a gross misapplication of these terms has prevailed, both in the division of the principles and in the division of philosophy. It has been supposed that the practical resting on notions of Nature and the practical resting on the notion of Freedom are identical, and hence a division into theoretical and practical philosophy has been made which is really no division at all, since both parts may have one and the same principle.

The will as a faculty of desire is simply one of the many natural causes in the world, namely, that which acts from notions. Everything which is possible or necessary by volition is said to be practically possible or practically necessary, and with this is contrasted the physically possible or necessary, *i.e.*, whatever is the effect of a cause which acts, not by means of notions, but by the mechanism of lifeless matter or by animal instinct. Thus the question is in no way settled, whether it is a notion of Nature or a notion of Freedom which gives the rule when the will acts as cause.


The distinction however is of the greatest consequence. For if a notion of Nature determines the will the principles are technically-practical, whereas if it is the notion of Freedom the principles are morally-practical. And as the divisions of a science of reason are determined by the nature of the principles on which either rests, the former will belong to Theoretical philosophy (science of Nature), the latter to Practical philosophy (science of Morals).

All technically-practical rules of art and skill, or of that practical sagacity which gives us a command over men and enables us to influence their wills, so far as their principles rest on notions, must be regarded as corollaries of Theoretical philosophy. . . . Only as standing under the notion of freedom is the will free from Nature, and the laws of freedom together with their consequences alone constitute Practical philosophy. The practical arts of surveying, housekeeping, farming, statesmanship; dietetics, &c., and even the precepts by which happiness may be attained, are merely technically-practical rules. Only those rules which rest on the notion of freedom are morally practical. They are laws which do not, like those of Nature, rest on sensuous conditions, but on the contrary on a supersensible principle, and hence they form a separate branch of philosophy, under the name of Practical philosophy.

any
from
vo-
eces-
le or
acts,
eless
n no
on of
ase.

ence.
iples
Free-
e di-
ure of
elong
ter to

that
n and
ciples
eoret-
otion
aws of
stitute
eying,
, and
ed, are
which
They
sensu-
e prin-
osophy,



II. The Realm of Philosophy.

The term *field* simply defines the general relation of an object to our faculty of knowledge, no matter whether the notion of that object makes knowledge of it possible or not. That part of a field in which knowledge is possible, is a solid ground or *territory* (territorium) for notions and their appropriate faculty. That part of the territory, again, for which laws are prescribed in notions, is the domain or *realm* (ditio) of these notions and their correspondent faculty. Empirical notions have therefore nature as the sum of sensible objects for their territory; but that territory is for them not a realm but merely a *dwelling-place* (domicilium), for although they are under law they are not themselves the source of law, and hence the rules based upon them are empirical or contingent.

Although Understanding and Reason operate on the same territory of experience, their laws are distinct and do not interfere with one another. The notions applicable to nature have as little influence on the law of freedom as the latter on the former. In the sensible world each realm is perpetually limited by the other, but in their laws they are perfectly independent. The reason why they do not constitute one realm is that the notion of nature has a meaning only in relation to objects of perception or phenomena, not to things in themselves, whilst the object of freedom is intelligible as a thing in itself, but cannot be given in a perception. There can, therefore, be no theoretical knowledge of either realm as a thing in itself or supersensible object.

The whole unlimited field of the supersensible thus lies entirely beyond our knowledge, and affords no solid ground, and therefore no realm, either for understanding or for reason. This field we must indeed occupy with Ideas in the interest of theoretical as well as of practical reason, but we can produce no other warrant for our occupation of it than a practical one, and so far as theoretical knowledge is concerned the supersensible remains as far beyond our reach as ever.

Between the sensible realm of nature and the supersensible realm of freedom a gulf is fixed, as impassable by theoretical reason as if there were two separate worlds. Nevertheless it lies in the very idea of freedom to realize in the world of sense the end presented in its laws, and hence nature in its formal aspect as conformable to law must at least be capable of harmonising with that end. There must, then, be a principle which *unites* the supersensible substrate of nature with the supersensible contained practically in the notion of freedom. And although that principle does not lead to a knowledge of the supersensible, and hence has no realm peculiarly its own, it yet enables the mind to make the transition from the theoretical to the practical point of view.

III. The Kritik of Judgment as connecting link between the two divisions of Philosophy.

There are three absolutely irreducible faculties of the mind, namely, Knowledge, Feeling and Desire. The laws governing the theoretical knowledge of nature as a phenomenon the Understanding supplies in its pure *a priori* notions. The laws to which desire must conform are prescribed *a priori* by Reason in the notion of freedom Between knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure and pain, just as judgment mediates between understanding and reason We must therefore suppose judgment to have an *a priori* principle of its own as well as understanding and reason. And as pleasure or pain is necessarily associated with desire, either preceding it as in the lower desires or following it when desire is determined by relation to the moral law, we must further suppose that judgment makes possible at once the transition from mere knowledge or the realm of nature to the realm of freedom, and in its logical use the transition from understanding to reason.


IV. Judgment as a Faculty of *a priori* laws.

Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the par-

en-
he-
ver-
the
na-
east
en,
e of
the
not
no
ake
t of

the
aws
phe-
riori
pre-
.....
asure
ding
ment
nder-
arily
ower
ation
ment
edge
n its
n.

y par-



ticular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular under it is *determining*. But if only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, the judgment is merely *reflective*.

The determining judgment subsumes particulars under the universal transcendental laws supplied by the understanding, and has no need to seek for a law of its own by means of which the particulars of nature may be brought under the universal. But nature has many forms, or modifications of the universal transcendental notions, as we may call them, and these are unaffected by the *a priori* laws of the understanding, which are but the general conditions, without which nature as a sensible object would not be possible at all. There must, therefore, be laws for those forms also, and such laws as empirical may be contingent so far as *our* intelligence is concerned, and may yet be regarded as following necessarily from a principle, which is the condition of the unity of the multifarious forms of nature, although it is unknown to us. The reflective judgment, which is compelled to ascend from the particular to the universal, therefore requires a principle of its own; and that principle it cannot borrow from experience, because it is to unite all empirical principles under higher ones, and so to make their systematic connexion possible.

The principle of judgment as reflective must therefore be conceived as if it were a unity imposed on nature by an intelligence different from our ours, to enable us to reduce our knowledge of nature to a system of particular laws. We cannot, however, assert that there actually is an intelligence of this kind, for judgment does not give a law to nature but only to itself.

Now a notion which contains the ground of the actuality of an object is an *end*, and the agreement of a thing with a character which is only possible in accordance with ends, is the *adaptation* of its form to an end. The principle of judgment, in its relation to the forms of things which come

under empirical laws in general, is thus the *adaptation of nature* in its manifold variety to an end. That is to say, nature is conceived as if the unity of its manifold empirical laws were due to an intelligence.

V. Formal adaptation in Nature a Transcendental Principle of Judgment.

A transcendental principle of judgment is one which enables us to think *a priori* the universal condition without which things could not be objects of our knowledge at all. A metaphysical principle, on the other hand, is one through which we think *a priori* the condition without which objects, the notion of which must be given empirically, cannot be further determined *a priori*. Thus the principle that the changes of empirical substances must have a cause is transcendental; but if we say that their changes must have an *external* cause, the principle is metaphysical. In the former case, such merely ontological predicates or pure notions as *substance* are employed; in the latter case, the empirical notion of a body as a movable thing in space is required, although when this is once obtained the predicate of motion by external causes may be deduced quite *a priori*. Now the principle of nature's adaptation to an end is a transcendental principle. For the notion of objects, so far as they are thought as standing under this principle, is merely the pure notion of objects of possible experience in general, and contains nothing empirical. But the principle of practical adaptation to an end, as implied in the *Idéa* of the *determination* of a free will, is a metaphysical principle, because the notion of desire must be given empirically. At the same time neither principle is empirical but *a priori*, for the predicate may be connected with the empirical notion forming the subject of the judgment completely *a priori*, and without any new experience.

That the notion of nature's adaptation to an end is a transcendental principle is sufficiently obvious from the *a priori* maxims of judgment employed in scientific enquiries

on of
to say,
irical

ple

h en-
thout
at all.
rough
h ob-
can-
nciple
cause
must
l. In
r pure
e, the
e is re-
cate of
riori.
trans-
s they
ly the
al, and
cal ad-
mina-
the no-
e time
edicate
ng the
without

d is a
n the a
quiries

f
t
y
f
t
(
H
t
i
t
c
t
a
n
n
c
f



into the specific laws of nature. Such maxims are continually cropping up, as occasion demands, in the shape of axioms of metaphysical wisdom: "Nature takes the shortest way (*lex parsimoniae*)"; "Nature makes no leaps (*lex continui in natura*)"; "Nature has many laws, but few principles (*principia propter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda*)", &c.



To attempt an explanation of the origin of these propositions psychologically is to go straight against their sense. For they do not tell us what happens, *i.e.*, by what rule our faculties operate and how that rule is judged, but how it has to be judged; and a logical necessity of this sort is inexplicable if those principles are merely empirical. The adaptation of nature to an end is therefore a transcendental principle, and requires a transcendental deduction.

That which is at once seen to be necessary in the grounds making experience possible are the universal laws, without which nature, as an object of sense, is not conceivable at all; and these laws rest on the categories in their application to the formal *a priori* conditions of all experience that we can have.




In relation to these laws judgment is determining, its sole function being to subsume particulars under the laws given to it. Thus understanding says: Every change has a cause (universal law of nature); transcendental judgment merely presents *a priori* the condition on which subsumption under the notion placed before it takes place, *i.e.*, the succession in the determinations of one and the same thing. That law is known, then, as an absolutely necessary condition of nature as an object of possible experience. But the objects of empirical knowledge are determined in many other ways than by the formal condition of time; at any rate we may at least say *a priori* that they are capable of being determined in many other ways. Hence the specific forms of nature may be caused not only in virtue of their common character as belonging to nature in general, but in an infinite variety of ways; and as a cause each species must







**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

0
11
E E E E E
16 18 20 22 25

11
16 18 20 22 25

have its own necessary rule or law, although we may be unable to comprehend the necessity of the rule, from the nature and limits of our knowledge. We must therefore suppose the empirical laws of nature to be possibly infinitely various, and to be for us contingent or incapable of being known *a priori*. So far as these empirical laws are concerned nature, as a possible unity of experience or system of laws, must accordingly be regarded as contingent. At the same time we must presuppose and assume such a unity, for otherwise the thoroughgoing connexion of empirical knowledge in a whole of experience would be impossible. The universal laws of nature no doubt enable us to connect things in a system so far as they are viewed as belonging to nature in the most general sense of the term, but not to connect them in their specific character as particular modes of nature. Judgment must therefore assume *a priori*, as a principle required for its own use, that what in the empirical laws of nature is from our human point of view contingent, yet involves a unity in the connexion of the multifarious laws of nature capable of being experienced, a unity which is certainly thinkable although it cannot be comprehended by us. Now a unity which is demanded by our intelligence, but which as known is contingent, is conceived of as the adaptation of objects to an end. Judgment, in relation to things that may stand under empirical laws not yet discovered, is merely reflective, and is compelled to think of nature in its special laws according to the *principle of adaptation* as regards our knowledge; a principle which is expressed in the maxims of judgment cited above. This transcendental notion of adaptation in nature is neither a notion of nature nor a notion of freedom, for it attributes nothing to nature as an object, but merely represents the way in which we must necessarily proceed in reflecting on natural objects with a view to a thoroughly connected experience. It is therefore a subjective principle or maxim of judgment.

ay be
m the
efore
nitely
being
con-
ystem
At
nity,
irical
sible.
nnect
ng to
not to
odes
ri, as
e em-
view
f the
ed, a
com-
y our
eived
nt, in
s not
ed to
ciple
which
This
er a
butes
s the
g on
l ex-
axim

l
t
a
a
o
c
b
m
fa

so
re
ap
In
qu
an
Bu
ph
sub
yet
exi
jec
acc
ent
it n
wit
obj
the
ada
atel
hav

VI. The Feeling of Pleasure connected with the notion of Adaptation.

The reduction of the special laws of nature to unity of principle is an end which understanding necessarily seeks to secure. With the attainment of that end there arises a feeling of pleasure which is determined by a ground *a priori* for everyone, and indeed from the mere adaptation of the object to our faculty of knowledge. The discovery that two or more heterogeneous laws of nature may be combined in a common principle gives rise to a very marked pleasure and often to a feeling of wonder that even familiarity does not destroy.

VII. The Aesthetic Aspect of Adaptation in Nature.

The aesthetic character of a representation is determined solely by its relation to the subject; its logical validity has reference to the object as capable of being known. In the apprehension of a sensible object both relations are implied. In the presentation of objects as outside of me, their spacial quality is merely a subjective element of my perception, and they are accordingly thought of simply as phenomena. But space is also an integral element in the knowledge of phenomena. *Sensation*, again, while no doubt it is a purely subjective element in perception of things as without us, yet affords the matter (*reale*) of that which is given as existing, and hence it is essential to the knowledge of objects without us. But the feeling of *pleasure* or *pain* which accompanies our knowledge of sensible objects *does not enter as an ingredient into knowledge at all*, for although it may be the result of cognition, it has nothing to do with our knowledge of an object. The adaptation of an object of perception to an end is therefore no property of the object. Such an object is therefore only said to display adaptation to an end when a feeling of pleasure is immediately connected with its representation. Here therefore we have the aesthetic representation of adaptation. When

the imagination, as the faculty of perception *a priori*, is found to be in harmony with the understanding, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby awakened, the object must be regarded as adapted for the reflective judgment. The object is then said to be beautiful, and the faculty which judges it to be so is called *Taste*.

The sensibility to pleasure arising from reflection on the forms of things (whether of nature or of art) indicates not only an adaptation for reflective judgment of objects to the notion of nature in the subject, but conversely an adaptation of the subject in virtue of the notion of freedom to the form or even formlessness of objects. Hence it is that the aesthetic judgment is related to the emotion of the *sublime* as well as to the feeling of the beautiful. The *Kritik of Aesthetic Judgment* has therefore two main divisions.


VIII. Logical Representation of Adaptation in Nature.

Subjective adaptation in an object of experience rests upon the mere harmony of the form of an object with our faculty of knowledge, as *directly apprehended* without the intermediation of any notion. Objective adaptation, again, implies that the form of a thing, as given in a notion which is its ground, agrees with the possibility of the thing itself. The former rests upon the pleasure immediately felt in mere reflection on the form of an object; the latter, as requiring a definite cognition of an object through a notion, is quite independent of any feeling of pleasure in it and implies a judgment of the understanding. When the notion of an object is given, the work of judgment lies in the *presentation* (exhibitio) of a perception corresponding to it. And we may either, as in art, endeavour to realize in perception a notion set up by our own imagination as end, or we may make use of our notion of end in judging of certain natural objects (e. g. organized bodies). In the latter case not merely the form of a thing implies *adaptation*, but the thing itself as a product is regarded as a *natural end*. Now

...ri, is
a fool-
...st be
...The
...which

...n the
...s not
...to the
...apta-
...to the
...t the
...blime
...tik of

...rests
...h our
...t the
...gain,
...which
...itself.
...mere
...iring
...te
...lies a
...of an
...tation
...d we
...ion a
...may
...atural
...e not
...thing
...Now



[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint, illegible text]

[Faint, illegible text]

e
o
f
j
l
s
r
t
P
t
t
P
o
b
th
is
in
to
to
te
w

although subjective adaptation does not imply any notion of an object, we may still, by analogy with the notion of an end, attribute to nature as it were a regard for our faculty of knowledge ; hence we may look upon *natural beauty* as the *presentation* of the notion of a formal or subjective adaptation, and *end in nature* as the presentation of the notion of a real or objective adaptation ; the former being the object of aesthetic judgment or Taste, the latter being judged logically by understanding and reason through notions. The Kritik of judgment has accordingly two parts, dealing respectively with the *aesthetic* judgment and the *teleological* judgment.

IX. Connexion of Understanding and Reason through Judgment.

Understanding prescribes *a priori* the laws which make experience or a theoretical knowledge of nature as an object of sense possible. Reason prescribes *a priori* the laws of freedom, and as itself a supersensible cause in the subject, it gives rise to an unconditionally practical knowledge. The realm of nature as under the laws of understanding, and the realm of freedom as under the laws of reason, are entirely removed from all mutual influence by the great gulf which sunders the supersensible from the phenomenal. The notion of freedom has nothing to say to the theoretical knowledge of nature, or the notion of nature to the practical laws of freedom, and so far there is no possibility of throwing a bridge from the one realm to the other. But although it lies in the notion of a free cause to be independent of nature, and the sensible cannot determine that which in the subject is supersensible ; yet the converse is not impossible in a certain sense, and in fact is implied in the very notion of a free cause the effect of which ought to be an event in the world. The word *cause*, when applied to the supersensible, signifies merely the *ground* which determines the causality of things to an effect in accordance with natural law, and while the possibility of causality

in this sense cannot be understood, it can be conclusively shown that it is not, as some have asserted, self-contradictory. The effect of freedom is the ultimate end which ought to exist as a phenomenon in the world of sense, and the condition of its possible realisation is presupposed in the nature of man as a sensible being. Judgment, as presupposing this condition *a priori*, independently of the practical, supplies us with the notion of natural adaptation, a notion which mediates between nature and freedom, and makes possible the transition from the notion of conformity to law to the notion of ultimate end.


The fact that understanding prescribes laws *a priori* to nature shows that nature is known merely as a phenomenon, and at the same time points to a supersensible substrate of nature; which, however, is left quite *indeterminate*. Judgment by its principle *a priori* for estimating nature according to possible particular laws gives us the *capability of determining* the supersensible substrate (both in us and without us) by our intellect. Reason, again, by its practical law *a priori* actually *determines* it; and thus judgment enables us to make the transition from the realm of nature to that of freedom.

As to the higher faculties of the mind, *i.e.*, those which contain an autonomy, understanding contains the *constitutive* principles of *knowledge*; judgment those for the *feeling of pleasure and pain*; reason those relative to *desire*. The notion supplied by judgment of the adaptation of nature to an end is one of the notions of nature, but it is merely a regulative principle of knowledge. The aesthetic judgment, as concerned with certain objects of nature or art, which are the occasion of that principle being applied, is a constitutive principle in relation to the feeling of pleasure or pain. The spontaneity of the faculties of knowledge, from the harmonious operation of which that pleasure arises, by intensifying the susceptibility of the mind for the moral feeling makes the notion of adaptation the fit connecting

sively
radic-
ought
d the
n the
esup-
racti-
on, a
, and
rmy

ri to
enon,
ate of
Judg-
cord-
f de-
with-
ll law
ables
that

hich
titu-
ding
The
re to
ly a
udg-
art,
is a
sure
dge,
ises,
oral
ting





re
th
by
of
in
su
du
as
th
dit
tel
ive
rea
in
he
I
sen
as
in

link between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom in its effects.

The following table exhibits all the higher faculties in their systematic connexion :—

Faculties of the Mind.	Faculties of Knowledge.
Knowledge.	Understanding.
Feeling of Pleasure and Pain.	Judgment.
Desire.	Reason.
Principles <i>a priori</i> .	Application to
Subordination to Law.	Nature.
Adaptation to End.	Art.
Ultimate End.	Freedom.

PART II.—KRITIK OF TELEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT.

First Section.—Analytic of Teleological Judgment.

§ 62. Formal Objective Adaptation.

Geometrical figures drawn on a principle often show a remarkable objective adaptation to the purpose for which they are employed, namely, the solution of several problems by a single method, or of one problem in an infinite variety of ways. The adaptation is here evidently objective and intellectual, not subjective and aesthetic. But although such figures are adapted to the end in view, namely, the production of a variety of geometrical forms, they are regarded as possible independently of the particular use made of them, and hence their adaptation to that end is not the condition of their very existence in thought. This intellectual adaptation to an end is therefore no doubt objective (not subjective, like aesthetic adaptation), but it is not real but merely formal: it can be conceived as adaptation in general without the notion of end being presupposed, and hence it is not an instance of teleology.

It is quite different when a number of *things* are presented as without me and enclosed within definite limits, as *e.g.* trees, flowers and walks disposed in regular order in a garden; for these are actually existing things which

must be known empirically, and not merely an idea of my own determined *a priori* according to a principle. The adaptation in this case is empirical or *real*, and presupposes the notion of an end.

§ 63. Relative as contrasted with Internal Adaptation.

Experience leads our judgment to the notion of an objective material adaptation, *i.e.*, to the notion of an end in nature, only when we find ourselves compelled to presuppose the activity of a cause as the necessary condition of the existence of a given effect. This may occur either when the effect is regarded as itself a product of art, or when it is regarded merely as material for the art of other possible natural beings; in other words it is either an end, or a means for the ends of other causes. Adaptation of the latter kind is called utility in relation to man, advantage when we are speaking of other creatures, and is merely relative; while adaptation of the former kind is an internal adaptation of a natural being.

A sandy soil is most advantageous for the growth of pine trees. Now when the sea withdrew from the land it left large tracts of sand on our northern shores, on which pine forests have grown up. Shall we then say that the original deposit of these tracts of sand is evidence of an end of nature, because it is of advantage to pine trees? Manifestly if this is an end of nature, so also must the sand be regarded as a relative end, for which the withdrawal of the sea was a means. So also if cattle, sheep, horses, &c., are to exist, grass must cover the earth. The objective adaptation in such cases is therefore not an adaptation of things themselves to an end, but merely a relative or contingent adaptation.

From all this it is quite plain that such adaptation can be regarded as an external natural end, only on condition that the existence of that for which something else is immediately or remotely advantageous is in itself an end of nature. But as this can never appear from a mere contemplation of

of my
The
poses

objec-
nd in
resup-
on of
either
when
r pos-
nd, or
of the
antage
erely
ternal

f pine
t left
pine
iginal
of na-
festly
oe re-
of the
, are
adap-
hings
ngent

n can
lition
mme-
ature.
on of

na
cal
tel

exp
of
the
oth
eve
pos
con
rea
No
obj
law
ing
rea
whi
con

T
ura
nat
ana
In t
a w
sam
is o
own
uate
proc
in th
that
by
rate
qua

nature, relative adaptation, although it points hypothetically to natural ends, does not of itself justify an absolute teleological judgment.

§ 64. The Properties of Things which are natural ends.

To see that a thing is really a natural end, or cannot be explained in a mechanical way, its form must be incapable of explanation by the ordinary laws of nature known by the understanding in its application to objects of sense; in other words, it must be of such a nature that it cannot be even known in experience as an effect except on presupposition of notions of reason. Even to comprehend the conditions required for the production of a natural object, reason must see that the form of the product is necessary. Now the very fact that in the present case the form of the object is not necessary but accidental so far as ordinary laws of nature are concerned, is itself a ground for regarding that form as possible only through reason. And as reason is the faculty of acting from ends (a will), an object which is regarded as possible only through reason must be conceived as an end.

To know a thing, however, not only as end, but as *natural end*, more than this is required. A thing exists as natural end only when it is (in a double sense) *its own cause and its own effect*. This may be illustrated by an example. In the first place, a tree produces another tree according to a well-known natural law. The tree so produced is of the same species; hence a tree, as continually self-produced, is on the one hand its own effect, and on the other hand its own cause, and by such continual self-production it perpetuates itself as a *species*. In the second place, a tree is self-productive even as an *individual*. The effect is no doubt in this case known simply as growth, but it must be observed that growth is quite different from any increase in size by mechanical laws. The matter which the tree incorporates, it previously works up into a specifically peculiar quality which is not due to any natural mechanism outside

of it, and thus it develops itself by means of a material which as assimilated is its own product. No doubt the tree, so far as the constituents obtained from external nature are concerned, must be regarded as an educt; but on the other hand it displays a power of separating, recombining and shaping this raw material, which human art is utterly incapable of imitating. In the third place, each part of the tree is self-productive, so that the preservation of one part is dependent on the preservation of all the rest. A bud inoculated on the twig of another tree produces a plant of its own kind, and so also a scion engrafted on a foreign stem. We may therefore regard each twig or leaf of the same tree as engrafted or inoculated on it, or as an independent tree attached to another and parasitically nourished by it. And while the leaves are a product of the tree, the tree is in turn dependent for its growth upon their effect on the stem, for if it is repeatedly denuded of its leaves it dies.

§ 65. Things which are natural ends are Organised Beings.

Causal connexion as thought by the understanding always constitutes a regressive series of causes and effects. This sort of causal connexion we call that of efficient causes (*nexus effectivus*). But another kind of causal connexion resting on the notion of ends is conceivable, which if it is considered as a series can be taken either backwards or forwards, and in this case that which has been named effect is with equal propriety termed the cause of that whereof it is the effect. Such causal connexion we name that of final causes (*nexus finalis*).

For a thing to be a natural end, in the first place its parts must be possible only in relation to the whole. As an end the thing itself is comprehended under a notion or idea, which must determine *a priori* all that is to be contained in it. This however does not distinguish a natural product from an artificial product, in which the cause is an intelligent being distinct from the material parts brought together

terial
t thé
al na-
at on
ecom-
n art
each
ation
rest.
ces a
a for-
af of
n in-
nour-
f the
their
eaves

ways
.....
uses
xion
it is
for-
ect is
it is
final

parts
end
dea,
ined
duct
elli-
ther

an
ib
se
ot
of
pa
of
oth
de
pa
art
kn
of f

A
mu
the
wh
gar
cipl
caus
fn

In
of th
of th
and
prod
instr
organ
cause

Or
them
thing
notion
end, f
such

and combined in accordance with the idea of a whole possible by means of them.

Hence, in the second place, a natural product must in itself or in its inner possibility imply relation to an end; in other words, it must be possible as a natural end irrespective of any intelligent cause external to it. Accordingly the parts of such natural product which combine in the unity of a whole must be reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form. Only in this way can the idea of the whole determine conversely the form and combination of all the parts, not indeed as cause—for then we should have an artificial product—but as the ground on which the thing is known, by the subject judging of it, to be a systematic unity of form and a combination of many parts.

A body is therefore a natural end only when all its parts mutually depend on each other both as to their form and their combination, and are thus themselves the cause of the whole, while conversely the notion of the whole may be regarded as the cause of the body in accordance with a principle. In such a body, accordingly, the conjunction of *efficient causes* is at the same time regarded as an *effect through final causes*.

In a natural product each part not only exists by means of the other parts, but is conceived as existing for *the sake* of the others and of the whole *i.e.* as an instrument (*organ*); and not only so, but its parts are all organs reciprocally producing each other, which is never the case with artificial instruments. Only a product of this kind, one which is an organised and self-organising being is called, and just because it is such, a natural end.

Organised beings are the only things in nature which in themselves and apart altogether from their relation to other things can be conceived to exist at all only as ends. The notion of an *end of nature* as distinguished from a *practical* end, first obtains objective reality from a consideration of such beings, and apart from them, the teleological consider-

ation of nature as a special principle of judgment would have no justification whatever.

§ 66. The Principle by which the Internal Adaptation of Organised Beings is Judged.

The principle of internal adaptation, which is at the same time a definition of it, is this: *An organised product of nature is one in which all the parts are reciprocally end and means.* Nothing in it is useless, purposeless or ascribable to blind natural mechanism.

This principle finds its occasion in the methodical observation of experience, but as it affirms the adaptation to be of universal necessity it cannot be derived from experience but must be *a priori*. But as ends exist only as an idea in the judging subject, not in any efficient cause, it is merely a regulative principle or *maxim* for judging of the internal adaptation of organised beings.

§ 67. The Teleological Judgment in regard to Nature as a System of Ends.

As has been shown above *external* adaptation does not justify us in saying that things can be known to exist only as ends of nature, or in employing the principle of *finis* cause to account for the adaptation which may seem to be implied in their effects When there is no reason for regarding a thing as in itself end, the external relation can be only hypothetically judged to imply adaptation to an end.

To regard a thing as a natural end on account of its internal form is a very different thing from holding the existence of that thing to be an end of nature. The latter assertion is justifiable only if it can be shown, not merely that we have the notion of a possible end, but that we have a knowledge of the ultimate end (*scopus*) of nature. But this requires the relation of such knowledge to something which as supersensible far transcends all our teleological knowledge of nature, since the end of nature must be

ould

ame
t of
end
rib-

ser-
be
nce
idea
rely
rnal

not
only
ine'
be
for
can
an

in-
xist-
tter
rely
ave
But
ing
ical
be

so
of
ju
em
at
we
di
co
en
we
fo

na
na
ari
en
di

bu
co
tio
ma
ou
ca
pri
no
po
pla
jud
jec
ma
enc
ide

sought beyond nature. The internal form of a simple blade of grass is sufficient to show that for our human faculty of judgment its origin is possible only according to the rule of ends. But if we change our point of view and look merely at its external adaptation for the use of other natural beings, we get no categorical end, but finding always a new condition of such adaptation, we are led to the idea of the unconditioned existence of a thing as ultimate end, and so entirely beyond the physico-teleological consideration of the world. So conceived the thing is not even a natural end, for it is no longer regarded as a natural product.

Only organised Matter, as in its specific form a product of nature, necessarily demands the application of the notion of natural end. But this notion when once obtained necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system of ends, and to this idea all natural mechanism must be subordinated in accordance with principles of reason.

It is manifest that this is not a principle of the determining but of the reflective judgment, that it is regulative and not constitutive, and that it supplies us with a guiding conception by means of which natural objects already determined may be considered according to a new law and order, and our knowledge of them extended by the principle of final cause. But this principle in no way interferes with the principle of mechanical causality already applied to them, nor does it entitle us to regard anything whatever as a purposive end of nature.

Even the beauty of nature, *i.e.*, its harmony with the free play of our faculties of knowledge as apprehending and judging of its appearance may be regarded as a sort of objective adaptation of nature as a systematic whole of which man is a member, after the teleological judgment by natural ends as applied to organised beings has brought us to the idea of a great system of ends of nature.

Second Section.—Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.

§ 70. Antinomy of Judgment.

In dealing with nature as a complex of sensible objects reason may either rest on laws prescribed *a priori* to nature by understanding, or on laws which are capable of indefinite addition as experience is gradually extended. In applying the former sort of laws, *i.e.*, the *universal* laws of material nature, judgment needs no special principle of reflexion; for as an objective principle is given to it by understanding it is merely determining. But so multifarious and diverse are the particular laws which have to be learned from experience that judgment must here supply its own principle if it is to conduct its investigations into the phenomena of nature in an orderly way. Without such a guiding thread there is not the least hope that our empirical knowledge may form a thoroughly connected and orderly system, reducing the empirical laws of nature to unity. Now in a contingent unity of this kind it may very well happen that judgment in its reflexion proceeds from either of those principles,—that given to it *a priori* by the understanding, and that which on occasion of particular experiences calls reason into play to estimate corporeal nature and its laws by a special principle. Hence it comes that these two maxims seem to be mutually exclusive, and there arises a Dialectic which leads judgment to err in applying the principle of reflexion.

The *first maxim* of judgment is the *position*: All production of material things and the forms of material things must be judged as possible on purely mechanical laws.

The *second maxim* is the *counterposition*: Some products of material nature cannot be judged as possible on purely mechanical laws (but require a quite different law of causality, namely, that of final cause).


Now if these regulative principles in the investigation of nature are converted into constitutive principles, determining the possibility of objects themselves, they will run thus:

jects
ature
defi-
a ap-
s of
f re-
un-
ious
ned
own
phe-
uid-
rical
erly
ity.
well
her
der-
per-
ure
hat
ere
ing

pro-
ngs

ro-
on
aw

of
in-
:



on
no
cip
the
the
not
ne
no
as
2
as
tor
and
be
to
any
oug
of n
tion
with
nat
sion
secc
(and
the
from
ism.
first
to f
are
ism
reus
spee
gain

Position: All production of material things is possible on purely mechanical laws.

Counterposition: Some production of material things is not possible on purely mechanical laws.

If we take the last pair of propositions as objective principles of the determining judgment, each is contradictory of the other, and hence one of them must be false. We shall then no doubt have an antinomy, but it will be an antinomy not of judgment but of reason. Reason however can prove neither the one proposition nor the other, for there can be no principle *a priori* determining the possibility of things as regards purely empirical laws of nature.

The first two propositions, on the other hand, regarded as maxims of reflective judgment are not really contradictory at all. For to say that all events in the material world, and therefore all the forms which are natural products, must be *judged* to be possible on purely mechanical laws, is not to say that *they are possible in this way alone* (apart from any other sort of causality). All that is implied is that I ought in all cases *reflectively to judge* them by the principle of natural mechanism, and making this principle the foundation of all my investigations to apply it as far as I can, since without it there can properly speaking be no knowledge of nature at all. But this in no way hinders me, when occasion is given for it, from following the guiding-thread of the second principle in my reflection on certain natural forms (and even by instigation of these on the whole of nature), the principle, namely, of final cause, which is quite distinct from that employed in the explanation of natural mechanism. The value of reflection of the kind indicated in the first maxim is not thereby denied, but rather I am bidden to follow it as far as I can. Nor is it said that those forms are not possible at all on the principle of natural mechanism: all that is said is that by following this path *human reason* will never be able to discover any ground of the specific character of natural ends, although it will certainly gain increased knowledge of natural laws. Thus it is left

undetermined whether in the inner ground of nature, which to us is unknown, conjunction by physical mechanism and conjunction by ends may not themselves be connected together in the same thing by one principle. We must conclude, however, that our reason is not in a position to unite the two principles, and that judgment, not as determining but as *reflective*, is compelled to think another principle than that of natural mechanism in order to explain the possibility of certain forms of nature.

§ 76. Note.

Without notions of the understanding to which objective reality must be given, theoretical reason can make no objective or synthetical judgments and in itself contains no constitutive principle whatever, but merely regulative principles Now the very nature of our intelligence compels us to distinguish between the possible and the actual. Such a distinction would not be made, did not our knowledge involve the exercise of two heterogenous faculties,—understanding for notions and sensible perception for objects corresponding to notions. Were our intelligence perceptive, its objects would always be actual The distinction of things into possible and actual is therefore a subjective distinction, which is valid for human reason merely because we can always think something that is not, or suppose something to be given as an object of which we have no conception. That possible things may not be actual, and as a consequence that actuality cannot be deduced from possibility, is certainly true when we are speaking of human reason, but it does not follow that such a distinction applies to things themselves. That it has no such application is plain from the irrepressible tendency of reason to suppose some unconditionally necessary existence (original ground), in which the distinction of possible and actual no longer holds good.

The notion of an absolutely necessary being is thus an indispensable Idea of Reason, but for human intelligence it is

which
m and
ced to-
st con-
o unite
nining
e than
ibility

ective
no ob-
ns no
e prin-
igence
ne ac-
ot our
facul-
eption
gence
. The
fore a
reason
is not,
which
ot be
ot be
re are
t such
as no
ncy of
istence
e and

an in-
e it is

pr
cu
je
in
th
lee
for
an
di
kn
so
for
tra

un
pr
or
co
is
its
cau
as
ne
evi
tic
ma
tha
but
son
sub
and
acc
be
pra
the
A p
wha

problematical and unrealisable. As arising from the peculiar nature of our faculties of knowledge, it is valid subjectively not objectively: hence it is not essential to every intelligence, because we have no right to assume that in all thinking beings there are two diverse conditions of knowledge, namely, thought and perception, and no right therefore to suppose that in them all the conditions of possibility and actuality are different. An intelligence for whom this distinction did not exist, might say: All objects which I know *are* (exist); and such a being could never suppose some objects to be possible that have no existence, and therefore to be contingent when they do exist, nor could it in contrast thereto represent others as necessary.

Just as theoretical reason must assume as an idea the unconditioned necessity of the original ground of nature, so practical reason presupposes its own unconditioned causality or freedom, implied in the consciousness of its own moral commands. Here the objective necessity of an act, as duty, is opposed to the necessity which it would have as event, if its ground lay in nature and not in freedom (*i.e.* in the causality of reason). The morally necessary act is regarded as physically perfectly contingent, since that which *ought* necessarily to take place, often does not take place. It is evidently owing to the subjective constitution of our practical faculty, that moral laws must be represented as commands (and the acts conforming to them as duties) and that reason expresses this necessity not as *being* (happening) but as *ought to be*. This would not be the case, were reason considered in its causality apart from sensibility (the subjective condition of its application to objects of nature), and therefore as cause in an intelligible world, completely accordant with moral laws; for in such a world there would be no distinction between being and doing, between a practical law of that which is possible through us and the theoretical law of that which is actual through us. A purely intelligible world, then, would be one in which whatever is possible (as something good) is at the same

time actual. But even freedom, as the formal condition of an intelligible world, is for us a transcendent notion, incapable of serving as a constitutive principle for determining an object and its objective reality. Nevertheless, from the character of our (partly sensuous) nature and faculty, for us and all rational beings related to the sensible world, freedom, so far as we can represent it in accordance with the nature of our reason, serves as a universal *regulative principle*. This principle does not objectively determine the nature of freedom, as form of causality, but it makes the rule of actions in accordance with that idea imperative on every one, and that as absolutely as if it were a constitutive principle.

Let us see the bearing of these considerations on the topic immediately in hand. Between natural mechanism and the technic of nature, *i.e.*, its teleological connexion, there would be for us no distinction, were it not that our intelligence is compelled by its very nature to go from the universal to the particular. There can therefore be no knowledge of the adaptation of the particular to an end, and consequently no determining judgments in this connexion, unless judgment has a universal law under which it may subsume the particular. Now the particular as such has a certain contingency with respect to the universal, and yet reason demands the conformity with law in the reduction of particular laws of nature to unity. Conformity with law in the case of the contingent is called adaptation to an end, and from such a universal particular laws, so far as they imply a contingent element, cannot be derived *a priori*. Hence the notion of the adaptation of natural products to an end, necessary as it is for our judgment, does not enable us to determine the objects themselves. It is a subjective or regulative principle of reason, although for our *human judgment* it has the same validity as if it were an objective or constitutive principle.

dition
otion,
term-
heless,
d fac-
nsible
dance
lative
rmine
es the
ve on
utive

topic
d the
ould
ce is
o the
the
ly no
nent
par-
ntin-
ands
laws
e of
uch
ntin-
no-
ces-
ter-
tive
t it
itu-

[The main body of the page contains extremely faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the paper. The text is too light to transcribe accurately.]

8
kn
ive
on
po
of
in
(th
of
ide
spe
7
not
jud
in g
mer
alth
not
I
that
form
gen
the
bilit
to d
ena.
that
the
us a
prod
not v
whic
ours
of ca
expla

§ 77. The notion of Natural End as due to the peculiar character of our Intelligence.

There are certain peculiarities of our higher faculty of knowledge which it is very natural to transfer as objective predicates to things, but which really appertain to ideas only, there being no possible object of experience corresponding to such ideas. This holds good even of the notion of natural end, which as a predicate can exist nowhere but in the idea. But as the effect corresponding to this idea (the product itself) is a real object in nature, the notion of nature as a being acting from an end seems to make the idea of a natural end a constitutive principle. In this respect the idea of natural end is different from all other ideas.

The difference however lies in the fact that this Idea is not a principle of reason for the understanding, but for the judgment, and is merely the application of an intelligence in general to possible objects of experience. For here judgment is not determining but merely reflective, and hence although the object is given in experience, judgment cannot *determine* it by the idea, but can only reflect on it.

It is therefore a peculiarity of *our human* intelligence that in its judgment, in regard to natural things, takes the form of reflection. And this leads to the idea of an intelligence different from ours and presupposed in it, just as in the Kritik of Pure Reason it was by supposing the possibility of a perception different from ours, that we were able to define our perception as by its nature limited to phenomena. It is then by reference to that supposed intelligence that we are able to say: Certain natural products, from the very nature of our intelligence, *must be considered by us* as if they could not exist at all unless they had been produced purposely or from conceived ends. But we cannot venture to say that there actually is a particular cause which acts from such ends, or that an intelligence higher than ours may not find in the mere mechanism of nature, as a sort of causality conceivable apart from intelligence, a sufficient explanation of the possibility of such natural products.

We must therefore look out for a certain contingency in the nature of *our* intelligence as related to its faculty of judgment, by the discovery of which we may learn how our intelligence differs from other possible intelligences.

The contingency is readily found in the *particular* which judgment is to bring under the universal supplied by notions of the understanding; for the universal of *our* understanding does not determine the particular, and it is contingent in how many ways different things which agree in a common mark may present themselves to our observation. But as perception is also required for knowledge, a *perfectly spontaneous* faculty of perception would be a faculty of knowledge different from sensibility and quite independent of it; in other words, an intelligence in the most general sense of the term. Thus we are able to conceive of a *perceptive* intelligence (negatively, that is, simply as not discursive), which does not go from the universal to the particular, and so to the individual. For such an intelligence there would not be that contingency in the adaptation of *particular* laws of nature to understanding which makes it so hard for us to reduce the multiplicity of nature to the unity of knowledge.

In order, then, to think at least the possibility of such an adaptation of natural things to our faculty of judgment, we must at the same time conceive of another intelligence, by reference to which, and apart from any end attributed to it, we may represent as *necessary* that harmony of natural laws with our faculty of judgment, which for our intelligence can be thought only through the medium of ends.

It is the nature of our intelligence to proceed in knowledge from an *analytical universal* or notion to the particular as given in empirical perception. The multiplicity of the latter thus remains undetermined, until judgment shall have determined it by bringing the perception under the notion. We may, however, conceive of an intelligence different in kind from ours, one that as perceptive and not discursive proceeds from a *synthetical universal* to the particular, *i.e.*,

gency in
culty of
how our

r which
l by no-
r under-
is con-
gree in
rvation.
wledge,
ld be a
quite in-
he most
ceive of
as not
he par-
ligence
tion of
akes it
e unity

such an
ent, we
nce, by
d to it,
natural
intelli-
nds.

know-
ticular
of the
ll have
otion.
ent in
ursive
r, *i.e.*,

fr
ge
w
B
w
bi
of
th
or
pr
th
it
ge
po
su
co
pr
it
for
ge
dif
nat
cip
thi
nor
ma
be
inv
nat
our
are
jud
the
of t
inte
the
arch

from a perceived whole to the parts. For such an intelligence the connexion of the parts forming a determinate whole would not be or appear contingent as it is for us. But from the peculiar character of our intelligence a real whole in nature is regarded only as the effect of the combined motive forces of the parts. We may, however, instead of viewing the whole as dependent on the parts, after the manner of our discursive intelligence, take a perceptive or archetypal intelligence as our standard, and seek to comprehend the dependence of the parts on the whole, both in their specific nature and in their interconnexion. And as it is a contradiction in terms to say of a discursive intelligence that the connexion of the parts necessarily presupposes the whole, it must be the *idea* of the whole that for such an intelligence explains the form of the whole and the connexion of its parts. Now such a whole is an effect or *product*, the *idea* of which is treated as the *cause* that makes it possible, and such a product is called an end. It therefore arises solely from the peculiar character of our intelligence that we regard certain natural products as due to a different sort of causality from that of the material laws of nature, namely, that of ends and final causes. This principle, therefore, does not determine the manner in which things themselves, even when they are regarded as phenomena, are capable of being produced, but merely the manner in which our intelligence can alone judge them to be produced. And this is the reason why in our scientific investigations we are so dissatisfied with an explanation of natural products by final causes. In such investigations our sole object is to judge of natural products, so far as we are capable of doing so conformably to the nature of our judgment, *i.e.*, our reflective judgment, not to determine them by judgment as things in themselves. The correctness of the view here taken does not require us to show that an *intellectus archetypus* may possibly be; it is enough that the idea is not self-contradictory, and that a perceptive or archetypal intelligence is the natural counterpart of our

discursive intelligence (*intellectus ectypus*), with the contingency attaching to it, as by its very nature dependent on individual representations.

If we think of a material whole as in its form a product of the parts, their forces and power of combining themselves with one another, we get the notion of a mechanical mode of production. But in this way we do not obtain any notion of a whole as end, such as we are compelled to suppose an organised being to be,—a whole the inner possibility of which is utterly inconceivable apart from the Idea of it, and on which depend the very nature and mode of operation of the parts. It does not follow, as we have just seen, that the mechanical production of such a body is impossible; for to say so would be to say, that *no intelligence* can possibly think such a unity in the connexion of different parts, unless the Idea of the unity is at the same time the cause of its production; unless, in other words, the production is purposive. For then the unity which is the necessary ground of the form of natural products would be solely that of space; and space is not a real ground of products but merely their formal condition, although no doubt it has this in common with the real ground, that no part of it can be determined except in relation to the whole. Now it is at least possible to regard the material world as a mere phenomenon, and to conceive of its substrate as a thing in itself to which an intellectual perception corresponds. Thus we get the idea of a supersensible and real ground of the world of nature to which we ourselves belong, although that ground is not for us an object of knowledge. Accordingly, we may apply mechanical laws in explanation of that which in the sensible world is necessary, but the harmony and unity of the particular laws and forms of nature—which relatively to the mechanism of nature must be regarded as contingent—we shall view as an object of reason to which teleological laws are applicable. Nature thus comes to be judged on two distinct principles, the mechanical and the teleological, which in no way conflict with each other.

e con-
ent on

product
seives
mode
ny no-
ppose
ity of
t, and
ion of
at the
for to
ssibly
s, un-
se of
on is
ssary
that
s but
s this
n be
is at
phe-
itself
s we
world
that
ngly,
hich
and
h re-
d as
hich
o be
the



w
b
ci
it
by
g
en
ye
ev
ne
of
N
ho
pr
ch
eff
sib
rea
tel
in
sh
pos
of
int
olo
the

7
posi
the
con
rati
a m

From this point of view we can see, what even in other ways might readily be guessed but in no other way could be asserted with any certainty and proved, that the principle of a mechanical derivation of natural products exhibiting adaptation is quite consistent with the teleological, but by no means enables us to dispense with it. In the investigation of a thing which we are forced to regard as a natural end (an organised being), we may try all the known and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical production, and may even hope to make good progress in that direction, but we need never hope to get rid of the quite different principle of causation by ends in our explanation of natural products. No human intelligence, and indeed no finite intelligence however it may surpass ours in degree, need expect to comprehend the production of even a blade of grass by purely mechanical causes. The teleological connexion of causes and effects is absolutely indispensable in judging of the possibility of such an object. There is indeed no adequate reason for regarding external phenomenon as such from a teleological point of view; the reason for it must be sought in the supersensible substrate of phenomena. But as we are shut out from any possible view of that substrate, it is impossible for us to find in nature grounds for an explanation of nature, and we are compelled by the constitution of our intellectual faculty to seek for the supreme ground of teleological connexions in an original Intelligence as cause of the world.

APPENDIX ON METHOD.

§ 87. The Moral Proof of the Existence of God.

Theoretical reflective judgment is quite justified in supposing the existence of an intelligent cause of the world on the ground of a *physical teleology*. Now in our own moral consciousness, and still more in the general notion of a rational being endowed with free causality, there is implied a *moral teleology*; but as the relation to ends, together with

the laws connected therewith, is determined *a priori* in ourselves, and therefore is known as necessary, this internal conformity to law does not require for its explanation the supposition of an intelligent cause outside of ourselves. At the same time moral teleology has to do with man as a being in the world, and therefore with man as connected with other things in the world. For in the conception of ourselves as beings under moral law we find the standard by reference to which those other things are judged either to be ends or to be objects subordinate to ourselves as the ultimate end. Moral teleology, then, has to do with the relation of our own causality to ends, and even to an ultimate end necessarily set up by us as our goal in the world, as well as with the possibility of realising that end, the external world being what it is. Hence the question necessarily arises, whether reason compels us to seek in a supreme intelligence outside of the world for a principle which shall explain to us even the adaptation of nature to an end relatively to the law of morality within us. There is therefore a moral teleology which is concerned, on the one hand with the *nomothetic* of freedom, and on the other hand with that of nature.

If we suppose certain things, or even certain forms of things, to be contingent, and therefore to depend upon something else which is their cause, we may seek for this supreme cause or unconditioned ground of the conditioned either in the physical or in the teleological order. That is to say, we may either ask, what is the supreme productive cause of those things, or what their supreme (absolutely unconditioned) end, *i.e.*, the ultimate end of that cause in its production of those or of all things? In the latter case it is plainly implied that the cause in question is capable of setting an end before itself, *i.e.*, is an Intelligence, or at least must be thought of as acting in accordance with the laws of an Intelligence.

From the teleological point of view, it is a *primary proposition* admitted by every one, that there can be no *ultimate end* at all presupposed by reason *a priori*, unless

in our
internal
on the
s. At
being
other
ves as
erence
nds or
e end.
r own
sarily
h the
being
ether
ide of
n the
mor-
which
free-

ns of
upon
this
oned
That
duc-
abso-
that
the
on is
ence,
with

pro-
no
less

th
of
te
th
va
be
fo
an
m
bu
en
en
th
di
em
it
th
be
O
ac

us
ow
as
a
ou
sit

hi
ha
wo
as
of
inc
of

that end is *man as under moral laws*. A world consisting of mere lifeless beings, or even containing living but unintelligent beings, would have no meaning or value, because there would be in it no intelligent being to appreciate its value. Again, suppose that in the world there are intelligent beings, whose reason enables them to value existing things for the pleasure they bring, but who have not themselves any power of imparting a value to things originally by means of freedom; then, there will indeed be relative ends, but there will be no absolute or ultimate end, for the existence in the world of such intelligent beings can never have an end. Moral laws however are of this peculiar character, that they prescribe for reason something as end without any condition, and therefore exactly as the notion of an ultimate end requires. The existence of a reason which may be for itself the supreme law in the relation of ends, in other words the existence of rational beings under moral laws, can alone be conceived as the ultimate end of the existence of a world. On any other supposition its existence does not imply a cause acting from any end, or it implies ends but no ultimate end.

The moral law, as the formal condition in reason of the use of our freedom, lays its commands on us entirely on its own authority, without appealing to any material condition as an end; but it nevertheless determines for us, and indeed *a priori*, an ultimate end as the goal to which our efforts ought to be directed; and that end is the *highest good* possible *in the world* through freedom.

The subjective condition which entitles man to set before himself an ultimate end subordinate to the moral law is happiness. Hence the highest physical good possible in the world is *happiness*, and this end we must seek to advance as far as in us lies, but always under the objective condition of the harmony of man with the law of *morality* as worthiness to be happy.

But it is impossible, in consistency with all the faculties of our intelligence, to regard the two requisites of the ulti-

mate end presented to us through the moral law as *connected* by merely natural causes, and yet as conforming to the idea of that ultimate end. If therefore nature is the only cause which is connected with freedom as a means, the notion of the *practical necessity* of the ultimate end through application of our powers does not harmonise with the theoretical notion of the *physical possibility* of the realisation of that end.

Accordingly we must suppose a moral cause or author of the world, in order to set before ourselves an ultimate end conformable with the moral law; and in so far as the latter is necessary, so far, *i.e.*, in the same degree and on the same ground, the former also must necessarily be admitted; it must, in other words, be admitted that there is a God.

§ 88. Limitation of the Moral Proof.

The ultimate end, as merely a notion of our practical reason, is not an inference from data of experience for the theoretical explanation of nature, nor can it be applied in the knowledge of nature. Its only possible use is for practical reason in relation to moral laws; and the ultimate end of creation is that constitution of the world which harmonises with the end which we can alone present determinately according to law, namely, the ultimate end of our pure practical reason, in so far as it is to be practical. Now we have in the moral law, which enjoins on us practically the application of our powers to the realisation of the ultimate end, a ground for supposing the possibility and practicability of that end, and therefore also a ground for supposing a nature of things harmonious therewith. Hence we have a moral ground for representing in the world an ultimate end of creation.

So far we have not advanced from moral teleology to theology, *i.e.*, to the existence of a moral author of the world, but have merely concluded to an ultimate end of creation determined in that way. But that to account for this creation, *i.e.*, for the existence of things adapted to an *ultimate end*, in the first place an intelligent being, and in the second place not only an intelligent but a *moral* being

connected
the idea
y cause
tion of
pplica-
ical no-
at end.
thor of
te end
e latter
e same
ted; it
d.

al rea-
e theo-
in the
actical
nd of
onises
ly ac-
ctical
in the
ion of
nd for
, and
s har-
d for
gy to
the
d of
t for
o an
d in
eing

r
c
f
r
e
t
c
s
Z
f
l

fi
te
n
e
re
ca
B
pl
pl
ki
th
re

po
wo

or author of the world, *i.e.*, a God, must be admitted, is a second conclusion which must be drawn. And this conclusion is of the peculiar character that it holds good merely for the judgment according to notions of practical reason, and as such for the reflective not the determining judgment. It is true that in us the morally-practical reason is essentially different in its principles from the technically-practical reason. But we cannot assume that in the Supreme Cause of the world, conceived of as an intelligence, the same contrast exists, and that a peculiar kind of causality is required for the ultimate end, which is different from that which is required merely for ends of nature. We cannot assume, therefore, that in an ultimate end we have a reason for admitting not merely a *moral ground* or ultimate end of creation (as effect), but also a *moral being* as original ground of creation. But we may certainly say, that *according to the constitution of our reason* we cannot make intelligible to ourselves the possibility of an adaptation relative to the *moral law*, and to its object as it is in this ultimate end, apart from an author and ruler of the world, who is also a moral lawgiver.

Physical teleology sufficiently proves for theoretical reflective judgment an intelligent cause of the world; moral teleology proves it for the practical judgment, through the notion of an ultimate end, which must be attributed to creation in a practical regard. It is true that the objective reality of the idea of God, as the moral author of the world, cannot be shown from a consideration of physical ends *alone*. But it is a maxim of pure reason to secure unity of principles so far as that is possible; hence the knowledge of physical ends, when it is brought into relation with the knowledge of the moral end, greatly aids us in connecting the practical reality of the idea of God with its theoretical reality as already existing for judgment.

To prevent a very natural misunderstanding these two points should be carefully borne in mind. In the first place, we can *think* the attributes of the Supreme Being only by

analogy. How, indeed, should we attempt to investigate directly the nature of a Being to whom nothing similar is given in experience? Secondly, in thinking the Supreme Being through those attributes we do not thereby *know* him, nor can we theoretically predicate them of him; for to contemplate that Being as he is *in himself* reason as speculative must take the form of determining judgment.

2692/42

igate
lar is
reme
him,
o con-
ative

