




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
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
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IN
Germany and Flanders, &c.

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IN A

LETTER

TO A

Member of PARLIAMENT.

Te nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam. Juv.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. LION, near *St. Paul's*,

MDCCLI.

[Price One Shilling.]

1911

W. K. RAY

1911

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LETTER

TO A

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

SIR,

IN Obedience to your Request, I send you my Thoughts in Writing, that you may, as you was pleased to exprefs yourself, examine at Leisure, what in our last Conversation seemed to have some Weight, in Support of the Expediency of engaging in the last *Land War*, and of our necessary Connections with the *Continent* in general. And this I undertake with the greater Pleasure, as the contrary

B

and

and prevailing Opinion is not only fal-
lacious in itself, but pernicious in its
Consequences ; as it can only tend to
give a Turn of Despondency to the
Minds of our People, prepare them to
bear the *present* Insults, and to submit
to the *future* Designs of *France*, if,
encouraged by its general Establish-
ment among us, she should again re-
sume Schemes against the Indepen-
dency of her Neighbours, which the
repeated Disappointments brought a-
bout by our Interposition have other-
wise, I am persuaded, induced her to
relinquish.

It were to be wished, that a like
Desire of Information on this Subject
were more general than it is : For I
have often observed, with Surprize,
that Knowledge of our *foreign Concerns*
seems to be a Matter of Indifference
to most Men, as if it was too myste-
rious to be acquired, or too insignifi-
cant to be useful. The Consequence
of

of which Indecision is, that, ignorant of what their real Interests require, they fly from Extreme to Extreme, as the Wind of Occurrences drives; are misled by the Designs of *Party*, the Errors of *Ministers*, and the Pretences of *Generals*: That, at one Time, they breathe nothing but War and vigorous Measures; and that, at another, they call for a bad Peace rather than none; and that, at this Juncture, the *late War* is as much blamed, as it was called for before its Commencement.

And while I endeavour to inform *you*, I have the additional Satisfaction of reflecting, that I take the readiest Method to inform the *Public*, with which your Opinion preserves all the Weight that it deserves, unhurt by the Transactions of late Years, which have taken away its Confidence from almost every body else.

As then the little Success, and enormous Expence, of the late War have broached anew the Opinion, that *England* has nothing at all to do with the *Continent*; or, in other Words, that *Land Wars* must ever be to us improper Measures; I conceive it will be sufficient to shew, that the War was entered into necessarily and wisely; and that it might have been concluded as *gloriously* as it was begun *judiciously*, if its repeated Losses had not been owing more to *Mismanagement* than *Misfortune*. For the present Opinion is, (but in other Words) that because one War has been carried on with as little *Conduet* as *Oeconomy*, none other ought ever to be entered into, however evident the Necessity that may urge, or imminent the Danger that may threaten.

After having shewn upon what Principle the War was begun, I shall state

state a few of the Particulars which occasioned its ill Success, that the proper Object may present itself to you ; and that your Animadversion may be directed to its Management only, which was such as almost rendered the Wisdom of its Commencement *fruitless*, and the indifferent Terms of its Conclusion *excusable*, if not *necessary*.

To be convinced of the Wisdom of the Councils which advised the War, you need but cast your Eyes back on the repeated Attempts that *France* has made, from the Days of *Richlieu* to the Death of *Lewis* the XIVth, to establish her Dominion over this Part of the World ; and on the successive Efforts which the rest of *Europe* has made against them, in Support of their own Independency. You will find, what deserved and universal Applause attended the *Triple Alliance*, by which *England* first engaged to assist in stemming the Torrent, which it then ef-
fec-

fectuated: And how urgent were the
 Addreffes of Parliament, that procured
 it to be ftopped once more by the
 Treaty of *Nimeguen*: And you will
 find how much the general Voice ap-
 plauds the *Augsburgh* and *Grand Al-*
liances (concerted for the *common Safe-*
ty) in Confequence of freſh Attempts
 againſt it of the *common Enemy*, which
 they gloriously fucceeded in difappoint-
 ing. The Expence of theſe Struggles
 has been great, and the Grievance of
 the Debts they have occaſioned is preſ-
 fing, but the Prize that was contended
 for was of infinite Value. It was
 whether we ſhould continue longer to
 be free, or tamely become the Slaves
 of an inveterate, inſolent Enemy. The
 Fire had already feized our Neigh-
 bour's Houſe; and had we refrained
 from aſſiſting him to extinguish it there,
 it muſt ſoon have inevitably communica-
 ted itſelf, with ſuch additional Strength,
 as muſt have conſumed our own.
France ſtrained every Nerve, waſted
 her

her Substance, and ruined her People, to establish Slavery: And can *England* grudge any Expence which was necessary to defend Freedom?—Surely whoever thinks of the Danger of the *Disease*, will no more complain of the Harshness of the *Remedy*. Allow me here to copy the Language of the *Dissertator upon Parties*, as no Language but his own is worthy to express his Meaning. In favour of the Addresses which, in 1677, called for the Protection of *Flanders*, he says, “ That War was not made in remote
 “ Countries, it was made at our
 “ Door. The Motives to it, on the
 “ Part of the Aggressor, were neither
 “ Injuries received, nor Rights in-
 “ vaded; but a Spirit of Conquest
 “ and bare-faced Usurpation. The
 “ Interest we had in it was not such
 “ as depended on a long Chain of
 “ Contingencies, and required much
 “ Subtility to find out, but plain and
 “ immediate.” Language which, I
 expect

expect, will weigh the more with you; as his Practice and Doctrine equally agree to shew, that Land Wars were never favourite Measures of its Author.

If then the Steps taken by *England*, at these Junctures, have ever been approved of because of their Necessity, this last War is surely intitled to more Approbation; because, undertaken on the same Principle of Self-Preservation, it was called for by more urgent Necessity. The Branches, at these Periods, were in Danger of being lopped off; but *now* the Axe was laid to the Root of the Tree itself, which in its Fall must have crushed us also. And therefore we were called upon, by Self-Preservation, to put our Shoulders to it to prop and support it; and more so, since *France* had fomented the Quarrel between us and *Spain*; and pushed it to that Pass, that they even sent a Fleet to the *West Indies* to guard and

3

assist

assist the *Spaniards*, and to support them in that unjust Breach of their Treaties.

It is in every body's Memory, to what a Situation the Affairs of *Europe* were reduced, when the Reins of Government shifted from the Hands of the *Walpolian* Administration, to those of its Successors: How *France*, tempted by the distressed State of the *Austrian* Affairs, after the Death of the last Emperor of that House; and encouraged, by our Neutrality in the War of 1733, to expect a like Indifference from us in this; ventured to resume her Scheme, which her former ill Success had made her abandon, to ruin the Chief of those Powers who had united to defeat her former Attempts; which, being ruined, she could have made an easy Prey of the rest; and how, at that Period, she was in a fairer Way to carry her Point than she ever had been; even at the

most successful Period of the Reign of
Lewis the XIVth.

The same Principle of Self-Preservation which led our Fathers to resist *him*, called for Resistance *now*. And had the Prospect of Success been ever so little promising, it was better to fall Sword in Hand, than abjectly to stretch out our Necks to the Yoke. But, thank God! the Case was not so desperate. The Means of restraining *France* were as *feasible*, as the Necessity of opposing her had been *evident*.

By withdrawing *Prussia* from her Alliance, *by our Influence*, her Troops were driven from threatening *Vienna* to seek Shelter in *Prague*; and, by our Arms at *Dettingen*, they were swept out of the Empire entirely.

1743. The Face of Affairs, *after* that Victory, shewed how equal we were to the Task we had undertaken; as the Danger of the Empire *before* it shewed

shewed the Necessity of undertaking it; and sufficiently removes the Charge of *Quixotism* from those who advised it. — And as that clearly vindicates the Commencement of the War, so the Councils of that Great Man the *Earl of Stair*, had they been followed, would have procured equal Approbation of its Close. But, as if Fortune had attached herself alone to his Sword, and Wisdom to his Councils; from the Moment he left the Army, its Affairs went backwards: And then, *that War* which had been, by all, allowed to be necessary at first, bringing no Return for *infinite Expence* but Loss and Disgrace, began to be generally murmured at; as if Success had been impracticable from the Beginning, and the Want of it not owing to Want of Conduct in the *subsequent Commanders*, who all had the Means in their Power, to assure it, if they had made proper Use of them. — To which Want of Conduct, however, the Fate of *Eu-*

rope would not have been expofed, if the *pacific* Part of the Administration at home, had not occasioned the War to be continued abroad, by rejecting the Treaty of *Hanau*.

But though from this *Æra* ought to be dated the Commencement of the War, and confequently all the Evils that enfued ought to reft on the Oppofers of that Meafure; yet the Mi-nifter, who continued ftill in Direction, deferves fo far to be blamed, as he was instrumental in nominating the *new General*, whose chief Recommendation, I fear, was, that being brought up in the School of *Minifterial Subjection*, greater Deference was expected from him to *Minifterial Directions*, than his Predeceffor could prevail upon himfelf at all Times to pay.—Thus by nominating *Marechal W*— to command the Army abroad, the Father of the War unnaturally put the Knife to the Throat of his own Child,

and was punished for it by the Loss of his Power.

The *French*, next Campaign, wisely 1744.
 ly turned their Arms on the *Low Countries*, where they could wage War to best Advantage, most answer their own Ends, and most distress *those* of their Enemies whom they principally dreaded. The *English* Troops (flushed with their *German* Victory, which might have been decisive, had not the *unfortunate* Advices, given by *Nieperg*, poisoned the honest Counsels and Intreaties of the *British* Commander in the R—— Ear) assembled to oppose them, unblasted in the Opinion of the Enemy, confirmed in their own.—But the Minister soon found, that he must now make more Use of the Whip than of the Reins, to urge on the Machine, of which, *lately*, he could not restrain the impetuous Course; but which, *now*, stuck in the smoothest Road.

The

The Enemy, after possessing *Courtrai*, were suffered to take *Menin* and *Ipres* successively; while our Generals, at last pacific, unlike *Stair*, who dreaded no Superiority but of Capacity (as indeed none other is to be dreaded) instead of stopping their Progress on the *Lis*, thought themselves happy in being covered with the *Scheld*. Nor was even *that* River thought a sufficient Security: For the Marechal, big with Apprehensions unworthy of an *English* Commander, sent away *his Plate*, to remain in Safety with *his Cannon* at *Antwerp*.

And thus the first Blow was given to the Army in its Spirit: The *French* being suffered to conquer, after Losses and Disgraces in every Part of the World, restored the Spirit of that *volatile* Nation, and prompted the Reflection of our *reasoning* People:— Reflection which led them to apprehend

hend that they might be beaten, because the Enemy was avoided. Fatal Reflection! since an Army that despairs of Victory, never will gain it!

The Difference of Numbers, which furnished to *our General* the Pretence for a Conduct which dispirited his Troops, was soon removed. And when our Army was strengthened, by Reinforcements from all Quarters, on *one* hand, as much as that of the Enemy was weakened by Detachments for *Alsace*, on the other; it soon appeared how mere a Pretence that had been, by the Continuance of the same Conduct. For the Camp on the *Scheld* was still preserved till *W*— was compelled, by Orders from *England*, to quit it:—Orders reproaching the Shame of remaining so long idle with a superior Army, which could make him indisputably Master of the Field; while *Saxe* maintained, in the Heart of the Queen's Country, his Army
little

little more than half the Number of ours. He was, I say, *compelled* to move, he was *urged* to fight; *Shame* obliged him to the one, but *Caution* kept him from the other——a Caution which little needed that Encouragement which was furnished to it by the Opposition of the next in Command to him, to all Actions of Vigour, in Consequence of private Instructions to thwart the Success of the War, from that very Part of the Administration which, by rejecting the Peace of *Hannau*, had occasioned it to be continued. ——Expectations of a Battle were only raised to create Disappointment. However, at last, after much painful marching, the Army got into the Enemy's Country, where he gave them a Specimen of his military Genius (since he could do it no other Way) in his *judicious* Manner of encamping.——Yet, let him not carry away all the Honour which the Camp of the Cavalry at *Anstain* deserved; for, though he ap-
proved

proved of it, yet some Praise is due to the *cool* and *able* Quarter-Master *General* who chose it.

But let us praise without Irony, and do Justice to Generals *Ligonier* and *Somerfeldt*, who, moved with Indignation at our scandalous Inaction, were daily proposing Schemes; the Success of which, as they could not be *doubtful*, must have been *decisive*; had we either, in Consequence of them, attacked the Enemy behind the *Lis*, or laid down before *Maubeuge*; in which there was but one Battalion and that new levied; the Possession of which would have opened the Door into the Heart of *France*, as, in either of these Designs, the Enemy wanted Troops to resist us.—But Mole-hills rose to the Height of Mountains; and Difficulties were found unsurmountable, in the Way of these Projects, which no other Man would have wasted a Minute to think of. The *Mare-*
D
chal

chal refused to order *Horfes*, to draw the Artillery and Carriages to convey the Ammunition, till the *Dutch* agreed to bear their Part of the Charge : And even when, at last, the *Arch-Duchefs* herself told him, they should be ready upon a Day named ; that she would advance the Expences ; and rely on the Generosity of the *Maritime Powers*, for the Reimbursement of a Charge, which the ruined State of her Sister's Finances was not able to defray ; he, still dreading, lest Reliance on *England* should be construed to imply an Indemnification, and expose him to be blamed ; at a Time when the Expences amounted annually to above Seven Millions ; for adding 60,000 *l.* to that Sum (which, upon Computation, was found as sufficient for the Purpose) though the whole depended upon it ; and though *Ligonier* and *Somerfeldt* offered to contribute the 9000 *l.* to which it was computed the Charge of Pioneers would amount ; refused the generous

2

Offer,

Offer; and obliged the brave Generals to sit down unwilling Witnesses of a Management which *none* could approve, and *they* would have remedied: Though Glory invited, his Country urged, nay, and though a Woman instigated him to Action. Thus, like the unprofitable Servant in the *Gospel*, he buried the Talent that was delivered to him; and, though almost sure of *gaining*, was contented with *saving*, rather than run the smallest Hazard of *losing*. Yet, though he rested his Merit on his Parsimony, as he knew he had none other to plead, neither will that avail him. For he squandered the whole Expences of the Year, as he applied them to no Purpose, and reaped from them no Profit: And not prodigal of Money *only*, he squandered Time, which, in War, is, of all Losses, the most difficult to be repaired.

The Army, however, had Forage at the Enemy's Expence, but not Authority enough to force them to bring it to the Camp; and the Cavalry was ruined by the Frequency of carrying it from the Distance where it was fought. Nor can we wonder at their Contempt. They saw us in a Situation on our Arrival, within the *Marque* to have insulted *Lisle*, à *vive force*; yet so uninformed, or unenterprizing, as to suffer them to remove the Danger by reinforcing the Garrison. They saw us between their Army and their whole Frontier, from the *Lis* to *Alsace*; yet make no Attempt to besiege one Town that might let us into the Heart of their Country. They suffered *Ab—m—b—g* indeed to get a little Contribution, while *Saxe* repaid them tenfold from the *Päis de Waes*. They saw us detach, to defend the Canal of *Bruges*, after *that* Contribution had been drawn from beyond it. They insulted us with their
Parties

Parties to our very Noses; one of which had once well nigh carried off the old *Marechal* from his Quarters; but which were, I suppose, discouraged from attempting any more an Enterprize that would have been, if successful, most prejudicial to themselves. And when we left their Country, loaded alike with *Glory* and with *Spoils*, they saw us march, in Order of Battle, to attack Count *Saxe* behind *Pont Espierre*; above *three Days* after we heard of his being there with only half his Forces, and *two Days* after he had left it; and then ingloriously retire into Winter Quarters.

A Campaign so glaringly mismanaged, obliged the Commanders, who could not vindicate it from Blame, to throw it on each other. Their Recriminations succeeded, if not their Apologies; for the World was pretty well convinced they were all in Fault.

As

As our Superiority this Campaign evinces the Truth I would establish; that we had the Means in our Power of finishing the War, with as much Glory as we had begun it with Wisdom, if they had been properly used; so doth the Inferiority of the Enemy furnish us with another Truth no less material: For, as their Inferiority was occasioned, by the Detachments necessary to defend *Alsace* from the Arms of *Prince Charles*; it shews that *France* is not able to make Head against such an Alliance, if attacked with Vigour on all Hands.

Thus began the *British* Laurels to wither (to blast them was reserved for others) by the Command being given to One every way unequal to it. And were not his Incapacity as *notorious* as it proved *prejudicial*, we would pay all due Deferences to the Pen of one of this Hero's *Eleves*, who has undertaken

taken his Defence. But till the doughty Performance of this *young Negotiator* fees the Light ; we beg leave to think as the Nation did, when it deemed him unworthy to bear the *Truncheon* longer, who had weilded it so unskilfully. For the Government, smarting with the *Effects*, wisely removed the *Cause*. The *Minister* who directed this *inglorious Campaign*, was thrown from his Seat of Power ; and the *General* who conducted it was laid bye at Home, to recruit a fresh Stock of Vigour for subsequnt Occasions. For at the most critical Juncture, that has happened in our Days, he was again raised from the *Infirmary* to the Head of the Army ; and, as if Remembrance had been lost of his Behaviour against the *French*, he was picked out to save the Nation from the *Rebels*. The same Cause must produce the like Effect. There he was rather more the Dupe of that *Militia*, than he had been of *Saxe*. But it is but Justice to
his

his Employers to say, that this happened *at home*, after opposite Qualities had miscarried *abroad* : In what Manner, the Analysis of next *Campaign* will shew.

1745. But we are now arrived at a Period when a new Administration (that of the Coalition) took the Direction of Affairs ; and when it was no Wonder that the War was mismanaged, if the Assertion in the *Apology for the Resignation* of one of them be true, that a Resolution was then taken *to ruin it on purpose*. [See the *Apology for a late Resignation*, p. 7.] But though I would not blindly credit this Assertion, which (by the bye) does but little Honour to the *Resigner* ; it must be confess'd, that, if such had been their Resolution, they could not have taken better Measures for executing it, than those they did take.—Another System (if I may be allowed to say they had any) seems likewise to have
di-

directed their Choice of a General. But a System which speaks little for their Wisdom. One Extreme had failed, and therefore they run into the other.

For as *W—*, who was *old* and had *seen Service*, had succeeded so ill; the Ministry hoped (I suppose) for contrary Success in opposite Qualities. As if from *Age* and *Experience*, Mismanagement had flowed; and not from a narrow *Capacity* which no Age could ripen, and no Experience improve. And, therefore, the **** **
***** was pitched upon to succeed him, to whom, with no Degree of Justice, these Objections could be made; for he was as *young in Years*, as in *Experience*. So far the Ministry were not disappointed. These opposite *Qualities* produced, indeed, opposite *Conduct*; but, instead of better, worse Success.

An Army, superior by half, attempted nothing in open Plains last Campaign; an Army, in the same Proportion inferior, attacked Entrenchments, in this. The former Campaign, the Army remained on the *Defensive*, though it was invited to Conquest on every hand; and altho' a Diversion was necessary to favour *Prince Charles's* Operations in *Alsace*. It began on the *Offensive* in this, tho' the principal Stroke was to be struck in *Germany*: (whither had been sent from the *Low-Countries*, part of the *Dutch*, the half of the *Hanoverians*, and the whole of the *Austrians*): And it was beaten, because it could scarce be otherwise.—I know that the Defeat of *Fontenoi* is charged to the Account of the *Dutch*. But, though I will neither compare them with the *English*, nor with the *Hanoverians*; yet, let it be mentioned as some Alleviation in their Behalf, that *Fontenoi*,
which

which they attacked, was too strongly fortified against them : And that they retired from that Village, as the *French* must have done from *Rocoux* or *Laveldt* ; if either of them had been equally prepared for their Reception, instead of being, (as, unfortunately, they were) *totally neglected*.

Though the Ardour of Youth, a *Disregard* of personal Danger, and a *happy Insensibility* of human Sufferings, plead with us for the Rashness of this Attack, and allow it to be *great* if it was not *judicious* ; yet I fear the Enemy did not allow it so much Favour. They felt, it is true, the *British* Valour to be the same they always have felt it ; but they learned, now, that it was no more to be dreaded ; lavished as it was as *profusely*, as it had been, lately, *timorously* restrained.

Beat into Experience, we changed
our Measures. From attacking the

Enemy in his chosen Post, we retired to chuse a Post for ourselves : And the Camp of *Lessines* furnished a good one. There the Enemy might have been received to Advantage ; and there *Flanders* could have been preserved while *Brabant* was covered. For the Enemy must have offered their Flank, if they marched into it on the same Side the *Scheld* ; or have marched on the other Side, and left us Masters to defend all the Towns on it. Draughts from *England*, and Reinforcements from *Holland*, soon repaired the Loss of the Battle : But Spirit returned not with Numbers. For *Apprehension* preponderated, after the Battle, as much as *Presumption* had done before it ; and shewed, that true Judgment and Courage were wanting to trim the Balance. On the Enemy's Approach towards us, we put the *Dender* before us. And though we had drained the Magazines at *Bruxelles*, and reserved those in *Ghent*, we now resolved to
cover

cover *Brabant* and abandon *Flanders*. But *Ghent* was not entirely forgotten. For after the Enemy had turned off towards *Oudenarde*, and consequently were nearer It than us; then, and not till then, was *General Mo—ke* detached with three Battalions, (*British*) and some Dragoons to reinforce it. The Remains only of one of the Battalions found their Way to the Town, and were surprized in it next Morning; and the rest of the Detachment was ruined at *Melle*, by the ill Conduct indeed, in a great Measure, of the General who commanded. But if they had *all* got safe into the Town, which, considering the Position of the Enemy, could scarce be expected; they had neither Time enough to remove the Magazines, nor Abilities to defend them. For the Largeness of *Ghent* rendered more Numbers *necessary*, and its Weakness would have rendered all Numbers *insignificant*.

Stunned

Stunned by the Loss of that Brigade, which was destined inevitably to be lost; and unhinged by the Surprizal of *Ghent*, which was as *unexpected* as it was unavoidable; the Army fled from the *Dender* to the Canal of *Bruxelles*; which likewise would have been abandoned, if the Enemy, having too much Generosity to suspect the Degree of our Pannic, had not saved us from that Shame, by desisting to advance towards us; contented to employ the Remainder of the Year, in reducing the many Towns we had abandoned to them.

As soon, therefore, as our Generals had recollected themselves, the Strength of the Canal of *Bruxelles* was attended to, and increased by Works in a manner that put our future Security behind it out of Hazard.—But what these Works rendered secure, Rashness (once more) put in imminent Danger. The

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Enemy,

Enemy, to cover the Siege of *Dendermonde*, were encamped between that Town and the Canal, at *Liploo*, about a League and a half from it; and, a few Days after they had taken the Town, laid a Snare into which our Army well nigh fell.—Beyond the Canal, at the Distance of about half a League from us, and about a League from the Enemy, we had occupied two Castles; one with the *free Companies*, and the other with one hundred Foot from the Line. These the Enemy marched *Sixteen Thousand* Men to attack, in hopes of drawing us from behind our Works; with Expectation of which, the rest of their Army was put under Arms. Nor did they reckon amiss; for, on the Report of their Attack, *** ***** passed the Canal at *Vilvorden*, with the three Battalions of Guards; and, with them, marched to the Relief of his Posts.

As

As the nearest Part of the Line was half a League up the Canal, it is easy to be seen that *** ***** must have been crushed before he was supported; or that the Enemy, by suffering more to march to his Relief (as the Picquets actually did by the nearest Bridge as soon as possible, and as the rest of the Line was ordered to support them) might have brought on an Affair as *general* as they pleased. For, as our Army then occupied the Space between *Bruxelles* and *Villebrook*, (no less than Five Leagues) it is easy to be conceived, with what Difficulty we could have supported an Affair, if it had been begun by a prepared Enemy; and how much they had it in their Power to beat us as we advanced, *in Detail*. And in this they must have succeeded, if the Jealousies of the *French* Nobility in *general*, and the Influence of *Belisle* in *particular*; had not prevailed on the King to send an
Aid

Aid du Camp to recall the Corps that had marched, and deprived *Saxe* of the Glory that must have resulted from his Designs, to which we had been so far the Dupes ; too happy not to have been the Victims also.

After this Escape the Campaign soon finished. And as the Miscarriages of the last were laid to the Disagreement of the Commanders ; so Want of Numbers, and the Behaviour of the *Dutch*, were made the Excuses for the Faults of this.—But I think enough has been mentioned, to shew that the W— had not fair Play ; that Mismanagement was the chief Reason of the Want of Success ; and therefore, that the Odium should be removed from the judicious Advisers of its necessary Commencement, to the injudicious Authors of its Misconduct ; from those who were *Authors of its Birth*, to those who, if a Phrase of *Cibber's* may be used, were *Authors of its Murder*.

As it can be no Breach of Charity to impute an Indifference, at least, to our Interests abroad, to the motley Administration which at this Time entered into the memorable *Association* at home; which was, at once, a *daring* Insult on the K—, and a *dangerous* Blow to the Constitution thro' the Sides of the Prerogative (for the Constitution depends as much on the Preservation of the Powers of the Crown, as of the Rights of the People; and is equally endangered by either's losing their Poize) I may venture to affirm, that their Preparations for next Campaign, confirm the Charge brought against them, of *having resolved* to ruin the W—. For though, the Empire being at last pacified, great Part of the Troops of the Queen were at their Command; and though the Nation expected, that all the *Hanoverians* should be again taken into Pay (for Want of whom we had suffered so severely at
For-

Fontenoi; and against whom no Objection could now lie, as they who opposed them formerly were now in *Place*) yet so few of the former were provided at first, and so late was it before the Agreement was concluded, for the latter; that *Bathiani*, who had supported himself behind the *Dyle*, till the 19th of *May*, was then obliged 1746. to abandon *Antwerp*; and to retire, to wait for Reinforcements, within the Territories of the States. There the *Hanoverians* joining him in *June*, the *Hessians*, and *L-g—r*, with four *British* Battalions only, in the Beginning of *July*; and an additional Number of *Austrians*, with *Prince Charles*, towards the End of it; an Army was, at last, got together, able to act, and Generals with it, capable to command. Pity it was that the *Dutch*, who continued *Prince Waldeck* in the Command of their Troops, had not made him entirely subservient to the *Austrian* General; and given *Prince*

Charles the same Powers they had formerly granted to the victorious Duke of *Marlborough*: For, what *Mismanagement* had done before, *Dissentions* accomplished now. *Prince Charles* could not bear, as an *Equal*, One whom he had always commanded as an *Inferior*: And *Waldeck*, naturally of a hot Temper, and elated with heading the Troops of so considerable a State as *Holland*, would stoop to no *Superior*. Hence sprung the ill Success of that Campaign; for which *Prince Charles* is so far to be blamed, as, in spite of his own Opinion, he always suffered himself to be drawn in to yield to that of *Waldeck*. Thus *Charleroi*, and a fair Opportunity of fighting *Saxe*, was lost; because *Waldeck* insisted, that the Preservation of *Namur* was capital to his Masters; and that, to the covering of that Town, every other Consideration ought to give Way: And thus an Opportunity was lost, of ruining the
Right

Right Wing and *Corps de Reserve* of the Enemy, which presented their Flank to us, on a March ; and which a *Defilé* divided from their Left, which had already passed it ; because great Part of the *Austrians* had moved to keep Pace with the Front of the Enemy, and bar them the Entrance within the *Mebaigne* ; and *Prince Waldeck* took no Notice of the broad Hints *Prince Charles* threw out, to offer his Troops to support that Enterprize ; which was too inviting to escape the Notice of *L-g — r*, who proposed, and urged it.

From the same Source sprung the Defeat of *Rocoux*, where, however, it must be owned, that *Prince Charles* did not seem displeas'd, that *Waldeck* was made to smart for his Obstinacy. He had insisted on taking that Ground which invited the Enemy to the Attack, and had undertaken to maintain his Post in it : And to this *Prince Charles*

Charles yielded, as the Situation of his own Troops rendered it improbable they would be attacked; and as the Neighbourhood of *St. Peter's Hill* furnished a convenient Retreat to secure them: And, indeed, the Right Wing acted as if the Defeat of the Left had been looked for. The very Orders for the Disposition of Battle favoured more of *retreating*, than of *engaging*. [The Place of Retreat was mentioned in the Orders for the Battle; and it was hinted to the Commanding Officers, to have always an Eye to *St. Peter's Hill*.] The Event happened as was expected. After the *Dutch* were beat (who, to do them Justice, behaved well) the *Austrians* retired, in great Tranquillity and Order, to *Maestricht*.—It was a Pity, however, that our Part of the Army, which had no Share in the *Fault*, should have shared in the *Punishment*: For several Battalions, as well *British*,

as

as *Hanoverians* and *Hessians*, suffered considerably.

It may be wondered, why no Mention has been made of *Bathiani* in this, as no Notice was taken of *Konigseg* in the former Campaign : But the R—*Nurse*, worn out by Age, and incapacitated by Infirmities, was, indeed, a mere Cypher : And *Bathiani*, since he could not reap the *Glory* of acting a *first Part*, seemed to be contented with saving himself from *Blame*, when only in a *Second* : And, since *the Abilities of the General* could only be exerted to reap Laurels for others ; he shewed the *Address of the Courtier*, in keeping himself out of Scrapes. Observations, which are justified by his Conduct in the succeeding Campaign, as well as in this.

But although the publick Cause was not benefited, yet several Occasions did Honour to the military Capacity of

our General. The Passage and Repassage of the *Maes*, under the Nose of *Saxe*, to whom the Change was given; that of the Rivers in the *Condross*, and of the *Jaar*, reflected as much Honour on *Prince Charles*, as they did Imputation on the *Intelligence* and *Judgment* of *Saxe*.

Though the Misfortunes of this Campaign were owing to the Cause I have mentioned; yet they were, with no little Industry, imputed to the Mismanagement of *Prince Charles*. That his Place might be supplied by another, it was necessary he should be deemed unfit for it. His late Defeats from the *Prussians*, gained the easier Credit to the Charge of Incapacity brought against him, in spite of all his great Actions. Nor was that all: His *private Character* was called in Aid to depreciate his *public*; and he was accused of Drunkenness, with as little Reason as of *Incapacity*. The End
proposed

propofed was answered. A new General was provided in the **** **
 *****, whose Victory at *Cull-*
den had confirmed the Opinion, that
 the Defeat at *Fontenoi* had really been
 occasioned by the *Dutch*; and who
 flattered himfelf, and the World, with
 a Continuance of his good Fortune
 againft the *French*. And good For-
 tune now feemed to depend upon him :
 For every Obftacle had been removed,
 which had been fupposed, hitherto,
 to have obftruded it. *Numbers* had
 not been complained of, laft Year,
 when even the *Dutch* diftinguifhed
 themfelves: And thefe Numbers were
 confiderably augmented now. Each
 of the Maritime Powers agreed to fur-
 nifh Forty thoufand Men, and the
 Queen of *Hungary* Sixty thoufand;
 which, as her Subfidy was to be paid
 but in Proportion as her Quota was
 complete, upon muftering, was found
 to fall but very little fhort of the Num-
 ber.—And no Wonder if, confident

of Success from such an Army, so commanded, our Plenipotentiaries slighted the fair Proposals made at the Conferences at *Breda* by *France*, who, in earnest, desired Peace; as she had miscarried in her Purpose of ruining the House of *Austria*, for which she had engaged in the War. For now every Objection was removed, which hitherto had *been made*, to account for former Misfortunes. What the **** had failed in *alone*; what *Numbers*, and the *Austrians* had failed in *alone*, was now confidently expected from *both* together: And was as confidently *promised* as *expected*. For every preceding Error was now to be redressed; and every Step that the Enemy had taken to our Disadvantage, was to be imitated. And as they had drawn manifest Advantage from taking the Field early, and before us, we began with getting the Start of them, in that Particular; but very soon were taught by Experience, that the Opposite of
Wrong

Wrong is not always right : For the Train of Artillery being embarked, and the Army being encamped, and marched towards *Antwerp* to besiege it ; we were scarce got into the Field, when our Dreams of Glory vanished : For, before we had marched above half Way thither, it was found we could proceed no further, for want of Subsistence ; having *forgot* to provide Carriages to convey our Forage to us. So there we remained on the bleak and barren Heaths, exposed to the *In-clemency* of the Weather, and the *Derisyon* of the Enemy ; who, as if he affected to despise us, continued to keep his Army in Quarters for a long while afterwards. And when, at last, Means were provided to procure Subsistence, *Antwerp* was found to be too tough a Morfel ; and, an Attack of it, equally contrary to the Rules of Prudence, and of War : For it was not in our Power to *invest* it, as it remained open for all kind of

Supply, from the opposite Side of the *Scheld*, which was in Possession of the Enemy. But though *we* abandoned our so much boasted Enterprize, *Saxe* proceeded, at his Leisure, to execute his; and, after the Reduction of *Dutch Flanders*, drawing his main Army out of Quarters, he proceeded towards *Maestricht*, marched to us, saw us, and beat us. We had now every Advantage we had ever wished for; we found the *French*, *uncovered by Entrenchments, unsupported by Batteries, in a Plain, and on their March*; and yet we suffered them to gain the *Battle of Laveldt*. For (not to mention, neglecting to cut off Twenty thousand Men, which was in our Power for two Days together) it seems we knew not, whether a Village, in Front of the Line, ought to be occupied or no: For, a little before the Battle, it was once ordered to be *burnt*, and twice to be *evacuated and repossessed*; and when, at last, some, wiser than the rest,

rest, prevailed on the R— C—, to make use of so capital an Advantage, nothing was done to add to the Strength of the Village, by *fortifying* it towards the Enemy; and nothing to procure Means of supporting the Troops in it, by *laying it open* towards our Line.—But this was not all: A Space was left *unoccupied*, which one of the Battalions, which had been ordered out, had never returned to possess; and, by that, the Enemy found at once an easy unopposed Entrance into the Village; which enabled them, by attacking in Flank and in Rear, to dislodge the Troops that were defending it. So that, from the first, they were as much Masters of the Village as we; nor ever could be thoroughly driven out of it, tho' several of our Battalions scrambled over Hedges (for no Communication had been made) to support their Companions: And then, though the Enemy had gained no other Advantage; though all the

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Troops,

'Troops, both on the Right and on the Left, stood firm and unattacked, without one Attempt to rally, a *precipitate Retreat* was made by the Infantry towards *Maeſtricht*; a Retreat, which would have been made with as *little Safety*, as it was with *little Order*, if *L-g---r's* ever memorable Attack with the Cavalry, had not secured it, and given Time to *** ***** to reach *Maeſtricht* in Safety: *L-g---r*, who, *Curtius*-like, sacrificed himself to ſave the Army, by leaping into the Gulph, with what was moſt valuable in it.—It may not be incurious to obſerve, that this Attack of the Cavalry, ſo beneficial to us, and ſo much honoured by the Enemy,—an Attack, wherein the *British* Squadrons of the firſt Line, and a few of the *Hanoverians* adjoining them, put a whole Wing of the Enemy in ſuch Confuſion, as obliged them to think of their own Security, inſtead of diſturb- ing our Retreat.—This Attack, I ſay, was
openly

openly condemned in our Army, before *L-g—r's* Return from Captivity in that of the Enemy. The Honour of saving the Army was envied him, by those who had reaped none themselves. But the Service was too glaring not to establish it's own Merit. Nor was the Testimony of the Enemy wanting, to acknowledge and admire what had checked their Pursuit. It is to be judged, how much more effectual *L-g—r's* Attack would have been, if made by that Corps of Cavalry which had been scandalously sacrificed, for the Sake of a Regiment *des Marionettes*. A wicked Reduction, which had not even the Merit of Oeconomy to plead in its Behalf!

The *Blunders* of the rest of the Year, are of the less Consequence to be noted, as even good Conduct now would have been ineffectual. Want of other, produced the trumping up again the old, stale Excuse, of Want of Numbers, to palliate the Disgraces

of the Year. To remedy which, the Courts concerned procured the March of a Body of *Russians* for next Campaign. But, at last, distrusting the Pretences of the Generals, the Management of this Campaign, for which they had so largely provided, led them to suspect, the real Cause of past Misfortunes, might continue to be the Cause of still greater; and convinced them, that their sole Resource, was in a sincere Negotiation; towards which, the *French* continued in the same Disposition, as before their Victory at *Laveldt*, and Conquest of *Bergen op Zoom*. They had hitherto removed every *imputed* Cause of ill Success, and yet found their military Affairs, every Year in a worse Condition than the former; and wisely determined, not to trust their Generals another Campaign, the Blunders of which might have been fatal to the Liberties of *Europe*, and the Existence of the Republic of *Holland*. They had brought Troops
from

from every Corner of *Europe*, and assembled Armies, greater than ever had fought under the Duke of *Marlborough*; they had lavished Money so profusely, as to put all former Expences out of Remembrance; and yet, *Defeat* followed every *Battle*, and *Disappointment* every *Scheme*. Wisely, therefore, and necessarily, had they Recourse to a Peace.

Though it is not much to my present Purpose, to take Notice of the ensuing Campaign, as it had no Influence on the Peace, which was, in great measure, agreed on, before its Commencement; yet it may not be incurious to touch on a very few Particulars, which justify the Reasoning that brought it about.

Common Sense, and uniform Intelligence, agreed, to point out *Maastricht* as the next Object of the offensive Operations of the Enemy; and yet,

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in

in spite of both, proper Measures were not taken to prevent them.

The People of *Holland*, who had raised the *Pr— of Or—* to the Dignities of his Fathers; from a Belief, that on him depended their Salvation; against their Enemies abroad, as well as their Enemies at home, required his Prefence at the Head of their Armies, to restore at once their Glory and Success: And as it was not reasonable to expect, what was inconsistent with his Rank, that he should act in an inferior Capacity; and, since the **** * * **** must be employed, it was necessary to form *separate Armies*, for their *separate Commands*: The *one* of which was destined to remain in the Neighbourhood of *Breda*; and the *other*, to cover and prevent the Siege of *Maeſtricht*. So that, whatever Way the Enemy pleased to turn their Arms, they could meet with but half our Force.—But they

they did not even allow us to make the most of this Division.

For to shew that, when Occasion required, they could take the Field early, to as much Purpose, as we had done it to little; they invested *Maestricht*, before the Army, destined for that Service, had assembled to cover it. — Nay, though their Motions confirmed universal Expectation, Part of the Troops of the *Maestricht* Army were drawn near *Breda*, as if *that*, and not the *other*, had been in Danger: And though *Marechal Bathiani* came, at the Beginning of the Winter, to the *Hague*, and wrote, jointly with the *Pr — of Or —*, the most pressing Letters, one after another, to *England*, to desire the **** * * * *
***** to come over, and to settle, with them, how this Campaign was to be carried on; yet, not wiser grown by the Disappointments of former Campaigns, no Concert was made;

nay, the **** set out from *England*
 only in the Month of *March*; and
 four Battalions of ours were not yet
 embarked, when *Maeſtricht* was in-
 veſted: And, to ſhew how far this
 Neglect went, the Magazines on the
Maes were not filled; and the Excuse
 for it was, the Pretence of not making
 them ſo far from the Sea; ſo they
 made them from *Grave* on to the Sea,
 inſtead of making them from *Grave*
 up the *Maes*; as if the Motions of the
 Enemy were not to direct, where our
 Operations ſhould be.

Too late, to prevent *Maeſtricht* be-
 ing inveſted, now that all Apprehen-
 ſion of Danger to any other Place was
 removed; what remained, but to en-
 deavour to raiſe the Siege?—An At-
 tempt, rendered ſo much the more
 practicable, as the Quarters of the
French Army were divided by the
Maes, and communicated only by
 Bridges; which Communication, the
 Swel-

Swelling of the River, at one Time, actually cut off, by breaking these Bridges. Yet, the two Armies remained separate (though to that under the *Pr— of Or—* were joined the whole of the *Hessian* and *Wolfembuttel* Troops, Part of the *Austrians*, and Part of the *British*) when, united, they might have been employed to effectual Purpose.—Thus an important *public Service* was sacrificed to the Vanity of *private Ambition*. It need not be said, how welcome the News of the Peace, which was then made, was to an Army in such a Situation.

As I have avoided entering into the *minute Detail*, than which, none other now remained to be thought of, I would end my Observations here ; but that the March from *Roermonde* to the Neighbourhood of *Grave*, in which, being the last of the War, all the Skill, acquired during its Course, might be expected to be exerted, is entitled to
some

some Notice.— What might have been performed in Three Days, with Ease, was scarce performed in Eleven. The destined Ground for the Camp, after marching two Days towards it, could not be got at, at all. The Cavalry was obliged, on the Eighth Day, to leave the Infantry, and make a forced March to approach the Forage; and the Infantry to follow and abandon the Artillery.—And yet this March was immediately directed by the General himself.

What now remained, but to transport the Troops to *England*, as expeditiously as possible; at once to consult their *Convenience*, and avoid unnecessary *Expence*? Yet the same *Fatality* attended to close the War, which had directed its Conduct. The Soldiers were kept, suffering with Cold, in *Dutch* Barns, till the Depth of Winter; while not only the Forage, but even the very Wood and Straw; Necessaries,

cessaries, which no Army ever paid for before, were purchased at an excessive Rate; and when, at last, they embarked, the stormy Weather, natural to the Season, put them in imminent Danger of perishing at Sea; destroyed most of the best and most spirited of the Horses, [This was particularly the Case of the *Grays*, *Draagoons*.] and drove some of the Infantry to *Shetland* and *Norway*.

Thus, Sir, have I endeavoured to give you some Idea of our Transactions on the Continent; which may serve as a Supplement to the *able Enquiry* into the *flagitious Conduct of the Two Brothers*. Of the Facts related there, as well as here, I have Materials by me to furnish you an ample Detail, if this should excite your Curiosity to procure further Information.

But, I dare say, you'll think I have said enough, at present, to convince you, that the War was mismanaged;

and the *fairest Occasions* lost, of finishing it to Advantage, with *all the Means*, in our Power : For, not to mention the Mismanagement at Sea, which rivalled that at Land ; *Want of Influence* prevented *Stair* from finishing the War the *first* Campaign ; *Want of Capacity* prevented *W——*, the *Second* ; a *rash Attack* sunk our Reputation, and blasted our Laurels, the *Third* ; when a *Defensive*, judiciously managed, might have confined the Operations of the Enemy, till Reinforcements from *Germany* (which it was capital to save, and which, by the Election of the Duke of *Tuscany*, was saved) might have enabled us to act again on the *Offensive* in *Flanders* ——if it had been necessary to continue the War, after that *Election* completed the Purposes for which it was undertaken. *Want of Concord* ruined the Hopes of the *Fourth* Campaign ; and such a *Want of Conduct* manifested itself in the *Fifth*, that a Peace was
ren-

rendered necessary, to prevent the bad Consequences of another.

Let then the Mismanagement of the War alone be questioned, and alone condemned ; for its Commencement was as necessary to save us from the Chains of *France*, as its Conclusion was, to rescue us from the Blunders of *our own G——ls*.

But though inglorious the War has been, by engaging in it, we saved *Europe*. The Empire is restored to the House of *Austria*; *Holland* has got a *Stadtholder*, whom we can, in all Times, depend upon ; and the *Netherlands* are once more our Barrier against *France*.—*France* has gained no Acquisition, and has had her past Experience confirmed ; that she never can succeed in establishing *Universal Monarchy*, while we exert ourselves to oppose her: Nor will she, I dare say,

ever resume a Project, which has hitherto, to her Cost, so often failed; unless she should be encouraged, by the Establishment of a new System of *Politics* among us, to expect, that we will no more thwart it.—Let us then cease to give her that Encouragement, by ceasing to declaim against *Land-Wars*, and *Foreign Connections*. Let our Interest direct us to watch every Motion of that over-grown Power: Let us interpose our *Influence*, at all Times, in Behalf of those States of *Europe*, whose common Interests join them with us, in a *Natural Alliance*, against it. And if, at any Time, any of them; especially if the Republic of *Holland*, or House of *Austria*, should be in Danger from it, let us interpose our *Force*, to defend those upon whom our own Security depends. Nor let us, because one War has been carried on, with as little Conduct as Oeconomy, determine never

to engage in another ; though the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe* (with which those of *England* are intimately connected) should require it.

F I N I S.

