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Post-hostilities planning
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CONTEXT



CONTEXTE

POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING

FORWARD

The attached papers reflect ideas developed by the Canadian government in respect of measures which could contribute to peace stability and security in the Middle East region in the period after the Iragi withdrawal from Kuwait, as well as to address broader problems which this crisis has highlighted.

The thoughts and proposals elaborated in these papers have been drawn together after reflection, consultations and collaboration, over a number of months, with respect to how Canada could contribute to the shaping of the environment that would prevail in the Middle East region in the period after hostilities have been ended. As part of these consultations there have been high level contacts by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and other Canadian Ministers with their counterparts in countries in the Middle Est as well as with the Secretary General of the United nations. These contacts, as well as those at the diplomatic level, are continuing as part of Canada's contribution to the international dialogue on this subject.

These ideas are being made public at this particular stage of their development to facilitate further examination and consultation.

> Dept. of External Affairs Min. des Affaires extérieures

> > JUL 12 1991

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POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING

I. INTRODUCTION

Even as the military conflict in the Gulf continues, governments are being properly asked about plans for the post-war period. It is an important subject that merits careful attention.

As we approach the challenges of the post-hostilities period, it is essential to situate any proposals within the context of a continued and determined commitment to the solidarity and objectives of the coalition. Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions, including complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, have been and must remain clear and non-negotiable conditions for the cessation of hostilities. At the same time, it is never too early to start planning for the post-hostilities period, particularly in such a region of complex problems.

A starting point has to be that it is up to the countries of the region to manage their own security, recognizing however that the deeply rooted animosities and distrust that mark the region will require an externally-guaranteed context. A central objective should be to uphold the authority of the UN and to strengthen its future effectiveness.

The requirements of the post-hostilities period must be addressed in a way that takes into account the underlying resentments and instabilities of the region, and the legitimate security and other concerns of all Middle East countries. The interests of other major players, including those of the coalition and others such as the Soviet Union, must likewise be addressed. Close consultation and cooperation among concerned states on post-hostilities planning is essential.

Canada has had a long involvement in the area, not only through association with the current UN-authorized military action or our diplomatic and economic activity since last August. Indeed, Canada has participated in all of the UN peacekeeping operations in the region over the last thirty-five years, and we have reiterated our willingness to play similar roles in the future. We also have a developed pattern of interlocking relationships involving personal, economic and other ties with

all the states of the region. Thinking about the post-war period must deal effectively with enduring resentments in the region, including the Palestinian problem and regional disparities.

Looking beyond the region, there are clearly some key global lessons to be learned from the crisis, particularly in the area of weapons proliferation as well as in such areas as economic development and environmental extortion.

The post-war problems can be grouped into three broad categories: providing for immediate post-hostility requirements; planning for longer-term regional security arrangements and issues; and addressing the larger lessons of the crisis that go far beyond the region.

IMMEDIATE POST-CEASEFIRE REQUIREMENTS

Whenever and however Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions is secured and a ceasefire comes about, two immediate needs can be anticipated, and a third is emerging as increasingly probable:

- humanitarian assistance coordinated through international agencies to assist with the hardships civilian populations and displaced persons will face;
- a peacekeeping presence under UN authority and centred on the Arab states but possibly including components from other states (eg. Moslem non-Arab states, Canada, the Nordic countries and others).
- an international effort to address the environmental damage of the conflict, particularly that caused by the massive release of crude oil into the Gulf.

Canada continues to provide humanitarian assistance to victims of the war. We believe that we could build on the cooperative effort made to bring support to the front-line states earlier in the crisis and we suggest a post-hostilities appeal to involve a maximum number of countries, including particularly countries of the region with the requisite means, as well as other major international players.

Preliminary planning for post-war peacekeeping operations is already being undertaken at UN headquarters. We and others have repeatedly stressed the advantages of ensuring that any peacekeeping contingent or force be composed primarily if not exclusively of countries of the region, with minimum non-Arab elements. Given the large peacekeeping tasks that will be required and the minimum amount of experience regional countries have had as peacekeepers, some sustained involvement by other countries may well be required. Canada is willing to make its expertise and experience available to assist this programme. In particular, we have, both through our contacts with the Secretary General, and informally through his staff, made clear our willingness to consider participation in any such operation planned for Kuwait and to assist in advance planning. We are willing to cooperate with the UN to host a small gathering of specialists to review the likely requirements and some of the alternatives that might be best explored.

On the environmental front, there will be a short-term need for a collective willingness to share in an international effort to clean up the damage created by Iraq's release of crude oil into the Gulf. In addition, legal experts could be brought together to explore ways of strengthening international law dealing with the use of environmental spoilage as an instrument of war or international extortion, either through expanding the effectiveness of existing arrangements or through a new international instrument.

PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE LONGER TERM

Simultaneous with the initial disengagement and peacekeeping of a post-ceasefire period will be a period when regional security will rely relatively heavily on deterrence and possibly containment. The objective should be, however, to move away from any deterrence/containment phase towards broader regional security, based on guaranteed borders and an effective collective defence relationship among the states in the region.

At least in the short to medium term, regional arrangements by themselves will likely be insufficient to provide adequate guarantees for the states in the Gulf. International guarantees may be required. Ideally, any external guarantees should be under the aegis of the UN, with external forces in the area reduced to a minimum. Security arrangements should be based on the principle of collective security as reflected in the UN Charter but should go beyond mutual defence undertakings to embrace cooperative security concepts providing for active dialogue on issues in the area to anticipate and prevent potential conflict situations. Cooperative security in the Gulf region could incorporate provision for pacific dispute settlement procedures. Although procedures for addressing the Iraq/Kuwait differences that preceded the Iraqi invasion existed or could have been created, a specific undertaking by the states of the region on means and procedures for peaceful dispute resolution would provide a surer way of resolving disputes without resort to armed conflict.

Cooperative security arrangements in the region will, of course, need to go beyond the notion of collective security and incorporate ways to develop multi-dimensional confidence and cooperation and the habit of dialogue - a concept on which Italy and others within the European Community have placed considerable emphasis. While the CSCE model cannot simply be transposed to the Gulf region, experience derived from that process might provide the basis for cooperative endeavours in the Gulf area. Joint efforts towards regional environmental protection and economic development are obvious fields for such joint action.

In general, Canada considers the development of democratic forms of government to be the best long term guarantee of stability and international cooperation. Any developments in this respect must come from within the countries concerned, bearing in mind their particular cultural and historical traditions and institutions.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

No plan for regional security can hope to be durable if it does not include a determination to ensure sustained progress towards a just and lasting negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute in all its aspects, based on resolutions 242 and 338, including the right of all countries in the region to live within secure and recognized boundaries and the requirement for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. Canada also believes that for there to be a just peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be taken into account, including their right to self determination, to be exercised through peace negotiations.

Resumption of efforts to establish dialogue between concerned parties may still hold the best prospects for early progress, because dialogue will remain an essential underpinning of any durable solution. Canada continues to support the convening, at an appropriate time once hostilities are over, of a properly structured international conference to facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement between the parties directly concerned.

It is also possible that the current crisis will permit the galvanizing of regional political will in a way that new frameworks for the pursuit of a durable solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute might emerge.

ECONOMIC DISPARITY AND RECONSTRUCTION

Security of course is not built only on military structures or political understandings. It has a critical economic dimension as well.

Economic disparity in the region may have been, furthermore, an underlying factor contributing to intra-regional tensions, and to widespread public frustration. In the wake of the war, significant economic reconstruction efforts will be required. A new regional framework for effective post-war economic cooperation might well be a factor of stability in the region, and could be coordinated with the work of other relevant international economic and financial agencies. Bilateral development assistance programs could also be dove-tailed with regional economic development plans.

The Gulf Crisis and the war have demonstrated the serious global repercussions of conflict developing out of instability in the Gulf region. Oil is at the heart of the region's global significance. An agreed multilateral framework to address oil-centred disputes might help contribute to stability and peace in the region. Broader dialogue on energy issues, also involving states from outside the region, might be helpful to international understanding and cooperation.

The economic impact of the war beyond the Gulf region will continue to require close attention. Many low-income, oil-importing states will be seeking further economic assistance to cope with the losses incurred as a result of the application of the UN sanctions and the

dislocations produced by the war. A coordinated response, presumably through existing international agencies, will be required.

Some institution, either existing or new, could provide the basis for coordination of post-war reconstruction efforts to reinforce essential economic cooperation among the states of the Middle East. The countries concerned could use such an institution to deal with serious underlying problems which confront them, and perhaps explore the development of funding mechanisms aimed at a broader distribution of the benefits of natural wealth.

THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONRY

The costs of this crisis in human, economic and political terms are large and growing, but perhaps they can be partially offset if we have the foresight and the political will to learn the lessons it teaches. Foremost among these is the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as by massive build-ups of conventional weapons.

A strong cooperative regional framework would reduce the motivation for excessive arms build-ups in the region, which have clearly contributed to the risks of conflict in the region. It must be recognized, however, that a special responsibility for arms build-ups resides with the major exporters and states leading in the development of weapons technology. New efforts among this group, but also reaching beyond to include other arms exporters, should be undertaken to ensure greater sensitivity to the problems inherent in the export of armaments and their technology and to encourage transparency and constraint.

In developing and implementing a program of action to deal with concerns regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the focus should be placed on global measures which will be as equitable as possible to all members of the international community. Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of export controls, a valuable and vital component of non-proliferation measures, need to be pursued with the guiding principle of non-discrimination in mind. The objective is clearly to deal with the proliferation of these weapons, not to prevent the use of technologies involved for established peaceful purposes.

Most of the problematic weapons systems, including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons and high-technology missile delivery systems, are already being addressed via one or more plurilateral or multilateral negotiating processes. Success to date has been limited primarily due to the lack of political will and the obviously mixed objectives of many major international players. If real progress is to be made, global political will must be mobilized.

A World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction could serve as a catalyst to generate the global political will necessary together with a program of action. That program of action might lead to a subsequent conference in 1995, at which time the signature of a comprehensive network of specific weapons control and non-proliferation regimes could be celebrated.

The following objectives could be further developed as the specific plan of action to be blessed by the World Summit.

Chemical Weapons(CW)

- a solemn commitment to conclude, by the end of 1992, negotiation of a global and comprehensive CW Convention, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;
- expansion of the membership and enhanced enforcement of the decisions of the Australia Group in controlling the export of chemicals which could be used in the production of CW;

Biological Weapons(BW)

- strengthen the effectiveness of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention by: developing further its confidence-building and conflict resolutions at the Review Conference this September; and, seeking the agreement of signatories to convene a specially mandated conference in 1993 to negotiate verification provisions for the Convention;

Nuclear Weapons

 early commitment of signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to its indefinite extension at the Fifth NPT

Review Conference in 1995;

- a reaffirmation by nuclear weapons states of their commitment to pursue further nuclear disarmament measures (START/Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT)) pursuant to Article VI of the NPT;
- strong and effective multilateral controls on dual-use nuclear goods;

Missile Systems

- achievement of a global consensus on the need to end the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;
- expanded membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to include the USSR, China and other potential participants; and, revised parameters for the regime to capture missiles with smaller payloads and longer ranges, and to more clearly promote the legitimate exchange of missile technology for space-related purposes;

Conventional Arms

- a meeting of the major arms exporters to encourage a formal commitment to ensure greater sensitivity in the export of conventional arms (i.e., greater transparency; constraint; consultations on unusual build-ups);
- early action on an information exchange system regarding arms transfers, including serious examination by all states of the recommendations of the UN Experts Group now studying the question of transparency in arms transfers when these are submitted for consideration at UNGA 46;
- a politically binding commitment by the 22 signatories of the CFE Treaty to ensure that arms affected by this accord in Europe are not exported to regions of tension or conflict.

Efforts to deal with the problem of proliferation on a regional basis will also have to be appropriately pursued against the background of this comprehensive program and the other activities and processes outlined in this paper. Such efforts will be essential for the longer-term peace and security of all states in the Middle East.



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