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Canada Believes Hopes for Progress in East-West Relations Strengthened by Reykjavik Summit

On October 21, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the House of Commons on the subject of the US-USSR Summit Meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. Following is the text of his address.

"Over our Thanksgiving weekend, the eyes of the world were focused on Reykjavik. There, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met to reinvigorate the summit process begun last year in Geneva and to narrow some of the many differences which divide them. Their goal was to give the process impetus, and they succeeded.

Arms control and security are the central international issues of our time and the manner of their resolution will shape the global outlook for decades to come.

It is still too early to provide a final assessment of this latest meeting. The task now in Washington and in Moscow is to ensure that the progress which appears to have been made is not wasted. All governments share in this responsibility and we in Canada must do our part.

Today, as a contribution to our own discussion and debate within this House, and in the country at large, I would like to make some brief observations about the nature of the Reykjavik meeting in the broad context of East-West relations.

First, it would be well to remember that Reykjavik was but one staging point in the difficult and unending process of managing the relations between East and West. During the meeting, both



Mr. Clark addressing the House of Commons.

sides moved more than anyone had thought possible. Immediately after the meeting, both sides reflected their disappointment that the breakthrough that was so close did not occur. Now reflecting on that progress, both sides agree that the proposals made in Iceland are still on the table and in negotiation.

This process of building East-West relations has been proceeding with renewed intensity since January 1985. Reykjavik was designed not to conclude new agreements but to lay the ground for them. Whether history will judge it a success depends entirely on the use that is made of the progress in Iceland.

The most notable aspect of the Reykjavik meeting is the extent to which the sides were able to reach understandings on the whole range of nuclear weapons and testing. They agreed provisionally to reduce by 50 per cent within five years

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the main components of their strategic nuclear arsenals — land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. At one point in their discussion, they also agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles completely in ten years.

On intermediate-range nuclear weapons, there was similar provisional agreement on their complete elimination from Europe within five years, with the USSR and USA each retaining only 100 warheads in Soviet Asia and the continental USA respectively. The USA and Soviet Union also agreed on the need to negotiate reductions in short-range nuclear arsenals.

There was mutual acceptance of a step-by-step process for reducing nuclear tests, leading eventually to a complete cessation of tests once nuclear weapons had been abolished. There was a broad convergence of view on the verification procedures to be applied to the various measures.

The fact that such detailed discussions occurred and resulted in such wide-ranging tentative agreement attests to the seriousness and dedication with which the two sides have been approaching their task. The main significance lies in the demonstration that major, negotiated reductions in nuclear arsenals need not be an impossible dream.

At Reykjavik three lessons were reinforced. The first two are: both sides are serious; and arms control is possible. But the third lesson is that arms control will not come easily. It is a deliberate and difficult process.

The more sobering element of reality as it has emerged from Reykjavik lies in the fact that the two sides remain far apart in their views on the future role of strategic defences. This is not a question of saying yes or no to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) but of finding a way of managing the research on defensive weapons in which both sides are engaged.

A key issue between the two governments is whether research is limited to

the laboratory under the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. That is a treaty with two signing parties — the United States and the Soviet Union. Its text does not refer directly to research, although the private negotiating record of either side may mention research. The agreement on what precisely is intended in that treaty is for these two governments who are the parties to the agreement to work out.

It is important to note that this is a different issue from the debate we have seen in recent months over what is allowed by agreed statement 'D' of the ABM treaty referring to ABM systems based on other physical principles. Our interest is to ensure strict adherence to that treaty, and continued respect by both sides for the integrity of this fundamental arms control agreement.

The situation today in no way represents a step backward from the situation as it existed prior to the Reykjavik meeting. Technological, political and legal uncertainties and disagreements have always characterized the debate on strategic defence. Even in this area, however, there has in our judgement been some movement towards better mutual understanding, in that the legitimacy of research related to strategic defence is now accepted by both

sides. In a treaty that refers explicitly only to 'development, testing and deployment,' the issue has become, in effect, what are the limits on permissible research?

Mr. Speaker, we ought not to allow ourselves to focus exclusively on nuclear and strategic arms questions as if they constituted the totality of East-West relations. True, these issues have inescapably become the central element of this relationship, but they should not be seen in isolation from the broader context. There are other areas of arms control, most notably in relation to chemical weapons, where there is ground for cautious optimism. Further, we understand that on human rights questions and on a range of bilateral matters, progress continues to be made. Mr. Speaker, I should add that I was encouraged by my own talks on human rights with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, when he visited Ottawa. Our discussion was frank and more open than I believe has been the case before. Canada believes progress here and on regional issues is essential to enable us to establish trust in each other's intentions. This process of building trust is far from finished.

Peace and security require patience and persistence. Emotional swings be-



US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev meeting across the table, with only their interpreters present, during Reykjavik Summit. Canapress



tween exaggerated expectations and gloomy foreboding do not facilitate the necessarily careful and painstaking way in which difficult policy choices must be tackled.

As both the Prime Minister and I have made clear, the USA and USSR have made remarkable progress on the central arms control and disarmament issues over the past months. They are still seriously engaged in the task of seeking compromise on remaining areas of disagreement.

We are encouraged by the public undertakings of both the President and the General Secretary to build on the progress which was achieved at Reykjavik. The resumption last Wednesday in Geneva of the nuclear and space negotiations can only be regarded as more good news.

The superpowers have succeeded in bringing a major arms control agreement tantalizingly close.

We can't stop here. We must move ahead. Arms control is a fragile process. Its environment must be protected. It is therefore doubly important that all actions be resisted which might be seen as weakening or unravelling the existing international framework on which East-West relations and arms control are built.

Much attention has been focused on SDI and the ABM treaty. The Geneva negotiations will need to resolve the differences that continue to exist here. Progress in other areas should not be held hostage to the resolution of these difficulties. Our European allies are especially concerned with intermediate nuclear forces. Canada would like to see an agreement in this area as well as in the area of strategic weapons, which threaten us directly.

Canada believes firmly in the value of the confidential negotiating forum. It is, in the end, irreplaceable. But it can be aided through techniques such as special envoys and, as we have just seen, by summits. We would urge both superpowers to continue to use all these techniques, and not rely on negotiating in public.

If a summit in Washington this fall is now unlikely, setting a date for early next year could help maintain the impetus of the process.

Canada is involved in East-West relations as a member of the NATO Alliance. That Alliance is the foundation of our security. What happens at the negotiating table between the USSR and the USA has a direct bearing on our own security. We are at the same time a nation dedicated to peace. Canadians have always worked for peace and international understanding. We have not, and will not, hesitate to make our views known: publicly when that is appropriate, privately on a permanent basis.

But Canada's role is not simply to give advice. Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues in particular attacks this question directly. Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence. Such an approach enhances the credibility of our counsel.

Canada's participation as a Western country in the process of building East-West relations will continue. The visits to Canada in the last month of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Czechoslovak Prime Minister were part of this process. And early next month I will travel to Vienna for the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-Up Meeting which deals with East-West relations from the human rights, security, economic and human contact dimensions. It provides us with another opportunity to move the process ahead in an integrated comprehensive manner.

Our hopes for real progress in East-West relations were strengthened by the developments at Reykjavik. Canada has been in touch with both sides, before and since the meeting in Iceland. We will continue to use all our resources to help the United States and the Soviet Union build on what they began."

Canada Views USA Decision on SALT II with Serious Concern

On November 28, the Department of External Affairs issued the following statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

"The United States took action today that places the number of US strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in excess of a specific limit of the SALT II agreement. President Reagan had announced last May that the USA would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II agreement and would no longer, as it proceeded with its modernization programme, dismantle older systems to stay within SALT II limits.

The Government viewed with serious concern the Administration's announced intention in the spring and deplores the implementation of that decision today. Our views have repeatedly been conveyed to the US Administration. We have most recently made our case in a letter from the Prime Minister to the President this week, and in my discussions with Secretary of State George Shultz last week. The Government recognizes that SALT II is not a perfect agreement and acknowledges that the USSR has not satisfactorily responded to charges of its own non-compliance with provisions of SALT II. At the same time, we believe that even an imperfect regime of restraint on the strategic arms race is better than no restraint at all. We have taken note of stated US intentions to exercise restraint and not to exceed the levels of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. I call on both sides to exercise restraint.

Our hope remains that the USA and USSR will agree, in the Geneva negotiations, on a new arms control accord that will radically reduce, and not merely put a cap on, the level of their strategic arsenals. Until such an accord is attained, however, we consider the interests of nuclear arms control and strategic stability are best served by both the USA and USSR continuing to abide by the provisions of the SALT II agreement."




SSEA Outlines Canadian Arms Control Priorities to United Nations General Assembly

On September 24, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. Following is an excerpt from that address.

"In this International Year of Peace, we will be judged more than usual by our achievements in arms control and disarmament. All members of the international community will join Canada in applauding the new dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Reagan has told us of letters he has exchanged with General Secretary Gorbachev containing new arms control proposals. We welcome this direct open engagement of the two leaders in the negotiating process. The talks last weekend between US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have also contributed to an improved atmosphere in superpower relations. We can all hope this will lead to progress at the nuclear arms control and space negotiations which the two superpowers have reconvened in Geneva. We are encouraged by recent signs of flexibility in the positions of both sides in their efforts to achieve the agreed goal of radical reductions in nuclear weapons — reductions which will strengthen the strategic balance and improve international security.

The current focus of attention on nuclear arms reductions should not, however, detract from the necessity of similar progress in the field of conventional arms control. The results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe have also added to the sense of momentum towards greater security and cooperation in East-West relations. Stockholm represents the signal accomplishment of bringing new openness and predictability to the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The establishment of agreed procedures for



Mr. Clark addressing the United Nations General Assembly on September 24.

air and ground on-site inspections is a landmark achievement which could serve as a productive precedent for other arms control negotiations. Canada, with our record of promoting constructive verification solutions, derives special satisfaction from having contributed to this outcome. It should facilitate the movement to the negotiation of more extensive measures of military restraint and reductions.

These signs of hope should spur the UN to tackle the broad range of important arms control questions before it. Progress on one issue can unlock progress on others.

Canada will strive for a ban on chemical weapons. We will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes. We will be seeking to play an active role in strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada will again be supporting a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is a fundamental goal and one towards which concrete steps can and should be

taken now. Canada welcomes President Reagan's undertaking that the USA is prepared first to move forward on ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and then to take subsequent measures to further limit and ultimately end nuclear testing.

We urge all nations to cooperate and indeed participate in the development of the verification techniques needed to provide the confidence necessary to ratify these agreements, and which will enable us to plan the subsequent steps which we must take in all areas of arms control. For verification is not just a question of technical capacity but of the political will to reach agreement on the application of technologies and techniques.

In this spirit and in cooperation with others, Canada will continue to work vigorously towards real progress on verification...."



Canadian Negotiator Describes Stockholm Conference Agreement as 'Immensely Important for Canada, its Allies and Whole of Europe'

The following article was written by Mr. Tom Delworth. Mr. Delworth was Head of the Canadian delegation to the Stockholm Conference.

Working against time in the negotiation of the last minute details, the Stockholm Conference came to an end on September 22, presenting to the world a remarkable document on confidence- and security-building in Europe. Impressed by the imaginative and in many respects pioneering features of the Stockholm outcome, the international media reported that a page of history had just been written in Stockholm. That is probably true, but only history will show whether that particular page represents the beginning of a new chapter or whether it will be just another page in the old.

Metaphors aside, the outcome of the three-year negotiation which began with a Preparatory Conference meeting in Helsinki in October 1983, leading on to the main Conference's beginning in Stockholm in January 1984, is immensely important for Canada and for Canada's Allies, and indeed for the whole of Europe. The reasons for this importance are not however as widely understood and appreciated as they deserve to be.

The balance sheet reflected in the Stockholm Document is positive, indeed surprisingly so when it is recalled that the Conference began its work in the very inauspicious circumstances of late 1983. It can be argued that the Stockholm Conference was in itself a kind of confidence-building measure in that it both contributed to a better East-West atmosphere while benefitting in turn from the process of improvement.

The concept of confidence-building measures is not new. In one way or another this notion has appeared in a number of international negotiations and agreements, most notably the Helsinki

Final Act of 1975. What is new from Stockholm is, in the first instance, the detailed development of the very general confidence-building measures outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and making such activities mandatory rather than optional: Stockholm changed the verb from "may" to "will." In other words the Stockholm outcome is marked by a very significant and detailed elaboration of confidence-building measures, and of the ways in which they are to be implemented. But above all, there are two features of the Stockholm Document which can be regarded as little short of revolutionary. In the first place, the zone of application for the detailed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) runs from the Atlantic right up to the Urals in the heart of the Soviet Union, which means that a much larger and more significant part of the Soviet Union's territory will be subject to the operation of CSBMs. More

than that, the Stockholm Document prescribes a regime of on-site inspection as a means of verification which obliges participating states within the zone of application to open their territory for inspection on demand and without the right of refusal. The implications of these two factors combined give grounds for hope that progress *can* be made in abandoning the rigid positions of the past in moving towards more cooperative attitudes and activities in matters of security.

It has been argued that the West's basic objective at Stockholm was to reduce the automatic secrecy barricades that have traditionally marked the Soviet Union's approach to confidence-building; put in other terms, this means that any measure or measures that would lower the threshold of suspicion and mistrust would, if carefully managed, nourish a healthier atmosphere of confidence and trust within the network of military inter-relationships within Europe. Western negotiators at the Conference again and again demanded the "de-mystification of military affairs," which is a shorthand way of saying that the West was urging



Mr. Tom Delworth (left), Head of the Canadian delegation to the Stockholm Conference, exchanging views with Mr. James H. Taylor (right), Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, during Mr. Taylor's visit to the Stockholm Conference in June 1986. In second row are Mr. Chris Anstis (left), Deputy Head of delegation, and Col. C. Namiesniowski (right), Military Advisor. In third row is Mr. Robert Vanier (left), Delegation Secretary.

Pressens Bild/Rolf Hamilton



the Soviet Union to adopt a more open attitude to many aspects of military information; such information should be regarded as a more matter-of-fact, straightforward, everyday area of interest rather than as an emanation of highly sensitive national policy.

From the beginning of the Conference there were two very different conceptions evident in the approaches adopted by the West and the East. The Soviet Union and its allies attempted to promote what might be called a declaratory conception of security, favouring high-level governmental statements and declarations outlining certain goals and prescribing certain forms of activity, but in terms that would be neither specific nor verifiable. For its part, the West (and this view was very largely shared by the Neutral and Non-Aligned group of nations) argued that confidence and trust must be built rather than declared; openness in military affairs, the West contended, would only come about as a consequence of specific cooperative actions undertaken by all participating states together or in smaller groups. Thus, in the very early days of the Conference, the Alliance presented a package of concrete measures which dealt in specific terms with the modalities for such activities as notification, observation and verification, among others. It is this action-oriented rather than declaration-oriented approach that is so clearly reflected in the Stockholm negotiation's outcome.

Any negotiation represents, of course, a bargain between two or more partners, and it is wise to bear this in mind in looking at the Stockholm results.

Despite the presentation of proposals for measures of an essentially declaratory nature, the Soviets and their allies entered into the Stockholm negotiations quite probably with very minimal specific demands. From the collection of declaratory proposals proposed by Eastern negotiators in the early stages of the Conference, only one found expression in the final outcome. This was the principle of the non-use of force. In actual fact, the section on the non-use of force in the Stockholm Docu-

ment is a very long way from the treaty which the East had originally proposed and which it will probably continue to put forward in other forums in the future. Some contend that the inclusion of this section in the Stockholm Document gives a semblance of legitimacy to the East's political and declaratory approach to security. Even if this is minimally true, it should be borne in mind that the non-use of force principle is a central feature of the West's view of international relations, and that the language in the Stockholm Document is Western rather than Eastern in spirit and in manner of presentation. It is clear beyond doubt that no governmental decisions will be taken nor policies adopted on the basis of this non-use of force text which are not consistent with Western interests as a whole.

Rather than winning general acceptance for their specific ideas — which they almost certainly knew would not be the case — what the Soviets and their allies were seeking at Stockholm was a move towards the establishment, on a more or less regular basis, of a forum for the constant or at least regular review of the security situation in Europe in a way that would give the Soviet Union a major voice. The establishment of an essentially political rather than military pan-European security conference has been a long-standing objective of Soviet foreign policy. Whether this goal will be fully satisfied in the future remains to be seen, but clearly it would have been impossible for Moscow even to seek to pursue it further if the Stockholm Conference had resulted in a failure or an outcome which had not been consistent with Western interests or demands.

For their part, the Allies achieved much substantive satisfaction at Stockholm; the Stockholm Document is an immensely detailed prescription for concrete activities and measures aimed at promoting confidence and greater security as an essential first step towards more stringent arms control and even eventual reductions. The Stockholm result comes close in very many respects to the initial package of measures the West tabled in January

1984 and the result could, if the measures are honestly implemented, induce more openness and predictability in military activities in Europe. This could in turn help to reduce one advantage that the East has traditionally enjoyed: secrecy. The problem of asymmetry has bedevilled almost all arms control, disarmament and security negotiations since World War II. Information that is readily accessible in the media in the West is generally regarded as highly classified in Eastern Europe. The programme of activities agreed to at Stockholm should go some distance towards reducing this asymmetry even though it may not eliminate it.

But this is only a first step towards a larger and more important objective. In all realism it must be noted that while an atmosphere of confidence is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for arms control, the results of Stockholm *per se* will hardly affect other advantages enjoyed by the East: more troops and more tanks, the advantages of geography and a military doctrine based on the concept of offence.

In assessing the basic components of the Stockholm Document and the balance of advantages inherent in the outcome, it must be emphasized that the whole complex bargain exists at the moment on paper; the ultimate success or failure of the negotiation will depend on how scrupulously the measures themselves are implemented — and this is a process that will take time.

Two questions come to mind immediately: how will the East's implementation of these undertakings be monitored, and, on the other side of the same coin, how will we ourselves in the West organize our own implementation activities? We, like the East, have undertaken some biting new commitments. If the process of confidence-building is recognized as a mutual and reciprocal one, it will be important that we establish a high level of credibility in our willingness to implement the Stockholm provisions accurately. At the same time, the conclusion cannot be avoided that it will be a much more exacting task to monitor the East's implementation of the



Stockholm Document's provisions than their compliance with the more minimal and permissive provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

In whatever we in the West do, it will be important to remind ourselves continually that the essential value of the Stockholm Document lies in its collective political commitment to achieve a high degree of confidence and trust in our collective interrelationships and that it is not in any real sense a new means of information gathering.

In this connection, on-site inspection as a means of verification is of course a special case. It would be a gross mistake for any party to abuse the as yet frail and nascent inspection regime by asking for an exorbitant number of inspections or in any other way placing excessive demands on this new system. Verification activities must be reliable, accurate and credible, but they must also be realistic in their defining of objectives.

It will also be necessary to be mindful of the interests of many of the members of the Neutral and Non-Aligned group, who, like the members of the two military alliances, have essential security interests at stake in the way in which the results of the Stockholm Conference are implemented.

From a Western point of view, and indeed more specifically from a Canadian point of view, the positive outcome of the Stockholm negotiation was in very large part attributable to the effective coordination of effort between and among the NATO allies — not at the expense of others but in consultation with them, and in measured, unpolemical negotiation. This lesson should stand us in good stead for the challenges of the future.

Because Stockholm was only a beginning.

The Military Implications of the Stockholm Document and its Application to the Canadian Armed Forces

The following article was written by Colonel C.A. Namiesniowski of the Department of National Defence. Colonel Namiesniowski was Military Advisor to the Canadian delegation at the Stockholm Conference.

It is difficult to draw a clear line in arms control negotiations between political and military issues. The recently completed Stockholm Conference is no exception. Stockholm dealt with military issues which have the potential to attenuate the degree of mistrust which exists in Europe and pave the way for a future political and strategic order in Europe. While this may well be a logical extrapolation of the Stockholm success, realists seek a more practical result in hoping for full compliance with the newly agreed Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) by all participating states which by establishing normal patterns of military activities would exert pressure for stability in Europe. The latter perception is defensible on the basis of "balance and reciprocity"¹ and would not place at risk the security of any state.

Stockholm produced five militarily significant CSBMs, all of which are obligatory. They include measures of notification, observation, an annual calendar, constraining provisions and compliance and verification. These CSBMs are politically binding, apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals as well as the adjoining sea area and air space, and involve 35 participating states — Canada, the USA and all the states of Europe except Albania. The measures are designed to clarify intentions and improve transparency of military activities. The agreement comes into effect on January 1, 1987.

The detailed features of the individual measures are as follows:

Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities

The threshold for the notification of certain military activities is 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks (having armament of 90 mm or more). Notification will be given in writing, in an agreed format, to all other participating states at least 42 days in advance of any of the following military activities when the threshold is met or exceeded:

1. Land forces engaged in the same exercise activity under a single operational command, independently or in combination with any possible air or naval component;
2. Information on participation of air forces in the land activity will be included if it is visualized that 200 or more air sorties will be flown by fixed-wing aircraft in support of the land force activity;
3. Amphibious landings or parachute drops if they involve 3 000 or more troops will be notified separately;
4. Transfers of troops at notifiable thresholds from outside the zone into the zone or within the zone will be notified if they engage in one of the military activities described above. Concentrations of transferred troops to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated at agreed thresholds or above will also be notified.
5. Alert activities, while an exception to prior notification, will nevertheless be notified at the time the troops involved commence such activities above the agreed thresholds.

Observation of Certain Military Activities

An improved and mandatory observation regime for all notifiable military activities has been agreed at a separate threshold of 17 000 troops. There is also a separate, lower, observation threshold of 5 000 for amphibious landing or parachute assault.

¹ Madrid Mandate, September 6, 1983.



The observation measure requires that two observers be invited from each participating state. While observers will be guided, the inviting state is obliged to provide general detail on the observation programme in the invitation and provision exists for the invited state to make requests with regard to the observation programme. There is an obligation also that the inviting state will provide daily briefings on the general situation of the activity being observed with the help of maps including geographic orientation. The mandatory nature of observation and the comprehensiveness of observation modalities which have been agreed have moved this measure substantially beyond any previous measure such as that contained in the Helsinki Final Act. It is in fact virtually a new measure.

Annual Calendars

A completely new idea in confidence-building is an exchange by November 15 of the preceding year of annual calendars containing a forecast of notifiable military activities for the next year. As required in the prior notification measure, although in less detail, information will be provided in an agreed form. Subsequent detailed prior notification 42 days in advance of an activity already forecast in the annual calendar will serve as confirmation of the calendar forecast and will contribute to the perception of the routine nature of the activity.

Constraining Provisions

As part of the information provided in the annual calendar, a constraining provision has been agreed which requires a participating state to notify in writing all other participating states two years in advance of its intention to conduct a notifiable military activity above a threshold of 40 000 troops. Participating states are enjoined not to carry out notifiable military activities involving more than 40 000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar not later than November 15 each year. States were further urged that if military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the calendar they should be as few as possible. Again this is a new measure.

Compliance and Verification

A verification package has been agreed which incorporates a challenge on-site inspection provision with no right of refusal. It provides for on-site inspection to be carried out on the ground, from the air or both if the state believes that the provisions of agreed CSBMs are not being complied with. A request for inspection must be answered in 24 hours or less and an inspection can commence 36 hours after the request is given. The inspection will be completed in 48 hours. Four inspectors comprise

the provisions of the Stockholm Document, the principle of on-site inspection has wider application and has the greatest potential to advance the concept of "openness" in the conduct of military affairs.

While inspection requests cannot be refused or prevented through the use of restricted areas, national sensitive points and other restricted, military defence installations, including certain equipment, will not be subject to inspection. Further, an undertaking exists that the extent of



The Stockholm Document provides for prior notification of certain military activities.

Canadian Forces Photo

an inspection team. The measure provides that no state is obliged to accept more than three inspections per calendar year on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs and no state is compelled to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating state. The on-site inspection measure is considered a breakthrough in an area where hitherto there has been an impasse; of course, it still remains to be tried. While the application will be specifically directed to

restricted areas should be as limited as possible and areas where notifiable military activity can take place will not be declared restricted.

The measure requires that the inspecting state will provide the receiving state with information *inter alia* on the reasons for the request, the location of the area, preferred points of entry, whether inspection will be from the ground, from the air or both simultaneously, whether a fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter or both will



be used, etc. Vehicles and aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement. Flight planning is the responsibility of the inspecting state which is also responsible for filing the flight plan with the competent air traffic authority of the inspected state. Provision exists for deviation from the approved flight plan under certain conditions and, in cases when the inspected state provides the aircraft, one member of the inspection team may observe data on the navigational equipment of the aircraft and have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew.

Implications for Canada

The direct impact for Canadian Forces stationed in or transferred to Europe under national command would be small because normally, Canadian peacetime military activity is conducted well below agreed thresholds required for notification and observation. Notwithstanding, participation in multinational exercises which could reach notification and observation thresholds will require the Canadian Forces to provide the same detailed information as called for by the Stockholm Document. Therefore, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant the Canadian military activity might be, allied countries on whose territories Canadian troops are exercising will have to be sent the same accurate detail as found in the annual calendars and prior notification in time for them to advise all other participating states if agreed thresholds are met.

An example of the type of information required for the calendar submission includes *inter alia* such information as: the type of military activity and its designation, the general characteristics and purpose, area of activity defined by geographic features and/or geographic coordinates, planned duration and start date, numbers and types of forces engaged and level of command.

The format for the content of prior notification is much more comprehensive and consists of 48 separate pieces of information which are divided into four section headings: general information; information on different types of notifiable military activities; the envisaged area and time frame of the

activity; and other information. It includes *inter alia* details on various equipment numbers, area and nature of the activity as well as firm timings.

Canadian military staffs, therefore, will have to provide this information in time to allied states concerned for them to include Canadian data in the submission of annual calendars and prior notification, if cumulative totals and all other conditions have been met. This will require both forward planning and coordination.

At present observation thresholds, it is unlikely that Canada will have to invite observers to national exercises. It is to be expected, however, that we would be subject to any observer programme for a multinational exercise conducted at or above the agreed threshold which included Canadian participation. Canada also has an obligation in the spirit of the Stockholm Document to respond to invitations to observe notifiable activities of other participating states; therefore all the agreed observation modalities are equally applicable to Canada, both as an observing and observed nation, which will require an allocation of resources to meet this obligation.

Like all other participating states, Canada could be included in a challenge on-site inspection while on the territory of an allied state located in the zone of application. Moreover, like all other participating states, Canada has the right to conduct challenge on-site inspections in accordance with the provisions of the compliance and verification measure. This will require the development of adequate arrangements to ensure that the provision of this measure can be met at short notice with the necessary manpower and equipment.

In summary, notwithstanding that by herself Canada is not likely to trigger any of the agreed thresholds, she will, nevertheless, have to observe all the provisions of the Stockholm Document. This obligation will require the Canadian Forces to provide timely detail for annual calendars and prior notification of certain military activities in the agreed format and to comply with the observation and verification provisions.

'Arms Control and Disarmament and Defence' Theme of Consultative Group Meeting

The following executive summary of the October 2-4 meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs was prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament as part of a contract with the Department of External Affairs. Copies of the full report prepared by the Centre are available by writing to the Editor.

The Consultative Group meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, whose responsibilities include representing Canada in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Canada's Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, addressed the opening session of the meeting on October 2. (The full text of his statement follows the executive summary.) Mr. Beatty's address was responded to by a panel that included Professor Albert Legault of Laval University and Ernie Regehr, Research Director of Project Ploughshares. Other speakers at the meeting were Professor Cynthia Cannizzo of the University of Calgary, Professor Douglas Ross of the University of British Columbia and Mr. Robert Reford, President of the United Nations Association in Canada.

The Consultative Group was created in 1979 in response to the recommendation of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. It meets periodically with the Ambassador for Disarmament and with officials of




the Department of External Affairs and other interested Departments to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control. The next meeting of the full Consultative Group will take place in October 1987.

"On October 2-4, 1986, the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met in Ottawa to discuss the interrelationship of arms control and disarmament and defence and, in particular, to explore opportunities for Canada to enhance Canadian and international security through the improved coordination of these objectives. This theme, developed by the Consultative Group's Steering Committee, responded both to an expressed desire within the Consultative Group to examine the interrelationship between arms control and defence matters — especially in the bilateral Canada-US context — and to the view expressed in the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations that: 'arms control and disarmament policy, on the one hand, and defence policy, on the other, should move in tandem.'

Approximately 50 individuals, representing a wide range of organizations and perspectives, took part in the meeting, along with some 20 government officials.

The Group looked at the interrelationship of arms control and disarmament and defence for Canada in three contexts: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD), and the United Nations (UN).

Many participants felt that membership in NATO facilitates the pursuit of Canadian arms control objectives, although others discerned tension between Canada's alliance role and its arms control efforts. The Group was divided over the issue of whether or not Canada should increase spending on its NATO



Mr. Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament. Mr. Roche is Chairman of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs.

contribution as a means of enhancing its influence on arms control issues and of protecting Canadian sovereignty, especially in the North.

Considerable interest was expressed in alternatives to the present structure of NORAD. A proposal to make NORAD a NATO command received strong support. The Group also evinced appreciable interest in establishing a Canadian air defence and early warning system, although there was some concern about the costs involved. It was noted that the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is likely to have implications for NORAD that Canada should be prepared to deal with.

Many participants felt that Canada should continue to play a strong and active role in the fora for arms control and disarmament provided by the UN. There were, however, many suggestions for reform at the UN.

The Group strongly urged the Canadian government to continue its distinguished efforts to achieve a com-

prehensive test ban (CTB). Many participants felt that a step-by-step approach is the most useful route to a CTB and, in this context, there was considerable (although by no means unanimous) feeling that the government should encourage a positive American response to the Soviet testing moratorium.

Many participants suggested that, as a Pacific country, Canada should pay more attention to defence and arms control matters in that region. The proposal that Canada encourage regionally-based restrictions on the production and distribution of conventional arms also received support.

The meeting included a special session dealing with the subject of public education on global security which featured a presentation by Mr. Roger Mollander, President of the Roosevelt Centre in Washington, D.C. Mr. Mollander suggested that, in grappling with contemporary problems of global security, it is useful to keep in mind long-term objectives. In addition, by taking a longer view, people can avoid the contention that characterizes much of the current debate on short-term problems and arrive at some agreement on a common goal. This, as a consequence, will make the near-term issues more susceptible to solution. There was considerable interest in Mr. Mollander's suggestion that simulation games can be useful tools in public education on nuclear issues.

In the opinion of most participants, this meeting of the Consultative Group had been a worthwhile endeavour and had gone farther than previous meetings in reconciling the tensions between the strategic studies community and the peace and disarmament community. Suggestions that the focus of future Consultative Group meetings be more specific and that the size of discussion groups be decreased received appreciable support. Several substantive issues for future consideration by the Consultative Group were proposed."



National Defence and Arms Control: Canadian Priorities that Share a Common Logic and a Similar Purpose

On October 2, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, addressed the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs on the theme of "The Interrelationship between Arms Control and Disarmament and Defence." Following is the text of his address.

"I have been Minister of National Defence for only three months. In that time, I have been very much aware of the task ahead as I prepare to put before Cabinet guideposts for the direction which Canadian defence policy should take in the years ahead.

Your group provides an important forum and I am happy to have this opportunity to outline my thinking on the relationship between arms control and defence. I regret that my schedule will not permit me to stay with you for the remainder of the afternoon but Bob Fowler and his team will stay and I will look forward to hearing your views from him. I am committed to consulting widely before introducing a White Paper and my office will be seeking further opportunities for us to exchange views on major defence and security policy issues.

The report of the Special Joint Committee last June recommended that the Government should engage the public in a continuing dialogue on security policy, beginning by making public its own views and the arguments behind them. I wholeheartedly agree and can think of no more important body with which to take up that dialogue than the Consultative Group.

For many Canadians, the fading memories of global conflict instill a sense that great wars are the stuff of history, of ancestral achievement and sacrifice. We learn to approach war as we would other subjects in a curriculum, and the study of conflict assumes its place on our library shelves, and in our minds, beside chemistry, English literature and engineering.

Our movie screens reflect a different approach. War becomes a subject of celluloid fantasy, taking place in exotic places, conducted by men and women of uncommon courage and beauty. With a few honourable exceptions, the causes of conflict are left unclear, and the effects on individuals and societies drift into the background, too complex, too disturbing, too bothersome to weigh on the minds of the moviemaker or moviegoer.


Perhaps all this is inevitable, a by-product of our 'long nuclear peace,' as *The Economist* magazine recently labelled the post-war period. It is not surprising that, for most Canadians, war is a subject of study or fantasy, since for most it is not within our experience.

But there is, possibly, an additional aspect to this phenomenon. Perhaps our minds have become numbed by the repeated cataloguing of the instruments of war which modern man has invented with such ingenuity.

We have become reluctant voyeurs, fixated by the endless march of technology, and the engineered elegance of ever more discriminating means of destruction.

Yet this is a fascination tinged with dread. For, while conflict is a distant memory for most Canadians, we know that history provides us with few examples of perpetual peace. And we also know that the gleaming weapons which are testimony to the technological genius of man may also be the instruments of his destruction.

Thus, it is not just a lack of familiarity which influences our approach to these questions. It is also fear, not simply of the unknown, but also of the unprecedented. I do not need to tell this group that never before in the history of man has the risk been so great that world conflict could be final and nearly instantaneous in its consequences. This potential for finality leads some to approach the question of security with a clinical —



The Honourable Perrin Beatty, Minister of National Defence.

even cynical — detachment inappropriate to the issues at hand. And it is a very different reaction which leads others to treat the same questions with an emotionalism bereft of logic, to cry in the darkness that reality must change simply because they wish it were different.

But reality does not provide solace to either the logician or the romantic. Nuclear weapons can never be disinvented. There is, however, legitimate concern that current international structures may not be able to prevent their use. Our talent for invention may not be matched by our capacity for control.

We live in a paradox. The very characteristics of nuclear weapons, which have undeniably helped to preserve our long post-war peace, compel us to search for additional mechanisms of control, of confidence-building and cooperation.

Perhaps it is the novelty of this condition and our growing estrangement from the past which causes old lessons to be discarded and new untested insights to occupy their place.



Much of the new wisdom is to be welcomed. It is clear, for example, that the terms 'National Security' and 'Mutual Security' have lost their separate meanings. The search for either at the expense of the other is futile.

Certainly, the old Roman maxim 'if you wish peace, prepare for war' is a far less adequate guide for action than it was in its time. In the nuclear age, something more sophisticated needs to be added, whether it be labelled arms control, disarmament, confidence-building or conflict resolution. As the Prime Minister said before this Group last year, 'the world at large should recognize that arms control is a component of, not a substitute for, a healthy national security policy.'

It is not surprising that people are generally reluctant and slow to recognize the new circumstances. After all, we have given governments the responsibility of protecting our physical well-being. Such responsibility requires neither blithe experimentation nor neglect of the lessons of history. Given the stakes, no one would wish his government to approach security with a gambler's abandon, playing the odds — double or nothing.

In the rush to invent new ways to order our affairs, we must neither turn our backs on the past, nor confuse what we seek to create with what we must learn to control. Proponents of a strong national defence often consider supporters of arms control to be misguided idealists at best, or at worst, the enemy within. Equally, advocates of arms control sometimes regard those who spend and offer their lives to preserve and protect our freedom as hangers-on from another time, yearning for battle and fearful that peace might break out at any moment.

Our country, and indeed our world, cannot afford to perpetuate either of these simplistic fantasies.

Surely, a prudent defence policy must provide a measure of physical protection and order so as to permit the pursuit of additional, and more durable, means of ensuring our security. While change

per se does not require order, predictable, desirable and controllable change certainly does.

You will recall the often brilliant and compelling essays of Jonathan Schell, which first appeared a couple of years ago in *The New Yorker*. He concluded that the only way out of the terrible dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons is the transformation of politics, the creation of a world government which would relieve us of the burden of our own invention.

Some of you may agree with him and perhaps history will judge him correct. But for those who must cope with today's problems, today's challenges and today's world, Mr. Schell's prescription is of little immediate assistance.

The world, for all its interdependence, remains a society of nation states. Each is, at least in part, an expression of its people's wish to be safe and protected in order not simply to survive (or, indeed, prevail) but also to pursue other ends. In some cases, those ends are aggressive and threaten the security and sometimes the very existence of other states. Such threats are not simply the stuff of bad dreams or paranoid personalities. They are real and palpable: the enormous number of tanks and ships and guns and aircraft of the Warsaw Pact exist and cannot be wished away.

Against such threats, those few states which choose not to provide for their own protection must accept the implications and the price of protection supplied by others. Indeed, far from challenging the legitimacy of national defence, the fact that some states choose to abandon their defences is an implicit acknowledgement of the vital importance of the defence efforts and sacrifice of others.

Such a decision presents a moral, and not simply a practical, choice. It is conceivable, for example, that Canada could abandon its efforts at national defence. We face little likelihood of invasion, and certainly none that we could successfully resist by ourselves or which could be viewed with equanimity by the United States.

We also benefit from the protection of others. But does this reality relieve us of doing our fair share to maintain the peace, to provide for our security, to achieve stability and order in the international system, and to preserve social justice and the democratic way of life?

We Canadians must accept the costs, risks and responsibilities which are part and parcel of the security system on which we rely so heavily. Rather than simply exploit the contributions of others, surely we must recognize that security is not a right to be enjoyed, but a status to be earned, involving an obligation to be fulfilled. If our efforts to provide for our own defence are inadequate, others, if only to protect themselves, will assume the task in our stead, and do it in a manner over which we will have little control.

Some Canadians insist that we ought to maintain a prudent national defence, but that Canada should do so in isolation, shunning alliances of our own making. They suggest that we should withdraw from Europe, that we should close our ports to the foreign vessels which guarantee our security, that we should deny our allies the facilities provided by our vast territory and open skies for military training.

Such arguments are most often made in an effort to cleanse Canada of any connection, however remote, with the nuclear deterrent on which we rely, as if ending all such reliance would increase the safety of Canadians or the possibility of our surviving global war. We cannot afford to insulate ourselves from reality; we live in a world where nuclear weapons exist, and we are willing members of an alliance which faces an opponent with vast conventional and nuclear forces so near the East-West divide. We cannot allow ourselves to slip into a false and selfish posture. To do so would affront reality, our own proud heritage, and our friends and allies. Our security will continue to depend for the foreseeable future on the collective strength and the collective influence of our alliances.

Some who argue for military isolationism state that nothing in our alliance



obligations requires us to continue cooperative arrangements. But, while ending such cooperation would not violate the letter of our obligations, it would certainly deeply offend the spirit. I cannot understand a logic which says, on the one hand, that the world is so interdependent and dangerous that we must cooperate in arms control and disarmament, yet asserts, on the other, that Canada should eliminate interdependence and dismantle cooperative arrangements in our national defence.

Surely these activities are two sides of the same coin. Our capacity as a country, and as an alliance, to conduct effective arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies rests on a confidence in our own strength and security, which is in turn based on shared values and true partnership.

It is in these terms that Canada approaches national defence and arms control: not as two solitudes, but as priorities which share a common logic and a similar purpose. Within tight budgetary confines and following a long and sorry period of neglect, we are beginning the slow process of rebuilding our military capability. Not so we may fight wars, but so that we can do our part to ensure that we never have to fight one again.

And to the same end, we are energetically pursuing arms control measures in the various international fora where Canada has a seat at the table. Canada also has a keen interest in the progress of those negotiations at which we are not directly represented, the talks between Washington and Moscow on nuclear and space arms. Both privately and in public, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and I have each maintained a frank and useful dialogue with our American counterparts. The Soviets too have been kept fully informed of our concerns. These efforts will continue. While we are not the custodians of these weapons, we are the custodians of the aspirations of Canadians and of our children's future.

The time is ripe for progress. The United States is blessed with a strong, vigorous and popular president who has rebuilt

America's strength to the point where significant and mutually beneficial arms control agreements are both possible and desirable. The Soviet leadership, for its part, has shown unprecedented willingness to discard the posturing of the past and put forward serious proposals.

For too many years, arms control posturing has been little more than a cynical element in a campaign to sow dissension within our alliance, to score propaganda points in the battle for Western opinion. It is essential that arms control proposals be practical and responsive to the security concerns of both sides. For too long, the inevitable imperfections of particular proposals have served as an excuse to block progress on all.

Ambassador for Disarmament Delivers Canadian Statement to UN First Committee

Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, made a major address to the United Nations First Committee on October 16, outlining Canada's approach to arms control and disarmament and to the agenda of the Committee, which deals mainly with arms control and international security questions. Following is an excerpt from that statement.

"Last weekend the United States and the Soviet Union brought an historic disarmament agreement tantalizingly close to achievement. Since then, both superpowers have informed the world that they will persist in this effort and build on the progress achieved at Reykjavik. The negotiators have already resumed their meetings in Geneva.

These are the highly significant developments that have produced a renewed atmosphere of hope as the First Committee begins its deliberations. For, as Prime Minister Brian Mulroney told the Canadian Parliament, the elements are in place for an ongoing civilized dialogue at Geneva and, hopefully, one which will result in

As Minister of National Defence, I can assure you that those who are responsible for the security of Canada judge agreed and reliable measures of arms control and disarmament together with our defence efforts to be fundamental to the security of the nation and the mutual security of all. I trust that, for your part, you agree that we have the same goals — and that it is the appropriate balance between defensive measures and arms control and disarmament measures that offers our best hope for a future in which freedom, security and prosperity prevail.

Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to many more like it in the future."

General Secretary Gorbachev coming to the United States as agreed upon. The Prime Minister added:

'There are stumbling blocks on both sides. That is what negotiations are all about, sitting down with open minds, knowing the objections on both sides and trying to effect an honourable compromise.'

The Canadian Government hopes that people of goodwill will achieve a substantive accord, which could be signed at an early summit. Arms control, however, is a fragile process. Its environment must be protected. It is therefore doubly important that all actions be resisted which might be seen as weakening or unravelling the existing international framework on which East-West relations and arms control are built. Compliance with existing agreements is essential.

It is a reality of our time that the USA and the USSR will determine the major aspects of any international framework for global security. But security is everyone's business. All of us have a stake in international security and all of



us have a responsibility to play a constructive role in the arms control process.

Canada will press on with constructive work in every multilateral forum that, one day, must achieve the basis for a world community freed from the weapons of mass destruction. Iceland showed that the complete elimination of ballistic missiles in ten years is now seriously discussed at the highest levels. The full implementation of this historic opportunity is our task. Iceland was a moment on the journey, but the journey goes on.

When President Reagan addressed the General Assembly before the Reykjavik meeting, he spoke of hope, of a future without weapons of mass destruction. He reaffirmed his country's commitment to peace, to a more stable superpower relationship, and to substantial progress on arms control and disarmament. The President expressed his Government's willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions once agreement is reached on improved verification procedures. He offered to consider other limits on nuclear testing in parallel with arms reductions. It is our hope that the Soviet Union might find it possible to build on this realistic and welcome approach as a firm foundation for real progress.

When Foreign Minister Shevardnadze came to New York earlier in this session, he too gave us reason for optimism. He spoke of relations with the United States as holding promise — of encouraging outlines of meaningful agreements between his country and the United States of America. When we later welcomed him in Ottawa, Mr. Shevardnadze once again repeated his country's commitment to more stable East-West ties, and to progress on arms control.

But in this atmosphere of expectation, two notes of caution are in order: first, any sense of new momentum can only lead to lasting, effective results if it is backed up by patience, quiet negotiation and due attention to adequate verification, which over the long term will assure confidence in compliance.

And second, our hopes and expectations surrounding the superpower talks

and the bilateral nuclear and space negotiations in Geneva, as important as they are, should not be allowed to distract attention from the necessity for complementary progress in conventional and multilateral arms control forums.

* * *

In this context, we are all much encouraged by the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. The results of this Conference bring new openness and predictability to the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The establishment of agreed procedures for air and ground on-site inspections is a landmark achievement — one which will provide an effective basis for other arms control negotiations.

More broadly still, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) has had a relatively productive session. The guidelines for confidence-building measures which the UNDC will report to the General Assembly, like the Stockholm Conference Document, should provide a useful basis for future negotiators. They could be drawn on to ensure those elements of confidence, compliance and verification which will be essential components of all effective arms control agreements.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has also had a more productive session; if it has still not reached agreement on a global chemical weapons ban, detailed negotiations are intensifying and there have been welcome signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to move forward on verification. We have particularly noted the proposal of the United Kingdom on challenge inspection, which we hope will provide a basis for practical progress on one of the most difficult issues associated with a global chemical weapons ban.

But the sense of positive accomplishment does not extend to other issues on the Conference on Disarmament agenda. We are frankly disappointed that progress on a comprehensive nuclear test ban has been so slow. We were particularly discouraged at the failure to agree on a practical mandate for a sub-

sidary body to work constructively towards an agreed test ban. We note and welcome that the Soviet Union has taken a more forthcoming approach on technical matters relating to the establishment of a global seismic monitoring network. The Australian proposal for an international seismic network is both consistent with Canada's concern for a reliably verifiable test ban, and an encouraging step towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban. Expert-level talks between Soviet and US scientists on nuclear testing are a welcome development — one which all of us hope can provide yet another step towards our common goal.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high priority for Canada. It was thus disappointing that the mandate for the subsidiary body on outer space was agreed so late in the last CD session. Once the mandate was agreed, discussion was both sober and thoughtful. The existing mandate is clearly demonstrating its usefulness.

Canada played an active part in the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. We are heartened by the Conference Final Declaration — by its strong reaffirmation of the principles of the Convention and its restatement of the common interest all share in strengthening the Convention's authority and effectiveness through promoting confidence and cooperation.

This activity shows that the world community is not indifferent or impotent in building a safer world. There is still much to do in the international arena and Canada pledges, once again, to do everything in our power to strengthen the international machinery of peace. This worldwide activity must reinforce the efforts of the superpowers to find bilateral agreements. Although 86 per cent of the people of the world do not live in the United States or the Soviet Union, we are all caught up in the fallout from this relationship of the two great superpowers who together possess 95 per cent of the more than



50 000 nuclear weapons in the world. Their relationship, as is obvious, affects everyone. It is in the interests of everyone to help improve the entire East-West relationship and, as the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, said in his acceptance speech last Friday, to 'demand of the governments of states which possess nuclear weapons that they reflect upon their responsibility to their peoples and to the planet itself and pursue policies that will lead to the elimination of these weapons.' It used to be said that history will be the judge of one's actions. But, in what we are discussing here, there will be no history to write in a non-future for human life if the means to destroy the human race, now in the possession of the two superpowers, should ever be unleashed.

The role of the United Nations in disarmament is to construct a viable framework of multilateral progress so as to enhance the prospect of major bilateral agreements. More attention should be paid in this Committee to consensus resolutions with as much substance as possible, rather than merely increasing the number of resolutions. At the 1976 session, there were 23 resolutions, eight of them consensus. Ten years later, in 1985, there were 66 resolutions, 20 by consensus. The growth of non-consensus resolutions, many of which cancel one another and split apart the Committee, is a dubious achievement and a complete puzzlement to the outside world. Let us not forget that the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, which remains the yardstick by which we measure progress, was a consensus agreement. Important advice has been offered by last year's Chairman, Ambassador Alatas of Indonesia, to form a small working group to attempt rationalization of the Committee's work.

What is needed to reinvigorate the concept of collective security, including arms control, is not a new structure or set of principles; we have a perfectly adequate framework for peace already in place in the form of the UN and its Charter. What needs to be done is to use it effectively...."



First Committee meeting in plenary during its 1986 session.

UN Photo 168935

Canadian-Sponsored Verification Resolution Adopted at United Nations

The Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué on November 14.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced that again this year, a Canadian-sponsored resolution on the role of verification in arms control agreements was adopted by consensus in the United Nations First Committee, which deals with arms control and disarmament and international security questions. The success of the Canadian-initiated resolution follows upon that of 1985, when Canada successfully promoted the first-ever United Nations resolution recognizing the importance of verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements.

Mr. Clark said that the 1986 resolution, entitled 'Verification in all its aspects,' attracted even greater support among UN member states this year, with twice the number of co-sponsors as previously, including representatives from the Western states, Eastern Europe and the neutral and non-aligned nations.

Mr. Clark emphasized that the resolution will give further impetus to the con-

sideration of verification by the United Nations, by referring the subject to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a deliberative body that meets annually at the United Nations to consider a limited number of arms control and disarmament items. The UNDC is expected to draw up principles, provisions and techniques to encourage the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in arms control and disarmament agreements, and to consider ways in which United Nations member states may play a larger role in the field.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs noted that Canada's success with the verification resolution is in keeping with the Government's emphasis on the role of verification contained in the Canadian Programme of Action for the remaining half of the Disarmament Decade, which focuses on practical solutions to arms control and disarmament problems. As part of this Programme, the Government provides \$1 million annually to the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs. He said that the verification resolution also reflects the strong support of the international community for Canada's continuing efforts in this critical area."



Canada Pleased with Outcome of First Committee Deliberations at UNGA 41

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

At the United Nations, subjects relating to arms control and disarmament (ACD) are assigned to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This is one of seven regularly constituted UNGA committees. The UNGA meets in New York from September to December every year. Since the UNGA is a deliberative rather than a negotiating forum, its principal function with respect to arms control and disarmament is to articulate the views of and convey advice from the community of nations. It does not have the power to compel member states to take specific actions. Nevertheless, the moral weight and public relations value of UNGA resolutions and decisions can often have a significant influence on international behaviour. Notwithstanding that the UNGA in plenary session gives final approval to all resolutions, the substantive consideration takes place in committee. It is therefore the developments within the First Committee that are most relevant.

Canada was pleased with the outcome of the First Committee's deliberations at UNGA 41, as the session was largely characterized by a businesslike atmosphere and spirit of compromise. This was manifested in a certain moderation of unproductive rhetoric and apparent efforts to steer a middle course. For example, a resolution sponsored by the Non-Aligned Members (NAM), calling for the cessation of all nuclear tests, moved closer in tone and approach to the more pragmatic Western resolution on the "Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty."

The Canadian delegation played a particularly active role at the 1986 session. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, was elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee and was also a member of a special group established to rationalize the work of the Committee. In addition, as Head of the Canadian delegation, Ambassador Roche chaired the Barton Group — an

informal group of delegates to the First Committee which meets periodically to discuss developments. The group was named for its first chairman, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN William H. Barton, and includes the 16 NATO members, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Ireland.

Canada acted as lead sponsor for resolutions on "Verification in all its aspects" and the "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" (FIZZ). Canada regards verification as a crucial requirement for meaningful progress in arms control and disarmament and devotes considerable effort and resources to the improvement of verification techniques and to the strengthening of international support for the concept. As a result of extensive Canadian lobbying and the willingness of several interested delegations to compromise, the Canadian verification resolution was adopted by consensus with, for the first time, two East bloc delegations agreeing to co-sponsor. The resolution provides *inter alia* that the subject of verification will be included for in-depth study on the agenda of the UN Disarmament Commission. As in past years, Canada's resolution on fissionable material was adopted by a large majority (120-1 (France)) with six abstentions.

Significant progress was made at UNGA 41 with respect to the achievement of an increasingly practical and realistic approach to a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). The realization of an effective CTBT remains a fundamental Canadian arms control objective. Canada resumed co-sponsorship of a resolution on the subject which *inter alia* urges the Conference on Disarmament to commence practical work on a CTBT, with the cooperation of the nuclear weapon states. It was adopted in the First Committee by a solid margin of 117-1 (France) with 16 abstentions. The USA moved from a negative vote the previous year to an abstention. A competing NAM resolution on the subject, although more moderate in tone than similar NAM resolutions in previous ses-

sions, failed to secure the same level of support. Canada also took particular interest in the resolutions relating to chemical weapons and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The "traditional" resolution on chemical weapons, for which Canada and Poland alternate as lead sponsors (Poland had the lead this year), again achieved consensus, with a useful change to incorporate the question of "use" in the operative paragraph referring to the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. On outer space, Canada was pleased that a modified NAM resolution was adopted in committee by a large majority, with no negative vote (130-0-1(USA)).

UNGA 41 voting statistics reveal some interesting facts. Sixty-seven arms control and disarmament resolutions were adopted by the First Committee, an increase of only one over 1985. Canada believes that a reduction in the number of resolutions would enhance the impact of the Committee's decisions, and is thus encouraged that the high proliferation rate of past years was held in check.

Canada supported 45 resolutions, that is 67 per cent of the total number adopted by the Committee, and co-sponsored 12 of these. This is the highest proportion of resolutions supported by Canada in recent years. By the same token, Canada opposed a smaller proportion (9) at UNGA 41 while the rate of Canadian abstentions (13) declined marginally. With regard to those resolutions which came to a vote, Canada's voting pattern was closest to that of the Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), West Germany, and Italy as well as Iceland, Japan and New Zealand.

The Canadian Government will turn its attention next to the implementation of the relevant arms control and disarmament resolutions within the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission, hoping to build on the progress achieved at UNGA 41.



Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) Resolutions at UNGA 41 (Total ACD Resolutions Adopted — 67)

Resolutions marked with an asterisk were co-sponsored by Canada.
Countries in parentheses were lead sponsors.

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (47 including 23 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote)
*41/9 (Costa Rica)	International Year of Peace	WOV
41/45 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	145-0-7
*41/47 (Australia)	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	137-1-15
41/48 (Egypt)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East	WOV
41/49 (Pakistan)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia	107-3-41
41/50 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	WOV
41/52 (Pakistan)	International arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	149-0-4
41/53 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	154-0-1
41/55A (Benin)	Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa	150-0-5
41/57 (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	WOV
*41/58D (Poland)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	WOV
*41/58A (Austria)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	WOV
*41/58C (USA)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	137-0-14
41/59N (Australia)	Notification of nuclear tests	130-1-22
41/59F (China)	General and complete disarmament	WOV
41/59H (Sweden)	Comprehensive study on the military use of research and development	137-1-17
*41/59J (USA)	General and complete disarmament	WOV
41/59M (Peru)	Regional conventional disarmament	137-0-7
41/59E (France)	Confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament	129-0-21
41/59C (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	WOV
41/59G (China)	Conventional disarmament	150-0-2
41/59A (Australia)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	WOV
41/59K (Australia)	Naval armaments and disarmament	153-1-1
*41/59L (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	148-1-6
*41/59B (UK)	Objective information on military matters	116-0-26
*41/59O (Cameroon)	Review of the role of the UN in the field of disarmament	WOV
41/60C (FRG)	Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures	155-0-0
41/60J (Mexico)	UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America	WOV
41/60B (Mexico)	World disarmament campaign	144-0-9
41/60D (Benin)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	WOV
41/60H (Nigeria)	UN fellowships on disarmament	154-1-0
41/60G (Yugoslavia)	Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament	WOV
41/86L (Sweden)	Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe	WOV
41/86I (Romania)	Economic and social consequences of the arms race	138-1-11
41/86E (Australia)	Report of the UN Disarmament Commission	WOV
*41/86P (Netherlands)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	101-0-50
41/86R (India)	Study on deterrence	WOV
*41/86A (UK)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	88-0-56
41/86N (Yugoslavia)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	140-0-13
41/86C (UK)	UN disarmament studies	WOV
*41/86Q (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects	WOV
41/86H (Mexico)	Nuclear winter	140-1-10



RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (47 including 23 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote)
41/87 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	WOV
41/61 (Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Conference	WOV
41/88 (Chairman)	Disarmament and development	WOV
41/89 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region	WOV
41/11 (Brazil)	Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic	124-1-8
NOTE: In addition to the above resolutions the following was also adopted.		
DECISION (Mexico)	Comprehensive Program of Disarmament	WOV
Opposed by Canada — 9		
41/51 (Bulgaria)	Assurance of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	106-18-25
41/59D (Czechoslovakia)	Role of UN agencies in arms limitation and disarmament	117-16-19
41/60I (Mexico)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	139-12-4
41/60E (India)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	136-12-5
41/60F (India)	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	132-17-4
41/86K (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	118-19-9
41/86B (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	118-17-10
41/86F (Argentina)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	130-15-5
41/86O (Yugoslavia)	Recommendations and Decisions of the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly	135-13-5
Canada Abstained — 20		
41/10 (Mongolia)	Right of peoples to peace	104-0-33
41/46A (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	135-3-14
41/46B (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-21
41/54 (Hungary)	Cessation of nuclear weapon tests	123-3-26
41/55B (Benin)	Nuclear capacity of South Africa	139-4-13
41/56 (Byelorussia)	Weapons of mass destruction	128-1-25
41/58B (GDR)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	100-11-43
41/59I (Iraq)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	111-3-38
41/60A (Bulgaria)	World disarmament campaign	114-3-36
41/86J (Iraq)	Recommendations and Decisions of the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly	128-0-18
41/86M (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	133-3-17
41/86D (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	123-1-23
41/86G (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	134-3-14
41/88A (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	94-0-12
41/88B (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	96-0-12
41/88C (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	119-0-8
41/90 (Romania)	Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	126-1-24
41/91 (GDR)	Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	117-1-33
41/92 (USSR)	Comprehensive system of international peace and security	102-2-46
41/93 (Iraq)	Israeli nuclear armament	95-2-56



The 'Canadian Commitment to Arms Control' Theme of Edmonton Address

Canada's commitment to arms control and disarmament was the theme of an address to the Edmonton Conference, "The True North Strong and Free?", made by Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, on November 8. Following are excerpts from that address.

"In arms control, as in any journey, setting your destination is the first, and often the easiest, part. Our goals must be long-range, because I do not believe it is realistic to expect to get there quickly. This is a judgement based on experience and not a statement of policy. Too often when we, the practitioners, urge patience the advocates say this is only because we want it this way. The goal of arms controllers must be to make themselves obsolete — good arms controllers want to do this sooner rather than later.

The failure to put arms control in its proper context can seriously undermine the arms control process.

An arms control agreement that is a disappointment, in that it does not contribute to security in the manner expected, risks becoming a negative factor in East-West relations, and thus in our security. Disappointment and distrust both lead to disenchantment with the arms control process and pessimism about the possibility of progress.

In considering what we hope to achieve in the arms control process it is important to remind ourselves that arms are the result or symptom of international distrust, and not the primary cause. Arms control may limit, and may perhaps even eliminate, some of the symptoms of international distrust but it does not address the core issue.

We must see arms control as what it really is — a tool in the management of East-West competition, a support for our security; it is not an end in itself.

The arms control process is at the heart of the process of reducing tensions, increasing confidence and thus building security. And while we often say that increased confidence is necessary for us to reach arms control agreements we must not fall into the trap of assuming that arms control agreements by themselves can be equated with an absence of distrust. Arms control and arms control agreements, if they are respected, can control and channel the competition; but they do not eliminate it.

Indeed an interesting question is to ask ourselves what the world would be like if some sweeping arms control proposals, such as those discussed in Reykjavik, are agreed to. Some say it would lead to rapid progress in other areas, others say lowering the level of nuclear arms would make the 'rocks' or basic problems more evident — factors such as the conventional imbalance, the Middle East, southern Africa, human rights, would loom larger. I'm not sure what the answer is but both possibilities require serious contemplation.

If the arms control process itself, therefore, is to be evaluated prudently, it is equally important to examine various arms control proposals critically.

It is important to take into account a broad range of factors. The first is that the East-West rivalry has global dimensions. This means that solutions in both international relations and in arms control have to be broadly based and must have wide applicability.

The second is that there is a deep interrelationship among weapon systems. The more radical the arms control proposal, the broader its implication for other weapons. Progress in one area of nuclear weapons changes the significance of the remaining weapons; progress across the whole range of nuclear weapons changes the significance of chemical and conventional weapons.

Finally, weapon systems and weapons exist for different reasons. These include economics, technological capability, geography, tactical and strategic decisions, international politics and on occasion domestic politics. This means that different weapon systems have different values to different countries. It may therefore be impractical to focus exclusively on particular systems. We have seen this in the US focus on Soviet land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and the Soviet attention to cruise missiles.

A responsible approach to arms control — and Canada's approach to arms control is a responsible one — must therefore be a cautious one; arms control proposals that do not do what they purport to do, that are easily circumvented, or that do not take into account the complex interrelationships I just mentioned, have to be avoided as unhelpful or misleading, and perhaps as dangerous.

The complexity and interrelationships involved in arms control account for the slow pace in negotiations, and also for our disdain for arms control by declaration. Declaratory proposals and quick-fixes proliferate in public debates, but experience has shown us that no meaningful arms control measures have been achieved and sustained outside the negotiating framework.

This brings us to the question of the international context of Canada's role in arms control. At this Conference and to an ever-increasing number of Canadians, the sense of Canada as sitting as sort of a no-man's land between the two super-powers is a powerful image. In the age of strategic and cruise missiles this concept has urgent meaning. As neighbours of the USA, and as partners in a democratic value system, we inevitably share the threat to the USA and the West. Geography, the power and effect of nuclear weapons, and the manner in which they are used, make it impossible for people who live huddled to the US border to avoid the threat — to suggest we can is wishful thinking. Our commitment to democratic values augments the



threat and diminishes our ability to avoid it. We sit between the superpowers only in the geographic sense.

The threat to Canada is what gives us the right to be concerned about arms control, but it is a right we share with all mankind and the harsh fact of political life is that, by itself, it does not buy us a very significant role in the arms control process. For, however vividly we may understand that in major nuclear war Canada will be a battlefield, this is not a concept that is well understood outside of Canada.

Other nations, including our European allies, tend, for the most part, to regard us as living basically out of harm's way, far away from the front line which they see as being in Europe. The superpowers, who worry about escalation arising from confrontation in Central Europe, from instability in the Middle East or problems in Central America, also have problems seeing Canada in this manner.

In today's nuclear terms the concept of living out of harm's way is not real. It is however a political perception we must live with, and one which we must overcome, if we are to play an effective role in international politics and arms control.

This perceptual problem exists to an even greater degree when we consider conventional war. Few nations in the world can be said to have as few direct threats to their national security as Canada. But because the danger is that conventional war very quickly will lead to nuclear war which threatens us, we have a real stake in resolving conventional arms control problems and insist on being at the table when these issues are discussed.

But mistaken perceptions are only one of the impediments to the role we can play. There are other factors that limit our voice. The most direct is that our military power is not what needs to be controlled. We have no nuclear weapons and our conventional forces are very small. This is not a situation we can do very much about; we are not about to undertake a massive rearmament campaign just so we can participate better in arms control.

Canada goes into arms control negotiations with another disadvantage. We are as I said earlier a principal power. Located elsewhere we would be known as a regional power. But we are a regional power without a region. Thus, despite our economic power and size we do not go to international forums carrying with us the weight of several clients or able to express the views of our region.

Canada has found over the years that it must consciously work hard to overcome these limitations. We have done it in a number of ways. The most important are:

- activist bilateral diplomacy;
- through multilateralism in alliances and organizations, NATO primarily, but also the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and
- finally through competence, pragmatism and responsibility.

We do carry out a large part of our arms control activity through and in the course of our bilateral foreign policy relations. We have found that lots of relations with the US or even good relations with the US do not always give us the voice we believe we should have in security affairs. But we work at it. We have learned that it is not simply a question of telling the US what we want, but also of being able to tell them how we think we should get there.

History, geography and our shared values with the USA have brought us certain advantages, but changing governments and the surprisingly personalized nature of policymaking in these areas mean that our involvement in arms control must be an ongoing process. It is therefore a constant focus of Canadian policy and of Canada's relations with the USA and its other major allies.

In bilateral terms our dialogue with the Soviet Union is far less intense; it does not approach the daily dialogue with countries such as the USA and UK. It nevertheless is real and growing. But we do not focus only on the superpowers.

We are aware for example that there is a limit to how far the superpowers would cut their arsenals without the French and Chinese cutting theirs. Our bilateral relations with potential new nuclear powers are of vital importance too if we are to prevent the proliferation that could damage the already fragile arms control process.

While bilateralism is one approach it is not enough. Canadian bilateral diplomacy alone brings us no seats at the negotiating table; we must therefore make creative use of our participation in alliances and multilateral organizations. In these organizations, by building alliances and coalitions and by working with like-minded nations we help build a stronger voice for Canada....

In seeking to develop our expertise Canada has had to choose where to focus its attention. We have chosen to develop our expertise on verification as a practical contribution to resolving arms control negotiation problems. Verification has often been dismissed as a political smokescreen, a problem which doesn't exist, or as an issue that has already been resolved by modern technology. I wish that were true. Verification continues to pose a series of technical problems. These technical problems are getting larger rather than smaller, as the numbers of weapons proliferate, as the types of weapons change, and as they are made smaller, faster and more and more to resemble conventional weapons.

Canadian work on verification cannot solve the problem of political will. It can however help resolve the technological problems that continue to exist. And this will help build confidence and in turn generate political will.

If I may then be allowed a few comments in summary, I would stress three points. We are committed to arms control, we are actively pursuing it and finally it is a difficult process. This is not, and must not be seen as, a call to pessimism. What we need is patience and perseverance: strength in our efforts, and a true commitment to our freedom and our values."



Canada Hosts International Workshop on Seismic Data Exchange

The following article is based on a report prepared by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Data communications experts from 17 countries met in Ottawa on October 6-8, 1986, to discuss the problems involved in the rapid exchange of digital seismic waveform data. This workshop, jointly hosted by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs and the Geophysics Division of the Geological Survey of Canada (Energy, Mines and Resources), was conducted in support of the activities of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) of the Conference on Disarmament, which meets twice a year in Geneva.

Agreed arrangements for the international exchange of seismic data would be needed to verify a complete ban on nuclear testing. The mandate of the GSE, established in 1976, is to define the characteristics of a system that would provide such data exchange with a reliability and speed acceptable to all parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty. This would include the establishment of international data centres that would collect and analyze such data. The United States, the Soviet Union, Sweden and Australia have offered to operate such data centres. The centres would not attempt to determine the character (earthquake or explosion) of a particular seismic event, but would provide its time and location together with other information required for such characterization, including event depth, spectral content and waveform complexity. This information would be made freely available to interested states who could then draw their own conclusions.

The data to be exchanged under this proposed international monitoring system fall into two distinct categories. The first, known as parameter or level I data, is provided by the country on whose territory the recording station is located from the original continuous data trace and consists of basic measurements such as the amplitude of signals



Group photo of participants from seventeen countries who attended workshop on seismic data exchange hosted by the Canadian Government.

detected. It may be either in analogue (e.g., paper) or digital form. The second is known as waveform, or level II data, which consists of the continuous data trace itself. The GSE has focused primarily on the relatively simple exchange of level I data, which consists essentially of telex-type messages. The medium chosen by the GSE for such exchanges has been the Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), primarily because it reaches most countries in the world. The GSE has conducted a number of experiments using the GTS. Canada, along with more than 30 other countries, took part in the most recent of these in 1984.

The exchange of the more useful level II data has proved more problematic. For example, the volume of such data is very large and is not readily handled by a telex-based system such as the GTS. While level I data are more readily transmitted, they suffer from a major theoretical disadvantage in that they represent an interpretation by a given country of its own level II data, which

may or may not be accurate. Hence it would be preferable if the original level II data were available through the data centres for analysis by any party. Until recently, the insistence by the Soviet Union that limits be established on the provision of level II data (only a few times each year in response to specific requests) has given rise to much disagreement within the GSE and impeded progress. However, in July 1986, the Soviet Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament stated that the USSR wished to promote the exchange of level II data on a large scale by satellite and other means. This apparent change in the Soviet position may give new life to the work of the GSE.

In February 1986, Canada offered to host the above-mentioned workshop for members of the GSE on the technical problems of level II data exchange. This proposal was received favourably by Western delegations, although it did not invoke much initial enthusiasm from the Eastern bloc representatives. (Soviet interest, however, increased after the Soviet statement in July 1986.)

Thirty communications experts from the following 17 countries attended: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the USSR, the UK and the USA. The first-time participation of Eastern bloc countries in such a workshop was encouraging. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister for Mines, the Honourable Gerald Merrithew, both paid a visit to the workshop and discussed the issues with participants.

The workshop focused on the problems of rapid computer-to-computer exchange of digital waveform data. The most effective way of establishing and using such connections is by the international packet-switched data networks now available in most countries. It was acknowledged that special provision had to be made for those countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, which do not yet have access to such networks.



Working groups focused on the topics of message formats, means of communications, and the communications protocols required for the use of such means across national boundaries. An impressive demonstration of computer-to-computer linkages showed the establishment of links from Ottawa to computers in Australia, Finland, West

Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA.

General agreement was reached on the format for waveform messages; several outstanding problems relating to the use of packet-switched networks were resolved; and the internationally approved protocol for computer linkage

was strongly recommended. The results of the workshop will be presented as a Canadian working paper at the next meeting of the GSE in March 1987. It is expected that the workshop's conclusions will be accepted within the GSE, thereby accelerating its work.


Upgrading the Yellowknife Seismic Array

The following article is based on a report prepared by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

The seismic array located just west of Yellowknife, NWT, is being completely modernized. A major impetus for this large-scale project is the recognition by the Canadian Government of the importance of contributing to the development of a global seismic network which could be used to assist in verifying an eventual comprehensive test ban. The upgrading of the Yellowknife seismic array will cost nearly \$4 million and is expected to be completed early in 1989. The modernization of the array will be carried out by the Geophysics Division of the Geological Survey of Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, which has operated the facility for almost 25 years.

The Yellowknife array was installed in 1963 and, aside from the addition in 1974 of analogue radio telemetry between the outstations and the control centre and automatic computer processing, has remained essentially unchanged. Most seismic observatories consist of seismometers at a single site, but the array has 18 outstations, each equipped with a seismometer, spread out at intervals of 2.5 km along two lines 20 km in length, oriented north-south and east-west. The array control centre, located outside the Yellowknife airport, receives data from all these instruments by radio. Using a computer, the direction and distance of a seismic source, whether explosion or earthquake, can be determined from the

sequence in which signals from the source arrive at the individual seismometers. In addition, by adding up the output of all the instruments after an appropriate time delay (a process called beamforming), smaller signals can be detected by the array than would be possible from a single seismometer, since the uncorrelated background noise tends to cancel out while the correlated signals reinforce each other.



The Yellowknife seismograph array is within 10 000 km of all principal underground testing sites.

Yellowknife was chosen as the site of the array for several reasons: it is far from oceans, which are a major source of background noise; the rock beneath it is unusually uniform; and its remoteness minimizes the most important secondary source of noise, namely human activity in the form of traffic, trains and industrial machinery. The array has proven very sensitive and detects many thousands of

earthquakes (and several tens of underground nuclear explosions) each year. The data produced by the array have been widely used by researchers in Canada, the US and Europe in continuing efforts to devise methods to detect smaller and smaller events and to characterize them accurately as either earthquakes or explosions — both essential prerequisites for a verifiable ban on nuclear testing.

Over the years, the array equipment has become somewhat antiquated. The data from the array accumulate on tape at the Yellowknife control centre and are sent to Ottawa at intervals of about two weeks. This delay would not be acceptable in a (test ban) treaty environment. The modernization therefore includes replacement of the existing seismometers and the addition of a four-element array (with a spacing of about 10 km) of new "broad band" seismometers. Data from these sites will be relayed by digital radio telemetry to a new control centre, from which the data will be sent by a dedicated satellite link in "real time" to Ottawa. Since the project was funded in July 1986, new equipment has been ordered, tunnel vaults about 15 metres long have been blasted into cliff faces for the broad-band sites, detailed design documents for both hardware and software have been completed, and work has begun on many of the high-technology components of the system.



Canada in Full Compliance with Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons and provides for their destruction. The Convention was negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and was opened for signature in April 1972. Canada deposited its instrument of ratification in September 1972. It entered into force in March 1975. More than 100 states now adhere to the Convention, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The Convention lacks effective verification provisions. In part, this may reflect the belief, widely held at the time it was concluded, that the development or use of such weapons was not a practicable possibility for the foreseeable future. However, advances in biotechnological research in the intervening years have prompted concerns about what many see as an increased potential for the development of biological or toxin weapons. Several allegations of breaches of the Convention have in fact been made. This has caused the international community to give increased attention to ways of strengthening confidence that all parties are in full compliance with the terms of the Convention.

A small step was taken at the First Review Conference in 1980, where it was agreed that in seeking to resolve any problem relating to the objectives and application of the Convention, any State Party has a right to request an expert-level consultative meeting open to all States Parties.

At the Second Review Conference, held in Geneva September 8-26, not only was this right reaffirmed but important additional progress was made through agreement on a variety of measures to strengthen confidence in the effective application of the Convention. The Conference agreed, *inter alia*, to exchange data and information on certain research centres and laboratories and on outbreaks of infectious diseases,

to encourage the publication of biological research related to the Convention and to promote contacts among scientists engaged in such research. An *ad hoc* meeting of experts is to be held in Geneva in April 1987 to work out modalities for the implementation of these measures.

Canada's main objectives at the Second Review Conference were: to register unambiguously our continuing concerns relating to unresolved uncertainties about compliance; to affirm Canada's full compliance with all the provisions of the Convention; to promote dispassionate discussion of ongoing biotechnological research and its potential implications for the application of the Convention; and to foster consensus on a Conference final document which would incorporate agreed measures to strengthen the effective application of the Convention. Canada considers these objectives to have been met.

Following is the text of the Canadian statement to the Second Review Conference on Biological and Toxin Weapons, made on September 9 by the Head of the Canadian delegation to the Conference, Mr. Arsène Després, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada in Geneva.

"The Canadian delegation welcomes the opportunity to participate in this Second Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. As has frequently been observed, this Convention has a quality of uniqueness in being the first multilateral agreement concluded with the purpose of effectively eliminating permanently from the earth an entire category of weapons. The strict adherence of all parties to all the terms and obligations of the Convention is thus a matter of singular importance. So, too, is the need for universality of adherence to the Convention and the norms which it embodies.

We should also not lose sight of the fact that when the Convention was concluded, as reflected in its preamble and in Article IX, it was seen as an important step towards the effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The negotiations to that end in the recently completed session of the Conference on Disarmament give cause for cautious hope that the prospects for the attainment of this objective have improved. It would be appropriate for the Conference to urge that the serious pursuit of those negotiations be intensified. Just as important, we must take care to conduct ourselves in this Conference in ways which are supportive of and in no way undermine or prejudice that negotiating effort.

As seen by the Canadian delegation, our task here will be twofold: to examine dispassionately the operation of the Convention since its entering into force; and to consider ways in which the effectiveness of its application might be strengthened so as to increase the level of assurance that all parties are adhering rigorously to their obligations. It is a truism that all areas of arms control and disarmament involve a kind of race between the ceaseless advances of science and technology and the ability of policymakers and lawmakers to ensure that such advances are used to strengthen rather than to undermine international peace and security. In the field of biotechnology, this tension between scientific and technical advance — which can be of inestimable value for enhancing the health, comfort and security of peoples everywhere — and the potential for misuse for non-peaceful purposes, is especially acute. Since the time when the Convention entered into force, even since the First Review Conference, there have been major advances in numerous aspects of biotechnology. The material put before us by the Depository governments makes this clear. Much of this technological progress, even when it results from perfectly legitimate, peaceful research programmes could, with distressingly little effort, be redirected towards illegitimate purposes of the kind prohibited by the Convention which we are reviewing. Indeed, such is the state of biotechnology that there is room for legitimate doubt that the Convention to



which we are all parties can ever be verifiable to the standards of adequacy which many of us would normally require to be incorporated into any significant arms control and disarmament agreement.

There is another regrettable fact which must be taken into account during the course of our deliberations here. In contrast to the situation which prevailed at the time when the First Review Conference convened, there have in the intervening period been several allegations of serious breaches of the Convention. This is cause for major concern. Canada accepts that these allegations have not been made frivolously nor in the absence of disturbing evidence. The seriousness of the Canadian Government's concerns about these allegations is attested by our having conducted several investigations relating to allegations of toxin weapons use in Southeast Asia. These investigations have formed the basis of three separate submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General. These investigations do not, in themselves, definitively confirm the use of toxin weapons in that region. However, neither do they refute the validity of the allegations nor in any way allay our sense of concern. On the basis of Canadian investigations, anomalous epidemiological phenomena in Southeast Asia in the early 1980s remain inadequately explained. The most salient point which Canada's investigative effort in that region underlines is the absolute necessity of full, prompt, unqualified cooperation on the part of all directly concerned parties if uncertainties about compliance are to be satisfactorily resolved. In the case of our own investigative activities, as in the case of a team of experts sent to the area by the UN Secretary-General in 1981, such cooperation was not forthcoming. We note that uncertainties relating to other alleged breaches of the Convention have similarly not been resolved. This is an unsatisfactory and unacceptable situation.

In the face of this situation, involving widespread doubts about the possibility of ever being able to devise adequate and practicable verification provisions, as well as as persisting unresolved uncertainties relating to allegations of non-compliance, it would be all too easy to lapse into a

despairing, do-nothing attitude. However, such a defeatist approach would only undermine the established norm against biological weapons. This Convention, which remains a legally binding instrument for all States Parties, is the strongest embodiment of that norm. The Canadian Government considers that it should be the task of this Conference to seek to strengthen the application of the Convention in realistic and operationally practicable ways. We hope this Conference will be able to reach agreement on a selection of measures to this end, which could be set out in politically binding form in the Final Document of this Conference, to be adopted by consensus. In particular, Canada would urge the desirability of building on the achievement of the First Review Conference by reiterating the right under Article V of any State Party to request the convening of a consultative meeting open to all States Parties at the expert level, and by stating the corresponding obligation of all directly concerned States Parties to respond positively to such a request through participation in the consultative meeting and by extending full cooperation in resolving any compliance-related questions. The Canadian delegation is also ready to give constructive and positive consideration to other proposed measures which could strengthen confidence that the norm against biological weapons is being respected and raise the level of assurance that the legal obligations embodied in the Convention are in reality being adhered to by all States Parties.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the Canadian delegation reaffirms before this body that Canada has never possessed biological weapons and continues in every respect to be in full compliance with all its obligations under the Convention. In the hope that it might encourage greater forthcomingness on the part of all States Parties with regard to the freer exchange of information concerning biotechnology research and development in our respective countries, the Canadian delegation is filing with the Conference Secretariat, with the request that it become an official Conference document, a paper setting out the general nature and magnitude of biotechnology activities in Canada and the extent of governmental involvement therein."

Canada Celebrates International Day of Peace

On September 15, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced the details of a special ceremony to commemorate the International Day of Peace that will take place in the rotunda of the Centre Block on Parliament Hill at noon on September 16.

Mr. Clark said that this ceremony is being held in recognition of the UN-declared International Day of Peace, which falls on the third Tuesday in September of each year. This Day holds



Senator Lowell Murray receiving IYP stamp kit from the Honourable René Marin.

DND Photo

special significance in 1986, which has been declared the International Year of Peace (IYP) by the United Nations.

Mr. Clark announced that Senator Lowell Murray, Government Senate Leader and Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations, will represent the Government of Canada at the ceremony. Mr. Clark noted that special projects undertaken by various government departments to mark the International Year of Peace will be displayed in the rotunda beginning at noon on September 16.



These projects form part of Canada's IYP programme previously announced by Mr. Clark on March 6.

During the ceremony, the Honourable René J. Marin, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Canada Post Corporation, will unveil a special embossed stamp commemorating the IYP. The Master of the Mint, Mr. Maurice Lafontaine, will present a special \$100 IYP gold coin issued by the Mint in August. Mr. Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament and Chairman of the

Canadian Government's IYP Committee, will also address the ceremony, as will General Paul Manson, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Clark also noted that the Dominion Carillonneur will play the Peace Tower carillon in recognition of the International Day of Peace as part of the privately-inspired 'Peal for Peace' project that will see bells ringing in a number of Canadian communities on September 16.

Mr. Clark said that the September 16 ceremony reflects the continued commitment of the Canadian Government to the pursuit of international peace and security and its support for the objectives of the International Year of Peace as outlined in the IYP resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, that received the unanimous consent of the United Nations General Assembly on October 24, 1985. He emphasized that Canada would continue to work towards the achievement of these goals, not just in 1986 but every year."

International Year of Peace: Poster/Essay Competition a Resounding Success

As part of Canada's International Year of Peace programme the federal Government sponsored a national essay competition entitled "What is peace and what can I do to achieve it" and a national poster competition on the themes of the International Year of Peace. The undertaking was organized by the United Nations Association in Canada, through a contribution from the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs.

Each competition was divided into three age categories — 12 and under, 13 to 17, and 18 and over. In total, more than 800 essays and 1 800 posters were received.

Judges of the essay finalists were Cathy Lowinger of the Children's Book Centre in Toronto, former Canadian Ambassador Yvon Beaulne, and Professor Albert Legault of the Department of Political Science at Laval University in Quebec City. Judges of the poster finalists were Canadian artist André Masson, Ottawa photographer John Evans, and John Sadler, interim director of the Ottawa School of Art.

Winners of the poster competition:

Age group: *12 and under*

Sonya Hatt, St. Stephen, New Brunswick;
Alison Rust, Gloucester, Ontario

13 to 17

Natasha Dastoor, Brossard, Quebec;
Kari McMillan, Woodstock, Ontario

18 and over

Roger Alexandre,
Saint-Jean-sur-le-Richelieu, Quebec;
Cathy Schmidt,
Vancouver, British Columbia

Winners of the essay competition:

Age Group: *12 and under*

Nicholas Matthew Kot,
Weyburn, Saskatchewan;
Cushing Thompson,
Rollingdam, New Brunswick

13 to 17

Leanne Penney,
Springdale, Newfoundland;
Claude Pigeon,
Squatec, Quebec

18 and over

Diana Dainty, Kanata, Ontario;
Serge Meyer, Montreal, Quebec



Winners of International Year of Peace poster/essay competition meeting with Mr. Clark during their visit to the United Nations on September 24.



Members of Consultative Group Attend First Committee Sessions

The following article is based on a report prepared by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations.

From October 12 to 17, nine members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs visited the United Nations in order to deepen their knowledge and understanding of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The First Committee is the principal UN General Assembly forum dealing with arms control, disarmament and international security questions. The programme in New York was designed to give the participants a better understanding of the operation of the First Committee, upon which they could draw during the course of their future work.

The participants were briefed on the arms control and disarmament activities of the Permanent Mission of Canada, the responsibilities of the Ambassador for Disarmament, overall UN organization, and the First Committee agenda. They were addressed by UN representatives of Poland, Cameroon, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by UN secretariat officials. The participants attended a number of meetings of the First Committee, where they were able to see firsthand how the arms control and disarmament process works in the First Committee. In the First Committee, the group heard the main Canadian intervention, delivered on October 16, by Mr. Douglas Roche, the Ambassador for Disarmament. There were also opportunities to make bilateral contacts, to attend sessions of the UN General Assembly and other committee meetings, and to meet non-governmental representatives at the UN.

During the course of their visit to the United Nations, the intricacies of multilateral diplomacy and the complexities of trying to obtain agreement on texts of draft resolutions became apparent to the participants, as was the fact that "reasonableness of position" is not always defined in the same manner



Ambassador Douglas Roche and members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs during their visit to the United Nations in October.

by all countries. Against this background, the participants probed — and prodded — the depths of Canadian arms control policies and did not hesitate to advance their own suggestions for appropriate Canadian policies.

Administrative arrangements for the Consultative Group programme were coordinated by Mr. Firdaus Kharas, Executive Director of the United Nations Association in Canada, who also served as the programme conducting officer.

Participants in the Consultative Group programme were:

Professor Cynthia Cannizzo
Strategic Studies Program
University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta

Professor Michel Fortmann
Professor of Political Science
Université de Montréal
Montreal, Quebec

Ms. Ellen Gould
Project Ploughshares
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Mrs. Joanne Harris
Educators for Peace
Torbay, Newfoundland

Mrs. Margaret Hoddinott
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
Rexdale, Ontario

Mr. Peter Ross
Canadian Student Pugwash
Ottawa, Ontario

Ms. Jill Lightwood
Island Peace Group
Charlottetown, PEI

Professor Denis Stairs
Professor of Political Science
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Ish Theilheimer
Operation Dismantle
Ottawa, Ontario



SSEA Tables Government Response to Report of Special Committee on Canada's International Relations

On December 4, the Secretary of State for External Affairs tabled in the House of Commons the Government's response to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations. Following are excerpts from the Government's response to the arms control recommendations of the Report.

“Conclusion/Recommendation

16. We recommend that Canada intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures. These measures, which have been enunciated by the government, are as follows:

Response

The government welcomes the committee's support for its six arms control and disarmament objectives and intends to pursue them energetically through all appropriate diplomatic channels.

Conclusion/Recommendation

16a. A mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems.

Response

The government believes that the first priority of the international community should be to bring about a mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction in nuclear forces of the superpowers. The government will continue to press both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty until an updated treaty is in place.

Conclusion/Recommendation

16b. The maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

Response

The government welcomes the committee's support for the importance Canada attaches to the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The emergence of new nuclear suppliers and new technologies has increased the urgency of finding a means of curtailing proliferation. At both the political and technical levels, Canada has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons from one country to another — 'horizontal proliferation' — while seeking equally to curtail the accumulation of more, and more advanced, weapons in the hands of the nuclear powers — 'vertical proliferation'....

Conclusion/Recommendation

16d. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable.

Response

The negotiation of an adequately verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. In the meantime, Canada is presenting proposals in various bodies designed to lead to such a treaty and is developing the necessary techniques of verification....

Conclusion/Recommendation

19. Decisions about defence policy, including the military decisions in which Canada participates as a NATO member, should not be taken without due regard to their consequences for arms control. Arms control and disarmament policy, on the one hand, and defence policy on the other, should move in tandem.

Response

The government's ongoing examination of defence policy is taking full account of its policy on arms control and disarmament. Both are essential components of Canadian security policy and neither can be pursued without taking into account the other.

Conclusion/Recommendation

20. We have concluded that the government's capacity for formulating policy on arms control and disarmament needs improvement. We are not in a position to specify the manner in which this capacity could be improved, but one essential requirement would be a new policy development mechanism designed to reconcile the views received from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. We also believe that foreign policy is conducted in a more coordinated and energetic manner if it is exposed regularly to public examination. For this reason, the new mechanism should be directed to report periodically to Parliament.

Response

While policy on these issues is ultimately coordinated in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy, the government recognizes the need for close dialogue with Parliament. Henceforth, should Parliamentarians so desire, External Affairs and National Defence could make periodic joint presentations to joint meetings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence. By this means and the use of existing mechanisms for interdepartmental liaison the objectives of the committee's recommendation would be met. Provision is already made for public participation in policy development in these areas, among other ways through the work of the Ambassador for Disarmament and the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control, and in the availability of ministers in Parliament. In the last analysis it is the responsibility of ministers to ensure the proper consideration of national security policy and defend that policy in Parliament.”



The Canadian Commitment to NATO

The following letter to the Editor, written by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, was published in The Globe and Mail on December 4.

"You have confused the relationship between security and arms control in your editorial Risky Violations (December 1).

Canada is a member of NATO and will continue to shoulder its share of the burden of collective defence. The Government's undertaking to allow air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) testing is a contribution we make to the viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent. As long as there are nuclear weapons we must rely on that deterrent. Testing unarmed cruise missiles in Canada is a small contribution compared to that of our European allies, who have deployed armed cruise missiles on their territory.

As a member of NATO and a partner in North American defence, we are unquestionably a US ally. But we are not unquestioningly a US ally. On November 28, I questioned the wisdom of the US decision to no longer abide by SALT II limits. We have repeatedly expressed that view to the US Administration, most recently in a letter last week from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to President Ronald Reagan, and two weeks ago in my discussion with US Secretary of State George Shultz in Ottawa. SALT II is not perfect, but even imperfect restraint is better than no restraint. Our position on this point has been consistent, clear and unequivocal.

It is untrue to say that testing of ALCM guidance systems entails 'co-operation in order to subvert SALT II.' Testing assures the effectiveness of a weapon; it does not determine how many weapons of that type there should be. ALCM testing in Canada no more made it possible for the US to equip its 131st B-52 bomber with cruise missiles than to equip the first B-52.

The important point is that negotiations on limiting the number of cruise missiles are under way in Geneva. This Government strongly supports those negotiations. We are looking for the superpowers to agree on a new arms control accord. In the interim, cruise missile

testing contributes to Alliance unity and demonstrates to the Soviet Union that attempts to drive wedges into the Alliance will not work. This is one reason they returned to the negotiating table in Geneva, and why they are now beginning to negotiate seriously."

Following is an excerpt from an address made by the Minister of National Defence to the Empire Club in Toronto on January 15.

"Deterring aggression, or intimidation through threat of aggression, requires forces with sufficiently credible capabilities to dissuade a potential enemy. The massive Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear capabilities in Europe pose a real threat to the democratic values enjoyed by our European partners. Canada shares with its allies in the West a commitment to these values. Preserving them cannot be taken for granted. They must be actively defended.

Canada could not survive as the sort of country we all wish it to be if democracy among our traditional allies were lost. A threat to the other Western democracies threatens us here in Canada as well.

We are not in NATO and in Europe today simply out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada. There can be no doubt that the defence of Western Europe continues to be critical to the defence of the Canada we wish to preserve.

The direct threat to Canadian territory is posed currently by Soviet long-range nuclear missile, bomber and submarine forces based in the Soviet Union. Since our geography uniquely situates us between the two nuclear superpowers, we could not remain unaffected by Soviet

aggression against the United States. Opting out is not possible, nor would it be consistent with our proud history, our beliefs and our responsibilities as a democratic and sovereign nation.

Bearing in mind our geographic location, I do not believe that a neutral cordon around Canada would make us safer or improve the global situation by the example it would set. Even if we could afford it, the cost for Canada of going it alone would be very much greater, with no assurance that we would be any more secure. Arguably, we could end up being much less so. In any case how could we hope to enforce Canadian neutrality or even verify that it was being respected?

To opt out would be to give up the collective development of all security measures, which includes arms control, in the North Atlantic Alliance. A disarmed or neutral Canada would not have become part of the process of security and cooperation building in Europe begun with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. We could not then have contributed to the success of the Stockholm Conference, nor have a seat at the table of the current Vienna meeting continuing the Helsinki process. We could not have become participants in European conventional arms control negotiations, and could not be part of allied consultations on nuclear arms control.

Would the declaration of Canada as a nuclear weapons-free zone make Canadians safer? Unfortunately, such a unilateral act does not provide the security its advocates suggest. A nation of nuclear-free zones is not a nuclear weapons-safe nation. Such a declaration would not by itself eliminate a single nuclear weapon or reduce the differences which divide East and West. Indeed, as the *Toronto Sun* observed, 'it serves more to comfort our enemies and confound our allies.' I do not believe that any worthy aim would be achieved by divorcing Canada from weapons and policies which, despite our action, would continue to provide security to Canadians. Along with all our NATO partners, we have rejected this course as illusory...."