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**THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTIONAL ARMS REGISTER:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY**



OCTOBER 1995

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


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Preface

The international community has demonstrated a growing interest in the subject of conventional arms proliferation since the 1991 Gulf War. Particular attention has focussed on the risks posed to regional and international peace and security from excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons, the potentially negative effects on peaceful social and economic development of arms transfers, and the dangers of increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking.

The Register of Conventional Arms, which was established by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/36 L of 6 December 1991, is the only global international effort aimed at promoting transparency in the conventional arms trade. It involves voluntary submission by Member States of data on international transfers of seven defined categories of armaments. It also encourages the provision of data on national holdings, procurement of weapons from national production and other relevant policies.

Canada is a strong supporter of the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. Enhancing the transparency of global and regional arms trade is one of the key issues on the emerging arms control agenda. Transparency can serve to improve the level of predictability and trust in a region and provide a crucial step in the development of a genuine security dialogue.

Canada supports the expansion of the register to cover additional categories of conventional armaments, national holdings and procurement through national production. We are also actively encouraging consideration of regional variants of the Register in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions.

We have encouraged full participation by all Member States in reporting data to the Register, recognizing the practical difficulties that some countries may face in undertaking this.

This Annotated Bibliography, which provides a unique and comprehensive reference tool, has been prepared to assist government officials and researchers in their efforts on this issue and to promote greater use of the Register by all Member States.

The Canadian Government wishes to acknowledge the work in the preparation of this Bibliography undertaken through the Department of Foreign Affairs' Verification Research Program by Mr. Ian Miller, as well as the assistance provided by Dr. Marc Kilgour (Director) and Professor Terry Copp (Co-Director) of the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. The authors also wish to gratefully acknowledge the financial support received for this Bibliography from the Directorate of Public Policy, Canadian Department of National Defence, and the much appreciated help to the project from the following individuals: Michael Bechthold, Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Mr. Alan Crawford, Dr. Ernest Gilman, Dr. Owen Greene, Ev Jones, Ms. Louise Koehler, and Dr. Ed Laurance.

Introduction

On December 6, 1991, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 46/36L, *Transparency in Armaments*, by a vote of 150-0. This resolution called upon the Secretary-General to establish a "universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings and procurement through national production and relevant policies." The resulting United Nations Register of Conventional Arms had seven categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. This document is an annotated bibliography of publicly available material on the Register. It is divided into five parts.

Part A consists of annotations of UN documents and resolutions relevant to the creation and maintenance of the Register, arranged in chronological order, beginning with "Study on the Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms," dated September, 1991. The annotations summarize the scope of each document and list its major arguments. For ease of reference, a serial number has been assigned to each citation. This number appears in the left margin before each annotation, and corresponds to the numbers included in the author and keyword indexes at the end of this report.

Part B is a series of annotations of publications which offer substantive comment on the scope and performance of the Register. The criteria for inclusion are as follows: first, written in or after 1991 and publicly available by August 1995; second, offering some analysis or assessment of the Register. Articles which merely reported the progress of the Register, without analytical comment, are not included. As in part A, each publication is annotated. This summary describes the scope of the article or book, lists the major arguments, and reports the conclusions. For the sake of clarity, part B is organized by publication date. Section B.1 consists of annotations of works published in 1991, B.2 encompasses 1992 studies, and so on through section B.5 which covers 1995. Within each section, articles are listed alphabetically by (first-named) author, and, in the case of multiple publications by one author, by title. As in part A, articles in this section have been assigned a serial number. Publications dated 1991 have numbers starting with 101; publications from 1992 start at 201, and so on through 1995 documents which begin with the number 501.

Part C is an appendix which reproduces, in its entirety, the resolution which founded the Register, 46/36L, in December 1991.

Part D is an author index which lists, alphabetically, the authors who wrote the documents examined in parts A and B. Where an article was written anonymously on behalf of an institution (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), the institution is listed as the author. Following each author's name is a list of the serial number(s) corresponding to his/her articles. The numbering system makes possible quick reference from the author and keyword indexes. For instance, the following reference appears in the author index:

Anthony, Ian: 301, 402, 403.

By virtue of the serial numbers, the researcher is able to determine not only that Anthony has published three articles, but also the years in which the articles were published. Since one serial number is in the 300 range, the corresponding article was published in 1993. Similarly, two serial numbers are in the 400 range, indicating that the articles were published in 1994.

Part E is an alphabetically organized keyword index. Items listed in this section appear in the text of the annotations in parts A and B, and fit into at least one of the following categories: first, a nation or region mentioned in the text of a study; second, a group involved in the preparation or maintenance of the Register (e.g. the UN Secretariat); third, a weapons system covered by the Register (e.g. battle tanks); fourth, a concept or term used to discuss the Register (e.g. background information section); and, finally, a treaty or other agreement discussed in conjunction with the Register (e.g. Missile Technology Control Regime). In addition, following each keyword, the serial number(s) corresponding to the annotation in which it appears are listed. As with the author index, each serial number allows the researcher to determine the year of an article. For example, the following reference appears in the keyword index:

Mediterranean Region: 302, 303, 307, 313, 315, 317, 320, 321, 323, 324.

From the numbers listed, it follows that this region was not discussed in analytical articles on the Register until 1993, at which point it received much attention.

Part A

United Nations Publications

1. Report of the Secretary General. *Study on the Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms*. UN General Assembly Document A/46/301, September 9, 1991.

Prepared by the 1991 Panel of Experts between January 1990 and July 1991, this document is the first study devoted to international arms transfers. Its authors hope to "...encourage prudent restraint by states in their arms export and import policies and to reduce the risks of misunderstandings, suspicion or tension resulting from lack of information concerning arms transfers" (p. 2).

The report examines several aspects of international arms transfers. First, past and current proposals and practices to promote transparency or regulate arms transfers (e.g. the League of Nations following the First World War). Second, the reasons for, and the consequences of, arms transfers (e.g. supplier states sell surplus weapons to defray the costs of research and development). Third, the trends in international transfers of conventional arms (e.g. the volume of arms traffic has been in decline since the middle of the 1980s). Fourth, the relationship between arms transfers, security, arms limitation and disarmament. Fifth, the purposes and objectives of promoting transparency (e.g. build confidence and security). Included in this section are several measures to implement transparency (e.g. a bilateral arrangement where participants inform one another of planned and executed arms acquisitions). Sixth, the role of transparency in facilitating limitations in arms transfers (e.g. it reduces the risk of misperceptions and makes it possible to have security with fewer armaments). Seventh, the illicit arms trade.

The final section relates the Panel's conclusions and recommendations. In addition to making a plea to governments to work together to end the illicit arms trade, the Panel concludes that arms transfers cannot be considered as necessarily destabilizing. However, they relate that both supplier and recipient governments have a special responsibility to work together to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms. Moreover, they maintain that openness can promote restraint in the arms trade. As a result, the Panel calls for the establishment, under UN auspices, of a system to collect, process and publish official standardized information on arms transfers. This register would complement the information already available through the UN on military expenditures. The Panel recommends that this register have the following characteristics: first, it should be set up on a universal and non-discriminatory basis; second, it should be designed so as to permit prompt implementation; third, participation should be universal; fourth, its parameters should allow standardized and comparable input from all states; fifth, it should build confidence, promote restraint in arms transfers on a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral basis and allow timely identification of trends in arms transfers; and, finally, it should have the potential to expand to more comprehensive coverage (e.g. to include military holdings and procurement through national production).

2. *Transparency in Armaments*. United Nations Resolution 46/36L, December 6, 1991.

The General Assembly recognizes that transparency in armaments would promote international stability. However, it reaffirms the right of states, under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, to acquire arms. Thus, it calls on each state to exercise restraint in its arms acquisitions. Moreover, it requests the Secretary-General to establish a "universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings and procurement through national production and relevant policies..." In addition, a panel of governmental experts should be convened in 1992 to make any changes necessary for the effective operation of the Register, and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of its scope.

Included also is an annex which defines the seven categories of weapons to be included in the Register (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers).

This resolution is reproduced in its entirety in an appendix in part C of this document.

3. Report of the Secretary General. *General and Complete Disarmament: Transparency in Armaments*. UN General Assembly Document A/47/342, August 14, 1992.

This report was produced by the 1992 Panel of Experts as directed by the founding resolution of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (46/36L). The Panel was asked to "...elaborate the technical procedures and to make any adjustments to the annex to the present resolution necessary for the effective operation of the Register, and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production" (p. 8). The report is divided into three sections.

In part one the technical procedures for the operation of the Register are examined. Broad definitions and guidelines are offered on several subjects. First, the transfer of arms (e.g. the physical movement of equipment into or from national territory and the transfer of title and control over the equipment). Second, the categories of equipment to be registered (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers). Third, the standard form for reporting international transfers. Fourth, the procedure for including background information regarding military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies (i.e. strictly voluntary and can be submitted in any form). Fifth, the operation of the Register (e.g. reports should be submitted on April 30 each year). Finally, the accessibility of the Register's information (e.g. through the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs).

In part two modalities for the early expansion of the scope of the Register are analyzed. To begin with, the future review of the Register is considered and items are suggested for inclusion on the agenda of the 1994 Panel of Experts (e.g. the extent of participation in the Register). In addition, modalities for the addition of further categories of equipment are considered. Categories could be expanded in two ways: first, by modifying the existing parameters (e.g. tonnage); and, second, by including new categories to address technical developments or to cover weapons not included by the existing structure (e.g. aerial refuelling aircraft). Moreover, modalities for the inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production are considered. The Panel advises that these concepts be defined. Several questions are included which must be addressed before these two elements can be incorporated into the Register (e.g. should military holdings be reported on the basis of the same categories of equipment as arms transfers?).

The third part describes the costs of maintaining the Register. General figures are offered with a stipulation that costs will rise substantially if military holdings and procurement through national production are included.

Included also are two appendices. Appendix A reproduces resolution 46/36L which established the Register. Appendix B consists of an example of the Register's standard reporting form.

4. *Transparency in Armaments*. United Nations Resolution 47/52L, December 15, 1992.

This resolution reiterates the determination of the General Assembly to ensure the effective operation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Furthermore, it endorses the recommendations of the 1992 Panel of Experts.

5. Report of the Secretary General. *General and Complete Disarmament: Transparency in Armaments: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*. UN General Assembly Document A/48/344, October 11, 1993.

Divided into three sections, this document is the first annual report of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Part one introduces the report. Part two reproduces the reports submitted by governments to the Register. To begin with, a composite table listing all the replies received by the Secretary General is provided. Following it are the individual replies of governments. Part three is an index of the information submitted by governments under the "background information" section of the Register. The actual reports are available for consultation at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.

Included also is an annex which defines the Register's weapon categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers).

6. *Transparency in Armaments*. United Nations Resolution 48/35E, December 1993.

The General Assembly reaffirms its request to the Secretary General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development.

7. Report of the Secretary General. *Report on the Continuing Operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and Its Further Development*. UN General Assembly Document A/49/316, September 22, 1994.

The 1994 Panel of Experts met from 7 February to 5 August 1994. Their report, unanimously approved by the members of the Panel (the expert from Egypt reserved his opinion), is divided into four sections.

In part one the continuing operation of the Register is reviewed. The Panel offers several conclusions. To begin with, universal participation should remain the goal of the Register. Moreover, concern is expressed about regional variations in participation. To rectify this problem, regional registers should be created to supplement the global Register. Finally, the continued existence of reporting discrepancies (i.e. the reports submitted by export and import countries did not match) is discouraging. Several factors account for these difficulties: first, conflicting interpretations of whether or not a transfer has occurred; second, conflicting interpretations of the definitions for the equipment categories; third, reporting errors; and, finally, conflicting interpretations as to when a transfer occurred. The authors conclude that a universal definition for "arms transfer" should be formulated.

In part two the future development of the Register is analyzed. The Panel considered three possible modes of expansion: first, adjusting the existing definitions for the seven categories of weapons; second, adding new categories of conventional weapons; and, finally, expanding the scope of the Register. Despite extensive discussions, consensus proved impossible. The Panel recommends the review of these expansion possibilities at a future date.

The creation of regional registers is discussed in part three. The Panel agrees that the establishment of regional registers, as a complement to the global Register, should be encouraged.

The fourth part of the report consists of an overview of the Register's reporting procedures. The Panel provides some guidelines for determining what constitutes an arms transfer. It also relates that the completion of the "background information" section remains voluntary. Moreover, states are encouraged to enter into bilateral talks before submitting their reports to avoid reporting discrepancies. In addition, the UN Secretariat should continue to advise member states on the technical aspects of participation. Finally, future reviews should be held to further develop the Register.

Included also are three appendices. The first provides definitions for the Register's seven categories of weapons. The second is a series of tables comparing participation rates in the Register for 1992 and 1993. The third consists of guidelines for completing the Register's standard reporting form.

Part B.1

1991 Publications

101. Macdonald, Mary K. "An Arms Control Phoenix: Building Transparency Through an Arms Trade Register." PhD Thesis, Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen's University, September 1991.

Macdonald examines whether states see an arms trade register as a viable way to promote transparency in the international arms trade. Writing before the formal creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, she evaluates its chances for success. A parallel is drawn between the UN Register concept and similar attempts made by the League of Nations in the 1920s. She concludes that current proposals demonstrate "little new thinking."

Macdonald studies a wide range of issues related to the register concept: first, the evolution of the concept, dating from the First World War; second, the measures taken in the years following the Second World War (e.g. Conventional Arms Transfer Talks); third, the patterns of the arms trade in the post-war world and the calls for transparency; fourth, the work of the UN Panel of Experts convened to study the viability of an arms transfer register; fifth, analogues to an arms register (e.g. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)); and, finally, Canada's position on transparency in armaments.

Macdonald argues that to create a register, a hegemonic leadership (state or group of states) must be willing to bear the costs of establishing it. Moreover, the register must be promoted as a multilateral concept more efficient than alternative unilateral or bilateral measures. In addition, states must be convinced that the benefits of such a regime outweigh the costs.

Once a register has been established, Macdonald maintains, its success will depend on four factors: first, a high participation rate; second, a willingness on the part of states to comply with reporting regulations; third, a desire to contribute meaningful and significant information; and, finally, an independent mechanism to resolve disputes. If these criteria are present, then an arms transfer register would be a valuable confidence-building measure. In addition, it would facilitate more far-reaching arms control agreements. The greater the information supplied to it, the greater its utility will be. Macdonald cautions, however, against relying on an arms transfer register as an ultimate solution; the search for an effective arms control measure must continue.

102. Regehr, Ernie. "A Seat at the Arms Dealers' Table." *The Ploughshares Monitor*. Vol. XII, No. 3, September 1991, pp. 10-13.

Regehr argues that it was fear of another Gulf War which provided the impetus for the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He maintains that the Register is the right solution, but to a different problem. Contrary to public perception, the Gulf War was "not even marginally" (p. 10) the result of an unanticipated build-up of arms. The

Register will not stop the deliberate transfer of weapons from one state to another--as occurred in Iraq. It is not designed as an arms control regime.

The Register is, however, a confidence-building measure designed to encourage political accountability, and to provide a starting point for future arms control negotiations. The submission of a report to the Register signals a state's willingness to enter into a mutual security dialogue. Before the creation of the Register an arms deal was concluded between the importing and exporting nations, without the international community having the chance to participate in the negotiations. The UN Register, Regehr concludes, will provide the international community with a seat at the arms dealers' table, albeit with observer status.

Part B.2**1992 Publications**

201. Epstein, William. "Write Down Your Arms." *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Vol. 48, No. 2, March 1992, pp. 11, 12, 44.

The UN Register of Conventional Arms marks the first attempt by the UN to regulate the trade of conventional arms. Epstein argues that two factors made the creation of the Register possible: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. No longer polarized by the Cold War, the international community worked together, in the wake of the Gulf War, to avoid destabilizing arms accumulations. Epstein chronicles the evolution of the concept of an arms register, through the UN vote which saw the adoption of the Register concept by a vote of 150-0. The creation of the Register was an historic achievement, endorsed by both arms importing and arms exporting nations. While granting that there is nothing legally binding states to participate, Epstein maintains that the momentum generated by the unanimous vote will guarantee wide participation. The result will be an increase in the possibility of early conflict resolution.

202. Hartung, William D. "Curbing the Arms Trade: From Rhetoric to Restraint." *World Policy Journal*. Vol. IX, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 219-247.

Hartung documents the calls for restraint in the arms trade following the Gulf War, and outlines the policy of the major arms suppliers since 1991 (e.g. U.S., former Soviet Union, France, Britain, China). Despite a rhetorical commitment to arms control, the reality in all arms exporting states is a continued high volume of arms sales.

He maintains that two major arms control initiatives resulted from the Gulf War: the Permanent Five Talks, and the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The former attempt has been stalled since 1991. However, the UN Register has made some progress. To begin with, it has made governments more accountable for their role in arms transfers. In addition, its creation is a starting point for a more comprehensive arms control system involving all major suppliers and recipients.

However, there are several shortcomings in the Register's structure which must be corrected. First, it does not include transfers of small arms. Second, participation is voluntary. Finally, it does not record military holdings or procurement through national production. Hartung suggests that the Register be developed into an active tool to curb arms proliferation. This task could be accomplished by requiring participation in the Register, and empowering the UN to challenge suspicious submissions.

203. Lamb, John M. and Jennifer L. Moher. *Conventional Arms Transfers: Approaches to Multilateral Control in the 1990s (Aurora Papers 13)*. Research Report Prepared for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, September 1992.

Lamb and Moher examine the nature of the arms market in the post-Cold War world. They analyze the global arms market, the nature of the arms suppliers, the various concepts of arms transfer control, and the criteria for assessing arms transfer control measures. In this context, they include an analysis of the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

They maintain that the Register's creation is "...the most significant step in the direction of international norm building" (p. 20). In addition to chronicling the Register's evolution, Lamb and Moher include a list of its merits: first, it establishes a valuable confidence-building measure; second, it draws international attention to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of weapons, thereby reducing the chances of conflict; third, at the national level, it promotes dialogue and the review of military practices; and, finally, it provides a foundation for future arms control.

The Register is not, however, without its problems. Lamb and Moher contend that a major obstacle to overcome is the perception that it discriminates against arms importing nations (i.e. since the Register does not include military holdings or procurement through national production it imposes greater transparency on arms importing states). Another difficulty arises from the fact that most weapons transfers between states are already known. As a result, some states will consider the Register redundant and choose not to participate. Despite these shortcomings, the Register "...possesses the potential to evolve over time into the cornerstone of an increasingly comprehensive, and mandatory arms transfer control regime" (p. 21).

204. Laurance, Edward J. "Enhancing Transparency Related to the Transfer of Military Technology and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Accordance With Existing Legal Instruments." A Paper Presented at the Tokyo Workshop on Transparency in Armaments. Tokyo: June 1-3, 1992.

Laurance chronicles the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and examines the implications of expanding its coverage. To begin with, he details what is beyond the scope of the Register (i.e. weapons up-grade packages, the transfer of high technology with military applications, and weapons of mass destruction). He then offers four basic approaches to improve the Register's transparency: first, develop the databases of non-governmental organizations (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS)) for use by UN member states; second, make available information given to international organizations (e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)); third, convince national governments to release information held at the national level; and, finally, develop an international verification system (e.g. Open Skies regime).

Laurance cautions, however, that an expansion of the Register will have to take into account the legal and political realities created by existing regimes. Agreements such as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, chemical weapons convention, and the missile technology control regime present difficulties for expanding the Register in those areas. Similarly, including the transfer of high technology with military applications will also be problematic. For instance, the effect of a transfer of technology varies greatly by region. As a result, reaching consensus on core technologies to be recorded will be a time consuming, if not impossible, task.

205. Laurance, Edward J. "Transparency in Armaments." *Missile Monitor*. No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 4-9.

Laurance claims that the movement towards transparency in armaments is a product of two factors: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. In this context, the UN created the Register of Conventional Arms. Despite the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution which created the Register (46/36L) by a vote of 150-0, its creation would not have been possible without compromise. For instance, to allay fears that the Register would discriminate against arms importing states, a measure was incorporated into the resolution. It called for a Panel of Experts to be convened in 1994 to attempt to integrate categories on military holdings and procurement through national production into future Registers. The UN Register is not, however, without its problems. For example, it does not track the transfer of weapons upgrade packages—an increasingly frequent transaction in tough financial times. Moreover, the Register does not record transfers of high technology with military applications.

The Register is not the only method to increase transparency. Laurance offers four other possibilities: first, develop the arms tracking databases used by non-governmental organizations (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)) for use by UN member states; second, increase the accessibility of restricted data already submitted to international organizations (e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has information on nuclear power facilities); third, convince governments to make available information currently restricted to national levels; and, finally, develop verification schemes to verify reports and to increase the comparability of the data generated.

Laurance does not, however, advocate the indiscriminate expansion of the Register. For instance, he advises against the incorporation of nuclear weapons. To begin with, most nuclear weapons are already strictly monitored by national controls. In addition, he fears a decline in overall participation if states currently without nuclear weapons are asked to give up their right to possess nuclear technology. There are many possible ways to expand and modify the UN Register; however, as the case of nuclear weapons demonstrates, expansion should not take place without careful consideration.

206. Moodie, Michael. "Transparency in Armaments: A New Item for the New Security Agenda." *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 75-82.

Moodie's purpose is to "...provide background on this 'transparency in armaments' issue and to examine some of those implications" (p. 75). Written before the publication of the first annual UN Register of Conventional Arms report, he outlines the transparency in armaments resolution (46/36L), which created the Register, and sketches its component parts. This resolution was passed by the UN General Assembly by a vote of 150-0, but this level of support was not easily achieved. Moodie includes a chronology of the evolution of the resolution, and the objections of several nations to earlier drafts (e.g. importing states complained that the Register imposed a greater degree of transparency on them than on countries with a domestic arms production capacity).

Moodie argues that the value of the Register is its potential as a confidence-building measure, and as a stepping stone to a more comprehensive arms control Register. Its success will depend on two factors: the level of participation, and the cooperation between arms exporters and importers. One concern has been the possible creation of a conflict between industrialized nations, who possess the technology, and developing nations which claim the right to own advanced military hardware.

Moodie includes an overview of the Conference on Disarmament and its role in expanding the Register. He argues that the establishment of the Register is an important break with the past. Its creation is a testament to international cooperation in arms regulation. He concludes by challenging the international community to match its eloquent rhetoric with full participation.

207. Office for Disarmament Affairs. "Conventional Armaments and Advanced Technology, and Their Dissemination." In *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 16: 1991*, New York: United Nations, 1992, pp. 327- 364.

Traditionally, efforts to reduce the proliferation of conventional weapons have been overshadowed by attempts at nuclear disarmament. However, three events have fostered concern over conventional weapons: the end of the Cold War, the destabilizing arms build-up prior to the Gulf War, and decreased global attention on nuclear weapons. As a result, proposals to control conventional weapons have been put forward by a number of states (e.g. France, Britain, Japan), and are summarized in this document. One recommendation suggests the creation of a register to record the transfer of conventional weapons. Several of the suggestions for its coverage are examined. For instance, Egypt wanted the concept broadened to include all aspects of arms and technology transfers, production and stockpiling. Also examined is the report of the 1991 Panel of Experts (General Assembly Document A/46/301), tasked with studying the ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms. An extensive annotation of the scope and purpose of this study is offered.

The actions of the Disarmament Commission in 1991 are also analyzed, as are the measures taken by the General Assembly to promote transparency in armaments. For

example, the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms' founding resolution is chronicled and the final draft is reproduced. It is concluded that the adoption of this resolution (46/36L) will "...represent the result of at least 25 years of varying attempts in the United Nations to begin to deal concretely with this question [transparency in armaments]" (p. 363).

208. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "The United Nations Register of Arms Transfers." In *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament*, ed. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 299-301.

A brief summary of the details of the newly established UN Register of Conventional Arms is offered. The author also includes details on the amendments necessary to pass the transparency in armaments resolution (which created the Register), eventually adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 150-0. For instance, the resolution was amended to include expansion in the areas of military holdings and procurement through domestic production. The creation of the Register, it is argued, marks an important advance in arms control. It will contribute to greater transparency and enhance global peace and security.

Part B.3

1993 Publications

301. Anthony, Ian. "Assessing the UN Register of Conventional Arms." *Survival*. Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 1993, pp. 113-129.

Anthony evaluates the UN Register of Conventional Arms in its first year. He begins by outlining several attempts made in the twentieth century, most notably by the League of Nations in the 1920s, to control the spread of conventional weapons. He then details the nature of the current Register. Arguing that it is a political and not a military instrument, Anthony contends that the Register is designed to provide a framework for future arms control agreements. It differs from a treaty in that it contains no verification measures, and it provides no detailed definitions of what is and what is not subject to the agreement. Anthony responds to those who criticize the agreement by arguing, "...the choice is not between a mandatory and detailed register on one hand, or a voluntary and limited register on the other. The choice is between a voluntary and limited register or no register at all" (p. 117).

Participation was higher among exporters than among importers of arms (participation was most notably lacking among Middle East countries). Two suggestions are made for the development of the Register: first, given the length of time required by each nation to develop the machinery necessary to report its arms imports, it would be unwise to expand it too quickly; second, exporting countries should be encouraged to maximize their disclosure to set the standard for future reports.

Anthony concludes that the Register's first year was a qualified success. It provides information that has not been available, and it is an important first step in building the confidence necessary to secure arms control agreements. However, its future is uncertain. If the Register is to enjoy continued relevance it must evolve and expand while ensuring the continued participation of a large number of UN member states.

302. Besancenot, Bertrand. "Transparency in Armaments in a Regional Context." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 51-55.

Besancenot maintains that transparency in armaments, at the regional level, has had both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, transparency measures helped initiate the Middle East peace process. On the other, the war in former Yugoslavia demonstrates the instability still present in many regions. Thus, a regional approach to transparency offers both hopes and severe doubts for peace.

Besancenot claims that several developments have been made possible by transparency measures. First, European Community members have made progress towards harmonizing arms export policies. Second, the Permanent Five members of the Security Council have made progress in creating a consultative process on arms transfers. Finally, the UN Register of Conventional Arms was established. Besancenot argues that

the Register could be improved. To begin with, he supports regional seminars designed to encourage participation. Moreover, he suggests the examination of the Register's existing framework by the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

For their part, the French government supports the Register concept. France would like to see the Register gradually expanded in several directions: first, define key terms and weapons categories; second, disaggregate the reported data; third, include, as the ultimate stage in a gradual process, a legally binding verification scheme; and, finally, examine existing confidence-building measures (e.g. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)) and adapt their framework to promote regional transparency.

303. Borga, Giuseppe Maria. "Italy's Promotion of Transparency in Armaments." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 40-46.

Relating Italy's perspective on arms control, Borga argues that transparency in armaments is an important concept. It ensures that ill-founded estimates and misperceptions by the international community can be avoided. He interprets the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to be an important step. However, he cautions against retaining its current format, and offers several areas for improvement. First, expand its coverage to include data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Second, record the transfer of high technology with military applications. Third, clarify key definitions to ensure accurate reports. Fourth, given that transparency is based on reciprocal trust formed through personal contacts, increase the number of meetings between military experts. Fifth, increase the number of international information seminars on the Register. Finally, promote inter-governmental cooperation to control illegal arms trafficking.

304. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Report of the Secretary General: New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*. New York: United Nations, 1993.

Boutros-Ghali details the profound changes which have taken place in the international community during the last five years and relates the corresponding trends in disarmament. He suggests that disarmament agreements be pursued in the following manner: first, they should be integrated with larger issues of general peace and security; second, they should be global in scope; and, finally, existing agreements should be used as a foundation for developing future disarmament measures. The UN Register of Conventional Arms is addressed as part of the last suggestion. Boutros-Ghali argues that the Register's goal, transparency, is not a substitute for disarmament. It is only an important step in that direction. He appeals to UN member states to support this new measure by participating and by supplying financial resources to ensure its survival.

305. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. *Implementing and Developing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Peace Research Report No. 32*. West Yorkshire: Bradford University, Department of Peace Studies, May 1993.

Writing before the first April 30 deadline for submissions to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Chalmers and Greene provide "... an initial examination of the implementation, significance and potential future development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms" (p. 2). They divide their report three sections: first, an examination of the establishment, implementation and significance of the Register; second, an analysis of potential solutions to the Register's problems; and, finally, an exploration of the links between it and other transparency measures.

As an introduction to these analytical sections, Chalmers and Greene examine the international arms trade. Three tiers of arms producers are outlined: the first tier includes states at the forefront of military development (e.g. the U.S., and to a lessening degree, the former Soviet Union); the second tier consists of states who can afford only to be innovators in a certain segment of the arms market (e.g. France); and, finally, the third tier contains states which reproduce weapons using imported designs and production facilities (e.g. Brazil). Despite the danger of producing weapons for export (as the Iraq military build-up demonstrated), the impetus for selling arms remains strong (e.g. the U.S. sells arms to underwrite the cost of developing high-end technology, and former Soviet Union countries sell arms to secure hard currency).

In their first section, Chalmers and Greene examine the history of arms registers, the significance of transparency, and the development of the Register. They contend that transparency is important for a variety of reasons: first, it reduces the potential for misunderstanding between states; second, it renders preparations for surprise attacks more difficult; third, once in place, it makes it difficult for states to withdraw without arousing unwanted international scrutiny; and, finally, it strengthens domestic control over the arms industry by requiring the implementation of export controls. However, transparency, as a concept, has its problems. For instance, a compromise must be struck which does not require more transparency from one state as compared with another. Assessing the Register's performance, Chalmers and Greene assert that it is too early for definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Register, with a broad base of support, is an important step forward. However, the "...biggest achievement...is in its structure rather than its content, and in the particular combination of its universality and capacity for further development" (p. 29).

In the second part, Chalmers and Greene examine the development of the Register in several categories: deepening and developing its categories, implementation review and verification issues, sanctions against non-compliance, and national governance and the Register. They contend that the Register can be developed in one of two ways. It can be expanded to include either new weapons types or more details for existing categories. Several types of weapons are examined (combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, ground-to-air missiles, missile launchers, look alike systems, mortars, and new forms of munitions) and suggestions are offered on how to include or improve these categories.

One critical avenue for expansion would be the inclusion of records on military holdings and procurement through national production. Such an expansion would represent a revolution in global arms control.

Analyzing the review and verification aspects of the Register, Chalmers and Greene maintain that its review process must be developed. If mistakes are found in a state's report, it should be allowed to revise its submission with a minimum of political embarrassment. They also examine the potential effect of sanctions on states which do not submit a report. It is argued that formal sanctions are not necessary since effective sanctions can be brought to bear informally. An international review process, and an increase in the political costs for non-compliance (i.e. diplomatic isolation), will suffice. In evaluating the performance of the Register, the single most important indicator of its success will be "...the extent to which it impacts on national debates on arms transfer policies, both in supplier and recipient states" (p. 54). It is hoped that the establishment of the Register will encourage debate on arms exports.

In the third part of their report, Chalmers and Greene examine complementary transparency measures. Three courses are described: first, develop the standardised reporting of military expenditures to the UN; second, develop existing supplier transparency regimes, possibly including a Register of End-User Certificates (e.g. Permanent Five Talks); and, finally, explore the possibility of regional transparency measures using the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a possible model.

They conclude that the establishment of the Register marks an important step forward in arms control. It provides "...the foundation for a new UN transparency regime in an aspect of global military affairs in which it has previously proved impossible to establish effective cooperative international arrangements" (p. 65).

306. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. *The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: An Initial Examination of the First Report: Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 2*. West Yorkshire: Bradford University, Department of Peace Studies, October 1993.

Chalmers and Greene evaluate the first annual report of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. They provide "...an initial examination of the first report of the UN Register, and discuss the significance of the Register and priorities for its future development" (p. 1). The Register's development is chronicled, from the initial proposal (initiated by the European Community and Japan), to the adoption of its founding resolution (46/36L). Chalmers and Greene argue that participation rates varied widely by region. For example, most Western European states submitted a return, but no sub-Saharan Africa country chose to take part. On a positive note, almost all of the main arms exporting nations participated, accounting for more than 90% of all arms transfers.

Chalmers and Greene maintain that there are few surprises in the Register's first report. Most of the data generated is already available through various non-governmental agencies (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)).

Nevertheless, the Register provides an avenue through which to identify destabilizing trends in arms transfers.

Chalmers and Greene also report several of the Register's "teething" problems. First, most states missed the reporting deadline. Second, several states completed the standard reporting forms incorrectly. Third, the comparability of the data was poor. Fourth, there were differences in what constituted an arms transfer. Finally, there were inconsistencies in reports of exporters and importers for the same transfer.

Three suggestions are offered to improve the Register: first, promote wider participation; second, resolve inconsistencies and improve the reliability of its reports; and, finally, include data on military holdings and procurement through national production.

They conclude that the Register is off to a promising start. Its contribution to arms control in the future will depend on its development over the next few years. If successfully applied in conjunction with other arms control measures, the Register will have an important role to play as a confidence-building measure.

307. Corradini, Alessandro and Francesco Cottafavi. "Transparency in Armaments: A United Nations Perspective." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 72-81.

Corradini and Cottafavi chronicle the establishment of the "Transparency in Armaments" resolution (46/36L) in 1991, which established the UN Register of Conventional Arms. They also summarize the report of the 1992 Panel of Experts (General Assembly Document A/ 47/342), convened to establish an operating procedure for the Register. In addition, they detail General Assembly resolution 47/52L (15 December 1992) and note the objections to it (e.g. Egypt and Algeria objected to the fact that the Register did not include military holdings or procurement through national production). Moreover, the items before the 1992 Panel are discussed (e.g. expand the Register's existing categories by modifying their parameters). Furthermore, Corradini and Cottafavi examine the founding principles of a complimentary organization, the Disarmament Commission (e.g. "all states have the responsibility to provide objective information on military matters and the right of access to such information (p. 78)). They also relate the role of the Conference on Disarmament in modifying the Register (e.g. to debate how to include the transfer of high technology with military applications).

They conclude that the Register is an important confidence-building measure. Moreover, it has the potential to be an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy. In addition, Corradini and Cottafavi include five possible effects of the Register: first, it can provide an official indication of trends relating to the accumulation of conventional arms; second, it can promote openness (internationally and domestically) in conventional arms transfers; third, it can promote the creation or improvement of states' instruments to regulate the flow of arms; fourth, it can provide a framework for dialogue; and, finally, it can allow more focused attention on the issue of illicit arms transfers.

308. Cottafavi, Francesco. "The United Nations Conventional Arms Register." In *Proliferation and International Security: Converging Roles of Verification, Confidence Building and Peacekeeping*, eds. Steven Mataija and Lyne C. Bourque, Toronto, York University: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1993, pp. 155-157.

Cottafavi provides an overview of the creation and development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He relates the origins of the Register and its potential role in future arms control discussions. If the Register is successfully implemented, it "...could become the most far-reaching international arms control mechanism yet created" (p. 156). Among its other potential benefits, the Register will encourage transparency, thereby enhancing confidence and promoting regional and international stability.

309. Department of Political Affairs. "Transparency, Confidence-Building and the Arms Register." In *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 17: 1992*, New York: United Nations, 1993, pp. 88-117.

Constructed as an introduction to the transparency in armaments concept, this article outlines the major developments in 1992. The general trends are outlined and some key achievements noted (e.g. Treaty on Open Skies, and the Helsinki Document 1992). The report of the 1992 Panel of Experts (General Assembly Document A/47/342) on the expansion of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is described and its establishment called "a ground-breaking endeavour" (p. 96).

In addition, the works of several UN groups in promoting transparency in armaments are outlined. First, the action of the Disarmament Commission, its guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters. Second, the issues before the Conference on Disarmament (e.g. expand the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production). Third, United Nations resolutions relevant to transparency in armaments (e.g. 47/52L).

It is concluded that the ultimate purpose "...of confidence-building measures is to reassure, to increase security, and to facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament" (p. 116). The UN Register forms an important part of this process.

310. Goldblat, Jozef. "Reservations About UN Arms Register." *Arms Control Today*. Vol. 23, No. 6, July-August 1993, p. 30.

Goldblat argues that the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is not grounds for euphoria. He points to the wide range of weapons presently excluded from the Register's annual report as a sign of its weakness. Moreover, the Register has no early warning capacity since it covers only transfers which have already occurred. In addition, no agreement has been reached on a working definition of what constitutes an "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms". Finally, the Register is of little utility since it failed to secure reports from even one-half of UN member states.

Goldblat concludes that reducing the transfer of arms is only possible in conjunction with prohibitions on weapons production. A good starting point would be to curb the sale of weapons whose use is already constrained by international law (e.g. land mines).

311. Greene, Owen and Malcolm Chalmers. "The UN Register of Conventional Arms: A Promising Start." *Bulletin of Arms Control*. No. 11, August 1993, pp. 12-16.

Greene and Chalmers introduce the UN Register of Conventional Arms and examine the data submitted to it prior to the April 30, 1993, deadline. They conclude that the responses were mixed. Participation was solid in Europe and North America, with most states submitting a report. Reports elsewhere, however, were more sporadic. For instance, only about half the Asian nations elected to participate, and the vast majority of Middle Eastern and African countries chose not to submit a report. Other "teething" problems included confusion regarding the standard reporting form, and the incomparability of some returns resulting from each state formulating its own definition for each of the seven categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile launchers).

Despite these difficulties, Greene and Chalmers conclude that the UN Register is off to a "promising start." Its continued relevance will depend on the extent to which it is developed over the next few years.

312. Goldring, Natalie. *Moving Toward Transparency: An Evaluation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*. British American Security Information Council Report 93.6, November 1993.

Goldring argues that the UN Register of Conventional Arms represents "...a promising first step toward international transparency" (p. 3). She examines the discussions surrounding the Register and analyzes the submissions for 1992.

The development of the Register concept, beginning with the failed attempt made by the League of Nations to record arms transfers, is chronicled. In addition, the Register's 1992 report is examined and several conclusions are offered: first, the U.S. is the undisputed leader in transfers of major conventional weapons; second, U.S. dominance is likely to increase in the coming years; third, the military buildups in Greece and Turkey are a matter of serious concern; and, finally, transparency in armaments does not equal restraint (e.g. Greece and Turkey reported large arms transfers).

In addition, Goldring evaluates the Register's progress. The conclusions of the 1992 Panel of Experts, tasked with establishing the modalities for the operation of the Register, are detailed. Moreover, a summary of the regional workshops held to promote participation in the Register is offered. Furthermore, several issues likely to be on the agenda of the 1994 Panel of Experts (e.g. whether or not to include military holdings or procurement through national production) are outlined.

Goldring claims that the Register has had several positive results. First, the level of rhetorical support for it has produced pressure on governments to participate. Second, it provides recent information on arms transfers. Third, it promotes increased transparency and restraint in the arms trade. Finally, it increases stability and decreases the risk of war.

Goldring also examines the Register's limitations. First, it makes no provision for analysis or dissemination of its information. Second, it covers only the five Conventional Forces in Europe categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters) plus two additional categories (warships, and missiles and missile launchers). As a result, detractors maintain that the Register does not greatly increase transparency since most transfers are reported elsewhere. Third, it does not require information on military holdings or procurement through national production. Fourth, it is only a record of transactions already completed and does not report future sales. Fifth, its report contained several inconsistencies (i.e. supplier and recipient states reported the same transaction differently). Sixth, it contains no specific penalties for non-compliance, nor any rewards for full disclosure. Finally, transparency does not equal restraint. Despite these difficulties, Goldring maintains that if the Register is successfully expanded, "...it will be a major step forward in helping nations and concerned individuals track the flow of arms" (p. 22).

Included also are two appendices. Appendix A reproduces the data submitted to the Register for 1992. Appendix B includes the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) records on arms transfers for 1992.

313. Hartung, William D. "Transparency in Armaments: Implications for the Future Security of the Mediterranean Region." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 95-106.

Hartung analyzes whether confidence-building measures, like the UN Register of Conventional Arms, can play a significant role in fostering peace and security in the Mediterranean region. Given the tensions in the area (e.g. war in former Yugoslavia), the region can be viewed as a microcosm of the security challenges facing the international community. For instance, since arms are both imported and exported by states in the region, it provides a good testing ground for the Register. Moreover, the region also includes significant arms producing states (e.g. France), indicating the importance of integrating military holdings and procurement through national production into future Registers. In addition, the high volumes of small arms transfers, and the exchange of weapons with sub-national groups, demonstrate further shortcomings.

Despite these difficulties, Hartung argues, the Register must be evaluated on its potential to avert future conflicts. He claims that it accomplishes several tasks: first, it places arms production and trade in an international context; second, it establishes a common vocabulary; third, it creates an international structure in which to examine security issues; fourth, it promotes openness in arms transfers at the national level; and, finally, it fosters debate on the appropriate mechanisms for regulating the arms trade. He

maintains that the Register "...can be an extremely valuable tool in the quest for lasting peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean region" (p. 101).

Hartung argues that, given its many ties to the region, the U.S. could play a pivotal role in promoting transparency. To this end, the U.S. should make an arms transfer conditional on its being reported to the Register.

Critics who argue that the Register cannot be successful because it is too modest a measure, Hartung maintains, are incorrect. It is "...precisely *because* the Register is an incremental, low-key, long-term measure, [that] it has tremendous potential for fostering a better climate for the promotion of arms control and the peaceful resolution of disputes in the area over the long-term" (pp. 102-103). He concludes that its development should be a priority for the states in the Mediterranean region.

314. International Institute for Strategic Studies. "United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." In *The Military Balance, 1993-1994*, London: Brassey's, October 1993, pp. 247-249.

This article's author details the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The seven reporting categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers), are listed and examined in turn. Moreover, the Register's first annual report is deemed a success. Any problems in its structure will be addressed by the 1994 Panel of Experts. In addition to modifying the structure of the Register, this Panel will attempt to expand its scope (e.g. to include data on transfers of aircraft which have an in-flight refuelling capacity).

315. Kamal, Ahmad. "Transparency in Armaments: A Regional Perspective." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 47-50.

Kamal examines transparency in armaments from a regional perspective. He maintains that the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms represents a step towards effective arms control; however, he cautions against evaluating it in isolation. Citing the Register's narrow focus, Kamal lists its difficulties: first, it does not cover military holdings or procurement through national production; second, it does not request information on the transfer of high technology with military applications; third, its coverage is restricted to certain categories of conventional weapons; and, finally, it does not include weapons of mass destruction. If the Register is to be successful, it must be expanded. In addition, he recommends the creation of regional registers which would be better equipped to manage the specific security concerns of different regions. Moreover, he suggests the formulation of definitions for the Register's key terms (e.g. "excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms").

Kamal stresses the importance of maintaining perspective when evaluating the Register. It should be viewed as only a part of the larger effort of securing effective arms

control, and should be applied "...within the context of the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the widely accepted norms of international law, and the principles of peaceful co-existence" (p. 50).

316. Laurance, Edward J., Siemon T. Wezeman and Herbert Wulf. *Arms Watch: SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, SIPRI Research Report No. 6*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Laurance, Wezeman and Wulf chronicle the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. They compare its data with the information collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and comment on the implications of expanding its scope. If successfully developed, the Register, the first instrument to link disarmament with international peace and security, will play a key role in future arms control discussions.

Laurance, Wezeman and Wulf report that 40% of UN member states participated in the first annual Register. Despite this low participation rate, almost 98% of arms exports were reported. The information on arms imports, however, was more limited. Only seven of the top fifteen major arms importing nations (identified by SIPRI) submitted a report. Due to variations in reporting, the quality of data varies by weapons category. For instance, over 90% of the transfers of tanks can be verified since their transfer was reported by both exporter and importer nations. By contrast, only 13% of missile exchanges can be similarly verified.

The authors also compare the performance of the Register with that of the SIPRI register. They note that the information provided by each organization does not always match. Three possible explanations for these discrepancies are offered: first, the SIPRI information is incorrect; second, the information reported to the Register is incorrect; and, finally, confusion stemming from the different structures of the two registers resulted in the same transfer being reported differently. The differences between the two registers are also outlined. For instance, the Register deals only with arms deliveries, whereas the SIPRI records ongoing deals. In addition, the Register has seven different categories, while the SIPRI report has only six. These differences, inevitably, will affect how data is reported.

The authors maintain that the Register's first year was not a complete success since only 78 nations participated. However, they also contend that it is too early to pass final judgment. Such an evaluation must await the publication of several more reports to track the results over time. Nevertheless, the Register included information on several hitherto unknown transfers and, in this respect, did improve knowledge on arms transfers.

They conclude with a brief examination of ways to improve the Register. First, the categories for reporting could be deepened and widened to secure more information. Second, military holdings and procurement through national production should be included in future reports. Third, information on weapons of mass destruction should be incorporated. Fourth, information should be requested on the transfers of high technology with military applications. Fifth, as a subset of the UN Register, regional

registers should be set up to reflect local concerns. Finally, a definition must be formulated for key terms such as, "excessive and destabilizing accumulations of weapons."

317. Laurance, Edward J. and Herbert Wulf. "The Continued Quest for Transparency in Armaments: Quantity Versus Utility of Information." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 82-94.

Laurance and Wulf offer a chronology of the development of the transparency in armaments concept from the Gulf War to the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Writing prior to the publication of the Register's first annual report, they maintain that its creation has already had several benefits: first, it provides a focal point for discussion; second, it demonstrates what can be done to build confidence in the post Cold War world; third, it encourages transparency at the national level (i.e. some states have changed secretive laws, which forbid the disclosure of weapons information, to participate); fourth, it creates a forum in which official data can be exchanged, thereby enhancing dialogue; fifth, it provides an opportunity to evaluate the performance of a self-checking style of verification (i.e. both importer and exporter should report the same transfer); and, finally, it represents the first attempt to link disarmament with international peace and security.

Laurance and Wulf examine the information available in the public domain under the following headings: military holdings and personnel, arms trade, characteristics of weapons, and military expenditures. The weakness of delivery data on arms transfers was one of the primary reasons for the creation of the Register. It differs from previous arms restraint efforts (e.g. the failed 1978 Conventional Arms Transfer Talks, and the stalled efforts of the 1991 Permanent Five Talks to curb arms sales) in that it does not attempt to determine whether a transfer is destabilizing before it takes place. While this approach is a good starting point, the Register must be expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production if it hopes to maintain its relevance.

Several steps are suggested to promote transparency in armaments: first, expand the Register from a transfer register to an acquisitions and holdings Register (i.e. include military holdings and procurement through national production); second, simplify and expand the standardized reports of military expenditures to the UN to complement the Register; third, address the issue of including weapons of mass destruction and the transfer of high technology with military applications; fourth, initiate seminars on military doctrine and force structures; and, finally, initiate regional arrangements to complement global approaches.

318. Laurance, Edward J. and Herbert Wulf. *An Evaluation of the First Year of Reporting to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms*. Research Report Prepared for the Program for Nonproliferation Studies. Monterey, California: Program for Nonproliferation Studies, October 1993.

Laurance and Wulf introduce the UN Register of Conventional Arms and its seven weapons categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers). They contend that there are three ways in which to evaluate the Register's performance. First, the extent of participation by UN member states. By the April 30 deadline, reports had been received from 79 nations, representing over 40% of the UN membership. This number is an increase over the parallel exercise of reporting military expenditures to the UN. In addition, all major exporters (except North Korea and South Africa) participated, reporting 98% of the total arms transfers for 1992. However, a poorer participation rate is noted for arms importing nations as several key importers did not participate (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia and Thailand).

Second, the extent of the arms trade made transparent. Laurance and Wulf argue that new information was made available by the Register. For example, it was successful in revealing transfers involving the world's traditionally secretive nations (e.g. China). Moreover, it produced data on actual delivery dates and quantities which have been difficult to track.

Third, the extent of agreement between exporter and importer in arms transfers (through cross-checking). Laurance and Wulf maintain that a significant percentage of the items transferred in 1992 cannot be verified because they were not reported by both importer and exporter. They claim that the Register's verification mechanism (i.e. cross checking the reports of importer and exporter) was more successful for some categories than others. For instance, 82% of tank transfers are verifiable. By contrast, in the warships category, only 11% of transfers can be verified. Four reasons for the existence of discrepancies are offered: first, key terms were not clearly defined (e.g. arms transfers); second, some governments, undecided on the merits of transparency, did not participate; third, some states have domestic legislation which prohibits the disclosure of military information; and, finally, nations with fledgling bureaucracies lacked the resources to collect the necessary data.

Laurance and Wulf consider the Register a positive step forward on the way to effective arms control. If it is developed to include military holdings and procurement through national production it would create "...unprecedented transparency both in international arms trade and the national production of arms" (p. 10).

Included also is an annex reproducing the reports submitted to the UN Register for 1992.

319. Laurance, Edward J. "The UN Register of Conventional Arms: Rationales and Prospects for Compliance and Effectiveness." *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 163-172.

Laurance argues that two events increased awareness of conventional weapons proliferation: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. With the subsequent failure of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council to regulate the arms trade, transparency was considered as an alternative. In December 1991, UN Resolution "Transparency in Armaments" was adopted by a vote of 150-0 and the UN Register of Conventional Arms was created.

Citing Michael Moodie, Laurance claims there are three alternative courses for the Register. One possibility is that it will develop a new approach to confront the security problems of the post-Cold War world. Another is that it will create a sharp new divide between North and South. A final alternative would see the Register become yet another sterile exercise in arms restraint. Writing before the publication of the Register's first annual report, Laurance maintains that the first option remains the most likely.

In chronicling the work of the 1992 Panel of Experts (convened to detail the structure of the Register), Laurance emphasizes the importance of their ability to produce a consensus report. This unanimity built on momentum which began with the adoption of the original resolution (46/36L) by a vote of 150-0. It is hoped that this momentum will influence states to participate.

Laurance also examines the reasons for participation and non-participation. On the one hand, states will submit reports as a result of three factors: first, having approved the Register's development, it is likely that inertia will cause a significant number of states to participate; second, some states (e.g. Italy) have domestic laws which require maximum transparency; and, finally, much of the information being requested is already publicly available (e.g. in reports by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) or the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)), and therefore disclosure poses no serious security risks. On the other, three reasons are formulated which would prompt states not to participate: first, the political culture and penchant for secrecy in some states will be a difficult obstacle to overcome; second, some countries will wait and see how other countries react before participating themselves; and, finally, the export controls necessary to produce the data are lacking in some states (e.g. former Soviet Union states).

To promote the Register's development, Laurance suggests that the U.S. take a leading role. If the U.S. maximizes its transparency, it would set the reporting standard. He stresses, however, that the Register is not a universal solution. It covers only the legal arms trade, is not a control mechanism, and has no formal verification scheme (except cross-checking the reports of importers and exporters). As a result, it must be pursued in conjunction with other arms control efforts.

320. McDonald, Ian S. "The United Nations Study on Promoting Transparency." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 37-39.

The Chair of the 1991 Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary General to study the ways and means of promoting transparency in arms transfers, McDonald focuses on the "content and intent of that report" (p. 37). He relates the shared perceptions of the 1991 Panel of Experts on the following points: first, any significant build-up of arms entails a risk to international stability; second, money spent on arms is money not available in other areas; and, finally, all states have a legitimate right to arm for self-defence.

In addition, McDonald relates the discussions of the Panel on transparency in armaments and the subsequent creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. On the positive side, the group concluded that the Register encourages international confidence, prevents ill-founded suspicions, and encourages domestic debate (i.e. it allows citizens to see how much and in what way money is spent). On the negative side, transparency cannot be enforced from on high. Its implementation depends upon international cooperation.

Despite its difficulties, the Panel agreed that transparency in armaments was a possible precursor to more effective arms control measures. McDonald offers several efforts which could complement the Register at regional and sub-regional levels: exchange information about arms purchases; explain defence policies and postures; observe military exercises; conduct shared military exercises; and, finally, discuss security perceptions and concerns.

321. Pierre, Andrew J. "The United States Role in Creating Multilateral Restraints on the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 61-71.

Pierre maintains that the Gulf War has focused international attention on the proliferation of conventional weapons. Leaders of some of the world's major arms supplying states (e.g. George Bush, U.S.; Francois Mitterand, France; and John Major, Britain) have all offered arms control initiatives. One common, and revolutionary, thread which runs through these proposals is "...the acceptance of the principle that the primary responsibility for creating some system of international controls over arms transfers rests with the nations that produce and supply the weapons" (pp. 63-64).

Dialogue between major arms producers has generated two concrete arms control measures: the Permanent Five meetings (P5), and the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The first measure represents a watershed in arms control. It marks the first time the world's major arms suppliers have come together with the purpose of restraining the flow of armaments. By contrast, the attraction of the UN Register may be political. It allows politicians to say they are doing something, and its establishment was easier than

reducing arms sales. However, several modifications must be made to the Register for it to succeed: first, it must be universal to inspire confidence in the regime; second, it should be expanded to include weapons components, technical support, and training arrangements; and, finally, its information must be made public and not restricted to governments. Despite these uncertainties, the UN Register could become a valuable confidence-building measure in several regions. However, Pierre maintains that the P5 talks hold more promise.

322. Regehr, Ernie. "The United Nations Arms Register." In *The Arms Trade Today: Arms Transfers and Proliferation: A CCLA Consultation, January 1993*, ed. Roger Williamson, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1993, pp. 143-157.

Regehr argues that the UN Register of Conventional Arms was created, in the wake of the Gulf War, to prevent future excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms. He maintains, that the Register is a good solution, but to a different problem. To begin with, the Gulf War was not a result of an unanticipated accumulation of arms. Moreover, the Register is not an early warning system; rather, it is designed to be a record of weapons transfers already completed.

He posits four ways in which the Register will contribute to global institution building: first, international confidence will be enhanced by the giving of information voluntarily to other states; second, the security debate will be democratized with each state made more accountable to its own people; third, non-discrimination and full disclosure will be achieved with the integration of categories for military holdings and procurement through national production; and, finally, the global security interest will be addressed by providing the international community with a seat at the arms trade table, albeit with observer status.

Three ways in which the Church could promote the Register are listed. One proposal would have it support improvements in the scope and operation of the Register (i.e. military holdings and procurement through national production). Another would have the Church promote compliance with the Register. Finally, the Church could encourage security discussions based on the information supplied to the Register.

323. Shoukry, Sameh. "Transparency in Armaments and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 56-60.

Shoukry maintains that the UN Register of Conventional Arms will help to promote general and complete disarmament. If it hopes to be truly effective, it must meet the following criteria: first, it should be a universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory confidence-building measure; second, it should be based on rights and obligations for all states; third, it should not infringe on each state's right to prepare for self-defense; and,

finally, it should make the transfers of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction transparent.

Shoukry criticizes the Panel of Governmental Experts who prepared the Register's rounding resolution (46/36L). This document has several shortcomings: first, it does not define "arms transfer"; second, it does not include suggested categories (e.g. military holdings); third, it does not require the inclusion of descriptions of transferred weapons; and, finally, it does not attach enough importance to the early expansion of the Register's scope. If the Register hopes to have continued relevance, it must secure universal participation and expand to incorporate all types of armaments.

324. Wagenmakers, Hendrik. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: A New Instrument for Transparency and Cooperative Security." In *Disarmament Topical Papers 15: Transparency in Armaments: The Mediterranean Region*, New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 1993, pp. 19-36.

Wagenmakers introduces the UN Register of Conventional Arms as part of a wider transparency process. He maintains that the Register has produced several benefits. To begin with, it contains its own self-checking form of verification (i.e. the reports of importing and exporting nations should record the same number of weapons transferred). Moreover, it has the potential to foster transparency *within* states (i.e. by encouraging states with secretive domestic laws to be more open). Finally, it is an important first step towards a more comprehensive system of cooperative security.

Wagenmakers also relates the work of several complimentary agencies. For instance, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is considering the role of science and technology in arms proliferation. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is evaluating the merits of including categories on military holdings and procurement through national production in the Register. Finally, the agenda of the 1994 Panel of Experts is outlined. Their discussions will focus on the following issues: participation levels, possible improvements to the standard reporting form, definitional problems, possible modifications of the existing parameters of the seven categories, and possible inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production.

In addition, Wagenmakers details the possible areas of expansion for the Register. In the coming years, it will be expanded to include data on weapons of mass destruction, and to record the transfer of high technology with military applications. Eventually, the Register, "...though its intrinsic value and thanks to parallel endeavours, may effectively help to reduce the occurrence of dangerous misperceptions as well as to promote trust and partnership between nations" (p. 34). This task would be furthered by the creation of a consultative mechanism to analyze and review the data submitted to the Register. Such an organization might also help states prepare their returns, thereby helping to standardize the reporting process.

325. Wagenmakers, Hendrik. "The UN Register of Conventional Arms: A New Instrument For Cooperative Security." *Arms Control Today*. Vol. 23, No. 3, April 1993, pp. 16-21.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, a growing international consensus emerged that excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms must be guarded against. It was in this context that the UN Register of Conventional Arms was created. Designed as a confidence-building measure, it requires each state to submit a report of the arms transfers made during the previous year in seven categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers). It represents a first step toward a more comprehensive system of cooperative security.

Several of the Register's benefits are outlined: first, it demonstrates that international consensus is possible on arms control measures (the Resolution which created the Register, 46/36L, was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 150-0); second, it has produced a cross-checking form of verification (the reports of importers and exporters should match); third, it has the potential to foster transparency within states by encouraging states with domestic legislation prohibiting the disclosure of military transfers to amend their laws; and, finally, it marks the first time governments will submit official military data to other governments.

Despite these benefits, Wagenmakers concedes that there are elements of the Register which could be improved. In describing the role of the 1994 Panel of Experts, he details several tasks likely to be on its agenda: first, offer clear definitions of key terms (e.g. "arms transfer"); second, modify the existing seven categories to maximize transparency; third, discuss the merits of including new categories of weapons (e.g. cluster bombs); and, finally, analyze the benefits of integrating categories for military holdings and for procurement through national production. Given the Register's goal of maximizing participation, the Register should be modified only if doing so will increase participation.

It is clearly in the interest of UN member states to take advantage of this new vehicle to enhance their security at no economic cost. The Register can be highly effective in helping to reduce dangerous misperceptions and in promoting trust and partnership between states. To succeed, however, it must have the cooperation of UN member states.

326. Wulf, Herbert. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, Appendix 10F." In *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 533-544.

Wulf maintains that the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms was made possible by two seminal events: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. He chronicles the history of the register and the transparency in armaments process. Also examined is the 1991 UN General Assembly decision to create the Register. Despite the adoption of its founding resolution (46/36L) by a vote of 150-0, the extensive debate prior to the vote shows that not all states were satisfied. Indeed, several contentious

issues remain: first, the Register does not include procurement through national production or advanced production technology; second, it does not take into consideration the security interests of member states; and, finally, it does not include all types of weapons (e.g. weapons of mass destruction).

Wulf also relates the findings of the 1992 Panel of Experts convened to improve the Register. Included in the analysis is the debate on the modification of the Register's seven weapons categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers).

Wulf maintains that the Register's development has been modest. Several structural weaknesses remain: first, due to its limited scope, the Register will not significantly facilitate a judgement about the military capacity of participating states; second, as a result of its voluntary nature, it will not restrict the transfer of arms, merely record them; and, finally, it contains no formal verification mechanism. Despite these difficulties, the Register "...could well be a success due to its novel approach" (p. 544). Its future development depends on governments' sincerity and willingness to participate. If it is properly developed, the Register will provide a basis for dialogue and a foundation for further arms control measures.

Part B.4

1994 Publications

401. Anonymous. "Flesh Out Arms Register." *Defence News*. October 31- November 6, 1994, p. 18.

While granting that the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is a crucial step on the road to greater openness in arms transfers, this article's author maintains that the Register is largely ineffective. The 1994 Panel of Experts should improve the Register by adopting the following modifications: first, the reports should be submitted in a standard format; second, the seven weapons categories should be expanded; third, definitions for key terms (e.g. "arms transfer") must be formulated; fourth, the same level of disclosure must be required both from exporting and from importing states; fifth, discrepancies between importer and exporter reports (which list different numbers of arms transferred in the same transaction) must be eliminated; and, finally, land mines should be included.

402. Anthony, Ian. "The Register and Its Future." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 66-96.

Evaluating the performance of the UN Register of Conventional Arms in its first year, Anthony concludes that despite some shortcomings, its basic structure is sound. He suggests that the 1994 Panel of Experts, charged with improving its performance, modify the existing structure of the Register before expanding it. Furthermore, the seven categories of armaments must be clarified. In addition, a more precise definition of "arms transfer" must be offered. Moreover, future reports should request disaggregated data to enable observers to gain a clearer sense of the offensive capacity of each state. A more refined report would list, for example, 2 T-54 tanks, 3 T-55 tanks and 10 T-80 tanks, instead of the current format which requires the reporting of the total number of tanks under the heading "armoured combat vehicles." Finally, to encourage wider participation, the seventh category, "missiles and missile launchers," should be eliminated. Doing so would make the Register exclusively concerned with conventional weapons platforms and remove ordnance from its terms of reference. This tactic would emphasize the political nature of the Register and lessen fears that it might contribute useful military intelligence to other states.

403. Anthony, Ian. "What is Required to Have a Useful Transfers Register?" In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 87-106.

Anthony compares the UN Register of Conventional Arms with the annual report on arms transfers published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Even though the Register is the product of intergovernmental agreement and the

SIPRI report is an academic construction, the two reports are similar enough to invite comparison. For instance, both organizations examine arms transfers and neither group tracks the trade of small arms. Anthony suggests that each regime should concentrate on its strengths. For its part, the SIPRI report should continue to track global trends in arms transfers; by contrast, the UN Register should concentrate on defining what constitutes an "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of weapons."

Anthony argues that the basic structure of the UN Register is sound. However, several problems resulted in reporting discrepancies: first, equipment categories are not clearly delineated; second, there is no clear definition of "arms transfer"; finally, there is a high level of aggregate data in each weapon category (i.e. instead of reporting the exchange of 2 T-54 tanks and 3 T-80 tanks, the Register records the transfer of 5 armoured combat vehicles). The 1994 Panel of Experts is advised to improve the structure of the Register before they expand it. Moreover, this group must address the problems outlined above if the Register's relevance is to be increased.

404. Centre for Disarmament Affairs. "Transparency and the Arms Register." In *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 18: 1993*, New York: United Nations, 1994, pp. 63-96.

This article's author describes the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the stages of its creation, and its operational goals (e.g. transparency in armaments, confidence-building measure). Four regional workshops (in Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Warsaw and Florence) were held between January and April 1993 to provide information about the Register and to increase participation. Due to the good attendance figures, these workshops are deemed to have been successful.

Moreover, the Register's first annual report is considered a good start. Reports were secured from 83 nations, representing 45% of the UN membership. Included in the report were submissions from virtually all major weapons exporters, covering most arms transfers. Somewhat more disappointing, however, was the lower reporting rate among major importing nations; nevertheless, the data submitted covered approximately two-thirds of all global weapons imports.

The future prospects for the Register remain strong. However, any changes to its structure will await the convening of the 1994 Panel of Experts. In the meantime, the Panel's efforts will be supplemented by the work of the Conference on Disarmament's 1993 ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments. Several amendments being discussed by this committee are detailed (e.g. defining what constitutes an excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms; including a section on military holdings and procurement through national production; recording transfers of high technology with military applications; and, including weapons of mass destruction).

In addition, relevant UN Resolutions are reproduced and explained (e.g. passages relating to verification and participation). The author concludes by stressing the success enjoyed by the Register in its first year and its potential to become an effective global confidence-building measure.

405. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. *Background Information: An Analysis of Information Provided to the UN on Military Holdings and Procurement Through National Production in the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms: Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 3*. Bradford University, Department of Peace Studies: Westview Press, May 1993.

Chalmers and Greene maintain that the UN Register of Conventional Arms was originally designed to provide data on transfers of conventional arms. However, some states objected, arguing that such a Register would discriminate against states less self-reliant in arms production. As a result, a compromise was reached which requested that states disclose information, on a strictly voluntary basis, in three areas: military holdings; procurement through national production; and relevant national arms import and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures. The purpose of this study is twofold: first, it makes the background information publicly available, outside of the UN, for the first time; second, "...it provides an initial analysis of the data provided, together with some reflections on possible implications for future development of the Register" (p. 2).

Chalmers and Greene examine which states provided information on procurement and/or holdings. Eighty-three states submitted a report to the Register for 1992, and, of this total, 33 gave background information (24 gave information on military holdings, and 15 on procurement through national production). Most of the states which provided the additional information were members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Outside the CSCE, only a handful of states took part.

The way in which the information was supplied is also analyzed. Since no guidelines were offered on how background information should be submitted, the data was supplied in a wide range of formats. For example, of the 24 states who supplied data on procurement through national production and military holdings, only 8 used all of the Register's seven weapons categories. Three explanations for this lack of scope are offered: first, CSCE states may have found it more convenient to submit data already generated as part of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and CSCE processes; second, some states used all of the Register's sections except the controversial missiles and missile launchers category; and, finally, some states, confused by the lack of guidelines, chose not to participate.

The authors maintain that despite the confusion, the reports have been of value. For instance, several interesting innovations have appeared in the background information section. Bulgaria provided a table on "military holdings for export" which reinforces the need for a definition of military holdings. In addition, some states included details of the weapons types and models in their data which, if applied to the Register as a whole, would increase transparency.

As the 1994 Panel of Experts prepares to meet to discuss the future direction of the Register, the central question remains how to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Chalmers and Greene conclude that the fact that "...so many Governments have so far been unable to provide any background information in this

regard...makes it difficult to predict the outcome of the 1994 Group's deliberations on this central agenda item" (p. 10).

Included also are three appendices: Appendix One is a composite table of replies of governments; Appendix Two is an index of background information provided by governments; and, finally, Appendix Three is a reproduction of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms background information on military holdings and procurement through national production.

406. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "Developing International Transparency: Successes for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." *International Defense Review*. May 1994, pp. 23-27.

Chalmers and Greene argue that the concept of an arms register is not new. Proposals to create one were made in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the context of the Cold War no international cooperation was forthcoming. However, with the end of the Cold War, and a desire to avoid another arms build-up similar to the one in pre-Gulf war Iraq, international cooperation was possible. The UN Register of Conventional Arms was created as a result of these two factors.

Chalmers and Greene analyze the first annual report of the Register. They note that the top fourteen arms exporters (as identified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)), submitted a report. The results for arms importers, however, was disappointing. Several major arms importers (e.g. Iran and Saudi Arabia) did not present a return. In addition, the Register contained several discrepancies where arms imports did not match arms exports.

The authors argue that the Register must be expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Failure to do so would be a "serious setback to hopes of establishing it as a major instrument for international confidence-building" (p. 26). Moreover, the Register must be modified in three ways: first, include guidelines for filling out reports to help consistency; second, provide a list of weapons, by category, to eliminate reporting errors; and, finally, outline standards for participation to ensure meaningful returns.

They conclude that the UN Register of Conventional Arms is an important step in arms control. With only minor adjustments it could continue to make a valuable contribution to international stability.

407. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "The Development of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Prospects and Proposals." *The Nonproliferation Review*. Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring-Summer 1994, pp. 1-17.

Citing the end of the Cold War and the desire to avoid a repeat of the Iraq crisis as necessary preconditions for the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Chalmers and Greene detail its evolution and analyze its prospects. In addition, the Register's first annual report is evaluated. A high participation rate is noted for Europe

and North and South America, patchy returns were supplied by Asian countries, and a poor rate is recorded for Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan Africa states. Moreover, the report was weakened by reporting discrepancies. While some nations included substantial information, others sent notes on why they could not submit data (e.g. Nigeria claimed that all its records had been destroyed in a fire). Nevertheless, new information was made available by the Register. For instance, more transfers were reported than had been recorded by the two main independent "arms watchers" (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)).

To ensure its continued relevance, Chalmers and Greene suggest strengthening the Register in three ways. First, establish minimum standards for disclosure. Second, convene a standing panel of experts to evaluate returns. Finally, create a standard list of weapons to ensure consistency of reporting.

The authors also address the problem of expanding the Register, an issue before the 1994 Panel of Experts, arguing that categories should not be expanded without careful consideration. While a more detailed submission would be more valuable, it will be meaningless if developing nations, with fledgling bureaucracies, are not able to generate the needed information. Another issue before the Panel is whether or not to include information on military holdings and procurement through national production. Again, caution is advocated. A balance must be struck between making returns as complete as possible, and keeping guidelines broad enough to ensure continued participation.

The authors conclude that the establishment of the Register was an important first step in regulating the arms trade; however, indiscriminate expansion should be avoided. Minor modifications, made incrementally over a period of years, will ensure the Register's relevance in future regional and global security discussions. Its future depends on strengthening the existing format without alienating those nations which have demonstrated a willingness to participate. The challenge for the 1994 Panel will be to strike a balance between a Register with sufficient guidelines to make returns meaningful, and one which is relaxed enough to ensure widespread participation.

408. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "Expanding the Register to Include Procurement Through National Production and Military Holdings." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 153-175.

The 1994 Panel of Experts will debate the merits of including military holdings and procurement through national production in future versions of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Such an expansion would provide more comprehensive data on the arms trade since nearly all nations have military holdings.

Chalmers and Greene analyze the "background information" section of the Register's first annual report. On the one hand, the 33 nations who submitted background information on military holdings were almost all members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As such, these states are accustomed to transparency measures and saw no security risk in taking part. On the other hand, some states, wary of

transparency measures, did not wish to disclose potentially damaging military information. Others, unconvinced of the merits of transparency, chose not to submit reports.

Analyzing the likelihood of including military holdings in future Registers, Chalmers and Greene argue that a significant political commitment would be required for this modification to occur. Moreover, such a section would dramatically increase the effort required to generate a report, and should not be included without careful thought. In the meantime, a standard definition of "military holdings" must be formulated (e.g. should the report include only holdings of a nation's armed forces or should it also take into account the equipment of organizations such as the coast guard).

Chalmers and Greene maintain that one way to mollify arms importing states would be to include a section which reported procurement through national production. As with military holdings, a strict definition would have to be formulated which clearly articulates when the transfer took place (i.e. once produced or when the armed forces took formal possession). In addition, a formula must be created which allows for the withdrawal of weapons sold or rendered unserviceable.

Given the effort required to set up new categories, Chalmers and Greene offer an interim solution which would require only a minor modification of the "background information" section of the Register. They suggest that each state be asked to supply the definitions it used in the preparation of its report. Analysts would then be better able to compare the data submitted, and the process would be no less voluntary than it is at present.

Chalmers and Greene emphasize that the 1994 Panel must confront questions critical to the future of the Register. They do not, however, offer a conclusion on the wisdom of including military holdings and procurement through national production in future reports. While the arguments in favour of such an expansion are strong, the obstacles to overcome remain considerable.

409. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "Further Development of the Register Reporting System." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 51-86.

Chalmers and Greene argue that the future of the UN Register of Conventional Arms depends on a successful blending of two elements: a strengthening of its existing format, and a skilful handling of the difficult choices over expanding its coverage.

On the issue of strengthening the Register, Chalmers and Greene analyze several areas which could be amended. First, future Registers should include guidelines which define participation. This modification would ensure a minimum level of data, and a qualitative improvement in the annual report. Second, a UN panel should be convened to regulate and standardize submissions. Third, governments should be encouraged to include the details of weapons transfers. Granting that some states will be reluctant, Chalmers and Greene maintain that such information would increase transparency.

Finally, due to the broad nature of the weapons categories, a common list of systems should be drawn up for each category to reduce errors made in categorizing weapons.

While supportive of the idea of strengthening the Register, the authors caution against its indiscriminate expansion. Doing so would dramatically increase the effort required to submit a report and, as a result, diminish the number of submissions. Two modest expansion proposals are offered: first include weapons systems already covered by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) transparency regime (i.e. primary trainer aircraft, combat support helicopters, armoured vehicle launched bridges and armoured personnel carrier lookalikes); second, register weapons systems which contribute to offensive capabilities but do not, by themselves, constitute a threat (i.e. in-flight refuelling aircraft). Chalmers and Greene warn against the creation of a category to register small arms transfers. Given the volume of traffic, the effort required to record these transactions would be significant and, as a result, discourage states from submitting reports. In addition, the expansion of the Register to include nuclear weapons transfers would be self-defeating, since these types of transactions only occur between the U.S. and Britain. If however, the Register was expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production, such a category would be useful.

The Register's goal in its first two years of operation was to maximize participation. To adapt for the future, however, the Register must refine its criteria for participation and improve the quality of its reports. To accomplish this task, the Register must be changed in two ways: first, its existing structure must be strengthened; and, second, the scope of the Register must be carefully expanded.

410. Chalmers, Malcolm, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf. "Introduction to *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 1-19.

This annotation summarizes the arguments put forward by Chalmers, Greene, Laurance and Wulf in their introduction to *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*. Annotations for each of the articles are included separately in this collection.

The introduction details the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. It is argued that it was created in the context of two seminal events: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. These two events combined to create a new international norm that an excessive and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons (as occurred in Iraq before its invasion of Kuwait) is something the international community should work together to prevent. In addition to outlining the events which culminated in the Register's creation, this collection of essays "...aims to examine the implementation and potential development of the Register, and its potential significance for international security" (p. 1).

The study is divided into five parts. Part one includes two chapters which provide an overview and developmental history of the Register. Part two deals with the question of whether or not the Register should be expanded. Part three examines how the Register

might be expanded to include procurement through national production and military holdings. Part four analyzes the relationship between the development of the Register and the development of global or regional confidence-building regimes. Finally, part five consists of a series of annexes which reproduce documents valuable to a discussion of the Register (e.g. relevant UN documents, the 1992 Panel of Experts report, and a summary of information provided in the first annual report).

411. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "The UN Arms Register: An Emerging Global Transparency Regime?" *Contemporary Security Policy*. Vol. 15, No. 3, December 1994, pp. 58-83.

Citing the participation of most of the top arms exporters, and the majority of arms importers, Chalmers and Greene consider the UN Register of Conventional Arms to be off to a good start. They trace the evolution of the register concept beginning with the attempt made by the League of Nations to record arms transfers following the First World War. Similar proposals were put forward in the years following the Second World War, but all were stillborn. By comparison, the impetus for the current Register was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the context of governments feeling pressure to "do something" about arms proliferation, the UN Register was established in December 1991.

In the first two years, participation rates varied widely by region. Participation was high in European states outside the former Soviet Union, North America and in South and North-East Asia. By contrast, participation was patchy in Latin America and South-East Asia, and poor in the former Soviet Union, Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Despite regional variations in reporting, the Register did reveal new information. Compared to the data published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Register reported previously unknown transfers of weapons. As a result, over a period of years the Register has the potential to add significantly to existing data on arms transfers and holdings.

Chalmers and Greene also examine the 1994 review process designed to expand and clarify the Register's coverage. The 1994 Panel of Experts was able to produce a consensus report, but only at the cost of deferring major changes to the Register's format until the next review (likely 1996). Five proposals were debated by the 1994 Panel, without agreement: first, expanding the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production; second, requesting more detail from states on weapons transfers (e.g. instead of reporting the transfer of one warship, states would be asked to describe it, for instance, as a 1960s frigate or a state-of-the-art air craft carrier); third, revising existing categories (e.g. the controversial missiles and missile launchers category) and including new ones; fourth, including transfers of high technology with military applications; and, finally, developing institutional processes to promote and review submissions.

Chalmers and Greene conclude that the Register has added significantly to global transparency. While it remains to be seen if it can promote restraint in the arms trade, it does encourage accountability. Its main significance "...lies in its potential for further

development and the foundations that a transparency regime in this area could provide for improving accountability, building international control systems, and developing regional security and confidence-building arrangements" (p. 77). The best way to improve its relevance would be to include military holdings and procurement through national production. However, since such a modification will not be possible until 1996, immediate efforts should be directed at securing wider participation. There are limits, however, to what the Register can achieve. It is a confidence-building measure, not a substitute for arms control or disarmament.

412. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." *Bulletin of Arms Control*. No. 16, November 1994, pp. 8-13.

Chalmers and Greene assess the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms by contrasting its first two annual reports. They contend that even though the participation rate increased only marginally in the second year (from 80 to 82 states), the quality of data improved. Participation continued to be high in Europe and North America, middling in East and South-East Asia, Latin America and Oceania, and poor in the Middle East and Africa. However, the number of "nil" returns dropped substantially from the previous year.

Nevertheless, there remain several problems with the Register. First, the continued existence of discrepancies between transfers reported by importer and exporter nations could affect the credibility of the Register. Second, the disappointing report of the 1994 Panel of Experts which agreed that the Register should be expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production, but were unable to reach consensus on how to proceed. As a result, a decision on expansion will await another review, likely in 1996 or 1997. Meanwhile, the Register will continue to document transfers which may or may not be sufficient to guarantee its survival. For instance, nations which rely heavily on arms imports feel that the Register's current format is discriminatory; it demands greater transparency from them than from nations with domestic production capacities. As a result, import dependent countries may elect to discontinue their participation. Third, the Panel could not agree on refining the broad guidelines of the seven categories of weapons. Even the widely criticized missiles and missile launchers category remains unchanged. Fourth, a definition of "arms transfer" was not agreed to. Without a clear definition, each state will continue to formulate its own definition with continued discrepancies in reporting the likely result.

Chalmers and Greene conclude that the fate of the Register will depend on the priority given its development by participating governments. Unless progress is made to improve the Register in the near future, its early promise will go unfulfilled.

413. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: the First Year of Operation." In *Verification 1994: Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment*, eds. J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, London: Brassey's Ltd., 1994, pp. 177-187.

Chalmers and Greene contend that the prospects for effective arms control before the Gulf War were slim. In its aftermath, however, governments were pressured to "do something" to regulate the spread of conventional weapons. In this context the UN Register of Conventional Arms was created.

Participation rates in the Register's first annual report, published in October 1993, exceeded initial expectations. The report contained information not reported by the two main non-governmental arms control organizations (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)). There remained, however, regional variations in reporting. Most European and American states submitted a report, along with approximately half the nations in south and east Asia. By contrast, participation rates in Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan African states were disappointing. If the Register is to enjoy continued relevance, its participation rate must be improved.

The Register is not likely to keep its current format. The UN General Assembly resolution which created it (46/36L) called for a Panel of Experts to convene in 1994 to discuss its modification. The proposals before this group are discussed: first, include categories for military holdings and procurement through national production; second, disaggregate the data supplied (i.e. to distinguish between a 1960s frigate and a state-of-the-art aircraft carrier); third, revise the most security sensitive category--missiles and missile launchers--to make reports meaningful; fourth, expand the Register to include new areas (i.e. small arms); and, finally, create a standing panel to evaluate the returns and interpret their significance. Chalmers and Greene advise that the first steps in the Register's evolution should be taken cautiously, and that efforts should be directed at securing the widest possible participation rate before expansion is considered.

Chalmers and Greene conclude that the Register's first report represents a modest, but significant, step forward. The Register is not a substitute for arms control measures or disarmament; rather, it is a confidence-building measure which should complement arms control discussions.

414. Chayes, Antonio Handler and Abram Chayes. "The UN Register, Transparency and Cooperative Security." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 197-223.

Chayes and Chayes stress the importance of viewing the UN Register of Conventional Arms as a mechanism to promote transparency in arms transfers, and not as an arms control measure. They outline five criteria essential to a cooperative security regime and evaluate the Register against this standard. First, a strong normative base,

with general acceptance and compliance with commitments to force levels, must be established. The Register secured the participation of only slightly more than 40% of UN states, and is therefore still in the developing stage. Second, a regime must aspire towards inclusiveness and non-discrimination to secure legitimacy. The Register should be praised for its commitment to inclusiveness, but it is not yet a reality. Third, transparency in armaments should be encouraged. This goal is the main focus of the Register; however, it has been more successful in securing transparency in exports than in imports and, as a result, there remains room for improvement. Fourth, active management should be present in the form of an institutional capacity to monitor the regime's development. For its part, the Register has no institutional capacity. The authors suggest the creation of a legally binding regime to ensure minimum levels of participation. Finally, a transparency regime should have access to sanctions to deter violations. At present, the Register has no recourse to such devices.

The Register has had a promising beginning. However, its participation rate, its depth and its reliability must be improved. The most pressing need is to strengthen the Register's institutional capacity. Failure to do so may result in its not being able to proceed very far along the promising path on which it has embarked.

415. DiChiaro III, Joseph. "Regionalization of the Register: Region-Specific Complements to a Global Initiative." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 97-116.

DiChiaro examines the merits of creating regional arms transfer registers to complement the existing UN Register of Conventional Arms. Explanations are offered to explain the regional variations in the Register's participation rate. Most Western states participated because they are accustomed to taking part in transparency exercises and have the bureaucracies necessary to generate reports. By contrast, sub-Saharan African states lack sophisticated bureaucracies and did not participate. Other states, particularly in Latin America, have national laws which preclude the release of details on military transfers. For their part, former Soviet Union states are still in the process of developing effective export controls; as a result, detailed submissions to the UN have not been forthcoming. Finally, DiChiaro argues that some states may not have participated because they did not see the relevance of the Register to their own security concerns.

DiChiaro claims that one way to increase global transparency is to create regional registers tailored to the concerns of specific geographic areas. States in favour of regional registers argue that the universal approach fails to consider the history or particular security needs of individual regions. A regional approach would include some of the following components: first, as a product of local initiatives, no state could claim that the regime was being imposed either by the "West" or by the "North"; second, if a weapon type not covered by the UN Register is destabilizing within a region, a category could be created, thereby adding a layer of transparency; third, since it appears unlikely that military holdings and procurement through national production will be included in the UN Register soon, it should be attempted in a regional register; fourth, due to the small

number of states, consensus might be reached on a verification scheme; and, finally, since regional registers can be tailored to suit specific concerns, participation rates may increase at both the regional and, by spin-off effect, the global level.

DiChiaro defends the record of the UN Register. He claims that to view it as an arms control device is simplistic. The Register is only a first step in a series of measures aimed at promoting transparency. Its goal is to reduce mistrust among states and enhance regional as well as global peace and security. The development of regional registers should be placed within this broader context and address regional concerns while contributing to global security.

416. DiChiaro III, Joseph. "The UN Register in a Regional Context: Basic Concepts." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 271-280.

DiChiaro maintains that regional registers should be developed in cooperation with, not in competition with, the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Regional registers will complement the UN Register in that they are better suited to reflect local security issues. In addition, given the enormous financial constraints on the UN, regional organizations may be necessary to share the burden.

Supporters of regional registers argue that the UN Register does not adequately address regional security issues. These advocates maintain that consensus building will be easier in a regional forum since states are more homogeneous. By contrast, detractors point to traditional regional animosities (e.g. the Middle East), arguing that consensus will be more difficult to achieve than at the global level.

DiChiaro contends that regional and global approaches could work together to increase transparency in armaments. Several modalities are listed which could be incorporated into a regional approach: first, any perception that the new system is being imposed by the "West" or by a dominant power in the region must be avoided; second, if agreement can be reached concerning potentially destabilizing weapons systems, then an additional category could be created; third, "arms transfer" must be defined (e.g. report only intra-regional transfers, or include global sales?); fourth, a category for military holdings and procurement through national production must be incorporated; fifth, a formal verification scheme should be created; and, finally, since a regional register can be tailored to the security interests of a particular area, participation rates are likely to increase.

DiChiaro criticizes those people who condemn the UN Register for failing to regulate the arms trade. The Register, he argues, is a necessary first step on the road to securing meaningful limitations on the transfer of conventional weapons. Given its importance in the international community, regional registers should be created to complement the UN Register, rather than to supplant it.

417. Donowaki, Mitsuro. "The Register--A Continuous Building Process." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 117-131.

In the wake of numerous failed attempts to regulate the arms trade, dating back to the League of Nations, Donowaki considers the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to be a significant accomplishment. He argues that the Register came to fruition as a result of four factors: first, the end of the Cold War made international cooperation possible; second, the desire to avoid another destabilizing accumulation of weapons, similar to that which preceded the Gulf War, put arms control measures back on the international agenda; third, the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe showed the utility of confidence-building measures; and, finally, in the wake of the Gulf War, several nations (i.e. Canada, members of the European Community and Japan) made determined efforts to establish a register.

Donowaki maintains that the Register's first annual report, which saw 83 nations submit a report, is a good start. However, if the Register's goal of becoming a global confidence-building measure is to be realized, it must secure fuller participation. The challenge in the next few years will be to balance two factors: on the one hand, expanding the scope of the Register to render the transfer of arms more transparent; on the other, refining the existing structure to improve participation. Despite the global nature of the Register, regional groups will be critical to its development. For instance, North American and European states could serve as a role model for other regions. In addition, the creation of regional and sub-regional forums could help to familiarize nations with the Register and its goals.

418. Duncan, Andrew. "The Military Balance and Publicly Available Information." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 133-152.

Duncan analyzes the data supplied in the official publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance*. Its information is garnered from reports submitted by individual states, from treaty data, and from journal articles. It includes details on military holdings from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states, and, increasingly, information from former Warsaw Pact nations. However, due to national security concerns, information from Middle Eastern and African states is not provided in any detail. In addition, owing to its focus on military capacity, *The Military Balance* does not include analyses of states' political intentions.

The UN Register of Conventional Arms provided the first opportunity to check the accuracy of *The Military Balance*. The section of the Register which requested information on military holdings (completed by 30% of respondents) revealed new information on some Latin American countries, but most of the information was already publicly available. The reason for this overlap, argues Duncan, is that it was nations which are traditionally more open about military spending who chose to include details of

military holdings. Thus, the UN Register failed to supply information on the military holdings of states in Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Register could still be a significant factor in enhancing international security. Before it can assume this role, however, it must secure wider participation. To achieve this goal, the Register's existing format should be strengthened before an expansion of its scope is contemplated.

419. Fergusson, James. "Spilldown and Stability: An Alternative Perspective on the UN Register of Conventional Arms." In *Control But Verify: Verification and the New Non-Proliferation Agenda*, ed. David Mutimer, Toronto, Canada: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1994, pp. 181-193.

Fergusson maintains that the current perspective used to evaluate the UN Register of Conventional Arms is technical and examines the requirements and impediments confronting political attempts to manage and control arms proliferation. He proposes an alternative way to evaluate the Register. This process, "spilldown," regards the Register as "...a learning process through which a particular set of beliefs and norms regarding the relationship between conventional weapons, national security, and war are being transmitted to states" (p. 181). This theory assumes that over time the thinking and behaviour of states will change to reflect new ideas and norms. For instance, a norm will be created which claims that arms acquisitions do not enhance national security, but rather, detract from it.

Fergusson argues that the Register is an important component in this new approach to arms control. It transmits several new norms to states: first, war is inherently evil and abnormal; second, war is either unintentional or a product of deviancy or evil; third, states should avoid procuring weapons of a type or amount which are likely to increase fear and mistrust; fourth, all states should openly provide information about their arms acquisitions to other states; and, finally, information on weapons holdings should be given to a neutral third party (i.e. the UN). In helping to transmit these new international norms, the Register can play a critical role in future arms control measures.

He cautions against using formal supply-side cooperation to control and manage conventional arms proliferation (e.g. Permanent Five Talks). Doing so may detract from the success of the Register since supply-side measures are inherently discriminatory. While the Register promotes equal and universal participation, supply-side measures consist of arms controls imposed by the North (i.e. the industrialized world) on the developing nations of the world. These arms control measures breed mistrust and foster the instability they hope to prevent.

420. Goose, Stephen D. and Frank Smyth. "Arming Genocide in Rwanda." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 73, No. 5, September-October 1994, pp. 86-96.

Citing the carnage in Rwanda as an example of the destructive potential of small arms, Smyth and Goose argue that a more effective arms control device is needed. They claim that disclosing arms transfers is in the best interest of the United States and the

international community since it promotes peace, stability, and economic growth. Despite the benefits, the international community has failed to establish a viable mechanism for controlling the proliferation of conventional arms. The Conventional Arms Transfer Talks during the Carter administration, and the post Gulf War UN Security Council Permanent Five talks, currently stalled, must be added to its list of failures.

It is in light of these failures that the newest measure, the UN Register of Conventional Arms, must be evaluated. Goose and Smyth contend that it has been a qualified success. Some hitherto unreported transfers of armaments have been revealed, but fundamental problems made its first annual report somewhat disappointing. Two ways to improve its performance are offered: first, include data on small arms transfers; second, make disclosure mandatory for a nation to be admitted to the international community. It is suggested that the United States should take a leading role. Transparency in armaments is not an end in itself; however, the U.S. should take advantage of its potential as a step towards effective arms control.

421. Grossi, Rafael M. "Latin America and the Caribbean: Transparency, Confidence-Building and the Register." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 148-160.

Unlike the United States and Canada, prior to the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Latin American countries had no experience in declaring arms transfers. As a result, states were initially cautious in providing information, fearing that transparency might jeopardize their national security. However, enough information was offered to make the exercise worthwhile.

From the Latin American perspective, the Register's first annual report was a qualified success. On the one hand, all relevant arms transfers were reported by at least one party and the most significant states participated. On the other, there were discrepancies in reporting, and some transfers proved impossible to cross-check.

Nevertheless, Grossi argues that there has been no indication that continued support for the Register will not be forthcoming. However, most Latin American countries would prefer a gradual development process.

422. Iburg, Holger. "Controlling High-Technology With Military Applications." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 107-122.

Iburg analyzes the debate on expanding the UN Register of Conventional Arms to include transfers of high technology with military applications. Proponents of free access to high technology argue the following: first, technology is neutral; second, for development purposes, access to technology should not be limited; third, multilateral controls, not unilateral ones, should be established as the means to pave the way for transparency; and, finally, dual-use items should be transferred. However, for every

argument listed above, there is a counterargument: first, technology is not neutral and certain products with obvious military potential should be regulated; second, access to high technology must be controlled to give first world nations an economic advantage over competitors; third, unilateral controls are easier to impose and can be implemented on a stricter basis than multilateral regulations; and, finally, dual-use items should be transferred only when it is clear that they will be used for non-military purposes.

Iburg claims that one way to limit the transfer of high technology is to establish an export control regime. However, he concludes that such an institution is not feasible for the following reasons: no consensus exists among UN states on a course of action, no enforcement procedures are available, and no financial backing is forthcoming. Given the absence of a viable alternative, Iburg argues, efforts should be directed towards improving the Register. Nevertheless, since the inclusion of a category for transfers of high technology with military applications would be problematic, the Register should not be expanded in this direction. Instead, efforts should be concentrated on improving the format of the existing Register.

423. Krause, Keith and David Mutimer. "The Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: New Challenges for Control and Verification." In *Control But Verify: Verification and the New Non-Proliferation Agenda*, ed. David Mutimer, Toronto, York University: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1994, pp. 39-55.

Krause and Mutimer provide an introduction to conventional weapons as a proliferation problem. They sketch the developments in the arms market since the end of the Cold War, stressing the prevalence and availability of conventional weapons. Attempts to regulate the arms trade, however, remain problematic.

A critical first step in controlling the conventional arms trade was putting the issue on the proliferation control agenda, traditionally focused on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Regulating the trade of conventional arms should be predicated on the use to which those technologies are put, rather than on the provision of the technology in the first place. Since verification, compliance monitoring and confidence-building measures emphasize the way in which technology is used, they are likely to play an increased role in this new global security agenda. For its part, the UN Register of Conventional Arms stands to be the "heart of any new, global conventional proliferation control regime" (p. 53). The Register has been successful in securing data on 98% of arms exports and 65% of arms imports. If it is amended to include military holdings and procurement through national production, it will be the basis for global military transparency.

424. Laurance, Edward J. and Christina K. Woodward. "An Evaluation of the Second Year of Reporting to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms." *The Nonproliferation Review*. Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1994, pp. 99-111.

Laurance and Woodward chronicle the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. They argue that participation in the Register's second annual report continued to vary significantly by region. For example, most Western European states submitted a report; by contrast, most African countries chose not to participate. In addition, the Register's first two reports are compared in the following areas: continuity in participation, data supplied under "background information," extent of transparency, extent of agreement between exporters and importers on arms transferred, and quality of reporting.

Five reasons are offered for the continued existence of discrepancies: first, lack of participation; second, conflicting interpretations of category definitions; third, conflicting interpretations as to when a transfer occurred; conflicting interpretations of whether or not a transfer has occurred; and, finally, poorly defined categories (e.g. missiles and missile launchers). Also included is an annex of the reports submitted to the Register for 1994.

425. Laurance, Edward J. and Herbert Wulf. "Lessons From the First Year." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 37-50.

Laurance and Wulf address two questions related to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. First, is the Register addressing the arms trade trends which have evolved since 1991 in the post-Gulf war environment? Second, to what extent is the Register leading to a mechanism that fails to make transparent or restrain those armaments actually being used in today's conflicts?

Laurance and Wulf argue that participation in the first Register was solid, with 45% of UN member states submitting a report. However, participation rates varied markedly by region. On the one hand, most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states submitted a report. On the other, no Gulf or sub-Saharan Africa state participated. In addition, the quality of reporting was not consistent, resulting in discrepancies in the data. Six explanations are offered for this trend: first, failure to secure global participation; second, conflicting interpretations of category definitions; third, a lack of guidelines on when a transfer occurred (some nations recorded a transaction when items were paid for while others awaited delivery before declaring the transfer); fourth, no agreement has been reached on whether or not leased armaments constitute a transfer; fifth, poorly defined categories (in particular, missiles and missile launchers) allowed for the provision of only very general information; and, finally, the inclusion of missiles and missile launchers in the same category allowed states to mask their offensive capability by submitting aggregate numbers.

In addition, the authors list potential explanations for the poor participation rates in some regions. Some states did not possess the bureaucracy necessary to generate the data. Others lacked the export controls to monitor arms transfers. Moreover, in some states domestic legislation prohibits the disclosure of information on arms transfers. Finally, indifference and skepticism about the Register's goals.

Laurance and Wulf also evaluate the Register's performance on the basis of its own stated goals. Transparency and openness were advanced but the Register must secure a wider participation base for it to be truly effective. Similarly, as a confidence-building measure it had moderate success. However, little progress has been made either in preventing excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons or in strengthening regional peace and security. In addition, the promotion of transparency in armaments at the national level remains problematic. Finally, as a mechanism designed to encourage "restraint" in the arms trade, the Register is deemed to have failed.

Laurance and Wulf conclude by outlining several problems which the Register must address. For instance, the inherent troubles of grouping missiles and launchers in the same category. In addition, the Register does not address the new trends in the arms trade (e.g. the sale of weapons up-grade packages). Finally, the Register must incorporate the transfer of small arms into its annual report.

426. Laurance, Edward J. and Herbert Wulf. "The Register: Its Philosophy and First-Year Experience." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 39-65.

The current international environment, Laurance and Wulf maintain, has been shaped by two seminal events: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. Together these two events have created a new international attitude that "the accumulation of excessive and destabilizing amounts of conventional weaponry by a state [is] unacceptable" (p. 42).

This climate prompted two attempts to regulate the trade of conventional weapons. The first involved an attempt by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) to regulate the arms trade. However, the five nations were unable to maintain unanimity and the attempt stalled. The other attempt saw the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. This organization, while recognizing the right of individual states to arm for self-defence, seeks to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms.

The Register's first annual report demonstrates mixed results. Eighty-seven countries submitted reports, but participation varied greatly by region. All North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries participated. By contrast, no Sub-Saharan African country submitted a report, and neither did any Gulf state. Three reasons are cited for this disparity: first, some countries lack the resources to prepare submissions; second, it is not legal in some states to disclose arms transfers; and, finally, some nations were indifferent to the process.

Due to the lack of participation in some key regions there was a disappointing level of accuracy in the first report. Laurance and Wulf cite six reasons for this lack of precision. First, non-participation by several key states made cross-checking impossible. Second, broad category definitions resulted in conflicting interpretations of what should be reported. Third, different notions existed concerning when a transfer occurred. Some nations reported a transfer once the arms were paid for, whereas others waited until the weapons were delivered. Fourth, the Register was not clear on what constituted ownership (e.g. should states report weapons on loan from another country?). Fifth, some weapons categories, most notably the missiles and missile launchers category, were so broad that no useful information could be gleaned from one aggregate total. Finally, the inclusion of missiles and missile launchers in one category made it impossible for states to give an accurate portrait of their offensive potential.

Laurance and Wulf maintain that the Register was successful as a confidence-building mechanism. It was not, however, successful in other areas. For instance, it is too early to evaluate the Register on its success in preventing excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons. Similarly, conclusions on its utility in promoting regional peace and security must await the publication of several more reports to evaluate trends over time. Moreover, several weapons systems are not covered in the Register's current format. For instance, it does not address illicit, or sub-national, arms transfers. In addition, it fails to include information on the trade of small arms (rifles, mortars and small artillery pieces) which have an influence on the peace and stability of several regions.

Laurance and Wulf suggest five ways to improve the Register: improve the quantity and quality of returns, include information on procurement through national production, develop new categories to widen its scope, request information on each state's military holdings, and, finally, promote it as a transparency and confidence-building instrument to ensure wider participation.

427. Laurance, Edward J. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Options and Proposals for Enhancement and Further Development." In *Non-Proliferation and Multilateral Verification: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)*, ed. Steven Mataija, Toronto, York University: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1994, pp. 153-186.

Laurance argues that two seminal events made the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms possible: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. He chronicles its development and analyzes the results of its first annual report. To begin with, the participation rate varied significantly by region. Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states submitted a report; however, very few African countries chose to take part. In addition, the quality of reporting differed greatly by category. For example 82% of tank transfers were reported by both importer and exporter, while only 13% of missiles or missile launchers were declared by both parties. Furthermore, there were discrepancies in the report and the quality of data was lower than anticipated. Six reasons

are offered for these shortcomings: first, lack of participation; second, conflicting interpretations of category definitions; third, conflicting interpretations of whether or not a transfer has occurred; fourth, conflicting interpretations of when a transfer occurred; fifth, a poorly defined category (e.g. missiles and missile launchers); and, finally, possible deceptions and cheating in reporting.

Laurance also evaluates the Register's progress in achieving its stated goals. Each of the following areas are discussed: promoting transparency and openness, serving as a confidence-building measure, securing universal participation, preventing excessive and destabilising accumulations of arms, strengthening regional peace and security, promoting openness in armaments at the national level, promoting restraint in the arms trade, and warning of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms.

Laurance maintains that the Register has three fundamental problems. First, it falls short of addressing the trade in missiles. Second, it does not address the new trend of purchasing weapons up-grade packages instead of complete systems. Finally, it does not record small-arms transfers. He also discusses seven possible ways to enhance the Register's performance: first, improve the current version as an arms transfer register (i.e. promote universal participation); second, develop it into an arms acquisition Register (i.e. include military holdings and procurement through national production); third, add new categories (e.g. aerial re-fuelling aircraft); fourth, transform the Register into a military capability Register (e.g. include weapons of mass destruction); fifth, develop the Register into a useful instrument of cooperative security; sixth, develop regional registers as a supplement to the UN Register; and, finally, develop a global consultative mechanism to evaluate the Register's data.

He concludes with a list of eleven concrete proposals for improving the Register. First, incorporate military holdings and procurement through national production as soon as possible. Second, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA) should be tasked with reducing the discrepancies uncovered in the first annual report. Third, to minimize reporting discrepancies, the UNCDA should help states produce reports. Fourth, the Register must be more vigorously promoted. Fifth, the norms of the Register must be promoted (e.g. excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms are a threat to international security). Sixth, the UNCDA should evaluate and verify submitted data. Seventh, it is still too early to add new categories to the Register. Eighth, weapons of mass destruction should not be included. Ninth, no attempt should be made to register the transfer of high technology with military applications. Tenth, regional registers should be created to complement the UN Register. Finally, a consultative mechanism should be created to interpret returns, settle disputes and, where necessary, recommend sanctions.

428. Laurance, Edward J. *The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Options and Proposals for Enhancement and Further Development*. Research Report Prepared for the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, September 1994.

Laurance argues that the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms was made possible by two seminal events: the end of the Cold War, and the Gulf War. Laurance chronicles the Register's creation and early stages of development. The 83 states which reported (45% of UN member states) was significantly higher than has been achieved by a parallel structure which reports military expenditures. However, reporting varied significantly by region (most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states reported, whereas, participation was very poor among Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa states), and proportionately more export nations submitted information than did import countries.

Laurance offers several reasons to explain why the report did not meet expectations: first, many states chose not to participate; second, broad category definitions meant similar transfers were reported differently; third, conflicting interpretations of what constitutes an arms transfer (e.g. is leased equipment to be reported?) resulted in vagaries in reporting; fourth, no clear guidelines were included which defined when a transfer took place (e.g. when the item is paid for, or when it is incorporated into a nation's armed forces?); fifth, poorly defined categories (e.g. the aggregate data reported in the missile and missile launcher category) made meaningful comparisons virtually impossible; sixth, indifference on the part of some states prompted them to decline to submit a report.

Laurance also evaluates the success of the Register by comparing its stated goals with the results of its first annual report. First, it was largely unsuccessful in promoting transparency and openness. The main obstacle remains securing wider participation. Second, good progress has been made in using the Register as a confidence-building measure. Detracting from complete success is the low participation rate in some conflict prone areas (e.g. the Middle East). Third, the goal of universal participation remains elusive. Fourth, little was accomplished in preventing excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms. Fifth, in promoting regional peace and security the Register has had only marginal success. Sixth, promoting openness in armaments at the national level will require substantial effort as little progress has been made to date. Finally, promoting restraint in the arms trade has, so far, been a failure.

In addition to these problems, the Register does not adequately address the arms trade trends of the Post-Cold War era. For instance, it does not track the transfer of ground-to-air missiles, nor does it address the problem of recording the transfer of weapons upgrade packages. Finally, in an era dominated by intra-state conflict, conducted primarily with small arms, the Register does not attempt to regulate small arms transfers. Addressing these problems, Laurance details several proposals to modify the Register, and offers eleven suggestions to improve its performance. First, categories for military holdings and procurement through national production should be included. Second, UN Conference on Disarmament Affairs (UNCDA) must be given an increased

role to reduce discrepancies in reporting. Third, UNCDA should offer assistance to states in preparing returns to ensure comparability. Fourth, participation in the Register must be more vigorously encouraged. Fifth, the international norm, that excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms must be checked, should be promoted. Sixth, UNCDA should be charged with evaluating and verifying submitted data. Seventh, due to the lack of consensus it remains too early to include new categories of weapons. Eighth, nuclear weapons should not be included. Ninth, registration of transfers of high technology with military applications should not be attempted. Tenth, regionalization should be promoted as a supplement to, not a substitute for, the global Register. Finally, a consultative mechanism should be developed to work through disputes.

He concludes by offering suggestions for future research. The first stage would establish the correlation, if any, between arms build-ups and conflict. This information could then be applied to evaluating the data generated by the UN Register. The result, he argues, would be an improvement in the ability of the UN Register to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms (included also are two appendices: A, statements by Member States on the UN Register during the First Committee Session, Fall 1993; and B, Articles, Books and Reports on the UN Register).

429. Litavrin, Petr G. "Russia and the Register." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 140-147.

Litavrin focuses on the role of the Russian Federation in developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Russia, he maintains, views the Register as an instrument to increase openness and predictability in military matters. The Register's first year, which saw the participation of 87 states, must be interpreted as a qualified success. There remain, however, significant obstacles impeding its development. Most serious is the wide diversity of opinion within the 1994 Panel of Experts concerning the future direction of the Register. For its part, Russia advocates a gradual expansion of the Register, with immediate efforts directed at securing wider participation. To this end, Litavrin details some problems the Russian Federation is experiencing in supplying data (e.g. developing the export controls necessary to generate the required data). A sudden increase in the scope of the Register would dramatically increase the effort required to submit a report, thereby jeopardizing its existence.

Litavrin suggests that a comparative study be undertaken which compares the Register's data with that published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Such a report would enable the 1994 Panel to identify the problems with the Register's current format and provide a starting point for discussion.

430. Mahon, Tim. "Jane's Information Group: Collection, Interpretation and Dissemination of Publicly Available Information." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 123-132.

Mahon sets out three objectives: outline publicly available information on arms transfers (e.g. the UN Register of Conventional Arms); discuss some collection and interpretation methodologies used by Jane's Information Group (e.g. 120 experts reporting from more than 50 countries); and, finally, include some thoughts on the future handling of such information (e.g. CD-ROM technology). Mahon argues that in the coming years the Register will change its reporting structure, its coverage, and the type of information it requests. The information collected by Jane's Information Group should be used to complement the reports of the UN Register and to point out ways in which it could be improved.

431. Menendez Hernandez, Jose R. "The Register: Its Evolution and Prospects." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 161-169.

Menendez Hernandez provides a historical summary of arms control initiatives dating back to the failed attempt by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s and summarizes the process which created the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

Citing the lack of submissions in the Register's first annual report, Menendez Hernandez maintains that it is not yet time to expand the scope of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Expansion at this junction would only decrease participation since there are two fundamental obstacles impeding the Register's development. First, there are no precise definitions of key terms (e.g. "excessive accumulation of arms", "international arms transfers", "military holdings", and "procurement through national production"). Second, there are no complementary measures designed to build confidence and security (e.g. ending military exercises in areas close to countries with which a dispute exists, and removing military bases which are close to other states). If the Register is to enjoy continued success, these two obstacles must be overcome.

432. Mutimer, David. "The United Nations Arms Register and Multilateral Proliferation Controls." A Paper Presented at the North Atlantic Assembly's Rose-Roth Seminar, Weapons Non-Proliferation and Export Controls. National Conference Centre, Ottawa, Canada: January 17, 1994.

Mutimer analyzes the UN Register of Conventional Arms in the context of three levels of multilateral proliferation controls. The first level, global regimes, limit the spread of a particular weapon technology (e.g. chemical weapons). The second tier, multilateral supplier groups, is a collective attempt by suppliers to control technology proliferation (e.g. the Permanent Five talks, currently stalled). The final layer consists of

national export controls. Mutimer contends that these three levels are in conflict. The root of the tension is the reliance of these structures on technology denial.

The UN Register has a different foundation in that it is designed to promote transparency. In turn, transparency will encourage arms restraint in two ways: first, it will produce accurate information, thereby eliminating the necessity to base arms procurement on worse-case scenarios; and, second, it will create a device capable of detecting destabilizing arms accumulations, allowing the international community time to react. In addition, the Register differs in that it has no formal verification scheme. Instead, it employs a cross-checking system (i.e. since both states should report the same transfer, their submissions should match).

In its first annual report, the Register contained reports from less than one-half of UN member states. Despite this low participation rate, it covered 98% of arms exports and 65% of arms imports. Nevertheless, Mutimer suggests improving the Register in the following ways: first, it must secure wider participation; second, it must improve the definitions of key terms; and, finally, it should include military holdings and procurement through national production.

Arms control based on technology denial does not work. Efforts at arms control should address the problems which prompt states to acquire arms. The Register is designed as a confidence-building measure. Its development will help eliminate instability and uncertainty in the international community, thereby reducing the need for states to acquire arms. Mutimer argues that the Register is off to a good start. However, if it is to fulfill its early promise it must be supplemented by regional confidence-building measures.

433. Pearson, Frederic S. and Michael Brzoska. "The Register as an Early Warning System: Case Studies and Empirical Evidence of the Role of Conventional Arms in Conflict." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, University of Bradford: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 225-250.

Pearson and Brzoska examine a series of post World War II conflicts to determine the relationship between arms accumulations and the outbreak of war. They conclude that the UN Register of Conventional Arms must be modified if it hopes to serve as an early warning device. Since some of the wars examined resulted in part from arms build-ups through national production (e.g. Falklands war), Pearson and Brzoska suggest that the Register include details of arms negotiations and domestic production rates. Moreover, one of the problems with the Register is its inability to warn of destabilizing accumulations of arms which take place in under a year. In addition, the difficulty of defining what constitutes an "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms" is evidenced, for example, by continued U.S. military support for Baghdad into 1990. As the Iraqi case demonstrates, arms suppliers often have a different interpretation of what is destabilizing than do arms importers.

Pearson and Brzoska maintain that using the Register as a predictor of war remains problematic since no one dimensional link exists between arms accumulations on the one hand, and the outbreak of war on the other. Wars have occurred in the absence of a military build-up or with only a small increase in armaments. To increase its applicability in this capacity, the Register must be amended. Pearson and Brzoska suggest including details on the political context of the receiving state, along with any pending arms deals or denials. Ideally, these amendments should be incorporated into an expanded Register which includes military holdings and procurement through national production. Without such modifications, the Register will remain an unreliable predictor of conflict.

434. Schear, James A. "Global Institutions in a Cooperative Order: Does the United Nations Fit In?" In *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Janne E. Nolan, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994, pp. 243-289.

Schear evaluates four of the UN's modes of operation: transparency in armaments, peacekeeping, peace building and enforcement activity. He maintains that "...the UN's rule-making system, which evolved during the cold war but was marginal to the security needs of that era, lends itself rather well to the pursuit of cooperative security" (pp. 244-245).

It is in this context that he evaluates the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He argues that its merits were made apparent as a result of the Gulf War. The subsequent adoption of its founding resolution (46/36L) by a vote of 150-0 reflected "...not only the superficial voguishness of the transparency idea but also some rather frenzied last-minute pork-barrel diplomacy" (p. 255). Western countries, by and large, liked the Register concept. By contrast, developing states felt that it discriminated against arms importing nations. These objections were appeased with a promise to integrate military holdings and procurement through national production into subsequent registers.

Schear maintains that the bureaucratic and cumbersome nature of the Register will make it difficult to modify. Nevertheless, it must be refined or its contribution to transparency in armaments will be modest. On the positive side, the Register could provide an early warning of arms accumulations. On the negative side, there remain several problems: first, transfers of weapon-upgrade packages are not included; second, no agreement is forthcoming on refining its seven arms categories; and, finally, there are several notable omissions (e.g. ground-to-air missiles). Despite these problems, the Register may help to achieve greater openness both internationally and domestically, and contribute to cooperative security.

435. Singh, Ravinder Pal. "Transparency in Arms Procurement Policies and Processes." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 177-195.

Singh argues that there are several obstacles to achieving transparency in armaments. The regional and national security environments of many states are marked by tension and hostility; making the promotion of confidence-building measures difficult. There is also an international debate between states who want to keep their military development secret and nations who desire increased openness. The political and cultural attitudes of states traditionally opposed to disclosing information on security issues must be changed.

Proponents of transparency include the following groups: media and public interest groups, academic and constitutional experts, and opposition politicians. By contrast, opponents of transparency typically fall into one of the following areas: politicians in power, officials engaged in security policy making, and members of the military. The challenge confronting the UN Register of Conventional Arms is to draw these two groups together.

Singh cautions, however, against considering the Register as a universal solution. There remains a need to develop "an entire range of strategic indicators and response mechanisms" (p. 188) to operate in conjunction with it. For example, governments should be encouraged to produce papers on arms procurement policies and explain their strategic assessments and defence budgets annually. Moreover, several ways to improve the Register are detailed: first, it must include a category which details procurement through national production; second, it must track upgrade packages which improve the lethality of obsolete weaponry; third, it must recognize that the production of arms is not a global phenomenon, and focus on the approximately fifty states who produce weapons to find a solution; and, finally, it must develop a credible verification methodology.

Singh warns against allowing the Register to become too Euro-centric. It must recognize that different security issues exist in different parts of the globe. In addition, definitions must be formulated regionally for critical terms (e.g. "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms") which more accurately reflect each region's security concerns. Finally, in its current form, the Register reflects a top-down approach to promoting transparency in armaments. In the future it should be developed to incorporate regional concerns into its global approach.

436. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "The First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms." In *SIPRI Yearbook, 1994*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 486-487.

The first annual report of the UN Register of Conventional Arms is analyzed. It is argued that the Register was successful in recording some previously unknown arms transfers. However, some transfers were not reported in the Register that the SIPRI

(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) had tracked. It is suggested that some transfers were omitted because of the Register's vague category definitions. This difficulty is attributed to different procedural approaches taken by governments in preparing their submissions.

437. Taylor, Colonel Terence. "Understanding the United Nations Conventional Arms Register." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter/Spring 1994, pp. 111-119.

Taylor argues that 1994 will be a critical year for the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He maintains that to understand its current problems, one must know how the Register developed. To this end, an overview is given of the negotiations which created the Register.

Taylor also chronicles the development of the concept of an arms register, beginning with the failed attempt by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s. Three lessons can be garnered from the League's failure: first, the UN should be cautioned against setting overly ambitious goals for the Register; second, it should be equitable with respect to both arms importers and exporters; and, finally, one must never lose sight of the fact that the root cause of international stability is not the transfer of armaments; rather, arms transfers reflect the lack of a workable political solution to international conflict.

In addition, Taylor documents the evolution of the Register from the first proposal in 1991, through the debates in the General Assembly, and includes an analysis of the activities of the 1992 Panel of Experts (convened to expand and clarify the Register). Given the difficult questions which the 1992 Panel was forced to set aside for the 1994 Panel another consensus report will be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, continued relevance is an attainable goal for the Register. Taylor maintains that the 1994 Panel would be well served to learn from the ill-fated attempt to regulate armaments in the interwar years and cautions against setting goals which are too ambitious. It would be better to expand the Register incrementally to ensure greater geographical participation and longer life. Failure to do so would consign the Register to the fate of its League of Nations predecessor.

438. Varas, Augusto. "Transparency and Military Information in Latin America." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 251-270.

The general characteristics of Latin American security issues are as follows: first, a coherent view on hemispheric security does not exist; second, owing to the focus of governments on domestic issues, regional and national defence issues are not of primary concern; third, a variety of internal alignments exist between civil and military authorities, with a close relationship in some states (e.g. Peru) and a distant one in others (e.g. Venezuela); fourth, there is no common approach to dealing with the region's dominant power, the United States, making it difficult to conclude hemispheric agreements; fifth, success has been achieved in working towards arms control at the level

of weapons of mass destruction, but little headway has been made in limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons; finally, at the institutional level, no consensus has been reached on the type of arms control regimes which would benefit hemispheric security.

Varus expresses optimism about the future of the UN Register of Conventional Arms to promote peace and stability. However, the Register must be modified if it is to have continued relevance in Latin America. To begin with, it should develop gradually. In the meantime, it must be promoted to secure wider participation. In addition, some sections need to be clarified, most notably the section which requests background information on military holdings. Finally, discussions which aim to include categories for weapons of mass destruction and transfers of high technology with military applications should be abandoned. Instead, a parallel register should be constructed to accommodate weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, high technology transfers should be monitored by existing regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)).

Varus stresses the potential of the Register to provide a foundation for new regional security cooperative regimes. To fulfil this role, however, it must be integrated with the efforts of other security regimes and regional institutions.

439. Wagenmakers, Hendrik. "The Register as a Proud Member of a Family of Efforts." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-22.

Early discussions between the European Twelve, plus Japan, and several non-aligned countries on the concept of an arms register did not lead to easy agreement. However, the desire to declare transparency in armaments an objective of the General Assembly resulted in cooperation and the eventual adoption of resolution 46/36L, creating the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Wagenmakers details the background of the Register as part of a "family" of confidence-building measures designed to promote transparency.

Also examined are the issues before the 1994 Panel of Experts, convened to expand and clarify the Register. Wagenmakers cautions against rushing its development, arguing that achieving stability in reporting should be the first goal. Furthermore, he outlines the parallel efforts being made by the Conference on Disarmament to encourage transparency in armaments. Some of the proposals before the Conference include measures which would require each nation to declare the size and organization of its armed forces, and schemes which would require advance notice of any major military exercise.

Wagenmakers is confident that the Register will be expanded to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Transparency in armaments integrates arms control and international security. Moreover, it provides a basis for cooperative dialogue on security concerns between nations. Therefore, every effort should be made to secure wider participation.

440. Wagenmakers, Hendrik. "Transparency in Armaments: The UN Register of Conventional Arms as a Proud Member of a Family of Efforts." In *Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, Bradford University: Redwood Books, 1994, pp. 21-35.

Wagenmakers maintains that the UN Register of Conventional Arms is not an end in itself; rather, it is a step on the road to an effective arms control regime. Stressing the international cooperation necessary to create this first step, he outlines the Register's development, from the early proposals put forward by the European Twelve (plus Japan), through its adoption by the UN General Assembly.

The Register's first annual report represents a promising start. However, future reports must secure wider participation. Additional suggestions, currently under discussion by the 1994 Panel of Experts, are also detailed. One proposal suggests that each government include the criteria it employed to generate its submission. Another recommends the inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. For his part, Wagenmakers cautions against the rapid expansion of the Register before current problems have been adequately addressed.

In addition, he details the parallel efforts devoted to securing transparency in armaments by the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Several proposals are currently under discussion. For instance, a British proposal would require each state to declare the size and organization of its armed forces. Another recommendation, put forward by the Italian delegation, suggests that the closure or conversion of military production facilities be declared.

It is in light of all these other attempts at arms control, argues Wagenmakers, that the UN Register must be evaluated. It is a proud member of a growing family of arms control measures. Nevertheless, its relevance would be improved if it included data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Before this expansion can take place, however, a wider base of participation must be secured.

441. Wagenmakers, Hendrik. "The UN Register of Conventional Arms: The Debate on the Future Issues." *Arms Control Today*. Vol. 24, No. 8, October 1994, pp. 8-13.

Wagenmakers argues that the UN Register of Conventional Arms is a product of the Gulf War. If it is to enjoy continued relevance, it must find solutions to the following difficulties: refining the provisions of the reporting categories, expanding its scope, and increasing its participation rate. Moreover, it must be evaluated as part of a family of arms control measures. For instance, the failures of other registers (e.g. the League of Nations attempt during the interwar years) are outlined and contrasted with the success of the current Register. On a positive note, in 1992 and 1993 all the major arms exporting nations submitted a report. In addition, reports were submitted by traditional rivals (e.g. India and Pakistan). On the negative side, however, several problems remain. To begin with, less than half of UN member states took part each year. Moreover, some significant arms importing nations did not participate (e.g. Iran). Furthermore, participation varied

widely by region (e.g. solid in Western countries, poor in African nations). Finally, because of different interpretations of what should be reported, discrepancies were prevalent in the first two annual reports.

Wagenmakers also evaluates the progress of the 1994 Panel of Experts, convened to review the Register. Unfortunately, consensus was not achieved in any of the following areas: first, defining an arms transfer; second, adjusting the existing categories of weapons (e.g. separate the seventh category, missiles and missile launchers, into two categories); third, adding new categories (e.g. small arms); fourth, expanding the scope of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production; fifth, incorporating weapons of mass destruction, and, finally, creating regional registers to complement the global initiative. Despite these difficulties, Wagenmakers maintains that the Register still provides a basis for progress in arms control.

442. Zahran, Mounir. "The Conference on Disarmament and Transparency in Armaments: 1992 and 1993 (with a short postscript for 1994)." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 23-38.

Zahran chronicles the role and work of the Conference on Disarmament with regards to improving the scope and utility of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He briefly outlines the informal discussions of the conference in 1992 which provided a foundation for the 1993 ad hoc committee. By comparison, the contentious issues before the 1993 committee are reported in detail. For instance, the committee debated how to define what constitutes an "excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms." Moreover, committee members discussed the merits of adding categories for military holdings and procurement through national production. The creation of a supplementary register to cover weapons of mass destruction and transfers of high technology with military applications was also considered.

Transparency in armaments does promote international confidence, but only up to a point. It is not a substitute for reductions in armaments. Zahran suggests that the 1994 Panel of experts consider including military holdings and procurement through national production.

A brief postscript on the 1994 ad hoc committee discussions is also included. Zahran relates that even though it is still early, there already exists "fundamentally differing approaches towards the issue of transparency in armaments" (p. 37). Some nations want limited transparency; others want more comprehensive disclosure. Debate is also ongoing on whether to increase the scope of the register incrementally, or to dramatically expand its mandate in the immediate future.

443. Zukang, SHA. "China and Transparency in Armaments." *Disarmament: A periodic review by the United Nations*. Vol. XVII, No. 1, 1994, pp. 132-139.

Zukang asserts that the first report of the UN Register of Conventional Arms was a partial success. In relating China's position on the future of the Register, he argues that

the main problem with the first report was the lack of universal participation. Three explanations are offered for this shortcoming: first, some states remain unconvinced that submitting a report will not have a negative impact on their security; second, several nations do not yet understand the reporting system; and, finally, some states, awaiting a demonstration of a concrete link between transparency and restraint, chose not to participate.

Zukang relates that China recommends the consolidation of the current format of the Register. Only after wider participation has been secured should the UN consider expanding the scope of the Register. Expanding it immediately would decrease the number of nations willing to participate and, as a result, would cause the Register to fail.

Part B.5

1995 Publications

501. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. *Taking Stock: The UN Register After Two Years: Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 5*. Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford: Westview Press, 1995.

Chalmers and Greene maintain that the UN Register of Conventional Arms is the only global cooperative security agreement to deal with transparency in armaments. They introduce the transparency in armaments concept, detail its historical record, and relate its benefits and liabilities. They argue that the Register has become a significant part of the international family of transparency measures. Their goal is "...to clarify the emerging strengths and weaknesses of this emerging conventional arms transparency regime, and to illuminate the prospects for its further development and use to promote international security" (p. 10).

Origins and Early Development of the Register

The concept of an arms register began with the failed attempt by the League of Nations to regulate weapons transfers in the wake of the First World War. Chalmers and Greene chronicle the various attempts at establishing an arms register made in the years following the Second World War. In addition, they detail the process of compromise which led to the creation of the current Register in 1991, and introduce the seven weapons categories included in the Register (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers). Finally, they outline the aims of the Register, namely, "...the building of confidence and security; the reduction of suspicions, mistrust and fear; [promoting] restraint on a unilateral and multilateral basis; and timely identification of trends in arms transfers" (p. 26).

Participation in the Register

Chalmers and Greene contend that the Register has had a good start, securing the participation of more than 80 states in its reports for 1992 and 1993. However, the total participation rates (80 in 1992 and 81 in 1993) conceal considerable turn over. While the 1993 report secured submissions from 23 new countries, 22 states which took part in 1992 chose not to take part in 1993. In addition, the quality of reporting improved in the second year. More states submitted "full" reports (i.e. they included data on arms transfers) in 1993 than in 1992. The participation rates should be considered a "substantial achievement" (p. 38). Not only has the quality of reporting improved, but the number of participants is also increasing.

In analyzing the participation rate of major arms exporters and importers, the Register's data is compared with that of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Of the top 14 arms exporters identified by the SIPRI, 13 submitted reports to the UN Register (the exception being North Korea), accounting for 95% of the total arms exports in 1992 and 1993. By contrast, of the top 50 arms importers identified by the SIPRI, only 36 chose to take part

in the Register in 1993. As a result, less detail is available on arms imports. In addition to these variations, participation differed significantly by region. Participation was high in Europe, North America, Southern Asia and North East Asia, middling in South East Asia, Latin and South America, and poor in the Middle East, former Soviet Union and sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts must be made to improve regional participation rates if the Register hopes to contribute to regional confidence and security building measures.

Examining the Transfers Data

Chalmers and Greene compare the reliability of the Register's data by comparing its reports with the information available in the SIPRI report. For its part, the UN Register includes details on the vast majority of arms transfers recorded by the SIPRI and provides information on arms transfers which the SIPRI has not reported. The SIPRI report is strongest in reporting transfers involving Europe and the United States; it is weaker, however, in reporting transfers in areas traditionally secretive about arms transfers (e.g. Asia). By contrast, the UN Register provides some information on transfers in these areas. As such, the UN Register makes a valuable contribution to international transparency.

The detail provided in the Register's report is also examined. The level of transparency achieved is affected by the level of information provided on an arms transfer. For instance, reporting the transfer of one modern aircraft carrier, as opposed to recording the transfer of one warship, allows a more detailed portrait of the security repercussions to be drawn. Unfortunately, the inclusion of such detail has been uneven. Importing nations, surprisingly, have been more open in including details. By contrast, top exporters have been reluctant to provide full disclosure, possibly out of a fear of offending their clients in a competitive international arms market.

Finally, Chalmers and Greene study the problem of discrepancies in the data reported to the Register (i.e. when the reports of importing and exporting nations do not match) and conclude that the major arms exporters must take measures to correct this problem. If they do not work to increase the reliability of the Register's data, its credibility as a source of accurate data could be seriously undermined.

"Background Information"

When the Register was created, instead of formally requesting information on military holdings and procurement through national production, it was agreed that the Register would include a "background information" section. This section would have no prescribed format, and submissions under this heading would not be published (although they are available at the UN Library in New York). Chalmers and Greene "...examine the information relating to 1993 provided during the Register's second year and, on the basis of comparisons with the first year, discuss key trends and implications" (p. 80).

Citing the increase in the number of states supplying information on military holdings (from 25 in 1992 to 30 in 1993), Chalmers and Greene maintain that a significant increase has taken place. Despite this increase, the overall participation rate remains low. In addition, the quality of the returns supplied by the participating nations varied widely. For instance, Canada was the only nation to provide detailed information on missile holdings. By contrast, 16 countries submitted information on procurement

through national production in 1993, an increase over the 12 reports for 1992. As with military holdings, the quality of the submissions differed greatly. As a result, questions remain about the viability of this section. While the increase in participation in 1993 is to be welcomed, further progress is likely to be slow.

Examining the 1994 Review Process

Chalmers and Greene evaluate the work of the 1994 Panel of Experts, which aimed to "...strengthen and further develop the Register, and particularly to consider ways in which it could be expanded to cover military holdings and procurement through national production" (p. 95). They describe the review process and how it was created. As it approached there were two views on how the Register should be modified. Some countries advocated strengthening the Register's current format before it was expanded. Others lobbied for the quick expansion of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. In addition, the authors examine the role of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in modifying the Register. They conclude that it had "little effect" (p. 101) on the 1994 Panel's discussions.

Furthermore, the authors analyze the issues on the Panel's agenda: first, review the Register's operation to date; second, examine proposals for its development (e.g. adding new categories of conventional weapons); third, discuss its institutional development (e.g. the creation of review mechanisms); fourth, consider ways of promoting transparency in weapons of mass destruction and transfers of high technology with military applications; and, finally, analyze the relationship between the Register as a global instrument and regional transparency and confidence building measures, including regional registers. Chalmers and Greene also examine the presentation of the Panel's report. Supporters of the Register were disappointed because the Panel failed to expand the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Moreover, no significant provisions were made to significantly strengthen the existing format (e.g. in quality of reported data).

Taking Stock

In this final section, Chalmers and Greene "...summarise and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Register as they appear after its first two years of operation, and briefly discuss its potential significance and the challenges and priorities for its future development" (p. 127). They argue that the Register has been successful in increasing transparency in international arms transfers. It has created a new international norm that states have a responsibility to be transparent in their arms sales and acquisitions. On the negative side, it suffers from a lack of participation in several key regions (most notably the Middle East). Moreover, the quality of data could be improved, and discrepancies between importer and exporter reports must be eliminated. Chalmers and Greene also analyze the Register's success in promoting the norm of transparency in holdings and procurement. Despite a growing number of submissions, most states seem reluctant to disclose information on military holdings. Furthermore, in analyzing the role of the U.S. in the Register's development, Chalmers and Greene contend that the U.S. has been critical in shaping the Register. However, the Register has been negatively affected by the largely indifferent attitude of the United States. As a result of its failure to participate

fully, the pressure on other governments to comply is diminished. They suggest that the Register could be improved if the U.S. would assume a leadership role in its development.

Chalmers and Greene posit four areas in which the Register is significant, and can be used to enhance arms control. First, on a global scale, it can have an input into the global processes relating to the transfer, procurement, and holding of conventional arms. Second, it can facilitate the development of other transparency and review mechanisms (e.g. transfers of high technology with military applications). Third, it can provide a basis for bilateral consultations on matters of concern (e.g. clarify a state's motivations for acquiring arms). Finally, it can promote improved national processes for monitoring arms transfers and procurement.

In addition, they offer a list of long and short term goals for the Register's development. The Register should aim to incorporate the following elements within the next ten years: first, establish it as a robust global cooperative conventional arms transfer regime; second, aim for universal participation; third, include military holdings and procurement through national production; fourth, increase the quality of submissions; fifth, add new categories of conventional weapons; sixth, improve the controversial missiles and missile launchers category; seventh, do not request information on transfers of light arms, weapons components and high technologies; eighth, develop regional transparency in association with the global Register; and, finally, create an institutional mechanism to review and rectify discrepancies in reporting. The Register's goals over the next two years, however, should be much more modest. Efforts should be directed in two areas: first, increasing participation (particularly in the Middle East); and, second, reducing discrepancies in reporting.

They conclude that much has been achieved by the UN Register in its first two years of operation. During a period in "...which all other global initiatives relating to conventional arms have fallen by the wayside, it has survived" (p. 143). However, if it is to enjoy continued relevance, the Register must secure more active participation from the major participants in the arms trade.

502. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: A Mixed Second Year." In *Verification 1995: Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment*, eds. J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, Boulder, California: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 209-228.

Chalmers and Greene compare the results of the first and second annual reports of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Participation increased in the second year, with 23 new states submitting reports; however, this increase was offset by the failure of 21 states, who participated in 1993, to submit a report for 1994. Again, all but one of the top 14 arms exporters submitted a report (North Korea being the exception). The participation rate among arms importers continued to be less satisfactory with only 33 of the top 50 arms importing nations taking part. Overall, regional participation in 1993 and 1994 was similar. Participation rates in both years among European and North American

states were high, middling in former Soviet Union, South American and Asian nations, and poor in Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan African countries.

Concern is expressed that discrepancies between importers' and exporters' returns did not decrease markedly in the 1994 report. Improvements must be made in this area to ensure the continued relevance of the Register as a confidence-building measure. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must play a central role since it accounts for more than half of all arms exports. On a positive note, there was an increase in the number of states that provided "background information" on their military holdings (24 reported in 1993, while 30 reported in 1994). However, there was continued reluctance to supply data on missiles and missile launchers (Canada was the only nation to do so).

The authors also analyze the 1994 Panel of Experts report, convened to discuss modifying the Register. The Panel concluded that the Register succeeded in providing data on most of the year's arms transfers. However, there were several negative results detailed in the 1994 Panel's report. First, participation in the Register continued to vary widely by region. Second, the Panel could not agree on a working definition of "arms transfer". Third, due to resistance from the Chinese representative, the Panel was unable to modify the contentious seventh category (missiles and missile launchers). Finally, an attempt to include military holdings and procurement through national production failed. Unable to reach a consensus, the Panel was forced to recommend that the Register continue to operate under the current format.

Chalmers and Greene conclude that the Register has had a good start. However, they are discouraged by the failure of the 1994 Panel to modify its format. As a temporary solution, they suggest that each state maximize its transparency by completing the background information section. This endeavour will demonstrate the continued commitment of the international community to increase transparency in armaments.

503. Chalmers, Malcolm and Owen Greene. "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the Asia-Pacific." In *Asia Pacific Security and the UN*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene and Xie Zhiqiong, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford: Redwood Books, 1995, pp. 129-154.

Chalmers and Greene maintain that the establishment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms represents a significant step forward in arms control. Participation in the Register (80 states in 1992, 82 in 1993) is higher than many expected, and it has grown more rapidly than comparable global regimes. The register concept, dating back to the failed attempt by the League of Nations to record arms transfers, is also chronicled, as is the series of compromises which led to the creation of the current Register in December 1991.

Citing the Register's aim of contributing to regional security, Chalmers and Greene analyze its participation rate. They argue that participation is high in Europe, South Asia, North East Asia and North America. By contrast, only middling rates are attributed to South America and poor levels are assigned to former Soviet Union states, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, discrepancies in the reports submitted to the

Register did not diminish for 1993 (i.e. importer and exporter reports did not match). Three reasons for this problem are offered: first, differing definitions of an arms transfer; second, different interpretations of the weapons categories; and, finally, errors in accounting.

Problems continue to plague the "background information" section of the Register as well. In this section, states are invited to provide information on military holdings and procurement through national production. However, no standard reporting format exists. Despite an increase in the number of submissions (from 25 in 1992 to 30 in 1993), there remains a wide diversity in the quality of reports. As a result, meaningful comparisons of military capabilities are impossible.

Chalmers and Greene also assess the Register's performance in the Asia-Pacific region. They argue that much of the information made public by the Register on the area is not available elsewhere (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)); as a result, the Register has made a substantial contribution to transparency. However, since military holdings and procurement through national production are not included in the Register, useful comparisons of troop strengths remain problematic. Nevertheless, the Register could serve as a basis for bilateral or regional discussions (e.g. to clarify motivations for arms acquisitions). If the Register hopes to build on its success in the region, the immediate priority should be promoting wider participation.

504. Donowaki, Mitsuro. "Conventional Weapons: Code of Conduct for International Transfer and Indigenous Production." A Paper Presented at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues. Nagasaki, Japan: June 12-16, 1995.

Donowaki examines the UN Register of Conventional Arms in conjunction with other arms control measures. He describes four attempts at restraining the proliferation of arms: first, promote transparency in the transfer, production and stockpiling of conventional weapons (e.g. the UN Register); second, introduce some restraint in the conduct of arms transfers (e.g. Permanent Five Talks); third, control the transfer of dual-use technology; and, finally, curb the sale of small arms.

Created in the wake of the Gulf War, the UN Register, argues Donowaki, has three goals. First, it is a confidence-building mechanism, not an arms control measure. In this respect, a high participation level is important. Second, it is designed to achieve greater transparency in the field of arms transfers. In contrast to its confidence-building role, accuracy in reporting is more important than widespread participation. Donowaki maintains that there is still room for improvement in this area (e.g. clarify the contentious missiles and missile launchers category). Finally, it is to contribute to restraint in military production and the transfer of arms. It is argued that, to date, the Register has failed to meet this last objective. A consultative mechanism should be created to improve the Register's credibility in this role.

In order for the Register concept to be successful, it must lay the groundwork for a new code of conduct in the arms trade. Once transparency has been established, the next step is to promote the creation of national controls on arms exports. A further

improvement would be the creation of a consultative mechanism to discuss the motivations for weapons acquisitions. Making arms transfers contingent on their being declared to the Register would also help. Finally, to avoid charges of discrimination, military holdings and procurement through national production should be included.

505. Laurance, Edward J. "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint." In *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare and Laura W. Reed, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, 1995, pp. 140-157.

Although focusing on ways to regulate the trade in small arms, Laurance makes detailed reference to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. As a result of two factors (the end of the Cold War, and a desire to avoid another arms build-up similar to the one which preceded the Gulf War), a new spirit of international cooperation has emerged. The Register is a product of this new atmosphere.

The Register differs from traditional multilateral arms control approaches in several respects: first, it assumes an international norm against allowing the accumulation of excessive and destabilizing collections of armaments; second, it legitimizes the arms trade by recognizing the right of states to import weapons for self-defence; third, it is not a control mechanism and contains no formal verification process; fourth, it is based on the concept of transparency and is a confidence-building exercise; and, finally, it assumes that after a period of years, trends towards excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms will become evident.

Laurance concludes that the Register's performance in its first two years has been positive. However, for a variety of reasons, there were discrepancies in some reports: no clear definition of "arms transfers" was offered; some governments still hold reservations about transparency and did not participate; some states have domestic legislation which precludes the disclosure of arms transfers; and, finally, some countries lack the control mechanisms required to produce the report. If small arms transfers are to be included in the Register, a clear link must be established between the transfer of small arms and the outbreak of conflict. As an interim solution, the inclusion of small arms transfers in regional registers is suggested. However, securing the political consensus required for even this initial step will be a difficult, if not impossible, task.

506. Sislin, John and Siemon Wezeman. *1994 Arms Transfers: A Register of Deliveries From Public Sources*. Monterey, California: Monterey Institute of International Studies and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 1995.

Sislin and Wezeman compare the arms registers of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). They maintain that there are three major differences between the two reports: first, the coverage in the

SIPRI report (representing about 60 states) is narrower than in the UN Register (approximately 90 states); second, the SIPRI document provides more detail on each transfer; and, finally, the SIPRI report uses one format for all entries while the UN Register allows each state a wide margin for interpretation (e.g. in defining "arms transfer").

Sislin and Wezeman outline the Register's standard reporting form and its seven categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers). By comparison, the SIPRI report includes only six categories (aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, guidance and radar systems, missiles, and warships). They also examine the SIPRI data collection process. They demonstrate that its report is based almost entirely on secondary sources and they examine how its analysts overcome problems in data collection.

In addition, the findings of the SIPRI and the UN Register are combined to create a report, in the Register's format, of 1994 arms transfers. Three conclusions are offered: first, tracking large weapons systems is easier than tracing transfers of smaller weapons platforms; second, the Register does not record transfers to non-state actors (e.g. transfer of tanks from Bulgaria to South Yemeni forces); and, finally, due to the lack of definitions in the UN Register, the way states define key terms (e.g. arms transfer) affects the level of transparency in the final report.

507. United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs. *United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Information Booklet*. New York: United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, 1995.

This information package is divided into four parts. The first part consists of a series of questions and answers on the UN Register of Conventional Arms designed to "...inform states about the Register and assist in the submission of information and data to the Register" (p. 2). Questions and answers are provided in the following areas: basic structure of the Register, categories of equipment, utilization of the report form, re-transfers and co-produced equipment, defining an international transfer, and administration of the Register.

The second part of the document is an evaluation of the Register's first annual report. The substantive part of the report by the 1992 Panel of Experts, tasked with improving the Register's performance, is reproduced. This Panel made several suggestions. To begin with, the term "arms transfer" must be clarified. Moreover, the Register's standard reporting form must be developed. In addition, it offers several suggestions for expanding the Register: first, modify its existing category definitions (e.g. calibre); second, include new categories (e.g. aerial refuelling aircraft); and, finally, before including military holdings and procurement through national production, these concepts must be defined.

The third part reproduces two UN resolutions, 46/36L and 47/52L (annotated in this bibliography), integral to the Register's development. Finally, the fourth section reproduces the Register's reporting forms.

508. Zhenxi, Jiang. "Arms Transparency and International Security." In *Asia Pacific Security and the UN*, eds. Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene and Xie Zhiqiong, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford: Redwood Books, 1995, pp. 121-127.

Zhenxi chronicles the development of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. He argues that its creation cannot be separated from the international context in which it was established since it was the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union which made transparency measures possible. The resulting UN Register is a valuable confidence building measure which can play a role in the following areas: first, enhancing confidence among nations; second, promoting international peace and security; and, finally, strengthening the role of the UN in arms control and disarmament.

The Register is not, however, without its limitations. One of its shortcomings is the great variety of submissions it receives. Since UN member states accept the concept of transparency in varying degrees, their submissions differ accordingly. Another limitation is the scope of the Register. The seven categories of weapons included in the Register (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers) are not exhaustive. As a result, complete transparency is not possible with the current format.

Zhenxi suggests three ways to expand the Register. First, it should be linked with strengthening international peace and security. Second, it should promote limitations on military transfers. Finally, all countries should participate in and respect the principles of the Register. He concludes that the expansion of the Register must be a gradual process. If it is modified too quickly, "the result will not be ideal" (p. 127).

Part C

Appendix

Transparency in Armaments. United Nations Resolution 46/36L, December 6, 1991.

The General Assembly,

Realizing that excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security, particularly by aggravating tensions and conflict situations, giving rise to serious and urgent concerns,

Noting with satisfaction that the current international environment and recent agreements and measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament make it a propitious time to work towards easing tensions and a just resolution of conflict situations, as well as more openness and transparency in military matters,

Recalling the consensus among Member States on implementing confidence-building measures, including transparency and exchange of relevant information on armaments, likely to reduce the occurrence of dangerous misperceptions about the intentions of States and to promote trust among States,

Considering that increased openness and transparency in the field of armaments could enhance confidence, ease tensions, strengthen regional and international peace and security and contribute to restraint in military production and the transfer of arms,

Realizing the urgent need to resolve underlying conflicts, to diminish tensions and to accelerate efforts towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control with a view to maintaining regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments,

Recalling also that in paragraph 85 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly ^{3/} it urges major arms supplier and recipient countries to consult on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional arms,

Disturbed by the destabilizing and destructive effects of the illicit arms trade, particularly for the internal situation of affected States and the violation of human rights,

Bearing in mind that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Member States have undertaken to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, and that the reduction of world military expenditures could have a significant positive impact for the social and economic development of all peoples,

Reaffirming the important role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps in order to strengthen that role,

Recalling its resolution 43/751 of 7 December 1988,

Welcoming the study submitted by the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 43/751 and prepared with the assistance of governmental experts, on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms, ^{11/} as well as the problem of the illicit arms trade, taking into account views of Member States and other relevant information,

Recognizing the major contribution of an enhanced level of transparency in armaments to confidence-building and security among States, and also recognizing the urgent need to establish, under the auspices of the United Nations, as a first step in this direction, a universal and non-discriminatory register to include data on international arms transfers as well as other interrelated information provided to the Secretary-General,

Stressing the importance of greater transparency in the interest of promoting readiness to exercise restraint in accumulation of armaments,

Considering that the standardized reporting of international arms transfers together with the provision of other interrelated information to a United Nations register will constitute further important steps forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters and, as such, will enhance the role and effectiveness of

the United Nations in promoting arms limitation and disarmament, as well as in maintaining international peace and security,

Recognizing also the importance of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,

1. Recognizes that an increased level of openness and transparency in the field of armaments would enhance confidence, promote stability, help States to exercise restraint, ease tensions and strengthen regional and international peace and security;
2. Declares its determination to prevent the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including conventional arms, in order to promote stability and strengthen regional or international peace and security, taking into account the legitimate security needs of States and the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments;
3. Reaffirms the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which implies that States also have the right to acquire arms with which to defend themselves;
4. Reiterates its conviction, as expressed in its resolution 43/75I, that arms transfers in all their aspects deserve serious consideration by the international community, inter alia, because of:
 - (a) Their potential effects in further destabilizing areas where tension and regional conflict threaten international peace and security and national security;
 - (b) Their potentially negative effects on the progress of the peaceful social and economic development of all peoples;
 - (c) The danger of increasing illicit and covert arms trafficking;
5. Calls upon all Member States to exercise due restraint in exports and imports of conventional arms, particularly in situations of tension or conflict, and to ensure that they have in place an adequate body of laws and administrative procedures regarding the transfer of arms and to adopt strict measures for their enforcement;
6. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms, which also addressed the problem of the illicit arms trade;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish and maintain at United Nations Headquarters in New York a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies, as set out in paragraph 10 below and in accordance with procedures and input requirements initially comprising those set out in the annex to the present resolution and subsequently incorporating any adjustments to the annex decided upon by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session in the light of the recommendations of the panel referred to in paragraph 8 below;
8. Also requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental technical experts to be nominated by him on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to elaborate the technical procedures and to make any adjustments to the annex to the present resolution necessary for the effective operation of the Register, and to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production, and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session;
9. Calls upon all Member States to provide annually for the Register data on imports and exports of arms in accordance with the procedures established by paragraphs 7 and 8 above;
10. Invites Member States, pending the expansion of the Register, also to provide to the Secretary-General, with their annual report on imports and exports of arms, available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies, and requests the Secretary-General to record this material and to make it available for consultation by Member States at their request;
11. Decides, with a view to future expansion, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review, and, to this end:

(a) Invites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views, not later than 30 April 1994, on:

(i) The operation of the Register during its first two years;

(ii) The addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production;

(b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts convened in 1994 on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament as set forth in paragraphs 12 to 15 below and the views expressed by Member States, for submission to the General Assembly with a view to a decision at its forty-ninth session;

12. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to address, as soon as possible, the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in this field;

13. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to address the problems of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase, openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments;

14. Invites the Secretary-General to provide to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant information, including, inter alia, views submitted to him by Member States and information provided under the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, as well as on the work of the Disarmament Commission under its agenda item entitled "Objective information on military matters";

15. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its annual report to the General Assembly a report on its work on this issue;

16. Invites all Member States, in the meantime, to take measures on a national, regional and global basis, including within the appropriate forums, to promote openness and transparency in armaments;

17. Calls upon all Member States to cooperate at a regional and subregional level, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;

18. Also invites all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their national arms import and export policies, legislation and administrative procedures, both as regards authorization of arms transfers and prevention of illicit transfers;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on progress made in implementing the present resolution, including relevant information provided by Member States;

20. Notes that effective implementation of the present resolution will require an up-to-date database system in the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat;

21. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-seventh session an item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

ANNEX

Register of Conventional Arms

1. The Register of Conventional Arms ("the Register") shall be established, with effect from 1 January 1992, and maintained at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York.

2. Concerning international arms transfers:

(a) Member States are requested to provide data for the Register, addressed to the Secretary-General, on the number of items in the following categories of equipment imported into or exported from their territory:

I. Battle tanks

A tracked or wheeled self-propelled armoured fighting vehicle with high cross-country mobility and a high level of self-protection, weighing at least 16.5 metric tonnes unladen weight, with a high muzzle velocity direct fire main gun of at least 75 millimetres calibre.

II. Armoured combat vehicles

A tracked or wheeled self-propelled vehicle, with armoured protection and cross-country capability, either: (a) designed and equipped to transport a squad of four or more infantrymen, or (b) armed with an integral or organic weapon of at least 20 millimetres calibre or an anti-tank missile launcher.

III. Large calibre artillery system

A gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of a gun and a howitzer, mortar or multiple-launch rocket system, capable of engaging surface targets by delivering primarily indirect fire, with a calibre of 100 millimetres and above.

IV. Combat aircraft

A fixed-wing or variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets by employing guided missiles, unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other weapons of destruction.

V. Attack helicopters

A rotary-wing aircraft equipped to employ anti-armour, air-to-ground, or air-to-air guided weapons and equipped with an integrated fire control and aiming system for these weapons.

VI. Warships

A vessel or submarine with a standard displacement of 850 metric tonnes or above, armed or equipped for military use.

VII. Missiles or missile systems

A guided rocket, ballistic or cruise missile capable of delivering a payload to a range of at least 25 kilometres, or a vehicle, apparatus or device designed or modified for launching such munitions.

(b) Data on imports provided under the present paragraph shall also specify the supplying State; data on exports shall also specify the recipient State and the State of origin if not the exporting State;

(c) Each Member State is requested to provide data on an annual basis by 30 April each year in respect of imports into and exports from their territory in the previous calendar year;

(d) The first such registration shall take place by 30 April 1993 in respect of the calendar year 1992;

(e) The data so provided shall be recorded in respect of each Member State;

(f) Arms "exports and imports" represent in the present resolution, including its annex, all forms of arms transfers under terms of grant, credit, barter or cash.

3. Concerning other interrelated information:

(a) Member States are invited also to provide to the Secretary-General available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies;

(b) The information so provided shall be recorded in respect of each Member State.

4. The Register shall be open for consultation by representatives of Member States at any time.

5. In addition, the Secretary-General shall provide annually a consolidated report to the General Assembly of the data registered, together with an index of the other interrelated information.

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Part E

Keyword Index

This section is an alphabetically organized keyword index. Items listed in this section appear in the text of the annotations in parts A and B, and fit into at least one of the following categories: first, a nation or region which is mentioned in the text of a study; second, a group involved in the preparation or maintenance of the Register (e.g. the UN Secretariat); third, a weapons system covered by the Register (e.g. battle tanks); fourth, a concept or term used to discuss the Register (e.g. background information section); and, finally, a treaty or an agreement discussed in conjunction with the Register (e.g. Missile Technology Control Regime). In addition, following each keyword, serial number(s) corresponding to the annotation in which it appears are listed. As with the author index, the serial number(s) allow the researcher to determine in which year an article appeared. For example, the following reference appears in the keyword index:

Mediterranean Region: 302, 303, 307, 313, 315, 317, 320, 321, 323, 324.

From the numbers listed it is possible to determine that the region was not discussed in conjunction with the Register in scholarly articles until 1993, at which point it received much attention.

- 1991 Panel of Experts: 1, 207, 320.
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