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

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
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The Canadian Naval Question



ADDRESSES DELIVERED

BY

Clive Phillipps-Wolley, F.R.C.S.,

Vice-President Navy League

~~M. C. M. L.~~

**The Canadian Naval
Question**



ADDRESSES DELIVERED
BY
Clive Phillips-Wolley, F.R.C.S.,
VICE-PRESIDENT NAVY LEAGUE

W

TORONTO:
WILLIAM BRIGGS
1910

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P49

INTRODUCTION

The writer of the addresses which are herewith submitted to the public, is, and has been for some years, actively interested in the work of the Navy League upon the West Coast of Canada.

His experience has been that there is no lack of interest in the naval defence of the Empire, but that there is a considerable lack of information, and that it is necessary to explain to busy men living at any distance from the sea the vital importance of sea power to them personally, as the basis of that Empire to which they belong, and as an insurance of those businesses upon which they depend for their prosperity.

A beneficent idiot told the writer that in Ontario he would find the farmers absolutely indifferent upon the subject, or even hostile to naval contribution in any form.

Doubting the accuracy of this statement, the writer ventured to take a trip through Ontario, encouraged thereto by the advice of the Navy League at home, the request of his own energetic Committee in Victoria Esquimalt, and the invitations of certain branch leagues in Winnipeg, Toronto and other Eastern cities.

The result of the tour was what might have been expected. The men he met in Eastern Canada were a busy, contented lot of farmers, whose necessaries seem to have fallen fifty per cent. in cost in the last twenty years, whilst the price obtainable for the things they produce has doubled, but the well-cultivated farms, with their red brick homesteads, and trim fields, the

pretty, prosperous "county towns" and villages, are owned by men in whom the spirit of loyalty and love of the Empire is as strong as it is anywhere in the world.

As some return for their large-hearted hospitality, and because they asked him to do so, the writer has cast his addresses into a more permanent form, endeavouring to set out the arguments which support his case without any of that party bias which is almost the only curse of Canada.

If he has succeeded in any degree in demonstrating the reality of the menace to Britain's supremacy at sea, the vital interest which Canada has in the maintenance of that supremacy, and the importance of the Empire's sea power to every farmer and tradesman in the Dominion, he will be amply repaid for his trouble.

There are, of course, better and more authoritative publications upon every subject dealt with in these pages, from which the writer has borrowed freely, but it is believed that none of them are written from a purely Canadian standpoint, and that, therefore, this pamphlet, inadequate as it undoubtedly is, will be of some assistance to those who wish to help in the making of Public Opinion as it affects the Navy.

It will at least prove to our friends in the East that their Western brethren want to work with them for the good of Britain's greatest Dominion, and especially those of this Province, in which every man, from the Premier to the youngest school child, is saturated with a belief in the dear old Mother Country, is unswervingly loyal to British connection, and firm in the faith in Canada's future.

The expenses of this pamphlet are borne by its author, and every cent of profit made from it (if any) will be put back into Mr. Briggs' hands for the purchase of more copies to be circulated gratuitously in different parts of the Dominion.

To those who wish this effort well, the writer says,
"Lend the copies you buy as widely as possible, and
found in every town a branch of the Navy League."
A request to the undersigned for information as to
the best way to do this will receive prompt attention.

CLIVE PHILLIPPS-WOLLEY,

*Vice-President Navy League, and President of
Victoria and Esquimalt Branch of the Navy
League in Canada.*

Victoria, B.C., November 16th, 1910.

AN INTERPRETATION CLAUSE

AN Act of Parliament always contains immediately after the title an interpretation clause, having read which you know, or ought to know, precisely what the Act is dealing with, and because there is sometimes an uncertainty in men's minds as to the exact value attached by individual writers to particular words, I propose to follow the example of the Acts and attempt to define to my readers and myself what I mean by one or two of the most important words which I shall use.

Of these, the first and most important is the word Empire.

If you look in any of the standard dictionaries of the day you will find Empire defined as "the dominions of an Emperor, usually including several nations or nationalities," and we must accept this as an accurate definition of the word as far as it goes.

But words are only symbols of things, and the symbols must grow as those things grow which they represent, and that British Empire to which I shall refer from time to time is distinctly one of those things which have grown.

Perhaps the dictionary definition may do for some Empires; certainly it will not do for ours.

If an Empire meant only the geographical limits of one man's rule it would not matter much, at any rate to the world as a whole: its continued existence might be of importance to the Emperor who ruled it and to the people he ruled, but not to God or to the world.

Our Empire stands on another footing. It is of

importance, I believe, even in God's sight, and its continued existence of first importance to the world at large.

To me at least it seems that the British Empire, our Empire, is the outward visible expression of the highest ideals of that race loosely spoken of as Anglo-Saxon.

To put my thought quite simply, I believe that the British Empire is the Life's Work of the British race; the express image of the British ideal; the monument to the mighty dead of our own kin; the great trust of the men of our own day; the hope of humanity in the future; the very best thing that we have been able to devise in over a thousand years of work for the betterment of man, to insure a fair field for the development of the individual and perfect fair play for rich and poor, weak and strong alike.

I believe that God created the world; I believe that Christ came to teach the world, and I believe that the British Empire exists to spread Christ's doctrines and to illustrate them, even though imperfectly, by its practice, and here I lay the foundation of my plea on the behalf of the Navy League, whose work it is to secure the maintenance of that supremacy at sea upon which the continued power of the British Empire depends.

If there be no great fallacy in this creed, the supremacy and continued activity of the British Empire is not only a condition that *we* should work for, but one for which the whole world should pray.

If my statement of the case for Britain is inaccurate; if or when She ceases to deserve Her proudest title, Fidei Defensor, there will no longer be any good cause why She should be the greatest power on earth.

Let us examine Her history to establish the claim which I have put forward for Her.

Britain has been built as the coral reefs are built, by millions upon millions of little lives, by millions

upon millions of men's minds, millions upon millions of human souls, and every life and mind and soul of them British, so that to-day this Empire of Britain is actually a live thing, having a body which is the body of our race, a mind which is the matured mind of the British people from their birth until to-day, and a soul taught and chastened by the labours and trials, the mistakes and achievements of more than a thousand years, and this Empire, thus built, stands to-day, even as the coral reef stands, a barrier between the destructive waves of the world's hungry sea, and the lands and waters of peace, between greed and anarchy and the blessings of constitutional government.

Let us try to see what the British ideal is, what are the main principles of those innumerable men and women, of whose souls, minds and bodies this British Empire has been built.

I am prepared to admit that our Empire has its faults; has had them in the past; has them in the present, and will have them in the future. That is to admit that this Empire is only an earthly kingdom. A faultless Empire would be the Kingdom of Heaven.

But I claim that there is none other like Her. I claim that the basis of Britain's creed is the basis of Her Master's; that service and self-sacrifice are the lessons which She lives to teach by Her example; that the law of Her is the law of fair play, and that Her gift to man is the gift of ordered liberty.

Is my boast a vain one? Look back in the book on which we built, and you will find as its central figure a Christ upon a Cross; you will read that "greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends" and that "the greatest amongst you shall be servant of all."

Surely self-sacrifice and service are amongst the keynotes of Christ's teaching, and as surely have we, in some measure and at an infinite distance, followed in His footsteps.

We began haltingly perhaps with the teachings of

chivalry, and, in our early days, it was only the best and noblest of our fighting men who fought for their God, for their King, for their fair ladies, and for fame.

Later they realized that fame smacked too much of price; Christ's teachings became more powerful than Odin's; the whole nation fell in love with what was, at first, only the soldiers' creed; new dangers, disease mental and bodily, bad and unequal laws and class tyranny, were seen to be more terrible foes and therefore more attractive to noble spirits, than such mere physical foes as Arthur's knights had fought, and therefore Alfred the King laboured that he might teach when he was not leading in battle; therefore, the wandering friars arose, starving themselves that they might feed others with the Bread of Life; therefore, the Barons wrung that first measure of universal fair play from a king at Runnymede; therefore, generation after generation, merchants and prentices struggled for civic freedom; therefore, year by year, whilst half-taught politicians libel them, the best brains and most gallant hearts of Britain labour silently in India and Egypt and elsewhere to give peace and prosperity to conquered peoples; therefore, Lord Shaftesbury and such as he gave their lives and brilliant gifts to the ragged poor, the lunatics, the children and women in factories and mines, yea even to the dumb beasts, and from one end of the British Empire to the other it is acknowledged, *not* that the labourer is worthy of his hire, but that for our noblest, the labour is its own sufficient reward, and that amongst the children of the British Empire the measure of a man's service is the measure of his honour.

From Alfred to Victoria the law has remained unaltered, "Who rules must serve."

At the passing of our mighty dead in 1901 and 1910 we opened our eyes and saw that the ideal of our race had been realized; that our greatest glory had been written in royal purple across the length and breadth of our Empire. The wording of it was "Ich Dien,"

and the translation of it, "If any man desire to be first he shall be servant of all."

This is the first principle of the British Empire.

Alongside of, and inseparable from, this principle of service and self-sacrifice has grown another, the yeoman's Law of Fair Play.

This is no knightly ideal, no rule of a class, no craze of an age. It is the very spirit and essence of England, taught and held as firmly in her playing fields and prize ring as in her Parliament. It is so English that at the very mention of the dear words the narrow Islands come vividly before our eyes, and without Mr. Kipling's "leaves of oak and ash and thorn" the miracle is worked, and we can see the Thames meadows and primrosed hedgerows, the glades of daffodils, and those red farmsteads nestling amongst their golden ricks from which came the sturdy apostles of fair play.

And this principle of fair play is the root from which most of Britain's glory has grown.

It is because Britons have preached fair play and practised it, that the bitterness between class and class has largely disappeared; that the way to the top is open to brains and courage and work; that men in the British Empire may think for themselves and pray as they please; that Britain's many churches are slowly uniting for the service of the universal God; that she has spent Her blood and treasure for the freedom of the slave and in relief of the oppressed; that British women enjoy a dignity and esteem accorded to their sex in no other country; that the Mother of Nations has been able to colonize and administrate as neither Rome nor any Empire of modern times has ever done.

It is in this spirit of fair play that She will some day listen to Her Dominions beyond the sea, when they who have helped to build and will help to maintain plead for representation in their own Imperial House.

Because such principles as these are Hers, the gift that Britain has offered to the world is the priceless gift of ordered liberty and self-government, not the license of a mad democracy to tear down and destroy, to do as every man pleases to his own detriment and the destruction of his neighbour; but to do as he pleases with himself and his belongings, so long as in so doing he does no harm to another.

I have no space in which to submit the vast mass of evidence that might be produced to prove that the very highest form of ordered liberty has been Britain's gift to the world. Evidence of this encompasses us. The very present existence of the Empire is a proof of it; the envy of all other nations affirms it; the self-governing Colonies are examples of it; Britain's free press, Her independent voters, Her million refugees from less happy lands, proclaim the fact, and the Sea-ways of the World, of which She is the mistress, wide open and safe for the world's traders, establish my contention beyond the possibility of dispute.

I will rather look for some argument which a possible enemy may use against me, than seek to strengthen a position already impregnable, but I can find only one such argument, one which seems to have been used against Mr. Robert Blatchford, and by him ably refuted.

Our adversaries tell us that Britain got Her Empire by robbery, and that it is Her duty to give back what She has stolen from India, Australia, New Zealand and the aborigines of Canada.

I have not claimed for Britain that She was without sin. In Her early days She was no doubt something of a Sea robber. The survival of the fittest was the law then, as it is now, and the very question I wish to put to the opponents of the Navy League's crusade is, "In the interest of the world, which Empire is fittest to survive?"

As Mr. Blatchford points out, in a pamphlet which

should be part of every Navy Leaguer's library, there are practically no aborigines to whom we could give back Canada or Australia; there are no Maories to whom we can return New Zealand, and if we gave back India to the natives they could not hold it against Russia, and still less could they govern it themselves so as to ensure as much general happiness and well-being as the inhabitants of India now enjoy.

The many weak would again become the prey of the strong fighting races, and they in turn would destroy each other.

And if we are not to give back our dependencies to their original owners, to whom are we to give them?

To Russia? Think of the Caucasus and its present condition. To Germany? Did you ever know a German settler in Canada who did not call himself Canadian, or could you find one to-day who would not rather live under our administration of British law than under the military autocracy of Germany? We settle our strikes by arbitration; in Berlin they settle them with sabres.

To the United States of America? Do not our new citizens from south of our line proclaim openly that they prefer our institutions to their own; a law which is absolute to laws made to be evaded; the rule of fair play to the prevailing power of the dollar?

Shall we hand them back to France? Nay, there is no France left such as the men of Montcalm's time loved. Our own French citizens cling to a dim and glorious memory, but the reality is as dead as Imperial Rome. The France of Faith, the France of Chivalry, is surely not the France of to-day. Probably the real France still lives in the hearts and long memories of French Canada and there only.

Think of any colonizing power in the world, and if you can find one which will compare favorably with your own Empire as an administrator of alien races, let our dependencies and colonies be given to that

power, but if not, then for the world's peace and for the happiness of humanity agree that the continued supremacy of the British Empire is essential to the well-being of man, and therefore in your eyes worth working for.

That Empire rests upon the British Navy.

SEA POWER

Sea power is the basis of the corporate existence of the British Empire.

Upon the truth of this axiom, this established principle, depends the whole force of the Navy League's appeal to Canada, and for that reason it is my duty to show, not only what sea power means to us, but that Canada is and must be an integral portion of the British Empire.

Let me deal first with the importance of sea power.

After all, and in spite of the talk of humanitarians and anti-militarists, the Court of Might is still the last court of appeal upon earth, and the might of Britain is on the seas and not on the land.

The best conceivable laws for the protection of the weak may be made by the best and most intelligent people in the world, but as against the worst and least intelligent people in the world these can, in the last event, only be enforced by that symbol of might, the policeman.

The other great nations of Europe are land forces; their boundaries are contiguous to those of their neighbours; it is from the land that they can attack or be attacked.

But England is moated by the sea, and the extensions of England, her Dominions, her Colonies, her dependencies, are separated from her and connected to her by the sea and the sea only.

Germany may march an army into France, Russia one into Asia, France into Italy, but no one can march into England. He must sail or steam. The British Isles, which are still the heart of the Empire, have nothing to fear from a land attack, but the sea, which was their road to expansion and wealth, if insufficiently guarded, may still be the road over which may come their ruin.

And it must be borne in mind that when the Heart stops beating the Limbs die; when the market has been destroyed it will be no use to ship wheat to it; it will be no good for the Middle West to go on growing more wheat than she wants for her own consumption. It will be no good to call upon London for the flotation of our bonds, for money for our development, when, the seaways having been cut or closed, London has been starved to death.

The land powers pay for their safety and prosperity by maintaining vast armies, in which the whole manhood of their nations serve. We, more shame to us, object to such universal service, and have, in consequence, an army unsurpassed perhaps in quality, but almost negligible in quantity.

Therefore, whilst it would be to our immense advantage as a nation, and even as individuals, to adopt the continental system of universal service, it is imperative in our own self-defence that we should have an overwhelmingly powerful navy.

We must play or pay. We cannot escape service, either in person or by proxy, and if we will not serve our own people, that is ourselves, we shall be compelled when conquered to serve others.

Look back for a moment upon our history. We are a sea-born people. The component parts of which

we are made came to us by the sea. They were sea rovers, sea robbers if you wish, finding safety and wealth where others found death and disaster. "Foes were they," sang an old Roman poet, "fierce beyond other foes and cunning as they were fierce, the sea was their school of war and the storm their friend; they were sea wolves who lived upon the pillage of the world."

Later we became adventurers upon the deep, finding new lands and colonizing them, that is to say, exploiting them for our own good and not a little for the good of those who dwelt in them. Later we became sea traders, and we are now the ocean carriers of the world. The business of the ocean carrier has made much of Britain's wealth, and it is this business which still offers us exceeding great reward, and to none of us greater than to those who live upon the Pacific seaboard, fronting the vast markets of Asia.

The power and wealth of Britain was caused mainly by Her colonial expansion, and that colonial expansion was only made possible by Her sea power.

The seas are the highways of the world, and having acquired the mastery of them we were able to go out from our islands like bees from a hive, to gather the riches of all lands, and when the hive was overcrowded, to settle our swarms in such places as best suited us; we were able to gather the varied produce of many countries and bring it back to our own, to be there manufactured into a thousand useful forms, which we shipped again to be sold for our benefit at the other ends of the earth, thereby not only adding to our national wealth, but ensuring to our home-staying folk an abundance of remunerative employment.

We did more than this. Other nations were content to be mere robbers, taking from other lands such wealth as was ready made, gold and silver and the like, but we, being by temperament traders, saw the possibilities of greater production in the lands we

visited, and, for our own benefit, established and encouraged the productive processes of those lands, thereby adding to their wealth and to ours.

The results of these methods have been that Britain, as a whole, is not only the richest, but the most widely scattered Empire upon earth, and the sea from which it grew is the only bond which binds the scattered Empire together.

Not only its wealth, but its very life depends upon the unimpeded interchange of those commodities which the component parts of it produce, and therefore the absolute command of the sea, the only bond between the parts, the only duct by which the produce and the help of the one can reach the others, is essential to Britain's continued existence.

I will not be a Pharisee, as I should be if I, as an Englishman, pretended that the welfare of the rest of the world was my first consideration. Quite frankly, I believe in the duty of self-preservation, but it is none the less true that it is best for the world as a whole that Britain should remain Mistress of the Seas, or, at least, that some great trader should be their mistress, and there is no other except Britain, unless it be Her eldest son on the American continent, and He at present is hardly in the shipping business.

As long as a trader holds the seas he will keep peace upon them and keep their ways open for commerce. Peace is essential to a trader's success; to a conqueror, the seas are merely means to bring his forces to bear upon those he would conquer.

Let us ask Sir Vincent Howard, one of our national auditors, to take down that map of the world which is our ledger and show us where we stand as regards this question of sea power.

As I read his report, he tells us that steam, being the motive power of men of war, and steam dependent upon coal, and the coaling stations for the most part in the hands of Britain, the sea ways of the world are ours. He illustrates the position thus:

If a German from the Baltic or a Frenchman from the Channel wants to visit China he must needs coal at Gibraltar by our leave; he must coal at Port Said by our leave; at Aden by our leave; at Colombo by our leave; at Singapore by our leave; at Hong Kong by our leave; whilst, whether he returns by the Cape of Good Hope or by Cape Horn, he is just as much at our mercy.

A man-of-war cannot steam for more than three thousand miles at speed without recoaling, and foreign ships cannot recoal without our permission. Neither can they repair without coming to our ocean repair shops. They cannot enter or leave the Mediterranean unless Britain sets the Atlantic gate open; they cannot enter or leave the Red Sea unless we give them leave. or the China Sea unless our Britain at Singapore and Hong Kong says "Pass, friend."

Gates, guns, motive power are ours; the world's ocean ways are ours. These are some of the things which I am pleading with you to retain.

And Sir Vincent Howard might have added that most of the white man's land in the world (by which I mean land suited to the requirements of the white races) is ours, and this is not only the greatest asset of a growing nation, but the greatest temptation to any other growing nation, strong enough to seize it.

During that hundred years of war, when all the nations of Europe were fighting for supremacy, all of them, with one exception, devoted themselves to the creation or maintenance of great land forces. England alone, seeing Her opportunity, steadily fostered Her mercantile marine and built up that navy which was necessary for its protection.

The result was, in the event, that the nation which was in reality most mobile, which could concentrate its forces in the shortest time on any given point, which could blockade and confine the forces of its foe, which could follow and feed its armies with food, ammuni-

tion and fresh troops, and could starve its enemies by closing their trade routes, that nation in a word which possessed the sea power, made herself the greatest and richest nation in the world.

For the purposes of a short address upon sea power I am trying to show to you the salient points in the works of other men, but you ought to read for yourselves at length such works as Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History" and Wood's "Fight for Canada."

If you have no time to do this, let me ask you to consider one illustration of sea power in war.

If you were asked what it was that made Canada British, you would probably answer that it was the taking of Quebec by Wolfe, and you would be partly right. Wolfe's magnificent landing party did take Quebec, but the navy under Saunders which landed that party, covered its operations, drew off the French in different directions at the time of the landing, patrolled the St. Lawrence, and above all, blockaded the ports of France so that no provisions, no munition of war, no reinforcements could reach Montcalm, that navy, I say, alone made Wolfe's success possible, and deserves half the glory of it.

Whilst Wolfe's army could be kept supplied, Montcalm's army was starved, because Britain, having command of the seas, blockaded the ports of France, and whilst Montcalm's men hurried laboriously from point to point over land to meet each feigned landing, the British shipping in the river gave Wolfe the chance of concentrating his own troops rapidly and secretly upon the unguarded heart of his enemy's position.

That in a nutshell is the story of Quebec, and it illustrates excellently the advantages of sea power in war.

A comparatively small nation which can concentrate its whole force rapidly upon any given portion of the power of a far greater nation, may hope to overcome

that nation in detail, and sea power is the only means by which such concentration and mobility can be attained.

It should be remembered, in connection with the taking of Quebec, that at that time Britain was at war all over the world; that France threatened Her with invasion, and that this distant victory, possible only to a nation whose true fighting ring is the sea, warded off the invasion and turned the balance in Her favour for the next hundred years.

Let me come back to my original thesis, that sea power is the basis of the corporate existence of Britain.

To live a man must make a living, so must a nation, and Britain makes Her living by trade.

The English working-man lives by working up raw material into manufactured goods and exchanging them for food. We also, in the Dominion, are beginning to manufacture, but we live principally by producing food and shipping that and certain raw material to others.

Without the command of the sea the English working-man could get neither raw material nor food. He could not therefore manufacture, he could not live.

Without the command of the seas, we in this Dominion could not reach our markets, and though we might not starve physically, we should financially.

England is dependent upon over-seas sources for three-fourths of Her total bread supply and half Her meat. Canada is dependent upon the old country for most of the capital with which She is developing this country, and Her over-seas trade may be estimated from the fact that She has two hundred million dollars' worth of wealth in one form or another upon the high seas.

England's food supply and bank account depend upon the maintenance of Her sea power, as does at any rate your bank account.

But that is not the worst of it.

Alone neither you Canadians nor any other of the great Dominions, the great segregated swarms from the Anglo-Saxon hive, can as yet stand. If that need proof I will prove it later on.

Alone it is doubtful whether the Old Mother of us all can continue the struggle against other nations with more man-power and greater potentialities of wealth than Herself, but united She and Her children can snap their fingers at the rest of the world and continue to dominate it in peace.

Britain is not like the great European nations. They are concrete, united in growth. We sever as we grow, and the only bond which continues to unite us is the sea. Cut that bond and the whole Empire falls to pieces. It is to preserve that bond that it is essential that Britain should retain Her sea power.

Her Fleet is Britain's all in all, Her answer to the threat of great continental armies; the one possible protector of the sea links binding together a whole which, if divided, would perish; the only insurance of Her vast wealth and your children's heritage.

WHAT IS A NAVY LEAGUE?

I have to define one more term, and then I shall have finished my interpretation clause.

The first questions asked of such men as myself are, "What is a Navy League? What does it do? What has your league done?"

I answer in this way:

Most white men's countries to-day are democratic, all tend to become more so, and in all democratic countries the greatest power is Public Opinion.

In some countries, and especially in ours, the most vital question dealt with by public opinion, is the maintenance of the national sea power. A Navy League is the instrument formed by a combination of energetic and patriotic citizens of all parties, for the making of public opinion as it affects the navy and the maintenance of national sea power.

The people, irrespective of party, make the Navy League; the Navy League makes public opinion, and Public Opinion endeavours to make the navy such as the needs of the nation require.

Britain depends absolutely, under God, upon the maintenance of Her supremacy at sea, wherefore the British Navy Leagues seek to convince Britain's people that their first duty, at any cost, is to maintain an invincible navy.

Under ordinary circumstances, and in comparatively unimportant matters, it has become the fashion to divide the educators and representatives of public opinion into two classes, the Ins and the Outs, and men vote and teach as they belong to one or other of the great Parties.

But the good sense of all truly patriotic and intelligent men is beginning to discover that there are questions of such vital importance to their country that upon them there can be no division of opinion; that as regards them no man can afford to be for a party; that as regards them, all men must be for the State, and this question of the maintenance of Britain's naval supremacy being one of these, the first by-law of a British Navy League is, that it should be above parties, absolutely non-partisan.

However honest men may be, this position is fraught with difficulties, and those who adhere to it most honestly cannot hope to escape reproach, except from those who are themselves absolutely honest and careful judges, for it must be that one or other of the parties, each probably in turn, will seem to err against the best

interests of the navy, so that each in turn may become the object of the Navy League's attack, and yet that attack will not be partisan, though it tells against the party attacked, and in favour of its opponents.

For instance, here in Canada, a Navy League may be heartily in favour of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's policy for the creation of a Canadian navy, fostering a naval spirit, and encouraging the shipbuilding industry in Canada, and yet be a bitter opponent of the party which suggests that the part (Canada) may be at peace with a nation with which the whole (Britain) is at war, or that a navy can be of any use to an Empire which in time of need has not instant and unquestioned control of it.

The Navy League is an advocate with only one client, the Empire as a whole, and is concerned in only one matter, the maintenance of British sea power. There is a tendency to-day to make a tyrant of the machine which we created for our service, to subordinate public good to party considerations, to forget that in the last event, if the country perishes, the parties perish with it.

Against that tendency Navy Leagues will be called upon, especially in Canada, to fight their hardest fight. It will be their duty to set their object clearly before them, and then remaining, if they please, staunch Tories or zealous Radicals, count those only as their friends who work for Britain's supremacy at sea, and the rest of the world, not as enemies, but as misinformed and mistaken fellow citizens, for them to educate and convert, until they too are upon our side.

This sounds as if we were striving for an impossible ideal. We are. It is every brave man's duty so to do. Failure to attain matters nothing if the attempt brings us nearer to our goal, and already we have come nearer to it, for in England men of both parties are on our side, Mr. Blatchford, the Socialist leader, on one extreme wing, Mr. Balfour on the other. Both are leaders in the Navy League's fight.

The British Navy Leagues, then (and I include all bodies, working for the same ends, whatever they are called), are associations of Britons of all parties working for the maintenance of their Empire's supremacy at sea, that is, for its Very Life, and the way in which they work is the way of all propagandists, by trying to inform themselves first, of the real truth concerning their subject (Britain's navy); of the actual state of other navies which may or might be opposed to it; of the best way to protect their country from any danger which might threaten it, and of the strongest arguments for convincing others of the soundness of Navy League views, and by preaching the Navy League creed with tongue and pen in such a way that all men will adopt it and all politicians agree in supporting it.

Our ultimate object is that the Navy League should be the nation. That accomplished, Britain is safe.

Alone, the Mother Country may not be able to maintain for ever the competition with other powers numerically greater and potentially richer, but with Her children round Her She can keep the seas to the glory of God and the benefit of all peaceful traders.

You may say to me justly, your Navy League is not a new body; you have been tried for some years; what have you or similar bodies in other countries done?

In answering, let me invert the order of the question.

In Germany, Britain's greatest and most dangerous rival, a Navy League known as the Flotteverein, was founded in 1898.

The Germans had learned in their war with Denmark (1848-49) that without a fleet the greatest of military powers might be helpless against an infinitely weaker power with a strong navy, and the years as they rolled by enforced this lesson, until in 1898 the Emperor of Germany appealed to His people for such a navy as would put the sea power of the world into His mailed fist.

Don't waste your energy in indignation.

Certain national conditions make it better, we think, for the world, that the sea power should be in the hands of the world's greatest trader, rather than in the hands of the world's greatest soldier, but, apart from this, there is nothing to be said against Germany's ambition.

The worst of the Germans from our point of view (as possible antagonists), is that they are so extremely like ourselves.

Much that is best in us came from them; some of the good which was in us they have kept, and we have lost. There is only one other Emperor alive who is the peer of their Great Worker. In some things they have excelled us; in some (even trade) they are dangerously close upon our heels. Their ideals are high; their scientific attainments the highest; their home life beautiful and clean; on land they have no equals, but on the sea we must, if we would continue to exist, be masters.

The very fact that Germany would make the most admirable of friends for Britain, enforces every word I write, for such as Germany mate only with equals, and unless we maintain our supremacy at sea, as She maintains Her supremacy on land, we shall no longer have a right to that respect upon which only national friendship can be surely founded.

Any attempt to belittle our great rival, or to embitter personal feelings between the members of the two great races, is not only useless and contemptible, but is diametrically opposed to the very spirit of England, which taught an Englishman even greater courtesy and consideration for the man who stood against him in the Prize Ring than he would show to his own friend.

Forgive this digression, which, after all, seems necessary, and let us get back to the Flotteverein.

In 1898, then, in direct response to their Emperor's call, His people formed their Navy League for the ex-

press purpose of giving Germany a navy which should hold the same position upon the seas which Germany's army holds upon the land. You know what that is, and what the existence of such a navy would mean to Britain.

The Germans do not do things by halves. Their Emperor not only called to His people, but He gave the new league as its leader His own brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, and, naturally enough, the chiefs of the German nobility enrolled themselves as members of the league, and the people swarmed after their natural leaders, until to-day, the league has between one and two million members, and an income exceeding £50,000 per annum.

This League has papered Germany with its pamphlets and war maps; it has begotten a naval spirit even in the inland agricultural districts of the Empire; it has taught the people the outlines of their own coasts and their rivals', and its work is almost done.

The Emperor acknowledges His indebtedness to His League, and the Premier of Great Britain has admitted that in 1912 the Germans will have 17 Dreadnaughts to our 20, instead of Britain having two keels to one of any possible navy that could be brought against Her.

Sir Edward Grey tells our people that when the German programme is completed, Germany will have a fleet of 33 Dreadnaughts (the most powerful fleet the world has ever seen) close to our shores, and the last news was (*Morning Post*, June 16th, 1910) that of the *completion* of a great naval base upon the North Sea within 350 miles of Sheerness.

A Canadian writer (Mr. C. F. Hamilton in the *University Magazine*) tells us that in 1896 the German battle fleet consisted of four small, badly constructed, thoroughly inferior ships.

The German navy seems to have grown since then, and I believe that the German Emperor would tell you, if you enjoyed His confidence, that it was His Navy League which made it grow.

I think that I have now answered that part of the question which relates to the work of other Navy Leagues. Let me apply myself now to answering as to our own, and, inasmuch as I am not able to obtain a reliable estimate of the number of members in the English League, I shall concern myself principally with the work done by the branches of it in Canada.

Some idea of the comparative weakness of our national League may be obtained by contrasting the income of the German League (over £50,000 per annum) with that of its English rival (£3,500 per annum), but it must be remembered that ours was not created at the call of the King nor led by one of our royal Princes. When it is so led, it may give a different account of itself. As to the branch of the League with which I am personally connected, I am not ashamed of its record.

It has not yet created a navy, as the Flotteverein has done, but it has created public opinion in the Dominion in which it works, and the embryo navy of Canada, small though it is to-day, may yet grow with that rapidity which is characteristic of our West. For Britain's sake, God grant it may.

The first branch of the Navy League founded in Canada was founded at Toronto in 1895. It was natural that such a movement should have its cradle in the home of the United Empire Loyalists, and it was not less natural that its second home should be in Victoria Esquimalt, the western outpost of Empire, proud in the memory of its great godmother, impulsive with the impulse of the West, and, until a recent unhappy date, one of the homes of Britain's navy.

Since then branches have grown up in various parts of Canada, no less than six of them being in this Province, but even as late as 1905, although a few zealous men had tried to show to Canada that it was Her duty as a grown-up child of the Empire to contribute Her share to that Empire's main line of defence, Public

Opinion was distinctly opposed to naval contribution, and a Navy League lecturer was expected to prove that it was Canada's duty to herself and to her mother, as well as to her own interest, to pay her share of the Imperial insurance fund.

The exponents of public opinion argued that (1) there should be no taxation without representation, forgetting that the British Navy represented Canada and protected Her, and Her commerce all over the world; that (2) we needed all our resources for our national development, forgetting that it is useless to develop unless we can retain what we develop, and that our annual deficit has become an annual surplus; that (3) we needed local squadrons for coast defence, forgetting that the only way to protect a coast is to go after the enemy and crush him with "foot loose fleets"; that (4) the naval department of the United Kingdom was inefficient, forgetting the naval history of our Empire and that Canadian ability, if proved, would be as welcome in that department of the Empire as any other; that (5) we were safe under the Monroe doctrine, forgetting that protection by a foreign power involved subordination to that power; that (6) the French-Canadians objected to any form of contribution, generalizing unfairly, it is believed, and forgetting that French-Canadians are British first, and have probably more to lose (language, religious freedom, national laws) by conquest or annexation, than any other class in Canada; that (7) the British Navy must in any case defend sea-borne colonial commerce, forgetting the dignity of our young nation, and that a navy supported by a part only of the Empire might not always be able to protect the whole; that (8) Canada had not money enough to spare any for the upkeep of the navy, forgetting our annual surplus and that such surplus could not be more wisely employed than in insuring our sources of income; and that (9) Canada had already done Her share in building the Canadian Pacific

Railway and other great works of Imperial utility, forgetting that these were Her share of the building of Empire and sources of wealth to Her, and that what we were asking Her to do was to pay Her share in the protection of the thing built, i.e., the British Empire, having admittedly done Her share in the building of it.

This was the position only five years ago. We had many and strong individuals upon our side; we had strong friends in the press, but the great majority had not then mastered the facts or considered the arguments, and was, therefore, opposed to the principle of contribution.

To-day, all that has been changed. The principle of contribution has been established, so that there is hardly a public man of any weight in Canada who dare oppose it from a public platform, and not only has the principle been conceded, but a national naval policy has been adopted, which does something to satisfy Canada's honor, and may in the future do much to strengthen the Empire's position.

The Navy Leaguer of to-day has only to contend that we should go further than we have gone upon our chosen road and do something to avert what we conceive to be an immediate peril by immediate help.

One word more, and I have done. The Navy League offers almost the only opportunity for some of us to serve our Empire as all of us would wish to do. Though their lips were sealed, of course, there were many sore hearts when the boys came back from Africa. All over the English-speaking world there were men who cheered young Tommy Atkins, but not because he had done his duty. They cheered him as a gallant and lucky lad, but, at the bottom of their hearts, they were jealous of him. To him had been given what to them had been denied, the privilege of fighting for Britain, and at heart they rebelled because the opportunity had found them too late, because Britain was still in a position, thank God, to pick and

choose the fittest, youngest and best, and the years which had left them young at heart, had left them unfit even to die for her.

To these especially, I commend the words of Sir George Clarke in the "Navy and the Nation," "Not as part of a consistent scheme of national policy; not on the initiative of a great statesman, was it at length determined to strengthen the fleet. The Naval Defence Act of 1889 was due to the efforts of writers and speakers."

So, gentlemen, there is still work for you to do, well worth the doing, even if your eyes are dim and your physical strength on the wane.

Get into the scrimmage as Navy Leaguers, and play with your heads if you can no longer play with your hands. Your business is to collect and marshal the facts which affect your cause; to consider and evolve arguments which will appeal to the people, and, above all, to see that the masses of the people who have not all of them leisure to educate themselves in naval matters, are by you thoroughly informed of the facts, and shown the incidence of these facts upon their own individual interests.

We are not a society for collecting money with which to build a fleet. That is the work of the nation as a nation, to which all will contribute in proportion, just as each man pays the insurance upon his own property.

We are a society for proving to the people that the maintenance of an invincible fleet is essential for the preservation of the nation as such, and the protection of the interests of every member of it and in our business, beyond the bare funds necessary to carry on our propaganda, what we want is not money but men, not dollars but votes.

As far as I know, we pay none of our officials. Some of them pay freely for the honour of serving, which is the right spirit, the spirit of our kings, and of the best of our citizens.

But we want every man with a warm British heart, with just British pride, with a clear British brain and temperate British tongue, to spread our doctrines, convince his neighbours, and, if need be, his political representative.

To this end we seek members who, in return for a subscription of \$2 per annum for our bare working expenses, will receive a monthly journal dealing with naval matters, designed to supply him with his brief. Such members will have a vote in the management of the League.

We also seek associate members, amongst those who, for any reason, cannot spare \$2 per annum, and these we charge 25 cts. per annum, giving them in exchange a vote in our management, and a quarterly magazine somewhat less pretentious than the journal.

And by "man" we mean human being of full age, and either sex, realizing fully the influence of woman, and believing that if the ladies would only enforce the old law, that only the brave deserve the fair, we should find every man in Canada in our ranks, eager to do all he could in person and in purse, to uphold the dignity of his race, protect the homes of his people and preserve the heritage which his sires won, for the enjoyment of his children.

Men and women of Canada, point out the fallacies of my argument if you can; examine my facts mercilessly but fairly, but if you find my position sound, if you love honour and would fain see good days for your children and your children's children, join the League, and help to bring your neighbours to a right understanding of their true interests and of the best way to conserve them.

WHY IS THE NAVAL SUPREMACY OF BRITAIN VITAL TO CANADA?

Before I can answer this question intelligently, you must answer me one question. Who are you?

This lies at the root of the matter in hand.

If you answer me that you are Canadians, I shall understand that you are members of a vigorous young nation about eight million strong, having an almost indefensible land frontier, running for nearly four thousand miles along the borders of a possible, if very improbable, enemy, of ten times your strength.

I shall understand that you have vast seaboard on both sides of your Dominion, defended by one old, first-class cruiser, the "Niobe," and one older, third-class cruiser, the "Rainbow," and when these vessels are not actively employed in protecting your fisheries or your mercantile marine in all parts of the world.

I shall understand that you hold in trust for your heirs, about three and a half million square miles of the best unoccupied white man's land in the world; that you have about \$200,000,000 worth of wares upon the high seas every year; that you have wheat enough to feed the world, coal enough to warm it and make all its wheels go round, lumber enough to fence it in, build its houses and its fleets; that you have cities and national utilities whose value I am unable to compute, and, over and above all this tangible wealth, those "illimitable possibilities" of which one of your favourite Governor-Generals, Lord Dufferin, never tired of telling you.

Behind you, in the past, you have some three or four hundred years of national history, made glorious by the indomitable perseverance of your pioneers, hallowed by the self-sacrifice of your United Empire Loyalists, and crowned by the evolution of Canada as a nation.

Before you, in the future, you have a great hope.

If Canada is allowed time to grow to maturity before her hour of trial comes, the future should be hers, as the past has been her mother's.

The greatest slice of land, suitable to the requirements of the white races, is hers already, whilst the carrying trade of the Pacific and the markets of Asia are waiting for her to enter in and possess them.

It is with that "if" that we are concerned.

If you are *only* Canadians, this time is not likely to be given to you.

If you are only a nation eight million strong, with one old cruiser for each ocean that washes your shores, with only two human beings for each square mile you possess, with an army at the very utmost of 100,000 men, it is worth while to remember that your West Coast seems to suit the Japanese, and that they have about a hundred fighting ships to your two, and an army which has just conquered Russia; that Germany can put into the field four million trained soldiers, and is building the greatest fleet that the world ever saw, and that both these mighty nations are terribly cramped for room and seek empty spaces for their people.

Human beings are still predatory. Only the strong can command peace. It is land that the peoples crave, colonies that the great nations seek. An empty continent is an irresistible temptation to a warlike and hungry people. Do you think that alone, as Canadians, you are yet strong enough to keep what all the world covets?

But suppose that you tell me that you are English!

In that case I shall understand that you belong to a nation of forty-two million, crowded into the hundred and twenty thousand square miles of the United Kingdom; a nation of forty-two millions, of whom every man bears ten men's burdens, paying for the policing of all seas, the protection of about fourteen million

square miles of land, and the insurance of 1,600,000,000 pounds' worth of commerce annually; a nation with a history which has no peer in all Earth's records; a nation that has not yet, mind you, called to her daughter nations for assistance, but one, nevertheless, which cannot for ever maintain the struggle against European powers numerically stronger and potentially richer than herself; a nation which, like the fabled pelican, feeds her brood annually with her own best blood, but one which has no more room for expansion within her own borders, which cannot possibly feed herself, which has an army excellent in quality, but, as compared with the armies of Europe, almost negligible in quantity, and a navy which is at last seriously challenged for that mastery of the seas upon which Her very life depends.

If you insist upon calling yourselves either Canadians or English, you are indeed in bad case.

As Canadians, your hard-won wealth, your children's heritage of broad acres, that national type which your history has produced, the fruits of your past and hopes of your future, are at the mercy of any predatory nation which believes with Bismarck that the only perfectly healthy state is a perfectly selfish one.

As Englishmen, you are among the last of a splendid but overburdened people, whose great day's work is almost done.

But if ye be Britons, hold up your heads and face the future, and rejoice as a young man to run a race, a race that for you as Britons is only just beginning.

As Britons, the greatest pages in the world's history are yours: the red pages of India and Europe; the golden pages of maritime adventure; the pure white pages which record the growth of a people's liberties, the making of a people's laws, and the spread of Christianity by a people and a people's Kings.

I do not say that even as Britons all the world is yet yours, but I do say that most of it which is best worth

having happens to be British; that the sea's highways are yours, and the best of the goals to which they lead; that the road-makers and the land-breakers, the teachers and the lawgivers, the explorers and pioneers, the lords (because they were the servants) of the world's wild races in all lands, were your fathers or your brothers; that if you will, you can feed the world with Great Britain's manufactured wares, Canada's corn and beef, Australia's mutton, the sugar and spices of the Indies, and that if you will you can close the sea gates upon the predatory peoples, and keep all seas for peaceful trade.

This you cannot do as Canadians or Australians, or even as New Zealanders, though the heart of New Zealand (God bless, her) is big enough for anything.

These things you cannot perhaps continue to do as Englishmen.

These things cannot be done by a kingdom, or by divided dominions, but they can be done by a United Empire of four hundred and fifty million Britons owning a quarter of the habitable globe, and controlling a commerce of £1,600,000,000 sterling per annum.

Here, then, I come to my first conclusion.

If you would secure the time necessary for each component part of the Empire to grow to maturity; if you would insure what you have won, and lay hands on the hope of your future, you cannot afford any longer to face the world as English or Canadians, Australians or New Zealanders; you must do so as Britons, and as Britons it is the duty of the various component parts of the Empire to contribute to maintain the naval basis of that Empire's corporate existence.

Is there any alternative course open to you?

As Englishmen, you might "let the Colonies go": shrink, as old age shrinks, into your narrow island limits, and die slowly of a timid and selfish senility, an object of pity to those of your enemies who knew and dreaded you in your prime.

Better a thousand times face the unequal combat, attempt the impossible without your children's help, and sink in the sea that nursed you, with the Jack nailed to the mast, whilst an awed world wonders.

As Canadians, you have two alternatives, and, though only Canadian by adoption, I say with certainty that no Canadian worthy of the name will accept either of them.

You might, if you chose, refuse to contribute your share to the Imperial navy's upkeep, and still continue to shelter yourselves and your commerce under its protection, and as long as that navy could protect itself, it would undoubtedly continue to protect you; or you might cower behind the protection of the Monroe doctrine and the United States.

In the first case, you would be parasites to the mother country; in the second, you would become parasites of a stranger.

Neither of these policies (the shame of them apart) would pay. It is conceded that Great Britain alone cannot maintain indefinitely the struggle against the great powers of Europe, and it is obvious that whenever the limit of Her endurance is reached any daughter nation which has depended upon Her for shelter will stand naked and defenceless before the world.

The first parasitic policy might procure for a time freedom from the cost of defence, but it would end in the loss of everything, including national honour.

The second parasitic policy means annexation by the United States, since it is inconceivable that a nation of the keenest traders in the world would protect another man's business for nothing, and annexation means absorption, the loss of Canada's 8,000,000 white men swamped in the 80,000,000 of her neighbour's parti-coloured population; the irretrievable loss of Canada's identity as a nation, and of the type evolved by her history; the loss to French-Canadians of those special privileges as to religion, law and language,

which they so highly prize; the substitution of American laws made to be evaded, for British laws invariably enforced; the exchange of British institutions, which Americans openly envy, for the institutions of the States; of our ordered liberty for their loud-mouthed license; and (putting the case at its best) the substitution of a partnership in the second-best business in the world for a partnership in the best, to say nothing of the fact that whereas at present Canada's eight millions own the unskimmed half of this continent, they would, if annexed, receive in exchange for it only an eleventh interest in the whole.

Annexation to the States would not even save Canada money in the matter of defence, since, if the States annexed us, they would be obliged, in common fairness to their present citizens, to insist upon payment by the newcomers of their full share of the national expenditure for naval and military purposes, and that share would amount to far more than any contribution contemplated or necessary for similar Imperial purposes.

Your distinguished fellow-citizen, Colonel Denison, has, I think, computed that if annexed by the States, Canada's share in the Defence Fund of that country would amount to \$25,000,000 per annum, whilst the total cost of the building of a complete fleet unit for the Empire is estimated at less than \$18,000,000, and its annual upkeep at only \$3,000,000.

It is difficult, in the somewhat uncertain state of our affairs at present, to decide how much per head Canada does contribute towards the Defence Fund of the Empire, but it is at least safe to say that Great Britain's contribution to that fund is not less than \$6.55 per head, and the contribution of the citizens of the United States to their Defence Fund not less than \$5.90 per head, whereas the contribution of Canada for the same purposes need not exceed a fifth of this, if she contributes on the basis first suggested by the British Admiralty.

It has been shown, then, that shelter under the Monroe Doctrine means annexation, and that annexation would be unpalatable and unprofitable, and that independence for Canada at present is impossible, and it may be added that if it were possible it would be ruinously expensive, since a nation of 8,000,000 would, to defend itself, be obliged to incur an expenditure equal to that of its possible enemy with a population of 80,000,000.

Having shown these facts, we come back to the only possible position for Canada, which is also the natural position, the most honourable position, and the least expensive, the position of an integral part of the British Empire.

As an integral part of the British Empire, whatever is vital to that Empire is vital to Canada, and we have shown that the maintenance of Britain's supremacy at sea is vital to her.

That Empire of which we are an integral part grew from the narrow islands of the United Kingdom, by maritime adventure and colonization (which mastery of the sea alone made possible), into an Empire which now includes one-fourth of the known world.

Its territory is composed of vast and *detached* tracts of land upon different continents, and of hundreds of islands scattered over all the oceans.

These are all separated from each other by the sea, and bound together by the sea; all are very largely dependent upon each other for their trade, and all dependent upon the Imperial Navy for their protection.

No one of them is capable of protecting itself single-handed, whilst Great Britain, the centre of the whole Empire, can only feed herself with imported food-stuffs.

Three hundred vessels a week are required to supply this Heart of the Empire with food and raw material, and from the Heart of the Empire its com-

ponent parts still draw the largest part of the money necessary for their development, an important part of the men who develop them, and practically all that prestige and consideration which a great navy commands, and it is this and this alone which secures Canada in her possessions, enables her to ship her produce in safety to all parts of the world, and dictate to the Asiatics who shall and who shall not enter into and settle upon her lands.

That which applies to other bodies, applies to the body of Britain. Any limb separated from the trunk must die, causing loss and disaster to the whole from which it is severed, but that which is fatal to the heart kills the whole body.

If Britain lost control of the seas, she could be starved to death, without a blow struck; her daughter nations, deprived of her support, could be dealt with in detail by anyone who controlled the sea's highways; the fabric of Empire would vanish like a dream; the wheat lands, coal fields, lumber limits, and young cities of Canada, would pay the conqueror for the building of his victorious navy, and those Canadians, if there were any, who had refused to pay a ridiculously small annual subscription to make the Common Navy of their own Empire invincible, would be compelled not only to pay their share of a war indemnity in the present, but their share in money and personal service, towards the upkeep of the Army and Navy which had conquered them in conquering Britain.

The supremacy of the seas is vital to Britain; the continued existence of Britain is vital to Her daughter nations; therefore, Britain's supremacy at sea is vital to Canada.

Christianity, pride of race, gratitude, self-interest, all alike demand from Canada that she contribute to that Imperial Navy which is the basis of the corporate existence of that Empire of which She is a part.

As a Christian nation, it is vital to Her that the

Fidei Defensor of the world should retain her power; that the Great Trader to whom peace is essential should continue to control the world's sea-ways.

As trustee of the pioneers, it is Her bounden duty to maintain that Imperial Navy which is the only bulwark between the land-hungry nations of the world and the heritage of those for whom She has been appointed to act.

As a proud young nation, it is essential to Her that She should obtain that time for growth which only the protection of the Imperial Navy can give, and, as a nation of business men, it is imperatively necessary that She should contribute to the only fund which can insure Her sea-borne wealth, the Defence Fund of the Empire.

Remember, that in any war which Britain may have to wage against the great powers of Europe, Britain will have to stake Her life against Her enemy's limb. The loss of Britain's Navy would be the loss of Britain's life, and our liberties as a free people; the loss of Germany's Navy would only leave Her where She was twenty years ago, a great continental power, with an unassailable territory guarded by the greatest army in the world.

Remember, too, that the threat of war does almost as much harm to trade as war itself; that what you and all the commercial nations of the world require, is a guarantee of peace, and that, therefore, it is the duty of Britons all over the world to make their Common Navy not merely strong enough to defeat any other navies in combination, but so strong that no other navies will dare to try conclusions with it.

Such a navy alone will command peace and lighten the burden of taxation for many nations besides our own.

THE MENACE

I have tried, up to this point, to show what the British Empire is, and that the vital interests of the whole are vital to every part of it; that separation means death to the limb separated and the gravest danger to the trunk from which it is severed; and that Britain's unity, and Britain's very existence, depend upon the maintenance of Her sea power.

I am now to show, if I can, that a real menace to Her continued supremacy at sea exists, and that the necessity for meeting it is urgent.

Here in a nutshell is the story; the world knows it; it is the glory of the Teuton and the peril of the Anglo-Saxon.

In 1815, after Waterloo, Europe paused, spent with the strain of war; most of the powers were ruined; Germany was unheard of; and England was not only the supreme naval power, she was, thanks to the sea-loving character of Her people and the genius of Her greatest son, the only naval power.

She owned the seas, and policed them. As the great sea carrier, She reaped the harvest of their wealth. All lands over-seas were Hers without question, to produce raw material for Her factories, as markets for Her manufactured goods, as colonies for Her surplus population.

For a hundred years She reaped where Her heroes had sown; She grew wealthy beyond the dreams of avarice; She moved armies of Her colonists across the seas She policed, that they might enter in, and possess all the fairest of Earth's waste places, and She almost forgot how She came by Her inheritance.

But whilst She waxed wealthy, other countries recovered their strength, and one of the least of them grew with a giant's growth.

Prussia was a hungry land with a scanty popula-

tion; manufactures, if any, poor and insignificant; a negligible army, and certainly no sea dreams.

But a hard country breeds hard men, Scotland knows that, and Canada, and if Prussia did not breed fat cattle or make fine wares, She bred men and made soldiers.

After a time She bred Bismarck.

Now, if I were a German I would thank God every day for Bismarck; as I am not, my prayer shall be "Give Kitchener a chance." We do not know the measure of his capacity as yet, but we do know that he is of the same blood-and-iron brand as Bismarck, of that brand which makes Empires or keeps them, of that brand which demands work and does it, which, instead of saying things, does them, which looks ahead, perfects details, and therefore wins. So much he has proved.

In 1862 Bismarck began his work by reorganizing the Prussian army in conjunction with Van Roon. In 1864 he began to use the weapon they had made. He attacked Denmark, and annexed Schleswig-Holstein. This gave him Kiel, a footing on the sea and an outlet for Prussian traders.

In 1866 he attacked Austria, defeated Her in six weeks, and took Hanover, Hesse and Nassau.

In 1870 Prussia attacked France, defeated Her, took Alsace and Lorraine from Her, and an indemnity of £200,000,000.

Then the Germany which Bismarck had built replaced the Prussia which begot him, and the world, opening its eyes, saw the Master of Europe, a mighty confederation of German States under one Emperor, with an army of 4,000,000 men, equipped and organized as no other army ever was.

The world saw more. It saw a flat contradiction of the stories of the anti-militarists; a proof of the wisdom of the law of creation, that everything must fight to live, that it is war, not peace, that perfects men.

This intensely military State had grown as greatly in arts as She had in arms, and to-day, after all Her wars, in spite of (or because of) Her law of universal service, Germany has almost overtaken Britain in Her race for wealth. She is close on Her heels as a trader, She has surpassed Her in population, and She stands without a rival in the world of science.

Two things only this great power still lacks, the mastery of the sea for Her trade, and the waste places of the world for Her crowded people, and these two things the Anglo-Saxon races hold.

Given these two, Bismarck's child might stretch out its hand and take that crown of world dominion for which all the great military races of the earth have competed in vain since history began.

France has been crushed; Russia has been crippled by Japan; Austria has been coerced into an alliance; Japan cannot afford to take Her eyes off Her crippled foe; the Eastern races are neither homogeneous nor trained; America is still a mob neither disciplined nor made, with a little leaven in Her of the best, which, in spite of Her lack of those essentials which made nations, the unities of race, religion and history, may yet lift Her above all the world; there is only one serious rival left for Germany, and that is Britain; Britain, the Sea Queen, strong in her command of ocean's highways, strong as long as She can keep them open for Her trade and Her food, too strong even for Germany as long as those sea links are unsevered, which alone bind Her five nations in one.

But if at sea is Britain's strength, at sea, too, is Britain's vulnerable spot. Stop those highways, and you starve Her. Break those links, and the limbs must fall off and die. Take from Her Her sea power, and She has no weapon left to fight with.

And this Germany knows. She learned in 1848 from the Danes the uses of a navy, and the limitations of a land power, and Germany not only remembers,

but what She learns She applies. The application of other people's inventions to practical purposes is Germany's most valuable characteristic.

If, up to this point, I have made Germany's career plain to you, and the causes of Her success, Her future course should be very obvious to you. She has only Britain to conquer, and She can only conquer Her at sea. But here the humanitarian, the anti-militarist, the pestilent "Gasbag," who in India undoes work with words, who still believes that cats won't steal cream, comes in and tells us that for moral reasons Germany would never think of fighting Britain, or quarrelling with America, though the German nation is composed of units who are uncomfortably crowded, of units who want markets for their goods, of men the most matter-of-fact the world has ever seen.

And this cry of the anti-militarist in spite of the almost brutally frank confessions of the Germans themselves! These are the men we are competing with, men who don't even condescend to lie, except professionally as diplomatists.

Do you not know that an ambassador has been defined as a good man sent abroad to lie for his country's good; do you not know that the great German Emperor taught that secrecy was the soul of success in war: that a ruler was bound to break agreements which conflicted with His people's interests: that any war was justified if it added to the prestige of the people, and have you forgotten the basis of Bismarck's creed, that the only thoroughly healthy state is a thoroughly selfish one?

Charity begins at home in Germany, as it should everywhere. It may spread as much as it pleases from that point, and the stronger the home the greater its power of doing good, but charity must begin at home.

I do not propose here to enter into the moral aspect of Germany's wars with other nations—Denmark,

Austria or France. Those who do pretend to show that in every instance Germany manufactured her *casus belli* to suit her own convenience.

Be this as it may, it matters little to us. We may take it for granted that if it is to Germany's advantage, or to the advantage of any country, to wage war upon Britain, a *casus belli* will arise, providing sufficient justification for the war.

It is my business to show that Germany is rapidly putting herself in such a position that if a *casus belli* arose she could undertake the war, with greater prospects of success than would be healthy for us.

Her intentions must be judged by her deeds, and if these do not speak with sufficient clearness I will add to them the opinions of some of our greatest public men and the frank declarations of some of the leading Germans of to-day.

Let us begin with the deeds.

I have shown how Germany's land power grew until she became the undisputed War Lord of Europe. To become more than that, it was necessary for Her to dominate the sea as She already dominated the land.

If She could do that, She would bring within Her reach not only the trade and the room for expansion which She openly covets, but that world-dominion which has been the prize for which ambitious nations have fought and failed from Alexander's time to that of Napoleon, and it must be borne in mind that the sea power, the trade and the Colonies are Britain's.

In 1896 we learn on reliable authority that Germany's battle fleet consisted of four small, badly constructed, thoroughly inferior ships, whereas to-day she has eighteen fairly good battleships of the pre-Dreadnaught class, and is building Dreadnaughts so fast that in 1912 she will be almost our equal in such ships.

That is where the real danger threatens.

It is not that at the present moment, with the ships that are built, Germany or any other power seriously

threatens our continued supremacy at sea, but it is that, in the words of the First Lord of the Admiralty, "A day will come when the maintenance of our superiority will depend upon our superiority in Dreadnaughts alone," and "The German power of constructing this particular type of vessel is at this time almost if not fully equal to our own, owing to their rapid development within the past eighteen months."

Sir Edward Grey, always considered almost a type of the moderate, level-headed statesman, is our authority for the statement that when Germany's present programme is completed, that country, "a great country close to our shores, will have a fleet of 33 Dreadnaughts. That fleet," he added, "would be the most powerful the world has ever yet seen." Graf von Reventlow makes it 38 instead of 33. And there is no sign that Germany's pace is slackening.

On the contrary, we know that in 1909 She had only one or two "slips" capable of carrying a Dreadnaught, whereas to-day She has seventeen. In earlier days we could afford to let Germany or any other country design a ship, build a specimen or two of the new type, show us its merits or demerits, and then, if we chose, we could go ahead and outbuild Her in ships of Her own design.

To-day it is a question whether we can build as quickly as She can.

In 1900 Germany spent upon Her Navy £3,401,000, but in 1909 she spent £10,751,000 upon it, and that although She declared a deficit of £10,000,000 that year.

It looks as if She meant to at least carry out Her programme, which will result in a navy of 33 Dreadnaughts, "the most powerful fleet the world has ever yet seen."

And the fact that She spent £10,751,000 upon Her navy in a year which showed a deficit of £10,000,000 suggests that She is building upon borrowed money.

Do men borrow except for an emergency, and if not what is the emergency? Who is to pay back that loan with interest, and how?

The long quays at Emden for the shipping of an invading force are known to us, and the cost of them; the enlarging of the Kiel canal is no secret. At Woodstock it was my good luck to have in my audience a gentleman of Ontario who had just returned from Germany. Those who listened to his sober account of the preparations which he had just seen with his own eyes will perhaps blame me for the moderation of my story, but I think that it needs no strong colour.

The last important news of Germany's preparations came to us in July, 1910, and was to the effect that our neighbour had completed Her splendid naval base in the North Sea at Wilhelmshaven, 350 miles from *Sheerness*, and was practising Her forces in the use of it.

Add to this that we are informed that these battle-ships which Germany is constructing at such a terrific pace are of so limited a coal-carrying capacity that they can only operate against a very near neighbour, and then tell me what they are being built for?

They are not built for the benefit of France or Austria, or any great continental power, because Germany's army of 4,000,000 men is amply sufficient to settle with any European power, and that army needs no ships to transport it into its neighbour's territory. They are not built for the benefit of America, China or Japan, because, with such coal-carrying capacity as they have, they could not reach these countries. They can only have been built for a near neighbour whose one weapon is Her fleet, who is accessible only by the sea, and who is within very short range of Wilhelmshaven.

Graf Ernst von Reventlow, in an article which appeared in the last Navy League Annual, declares that the object of Germany's great shipbuilding programme

is the protection of Germany's commerce, her Colonies and oversea interests, but one is tempted to ask "Who threatened them?"

Is Britain sorely in need of colonies? Even in this, which some amusing people seem to regard as her period of decadence, is her trade in such a very bad way? Read the astounding records and judge for yourselves.

Has she given Germany or any other power reason to suspect her of military ambition? Has she even shown herself sufficiently ready to take the offensive?

I read in a German journal of high standing, that "five years ago England might have done something to check Germany's naval growth, but that now is too late," and that "if Bismarck were still alive he would 'call' Britain's hand."

Quite so, and if any fleet were really necessary to protect Germany's trade or Colonies or oversea interests, whatever they may be, which need such expensive protection, surely England would have struck before Her rival had perfected Her strength.

Britain's action has proved the fallacy of Germany's fears, but Germany goes on shipbuilding as fast as ever.

Apart from instinct, which teaches all created things the duty of self-preservation, and warns the weak to hide or arm themselves against the strong, man's only source of knowledge is experience. He judges from analogy. What has happened under certain circumstances he believes will happen again under similar circumstances, and, if Britain judges from experience, and especially from the recent history of Germany, Britain's outlook is full of peril unless She unites and arms as an Empire.

All the sanest and wisest and most experienced of Her sons have warned Her, and have been called scare-mongers for their pains. Lord Roberts, who won his cross as a boy, and but recently turned the fortunes of

a dangerous war almost by the weight of his own ability; Lord Charles Beresford, with his gallant Irish recklessness sobered by a long career of command; Mr. Asquith, the level-headed leader of a party to which any admission as to the existence of this menace must be damaging in the last degree; Sir Edward Grey, upon whom men of all parties used to look with trust as a sober-minded patriot; Mr. Balfour, who plays politics with as much restraint as if he were playing golf; Lord Cromer, the administrator; Lord Milner, our greatest Pro-consul; Lord Curzon, with his knowledge of the world's history, made real to him by his own share in it; and Mr. Blatchford, with his socialistic theories, intensified, perhaps, but controlled by and subordinated to his love of his own land; these are your scaremongers, or some of them, backed by the frank assertions of the press and public speakers of Germany.

On the other side you may count such great men as Mr. Lloyd-George, whose life's work seems to be to set class against class in the old country, and Mr. Winston Churchill.

I will quote you, in conclusion, a few statements made by the scaremongers and others, and will then leave you to judge between the admitted facts of history, the avowed national morals of Germany, and the deliberate warnings of these scaremongers on the one side, and the soothing and contemptuous words of the little navy men on the other.

Here is my first quotation:

The German Navy Bill of 1900 declared that "Germany must possess a battle fleet so strong that a war with her would, even for the greatest naval power, be accompanied with such dangers as would render that power's position doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest sea power, because, generally, the greatest sea power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

This seems sufficiently explicit, even extraordinarily so for an Act of Parliament, and the threat in the last clause suggests our real danger. Germany does not need a navy equal to our own, to fight us. She knows that, though we have stripped our foreign and colonial stations to concentrate for Her benefit in the North Sea, we shall not be able to so concentrate when the day comes.

Germany guards Her North Sea gate; Britain's scattered Empire makes it necessary for Her to guard Her gates all over the world.

Here is another quotation:

Professor Treitsche, the great German historian, wrote: "If Germany has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is unavoidable." That Germany had to settle affairs with all the great powers; that she had settled with Austria-Hungary, France and Russia, but that the last settlement, the settlement with England, would probably be the lengthiest and most difficult. The rapid increase of Germany's population makes it inevitable that She should follow an independent colonial policy with determination unless someone is strong enough to stop Her.

Mr. McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, admitted the difficulty in which the Imperial Government finds itself (March 16th, 1909) of not knowing the rate at which German construction was taking place; he admitted the creation of a "new situation" by the building of German Dreadnaughts; admitted the vast increase in her building power, and the necessity of sacrificing everything for the safety of the Empire.

Mr. Arthur Balfour, the leader of the Opposition, stated that we were "face to face with a situation so dangerous that it is very difficult for us to thoroughly realize all that it imports. For the first time, there is bordering on the North Sea, upon the waters bathing

our shores, a great power, which has the capacity, and which looks as if it had the Will, to compete with us in point of actual numbers of great battleships."

Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary) declared that "a new situation is for this country created by the German programme. Whether that programme is carried out quickly or slowly, the fact of its existence makes a new situation. When that programme is completed Germany, a great country close to our own shores, will have a fleet of 33 Dreadnaughts. This fleet will be the most powerful which the world has ever yet seen."

These are a few important specimens of the things said. To them might be added the words of Mr. Asquith, Lord Roberts and others, but it seems unnecessary. If words have weight, these should suffice, when we add to them the facts that, in spite of the hostility of the "little Englanders" and extremists on whose votes the Government of the day in England largely depended, that Government has been obliged to sanction increased expenditure upon our Navy; that in spite of the sacrifice of other political considerations, our ships have been withdrawn from distant points and concentrated in home waters; that all over the Empire leagues have been formed to urge the necessity of further expenditure upon navy and military defence, of closer union between the component parts of the Empire, of universal service, of the education of our young men in the essential arts of rifle shooting, and even of our boys in drill and that which is succinctly termed scouting.

Of course, the strongest proof of the existence of the danger is the building of the German ships at enormous expense, whilst Germany's budget shows a deficit, ships suitable only for use against a near neighbour, ships built for the North Sea and exercised in the North Sea, with a base created also at enormous expense in that sea, and the continued strain upon the

German finances and the temper of the German lower classes for expenditures which only an imminent war with Britain could justify, a war which, if successful, would for Germany pay the cost in colonies and cash, in trade and captured ships, and for our Empire would mean dismemberment and ruin.

If these facts and words prove to reasonable men that the force of circumstances makes a conflict between Britain and Germany probable; if there is nothing in the national morals of Germany to prevent it; if history warns us that such conflicts have been precipitated in the immediate past by that country from purely selfish motives, and if no other construction can be put upon Germany's programme of shipbuilding and her establishment of naval bases in the North Sea, it becomes imperative for Canada to consider whether she is taking the precautions necessary under the circumstances.

Her own stake and interests in the possible war have already been indicated. They are sufficiently serious. To her, as to Britain, such a war would mean her continued existence or obliteration as an independent nation.

It is for Her to consider whether this war would be a sudden war, or one with years of warning. To the writer it seems that we have had our years of warning, and that the day of Britain's emergency has arrived; that Britain single-handed cannot expect to cope indefinitely with a vast European nation potentially greater in men and money; that our five nations must fight as one Empire, if we would be victorious, in which case I submit that, although the creation of a Canadian navy is altogether admirable, as a permanent policy, it does not meet the present needs.

If an emergency exists, Britain requires immediate, substantial help in Her fighting line, whereas such ships as we now possess or are to possess, instead of helping to protect, would require protection.

The least we can do is to follow the lead of the two smaller sister nations, and offer fighting ships untrammelled by conditions—now.

Shall we boast of our prosperity and plead poverty, in the same breath; vaunt ourselves of our manhood and cower under the protection of our old Mother or Her younger children; claim the first place amongst the younger nations, and voluntarily take the last?

CANADA'S NAVAL POLICY

I do not propose in this address to advocate my own personal views, but the views of that considerable portion of the Public which seem to be most nearly in accord with my own.

In practical politics, only such views as seem likely to secure the support of the Electorate have any immediate value, wherefore, the most that a man can do in an emergency is, to get as near to the attainment of his object as he can, with the assistance of those he can persuade to agree with him in part or altogether.

Now, the object of the Navy League, I take it, is to strengthen our Empire, by adding as much as possible to that basis of its corporate existence—The Navy.

If those friends of the League who read this will keep this object clearly in view, they will the more easily understand my position, and be the more ready to support a policy which may not go as far as either I or they might wish, rather than press for an extreme policy which we could not possibly carry.

Those who refuse to support a policy because it is not all they wish, are as foolish and as dangerous as those who denounce Canada's "tin pot navy," thereby making it impossible for that to grow, to which they only object on the score of its diminutive size.

Help it to grow, gentlemen, instead of trying to laugh it out of existence. There are just as honest men as you are trying to make this experiment a success, and they will want all the help that you can give them.

Personally, I believe, like many better qualified to form an opinion, that the cheapest and most effective aid which Canada could give to the Common Navy of the Empire would be a contribution in cash to be spent in the building of ships by those most competent to build them, in that place in which the greatest facilities for ship building exist, and in this connection it is well to remember that ship building is a highly specialized industry, which cannot be created, either as to its men or its machinery, at short notice.

Moreover, a number of the minor trades necessary for the completion of a battleship could only subsist in a centre where *many* ships are built. If such trades established themselves in a small centre, where only a few ships were built annually, they would be idle half the year.

It is also worth while to remember how many years it took the States to learn to build their own ships.

But this is only one side of the question, and even if the stronger arguments are on this side, which I do not assert, it is useless to consider them.

Canada could not be persuaded to "pay tribute," as She calls it, and any attempt to persuade Her, would alienate Her sympathy, and be a mere waste of time, and time, if our need is real, is the one thing which we cannot afford to waste.

It will not hurt us to waste a little money. If it teaches us anything, it won't be wasted; but we cannot afford to waste time.

At present, Canada has elected to do something, but to take Her own time in the doing of it, and Her own way; and, after all, the policy of building by driblets is not a policy peculiar to this part of the Empire. England Herself has set the pernicious example.

If She is really in imminent danger; if She indeed wishes to put a stop to competition in ship building which is draining Her life blood, irritating without crippling Her rival, and certain eventually to lead to war, it would be wiser to raise a great loan at once with which to build a fleet beyond the reach of competition.

It would not only be wiser to do this, but in the long run it would be cheaper.

Britain's fleet is Her all in all.

A little successful war in South Africa cost her £300,000,000; a great unsuccessful war would cost Her everything, and I confess that I am not enough of a mathematician to express that in figures, but the ships which I understand Lord Charles Beresford to have asked for would cost £50,000,000, and an invincible fleet such as would stop this war of the workshops, £100,000,000.

Even that apostle of peace, Mr. Cobden, said in 1861, "I would vote £100,000,000 rather than allow the French Navy to be increased to a level with ours, because I should say any attempt of that sort without any legitimate grounds would argue some sinister design upon this country."

What applied to France in 1861 may be applied to Germany in 1910, especially after the pronouncement of Herr Gadke to the effect that Germany's fleet was already larger than was needed for protective purposes.

If the cost of a war be such as I have stated it to be, and the prevention of one, such as my authorities suggest, what kind of fools are we, on both sides of the water, to hesitate a moment about putting up that £100,000,000?

Even Mr. Hyndman, the veteran socialist leader, so I read in a recent issue of the *Morning Post*, endorses the idea of a great national loan for the Navy, adding, of course, a rider to the effect that the money should

be derived from those who have plenty of it, by which he probably means from that old British milch cow, the Landed Class.

It is, perhaps, almost too much to expect, even from the class to which England owes most, but yet if it were possible for that class to voluntarily tax itself to raise this money, such action would be a splendid answer to those radicals who teach that our land owners' resistance to certain taxes, comes, not from a sense of injustice, but from parsimony.

I have digressed, and I apologize; let me get back.

The policy which has found favor with those branches of the Navy League with which I am connected in Canada, and which has been endorsed, at any rate, from Victoria to Winnipeg, is contained in the following resolution:

"This meeting endorses the present policy of the Government of Canada as being the best permanent policy for the Dominion, but recognizing that an emergency exists, urges an immediate additional contribution in dreadnaughts or cash to the Imperial authorities, under such conditions as may be mutually agreed upon, and further affirms that the entire naval service of Canada should pass automatically under the control of the Imperial authorities on the threat or outbreak of hostilities."

Those who endorse this resolution understand that the present policy of the Canadian Government provides for the gradual building of a Canadian unit of the Imperial Navy in Canada, by Canadians, with Canadian money, for service in all quarters of that Empire of which Canada is a part, and they lay stress upon the word "permanent," because, whilst it is felt that to grow slowly but continuously must be better than to "put up a lump sum and have done with it," it is also acknowledged that our permanent policy by itself is manifestly inadequate to cope with an emergency.

This difference between a permanent policy and one to meet an emergency must not be lost sight of. A Canadian navy built as we are proposing to build it, may become a useful addition to Britain's fighting power *in the future*, but would be no good at all, if the summons to arms came next year.

Therefore it is that we have tried to prove elsewhere that an emergency exists, and therefore we urge for the Empire's sake, and to save Canada's honour, that She should follow the example of New Zealand, and make an immediate additional contribution in dreadnaughts or cash.

Let us consider for a moment what the Government's policy is, although our sources of information are still somewhat vague and confused.

As I understand it, when we first began seriously to consider these matters, the record stood something like this. The Colonies owned one-seventh of the commerce which the British Navy protected or insured; the revenue of the combined Colonies was nearly half that of the Mother Country; the Colonies had fifty times as much territory to guard as the Mother Country, and towards the insurance of the commerce and the protection of this territory the Colonies contributed between them, not one-seventh of the cost, but one-ninetieth, and perhaps it would be best for us not to ask how much Canada contributed, even to this pitiful mite.

At this point, Canadian pride revolted, and the business men of Canada also awoke to the fact that it was just as necessary to insure their sea-borne commerce as their business or lives.

As a result, certain proposals for assisting in the naval defence of the Empire were discussed at the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, and, although it may not be necessary to set out in detail these various proposals, it may be stated generally that the Admiralty laid down that unity of command and unity

of training were essential, and that the smallest fleet which would be of any real use should consist of at least one armoured cruiser (of the Indomitable Class), three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, and that of these the Indomitable must be built first. It was estimated that such a fleet unit would cost about \$18,500,000 to build, and \$3,000,000 a year for upkeep.

It will be observed that the Dreadnaught was the first essential, and unity of command a prime necessity, but Canada did not see Her way to build a Dreadnaught, and some doubt has been created as to Her acceptance of the doctrine of unity of command.

Since, then, Canada would not accept the Admiralty's smallest scheme which could be of "any real use" (for fighting *now*?), two alternative schemes seem to have been submitted by the Admiralty.

(1) Four cruisers of the Bristol Class; one cruiser of the Boadicea class; and six destroyers.

(2) Two cruisers of the Bristol Class on the Pacific, and one Bristol and four destroyers on the Atlantic.

Whilst the ships recommended in either of these schemes were being constructed, it was suggested that two cruisers (Apollos) might be lent to train the personnel, whilst docks to hold dreadnaughts might be built on the St. Lawrence, Atlantic and Pacific.

This was in July, 1909.

Now, what have we and our poorer and less populous sister nations done since that date?

Let me deal first with Australia and New Zealand.

Of these, Australia, with a population of 4,000,000 and a revenue of \$70,000,000 (I am writing in round figures), eventually agreed to supply a Fleet unit to consist of: One armoured cruiser (New Indomitable Class), three unarmoured cruisers (Bristols), six Destroyers (River Class), three submarines (C. Class); to cost approximately \$18,500,000 for building, and \$3,750,000 p. a. for maintenance.

In addition to this, I understand that \$1,000,000 were raised by public subscription, and devoted to the foundation of a Naval Training College and training farms for British immigrants.

New Zealand, with a population of less than 1,000,000, and a revenue of \$45,000,000, at first offered "to bear the cost of immediate building and arming by the British Government of one first-class battleship of the latest type. If subsequent events show it to be necessary, will also bear cost of second warship of the same type."

The latest apparently reliable information which I have is contained in the following paragraph from the *Navy League Journal*, June, 1910: "By the end of next year the Australian and New Zealand units, each consisting of thirteen modern ships with a Dreadnaught at the head, will be ready to leave for the Antipodes."

Of course, some of them have already left.

Now, let us consider what Canada, with a population of 8,000,000 and a revenue of \$96,000,000, has done, and, in order to avoid any suspicion of party bias, I propose to show Sir Wilfrid Laurier's policy as it was understood by a great English Weekly which no sane man would accuse of prejudice against the party in power at Ottawa.

The English Spectator of January 15th, 1910, writing of the introduction of the Bill for creating a Canadian navy, dwelt with enthusiasm upon the indivisibility of Empire, and quoted with approval that clause in the Bill which provides that "in case of emergency, the Governor-in-Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy, the naval service (of Canada), or any part thereof," and Sir Wilfrid Laurier's explanation that "an emergency means war anywhere in which Great Britain is engaged. If Great Britain is at war, Canada is at war, and is immediately liable to invasion."

The *Spectator* then went on to define the Canadian Government's naval policy as providing four ships of the Bristol Class, one of the Boadicea type, and six destroyers, to be divided between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The cost to Canada, it was assumed, would be about £2,338,000 if the ships were built in England, or about twenty-two per cent. more if the ships were built in Canada.

A naval college on the lines of the Military College at Kingston was also a part of the scheme, and (though this was not mentioned in the *Spectator*), it was reported on the West Coast that a visiting member of the Cabinet, Mr. Pugsley, had said that the Government would see the necessity of building large drydocks on the Atlantic and Pacific, capable of accommodating the largest warship.

This programme, as a whole, though it did not come quite up to the minimum suggested by the British Admiralty, and made no provision to meet an emergency, had in it much to recommend it to our people.

The idea of a Canadian unit of the Imperial Navy to be built and manned by us, especially caught Canada's fancy.

No one, we argued, takes as much interest in an article which he buys ready made, as he does in one he makes himself, even though the one he makes is inferior to the one he buys.

Therefore, Canada will take more interest in the fleet which her own men build, than in one which other men build for her.

There is (we said) a certain amount of employment and profit for the working classes, in the building of ships, and if anyone is to have that employment and make that profit, it should be those who provide the money for the building.

If it is true that for some of the skilled work we shall be obliged to import skilled mechanics, we are

quite content to do so, because we want men in this country more than we want anything else, and especially skilled men of our own breed.

Even if at first it should cost us more to build a ship in Canada than it would cost us to get a better one built for us in England, we are content to pay the extra price for the benefits already referred to, and for the establishment in Canada of the important industry of ship building.

Besides all this, we thought that we saw in the Laurier policy of building ships in Canada some very manifest advantages for the Empire.

If carried out, it should create a national naval spirit, which is the only permanent basis of naval power; it should engender a spirit of emulation between the different dominions which could only inure to the advantage of the Empire; it would ensure the establishment and protection of Coaling Stations and repair shops, and the creation of building slips, which are, after all, as important as dreadnaughts.

On the other hand, this programme was admittedly something less than the least of the Admiralty's suggestions, and (a sore point with us), less than the contributions of our younger, poorer and less populous sister nations.

But what we have actually done so far, seems to be nothing more than this:

We have purchased one old, first-class cruiser, the "Niobe," the original cost price of which was, long ago, £535,603, and one third-class cruiser, the "Rainbow," the original cost of which was, a much longer time ago, £185,094.

I have seen newspaper reports of ships which we had ordered, or which we contemplated ordering, but these reports were unconfirmed, and I submit that, though these two old boats may be, and no doubt are, excellent as training ships, they are of no particular value as an addition to that Pacific Fleet for which

our younger sister nations are providing such useful units.

At that I leave it. It is not my business as a loyal subject of the Crown to ridicule the beginnings of our infant navy, but, having, as I believe, good warrant for maintaining that a crisis in the affairs of Britain is approaching, it is my duty to point out that unless that crisis is postponed for twenty years, the aid offered by Canada will not be of very material value in the fighting line, and, therefore, it is reasonable for every Canadian who has the Empire's safety or Canada's honour at heart to press upon his political representative for such an immediate additional aid as will enable us to take such a place in the present as we all of us aspire to in the future.

Our scheme of building a national navy for ourselves is excellent as a permanent policy, but think what it means if time is really of the essence of our contract.

The Government, we are told, will avoid all unnecessary delay. No doubt it will, but there are the sites for the building yards to be chosen, and it will take some time and a good deal of political ingenuity to decide between the rival claims of Montreal, Halifax, St. Johns (perhaps), Victoria, and Vancouver, to become the sites for the building yards.

It will take time, a year perhaps, to equip the yards to build the ships, and then there are the ships to be built.

Even if the sites are decided upon in a year, if the yards are equipped in another year, if the ships are successfully completed at the first essay in two more years, it will be 1914 before we are ready to render any real assistance to the Empire, and those who should know point to 1913 as the year of our peril.

The final clause in the resolution quoted deals with indivisibility of control, a subject about which there

may be some apparent confusion at present, but about which there can be no dispute upon closer examination.

We are either British, or we are not. These addresses are written for Britons. I know nothing of any other people in Canada. I have never met any others.

If we are British, the Empire's wars are our wars. If we are not ready to fight at the call of the Empire, then we are not British. As Britons, we are, of course, liable to attack from those who are at war with our Empire, and the mere words of our Parliament would not save us. Moreover, all our power to legislate, whether upon the use of our fleet or any other subject, was conferred upon us by an Imperial enactment of the Mother Country, and the power which passed the North America Act could, I suppose, repeal it.

The point has been ably argued by Mr. Northrup, M.P., in his speech of March 10th, 1910, but it is of comparatively small importance. That which counts, is the will of the People of Canada. They let their politicians talk. That is what they keep them for. In the time of need, the People will act, and in that time they will not question whether Britain is wrong or right, but at the first flap of Her old flag they'll fight.

That, we know, is the only way in which men can know anything—from the lessons of experience.

But, however certain we may be ourselves of the Nation's action when the time of trial comes, it behooves us to remember that others cannot be expected to decide accurately which public utterances are merely political and which national, and to remember that Britain and Britain's enemies realize quite clearly that a fleet which is not immediately available in case of need, one which can only be relied upon if party politicians allow its use, is not only valueless to a commander, but is a real source of danger to him as tempting him to miscalculate his strength.

The whole trend of public opinion in the other dominions appears to have been in favour of unity of command and complete interchangeability. They want "one great Imperial Navy with all the overseas Dominion contributing either ships or money." This is what we want.

One last argument. If you enter your boys, as I hope you will, in this Canadian Navy, think of the difference it will make to *them* whether this Navy is separate or an integral part of one Great Whole.

If it is separate, it will never be large enough in their lifetime to offer them a career wide enough for their ambition, but if it be an indivisible, interchangeable portion of the great British Navy, before them will lie a matchless career, with, as the prize of it, the position of the Supreme Sea Captain of the World's greatest sea power.

POSTSCRIPT

This postscript is written principally for the people of British Columbia.

The subject of it is of importance to Britain as a whole, and to Canada as a Dominion; to British Columbia, it is of supreme importance.

In every town which I visited during my Eastern tour, I was met by some such remarks as these:

"You are overlooking the real difficulty. We can get the ships whenever we choose to pay for them, but we cannot man them, unless we bring men out from the Old Country, and those, if we bring them, we shall not be able to keep as sailors. When the ordinary wages of able-bodied men on the Pacific Coast run from \$2.50 to \$3.00 a day, how can you expect to get men as seamen at something like 60 cents a day?"

Here a sailor man, with twenty years' experience, broke in:—

"You can't do it. We could not do it in the East, and we had a better chance than you. From Cape Canso to Shelburn, the people are all fishermen, good men, good sailors, and yet when I wanted men for the survey boat, I could not get them.

"It was the same with that fishery protection cruiser, the 'Canada,' though she paid a little more for her men.

"Men! I tell you that since the industrial development took place in Eastern Canada, I have seen whole fleets of fishing boats on the Nova Scotian Coast, lying idle because they could not get crews.

"We always paid the current rates of the ports we were in for our men, and when I first went there, I paid \$14.00 a month and 'all found.' That was in 1891.

"In 1903, I had to pay from \$24.00 to \$30.00 a month and all found, and even then had to go to Newfoundland to get my crew.

"Sailoring is not a sufficiently well paid job to tempt men much in a new country. It is not because the life is a hard one. It isn't. The bluejacket has a good time, and is extremely well looked after. If he only gets about one shilling and eightpence a day at home, he can double that by qualifying in gunnery, torpedo work, or signalling; he gets a good pension whilst he is still young enough to secure a well-paid job ashore, but the average Canadian does not know this, and if he did, it would not look very attractive to him, compared to \$3.00 a day and personal freedom."

The experience of the sister service in British Columbia seems to corroborate these statements. Everyone has heard of the difficulty we have found in obtaining recruits, and, although we have not yet heard any complaint from our new training ship, we shall be very much relieved if we find that the "Rainbow" can get all the men she wants.

It is not, at any rate, going too far to suggest, that

Britain wants sailors more than She wants anything else, and that the raw material from which sailors are made is not easily procurable on this Coast.

In this connection, it is to be remembered that Britain has in all Her wars depended a great deal upon what people call the personal equation; that she expects to atone for Her want of quantity by the quality of that which She has, and that if this is so, *any* raw material is not good enough for the making of Britain's bluejackets.

It is true that Germany draws seventy per cent. of Her sailors from rural and urban districts far from sight or sound of the sea, but in spite of two and a half years of education at high pressure, She does not succeed in producing anything better than a highly drilled yokel in a sea kit.

This is not the same thing as a British Tar, and the fortune of our future may just turn on this fact.

Even a dreadnaught without a full and efficient crew, would be a mere mass of dead iron, and a crew cho^l-eful of initiative and courage would be almost useless without discipline and seamanship.

We must have the best material for the making of our bluejackets, and we must be able to keep them long enough to make them perfect.

There is one very hopeful condition in our environment.

Fishermen make the best sailors, and the natural industry of this Coast is fishing.

Glance at the Reports of the Marine and Fisheries Department. There you will find that the two great fishing Provinces of Canada are Nova Scotia and British Columbia, and that, although Nova Scotia has been in the fishing business for three hundred years, whereas British Columbia has hardly been in existence as a Province for one-sixth of that time; although British Columbia barely employs one man to Nova Scotia's three, the younger Province runs the older one a very

close race for first place as a fish producer, and in one year (1905) beat the older Province by \$1,500,000.

If you will look a little more closely into these Reports, you will see that even the few men we do employ are mostly employed in catching salmon about our river mouths, and that, though the waters about our northern coasts are almost fabulously rich in fish, we are only employing enough men in our deep sea fisheries to show how great a return we might win from them if we would.

I said that we are only employing about one man in our fisheries to every three men employed by Nova Scotia. I might add that we are not employing one man for every ten who could find profitable employment if our fishing business were fully organized.

There is a Japanese fishing village at Steveston, but where are the white fishing hamlets on our coast to correspond to those of the English or Nova Scotian shores?

It is from these that our bluejackets come.

That great authority upon the fishing industry, Sir George Doughty, was out here this year, and found that "all kinds of fish abound in British Columbia's waters, but," he adds, "I am sorry to see that they are almost absolutely neglected. It is pitiable to see these fisheries in the condition they are. *Yellow labour seems likely to dominate the situation.* Colonies of white fishermen should be established on the Coast, which should not only carry on the industry, but control it. When the Grand Trunk Pacific gets its line through to the Coast, it will offer means of transportation, etc."

There is the whole story in a nutshell. Britain wants sailors; the men who fish in the deep seas are the best material for the making of sailors; the deep seas of British Columbia are teeming with fish, and Prince Rupert in a few years will be the natural port of the deep sea fleets, the shipping point for the fish

food with which we shall feed the prairies and even Asia, *but* we have not the men here to fish those deep seas, and if we are not very careful the yellow men will monopolize our deep sea fisheries, and drive us off our own halibut banks, as they have already been allowed to drive the white men off the Fraser. That which should have been a small nursery for British sailors, has become an exercising ground for Japanese boatmen, and, already, it is very doubtful if anyone knows our Coast waters as well as our Japanese allies. As long as they are allies, perhaps that does not matter, but alliances are not for ever. "The only thoroughly healthy state," let me repeat Bismarck's maxim, "is a thoroughly selfish one," and if you glance at Mr. Satori Kato's article upon the Mastery of the Pacific, you will see that he quite realizes that it would be a blunder to expect that, under all circumstances, "the allied two States could for ever mutually agree," whilst if you glance at some recent American publications, or intelligently at the facts around you, you will realize that the position already attained by the Japanese in relation to this Coast is at least as strong as it is safe for it to be.

Remember, that one of Nature's laws is that a vacuum must be filled; remember that we have about one man to a mile of the best land on earth; remember that the Japanese are a very crowded people, a race of fishermen and fruit growers, to whom British Columbia offers an ideal opening.

They are a seafaring race, these Japs; they are a militant, expanding people. They may not have contributed so much to the conquest of Russia, as Russia's own mistakes did, and they may be suffering from seriously swollen heads which will yet get them into trouble, but they are dangerously elated, and they are curiously persistent in the way in which they are intruding themselves into this Western country on both sides of the line.

I cannot be absolutely sure of my facts, but I have fair warrant for saying that Hawaii is now a Japanese base; that it has been peacefully conquered by the Japanese: that there are at least six or seven Japanese in Hawaii for every European there; that they own some 60,000 acres of the best fruit land of California; that they dominate the fruit growing of one district, the peach growing of another, and the rice farming of Texas, whilst in British Columbia there are at least from 9,000 to 10,000 Japanese men, scattered amongst our sparse white population, and these men are of fighting age, fresh from a victorious war, drilled, trained and armed.

Ask any competent soldier what he could do with 10,000 well trained fighting men in such a country as ours, with such a fleet as Japan controls to support him.

Already, the Japanese have driven our fisher folk from the Fraser; they have beaten our Coast fishermen at their own trade; they have got a great deal of the boat building into their hands, and they are mining in a very large and independent way along our Coasts.

In every direction, they are intruding dangerously.

Can we afford to let them get control of our deep sea fishing, to the exclusion of those white men upon whom our future as a nation depends?

As they have done in other trades, they will do in the deep sea fishing. They will work for less than the white man until they have drawn the business into their hands. Then they will raise their prices, having killed competition.

It seems to me, that the deep sea fishing industry, of which in a few years' time Prince Rupert will be the centre, is the most important matter now upon our horizon, because it will be, if properly handled, not only an enormous source of wealth to us, but a nursery for those sailors without whom Ships are useless.

But to be any good to us, we must take active steps to secure our own fish for our own people, and *the industry for those who can if necessary man our fleets.*

That is the point to which I have been working. We want the waters of British Columbia as a nursery for British sailors; we don't want them to be turned into a place of exercise for our present allies, who may possibly become our foes in the future.

To secure these desirable conditions, prompt action is necessary.

It is known that practically unlimited British Capital is ready for use in the development of this deep sea fishing business, and that to be successful the industry must be founded upon a very broad base.

We have to do more than catch the fish. We have to provide for their handling, curing, transportation and marketing, and all this upon such a scale as only the strongest Capitalists could attempt.

But we are assured that the money can be had, if satisfactory arrangements can be made with the Dominion and Provincial Governments. What these are, subsidies in land or cash, or exemptions of any kind, I do not know, but, bearing in mind British Columbia's readiness to bonus anything in the way of a manufacturing industry, from an American peanut stand upwards, I would plead for the utmost generosity towards those who will found British Columbia's natural industry upon a firm basis, *provided that such laws be enforced as would make it possible only for those eligible for service in His Majesty's Navy, to engage in our deep sea fishery.* That need give offence to no one, and, if a Jap does not happen to be big enough to make a bluejacket, is that our fault?

Our Premier has shown himself a strong friend of the working man, in the resolute stand he has made against Oriental labour, although his position has been made exceedingly difficult by the impossibility of

obtaining white domestic labour for our new settlers and fruit growers.

We can, I think, trust him to protect our fishing grounds and keep British Columbia's most important industry for those who may sooner or later be called upon to protect them for us, and he, in turn, may rely upon the support of a united people already strongly attached to him.

Domestic labour is not congenial to the white people of the West; deep sea fishing is.

