

# STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES



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## SOME ELEMENTS OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Extracts from a Statement to the House of Commons on November 28, 1963, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Paul Martin.

...As we all know, there are certain factors which condition our responses to the shifting international events of our time. Factors such as history, our traditions, our resources, our geographical location and our cultural composition are present at all times, whatever the issue happens to be or whatever government in Canada finds itself in power, and they combine to create what I would call a natural Canadian reaction to any major international development. At the very least, these continuing factors tend to define the limits within which Canadian policy can develop and still remain true to our national values. They give a general continuity to Canadian policy which transcends party considerations, and I am sure that all Honourable Members would wish to see continued the non-partisan spirit that customarily has been reflected in our external policies.

### Canada - U.S. Relations

Just as there is a constant theme running through Canadian foreign policy over the years, so also do I believe there is a continuity of external policies on the part of our great neighbour to the South. Even so profound a tragedy as that which befell the United States just a week ago will not alter in any fundamental way the firm but wise and humane qualities which generally have been the hallmark of American leadership on the great international issues of our times, those affecting peace and war, and the task of raising living standards of the less fortunate peoples of the world. The wanton crime which ended a brilliant young life and career, striking grief into the hearts of all citizens of the world, as the late President Kennedy often called his fellow human beings, may lead to a pause while the new President gathers to himself the strands of office; but the course of American policy, as we know now from his statement yesterday, remains unchanged. The values by which John Kennedy lived, and for which he died, will live on. I know the House will join with me in extending to the President of the United States our best wishes and our pledge of Canadian co-operation in discharging the arduous responsibilities which have fallen to him.

Among the tasks which will confront him are a number of important and delicate questions affecting Canadian-United States relations....

Institutional and personal relations between these two countries are so varied and so intertwined that problems are bound to be manifold, and some conflict of interest cannot be avoided in intercourse between two nations. But without continuous communication in an effort to find solutions that will satisfy the interests of the United States and Canada, no tolerable solutions will be found. It has therefore been a primary objective of government policy to see to it that a genuine dialogue was resumed at all levels between our two countries. This process was begun at Hyannis Port and has been maintained ever since through a variety of channels. It is our intention that it should be continued uninterrupted, however difficult the problems may seem, and I believe it was not without significance that the Canadian Prime Minister was among the first, along with the President of France, to be received by the new President of the United States on Monday last.

At this meeting with President Johnson, which I attended, it was clearly evident that the President regards the relations between our two countries as important, and I can say it was quite evident that he will derive considerable satisfaction from continuous contacts with the Prime Minister of Canada.

#### East-West Relations

In assessing the international atmosphere as a whole, which is one of the things I wish to do in this statement, the state of relations between the Communists and the rest of us is of course basic. Some other problems, particularly that of assisting the peoples of the less-developed countries to advance into full participation in mankind's heritage of dignity, freedom and welfare, are no less difficult and, in the long run, even more important, but it is relations with the Communist countries that have involved the risk of war and have demanded the diversion to defence of vast resources that, in a more settled world, could be used for the purposes of instruction and well-being.

It is, therefore, with some sense of satisfaction that one can compare the general international situation today with what it was a year ago. At that time, the world stood on the very brink of nuclear war as the result of a sudden, secret deployment of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. We now know...that a year ago...the nations looked for the first time right down into the pit of nuclear fire. That Soviet clandestine move produced the most dangerous crisis of the post-war period; but it was one that, I believe, may mark a new chapter in East-West relations. Happily, that situation was resolved in a way which not only avoided open conflict but opened up new avenues for reducing tensions. It was typical of the late President of the United States that at the peak of that crisis he had the foresight to speak of peace.

But the major political problems of the world remain, in Germany, in Indochina, in Cuba. The problem of Berlin access is with us still, as recent tense moments on the Autobahn have reminded us. These and other problems caused by Stalin's division of Germany and Europe remain as grave sources of tension in the world, potentially as dangerous as Cuba. So when I speak of satisfaction at the improvement in the world political situation during the past year, I do not suggest that there are any grounds for complacency. Critical problems in adjusting relations between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds remain. Of course,

it is not possible to define precisely what prompted the Soviet authorities to co-operate in concluding certain limited, tension-easing agreements, of which the partial test ban treaty is the most significant, after some years of refusing these same proposals. Doubtless a variety of factors entered into the decision. One Soviet motive may have been a desire to reduce the risk of war; for there is no question in my mind but that the Soviet people, like our own, ardently desire peace and that Cuba was a sobering lesson for everyone. Another motive was, I think, economic, since the partial test ban treaty seems likely to limit the extension of the arms race into even more sophisticated and expensive areas of development. The Soviet leaders probably also share with us a desire to discourage the dissemination of nuclear weapons under the independent control of more and more governments, a development which could vastly increase the danger of accidental war and make much more complicated, and perhaps hopeless, the prospect of achieving disarmament.

Evolution within the Communist bloc may have exerted considerable influence. In Eastern Europe the Soviet Union's allies now enjoy a greater freedom to manoeuvre than was possible a few years ago. I think this was highlighted the other day when my colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce and I received in our offices a member of the Government of Bulgaria who had come to Canada to discuss with us matters involved in a prospective trade treaty. Although on key international issues such as disarmament and Germany and Berlin the bloc countries give apparently unquestioning support to the Soviet Union, it is nevertheless evident that on internal policy relating to collectivization of agriculture, de-Stalinization, and so on, and on bloc economic policies, there are variations which indicate clearly that differing national requirements and interests are more and more taken into account.

Moreover, there seems to be some increase in the realism of the Soviet leaders on the essential issues of Soviet-Western relations, and this realism may make possible in due course limited agreements on a number of other issues to complement and consolidate the relaxation begun by the achievement of the limited test ban agreement. The dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States, as the leading representative of the West, has been resumed and it is to continue, as President Johnson's first message to Chairman Khrushchov indicated yesterday.

#### China and U.S.S.R.

A major factor in Soviet thinking, of course, is the problem of its relations with Communist China. While we have long known that there were serious differences between the Soviet Union and China, and that China has never been a true satellite of the Soviet Union, the new element is the unrestrained public disclosure of the extent of the rift. The dispute now appears to have been carried into the field of inter-state relations, affecting economic, political and possibly even territorial aspects. It would be unwise, of course, to judge how far these differences may yet be carried, for the sobering fact is that they are still agreed as to their basic aim, the extension of Communism throughout the world. Their differences are related primarily to the means by which this aim can best be achieved, although in the process national and racial considerations appear to have become involved.

Neither do I wish to minimize, however, the significance of the nature of their differences over method. Communist China maintains an attitude of unreasoning militancy while the Soviet Union proclaims the policy of peaceful coexistence. The Communist dogma of the inevitability of war is thus at the very root of Sino-Soviet differences. How this conflict of view between the two leading nations competing for influence and domination of the international Communist movement is resolved can have the most profound influence on the peace of the world for years to come.

There can be little doubt of the aggressive nature of current Chinese policies. Quite apart from China's often proclaimed call for active prosecution of wars of liberation, her adherence to the doctrine of the inevitability of war, her rejection of the test ban treaty, and similar evidence of a hard attitude, Communist China has provided a modern example of expansionism through her limited invasion of India last year. A statement at the time revealed that her object was not only the promotion of territorial claims, but the diverting of India's economic resources to defence and the discrediting of India's democratic process. It had all the evidence of a bid to demonstrate to other nations that the principal power in Asia was Communist China, not India. It is also noteworthy that the Soviet Union condemned China for its intransigence in refusing to negotiate the border settlement with India on the basis of the so-called Colombo Proposals, and reiterated its belief that negotiations are better than war....

The dispute between Communist China and the Soviet Union is likely to force both of these countries to re-examine the fundamentals of their relations with the rest of the world.

We should be careful, however, not to become complacent at the sight of the two Communist giants openly quarrelling between themselves. There are factors which could make them keep their dispute, despite the evident contradictions, within bounds. But quite apart from this, it does not follow that bad relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China will necessarily mean any improvement in relations between either of them and the West, nor even necessarily any benefit to the non-Communist world in which they are already competing for influence.

#### China's Dangerous Isolation

How, then, are we to deal with the Communist Chinese colossus, whose annual population increase is equal to the present population of Canada? For almost the entire period of its existence Communist China has been effectively isolated from the non-Communist world, partly as a result of Western policies but partly out of deliberate choice. We have had a recent example of China taking an initiative to intensify its own isolation. The test ban treaty was a step, albeit a small one, away from the arms race and, therefore, away from war. It is unfortunate and ominous that the Peking authorities chose to express strong opposition to it, in sharp contrast to its ready acceptance by the vast majority of the nations of the world.

So we must carefully consider whether the degree of isolation which now surrounds Communist China is healthy, whether it promotes international peace or tends to intensify the threat to it. At one time, the Soviet Union

was in a similar state of isolation. I wonder how many of us believe that Soviet isolation served the interest of world peace? I well remember Mr. Vishinsky saying in the United Nations that never would he allow the windows of the Soviet Union to be opened to the ideas of the West. And the nations of the West at that time, for the most part, strove to establish contact with the Soviet Union along lines which have now clearly become better established.

Some means must be found to remove the suspicion and ignorance which feeds on isolation. The lesson of the last years seems to point toward increased contacts. Whether those contacts take the form of scientific and cultural exchanges or of limited agreements, they serve to lower the barriers of hostility. I do not suggest it would be appropriate to rush into some new formal relationship at this time with the Chinese people's Communist republic. The avowed intention of Peking to occupy Formosa stands as a serious obstacle to both the seating of Communist China in the United Nations at this time and to the recognition of the Peking regime. But I suggest that the increasing ostracism of Communist China from the world community may be self-defeating and a potential threat to international stability. It is not too soon to begin in the West to formulate realistic and far-sighted policies toward this Asian giant.

Trade, of course, has a special place in the process of overcoming the mistrust which exists between the West and the entire Communist bloc. The Soviet Union and other Communist countries are facing a particularly difficult problem of resource allocation at the present time, and both the nature of this problem and the attempts to deal with it will have important implications not only for the domestic and foreign policies of those countries but for East-West relations in general.

What are the implications for Canada of the developments which I have been discussing? First, it must be understood that we are bound by treaty obligations, by tradition and by national interest to the Atlantic world and to those countries which derive historically, economically and politically from Western Europe. Interdependence is a fact of international life, and Canadian relations with the Communist world are inevitably governed by the general state of relations between the two great military groupings, particularly those of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is neither possible nor desirable that our relations with the Communist world should be significantly better or worse than the relations of our closest friends and allies with the Communist world. Within those limits, however, there are certain possibilities open to us which could serve our interests and those of our allies. I believe profoundly that the long-term solution of East-West problems will come through the slow evolution of Communist thinking about their own methods and objectives, and about the outside world. It will not help if the Soviet leaders continue to feel that the West is totally alien and implacably hostile. Breaking down this dangerous misconception is the political reason behind our encouragement of cultural and other contacts, and it should also be the political reason for our trade with Communist countries.

So, for these broad political considerations, as well as for the commercial advantages which accrue to Canada, a country vitally dependent upon its exports, the Government intends to allow non-strategic trade with the

Communist world to develop. We believe that through trade we shall encourage the evolution of institutions and attitudes in the Communist countries more favourable to co-operation with the rest of the world.

### Recent Easing of Tension

It is essential, I believe, to assess realistically the elements which have contributed to the better atmosphere which undoubtedly does prevail at the present time....

Apart from the critical role of the Cuban crisis in stimulating a re-examination of policies in both the East and the West, the concrete steps taken toward the easing of tensions have in fact been few in number. They consist exclusively of measures to slow down the arms race or reduce the danger of a sudden outbreak of war, but they leave completely unresolved all the political problems which could give rise to war.

The measures are three limited agreements, all falling within the general field, which might be classed as preliminary to disarmament. First, a direct emergency communications system has been established between Washington and Moscow which should do much to ensure that war between East and West does not come about as a result of accident or miscalculation. The difficulty encountered in communicating rapidly at the time of the Cuban crisis was evidently enough to induce the Soviet Union to accept this measure, which the United States had first proposed in April 1962.

Second, there was the Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapons testing in all environments except underground, signed by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union on August 5, 1963. Canada signed the treaty in the capitals of the three depository governments on August 8, 1963. It was an unprecedented first step toward limiting, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the production of nuclear weapons, and of course it carried with it the enormous human dividend of removing the most serious source of radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and seas.

But above all the signature of this treaty by the nuclear powers, and its subsequent acceptance by over 100 states, proved that by patient exploration agreements can be arrived at which serve the interests of both East and West. Its real significance lies in the prospect it holds out for a broader settlement of East-West questions by the same process. On the Western side, it was accomplished without any sacrifice of principle or of security, and involved no political concessions....

The third limited agreement was that reached at the United Nations between the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from stationing or orbiting nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space. This took the form of separate expressions of intention by the Soviet Union and the United States, which were welcomed by a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly in October last;...this is a measure which successive Canadian Governments have advocated.

It is to be noted that none of these agreements constitutes an actual reduction or elimination of weapons and armed forces. None the less the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva have been productive. The Committee has played an important role in helping the major powers to reach agreement on all three measures. Even in the field of general disarmament the Committee has made a valuable contribution toward narrowing the areas of difference between the Communist and Western positions.

#### Disarmament Problems Remain

Important gaps still persist, however, and I would not wish to leave the impression that progress on actual disarmament is likely to be quick and easy. The Soviet position on control, inspection and verification is not giving any evidence of moving in the direction which the West regards as essential.

The outlook, therefore, for disarmament is fraught with problems, and the Eighteen-Nation Committee faces an enormous task. In the view of the Canadian Government, among those measures designed to increase mutual confidence the Committee might give priority to the examination of measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack by land forces, such as the establishment of ground observation posts. If these posts have sufficient liberty to observe within an adequate radius of action, they could give assurance against the possibility of sudden war. I appreciate, however, that discussion is likely to be difficult, as the Soviet Union tends to try to couple intrinsically worthwhile measures of this kind with unacceptable conditions, at least unacceptable to the Western countries. The Soviet approach to disarmament has always been heavily influenced by its policies toward Central Europe, and toward Germany in particular. Their latest objective seems to be to induce the United States and Canada to withdraw their forces across the Atlantic and thereby remove the North American presence, which is, to the great majority of Europeans, the tangible evidence of our commitment to their effective defence. The Western response to all these overtures must of necessity be such as will take into account the exigencies of NATO defence as well as the need to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

It is difficult to maintain the momentum toward disarmament engendered by the limited agreements which have been reached, especially in the face of political setbacks such as the renewal of Soviet harassment in the Berlin corridor. Yet it would be wrong to slacken our efforts for, as in the case of the limited test ban and the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, a seemingly endless and inconclusive discussion can lead suddenly to progress and achievement. We owe it to ourselves and to humanity to persist in our efforts to achieve disarmament within conditions of security that will create the kind of international climate which in turn may encourage the settlement of some of the major political problems dividing East and West.

#### Developments at UN..

Our membership in the United Nations, along with NATO, our membership in the Commonwealth and our proximity to the United States represent the cornerstones of foreign policy which have been recognized by all Governments in Canada. Developments at the United Nations, therefore, continue to occupy a very important place in Canadian foreign policy.

There are discussions proceeding between Canada and a number of countries with regard to the proposals for nuclear-free zones...As a member of the NATO alliance we must naturally take into consideration the views of our allies and the interests of the alliance itself... With regard to the proposals for nuclear-free zones in other areas of the world, we have given sympathetic support providing, as I have said before in answer to a question in this House, certain conditions which we believe essential are observed.

The atmosphere at the current Assembly appears calm in the sense that the tensions between the Communist and the non-Communist blocs have eased, thus eliminating one familiar obstacle to constructive action by the world body. But one direct consequence of understanding in one area has been to cause renewed activity in another of no less importance. I refer to race relations, which now emerge as one of the dominant factors in international affairs. The African states are understandably aroused at the failure of their persistent efforts in the United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies to bring about any appreciable change in the policies of South Africa and Portugal. These and other issues of colonialism and racial discrimination are being featured prominently in the Assembly debates. The aims and objectives sought by the African members are shared by almost the whole membership, but there is a substantial area of doubt about some of the measures proposed for achieving their desired ends.

Canada has consistently urged, under this Government, under the preceding Government and under the Government before that, that the membership of the United Nations should be comprehensive in character, and this is the fundamental reason we are opposed to any move to have members expelled from the United Nations. South Africa and Portugal have become the immediate object of such moves, which could have much wider application. There are within the organization other member states whose policies are just as repressive and just as discriminatory as the ill-advised and repugnant policies now being followed by these two countries. In all cases we believe that such policies are more likely to be modified if they are kept under close scrutiny by the United Nations than if the states concerned were to be expelled. Moreover, we believe that all such measures which conform strictly to the letter of the Charter of the United Nations could, unless carefully observed, create a situation resulting in far reaching harm to the United Nations itself....

#### UN Peace Keeping

I made clear at the United Nations the position of Canada and its determination and desire to see the United Nations strengthened in every possible way, particularly as regards capacity to engage in peace-keeping operations. We have urged other member states to follow the example of countries like Canada, the Scandinavian members and now the Netherlands, which have taken steps to prepare their national forces for emergency service with the United Nations.

We have called for the establishment of a compact military planning team in the Secretariat to assist the Secretary-General in the conduct of peace-keeping operations involving military personnel and equipment. We have offered



to share with other governments our experience which we have gained from extensive participation in peace-keeping operations over a period of many years in the United Nations and, pursuant to the Geneva accord of 1954, and through Canadian participation in the three International Supervisory Commissions operating in Vietnam, in Cambodia and in Laos. We see the suggestion for extensive participation outside the United Nations by interested countries as a possibility for giving strength to the idea of a world peace force together with the suggestion of improvements to the Secretariat by providing for the possibility of staff training for United Nations military operations. We are examining intensively, in this context and in others, ways in which these improvements can be achieved.

An important aspect of United Nations peace-keeping relates to the financing of...ad hoc operations, principally those in the Congo and in the Middle East. We have been greatly concerned in recent times...about the growing deficit in relation to the peace-keeping accounts of the United Nations. The Secretary-General has estimated that this might be about \$140 million by the end of 1963, and it is an indictment of our time that it should be possible for us to provide so readily, as we must, for our defences, when, at the same time, it is so difficult to get the necessary moneys to keep functioning properly the organization that was established at San Francisco to try to substitute pacific means, conciliation, adjudication and discussion, for settling disputes between nations; instead of resorting to force.

We believe that the financial burden should be shared by all members of the United Nations, not only by some of the great powers and some of the lesser powers but by all the great powers and all the nations. There is room, of course, for offering the less-developed countries some measures of relief from their assessments when peace-keeping costs are high. There is none for absolving countries with a capacity to pay from their financial commitments.

We believe that the peace-keeping operations in the Congo and in the Middle East should be continued as long as they are considered necessary, and this will be a determination based upon prevailing practical and other considerations....

The most recent peace-keeping effort of the United Nations, to which Canada is contributing an important element in the staffing and maintenance of the air component, is the observation mission in Yemen... The Government's decision to meet the Secretary-General's request for Canadian participation was consistent with our policy of supporting this fundamental aspect of United Nations activity. This was a hazardous experience. It was originally participated in by Yugoslavia, the country which supplied the ground force, and by Canada, which supplied the air component. The Governments of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia undertook to supply the necessary finances for an initial two-month period. Following further commitments to finance an additional four months' operations, the Secretary-General has extended the mission until January 4, 1964, at which time the situation will, I expect, be reviewed by the Security Council.

But I must emphasize in this connection that the United Nations mission in Yemen is strictly a temporary operation limited to observing and verifying the progress of disengagement. It is not charged with the supervision

or enforcement of the agreement. Unfortunately, progress on disengagement to date has not been encouraging, and I can only express the sincere hope that the extension of this mission's period of responsibility will afford time for more effective implementation of the agreement. I also expect that time will be utilized in devising some civilian observation machinery more appropriate to the task in Yemen.

A situation must not be allowed to develop in which the parties would use the presence of the United Nations mission as a cover for the indefinite continuation of their involvement in the affairs of Yemen.

#### Canadian Support for UN

The Canadian Delegation at the United Nations is active, as in other years, in many other fields - in promoting disarmament, co-operating in outer space, scientific research in relation to the hazards of radiation, respect for human rights, and the programme of economic and social development carried out under the auspices of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. We shall continue our support for humanitarian programmes designed to alleviate refugee problems. We are actively engaged, as a member of the preparatory committee in each case, in the organizing work for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in March of 1964, and for the International Year of Co-operation in 1965....

Canada has been able in the United Nations, I believe, as I found in the period when I was there at the beginning of the session and from time to time when I returned, to strengthen bilateral relations with most member states, particularly with the new states of Africa. I have welcomed the occasion to talk to many of the representatives of the African states, to get to know their problems a little better and generally to let them understand the goodwill and the favourable disposition that Canada has toward them.

The opportunity for personal conversation on a wide range of subjects is, in my judgment, one of the valuable dividends of the General Assembly. Another is the ability of the organization to provide its member states with a wide variety of means for bridging and reconciling differences. This may be the real reason for striving ceaselessly to keep the United Nations in working order; for in spite of its imperfections this international instrument has demonstrated its capacity to respond to most of the basic needs of the international community in a period of exceptional difficulty....

#### Co-operation in the New Nations

I made reference a few minutes ago to the rapidly changing nature of the world in which we live. One of the most dramatic manifestations of change has been the emergence in the past few years of scores of new independent nations with widely varied backgrounds. In Africa a whole continent has come awake and for the first time has taken its place on the world stage. The vitality of these new countries, and their determination to play a significant part in world affairs, were demonstrated at the conference of the heads of some 32 independent African states held in Addis Ababa last May. At that meeting the Charter of the Organization for African Unity was adopted,

envisaging a new era of political and economic co-operation. At that gathering, the African states also served notice of their impatience with the rate of progress toward the solution of the remaining colonial problems.

The Portuguese African territories in South Africa are the focal point of anti-colonial pressure. In the case of Portugal, the difficulty arises from its claim that its overseas territories are an integral part of metropolitan Portugal. The time is, in fact, long overdue for Portugal to give some sign that it recognizes the principles of self determination in its overseas territories. The Canadian Government has made it clear that it cannot accept the theories on which Portugal's colonial policy is based. We welcome the reforms which Portugal has instituted during the past two years in its overseas territories. We hope that the Portuguese Government will wisely take the further steps which alone can turn aside the criticisms to which it is now exposed.

It is harder to foresee any solution to the problem of race conflict in South Africa. The Canadian Government can understand the fears of white South Africans about the possibility of being submerged and eventually forced out of their homeland. However, the Canadian Government cannot understand South Africa's claim that apartheid is the only solution, and we deplore the use of harsh and repressive measures offensive to fundamental human rights which are used to carry out this policy. We derive no pleasure, and I am sure no one in this House derives any pleasure, from seeing our former sister nation of the Commonwealth become an outcast amongst nations for its race policy. I repeat what I said at the United Nations, that we are prepared to help in any way possible to achieve a solution based on justice, but we cannot and we will not support one which is offensive to human dignity.

In Southern Rhodesia the race problem is not yet hardened along irrevocable lines. African leaders, including some Commonwealth leaders, have pointed out that it would not be in keeping with normal Commonwealth practice if Southern Rhodesia were given her independence under a Government which is not broadly representative of its whole population. More time is needed to search out a solution in Southern Rhodesia which will avoid the heavy problems now facing South Africa.

Elsewhere in former British colonial territory the movement toward independence marches steadily forward. Malaysia came into being on September 16, embracing Sarawak and North Borneo. We in this House welcomed wholeheartedly the founding of Malaysia. We now regret, along with the British Foreign Secretary who spoke on this yesterday, the external difficulties which have attended the birth of a state which we are satisfied is destined to enhance the peace and stability of Southeast Asia.

In the Caribbean we have watched with satisfaction the progress of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago since they achieved independence last year. They have provided reassuring models of stability in an area which has been otherwise turbulent. The Canadian Government continues to follow closely constitutional developments in other islands and territories in that region, and, as I have already announced, steps are being taken to improve and expand our aid arrangements for the region in the economic field....

### The Commonwealth

The nurturing of one of our other cornerstones of foreign policy, the Commonwealth, is a basic feature of our external policies. In the past few years membership has been progressively enlarged until today it embraces 16 sovereign states. The majority now are in Asia and in Africa. It is because of the special insight which the Commonwealth gives us into the new forces which have emerged in the post-war era that we most value this unique association of states. The Commonwealth practice of continuing consultation among members on matters of mutual concern is especially valuable in a world in which race and colour have too often tended to be divisive forces.

### The French Community

A second important group of newly emerging states meriting special attention from Canada are the 20 French-speaking states of Africa, most of which are members of the French Community. It is only natural that Canada, a bicultural state, should wish to contribute to the advancement of this important group of French-speaking African countries as it does to the African members of the Commonwealth. There is a natural link here that also prompts French African states to turn to Canada. Like all the countries of that continent, these states are faced with the enormous problems of education and economic and cultural development. It is our intention to increase the level and quality of our assistance to them in terms that are represented by the announcement I made a few days ago, the details of which are now being formulated into a plan, which will, I hope, be of increasing value in manifesting Canada's concern for these countries.

### Canada and OAS

...This Government is fully aware of the role that the Organization of American States plays in hemispheric affairs. We are aware, too, that there has been a noticeable growth of interest on the part of Canadians in connection with developments in Latin America, with which many of our citizens have a cultural, religious and social affinity.

This is not a question which can be settled summarily. There are a great many factors which the Government must take into consideration and which are being carefully weighed. To this end I have had discussions with the President of the Council of the Organization of American States, and I have had discussions with the President of the Inter-American Bank. We are watching carefully the discussions now going on within the organization concerning terms of membership, a matter of considerable importance as well to the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean, which are showing increasing interest in participation. All these aspects of the question are now being actively reviewed....

### Objectives of Foreign Policy

A number of years ago a former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Right Hon. Louis St. Laurent, gave the following description of how Canada should pursue its international responsibilities:

"In her participation in international affairs Canada will, I hope, act with resolution, with responsibility, and also with restraint. We should not evade our international duties; but in discharging them we should not be influenced unduly by national pride and prejudice. I hope that in our foreign relations we can reconcile our first duty to our own people with our ultimate obligations to the international community. In a frightened and suspicious world this is not always easy."

His prescription for Canadian conduct is as valid today as when it was first enunciated on April 29, 1948, and the world is only now beginning to be slightly less beset by fear and suspicion than it was then, when the expansionist and threatening behaviour of international Communism provided the impetus for the present Western system of collective security, of which Canada is now an integral part.

The fundamental objective of Canadian policy was then, as it is now, to preserve peace and to seek a reduction in international tensions, whether those tensions arise from the ideological conflict between East and West or from the upheavals which have been engendered by the surge toward independence and higher living standards of former colonial and underdeveloped peoples. In our pursuit of these objectives we aim to maintain a balanced, realistic and co-operative outlook on international affairs, avoiding excesses of optimism, pursuing policies commensurate with our capabilities, and ensuring that Canada speaks with a reasonable and constructive voice in international councils.

I have dealt at length with relations with the Communist part of the world and with the less developed areas, because those are the dominant forces in contemporary international life, affecting directly the scope for Canadian initiative in international affairs. I have outlined what I believe to be some of the ways in which we can work toward a further relaxation of tension. But I do not wish to exaggerate the possibilities. We are far from the point where we can relax our vigilance. There is no evidence as yet that the decrease in international tension which has begun will prove so durable that the dismantling of our defences would be warranted. We must recognize that the collective security arrangements, which we have developed within the North Atlantic alliance, by their very effectiveness have been a major factor in bringing about the more hopeful atmosphere which prevails today. NATO, which embraces our major military efforts in both Europe and North America, remains one of the main cornerstones on which Canadian foreign policy rests and must rest, not only in our preparations to defend ourselves if the need to do so should be thrust upon us but also in our approach to an era of peace, if that should materialize; and on this question I think the latter is the more likely consequence and result.

#### The Atlantic Community

It is important to recognize in this connection that NATO is not just a military alliance but an assembly of nations with common ideals and a high identity of purpose, in peace and in war. Since the competition between the Communist and democratic worlds will certainly continue, even if war is abandoned by Communism as an instrument of policy, all members of the Western world will be faced with the same problems of how best to respond. Thanks to

the habit of consultation which has been developed over the years, the organization today is well equipped to become a central forum for co-ordination of Western policies in the more hopeful period that may lie ahead. The forthcoming ministerial meeting of NATO in December, which some of my colleagues and I will attend, will be of great importance in exchanging views and charting a common course.

That meeting will also be significant in another sense. As a consequence of the re-emergence of Europe as a major world power centre, certain changes in relationships are taking place within the alliance. This development is itself in large measure the product of enlightened policies consistently pursued through the post-war period. It is inconceivable to me that, in the moment of success of policies so deliberately pursued, there should be a fear to accept the consequential change in transatlantic relationship that inevitably had to ensue.

There is no cause for concern in the evolutionary process taking place in the West. To be sure, certain problems have been introduced into the relationship within the Western family of nations, but I stress that these problems can and will be resolved without undermining the fundamental cohesion of the Western alliance, and certainly without harmful consequences to any outside nation.

#### Continuity in Canadian Policy

...I conclude this statement on Canadian foreign policy as I see it at the present time, a policy that is predicated upon certain constants, membership in the Commonwealth, membership in the United Nations, membership in NATO, our traditional and cultural affinity with France, one of the great and strong nations of the world and one of the strong powers in Europe today. I dedicate the efforts of this Government anew to the twin objectives of promoting the Atlantic partnership, while working unremittingly for international peace and stability.

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