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
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
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
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THE CANADIAN MILITIA AND NAVY

It has been asserted of late by certain Canadian public men and newspapers that the Laurier Administration has made fundamental alterations in the Militia Act without the knowledge or consent of the people, whereby conscription as practiced in European countries like France and Germany, has been established in Canada; and the Militia force, which formerly could not be sent abroad on active service, rendered liable to be drafted for every Old World war in which England may be engaged without the yea or nay of the Dominion Parliament.

Some of these erroneous views have been set forth or suggested by the *Toronto Weekly Sun*, a paper of considerable influence in Ontario. Other newspapers and one or more of the Nationalist leaders in Quebec have made it appear that the new Naval law, if not openly exacting conscription, renders conscription for the Navy necessary, and, in addition, leaves the Canadian Parliament and people without adequate control of that service, which, like the Militia, may be hurried at any moment to Old World hostilities in which England is a participant.

All this is so radically untrue that it may be well to present the facts at some length. Briefly, the Canadian Navy is to be built in Canada, and to be entirely under the control of Canada; whilst so far as the Militia is concerned the Laurier Government has not placed it under Imperial control, but, on the contrary, has brought it more exclusively under that of our own Parliament.

The action of the Laurier Government in this respect is in accord with the natural evolution of things. Time was when by far the greater portion of the expense involved in the defence of Canada was borne by the British taxpayer. For a century or more after she entered into possession of this country, England had to maintain in it a large force of British Regulars. In that period she carried on the war with the American Colonies and the War of 1812 with the newly formed United States; while she and they were often on the brink of war over such questions as the Maine and Oregon boundaries, the "Trent" affair, and, in a minor degree, the North Atlantic Fisheries. As we advanced in material growth and began to feel the stirrings of national life, she frequently suggested that we should prepare to defend ourselves; till at length the day came when she withdrew her troops, not from Canada alone, but from the other large Colonies.

This decision was reached about the time that friendly relations were established between her and the United States. Thereafter we were obliged, whether we liked it or not, to undertake the task of protecting ourselves: and have succeeded in creating a distinctively Canadian force, which, so far, has proved equal to all emergencies and reflected credit upon us in every particular. No doubt professional soldiers can find plenty of room for criticising it, but then it is not a professional army, nor are we ambitious to be known as professional experts in war, having something better to do. The Laurier Administration has presided over and facilitated the transition between the old *régime* and the new—the change from a Canadian Militia that was a mere auxiliary to the British Army serving in Canada to a Canadian Militia that has become a great Canadian institution, living its own life, yet bound by ties of loyalty and affection, as we all are, to the support of the British Empire.

A similar process has been at work in other fields. When the first Militia Acts were passed in Upper Canada, over a hundred years ago, the Governor, Simcoe's biographer tells us, "did not acknowledge any responsibility save to the Government that had appointed him," to wit, the Colonial Office, "while the officials assisting him to carry on the Administration were his nominees, acknowledging no responsibility to the people's representatives, but only to the Governor and the Crown." The same system prevailed in Quebec and the other Provinces. We of to-day cannot very well comprehend the frame of mind of a generation which believed that such a form of government was, as the Duke of Wellington said of that of England before the Reform Bill of 1832, so perfect that no one *a priori* could possibly have devised a better. In due course, however, our forefathers insisted that the acts of the Governor must be in harmony with the advice of his Executive Council, which in turn should be responsible to the people. The Reformers were branded as rebels but the modern historian, with better lights, regards them as agents or ministers of the natural forces that make for the political development of every young community, just as they transform the infant into the boy and the boy into the man.

In like manner we have outgrown the old Colonial Policy, as it was termed, whereby the Mother Country gave us a preference for our raw products in her market, and, in return, drafted our tariff in the interest of her manufacturers, whose goods received a substantial preference in ours; which tended, and indeed was designed, to pre-

vent the development of manufacturing industries in Canada. The Post Office and other departments have passed under Canadian control. Above all, the practice of settling with the United States questions of importance to Canada without our being allowed a hearing has been abandoned; besides which we are now permitted virtually to make commercial treaties of our own with all nations.

This gradual extension of our powers of self-government alarms some well-meaning persons, who imagine that before long we may be detached from England; when in truth, paradoxical as it may seem, the more independent we become the greater the service we are enabled of rendering her. Tied to her apron strings, we were always a source of expense and anxiety and sometimes a positive burden; but now that we are self-governing, with vastly greater resources, we are in a position to assist her when necessary at our own cost.

The Liberals who demanded Responsible Government were but asserting the doctrine, then somewhat new to England but now acted upon by her statesmen of both parties, that the British Empire can be held together only by England's conceding a wide autonomy to every Colonial unit fit to exercise it. This talisman saved Canada and Australia to the flag, and has rendered possible the reconciliation of the discordant elements in South Africa. Similarly, since acquiring control of the Canadian Militia, we have been able to assure England that, instead of being a drag upon her as before, we are prepared to lend her our aid whenever we are of opinion that she needs it; and as Canada is destined to be a great nation, and that before long, this is no mean guarantee of help and comradeship in the hour of trial.

Fifty years ago the question was raised, both in England and Canada, whether she could give us a co-relative undertaking that she would assist us in case we were attacked by the United States. At that time France, under Napoleon the Third, was a menace to her in Europe; now Germany is or is supposed to be her enemy. But whether or not fear of a German invasion might deter her from defending us, we on our part are ready to do our share in defending her; we being the judges, as becomes an autonomous people, of the occasion when and the form in which the aid shall be granted.

It is of the first importance that there should be no misunderstanding as to the relations between England and ourselves in this respect. The American Colonies were lost through a misunderstanding. While they had been in the habit of co-operating with England in her wars with France and Spain on the American Continent, and of taxing themselves for that purpose, they had never been asked to aid her in her Old World wars, although in his examination at the bar of the British House of Commons Benjamin Franklin declared

they were willing to do so. Had it come to that, however, we may be sure they would have provided the money through taxation imposed by their own Legislatures rather than have suffered themselves to be taxed by the Imperial Parliament, where they had no representation. Unfortunately, as we all know, there was a lack of definiteness in their position towards England, as well as in England's position towards them, in regard to the subject of taxation.

That the British Parliament had the constitutional right to tax them was apparently beyond doubt; and certainly every farthing Grenville intended to raise in the Colonies was to be spent in the Colonies. On the other hand, while the Imperial Parliament had always fixed the Customs duties, not for revenue purposes so much as for the regulation of commerce then subject to the preferential system, the internal taxes, those primarily designed to produce revenue, had from first to last been imposed by the Colonial Assemblies. Consequently, said the latter, Grenville's action in levying Stamp Taxes is an invasion of local rights and autonomy that may be, and therefore is sure to be, carried to the length of an impoverishing tyranny. "Errors in raising money," observed one of the old English Governors of Ireland, "are the compendious ways to cause a general discontent; for whereas other things are but the concernments of some, this is of all. Wherefore, I hope God will in His mercy not lead us into temptation."

So far as Canada is concerned, she has always professed her willingness to take part in the Old World wars of England, but the conditions have never been clearly set forth by Canada till now. Three modes of raising and applying the money to enable us to do so have been debated:

First, we should submit to be regularly taxed by the Imperial Parliament for the support of the military and naval forces of England, and, in addition, pay our proportion of the cost of carrying on a war. This would at once bring up the question of taxation without representation, on which the Empire split before. There are other grave objections to the project, but this is sufficient to condemn it.

Second, we should vote money of our own free will in the Dominion Parliament for British armaments whenever the Empire is in danger. This scheme is favored by the generality of Canadian Conservatives. But who is to say when the Empire is in danger? At the British elections in January, 1910, half the people of England

declared that England was in the greatest danger, while the other half said the thunder of the captains and the shouting did not proceed from Berlin but was merely the noise of the Tory scaremonger in Fleet Street; an hypothesis that was evidently the right one, for, the elections over, the scare was allowed to subside. It would hardly do for us therefore to take the word of a British Opposition that the Empire was in jeopardy, and about equally unsafe to take that of a Ministry which might have been returned by virtue of just such misrepresentations, or have been subsequently influenced by them.

We in Canada have an eternal war of our own on our hands, the war against the wilderness, which calls for immense sums for railways, canals and other instrumentalities of civilization; in fact, it is about all we can do to meet this beneficent budget. But if our taxes were to be augmented by 20 or 30 millions whenever one or other of the political parties in England had worked itself into a frenzy over the intentions of Germany or Russia, we should speedily find the load intolerable; and then what?

In England the Ministry and Parliament declare war and conclude peace. But this automatic voting of money in the lump, to be followed perhaps by the automatic despatch of Canadian troops, as often as a British Minister or a combination of London editors asserted that the Empire was in peril, would reduce Canada pretty much to the level of a colony of the old Roman Empire, the chief end of which was to furnish soldiers for Imperial wars and ask no questions. Our taxation would be determined by persons in no manner responsible to us. If self-government is vital in small things, it must be doubly so to us in matters involving the expenditure of Canadian blood and treasure across the sea.

By the abortive treaty of neutrality between James the Second and Louis the Fourteenth in 1686, it was agreed that the Colonies of England and France in North America should remain at peace when the nations were at war in Europe. The proposal came to nothing, but it laid down the principle that the Colonists were not mere liegemen bound to follow their distant lord in war even when the issue in no way concerned them. Yet the fire-eating majors and colonels of the Opposition at Ottawa would put us back to the liegeman stage.*

Third, this brings us to the proposal of the Laurier Administration, that while maintaining a Militia and a Navy for her own purposes,

*In 1885, when General Gordon was imprisoned in Khartoum and a British expeditionary force was being sent to relieve him, certain Canadian officers desired to contribute a Canadian force, as Australia was offering one. The Conservative Government at Ottawa, however, threw cold water on the project. From which we may conclude that it is only when they are in Opposition that these majors and colonels are out-and-out Imperialists.

Canada should be ready to employ them in behalf of England whenever in the opinion of the Canadian Government and Parliament it is necessary or desirable to do so. This keeps our autonomy intact and our self-respect along with it. We cannot be stampeded by the alarmist in London, nor by a British Cabinet elected by or subject to his influence. It is provided in the existing Militia Act, that of 1904, that whenever the Canadian Militia is called to active service, Parliament must meet within fifteen days thereafter. The Naval Act also says that when the Navy, or any part of it, is placed on active service Parliament shall meet within fifteen days. By this means we are protected against hysteria on the part of a Canadian Ministry. Before the troops could be mobilized at Quebec or the Navy got together at Halifax or Esquimalt, Parliament would be sitting and the people throughout the country heard from in various ways. The amount we chose to spend would be left to ourselves, and it would be for us to consider whether England's cause was a righteous one or not. If for any reason we declined to take part we should doubtless be assailed by the Jingoës. On the other hand, the English people would be aware from the outset that this policy had been deliberately framed to secure us a free voice in the matter; hence it is just possible that, in the day when our support counted for a good deal, they might think twice before entering upon some campaigns. Lastly, the Laurier plan is all in line with our natural development and safe in that it leaves us masters in our own house.

There is a chapter in the history of the Canadian Militia which is well worth resurrecting in these times when many are disposed to think lightly of Canadian self-government, and to endorse projects of Imperial centralization that would destroy it.

In 1861, the War Office, which a short time before had been induced by Lord Elgin to abandon a costly scheme of Canadian fortifications, turned to the establishment in the old Province of Canada, with a population of only 2,500,000 and a more or less straitened treasury, of an active Militia of 50,000 men and a reserve of 50,000 more. About all that could be said for the scheme, which would have cost over a million dollars a year, was that a civil war was raging in the United States and that possibly at its close the combatants on one side or the other, or both, might invade Canada. The Conservative Ministry of John A. Macdonald and Cartier brought in the Bill in 1862. A report had previously been made by a Defence Commission, but it was commonly understood, and Sir John Macdonald is said

to have acknowledged it in after life, that the measure in the rough came direct from the War Office. On the second reading the Ministry was beaten by 61 to 54 and resigned. The London newspapers jumped to the conclusion that Canada was about to secede from the Empire; and the Duke of Newcastle, the Colonial Secretary, wrote a letter to the Governor-General, Lord Monck, containing some remarkable proposals. It was dated August 21st, 1862, and will be found, together with the reply of the Sandfield-Macdonald-Sicotte Government, which meanwhile had taken office, in the "Imperial House of Commons Papers, Canada, Vol. 16, 1860 to 1867."

His Grace desired the "speedy resumption of measures for the better military organization of the inhabitants of Canada," saying that the existing force would be quite inadequate in the event of war, and that an active militia of 50,000 was the least that would meet the requirements. He was of opinion that the "administration and the supply of funds for the support" of the force "should be exempt from the disturbing action of ordinary politics," for unless this were done "there could be no confidence that in the appointment of officers, and in other matters of a purely military character, no other object than the efficiency of the force would be kept in view." And in order that the force might be taken out of the disturbing action of politics, he suggested that the appropriation for the Militia, or a certain fixed portion of it, should be voted, not annually, but "for a period of three or five years," in which case, as is obvious, the control of the Militia expenditure, year by year, by the Canadian Parliament would have been done away with.

His Grace observed that "a country which, however unjustly, is suspected of inability or indisposition to provide for its own defence, does not in the present circumstances of America offer a tempting field for investment, and while it might be argued that the increased charge for a larger Militia would diminish rather than enlarge the credit of Canada," he was "convinced that such would not be the case if steps were taken for the securing of a basis of taxation sounder in itself than the almost exclusive reliance on Customs duties." He likewise recommended that a uniform system of training and organization should be introduced in all the British North American Provinces, the Governor-General to be Commander-in-Chief of the whole force, with the Lieutenant-Governors acting as Generals of Divisions under him, and an Adjutant-General, approved by Her Majesty's Government, "moving to and fro to give uniformity to the training and cohesion to the force itself." But as such a scheme would affect more than one Colony, it must of course "emanate from the Secretary of State," although the Imperial Government would not entertain it "unless they were convinced it would be acceptable to the people of Canada and the other Colonies."

The reply of the Sandfield-Macdonald-Sicotte Administration, in the form of a report of Council to Lord Monek, is dated October 27th, 1862. After the usual preliminaries, it went on to say that "a volunteer organization is that alone through which the military spirit of the Canadian people must find vent in a period of peace." In case of emergency "the response to an order calling out the Militia would be unanimous, but there is a decided aversion to compulsory service except in the presence of actual danger." In this spirit "amendments were made to the Militia law previously in force, the aim of the new Government being to infuse vitality into the voluntary branch of the service." In this and other particulars, Ministers point with confidence to what they have done and are prepared to do as evidence of their determination to fulfil their duty in regard to the defence of the Province; and "look forward without any misgivings to the realization of results which will vindicate the wisdom, patriotism and loyalty of the course they have pursued."

The proposal to organize and drill not less than 50,000 men had been rejected by Parliament and the present Ministry, says the reply, "cannot disguise their opinion that the Province is averse to the maintenance of a force which would seriously derange industry and tax its resources to a degree justifiable only in periods of imminent danger or actual war." The Canadian people feel that if war with the United States should occur, "it will be produced by no act of theirs, and they have no inclination to do anything that may seem to foreshadow, perhaps to provoke, a state of things which would be disastrous to every interest of the Province." Turning to some recent elections, the reply said that so far as known "not a single candidate has ventured to declare himself in favor of a measure so extensive as that which was prepared by the late Government, and is now again recommended by His Grace"; so that the new Ministers find themselves fortified by public opinion, their own estimate of what is required having been "confirmed by the calm judgment of the people."

The reply goes on to note that what His Grace evidently has in mind, speaking of having resort to a basis of taxation sounder in itself than exclusive reliance on Customs duties, is "direct taxation, to obtain an increase of income commensurate with the increase of expenditure which would follow the organization of the large force proposed." But "this is not the occasion for adopting a principle hitherto unknown in the fiscal policy of the Province, and assuredly this is not the time for plunging into an experiment for which the people of the Province are unprepared. Your Excellency's advisers believe that no government could exist that should attempt to carry out the suggestion of His Grace for the purpose designed." As for the credit

of the country, Ministers hold "that they are, and must be allowed to be, the best judges of the pressure which the Provincial credit can sustain"; and they are not prepared to "enter upon a lavish expenditure to build up a military system distasteful to the Canadian people, disproportionate to Canadian resources, and not called for by any circumstances of which at present they have cognizance."

As for the proposal that the Militia expenditure should be removed in part from the control of Parliament, "it is certain that any measure liable to this construction never will be, and ought not to be, entertained by a people inheriting the freedom guaranteed by British institutions." The Imperial Parliament guards with jealous care the means of maintaining the military and naval forces of the Empire, the appropriations being annually voted, and "not the most powerful Minister has dared to propose to the Imperial House the abandonment of its controlling power for a period of five years." What the British Commons "would not under any circumstances of danger entertain," is not likely to be entertained by the Legislature of Canada, for "whatever evils are incident to representative institutions, the people of a British Province will not forget that they are trivial in comparison with those which are inseparable from arbitrary authority."

The suggestion that a union for defence should be established among all the British Provinces—"a union whose details would emanate from the Secretary of State and whose management would be entirely independent of the several Local Legislatures"—was one that could not at present be discussed. Assuming, however, that in consequence of the construction of the Intercolonial, and of other measures, more intimate relations arose between the various Provinces, they "would never contribute to an expensive system of defence unless it were subject to their own control. Speaking for Canada, your Excellency's advisers are sure that this Province will continue to claim the exclusive right of directing the expenditure of public monies."

The reply closed with an account of the peculiar position of Canada in respect to the United States, and of the sacrifices she had made for her defence. No more was heard of His Grace's recommendations. In due course the Conservatives returned to office but they made no attempt to resurrect them; on the contrary, they accepted the situation and set to work, with the hearty co-operation of the Liberal party, to improve the Canadian Militia while keeping it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Parliament.

Some were found who berated the Liberal Government of 1862 for not adopting the Imperial programme of the Duke of Newcastle, and who declared that it was impossible for Canadians to create a

Militia worthy of the name—that such a force could not fail to be impotent and ridiculous in the field, and so on; exactly what some persons are now saying of the Canadian Navy. But the good sense of Canadians soon led them, irrespective of party, to see that we could not afford as a people to let our taxes be spent on highly costly plans of defence in the creation and control of which we had no voice. And we soon showed, too, that we were capable of raising a Militia fit to rank with any regular troops, the British not excepted; witness the dashing exploits and great bravery of the Canadian contingents in South Africa, the splendid bearing of our men in the North-West Rebellion of 1885, and, to go further back, their gallant defence of the frontier in the Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870.

I have dealt at length with the events of 1862 because they have a direct bearing on the present controversy as showing with what resolution the Canadians of that day stood up against those who, with the best motives in the world, would have restricted our rights of self-government for the furtherance of what they considered to be Imperial ends.

The Conservatives of that time were quite as determined that Canada should not be thrown back on Downing Street rule. In 1859, Sir Alexander Galt objected to Colonial Office interference with our tariff in language which must have startled the British officials. In order to raise revenue for the construction of canals and other public works, and also, no doubt, to encourage Canadian industry, Galt had put a 20 per cent duty on a number of articles. The Duke of Newcastle protested, and was urged by some of the Chambers of Commerce in England to disallow the Act, whereupon Galt and his Conservative colleagues replied:

“Respect for the Imperial Government must always dictate the desire to satisfy them that the policy of Canada is neither hastily nor unwisely formed, and that due regard is had to the interests of the Mother Country, as well as of the Province. But the Government of Canada, acting for its Legislature and people, cannot, through those feelings of deference which they owe to the Imperial authorities, in any manner waive or diminish the right of the people of Canada to decide for themselves both as to the mode and extent to which taxation shall be imposed.

“The Provincial Ministry are at all times ready to afford explanations in regard to the acts of the Legislature to which they are a party; but, subject to their duty and allegiance to Her Majesty, their responsibility upon general questions of policy must

be to the Provincial Parliament, by whose confidence they administer the affairs of the country. And in the imposition of taxation it is so plainly necessary that the Administration and the people should be in accord, that the former cannot admit responsibility or require approval beyond that of the Local Legislature.

"Self-government would be utterly annihilated if the views of the Imperial Government were to be preferred to those of the people of Canada. It is, therefore, the duty of the present Government distinctly to affirm the right of the Canadian Legislature to adjust the taxation of the people in the way they deem best, even if it should unfortunately happen to meet the disapproval of the Imperial Ministry. Her Majesty cannot be advised to disallow such acts unless her advisers are prepared to assume the administration of the affairs of the Colony irrespective of the views of the inhabitants.

"The Imperial Government are not responsible for the debts and engagements of Canada; they do not maintain its Judges, or its Educational or Civil Services; they contribute nothing to the internal government of the country; and as the Provincial Legislature, acting through a Ministry directly responsible to it, has to make provision for all these wants, they must necessarily claim and exercise the widest latitude as to the nature and extent of the burdens to be placed on the industry of the people.

"The Provincial Government believes His Grace must share their own convictions on this important subject; but as serious evil would have resulted had His Grace taken a different course, it is wiser to prevent future complication by distinctly stating the position that must be maintained by every Canadian Administration." (Sessional Papers, Province of Canada, No. 38, 1860.)

If the Liberals and Conservatives of that era insisted thus vehemently upon our rights of self-government, it was because the dangerous state of affairs prevailing under the former *régime* when Downing Street centralization was in vogue, was fresh in their recollection. To them the struggle for responsible government had been, in a very literal sense, *articulus vel libertatis aut servitutis*, a question whether Canadians were to be bond or free; and they felt that the restoration of the centralization policy, so contrary to the instincts of the English-speaking race, and so much at variance with the spirit of the New World, could not fail to result in the loss of Canada to the Empire.

One of the worst of the minor abuses of the old time was the voting of money *en bloc* for a period of years for Civil Government. The Reformers said the appropriation should be voted item by item, in order

that the people might know what they were paying for, and be in a better position to enforce economy. The Executive in Lower Canada replied on one occasion, and entertained the same view on all, that if such a rule were sanctioned "it would give to the members of the popular Chamber, not only the privilege of giving or withholding the supplies, but the power to prescribe to the Sovereign the number and character of his servants, and the wages he was to pay to each; all of which would end in making His Majesty's officials subservient to the electors, since the latter, and not His Majesty, would virtually be their paymaster, although they were bound to honor and obey His Majesty alone."

The Civil List of Lower Canada earned a chief justice, who appears to have been a disgrace to his office, a lieutenant-governor who had never set foot in the country, a non-resident governor of Gaspé, a judge who also drew pay as a French translator, another who was a paid auditor of the public accounts, and one or two subordinate officials who had defaulted to a considerable amount. It was not merely because the vote-in-the-lump covered a multitude of sins, but because it was wrong in principle, that the people's representatives attacked it till it became odious to all save the beneficiaries. A similar system, only on a much larger scale, prevailed at one time in England, and is dealt with by Burke in his "Present Discontents." The object of a detailed estimate in advance, Burke says, is that "the reality of the charge, the reason of incurring it, and the justice and necessity of discharging it, shall all appear antecedent to the payment," for "no man ever pays first and calls for his account afterwards, because he would thereby let out of his hands the principal, and, indeed, only effectual means of compelling a full and fair one," and preventing a "corrupt and prodigal use of public money." The early history of Upper Canada teems with abuses arising from votes *en bloc* for services within that Province.

The sober-minded Imperialist must see that Canadians would soon tire of voting huge sums of money in the lump to be spent upon the alarms and excursions of the war party in England. If England herself was actually in danger we should, of course, hasten to her assistance with all the forces we could muster. That goes without saying. It is important to bear in mind, however, that she has Old World responsibilities in which we have little if any concern. Besides having to defend India and other remote possessions, she is under treaty obligation to maintain the territorial integrity of Belgium, Portugal, Turkey, Persia, and other regions, which to us are mere spaces on the map; and may at any moment have to fight Kaffir or Arab peoples, who stand in the way of her constantly expanding Empire, but who assuredly are doing no harm to us in Canada.

Our Imperialistic friends in Canada seem to think that the Empire is in danger whenever British troops take the field, and that we should participate automatically in her "little wars," as well as in the Armageddons. It is possible that they do not in their hearts believe this doctrine, but assert it merely for the purpose of putting Sir Wilfrid Laurier "in the hole," of exposing him to the cry in the English-speaking Provinces that, being a French-Canadian, he is anti-British. Anyhow such a condition of things would be a standing menace to British connection. It would divide and probably in the end upset a mixed community like ours, an amalgam still in the making of a great number of nationalities other than British. Many of our foreign-born settlers fled from Europe to escape the evils of militarism, and obviously it would be a grave affair to plunge Canada into that turbid tide by committing her without sufficient cause to Imperial armaments that might be employed next day in levying war upon the country of their origin.

The money side of the question is likewise serious. The expenditure on the British Army in the last twenty years has risen from \$90,000,000 to close on \$140,000,000 per annum, the exact estimate for 1910-11 being \$138,800,000. In the same space the annual cost of the British Navy has increased from \$115,000,000 to over \$200,000,000, the estimate for 1910-11 being \$203,000,000. The recent growth in naval expenditure has been due in the main to the race with Germany for supremacy on the sea. The Dreadnoughts, of which so much was heard a while ago, are likely to give place to vessels of another and less costly type; while all the signs point to the early adoption by England and Germany of an agreement for reducing the vast amounts spent on naval construction.

Suppose Canada had been committed in 1890 to contributing to the Imperial Army or Navy, or both, as often as any considerable body of Englishmen was thrown into a panic by the yellow press, our aggregate contribution by this time might easily have amounted to as much as would suffice to deepen the Welland Canal several times over, or build two or three Hudson's Bay railways, and leave a comfortable balance for reducing the Dominion debt. By the way, it would not be amiss for the British Government, and the Dominion Government as well, to spend a few thousands on hanging in every school-house and editorial room in letters of gold what Burke said of the Jingoës of his day:

"While the poorest being that crawls the earth contending to save itself from injustice and oppression is an object respectable in the eyes of God and man, I cannot conceive any existence under Heaven (which in the depths of its wisdom tolerates all sorts of things) that is more truly odious and disgusting than an impotent, helpless creature, without civil wisdom or military skill, calling for battles which he is not to fight, or contending for a violent dominion which he can never exercise."

One of the drawbacks of our Colonial status is that it leads us unconsciously to regard ourselves as an inferior people; and an inferior race, as we know, is apt to imitate the vices rather than the virtues of the superior. Hence some of us consider it "good form" to endorse the views of the British aristocracy, and of the large class of Englishmen who identify themselves with it, even when those opinions, carried into effect, would damage the best interests of Canada. Here is a writer in a Canadian University magazine who says that our motto should be: "The British Empire before everything; and afterwards (not till afterwards) the individual advantage of its component parts"; adding that "a cry of Autonomy has gone up from the smaller minds who cannot think in Empires, whose brains can grasp nothing much larger than parishes," but "where will Autonomy stand when a foreign Dreadnought is anchored at Montreal?" Another Canadian of the same school lauds the theory of Lord Beaconsfield that as *Imperium et Libertas* was the secret of the old Roman Empire, so it should be the foundation of the modern British Empire, existing arrangements to the contrary notwithstanding. Lord Beaconsfield was reminded when he advanced this fantastic notion, upon which the new Imperialistic movement largely rests, that while the *Libertas* was indeed enjoyed by Rome, all that her outside subjects got was the heavy hand of the *Imperium*. That the British Empire could last if the self-governing Colonies had to consult Imperial interests first and their own afterwards, no intelligent person can believe.

No one is so well qualified to speak on the subject of Canadian contributions to Imperial armaments and wars as the veteran Sir Charles Tupper. He remembers Nova Scotia when it was struggling for Responsible Government, and as Provincial Minister and Provincial Premier, Federal Minister and Federal Premier, had a wide experience of the workings of our existing institutions, and realized the importance of maintaining them in their integrity, so that Canadians may not be halted for a moment in their advance towards a fuller national life. As far back as 1892, Sir Charles warned one of the Imperialistic leagues in England that wished to have us taxed at Westminster for the Imperial services, or brought under some arrangement whereby we should from time to time vote money in our own Parliament for them, that the disruption of the Empire lay that way. In November, 1909, when the Dominion House was discussing what form aid to the British Navy should assume, Sir Charles wrote a letter to Mr. R. L. Borden, the Conservative leader, of which this is the salient part:

"I regard that question as more important than any mere party issue, and am glad to learn that you are resolved to maintain the patriotic attitude of the Conservative party assumed last session. A few years ago when Canada was struggling to open up for British settlement the great granary of the world, a few gentlemen here raised the question of a Canadian contribution to the Imperial Navy. I joined issue with them and was sustained by the press and public opinion.

"Regarding as I do British institutions as giving greater security to life, property and liberty than any other form of government, I have devoted more than half a century to unceasing efforts to preserve the connection of Canada and the Crown. When Great Britain was involved in the struggle in the Transvaal, I led the van in forcing the Canadian Government to send aid. But I did not believe then, and do not believe now, in taxation without representation. The demand which will soon be made by some that Canada should contribute to the Imperial Navy in proportion to population, I regard as preposterous and dangerous.

"I read with pleasure the resolution passed unanimously by the House of Commons pledging Parliament to proceed vigorously with the construction of the Canadian Navy and to support England in every emergency; and all that in my opinion is required is to hold the Government of the day bound to carry that out honestly.

"I cannot understand the demand for Dreadnoughts in the face of the fact that the Admiralty and the British Government have determined that it was not the best mode of maintaining the security of the Empire, and arranged with Canada and Australia (the latter of whom had offered one or two Dreadnoughts) for the construction of local navies to keep open the trade routes in case of war.

"Of course, the Government of the day will be held accountable for carrying out the policy thus agreed upon in a thoroughly effective manner; but I cannot avoid thinking that a fearful responsibility will rest on those who disturb or destroy the compact entered into on this vitally important question."

It is clear that Sir Charles views with suspicion all projects which would tax us from the outside for Imperial armaments, and stands for a Canadian Navy controlled, like the Canadian Militia, by the Dominion Parliament; in other words, for the policy of the Laurier Administration.

An English writer, who regards Canadian autonomy as a nuisance because it is in the road of the Imperial centralization he is anxious to see established, replied to Sir Charles by saying that as Canadians were taxed by England for the War of 1812, which was a war for the defence of Canada, there is no good reason why they should not be taxed for other British wars, all of which must be in defence of Canada in the sense that Canada is part of the Empire. In the first place it is not

historically true that the War of 1812 was waged for the defence of Canada. The war was not provoked by Canada; we were attacked solely because, as in the Fenian raids, we belonged to England. It is misleading to tell a Colony that you are spending men and money for its protection, when as a matter of fact it is entirely on your account that it has been made a battlefield. Secondly, Canadians were not taxed by the Imperial Government or forced in any other manner to contribute towards the expenses of the War of 1812. The contributions of Upper Canada and Nova Scotia — the only ones sent in — were voted of their own motion by the Provincial legislatures. Indeed, England had forever renounced all idea of taxing the Colonies by the Colonial Tax Repeal Act of 1778, passed by Lord North in the hope of conciliating the American Colonies. That famous statute is part and parcel of the Bill of Rights of every British Colony at the present hour; and it would be a sorry day for the Empire if the modern Imperialist should tamper with it.

Before briefly describing what the Laurier Administration, under Sir Frederick Borden's able management, has done towards Canadianizing the Militia, a few preliminary observations are necessary.

Shortly after the Crimean War (1854-56), when England had to call in her troops from Canada and other Colonies, English Liberals suggested that, as we were now self-governing, it was advisable that we should be entrusted with our own defence, especially as the bogey of a French invasion of England had been put on the boards by the alarmists. These men were dubbed "Little Englanders," a name now applied to all who do not worship the god of war. Yet British military experts were of the same opinion, notably as regards Canada, which they allowed could not be adequately defended against the United States by any force of British troops which England could spare from her Old World necessities. A Select Committee of the House of Commons on the "Expense of Military Defences in the Colonies," looked into the subject and advised against the whole burden of their defence being any longer borne by the British taxpayer, in a report of which this was the keynote (Imperial Accounts and Papers, Vol. 41, 1860):

"We consider that this immunity, throwing as it does the defence of the Colonies almost entirely on the Mother Country, is open to two main objections. In the first place, it imposes an enormous burden and inconvenience on the people of England, not only by the addition which it makes to their taxes, but by calling off to remote stations a large proportion of their troops

and ships, and thereby weakening their means of defence at home. But a still more important objection is the tendency which this system must necessarily have to prevent the development of a proper spirit of self-reliance amongst our Colonies, and to enfeeble their national character. By the gift of self-government we have bestowed on our Colonies a most important element of national education; but the habit of self-defence constitutes a part hardly less important of the training of a free people, and it will never be acquired by our Colonists if we assume exclusively the task of defending them."

This statesman-like view commended itself to everyone in Canada with the exception of those who were personally benefiting by the presence of the Imperial troops. The Committee proceeded to outline a plan whereby the defence of Canada was to be cast upon Canada, the Imperial Government bearing, however, a share of the cost. What it desired above all things, it said, was to "convey in the most marked and emphatic way the determination of the Mother Country that the Colonies should be governed through and for their own people" in military affairs; in brief, that the autonomy we had secured in other things should apply to our defence. There is a copious official literature on this branch of the subject, but all in this spirit; so that when the British troops were withdrawn ten years afterwards we never so much as dreamed of protesting or complaining. No one suggested that a Militia was not required, or that we should place ourselves under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. The Conservative Government of the day set about improving and enlarging the force, and the Liberal Administration of Mr. Alexander Mackenzie loyally carried on the work by, amongst other measures, establishing the Military College at Kingston for the education of Canadian officers. Both parties agreed that Canadians must look to themselves for their defence on land, just as Liberals now say we are bound as a self-respecting people to look to ourselves for defence on sea.

The Monroe Doctrine, which has so great an attraction for some of our Nationalist brethren in Quebec, is undoubtedly a policy of much importance to America. Originally adopted by the United States at the instance of Canning, when Foreign Secretary of England, to prevent certain European powers from restoring to Spain her revolted American colonies, it has come to mean that the United States will protect every American community from attack from the Old World for the purpose of conquest or transfer. To state it with more precision, the United States has no desire to interfere with the existing colonies in America of

any European nation; but, while disavowing any intention of establishing a protectorate over the New World, will not permit any European Power to overthrow any existing independent State in America, or to establish new Colonies under the pretence of promoting emigration settlements. This provision was invoked not long ago against Germany, when it was suspected by Washington that Germany was attempting political colonization in Brazil. Lastly, the United States will not permit any European Power to attempt to gain possession of any colony in America now belonging to another European Power. Or, as Mr. Roosevelt puts it: "No transfer of an American colony from one European State to another is to be permitted, if, in the judgment of the United States, such transfer would be hostile to American interests or to those of the colony."

It seems to follow that if England were at war with Germany, Germany would not be allowed by the United States to attack Canada since that would be *prima facie* evidence, to say the least, that Germany desired to take possession of this country—a result which would certainly be contrary to our interests and doubtless would be considered hostile to those of the United States. Of course, the same rule would apply to France, Russia or any other European nation with which England might be at war, as well as to Japan; they would not be permitted to employ troops or warships against us. Therefore, in the scarcely conceivable event of the British flag going down to defeat, the Monroe Doctrine might be a very valuable asset of ours.

Yet, when all this is said, we could not seek sanctuary under the Monroe Doctrine, if England were assailed by an Old World enemy, without practically identifying ourselves with the Stars and Stripes and electing to dwell beneath them ever after. It would be the act of annexation inspired by cowardice. We should be scorned by the rest of the world for leaving England in the lurch and abandoning a national life of our own, and a guilty conscience would torment us to the end.

Putting it in the briefest compass what the Laurier Government has done for the Militia is this:

(1.) Taken over Halifax and Esquimalt, formerly Imperial military and naval stations. The British taxpayer does not now contribute a shilling to Canadian defence.

(2.) Abolished by the Act of 1904 the restriction which formerly as good as prevented the appointment of a Canadian officer to the highest position in the Canadian Militia. The rule that a British Army officer of the same rank as a Canadian officer, but of junior date of appointment,

should take precedence of that Canadian officer, has also been done away with. Pitt, in the days of the American Colonies, put the American officer with the same rank and qualifications on an equal footing with officers of the British Army. But the old abuse crept into life again in Canada and was a source of humiliation to Canadian officers.

(3.) Substituted for command by an Imperial officer the direction of the Militia by a Military Council composed of the Minister and the principal officers of the force, which, of course, is subject in all things to the Government and Parliament of Canada. The British officers who were formerly at the head of the Militia were able and accomplished soldiers, but, as Sir Frederick Borden said in the House in 1904, "each new one seemed to be possessed with the idea that it was his duty to change and overturn everything that had been done by his predecessor." Some were loth to acknowledge the supremacy of the civil authority as represented by the Minister and Parliament, and, like Lord Dundonald, wanted to be a law unto themselves. Others unhappily came in conflict with Canadian public opinion through looking at matters altogether from an Imperial standpoint and seeking to commit us to projects beyond our means. The Military Council works well and without friction.

(4.) Adopted a system of annual drill for the whole Militia. Formerly only portions were drilled. Established an age limit for each rank, and limited the term of commanding officers so that now the younger men stand a chance of being rewarded with promotion for their services to the country. Established cadet corps and cadet battalions for enlisting the sympathy of the young in the defence of Canada. Raised the qualification for officers. Created a pension fund for the Permanent Corps, a School of Musketry, an Engineers branch, Ordnance branch, Medical Service, Army Service Corps, Veterinary Service, and Intelligence Department, together with a Central Camp. Encouraged the formation of rifle associations, established a Small-Arms factory in Canada for the manufacture of rifles and bayonets; also factories for making wagons, limbers, etc., for artillery, which formerly had to be brought from England.

(5.) Added to the numerical strength of the Militia, increased its efficiency in every arm, and brought it more in touch with the people from whom it springs, as well as more under their control.

Now let us note what the Laurier Government has not done. Some newspapers have it that by making His Majesty the King the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Militia it has empowered him to do

what he likes with it; he may order it abroad without our sanction or against our will. This is not the case. In England the King is no longer able of himself to declare war, or send British troops abroad. So in Canada, whenever the King's name appears in a statute or that of the Governor-General, it is well understood that those personages have no power or prerogative of their own, but must act as advised by their Ministers at Ottawa, and not otherwise. The Act of 1904 expressly says that the calling out of the Militia is vested in the Governor-in-Council, *i. e.* the Government.

Other newspapers and some Nationalist speakers say that the Act of 1904 alters the mode of constituting the defensive force in an emergency by providing that every male person over 18 shall be summoned, which is conscription. This is likewise an error. The Act does not differ in this particular from previous Acts. From the first, universal service in case of invasion has been provided for. Every civilized nation has a similar law, except perhaps the little commonwealth described by Voltaire, which had no fighting force at all, only the picture of a warrior on the front gate.

The *Weekly Sun* contends that the Government has introduced into the Act words which practically mean that the Militia may be drafted abroad, to the Old World wars of England, by Order-in-Council. Section 69 of the Act reads that the "Governor-in-Council may place the Militia, or any part thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, and also beyond Canada for the service thereof." This, it is suggested, is an innovation which puts the Canadian Militiaman in the position of a British regular, liable any day to be sent beyond sea.

The fact is that language identical with, or of the same signification as this, appears in every Militia Act that has been passed since Governor Simcoe's time, and before his time if we include the early Acts of Lower Canada. Take, for instance, the Militia Act of Upper Canada of 1808. It provides that the Governor or his Deputy may call out the force and march it "to any part of this Province," and goes on:

"But is shall not be lawful to order the Militia or any part thereof to march out of this Province except for the assistance of the Province of Lower Canada (when the same shall be actually invaded or in a state of insurrection); or except in pursuit of an enemy who may have invaded this Province, and except also for the destruction of any vessel or vessels built or building, or any depot or magazine formed or forming, or for the attack of any enemy who may be embodying or marching for the purpose of invading this Province, or for the attack on any fortification now erected, or which may be hereafter erected, to cover the invasion thereof."

War with the United States was always imminent in those days, and manifestly could not have been waged with advantage by England unless the officer in command of the forces in Canada had been empowered to lead the Canadian Militia, as well as the British Regulars, across the frontier. All subsequent Militia Acts contain a similar clause except that in some the long story about depots, vessels, and magazines is omitted.

The first Militia Act adopted after the union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1841 was that of 1846. Here the Governor is given authority "to march the Militia into any part of the Province, or to any place without the limits of the Province but conterminous therewith, for the attack of an enemy," etc. After specifying the services in which the Militia may be employed while operating without the limits of the Province, that is, in adjoining American territory, the Act proceeds to say that "in no other case or cases whatever" is it to be marched beyond the frontier. From this restriction, which does not appear in any other Militia Act, one might almost conclude, although there is no mention of it in the books or newspapers of the time, that some one in 1846 had raised the point now raised by the *Weekly Sun*, that the Governor had power to order the Militia beyond sea. If so, it was not well taken, for neither then nor at any other time, as plainly appears, could he send them out of Canadian territory except into adjacent American territory, and then only for the defence of Canada. The abortive Militia Bill of 1862 authorized the Governor to call out the Militia for service "either within or without the Province." The first Militia Act after Confederation, that of 1868, used the words "within or without the Dominion," and the same phraseology is employed in the Acts of 1883 and 1886.

But, says a Nationalist paper, Lord Beaconsfield once ordered Indian troops to Malta. To this the answer is that those troops belonged to the native army of India, which is a regular army in the employment of England, as much so as the white British Army; whereas the Canadian Militia is not a regular army and is not subject to the control of the Imperial Government, which could not order it from Ottawa to Montreal, let alone to the Mediterranean. On the breaking out of the Boer War, Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared that the Canadian Government could not legally send the Canadian Militia beyond the limits of Canada. The Canadian troops, 8,000 in number, who went to the Transvaal, volunteered to serve with the British arms. Nor could he or his Cabinet to-day, of their own motion, order the Militia to go outside of Canada except for defensive purposes in the narrow sense spoken of; that is, if Canada were invaded from the United States they could be sent across the American frontier. In brief, the language of the existing Act does not contain in that respect any meaning not possessed by that of former Acts.

But, as already observed, lest any Canadian Administration should hereafter be tempted, at a time of excitement over an imminent war in which England was to be a combatant, to ignore the existing limitations and rush a body of troops across the Atlantic, a clause was inserted in the Act of 1904 that, on the Militia or any part thereof being called into active service, Parliament shall meet within fifteen days. No former Militia Act contained such a proviso, the object of which is to give the country time to reflect upon the proposed step and an opportunity of approving or disapproving it. Here again the Laurier Cabinet has been faithful to the principles of self-government, our only safe anchorage. England is the mother of free nations, and "her children rise up and call her blessed." But just because we in Canada are free, and intend with God's help to continue so, it is, as I am sure you will agree, of the first and last importance that we should not be plunged into Old World wars, even for her sake, without due consideration being given by the representatives of the Canadian people to so momentous an undertaking.

Let us now turn to the Canadian Navy. The Laurier Administration is treating it as it has treated the Militia, making it a thoroughly Canadian force, the vessels built of Canadian material with Canadian officers and crews, and placing it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament. It is getting on for six years since Britain removed her warships from Canada and left us to our own resources for the defence of our coasts. A modest Canadian Navy will have plenty to do in guarding the Fisheries and Customs on the Atlantic and Pacific from foreign trespassers. It will not be called into active service except when our Government and Parliament decide that it can be usefully employed in protecting our shores and convoying our merchant vessels during a war in which England is engaged; or when England is actually in need of its assistance in European seas. This is not likely to happen in our day and generation, seeing that the British Navy is overwhelmingly stronger than that of any single rival, and stronger than the combined navies of any two in Europe. But it is only right that we should prepare to defend ourselves and be in a position to help her should she ever, which Heaven forbid, be "stranded on the reefs of despair."

When, half a century ago, Englishmen were asking in what respect England profited by her Colonies, which did not pay for their defence or supply her with revenue, or under Free Trade afford her any special commercial advantage, one of the largest items with which they debited the Colonies was the cost of maintaining British warships in Colonial

and more particularly in Canadian waters. Australia and Jamaica replied that her outlays on their naval protection were to save them from attack by the ships of some Old World nation hostile to England, and for that reason, and for that only, hostile to them. In other words, British naval expenditure on behalf of those Colonies was necessitated by Imperial rather than by Colonial considerations.

We in Canada could not enter that plea because for years the British squadron stationed on our North Atlantic coast had been employed, at England's expense, in enforcing the Treaty of 1818 for our exclusive benefit. That treaty, everyone knows, allows American fishermen to enter Canadian ports for wood, water, shelter and repairs only; and in conjunction with the Law of Nations prohibits them from fishing within three miles of the shore. The American fishermen of Gloucester and Provincetown had argued themselves into the belief that they had a right to share in our inshore fisheries just as they had done before they were separated from England, as well as to use our harbors as a base of operations for the pursuit of the deep-sea fishery on the Banks of Newfoundland, which is open to the fishermen of all nations; notwithstanding that the Washington authorities excluded our fish from the American market by onerous duties, and even taxed the tins when by temporary treaty arrangements we were permitted to ship canned fish to them duty free.

This, let it be said again, was not an Imperial question, but a Canadian one of great importance to the fishing population of the Maritime Provinces, and to the various industries dependent on it. The interest of England, if she had thought of herself alone, would have counselled her to sacrifice the Canadian fisheries to the New England fishermen for the sake of peace and quietness with the United States. Instead of that she spent a very large sum between 1818 and 1870 in maintaining the North Atlantic and West Indian squadron for the protection of these fisheries, at the risk of embroiling herself with the Washington Government and thereby affording her Old World enemies a splendid opportunity for destroying her. Throughout that period from ten to fifteen per cent. of the whole tonnage of her Navy was engaged in this service, and, as I have said, on account of frequent seizures of American fishing vessels for poaching in our inshores or otherwise violating our local laws or the provisions of the treaty, she was over and over again within an ace of hostilities with the United States. In 1870 we began to build small cruisers for the work, and her warships were gradually withdrawn from it; but they continued to guard our coasts, both on the Atlantic and Pacific, till 1905, still at the expense of the British taxpayer.

Along about 1887, as many will recollect, the Dominion Government found it necessary to seize a number of American fishing vessels in order to assert and maintain our rights. In fact, as Sir Charles Tupper afterwards said, we were at that time very nearly at war with our neighbors. Clearly we should not have ventured that far but for the presence of the British fleet. It is no exaggeration to say that at any time between 1818 and 1887 we might have lost our fisheries altogether had it not been for the action of England in standing by us in a controversy that did not concern the British people, except in so far as they were resolved that we should not be deprived, if they could help it, of an extremely valuable property that rightfully belonged to us. It has always appeared to me, and I am sure to you, that England's conduct towards us from 1818 onward was admirable and deserving of our lasting gratitude. "In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the angel of his presence saved them; and he bare them and carried them all the days of old." We can see at this distance that if the Seaboard Provinces had not enjoyed her active protection, rendered without hope or expectation of any return from them, they might have been prevented from joining or forced to abandon Confederation; in which event the rest of Canada would have been dependent in winter upon the United States for a separate existence, which is but another way of saying that it must soon have ceased to be a British and Canadian community.

Why did England withdraw her warships from Canada in 1905? For precisely the same reason that she withdrew her troops thirty-five years before—because they were required for the better security of the British Islands. The rise of Germany as a naval Power had created an uneasiness which early in 1905 was deepened by the Dogger Bank incident, when the Russian fleet under Rojestvensky, destroyed by the Japanese in the Straits of Korea, fired upon British fishing vessels as if with the design of provoking reprisals by Britain and bringing the German fleet on the scene as Russia's ally. It appeared later that there had been no such intention, but at the moment the affair was regarded as an additional justification for the greater concentration of British warships in British waters, which had been determined on in 1904.

The abolition of the North Atlantic and Pacific squadrons, with the assignment of the ships to the defence of Britain, was not the work of Little Englanders reckless of the interests of Canada, but of Lord Fisher, then chief expert Commissioner of the Admiralty, and of the Conservative Government of which Mr. Balfour was the head. No doubt Mr. Balfour felt, and had a right to feel, that we could have no

objection to assuming the responsibility of our naval defence, just as we had assumed that for our land defences; that in transferring the burden from the back of the British to the back of the Canadian taxpayer we should be but performing an act of common justice and equity, and taking one more step towards establishing the complete self-government of the Dominion.

This was the view entertained by the great majority of Canadians. A small minority was sorry to lose the benefit of the expenditure within Canada for the upkeep of the two British squadrons. In 1904, the year before the withdrawal, the North Atlantic squadron, with Halifax as its base, consisted of seven cruisers, some of them very powerful ones, and three sloops of war; while the Pacific squadron, with its base at Esquimalt, was composed of three cruisers and one sloop. In addition there were dockyards, victualling yards and fortifications with British soldiers or sailors to man them at both those places; the total outlay by the Admiralty within Canada that year being close on \$3,500,000. I venture to think that those Canadians who lamented the loss of that amount of British taxes, yet were not prepared to spend a Canadian dollar for a Canadian Navy, did not do themselves justice. Indeed, if I may venture to say so, it was a rather depressing exhibition of private greed and lack of public spirit.

Some of us to-day assert, as a reason for opposing the building of a small Canadian Navy, that in case of hostilities on sea England must either employ her warships in convoying our food steamers or starve. During the American Civil War a drafted man was allowed to hire a substitute. But to say that we should call on England to be our substitute, when with her back to the wall she is fighting for life, and pay her nothing, is a proposition so unique in its meanness that one wonders how any honest Canadian can support it.

Others say that a Canadian Navy is not needed because in the event of war between England and Germany we could ship our produce to Europe in American merchant vessels and bring back our imports in the same manner. This is quite correct. Under the Declaration of Paris of 1856, to which England is a party, a neutral flag protects everything except contraband of war. The Declaration of London of 1910 has not yet been adopted but will not materially alter things. Mr. Bowles, a noted English authority, says that Germany, knowing to what an extent England depends upon foreign food supplies, would doubtless declare breadstuffs to be contraband, as France when fighting in Tonkin declared rice. Even so, however, the Germans would probably think twice before stopping an American steamer sailing from New York or Portland with a cargo of Canadian wheat and compelling her to hand it over. By this device we could escape payment of the war insurance rates on our merchandise and hulls, the latter of which, by

the hypothesis, would be put out of business for the time being together with Canadian ports.

But would not this be a step close akin to taking shelter under the Monroe Doctrine? Our self-respect would be gone, for, to say the least, it would be a miserable ending to all our professions of loyalty to England. Unless British men-of-war were numerous enough to stop the traffic, and England was bold enough to risk American displeasure, the Germans could obtain their food supplies from the United States and the Argentine in neutral bottoms sailing to the neutral port of Antwerp, from which the cargoes would be transported by rail to the German consumer, as is done now. This, English experts say, is where Germany would have an advantage over England, which obviously could not use neutral ports in Continental Europe without exposing the food to capture on its transfer to her own. If England, for political reasons, let American merchant ships alone, Germany could rest assured of being abundantly fed whilst England might be in danger of famine; especially if the German cruisers ranging the seas in pursuit of British food-carriers were aided by privateers fitted out in neutral countries—a contingency which the Admiralty is said to be taking into account.

Whatever Germany might do in the way of placing her commerce under a neutral flag would, of course, be justified by the fact that she was fighting the greatest of all naval Powers, and that a nation's safety is her supreme law. On the contrary, if we in Canada turned our foreign commerce over to American railways, American ports and American vessels, it would be simply because we were unwilling to provide a Canadian Navy capable of protecting our own cargoes; literally, because we were evading our responsibilities from mercenary motives. Yet on the lowest ground, that of money, it would be a mistake; for such a course would at once impair our credit. The British and foreign financiers, on whom we depend for the capital to develop Canada, would almost to a certainty conclude that a people who could thus shirk the duty they owed to themselves—saying nothing of their moral obligation to their Mother Country—would not be above repudiating their debts and could not be trusted in anything that concerned their pockets.

There is another aspect of the matter which the opponents of a Canadian Navy who take this stand appear to overlook. Once we had transferred our export and import trade to American channels, and it had become set in them during the existence of the war, which might last for years if other nations were dragged in, what would it cost us to get it back to Canadian channels?

Take the exports of grain from the Canadian West. We have

spent \$100,000,000 in improving the St. Lawrence route by constructing canals and harbors and deepening the river between Montreal and Quebec. Under the conditions we are discussing the Winnipeg grain merchant would send everything to Buffalo and New York, which already handle about a fourth of each year's export crop, instead of to Montreal by all-water from Fort William, or by water and rail from the Georgian Bay. All export grain west of Winnipeg would go south by American roads to get under the American flag on the Atlantic. The Canadian Pacific, Canadian Northern and Grand Trunk Pacific would, as now, carry the grain destined for local consumption in Eastern Canada; but their export business would be lost, and they would have to raise their rates on other commodities in order to live. The steamship lines sailing in and out of Montreal and Quebec, Halifax and St. John, Victoria and Vancouver, would be laid up till the war ended; and it is safe to say the Americans would not only exact the last cent from our shipments through their ports, but do their utmost to keep the traffic in their control for all time.

Nothing is so hard to regain as a transportation business that has been diverted to other routes. The stoppage of ocean traffic by the St. Lawrence for the five winter months is a tremendous drawback to that route; but what would happen if the whole of our seagoing commerce on both coasts were transferred to American interests for an indefinite period? One can hardly calculate what the transportation of Western produce alone means to the lake and ocean vessels, railways, banks and general industries of the older Provinces. I have looked into the subject as well as I am able and take it on myself to say that, directly and indirectly, Canada would stand to lose a great deal more, out of sight more, by transferring her oversea traffic to the American flag than would be required for the construction and maintenance of an efficient Canadian Navy; so that, judging merely from the standpoint of dollars and cents, which is their criterion throughout, the opponents of a Navy seem to be penny wise and pound foolish.

Thus far we have been considering what a Canadian Navy could and should do in time of war. Its principal occupation, however, will be to watch our coasts in time of peace. Since 1870 we have accumulated a number of small cruisers and armed steamers, many of them now out of date, which are engaged in the Fishery Protective Service, and the important part of their work will be taken over by the new Navy. The Atlantic fisheries extend from the Bay of Fundy to the Strait of Belle Isle, the Pacific from the Fraser River to Prince Rupert; whilst the inland fisheries of Canada embrace 250,000 square miles of fresh water.

The yield from all the fisheries last year amounted to \$30,000,000, and is steadily increasing. Formerly Nova Scotia was the banner province, now British Columbia tops the list in value of catch. The industry throughout our seacoasts employs 1,700 sailing vessels, steamers and tugs, a few of which are engaged in fur-seal hunting, and over 40,000 boats, manned by 70,000 men, with 22,000 more in the business of cleaning and canning. The private capital invested is nearly \$20,000,000. A glance at the blue books is sufficient to show that the industry is only in its infancy. Since 1870 the yield in Nova Scotia has doubled, that in New Brunswick trebled, that of Prince Edward Island increased five-fold. The first returns from British Columbia, those of 1876, showed a yield of a little over \$100,000; last year it exceeded \$10,000,000.

It is essential that we should make the most of the victory Canada recently won at The Hague, and American fishermen made to understand, once for all, by strict though friendly measures, that we intend to hold on to what is ours in the North Atlantic. In the Pacific we possess an extraordinary amount of fishery wealth in the form of salmon, halibut, herring, and cod, and of other fish that have not yet become merchantable. The American fishermen from Seattle and elsewhere have for years frequented the British Columbian coast, and even made it their base of operations. We wish them well if they will only fish in their own waters, but they cannot be allowed any longer to poach in ours. A portion of the Canadian Navy will, no doubt, be detailed to that service. There is abundance of other work, such as the suppression of smuggling by sea, the rescuing of vessels in distress, the mapping of sunken rocks, and a general oversight of the conditions on our vast seaboards.

Finally, the Navy will bear witness to all and sundry that Canada is emerging from the Colonial stage. In the poem entitled the "Scottish Exile in Canada," Loekhart described the newly-arrived immigrant as lost in wonder at our boundless territory, yet giving his mind and loyalty to the land from which he came:

From the lone shieling on the misty island
Mountains divide us and a waste of seas;
Yes, still the blood is strong, the heart is Highland,
And we in dreams behold the Hebrides.

We native Canadians also glory in the land of our ancestors, but are proud beyond measure of Canada as she moves into her place among the nations with a predestined future of no ordinary splendor. We are not a warlike people, the only conquests we care to boast of being those over the forest and prairie, by which we are creating free homes for millions of the poor and distressed of mankind. Yet surely self-respect, if nothing else, suggests that we should have a Navy of our

own, if only as a symbol of our authority on both oceans, to take the place of that which England so generously maintained for our protection when we were not accustomed to self-government and were too weak to protect ourselves.

It is said that the Canadian Navy is based on or would involve conscription. There is nothing in this assertion. The only occasion on which something approaching conscription for naval purposes was provided for was in 1862, when the abortive Militia Bill of the Macdonald-Cartier Government obliged (Section 130) "every seaman or other person engaged ordinarily in the calling of a seaman or sailor, or otherwise occupied or engaged in or upon any of the steamers, schooners, or other vessels upon the lakes or waters in this Province, or belonging to any of the ports thereof," to register every December at the nearest Custom House; and compelled the captains of vessels to see that their men were so registered. There may be naval conscription in Australia; if so, it has nothing to do with us. Our Naval regulations provide for voluntary enlistment. The Nationalists tell the Quebec people that men and boys are to be taken from their beds by press-gangs like those which formerly seized the passer-by in England and hurried him aboard a British warship. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Government advertises for recruits.

Nor is it true that the Canadian Navy may be ordered abroad by His Majesty the King, or by the Governor-General as his representative, or by Order-in-Council. The Act of 1910 says:

"In case of an emergency the Governor-in-Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service."

But this has to be read in the light of a succeeding section, which, as in the case of the Militia, leaves the decision as to whether the force is to be sent abroad or not to Parliament:

"Whenever the Governor-in-Council places the Naval Service or any part thereof on active service, if Parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall issue for a meeting of Parliament within fifteen days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue

to sit in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day."

It is quite true that if Parliament should approve of placing the Canadian Navy at the disposal of England the command of it during hostilities would be vested in the British Admirals. Clearly there could not be two separate commands on the same side in a naval battle without grave danger to that side.

Lastly, it is said by the Opposition that the question of building a Navy should first have been submitted to the people by Referendum. The Opposition had nothing to say about a Referendum when in March 29th, 1909, Mr. Foster moved that a Navy should be built without longer delay, or when the Conservative press during the German scare advocated a contribution from us to the Admiralty of 20 or 25 millions in the lump. It was not till the Nationalists at Quebec, who desire to do away with the Navy scheme, raised the Referendum cry that the Conservative party at Ottawa adopted it. Not long since, when Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne urged a Referendum on Preference and the Reform of the House of Lords, Lord Chancellor Loreburn wrote a letter (December 3rd, 1910) in which he said among other things:

"The word and the thing are utterly unfamiliar in this country. We live under representative government. The electors control both policy and legislation by choosing members to represent them in the House of Commons, to whom is left the duty, not only of settling the scheme and clauses of a bill, but also of keeping in or driving out the Ministers of the Crown. The Referendum, in any of its numerous varieties, means that a direct question is to be put to the electorate over the head of its representatives. It supersedes representative government so far as it is adopted. How far will depend upon the variety we choose.

"To incorporate the Referendum as an integral part of our constitution in any form in which I have seen it advocated would be a blow to representative government of a most serious kind. The electors of this country are busy men. They cannot study each of our complicated controversies in detail. It is enough if they choose men whom they trust, whose point of view they agree with in general, and commit to them for a limited time the control of legislation and of policy."

To have left the Canadian Navy to a Referendum would probably have resulted at the time in Quebec's voting against it, whilst the English-speaking Provinces would have been divided. The subject was not then understood by the people of Quebec, for the Government's policy had been grossly misrepresented. Yet the hostile attitude of Quebec would have been seized upon by the ultra-Imperialists as proof that the French-Canadians were disloyal at heart, and the two races

once more brought into collision. After the British elections, when the Referendum proposal had served the purpose of shelving Protection as a Tory plank, some of the leading Tory journals took Lord Loreburn's ground, that it would be a dangerous innovation upon British constitutional methods. It would be an equally dangerous and costly innovation in Canada, besides, as any one can readily perceive, tending to split up a population not yet welded into a homogenous mass.

I have now briefly examined all the objections thus far raised against the Canadian Navy. The Government has purchased two British cruisers, is establishing a Naval College at Halifax for the education of Canadian officers, encouraging the construction of docks large enough to accommodate our vessels of war, as well as the largest merchant steamships, and will shortly commence building a Navy of moderate size and power from designs furnished by the British Admiralty, but of Canadian material and equipment throughout. We shall have to import the guns for a time, but before long they will be made in Canadian factories. The plates will be of Canadian steel and we have plenty of nickel at Sudbury. In all, ten or eleven vessels will be built; that is, four or five second-class cruisers in addition to the two purchased from the Admiralty, and six torpedo destroyers. Their construction will create a new Canadian industry and benefit existing industries in all directions; and, returning to the questions of dollars and cents, the cost will scarcely be felt. It is estimated that the vessels can be built in the first instance for about \$10,000,000, while the upkeep will amount to a million a year or less.

The opponents of the Navy forget that the Canada of to-day is a vastly richer community than the Canada of yesterday, and that the Canada of to-morrow will be richer still. We are growing at a marvellous rate and can bear a burden like this without any difficulty. This year we shall get, it is said, 300,000 immigrants. Long ago they used to reckon the economic value of a slave at \$800. If for argument's sake we put the value of each free-born immigrant at no more, we shall profit this year, potentially speaking, to the extent of \$240,000,000, the interest on which for a twelvemonth would be sufficient to build the Navy, without going further afield.

While the Laurier Administration is thus proceeding to create a Navy Canadian in every fibre and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, it is hard to say what the Opposition favors. So far as one can judge, the great majority of Conservatives are in favor of our contributing to British armaments whenever the

Empire is in danger; but, as said before, this policy would in effect leave the adjustment of our taxation to Englishmen like Lord Northcliffe and Lord Charles Beresford, who are always rigging up invasion bugaboos to frighten the weak-minded. We cannot afford to tie up to either party in England, least of all to the one whose clamor for bloated armaments has been repudiated at two general elections within the space of a year by the British democracy.

The tortuous course of the Canadian Opposition is shown in their motions and amendments during the past two years. It would occupy too much space to print all the motions in full, but the dates here given will enable any one to find them in Hansard. One or two unimportant motions from both sides are omitted.

(1) March 29th, 1909.—Mr. Foster moves that Canada "should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great seaports."

(2) March 30th, 1909.—Sir Wilfrid Laurier moves in amendment that while the House fully recognizes the duty of the Canadian people in the matter, it is of opinion that "under the present constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Colonies the payment of regular or periodical contributions to the Imperial treasury for Naval and Military purposes would not, as far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence." He proposed therefore to build a Canadian Navy.

This plan was accepted by the Opposition. It was the arrangement spoken of by Sir Charles Tupper in his letter of November, 1909, in which he said that a "fearful responsibility would rest on those who disturbed or destroyed it." For a while both parties agreed that the true solution of the problem of defence was to be found in a Canadian Navy entirely controlled by Canada. Then the Nationalists, who, as far as I can gather, are opposed to our assisting England under any circumstances, conceived the idea of a Referendum as a means of killing the plan; whereupon the Opposition, notwithstanding Sir Charles' warning, changed front to this extent, that while in the English-speaking Provinces they continued to advocate a Canadian Navy, in the Province of Quebec they advocated a Referendum.

(3) February 3rd, 1910.—Mr. Borden moved that a Referendum should be held on the Navy question, but his motion likewise declared "that in the meantime the immediate duty of Canada and the impending necessities of the Empire can best be discharged and met by placing without delay at the disposal of the Imperial authorities, as a free and loyal contribution from the people of Canada, such an amount as may be sufficient to purchase or construct two battleships or armoured

cruisers of the latest Dreadnought type, giving to the Admiralty full discretion to expend the said sum at such time and for such purposes of naval defence as in their judgment may best serve to increase the united strength of the Empire, and thus assure its peace and security."

The Referendum was intended by Mr. Borden for Quebec, the vote of money in the lump for the Toronto Imperialists. Yet in his speech on March 29th, 1909, Mr. Foster had opposed a money contribution "because it bears the aspect of hiring somebody else to do what we ourselves ought to do," and, besides, would leave Canada without any defence or preparations therefor.

(4) November 22nd, 1910.—Mr. Monk, in behalf of the Nationalists, moves on the address in reply to the speech from the Throne that "the House regrets that the speech gives no indication whatever of the intention of the Government to consult the people on its Naval policy and the general question of the contribution by Canada to Imperial armaments."

(5) November 24th, 1910.—Mr. Borden moves in amendment to Mr. Monk's motion, because, as he said, he "was not particularly satisfied with all the verbiage of it"; "That while assuring His Excellency of the unalterable attachment and devotion of the Canadian people to the British Crown, etc., we desire to express our regret that your Excellency's gracious speech gives no indication whatever of any intention on the part of your Excellency's advisers to consult the people on the Naval policy of Canada."

Mr. Borden has thus altogether adopted the Nationalist device for postponing the construction of a Navy. Nevertheless, in 1909, as we have seen, he and his friends were all for an immediate contribution of cash or Dreadnoughts, because, as they said, no time was to be lost in aiding England, and the delay necessary for the construction of a Canadian Navy was not to be thought of. On October 14th, 1910, when he made a speech at Halifax, Mr. Borden seemed to have reverted to the idea of a Canadian Navy, no matter how long it might take to build it, for he said then that "one governing principle at least should control, that out of our own materials, by our own labor, and by the instructed skill of our own people, any necessary provision for our own naval defence should be made." This, he added, would be Nova Scotia's opportunity, Providence having endowed her with the material, the men and the situation, "which are essential for developing a scheme of naval defence and protection."

Henceforth, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier observed in the House, Mr. Borden "will have the insult of Nationalist praise," for after all his protestations of loyalty and his haste to assist England, in a manner not at all desirable from the point of view of Canadian self-government, the

temptation of the Quebec vote has carried him over to the side of Mr. Bourassa. If England takes any interest in the Conservative party in Canada, she may well say of it: "This people draweth nigh unto me with their lips, but their heart is far from me."

I have now, as far as time has permitted, told the whole story of the policy of the Laurier Administration with respect to the Canadian Navy and the Canadian Militia. If Sir Wilfrid could have his way he would prefer that war should be banished from the face of the earth and peace and good-will among men reign forever. As things are, he had to do his duty for the protection of Canada and he has done it, I submit, as a Canadian should—by putting our land and sea forces under the exclusive control of the Dominion Parliament, thereby enlarging the sphere of our autonomy; while leaving us in a position, should the day come when England is in peril, to help her of our own free will and out of our deep affection for her to maintain her position as the most glorious apostle of liberty and civilization that ever ministered to the children of men.



