




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

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CONSIDERATIONS

UPON THE

AMERICAN ENQUIRY.

[Price 1 s.]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

PHYSICS 354

[1971]

CONSIDERATIONS

UPON THE

AMERICAN ENQUIRY.

———*Quid facitis? quæ vos dementia, dixi,
Concitat, O focii, captam dimittere Trojam?*

THE SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. WILKIE, No. 71, in St. Paul's Church-yard.

M DCC LXXIX.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHILOSOPHY

THE SECOND EDITION

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

CONSIDERATIONS

UPON THE

AMERICAN ENQUIRY.

THE present is an alarming moment; nor are they to be despised who feel fears upon the occasion. Our situation would justify apprehension, if apprehension did not render our situation more desperate. With an expence of treasure new difficulties croud upon us; with a waste of blood, fresh enemies hourly present themselves. We have seen the force of this country unsuccessfully tried in America; and we are now called upon to exert it against America, France, and Spain. Our natural foes contemplate our enfeebled situation with rancorous delight, and are advancing to press us to the ground. The powerful nation, whose right hand, but yesterday, was to smite America, now

B

trembles

trembles for herself: from dreams of foreign conquest, she wakes to plans of domestic safety, and starts, affrighted with the din of arms, from her luxuriant couch.

What has given rise to this revolution? How has this sudden change been effected?

While Parliament was sitting, it would have been presumption in an individual to have endeavoured to call off the attention of the people from the collected wisdom of the nation. The deliberations of their representatives were the oracles to which they would naturally resort, in all cases of doubt and difficulty; and in whose determinations all their confidence would be vested. But, whether fortunately or unfortunately for this country, time must decide, those difficulties, which appeared to us alarming, have scarcely seemed worthy of notice to them. In the Lower House, the greatest part of the last Sessions has been consumed in enquiries that could only derive their consequence from a total dearth of any more interesting subjects. For had there been a prospect of immediate danger to the kingdom, the safety of the nation could never have given way to Admiral Keppel's vindication, or to the establishment of Sir William Howe's military fame. In the proceedings of
the

the Upper House this truth becomes more striking. The dignity of Peerage condescended to examine into the breeches of decayed seamen; and the first assembly in the nation, with a more than Gallic regard for the rules of decorum, consumed a day to settle the etiquette of salute between the chaplain and the pensioners of Greenwich hospital.

If we had therefore no other proof of existing danger but the proceedings of parliament, we should naturally conclude it ideal and imaginary. But when we look around, and behold in every part of the kingdom the most unusual preparations; the husbandman dragged from his peaceful occupation; the mariner torn from his wife and family; felons permitted to make their option between military service and infamous punishment; every purse open to the hand of Government; an intended invasion announced from the Throne;—we wake from the delusion, into which Parliament had plunged us, astonished at their inconsiderateness, and alarmed for our own situation.

With regard to our natural enemies, one sentiment only can prevail. But it becomes a question, whether, under our present circum-

stances, we should still persist in our efforts against America—Let us look back to the measures we have already pursued; and from past errors endeavour to collect precepts for future wisdom.

The privilege of not being taxed without our own consent, has, since the earliest periods of our constitution, been deservedly dear to every Englishman. Perhaps there is not one of which the people are more jealous; or even their representatives, in times of the greatest corruption, more watchful. Independently of the quiet enjoyment of “private property” being one of the three component parts of liberty, it forms such a restraint upon the royal power, as to give to the people, could they remain uncorrupted, the controul over almost every action of the crown (a).

I will not enter into the question, whether a distant colony, dependent upon a kingdom, has a right to share every privilege in common with that kingdom: or whether this country had any just claim of taxation over America unrepresented. It is sufficient for the present purpose to consider, that this country attempted to exer-

(a) In De Lolme on the Constitution, p. 86, this is placed in a very strong light.

cise that right, and that America resisted. In opposition to an unpopular act, they made use of every popular art; and employed language very harmonious to the body of the people. With political sagacity, they represented themselves as contending for the common cause; and turning aside the dagger that was through their sides to stab the constitution of this country. They called upon every Englishman to join them in opposition to so odious a claim; and to feel for fellow-subjects who were labouring to resist an unconstitutional measure. They artfully affected to consider the *act of parliament* as distinct from the *act of the people*; while their friends in this country refined upon their cunning, and distinguished between the *act of parliament* and the *act of the minister*. The plain understanding of an Englishman was not proof against such address, and the nation was much divided upon the justice of their cause. The most violent justified their resistance, and considered them as champions in the cause of liberty; while even the most moderate alleged, it was imprudent in this country to endeavour to enforce a claim, which, whether just or unjust, would certainly never be quietly submitted to.

But the time was come when the contest was to assume another appearance, and the question

question of strength to be tried. Parliament adopted a hostile system; armies were sent forth, and fleets equipped. A new scene was now exhibited, and the subjects of this country were permitted to array themselves in a hostile manner, in the face of the British army. They were collecting ammunition, and had provided cannon; when the plains of Lexington were dyed with the first blood shed in the present civil war.

The nation now paused for a moment.—Grief was seen upon some countenances; deep reflexion was perceived upon all. From different emotions different counsels resulted. One party thought it time to drop every peaceful measure, and became clamorous for hostility and war. The other threatened Ministers with the consequences of their conduct, who had provoked a brave people to resistance by an invasion of their rights; and charged them with irritating the minds of freemen by pointing the bayonet at their breasts.

Ministry seemed to feel the divided state of the nation, and their measures were indecisive and irresolute. They appear not to have thought seriously of any lasting resistance on the part of America; and to have imagined,

that the appearance of force would terrify them into submission. Indeed such was the language of the day. The Americans were represented as dastardly poltroons, incapable of any manly exertion; and the expression was employed, that though, “dogs in forehead, in hearts they were deer (*b*).” Those, who published these opinions, seemed to forget, that there is a certain value beneath which no human quality should be estimated; and that even the timid “deer,” when it perceives no hope but in despair, will turn upon its pursuer, and exert those means of defence, with which nature has provided all her creatures.

But whatever might be the opinion of different parties, with regard to the resistance which America made to the claim of taxation, the declaration of independence staggered her most zealous friends. A declaration that was to throw off all the authority of this country over America; to expunge from our books every statute concerning her; to annihilate our commerce; to shut up our nurseries of seamen; —and taking from us these great resources, pour them into the lap of a powerful rival, and

(*b*) Pope's Homer.

inve-

inveterate enemy—such a declaration can hardly be supposed to have been very favourably received. There were not, however, wanting men to vindicate this measure; while the majority of the American party only endeavoured to palliate it. They attributed it to that system of oppression, which Administration, they said, had uniformly pursued; to the contempt with which every petition had been received, and every remonstrance rejected; and looked forward to the time, when under the administration of men in whom they could confide, and upon the adoption of measures they might deem equitable, the Americans would revoke this declaration. In the mean time, every packet, that arrived from America, brought fresh proofs of her fixed purpose to emancipate herself from the dominion of this country. The seeds of rebellion, scattered with a profuse hand, were spreading widely. The soil was friendly, and the climate genial.

Posterity will hardly credit the tale, that at a time, when we were at peace with all the world, except America, there could be found a man, who, urging so disgraceful a motive as the defeat of our arms, could propose to the people of this country to acknowledge American independence.

pendence. The Duke of Richmond (c) was the man who came forward with this dastardly proposal; which was shortly followed by a notification from the Court of France, of their having concluded a treaty with America as an independent state. The Earl of Chatham still lived; or rather, under a complication of disorders, he protracted a wearisome existence. His under-

(c) It would be disrespectful to pass by this illustrious character, without rendering it due homage. His Grace plays a very conspicuous part in the tragedy of the times. He is no orator; but, like the prostitute in Scripture, "loud and noisy." His application is indefatigable; and it is not his fault if his judgment is not equal to it. By opposing Ministers he has acquired some degree of fame. There are men who, without possessing wisdom enough to discover what is right, have just sense enough to discover what is wrong. His Grace is certainly a powerful opponent; not from any final triumph which he obtains, but because he proves an obstacle in the mean time. He is, moreover, remarkably captious and turbulent; and calls to our recollection John Lilburn of notorious memory, of whom it was said, *if there were no other man living but himself, Lilburn would quarrel with John.*

The following lines have unaccountably strayed into this note:

Thersites only clamoured in the throng,
Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of tongue;
Aw'd by no shame, by no respect controul'd,
In scandal busy, in reproaches bold.
The Great to censure was his darling theme,
But Royal scandal * his delight supreme.

* What cared he for the King's birth-day?—D. of R.

standing preserved its vigour; but his corporal infirmities rendered him unfit for the labours of public life. His mind was the helpless tenant of a decayed castle, venerable in its ruins! He was the first, who had started doubts in Parliament with regard to the right of this country to tax America, and had declared that "he rejoiced in her resistance." He had censured the conduct of Administration as founded in error and folly, and had made unsuccessful efforts to effect a reconciliation. But when he found that the aims of America were no longer disguised, and that, renouncing all attachment to this country, she became an instrument to the ambition of France, he hurried down to Parliament, anxious to deliver his opinions. He exclaimed against the perfidy of our enemies; he execrated their mad ambition, that was kindling throughout Europe the flames of war. He dwelt upon the resources of this country; he expatiated upon her spirit. He avowed himself a friend to America till she had declared independence; but in the pursuit of this measure he "would contribute his shirt off his back to oppose her." It was a solemn sight, to behold the expiring efforts of this illustrious Statesman! All parties gazed upon him with reverence; and a mute awe pervaded the august Assembly. It seemed as if they had anticipated the event that was soon to take place; and, like children, were croud-

crouding round the death-bed of their aged and venerable parent, to receive the last testimonies of his affection, and the dictates of his departing experience.—His words gave new vigour to firmness; fresh confidence to hope; and sentiments, flowing from his enlightened understanding, were received and treasured up, as the sacred precepts of political morality.

The opinion of the nation became settled from this time. No man in a public situation would avow a sentiment in favour of American independence; and none but a few slaves to system, whose influence was as weak as their abilities were insignificant, were heard to mutter in support of it.

Force had been exerted without success; and Parliament determined to try the effects of moderation. Commissioners went out, with a power to grant every privilege to America, short of independence. Unfortunately the intentions of this country could not be fully revealed to them; for expressions occurring in the Commissioners declaration injurious to “their great and generous ally the good King of France,” reduced the Congress (*d*) to the necessity of putting an end to its further reading; and after a series of fruitless efforts, the Commissioners returned to this country.

(a) Proceedings of Congress.

Such has been the progress of this unhappy contest; and at this day there cannot remain a doubt with regard to the future conduct of the American Congress. They will never relinquish independence while they can possibly preserve it; and no entreaty, no concession, upon our part, will induce them to change their purpose. Force only can bring them back to the subjection of this country; and we must trust to the vigour of our arms, for what every other method has been unsuccessfully exerted to obtain.—But what have we to hope from these? Has not the glory of our arms been already sufficiently tarnished? To what purpose have we handled them, but to crowd the prisons of America, and to call forth the armaments of France and Spain? Where are our successes to be found? Where are our triumphs recorded? Every victory we claim disputed by the enemy, and nothing certain but our defeats. Of these we have unfortunately the most damning proofs:

—————arma,
 Militibus sine cæde———
 Direpta vidi; vidi ego civium
 Retorta tergo brachia libero.

HOR.

In return for the most ample supplies of money and men, we have no other satisfaction but to learn, that our failure has been owing to the
 igno-

ignorance of Ministers, or the incapacity of Generals.

But there are candid and disinterested men, who, neither blaming Ministers nor Commanders, impute our failure to the impracticability of our attempt. You have not, say they, made difficulties to yourselves; they have not grown out of your errors; they were inherent in your situation. You have attempted to disturb the necessary relations of things; you would combat the order of events. Desist from the vain endeavour; withdraw your troops from America; acknowledge her independence; and conclude a treaty with her as beneficial as you can render it to your interest. Your situation becomes every day more difficult. If, after a profound peace of several years, with the most lavish contribution of money and troops, you have not been able to conquer America, in the infancy of military discipline, unassisted by any foreign power; what probability is there of your success, after you have spilled your blood, and exhausted your treasure, against America trained to arms, hardened in war, and assisted by France and Spain?

To those who are unaccustomed to reason, it is difficult to detect the fallacy of this argument. The positions are founded upon assumed facts
of

of popular existence, which, if they were true, must compel an inference in its favour. But it is not true that we have made war against *America*, but against *a rebellion existing in America*; and it is equally false that *we have done all in our power* to subdue that rebellion.

It is confidently asserted by Gentlemen (e), whose long residence in America has afforded them every means of information, and whose veracity stands unimpeached, that not one fifth part of the people of America has, at any period, supported from choice the American rebellion. This assertion is proved by a variety of facts. The reluctance which the people shewed to send Delegates to Congress was so great, that the last delegation from the province of Pennsylvania was made by less than two hundred voters, although there are, at least, thirty thousand men entitled to vote by the laws of that province. In the Congress of 1774, one of the Delegates from the province of New York, representing a considerable district in that province, was chosen by himself and his clerk only. At the time that the British army was expected in Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania militia could not be prevailed upon to turn out. In disobedience to repeated proclamations, the British army was supplied with great plenty of provisions. Though Con-

(e) General Robertson and Joseph Galloway, Esq.

gress voted for the campaign 1777, sixty-six thousand men, they could not bring into the field, at the utmost, sixteen thousand. The Congress paid 56 *l.* 5*s.* for every recruit, while we only paid 2 *l.* 5*s.* Desertions were so frequent, that in a day fifty have been known to come in. Such was the aversion to serve, that 200 *l.* currency has been given for a substitute. Seven thousand provincials are actually serving in our army. In the back parts of Carolina, one thousand six hundred took up arms in support of the King's authority. It was thought necessary to disarm all the people of Queen's County; and when we consider the art and violence the Congress made use of; shutting up every source of information and complaint, by imprisoning printers, who dared to canvass their measures; appointing Committees to frustrate every plan of the friends of Government; holding forth to them the penalties of confiscation and high-treason; keeping spies to watch every motion; an armed force constantly before their eyes (*f*);—when we consider all these circumstances, it is impossible to refuse belief to the assertion of General Robertson and Mr. Galloway.

But if the people in America are so friendly to our cause, how happens it that these favour-

(*f*) Evidence of General Robertson and Mr. Galloway before the House of Commons, *passim*.

able dispositions have not been improved, and that the immense force we have sent into that country has not been able to bring her back to a constitutional dependence upon this? The question is important, and deserves some degree of consideration.

Sir William Howe took the command in America, with every favourable expectation from his conduct. He had not signalized himself by any display of military knowledge; but had served in America under the late General Wolfe, and had given very honourable proofs of his bravery. This was sufficient to procure him the affection of the people, with whom courage effects even more than charity. He embarked for America with the Generals Clinton and Burgoyne. The second was but little known out of the profession. The latter had, indeed, appeared in more characters than one to the public. His exploits at Preston were well known, and for some time remembered with resentment; but his zeal to do justice to an oppressed people, and to vindicate the character of the nation, had in a great degree reinstated him in the opinion of his countrymen (*g*). Their departure was celebrated with all the pomp of poetry; and a tempest that appeared, about the time of

(*g*) Enquiry into the state of the East India Company.

their

their sailing, upon the face of the sky, was prophetically interpreted to be the God of Battles arming them with his lightning. *I pede fausto quo te rapit Jupiter*, was the farewell they received; and the nation was convinced that victory beckoned them across the Atlantic.

But popularity is more easily acquired than preserved. The first news that arrived from America (*b*) brought us proofs of what was before very clearly ascertained, the courage of Sir William Howe; but the nation had reason to lament that this gallant officer had been so much exposed. At the expence of the dearest blood in the nation, a victory it is true was purchased; but there were some, who, in the emotions of grief for their departed friends and kindred, were heard to exclaim, "It is one thing to gather laurels, it is another to scatter cypress (*i*)!" It was said, that the rashness of a foldier, not the prudence of a General, had conducted this enterprize; and that to "take the bull by the horns" was not always the part of wisdom.

Sir William Howe felt the reproof, and seems to have determined never again to incur a like censure. From this period the war was carried

(*b*) Engagement at Bunker's hill.

(*i*) Sterne.

on, if not with the delay, at least with all the caution of a Fabius; and Sir William Howe had been taught to respect the enemy too much, ever again to approach them without all the ceremonies of combat. It is not here a proper place to enumerate what these were. They are recorded at length in every Gazette; and may serve to undeceive those who have foolishly imagined, that any success is to be effected in war by dint of discipline and valour.

The bulk of the people, who have no conception of armies being long opposed to each other without an engagement taking place, began to murmur at this inactivity of the Commander in Chief. Some doubted his capacity, others his zeal in the cause. The liberal told us, that the influence of women and wine was irresistible; the sordid whispered, that Sir William's fortune had been ruined in this country; and insinuated that his appointments were immense. A foreign officer (*k*) was heard to declare, "If you had paid your Generals by the job, and not by the day, this business would have been settled long ago." The most insulting pasquinades were circulated through the town; a reward was offered to whoever should bring news of a strayed army; a most hackneyed allusion was worn thread-bare; and Antony and

(*k*) General De H—.

Cleopatra led the van of political paragraphs.

Those who attacked his measures with serious argument, pretended that they discovered unpardonable errors in every part of his conduct. With powers for negotiating peace, he never exerted them but upon some great advantage gained by the rebels; and offered them terms of pardon, when they were flushed with success, and most confident in their cause. They alleged that he had lost several glaring opportunities of putting an end to the rebellion; and that in five several complete defeats, at Long Island, the White Plains, Quibble Town, Brandy-Wine, and German Town, there was no pursuit made after victory. He permitted the rebels to escape, and returned to the dice and his mistress. He indulged in the luxuries of Capua, when he should have marched to the gates of Rome.

Lord Howe, who had been appointed to the command of the fleet, shared in some degree these reflexions with his brother. At the head of an immense naval power, he suffered the Americans to fit out ships of force; and what had never been foreseen, to become formidable by sea. Our trade suffered severely; the packets of Government were intercepted; and

even upon the coast of America a King's ship (*1*) was obliged to strike her colours to the American flag. It is said that some Gentlemen, who had lost all their property in this contest, applied to his Lordship for leave to fit out letters of marque to cruize against the enemy; and that he sternly replied, "Will you never have done with distressing these poor people? Will you never give them an opportunity of seeing their error?"

The complaints of the nation, and the general dissatisfaction that prevailed, were become too serious to be disregarded; and it having been signified to the Brothers, that his Majesty consented to their return, Sir William, and shortly after, Lord Howe arrived in this country. In their turns they became clamorous for redress, and talked much of their insulted honour, and much of their injured fame. Parliament after some difficulty met their complaints, and an enquiry was instituted into their conduct.

We have seen that enquiry proceeded upon; and there are three things necessary to be considered; the nature of the tribunal, the evidence given, and the result of the enquiry.

(1) Fox, Captain Fotheringham.

It may, perhaps, hereafter be a matter of surprize, that no Court could be found in this kingdom to sit in judgment upon military operations, but the House of Commons; and that no better time could be appointed but at the close of a laborious Sessions, and at a time of great national difficulty and danger. It is not easy to conceive, how men not bred to the profession, and only accustomed *fiētis contendere verbis*, could be able to form proper opinions upon the complicated list of military manœuvres that have so peculiarly distinguished the present war. The honourable Mr. C. Fox has a quick understanding, and Mr. Edmund Burke (*m*) most surprising volubility; but we are yet to learn that they have military judgment, and experience in the art of war. Were they witnesses of the condition of the rebel army, of their numbers, of their want of discipline? Are they acquainted with the face of the country? or

(*m*) When I mention the names of these two Gentlemen, I do not mean to represent them as ignorant beyond the rest; but only as having been most active in this enquiry. I respect their abilities; and have, perhaps, a better opinion of their patriotism than the public. Whatever is suggested by them should be heard with attention. Their efforts can only proceed from a pure affection to their country; for if our enemies were to become possessed of every acre of land in the kingdom, they cannot be losers by the event: and their opinion ought to be attended to; for they are certainly best judges in a cause who are not parties interested.

can

can they, from a description of it, form any comparative opinion upon the strength of particular situations, from similar situations that come within their own experience? When and where was this experience acquired? *During their service last war in Germany?* The idea is too absurd for serious refutation! It is true, the conduct of the Howes was of great national consequence, and merited the consideration of the representatives of the people. But this consideration should not have been confined to the House of Commons. The reports of men, enabled from professional knowledge and faithful services to decide, might have merited their most serious attention. In effect, we should be at a loss to say, how it was possible that this enquiry found its way into the House of Commons, if we did not know that Opposition * had taken it by the hand. The noble Lord and his Brother
relying

* The following sketches are hazarded with diffidence :

Mr. EDMUND BURKE is attached from friendship and interest to Lord Rockingham, and shared in his short Administration. As its character was "debility," so is that of Mr. Burke. He possesses genius, but he wants judgment; and is better calculated for the closet than for a public assembly. Intent upon the display of his own abilities, he cannot watch the passions, or accommodate himself to the temper of his audience. In his reasoning he is too subtle and abstruse. He never strikes boldly at his adversary, but by endeavouring to circumvent, suffers him to escape. He renders politics a

relying upon such powerful assistance, looked forward, not only to an honourable acquittal, but

system of metaphysics. We admire, but we are not convinced. Trifling, diffusive, and puerile, he seems to have chosen the *ludit amabiliter* for his motto; and when we expect him, in all his dignity, upon the front of the theatre, we find him at play behind the scenes.—Yet he has his excellencies. His imagination is warm and fruitful. He plays with the most difficult subject; he leads it through the winding mazes of his fancy; he places it in a thousand lights; he gives it an infinity of colours. We admire for a while the splendour of the dress; but the eye becomes tired with the gaudy glare of the glittering tinsel, and wishes for the beautiful simplicity of nature. Instead of bringing forward the bold outlines and prominent features of his figure, he bestows his labour upon the drapery. And even in this he is faulty. His purple robes resemble a patched garment. He often debases the sublimest thought by the coarsest allusion; and mingles the vulgarity of idiom with the most delicate graces of expression.—Mr. Burke has a certain currency with all parties. He can never rise into *Sterling value* with any.

Mr. Fox wants every requisite to form the exterior of an orator. His person is short and squalid; his appearance mean and disagreeable. His voice, naturally inharmonious, is rendered more so by his unskilful management of it. His countenance is strongly Judaic. At his Jerusalem levee, if a stranger were to be asked, which of the chosen race present had most of the blood of Jacob in his veins, Mr. Fox would be pointed out as the man. He possesses strong ingredients to form a political character. He has early been accustomed to the vicissitudes of fortune, and been marked out by the storms
of

but to a vote of thanks: and it was the interest of Opposition to promote the enquiry, whatever

of fate. He is a stranger to those indulgences of youth, which unnerve the intellectual system: the listless languor that succeeds the excessive hilarity of social pleasures; the abuse of wine; or the immoderate enjoyment of women. Play has filled up the measure of his time; and he has experienced all its distraction. From affluence and prosperity, he has been reduced to beggary and want; from a command of fortune and friends, to a servile dependence upon usurious creditors. This has fitted him for the great business of a kingdom, and taught him to look for revolutions. In the House of Commons he leads Opposition. He is not supposed to possess a great fund of information, but his mind supplies this deficiency from her own inexhaustible treasure. His understanding is strong and masculine; his expression full and copious: In proportion to the quickness of his conception, his delivery is rapid. The torrent of argument comes rolling from him with irresistible force. He does not leave his hearers to follow; he drives them before him. He is a perfect master of the art of debate; and disguises the sentiments of his opponents with so much dexterity, that it is some time before we perceive the distortion. The strongest sense is not proof against his power. He fits truth to the rack of ingenuity, and tortures the unhappy sufferer. His eloquence never fails to produce its effect. It strikes the whole assembly; every man communicates the shock to his neighbour.—With these qualifications he would rise to the highest offices in the state, if the same striking disadvantages did not fetter his flight. He is supposed to want firmness. He is said to be destitute of principle. As his character is so bare to public view, his efforts are not imputed to honourable motives. His invincible attachment to play makes it impossible for him to possess the confidence of his country; and though his abilities are admired by all men, no man wishes him to be employed.

might

might be the event to the noble Admiral and the honourable Commander, because it would take up the time and harass the attention of Government, at a juncture when time was most wanting, and attention should be least embarrassed.

Such was the tribunal, before which they appeared: Ministry had declared they should confine themselves to their own exculpation; Opposition favoured their cause; so that they had little to dread from the rigour of their judges. The evidence is equally strange.

Lord Cornwallis was the first examined; and truly his Lordship's testimony is of a very curious nature. Before he answers any question, he takes an opportunity to assure the House of his great veneration and regard for the character of Sir William Howe; and that he thinks he has served his country with fidelity, assiduity, and great ability. After having borne this public testimony to the General's conduct, he begs the House to understand, that he shall not answer questions of opinion, but merely questions of matter of fact. The policy of this conduct is obvious. Lord Cornwallis will not subject himself to the dilemma of giving his opinion upon particular operations, because if he gave it in favour of the General, he might be at a loss

to justify it; and if upon questions being proposed to him, the answers should turn out unfavourable to the General, he would then leave the House at a loss to understand, how he came to form such an opinion of Sir William Howe's *great ability*. The resource was certainly happy, and does honour to his Lordship's ingenuity.

I shall not enter into the particulars of his Lordship's evidence; because, upon the face of it, it is inadmissible evidence. He appears to have been so much a party concerned, that the vindication of his military reputation is necessarily connected with that of Sir William Howe. Like Pylades and Orestes, they will go down hand in hand to posterity. It is universally admitted, that the defeat at Trenton* gave a most unfortunate turn to the war; perhaps the most so of any defeat we have suffered. It is as undeniably

* The success of the Rebels at Trenton had a very mischievous effect on the British service. It removed that panic with which the New States of the Middle Colonies were stricken. It enabled the Congress and the Members of the New State of Pennsylvania, to return to Philadelphia, the most advantageous post for their residence in all America. It revived their spirits, and the spirits of the disaffected.—It induced a number of the militia to turn out, who otherwise would not have done it; and contributed in a great measure to the raising of the army which Washington commanded the next campaign.—Evidence of J. Galloway, Esq.

true,

true, that that defeat was owing to the too great extension of our cantonments. "I was the person, says Lord Cornwallis, who suggested to Sir William Howe the idea of extending his cantonments; and I think myself bound in honour to answer for it (*n*).” Upon another occasion, the action of Brandywine, he assures the House, "he did not concur in that measure; that he has no right to take any merit from it (*o*);" from this negative pregnant we are left to conclude he did concur in most other measures; and in answer to several questions, he makes a distinction between public consultations, and private conferences (*p*); from all which it evidently appears, that Sir William Howe, upon almost all occasions, consulted with Lord Cornwallis. His Lordship is indeed cautious how he gives any direct proof of this. When a question is put to him, the answer to which might make any measure his own, his Lordship objects to it; and his objection cannot certainly be over-ruled. It would be admitted at the bar of any court of justice in the kingdom, *I will not answer your question; it tends to criminate myself.*

(*n*) Examination of Lord Cornwallis before the House of Commons.

(*o*) Ibid.

(*p*) Ibid.

General Grey, who comes next, is certainly a competent, though not a very credible witness (q). He speaks with too much confidence, and with too little consideration to make much impression upon the minds of sensible men. He mentions Sir William Howe, in terms of the highest panegyric, and enters into a justification of many particular transactions. He considered the force, under Sir William, as very incompetent to the purpose he was entrusted with it to accomplish; and he does not think that any force this country can spare from her home defence and that of her distant possessions, will be able to subjugate America (r). His evidence may be reduced to this; matter of opinion upon American measures, and a great character of Sir William Howe. As to the first, his experience does not entitle him to speak with any precision; and accordingly we find that he is contradicted in every opinion he has formed; and, with regard to the latter, character

(q) This expression is not to be understood in an odious sense. It is merely used as a legal phrase. An evidence is *competent*, unless under particular disqualifications; but if his testimony be contradicted, we are to judge of his *credibility*. General Grey speaks to matters of opinion, and, I verily believe, speaks from his conscience; but he is liable to error; and it is no reason, because he is too positive, that we should be too credulous.

(r) General Grey's evidence before the House of Commons,

can

can only avail in doubtful circumstances, and is never suffered to be placed in opposition to facts.

It is unnecessary to dwell long upon the testimonies of the Captains Montrefor and Mackenzie, or Sir George Osborne. Captain Montrefor speaks to the strength of the Rebel lines at Long Island, and the position above Quibble-Town, and he thinks in both instances the General acted properly in not attempting to force them (*s*). Captain Mackenzie is examined, and informs the Committee, that General Howe gave leave to Sir Henry Clinton to make a diversion in the Highlands to favour the operations of General Burgoyne (*t*); and Sir George Osborne proves that the General had notice of the attack at Trenton, and that our defeat was owing to Colonel Rhall's intoxication, and disobedience of orders. He speaks highly in favour of Sir William Howe, and considers him as a great, able, and judicious Commander (*u*).

(*s*) Captain Montrefor's evidence, before the House of Commons.

(*t*) Captain Mackenzie's evidence, before the House of Commons.

(*u*) Sir George Osborne's evidence, before the House of Commons.

Such

Such is the evidence produced by Sir William Howe; and without considering the testimony on the other side, but admitting this to stand uncontradicted, would it be considered by the nation as an exculpation from the very heavy charges, under which he has so long and so generally laboured? Can it be supposed that the sense of the army has been fairly collected from the opinions of two or three Officers attendant upon his person; obliged to him for preferment; attached to him from friendship; who seem to have shared his councils, and to have had an influence over his measures? And after all, what does it amount to? That the rebels were in possession of a strong country, and that they understood the art of intrenching themselves to advantage. Good God!—but I would wish to keep my temper—was Sir William Howe entrusted with forty thousand men to encounter no difficulties? Was he to prepare for no labours? Did he imagine that his troops were to walk over the smooth surface of a lawn, and never to attempt a victory but where there was an impossibility of a defeat? In an enemy's country, was not delay destruction? and should not a blow have been stricken that might have spread an universal panic, even though at a considerable expence? If the rebels were found to fortify themselves so strongly, when they were dislodged from one post, why were they suffered

ferred to strengthen themselves in another? Was nothing to be hazarded at the head of a valiant and disciplined army against feeble and raw recruits? Was nothing to be trusted to the ardour of troops flushed with victory, and in the full career of pursuit after a flying and defeated enemy?—When I hear Officers high in rank hold such language at the bar of a British House of Commons,—I grow ashamed for my country; every manly feeling takes the alarm within me! and my blood runs cold with indignation!

If we look back to the time of our gallant ancestors, we shall have reason to wonder at their successes. The system of war admitted not then of such mathematical precision; nor did they consume weeks in the field to calculate the exact force of a ball, or the resistance of an intrenchment, behind which an enemy was lodged. The event of an engagement was not reduced to a certainty; no intricate estimation of difficulties determined every enterprize. All was darkness, uncertainty and ignorance! They vainly confided in their valour, and trusted to the reputation of their arms. They never counted the numbers of the enemy, but rated the energy of their own troops. And yet this imperfect system has led to victory and renown,

and rendered the name of Briton respectable in every part of the world.

If engagements had never taken place but between armies of equal strength; the history of human combats would be comprized within a narrow compass; and if this system were to prevail, mankind would have little to fear from the future ravages of war. But those troops which we did not dare to *attack within their entrenchments*, those very troops thought it their duty to attack us within ours. "On the morning of the 7th of October, General Arnold marched out to *attack us within our entrenchments*: he advanced under the heaviest cannonade of artillery, grape shot, and rifle fire, I ever beheld, and never gave way till they met the British grenadiers (*w*)."—I will only observe, for the regulation of our future conduct, "*Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*"

Thus would the matter stand, if no evidence had been produced to controvert that in favour of Sir William Howe. But the evidence of Mr. Galloway and General Robertson contradicts directly that of General Grey; and when we consider that General Robertson has been

(*w*) Captain Money's evidence, before the House of Commons upon the Canada enquiry.

twenty-four years in America, and Mr. Galloway forty-eight; and that General Grey has only passed eighteen months in that country; their characters in every respect standing upon the same footing, we cannot hesitate one moment in our determination (x).

But no proof can be so strong of the guilt of Sir William Howe, as the manner in which this enquiry terminated. The evidence upon the

(x) It is unnecessary to dwell upon the particulars of General Robertson's and Mr. Galloway's evidence, of which advantage has been already taken, further than to state briefly, that the latter Gentleman is of opinion that the powers for negotiating peace, with which Lord and Sir William Howe, as Commissioners, were invested, have been injudiciously exerted; and instead of promoting the purpose for which they were delegated, from the manner in which they were employed, have protracted the war, and materially injured our cause. General Robertson does not think the country remarkably strong, and is of opinion we ought to have attacked the Rebel posts. We waive other particulars. The retreat from Boston; the expedition to Philadelphia; or the business of the Jerseys. The having neglected to make a proper use of the powers for negotiating peace; the permitting the rebels to throw up entrenchments, and not attacking them; making no pursuit after victory; are the great facts upon which we rest. We do not institute a rigid scrutiny into the conduct of Sir William Howe to bring to light any latent error, but to discover whether there is any part of his conduct that is free from error. It is not the trial of virtue; it is the condemnation of vice.

part of Sir William had been gone through; Ministry were upon the examination of theirs; when Sir William Howe, who had entreated, who had provoked, who had insisted upon this enquiry, neglects to attend at the usual hour; no Member in his absence chuses to move for the further sitting of the Committee, and it becomes dissolved of course. The Committee makes no report; the House comes to no resolution.—It is sufficient to state the fact. It is impossible to err in the commentary.

These observations are founded in stubborn fact, and they will not easily be refuted. They are made with the freedom of truth, and the confidence of conviction. They do not proceed from enmity to Sir William Howe, but from zeal for the public service. May he long continue undisturbed in the *peaceable* possession of his enjoyments! Let him throw the dice. Let him lie with his mistress. Play is a venial error, unless carried to a criminal excess; and the immoderate love of women is a generous failing. We freely forgive the errors which it occasions, and impute them to an amiable weakness. Sir William may be the man of gallantry, the agreeable companion, the generous friend; but it was necessary the Public

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should

should know, that he is not the great Commander*.

But whatever may be the opinion respecting him, we have certainly derived lights from this enquiry to guide us in our future attempts. If the system of war which he pursued be justified as a general system; still it will be admitted that the opposite one would have proved more successful in our particular instance (y); and of course we may expect to see it adopted in future. It has convinced us, that the contest is not vain, nor the pursuit impracticable; and that if favourable circumstances have not been improved; if war has been unskilfully carried on; if peace has been injudiciously negotiated; we have suffered through our "folly, not our fate," and we may hope that the errors of our conduct are not irreparable.

With regard to general Burgoyne, it is not yet time to enquire into his conduct. The day must come when that will be discussed in a proper place. If every Commander, who, in any manner what-

* Perhaps his character may be summed up in a few words, by applying to him what Montesquieu says of Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, *Sir William Howe is not an Alexander the Great; but he would have made a good soldier under Alexander.*

(y) It appears from General Robertson's evidence, that if the grenadiers had not been called off by the General they would have stormed the lines at Brooklyn; and if the attack had been made, they must have forced them, as Putnam could not collect three hundred out of all the troops to stand to their arms.

soever, loses a King's ship, must be brought to a court-martial; is it not fit that he also should face one, who has lost an army? One fact, however, is very glaring upon the face of the Canada evidence.—Great stress is laid throughout upon the opinion of the late General Frazer. His memory is deservedly esteemed. His death happened unfortunately for us; it happened fortunately for him. He was not a witness to the unhappy condition of his fellow-soldiers. He died in the bed of honour; and the tears of his country streamed over his grave.—It is painful to me to quit the language of panegyric for that of reproach. “General Frazer (says Colonel Kingston) (z) found fault with no operations of the “campaign, but that of employing Germans instead of British, upon the expedition to Bennington.”—Is there a man who will take upon him to assert, that the Bennington expedition was not the loss of the Northern Army*?

(z) Colonel Kingston's examination before the House of Commons upon the Canada enquiry.

(*) The evidence concerning Lord Howe will not be taken any notice of, In his character of Commissioner he is equally culpable with the General; and the evidence that affects the one applies to the other. As an Admiral, commanding a numerous and powerful fleet, he has also been censured. He certainly suffered our commerce to be very shamefully annoyed. But as the public opinion does not seem to be with those who have attacked his conduct, we would rather “praise where we can, than censure where we may.”

It

It is already very clearly proved, that the Americans in general have been favourable to our cause. Events remain to be mentioned that will place this truth in the strongest light. No two measures could be more odious to the people of America than the Declaration of Independence, and the Treaty with France. At the beginning of this contest, the people in general were very far from having independence in view. There were, however, a particular set of men who indulged this hope; and by every art, which the designing could practise over the weak, laboured to bring about their purpose. But so sensible were the Congress of the general aversion that prevailed from a separation with this country, that even at the time that they declared independence, they asserted, that it was not with a view to a total separation of the two countries, but from necessity; [because, unless they declared independence, *the Powers of Europe would not trade with them*, and they were in great distress for want of many foreign necessaries. To carry the Declaration was found a most arduous task. Their debates lasted near a fortnight; and when the question was put, six Colonies divided against six; the Delegates for Pennsylvania being also divided, the question remained undecided. One of the Members of that Colony, however, changed his opinion; and upon the question, the next day, it was carried

carried in the affirmative, by a *single vote only* (a).

It is, therefore, fair, from the very face of the proceedings of Congress, to conclude that America was divided upon the question of Independence. But, when we consider that Congress was by no means a just representation of the people; that the friends of Government would not vote for a Deputation to an Assembly, whose proceedings they considered as violent and unlawful; that some counties sent no Delegates; that in no county where these Delegates were not appointed by the Assemblies (which were in four only) were they chosen by one-twentieth part of the people (b);—when we consider all these circumstances, we may safely affirm, that a very small part of America favoured this measure.

And if such was the case at that time, have any circumstances since occurred to reconcile them to it? This country had then treated them with too much pride; and by returning no answer to their petition, as if unworthy of any answer, had aggravated a fancied injury by a real insult. The most vigorous preparations

(a) Evidence of J. Galloway, Esq.

(b) Ibid.

were

were making to subdue them; the measure of employing foreign troops was then known; unconditional submission was sounded loudly; in short, it was the time, at which there appeared to be the greatest degree of irascibility in the proceedings of this country—and yet America wished not for Independence! What then must be her feelings at this time, when Great Britain has made the most ample and liberal concessions; when she has offered to wave the claim that gave rise to the dispute; and to establish the connection, between the two countries, upon the broad and liberal principles of mutual commerce, and reciprocal freedom? The Congress assured them, they declared Independence, that they might *trade with foreign powers*; they have since made them parties to a *treaty offensive and defensive* with that power, whom America has ever been taught to consider with an eye of detestation:—a treaty with a despotic Monarch, who affects to feel for their violated rights, and their invaded freedom; against a nation, from whom their ancestors descended; with whom they have long maintained the nearest and dearest connections; whose constitution is known to be the purest production of liberty; whose manners, customs, and dispositions are so similar; and with whom they have so often fought, bled, and conquered!

But

But it will be naturally asked, If such are the sentiments of the people in America, and if this aversion from Independence be so universal, why do they not rise in opposition to Congress? The question is not of difficult solution. It may be answered by another. *Every tyrant is odious to his people; for the mind of man cannot brook oppression; how happens it then, that so many tyrants have been suffered to exist?* The truth is, it is difficult for a body of people to act in concert. Their feelings are too strong, and their proceedings too disorderly, to cope with command of temper, regularity, and method. It is not often that men are found who chuse to lead so fickle and tumultuous a body. For if the popular tack should fall short of its purpose, it would be impossible to punish the body of the people, and the Chiefs alone would remain exposed to the vengeance of power (c). It is to the creation of tribunes that Cicero attributes the equilibrium of the Roman constitution having been so long preserved. They acted betwixt the senate and the people. They knew the fickle temper of the latter, who

(c) The American dispute presents us at once with the proof and the exception to this rule. The conduct of the Congress is certainly an exception to it, for they have placed themselves in a responsible situation. The first proclamation issued proves it; a pardon was offered to all those who should return to their allegiance, *except Hancock and Adams.*

had

had forsaken so many of their friends, and permitted so many of their favourites to be sacrificed; and a regard to their own safety induced them to controul the fury of the populace, for whose measures they must ultimately be responsible; and who to-day might storm the Senate house, and to-morrow pull down the Tribunal. Hence they encouraged them in a constant opposition to the measures of the Senate; their harangues were vehement and seditious; but they faltered when it became necessary to act. Though the inhabitants of America may, in general, be hostile to the Congress, no one chuses to be the first in resisting them. It is difficult to destroy a form of Government; and of the only form that at present prevails in America, the Congress are in possession.

Perhaps we may in a great measure owe our success to accident. From the earliest times, the subversion of tyrannical Governments has not being owing to any preconcerted scheme, or combination of plans, on the part of those who have suffered under them; but to events, which, operating strongly upon the most violent passions of the human mind, have suddenly driven the people to measures of distraction and fury, and roused all the powers of despair. At Rome, the tyranny of the Tarquins was not likely to

be abolished, when the dead body of Lucretia produced the expulsion of the tyrants ; the people, groaning under usury and extortion, would never have seceded, had not the Debtor appeared in the Forum, covered with stripes ; and the bloody knife of Virginius effected the ruin of the Decemvirs (*d*). In like manner, at Athens, a domestic injury placed Harmodius and Aristogiton at the head of the people ; and put an end to the usurpation of Hippias.

The Congress of America, sensible that the same causes must ever produce the same effects, have endeavoured, by force and fraud, to strengthen and to disguise their proceedings. Those, who absolutely refused to come into their measures, have been subjected to all the penalties of confiscation, and finally to the punishment of high-treason. To prevent resistance, a whole province has been disarmed. The members, who dissented from the measures of Congress, have not been permitted to enter their protests. While their resolutions were published to the people, such, as bespoke the violence and distraction of their proceedings, had been expunged from their journals ; and their measures falsely appeared to be the result of undisturbed unanimity. But America begins to

(*d*) *Esprit des Loix.*

murmur at their conduct. She perceives that her happiness is not their aim, but that they are actuated by a mad ambition. It is not to be expected that they will cheerfully enter into any negotiation with this country, which might put an end to the contest. War drew them from insignificance: peace must give them back to obscurity. But with dispositions in our favour, upon the part of the people, we have little to apprehend from them. Their situation is our best security. When America shall be ripe for a change, it will become unsafe for them to continue in it; and their measures must necessarily accelerate that moment. They will early affect to swim with the stream. They may in secret strive to counteract, but it is impossible that they should openly endeavour to check the general spirit. Should they be mad enough to attempt it, our force would co-operate with the people, and leave them no alternative but submission.

If there be any who affect to disbelieve the testimony of Mr. Galloway (e), and to suppose it founded in interest, error, or partiality; to
such

(e) When Mr. Galloway appeared before the House of Commons, an attempt was made to invalidate his testimony, by representing him as an *interested witness*. He had quitted his family; he had fled his country; he had incurred the

such let the *internal evidence* of the contest at this period afford demonstration.

The Americans, before the fatal rupture with this country, enjoyed the produce of a most luxuriant climate, and all the advantages of a lucrative commerce. But cultivation has necessarily ceased, and commerce has been interrupted. The husbandman loiters over the land, when he considers that he is not industrious for himself; that some hostile excursion may soon render his fertile dwelling a desolated waste, and snatch from his helpless family their only mis-

guilt of high-treason against the States of America; he had given up 40,000 *l.* for a scanty pittance barely equal to the wants of the day,—and yet he was an *interested man*! one whom *mercenary* motives, it was to be presumed, would warp from truth, or influence to falsehood! If such insinuations are practised with any success, what man will in future make a like sacrifice for so ungrateful a nation? What American in his senses will espouse our cause, if after having experienced every species of persecution from his own countrymen, he is to meet with such a reception from those for whom he has willingly incurred it? I hope, however, that the national character is too well established to suffer from the behaviour of a particular description of men. Mr. Galloway has endeared himself to the inhabitants of this country. The house of every loyal Englishman is open to him! the hand of every loyal Englishman is warm to him! the heart of every loyal Englishman beats in his favour! Mr. T——d, Mr. F—x, and Mr. B—ke may asperse his character; but every man of honour, justice, and humanity, will defend it.

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rable support. The parent no longer sends his offspring to the field, animated by the tale of liberty, and glad in his country's cause. He tells him the forebodings of his anxious mind; he imparts to him the suspicions he entertains; and communicates the doubts which distract his aged experience. He turns to the page of history. There they find that most tyrannic governments have owed their origin to popular delusion, and to the arts of men who have appeared to be the warmest friends of liberty, at the moment that they were meditating the most absolute measures of despotism. They read of Pisistratus at Athens; of the Decemvirs at Rome; of the Medici at Florence; and, in the history of their own ancestors, of the Long Parliament in this country. "My son (exclaims he), what are we contending for? We are relinquishing the best form of Government which human wisdom ever devised, in quest of uncertain and ideal advantages. We are renouncing an alliance with a free country for one with an absolute Monarch, who professes a regard for the freedom of America, and an attachment to the natural rights of mankind. What reason have we to suppose him sincere? Will the nation who sought to enslave the United States of Holland, and to deprive them of freedom and independence, become a friend to the United States of
4 America,

America, who have no other claim to her friendship, but that they are struggling to gain these privileges? We took up arms to obtain redress of a grievance; that purpose is effected, and it is time that peace should be restored."—The trembling parent thus discloses his mind; and the young man sorrowful, departs to return no more.—The Congress have contracted an immense debt, which must ultimately fall upon the people. The latter are tired of military service, and pant for the return of peace and domestic enjoyment. They compare their former situation with the present; and are melancholy at the change. One hundred thousand men have already perished, the fifth part of the white people in America capable of bearing arms (*f*). Under these circumstances, Congress must have recourse to compulsive methods to raise supplies, and send troops into the field; and with these dispositions upon the part of the people, they will not be very patiently submitted to.—The man of sense and reflection, who draws information from his own mind, and reasons upon the probable consequences of every measure, not madly concurring in it as his passions urge, or servilely acquiescing as authority requires, perceives in a very striking

(*f*) Mr. Galloway's evidence.

point

point of view, the different situations of the two countries. He knows, that if the contest were to cease at this moment, it must terminate prosperously for America; much to the glory of her arms, to the honour of her councils, and to the advantage of her people. She will have obtained the first object of contention, and have acquired the most invaluable privileges. He considers that Great Britain cannot put an end to the war by treaty, without acknowledging American independence. If he consider independence as a desirable object for America to obtain, he also considers, that it will be disadvantageous for Great Britain to lose it; and that if it will be glorious for America to succeed, it will be disgraceful for Great Britain to be defeated. If it should take off a few restraints from their commerce, it will not only ruin our trade, but may terminate in the loss of all our distant possessions, of our name among nations, perhaps of our existence as a state. He sees nothing but certain disgrace and infamy, and probable ruin for Great Britain, if she were to acknowledge the independence of America. Her nice sense of honour; her pride as a great nation; her spirit, and her invincible perseverance; her former conduct, and even her present reputation, afford him no reason to conclude, that she will easily become reconciled to infamy, and resigned to disgrace; or that she will
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give herself up to ruin without a struggle, and expire without a groan. He places himself in her situation. He feels what powerful motives urge her to carry on the war, and he foresees from its continuance an innumerable train of ills. He reflects, that though America is at this moment successful, her arms may yet be defeated; and, from every possible consideration, he concludes, that it is not for her interest to persist obstinately in the struggle.—The daily labourer enters not into nice disquisition, but reasons from his immediate feelings. The advantages which he is told to look for, are distant and uncertain; instant calamities press upon him. His person is subjected to the hardships of military service; his property is insecure from hostile attempts; he is oppressed by his own friends, and plundered by his enemies. He cannot enter into the views of the former, and of course he repines at the hardness of his lot; and when he looks around, he beholds no possessions of the latter, upon which he may satisfy his resentment by committing depredations, or reimburse himself, by making reprisals. Thus persecuted and distressed, it is but natural that he should wish for an end to the war, because it would prove an end to his calamities.—On the other hand, if the people of America look up to their friends, they are possessed of too much sense to suppose, that the motives pro-
claimed

claimed by the court of France are those which really influenced her to afford them assistance. They know that her history is one continued endeavour to subdue the liberties of mankind, and to reduce the government of every nation to her own despotic standard. Interest and ambition armed this aspiring power. She diverts the streams of American commerce from their accustomed channel, that they may flow in upon her own soil, and render it rich and fertile: she assists America to shake off the dependence upon this country, that America may become dependent upon her. These truths are too striking to be disguised; and the Americans are already alarmed for the consequences. They foresee that it is impossible the two powers can long maintain an intercourse founded upon the principles of mutual advantage; that the dissonance of their manners, government, and religion, can never act in concert so as to produce harmony. How will a people, the forms of whose religion are so simplified that they will not even suffer a Bishop to reside among them, be reconciled to the pomp of high mass, and the idolatrous worship of the Roman Catholic church? If they will not tolerate these, is it not likely that France will feel for her insulted faith, and insist upon a due observance of her ceremonies? Is a spirit of meekness and submission, of patience under controul, the distinguishing characteristic

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of

of this sect? In short, the union is unnatural, and it cannot possibly continue.

It is true, our situation is in some respects more arduous than it was. France and Spain have armed against us, and it does not appear that we have any foreign allies. We must not, however, despair. The national jealousy, which subsists between these powers, will, in all probability, prove favourable to us. Instead of strengthening, they may weaken each others efforts. If we should not prove successful, our situation must make us friends; for it is not the interest of Europe to permit us to be sacrificed. Holland will afford us assistance in time, though she seems unwilling to give it at present. She is a trading power, and will endeavour to make the *best bargain*. The market is certainly favourable to her; but when we shew less anxiety to purchase, she will become more willing to treat. But even should we remain totally deserted, and continue without assistance, the situation is not unparalleled in our history. “When poor old England stood alone, and had not the access of another kingdom, and yet had more, and as potent enemies as it now hath, yet the King of England prevailed (g).”

I do not, however, mean to represent our situation as that of perfect ease. It has great

(g) Sir Edward Coke, Parliamentary History, Vol. vii. p. 400.

and numerous difficulties. If we should be under the necessity of recalling our troops from America, the probability of recovering it will be distant indeed. We can only preserve our friends by affording them protection; or induce others to become so, by having a force at hand to assist them. We have in this part of the world a fleet which can face that of France and Spain; in the West Indies we are equal, and in the East Indies greatly superior to them (*b*). They cannot transport any body of troops to attack our distant possessions, while we preserve the sovereignty of the sea; and at home we have a defence that leaves us little to apprehend.

To

(*b*) Since the first edition of this Pamphlet was published, our fleet in the West Indies has suffered a defeat, and at home we have avoided an engagement, by retreating before the fleets of France and Spain. The circumstances of Admiral Byron's misfortune are well known; unhappily the wind would not permit him to succour his own ships, or to combat those of the enemy, or there is every reason to conclude, from the gallant conduct of the few which engaged, and from the French under all their advantages having reaped no benefit from the engagement, that the British fleet would have proved victorious.—The fleet under Sir Charles Hardy, it is true, did avoid the enemy; but, I trust, not by a confused and precipitate flight, but by a deliberate and undaunted retreat: Whether the nation has a right to expect; that at all times the navy of Great Britain should be superior in numbers to the combined fleets of France and Spain, is a point I will not pretend to determine; though it is certain, our object ever has been, and ever must be, to preserve the dominion of the seas: British courage may

To our navy every effort ought to be directed; and while this continues upon a superior footing, our army in America may be left to act. At any rate, we should suffer many of our possessions to be sacrificed before we consent to relinquish America. In the shipwreck of the state, every thing valuable cannot be preserved; but this is the plank to which we should cling, and the last property from which we should part.

It is often said, How did this country subsist before America was discovered? The answer is plain: *America unknown to us was unknown to every other power.* But now that she has received from this country the principles of freedom, and the elements of commerce; that her inhabitants have been employed in our manufactures; that her shipwrights have built, and her sailors navigated our ships; that her soldiers have been trained to our discipline, and fought under our banners; shall we permit them to turn these advantages against the nation from which she derived them? It is not only a weight

effect miracles; but we should rather rejoice when they happen, than trust to their taking place; and it is even possible for courage to be overpowered by numbers. No doubt we shall receive some satisfaction upon this subject from those within whose peculiar province it falls; and who, I am persuaded, feel it equally their duty and their inclination to submit their conduct to the consideration of their country.

taken

taken out of our scale, but it is also thrown into the opposite one. If America were to become a great and independent power in a durable alliance with France, what a powerful addition of strength would this country have to combat in every future war with her natural enemies ! But if France were not to succeed in her views upon America, and the latter were to become a great nation unconnected with her, it is at least certain, that if America and this country were to make war against each other, France would always join America. Lord Shelburne truly said, *When the independence of America shall be acknowledged, the sun of this country will be set for ever in the West.*—The power, the commerce, the constitution of this country, can exist no longer than America is dependent upon her.

If we are not convinced of this truth, every blow that we strike is an outrage done to humanity. Every drop of blood that we spill becomes an indelible stain upon the national character. We do not wage honourable war. We commit barbarous murder.—If, on the contrary, we feel its force, the object is worth contending for. Every man will be convinced that the safety and existence of his country are at stake; that he is not struggling for dominion and empire, but that he is fighting *pro aris et focis*. He must not listen to the idle discourses of extravagant theorists, who talk of “the friendship

friendship of America being an infinite recompence in exchange of an irksome dominion, onerous to them, and barren to us (i)." Treaties are dictated by convenience, and violated as interest requires. Friendship among nations is a solecism in politics. We must have some better security for the friendship of America, than an unhallowed form of words. That security must be a dependence upon this country; and in the pursuit of this object, disadvantages must not dishearten us. Let difficulties multiply, and one defeat succeed another, still we must continue firm and constant to our purpose, and not waver, as fortune proves fickle. We will emulate the conduct of that illustrious people, among whose conquests that of our ancestors was not reckoned the least difficult. They seemed to acquire activity from every defeat, and to gain, like *Anteus*, fresh force from every fall. They were not dejected with every reverse of fortune; but preserved a greatness of soul in the most desperate situations. When Pyrrhus, after having obtained many successes over the Romans, offered to treat with them upon advantageous terms; they replied, in the true spirit of magnanimity, *Let Pyrrhus depart from Italy*. When Hannibal was laying waste the Roman territory, they sent

(i) Mr. David Hartley's Letters, p. 41.

Scipio to beat down the gates of Carthage.— We must be prepared for the most calamitous events. We must look forward to what *may* happen, and put the question to ourselves, Have we fortitude to encounter it? If the answer should prove in the affirmative, let us not only act, but reason like men. To-day we may reduce a fort in America; to-morrow we may be defeated before one; but these are casualties which must not be suffered to interfere with our great purpose and design.

But it is time to put an end to these Observations. It has been said, *It is impossible to subdue the rebellion in America*;—they are offered to the public, with a view to prove the falsehood of that assertion. They submit to the candour of the nation, whether it has not been established by incontrovertible evidence, that our failure hitherto has been owing to very gross mismanagement; and that though from their public and formal acts it may appear otherwise, yet the people of America are favourable and friendly to our cause; and there is every reason to hope for future success from wise and vigorous measures. If the attempt is admitted to be practicable, the merits of this imperfect performance will then be compressed within a narrow compass. To those who are of opinion, that the essential welfare of this country depends upon
reducing

reducing the Americans to their former dependence, little argument will be necessary to prove, that we should shed our last drop of blood in the attempt; and it is hoped, that these remarks may contribute to inspire them with proper confidence, and manly hope. But to those, who think differently; who assert, that, "the friendship of America will be an infinite recompence in exchange of an irksome domination, onerous to them and barren to us," all argument must be vainly employed! For it would be madness to justify a war that may terminate in our ruin, and cannot possibly contribute to our advantage.

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