



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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Statement by Mr. Sidney E. Smith,
Secretary of State for External
Affairs, in the House of Commons,
July 25, 1958.

The first item, of course, with which the House will expect me to deal is the grave and vital situation in the Middle East. I am sure there is no need for me to rehearse in detail the developments in that area during the past two weeks, because members are no doubt familiar with those developments; but with respect to Canada, and indeed the whole world, our attention is directed to New York, and I propose at the beginning of my remarks to give to the House a full account of the latest happenings here.

LEBANON

Before doing so, however, I should make reference to the developments in Lebanon leading up to this particular crisis, and give to the House some information with respect to the evolution of that crisis. Members will recall that on May 27, 1958, Lebanon presented charges to the Security Council of the United Nations simultaneously with those to the Arab League. The charge of Lebanon was that the United Arab Republic had intervened in its internal affairs. The Arab League had nothing to offer in the way of a solution of the issues involved in this charge and subsequently the Security Council, after discussion of the charges, decided to act in this particular regard.

May I remind the House, however, that there had never been any overt aggression from Syria into Lebanon. It had to do with indirect aggression. This was a new type of aggression with which the Security Council had to deal. It is difficult to define what is indirect aggression, yet the Security Council addressed itself to this question.

I may interpolate here that for some time the United Nations has been endeavouring without success to define indirect aggression, and certainly it was understood and recognized that the Security Council had power to investigate charges with respect to that type of intervention, indirect though it be, in the affairs of another country. And so on June 11 the Security Council set up an observation group, and I read part of the text of the resolution:

- to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders.

The Government of Canada considered that the situation which was unfolding in Lebanon merited prompt action. From the beginning in the discussions in the Security Council we gave our firm support to this resolution, a resolution that provided machinery under the auspices of the United Nations. We welcomed the resolution, Mr. Speaker, by reason of the fact that it afforded to the Secretary-General an opportunity to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Lebanon. We also welcomed the ambit of the resolution that gave certain flexibility to the Secretary-General in carrying out or implementing the resolution's objectives.

That resolution was adopted on June 11. There was no veto and no dissenting vote. On that particular occasion, and it was very encouraging, the U.S.S.R. abstained from voting on the resolution. The Secretary-General then moved very quickly, and within a few days he had officers of his observation corps present in Lebanon. Hon. members will recall that Canada immediately responded to the appeal from the Secretary-General and sent ten officers to join the observation group. Indeed, Canada at the moment has 11 officers there. A Canadian officer who was attached to the United Nations truce supervision organization was seconded to the observation group in Lebanon.

This group, the United Nations observation group in Lebanon, has become known as UNOGIL, and that is the designation I shall use. It encountered at the outset many difficulties in carrying out its task. Initially the group had access to only 18 kilometers out of the 325 kilometers of Lebanon's frontier with Syria. Other difficulties were encountered by reason of the rugged nature of the terrain, the location of the border populations, and also by reason of the traditional freedom of people to move across the border from Syria to Lebanon, a freedom they have had for many years. Here was a fairly recent boundary line between Syria and Lebanon. Many of these initial difficulties, however, were overcome by the middle of July and the

observer group, UNOGIL, had access to all the frontier areas between Lebanon and Syria. They had been increased in numbers and personnel and were also getting aircraft for the purpose of carrying out their directives from the Secretary-General.

During recent weeks there has been one frontier of Lebanon that has been quiet. That is the frontier with Israel. Indeed, I would point out that during this difficult period all of Israel's frontiers have been quiet. That is a tribute to Israel, to the United Arab Republic and to other countries, and it is also a tribute to the effectiveness of two other United Nations organizations, the United Nations Emergency Force along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line and the United Nations truce supervision organization on Israel's other frontier.

Now to return to the narrative of events that I anticipated a few moments ago I would give. On July 14 there occurred the sudden, swift and violent revolution in Iraq which transformed the situation in the Middle East overnight. Within Lebanon it appeared still further to exacerbate internal dissensions and - of this I am convinced - the happenings in Iraq rendered UNOGIL incapable, at least temporarily, of meeting its responsibilities, in the dangerous situation thus created. And so it was in this situation that President Eisenhower responded promptly and affirmatively to a request from President Chamoun of Lebanon. As President Eisenhower stated at the time of the landing of United States troops in Lebanon, the force was not there to engage in hostilities but to help Lebanon in its own efforts to stabilize the situation until - and I emphasize that word "until" - the United Nations could take the steps necessary to protect Lebanon's independence and integrity.

Two days later, as we recall, the United Kingdom found it necessary to take similar emergency action in response to an appeal from King Hussein of Jordan for military assistance in the face of a plot instigated from outside Jordan to overthrow the regime. I have been informed reliably, and I know, that there was not only a plot to overthrow the government in Jordan but also that the plot extended to other countries in the Middle East to overthrow their governments.

As the Prime Minister informed the House on July 17, the Canadian Government appreciated that the United States and the United Kingdom had no alternative but to take these interim measures. We knew then that both governments had stated specifically that the landing of troops and the keeping of troops there would be terminated as soon as the United Nations could take effective action. We understood the difficulty of the decision that the two countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, had been forced to take.

To return to the point I attempted to make a moment ago, we recognized clearly that the United Kingdom and the United States appreciated the ultimate authority and responsibility of the United Nations.

Since that time we in Canada have made every effort at the United Nations and in some of the capitals of the world to bring about as swiftly as possible those United Nations actions which would provide some instrumentality of the United Nations to the end that the United States would withdraw their forces from Jordan.

In the United Nations Security Council, the United States and the United Kingdom have joined, or we have joined with them and other countries, in promoting steps that would provide personnel on behalf of and under the United Nations that would in turn enable those two countries to withdraw their forces. To this end we gave full support last week to a draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the United States. In brief, the purpose of that resolution was to enable the Secretary-General to establish an instrumentality - and the type of instrument would be in his good judgment - that would add to the forces of UNOGIL now in Lebanon. We supported that; yet at the end of last Friday, just one week ago, the Russians vetoed that proposal. That was on July 18.

With respect to my own activities at this time, I may say that I had flown to Washington where I had valuable discussions with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, a valuable exchange of views. The newspapers have quoted me as taking the stand on behalf of Canada that there should be no expansion of military activities by these two countries, that is, outside of Lebanon and Jordan. The Prime Minister has also taken that stand, and he has so informed the House. From Washington I went to New York, where I had discussions with Mr. Hammarskjold. Then I came here to report fully on the situation as I saw it to the Prime Minister.

I got off the aeroplane on Saturday and heard for the first time that Mr. Khrushchev had extended an invitation for a summit meeting on the Middle East. At the Prime Minister's request I went back to New York on Monday morning where I took charge of the Canadian Delegation, and I seized the opportunity then to express the hope that nations would respond to the invitation issued by Mr. Khrushchev for a summit meeting on the Middle East. I shall deal with that matter later.

On that particular day the Prime Minister informed the House that on Monday morning he had sent messages to Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Nehru, and in those messages he expressed the hope that there would not be a negative reaction to the proposal put forward by Mr. Khrushchev.

In New York on Monday and Tuesday of last week our delegation worked very closely with the delegations from the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan in an endeavour to work out a compromise resolution which might be more acceptable to the Russians than the one they vetoed on Friday last, which had been put forward by the United States. This particular resolution was put forward by the Japanese. We were rather hopeful of this resolution that provided in its operative part for an increase in the observer group of UNOGIL and gave further authority to the Secretary-General to endeavour to stabilize the situation in Lebanon to the end that the United States could withdraw its forces.

As I said in the meeting of the Security Council on Monday of last week in support of this resolution, I deemed it a positive approach, one which offered the Council an opportunity to use and strengthen the United Nations machinery that it had in Lebanon; but this, too, the Soviet Union vetoed. And so, as far as the activities of the United Nations in Lebanon are concerned, we are back where we were at the beginning of last week. However, after the veto the Secretary-General expressed his determination to use the powers that had been voted to him on June 11 by the Security Council, and he said he would firmly proceed to implement his mandate in the resolution of the date to which I referred. I think it would be of interest to the House if I read a part of the statement the Secretary-General made on Tuesday afternoon after the veto of the Japanese resolution by the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hammarskjold said:

I am sure that I will act in accordance with the wishes of the members of the Council if I therefore use all opportunities offered to the Secretary-General within the limits set by the Charter toward developing the United Nations effort so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find ourselves.

Even before the Japanese resolution failed of adoption Mr. Hammarskjold had decided to increase the personnel of the UNOGIL in Lebanon from about 135 officers to something approximating 200, and he requested Canada to send three additional observers. The Prime Minister has

informed the House of Canada's ready response to that invitation from Mr. Hammarskjold, and I recall the words the Prime Minister uttered in this House, that Canada was willing to take that action, ready to do it, glad to do it, and then he made this statement:

Canada will supply immediately three of the additional observers, of course giving every attention to any further requirement of UNOGIL as events transpire.

Therefore what is needed now is an expansion of the scope and importance of UNOGIL activity. The hon. member for Essex East asked a question on Wednesday of this week. I was not in the House at the time. The hon. member asked whether Canada had received any further invitation from the Secretary-General for additional personnel from this country. No invitation has come forward as yet, but Mr. Hammarskjold intimated on Tuesday afternoon at the meeting of the Security Council that if the Russians vetoed the Japanese resolution he would go to work immediately and evolve a plan for the increase in that particular group. That plan is now, we know, being developed but it has not yet been made final.

Members of the House may recall, Mr. Speaker, that at the time of the establishment of UNEF Mr. Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, associated with himself an advisory committee of member states to assist him in the conduct of his task with respect to UNEF. There are indications now that Mr. Hammarskjold will invite certain countries to send representatives to such an advisory committee, and it may well be that he will choose the personnel of the advisory committee of UNEF, the advisory committee that has been in being for some time.

So that is where we stand now. A new United Nations body, not new since Tuesday afternoon but new since June 11, has been developed and set up, and we hope this body will be effective in enabling the Lebanese people to work out their own internal difficulties and dissensions in their own way. I have confidence that such a United Nations body, developed under a plan still to be presented by the Secretary-General, will be effective in establishing stability.

But what of the future? Is there a way to ensure permanently the independence and integrity of this small country with its unique balance of East and West, with its unique composition of population...?

We had discussions in Washington about the future of Lebanon. The discussions had to do with the possibility of having the Lebanese accept a position of neutrality. Favour was expressed by the United States and United Kingdom representatives with respect to that proposal.

I was not here on Monday, but I have read the address of that distinguished representative of a member of the Commonwealth, the Prime Minister of Ghana. I know that he also advanced that proposal when he addressed members of the House in joint session with members of the Senate. Can we work toward a status of neutrality for Lebanon and have an international guarantee of its neutrality such as is provided in effect for Austria? It cannot be imposed on the Lebanese, but it should not come as a novel suggestion to them because throughout the centuries, indeed from Phoenician times, the Lebanese have been merchants and traders. Their history shows that by reason of necessity to be friendly with as many people as possible in order to trade with them, they have over the centuries achieved that relationship with bordering countries.

Of course there is a new factor, one that I adverted to earlier in my remarks. Recently Lebanon has been rocked by pressures, sometimes violent pressures, from outside countries. Recently those pressures have been manifested in hostile radio broadcasts and other activities, and these pressures have brought about the vexed situation in which the Lebanese find themselves at this particular time. But it is, I think, possible to find a way out of the situation along the lines I suggested a moment ago. I would expect that the Lebanese might welcome some arrangement establishing neutrality that would assure them their independence in this middle position. But I am convinced that that cannot be brought about without the practical assistance of the United Nations. Indeed, I think it might well require some physical manifestation of United Nations authority, a physical manifestation of such authority on the ground in Lebanon.

The task which the observer group is now performing and will perform to a greater and more successful degree, I hope, will be to insulate the political affairs of Lebanon from those of its neighbours and thus help to restore tranquility in that divided nation. That, Mr. Speaker, could be the forerunner of some continuing role on the part of the United Nations in that country, perhaps not unlike the role played not by the United Nations but by Canada and other members of the international commissions in Indo-China. As hon. members will recall, these commissions were set up by the Geneva agreements of 1954.

In putting forward this suggestion I realize that the United Nations should proceed cautiously, but if the experiment were successful it might be used as a precedent for stabilizing other countries in the Middle East, torn not only by fierce internal antagonisms but by hostile external rivalries and tensions. The possibility of insulation through the United Nations raises novel problems and vast difficulties, but so acute have the problems of this region become that we must cast our minds about to examine every possible line of approach which might offer the prospect of advance.

I make another reference to the stability not only of Lebanon but also of the Middle East. Much of their trouble can be traced to the economic difficulties in which they find themselves, and I would hope it would be possible to give some assurance of economic stability not only to Lebanon but to the whole Middle East that would warrant and promote political stability. In this particular task I can foresee for the United Nations and for other organizations a really valuable role.

MEETING AT THE TOP

As the Prime Minister said the other day in the House, this is not the time for stagnant thinking, and if there is anything in this new United Nations approach, the West could seize the opportunity at the summit meeting which now appears certain to be held in New York and endeavour to make a small beginning, at any rate, in the country of Lebanon.

That was one reason that prompted the Canadian Government to welcome the Soviet proposal of last Saturday, a proposal that contained offensive and provocative language giving unnecessary offence to the addressees. Indeed, I had occasion to point out to Mr. Sobolev when I was in New York that it was unnecessarily truculent and offensive. But I know I can speak for the Prime Minister when I say that in sending messages to President Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Nehru, expressing hope that there would not be a negative attitude to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal, we had in mind that some constructive measure such as the one I have been indicating might be looked at and adopted not only for Lebanon but for the Middle East.

Then with reference to the message that was received by France, the United Kingdom and the United States from Mr. Khrushchev, we had in mind that a meeting at the top could result in a diminution of international tension. On Sunday we discussed also the terrible possibility, not the probability but the terrible possibility, of the nations of the world sliding into a global nuclear war. The

leaders of the governments of this generation would never be forgiven if they did not exhaust every possible way of relieving, at least in some measure, international tension.

This was another basis for the messages that went out from the Prime Minister over the week-end. I can claim that in this regard Canada took the lead. The public expression of the desire of this Government to promote the holding of a summit meeting was the first public utterance on the Western side in this respect. I took the opportunity in the Security Council, as did the Prime Minister when he informed the House on Monday, of making very clear our concept of the desirability of holding an international conference as suggested. I have in mind, but I cannot claim this, that my observations had something to do with the postponement at least of the U.S.S.R. proposal to call for a General Assembly meeting in which they could indulge in more propaganda.

I have in mind also that the stand of the Canadian Government, as expressed by me in the Security Council on Monday of last week, had something to do with the acceptance of the counterproposal put forward by Mr. Macmillan on behalf of the United Kingdom. The real significance to me of the resolution with respect to the holding of a meeting in the Security Council - I do now expect it will be a favourable decision - is that this meeting will be held under the aegis of the United Nations. The Security Council, and I quote from the United Nations Charter, was established for the following purpose:

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Councils acts on their behalf.

In my opinion, that is the proper forum for a meeting of Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Eisenhower, General de Gaulle and others. We have noted with encouragement that Mr. Khrushchev has responded to this proposal that was sent out in clearer terms, perhaps, from London than from any other capital, that this meeting should be held within the Security Council. It could be, it may be - I emphasize the word "may" - a meeting of momentous consequence. Again, I say that it is worth trying in terms of the voice of humanity. Furthermore, I have in mind that apart from the powers whom I have named and to whom the letters were addressed by the author, the presence of Mr. Nehru, the distinguished leader of one of the nations of the Commonwealth and a representative of the awakening world of Asia, would contribute much to such a conference.

With reference to the eventual composition of the Conference, I am sure that the House will have noted the observations made yesterday by Right Hon. Mr. Macmillan at Westminster. These are his words:

I am glad to note Mr. Khrushchev's latest letter recognizes ... (that) ... until the form of the meeting has been agreed it would be premature to lay down which countries, which are not members of the Security Council, should attend, or by whom they should be represented.

I agree with that particular view, at this stage, when there will have to be negotiations with respect to the time, with respect to the agenda and other matters. I would say this, however; that it will be for the Security Council to decide what nations, which are not members of the Security Council, should come to the table of the Security Council. That is a procedural matter for the Security Council. I saw it in operation on Monday and Tuesday of this week, for example. The Council, by formal resolution presented by the chairman before one meeting on Monday started and before the two meetings on Tuesday started, asked the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan to come and be present at the Council table. I say again, Mr. Speaker, that is a matter for the Security Council to decide.

However, I express anxiety lest these matters having to do with who will sit and who will go to the meeting should jeopardize the holding of that meeting. Questions of this sort should not be insuperable or prevent the proposed meeting of the Security Council. In my opinion they should be treated and considered as secondary. With respect to this meeting in New York, whatever the date may be, I have in mind that it is desirable also, if some means can be found, to have the opinions of the numerous countries concerned, because no plan that may be evolved in the Security Council will be successful unless the proposals are accorded the approval of the peoples of those regions.

One of the problems we in Canada must always keep in mind is a concern, for example, lest the prosperity of Israel should not be safeguarded in the forthcoming negotiations. Surely it will be possible to get the views of the Middle East countries whatever the procedural device may be. Many problems, as I indicated a moment ago, will arise on the subject of time, on the subject of the agenda and prior consultation. But when the Prime Minister spoke in this House on July 25 about the possibility of holding such a meeting within the Security Council he deliberately used words which took into account the flexible procedure that would have to be devised if this conference is to be brought into being.

I would express on behalf of Canada the hope that we will have this concept of flexibility. It is here, I believe, that the Secretary-General, with his great experience and wisdom which he has shown particularly during the past two weeks, could be given the opportunity of devising some formula within the existing United Nations structure in order to enable these important conclusions to be reached with respect to those matters to which I referred, and to the end that the consultations at New York will be fruitful.

INDOCHINA

It is not inappropriate that I announce at this time an important development in connection with the responsibilities of Canada in Indochina. I would just bring back to the attention of the members of the House the role that Canada has played through its membership in three international commissions in Indochina; one international commission in Laos, one in Cambodia and one in Viet Nam. That was an example I used a few moments ago. Here were powers sitting down at Geneva in 1954 to deal with dissensions in these three parts of Indochina. There was in that particular area the possibility, indeed the probability, of a collision of the communist powers on the one side and western countries on the other.

What was done? There was established at the Geneva meeting machinery whereby the situation in these three countries could be stabilized or helped to be stabilized through the presence of international commissions. Canada was and is a member of those international commissions in the three countries, the other members being India and Poland. With the physical manifestation, if nothing else, of these three international commissions the result was that in Laos the Royal Government was enabled to bring about the stabilization of the situation there. There was a reconciliation of the communist forces and the royal force and there came about stability. On May 4 of this year supplementary elections were held in Laos and they indicated to Canada that its task had been performed in Laos through its membership in that commission.

Hence I informed the House recently that the Canadian Delegation to the International Commission for Supervision and control in Laos had introduced a resolution calling for the dissolution of the commission. I wish now to inform the House that the international commission for Laos was adjourned sine die on July 19. There were forces at work there - and you can guess their origin - which resisted the retirement or the adjournment of the Laos international commission.

In the end Canada joined with others in bringing about this adjournment sine die. We made it very clear that we were not getting out by reason of any threats or suggestions by Laotians, but we had in mind the representations made here by Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, that after the election had been held and the situation stabilized, he felt that the commission would have performed its task. That commission can be reconvened in Laos at the call of the chairman, the representative for India. Canada must be consulted. If we go back by reason of any particular emergency we will always have in mind the rights of the Laotian Government, and we will not interfere with the sovereignty of that country. In the opinion of the Canadian Government, the commission which began its operations in 1954 has completed its task.

With respect to Viet Nam there is tension, as the members of the House well know, between South and North Viet Nam. That situation has not been stabilized. There is a need for the continuation of the work of the international commission in Viet Nam, but we have advice that we can apply a formula similar to the Laos one to Cambodia where the situation has been stabilized.

I seize this opportunity to pay tribute to India, which provided a chairman, for its co-operation, and also to pay a tribute to the success of the Royal Government in Laos in bringing about a reconciliation of the two forces that were indeed hostile to one another. We will now take up the problem with respect to Cambodia. As I indicated a moment ago, we should be able to use the same formula of adjournment.

I come back to this concept that I advanced earlier with respect to Lebanon and with respect to certain other countries in the Middle East. Is there not something in the example of the success of the international commissions in Laos and Cambodia for a solution of some of the problems at least in some of the trouble spots in the Middle East?

DISARMAMENT

I will now speak on the problem of disarmament. It may be that some will have the thought that we should not be talking about disarmament in the particularly vexed situation that we now have. I do not share that view. Indeed, the interest in and the desire for disarmament have been intensified by events in the past few weeks. In order to provide members of the House a perspective with respect to disarmament, a perspective that will be read with deeper concern during the present situation, I am tabling a White Paper with respect to the disarmament discussions in 1957.

I need hardly recall for the information of the House the breakdown of the negotiations that were carried on through the Subcommittee of the Commission on Disarmament established by the United Nations. France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada put forward certain proposals on August 29 of last year. They appeared to be a package deal, if I can use that expression. Since the time negotiations broke down, the Russians having flatly rejected the proposals, the countries of the West including Canada have been endeavouring to make clear that those proposals of August 29, 1957, were merely put forward as a basis of discussion. Indeed the Prime Minister in the General Assembly last year and I myself in the political Committee of the United Nations and in the General Assembly urged that the Russians look at those proposals as being flexible. But that situation was not accepted by the U.S.S.R., and little if anything has been done within the United Nations since last autumn with respect to disarmament.

However, there have been some encouraging signs recently of a resumption of negotiations. We were all gratified that President Eisenhower felt it possible to make a suggestion with respect to one kind of disarmament or with respect to certain measures that could lead to one kind of disarmament, and he put those forward to Mr. Khrushchev. We are gratified and encouraged to hear that Mr. Khrushchev has accepted the proposal to establish a technical group for the purpose of examining the possibility of providing adequate supervision and control of nuclear tests and methods for the detection of nuclear tests.

The discussions began in Geneva on July 1 of this year with respect to the scientific problems involved. Even if I knew what had been happening at those discussions I would not understand the scientific problems, but I can say it is authoritatively reported that the talks between the scientists are making headway in an encouraging manner. Without attempting to predict the final outcome of this scientific conference, I am confident that significant findings will be made by this technical group. Canada, as the House knows, is represented there by Dr. O.M. Solandt who has associated with him four other Canadian scientists. The other Canadians are Mr. N. Larnder and Mr. A.K. Longair of the Defence Research Board, Dr. P.L. Willmore of the Dominion Observatory and Professor G.M. Volkoff of the University of British Columbia.

The Government has held the view that after the findings of this group are made known, in which findings we feel confidence could be placed, a method might be arrived at by which to detect nuclear tests, and then the countries carrying on such tests might then come

to a political agreement with respect to the cessation of these tests. This is a view which has been advanced by the Prime Minister throughout the country on several occasions; but let me say that the detection and inspection, the control and supervision of nuclear power do not constitute in themselves a measure of disarmament. They are a means to ensure disarmament; they provide sanctions for a political agreement with respect to a type of disarmament, and I would express the hope that after the successful conclusion of the present technical studies there might be taken what could be regarded as a step having a revolutionary effect on the international climate.

An initial move might be made with respect to the cessation of further nuclear tests, and in that way there might be established some element of mutual trust and confidence, after which the nations concerned could move on to the more complex aspects of a disarmament program. The suspension of nuclear tests with these guarantees as to detection could constitute the first step toward agreement, which agreement would in turn be the first step toward disarmament, even though this would not be the most important measure, which is that having to do with the use of nuclear weapons already proved.

There is another encouraging factor on which I would like to report with respect to disarmament. Mr. Eisenhower proposed that it would be useful to study practical measures to provide required safeguards against surprise attacks and we have been heartened by a rather affirmative reply by Mr. Khrushchev. We in Canada should promote in every possible way the holding of a meeting of scientists of a somewhat similar nature to the present Geneva meeting with respect to the detection of nuclear tests, in order to study means and methods of preventing surprise attacks. This is a matter which is, of course, of very direct concern to this country with particular reference to surprise attacks over the Arctic region.

I am sure I need not spell out the implications of this matter or draw a picture of what we have advocated in this regard. I reported on our advocacy at the Copenhagen meeting. The Russians had indicated - and this I would like to emphasize - that they might be willing to sit down with such a group. I do not think a political agreement would be necessary at this stage, any more than it has been necessary to enter into a political agreement with respect to the holding of nuclear tests while the current meeting of scientists is being held. I propose, however, that scientists should be brought together in order to study this further problem.

One cannot anticipate the measures which the scientists would put forward. They may have to do with electronic or radar devices, or they may be along the lines of ground inspection as proposed by the U.S.S.R., which could operate rather simply as a bilateral exchange of inspectors, or a more strictly supervised international system might be involved under the control of the United Nations. We could, however, make progress in this regard.

The U.S.S.R. has on many occasions replied to the proposal for detection or knowledge of the possibility of surprise attack over the Arctic that this really does not matter very much. To us in Canada, however, it does matter, and the Prime Minister indicated last summer that for the operation of a scheme to prevent surprise attack all of the Canadian territory would be made available on a reciprocal basis if the Russians would give a similar undertaking.

The proposal has now been made by the United States and Canada that both countries would throw open their territories to inspection to ensure against surprise attacks if the Russians would do likewise, but the U.S.S.R. wants this system extended to the United States bases in Europe. The United States has said, we will throw open Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but if we go as far as Europe will you also agree to allow inspections of that kind? It seems to me, however, that without decisions at this time as to the exact location of such inspections we would at least make a start by arranging a meeting of scientists to consider effective scientific measures which could be taken in the event that such a political agreement were made.

To come back to the Arctic area, it would be easier to establish a system of control and supervision in that region than it would be in the more populous areas of the North American Continent; but we must arrive at some agreement, however small and paltry it may seem, to take a step forward in order to establish some measure of mutual trust and confidence. We could go on from there to deal with the more difficult areas and more complex problems. We must, however, always be conscious of a dilemma. Every government must be concerned about the security and safety of its people. Any government which failed in that respect would be guilty of a grave sin.

On the other hand, if we are not going to think about the possibility of disarmament, if we are not going to endeavour to take some steps, what is the situation ahead of us and of the world? There is a certain inevitability, an inexorable result, that might flow from a continuation of the building up of armaments on this side and on that side. That is what I meant when I used the word "dilemma" in terms of national and international

security. We will have to break that down and give our people some assurance that we do not admit the abiding necessity of building up armaments, and that we intend - to use an expression that I employed in this House some months ago - to keep our powder dry and at the same time endeavour to make some advance in establishing mutual trust and confidence and come to some understanding with the U.S.S.R. I cannot believe that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. any more than the Canadian people want to go on and on in building up armaments. Indeed, there are suggestions and signs that it concerns them economically now as well as in terms of the possibility of an international conflict that would destroy the governments and many people of all countries.

AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

I should now like to refer to another device of the U.S.S.R., and that is the economic device to the end that they might obtain and could obtain world domination. They have been infiltrating into countries in various parts of the world that are not yet committed to the U.S.S.R., to the communist group, and not committed to the West. By economic penetration, by barter systems and loans and other means they are making advances in that regard. To me that might mean that they will win the victory in their search for world domination without ever firing a shot. I regard this as one of the most urgent aspects of our foreign relations and one of our major contributions to peace, the aid and assistance particularly of underdeveloped countries, and I know I speak for the Canadian Government when I say this. There are measures that are being taken - but I think they should be increased - to respond to this challenge.

With respect to Canada's role, during the past year we have continued to support the Colombo Plan and the Specialized Agencies within the United Nations. Indeed, in several instances the support has been increased as compared with the year before.

The Colombo Plan operates under the broad umbrella of an annual consultative conference. It really works out, though, that the assistance is given by bilateral arrangements between Canada and some other country, and out of these arrangements come discussions that have to do with the plans and priorities of the recipient country. There has been no suggestion on Canada's part, and I think it is wise and will be effective in the long run, of any political strings attached to the gifts.

With respect to the Colombo Plan, there are two countries that are not within the Colombo Plan but for which we have a deep concern, namely Ghana and the British West Indies. This House has been informed of the contributions that have been made to Ghana in terms of personnel and to

the British West Indies also in terms of personnel. I will not take the time of the House to inform you with respect to the men who are now in those two countries, men who are particularly well qualified in their own chosen field, in order that they may assist these newly emerging countries and also help them to help themselves. The bulk of Canada's aid, however, is now under the Colombo Plan which is being directed to those parts of the world for which we have a special concern.

With respect to economic aid, I would remind the House that Canada has contributed to the establishment and the sustenance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and we would hope that agency could be strengthened. We can take pride that Canada, on a per capita basis, is the second largest contributor to United Nations Technical Assistance; but getting away from the per capita yardstick, Canada is the fifth country of the world in terms of total contributions to the United Nations in her technical assistance and relief programmes.

Hon. members may recall - I am certain that those who were members of the Committee on External Affairs last session will recall - that there was much consideration given to the possibility of establishing a fund within the United Nations to be known as SUNFED. That concept as conceived at the United Nations was given up and in its place there was proposed the establishment of a special fund. This proposal was referred to a preparatory committee of the United Nations on which Canada was represented. The Economic and Social Council is now considering the report of this preparatory committee, and at the next General Assembly the final details should be settled and a new instrument of United Nations aid achieved. Canada has indicated that it would consider making an appropriate contribution to this fund provided that the organizational arrangements are well designed and provided that there is broad support for the proposal among, particularly, the contributor nations.

During the last session, information was given to the House with respect to Canada's extension of its aid in terms of flour and wheat in emergency situations.

I would go back for a moment to the West Indian contribution. I recall that a few weeks ago the hon. member for Laurier asked a question with respect to the giving by Canada of a steamship for interisland communication in the British West Indies. I intimated then that there would be a team of shipping and shipbuilding experts sent from Canada. That team has been to Port of Spain and has now returned. We expect that a report will be made in due course concerning the specifications for the new ship that Canada has undertaken to build and give to the British West Indies.

We will be holding a conference with respect to trade and economic matters within the Commonwealth at Montreal in September of this year. There will be on the agenda of that conference an item relating to the economic progress of the underdeveloped parts of the Commonwealth. I am confident that through those discussions Canada can make a further contribution in respect of those nations to which I referred, a contribution not only of capital but also in terms of technical assistance. I should not like to leave the impression that under the Colombo Plan and other systems of aid to underdeveloped countries Canada has forgotten underdeveloped countries that are not members of the Commonwealth. The most of our assistance, however, has gone to the Commonwealth countries and, as I intimated a moment ago, further thought will be given to these matters in the context of the Montreal meeting.

My foregoing remarks have to do with countering the movements of the U.S.S.R. in the economic field. Indeed it is a fact, Mr. Speaker, that the West has given more and has been giving more for a longer time to underdeveloped parts of the world than the Soviet bloc. They are paying us the compliment now of following our activities in that regard, but you may be sure that their gifts always have a political string attached to them. I do not think we should ever endeavour to counter every Soviet gesture. We should work steadily, in co-operation with the people of those countries, within their plans and priorities in our earnest desire to help them and to bring reality to their hopes. In this way we can best counter the Russian activities in this regard and we can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world.

I eagerly look forward to this debate and to the discussion in the meetings of the committee on external affairs, to the end that in the formulation of its external policy and in the implementation of this policy, Canada can speak with a strong voice.

S/C