


CA1
EA360
C44
1983
c.1
DOCS

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1983 SESSION




PV

COMPILED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA


FEBRUARY 1986



COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1983 SESSION



This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1983 session relating to chemical weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussions and research on this issue.

Dept. of External Affairs
Min. des Affaires extérieures

26 1986

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY
RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTRE

COMPILED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA

FEBRUARY 1986

43-250-715

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Statements Made in Plenary Session Chronological Index

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
<u>1983</u>				
32	CD/PV.189	10	Mongolia/Erdembileg (Chairman)	1.2.83
	CD/PV.189	22	Canada/MacEachen	1.2.83
	CD/PV.189	29	USSR/Issraelyan	1.2.83
	CD/PV.189	31,34,37	Kenya/Don Nanjira	1.2.83
33	CD/PV.190	9,13	FRG/Genscher	3.2.83
	CD/PV.190	21	Sweden/Theorin	3.2.83
34	CD/PV.191	11-13	USA/Bush	4.2.83
	CD/PV.191	15-16	USSR/Issraelyan	4.2.83
35	CD/PV.192	9-10	Belgium/Onkelinx	8.2.83
	CD/PV.192	13-14	UK/Cromartie	8.2.83
	CD/PV.192	18,22-23	GDR/Herder	8.2.83
	CD/PV.192	27-28,29	Australia/Sadleir	8.2.83
	CD/PV.192	32	China/Li Luye	8.2.83
36	CD/PV.193	7-8	Italy/Alessi	10.2.83
	CD/PV.193	13	Japan/Imai	10.2.83
	CD/PV.193	17	Peru/Cannock	10.2.83
	CD/PV.193	31	Bulgaria/Tellalov	10.2.83
	CD/PV.193	33-37	USA/Fields	10.2.83
	CD/PV.193	40	Nigeria/Ijewere	10.2.83
	CD/PV.193	43	Ethiopia/Terreffe	10.2.83

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
37	CD/PV.194	11	Secretary-General/Pérez de Cuéllar	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	15,16,17	Norway/Berg	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	20-21	Pakistan/Ahmad	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	24-25	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	29	Sri Lanka/Jayakoddy	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	35-36	France/de la Gorce	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	40	Hungary/Komives	15.2.83
	CD/PV.194	45	Algeria/Oul-Rouis	15.2.83
38	CD/PV.195	10	Morocco/Skalli	17.2.83
	CD/PV.195	15	Romania/Datcu	17.2.83
	CD/PV.195	20	Burma/Maung Maung Gyi	17.2.83
	CD/PV.195	38-39	Poland/Zawalonka	17.2.83
	CD/PV.195	43-44	Egypt/El Reedy	17.2.83
	CD/PV.195	45-47	Finland/Rajakowski	17.2.83
	CD/PV.195	47-48	Canada/McPhail	17.2.83
39	CD/PV.196	9	Cuba/Sola Vila	22.2.83
	CD/PV.196	10-14	GDR/Herder	22.2.83
	CD/PV.196	17-22	USSR/Issraelyan	22.2.83
40	CD/PV.197	9-10	Indonesia/Sutresna	24.2.83
	CD/PV.197	13-16	FRG/Wegener	24.2.83
41	CD/PV.198	20	USSR/Issraelyan	28.2.83
42	CD/PV.199	9-10	Argentina/Carasales	1.3.83
	CD/PV.199	14,15-16	China/Li	1.3.83

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
43	CD/PV.200	11	Yugoslavia/Vidas	3.3.83
	CD/PV.200	12-14	Spain/Laiglesia	3.3.83
	CD/PV.200	22	Pakistan/Ahmad	3.3.83
	CD/PV.200	28	GDR/Herder	3.3.83
44	CD/PV.201	13-15	Sweden/Lidgard	7.3.83
	CD/PV.201	16-18	France/de la Gorce	7.3.83
	CD/PV.201	21-22	GDR/Herder	7.3.83
	CD/PV.201	22	Cuba/Nunez Mosquera	7.3.83
45	CD/PV.202	11	France/Andreani	10.3.83
	CD/PV.202	14-17	UK/Hurd	10.3.83
	CD/PV.202	19-22	Brazil/de Souza e Silva	10.3.83
	CD/PV.202	25-28	USSR/Issraelyan	10.3.83
	CD/PV.202	29-30	Japan/Imai	10.3.83
46	CD/PV.203	19-21	USSR/Issraelyan	15.3.83
	CD/PV.203	23-25	Poland/Zawalonka	15.3.83
	CD/PV.203	30	USA/Fields	15.3.83
47	CD/PV.204	7-10	USA/Fields	17.3.83
	CD/PV.204	10-14	Bulgaria/Tellalov	17.3.83
48	CD/PV.205	11	India/Dubey	22.3.85
	CD/PV.205	14	Nigeria/Ijewere	22.3.83
49	CD/PV.206	7,8-12	Belgium/Onkelinx	24.3.83
50	CD/PV.207	12-13	Netherlands/van den Broek	29.3.83
	CD/PV.207	15-19	Yugoslavia/Vidas	29.3.83
51	CD/PV.211	12-14	USA/Fields	12.4.83
	CD/PV.211	15-20	USSR/Issraelyan	12.4.83

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
52	CD/PV.212	10-11	Poland/Jaroszek	14.4.83
	CD/PV.212	14	GDR/Thielicke	14.4.83
53	CD/PV.213	6-10	Vietnam/Nguyen Thuong	19.4.83
	CD/PV.213	29-30	Mongolia/Erdembileg	19.4.83
54	CD/PV.214	15-18	Australia/Sadleir	21.4.83
	CD/PV.214	22-24	China/Tian Jin	21.4.83
55	CD/PV.215	26-27	Nigeria/Ijewere	26.4.83
	CD/PV.215	30	USA/Fields	26.4.83
56	CD/PV.216	11-12	Canada/McPhail	28.4.83
	CD/PV.216	24-25,26,27	Mongolia/Erdembileg	28.4.83
	CD/PV.216	29	Mexico/Garcia Robles	28.4.83
	CD/PV.216	32-34	France/de la Gorce	28.4.83
57	CD/PV.217	8	Nigeria/Ijewere (Chairman)	14.6.83
	CD/PV.217	12-13	Belgium/Tindemans	14.6.83
58	CD/PV.219	6	UK/Cromartie	21.6.83
58.1	CD/PV.220	14	USSR/Issraelyan	23.6.83
	CD/PV.220	18	Finland/Valtasaari	23.6.83
58.2	CD/PV.221	14	Cuba/Nunez Mosquera	30.6.83
59	CD/PV.222	15-17	USA/Fields	5.7.83
	CD/PV.222	28	GDR/Rose	5.7.83
60	CD/PV.224	13	Hungary/Komives	12.7.83
	CD/PV.224	25-27	Japan/Imai	12.7.83

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
61	CD/PV.225	29-32	Australia/Sadleir	14.7.83
62	CD/PV.226	21-23	Yugoslavia/Mihailovic	19.7.83
	CD/PV.226	26	Brazil/de Souza de Silva	19.7.83
63	CD/PV.227	6-10	Italy/Alessi	21.7.83
	CD/PV.227	11-14	Spain/de Laiglesia	21.7.83
	CD/PV.227	16	Kenya/Wabuge	21.7.83
	CD/PV.227	18-21	China/Li Luye	21.7.83
	CD/PV.227	21-25	Argentina/Carasales	21.7.83
	CD/PV.227	26-29	Sweden/Ekeus	21.7.83
	CD/PV.227	31-32	Poland/Turbanski	21.7.83
64	CD/PV.229	7-9	Norway/Vaerno	28.7.83
	CD/PV.229	11-14	Czechoslovakia/Vejvoda	28.7.83
65	CD/PV.232	12-14	India/Dubey	9.8.83
	CD/PV.232	19-21	Egypt/El Reedy	9.8.83
66	CD/PV.233	27-30	FRG/Wegener	11.8.83
67	CD/PV.234	9	Venezuela/Labrador Rubio	16.8.83
	CD/PV.234	25	Ethiopia/Berhane Deressa	16.8.83
68	CD/PV.235	17-24	USSR/Issraelyan	18.8.83
	CD/PV.235	29-30	Netherlands/Ramaker	18.8.83
69	CD/PV.236	18-22	UK/Cromartie	23.8.83
	CD/PV.236	25-29	USA/Busby	23.8.83
	CD/PV.236	34	Nigeria/Ijewere	23.8.83
	CD/PV.236	41-44,45-46	Canada/McPhail	23.8.83
	CD/PV.236	50-53	USSR/Israelyan	23.8.83

Serial	Reference	Page	Nation/Speaker	Date
70	CD/PV.237	9	Pakistan/Ahmad	26.8.83
	CD/PV.237	12	UK/Cromartie	26.8.83
	CD/PV.237	17	China/Qian Jiadong	26.8.83
	CD/PV.237	22	Australia/Sadleir	26.8.83
71	CD/PV.238	7-9	FRG/Wegener	30.8.83
	CD/PV.238	24-25	USSR/Issraelyan	30.8.83
	CD/PV.238	27	France/de la Gorce	30.8.83
	CD/PV.238	32-33	FRG/Wegener	30.8.83

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

MEMORANDUM

On the 10th day of June, 1900, a meeting was held at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York, for the purpose of discussing the proposed plan for the construction of a new building for the use of the United States Department of the Interior.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who were present at the meeting held on the 10th day of June, 1900, at the residence of Mr. J. H. Smith, in the city of New York, New York.

(The Chairman)

Distinguished delegates, as regards the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, the world expects concrete results from our Committee. I think that, as is shown by the outcome of our work at the last session, the conditions necessary for the achievement of agreement exist. As I see it, the important thing now is to proceed as rapidly as possible to agreement on the text of the basic provisions of a future convention, taking into account all the existing proposals and future initiatives.

CD/PV.189

22

(Mr. MacEachen, Canada)

The time is right for progress this year towards a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We intend to participate vigorously along with others in seeking to realize the maximum from the present opportunity.

Continuing Canadian research on defensive measures enables us to put forward suggestions on such aspects as the verification provisions of a treaty banning chemical weapons. Canada has contributed working papers. We have allocated funds to enable Canadian technical experts to participate here in Geneva for longer periods, beginning with the 1983 session. Expertise from many countries, including non-members, has been brought to bear in this Committee on the complex issues involved. The achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons again illustrate that work in this body can complement bilateral negotiations.

I have focused on four important issues, four Canadian priorities for 1983, on which I wished to put Canada's position strongly:

Canada will press for progress toward the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban;

Canada will press for a more effective non-proliferation regime;

Canada will press for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons;

Canada will press for progress towards the objective of prohibiting all weapons for use in outer space.

These are issues where there are prospects for genuine progress and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries believe that it is essential to speed up the achievement of agreements on a number of specific issues and in this connection call upon all States to give a new impetus to the negotiations with a view to: working out as soon as possible a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests; speeding up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons; embarking upon the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the neutron weapons; starting without delay negotiations on the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any kind; completing as soon as possible the drafting of an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, and speeding up the solution of the question of strengthening security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Let me also note that, as has already been noted by the distinguished Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Canada, the political declaration stresses the important role of the Committee on Disarmament in dealing with specific questions, namely, a nuclear test ban, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the prohibition of neutron weapons, the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the prohibition of radiological weapons and the issue of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

Three: consequently, the working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, chemical weapons, radiological weapons, a nuclear test ban and negative security assurances should be re-established under their former mandates, except for the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, whose current mandate is inadequate and should hence be reformulated to make it comprehensive and more suitable and appropriate. Once these existing working groups have been re-established, consultations should be held to finalize the allocation among the various regional groups of the chairmanships of these subsidiary bodies. Again, action to this end should not consume too much of the Committee's time. No delegation which seriously wants to see a comprehensive test-ban treaty signed would disagree with the argument that the terms of reference of any working body charged with the responsibility of negotiating a CTBT, or an NTBT, must include, apart from verification, such questions as the scope of the future treaty and its final clauses. The mandate of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban should thus be elaborated accordingly.

(Mr. Don Nanjira, Kenya)

On the other important issues before the Committee for deliberation at its current session, I would have the following to say.

1. On chemical weapons, it is most regrettable that the discussions in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which convened here in Geneva on 17 January last and worked for two weeks, were a mere reaffirmation of the positions the various delegations had adopted during the second part of the Committee's 1982 session. The deliberations of the contact groups created by Ambassador Sujka of Poland have, however, been useful and the adoption of a similar work programme for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the Committee's present session might be very worthwhile. The Working Group itself should convene as few formal meetings as possible in order to allocate most of its time to discussions in smaller units which have proved to be better forums for negotiations than larger ones— provided, of course that such smaller working units are open-ended and announced for all delegations to participate in if they should so wish. I take this opportunity to express my genuine thanks to Ambassador Sujka and his team of co-ordinators who have done an outstanding job in the past two weeks within the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

Disarmament and arms control are integral parts of our security policy and that of the alliance. As early as 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany gave its allies a contractual assurance that it would not manufacture nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons. So that its renunciation of the manufacture of chemical weapons can be verified, the Federal Republic has ever since then accepted international on-site inspections, which can be carried out without impairing the legitimate interest in preserving business secrets.

(Mr. Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany)

I note with satisfaction that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban have been greatly intensified during the past year. This affords a good basis for the Committee's work this year.

The indispensable prerequisites for such a ban are reliable verification procedures. As we all know, national technical means are absolutely insufficient for verifying a weapons ban. Consequently, decisive importance attaches to an international committee of experts with autonomous competence, including the right to carry out on-site inspections.

My country is the only one to have directly experienced international inspections in connection with the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this experience, we presented specific, practical suggestions in 1982 both at the second special session devoted to disarmament and in the Committee on Disarmament. I appeal to the Committee to examine these proposals carefully and to use them as a basis for its subsequent deliberations so that the negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Last year the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament again confirmed that there exists a broad political consensus on the need to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group was able to make substantial progress on a number of technical and scientific issues relating to a possible convention on a complete ban on chemical weapons. On issues of a more political nature there was some progress with regard to the question of on-site inspection. This matter should be explored further, as the question of verification is one of the greatest problems in the negotiations. It is imperative that all delegations demonstrate the political will that is required in order to ensure such concrete progress that brings us closer to a generally acceptable agreement.

(Mr. Bush, USA)

Let me now turn, Mr. Chairman, to the work directly before this Committee, to which we also attach the highest importance.

The Committee is confronted with numerous important issues. None has a higher priority for the United States than the efforts to ban for ever an entire and different class of weapons from the world's arsenals. As the President has stated, the goal of United States policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban of chemical weapons.

The nations of the world have already prohibited the first use of chemical and biological weapons in the Geneva Protocol, and have outlawed the possession of biological and toxin weapons in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Like most other nations at the table, the United States is a party to these treaties, and, like most others, we are in full compliance with these provisions. Beyond the provisions of these treaties, there is an even broader moral prohibition against the use of these weapons. President Franklin Roosevelt perhaps expressed it best when he said that their use "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind".

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Bush, United States)

All forms of warfare are terrible. But these weapons are particularly to be feared because of the human suffering that they inflict. That is why the civilized world has condemned their use. Sadly, mankind has, nonetheless, had repeated demonstrations of the cruelty and horror wrought by the use of these weapons. And now, chemical and toxin weapons are being used in Afghanistan and south-east Asia in violation of international law and international arms control agreements. These violations are made all the worse by the fact that the victims do not have the means either to deter the attacks against them or to defend or protect themselves against these weapons.

The United States presented conclusive evidence to the world community of the facts surrounding the use of chemical and toxin weapons. Others have presented evidence as well. We did not come to these conclusions seeking confrontation or rashly, but only after the most exhaustive study. The implications that flow from the use of these weapons are so serious that many would prefer to disbelieve them, simply to ignore them. In our view we just have to face the facts.

The world's progress toward more civilized relations among States has been doggedly slow, and beset at every turn by fears, ambitions, rivalry among nations. We cannot, therefore, allow the progress which we have made in civilization to be destroyed. To do so would be to begin a relentless slide back to a new dark age of mindless barbarism. This is what is at stake here, and this is what we must prevent.

What must now be done? We have called upon the Soviet Union and its allies to stop immediately the illegal use of these weapons. I strongly repeat that call here today. And I urge the Soviet Union, and all other members of the Committee, to join the United States in negotiating a complete and effective and verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of chemical weapons, a ban that will ensure that these horrors can never occur again.

A complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons is really long overdue. My Government, therefore, would like to see the work of this Committee accelerated, and negotiations undertaken on a treaty to eliminate the threat that is posed by chemical weapons.

A number of key issues, of course, must be resolved if we are to be successful in negotiating such a treaty. In the coming days, our delegation will present to this Committee a new document that contains our detailed views on the content of a convention that we believe could effectively — more specifically, verifiably — eliminate the chemical weapons threat. We undertake this initiative with the aim of further advancing the work of the Committee, and to encourage contributions and co-operation from others as well.

(Mr. Bush, United States)

The key to an effective convention — one that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare for ever — is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. I think we would all agree that this principle is absolutely fundamental. Effective verification, as the world's recent experience with the use of chemical and toxin weapons shows, is an absolute necessity for any future agreement that could be entered into. This is why we seek a level of verification that will protect civilization, our allies, and indeed humanity itself from this terrible threat. For today, the threat of chemical warfare has increased. And until an effective agreement can be achieved, the United States, just as others, must continue to ensure that it can deter the use of chemical weapons against its citizens and friends. If we are to expect nations ever to forgo the ability to deter chemical warfare, those nations must have confidence that others who accept the prohibition cannot circumvent their obligations and later threaten the peace with chemical weapons. They must be certain that they will not be attacked with such weapons by any State which has likewise forsworn chemical warfare. In short, for us, the verification and compliance provisions of a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty have got to be truly effective.

We know that most of the members of this Committee, like ourselves, are dedicated to accomplishing this important task. To do so will require more than our dedication. It will require greater willingness and flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to work seriously and constructively on resolving these key outstanding issues — especially those pertaining to the verification and compliance side. And such issues must be resolved if we expect to make progress. For although some may argue that progress could be made by concentrating on the "easier" issues, or even by drafting treaty texts on them, this would be a fruitless exercise if the verification issues cannot be addressed, cannot be resolved. We will not support a diversion of effort here.

I urge all members of this Committee to begin negotiation in this session to resolve the key issues that face us in this area, and to join with us in achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

[resuming in Russian] As regards the questions that are being discussed here in the Committee on Disarmament, our position on those, too, has been repeatedly stated, and not only in a general way but also in the form of concrete proposals and in particular in the form of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

With respect to the Vice-President's assertions about violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, I should like to remind him, and others as well, that the Geneva Protocol has indeed been violated. The facts are well known: in 1935-1936, poison gases were used by Fascist Italy against Ethiopia; they were used by Hitlerite Germany against my country, especially in the Crimea, in 1942; both before the Second World War and during it, as President Roosevelt said, chemical substances were used by Japan against China. Lastly, poisonous chemical substances were widely used for a long time during the period of the American aggression against Viet Nam, and this, too, is well known. As to the lies about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and south-east Asia, well, a lie will never be anything but a lie, however many times it is repeated.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Belgium hopes that the Committee will this year give priority in the use of its time to what is actually negotiable. The disappointing results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament inevitably led the Committee, during its session of last summer, to pursue this course to some extent. We trust that this trend will be confirmed and developed in 1983.

I wish to refer in particular to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is in fact these negotiations which offer the most promising prospects since the conditions for fruitful negotiation now actually exist. These negotiations can be brought to a successful conclusion in the fairly near future if all the parties concerned show the necessary flexibility. I should like today to launch an urgent appeal for this chance of success to be seized.

We are particularly encouraged by certain statements and declarations by the two countries which were conducting bilateral negotiations on this question before the Committee on Disarmament took it up. These declarations, as Mr. George Bush, the Vice-President of the United States, has just confirmed to us, indicate a willingness to move forward which can only be welcomed and which the Committee on Disarmament ought to convert into reality. We await with much interest the document promised us by Vice-President Bush and we endorse the objective he set of accelerating the work of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.

We should be making a great mistake if we did not decide to put all the resources necessary at the service of these negotiations. If the Committee succeeds in putting before the General Assembly the text of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons, we shall have achieved a great step forward in our work. If, on the other hand, we disperse our efforts, the Committee will become more and more an outmoded instrument that will fall into disuse.

Let us, then, in our use of time, give these negotiations all the priority they merit. The Working Group ought to resume its activities as soon as possible. It ought also to be able to set aside time for periods of "concentration" like those we held during the month of January. We must also take care to conduct our work in an orderly manner. The Working Group's report for 1982, usefully supplemented by the three weeks of work at the beginning of this year, provide the necessary basis for the continuation and conclusion of these negotiations.

Important work remains to be done to clarify the structure of the convention. Generally speaking, it is my delegation's belief that we should remain very flexible as regards the use of negotiating techniques. At the same time, we ought clearly to take care to avoid two dangers: the first is that of becoming embroiled in semantics, which would be a waste of time; the second is that of forgetting that there can be no agreement on the whole of the draft treaty without prior agreement on each of its elements.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The Working Group will no doubt be obliged simultaneously to give attention to some more technical issues relating to certain aspects of the convention. I am thinking in particular of certain problems concerned primarily with the procedures for verification of compliance with the convention. Useful work was done during the last technical consultations with the participation of experts, especially in the matter of the determining which precursors of chemical warfare agents will call for specific verification procedures during the chemical production process. The same applies to the definition of requirements as regards verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the dismantling of facilities. However, it seems to me that it should be clear to everyone that these technical discussions ought to lead to arrangements that can be incorporated in the convention. In other words, we must not lose sight of the ultimate object of such exercises, and see to it that overly technical or academic considerations do not unnecessarily add to the complexity of these talks. It will be necessary, at an appropriate time, to consolidate the elements which have formed the subject of convergencies of views during these consultations into draft annexes to the convention.

While the Working Group continues its efforts -- which we hope will be resumed shortly, for it would be unwise to interrupt the process that is under way -- it would seem to us appropriate to initiate, at the highest level in this Committee, genuine negotiations on the main issues where divergencies of views remain. I think we now know very well what these issues are. I think it would be easier to reconcile the opposing views in small consultation groups. We believe that this is essential to the success of our work.

CD/PV 192

13-14

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

My delegation is encouraged by the general agreement that progress can be reached in the field of chemical weapons. We are much encouraged by the remarks on this subject made by Vice-President Bush during his visit to the Committee last week. We support his call for the Committee to begin real negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, and hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons can resume its work without delay. We look forward to examining in detail the proposals put forward by the United States delegation when its paper becomes available and hope that it will provide the necessary impetus for rapid progress.

My delegation will make a further statement on this subject in due course, but I should like at this stage to comment briefly on the outcome of the recent consultations on technical issues relating to a chemical weapons convention. My delegation thought that these consultations showed that a measure of agreement was emerging on a number of technical points relating to the definition and identification of key precursors of chemical weapons, and to some of the procedures which might be suitable for verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. We were therefore disappointed to find that delegations were not able to reach agreement on a way of recording the discussion which had taken place. An oral report by the Chairman, however careful and balanced, cannot really replace an agreed written report.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Unfortunately, some States are not following such a course of action, even if one has tried in recent days in this Committee to make us believe the opposite. But how can a policy of superarmament and confrontation be reconciled with the search for peace and disarmament? We heard dramatic words about the danger for civilization stemming -- as we were told -- from the alleged use of chemical weapons, an assertion based only on lies and distortions. Does that mean that we should forget about the sword of Damocles, i.e. the danger of nuclear war, hanging over us? Recent events show that these are real dangers we are facing.

The "Defence Guidelines" of one nuclear-weapon State for 1984 to 1988 have become known. They are said to contain plans for a "protracted nuclear war". They project a nuclear first strike against targets on the territories of the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty, including the use of nuclear medium-range systems. The so-called decapitation strike is a main pillar of this strategy. Outer space has been fully integrated in these war plans.

To back up such plans, armament programmes are being implemented which include all categories of weapons: nuclear and chemical as well as conventional weapons. The representative of a Western nuclear-weapon State who some days ago explained to us the so-called arms control policy of his country declared already in 1981 in this regard: "One has to have a weapons potential which inflicts more damage on the other side than they can do to us. That exactly is the way to victory in a nuclear war."

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has recently achieved some progress. The shape of a future chemical weapons convention is becoming clearer. Now is the time to tackle the matter with the seriousness it deserves and proceed to actual drafting work. In this process the problems remaining can be overcome. Let us not waste time in discussions which might lead us away from our common aim — a chemical weapons convention, the elaboration of which is first and foremost a political task and not so much a question of technical perfection.

We noted with interest the recent announcement that a new comprehensive proposal will be tabled by the United States delegation. It is our hope that it will further our work in drafting the convention. But how can one reconcile this announcement with news reports coming these days from the capital of the same country that additional funds — the figure of \$150 million is mentioned — will be allotted to the development and production of new chemical weapons? This is certainly a counterproductive measure, and at the same time, it would be counterproductive perpetually to bring up new verification demands. From the history of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and other disarmament issues we know what this may lead to.

We stand for a realistic verification system, based on a combination of national and international procedures, including certain on-site inspections. This would correspond to the legitimate interests of all sides in enhancing confidence that the convention is being complied with. So, we do not believe that it is necessary to preach to us the virtues of verification.

At the recent session of the General Assembly, special attention was directed towards countering the qualitative development of chemical weapons and their stationing on the territory of other States, for this worsens conditions for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. In short, everything should be avoided which stands in the way of the process of elaborating the convention.

That is why the German Democratic Republic reaffirms the proposal submitted in the Prague Declaration for a Europe free from chemical weapons. Moreover, the Government of my country has officially declared that it is ready to create together with interested States a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe and has proposed to enter into appropriate negotiations.

Like other Delegations, we hope that at the current session the Committee will be able to speed up its work in negotiating and elaborating a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons with a view to fulfilling at an early date the task of thoroughly eliminating such weapons and detaching them from the earth. The Chinese delegation will continue to make active efforts in this regard.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is, in Australia's view, one of the most important tasks before the Committee on Disarmament. Under successive dynamic chairmen the Ad Hoc Working Group has tackled the task well at the past three sessions. Key issues have been identified; broad agreement has been reached on the main problems; alternative formulations for elements of the future convention have been advanced. Novel approaches have been successfully tried. These approaches have included resort to highly informal sessions and periods of intense concentration with experts strengthening delegations. The Soviet Union last year submitted "basic provisions" for a chemical weapons convention. The United States is shortly to table its own detailed ideas. My delegation greatly welcomes this development. We welcome, too, the steady stream of new ideas and technical papers from many quarters, as well as the active involvement demonstrated by all delegations. In view of the promise generated by the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I urge that no hiatus and no hesitation be allowed to damage its prospects and that it be permitted without faltering speedily to continue its operations under a new Chairman.

The key problems before the Working Group relate to scope and to verification. On scope, my delegation believes that the case of including a ban on the use of chemical weapons is stronger than ever. Ambiguities remain as to the existing prohibition; it is also the case that the use of chemical weapons reportedly continues. Moreover, the concept at the heart of the future convention -- that there must be a ban on the use of chemicals as weapons -- is a concept of use; and the so-called "general purpose criterion" which all agree should define this concept is a use criterion. Having said that, my delegation will carefully examine any alternative ways to meet our central concern. It may prove possible, for example, by providing in the convention for strong verification mechanisms which would be triggered by evidence that these repugnant weapons have been used, decisively to end the prospects of that ever happening.

Verification is the central issue. The international community must have some way of ensuring that treaty commitments are being honoured. National arrangements can certainly simplify the task but they can never be a substitute for verification measures of international scope. The Ad Hoc Working Group has recently gone into greater depth on what chemical stocks States should declare when they become parties to the convention, and on what procedures are necessary to destroy stocks: the conclusion which seems increasingly inescapable is that a strong system of international checking is essential to these and other aspects of the future treaty. Such a system, it is clear, must provide for a measure of on-site inspection under international auspices. How much, how intrusive and how often are questions awaiting answers and elaboration, but the principle is a fundamental one. On-site inspection, strengthened as necessary by remote sensors and other non-intrusive technological means, is the key to achieving a chemical weapons convention. If agreement is reached here, the outstanding issues will almost certainly fall into place.

...

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

. . .

Finally, I urge on this body a new spirit of accommodation. Many speakers have urged that we get down to substance, that we spend less time on procedural questions, that we not tolerate political obstacles. But it is time for action, not words. Last week the Committee failed to carry out an important task called for in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in document CD/334, namely, to produce a report on the latest consultations on technical issues. One delegation blocked consensus, and did not offer an explanation. There is a risk that those areas where this negotiating body not only can do good work, but actually has done good work, may be frustrated by actions such as these. In addition to the technical consultations it could be that the normal work of the Chemical Weapons Working Group runs this risk. The seismic work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, the direct relevance of which to the nuclear test-ban item has been repeatedly shown, has also been recently queried in the same way. Informal consultations have not, so far, it seems, produced consensus on chairmanships for our subsidiary bodies, despite the existence of understandings which normally constitute the oil that enables our somewhat cumbersome machinery to function effectively. Mr. Chairman, my delegation insists that we get down to work at the earliest possible moment.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

The prohibition of chemical weapons is a question of great concern to all countries. Over the past few years, the Committee on Disarmament has done a lot of work in this regard and has made some progress in the elaboration of the elements of a future convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. At the beginning of this year, delegates and experts of various countries continued their in-depth discussions and consultations on the basis of last year's results and made some progress on certain issues. This is a positive development. However, we have noted wide divergences on such important issues as "verification" and "the scope of the prohibition", where we still have a long way to go before agreement can be reached. In particular, on the questions of international verification and on-site inspection, to which many countries attach importance, a major power that possesses chemical weapons remains at a standstill. This cannot but make people feel concerned.

Like other delegations, we hope that at the current session the Committee will be able to speed up its pace in negotiating and elaborating a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons with a view to fulfilling at an early date the task of thoroughly eliminating such savage and detestable weapons from the earth. The Chinese delegation will continue to make active efforts in this regard.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

My delegation considers that progress can and therefore must be made during the present session, in three directions in particular: nuclear questions, and especially the general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests, chemical weapons, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In the short term, the elaboration of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons appears to be a realizable objective. In view of the importance that such a result would have in itself and for the multilateral disarmament negotiations as a whole, no effort should be spared to attain this objective. On 4 February 1983, we heard with satisfaction Mr. Bush, Vice-President of the United States, express the hope that the Committee's work in this field would be accelerated and negotiations undertaken for the conclusion of a treaty. A number of speakers have already stressed the interest with which the comprehensive document announced by Mr. Bush is awaited.

The areas of convergence, as well as the points of divergence, appear to us to be identified sufficiently clearly. The time has come to make a decisive effort to seek the necessary compromises and to overcome the points of divergence. In our view, the Working Group should concentrate its efforts on this task, with a view to moving on as soon as possible to the drafting of the articles of the convention. This delicate phase in the negotiations calls for appropriate methods and rhythms of work; it will be for the new Chairman of the Ad hoc Working Group to find procedures which, through their flexibility and informal nature, will contribute to the success of our efforts.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Considerable progress has been observed in the field of a ban on chemical weapons, resulting from the intensive work of last year. It will, we hope, become the basis on which further progress will be achieved this year, and in this context the recent statement by Mr. George Bush, Vice-President of the United States, who used the occasion of his presence in this Committee personally to announce that the United States' views on the content of a treaty banning chemical weapons would be submitted soon, is a welcome indication of the positive attitude which his country is assuming on this subject.

In the Working Group on Chemical Weapons this year, the key elements of a chemical weapons convention, that is, "Definitions", "Declarations", and "Verification", need to be considered in depth and in close connection with each other. With regard to "Verification", we expect that progress will be achieved toward the establishment of effective international verification measures, including on-site inspections, with the co-operation of the Group of Scientific Experts on their technical aspects. I believe that progress in the field of verification will facilitate the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

With regard to item 4 of our agenda, chemical weapons, I should like to express our gratitude to the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject for the work it did under the able guidance of Ambassador Sujka, which made significant progress possible in this sphere. This goes to prove that when the political will exists to act, or at least not to obstruct the efforts of the Committee, it is perfectly possible to make headway. Naturally, this recognition is without prejudice to the order of priorities established by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, which was recently confirmed.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

We share the view that one of the Committee's main tasks is accelerating the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. The socialist countries, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria, are actively pursuing this course. The basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention introduced by the USSR, the other relevant documents of the socialist countries, as well as their participation in this Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons are significant examples of their constructive activity. For co-ordinating mutually acceptable texts, however, it is necessary for certain States to give up their attempts to enforce the inclusion of unrealistic or biased elements in the future convention. We are awaiting with interest the proposal of the United States on this matter.

Regrettably, the leading Western power continues to disrupt the normal atmosphere in the Committee and its Working Group, and by directing unfounded allegations against another member State is trying to influence the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. As in the past, my delegation is of the opinion that the resumption of the Soviet-American negotiations on banning chemical weapons will considerably improve the chances for the early elaboration of a convention.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

Mr. Chairman, the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons is perhaps the most important task currently before this Committee. This is an area which is ripe for serious negotiations. Much preliminary work has already been done and the principal issues have been well-defined. It is now time for the Committee to intensify its efforts to resolve these critical differences so that the spectre of chemical warfare may never again threaten mankind.

In his statement to the Committee on 4 February, Vice-President Bush reiterated the commitment of the United States to the objective of the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons and stressed the urgency of its accomplishment. My task in taking the floor today is to present in detail the views of my Government as to how this long-sought objective can finally be reached. I will offer to the Committee a comprehensive document on the content of an effective convention and outline our suggestions on how the Committee can most rapidly move ahead.

If progress is to be made, it is essential that the views of all delegations be clearly stated -- and in detail. To this end my delegation outlined, on 12 August last, the points which we believe could serve as the basis for a chemical weapons convention. We further developed these ideas in the contact groups and consultations on technical issues.

Today, the United States is tabling our detailed views on the content of a complete and verifiable chemical weapons convention, which we hope will serve as a framework for discussion. It will be the basis for United States participation in negotiations to resolve key issues which are indispensable to the realization of our common objective.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Our document is an elaboration of the general points which we presented last summer. I would stress, however, that the substance of the document results from a very careful review by our experts of the ideas presented in the Committee by many delegations over a period of years. The results achieved in the contact groups established last summer received particular attention. As you study our document, it will become apparent that suggestions and ideas from many different sources have been adopted. There are also many new ideas.

As delegations will have an opportunity to study the document in some detail, let me just sketch out briefly our approach to the key issues, especially those relating to verification and compliance.

The United States supports a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Any activity to create or maintain a chemical weapons capability would be forbidden. On the other hand, chemical activities with a legitimate purpose would continue unhampered. The convention should also contain several specific provisions relating to the use of chemical weapons to help ensure that our common objective -- to remove the menace of the possible use of such weapons -- is met. In particular, use in circumstances not covered by the Geneva Protocol should be prohibited; the provisions for dealing with compliance issues should be applicable to all allegations of chemical weapons use.

Existing chemical weapons stocks and production and filling facilities would be promptly declared, and destroyed over a 10-year period. In order to take into account concerns expressed in contact group discussions, we have incorporated specific ideas for dealing with the possible discovery of chemical munitions, for example, on World War I battlefields, after the initial declaration of stocks.

As Vice-President Bush emphasized, the key to an effective convention is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification. We have learned the hard way -- through the bitter experience of recent events in Sverdlovsk, south-east Asia and Afghanistan -- that effective verification is an absolute necessity for any future agreement.

Many different approaches to the verification of a chemical weapons ban have been discussed in this Committee. We share the view of the majority of delegations, which have emphasized the importance of systematic international on-site inspection. Only an independent, impartial system responsible to all the parties can provide the necessary confidence that the provisions of the convention are being faithfully observed. National technical means alone are not sufficient, as they are available only to a few and are of extremely limited utility for the verification of a chemical weapons ban. Nor can so-called systems of "national verification", which would be tantamount to self-inspection by parties, be taken seriously when one considers the vital import of such a convention.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In our view, the following should be subject to appropriate forms of systematic international on-site inspection on an agreed basis:

Declared chemical weapon stockpiles and the process of their elimination;

Declared chemical weapons production and filling facilities and the process of their elimination;

Declared facilities for permitted production of chemicals which pose a particular risk.

To avoid misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that we do not believe it necessary to subject the entire chemical industry of States to inspection, nor do we seek to have inspectors roam throughout the territory of a party. Systematic international on-site inspection is necessary only at a limited and carefully-defined group of facilities, which must be declared.

An effective mechanism for dealing with compliance issues is essential. This is one of the key lessons to be drawn from the compliance problems encountered in recent years with respect to the Geneva Protocol and the biological and toxin weapons Convention. My delegation believes that the mechanism must promote prompt resolution of issues at the lowest possible political level. At the same time it must be flexible, and allow issues to be taken to higher levels, including the Security Council, whenever that may be necessary. We believe that States must undertake a strong commitment to co-operate in resolving compliance issues. This should include a stringent obligation to permit inspections on a challenge basis.

The United States delegation is putting forward this document to help advance the work of the Committee. We believe that the verification approach it described is tough but fair and practical. I want to emphasize that we are not seeking absolute verification. We recognize that some risks will have to be accepted. However, we do insist that these risks be minimized in order to safeguard our security and that of all other countries. We must have a level of verification which meets that objective.

I want also to emphasize that we are continuing to explore possibilities for new and more effective means of verification, for example, possible use of on-site sensors. We have invited others to join us in a co-operative evaluation of such sensors. I wish to reaffirm that invitation. Furthermore, we are prepared to explore seriously any suggestions by others for achieving an effective level of verification. Our views are subject to modification and further refinement. In fact, we encourage constructive comments and contributions

(Mr. Fields, United States)

from other delegations, particularly with respect to any additional verification arrangements which would reduce the problems of possible undeclared stockpiles and facilities.

We recognize, too, that on reading this lengthy document questions may arise. We welcome your questions and will do our best to respond promptly. We are anxious to explain our approach. In fact, our delegation is tentatively planning to hold, in the near future, an informal session open to all delegations for the express purpose of receiving and responding to your questions and comments.

Vice-President Bush pointed out that a chemical weapons ban is long overdue and urged that efforts toward this long-sought goal be intensified. The United States delegation is ready to engage in intensive negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. We have once again augmented our delegation with our best experts. Our interest is in solving problems so that a convention can be achieved as soon as possible, and we sense that most delegations here share that ardent desire.

But, speaking frankly, the first three weeks of work on a chemical weapons ban this year have been discouraging. It has been quite clear that a small group, led by the Soviet delegation, has thwarted any achievement of concrete results. We call upon the Soviet Union to join with us and other members of the Committee at our 1985 session to find ways to overcome the difficult issues which have prevented progress -- especially those pertaining to verification and compliance. As we have repeatedly made clear, we are prepared to consider any and all channels, including bilateral negotiations, that promise to be productive. We must have reason, however, to expect that bilateral negotiations would be productive rather than simply a device to draw a cloak of secrecy around these vital negotiations. Thus far, we have had no reason to be optimistic on this point.

We have repeatedly stated that for such negotiations to be fruitful, the Soviet Union needs to demonstrate, rather than simply profess, that it is genuinely ready to work out and accept effective provisions to verify compliance with a chemical weapons prohibition. And the Soviet Union must also show the United States and the rest of the world that it will abide by existing agreements in this area if meaningful progress is to be made.

It is sobering to realize that the chemical weapons Working Group is entering the fourth year of its existence. Considerable useful work has been accomplished, but the pace is much too slow. The work can and must be accelerated. I would like to outline some suggestions as to how this could be accomplished.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

First, let us not waste time and energy on procedural struggles. The chemical weapons Working Group should be re-established and resume its negotiations immediately. It is the responsibility of the western delegations to nominate this year's Chairman. As you know, Ambassador McPhail has agreed to assume the Chair under the rotation system. Consultations on other procedural issues could be conducted simultaneously. Let us not hold up this vital work while we attempt to sort out other problems.

Secondly, let us focus on the tough issues, which are the key to real progress towards a convention. Some may argue that progress could be made by dealing with the "easier" issues, or by drafting treaty texts on matters already agreed on in principle. But this would be a fruitless exercise if the key verification issues cannot be resolved. We will not support a diversion of effort away from the real obstacles to a convention. Before the drafting of actual treaty text can be productive, an acceptable verification and compliance framework must first be negotiated.

Thirdly, the chemical weapons Working Group should be allowed to proceed at its own pace. It should determine its own schedule and not be dependent on the schedules of other groups. It is to be expected in any serious negotiation that during some periods frequent meetings will be needed, while in other periods very informal consultations and work within delegations will be most productive. The Working Group should have the flexibility to adopt whatever schedule will best facilitate its work.

Fourthly, the very useful innovation of contact groups should be retained and refined to permit related issues to be dealt with together. For example, a method needs to be found to deal simultaneously with all questions related to stockpiles -- declarations, destruction and verification. These issues are so closely linked that they cannot be resolved in isolation.

Fifthly, more effective ways must be found to make use of technical expertise. Experience has shown that close interaction between technical experts and diplomats is essential. While there will continue to be a need for discussions which are primarily technical, the highest priority should be given to integrating political and technical considerations, perhaps within the framework of the contact groups. As part of the work of these groups, specific periods should be planned, well in advance, for combined political-technical discussion of issues on which technical advice is particularly important.

In closing, I want to stress again what Vice-President Bush said a few days ago in this room. The goal of my Government is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. We urge every member of this Committee to join the United States in intensive negotiations to ensure that the possibility of chemical warfare is eliminated for ever.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

While it is true that we have many urgent problems to deal with, it is the view of my delegation that there is an ascending order of urgency. For psychological reasons it might be necessary to concentrate on those areas where success is more likely and in this regard the negotiations to ban chemical weapons come readily to mind. It is, therefore, the view of my delegation that we should not lose the momentum already acquired in the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban. While we believe in the psychological advantage of trying to achieve success where it is more likely, we are convinced, like the rest of mankind, that the most urgent task before us is nuclear disarmament. Because of their devastating and indiscriminate effect, nuclear weapons can hardly be regarded primarily as weapons of war. They are essentially weapons of genocide and mass killing. The intended targets of nuclear weapons are not the combatants in the field but the civilian population. This was demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is, therefore, our hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban will start its work as soon as possible, with a wider mandate covering not only verification but also the scope of an agreement.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

As regards the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, useful work has already been done. The Ethiopian delegation would like to emphasize the necessity for the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. While some outstanding issues pertaining to the scope of the future convention and its verification require intensified negotiations and greater flexibility by all, it would be highly essential and imperative not to further complicate the present negotiations by pursuing the development and production of new types of chemical weapons. In this respect, resolution 37/98 A adopted by the United Nations General Assembly deserves attention. In its operative paragraph 5, the resolution "reaffirms its call to all States to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States". Assent to this resolution by the United States which, regrettably, was the only State to have voted against, as well as the resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States as called for in the resolution could, we believe, facilitate chemical weapons negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

(Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General)

As far as the question of nuclear disarmament is concerned, I feel sure that the Committee will look closely at the various concrete proposals that have been made so far and devise appropriate procedures for a sustained consideration of that question. The other issues on your agenda deserve equally pragmatic handling, notably the negotiations on chemical weapons. The Committee has been conducting an in-depth review of technical issues relating to a chemical weapons ban. The time now seems ripe for political action leading to agreement on this question.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

Norway recognizes the importance of the progress which was made during the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament in the negotiations concerning a multilateral convention on chemical weapons. We are indeed encouraged by recent developments and would like to welcome the new United States initiative announced in this Committee by Vice-President Bush on 4 February. In a statement on the same day, the Norwegian Foreign Minister expressed the hope that this move would provide a new impetus in these negotiations. The document which Ambassador Fields presented on 10 February certainly provides the Committee with a fresh opportunity to intensify the negotiations on such a convention. Given this document, together with the basic provisions which Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR introduced during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it seems that a sound basis has now been established for real negotiations with a view to concluding a convention containing adequate provisions for on-site inspection. Energetic efforts should now be made to prepare a draft convention at the earliest date, while solving all outstanding issues.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

In our view this is more than ever a priority task in multilateral disarmament. The importance which my Government attaches to this question is demonstrated by the fact that a research project has been undertaken in Norway dealing with verification of a chemical weapons convention. Last year, as the Committee will recall, we presented a working paper on the results of the first phase of this research project. The second stage of the project is now under way. The results of this will be presented in a follow-up document during the second part of this year's session.

(Mr. Berg, Norway)

Finally, I should like to sum up very briefly how I see Norway's involvement in the activities of this Committee during the current session:

Pending a solution to the membership question, we should like to take full advantage of our observer status and continue our full and active participation in all of the Committee's working groups.

Norwegian scientists will continue to participate in the Group of seismic experts and in expert consultations on chemical weapons. In addition, we would like to see Norwegian experts follow the work of the Committee with regard to outer space.

We intend to continue allocating resources to research projects relevant to disarmament matters on the agenda of this Committee.

Working papers will be prepared on the verification of a chemical weapons convention and on the results of an international experimental exchange of seismic data (so-called level II data).

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

We are satisfied that 1982 was a productive year at least for the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons. The contact groups have painstakingly worked out substantive details of the draft elements of a convention. Various views and perhaps all possible alternative approaches, ideas and proposals have been taken into account. The work, however, has now reached a plateau, and unless the major Powers display a degree of foresight and political will at this point, we may run the risk of sliding back to irreconcilable positions. On the question of verification, there was evidence late last year of a growing realization that a measure of least intrusive yet on site inspection is inescapable for ensuring mutual compliance with a future convention. National verification measures alone are an insufficient and unacceptable guarantee. We need to build upon this in the Working Group this year.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The next issue I wish to address now is the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation highly appreciates the efforts made by Ambassador Sujka of Poland, assisted by Colonel Cialowicz, as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the last period of our work. He undoubtedly succeeded in bringing new initiatives and reaching progress in the negotiations. In document CD/333 he also summarized the most important opinions which had emerged up to then from the deliberations in the Group, indicating that there does exist a significant convergence of views, and that drafting the treaty is a realistic task which could be started sooner than some delegations are ready to admit.

It is the view of my delegation that the Committee and the Working Group should concentrate maximally on efficient work on the treaty, and that we should not allow ourselves to be distracted from such work by discussing questions having nothing to do with the negotiation of a convention. This is exactly what happened at the end of the last technical consultations, thus preventing the Group from reaching consensus on the report summing up the results of the consultations.

We are ready to consider seriously any new proposal aimed at the solution of difficult issues involved in the treaty. We are upset, however, at the repeated tendencies to present in the Committee unsubstantiated allegations clearly distorting the historical effects regarding the use of chemical weapons in a contemporary conflict.

I would also like to express bewilderment over the way the United States delegation presented its draft concerning chemical weapons. This body, whether as the ENDC, the CCD or the CD, has always worked in a matter-of-fact, lucid atmosphere, in which one delegation never tried to offend another. And this atmosphere had been maintained even during difficult situations in the international field. But what are we witnessing now? How can one believe in the sincerity of its intention if one delegation accompanies its proposals with words full of poison and distortions, concerning not only general issues but also the relations in this Committee?

The slanders against the delegations of the socialist countries which allegedly created obstacles to the deliberations of the chemical weapons Working Group during the month of January, convened for this period, by the way, upon the initiative of the socialist countries, do not testify to the intention of the authors of the draft to undertake business-like negotiations. Moreover, certain preconditions for further negotiations on a chemical weapons convention were raised. All this increases the doubts of the Czechoslovak delegation as to the sincerity of the United States delegation's intentions.

(Cont'd)

CD/PV.194

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

There is no doubt that the verification issue remains one of the most important unresolved problems. It would seem unwise, however, to press for the inclusion in the treaty of political views bearing so much the mark of the present political atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion and of such evident efforts to gain a unilateral military advantage.

This is why my delegation supported, and is going to support, the concept of international verification underlying the basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention submitted last year by the USSR. May I recall that, according to this concept, different phases with different amounts of information and of verification measures have been foreseen for the substantial period of time needed for the complete destruction of chemical weapons stocks and facilities. This period has been understood as a sui generis process of international co-operation, in the course of which the States parties will be given an increasing opportunity to prove mutually their serious commitment to a strict compliance with all the provisions of the convention.

This concept has fully taken into account the existing international situation and provides for a dynamic process of permanently increasing confidence as well as an increasing mutual exchange of information, satisfying all legitimate demands of States for the necessary security guarantees. At the same time we are of the opinion that the concept of a systematic international verification on the basis of agreed quotas could be further elaborated in a more detailed form.

I would like to assure you that my delegation is ready to co-operate in the negotiation of these important questions in a most effective and constructive manner.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

The one area in which the Committee has made some evident progress which can give rise to a faint degree of hope and optimism is its work on a chemical weapons ban. Successive working groups supplemented by contact groups on this item have helped to bring closer the day when we can with caution expect that drafting of a treaty could begin this year. It is evident that all representatives in this Committee continue to demonstrate willingness to move the work further forward. The Committee, therefore, can justifiably claim a small degree of achievement on this issue.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Among the tasks confronting the Committee, that of negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is of primary importance and could offer prospects of real progress in the very near future. We note certain positive elements in this connection.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

During our 1982 session, with two additional weeks of intensive work in January 1983, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons achieved significant results. The "contact groups" method introduced by Mr. Sujka -- and I should like to take this opportunity to offer him the thanks of my delegation for the work he has done as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons -- gave rise to an intense exchange of ideas resulting in a clearer definition of the problems and of possible solutions. The reports of the co-ordinators of those contact groups, which are annexed to the report of the Working Group on its 1982 session, will constitute one of the bases of negotiations during the present year. It would seem to us useful if this method could be used again, with the necessary adjustments.

The Working Group will also have the benefit of the technical contribution made each year through the meetings of experts. At the meetings which have just taken place, the discussions were more substantial than they have been heretofore. It was thus possible, under the able guidance of the Egyptian expert, Dr. Ezz, who was asked to undertake this task by the Chairman, to draw up a list of precursors with the active participation of all the experts. The content of this list was not contested. My delegation considers it all the more regrettable, therefore, that the opposition of certain delegations prevented the submission of a report on the results achieved. We hope that the Chairman's practice of holding consultations with experts will be continued and that they will provide the technical data necessary for the current negotiations.

The submission by the United States delegation of a very full document on the content of a future convention, which it is prepared to negotiate, as announced by the Vice-President of the United States, also constitutes a very positive element.

The Soviet delegation circulated to the Committee last year, on 21 July, a document containing proposals for the basic provisions of a convention on chemical weapons.

Documents of such importance have prompted and will undoubtedly continue to prompt comments and requests for clarification from other delegations. The United States delegation has said that it is ready to answer questions put to it at a meeting arranged for that purpose. We are glad to hear this, and are sure that the Soviet Union delegation will do likewise.

The French delegation hopes that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be re-established without further delay. In addition to those I have just mentioned, it has at its disposal many important contributions and there will no doubt be others.

On the basis of the discussions that have taken place and the documents that have been submitted, the Committee is now in a position to perceive clearly those points on which there are divergencies of substance, and it is on these that the negotiations should be concentrated from now on.

(Mr. Oul-Rouis, Algeria)

At the present stage in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the negotiations on chemical weapons are indisputably the only sphere in which agreement is possible.

While it is true that the negotiations are proceeding with difficulty because of the divergencies of views that persist, nevertheless they offer promising prospects. The establishment of contact groups each responsible for looking into a given aspect of the future convention has had the merit of bringing out clearly the areas of agreement and the points where there is disagreement. The time has come for the major Powers to show the political will necessary to permit the solution of the problems that are preventing the Committee from passing on to the phase of drafting the articles of the future convention. The proposals made by the Soviet delegation at the last session and those put forward at the beginning of this session by the United States delegation should serve as the basis for finding solutions acceptable to all parties, so that the present difficulties can be overcome.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

The question of the prohibition of chemical weapons is one of those to which we all attach great importance. This conclusion of a convention to ban such weapons seems to us an essential measure of disarmament. The progress achieved during the meetings of the Working Group concerned with this matter is promising. In fact, the state of advancement of the work of this Group suggests that we should be in a position shortly to begin negotiations proper and to proceed in the very near future to the drafting of the text of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. It was with satisfaction that we heard the statement made in this regard on 10 February by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields. We consider that this statement gives us cause for optimism.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

The priority our delegation attaches to nuclear disarmament does not make us forget the dangers represented by the existence and development of other weapons of mass destruction. We attach great importance to the Committee's negotiations on the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons and on new types of weapons of destruction and new systems of such weapons.

An increasing number of delegations have this year expressed the idea that our negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons are of top priority, bearing in mind also the impressive amount of work which has been done to date. Perhaps I may be permitted in this connection to add the thanks of the Romanian delegation to those already addressed to the Chairman of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka of Poland, and I beg the representative of Poland to convey my sincere gratitude to him. It is my delegation's most sincere conviction that all the necessary preparations within the Committee have been completed and that this year we can elaborate a draft text of the future convention in this sphere. We believe that the presentation by the United States of its detailed views, last year's initiative by the Soviet delegation, which put forward the basic elements for a future convention, and the other documents we have before us constitute the necessary basis for going on to effective negotiations in this regard.

(Mr. Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

As negotiations go, our work on a chemical weapons convention is in an advanced stage that offers high prospects for elaborating a draft treaty. Therefore, the further intensification of our work on chemical weapons will, we hope, result in progress that will stimulate the political will that is necessary for concluding an agreement.

The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is, in Poland's view, one of the most urgent and important tasks before the Committee on Disarmament. The Ad Hoc Working Group has already done the groundwork and with political will the remaining obstacles could be overcome.

As far as the procedures for verification are concerned, we repeat our opinion that it will have to be a compromise between national and international means of verification. We have discussed at length the main elements of the future convention and we have already many drafts of such a document on our table. The question now is how to use most effectively the accumulated experience in order to bridge the remaining differences and to start the task of drafting the text of a chemical weapons convention. We are firmly convinced that the realization of this task is now within our reach.

I would also like to say that my delegation noted with interest the views of the United States delegation concerning the contents of a chemical weapons convention which have recently been published as document CD/343. We shall study it and address the question in greater depth in the course of our discussion under the agenda item "Chemical weapons".

While I am speaking about chemical weapons allow me, now, Comrade Chairman, to express on behalf of Ambassador Sujka his heartfelt thanks to all those who from the beginning of this session have spoken warmly on his performance as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the 1982 session. Ambassador Sujka, as you may know, has completed his tour of duty at Geneva and left for Warsaw. He could not introduce the report covering the period 17-28 January 1983 personally to the Committee on Disarmament. That is why he conveyed the report with a letter which reads as follows:

"Comrade Chairman, I have great pleasure in enclosing for your consideration the report on the work done during the period 17-28 January 1983 in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, in accordance with paragraph 17 of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons of 17 September 1982 contained in document CD/334. Let me express the hope that this report will provide a contribution to the future work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. Signed: Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, B. Sujka."

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has covered a considerable amount of ground. When it resumed its meetings last month, it was able to achieve some progress. It conducted intensive technical consultations in which two experts from Egypt, namely, General Ezmat Ezz and General Said Sultan, took part. General Ezz presided over a small contact group entrusted with the task of drawing up a list of precursors and key precursors. Although this contact group did excellent work and achieved considerable progress, it was unable to submit a report, or even to record the proceedings. This is most regrettable since, as members of this Committee, we have so often been given advice on the usefulness of the participation of experts from national capitals, the importance of their being representative of all geographical regions, and the need for such experts to work in accordance with the customary procedures of the Committee and in a spirit of mutual respect.

A few days ago our Committee received the proposals mentioned by Vice-President George Bush in his statement. We heard them presented by our colleague Ambassador Louis Fields. Last summer we also received Soviet proposals on basic provisions for a chemical weapons convention. We believe that all of this constitutes a development of paramount importance which should enable the Committee to proceed in an efficient manner towards the drafting of a chemical weapons convention.

At the outset, we wish to emphasize that such a convention should provide for an effective system of verification. As a developing country, we regard international verification as indispensable.

We also attach the greatest importance to provisions that would deter any party from violating the Convention. Provision should also be made to ensure a collective response by States parties to the Convention in the event of any violation.

Mr. RAJAKOWSKI (Finland): Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the floor and may I say first of all how happy I am to address this distinguished Committee today.

Mr. Chairman, in his important intervention before this Committee last Tuesday, the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, gave a graphic description of the importance of the disarmament issue and the role of the Committee on Disarmament in multilateral disarmament negotiations. He pointed to the mounting concern among peoples all over the world at the threat of nuclear war and set in very clear terms the rather poor record of negotiations within the United Nations in response to this concern. The Finnish Government very much concurs with his view that efforts should not be spared in using the growing momentum towards agreement in the field of disarmament. It is also our view that negotiations on chemical weapons seem to offer such an opportunity.

Since the views of the Finnish Government were expressed at length in the First Committee of the General Assembly last autumn, I should like in this intervention to make only a few remarks on disarmament negotiations generally. I will then elaborate on certain more specific prospects in the field of chemical weapons.

Despite the virtual lack of progress in most fields, some noteworthy developments are discernible in certain sectors of disarmament. Problems relating to the verification of arms limitation measures command increasing attention.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Rajakowski, Finland)

There are signs of undeniable progress in this respect. The conditions for an advance in verification problems relating to arms limitation may further improve in the coming years. Progress in the field of detection seismology has, in our view, largely improved the possibilities for solving the verification problems associated with a comprehensive test ban, a longstanding priority issue on the international disarmament agenda. Recently, views on prohibiting chemical weapons appear to have converged significantly. Both technically and politically, the problems related to the verification of a possible chemical weapons convention may have come closer to their solution.

Chemical weapons are universally considered particularly repugnant. Recent controversies relating to the development, manufacture, storage and use of these weapons are proof of this. Possibilities for progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons exist perhaps now more than before. I have in mind certain statements made in this Committee in the past days as well as proposals put forward in other forums. We look forward with some optimism to the possibilities of negotiated results to ban chemical weapons.

The Finnish Government has for its part devoted particular efforts towards facilitating international negotiations for a comprehensive ban on chemical warfare agents. As is well known to members of the Committee, Finland in 1971 initiated a research project for the analytical verification of chemical warfare agents. The goal was to create a comprehensive monitoring system which would apply equally to all areas covered by an eventual agreement. This would be achieved through a detailed verification manual and an automatic method of analysis to be used by the signatories of an eventual agreement in carrying out reliable analysis in a standardized manner. The same method could also be used by international monitoring organs, should such be created.

The Finnish project started in 1972 in the form of laboratory research aiming at creating sufficient scientific experience and methodological capacity in the field of chemical weapons. The first substantial report with concrete laboratory results was published in 1977 with the title "Chemical and instrumental verification of organophosphorus warfare agents".

In 1979 a large handbook was presented to the Committee on Disarmament with the title "An approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data". This study introduced the application of several highly sensitive instrumental techniques and described the possibility for their automatization in order to improve the reliability of the identification of individual compounds. Further, the identification of the degradation products of all important nerve agents was studied in 1980.

The following year, in 1981, an approach for the environmental monitoring of nerve agents was presented in a more comprehensive manner. In 1982 the same automatic methods were applied to 20 of the most important non-phosphorus agents.

Together, the three parts on systematic identification published in 1979, 1980 and 1982 form an identification handbook in which the collection and concentration, retreatment and analysis by five instrumental methods are presented. In these three handbooks more than a hundred chemical warfare agents or related compounds synthesized by the project are analysed and detailed analytical results are presented.

(Mr. Hajakowski, Finland)

Among the central areas for future research is first of all the identification of possibilities for remote monitoring, on which we will publish a detailed report. In remote monitoring a moving laboratory unit is used. It will be transported to the required locations for the collection of examples of air or water and their analysis.

Another area is automatic "black-box" monitoring of installations for the destruction of chemical agents and suspected production establishments. This issue is best discussed by experts. Finnish research in this area concentrates primarily on methods of automatic identification of agents and their application in the monitoring of the above installations.

A third central area is the improvement of the reliability of the methods published in the Finnish reports, the testing of these methods with simulation and unidentified samples as well as comparisons of results obtained by various laboratories.

If I have elaborated at considerable length the technical aspects of the Finnish verification project, it is because my Government considers it important that all efforts be devoted to the crucial issue of banning chemical weapons. In our mind, all approaches should be explored. It is a fact that much interest has been vested on all sides in coming to grips with banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

During the present period of the Committee's activity, in which general statements are made in plenary, many of them with particular focus on chemical weapons, and I refer for example to the intervention, a few moments ago, of our Finnish colleague, a very interesting and useful contribution, my delegation wishes to place on record a number of observations to supplement the comprehensive views of the Government of Canada which were presented to the Committee on 1 February by the Deputy Prime Minister.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

The Deputy Prime Minister during that address on 1 February said: "The time is right for progress this year toward a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We intend to participate vigorously, along with others, in seeking to realize the maximum from the present opportunity". With that reference I need not take the time of this Committee to reiterate that the Government of Canada attaches high priority to the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention. Nor do I intend to discuss today the various negotiating elements of this issue — these are well known to the Committee. Rather, I want very briefly simply to say why Canada considers that this session has the potential to lay the groundwork for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, building upon the progress achieved in the chemical weapons Working Group over the past three years.

We must first look back to the words of USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament last June when he suggested that Soviet proposals about to be placed before the special session held the potential of a breakthrough on the issue, particularly in the area of verification. Those proposals were submitted to the special session and subsequently were tabled here as document CD/294. At the time of the special session, the Prime Minister of Canada stated that he was encouraged by the positive approach to verification procedures contained in the remarks of the Soviet Foreign Minister. I think we all look forward to discussing the Soviet proposals in detail, and to receiving amplification of them this year in the Committee.

Of equal significance was the intention, indicated by Vice-President Bush in his address to us on 4 February, of the United States Government to submit a detailed paper on the same issue early in this session. That document has now been tabled as CD/343. It is both wide-ranging and forthcoming, and it constitutes a valuable addition to our search for a convention. Not since the joint USA/USSR Report of 1980 tabled as document CD/112, I believe, have we had the opportunity to assess and compare positions which documents CD/294 and CD/343 now afford us. Indeed the parallelism between those documents in a great many areas, ranging from objectives to destruction of stocks, is striking. Both accept, for example, the principle of systematic international on-site inspections, although there are differences on implementation. Nevertheless, it is the common recognition of the principle of and the need for such inspections which is significant. From the Canadian perspective, verification procedures based upon equity, non-discrimination, reciprocity and preservation of national sovereignty can be, and should be, acceptable to all.

Since it is generally recognized that the bulk of chemical weaponry is held by the USSR and the United States and since they have placed proposals before us, the Committee has a special responsibility at this session to ensure that the opportunity to reach significant agreement is not missed.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Before concluding, I should like to introduce the document which we have made available to all delegations and transmitted to the secretariat for distribution as an official document, with a view to contributing to this Committee's work on the subject of chemical weapons -- the text in question will be or is being issued as document CD/349.

This document contains the report of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War, which was held in Ho Chi Minh City from 15 to 20 January this year with the participation of 160 scientists from 21 countries, including Cuba.

The conclusions of the report as regards what was essentially a chemical war waged with herbicides and defoliants in Viet Nam between 1961 and 1975 are of particular interest.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, in the general statement I made on 8 February here, I declared that it was my delegation's intention to express our views in a more detailed manner on the items of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, in the course of this annual session. My statement today will be devoted to the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The German Democratic Republic continues to attach high priority to the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In the recent Prague Declaration my country, together with the other Warsaw Treaty member States, advocated that this Committee accelerate the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

In my statement delivered on 8 February my delegation has already expressed some ideas on how this goal can be achieved. Today I would like to elaborate on our basic approach to the work of the Committee on Disarmament in the field of chemical weapons.

In the view of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic as well as many others, it is now high time for the Committee to proceed to actual drafting work with regard to a chemical weapons convention. All prerequisites for such an endeavour exist.

Firstly, we have before us quite a number of comprehensive proposals with regard to a chemical weapons convention. Let me only mention the documents tabled by the socialist countries, Japan, the United Kingdom, the joint documents by the USSR and the United States as well as the Soviet "Basic provisions".

The papers submitted in recent years by the consecutive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons have been most helpful for advancing our work. The valuable "Views of the Chairman on a chemical weapons convention" submitted last year by Ambassador Sujka (CD/333) deserve particular praise. The same applies to the interesting papers reflecting the work done in the contact groups set up by Ambassador Sujka (CD/334, Annex). Now also the views of the United States on a chemical weapons ban have been tabled.

Consequently, there is enough material to be processed in drafting the convention.

Secondly, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons which was agreed upon last year and to which, after all, every delegation gave its consent, provides for the elaboration of a convention. Thus, the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and in particular of its Working Group, can no longer be limited to a mere systematization of views and positions or lengthy discussions on certain questions. Now, the Committee should really start discharging its political negotiating role concerning a chemical weapons convention. It stands to reason that negotiations entail more than just reflections on working papers tabled in this Committee.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Thirdly, the demand to proceed with actual drafting work also takes into account the time factor. Each day spent on discussion may only lead us further away from the aim of a convention. While we are spending our time on discussions, a new generation of chemical weapons — the binary weapons — is being introduced into military arsenals. It is likely to give the whole chemical weapons problem a new dimension. This is also a challenge for the Committee, where the tendency can be felt to involve it ever more in a growing tangle of technical material and ideas, sometimes of no or only marginal importance to an international political and legal instrument.

Fourthly, questions which are still open could be overcome in the course of the drafting of the convention, in a serious and systematic negotiating process. To mention only one methodological example, I would like to refer to the personal experience I gathered during the drafting of the ENMOD Convention which took place in the predecessor of this Committee in 1976. This agreement was then drafted within quite a short period of time, during which intensive efforts were undertaken by delegations and all open questions were solved in the course of the negotiating process.

Having stated the case for drafting work one might well ask how this should be done. As far as the negotiating forum is concerned, one possibility could be to use the instrument provided by contact groups in a more systematic way. One could think about setting up such a group for all questions connected with the scope of a future convention. It could also tackle the issues connected with stockpiles and facilities, perhaps even the question of declarations. Another group could deal in a comprehensive way with all verification matters. Thus, we favour an approach which would follow the actual structure of the future convention. We have strong doubts about the usefulness of an approach aiming at a priority discussion of certain activities — stockpile destruction, for instance — and dealing with them in a separate, isolated way. This could perhaps lead to interesting scientific and technical debates, but would obviously lead us away from drafting work on a chemical weapons convention. With regard to the working method, we would prefer the use of brackets. In this way we could proceed on the basis of the structure envisaged for the convention and narrow down differences of opinion concerning questions of detail. This, of course, presupposes a readiness to compromise, to engage in real negotiations.

Sometimes we are told that the main problem of a chemical weapons convention would be that of international verification. We do not overlook the fact that in this field different views still exist. But this is the case with other areas as well, as has been shown by the United States document which I have already mentioned. So, how can one agree to the proposal to negotiate first an acceptable verification and compliance framework before drafting an actual treaty text? This would contravene common practice in international law. Such a position would amount to putting the cart before the horse. It could endlessly postpone actual

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

disarmament, as historical experience shows. Besides, paragraph 31 of the Final Document states clearly that the forms and modalities of verification depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Moreover, should we now in the field of chemical weapons take the same dangerous approach as we were asked to do last year with regard to a comprehensive test ban? Should it be a rule from now on, first to agree on a verification system which would be acceptable to one delegation, and then, perhaps, start working on the disarmament agreement?

Experience has shown that it is not a serious approach to expect one side to accept the demands of the other side on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Here again we should bear in mind paragraph 31 of the Final Document which provides that verification measures should be satisfactory to all parties concerned. So, our aim cannot be absolute verification or a verification system which might be perfect and not leave any doubts or risks. It is common knowledge that taking into account the complexity of the modern chemical industry, we have to live with certain risks. What is necessary, however, is a system which creates the necessary confidence and ensures that the relevant agreement is observed by all parties.

In this we share the view, expressed two years ago in the Committee on Disarmament by the Indian delegation: "Let us not pursue verification procedures which may be 'intrusive' but not necessarily effective in ensuring compliance. There is a tendency in the Working Group to assume that on-site inspection or other intrusive methods of verification necessarily ensure compliance. When we are dealing with as complex a field as chemicals, we cannot be so sure. Our debate should not concentrate merely on whether or not to have on-site inspection. Rather we should try to determine what methods of verification are (i) feasible and (ii) optimal in ensuring compliance." (CD/PV.142, p. 31).

On several occasions my delegation has outlined its basic approach to verification. In the Working Group we have expressed our viewpoint about a verification system consisting of a combination of national and international procedures, including different kinds of systematic international on-site inspections and inspections by challenge.

It is the aspect of combination that we miss in the United States document. Virtually nothing is said concerning implementation and monitoring at the national level, that is, on the level of the States parties which, after all, would be responsible for carrying out the obligations of the convention and overseeing national enterprises and other bodies in order to guarantee compliance. This is common practice in international law and has been recognized by many delegations in this Committee. I would only like to refer to working papers CD/203 tabled by the Netherlands, CD/167 and CD/313 by Canada, CD/CW/CRP.35 by Australia and CD/326 by the Federal Republic of Germany. Our approach does not imply a "confrontation" of national and international verification. They should be considered two sides of the same medal. It certainly does not mean the establishment

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

of a so-called self-verification. In calling for sound national procedures we start from a purely practical viewpoint, since a well-functioning national implementation and monitoring system is a sine qua non for international verification. Where should the consultative committee send the inspectors, if there is no point of contact at the national level which keeps track of national activities concerning the implementation of the convention? Who should keep the records to provide the consultative committee with the required information?

In this connection we would like to refer to the experience gathered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The safeguards applied by this Agency are largely based on national systems of accounting and control.

Furthermore, I would like to mention the national experience of my country in the chemical field. The improved Law on the Handling of Poisons adopted five years ago, for example, provides for a full inventory of all poisonous substances, which applies to all branches of the national economy and covers the whole process, beginning with the production and ending with the disposal of poisons. A system of national agencies oversees the implementation of the law. To our knowledge, similar laws exist in other countries as well.

It is the intention of my delegation to express at a later stage of our work more detailed ideas with regard to the co-operation between the national and international bodies of the verification systems.

In our view it is exactly the co-operation aspect which counts, namely, activities based on mutual trust, not an atmosphere of distrust. Moreover, suspicions should be eliminated by verification activities. But how can this be achieved when even the declarations of parties who voluntarily entered the agreement are not trusted and should be verified?

In the course of the Committee's work on a chemical weapons convention we have seen, like many other delegations, that the problems connected with banning chemical weapons are, indeed, quite complicated. One particular reason is that it is sometimes rather difficult to draw a line between what is connected with chemical weapons and what does not belong to it. That is true of chemicals forming the basis for chemical weapons, as well as of facilities producing these chemicals.

Such difficulties arise not only with regard to the scope of a chemical weapons convention but also concerning verification of compliance. These problems are further complicated by differences in the organization of the chemical industry in various countries. The production of binary chemical weapons and their introduction into military arsenals will bring about serious additional problems. This "latest achievement" in chemical weaponry would be more closely connected with the commercial chemical industry than the so-called unitary chemical weapons. This applies both to the chemicals involved and to the facilities concerned.

CD/PV.196

14

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

We share the concern of many delegations about this dangerous development and join their request that the problem should be carefully studied and solved on a priority basis. A situation has to be avoided where attention is concentrated only on the declaration and destruction of facilities for the production of traditional chemical weapons, while the same is not sufficiently guaranteed for the most modern chemical weapons.

In view of this situation, we should look for a solution which would eliminate this imbalance and bring positions on the timing of the declarations for chemical weapons production facilities closer together.

A possible solution could be to elaborate specific measures with regard to production facilities for binary weapons, namely, to declare their location and to destroy them earlier than other facilities. Such a procedure would give all other States parties to the convention confidence that this new kind of chemical weapon does not exist any more. This approach would, in fact, not place those who have binary weapons in an unequal situation. On the contrary, it would improve conditions for elaborating and implementing the convention. Therefore, my delegation proposes that the convention provide for the declaration of the location of production facilities for binary chemical weapons during the first year after its entry into force. They should be destroyed in the course of the first two years.

The Committee has before it a working paper containing the final summary report of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983, which has just been introduced by Ambassador Sold Vila. Scientists of my country participated in this Conference. We highly appreciate its results. There is no doubt that the results of this symposium are directly linked with our efforts to elaborate a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. They therefore deserve our special attention. Proceeding from this consideration, we would like to suggest that you, Comrade Chairman, should hold consultations with a view to inviting representatives from Viet Nam to explain in a more detailed way the results of the above-mentioned symposium.

Concluding my remarks, I would like to express the readiness of my delegation to offer in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons additional comments on questions referring to the drafting of the convention.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons occupies an important place in the attainment of the historic goal of the cessation of the arms race and the lessening of the threat of war. The Warsaw Treaty member States, in their Political Declaration adopted recently in Prague, called upon all States to give a new impetus to negotiations, including those conducted within the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, in order to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

This approach of the socialist countries to the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons is shared also by many other members of our Committee.

As the deliberations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons at the beginning of this year showed, the most important obstacle hindering the completion of work on the provisions relating to the scope of the future convention is the lack of agreement on whether the convention, in spite of the existence of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, should in some or other way envisage the prohibition of the use of this type of weapon of mass destruction. In our statement today we would like to dwell upon this question.

I would like to recall that various points of view have been expressed on the question of confirming the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and different ways of resolving the issue were proposed.

In particular a number of delegations, including the delegation of the Soviet Union, have expressed apprehension that the duplication in the future convention of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons established by the Geneva Protocol some 60 years ago might be to the detriment of this authoritative international treaty. In this connection the delegations deemed it necessary to display the maximum prudence and care and to try to solve this problem by stressing in the preamble of the future convention the importance of the Geneva Protocol and including in the convention an article stating that none of its provisions should be interpreted as in any way limiting or diminishing the undertakings of States under the Geneva Protocol and certain other international agreements.

On the other hand some delegations have maintained that since what we are concerned with is the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, then it would be advisable to include in the convention also a provision on the prohibition of the use of such weapons, so indicating the completeness of the scope of the prohibition.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Other proposals too, have been made for the solution of this problem, in particular, the inclusion in the convention of a provision or provisions extending the mechanism of verifications envisaged by the convention for unclear situations to cases of the use of chemical weapons. Ideas have even been put forward, although not here in the Committee on Disarmament, to the effect that the strengthening of the regime of the non-use of chemical weapons could be achieved through procedures suitable rather for the adoption of resolutions than for the elaboration of effective measures in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, and which would have practically no links either with the 1925 Geneva Protocol or with the future convention.

I am thinking of resolution 37/98 D of the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly. Soviet representatives have already had occasion to state their basic attitude to this resolution which provides, contrary to the principles generally recognized in international law for the drafting and review of international agreements, that the elaboration of a mechanism for the verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol should be carried out not by States parties to the Protocol but by all the States Members of the United Nations, including, therefore, States which are not parties to the Geneva Protocol. Moreover, it is proposed that the adoption of the mechanism for the verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol should be carried out, not after the reconciliation of the various viewpoints in the course of negotiations and on the basis of consensus, as is always done at disarmament talks, but through simple voting. It is clear that should we follow this resolution an unprecedented situation would be created. In short, one cannot but see that resolution 37/98 D, which was supported, by the way, by only approximately half of the States parties to the Geneva Protocol, can bring nothing but harm, and of course it will not solve the problem of strengthening the regime of the non-use of chemical weapons.

As you see, quite a number of proposals have been made on the question of the non-use of chemical weapons, but up to the present time no mutually acceptable solution has been found. It is clear that the time has come to tackle this problem seriously, the more so as, in spite of the fact that the use of chemical weapons was prohibited de jure long ago, de facto such weapons have been used, and more than once. We have no desire to turn back now to this unattractive page of history, but since we are on the subject, distinguished delegates, let us dot all the "i's".

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

First of all we would like to emphasize very firmly the positive significance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the parties to which number more than 100 States. Whatever attempts are made by some critics to find weak points in this instrument, with references to its lack of this or that provision, its brevity, etc., the main thing is that the Geneva Protocol placed an effective barrier in the way of the use of one of the most barbarous types of weapons. The Geneva Protocol, as we have already pointed out, has become an irrevocable part of international law. Given the lack of a comprehensive system of international disarmament treaties and agreements, it is even more valuable as a corner-stone for the creation of such a system.

Even the members of the fascist bloc which unleashed in 1939 the most bloody, merciless and inhumane war in the history of mankind, did not dare to make large-scale use of chemical weapons in combats at the front during that war. Although they prepared to use chemical weapons, they were to a large extent constrained by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the unswerving determination of the major States of anti-Hitlerist coalition severely to punish the fascists for any attempt to violate the Protocol and use chemical weapons.

In this connection it is interesting to recall that in the spring of 1942 the Soviet Government informed Mr. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, of the possibility of the use by the Hitlerites of poison gases against the Soviet Union. In this connection the British Prime Minister informed the head of the Soviet Government, Stalin, in March 1942, of the decision of the British Government to treat any use of poison gas against the USSR exactly as if it were directed against England. "I have been building up an immense store of gas bombs for discharge from aircraft", Churchill wrote to Stalin, "and we shall not hesitate to use these over all suitable objectives in Western Germany from the moment that your armies and people are assaulted in this way." The stern warning of the heads of the anti-Hitlerite coalition States had its effect, although it has to be said that the fascist troops occasionally used chemical gases. In 1942, for example, they were used in the Crimea in the course of military operations against Soviet troops and civilians defending themselves in the Adzhimushky quarry.

There were reports of the use of chemical weapons by Japanese troops in China on a number of occasions. President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated on 5 June 1942: "Authoritative reports are reaching this Government of the use by Japanese armed forces in various localities of China of poisonous or noxious gases. I desire to make it unmistakably clear that if Japan persists in this inhuman form of warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be regarded by this Government as though taken against the United States, and retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out. We shall be prepared to enforce complete retribution. Upon Japan will rest the responsibility."

It is known that chemical weapons were used by the Italian fascists in their aggression against Ethiopia in 1935-1936 and in some other cases.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

However, since the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol, poisonous chemical substances have been most widely used -- on a truly massive scale -- by the American armed forces in their aggression against Viet Nam. About 100,000 tons of various chemical and poisonous agents were used against the people of Viet Nam, including several hundred kilogrammes of the most terrible poison -- dioxin. A few dozen grammes of this agent dissolved in water are enough to eliminate the entire population of a city with several millions of inhabitants. Not only did these actions of the United States damage almost half the cultivable lands and tropical forests of Viet Nam, but in addition many hundreds of thousands of people became their victims. Those who survived have experienced the same genetic changes as the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

A few days ago the Vice-President of the United States pointed out in this room that apart from the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, "there is an even broader moral prohibition against the use of these weapons". It is pertinent to ask how, in the light of this statement, we should qualify the actions of the American troops in Viet Nam for more than a decade. Some may tell us that this is a matter of past history and that it is not worth while dwelling upon it now when we are conducting business-like negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We do not share this opinion, because the use of American chemical weapons in Viet Nam is by no means a closed question. In this connection we would like to draw your attention to the symposium held in Ho Chi Minh City which was devoted to the study of the consequences of the use of chemical weapons in Viet Nam. We believe that all participants in the negotiations should seriously and carefully study the documents on that symposium.

There is another aspect to the question of strengthening the regime of the non-use of chemical weapons. A good half of the States parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, when adhering to it, made reservations in which they reserved their right to consider themselves free of their commitments in the event of the use of chemical weapons against them. At the same time, however, some States -- the present members of NATO -- have since broadened their reservations to such an extent as to exclude a number of categories of chemicals completely from the prohibition as regards themselves. For example, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada have in

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the past declared that they do not consider CS and other such gases and "riot control" agents, i.e. the so-called harmful chemicals, as subject to prohibition under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The United States has also left room for itself to use harmful chemicals and not only for police purposes but also even for certain military purposes.

In these conditions the Soviet Government, having carefully weighed all the circumstances connected with the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and guided by the desire to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons, has decided to agree with the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States members of the Committee on Disarmament for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Government considers that the procedures for the verification of compliance with the provision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons should envisage the use of the verification mechanism of the convention, including on-site inspection on a voluntary basis.

In what manner might this new Soviet proposal be reflected in the text of the future convention?

First of all, its preamble should forcefully emphasize the great importance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. By prohibiting the development and production of chemical weapons and the retention of stockpiles of such weapons, the convention would in fact eliminate the whole class of chemical weapons, thus providing a serious material foundation for the Protocol.

The convention would, further, contain a provision stating that nothing in it should be interpreted as in any way limiting or diminishing the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol. In other words, the future convention would be organically incorporated into the fabric of already existing international agreements, not destroying, but on the contrary, strengthening it. Should any State not be a party to the future convention, it would in no way be released from its obligations under the Geneva Protocol. As far as the parties to the convention are concerned, they would be bound by the obligation not to use chemical weapons under both international agreements at the same time. There is nothing wrong with that.

Of course, it would be necessary to amend the wording of the main prohibition contained in the Soviet "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". This should read as follows:

"Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons and undertakes to destroy or divert to permitted purposes the accumulated stocks of such weapons and to destroy or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons."

Lastly, the section of the convention devoted to verification should envisage appropriate procedures for the verification of compliance with the provision on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We believe that the approach we have proposed will provide for an extremely clear and truly comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, including the prohibition of its use, ensure the verification of that prohibition and eliminate many difficulties contained in other approaches. In particular, if we start walking on thin ice looking for the boundaries between the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in warfare on the basis of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the prohibition proposed in document CD/343, on the use of such weapons "in any circumstances where use is not already prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol", then we shall be faced with a virtually impossible task. And it is not excluded that we might merely damage the regime of non-use. We shall not even talk about the serious consequences that would result from attempts to solve the problem outside the framework of the convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Our delegation, in putting forward this new important proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the strengthening of the regime of non-use of chemical weapons, wishes to emphasize that the Soviet Union will continue to play a constructive part in the solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

After listening to the enlightening statements by the distinguished delegations in this Committee, my delegation has become more convinced than ever that the work of the Committee on chemical weapons has the best prospect for further progress. I fully share the views expressed by many delegations that the Committee, through the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, should make serious efforts to resolve the main differences and take appropriate steps to ensure that the drafting of the possible provisions of a future comprehensive convention on the matter can be initiated during this session. The statements made by Ambassador Issraelyan, the head of the Soviet delegation, on 22 February, and by Ambassador Fields, the head of the United States delegation, on 10 February, have indeed given us further encouragement, for which my delegation is very appreciative. The agreement expressed by the Soviet delegation to the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the provisions dealing with the scope of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is clearly a concrete contribution of that delegation in making real progress in the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, complementing its previous contribution contained in document CD/294 entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction".

A similar valuable contribution has been made by the United States delegation in document CD/343 introduced on 10 December, entitled "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban". The document contains an important feature relating to the scope of the prohibition which, as my delegation interprets it, constitutes an advance from that delegation's earlier position on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

As one of the delegations which persistently advocate the importance of the prohibition of use, my delegation heartily welcomes this important development. I am convinced that the two important documents proposed and others that may come together with the work done so far by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons as contained in the report of the Committee on its 1982 session, will provide a sound basis for making real progress toward the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

May I now turn to the subject of chemical weapons. My delegation, with others, regrets the lengthy and largely unnecessary procedures which have prevented the working groups of the Committee from commencing their annual work. However, in the field of chemical weapons some delegations have already made important contributions to the negotiation process. In the first place, I would like to refer to document CD/343, entitled "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban".

The Federal Government welcomes the introduction of this document which contains the essential substance of a future chemical weapons ban. The great value of this document is that it reflects the actual state of negotiations and that it has richly absorbed suggestions from other delegations. Its comprehensive nature, but also the professed flexibility of the authors on many of its positions, will make this document an essential tool for our future joint work. It also testifies, in a welcome manner, to the determination and good faith of its authors in their quest for a rapid conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. The document places particular emphasis on the key issues of international verification.

My delegation is particularly pleased to state that the suggestions which the Federal Government submitted throughout the year of 1982, and most particularly in document CD/326, have been largely incorporated into the United States text. Some delegations on the other hand, have already voiced initial criticisms vis-à-vis these verification proposals. They should, however, recognize the great advantage that the clear views and precise formulations on

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

the part of the United States delegation on a crucial issue of the chemical weapons convention allow us to sharpen our focus on the key decisions negotiators will have to take. The document will undoubtedly stimulate a dialogue between the United States, the Soviet Union and other interested delegations on the key provisions of an international verification system and will hopefully facilitate a narrowing of differences.

Last year my delegation, together with others, formulated a certain number of questions designed to clarify those parts of the Soviet "Basic provisions" document which relate to international verification issues. While our patience has been somewhat taxed in waiting for a satisfactory response, we are pleased that replies to our queries are now imminent. They will certainly fertilize our further work. We continue to hope that the Soviet Union, pursuing further the promising course on which it had embarked in its Basic provisions document, will soon come to the insight that an obligatory on-site inspection clause in the case of on-challenge cases will be an indispensable feature of the future convention. As regards such on-site inspections, my Government reiterates its full preparedness to contribute to the rapid success of the chemical weapons negotiations and to make its territory available for international controls like those it already practises in connection with its unilateral renunciation of chemical weapons of 1954.

Another important proposal that is certain to have a substantial bearing on our negotiations is contained in the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan of Tuesday (22 February 1983). The suggestion that a non-use provision be incorporated into the scope of the prohibition of a future convention is of the highest interest to my delegation. A number of factual and legal arguments why the scope of the prohibition should be so defined has been adduced by the Soviet delegation. My authorities have already initiated a thorough examination of the Soviet proposal, and I hope that I will soon be in a position to provide more substantive comments on it. One of the criteria which my Government will apply in analysing the legal complexities which the proposal entails is whether it is likely to render the future convention, including its verification provisions, more effective.

In the last months, and specifically at this session, several proposals have been formulated for the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones in Europe. These proposals come in two variants: some speak of a narrower chemical-weapon-free zone covering only a strip of territory in central Europe, while others call for a zone comprising all of Europe. Objections against the former, more limited concept may be even greater and come to mind even more readily, but in principle both concepts appear to offer similar problems. On 19 November 1982, my delegation had the opportunity to spell out some of our doubts on these concepts before the First Committee of the General Assembly. The fact that the idea of a chemical-weapon-free zone has nevertheless been reiterated with some insistence prompts me to clarify our viewpoint further.

In the first place, we should see the negligible military relevance of such zones. Chemical ammunition is easily transported and can readily be reintroduced into a free zone, if indeed it has not remained hidden there in the first place.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

In the meantime, the threat from chemical weapons from outside the zone would remain totally undiminished -- the more menacing the smaller the zone. The mere fact that stocks have been removed from one part of a territory does not contribute to protecting it from being fired into (by ordnance or from airplanes) with the same kind of ammunition.

Any agreement on a chemical weapons ban in a particular zone would of course require the solution of the problems of verification. In fact, in comparison to a world-wide ban on chemical weapons, an even greater number of problems would have to be solved, since it would be indispensable (and very difficult) to control access to the limited area which the zone would comprise. We all know that verification questions in the chemical weapons field are technically complex. Any negotiation on a limited territorial chemical weapons ban would require a negotiation effort which would not only duplicate but in fact undercut the serious negotiations on a world-wide ban in which we are here engaged.

My Government attaches absolute priority to the world-wide prohibition of all chemical weapons and is working actively towards the rapid conclusion of this endeavour. A universal chemical weapons convention would automatically make a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe superfluous. Why, then, lose time with the elaboration of limited zones which would only exist to be superseded by the larger, world-wide prohibition? I cannot escape the suspicion that those who purport to promote the concept of geographically limited chemical-weapon-free zones of smaller or larger dimension are less concerned about the rapid conclusion and effective implementation of a world-wide ban on chemical weapons.

Even if, by a miracle, a chemical-weapon-free zone within Europe could be negotiated and implemented more rapidly than a world-wide prohibition, there would be negative consequences. Possibly, two verification systems with different obligations, and two contractual systems with divergent consequences would exist side by side; and again, much effort would have to be wasted to clear up the situation. These are cogent arguments for all of us at the negotiating table in Geneva to erase the concept of geographically limited chemical-weapon-free zones from our vocabulary, and to concentrate our full effort on the world-wide interdiction.

Let me put my comments on the concept of chemical-weapon-free zones in the wider perspective of proposed weapon-free zones or other zones of peace. Several proposals for subregional weapon-free zones in Europe, or European zones free of particular kinds of nuclear weapons, have been made in the past months. At least this concept is familiar. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are described, and under certain conditions recommended, in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, while chemical-weapon-free zones are not. However, the proposals which are at present being promoted by various interested sides suffer without exception from the fact that the conditions which the Final Document spells out are not or not fully met. The Final Document has obviously limited its recommendations for the establishment of such zones to whole

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

regions, and not to bits and pieces of territory arbitrarily chosen to meet the vested military interest of this or that proponent. Like all other disarmament measures described in the Final Document, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should meet the requirement that these zones should safeguard the undiminished security of all concerned, and should operate under effective international control. My Government is certainly in keeping with the Final Document when it also believes that the supreme criterion for arms control proposals, including the establishment of such free zones, would be their contribution to the prevention of all armed conflicts and to the preservation or enhancement of security. To achieve these ends, they must obviously be geographically balanced and, as the Final Document says, comprise all States of the region concerned. This would eliminate zones with arbitrary geographical limits, such as characterize the zones recommended in some current proposals. It is obvious that free zone models are incompatible with the Final Document if they constitute an encroachment upon the military balance and the military stability of a region, and if they thus make a conflict more probable rather than less.

A shortcoming of those current suggestions which aim at the creation of limited zones free of battlefield nuclear weapons is that they do nothing about such weapons outside the area. But for the nuclear menace that hovers over a particular territory, it is not important whether there are nuclear weapons stationed within the confines of the zone; the decisive question is, whether nuclear weapons are targeted upon it. Negotiations which would only lead to a limited geographical disengagement of nuclear arsenals in Europe would therefore not enhance stability but create a mere illusion of greater security. They would also create zones of different degrees of seeming security in one and the same country, running counter to a Government's duty to guarantee the same measure of security to all its citizens. The promotion of such a limited and insufficient concept can only distract attention from the ongoing vital negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons and would therefore render their rapid conclusion more difficult and lengthy. Verification obviously is another problem, in fact the same as found in considering the implementation of chemical-weapon-free zones. Here again it would be futile to engage in the elaboration of technically complex verification measures with limited geographical parameters, while at the same time almost identical verification problems would have to be solved in the ongoing nuclear negotiations. My delegation continues to be of the opinion that nuclear-weapon powers and the military alliances should, in the nuclear realm, concentrate all their efforts upon those disarmament and arms control activities which have a potential to bring about concrete, balanced and verifiable negotiation results in terms of substantial over-all reductions of arsenals.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let us go on to agenda item 4 — the prohibition of chemical weapons. It might appear that it would be possible to resume without any delay the negotiations on this question which were successfully conducted last year and at the beginning of this year under the chairmanship of the Ambassador of Poland, Comrade Sujka. But here again difficulties have arisen because of the ultimatum issued to the delegations of the socialist States. Attempts have been made virtually to exclude the group of socialist countries from participation in the decisions on the chairmanships of the working groups. Furthermore, with respect to some working groups it has been proposed that the principle of rotation should be adopted, while with respect to others it has been suggested that we keep to the same distribution of posts of chairmen as in 1982. As a result of this approach the group of socialist countries could find itself entirely deprived of a post as chairman. As Comrade Komives, the Ambassador of Hungary, has again confirmed today, the position of the socialist countries is flexible: we are prepared to agree either to a system of rotation or to the maintenance of the distribution of posts of chairmen which was in force last year. But whatever the decision, it must apply to all the working groups. We are not proposing dishonest deals to anyone and we ourselves shall not agree to any. We shall not permit infringements of the interests of the socialist countries.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

As it has stated repeatedly in the past, my delegation is convinced of the urgent need to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, before the trend towards the production of newer and more sophisticated weapons of this kind makes that impossible. History shows that qualitative development and the consequent appearance of improved weapons make any disarmament effort, even partial, constantly more difficult, and we note with concern that this danger is arising in the sphere of chemical weapons.

Prompted by this conviction, my delegation participated actively in the negotiations conducted by the Ad Hoc Working Group during the 1982 session, with an open mind and in a spirit of compromise. It was in the same spirit also that we took part in the work of the contact groups usefully established in 1982 by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, whose personal contribution to the work of that Group was undoubtedly great. I believe that the value of the exercise conducted last year and this through the contact groups consisted basically in the open and frank exchange of ideas made possible by the informality of such meetings. There is no doubt that exchanges of that kind are helpful in the elaboration of a convention and facilitate our task as diplomats responsible for multilateral negotiations, for our task consists not only in defending the positions of our countries but also in fully understanding the positions of others and the reasons underlying them, so that we can thus together seek solutions to the various problems before us.

Certainly, there are still various questions to be resolved, and they merit careful attention, but there are also widening areas of agreement. This justifies us in thinking that we already have a sufficient basis to be able at this session to begin the drafting of actual texts embodying those ideas which appear to have crystallized so far.

Argentina is one of the countries that are most firmly in favour of the inclusion of a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in the scope of the convention, and I therefore believe that, notwithstanding the repetition, an explicit reference should be made in the future convention to the prohibition of use. Even though this is already contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, its inclusion in the future convention will both permit the possibility of the verification of non-use, which was not provided for in the Geneva Protocol, and also extend the scope of the prohibition to cover situations of hostilities not considered as cases of war or foreseen in 1925.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

In this connection, my delegation has noted with satisfaction the development in the position of the Soviet Union, as expressed in the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan of 22 February last, in which he agreed expressly to the inclusion in the future convention of a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We appreciate this decision as a contribution to ensuring that the scope of the convention is complete and that its provisions complement those of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; it thus at the same time shows a willingness to negotiate which my country hopes will be reflected in important achievements during the Committee's present session.

My delegation likewise considers the submission of document CD/343, entitled "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban", a valuable contribution by the United States delegation, which has been supplemented by an interesting preliminary exercise in the clarification of positions. This document has been transmitted to the competent authorities of my country for consideration and study, and for that reason I shall make no comment on its contents, but the very fact that delegations have set forth their basic positions in writing undoubtedly represents a step forward in the process of negotiation.

Certainly, a key issue in the negotiations will be the question of a verification system which will adequately ensure compliance with the provisions of the future convention.

In that connection, we believe that the essential element on which agreement should rest consists in a real commitment and in the political will on the part of the States parties never in any circumstances to use or to hold chemical weapons. On such a basis, verification should be simply a mutual reassurance for States and not a mechanism of such complexity that by its very nature it will entail endless negotiations.

In my delegation's view, the verification system should be such as to meet the needs of the international community and it should make use of simple, accepted and recognized methods that will make it possible to obtain speedy and conclusive results. It should in addition use suitable procedures, such as random visits to the facilities of the various countries, which will serve to reinforce mutual confidence and ensure compliance with the convention. It should also serve for the investigation of any complaints of non-compliance that may be made and permit the settlement of disputes through some effective machinery in which all States parties have equal rights.

The future convention should provide for the possibility of investigating reports of activities prohibited under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, activities which, it is to be hoped, will also be covered by the convention. This would make it unnecessary to resort to abnormal procedures such as those envisaged in resolution 37/98 D adopted by the General Assembly at its recent session, a resolution about which the Argentine delegation has serious reservations of a juridical nature.

The Argentine delegation, aware of the importance of the speedy conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, reiterates its willingness to negotiate and trusts that it will meet with the same spirit in other delegations, so that the multilateral negotiating effort we are making in this high-priority field will lead as soon as possible to the success which the international community expects and which the Committee on Disarmament needs in order to demonstrate its usefulness and confirm its prestige.

(Mr. Li, China)

Today, the Chinese delegation would like to submit some of our views and comments concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Great importance is attached by various States to the banning of chemical weapons because this kind of savage and abominable weapon constitutes a real threat to mankind. Decades have passed since the coming into force of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and yet large amounts of chemical weapons are still in the arsenals of the Superpowers. Moreover, the chemical arms race aiming at a qualitative improvement is still continuing unabated. Reports and complaints about the use of chemical and toxic weapons in certain regions of conflict in recent years have not been dealt with effectively. All these facts lend a greater sense of urgency and importance to our task, which is to reach a negotiated agreement on a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons.

It is heartening for us to see that in the past few years, through the efforts of delegates and experts of various countries, in-depth discussions and consultations have been carried out on the elements of a future convention in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Progress has been made on some issues, and on certain problems, where views remain divergent, concrete compromise and alternative provisions have been put forward; thus providing us with a sound basis for the formulation of the basic articles of the future convention.

...

(Mr. Li, China)

...

I wish now to turn to a few issues on which divergencies of view still remain wide.

First, on the scope of the prohibition: this is an important matter which would determine whether a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons were to be a legal instrument which was comprehensive in nature. China as well as a number of other countries, have all along maintained that the scope of the prohibition in the future convention should include a prohibition on use. The reasons behind this have already been explained on many occasions and working papers have been submitted on the subject. In sum, we feel that the inclusion of the prohibition of use in a future convention will complement and strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol, rather than weakening it in any way. As a State party to that Protocol, we are ready to uphold its noble purpose and objective of saving mankind from the scourge inflicted by these inhumane weapons. But on the other hand it is also undeniable that notwithstanding its significance and the role it plays, the Protocol has its historical limitations and deficiencies as it was stipulated half a century ago. Such deficiencies can certainly be remedied by a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons with provisions on effective verification.

As the subject of repeated discussions in recent years, the inclusion of use in the scope of the prohibition has attracted increased attention from many countries. They think that this question must be dealt with properly. In this respect, we have noted welcome changes on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States in their respective positions. We wish to see an early solution to the question of the scope of the prohibition so that we may concentrate our time on other important issues.

Secondly, on the question of the definition and list of key precursors, this is an important technical matter concerning the future convention and should also be dealt with very carefully. We hold that in spite of the numerous existing difficulties, it is imperative that a substantive definition should be laid down for key precursors. This is a problem which cannot be side-stepped. In the course of the technical consultations held at the beginning of this year by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the contact group conducted useful discussions on the criteria to be included in this definition under the chairmanship of the expert from Egypt, General Ezz, and certain agreements were reached. We should continue our work in this direction.

So far, a few illustrative lists of certain key precursors have been submitted by some delegations. Our delegation has also submitted a tentative list. We believe that an important principle in working out the list should be to ensure that it is illustrative of the key precursors which are to be banned or controlled on the one hand, and non-detrimental to the full development of the civilian chemical industry on the other. It follows that certain raw materials important for the chemical industry should be exempted from the list. Furthermore, it is not advisable to use the "type of chemical weapon" as a criterion for the list of key precursors, as this will only complicate matters.

(Mr. Li, China)

Like many other delegations, the Chinese delegation also regrets that the report on the technical consultations of the Working Group was not submitted to this Committee because of the unjustifiable objection of a certain delegation.

Thirdly, on the question of verification: this is a matter of general concern. My delegation has always maintained that the future convention should include strict and effective provisions on verification in order to make up for the lack of verification provisions in the 1925 Protocol. Verification measures should be based mainly on international measures, including the necessary on-site inspections, such as the on-site inspections of destructions of chemical weapons, stocks and production facilities. Prompt on-site inspection should be carried out in any case of a complaint of the use of chemical weapons. Our study of the papers submitted by other States on the question of verification is under way, and we shall submit our paper on the subject at an appropriate time in the future.

At present, despite the acceptance in principle by all parties of the concept of international verification and on-site inspection, there still exists a wide divergence of views on specific issues. We hope that this session of the Committee will see some progress in seeking a convergence of opinion.

Many delegations have referred to the fact that the prohibition of chemical weapons is one of the items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament on which progress is likely to be attained, and have expressed the hope that the Committee will speed up the negotiations. We cherish the same hope. We feel that the existing divergence between the various parties on specific issues is a reflection of different political stands and interests. The key to resolving this divergence lies in political will, in other words, in whether the big Powers in possession of the capacity for chemical warfare sincerely wish to give up chemical weapons as a means of warfare. But what it is difficult to understand is that although everyone has expressed his willingness to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, what we are facing now is still a deadlock, even on some non-substantive issues, such as who should be the Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Working Group. We appeal to all parties concerned to demonstrate their sincerity with actual deeds so that the current session will be crowned with practical progress in the elaboration of the future convention. The Chinese delegation will continue its active efforts in this regard.

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

One of the priority items and an area which is promising for an agreement is the prohibition of chemical weapons. New proposals, submitted by the delegations of the USSR and the United States, as well as the proposals of other delegations which have accumulated with time, offer a solid basis for the completion as soon as possible through intensified efforts of the negotiations conducted so far. We consider that the time has come to initiate the drafting of particular provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. After many years with no results, the Committee must show that it is capable of at least beginning the drafting of the convention this year.

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

The Committee's agenda is extremely ambitious and covers almost all the problems relating to disarmament. It is our intention, therefore, to take part in the work on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, on the elaboration of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, on radiological weapons and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. On this occasion, however, we shall confine ourselves to speaking about the item on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and that for two reasons. In the first place because we believe that the time is sufficiently ripe for a draft treaty on that question and we do not think that it would be rash to suppose that the negotiations under way could give rise to such a draft in the reasonably near future. In the second place because the Spanish delegation has given this problem particular attention, both in its statements at plenary meetings and in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the subject.

For the reasons I have given, I have the honour to submit to the Committee for its consideration the working paper in document CD/350, in which we refer to the report of its Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations he held with experts on technical issues, which is contained in document CD/CW/WP.141.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

The importance of this report which suggests an agenda for the meeting of experts to be held this spring, has led us to study it very carefully and to comment on certain of the points contained in it. It is our view that the principal obstacles to the completion of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons are technical in nature, for we believe that the political will exists and that on many aspects — for example that of on-site verification — considerable progress has been made. We therefore feel that the most useful thing to do at this stage of the negotiations is to make a more thorough study of valid methods which would enable us to determine with absolute precision which substances should be prohibited and consequently destroyed. It is likewise important to determine the most effective methods of establishing the degree of toxicity of certain substances capable of being used for the manufacture of chemical weapons. It is also important to clarify ideas about the instruments that could be used to verify the destruction processes and, where necessary, to check possible violations of the treaty as regards the non-production of chemical weapons or their precursors. The latter also give rise to technical problems which should be investigated and we ought, so far as possible, to differentiate between those which can be used for various purposes — among them chemical weapons, including binary weapons — and those which have virtually no other purpose but the production of chemical weapons. In this connection we must not overlook the problems connected with the so-called additives, which help to improve the quality of this type of weapon. Lastly, the degree of toxicity by aerosol inhalation and the methods for the protection of the environment during the carrying out of the procedures for the destruction of stocks of component substances of chemical weapons, are also important.

The working paper which I have the honour to submit to the Committee for its consideration is based on the content of the report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on his consultations with experts on technical issues, which was circulated as document CD/CW/WP.41. Our working paper consists of four parts. The first part refers to aspects to be taken into account with respect to the lists of agents in the category of "other harmful chemicals" and the list of important precursors. In this connection we stress the complexity of the chemical industry as well as the work of certain national bodies which study the harmfulness of chemical substances. We also suggest the possibility of establishing a system of "open lists" the contents of which could be changed in accordance with developments in the technological capabilities of the States signatories of the treaty.

The second part is concerned with the formulation of recommendations concerning methods for the determination of toxicity by aerosol inhalation. In addition to mentioning a number of systems that are used in various countries, this section refers to certain aspects which should be studied separately in order to determine the toxic effects produced, using, as is suggested, a standardized method for the purposes of the treaty, while recognizing various other methods that might be used by States, which would be contrasted with the former.

The third part deals with the technical evaluation of the use of specialized information-gathering systems (black boxes) as components of a chemical weapons verification system. It suggests a new definition of the black boxes, one which, we believe, is stricter than that appearing in paragraph 13 of document CD/CW/WP.41.

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

Lastly, the fourth part of the document deals with methods for the protection of the environment during the destruction of chemical weapons, and it refers to various matters connected with air quality and the parameters of pollutants.

We hope that this document will contribute to the success of the work being done by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to put before the United Nations General Assembly as soon as possible the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons which the international community will be able to adopt. More than half a century has passed since the adoption of the Protocol which prohibited the use of such weapons in war. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that for a fairly lengthy period such weapons appeared to have been abandoned by the major powers, there have for some time now been large stocks of such weapons in the arsenals of a number of powers. It is therefore urgently necessary to adopt the proposed treaty in order to remove the risk of the violation of the provisions of the 1925 Protocol. Although most States are signatories of the Protocol, there is no doubt that the existence of chemical weapons always constitutes a great danger, for the possibility cannot be excluded that they may be used through miscalculation or as the result of an unforeseeable accident. If this is one of the risks in the sphere of nuclear weapons, there is no reason why the same thing could not happen as regards chemical weapons; and if, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, an escalation is probably inevitable, the same is also true if someone uses toxic gases in a conflict. It is therefore important that no one should be in possession of them.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Pakistan, along with Argentina, Australia, China and Indonesia, has long stressed the necessity of including the prohibition of use in the proposed convention on chemical weapons. It is a matter of satisfaction to us that the Soviet Union, in recognition of its concrete value, has accepted this proposal. The significance of this policy decision will not be lost on anyone. It is our hope that other countries will give serious consideration to a general acceptance of the inclusion of the prohibition of use. It will mark the end of controversy in one important area of the convention.

The United States delegation has also taken a positive initiative in tabling its detailed views on a chemical weapons convention. Provision has been made for the international supervision of chemical weapons stocks found after the declarations have been made. We have always advocated international control of all stocks and facilities following the convention's entry into force. Chemical weapons stocks declared at the time of the entry into force of the convention or found afterwards will equally jeopardize the continued faithful adherence to the convention until these are destroyed. The acceptance of the prohibition of their use by the convention sharply brings our proposal into focus. It is also a natural corollary to the British proposal that chemical weapons production facilities should be sealed and internationally supervised within six months after the convention comes into force.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In conclusion, allow me to offer a few suggestions, which I will make in my capacity as co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for the month of March. At one of our recent plenary meetings my predecessor as co-ordinator, Ambassador Kömives, the distinguished representative of Hungary, has already expressed the great concern of the group of socialist countries that owing to the negative attitude of the group of Western countries it has not been possible so far to adopt the Committee's agenda and to solve the other organizational questions. At the latest meeting of the group of socialist countries, we again assessed the present situation and decided to submit new, constructive proposals to enable us to proceed to substantive negotiations in the Committee without losing any more time.

We accordingly submit the following concrete proposals:

1. Considering that with regard to item 4 of the proposed agenda, on "Chemical weapons", as far as we know no objections have been raised by any delegation regarding the formulation of the item itself or of the mandate for the relevant Working Group, the group of socialist countries proposes that the regular activities of this Working Group be resumed immediately, starting from 7 March 1983.

2. Considering that with regard to the chairmanship of the working groups there continue to be differences of opinion, our group suggests that we proceed in accordance with one of the following alternatives:

(a) Continue in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a chairman from a socialist country as in 1982, following the principle of continuity for the chairmanships of working groups;

(b) Extend temporarily the chairmanship of the chemical weapons Working Group by a representative from the socialist group, until consensus has been achieved on the chairmanships of all working groups set up for the 1983 session on the basis of the principle of rotation;

(c) Apply the principle of rotation for the chairmanship of the chemical weapons Working Group on a weekly basis among the three principal groups in the Committee, until the question of the number of working groups this year and of the principle for the distribution of the chairmanships of all working groups has finally been resolved; or

(d) Appoint the Chairman of the Committee for the month of March as temporary Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and settle the question of the chairmanship of the Working Group during the period of his mandate, taking into account the distribution of chairmanships in the other groups.

We are submitting these alternative proposals for the Committee's consideration. At the same time, the group of socialist countries is prepared to consider other possible solutions, which would not violate the legitimate interests of the principal groups in the Committee. For us, the main thing is to continue immediately the useful negotiations taken up last year and continued early this year under the guidance of the Polish representative.

The socialist group requests you, Mr. Chairman, to conduct consultations immediately in order to solve this question and to resume the activities of the chemical weapons Working Group starting next Monday.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

In my statement today I intend to deal with the item on chemical weapons.

The Swedish delegation deeply deplores the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has not yet been able to reconvene and get on with its highly important task. We have noted with appreciation the initiative last Thursday of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic suggesting ways out of this dilemma in order to enable the Working Group to start as soon as possible, as a matter of fact, already from the beginning of this week.

My delegation will welcome any further efforts to this end and will contribute in any way possible.

We started out with intensive work in our chemical weapons negotiations before the beginning of this session. It is rather unfortunate that so much valuable time has since been lost because of lengthy procedural discussions in our Committee. Ways must be found to prevent a repetition of this in the future, and we noted with much interest the ideas expressed by the representative of Yugoslavia on this question at our last meeting.

I would now like to recall some positive developments in the area of chemical weapons negotiations, to which many delegations have contributed.

It is encouraging that several delegations have shown increasing interest in and contributed constructively to the work in the Ad Hoc Working Group. We take note of the fact that the Soviet Union in less than a year has made two major suggestions concerning difficult problems involved in a chemical weapons convention. I am referring both to its position on systematic international on-site inspection as contained in document CD/294, and to its preparedness to include a renewed ban on use in a chemical weapons convention.

Another key delegation, that of the United States, has recently presented its views on the contents of a chemical weapons convention in document CD/343. We also appreciate the initiative that the United States delegation has taken in giving other delegations the opportunity of exploring its views more deeply.

The material which is now available to the Working Group has been compiled during many years. It constitutes a sufficient basis for our negotiations, which should be renewed without further delay.

My delegation notes with satisfaction that the United States has observed a unilateral moratorium on the production of chemical weapons since 1969. We regret, however, the current preparations for starting production of binary chemical weapons now that the prospects for a chemical weapons convention look more promising than they have done for many years.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

I take this opportunity to express once again the opinion of the Swedish delegation that it would be of the utmost importance for creating a climate of confidence in the negotiations if nations clearly declared their possession or non-possession of chemical weapons. As the case may be, they should also declare whether they have in the last few years produced any chemical weapons.

My delegation sincerely appreciates the work of the previous Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. He made considerable efforts to advance our work last year. Not least successful was his invention of the system of contact groups, which turned out to work very effectively. This also increased the possibilities for delegations to participate more actively than in the Working Group sessions.

I would now like to offer some views on the issues to be negotiated.

With regard to the question of use, my delegation has noted with great interest the Soviet proposal to include the ban on the use of chemical weapons in a chemical weapons convention. This seems to be in agreement with the view of the majority of States in the Committee on Disarmament. Sweden has always belonged to those who argue for caution in this context because of the possible detrimental effects such an inclusion could have on the Geneva Protocol. Such effects would be particularly serious if they were to create misgivings among the parties to the Protocol about its value. If, however, a majority of States are now in favour of a repetition, a new situation emerges. Some consequences could be discussed already at this juncture.

An agreement to include a ban on use could mean that the prevailing interpretation of the Geneva Protocol concerning prohibited chemicals must apply also to the chemical weapons convention. This would be consistent with the general purpose criterion, which is a fundamental feature of a future chemical weapons convention. In some practical instances this would mean that both the use and the production, development and stockpiling of tear gases and herbicides should be included in the convention. It cannot be logical to exclude these substances from being covered by the chemical weapons convention if they are generally considered to be included in the Geneva Protocol. Their production, development and stockpiling for permitted purposes should be clearly spelled out in the convention.

It is appropriate to consider another aspect of the inclusion of a ban on use in the convention. As is known, Sweden has proposed that some activities in order to acquire or retain a capability to use chemical weapons should also be prohibited. Those activities concern planning, organization and training for offensive use of chemical weapons, and should, thus, also become subject to compliance procedures. We have noted with great interest that similar thoughts have been brought forward in the United States' views on the contents of a chemical weapons convention.

Significant progress has been made in the last year with regard to the question of compliance and verification. However, further development is necessary. For my own delegation it is clear that international on-site inspection is necessary in order to monitor the destruction of chemical weapons and of facilities for their production. The questions of levels of verification and methods to be used require further consideration. My delegation attaches great importance to this question. I would like to underline that countries like Sweden, which do not have any chemical weapons, but are situated in regions where such weapons exist, have a particular interest in ensuring that those weapons and their production facilities have actually been destroyed. We must, like any other country, safeguard our own security.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Likewise, international means have to be found to monitor the non-production of supertoxic lethal chemicals and key precursors. This might be best ensured through routine monitoring on the basis of agreed on-site visits according to a random selection system. In this particular case it would thereby be possible to avoid a politically cumbersome system based on verification by challenge.

On the other hand, a system of verification by challenge would be necessary in the future, when the destruction period has expired. Situations can then be foreseen in which consultations, either bilaterally or in the consultative committee, will not clarify the issues. In such cases the parties will have to resort to on-site inspection. It is particularly important to note that once a question of a possible violation of the convention has been brought before the consultative committee, it is no longer the concern merely of the parties directly involved but of all parties to the convention. This fact should encourage a challenged party to admit on-site inspection rather than to refuse it. We cannot accept as an argument for a refusal the contention that allegations of a violation of the convention were made primarily or for that matter solely in order to embarrass the challenged party. That party would rather have an excellent opportunity to expose such inadmissible aims simply by allowing inspection. Turning down the request would, on the other hand, be perceived as a tacit admission of a violation. Likewise, the excuse that the challenging party would get a chance to explore conditions unrelated to the convention would not hold water either. If there is willingness, on-site inspection can no doubt be arranged in ways to preclude disclosure of unrelated sensitive knowledge to the challenging party.

I do not wish to go further into other aspects of the verification issues at this juncture. My delegation hopes that they will soon be effectively handled in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

Finally, I wish to state that the Committee on Disarmament in the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention, has been entrusted with a truly important task. It is immensely complicated and difficult. We are, however, greatly encouraged by the fact that the major military powers seem genuinely committed to achieving results on it in this multilateral negotiating forum. If we succeed, and let us hope we shall, it will also give the strongest impetus to the Committee as an instrument for disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

I have already, in an earlier statement, stressed the importance of the negotiations initiated in our Committee on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

This importance and this urgency make it all the more regrettable that today, more than a month after the opening of our 1983 session, it has not been possible to resume those negotiations.

This delay has nevertheless not prevented our Committee from hearing important statements on the subject of chemical weapons.

Following upon the statement of Mr. Bush, Vice-President of the United States, the United States delegation on 10 February submitted a document on "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban" (CD/343). This document has evoked reactions and comments from a number of delegations.

Since then, two States non-members of the Committee, Finland and Spain, have expressed their views on certain technical aspects of a convention.

Lastly, on 22 February, we heard a statement by Ambassador Issraelyan, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, which we found of the greatest interest.

That statement and the United States document had something in common: both dealt with a subject to which France, the depositary of the 1925 Protocol, attaches particular importance, namely, the question of the inclusion in the future convention of a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons -- a prohibition already contained in the Geneva Protocol.

On this matter, the statement of Mr. Issraelyan marks a change in the Soviet position. The delegation of the USSR now proposes that the States parties to the convention should undertake not to "develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons".

It also proposes that the section of the convention devoted to verification should envisage appropriate procedures for the verification of compliance with the provisions prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.

The French delegation would have no objection to the inclusion of provision for such procedures in the convention. Obviously, any use of chemical weapons would be proof of the violation of the prohibition on retention of them.

But the negotiations required for the adoption of such provisions -- in the convention we are discussing -- will take time. Until then, it would seem useful to establish provisional procedures.

That is the purpose of resolution 37/98 D adopted by the General Assembly at its last session and entitled: "Provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol". The Soviet delegation has expressed criticism of that resolution and the procedures it provides for.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

It considers, on the one hand, that such provisions should have been adopted by the States parties to the Protocol and not by the States Members of the United Nations. We do not find this objection convincing because, as Ambassador Issraelyan said, the Protocol has become "an irrevocable part of international law". It is thus legitimate for the international community represented by the United Nations to decide to adopt procedures to uphold its authority.

The Soviet delegation also considers that provisions relating to the verification of compliance with the prohibition of use ought to be adopted on the basis of negotiations, which implies a consensus, and not through a vote on a resolution.

We agree with the Soviet delegation in thinking that provisions adopted through a convention should settle the problem of verification once and for all, in the matter of use as in other spheres.

However, we maintain that the procedures set forth in resolution 37/98 D are in no way contrary to international law and fill a need until such time as the provisions of a convention have been adopted.

The French delegation, in its statement introducing resolution 37/98 D on 19 November 1982, quoted in detail the conclusions submitted in this connection by independent bodies whose members included persons of all political persuasions, including some from the Soviet Union: these bodies were the Palme Commission and two Pugwash groups of experts who met in 1981 and 1982. All recommended the speedy and necessary establishment of machinery for the consideration of complaints and the investigation of charges.

The "provisional procedures" provided for in resolution 37/98 D have the same object in view. I would stress the word "provisional", for it was never the intention of the sponsors of the resolution to prejudge the future or to replace future commitments under a convention. The sole object of the resolution is the speedy establishment of a means of investigation in order to uphold the authority of and to ensure respect for the Geneva Protocol pending such future commitments.

The procedures instituted under that resolution will cease to be applicable when a convention on chemical weapons enters into force; until then, and whatever the scope of application proposed for the convention under negotiation, they will be extremely useful.

As to the repetition of the prohibition on use itself in the text of the future convention, the French delegation has always had reservations in this respect. In fact we believe that such a repetition might create more problems than it resolves.

What is important is to avoid in any way undermining the authority of the Geneva Protocol, which is the very basis of the regime of the prohibition of use of chemical weapons.

In this connection the French delegation noted with satisfaction the firmness with which Ambassador Issraelyan stressed the value of the Geneva Protocol as an "irrevocable part of international law".

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The French delegation believes that the preamble to the convention should include a paragraph reaffirming the validity of the Protocol. In our view, such a text ought also to state that the Protocol forms part of international law and that the prohibitions it contains apply to all. We also think, like the delegation of the Soviet Union and most other delegations, that the future convention ought to stipulate that none of its provisions should be interpreted as in any way detracting from the obligations flowing from the Geneva Protocol.

Is it necessary to go further and repeat, in a specific provision, the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons? The Soviet delegation assures us that there would be no disadvantage in parties to the Geneva Protocol who became parties to the convention being bound by two undertakings at the same time. We have serious reservations in this respect.

We cannot be sure that a repetition of the prohibition on use really reinforces that prohibition. Is it intended thereby to prohibit any possibility of a response to a possible violation of the convention? The complete and verified elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities will, when completed, make a response physically impossible; and until then it seems unlikely that a provision in a convention could annul the right of every State to derogate from its obligations under a treaty with respect to a partner which violated them, and to formulate reservations to that effect.

It would seem, too, that the inclusion in the same article of the convention of the prohibition of use, on the one hand, and the prohibition of manufacture, retention, etc., on the other, would create a difficult problem. In fact it would almost inevitably start a discussion on the scope of application of the prohibition of use (as regards the products covered).

Some among us will undoubtedly not be content with the general formula in the Geneva Protocol; in trying to make it more explicit, they will inevitably end up with provisions that will restrict its scope.

Furthermore, there is no question for us but that the sphere of application of the prohibition of use should remain what it is in the Geneva Protocol, that is to say, something much wider than the scope of the prohibitions relevant to chemical disarmament.

The French delegation is ready to continue examining the new Soviet proposals in the light of the explanations that may be given us in the course of our discussions.

Although Ambassador Issrealyan has told us that the Soviet delegation's proposals are designed to remove the principal obstacle hindering the negotiations, the French delegation nevertheless considers that these proposals still do not offer a definitive response on the question at issue: that of the scope of the prohibition. It would like, lastly, to point out that the elaboration of an international verification procedure remains an essential task and the one presenting the greatest difficulty. We look forward on this point, too, to constructive proposals from the Soviet delegation.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Last Thursday my delegation, on behalf of the socialist group, submitted a number of concrete proposals aimed at the early resumption of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Our group proposed that work on the chemical weapons convention be resumed immediately, on 7 March 1983. We submitted a number of alternative proposals to facilitate this process and to solve pending questions.

Unfortunately we have to state that these proposals have not found the attention they deserve. Last Friday, at the informal consultations headed by you, Mr. Chairman, and with the co-ordinators and many other delegations participating, the delegations concerned -- despite repeated questions -- did not comment on these proposals nor did they submit their own proposals. We are deeply concerned by this situation. We want to reaffirm our readiness to agree immediately on the resumption of the activities of the chemical weapons Working Group.

In the meantime another alternative has been mentioned, namely, to appoint the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, to act as temporary Chairman of the chemical weapons Working Group during the month of March. We would be ready to consider this also as a possibility to enable us to get out of the deadlock.

We would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, to take all measures necessary so that as a result of further consultations agreement can be achieved quickly on starting the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

On this occasion I would like to recall that in my statement on 22 February I proposed that we should invite a representative from Viet Nam to explain in a more detailed way the results of an International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War held in Ho Chi Minh City early this year. Your predecessor in the office of Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Erdembileg, had agreed and started consultations. I would like to ask you to direct the requisite attention to this question and to continue consultations. I would be glad if, as a result of your consultations, we received already in the next few days a positive reply to this proposal.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Nunez Mosquera, Cuba)

Without prejudice to what Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic has just said, which my delegation supports, I have asked for the floor in order to issue an invitation to interested delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and I have requested the secretariat to distribute this invitation today. As you know, on 21 February 1983 the Cuban delegation submitted to the Committee on Disarmament document CD/349 containing the Final Summary Report of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, which was held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983 and in which more than 160 experts from 21 countries participated, including some members of the Committee on Disarmament such as Cuba, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and others. From 9 to 11 March, that is to say, during the coming three days, Mr. Ton Duc Lang, a professor at the Hanoi Hospital and one of the scientists who participated in the Symposium will be in Geneva after completing a tour in the Federal Republic of Germany where he gave a number of lectures on the use of chemical weapons in Viet Nam. In view of the interest which some delegations have shown in document CD/349, my delegation would like to take advantage of the occasion and has decided to invite interested delegations to an informal meeting to be held on Thursday, 10 March, at 9.30 a.m. in conference room I.

CD/PV.202

11

(Mr. Andreani, France)

The Committee is, of course, required to continue its work on the other items on its agenda. In this connection I should like to emphasize here the great importance which the French Government attaches to the negotiations on chemical disarmament. These negotiations are the most important which the Committee is in a position to conduct in present circumstances. They offer prospects of progress. The conclusion of a treaty on this question would constitute a major success for the Committee and for the cause of disarmament.

CD/PV 202

14

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

So, then, we look for practical discussion of practical objectives and we want to see real results which advance the practical cause of peace. Now there is much work to do in the conventional field because the subject-matter is vast. And I would now like to spend a little time — a few minutes — on one striking new opportunity which we believe exists. We have agreed in this Committee on a number of objectives as regards chemical weapons. The progress made over the last four years in the Committee on Disarmament seems to us to offer a real hope of concluding a convention to outlaw these chemical weapons of mass destruction completely. Ever since they were first used — ever since the experiences of the First World War — they have evoked a general feeling of revulsion in the civilized world, which found its first expression in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Protocol was an important step forward, and has helped to preserve the world from the horrors of chemical warfare, although we have recently been reminded that it has not always been totally effective. My own country gave up its retaliatory

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

capability in this field but this did not lead to similar steps by other countries possessing a formidable capacity for chemical warfare which, in the case of the Soviet Union, has been strengthened since that time. So we must move on now and do our utmost to conclude a comprehensive convention which would ban chemical weapons.

Such a convention would be a solid expression of faith in the purpose and work of this Committee. It would be a real contribution to making the world a more decent and civilized place. Now we have been encouraged in recent months by the major contributions made by the two States represented in this Committee with the largest arsenals of chemical weapons. We welcome the fact that all members of the Committee have shown, by joining in the Working Group, their commitment to making progress. The preparatory work has given us a clearer idea of what is needed to reach agreement on a chemical weapons convention. We strongly support the proposal by Vice-President Bush that the Committee should in this session move into the phase of negotiation.

The specific proposals made by Vice-President Bush and developed by the United States delegation in its working paper, document CD/343, seem to us sensible. The readiness of the United States delegation to explain its proposals in detail has been of great help to other delegations. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the principle of international, on-site inspection in the verification regime of a chemical weapons convention was also an important step forward. We hope that the Soviet delegation can soon elaborate on its proposals and enter into detailed negotiations.

We were also interested to learn that the Soviet Union is now prepared to include the use of chemical weapons in the scope of a convention. We need to discuss how a convention which covered use would relate to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. A convention would have to provide adequate means for investigating any allegations that chemical weapons were being used. If evidence were found to that effect, it would have to be regarded as evidence of a breach of the convention.

Now some have argued, I know, in this Committee and elsewhere, that the problems of chemical weapons are so complex that we shall never agree. I believe that we need to step back from our detailed discussions to analyse what is really important in this field. The most important and immediate task is to rid the world of the existing arsenals of chemical weapons. We might begin with substances in the supertoxic category, of which by far the most important are the so-called nerve agents. No one can contemplate their use without revulsion. No commercial use is made of these substances. This should make it easier to agree on a convention which effectively proscribes them and which incorporates means of verification to give confidence to other parties.

While concentrating attention on the nerve agents, we should recognize that there are many other less toxic but nevertheless lethal substances which have been, or could be used as chemical weapons, but which also have extensive civil applications. For example, we know that hydrogen cyanide and phosgene are widely used in the chemical industry as synthetic intermediates. We believe that

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

a less stringent regime of verification would be acceptable for such substances than that which could be achieved for the nerve agents. We cannot and should not want to police in detail the civil chemical industries of the world, when good progress can be made by focusing on the products of a very narrow and particularly dangerous category.

My Government believes that the verification regime for the convention should combine routine international on-site inspections with the possibility of fact-finding procedures to investigate any doubt which may arise about compliance with the convention. Agreement must be reached on a procedure for handling complaints. Without such a procedure, confidence would be weak, because there would be no established machinery for resolving questions on which doubt remains. We believe that the need for its invocation could be lessened, though not eliminated, by the system of routine inspections which we have in mind. Such inspections would carry no implication that the convention was being violated by the country inspected. We have a model for a world wide system of international inspections in the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Many features of this system might not suit chemical weapons, but I believe that there are valuable lessons to be learned from the Agency's long and respected experience.

Routine international on-site inspection would be required for four activities set out in the provisions envisaged for a chemical weapons convention. These are:

First, destruction of stockpiles;

Secondly, destruction of production facilities;

Thirdly, production of supertoxic agents for permitted activities; and

Fourthly, monitoring to make sure that chemical weapons are not being produced after the destruction of existing stockpiles.

We are encouraged that agreement in principle already exists on the need for the first and third categories, i.e. destruction of stockpiles and monitoring of permitted production. But we are puzzled at the seeming reluctance of some States to contemplate international inspection to verify the second activity, namely, the destruction of production facilities. It is clear that once stockpiles have been destroyed, parties to the convention must be confident that the means to build them up again have also been removed. This is particularly true for the supertoxic nerve agents. As in the case of destruction of actual stocks, Governments should have nothing to fear from letting the world see that they are destroying permanently their production facilities in fulfilment of their obligations under a convention; indeed, they should be happy to do so.

I should like to recall that in 1979 the United Kingdom invited representatives of Member States to visit the pilot nerve agent production facility at Nancecuke in Cornwall which was then being dismantled. This was not, of course, intended as a detailed model for the procedure for inspection of destruction of production facilities, which will need to be worked out here in this Committee. It was designed rather as a confidence-building measure. We showed that we were willing to accept visitors at such a facility. I hope that there will soon be agreement in principle on this aspect of verification.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

The fourth type of on-site inspection which I mentioned is particularly important. This is designed to verify that States are not starting to produce chemical weapons again once their stockpiles have been destroyed. As a contribution to the consideration of this subject, my delegation has circulated a working paper entitled, "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons", which I introduce today. This is the latest in a series of initiatives which successive British Governments have taken in seeking a ban on chemical weapons. We gratefully acknowledge the important contributions in this field already made by other delegations, particularly that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The proposals we make have as their objective the development of a system of non-discriminatory routine inspections, to provide confidence that those substances which pose the greatest threat are not being produced in violation of the convention. Although this type of inspection would, in our judgement, have to continue indefinitely, we aim to show that the regime required for this purpose would not be anything like as onerous to the chemical industry as has sometimes been suggested. We know that that has been a cause of comment and concern in some countries. We are examining the problems that might arise with the help of the British chemical industry and hope to be able to report to the Committee in due course on the results of these discussions.

We look forward to hearing detailed comments from other delegations on our working paper, and, indeed, on all the other substantive contributions that have already been made. Because we really believe that an opportunity now exists for serious, detailed negotiation, we have tabled this paper. The commitment of other governments to these negotiations will be judged by their disposition to grapple with difficult but necessary detail.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, the Brazilian delegation would like to address today some of the issues relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction. Both in this Committee and in its predecessor, the delegations of the Group of 21 have long advocated the speedy conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons and have urged serious multilateral negotiations to that end. Concrete action now appears feasible, since the nations which possess the largest arsenals of such weapons at last seem willing to join the other members of this Committee in an effort to achieve agreement. Both the Soviet Union and the United States recently submitted documents containing their ideas and stating their views; the Committee also has before it a considerable number of papers on the various aspects of the convention, and in this connection I should like to acknowledge and welcome the contribution just made by the United Kingdom through its Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and in document CD/353.

The Working Group established in 1960, first to "examine issues to be dealt with" in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons, and since 1962 to "elaborate" the relevant convention, produced significant results during its three years of activity. The elements identified in the earlier stages of its work were subsequently studied in greater detail, and a substantial measure of convergence was achieved with regard to several issues. There are still differences to be resolved on other relevant parts of the convention, but the current trend toward greater flexibility on substantive questions should be pursued in order to overcome the remaining problems.

Agreement on the important question of the scope of the future convention seems now within reach. The statement by Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 February brought positions closer on that account. My own delegation would have been satisfied with the solution proposed by the co-ordinator of the contact group on the scope, which had the merit of upholding the 1925 Protocol while at the same time equating an incident of use of chemical weapons with a violation of the prohibitions contained in the convention. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the possibility of use of a weapon whose production, possession, stockpiling and transfer are prohibited, particularly if adequate verification provisions are included in the convention. We are ready, however, to examine the existing proposal aimed at making the prohibition of use explicit in the text, with a view to drafting the article which will set forth the scope of the agreement. If a generally acceptable draft is achieved, negotiations on the verification clauses would be greatly facilitated, since the area of application of the convention would be clearly defined.

There seems to be general agreement that the main article on the scope of the convention should spell out a set of prohibitions and a set of obligations, namely, the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and possibly

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

also use of chemical weapons, plus the obligation to destroy existing stocks and production facilities. It is obvious that some exceptions must be contemplated under non-hostile, or permitted purposes, such as industrial, medical and scientific research as well as law enforcement needs. The question of permission to retain certain quantities of supertoxic lethal chemical agents for so-called "protective purposes" must be more closely scrutinized to avoid any loopholes that might defeat the aim of the convention. If existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities for their production are to be destroyed, there seems to be no sensible argument in favour of maintaining a protective capability, for there would be nothing left to protect oneself against.

"Permitted", or "non-hostile" purposes to be allowed as exceptions under the convention should, in our view, be understood in the narrow sense described above. It would not be practical or feasible to consider the entire peaceful civilian chemical industry as an exception to the prohibitions contained in the Convention, since the regulation of the chemical industry as a whole clearly falls well beyond the scope of the instrument that we are negotiating here.

Beside the prohibitions contemplated, special attention should be given to the obligations which are an integral part of the scope of the future instrument. Such commitments would require those who now possess chemical weapons in their arsenals to destroy their stocks and their facilities for the production of chemical weapons. Verification procedures should ensure that destruction is carried out in accordance with the obligations entered into. My delegation considers it important to bear in mind that verification does not constitute an end in itself, but rather a means to ascertain that both the prohibitions and the obligations are respected by each of the parties to the convention. International procedures, including on-site inspection, should aim at the minimum degree of intrusiveness necessary to satisfy all parties that the provisions of the convention are being adequately observed. Special care must be taken to devise a set of procedures that allows ample opportunity for consultation and co-operation between parties to clear any doubts about the implementation of the convention, before the mechanism for international verification is set in motion. In carrying out agreed verification procedures, the appropriate international body to be instituted by the convention must take into account the preservation of the sovereign rights of States parties, in order to avoid the utilization of allegations as a tool for the exacerbation of tensions or for increasing confrontation between States. National institutions and internal legislation should function in co-operation with the international body and in accordance with the provisions of the convention.

Provisions dealing with the procedures of verification should aim, in our view, at establishing a multilateral, non-discriminatory regime in which all parties have equal rights and obligations. Nothing can prevent any State from utilizing its

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

technological advancement to gain private knowledge about facts and events taking place in another State, provided that the use of such methods does not violate existing principles and practices of international law. The convention should not, however, become a means of condoning or legitimizing such practices, nor should parties be required to give their consent in advance for the use of so-called "national technical means", the nature and scope of which is necessarily covert. Whenever information obtained by a party is introduced to substantiate claims of a possible violation, all parties should have equal access to the available data through the international body charged with the verification of the convention. By the same token, the composition of the international body should not be based upon any form of discrimination, by granting to some parties special rights and responsibilities which are denied to others. Nor should the convention refer the solution of such claims to any existing international organ whose rules permit a few privileged parties effectively to block action. Under the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States are already entitled to bring to the attention of the Security Council any situation which might endanger international peace and security. Action by the Security Council should not be confused with or become a substitute for action by the mechanism provided for in the convention.

As I said at the beginning of this statement, there seems to exist now an opportunity for the achievement of an effective convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The few nations which currently possess such weapons in their arsenals have apparently come to the conclusion that the possible advantages of the military use of supertoxic agents would be offset by the hindrance to the regular operation of troops, caused by the need for cumbersome protective equipment. Quite apart from moral considerations, the purely military value of chemical weapons appears to be doubtful. But because huge arsenals exist, some powers have continued to produce and stockpile large quantities of chemical agents that have no application in peaceful industry. Their cost, and the tactical drawbacks of their actual use in military operations may have been the main factors in the political decision to seek an agreement to ban chemical weapons taken by those who possess them. Their main interest, accordingly, is the achievement of an international instrument which will ensure that the potential adversary also eliminates its own arsenals and its capability for chemical weapons production, and which at the same time provides reciprocal confidence that no such weapons are ever used in combat. The international community, represented in this Committee, should seize this opportunity to negotiate and conclude a convention through which chemical warfare will no longer remain an indiscriminate threat in the hands of those who are capable of waging it. Thus it is imperative that the arsenals in the hands of a few be completely destroyed, so as to win the confidence of those who do not possess any chemical weapons at all.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

For the vast majority of nations, the convention can also have another useful purpose: the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemical agents.

The Brazilian delegation, together with other delegations of the Group of 21, has long argued that the convention should contain meaningful provisions on international co-operation for peaceful purposes. We are convinced that such provisions would be instrumental in promoting confidence among parties, by ensuring that technological progress in the field of chemistry is made available to all parties, particularly the developing countries. A number of proposals to this effect have already been advanced, and we hope they will receive the serious attention they deserve. The "detailed views" submitted by the United States do not elaborate on this subject, while the "basic provisions" of the Soviet Union only contain a general statement which needs further clarification and expansion.

Finally, let me dwell for a moment on the procedural difficulties with which this Committee has been confronted since the start of the 1983 session and which have so far **prevented** it from building upon the results of the fruitful activity of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My delegation deeply regrets the absence of a report by the previous Chairman of the Working Group on the result of his consultations with experts. The obstacles raised by a group of delegations deprived the Committee, for instance, of the possibility of consolidating the progress made by the contact group led by the distinguished Egyptian expert, General Ezz. The inability of the Committee to agree on an agenda and programme of work for its 1983 session also adversely affects the continuation of work on the elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons, since the intransigent attitude of some delegations has so far prevented the re-establishment of working groups and agreement on their chairmanships. The consequence of the procedural obstacles raised is the unjustifiable and counterproductive delay in the resumption of the activities of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which might otherwise have already started its work on the basis of existing proposals, thus taking advantage of the political will to achieve a convention. My delegation fails to understand the motivations of this attitude, especially since the delegations concerned profess their active interest in the speedy conclusion of a convention. We are confident that under your guidance Mr. Chairman, the procedural deadlock can be quickly broken so that work on a draft convention may start very soon.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I should now like to dwell on some aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall, of course, study the proposals put forward today by Mr. Hurd, the representative of the United Kingdom, in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons. I should, however, like to make one observation immediately. We note the fact that the United Kingdom is ready to proceed to negotiations on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom delegation linked this readiness on its part with the statement of Vice-President Bush of the United States. In that connection, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the socialist countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, together with many non-aligned States, have long been urging the Committee on Disarmament to move on from general discussions on the question of chemical weapons to real and serious negotiations on the drafting of the text of a convention.

At a recent meeting of the Committee, the Soviet delegation informed members of the decision of the Soviet Government to agree to the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Government was guided by the desire to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of such weapons, and therefore to make progress on a question which has for a long time caused the greatest divergence of views in the sphere of the definition of the scope of the prohibition in the future convention. We have listened to the comments on our proposal, which have on the whole been positive; we have also taken note of the statement made by the French delegation at our last plenary meeting, and we shall be ready to revert to this question at a later meeting of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation today intends also to touch upon a number of other questions, with a view to facilitating the search for mutually acceptable solutions on a number of important provisions of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

One of these questions has already been raised recently in a statement by Ambassador Herder, the representative of the German Democratic Republic. He spoke about the "serious additional problems" which arise in connection with the technological breakthrough in the field of chemical weapons -- the appearance of binary types of such weapons. These problems are of different kinds. We shall touch upon one of them, which consists in the following. The introduction of binary weapons could significantly undermine the basic principle of the future convention in the course of its implementation -- the principle of the undiminished security of all sides. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic proposed the following solution to the problem: the inclusion in the convention of a provision whereby the States parties, during the first year of its implementation, shall declare the location of plants producing binary chemical weapons, and shall, during the first two years of the implementation of the convention eliminate these plants.

While supporting this proposal, we would like to express our point of view on it.

There is every reason to describe the existing situation with chemical weapons as such that some States possess only unitary types of such weapons and the capacities for their production, while others possess both unitary types of chemical weapons and samples of munitions of binary chemical weapons and designs for facilities for their production or, in any case, have elaborated the technology of their production and consequently are capable of creating in the future stockpiles of such weapons. This puts future parties to the convention in an unequal situation, allowing some of them to maintain the material basis for circumventing their

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

commitments under the convention if appropriate measures are not taken. Everybody knows that it is much easier to create illegally, in violation of the convention, new stockpiles of binary chemical weapons than of the traditional types of such weapons. Binary weapons need not necessarily be produced at specialized military facilities; they can, besides, be manufactured unnoticed since the production process for binary weapon components does not include several particularly dangerous stages which are difficult to conceal, in contrast to the production of unitary chemical weapons.

As we understand it, this is the essence of the German Democratic Republic proposal aimed at a certain equalization of the positions of the future parties to the convention through the introduction of a special, very strict regime for the prohibition of binary weapons. As we see it, such a proposal does not create any significant difficulties for future parties to the convention. It assumes, of course, that if by the time of the conclusion of the convention, one or another State has created specialized facilities, belonging to military agencies, for the production of the components of binary or multicomponent weapons, or concludes contracts for the production of such components with commercial firms, then, after the convention has entered into force it should, as a matter of priority, declare the location of these facilities, and their capacity and then eliminate these facilities. Naturally, this proposal also means that we should already now be thinking about and envisaging for the convention a provision determining how the elimination of such facilities should be carried out, particularly those belonging to commercial firms -- whether they should necessarily be physically eliminated "down to the foundation", as is proposed by the United States delegation, or whether their dismantling or reorientation for commercial production could be allowed.

In the light of the proposal of the German Democratic Republic, the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolution 37/98 A to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons is particularly relevant.

Of course, the proposal of the German Democratic Republic does not solve the entire problem. There still exists the possibility of circumventing the convention through the covert production of the most dangerous types of prohibited chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons at commercial enterprises, and not only to create stockpiles of binary weapons but also to increase the stocks of traditional chemical weapons. In order also to eliminate this possibility of upsetting the balance, we would like to propose another solution. We suggest that the parties to the convention should not only close and then eliminate the facilities specially designed to produce chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons, but in addition should refrain from the production, at their commercial enterprises also, of products the molecules of which contain the linking of the methyl group with the phosphorus atom. We believe that this proposal would eliminate the material basis for the covert production of chemical weapons on the basis of organophosphorus compounds. As is known, these compounds serve as the basis for obtaining the most dangerous supertoxic lethal chemical nerve agents such as, for example, GB, GD, GF, VX, both in industrial conditions and in binary systems. Since they are not widely used in the commercial chemical industry, the economic damage resulting from the cessation of their production would not be significant.

No less important is the fact that our proposal would facilitate verification of the non-production of prohibited chemicals, especially for binary weapons, at commercial enterprises. In particular, it would eliminate the need "to make an inventory" of the entire organophosphorus industry and to identify those enterprises

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

capable of producing chemical weapons. Detection of the fact of the production of organophosphorus compounds containing the methylphosphorus link in the commercial industry would constitute proof of the violation of the relevant provision of the convention.

The question of the undiminished security of all sides has other aspects. The military capability of States possessing chemical weapons of course comprises not only chemical weapons but also other types of weapons. It is improbable that even two States could possess completely identical components of their capabilities, including also the chemical components, from the point of view of their qualitative and quantitative parameters. Finally, it is difficult to imagine that the States which will have to eliminate stockpiles of chemical weapons would elaborate, if there is no previously agreed order, even approximately similar plans for the destruction or reorientation of these stockpiles according to such indicators as, for example, uniformity, dates, rates of destruction of various categories of chemicals, etc. And that being so, the question arises what to do in order not to diminish the security of States but on the other hand to give them confidence that the convention is effective and that they should not postpone the destruction of stockpiles to the last moment.

Taking all these factors into account, the Soviet delegation proposes the working out of an order for the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which would not give unilateral military advantages to any participant at any stage of the elimination of stockpiles and would ensure the evenness of the process.

This order should be carefully thought out and embodied in appropriate provisions of the future convention. Naturally, after the convention enters into force, taking into account the specific quantities and parameters of the stockpiles of chemical weapons declared by the States parties, these provisions should be spelled out in greater detail.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about organizational matters. The Soviet delegation, like the delegation of Brazil, is concerned at the stagnation which has overtaken the work of the Committee, and it appeals to those delegations which have prevented the resumption of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons during the past several weeks to agree to the proposals that have been made, offering a way out of the present situation. Twice last week Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, speaking on behalf of the socialist countries at plenary meetings of the Committee -- not to mention our actions through informal channels -- put forward proposals and alternatives designed to permit the immediate resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We hope and we are even convinced that the efforts of the group of socialist States will have positive results and that all the formal obstacles that existed earlier, and which of course were not created by the group of socialist countries, will be removed, and that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be able to resume its activities.

At the same time, we would like to note with satisfaction that many delegations in the Committee have responded to our proposal concerning the conduct of bilateral consultations on various specific aspects of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation has already had a number of bilateral meetings and others are envisaged in the very near future. We confirm our readiness to display any form of co-operation with delegations in the Committee which will allow the speediest possible progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

With this much preface, I would like to get into the clarification of our positions first on the matter of the working groups. We fail to understand why there should be any problem regarding the chairmanship of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. It has been an established practice, to which we have never raised any objection and which we quietly followed in the previous years, that this chairmanship be on a rotation basis. We cannot think of it in any other way, and thus we fail to understand the alternatives proposed by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic last week.

Everyone in the Committee agrees that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is doing very important work and that we might be able to accomplish something very meaningful if we do not waste time on non-existent problems. Our proposal is, therefore: let us have the chemical weapons working group with Ambassador McPhail as Chairman and with the existing mandate and get to work.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

How is the work in the Committee on agreements proceeding at the present time? Let us take the convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. I think everyone will agree that a great deal of work has been done on this subject. In the summer of last year the Soviet Union put before the Committee for its consideration the basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. On the basis of that document and the constructive contributions to the drafting of a convention made by many delegations during past years and at the beginning of this year, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was able to lay very firm foundations for the elaboration of the text of the future convention.

This year the Soviet Union, in response to the wishes of many non-aligned States, made another contribution to the goal we are all seeking by agreeing that, without prejudice to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the convention should also provide for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

On 10 February the United States delegation submitted its document on the subject of chemical weapons -- "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban". We are still studying this document, which contains both provisions that are acceptable to us and at the same time unrealistic approaches which will not contribute to the success of the negotiations. However, it can be said even now that there is a coincidence or proximity of views among the participants in the negotiations on many key issues of the future convention.

The question now is how to organize our future work in order to speed up the drafting of the convention. It would seem that we ought to arrange our work in such a way as to try first of all to embody in specific forms of wording those provisions on which there is a coincidence or proximity of views, while at the same time continuing work towards finding generally acceptable solutions on the outstanding issues. This is the time-honoured way of drafting agreements.

But let us see how the United States proposes that we should go about our work. As was stated in this Committee, it considers that it would be "a fruitless exercise" to draft treaty texts on those issues on which it would be possible now to agree on actual forms of wording. It considers that this would be merely a "diversion of

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

effort", and that all that we should do here is to continue discussing the details of verification, although we have not yet defined and formulated the basic obligations of States under the convention (CD/PV.191).

There is only one conclusion to be drawn from this: it is that those who make such demands do not want to work on the drafting of a convention and are trying to replace the entire effort by the continuation of abstract and therefore futile discussions on various technical aspects. We see no other way of viewing such "innovations" in the practice of conducting negotiations as the proposal that we should build the house not from the foundation but from the roof.

We sometimes come up against other methods of hampering the attainment of agreement on questions that are ripe for settlement. Let us take the matter of the prohibition of radiological weapons. As long ago as in 1979 a proposal was put before the Committee for the basic provisions of an appropriate international treaty which had been agreed on by a number of delegations, and furthermore those delegations expressed their readiness to take account in a constructive spirit of the wishes of other members of the Committee. It might have been expected that a draft international agreement would very quickly have been prepared in order to prevent the appearance of an extremely dangerous new type of weapon of mass destruction.

However, the settlement of this question was fatally linked with that of another question no less important but not directly connected with the problem of radiological weapons -- the question of the prevention of military attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities.

We may well ask what was the point of artificially linking two important questions which could both have been fully dealt with independently of each other? Who benefited from this linking? The course proposed radically contradicts all past practice in the conduct of negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament questions. This practice long ago rejected the "all or nothing" approach. We urge that the Committee should be given the opportunity of settling both questions without delay.

We are likewise preoccupied by the fact that virtually every year the Committee wastes valuable time on discussions of organizational matters. It seems to us that it is not possible to go on tolerating this situation. A group of socialist countries in July 1981 put forward its proposals concerning ways of regulating the settlement of organizational questions in the Committee on Disarmament (document CD/200). Unfortunately those proposals, many of which have not only not lost their relevance but have in fact become even more urgent, have not been the subject of any practical discussions in the Committee. At the same time, the situation calls for newer ideas also.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Perhaps, in particular, it might be worth thinking about the possibility of agreeing that questions concerning the organization of the Committee's work should be resolved before the beginning of its annual sessions, let us say on a preliminary basis in the course of the consultations between members of the Committee which ordinarily take place in November and December in New York, and then final agreement could be reached a week before the date of the formal opening of the session here in Geneva. This, we believe, might create more favourable conditions for seeking mutually acceptable solutions on organizational questions.

Of course, during the course of the session itself, State members will have the right to propose the inclusion in the agenda of new items, but this would be done without prejudice to the work of the subsidiary bodies where in essence the practical negotiations actually take place.

I would like to refer to another largely procedural matter, concerning the preparation of the reports of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies. It is no secret that the drafting of reports at times takes up the greater part of the time available to the Committee. It seems to us that in this matter too it would be possible to introduce greater order and in this respect the secretariat of the Committee could play a very important part. Many proposals have been made on this subject, including some by the United Kingdom delegation, which we believe merit consideration.

We cannot but express our concern, in this connection, at the fact that there have recently been cases where certain delegations, by insisting either on the inclusion in such reports of matters of little value or on the special highlighting of the activities of certain participants in subsidiary bodies who did not even have any formal status, have frustrated the elaboration of specific reports. In particular, this took place most recently during the preparation of the report on the consultations of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons with delegations on technical issues. These attempts, and the lack of flexibility of those who made them, also in the end led to the failure to draft this report. This can only be regretted, as also the statements in this connection of certain delegations at plenary meetings of the Committee. We hope that those concerned will draw the appropriate conclusions from this whole sorry affair.

(Mr. Zawalonka, Poland)

My intervention today will be devoted to one of the most important questions before our Committee: chemical weapons. Needless to say, the delegation of Poland attaches great importance to this priority item on our negotiating table and will, as has been the case so far, spare no efforts in trying to contribute to finding satisfactory solutions to very many unresolved questions. We deeply deplore the fact that although one and a half months of this session have already elapsed, which in this connection means lost, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has not been re-established and has failed to initiate the activities provided for in its mandate.

Our anxiety is all the more justified as the good pace of work which characterized this Working Group in the past has thus been stopped and the momentum which it gained at the end of the 1982 session and in January 1983 is being lost. Lacking the negotiating body, we are not in a position to make use of a number of documents which constitute a real, good basis for the consolidation of the results already achieved, as well as for reaching out to new ones. Among these documents, mention should be made of the "Basic provisions of a convention" (CD/294) presented last year by the Soviet Union. The reports on the activities of the Working Group (CD/334 and CD/342) and the views of the Chairman of the Working Group on its 1982 session (CD/333), constitute a collective effort of all delegations. This year, detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban were presented by the delegation of the United States (CD/343). The USSR delegation announced in the statement by the distinguished Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 February its agreement to the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Most recently, the USSR has proposed the giving up of the production of organophosphorus compounds containing the C-P bond with the methyl group, while the delegation of the German Democratic Republic has submitted specific proposals on banning binary weapons. The delegation of the United Kingdom, for its part, has proposed detailed procedures concerning the "verification of non-production of chemical weapons". Many other delegations, through their interventions in plenary, have also contributed to the common effort in this respect.

In other words, we are of the opinion that, provided the possibilities for negotiations exist, further, real progress can be achieved in quite a number of important issues. This relates, to a high degree, to the scope of prohibition. But it may also facilitate the initiation of a debate on other problems, on which we have not so far been able to achieve a convergence of views, that is, on verification procedures. As is well known, there exists a general agreement that on-site inspections will constitute, under determined and agreed situations, a permanent feature of the international verification system. My delegation would like

(Mr. Zawalonka, Poland)

to emphasize, however, in this connection, that if some delegations continue to insist on discussing the verification procedures only, as if other questions were already solved, we shall not be able, for a long time yet, to elaborate the draft convention. In other words, in the negotiations we are speaking about, there is not only one and unique problem — international verification procedures — which should receive serious treatment. There are also other proposals concerning verification procedures which should be treated equally seriously. I am sure that only with this approach can more propitious conditions be created for going speedily ahead.

Secondly, my delegation has always been of the view, and I am ready to repeat it again, that it is high time to start the drafting process. Otherwise, we shall become involved again in a general discussion around any given problem. But for the time being, as I said earlier, our most important task is to re-establish and set to work the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, to ensure the maximum number of its meetings and, if need be, to organize contact groups with the assistance of interpreters.

While speaking about the favourable climate for the activities of the Working Group I cannot help taking up the question of the Chairman's consultations with delegations on technical issues which were held for three weeks last January and February.

The delegations of socialist countries, like many others, actively participated in consultations, according to the agreed schedule, on:

The precursors of the toxic chemicals;

Verification of the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, and

Verification of the destruction of facilities producing chemical weapons (other technical issues).

The work was carried out in a constructive spirit and quite good results were at hand. However, the motives advanced by some delegations, with no direct relevance to the consultations, went beyond the substance of the discussed problems and even beyond the discussion on the summary of the results of the consultations on verification. This fact was noted with particularly deep regret by my delegation, which headed these consultations. Let me state that the Polish delegation spared no effort, informally, to terminate successfully these consultations on technical issues. My delegation is of the opinion that in spite of the fact that the final report was not adopted, the time devoted to these consultations has not been wasted and the results of the discussions have not been lost. They could be appropriately taken advantage of in the work of the Working Group.

My delegation, like many others, is seriously concerned about the complex problem of ensuring an effective ban on binary weapons. That is why we fully support the proposal of the distinguished Ambassador Israelyan submitted during the last plenary meeting on a possible agreement by the States parties to the future convention not to produce any organophosphorus chemicals containing the C-P bond with the methyl group. This proposal would in fact facilitate control of the non-production of the most toxic chemicals. Moreover, in our view, it falls perfectly well within the concept of the scope of the prohibition which other

(Mr. Zawalonka, Poland)

delegations would also like to see adopted. We have listened as well to the USSR proposal on the elaboration and inclusion in a future convention of a time-table for the destruction of chemical weapons stocks which would not enable any party to the convention to gain a unilateral military superiority during any stage of the destruction of such stocks in the proposed 10-year period.

In concluding my statement today, let me quote a short passage from resolution 37/98 B. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the General Assembly "Urges the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1983, the elaboration of such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for this purpose".

The paragraph I have quoted contains a very clear appeal to our Committee. It is high time for us to start implementing it. Any further delay in the re-establishment of the Group and its activities is inadmissible.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

I want also to comment on the remarks by Ambassador Issraelyan, concerning the work of this Committee. Let me say from the outset that there is one point on which I am in complete agreement with him. This Committee is in a state of crisis. In the view of my delegation, the reasons for this state of affairs are a bit different from those he put forward, however. Again, let us not be fooled by double talk. The work of this Committee has been brought to a standstill by a series of manoeuvres designed to accomplish just that purpose: it began with the blocking of the adoption of a report by the Group of chemical weapons experts; then we had problems with the simple matter of the election of a Chairman for the Group of Scientific Experts; then came the debate on the agenda, which continues to this very day, and the insistence that one position characterized as "irreducible" be accepted outright. Further, we have the position that one group is taking that they can no longer live up to previous agreements on chairmanships, and a position, which my delegation finds bizarre, that the mandate of one working group must have a new mandate, when it hasn't even begun work under the old one. The Committee has had problems on the participation of non-members, and who knows what new problems will be raised?

Well, where is this going to end? My delegation makes no claim to clairvoyance -- we don't know but we are deeply concerned. In his opening statement, Ambassador Issraelyan called our Committee a "cemetery of disarmament". That statement concerned me at the time. In the light of the events of the ensuing several weeks and his remarks here today, one can only wonder whether what we heard that day in February was not intended to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Let me be frank. In the four years since this Committee was formed, we have come to expect polemics and rhetoric as part of the normal course of business. But underlying this surface turmoil, there has been a solid desire by all to do the patient and time-consuming work of disarmament. We could be close to agreement on a radiological weapons treaty; we have made progress toward a chemical weapons convention, and progress has been made in other areas. Today, however, we see our work stalled by a series of procedural manoeuvres and artificial linkages, and the presentation of irreducible positions which seem to be based more on a desire to make a theological point than a concrete desire to get on with the work of this Committee.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

Following Vice-President Bush's initiative in the Committee, I had the pleasure of introducing on 10 February the United States' detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban (document CD/343). I am pleased to note that since that time others have also made contributions to the Committee's efforts to achieve an effective ban on chemical weapons. The working paper, document CD/350, on the technical aspects of a convention on chemical weapons, introduced by Spain on 28 February, is a useful and thoughtful effort, and my delegation is carefully studying it. The working paper, document CD/355, submitted last week by the delegation of the United Kingdom, on verification of non-production of chemical weapons, is also an important contribution and adds a great deal to our knowledge and understanding of the critical aspect of effective verification of a chemical weapons convention.

My delegation is also gratified that many delegations -- indeed, virtually all who have spoken at this session -- attach great importance to this body's efforts to negotiate a chemical weapons ban. This is a priority task which we all share. However, as I said on Tuesday last, we are greatly concerned that the chemical weapons Working Group and, indeed, other working groups, have not been allowed to begin their important work. We are hopeful that delegations will see their way clear to allow work to begin without further unnecessary procedural delays.

Since the introduction of our paper, many delegations have accepted our invitation to detailed briefings and open discussions regarding our views. These exchanges have been valuable to us and, we hope, to the others who have participated in them. We look forward to the continuation of this frank and free exchange of views and ideas in further group sessions and, of course, within the Working Group when it resumes its work. We believe that only through a complete understanding of the details and underlying principles inherent in our respective positions on the issues can true progress be achieved.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In this regard my delegation has noted statements by many delegations which reflect both an understanding and an acceptance of the need for effective international verification of a chemical weapons ban. The United States believes that timely agreement on the elements of a verification regime is necessary in order to realize progress on elements of the over-all convention. Vice-President Bush said during his appearance before this Committee on 4 February: "The key to an effective convention -- one that could eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare for ever -- is the firm assurance of compliance through effective verification". He further pointed out what we all know -- the key outstanding issues impeding agreement on a chemical weapons ban are those pertaining to verification and compliance.

In an effort to facilitate the work of the Committee on the verification and compliance issues, I would like to focus today on some of those key issues and, specifically, to elaborate our views on several points made recently by other delegations.

Two delegations, those of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, in their respective statements on 22 February and 10 March, made several points and offered proposals relative to the potential for evasion of obligations under a chemical weapons ban. These proposals were set in the context of what was characterized as the principle of undiminished security of any party. It was proposed that the location of one type of chemical weapons production facility, those involved in the production of binary weapons, be declared during the first year after the Convention enters into force, and that during the first two years of the Convention only this type of facility be eliminated. Although their statements were silent on verification provisions regarding the declaration and elimination of binary production facilities, judging from their expressed concerns, we must conclude that they would consider systematic international on-site inspection to be essential.

Based on other standing proposals made by the Soviet Union and its allies, we note that the location of other types of chemical weapons facilities, however, would not have to be similarly declared nor their status relative to closure ascertained until some time later, but within 10 years after the Convention enters into force. The effect of their proposal, therefore, would be to require early declaration and destruction of some facilities while others would remain unaffected for a much longer period of time. This outcome is not consistent with the principle of undiminished security.

The United States shares the belief that the Convention should not result in undiminished security or unequal obligations for any party. Indeed, the principle of undiminished security is one of the pillars of any effective arms control agreement. This approach is reflected in our "detailed views" paper. We have proposed in our paper that the location, nature, and capacity of all chemical weapons production and filling facilities be declared within 30 days after the Convention enters into force. This includes dual-purpose facilities designed or used in part for civilian production. As well as other facilities designed, constructed or used for the production of certain commercial chemicals deemed by the Consultative Committee to pose a particular risk. These chemicals would include all key precursor chemicals potentially useful for all types of chemical weapons, including binary weapons.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We have also stated our view that all activity, except that required for closure at all chemical weapons production and filling facilities, be immediately ceased upon the entry into force of the Convention; that all such facilities be closed according to agreed procedures which render the facilities inoperative; that all parties permit systematic international on-site inspection of each such facility promptly after declaration and, subsequently, at agreed intervals until the facility is destroyed; that parties permit the monitoring of all facilities by agreed appropriate types of sensors installed at the facility, and that all such facilities be destroyed by razing them, employing agreed procedures which permit systematic international on-site verification, and according to an agreed schedule.

It is obvious that our own views take fully into account the concerns expressed and, if adopted, would preclude any possibility of evasion such as was envisaged by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. Indeed, our views are designed to prevent any continuation of production of all types of chemical weapons at production and filling facilities by all parties to the Convention regardless of the technical nature, design or fabrication of such facilities or the type of chemical munition produced.

Concerns have also been raised regarding the possibility of evasion of the Convention through covert production of dangerous chemicals for the ultimate creation of chemical weapons at commercial or non-military facilities. We share these concerns, which have been expressed by many others as well. The group of chemical weapons technical experts and the Working Group have spent a great deal of time on this particular issue, and we believe a solution is at hand that does not present unreasonable demands on commercial chemical industries or otherwise put in jeopardy the production of those legitimate chemicals or synthetic substances on which so much of our basic existence depends.

The proposal of the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the banning of all production of all methyl-phosphorus bond compounds, regardless of any future, potential peaceful benefit to mankind, seems to my delegation to be unnecessary and, more importantly, would provide only a partial solution to the problem. There are many other chemicals which have similar potential importance not only for supertoxic compounds useful for chemical weapons purposes but also for incapacitants as well. To ban only one of them and not place controls on the others would in reality lessen the degree of protection which all parties require against possible covert chemical weapons production at commercial facilities. The United Kingdom working paper, document CD/353, presented just last week, contains elements of a better approach, which closes this loophole, and seems to offer a sound approach for dealing with this aspect of the verification problem. The United Kingdom paper suggests that all commercial facilities producing any of a listed group of chemicals having potential for chemical weapons purposes would have to be declared and made subject to an agreed mandatory international inspection regime to ensure that they are not being used for the production of chemical weapons. The components of such a verification regime could easily be designed so as not to be unnecessarily intrusive but still provide the necessary degree of assurance to all parties that such chemicals are not being diverted for the fabrication of any type of prohibited chemical weapon.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Another point which I will address today relates to the concern expressed with regard to the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons under the Convention. It has been rightly pointed out that if one party purposely delays the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks until the latter part of the period allowed for destruction, while another party commences the destruction of its stocks immediately after the Convention enters into force, a unilateral military advantage can be legally gained under the Convention. It has also been pointed out in this respect that parties may have different chemical weapons capabilities -- components as well as total stocks -- in being at the time the Convention enters into force. This is a legitimate concern. We welcome Soviet acceptance of our suggestion that procedures must be worked out during negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament with regard to the timing and rates of destruction of chemical weapons stocks on an agreed basis. Specifically, we believe that an arrangement for effective and verifiable reductions of chemical weapons stocks to equal levels between parties, or groups of parties, in the early phase of the destruction period is necessary to ensure the mutual security of all parties. We look forward to further discussion on this and other aspects of this most important issue.

In conclusion, let me say that my delegation considers the flexibility indicated by the Soviet Union delegation on the inclusion of a ban on the use of chemicals prohibited by the Convention as a constructive development. We welcome the Soviet statement that appropriate, effective verification procedures regarding alleged use should be provided. We are carefully assessing the legal implications of a new ban on use. It is essential to ensure, however, that the 1925 Geneva Protocol remains fully effective. In this context, the development by United Nations experts of more effective procedures for investigating alleged chemical weapons use, in response to General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, is particularly important as a complement to the Committee's work on a chemical weapons ban and to provide a mechanism for dealing with this problem until that agreement comes into effect.

CD/PV.204

10

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, today the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would like to take the floor also on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons -- a question whose importance and urgency need hardly be further supported with arguments. Last week, in the presence of over half the delegations to this Committee, Professor Ton Duc Lang of the Medical Faculty of the Hanoi Viet Duc Hospital showed us with irrefutable scientific data the horrifying consequences for the land and the population of Viet Nam as a result of the use of chemical agents for military purposes.

For two decades now the task of banning chemical weapons has been holding a particularly important place in the policy of the socialist countries. The Prague Declaration of January 1983 of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty pays special attention to the need for the accelerated elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In connection with the work done by the Committee on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, my delegation would like to point out that the Ad Hoc Working Group, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador B. Sujka of the People's Republic of Poland, and its subsidiary contact groups, headed by Mr. T. Melescanu of Romania, Dr. J. Lundin of Sweden, Mr. T. Altaf of Pakistan, Mr. S. Duarte of Brazil, Mr. G. Skinner of Canada, Mr. R. Steele of Australia, Dr. H. Thielicke of the German Democratic Republic and Miss N. Nascimbene of Argentina, did a considerable amount of work in 1962 and at the beginning of this year. On some issues the groups reached the stage of drafting texts and created the basis for further progress in our work on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many representatives of various other delegations took an active and fruitful part in the work of the groups and thus helped the Chairman and the co-ordinators. To single out any one of them would be rather out of place and indelicate in regard to other active participants in the negotiating process, and to make the adoption of the progress report on the technical consultations dependent upon a selective mentioning of participants, as some have suggested, is simply inadmissible. The negotiations for prohibiting chemical weapons are not to be made a scene for political play which has nothing in common with the substantive tasks of such negotiations.

Within the framework of the consultations of the Group's Chairman with technical experts, a number of important issues were co-ordinated. This refers, among other things, to the working out of criteria for identifying "important" or "key" precursors. The work on this issue should be completed. Progress was also achieved on the issues of verification.

The proposals submitted recently by a number of delegations represent a new and important stage on the way to the elaboration of a convention. My delegation is in the process of studying these proposals with the utmost attention. We shall do the same with respect to the clarification just made by our distinguished colleague from the United States. The position of the USSR on the inclusion of the use of chemical weapons in the scope of a chemical weapons ban and the ideas of the Soviet delegation contained in its statement of 10 March are of particular importance for activating the negotiations. As can easily be seen, bearing in mind the significant arguments in the Soviet statement, there are a number of problems of immediate importance for the security of States which should find their solution in the text of a future convention in good time.

As far as the problems of verification are concerned, it is now obvious, judging from the statements of many delegations, that they are not -- as asserted by some Western delegations -- "the real obstacles to a convention".

(Mr. Tullalov, Bulgaria)

The actual obstacle to a convention is above all the one-sided and unconstructive approach some delegations apply -- in regard both to the organizational issues and the issues of substance.

Now I would like to state in more concrete terms the views of the Bulgarian delegation on some specific issues.

The problem of including "use" in the scope of the prohibition has been occupying our attention from the very beginning. As is well known, different arguments have been adduced both by those who are in favour of the inclusion of use as well as by those who are against it. It is not our intention to recall these arguments now. But it would be only fair to say that most of the arguments, regardless whether they have been used for or against inclusion are cogent and weighty. This has created a serious dilemma which has to be solved if we are to move forward. It is in this light that the importance of the step recently announced by the Soviet delegation should be viewed.

The new Soviet step, which has the support of the socialist countries, is designed to open the way for reaching consensus on the scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons. This is in itself a serious contribution. But apart from this, the inclusion of "use" in the prohibition promises certain important advantages which deserve special attention.

One important advantage has to do with security considerations during the period of the elimination of stocks and facilities.

We believe that the prohibition of use in the future convention should be formulated in clear terms. For this reason, while it is to be welcomed that in document CD/343, submitted by the United States delegation, "use" has been accepted in principle as one of the components of the prohibition, at the same time the terms employed suggest certain important qualifications. It has rightly been pointed out that the banning of only such uses as are not already prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol could certainly bring about confusion and controversy.

As has already been pointed out, the clear definition of the scope of the prohibition in the future convention is essential. With the conclusion of such a convention it must be ensured that there may not be two different regimes of non-use of chemical weapons.

The great deal of experience gained in the working and contact groups, as well as the various proposals made by a number of delegations, make possible the commencement of a drafting process on certain parts of the text of a future

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

convention, such as the preamble, the provisions regarding the scope of the prohibition and the concluding provisions. We can hardly agree with the stand taken by one delegation that the drafting of the actual convention must be conditioned upon the negotiation of "an acceptable verification and compliance framework". In view of the interdependency of the different parts of the convention, the proper method would be to elaborate and co-ordinate all the main sections of the convention in parallel.

Bearing in mind the views expressed by the delegation of the USSR on the question of security, the Bulgarian delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee to certain additional aspects. Document CD/343 on the one hand allows for the production by any party of supertoxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes in quantities of up to one metric ton, and on the other hand it restricts the transfer to another party of such substances and for the same purposes to only 100 grammes annually. With very good reason one may ask: will not such an arrangement in practice encourage an increase in the number of the States producers of supertoxic lethal chemicals? Faced with the alternative -- either to have 100 grammes annually or to produce any other quantity up to one metric ton, a number of States will probably choose the second possibility in conformity with their security needs. The consequences of this could be better perceived within a regional security context, particularly in situations where some countries may not adhere to the convention and thereby remain unaffected by its limitations.

We are not against a restricted transfer of supertoxic chemicals but the provision should be formulated in such a way that the security interests of all States parties should be taken into account.

The problems of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals after the entry into force of the convention also pose the question of the eventual introduction of criteria specifying in what quantity such chemicals may be produced. The correct answer to this question will be most possibly found in connection with the considerations regarding peaceful chemical-technological activities.

We would like to stress once again that the correct and mutually acceptable solution of the problem of verification can be found only on the basis of combining and supplementing with each other all known types of verification: national legislation, national technical means and international verification on the basis of motivated challenge and on a systematic basis. In this connection the corresponding section of document CD/343 seems to us to be rather far from the best proposals on this issue tabled in the Committee. The role of national means of verification is diminished practically to nil in this document. This hardly helps

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

to advance the negotiations but rather holds them back and represents a retreat from the stated positions of other Western countries contained in their documents and formal proposals. We would hope that this is not the last word of the United States delegation on this issue.

As I said earlier, at this stage my delegation would like to confine itself to only some comments. We are prepared to enter into more substantive negotiations within a working group as soon as possible. Under the circumstances the consultations between delegations have a particular importance for the prospect of bridging their differences on specific issues of a convention. The Bulgarian delegation welcomes the fact that bilateral consultations between different delegations are going on. It is our belief that this will greatly help the progress of the negotiations in the future working group and in the Committee itself.

It is high time for the Committee to solve the questions related to the re-establishment of the chemical weapons Working Group. It is to be regretted that the temporary solution for the chairmanship of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons proposed by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on behalf of the socialist group, which included four or five alternatives, was rejected by the Western group and thus precious time for negotiations was lost. These proposals are still valid.

The only possible way of resolving the present deadlock is through the displaying of a constructive attitude by all delegations, recognizing the interests of the different groups and delegations in the context of the whole range of procedural questions at this year's session. Such an attitude has been displayed by the countries of the Group of 21 whose proposals with regard to the resumption of the work of the working groups are currently under active consideration and offer a promising alternative.

In this connection, I have been authorized by the group of socialist countries and its co-ordinator to state that we are in agreement with these proposals and the socialist countries declare that we are ready to accept the immediate setting up of ad hoc working groups on:

A comprehensive test ban, under the chairmanship of a representative from the socialist group;

Radiological weapons, under the chairmanship of a representative from the Group of 21;

Chemical weapons, under the chairmanship of a representative from the Western group.

In this case it would be possible for the long overdue process of negotiations on these items to start without any further delay. In practical terms this means that the work of the groups can start as from next week.

The socialist countries strongly believe that our position will create no difficulties whatsoever and expect that the Chairman of the Committee and the co-ordinators of the different groups will be able to finalize these organizational issues promptly.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

Permit me to make a few comments on an important issue before the Committee: I have in mind the question of chemical weapons. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been a major concern of the Committee since its inception. My delegation welcomes the various proposals on a chemical weapons convention that have been presented to the Committee and considers them a useful basis for negotiation.

In the view of my delegation, a future convention should contain provisions aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. There should be provisions for both national as well as international means of verification but greater emphasis should be placed on international means. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons held a number of contact group meetings in January. Consultations on technical issues were also held and experts took part in them. It is our belief that the results of the contact group meetings as contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group (document CD/342) should be translated into action.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Permit me to make a few comments on an important issue before the Committee: I have in mind the question of chemical weapons. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been a major concern of the Committee since its inception. My delegation welcomes the various proposals on a chemical weapons convention that have been presented to the Committee and considers them a useful basis for negotiation.

In the view of my delegation, a future convention should contain provisions aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. There should be provisions for both national as well as international means of verification but greater emphasis should be placed on international means. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons held a number of contact group meetings in January. Consultations on technical issues were also held and experts took part in them. It is our belief that the results of the contact group meetings as contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group (document CD/342) should be translated into action.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

I shall devote my statement today to the subject of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

More than six weeks ago, when we initiated our work for this new session of the Committee on Disarmament, it seemed to me that at least general agreement prevailed among us. I think I am right in summarizing the elements of that agreement as follows:

First, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons is the one offering the most promising prospects for the Committee on Disarmament this year;

Secondly, the conditions for fruitful negotiations now exist;

Lastly, all the necessary resources must be devoted to those negotiations.

I do not intend now to go into the procedural reasons why, in spite of that broad convergence of views, the Committee on Disarmament has since then been totally incapable of resuming and pursuing the work it has done on this question in past years.

I do not think that I should be betraying the general feeling if I were to express the firm hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons -- which should remain the centre of those negotiations -- will be re-established without delay, on its own merits, that is to say, without any link being established between this matter and the other matters with which the Committee on Disarmament should concern itself and to which also Belgium attaches great importance.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

...

Apart from our desire, which I hope is general, to work towards the speedy conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Committee on Disarmament now has the benefit of certain advantages, as follows.

First, the basic structure of the future convention is now well established, both in the compilation of the various elements and in the reports of the co-ordinators of the various contact groups.

Secondly, the views of the members of the Committee and of the Chairman of the Working Group in 1982 have been very fully expressed on many aspects of the convention. In this connection I should like to stress the particular importance we attach to the views of the two States which participated in the bilateral negotiations. And we now know the detailed positions both of the USSR and of the United States.

As far as the United States is concerned, we appreciated its willingness to try to reply to the questions raised by its proposals. Such exercises in clarification are a great aid to negotiations.

Thirdly, recent statements and declarations of position have also shown a development in the attitude of delegations. I am referring here in particular to the new proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to the scope of the convention and the intentions expressed by the Soviet Union -- which will, I hope, be explained in greater detail -- as regards the on-site verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal agents.

The taking into account of proposals made by others, as is shown, for example, in many instances by the document submitted by the United States delegation, and the adoption of new positions such as those just announced by the Soviet Union with respect to the scope of the prohibition, are actions which will give new impetus to the negotiations since they mean a relinquishing of positions on which there has not up to now been any agreement.

As we approach this new phase in our negotiations, I should like to express Belgium's views on various aspects of our work.

The method we adopt in attempting to move forward in this complex sphere will be one of the key elements in the negotiations.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It therefore seems to me essential that we should continue our work within the structure that appears to have been generally accepted up to now. This structure is particularly well represented in documents CD/CW/WP.33 and CD/334. We ought to make sure that any proposals made later fall clearly within that framework.

It might also be useful if, on the basis of that structure, the secretariat were to make a compilation, element by element and point by point, of the various proposals that have been made since that time. In fact an effort at regrouping proposals appears necessary at the present stage. This compilation could then form the basis of our future negotiations. It would save us having to refer to the various different documents containing the many proposals made up to now.

Without such a compilation, our negotiations are likely to become more and more complicated by the very fact of their being undirected.

It has been unanimously agreed that the contact groups set up last year proved an excellent framework for our work. It would be useful if we could use this method again, rationalizing it where necessary so as to avoid an excessive proliferation of these contact groups but also so as to study the problems not only vertically -- the approach we have followed up to now -- but also horizontally.

Great flexibility will be needed in this sphere. The problems that might be called horizontal, as, for example, the relationship between the scope of the convention and its verification, or the question of the destruction of stocks or the dismantling of facilities, could be dealt with on an ad hoc basis and under the guidance of the co-ordinators of the contact groups concerned.

Apart from these questions of method, we also need to try to clarify our concepts.

What do we want to prohibit?

My delegation believes that we ought to enact as general a prohibition as possible of the production, stockpiling and development of chemical agents intended for use in armed conflicts by reason of their toxic properties and for purposes other than those authorized.

What this means, broadly speaking, is the application of the well-known general purpose criterion, that is to say, the intention to use chemical agents for non-authorized purposes.

Too often in our discussions there is an absence of any clear perception of the application of this general purpose criterion.

In practice, once the prohibition has been enacted -- and without prejudice to the application of the definition of chemical weapons to animals and plants -- we ought to organize the regime of the prohibition of chemical weapons accordingly.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In the first place, everything that exists that is in clear violation of the general purpose criterion, namely, stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities, must be destroyed.

Secondly, it will be necessary to evaluate the consequences of the general prohibition as regards the lawful production of chemicals. We are already in broad agreement that in such production, the supertoxic lethal chemicals — those which might otherwise be the most likely to be used in armed conflicts — should be regulated, their production or retention for authorized purposes being strictly limited.

Up to now, in accordance with the general purpose criterion, we have assumed that no civilian production would be prohibited. The recent proposal of the Soviet Union for a complete prohibition of the production of substances containing the methyl-phosphorus synthesis raises many questions in this connection.

The third consequence of the regime of the prohibition of chemical weapons concerns the verification of compliance by States parties with the obligations they will have contracted under the convention.

This verification has two distinct aspects.

The first, and we believe the most important, is that of routine inspections, namely, those which will give States parties the security which they have decided not, or no longer, to ensure by means of chemical weapons.

Such security can basically only be provided by international means of verification, including, when necessary, on-site inspection.

The papers submitted, such as that of Canada in 1981 (document CD/167) and more recently that of the United Kingdom on the subject of the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, have clearly indicated the widely differing needs as regards verification according to the different activities to be verified.

In the intentions it has expressed as regards verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals, the Soviet Union implicitly recognizes the need for such differentiated verification. The concept of general on-site inspection is thus now accepted. We still have to agree on the range of activities for which such inspection is needed and on the procedures for such inspection.

The work we did at the beginning of this year in the course of the technical consultations were particularly useful in this connection, and it is to be regretted that it did not prove possible to submit a report on them.

We made important progress in the identification of the key precursors which will call for special attention in the process of verification of non-production.

The recent contribution of the United Kingdom constitutes a very logical sequel to that work.

Similarly, the needs in the matter of verification of the destruction of stocks have certainly been made clearer. However, we have some doubts about the proposal made by the Soviet Union in document CD/CW/CTC/37 suggesting that the methods of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons should vary according to the type — the Soviet Union proposes six categories — to which they belong.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In our view, the first stage in the process of verification of the destruction of stocks should consist precisely in the identification, through on-site inspection, of the different types of chemical substances in question. This first stage could not, therefore, be predetermined, as the Soviet proposal implies.

At the same time, since a growing conceptual convergence appears to be developing in the sphere of the verification of the destruction of stocks, it seems to us necessary to make a similar effort with regard to the procedures for the verification of the destruction or dismantling of facilities.

I have just spoken about the routine aspect of verification. The other aspect concerns that part of the process of the settlement of disputes which the convention can organize before States resort, if necessary, to the machinery of the United Nations Charter. There will be fewer chances of this aspect of verification being employed the more routine inspections permit the removal of suspicions between the parties.

There will be fewer reasons to have doubts about the activities of a State party if the routine verification methods are sufficiently extensive to create confidence.

I would add that it would no doubt be useful for the convention to define the nature of the co-operation necessary between international means of verification, as represented by the consultative committee, and the organs for national implementation measures, which ought above all to form a point of contact for the activities of the consultative committee in the various States parties.

As regards national technical means of verification, we ought to ensure that, like the international verification means, they are not hampered.

I should like, in conclusion, to make some comments on the subject of the prohibition of use.

As we see it, the inclusion in the convention on chemical weapons of a general prohibition on development, production and stockpiling corresponds to the general prohibition of those same activities enacted under the 1972 Convention on bacteriological weapons.

As regards the prohibition of the use of weapons, whether chemical or bacteriological, this, in our view, has become a prohibition of a general nature deriving from the Geneva Protocol of 1925. It is because we consider that the regime of the prohibition of use is common to bacteriological and chemical weapons and that international customary law has established it sufficiently clearly that we have reservations as regards the repetition of that prohibition within the framework of the convention on chemical weapons. We believe that the real problem lies in the verification of compliance with the prohibition enacted by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and subsequently enlarged by international customary law.

It was for that reason that Belgium last year submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a proposal concerning the verification of compliance with the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological or toxin weapons.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

I should like to note in this connection that our proposal seems to me to meet the conditions put forward by my colleague from the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, in his statement of 22 February last, regarding the establishment of machinery for verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol. Those conditions can be summed up as follows: the States parties to the international instruments concerned should negotiate about such machinery, and reach agreement through negotiation and on the basis of consensus, as is usual in matters of disarmament.

In the particular case of the convention on chemical weapons, we have noted with great interest all the new proposals and positions which have been expressed on this point. They bear witness to a conciliatory spirit which we fully share.

I should nevertheless like to make certain comments in this connection.

The first concerns the proposals suggesting that we should simply incorporate the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons within the scope of the convention.

If we were to do that, could we be sure that such a prohibition of use would be as general in application as that resulting from the customary international law deriving from the Geneva Protocol? Would there not, on the contrary, be a risk of creating a lacuna in the matter of the prohibition of bacteriological weapons? For if it is accepted that the regime of the prohibition of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons derives from the 1925 Protocol, would not a partial repetition of that prohibition, that is, solely in the context of chemical weapons, cause doubts with regard to bacteriological weapons?

Again assuming the inclusion of a prohibition on use in the convention on chemical weapons, will it be necessary to provide for specific machinery for the verification of compliance with that prohibition, or shall we be able to rely on the terse formula that any use of chemical weapons would constitute proof of the violation of the convention, and will its verification provisions apply also to such situations?

In the latter event, how would the fact of the use of chemical weapons be established? Ought there not to be some special machinery for the establishment of the facts, given the special nature of the verification procedures necessary in the matter of allegations of use?

My second observation concerns the proposals suggesting that with respect to chemical weapons alone we should extend the sphere of application of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Would there not be a danger that this would affect the customary character of the general prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons?

Would that not seem to imply that the prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons is not absolute as regards the interpretation which international custom has given to the 1925 Protocol?

It is precisely because we have not up to now found adequate answers to these questions that my delegation has envisaged specific machinery for the verification of the prohibition of the use both of bacteriological and of chemical weapons.

As I have already said, these proposals were intended to stimulate our thinking on the subject. My delegation would be perfectly prepared to amend them if there was a possibility that they might then meet with the approval of all members of the Committee.

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

On the subject of yet another category of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, I should like to say the following.

I reiterate that the Netherlands armed forces do not possess chemical weapons, that the Netherlands Government does not consider introducing those weapons into its armed forces and that it also rejects the stockpiling of chemical weapons on Netherlands territory.

Awareness has grown that the question of chemical weapons is not merely an East-West problem. These weapons can effectively be used against technologically less developed countries, which virtually lack any protection against such a threat. Though little proliferation in this field has taken place thus far, they can be also used by countries from the third world. A treaty must be concluded, before developments get out of hand.

One of the main obstacles to a chemical weapons treaty is the question of verification. I fully realize that. In the past year the Committee has started to tackle that problem seriously. This momentum should not be allowed to peter out.

I therefore welcome the recent important contribution by the United States. On verification we think along the same lines; individual elements, in particular regarding routine inspections, are of course in need of further refinement.

It is encouraging to note that the Soviet Union has somewhat modified its position regarding on-site inspections. Essential gaps, however, continue to exist and differences remain on the conditions for challenge-inspections. In our view, systematic international inspections are necessary both with respect to the destruction of stockpiles and to the closing and dismantling of chemical weapons plants. The full use of modern technical equipment can help to decrease the degree of intrusiveness of such inspections. Some random inspections to deter clandestine production in the civilian industry of the most dangerous chemicals can likewise not be dispensed with. In many respects, such inspections are preferable to a system of challenge inspections alone: it will often be difficult to acquire enough

(Cont'd)

(Mr. van den Broek, Netherlands)

information to justify a request for a challenge inspection. In addition, the procedures regarding a challenge inspection could easily lead to mistrust and reciprocal reproaches of a dubious nature.

Verification is not an end in itself but a tool to strengthen confidence in the implementation of and compliance with a treaty, and to deter violations. Many ideas have been put forward to promote this verification. Perfect verification is neither possible nor wholly indispensable. And so a trade-off between scope, verification and protection against chemical attack could create the necessary confidence.

As for the question whether a chemical weapons treaty should include a provision against "use", we have always believed that any use would indicate a violation of the treaty and would therefore trigger an investigation. We have no objection at all; however, in accepting a specific ban on use in the convention itself. This seems to be the view of the majority of States in the Committee on Disarmament. Naturally, we must see to it that such a ban will not in any way detract from the obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Much to the contrary, the treaty should build on the Protocol and strengthen it.

We will study with interest the proposal made by the Soviet Union for a complete ban on all chemicals related to nerve agents with a particular structure.

CD/PV 207

15

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

The prohibition of chemical weapons seems to be the only item on the Committee's agenda on which there is broad agreement that much has been achieved so far in the harmonization of views expressed and in the consideration of various elements proposed for the future convention. The Seventh Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in New Delhi emphasized that while nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty banning chemical weapons.

With political will and additional efforts within the Committee, it would be possible without much difficulty, as we have already pointed out in our previous statement, to take the next important step which should be the elaboration and the beginning of drafting of specific articles of the convention. Many delegations to the Committee on Disarmament, through their concrete proposals, either with regard to the issue as a whole or concerning some elements of the future convention, have made a significant contribution to that effect. Their active participation in the work of the contact groups has facilitated the elaboration, elucidation and harmonization of particular elements of the convention.

The reports on the activities of the Working Group as well as the views of the Chairman of the Working Group at the 1982 session represent a significant compilation of collective efforts that have been put into the preparation of the convention.

We would particularly like to refer to the proposals of the USSR, "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", that of the United States entitled "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban", and the United Kingdom working paper entitled "Verification of non-production of chemical weapons". All these proposals are the subject of careful consideration on the part of our experts.

Yugoslavia has also made its contribution to the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the course of 1982, we submitted two working papers, one on "Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification",

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

and the other on "Some aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention". In the consideration of verification matters, we have always proceeded from the standpoint that this problem should be solved in such a way as to inspire confidence in the implementation of an agreement banning chemical weapons. The discussions on verification procedures in the Committee's Working Group have indicated the complexity of this problem, both from its technical and political aspects. We also consider that it would not be practicable to devise verification procedures which would provide an absolute assurance that the convention is not being violated. At the same time, we share the view that a chemical weapons convention must provide for sufficient verification to deter the would-be violator and to provide a degree of assurance against violation by one party which is accepted as adequate by others.

The verification of chemical weapons should, in our opinion, be implemented on the basis of national and international procedures, where we consider that national verification does not preclude international verification but rather that they complement each other. In order to increase confidence among countries, it is possible that both national and international verification be based on an agreed, generally acceptable and unified identification system -- methods that would be standardized for particular chemical warfare agent categories. This, of course, does not preclude a separate national approach, especially when a country has qualified personnel, equipment and organization for the gathering of samples, data processing, etc. The standardizing of the methods of international verification can greatly facilitate the national verification system and chemical defence measures, in those countries as well which have no experience in developing their own verification methods. The standardizing of verification methods presupposes their periodical modification in accordance with scientific and technological progress. It is understandable that the introduction of new methods and procedures should be subject to agreement and acceptance on the part of an international organ created by the States parties to the chemical weapons convention. In our view, arms reduction and disarmament agreements must be founded on reasonable confidence, as is the case with some existing agreements. If there is a decrease in confidence or if there is doubt concerning the violation of agreements, then only verification measures can restore confidence among States parties to the agreements. This is particularly true for the countries which possess production facilities and stockpiles of chemical weapons.

Acknowledging the importance of the verification system in agreements concerning arms reduction and disarmament, we nevertheless deem unacceptable the condition that agreement should first be reached on verification provisions and that only then should we proceed to the elaboration of other parts of the convention. We accept, of course, and consider it useful to accord due attention to verification as well, parallel with the consideration of all relevant issues. However, we see no reason for emphasis to be placed exclusively on this question while all other equally important ones are left aside. Because important

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

progress has been made in the consideration of some other issues, it is realistic to expect that they can easily be finalized with an added effort. After all, it would be difficult to consider in isolation only verification issues without having previously reached a firm agreement on what should be subject to verification.

The system of work applied so far in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has proved itself useful. Within the contact groups that simultaneously considered particular elements of the convention, fundamental material which ought to make up the future convention has been categorized. Alternative possibilities have been put forward for those questions which have not yet been cleared up, or indications have been made as to what direction should more or less be looked at in seeking solutions. It has also been shown to be necessary, in the process of examining particular proposals and, respectively, the views expressed by particular delegations, to require some clarification in order to accelerate even more the process of the harmonization of views. In this connection, we would consider it useful if the United States delegation were to explain certain questions which have emerged in the course of our preliminary examination of the United States paper. Perhaps some of the questions that will be posed in the meantime have already been clarified at informal meetings between the United States and interested delegations. We would be grateful if the United States delegation would find it possible to furnish further explanations at an appropriate time.

The first question concerns the basic prohibition, as stated on page 1 of document CD/343. Riot-control agents and herbicides have been excluded from the prohibition. Why is this so, when it has been previously stated that the provisions of the convention should cover super-toxic lethal, other lethal, other harmful chemicals (such as incapacitating chemicals) and their precursor chemicals?

The next question refers to the non-transfer/non-assistance under (b). The prohibition of the transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals is envisaged only in relation to non-parties to the convention and not for the parties to it as well. What are the reasons for this and also for setting the limit at exactly 100 grams?

We understand the expression "permitted purposes" (page 2 of CD/343) to refer to the use of any toxic chemical and its precursor chemical in smaller concentrations for medical purposes as well as the protection of plants. If used in greater concentrations, then appropriate protective measures should be applied. Have we understood the meaning of "permitted purposes" correctly? Is not a metric ton too large a quantity for such purposes?

The proposed preparatory commission, which would come into existence soon after the convention is opened for our signatures and which should remain in existence until

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

the convention comes into force and thereafter until the first meeting of the consultative committee, is given an important role in facilitating prompt implementation of the provisions of the convention. In view of the fact that it is uncertain when the convention will enter into force -- in unfavourable circumstances this could take some time -- would the preparatory commission in that case continue working without interruption or would another procedure be envisaged?

What is the relationship of the fact-finding panel to the consultative committee? Both organs could, for example, carry out on-site inspection, but it is not clear whether the panel has any obligations toward the consultative committee. Can it be assumed that this is a direct organ of the depositary, which appoints ten of its members and serves as chairman of the panel?

With regard to the panel's composition, we wish to state that we consider the proposed procedure for the election of permanent and non-permanent members as being unacceptable, as it introduces differentiation between permanent and non-permanent members, according greater rights to a small group of States.

Apart from the confidence-building measures referred to, are any other confidence-building measures considered?

Does the United States envisage -- and if so, what kind of role is envisaged for -- national technical means of verification, given that there is no mention of it whatsoever in the paper?

In the section on "Additional provisions", it is recommended under (a) that the convention should also contain a preamble and provisions regarding international co-operation in the field of chemistry. Would you also consider the possibility of international co-operation including the field of toxicology? We consider this also to be an important field of international co-operation.

The USSR proposal entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" (CD/294), apart from the many common points it has with other proposals, contains some differences as well. We would also appreciate it if the Soviet delegation would offer some additional information in order that we can better understand the proposal submitted.

In the part referring to the elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons (page 3), under paragraph 1, there is mention of the elimination or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. However, no mention is

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

made of filling facilities as well, which are part of the prohibition mentioned in the "United States detailed views". We assume that this has to do with separate technological production processes. On the one hand, chemical warfare agents and, on the other, filling facilities in which the final product -- i.e. the chemical weapon -- is obtained. If this is correct, we think that the Convention should encompass such filling facilities as well, bearing in mind particularly the binary weapons.

The Soviet proposal does not mention specifically the closure of production facilities which would have to precede their elimination or dismantling. In our view, each State party to the convention should start with activities in order to destroy or divert its stock of chemical warfare agents, munitions, devices and equipment specifically designed for chemical warfare immediately after it becomes a party to the convention, and complete them no later than ten years after that date.

The question previously raised whether one metric ton of super-toxic lethal chemicals which may be left for "permitted purposes" is an excessive quantity also applies to the proposal of the USSR.

Our last question concerns the part having to do with the fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the convention. To be more precise, it refers to the second paragraph of item 2 on page 8 of the proposal, in which it is said, inter alia, that "The State Party to which such a request is sent may treat the request favourably or decide otherwise". In view of the fact that this relates to requests for on-site inspection concerning the destruction of accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and concerning the destruction and dismantling of facilities, we would like an explanation of what particular situation is envisaged that would give a justification to the State party so requested to "decide otherwise".

We would also be grateful to the Soviet delegation if it would provide the necessary clarifications at an appropriate time.

We would like to express the hope that these and other questions will be considered in the deliberations of the Working Group, which will, we expect, begin its work without delay. In view of the results achieved so far in the chemical weapons contact groups, we are of the opinion that there is no need for all of them to be set up again. It would be much more rational if work were concentrated on a parallel consideration of some of the most important elements of the convention in appropriate contact groups, while at the same time one such group could immediately initiate the elaboration of those parts of the convention on which general agreement exists. We think that this year the Committee should complete the elaboration of the first draft of some of the future provisions of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons or of corresponding annexes.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

I take the floor today to speak on the subject of chemical weapons.

My delegation is gratified by the positive interest shown in our document (CD/343) containing detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban. We have had fruitful and constructive informal exchanges with many delegations and have welcomed the questions of our colleagues. We have tried to respond promptly and clearly to such questions in whatever forum they were asked.

At the plenary meeting on 29 March we were pleased to have several thoughtful and serious questions put to my delegation by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas. Such interest in our paper is deeply appreciated and deserves an equally serious response, which I am pleased to provide today.

The United States holds the view that riot-control agents and herbicides should not be covered by this convention. Let me say at the outset that, although we hold this view, our objective is not to retain an option for waging chemical warfare with such chemicals. We ruled this out years ago. This fact is certainly well known. Most importantly, we do not see that including these chemicals in a ban on development, production, stockpiling and transfer would promote the ultimate objective of preventing their use in combat. In contrast to the military nerve gases, for example, herbicides are not developed, produced, or stockpiled for chemical weapons purposes but can easily be obtained through commercial channels. In fact, military forces may well have substantial quantities of herbicides readily available for vegetation control at bases, a perfectly legitimate purpose. Commercial spraying equipment, such as spray aircraft, can be quickly requisitioned. Quite probably, a State could be in full compliance with a provision banning the development, production and stockpiling of herbicides for chemical weapons purposes and yet be able to use herbicides for prohibited purposes within a few days.

A similar situation exists for riot-control agents. In many countries, military and paramilitary forces are equipped with substantial amounts of such agents for the purposes of maintaining internal order. We do not see how a provision against the development, production, and stockpiling of riot-control agents for military purposes could be effective in preventing their use for prohibited purposes when the substances are already available in significant quantities for permitted purposes.

Ambassador Vidas also dealt with the permitted transfer of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes. It is well known that many countries use small quantities of such chemicals for research purposes to develop protection against chemical attack. In many cases the State obtains the necessary chemicals from an ally, rather than producing the chemical itself. It seems desirable to permit such arrangements to continue once a treaty comes into force. A ban on small-scale transfers could have the clearly undesirable effect of encouraging many States to set up production facilities in order to have super-toxic chemicals for protective research purposes. Of course, transfers should be permitted only under appropriate controls, which necessarily can apply only to parties. Thus, we can agree that even small-scale transfers to non-parties should be banned.

(Mr. Fields, USA)

The proposed limit of 100 grams is a nominal one for purposes of discussion. We would welcome comments as to whether it is reasonable or not.

We have also been asked to clarify our understanding of the term "permitted purposes" as used in our document. This is a very broad term which covers industrial, agricultural, research, medical and other peaceful purposes, law enforcement purposes and protective purposes, as well as military purposes -- such as the use of chemicals as rocket fuels -- which are not related to chemical weapons. The one-ton limit would apply specifically to super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, a legitimate activity which is closely related to chemical weapons. Again, one ton is an approximate figure for discussion purposes. We believe the one-ton limit is low enough to preclude waging chemical warfare on any militarily significant scale. In assessing whether it is reasonable, it should be kept in mind that one ton is a ceiling, not a quota. States should be required to justify whatever amount they used, even small quantities. Also, the one-ton figure is an aggregate for all super-toxic lethal chemicals used for protective purposes.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Fields, United States.)

The Yugoslav delegation also asked if in our view the proposed preparatory commission would continue working without interruption until the treaty entered into force, whether this occurred quickly or only after some time. Our hope is that the preparatory commission would be able to complete promptly the tasks assigned to it by the convention. But certainly it should work as long as necessary. As a legal matter, it would exist until the consultative committee was established, shortly after the entry into force of the convention.

A question was raised regarding the relationship between the fact-finding panel and the consultative committee. Our suggestion is that the fact-finding panel should be a subordinate body to the consultative committee, established for the specific purpose of looking into compliance questions. The intent is that the depositary would be involved only as the chairman of the consultative committee. In this regard, we would note that we simply assumed that, as in the case of the ENMOD Convention, the depositary should be the chairman of the consultative committee.

With regard to our views on any confidence-building measures beyond those mentioned in our paper, the subject has certainly not been exhaustively treated. Constructive suggestions have already been made by the delegation of Sweden and many others. We have an open mind on the question and would welcome further ideas from our colleagues.

It has been noted that national technical means are not mentioned in the United States paper. To our way of thinking, it was not necessary to include such a reference. Of course, States will continue to acquire information using whatever national technical means are available to them. But such means are not accessible to many States and, in any case, are hopelessly inadequate for verification of a ban such as is envisaged in this convention. The principal means for verification must be international in nature to ensure effectiveness and political acceptability and to inspire confidence.

Finally, Ambassador Vidas raised the question whether the provisions for international co-operation would include the field of toxicology. My delegation feels this would be entirely appropriate. Knowledge of the toxic effects of chemicals is becoming increasingly important.

I hope I have been successful in clarifying our position in response to the questions put by our Yugoslav colleagues and others. We hope that by doing so we have facilitated negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We look forward to similar clarifications from other delegations. Only if delegations clearly explain their views on the key issues shall we be able to move fruitfully ahead.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation today intends to refer once again to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Like other delegations we, of course, very much regret that at least two months of work have been lost and that the good start made in its work at the beginning of this year by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka of Poland was not appropriately followed up.

As to the Soviet delegation, it has not wasted its time during this enforced break. The USSR delegation has submitted a number of new proposals on key issues of the future convention at plenary meetings of the Committee. In addition to that, in March we conducted intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations on various aspects of the complicated chemical disarmament problem. The main conclusion we have reached from these consultations is that progress in the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is entirely possible. A large number of questions was put to us, to which we tried to give exhaustive answers. We, for our part, put questions to our colleagues which were of interest to us. In addition, all those taking part in those consultations made interesting comments and observations, which will, we believe, help towards mutual understanding.

In this connection we would like to express our gratitude to the delegations which took part in the consultations. This, of course, includes the delegation of the Netherlands, with which also we held consultations, and we should like, through you, Mr. Chairman, to convey our gratitude to the head of the Netherlands delegation.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work a few days ago. First of all, the Soviet delegation wishes to congratulate Ambassador McPhail of Canada on his appointment as Chairman of this Group, and wishes him success. We should also like to make a few general comments on the Group's work.

We endorse a great deal of what Ambassador McPhail said in his interesting statement at the meeting of the Working Group on 6 April and in general the optimistic and business-like tone of his statement. We could go even further in expressing optimism. We continue to believe that the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons could be successfully completed this year.

What is our view of the general content and character of the future negotiations in the Working Group? It would of course be possible to choose the easy path and concentrate all the attention of the Working Group on questions on which there is a coincidence or similarity of positions. In fact, there is a large number of such questions, including many key, basic issues affecting the future convention. If we were to put agreed wordings on these issues on paper, we could blow the trumpets announcing to the world our great success and keeping quiet about those serious differences which continue to exist. Such an approach would rather delude world public opinion and would hardly contribute to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations.

But we could also go to the other extreme. We could concentrate all attention on the problems on which there are differences between us, including secondary ones, amplify and exaggerate them, gamble on them and thus lead all our work to a deadlock. Perhaps some are pursuing these goals, but certainly not the Soviet Union delegation. We are resolutely opposed to such an approach and will not follow this line.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We should go along the tested road of international negotiations. On the one hand, we should agree upon, formulate and draft those provisions, and first and foremost the key provisions relating to the general scope of the convention, the necessary definitions, verification and other subjects, on which there is a coincidence or similarity of positions. On the other hand, in close connection with this work, we should continue intensive negotiations in order to find the solutions to the problems on which there are still differences. We believe that the recording of similar positions on the key problems should keep ahead of the phase of finding solutions to unsolved questions. I will explain this idea. For example, what is the need to conduct negotiations on specific methods of conducting international on-site verifications of the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, on the basis of quotas or the drawing of lots or on any other basis, if there is no recorded agreement, even of a preliminary nature, on the mandatory conduct of systematic international on-site verifications of the destruction of stockpiles and on the method to be used? To be brief, we wish to construct the building starting from its foundation and not from the roof.

Now I would like to touch upon the comments on our proposals and the observations made by various delegations both at plenary and at other meetings. We shall also reply to the questions addressed to the Soviet delegation.

Our agreement with the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States to include in the future convention a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in general met with a positive response in the Committee. Some delegations at the same time stressed the need to be cautious so as not to prejudice the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We fully share this view and believe, like the delegations of Indonesia, Sweden and of many other countries, that the task is not merely to avoid unfavourable consequences for the Geneva Protocol, and in particular not to allow a limitation of the general scope of the prohibition in it, which covers also bacteriological weapons, but to make the regime of non-use of chemical weapons established by it even stronger, more reliable and more universal.

The Soviet delegation wishes the future convention to provide a regime of the non-use of chemical weapons that is unique and strictly mandatory for all States and based on the idea that there can be no justification for the use of chemical weapons either in war, in military conflicts or as a first or retaliatory strike, with the use of the completely prohibited supertoxic chemicals or the so-called "other lethal chemicals" which are and will always be produced in huge quantities for peaceful purposes.

Together with an agreement on the use, within the framework of the convention, of the verification machinery for the verification of compliance with the provision on the non-use of chemical weapons also, this would lead to a substantial strengthening of the non-use regime, and we believe that it should be our main goal.

The delegations of the United States and France have spoken here in favour of a "provisional" solution of the problem of verification of non-use based on resolution 37/98 D of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that the earliest possible conclusion of the convention would be the most effective and complete guarantee of the non-use of chemical weapons. Proceeding from this premise, it is necessary to make every effort in order to speed up the elaboration

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the convention, avoiding actions which might complicate the negotiations. By proposing the verification of compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the resolution enlarges the obligations of the States parties through a vote in the United Nations, with the participation also of States which were not signatories of the Protocol. We have already noted that slightly more than half of the States parties to the Geneva Protocol voted in favour of the resolution. Thus, a dangerous precedent could be created of the revision of an international agreement without taking into account and contrary to the opinions of a significant number of the parties to it. Such a practice would be in flagrant contradiction with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of international treaties, and in particular with article 39 thereof, which allows the amendment of a treaty only on the basis of an agreement between the parties.

That is why the Soviet Union will not take part in the implementation of the above mentioned resolution and we have stated so recently to the United Nations Secretary-General. We appeal to every delegation to think about the negative consequences that would result from an attempt to impose the solution of disarmament problems through a majority of votes.

I shall now pass on to another question. A number of the Committee's members put questions on the Soviet proposal for a renunciation, by the States parties to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, of the production of methyl-phosphorus bond compounds. We were asked whether such a decision is really necessary, whether it might not be harmful to progress in the sphere of the peaceful chemical industry in the distant future, and what is the point of such an action if there are other chemicals which are also used for chemical weapons production.

Unfortunately I cannot, in the present statement, reply in detail to these and similar questions. That will be done in the Working Group. For the moment I will make some general observations on our approach.

A number of delegations in the Committee believe that even after the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons enters into force, every State will in effect be entitled, if it so wishes, to produce supertoxic lethal chemicals and any other chemicals, including those capable of being the key precursors for chemical weapons, as well as particularly dangerous organophosphorus compounds with the methyl-phosphorus bond, provided that States intend to use them all, not for arms production but for peaceful purposes. We have been told that such facilities will be declared and be subject to verification — to verification by the drawing of lots, what is more.

In this event, apparently, the sword of Damocles would be hanging over any declared facility in the form of the possibility of its becoming unexpectedly subject to verification. But this requires as a minimum that all such facilities be really declared, both those producing and those capable of producing such chemicals. If we follow this way proposed by some delegations, then the lists of the declared facilities will contain hundreds or even thousands of facilities of kinds various, both large and small, and the element of chance in the carrying out of verification by the drawing of lots will be so great that the potential violator of the convention is hardly likely to be disturbed by such a method. I do not even have to say that such a system, whereby the special lists would contain almost all chemical enterprises, might cause them to be discredited in the eyes of the consumers of their products. Thus the proposed approach is very complicated, vulnerable and, what is more, ineffective.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As far as our approach is concerned, it narrows down the range of the industrial facilities capable of producing any supertoxic lethal chemicals, as well as those chemicals -- "key precursors" (with the methyl-phosphorus bond) which are the most dangerous from the point of view of their use for chemical weapons production, practically to a single special facility in any State party. Regardless whether 30 kg or 300 kg of such chemicals are needed, they should be produced at the special facility subject to systematic international on-site verifications by quota, and nowhere else. The detection of the production of these chemicals by other enterprises on the basis of verification by challenge would prove the violation of the convention.

Now I come to the questions of distinguished Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia addressed to us on 29 March.

The delegation of Yugoslavia was interested in whether according to the Soviet position, facilities for filling chemical weapons should be eliminated or dismantled and enterprises producing the chemical weapons should be closed immediately after the convention enters into force. Naturally, our reply to both questions is positive.

One thing should be explained however. The verification procedure proposed by the USSR for the closing and elimination or dismantling of chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the timing for their declaration considerably differ from the approach contained, for example, in the "United States detailed views on the contents of a chemical weapons ban" and in the statement by the United States delegation in the Committee on 17 March, upon which we shall dwell in greater detail in the Working Group.

The delegation of Yugoslavia requested us to explain our position on specialized facilities for the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals.

The Soviet Union believes that the upper limit of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes, i.e. for industry, agriculture, research, medicine and any other peaceful purposes, for the purpose of protection from chemical weapons as well as for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, should be one metric ton for any State party. This means that the total quantity of such chemicals produced at the special facility, transferred from stockpiles or acquired in some other way every year or at the disposal of the State party at any moment should not go beyond this limit. It may be less, be only a part of this amount, but it should not be superior to it at any time. Taking into account all these features of our position, the one-ton limit does not seem to us to be too high.

Finally, the delegation of Yugoslavia was interested in how the Soviet Union understands the verification of a justified request on a voluntary basis. We confirm that we see this form of verification as universal and one which could be used especially for the verification of the non-production of chemicals for chemical weapons at commercial enterprises. As to the verification of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

destruction of stockpiles, we believe that its main form will be systematic international on-site verifications on the basis of an agreed quota at a transformed or special destruction facility.

The decision of the State in the case of a request for verification by challenge will depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the request, the specific circumstances which provoked it, and so on. The request should be prompted by the real interests of compliance with the convention by all States, and not by any other reasons; it should be justified. It is only natural that a completely unjustified request submitted on the basis of considerations which are far removed from the convention's purposes will be met accordingly. Let us be realistic and ask ourselves — can we demand from a State to which a request is addressed that it should accept verification automatically? That would mean that verification could cover any enterprise which has nothing to do with the production of chemicals for the purposes of chemical warfare but which, let us say, is directly connected with military production, for example, the production of missile fuel, explosives, various types of armaments, military equipment, etc., since at present chemistry is used everywhere. Those who state that they are ready automatically to permit an international on-site verification in response to any request, even if unjustified, are demagogues. We have no doubt about it.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union, in proposing the prohibition of the production of methyl-phosphorus bond compounds at commercial enterprises, wishes to exclude the entire commercial industry from the scope of verification under the convention. Of course, this is a flagrant distortion of our position. We in no way eliminate the problem of the verification of the so-called key precursors. We are in favour of the elaboration of criteria and definitions for such precursors and the setting up of appropriate lists on the basis of these. We believe that the States parties to the convention should annually submit information on the precursors included in these lists that they have produced, acquired, retained or used for permitted purposes. We in no way eliminate, either, the question of the verification of chemicals which are particularly dangerous from the point of view of their possible diversion for purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons. We propose a similar approach to them. In both cases the system of on-site verification on the basis of a justified request could be applied.

Distinguished delegates, the Soviet delegation would now like to make some general comments on the prospects for the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Committee is on the eve of the decisive stage of the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Of course, a lot will depend on the proper organization of the negotiations, on the time allocated for them, on the activity of all delegations and on other questions. But in the final analysis, success will be determined not by these factors but by the readiness of every delegation to search for mutually acceptable solutions and compromises, to display flexibility. It will also depend on whether attempts will continue to be made artificially to heat up the atmosphere at the negotiations and to turn them into an arena for various political speculations, or whether a business-like situation will prevail.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In this context I should like to draw your attention to the following. Since 7 July 1980, when the USSR and the United States submitted to the Committee their "Joint report" (document CD/112), the Soviet Union has repeatedly improved its approaches to certain aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, come out with various initiatives, meeting half-way the other participants in the negotiations, including the Western countries, in order to achieve an early agreement. It is enough to recall that the Soviet Union, while believing that for the purposes of verification, national forms of verification, national technical means and international on-site verification on the basis of a justified request are adequate, nevertheless agreed that the verification of the destruction of stocks and of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes should be conducted on the basis of mandatory international on-site verifications. Quite recently, we agreed with the position of the non-aligned countries on the inclusion of a provision on the non-use of chemical weapons in the convention.

And what has happened during this time to the United States approach to the key questions of the prohibition of chemical weapons? Using as a cover the allegations invented by them in respect of the USSR and other socialist countries, the United States has moved away from some of its earlier positions, has toughened them, in particular on questions of verification, etc. Such a movement does not inspire great optimism, but on the contrary leads to the sad conclusion that what we are dealing with is no more than another political game. We cannot leave out of our reckonings the fact that chemical weapons have an important role to play in the Pentagon's plans for the next decade. Various American statesmen have said a great deal about this in recent times.

We also pay attention to the fact that sometimes proposals are put forward in the Committee which are known to be unacceptable to us and which in some cases have a quite unrealistic and demagogic character. Sometimes differences appear as if from nowhere, based simply, it seems, on a lack of desire to take into account the opinion of the other side. This happened recently when the tasks of contact group C were defined within the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, when, in spite of the objections of the entire group of socialist countries, it was considered possible again to put forward an unacceptable range of such tasks at the Group's meeting on 11 April. There are also in the Committee those who are in favour of a method of negotiating with the Soviet Union which offers no prospects at all -- the method of putting pressure on it. They believe that the greater the pressure on the Soviet Union, the greater are the chances for an agreement. This is a profound delusion. It was very convincingly stated by the USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, at his press conference on 2 April.

We call upon all delegations and in the first instance the United States delegation to embark upon honest, constructive negotiations taking into account the mutual interests of the sides. Only such negotiations can lead to success. The Soviet delegation, at any rate, will resolutely follow such an approach to the negotiations.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to turn now to another pressing, high-priority item on the agenda of this body, namely, the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. As is well known, that question has traditionally figured prominently among the disarmament issues on which my country has focused its attention, both around this conference table and in the United Nations. At the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, I had the opportunity of putting on record Poland's satisfaction with the productive results which this organ, through its subsidiary body, had been able to score in 1982. Indeed, we hope that also in 1983, despite the regrettable delay in the reactivation of the chemical working group, it will prove possible to make a meaningful advance towards the long-overdue goal of a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Prague Declaration of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which — as will be recalled — addressed also a number of other priority items on the agenda of the Committee, urged this body to accelerate the elaboration of an international convention on banning and liquidating chemical weapons. We believe that constructive proposals and important concessions, especially with regard to the scope of prohibition and verification in a future convention, made by the USSR, both at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and again last February in the Committee on Disarmament, should greatly help in achieving early, positive results of the Committee's nearly 15 years of efforts. The question of chemical weapons has its specifically European aspect, too. There is the prospect of the imminent deployment by the United States of the most lethal, binary weapons in Western Europe, on the territory of some of its NATO allies. Bearing this in mind, in the Prague Declaration the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty offered a constructive, practical and far-sighted proposal. It provides for practical steps, parallel to the efforts of this Committee, to be taken in order to rid Europe of these weapons of mass annihilation. Poland and other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty welcome the interest shown in this idea on the part of a number of European countries. Building upon this understandable interest, the socialist States are prepared to initiate meaningful contacts with all interested States, including States members of the NATO alliance, in order to arrange for a common consideration of practical problems with a view to achieving the goal of a Europe free from chemical weapons. This readiness of ours has been reaffirmed by the Foreign Ministers of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty meeting in Prague last week.

We have no doubt in our mind that the successful outlawing of these weapons from the continent of Europe would greatly contribute to the comprehensive ban on chemical weapons which we in this Committee have been tirelessly seeking for more than a decade.

(Mr. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

Before I conclude, allow me to make some remarks with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the course of this session my delegation has already commented on recent regional initiatives which have been motivated by the danger of the production and deployment of new kinds of chemical weapons. At their recent Prague meeting, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States further developed the proposal to free Europe from chemical weapons. The Ministers expressed the readiness of the socialist countries to consider with other interested States practical questions related to this objective. This would especially apply to the scope and sequence of the relevant measures, the content of the commitments and verification of their observance.

In this connection I should like to draw your attention to the proposal made by my country on the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe.

These proposals have met with interest and response in many European countries. At the same time we heard here in this Committee arguments according to which the proposals in question would be bound to distract attention from a comprehensive solution of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The recent Prague meeting gave an unequivocal and pertinent answer to those arguments in stating that "the Warsaw Treaty member States continue to maintain that the radical solution of the problem of the prevention of chemical war would be the prohibition and the destruction of chemical weapons on a global scale". It was emphasized that the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone, as a parallel measure, should facilitate the achievement of this goal.

As far as the further negotiations on a chemical weapons ban in this Committee are concerned, my delegation outlined on 22 February its approach aiming at beginning a new phase in our negotiations. In the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we noted with interest the ideas of its newly appointed Chairman, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, on the further proceedings of the Group. We will support all efforts directed at reaching quick results in drafting a chemical weapons convention. Having this in mind we see much merit in a kind of "double approach", i.e. to draft in the Working Group and its contact groups the basic provisions of the convention on which there is agreement, and to proceed with the clarification of unresolved questions as well as the elaboration of detailed provisions connected with the implementation of the convention.

In the Working Group, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will actively take part in such work and elaborate on the issues in question.

At the same time, the Committee also has before it a question to which the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, like all the non-aligned countries and many other countries, pays very close and sustained attention, namely, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. No other people in the world in recent decades has suffered as much as the people of Viet Nam the horrible and lasting consequences of the use of toxic chemical substances in war. This barbarous weapon of mass extermination ought to be prohibited as soon as possible.

In connection with this urgent need for a strict prohibition of chemical weapons, I feel it to be my duty, as the representative of the people of Viet Nam and of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, to present to this Committee in this statement some additional information concerning Viet Nam's experience, which is still continuing, of the long-term consequences of the massive and repeated use of chemical substances in the war in Viet Nam during the years 1961 to 1971. I am doing so in the fervent hope that after hearing me the Committee and the countries represented here will be even more determined to spare no effort to accelerate the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, so that the tragedy which struck my country may never be repeated anywhere, against any people.

As you know, an International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, was held in Ho Chi Minh City at the beginning of this year. The symposium dealt with a subject which is far from being an outmoded theoretical exercise. The emotion caused in recent months in many European countries by the transfer of toxic wastes from the Seveso factory, and the apprehensions of countless veterans of the Indo-Chinese war in America and Australia are evidence of the present-day relevance of the problem. The Ho Chi Minh City symposium was attended by more than 160 scientists and experts, nearly half of whom came from 21 foreign countries, including the United States of America, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, India, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Mongolia, to mention only those countries that are members of this Committee, and in one week the participants heard 72 scientific reports and papers and held very frank exchanges of views, both at plenary meetings and in working groups the rapporteurs of which were all well-known foreign scientists, American, English and Dutch. The symposium was strictly a working conference of scientists whose object was not only to make an objective assessment of existing scientific information but also to identify and encourage the research-work needed and to promote international co-operation to that end. The final summary report of the symposium, which was adopted unanimously, was put before the Committee on 21 February 1983, and shortly thereafter, in order to take advantage of the presence in Geneva of a well-known scientist from my country, Professor Dr. Ton Duc Lang, a meeting was arranged between him and the experts in this Committee, during which he presented additional information on the results of the symposium. In that connection, I should like to say that we are very grateful to the delegations which took part in that meeting, and we should also like to thank the secretariat of the Committee for its help in organizing the meeting.

As was indicated at the symposium, various compounds of toxic chemical substances were used in Viet Nam, including in particular dioxin, a substance known for its great toxicity. The total quantity of all these herbicides and defoliants used against my country is estimated by different scientific authorities at some 100,000 tons. According to the United States biologist, Arthur H. Westing, this total included 57,000 tons of the famous agent orange, containing up to 170 kg of the terrible dioxin. Other authorities even put forward the figure of 500 kg.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam.)

These toxic chemical products which were sprayed on a vast scale, in strong concentrations and in large quantities, have caused serious damage to the environment of South Viet Nam: 45 per cent of the forests were destroyed, including 70 per cent of the coconut groves and 150,000 hectares of tropical forests, and 13 per cent of the agricultural land, which it has not yet been possible to restore in spite of the passage of 10 years. Ecological systems were seriously damaged. The systematic sprayings over vast areas of South Viet Nam totally or in large part destroyed extensive areas of forests in the provinces of Tiên Giang, Ben Tre, Cửu Long, Hậu Giang and Minh Hải and in the environs of Ho Chi Minh City. This fact was already noted in 1974 by a group of American scientists from the Academy of Sciences who considered that, as a result of the extensive damage caused to the forests, the process of natural recovery could take 100 years and even more in certain regions.

The massive and repeated sprayings over large areas changed the structure of the soil, reduced its fertility and caused a decline in agricultural production, aggravating the difficulties of feeding the population. Many areas, such as the valley of A Sầu, formerly populated with an abundant and varied fauna and covered with rich forests and other useful vegetation, were transformed into infertile savannahs covered with wild grasses and secondary vegetation of little economic value, as a result of which many species of animals, both large and small have completely disappeared and there remain only hordes of small rodents, which are disease-carriers.

Thus, the tropical forests in the areas heavily sprayed with herbicides are on the point of disappearing. The destruction of foliage, the considerable reduction in the country's forest areas and the contamination of the soil have caused changes in the water run-off system, aggravating further the periods of flood and drought.

Considerable damage, difficult to remedy, has also been caused to the river, maritime and coastal ecological systems. Certain types of aquatic animals have disappeared and reserves of sea and river fish have been considerably reduced.

As a result of all these harmful effects of toxic substances on nature, Viet Nam is at present confronted with an extremely difficult task, that is, how to restore the fertility of the soils and transform these dead savannahs into crop-growing areas or to repopulate them with animal species and useful plants.

The famous operation known as the chemical clean-up of the jungle, through the use of herbicides containing a high proportion of dioxin, also had harmful effects, which are still continuing, on the health of the Vietnamese people: 2 million Vietnamese have been victims, of whom 3,500 have died and the rest are still today suffering their consequences. Professor Ton Duc Lang gave a scientifically detailed report on this subject during his meeting with the distinguished experts from delegations; I shall therefore be brief in this connection.

Numerous investigations and tests by Vietnamese scientists confirm that the massive use of these toxic substances containing dioxin has had extremely harmful

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

effects on the genes of the population inhabiting the regions concerned, including the children born there. Even a number of years after contamination, genetic aberrations and abnormalities have been found among the victims.

At the Symposium, 12 reports were submitted giving strong evidence of a direct link between the use of chemical substances and the increased number of congenital abnormalities, monstrosities and malformations among children born in the areas that were sprayed with such substances.

Thus investigations in the province of Ben Tre, which was subjected to massive and repeated sprayings, show that in comparison with the pre-war years, the number of extra-uterine pregnancies has increased six to eight times, the number of sterile marriages eight times, and the number of congenital abnormalities and monsters among new-born children 10-15 times. These are terrible figures.

In the opinion of our experts, the use of chemical substances has also caused an increase in the frequency of cases of cancer of the liver. In a Hanoi hospital it has been noted that between the period 1955-1961 and the period 1962-1968, the incidence of cancer of the liver among persons subjected to those sprayings increased from 2.89 per cent to 9.07 per cent. Furthermore, many statistical investigations carried out in different countries have shown the carcinogenic effect of dioxin in minute doses (in particular the work done on behalf of the Dow Chemical Company and the work of the cancer research group of the Environmental Protection Agency). Studies made in recent years in Viet Nam have also shown that the incidence of primary cancer of the liver among subjects exposed to sprayings with defoliants is five times higher than among subjects not so exposed.

These facts represent only a small part of the information contained in the reports submitted at the Ho Chi Minh City Symposium. While further research is still needed on certain aspects, at the conclusion of the Symposium everyone was agreed that the use of herbicides and defoliants in the Vietnamese war had resulted in grave and harmful long-term consequences for man, nature and the economy of Viet Nam. Professor Arthur W. Galston of the United States said so as long ago as on 9 February 1977 at a Congressional hearing, when he stated that he was convinced that the destructive effects of toxic chemical products on Viet Nam, including the environment and the country's entire civilization, were unforeseeable.

The International Symposium held at Ho Chi Minh City, nearly half of the participants in which came from foreign countries, in its conclusions appealed to the international community to take urgent measures to help the Vietnamese people to eliminate the terrible consequences of the use in war of herbicides and defoliants. We believe that we can count on international co-operation in the solution of this problem, a very difficult one and extremely costly in material and financial resources, clearly far beyond the possibilities of our country. We believe that this will be for the benefit both of the Vietnamese people and of mankind as a whole.

(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

To come now to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to emphasize how much these preliminary results of the Symposium underline the importance and urgency of finding a successful solution to the problems posed in this sphere of chemical weapons.

It seems to me that at the present time a sound basis exists for the speedy drafting of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons: a number of important documents and concrete and practical proposals have been submitted, including in particular the document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction", presented by the Soviet Union, a document rich in constructive ideas for solutions to the specific problems connected with the prohibition of such weapons. Many countries among the Group of 21 have also put forward useful ideas.

Allow me, on the basis of the results of the Symposium, to put certain thoughts before the Committee. In my view, the prohibition of chemical weapons should be universal; each State party to the convention should undertake never and in no circumstances to develop, produce, acquire in any way, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons, and to destroy its stocks of them or redirect them into authorized purposes as well as to destroy or dismantle facilities for the production of chemical weapons.

As regards the question of what chemical substances should be prohibited, my delegation considers that the future convention should prohibit all chemical substances for purposes of war without, however, placing unnecessary difficulties in the way of the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes.

Certainly, the future convention ought to contain provisions giving an assurance of its strict application. As regards the question of what specific methods of verification should be used with respect to the various aspects of the activities prohibited, my delegation is of the view that verification measures should be effective but should not be such as to lead to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States or the creation of obstacles to the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes; in other words, they should be very carefully thought out from every point of view. Thus what is needed is a rational and effective combination of national and international means of verification.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that all the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, through their distinguished representatives here present, will make greater efforts in order to complete as soon as possible the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is urgently called for both by the lesson of the tragedy of the Vietnamese people and by the interests of all mankind.

The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, for its part, would like to be able to take a more active part in the drafting of this future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We could thus make available to the Committee the knowledge we have acquired and the results of the research being carried out by our Vietnamese experts, among others, on the basis of the experience suffered by the Vietnamese people, the harmful consequences of which are still being felt even today in the lives of our people.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

To conclude, I should like to make some comments on item 4 of the agenda.

By contrast with the consideration of other substantive issues, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in this Committee have made considerable headway as far as the scope of the work done is concerned. Like many other delegations we believe that if all participants in the negotiations were prepared to contribute to the successful completion of the work on a convention prohibiting chemical weapons this year, that would be a completely attainable objective.

The important thing, as we see it, is that the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be conducted in a practical way. In this connection we wish fully to support the proposal made by a number of delegations for a parallel approach consisting, on the one hand, of the formulation of those key provisions of the future convention on which there is a coincidence or similarity of views and, on the other hand, in close connection with this work, the continuation of the search for mutually acceptable solutions to questions on which there are still divergencies of views. We think that such an approach will speed up and bring us significantly nearer to agreement on the final text of a convention.

As regards questions of substance, the Mongolian delegation would like particularly to note certain constructive proposals that have been made during the present session. I am thinking primarily of the support given by the Soviet delegation to the proposal of a number of non-aligned and neutral States for the inclusion in the future convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, of the Soviet proposal for a renunciation of the production of chemicals with the methy-phosphorus bond, and of the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for the declaration and liquidation of stocks of binary weapons during the initial phase after the entry into force of the convention. These proposals are undoubtedly extremely important from the point of view of facilitating the negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

After the prolonged interval between the end of January of this year and last week, the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has at last managed to resume its work. The Mongolian delegation would like to express the hope that under the chairmanship of Ambassador McPhail of Canada this Working Group will be able to complete the task before it.

The Committee on Disarmament has today heard the important statement of Comrade Nguyen Thuong, the Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. In that statement he dwelt in detail on the results of the International Symposium on Herbicides and Defoliants in War: The Long-Term Effects on Man and Nature, which was held in Ho Chi Minh City from 13 to 20 January 1983. The Mongolian delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam for its noble efforts and its great contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

We consider that the statement by the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam usefully supplements the document which was distributed in the Committee at this session (CD/349), and will serve an important source of information in the consideration of questions of substance in the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Today I address myself to the question of chemical weapons. At the outset I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction that the lengthy and unnecessary complications which prevented a start on work in this important and promising area have been resolved, and that the Ambassador of Canada, Mr. McPhail, has been appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. My delegation congratulates him on his appointment and looks forward to working closely with him at this session.

Ambassador McPhail has promised to speed our work, putting the focus on negotiation. In this he deserves our full support. Frankly, his task is no easy one. In the first place, proceedings have passed beyond the testing but still relatively straightforward phase of identification, to the much harder stage of trading off firmly held positions. Secondly, important procedural brakes are active.

Under the last Chairman, various circumstances, including the General Assembly's special session on disarmament, conspired to give the Committee on Disarmament something of a free run on chemical weapons. We were able to schedule concentrated periods of work, even outside the regular spring and summer sessions. We were able to take advantage of an imaginative idea of Ambassador Sujka for contact groups, convened with maximum informality. My delegation, with many others, went on record in favour of that approach.

Since then, several delegations have legitimately pointed out that to do business only in English, as happened in the contact groups last year, placed them at a disadvantage. Accordingly, they have asked for full interpretation services. As a result, the contact groups are better serviced and better managed, but they have lost something of their informality — in a sense their youth, innocence and dynamism. It is my delegation's strong recommendation that some element of this be restored and that contact group co-ordinators be allowed, as they see fit and as the need arises, occasionally to resort to informal methods of business. There is a further good reason for this, namely, the absolute limit on the number of rooms available in any one week for full secretarial services, and the ferocious competition for them. The competitiveness will only increase. It would be an enormous pity if progress towards a ban on chemical weapons became the price we had to pay. If the secretariat is able to provide additional facilities, notably increased availability of interpretation, this would be a real contribution.

When I last spoke on the question of chemical weapons, on 8 February, the United States delegation was on the point of tabling its detailed views on a chemical weapons convention. We have since studied these with profound interest: there is no doubt that the substantive matter which is to be found in document CD/545 will advance our negotiations. On 22 February, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union announced a new policy of his Government under which it could agree to include a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in a future treaty. This, too, is a major development, and one which my delegation welcomes as advancing our efforts in the elaboration of an international convention to ban chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The arguments for not following this logic and for rejecting the concept of a prohibition on use really boil down to one: there is already in place a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Other arguments flow from this — that ambiguities could arise in relation to the Protocol, or the Biological Weapons Convention which derived from it. Delegations might wish to refer to two comprehensive statements in this regard, one by the head of the Polish delegation in 1981 (CD/PV.138) and the other by Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium last month (CD/PV.206).

I do not intend now to attempt a detailed counter-argument, particularly as I addressed the matter last year (CD/PV.168). It might help delegations, however, if I simply tabulate some of the major points made in support of including a prohibition on use in a future convention. These derive from statements by the Ambassadors of Argentina (CD/PV.167), China (CD/PV.118), Indonesia (CD/PV.169 and 180) and Pakistan (CD/PV.171). Since our five delegations have in recent years worked together on this issue, I trust they will excuse my borrowing from them in this way. The points that I might tabulate are the following:

1. A new convention containing a distinct ban on use would be truly comprehensive;
2. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, rather than being weakened in this regard, can be strengthened;
3. Treaties build on each other: there are numerous precedents;
4. The 1925 Protocol logically should have ended the use of chemical weapons, but unfortunately it did not — indeed the potential for the use of chemical weapons exists under the Protocol;
5. The Protocol did not anticipate that the concept of "war" would evolve into the larger concept of armed conflict;
6. The Protocol allows for ambiguity on the chemicals to be covered;
7. The protocol is limited (by reservation and interpretation) to no first use, and to States that are parties to it;
8. The logic of future verification mechanisms (verification is not itself provided for under the Protocol) is that use should be included in a future ban.

I have mentioned logic more than once, for example, in the additional argument that the general purpose criterion should lead to including a ban on use. The logic of the concept that the future convention should base itself on purpose rather than capability should lead to the inclusion of a ban on use: it is use which transforms purpose from something subjective and debatable to objective reality. On the other hand, there are arguments, good ones, that chemical weapons capability itself should also be restricted by the future convention and here, too, logic leads to including a ban on use. Without a restraint on chemical weapons capability, the convention might actually add to the risk that States could develop a threatening chemical posture, within the law. The threat of use will be much more apparent than the threat of manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and so on.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Of all the arguments, verification is the main one. Let me assure those delegations which have expressed the fear lest the verification cart be put before the convention horse that the correct order is being observed. The chemical weapons area is a good example of the proposition that disarmament and arms limitation conventions aim to increase security, and that verification contributes to this as a consequence. States give up partially and/or temporarily some of their national security when they adhere to a convention so that they might benefit from a general consequential improvement in security. The reassurance that the process is worth it comes largely through the methods available to them of verifying that all States are complying. In the sphere of chemical weapons, there will have to be an extended and delicate period during which States reduce their chemical weapons profile, actual or potential. There will be asymmetries and uncertainties. There will be a need to ensure — in stages or phases — that complex obligations are being honoured. How this verification is achieved will require continuous regulation in the course of negotiating the convention, but it will of course be subordinated to the objectives of the convention itself.

There has been a wide measure of agreement that the future convention must provide a means to verify that chemical weapons have not been used. The basis of this agreement is that the 1925 Protocol's prohibition on use has no verification mechanism. It might be possible to verify something under one convention which is prohibited in another but, to put it mildly, that would be untidy. My delegation argues a simple proposition: let the future convention ban the possibility of the use of chemicals as weapons, and let it provide a verification mechanism to ensure compliance with this ban.

I said earlier that we were moving into negotiations proper. This is a stage which calls for flexibility. The Soviet delegation has indicated the maximum flexibility on this key question. The United States delegation earlier, in its detailed views submitted as document CD/343, also demonstrated an adjustment of its position on the issue of explicitly prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. The French delegation, too, has recently considered ways in which its own concerns, as well as the concerns of those seeking a ban on use, might be met by some formula which affirmed the enduring validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. My delegation is ready to negotiate on this issue. We sense that the basis for consensus is there: one which protects the undeniable and lasting achievement of the Protocol and yet one which will of itself effectively ensure against the use of chemical weapons.

Concretely, my delegation proposes that in our new negotiating phase we do not, as in the past, exclude "use" from our terms of reference. On the contrary, we should build it in, by brackets, unwritten agreement or any other device. As we proceed, we should ask ourselves: what would inclusion of a specific reference to use involve? What would be the legal and other implications? What verification procedures would be affected? I do not discount the possibility that as a Committee we shall eventually conclude that a specific reference to use is not necessary in the prohibition itself. But such a conclusion should only come after we have convinced ourselves — and have a consensus to this effect — that our future convention will rule out the use of chemicals as weapons.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

At the meeting this morning the distinguished Ambassador Sadleir of Australia made a comprehensive and convincing statement on the reasons why prohibition of use should be included in the future chemical weapons convention. The Chinese delegation supports his statement. It is our hope that the Committee on Disarmament will arrive at an early agreement on the important subject of the scope of the future convention, so as to speed up the pace of negotiation and elaboration of the convention. It is in this spirit that the Chinese delegation has tabled a working paper today concerning the scope of prohibition, namely, the question of the prohibition regime of the convention. We hope this paper will soon be distributed in different languages.

Now, I wish to make a few comments on this subject.

Over the last few years, there have been fairly deep differences of opinion between countries on the question of whether or not the scope of the future convention should contain a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. The Chinese delegation is pleased to note that quite a number of delegations have come to accept the idea of including such a prohibition. However, there are still some delegations which express varying degrees of reservation and doubt on the subject. One of the questions they have raised is, if such a prohibition is included in the future convention, what will its relationship be with the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol? My delegation believes a solution to this question can be found.

First, in statements in the plenary and again in the contact group, quite a number of delegations have pointed out that the prohibition regime of the 1925 Geneva Protocol should be in line with that of the future convention. We associate ourselves with this view. Should there be any difference between the two, problems would arise which would be similar to those we encountered during negotiations when the prohibition of use was not supposedly to be included in the scope of the convention. For instance, it would be necessary to differentiate which areas come under the prohibition regime of the Protocol and which would

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

come under the regime of the future convention; then it would be necessary to solve the problem of verification of compliance with the Geneva Protocol prohibition regime. As everyone knows, such matters involve many complicated issues, making their solution rather difficult. However, all the above difficulties could be resolved, if a prohibition of use of chemical weapons were to be included in the future convention, and it could be brought in line with that of the Protocol, because on the common ground of the two regimes, any failure of compliance with one regime would simultaneously be a failure of compliance with the other. And this failure of compliance could be dealt with according to the verification or other possible relevant provisions of the future convention.

Secondly, how to bring these two prohibition regimes in line with each other? It is our view that this can be done on the common basis that both regimes prohibit the direct and indirect use of the toxic physiological effects of chemical substances for fighting purposes. (Here we do not refer to biological warfare, because it is outside the scope of our present debate.)

Such a basis not only conforms to the obligations provided for in the Geneva Protocol, but is also in full accord with the "general purpose criterion" of the future convention. At the same time it can suitably resolve the differences of opinion on herbicides and irritants, that is, it prohibits their use for fighting purposes while permitting their use for purposes of peace and law enforcement. And it naturally follows that research, development, production, transfer, acquisition by other means and stockpiling which are in conformity with these two purposes are also legal.

Thirdly, as we have previously pointed out, the best way to unify the two regimes is to use the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the definition of chemical weapons to be included in the convention, and also to include its definition in the convention. This concept of "chemical warfare agents" embodies the fundamental characteristics of chemical weapons and also reflects the content of the "general purpose criterion". As such it can aptly become the basis for unifying the two prohibition regimes mentioned above. In our view, the term "chemical warfare agents" sums up in the most precise and appropriate term the whole concept of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol (of course, this does not refer to biological warfare either). And what lies at the centre of the prohibition by the future convention is exactly "chemical warfare agents", whether they be super-toxic lethal, lethal, other harmful substances or any other kind of substance, as long as they are used for fighting purposes.

Consequently, the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in itself contains the basis for unifying the prohibition regimes of the two international instruments.

The Chinese delegation has always advocated using the concept of "chemical warfare agents" in the future convention. In the course of the previous negotiations, many other delegations have also submitted working papers on the definition of this term. At this stage, when we are attempting to examine and settle the question of the relationship between the two regimes, the adoption of this concept becomes even more necessary. It is our belief that by straightening

out the relationship between these two regimes, we will be in a better position to achieve an agreement on the question of the scope of the future convention. The Chinese delegation stands ready to exchange views with all other delegations on this issue.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall confine my short remarks on this occasion to two main subjects on our agenda, namely, chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the first topic, chemical weapons, I would like first of all to express our thanks to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail of Canada. Like his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, he has approached his task with remarkable seriousness of purpose and sense of direction. His method has made it possible to minimize drift and interminable arguments. It is our fervent hope that the expectations expressed by various delegations regarding the elaboration of a convention aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons will not be misplaced.

My delegation is of the view that the extensive work carried out in the month of January this year within the chemical weapons Working Group and in which technical experts participated, the many proposals of various delegations, including those of the Superpowers and the ongoing deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons constitute a sound basis for concrete negotiations that could produce a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The distinguished representative of the

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, in his intervention on 12 April said, "The Committee is on the eve of the decisive stage of the negotiations aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons". I hope that the two Superpowers will demonstrate with concrete results that the adage "to whom much is given much is expected" holds true for them too.

Let me reiterate my delegation's firm conviction that the technical issues of verification and compliance are not insurmountable, and that the time has now come for the two Superpowers to demonstrate with a sense of urgency the much-needed political will with a view to reaching agreements on a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty under effective international control.

In the process of working out the details of a convention, my delegation favours a general purpose criterion rather than selecting certain substances only for prohibition. In the view of my delegation, the latter could provide a fertile loophole. Though most of the chemicals or substances in this regard may not be weapons in themselves, one can liken them to nuclear facilities which may be military or peaceful, depending on who is making the declaration. Most delegations seated around this table have expressed willingness to proceed seriously with progress on a convention banning chemical weapons. In particular it is reassuring to note that the Soviet Union has indicated flexibility on its once-hardened position and also the United States delegation's detailed proposals made at the beginning of this session have come a long way to providing a live picture of a future chemical weapons convention. So the ball is now in the Committee's court; we have the ingredients for what looks like a chemical weapons convention. My delegation therefore urges the Committee to seize the bull by the horns now.

It is the belief of my delegation that the present momentum in favour of the elaboration of a chemical weapons ban should be maintained. In order to advance the cause of our work on this question, may I suggest that a chemical weapons convention drafting group be set up within the Committee. Such a body, made up of representatives of various groups within the Committee, should be charged with the responsibility of elaborating a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty. Such a drafting group should concern itself with identifying those areas where agreement has been reached, while the remaining provisions can be inserted in the draft as soon as final agreement on them is reached. We should not let this momentum slip away. The merits of this proposal, we believe, are psychological and procedural in nature; by collating those areas where there is a consensus, it will help to focus attention on those topics needing further treatment.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, as we come to the close of our spring session, permit me a brief survey of the state of the Committee from the perspective of the United States delegation.

This session began on a high note with the visits to the Committee by many distinguished government officials, including the Vice-President of the United States, the Minister for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. These important visitors were followed later by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, the Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria joined this distinguished host of visitors and also addressed the Committee. Aside from the prestige of their respective high offices, each brought to the Committee their expressions of respect and encouragement for the Committee. For our part, Vice-President Bush brought a major new initiative on chemical weapons to the Committee. However, despite the auspicious beginning and the attention devoted to our work, the Committee wasted almost two months of precious time -- virtually two-thirds of its spring session on futile debate. Consideration of agenda items and procedural arrangements were linked to important substantive measures awaiting its consideration. This was a deplorable situation which prevented any real progress for this half of our 1983 session. Our performance this spring can only serve the interest of our critics and depreciate their opinion of our role as a negotiating body. Let us learn a lesson from these mistakes, lest we, as Santayana cogently warned, "are damned to repeat them".

We have, however, taken some small steps in this session. Our agenda finally settled, we re-established our working groups, elected their chairmen, and finally began to settle down to the substantive work of the Committee.

The achievement of a ban on chemical weapons, a priority item for the Committee -- and certainly of my delegation -- got off to a promising start. The Working Group, under the capable leadership of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, moved quickly to organize itself and set about the important task of resolving differences. Continuing the extremely useful method of work begun under Ambassador Sujka last year, contact groups were established to focus on key issues. The Working Group is considering the wealth of material developed on this subject -- and, in particular, the "basic provisions" tabled by the Soviet Union last summer (CD/294) and the United States "detailed views" tabled this year on 10 February (CD/343). The Chairman, aided by his consultations and the energetic work of his contact group leaders, has placed us in a good position to make significant progress in the coming summer session. Let us all dedicate ourselves to this vital task.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I hardly need emphasize the priority Canada attaches to the expeditious conclusion of an agreement banning chemical weapons. We have been entrusted with a special responsibility by the Committee, and I assure you I intend to make good the confidence the Committee has placed in me as Chairman of the chemical weapons Working Group, and I want now for a few moments to speak in that capacity.

Perhaps the opening statement from the Chair to the Working Group on 6 April bears some repetition: "The goal of the Group is to achieve the negotiation of a verifiable convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles and means of production, thus finally eliminating the threat of the use of these terrible weapons in war for all time." I do not predict that this far-reaching goal will be wholly achieved during 1983, but at this stage I make no prediction either that we shall fail to reach such a conclusion. Certainly the process can be moved forward in a most substantial way. Great progress has been achieved under the Chairmanships of Japan, Sweden and Poland during the past three years; and as delegations on all sides lately have pointed out, we are now poised to move into a highly productive final phase of these negotiations. That is the challenge before us in 1983.

I am satisfied that we are moving towards this goal. The late start of the Working Group prevented us from moving as quickly as we should have liked in tackling many of the key issues, and hard negotiations lie ahead. This is to say that the test of the chemical weapons Working Group to make real and substantive progress lies in the summer session when the hardest negotiations will begin, when concessions must be made, and when difficult choices must be taken if we are to progress further: the Working Group, in the opinion of its Chairman, is now at the stage where it must be prepared to confront these matters.

On substantive issues before the Working Group, areas of consensus and also areas where further work needs to be done have been identified, with a view to providing a focus for our negotiations. Areas of consensus include many aspects related to the question of scope; equally, there is basic agreement on a number of definitions. Co-operation and confidence-building measures also have a good foundation for consensus as these measures are elaborated; and there is a general pattern of agreement on many matters concerning the duties of compliance organizations. There is, in addition, sufficient agreement on the preamble and concluding articles of a chemical weapons convention to suggest that the remaining issues related to them can be effectively dealt with when the time comes.

But there are also areas of divergence, and it is here that our work must be most intense. The principal areas where consensus is lacking are the following:

Certain definitions, especially of precursors and key precursors, as they relate to the preparation and use of lists for purposes of determining levels of prohibition or control and verification procedures;

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

Destruction of existing stocks — scope, declarations, timings and monitoring;

Destruction of existing means of production — scope, declarations, timings and monitoring;

Non-production — scope, declarations, timings and monitoring;

Compliance provisions, particularly challenge methods and fact-finding procedures;

Provisions for the prohibition of use and the verification of alleged use.

These matters of substance, and other issues as well, including problems and approaches in recording areas of consensus (and differences) have been examined by the Working Group in its short period this session. Besides the regular Working Group meetings, three contact groups — on existing stockpiles, on the issue of non-compliance, and on the prohibition of use — were established under the Chairmanships of Poland, Brazil and the Netherlands respectively. The Working Group yesterday received oral reports from the Chairmen on progress so far, and while quite clearly, work is far from complete, no insurmountable obstacles have yet appeared. These three contact groups, the Working Group agreed, will continue their activities into the summer session, and I am confident that they will prove equal to the task of dealing with some of the tougher issues which will confront us then.

We, I think, know what the end product is that we are seeking to achieve this year. I will attempt to move the negotiations forward as fast as possible but I do not pretend to believe that we will manage to solve all the major issues. I hope that we can produce a document setting out in reasonable form all of the material where agreement has been reached and, where possible, to indicate by various techniques, via areas, where agreement remains to be achieved. Hopefully, this will show clearly what further negotiations may be needed and also where the Committee may then proceed with the final elaboration of a text.

During the present session, a certain amount of work has been done on the elaborating of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. A number of delegations in their statements both at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Working Group have noted the contribution of the Soviet delegation towards the speeding up of this work. A number of important proposals were made by other delegations also -- the United States of America, the German Democratic Republic, the United Kingdom and others. However, we are far from feeling euphoric about the results of the work done. The most difficult part of the negotiations lies ahead.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation, like the delegations of the other countries of the socialist community, considers it essential to speed up the attainment of agreement on a number of specific questions in order to give fresh impetus to the negotiations taking place within the framework of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, towards the following ends:

The drafting as soon as possible of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;

The speeding up of the work on an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons;

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

...
Nevertheless we note with great satisfaction the profound interest shown by many States, and especially the socialist States, in the speediest possible achievement of agreement in the sphere of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In the course of the session quite a number of constructive proposals were put forward, and these will undoubtedly serve as a stimulus to the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Mongolian People's Republic, as you know, attaches great importance to the relationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We would like, therefore, once more to say that the step taken by the Soviet Union to meet the position of a number of non-aligned and neutral countries regarding the inclusion in the convention of a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons creates favourable prospects for the solution of this very important question.

It cannot be denied that the many years of discussion of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons are bearing fruit. We share the view of those who consider that a sound basis now exists for more substantial and, more important, more concrete work on the text of the future convention. We hope that under the chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail, it will be possible for the work of the Group to move, to a greater extent than has been the case in the past, precisely in this direction. It would, of course, be a mistake not to take account of the divergencies existing between the positions of different countries on a number of questions which will call for further careful consideration and thorough study. A judicious combination of these two approaches will, we believe, make it possible in the course of the summer part of the session to make substantial progress towards the prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

My delegation is glad that as regards the efforts to achieve the elimination of chemical weapons as well as with respect to radiological weapons, on both of which items there are ad hoc working groups, and as regards the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, where it seems that only one delegation still has reservations about the setting up of another ad hoc working group, the prospects are less discouraging than they unfortunately appear to be with regard to the items I reviewed earlier.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

While the vicissitudes we encountered at the beginning of this session delayed the re-starting of the working groups, we must nevertheless recognize that the weeks devoted principally to the discussion of procedural problems and the agenda were not altogether lost, even as regards certain questions of substance, and I would refer in particular to the question of chemical disarmament. During the first two months of the session, some very important contributions were made on this issue; we heard statements of great interest at plenary meetings of the Committee; even before the opening of the session, the Working Group had spent three weeks continuing its efforts under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, and in fact it could be said that it was that subject -- one we consider extremely important -- which marked the opening of the session. The situation has now returned to normal, with the resumption of work in conditions we consider favourable. The responsibility for this, I should like to say, is due in large part to the new Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador McPhail. We particularly appreciate his determination to concentrate the work of the Group on trying to reach agreement on the points of substance on which there are still divergences of views. Ambassador McPhail has again used the method of contact groups which proved so fruitful under the chairmanship of his predecessor, Ambassador Sujka, while reducing the number of those groups to three.

I should like to say a few words about the subjects so far dealt with by these groups: the declaration and destruction of stocks of chemical weapons; the procedure for on-site inspections by challenge, and the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons.

As regards the verification of the destruction of stocks, the position of the French delegation is well known; we believe that such verification should in the first instance guarantee that the nature and the quantity of the products destroyed in fact correspond to what has been declared; then, that there is no possibility for the diversion or substitution of products during the process of destruction, and lastly, that the destruction is carried out in a manner that is irreversible or very difficult to reverse and that the final products are unusable as chemical weapons.

We believe that in order to guarantee all these things, international verification should be carried out continuously throughout the period of the operations of destruction. In the present state of technology, this means that international inspectors must have access at all times to every part of the destruction facility. The development of automatic verification systems will perhaps one day make it possible to reduce these constraints, but it will still be necessary for any equipment installed to be reliable and guaranteed against any manipulation.

(Cont'd)

(dir. de la Gorce, France)

In the contact group concerned with the procedure for on-site inspections by challenge, the discussion has centred mainly on the way a State forming the subject of a request for an inspection by challenge should react to it. According to the consensus which appears to have emerged in the contact group, a State forming the subject of such a request could not refuse to accede to it arbitrarily and without explanations. We believe that it is necessary to go much further. Once the destruction of stocks and facilities is complete, confidence between the parties can be assured only by a guarantee that none of them will subsequently resume the manufacture of chemical weapons. This requires, on the one hand, that the industrial establishments manufacturing products capable of being diverted for use in chemical weapons -- for example, products containing the methyl-phosphorus bond -- should be subject to systematic international verification of a strictness dependent on the potential danger of the products in question. In that connection, verification by the drawing of lots appears to offer an appropriate method. On the other hand, it is essential that any suspicion of a possible violation of the convention should be investigated promptly after the addressing of a "challenge" to the State suspected, by means of an on-site inspection conducted by an international team. This kind of inspection is so important that acceptance of it ought to be the rule -- it would, moreover, be to the benefit of the innocent State and would embarrass any dishonest accuser -- and refusal ought to be the exception. What the contact group ought to consider, therefore, is not the conditions that should be met by a request for inspection by challenge, but in what very limited cases a State so challenged could refuse such an inspection, and what justification it would then be required to provide.

The third contact group has been dealing with the question of the possible inclusion in the convention of a clause prohibiting use, and the question of verification of compliance with that clause. As we explained on 8 March last, we are not convinced of the need for such a provision. We consider that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is already ensured in as complete a manner as possible by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, both as regards the products to which that prohibition would apply -- "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices" -- and as regards the circumstances in which use is prohibited. The expression "use in war" ought not to be interpreted as having a restrictive meaning: in 1925 the idea of armed conflicts other than formally declared wars had not made its appearance in international law, and it is clear from the terms of the Protocol itself that its authors had no intention whatever of restricting its application to formally declared wars.

However, if a consensus emerges in favour of a repetition of the prohibition of use in the future convention, it would be essential, and I think we are all agreed on this, to avoid anything which would prejudice the authority of the Geneva Protocol. As the French delegation has already stressed, the preamble to the convention ought to contain a paragraph reaffirming the validity of the Protocol. Such a text ought also to state that the Protocol forms part of international law and that the prohibitions it contains apply to all. The future convention ought also to stipulate that none of its provisions can be interpreted as derogating from the obligations flowing from the Protocol.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

If more is felt to be needed, the States parties to the convention which are parties to the Geneva Protocol could recall the commitments they had assumed under the latter, and those States which were not parties to the Protocol could declare their acceptance of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons embodied in the Protocol. Such a solution, which is very near to that suggested by Mr. Ackerman, the co-ordinator of the contact group responsible for this question, would have the advantage of avoiding both duplication with the Geneva Protocol and the risk of instituting regimes for the prohibition of use that were different for States parties to the protocol and States not parties to the Protocol.

As to verification of compliance with the prohibition of use, as was proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union and other delegations, this should form the subject of appropriate provisions in the part of the convention devoted to verification. These provisions should take account of the specific conditions-- state of war or armed conflict-- in which a violation of the prohibition of use might be committed. They ought to be based essentially on on-site inspection by challenge and to provide in particular for speedy and unhampered access by inspectors to the locations of alleged violations. The French Government attaches particular importance to this matter of verification of violations of the Geneva Protocol and more generally to the rule of international law it embodies. It was for this reason that at the United Nations General Assembly session of last year the French delegation, along with others worked to secure the adoption of a procedure for that purpose. We have already replied here to the objections raised that the resolution adopted violates the law of treaties. We shall, if necessary, revert to this matter. But we should like to repeat that an action designed to ensure respect for a provision of international law cannot be presented as being contrary to international law. In adopting resolution 37/93 D of 13 December 1982, the General Assembly in no way exceeded its competence. It merely provided for the adoption of provisional procedures designed to uphold the authority of the 1925 Protocol, an authority which would be weakened if such procedures could not be applied when there was an allegation of a violation of the Protocol. The well-known and indisputable rule of international law concerning the useful effect of treaties -- Potius valeat quam pereat (the treaty should prevail rather than perish) -- fully confirms this.

In the event of any lacuna in an international undertaking, it is implicitly within the competence of the body best equipped, both by its composition and by the range of its general functions, to act on behalf of the international community of States as a whole, to provide for the creation of a mechanism to ensure that that international instrument is in fact respected and that possible violations thereof shall be brought to the notice of international public opinion when such an instrument forms an integral part of general international law, and in the present instance the body of rules of international law applicable in the case of armed conflicts.

(The Chairman)

As the Committee is well aware, we are expected to embark on serious and meaningful negotiations aimed at achieving concrete results on a number of priority disarmament issues. These include the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling and deployment of chemical weapons, the submission of a clean draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session in consonance with the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the question of a mandate for and the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. We also have the subject of the broadening of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, the question of the enhancement of the Committee's effectiveness, its redesignation, and other items on the agenda.

At this juncture, it may be worth while to affirm that the virtual consensus and the momentum achieved during the spring session in favour of a future chemical weapons convention should be maintained and carried to its logical conclusion.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

The Committee has yet to demonstrate its ability to finalize international treaties relating to the limitation or elimination of armaments. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, a start was made on the adoption of international legislation in this sphere. This legislative effort should be resumed as soon as possible. Since joining the Committee in 1979, Belgium has always advocated the identification of specific topics suitable for negotiations. Although important work has been done in recent years, particularly on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Committee has often wasted time on lengthy procedural discussions or academic debates sometimes on abstract subjects hardly lending themselves to negotiation. It is generally agreed that this year once again the most promising topic is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Belgium, on whose territory asphyxiating gases were used in an armed conflict for the first time in history, hopes that the Committee will devote all the necessary resources to these negotiations, which have reached a sufficiently advanced stage to permit their conclusion in the fairly near future. A willingness to negotiate was reaffirmed, here in the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of this year by Mr. Bush, the Vice-President of the United States, and at the second special session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko. In this connection, Belgium was encouraged by the proposals made at that time by the Soviet Union concerning systematic international on-site inspection, even if those proposals have not been sufficiently elaborated since then.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

Concerned at the virulent discussions which have developed in recent decades as a result of allegations of the use in combat of chemical warfare agents, I put forward in New York in June 1982 detailed proposals for monitoring compliance with the prohibitions on their use laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Since then, other suggestions have been made for dealing with this problem, both in the General Assembly and here in the Committee on Disarmament itself. Nevertheless, we consider that our proposal remains valid and should be kept in mind when considering the legal aspects of the scope of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Starting from the idea that the prohibition of the use in combat of chemical and bacteriological weapons has, after the passage of more than 50 years, become universally accepted, it seeks solely to improve the range of concrete measures available to the international community to ensure compliance with this prohibition. However, I repeat, the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons is a priority matter and Belgium expects the Committee to devote the time necessary to it in order to produce the text of a treaty as soon as possible.

CD/PV.219

6

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

I should like once again to stress the importance which my Government attaches to the negotiations in this Committee on a chemical weapons convention. We believe that significant progress has been made towards this goal in the chemical weapons Working Group and we are ready to work intensively on this subject during the summer. We should like to see chemical weapons given priority in the scheduling of meetings and the allocation of secretariat resources. We believe that it is now time to come to grips with the outstanding problems, particularly in the difficult but vital area of verification. We hope that all delegations will strive to reach agreement on the substantive issues where differences remain, and that efforts will not be diverted in going over areas upon which a broad measure of agreement already exists. Our aim for the summer should be to enlarge the areas of consensus -- indeed, we should if possible seek to reach agreement in principle on all major points of substance.

My delegation at our last session tabled a working paper, document CD/353, on the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. We look forward to hearing the views of other delegations on the ideas contained in that working paper during the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We hope in particular that delegations will be able to make available information about their national production of the key precursors mentioned in our working paper, to enable us to make a better judgement of the size of the problem involved. We very much welcome the news that a number of delegations are in a position to present such statistics to the Committee.

CD/PV.220

14

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

When it is said that at present negotiations are being conducted in the Committee on Disarmament that give promise of the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement, that is usually with reference to the talks in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. However, we are not fully convinced that such an assessment is justified.

The question of a chemical weapons ban has been under consideration in the Committee on Disarmament since 1970. For the last 13 years, the majority of States participating in the Committee's work have expressed their views in detail. They have submitted about 300 documents which provide a comprehensive analysis of the technical, military, legal and other aspects of the problem. However, even now, the elaboration of the text of a possible agreement on a chemical weapons ban has still not been initiated. In our view, if no work is being done on the drafting of the text, then we cannot speak about the promising character of the work. The Soviet delegation appeals to all delegations really interested in progress in this field to make efforts to secure the speediest possible initiation of drafting work in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Otherwise, the Ad Hoc Working Group may find that the interest of many States in its work is noticeably declining.

(Mr. Valtasaari, Finland)

Another priority of Finland in the substantive work of the Committee is the issue of chemical weapons.

In 1971 my Government initiated a research project on the analytical verification of chemical warfare agents. The systematic publication of laboratory results began in 1977 with the report, "Chemical instrumental verification of organophosphorus agents".

Perhaps the most important result of the Finnish project is an identification handbook consisting of three parts. The first was published in 1979 and dealt with an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data; the second, published in 1980, dealt with the identification of the degradation products of all important nerve agents, and the third, published in 1982, dealt with applied automatic methods to 20 most important non-phosphorus agents.

The next publication in this series of what we call "blue books" will come out this summer. It will, in our view, be a timely contribution to the substantive issues discussed in the Working Group. The title will be "The precursors and key precursors", and the report will deal with the identification of precursors of nerve agents, and a few classical and other non-phosphorus chemical warfare agents and the degradation of the products of adamsite, lewisite and mustard.

Our project will continue beyond this year, and we hope with it to contribute to bringing the problems of the verification of a possible chemical weapons convention closer to technical solution.

In view of the significant effort invested in the preparations for the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention as well as of numerous positive statements by many governments, we would hope that the necessary political basis for negotiations has been strengthened. Of course this hope will be proven true or false only after the negotiations have reached a more concrete phase.

(Mr. Nufiez Mosquera, Cuba)

Another important item in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and one on which serious efforts are being made to achieve concrete agreements, is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, the drafting process has yet to be begun in the relevant Working Group, although it is repeatedly said that areas of agreement are being identified. If there are indeed areas of agreement, why, then, do we not begin the process of drafting?

(Mr. Fields, USA)

This morning I intend to speak about the prohibition of chemical weapons. I will present my delegation's views on the topic scheduled for this week -- the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters -- at our next plenary meeting.

Let me begin with some general remarks. The over-all results of the spring part of the 1983 session were very disappointing to my delegation. Our disappointment was particularly sharp in the area of chemical weapons, since we had undertaken major steps at the beginning of the session to facilitate progress toward an agreement in this critical area. The failure of the Committee to resolve procedural issues promptly led to an unconscionable delay in resuming work on the important chemical weapons ban. None the less, by the end of April we were modestly encouraged by the activities of the chemical weapons Working Group. We believed that prospects were good for more intensive and productive work once the Committee reconvened in mid-June.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Fields, United States)

We continue to be optimistic about what realistically might be achieved this summer. It is now clear that an agreement cannot be completed this year, given the complex and difficult issues that remain to be resolved. On many issues the necessary foundation for a convention is still far from complete. However, by systematically tackling and resolving each of these remaining key issues, an effective ban can be constructed. We would hope that by the end of the summer some of these issues will be resolved, and that positions on others will be closer.

Under the able leadership of Ambassador McPhail, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has established contact groups on four important problem areas -- stockpiles, the compliance mechanism, a ban on use, and recently, definitions, lists and related verification measures. We applaud the decision to deal comprehensively with each area, to pull together work on related issues of scope, declaration and verification. In each of these four groups there are a number of issues yet to be resolved. While these contact groups have been under way for only a short time, there already seems to be encouraging forward movement. Still, much remains to be done. In particular, it must not be forgotten that there is not yet active discussion of one of the most important problem areas -- the declaration, monitoring and elimination of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. Positions are far apart here, and much needs to be done. The chemical weapons Working Group needs to find a way to intensify its consideration of this key area.

Of the existing contact groups, the one on stockpiles has the most complex task. The group's mandate encompasses declaration and destruction, the monitoring of the stocks until they are destroyed and the verification of their destruction. We expect each of these issues to be dealt with seriously in the group this summer. Special attention should be given to issues which have not already been discussed extensively, such as inspection and monitoring of declared stocks. Issues whose resolution appears within reach, such as verification of stockpile destruction, should also be focal points for the group's work and, in that regard, I would like to make some specific comments.

In his statement of 4 February, Vice-President Bush stressed the need to intensify work on a chemical weapons ban and committed the United States to help accelerate the Committee's efforts. Toward this end the United States delegation immediately presented a major initiative, which is contained in document CD/343. We have been encouraged by the constructive response from most delegations.

In order to facilitate progress toward an agreement, today the United States delegation is tabling another major document. The document deals with the critical issue of verification of stockpile destruction.

Verification of stockpile destruction has, of course, been discussed at length in the Committee. These discussions, which have thus far been largely conceptual in nature, have none the less resulted in a significant narrowing of differences. The most important remaining issue -- whether or not international inspection needs to be continuous while stockpile destruction is under way -- has a major technical component. Conclusions about the need for continuous inspection necessarily rest on information about the characteristics of the destruction process, the capabilities of sensors and the functions of inspectors.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

In our view, further progress on verification of stockpile destructions can only be achieved if the discussions move now from concepts to real-life situations. The paper we are tabling today is intended to facilitate a realistic consideration of the level of verification needed in a concrete existing situation. It is the product of intensive work during the recess period by members of my delegation in conjunction with United States army experts. Although the paper certainly reflects our own approach, in preparing it we have been mindful of the views and concerns expressed by other delegations. Delegations should be mindful as they study the paper that we have modified our approach at several points to take into account the views of others.

Our paper shows in detail, and in layman's language, how our approach to verification of stockpile destruction would actually work, using an existing destruction facility for the purpose of illustration. The first part of the paper describes the operation of the facility, the chemical agent munition disposal system (CAMDS) at Tooele army depot in Utah. This discussion is followed by an outline of the principles which form the basis for the verification plan. The concluding part describes in very specific terms how the destruction process would be monitored at the Utah facility through a combination of sensors and human inspectors. The type and location of sensors is spelled out and the specific tasks for inspectors described. Specific measures are provided to ensure the validity of data used for verification. The exact procedures to be used at another facility could, of course, be somewhat different, but the general scheme would be quite similar.

In our view, a careful analysis of this real-life example demonstrates clearly that effective verification of stockpile destruction can only be achieved through the continuous presence of inspectors while destruction operations are under way. Current sensors are inadequate to permit inspection visits to be put on a periodic basis. But it should be noted that effective verification does not require a throng of inspectors. For the Utah facility, for example, only a handful would be needed, and these only during the destruction process.

We trust that those who take a different position will also explain their approach in specific terms, as we have done. Specifically, it would be helpful for the group working on this issue to know: how would another approach work in practice at a real-life facility? How would it provide effective verification?

On this issue the time is past for vague, hypothetical arguments. The Committee's efforts must be directed to working out sound provisions which would lead to a truly effective ban on these odious weapons. It is our intention to make a more detailed presentation of this paper later this week in the contact group on stockpiles, and also to hold a question-and-answer session later for interested members of delegations and experts. Our experts will, of course, be prepared to respond to questions in the contact group meeting and in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well.

I believe it is clear that the United States delegation is ready to work hard on this issue with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution this summer. We hope that others are prepared to do the same. In our view, whether or not a solution can be found soon on this issue is a good way to judge the prospects for an agreement. Success here will augur well, even though more difficult problems are still ahead. Failure will cause many to question the seriousness of some within the Committee. For our part, we are ready -- and eagerly looking forward to -- a constructive dialogue which will inevitably lead to success.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

5. With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons we expect the Working Group to take up the drafting work at this session, so that concrete results can be achieved soon. The same applies to radiological weapons.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

To discharge these tasks the Committee on Disarmament should undertake, as a first step, the following measures:

1. The establishment, with an appropriate mandate, of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war.
2. The expansion of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban with a view to carrying out negotiations.
3. The start of the drafting process in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in order to elaborate the chemical weapons convention at an early date.
4. The establishment of a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space with a mandate allowing negotiations on the prohibition of all types of weapon in outer space.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Now let me turn to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation is very much encouraged by the fact that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the energetic and able leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, is examining various aspects of a future convention on chemical weapons more intensively than ever. I would like to point out that many active contributions have been made to facilitate the negotiations on a convention, the most recent one being the documentation by the United States delegation on the question of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. It has long been the strong conviction of my delegation that the ban on chemical weapons should start with the complete destruction of existing stockpiles. In this sense, we highly appreciate the efforts of the United States Government in sharing with the Committee its experiences in the field by presenting in detail the method now in use, as well as the possible procedures for verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. I sincerely hope that with this sort of practical example on our table the Committee will now be able to tackle this difficult yet most basic and important task in connection with banning chemical weapons, namely, destruction and its verification, with a view to coming to an agreement on this question.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

The fundamental difficulty which seemingly exists in the work on a chemical-
weapons ban comes from a certain confusion, I might say, on what it is that we
want to prohibit under the future convention. We have repeatedly stated that many
practical problems will have to be dealt with, unless we have a very clear
understanding about interactions between "definition", "declaration" and
"verification". That the delivery equipment for the specific purpose of chemical
warfare should be banned will meet with no objection. When it comes to chemicals
or chemical compounds, however, the matter becomes more complicated, and the root
of such confusion may be in the general understanding of what should be prohibited
on the one hand, and the generalized expression proposed as treaty language on the
other.

According to the definition of "chemical weapons" now proposed, chemicals,
whether super-toxic lethal, other lethal or other harmful, will be prohibited as
chemical weapons if they are intended for hostile purposes. This definition, as
we understand it, intends to prohibit the development, production, etc., of
chemicals for weapons purposes only, most of which are in the area of common
knowledge as regards their names and molecular compositions. As has already been
pointed out on many occasions in this chamber, and I hope there is a common
understanding on this, chemicals themselves are not weapons, except for those
already known to be dedicated to weapons purposes. Rather, many chemicals of
various toxicity levels are widely used in industry in large quantity for the
benefit of mankind. And I am sure that there is no intention on the part of any
delegation in the Committee to include such uses of chemicals for peaceful
civilian purposes in the scope of the prohibition. In the light of this, I would
like to point out the following with regard to the definition which I referred to
a moment ago.

(1) For a general-purpose criterion to be effectively applied, it is
necessary to define clearly such terms as "hostile purposes" or "hostile
activities", and this, I am afraid, is not an easy task.

(2) The element of "intention" is difficult to verify, especially when it
comes to the declaration of non-production of chemical weapons.

What, then, is the best possible approach to overcome these complications?
In our view, it would be essential that by the time of concluding a convention we
identify and list the chemical agents known to be used primarily for weapons
purposes, and that such listing should become an accepted common understanding by
the States parties to the convention. The convention will prohibit the
development, production, etc., of these agents as chemical weapons. A small
quantity may be permitted for protective purposes in a very limited way. There
probably is a need to provide for the constant up-dating of such a list, but
without it, it will be extremely difficult to proceed to declaration, destruction
and other steps just on the basis of generalized categorical definitions.

At the same time, my delegation fully recognizes the dangerous consequences
which other chemicals would cause to human life if used for hostile purposes,
including possible long-term or genetic effects. Therefore, a second measure
will be needed in a convention to ensure that these chemicals with a high
probability of misuse are restricted only to civilian peaceful purposes. To this
end, it will be important that some of these chemicals, including immediate
precursors, which can, by a single chemical reaction, be converted to weapons,

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

be also well-defined, identified in a list and placed under control to a certain extent with necessary verification procedures. We do not, however, envision the prohibition of production, etc., of these chemicals, in the same manner as what, for the lack of proper terminology, I will just call weapons-grade chemical agents. This second measure will be most appropriately supplemented by the prohibition of use for hostile purposes of these chemicals. Whether this second list, as well as the list of weapons agents, should form an integral part of a convention is a matter that needs further examination. I would confine myself to pointing out the practical need for their existence in the context of a chemical weapons convention.

I only hope that careful examination in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will find a suitable solution and that our suggestion may contribute to that end.

Now, Mr. Chairman, allow me to say a few words on the question of the non-use of chemical weapons. It has now been widely held that a future convention banning chemical weapons should not detract from the obligations of States under the 1925 Protocol and should include verification measures for the non-use of chemical weapons. We certainly share this view. Furthermore, it should be noted that, since the convention we are negotiating is legally independent of the 1925 Protocol, it should be legally self-consistent and self-contained. Therefore, if we intend to provide for verification procedures for non-use in a convention, a logical consequence would be that the use of chemical weapons or chemicals for weapons purposes should also be prohibited.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Today, I take up the subject of chemical weapons. I do so because, for the moment, this is the last week of this summer session during which the Australian delegation will be strengthened by the presence of an expert in this field. The Committee's experience with chemical weapons' experts has evolved from their first appearance here following an Australian proposal in 1979. That proposal was contained in document CD/59. The experts have come for informal meetings, for concentrated periods of technical consultations and, finally, as a team integrated into the activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and the various contact groups of that Working Group. There is no doubt in my mind that their presence has served substantially to advance our work, both by highlighting the technical problems which our efforts have identified and by showing the way to possible solutions, in every case promptly and practically.

The Committee has begun a new phase of intensive work on chemical weapons, seven meetings a week being scheduled with full secretarial services, and a range of other consultations on a bilateral, a regional or an informal basis. Inevitably, the results of this activity will be incremental and will not necessarily be seen all at once. There is, for example, consensus in the Committee that no delegation should be bound by any part of an emerging convention on chemical weapons until the convention as a whole is put together. Thus, reservations are often made for that reason, even when the delegation making them can broadly go along with the solution envisaged. We are erecting a complicated structure with many levels, ancillary facilities and annexes.

There are two things I want to stress. First, we are making progress. Secondly, the time has come to negotiate. On progress, we should continue on our current course, and by no means allow ourselves to be attracted to or distracted by the siren calls of procedural wrangling. That will be important when we begin to record how far we have got. On negotiation, we should all seek instructions allowing us flexibility, since we can now see enough of the structure of the convention to judge the extent to which our positions can contribute to or hamper further work.

When I last spoke on chemical weapons, on 21 April, I offered a clear hint that Australia was willing to show some flexibility on the question of a specific provision against the use of chemical weapons. The contact group, co-ordinated by the Netherlands delegation, which has this issue before it, has been the forum for some actual negotiations. Regrettably, this is a rare enough phenomenon in the Committee on Disarmament. The breakthrough we want is not yet, however, there. My delegation urges flexibility on others who, like ourselves, have strong views on this particular issue. I applaud, in particular, Japan which (as we heard from Ambassador Imai on 11 July) has now joined those delegations that advocate the inclusion of a prohibition on use in the new chemical weapons convention.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The analytical procedures necessary for verification of stockpile declarations and destruction will involve quantities of chemicals far in excess of the trace amounts of chemical agents and their residues which are likely to be available in challenge procedures involving use or non-use. Thus the standardized procedures which would be developed will be of two kinds: those designed to determine the chemical nature, breakdown products and other impurities of a sample taken routinely at a facility, and those designed to detect very small amounts of chemicals in environmental samples.

Once stockpiles have been destroyed—i.e., after 10 years of the convention's life—the stress will shift to the verification on non-production of new chemical weapons in either civilian industry or possible hidden facilities. Verification of use or non-use will remain an issue.

Controls on the precursors of chemical weapons will be important throughout the lifetime of the convention. During the phase of stockpile destruction, precursors of binary or multicomponent systems should be destroyed, subject to the same verification as the chemicals they precede.

Verification of the adequacy of controls on precursors will require different procedures from those developed for chemical weapons as such, since the toxicity of the precursor will not be relevant to its possible use in chemical warfare. Adequate analytical procedures exist, but the system of control will need to include definitions of precursors and lists of precursors. Thus the problem presented by the precursors of chemical agents relates more to how to define and list them than to appropriate analysis.

It has been suggested that States parties should be allowed to maintain, for non-hostile military purposes, small amounts of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Such purposes would include research into and development of purely protective military procedures. Measures to control this production should, in our view, include:

1. Notification and justification of the type and quantity of chemical;
2. Full recording of the use of the chemical;
3. Notification of the transfer of agreed amounts to another State;
4. Inspection of the facility if annual production exceeds a small given amount;
5. The possibility of challenge inspection.

The civilian use of small quantities of super-toxic lethal chemicals for research purposes should not need any form of control. The licensing for sale of chemicals requiring "key" precursors in their synthesis should be subject to scrutiny. The reasons for such scrutiny would be to ensure that the type and quantity of production is consistent with the proposed use and that the production, for civilian purposes, of chemicals containing the methyl-phosphorus bond should be controlled if such chemicals are seen to put at risk the verification procedures suggested above.

In document CD/CW/CRP.78 introduced this week in the relevant contact group, my delegation discussed the implications for verification of the widespread civilian dissemination of compounds containing the methyl-phosphorus bond. It will be

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

recalled that this bond is stable, and can be detected analytically at great dilution. Because of this it could serve as a marker for the presence of nerve agents at an on-site inspection. The importance of such a marker during the 10-year period of destruction would be greater than later in the life of the convention, since any clandestine production of super-toxic lethal chemicals would be expected to avoid chemical bonds which have a characteristic breakdown product.

The actual process of verification has not yet been fully addressed by delegations. It may be appropriate to bring together ideas which have been put forward in a number of contexts. Clearly, a secretariat will be needed, to co-ordinate the work of inspectors and carry out the day-to-day work of the consultative committee. However, the inspectors, in addition to formal qualification as chemical engineers, analytical chemists and so on, will need specific training for their tasks. Indeed, we have yet to work out the exact nature of their tasks and the operating procedures that must be set up. The presentation last week by the United States delegation of the document entitled, "Illustrative on-site inspection procedures for verification of chemical weapons stockpile destruction" indicates concretely one set of inspection procedures that could apply at one type of destruction facility. Much work of a technical nature needs to be done to determine how to obtain optimal results from inspection, analysis and the operation of sensors and monitors. Work of that kind is in hand in several countries. Our own discussions, notably in the contact groups, have pointed up the need to co-ordinate such work on an international basis. A co-ordinated effort of this kind will take time to develop, and should proceed in tandem with the consideration of other aspects of a draft convention.

Here, several questions come to mind: should the inspectors be permanent international civil servants? Should a centralized laboratory facility be available to them, or should we look at the option suggested by United Nations General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, of giving them access to national laboratories, perhaps on a roster basis?

Technological progress is particularly rapid in the areas of analytical chemistry, automation and sensors. These areas are relevant to the convention. Consequently, verification procedures may need to be modified after the convention has come into effect. The framework in which control and verification will go ahead needs to be considered.

Verification cannot be carried out on an ad hoc basis. Data collection and data evaluation must be organized in the light of an evaluation of the over-all problem of control. There is no body of knowledge available to the international community against which such evaluation can take place. Much of the necessary information exists in individual countries, but this must be shared and co-ordinated before we can approach the various tasks of verification in an appropriate manner.

I conclude by repeating something I said at the outset. We are entering a new phase in our work, one which demands two things: first, it demands a focus on the very practical problems which confront us; secondly, it demands negotiation. All delegations should prepare themselves for these new tasks, and if necessary be ready for a wholly new approach. Basically it is imperative that instructions for this new phase come from capitals. Some will need advice of relevant practical experience. Others, indeed all delegations, will need a brief to operate flexibly within the demands of national security. Only thus will delegations be able to contribute usefully to our work.

Mr. MIHAILOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, in its working paper, document CD/298 of 26 July 1982, the Yugoslav delegation presented its general views on certain aspects of verification in a chemical weapons convention. Specifically, in that paper it expressed its general views on three fundamental categories of international verification as a working hypothesis for the consideration of different levels of international verification.

Today I would like to introduce the new Working Paper of the Yugoslav delegation, document CD/393 of 13 July 1983, which has already been distributed to delegations, and to make some comments related to it. This working paper deals to a certain extent with some technical aspects of the process of verification having to do with the declaration of stockpiles of chemical weapons, including facilities for the production of chemical warfare agents and filling facilities for chemical weapons, the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the monitoring of production facilities of super-toxic chemical agents for permitted purposes.

In view of the fact that each stage of the operations in question in itself represents a very complex process with many technological operations, the working paper points to the different procedures which should be applied when they are implemented.

Thus, for instance, production facilities for chemical warfare agents can be diverted to the production of chemicals needed by the chemical industry for permitted purposes, in which case only some of the key elements need be destroyed completely while all other devices, apparatus and measuring instruments can be utilized in a very useful manner. At the same time, the facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons are used only for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and after that they, too, should be destroyed.

The already existing division of chemical warfare agents into three categories according to their toxicity makes it necessary to consider and implement various categories or degrees of verification. Given the considerations so far, the Yugoslav delegation shares the opinion of many delegations that control should be comprehensive when verifying the destruction of super-toxic chemicals, while less rigorous measures may be implemented when destroying the stockpiles of toxic or other harmful agents. This means that on-site inspection should be applied in the former case, which can be systematic or random, while in the case of the destruction of lethal or other harmful agents national measures might be accepted with periodic on-site international verification.

In the consideration so far of the organization and forms of international and national verification measures, the relationship of the former toward the latter and vice versa has been insufficiently clarified. This is also the case with the obligations and competences of the States parties to the future convention with respect to the implementation of national verification measures. While it is generally agreed that international verification must be implemented on the basis of an agreed procedure, there is still a lot of ambiguity concerning national verification procedures.

(Mr. Mihailovic, Yugoslavia)

It is not completely clear, for example, whether the national inspection team is accountable only to its own Government or whether it should also have some direct obligations toward the consultative committee.

The question arises, how would the co-operation between the national team and the consultative committee be carried out? Systematic on-site inspection, on the other hand, is not and should not always be the only solution, especially in view of the fact that this type of control is not always considered to be necessary by some States. However, regardless of the type of verification, it is essential, in our view, that it be based on confidence and a negotiated agreement on verification measures.

It is understood and by now generally accepted that measures of international control should be applied particularly in the case of violations of the convention. If control is to be effective, in such an event on-site inspection should be implemented as soon as possible. It is only then that it can be credible and provide all the necessary information for establishing the facts.

In this process, as we have already pointed out on several occasions, it is also necessary to compile a list of laboratories and to standardize technical methods of verification. The above is the only way to obtain the necessary expertise and objective results.

This would secure the timely control of results and the possibility of controlling the analysis of samples even when there is no on-site inspection. Possibilities for remote control today facilitate comprehensive and varied monitoring of the process of destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. However, the results of the implementation of all these measures would be far more successful if there were confidence among the States parties. By this we mean that it is necessary from the very beginning for countries which possess them openly to declare chemical weapon stockpiles as well as all chemical weapons production facilities and key precursors production facilities. In this entire process it is very important that the consultative committee be given precise data on chemical weapons in order that it can determine and propose, in co-operation with the expert sub-organ, the corresponding verification measures.

As has been stressed on numerous occasions, the declaration of existing stocks of chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons should be done immediately or as soon as possible after the entry into force of the convention. It is specified that this should be done within 30 days, which we also consider as realistic and indispensable for the declaration of, inter alia:

The existence of stocks of chemical weapons or of chemical warfare agents in containers;

The location of these stocks;

The location of stocks if they are on foreign territory and under whose jurisdiction;

The type and quality of chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons.

These declarations should also contain:

(Mr. Mihailovic, Yugoslavia)

Proposals as to when the destruction of stocks is tentatively to begin, and

Proposals as to the manner of verification (international, national, method of monitoring the process of destruction).

Declarations should also be made in respect of the stocks of precursors (key precursors and other chemicals) which can be used both for the production of chemical warfare agents and for the filling and production of binary weapons.

The working paper specifies what types of organic compounds of key precursors should be declared, and a similar procedure for their destruction. It also refers to the declaration concerning the production and filling facilities for chemical weapons.

The importance which is accorded to the precision of information contained in the declaration consists in that the proposed verification measures will then be more objective and the consultative committee and the States parties will accordingly be able to assess more realistically the importance of this control.

The chapter which deals with the destruction of chemical weapons stocks points to the basic reasons which call for the application of different methods in the process of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and the destruction of chemical warfare agents in containers.

The principal question which arises in connection with the process of destruction is how to ensure full control of the process and thus be sure that all the declared quantities have been destroyed. The safest control is certainly the constant physical presence of an international team of experts. However, there is another question which imposes itself right away—whether it is necessary for this team to be in the facility and exercise control all the time, when it is known that the process of destruction of stocks can take several years. In our view, the most acceptable solution in the case of the destruction of super-toxic chemicals is random inspection and systematic international on-site inspection. It is understood that the technological destruction process will be automatic, while the control of the technical process and the recording of parameters (pressure, temperature and other) will be analysed by computer. Moreover, samples of chemical warfare agents and decomposition products should be taken periodically and sent for analysis to certain laboratories.

This entire monitoring system should, naturally, be set up and established by the international team of experts before the destruction facility is put into operation.

As far as the destruction of stocks of toxic lethal chemicals and other harmful chemicals is concerned, in our opinion, this could be carried out under the control of a national inspection team which should be obliged periodically to send the results of control to the consultative committee and periodically to send samples to be analysed to specific laboratories. In such cases, international on-site inspection would be carried out at random. We hope that this working paper will contribute to the solution of the complex issues of verification. We would like, however, also to express our conviction that the complexity of the question of verification should not serve as a pretext for prolonging the work as a whole, particularly with respect to the long-awaited process of the drafting of the convention.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like today to make some brief comments on the work of this Committee on two items of its agenda: chemical weapons and radiological weapons. I do not intend to repeat the basic position of Brazil on those two issues, but simply to reflect on the state of our efforts to achieve progress in the respective negotiations.

My delegation supports the practical approach which the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has adopted, especially through the establishment of contact groups to deal with specific areas where further work is needed toward achieving consensus. This is a painstaking exercise, mainly because of the detailed nature of the questions involved. It is obvious that the convention cannot be negotiated all at once, in one single piece, as it were. We must necessarily proceed by parts, trying to work out in as much detail as possible the various problems raised during the earlier stages of our work, then recording the progress achieved, and eventually tackling the task of putting the pieces together in one coherent whole. I believe that all of us understand clearly that during the current phase of this process, and especially when putting down on paper the results of the work in the contact groups, no delegation should feel irrevocably bound by the formulations recorded. By the same token, however, such formulations must be seen as a common basis for the future work of consolidation.

In order to serve as a common basis, therefore, such formulations must be arrived at with the full participation of delegations. Ambassador Sadleir of Australia, stressed two points last Thursday, and I fully agree with him; first, we are making progress, and secondly, the time has come to negotiate. On negotiating, he went on, we should all seek instructions allowing us flexibility, since we can now see enough of the structure of the convention to judge the extent to which our positions can contribute to or hamper future work. Statements of general positions must now give way to the search for accommodation in the normal give and take process, as we deepen the examination of each specific section of the convention. Otherwise, contact groups and informal consultations, under the guidance of Ambassador McPhail, will not be able to provide such a common basis with the necessary degree of clarity and detail needed to ensure the success of this phase of the negotiation.

We have heard from all quarters expressions of resolve and determination to proceed speedily with the achievement of the convention. A few important conceptual points on which there was disagreement have now been resolved, but only in a general way. The co-operation of all delegations in the sorting out of the details and in recording the understandings at which we may arrive in the coming few weeks is a crucial element for the successful accomplishment of the work of the Committee on chemical weapons during this session.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The negotiations on a convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons seem to me to be marked at this stage by the intensity of the work, the extremely useful contribution made by experts participating fully in the discussions and the fact that some of the details are being worked out more fully. These negotiations are, furthermore, benefiting from the submission, in the form of working papers and other documents, of important contributions on many different aspects of the convention.

It is essential, now, that reactions and contributions should come from all sides as soon as possible, so that the Committee may have a complete picture of all the main positions. That is the most urgent requirement if we are to pass on to a new stage, as Ambassador Sadleir of Australia urged us to do last week. We are very fortunate in having as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group a colleague of such talent and competence as Ambassador McPhail, together with the Canadian delegation which has contributed so effectively over the years to the negotiations on chemical weapons. This guarantees our success as we move on to the concluding phase of our summer session; in which we shall be obliged to record the results of our work.

We are compelled once more to recognize that the main difficulties to be resolved in these negotiations concern the adoption of an adequate verification system. I am not minimizing the importance of other outstanding issues if I say that, in the final analysis, the success of our negotiations depends largely on our reaching agreement on such a system.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

In order to adhere to a convention on chemical disarmament, a State must be convinced that it will find in the convention effective mechanisms at its disposal to be sure at all times that the obligations flowing from the convention are being respected by all other parties. This is true for certain States which possess chemical weapons but would renounce the possibility of being able to use them against a potential adversary in the event of an attack with chemical weapons. This is all the more true for countries which do not possess chemical weapons, and in particular for the small or militarily weak among them. If, in violation of a treaty, chemical weapons were to be used against a major power which had conscientiously divested itself of such weapons, it would still possess a vast array of other means for its defence and for retaliation. The same would not be true for a small or medium-sized power: the cases in which there has been a question, in recent years, of a possible use of chemical weapons have all concerned unprotected military forces which did not possess any effective retaliatory capacity.

The verification of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons ought to be not only effective but also non-discriminatory in character, that is to say, accessible to every State party whether or not it has highly developed national technical means. These two requirements can be met only by an adequate international verification system.

The attempt to reach agreement on such a system raises difficult political questions; it also raises complex technical problems. We must try to ensure that the solution of the latter facilitates agreement on the former.

It is for this reason that my delegation wishes to express its great appreciation of the working paper in document CD/387, submitted on 6 July last by the United States. At this stage of the negotiations a contribution of this kind appears to us particularly useful, in the first place for reasons of method: the document in question describes in detail a concrete experience, and it is on the basis of that experience that it endeavours to draw conclusions and formulate requirements; and in the second place because this contribution concerns a sphere -- that of the destruction of stocks -- where there are already significant points of proximity if not of convergence of views which could make decisive progress possible. Other contributions of the same kind as that contained in document CD/387, bearing on other key aspects of the convention, would be extremely desirable. I note with appreciation, in passing, that of the United Kingdom delegation on the experience acquired during the operations for the destruction of the Nancycook factory in Cornwall.

The merit of the American working paper will have been to prove from experience that while the continuous presence of international inspectors is an essential element in any verification system, that presence can be contained within narrow numerical limits. This shows us at the same time that the problem of the resources and measures necessary for the maintenance of a body of international inspectors should not create major difficulties.

The effective verification of the destruction of stocks as well as the maintenance of a balance between the potentials of the various States during the

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

period of destruction naturally presupposes initial declarations which are informative (detailing type, chemical structure and quantity of the agents to be destroyed as well as the location of stocks) and verifiable. Such declarations would at the same time bring about the necessary level of confidence for the starting of the process of implementation. I note in this connection that the working paper in document CD/393 of 13 July last submitted by Yugoslavia calls for a considerable degree of detail in declarations, including the location of stocks.

My delegation would like at this point to emphasize one particular aspect of the destruction of stocks, that of the security conditions which should be ensured for the operation. In order that no quantity of a toxic agent should be able to escape into the environment, a destruction facility should be completely "leakproof". Another aspect of major concern is the evacuation of the final products resulting from the destruction of the chemical agent. These final products, although themselves of relatively low toxicity, could cause considerable harm if they were introduced into the environment in large quantities. The destruction of all the stocks of chemical weapons existing in all the arsenals of the world should be accompanied by extensive environmental and security measures, measures which would affect both the methods to be used for the destruction of massive quantities and the probable duration of these operations. I should like in this connection once again to stress the need to include in the convention a clause permitting the transfer of stocks of chemical weapons for purposes of destruction, under appropriate international control. In many cases such a transfer could prove to be the most reliable, the cheapest and the quickest way of eliminating certain stocks of chemical weapons.

An adequate verification system is also essential with respect to the non-production of toxic products for weapons purposes. Such a system should have two main objects: (a) to make sure that States are not manufacturing single-purpose chemical warfare agents or single-purpose precursors; (b) to make sure that dual-purpose agents or precursors are not being diverted to weapons purposes.

This is a very difficult and complicated matter because it involves the whole of national chemical industries. It is to the credit particularly of the United Kingdom delegation that, through its document CD/353, it stimulated a full-scale debate on the subject, which is now under way. Following the British initiative certain delegations, resuming an exercise started at the time of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have begun to divulge certain statistical data concerning their national production of key precursors, and in particular the number of chemical plants engaged in such production. As a result of the consultations we have undertaken with our chemical industry we are now able to provide the following preliminary information.

At present, none of the chemical substances or families of chemical substances listed in the table given in working paper CD/CW/WP.46 of 12 April 1983 is being produced in Italy;

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Phosphorus trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride are imported into Italy at a rate of approximately 2,500 tons in all per annum. They are used principally in the production of additives for resins, plastic materials, fibres and lubricants. They are also used, as intermediaries, in the pharmaceutical and dyestuffs industries. We are in the process of determining the quantities imported, if any, of the other products on the list.

One conclusion is to be drawn at this stage: the information so far made available by various delegations appears to support the thesis developed in the United Kingdom document, namely, that a system of verification of the non-production of chemical weapons based on routine on-site inspections carried out by a team of inspectors at facilities chosen by lot from among those declared would be both possible and adequate. It has in particular been confirmed that the verification system proposed would affect only a small number of facilities and would not impose an excessive burden on the civilian chemical industry.

The unique experience acquired in this matter by the Federal Republic of Germany and synthesized in many working papers submitted to the Committee also confirms these conclusions and particularly the preferability of a system based on regular checking rather than on special on-site inspections by challenge. The latter possibility would still remain open to the parties through the complaints procedure which, through being brought into operation in particular in cases where there were doubts or suspicions, would complete the system and increase its general effectiveness.

Having touched upon the subject of on-site inspections by challenge, I should like to add one comment: by issuing a challenge, a State would thereby assume a considerable political responsibility, both with respect to the State suspected and with respect to the other parties to the convention. It can be supposed that no State would take such a step lightly; consequently, acceptance of the challenge should be the rule -- it would cause embarrassment to a dishonest accuser -- and refusal should be the exception. It is impossible not to note the basic ambiguity in the attitude of those delegations which demand that the State challenged should be entirely free to accept or reject the request for an inspection (even when filtered through the consultative committee) and at the same time insist that the challenge procedure should be the cornerstone of the entire international verification system under the convention. The pursuit of these two objectives at the same time would have only one result: the general weakening of the system. If it is feared that the challenge procedure could lend itself to abuse, the obvious thing to do is to favour a system of routine on-site inspections, which would not have a political connotation.

To revert to the question of non-production, it has to be recognized that there will still, in practice, remain possibilities for violation. The most difficult problem is that of dual-purpose chemical products or precursors. In this connection, the verification system outlined in document CD/353 could be usefully supplemented -- supplemented and not replaced -- by the periodical

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

publication of reliable statistical data at the national level. The data could give the quantities produced, exported and imported and the quantities consumed in each State. A consideration in detail of the type of information to be supplied, as well as of the use which the consultative committee would have to make of it, should be undertaken in due course.

On the other hand, we consider that it would be unrealistic to try to prohibit the manufacture of certain categories of products which have some civilian use, subject, of course, to an appropriate monitoring of the quantities produced and their use. Nor would it be practicable to establish quantitative limits or a system of licences to manufacture. The general purpose criterion should suffice in this connection.

The effectiveness of the system for the verification of non-production should be assessed jointly with other procedures introduced for the verification of other activities such as the destruction of stocks and production facilities. The cumulative effect of the various investigative techniques adapted to the forms of concealment and diversion which it is intended to discourage or detect should be sufficient to dissuade any intending offender and to provide, against possible violations by one of the parties, guarantees considered adequate by the others.

In any agreement, the means of verification must be commensurate with the scope of the prohibitions. It is therefore necessary to define precisely both the scope of the prohibitions and the methods of verification.

I shall refer in a later statement specifically to questions concerning the sphere of application of the convention; for the moment, I shall confine myself to making a few remarks on the question of the prohibition of use. The positions of States on this question are known and understanding of them is now infinitely greater, thanks to the thorough work done by the contact group co-ordinated by Mr. Akkerman of the Netherlands delegation. The alternatives that have been identified will prove very useful in our future work. Like other delegations, the Italian delegation has stressed the need not to undermine the Geneva Protocol of 1925 but to reaffirm it in all its lasting value. This approach appears now to have won a consensus. We have also considered the possibility of strengthening the role of the 1925 Protocol; suitable clauses have been proposed by the co-ordinator. The explicit extension of the prohibitions embodied in the Protocol to all armed conflicts (and not merely war) appears no longer to pose any difficulties either: in any case, that is the interpretation which a number of parties, including Italy, give to the scope of the 1925 Protocol. The consensus on the need to safeguard what was achieved by the Protocol, and if possible to reinforce it, facilitates, we believe, our effort to find ways of going beyond the Protocol and even introducing a prohibition on use in the body of the convention. Although we have not yet found a solution to this question, we are certainly much nearer to one. My delegation pledges itself to continue studying the problem in order to help find a solution acceptable to all. One important point appears to me, however, to be accepted: whatever the solution found, the prohibition of use should be supplemented by a verification procedure which would allow speedy and effective investigations of any allegation of the use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. De Laiglesia, Spain)

I intend to refer once again to the negotiations that are under way for the elaboration of a draft treaty prohibiting the manufacture, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. When this instrument comes to exist it will constitute the necessary complement to the 1925 Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in war. In this connection I should like to recall that my country has been a party to the 1925 Protocol since August 1929 and is thus a member of the fairly small group of the original parties to it.

It is a matter of great satisfaction to my Government to see the substantial progress that has been made in the Committee in this sphere. We venture to hope that in the not too distant future it will be possible to submit to the United Nations General Assembly a text acceptable to the vast majority of the international community. To this end, and although in the matter of negotiations of this kind it is not advisable to fix time-limits, we would like to suggest that the Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session should mention the possibility that during its 1984 session the Committee will achieve results sufficient to enable it to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a draft of the treaty so long awaited by all those of us who wish to see the elimination from arsenals of certain weapons of mass destruction which are unfortunately now far more deadly than those in use in the First World War.

We are convinced that the work now being done by this Committee in connection with chemical weapons is entering its final phase. We are also fully aware that it is the most difficult questions which will have to be resolved last. But we should not underestimate the progress which has been made up to now or forget that certain positions which appeared to be totally unchangeable have been modified. Likewise, in the sphere of the many and complex technical aspects, it seems to us that many doubts have been removed. For all these reasons, if there is a firm political will on the part of the members of this Committee, it will be possible in the near future to eliminate these weapons of mass destruction whose cruelty is well known to all of us, thanks to the existence of a treaty which can be ratified by all the countries members of the international community. This will also allow us to implement paragraph 75 of the Final Document approved by consensus at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which took place in 1978.

I should now like to make some comments on the aspects of the future convention that are being examined by the Ad hoc Working Group. The most important of these is the question of the scope of the convention. Although the 1925 Protocol is still valid, it seems to us important that the undertaking assumed in that Protocol should be ratified in the new treaty. We accept the thesis that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons forms part of customary international law. However, we think that it would be advisable to make a specific reference to that prohibition in order to strengthen the verification provisions and to extend their application to the non-use of such weapons. The contributions made by a number of delegations in proposing texts which would resolve the problems of international law arising in this connection seem to us to be of great interest, for they indicate a certain drawing together of positions that have up to now remained divergent.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

As regards the declarations States will have to make concerning the stocks of chemical weapons they possess, as well as their production capacities, my delegation considers that those declarations should contain all the information necessary to make it possible to carry out a destruction of stocks and dismantling of facilities that are truly verifiable. The declarations ought in the first instance to refer to all chemical products and facilities whose sole purpose is the manufacture or filling of chemical weapons, including binary weapons. The States parties ought, in addition, to make declarations concerning their stocks of chemical products intended for peaceful uses or permitted purposes which could be considered as precursors or key precursors of chemical weapons, including binary weapons, as well as the relevant facilities. The declarations ought to contain all the information necessary to permit a verification designed to prevent the declared stocks and facilities being used for purposes not permitted by the convention. All these declarations should contribute effectively to transparency in the matter of the possibilities for an industrial mobilization with a view to the rapid acquisition of a chemical weapons production capability. As far as this question is concerned, we have unfortunately to note that although there is agreement as to the basic principles, there are still considerable differences of view on points of procedure.

As regards the verification both of the destruction of stocks and production facilities and of non-production, the powers of the consultative committee should be very broad so that it can determine the means and methods appropriate to each period in accordance with the prevailing technology and circumstances. Obviously, the verification methods should consist of a combination of national and international systems sufficient to guarantee States parties a reasonable assurance that the convention is being complied with.

The lists of precursors and key precursors should never be considered final and it should, in our view, be one of the tasks of the consultative committee periodically to bring them up to date. The purpose of these lists is to facilitate States' preparation of their declarations and also to facilitate verification both by national means and by international means. The lists ought in no case to be regarded as restricting the scope of the prohibition contained in the convention. For this reason they ought not appear in the text of the convention but in a supplementary instrument attached to it. The prohibition contained in the text of the convention should refer to categories of products the details of which could be given, in order to facilitate declarations and verification, in appropriate annexes periodically updated by the consultative committee.

Verification is undoubtedly the most important and complex aspect of all the problems connected with arms control. In the realm of chemical weapons, this question raises special difficulties. New products in large quantities appear every year, with constant changes of technology. Many of these products are toxic and could be considered as new materials that would be usable in the event of chemical warfare. Furthermore, there are many activities to be verified in connection with a convention: the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, the destruction of stocks and of production and filling facilities, the clandestine manufacture of chemical weapons and, lastly, the problem of transfer, involving both the purchase and the sale of prohibited products or their technologies. Since transfer could involve

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

countries not parties to the convention, this subject has not been sufficiently studied from the point of view of verification, which presents special difficulties in the case of the multinational corporations. This aspect of verification is as important as regards the countries non-producers of chemical weapons as is the question of ensuring non-manufacture in the case of producers. In the event of conflicts between non-producing countries, the sole possibility for the use of chemical weapons is the illegal transfer of such weapons or their technology.

Although the difficulties posed by verification in connection with the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons are considerable, nevertheless all the countries taking part in these negotiations are agreed on the need for the establishment of an effective verification system. It should not be forgotten that technological development has made available for purposes of the verification of arms control agreements tools that were unheard-of a few decades ago. It is thus true to say that verification systems can constantly be improved. From all this it can be concluded that if there is political will, the adoption of a given system should not constitute an impediment to the achievement of a draft convention rendering the use of chemical weapons in war impossible and eliminating them for ever from scenes of combat.

With a view to the effectiveness of the means of verification, both national and international, which should have adequate personnel and equipment, it would be extremely useful if countries which have experience in the analysis and detection of the most modern chemical warfare agents were to organize seminars to train the technicians of States which have adequate laboratories so that they may help in the work of verification, which is rather different from the analyses that may usually be carried out in those laboratories. This would be of particular value in connection with the verification of non-use, the urgency of which would necessitate the utilization of the means nearest to the place of the possible violation of the provisions of the convention.

At the present stage of the work of the Committee, it would seem to us extremely desirable to begin the process of the drafting of the texts which will constitute the basis of the draft convention. In our view, there are grounds for thinking that there is sufficiently broad agreement for us to tackle this task with reasonable possibilities of success. It is obvious that if all the delegations involved in the negotiation of this treaty were to try to embody in a text the areas of coincidence which, in our view, would make up the greater part of the convention, the results of this session of the Committee would be very positive. It should be borne in mind that if the text of the convention does not contain points of conflict which could be included in supplementary instruments that might in due course be drafted and perhaps later improved, the work of the Committee would be greatly simplified.

I do not wish to end this statement without referring to the admirable work done by Ambassador McPhail of Canada, whose effective guidance of the work of the Ad hoc Working Group has given us all great hopes for a successful outcome, which would undoubtedly contribute to the prestige of this Committee, to which the Spanish Government attaches special importance. Its status as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body means that countries like mine, which attach the highest priority to the eradication of armed conflicts as a means of resolving

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

differences between the members of the international community, watch with extraordinary interest its efforts to achieve a climate of peace that will make it possible to devote the resources spent on the arms race to combating the hunger and underdevelopment from which the greater part of humanity is suffering.

(Mr. Wabuge, Kenya)

Finally, my delegation is encouraged by the ongoing negotiations on a future chemical weapons convention. We regard the various initiatives and draft proposals as a welcome development in this Committee. We expect the Ad hoc Working Group to bring to fruition the drafting task on a future chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

Now I wish to turn to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons figure prominently on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. This is also one of the more promising areas for achieving results. During the summer session this year, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the guidance of the experienced ambassador of Canada, Mr. McPhail, and with the assistance of the able co-ordinators, has been working very hard and has made certain progress. Of course, we still need time to settle the many difficult problems still facing us.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Li Luyue, China)

Today, I shall not take up all the outstanding issues. Instead, I will make a few comments on two questions which should have been resolved without much difficulty.

First, the question of the prohibition of use. This is one of the questions most frequently discussed in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In April this year, Ambassador Sadleir of Australia made a comprehensive statement on the subject here. We support his statement which in fact reflected the common position of the other delegations which also advocate the inclusion of the prohibition of use in the scope of the future convention. Rather than repeating the arguments contained therein, I just wish to make one point: if we fail to include explicitly the prohibition of use in the scope of prohibition of the future convention, there will be difficulties for the solution of other relevant issues.

It is generally held that the future convention should strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925. All delegations agree that the convention should make up for the deficiencies of the said Protocol by including provisions on verification. It is the view of the Chinese delegation that a better way to achieve this is to include the prohibition of use in the scope of the convention.

There exists a different view which involves resolving the issues related to the prohibition of use without including it in the scope of the convention. Obviously, this is difficult, simply because it is illogical to expect the convention to solve the problems of verification concerning use if use per se is not included in the scope of the prohibition. In fact, we have already encountered such contradictions in discussing such proposals. Therefore, by including use in the scope of the prohibition and verification concerning use in the verification provisions, we will have a consistent, logical and clearer text.

In our view, the inclusion of the prohibition of use within the scope of the convention will serve to strengthen and not to weaken the regime for prohibition of use of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We understand the misgivings that certain delegations entertain on this point and so we have agreed to the reaffirmation and emphasis both in the preamble and in the operative parts of the convention of the indelible historical role of the Geneva Protocol and its continuing important effect.

Yet another opinion proposes dealing with the chemical weapons convention along the lines of the bacteriological weapons Convention. We think that this is not necessary. Although it is true that the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons and the chemical weapons convention are to be related in certain ways, they will, after all, be two independent international instruments. The latter can indeed include some of the useful elements of the former, but it should in no way repeat its deficiencies. It would be better to take a forward-looking posture.

We are all aware that the weakness of the bacteriological weapons Convention is its lack of a prohibition on use and of verification provisions. Therefore, if the chemical weapons convention copies the bacteriological weapons Convention in this deficiency, it will be difficult to resolve the question of verification of use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

In addition, it is obvious that chemical weapons and biological weapons are different weapons, which cannot but affect the contents of the international instruments which deal with these two types of weapons. At one point in the early 1970s, it was planned to deal with both types of weapons in a single convention, but later it was decided to deal with them separately. Now, 10 years later, we must take into consideration certain international events and deal with the chemical weapons convention in a more circumspect manner.

With regard to the possible emergence of two non-use regimes under the future convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Chinese delegation had occasion, at a plenary meeting last April, to make its views known and put forward a working paper (CD/378). Here I wish to add a few remarks.

In our view, the future convention should complement and perfect the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in the light of the present circumstances and contain more concrete provisions than the Protocol in many of its aspects, with the basic aim of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Therefore, the prohibition regimes under these two instruments are in line with each other, and to our understanding, will not give rise to unbridgeable differences. This is the rationale behind our working paper CD/378.

In conclusion, the prohibition of use is not the most crucial question in the way of an agreement on the convention during our current negotiations. However, we hope that this question can be settled as soon as possible, so that more time can be allocated to the solution of the other complicated question.

That question concerns the concept and definition of chemical warfare agents. Over the past four years, quite a number of delegations have put forward working papers on the concept and definition of chemical warfare agents. This shows the importance accorded to the question. We have all along maintained that the future convention should deal with the question in the light of the following considerations:

1. The reason why chemical weapons constitute a weapons system lies in the fact that they exert the toxic effects of certain chemicals for war purposes. Only by clearly defining this specific category of chemicals can there be a precise and unambiguous concept and definition of chemical weapons. For this reason, we find it difficult to understand how the definition of chemical weapons can be formulated without touching upon the concept of chemical warfare agents.
2. Since chemical warfare agents are the essential element of the three elements making up chemical weapons, they are necessarily the key element of prohibition under a chemical weapons convention. We can hardly imagine a convention providing no explicit definition of the main subject of its prohibition or even containing no reference to this very concept.
3. Chemical warfare agents have long become a well-established concept and term, which is recognized on its merit of clearly denoting the use and purpose of such chemical agents. Therefore, it can just well concretize the generally-accepted "general purpose criterion".

In sum, the Chinese delegation holds that by using the concept of "chemical warfare agents", the scope of the future convention can be more precise. It should

(Mr. Li Luye, China)

be pointed out that up till now no proper status has been given to chemical warfare agents in the future convention. This has already caused some conceptual confusion and inconveniences in practical work.

Within the Working Group, a kind of toxicity categorization of chemical warfare agents has often been used to replace the concept and definition of chemical warfare agents. Wherever the general concept of chemical warfare agents should be used, the formulation of super-toxic and lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals has been applied. For the purpose of the convention, this kind of categorization can and should be used, but it must be used under the general concept of chemical warfare agents. Otherwise, a correct categorization, if used in a wrong way, may also produce errors. The reason is very simple: not all the super-toxic and lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals can be used for hostile or war purposes. What the convention is intended to deal with is the portion which may be used for hostile or war purposes. Therefore, using the three types of chemicals alone -- which are classified according to their toxicity categorization -- cannot define the scope of the prohibition of the convention in a correct and precise manner. This seems to be a major flaw in the future convention so far discussed. And the flaw originates from the fact that only the toxicity criterion is used, whereas another and even more fundamental criterion -- the general purpose criterion -- is neglected.

That the concept of chemical warfare agents is not used has also caused some confusion in other concepts. For instance, strictly speaking, the concepts of "precursor" and "key precursor" should be "precursor" and "key precursor" of "chemical warfare agents". However, as the concept of chemical warfare agents has not been accepted, sometimes such paradoxical formulations as "the key precursor of chemical weapons" is used. Of the three component parts of the chemical weapon, only the chemical fillings of the chemical weapon, namely, "chemical warfare agents", involve precursors or key precursors, whereas the shell body and the launching device have nothing to do with precursors and key precursors.

To sum up, "chemical warfare agents" should be one of the most fundamental and most important concepts and definitions in the future convention. In our view, this is mainly a technical problem and ought to be solved more easily.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, in my statement this morning I intend to refer to the item that is on the time-table for our plenary meetings this week, namely, chemical weapons.

My delegation is convinced that the time has come to make the maximum effort to intensify the negotiations in order to agree on a convention on

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

the prohibition of chemical weapons before a new arms race develops in this area and constitutes a further threat to international peace and security.

We believe that it is perfectly possible to achieve, within a reasonable period of time, a convention which would remove the danger represented by this odious weapon and strengthen the security of States and which would not indirectly create the situations of inequality or discrimination that could arise as a consequence of the differences in degrees of development.

I shall now refer to certain points which, although they have already been dealt with a number of times, are still of great relevance to the process of negotiation on which we have embarked. Gradual changes of position with respect to these will enable us, we hope, little by little to achieve a convergence of views which can then be translated into agreed texts and finally into the convention that is so necessary and so much desired. The Argentine delegation has always believed that a frank exchange of ideas and viewpoints in the various forums of discussion, namely, the Committee, the Ad Hoc Working Group and the contact groups, is an essential prerequisite to the progress of the negotiations.

Before mentioning specific questions, however, I should like to make a general comment. While it is true that some progress has been achieved in the course of our discussions and they have contributed to clarifying positions, the fact is that no substantial headway has been made on certain aspects of crucial importance such as the kind of information countries should provide in their declarations or the specific methods to be used for the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of production facilities.

This has meant that in one of the contact groups we are continuing to have interesting discussions but they are theoretical and have nothing to do with the essence of the tasks entrusted to us nor are they truly commensurate with the purposes of this multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

The presence of experts has been very useful in the present phase of the work being done during the summer part of the Committee's session. My Government decided to send a technical official to co-operate in the work of the different groups. We consider that the discussion of the various complicated matters to be covered by the future convention makes it essential to have available the requisite specialized information and infrastructure and we hope that the method used this year will be repeated. It should be pointed out in this connection that it is not an easy matter for experts from developing countries in distant regions to come to Geneva and it is therefore necessary to plan in detail and as far ahead as possible the use that will be made of the presence of experts here so that the utmost advantage can be taken of their contribution during the short space of time available.

As you know, the Argentine delegation has always been firmly in favour of the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the scope of the convention.

For this reason, and as the Ambassador of Australia said a few days ago, we were pleased to hear the statement made by Ambassador Imai on 11 July indicating that Japan may now be counted among the countries holding this view.

It would perhaps not be superfluous in this connection to emphasize once more the importance and significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which represented an important milestone in the development of international law and for that reason merits our appreciation and our respect.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

We have to recognize, however, that the Protocol does not contain any restrictions on production, development, stockpiling, transfer and other possible activities in the sphere of chemical weapons. It stipulates solely that their use in war is prohibited.

Since some countries have reserved their right of reprisals the Protocol has become essentially an agreement on "non-first-use". Other States parties to it have confined the scope of their undertaking solely to signatories.

It is for this reason that in the present negotiations we ought to formulate a treaty which prohibits, without exception, the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisition and use of chemical weapons. The new convention ought to avoid a double regime, allow for verification and cover situations of hostilities not considered cases of war or foreseen in 1925.

My delegation hopes that a spirit of flexibility will prevail in this matter so as to permit a consensus which will not only make it possible to achieve a truly comprehensive instrument but also undoubtedly help us to reach agreement on other important aspects of the convention.

Another element to which we attach special importance is that of the definitions to be included in the convention. With respect to precursors and key precursors, my delegation made a statement in Contract Group D which appears in a document dated 29 June.

We believe that the definitions should be as complete as possible and should in addition contain an indication of the basic characteristics of the key precursors, which will serve as a guide to the consultative committee in its future work.

The statement to which I have referred was made with the object of contributing constructive information for this purpose, and we hope that progress can be made on this score.

As regards the destruction of stocks, my delegation maintains the right of each State party to possess substances classified as prohibited toxic agents for non-hostile uses, but in quantities defined and declared so as to facilitate, where necessary, the requisite verification.

By non-hostile uses we mean those directly connected with industrial, agricultural, scientific and research purposes and also protection purposes. The use of irritants or temporary incapacitants should be permitted for the maintenance of public order and the enforcement of the domestic laws of States.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

The work of the Ad Hoc Working Group has confirmed that the destruction of stocks would require the virtually permanent presence of inspectors at destruction installations.

We are not opposed to this. We wonder, however, what is the point of strict verification in this respect if the stocks that are declared cannot be verified.

We mention this example simply in order to indicate the differences of views which still persist in the negotiations and which require clearer political definitions.

At the same time, while we well understand that the convention should not be an obstacle to the development of chemical industries, we consider that commercial operations ought not to contribute to the masking of the production of supertoxic lethal substances or their precursors. On the contrary, the chemical industry should ensure that the levels of such production are not higher than those permitted, including that of the relatively less toxic components of binary weapons or dual-purpose agents.

The elimination of chemical weapons production and filling facilities is an important aspect of the convention. They should be declared, immediately closed, and destroyed within an agreed period.

It goes without saying that the process of destruction should also include those chemical weapons production facilities that are temporarily converted for the elimination of chemical weapons arsenals, as soon as this transitory activity comes to an end.

The presence of international commissions during the process of the elimination of production facilities will serve to increase confidence.

In the matter of ensuring compliance with the convention, it should be pointed out that the timing and characteristics of the verification process will have to vary, depending on what is being verified -- declarations, the destruction of installations, non-production or the destruction of stocks. The verification of each of these will call for special procedures.

We believe that there is a consensus on the need for the complaints procedure and the system of verification adequately to ensure the effectiveness of the provisions of the convention. Nevertheless the basic element on which the agreement should be built consists in the political will and the determination of States not to use or to possess chemical weapons, ever or in any circumstances.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

Verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures, including systematic on-site inspections to investigate possible violations of the convention.

Existing means of monitoring have an important but limited capacity for the detection of activities in preparation for chemical warfare.

It is necessary, in our view, during the negotiations, to agree on a balanced system of verification which will offer a reasonable degree of assurance that the provisions of the convention are being complied with, but we should not attempt to achieve perfection, for the very complexity of the interests at stake makes this unattainable and such an attempt would certainly mean the indefinite postponement of the adoption of agreements at a time when they are ever more necessary. What we should seek is the greatest degree of certainty possible in the detection of activities on a sufficiently large scale to constitute a military threat as regards this type of weapon.

The international character of verification will be assured by the presence of the experts of a subsidiary body of the consultative committee, who will be able to act rapidly and effectively within their sphere of competence, without going into aspects unconnected with the scientific technical content of the task they are required to perform.

Similarly, the procedures should be appropriate to each case. In this connection random visits will serve to strengthen mutual confidence and help ensure compliance with the convention.

The Committee on Disarmament has been engaged for a number of years in the effort to achieve a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The distinguished chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject, Ambassadors Okawa, Lidgard and Sujka, and now Ambassador McPhail, and their colleagues the co-ordinators of the contact groups, together with all the participants in the meetings held at every level, have worked intensively, and it is this work which is now bearing its full fruits.

What we ought to do now as soon as possible is to start the actual work of drafting the provisions of the future convention. My delegation is aware that considerable difficulties still lie ahead and that a great deal of work will be required. But at least we should start it, and it is to be hoped that that beginning will prove to be a psychological stimulus towards the reaching of compromises, which are not unattainable if there is a real political will to reach agreement -- an agreement which would be not only the first achievement of the Committee on Disarmament but also a very important step towards disarmament, which the international community is demanding more and more insistently.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

I intend to speak today about the agenda item for this week -- chemical weapons. This area at present seems to have the best prospects for a successful conclusion in a not too long a time. The complex and difficult questions connected with the negotiations are being tackled vigorously and seriously. This is not least the positive result of determined efforts by the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, including the Chairman for this year, Ambassador McPhail of Canada. We can note with satisfaction that the contact groups are working very actively.

However, several difficult problems remain to be solved. I will comment briefly on some of them.

First, however, a couple of positive notes on some concrete contributions which have been developed during this summer session.

Several countries have answered the questions put forward by the United Kingdom delegation at the spring session with regard to the production and consumption by different countries of some possible so-called key precursors, as asked for in the British working paper, document CD/353. Sweden is among those countries. We agree with those who think that this is a very useful approach. This approach will make it possible for us to identify the problems which would arise for the chemical industry if some of those key precursors have to be regulated under a future convention. We look forward to the revised version of the working paper announced by the United Kingdom delegation, and which I understand will contain answers from other countries. We would also like to urge more countries representing different economic systems to provide answers.

Another tangible contribution has been the presentation by the delegation of the United States of the working paper in document CD/387 on the question of the destruction of chemical weapons. Hopefully, the ongoing discussion of this paper will make it possible to solve an extremely important problem for the convention: that of clarifying the concepts of respectively, continuous and systematic on-site inspection of the destruction of stockpiles. Although the final solution to this problem will depend on political considerations, the question nevertheless requires considerable technical studying in all its aspects. This is very clear from the conclusions drawn by the delegation of the United States itself with respect to the need for continuous on-site international verification of the destruction of stockpiles at a large facility. It seems to

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

my delegation, however, that it is necessary to study very closely these conclusions and the premises on which they rest in order to see whether alternative and perhaps less intrusive means might be found. My delegation will revert to this problem later on. In the meantime, we have put some questions to the delegation of the United States in the hope that the answers could be helpful in the evaluation we will attempt.

In this context we would also like to acknowledge the very interesting statement by Ambassador Sadleir on 14 July outlining a "strategy" for verification and indicating a practical and flexible approach.

It should be underlined, however, that this is a problem where all concerned parties have to contribute with constructive proposals and to take part in the discussions, as the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil said in his statement at our last plenary meeting. Progress in the negotiations process will not be advanced if some parties just wait for suggestions to be made by others.

One would hope also that progress regarding the problem of the destruction of stockpiles might pave the way for dealing with the question of the destruction of production facilities. This is the more important since ensuring that no production facilities would remain for future use is crucial with regard to the future validity of the convention we are working on.

Some progress has been reached on the question whether the convention should contain a new prohibition of use of chemical weapons. One reason for this is the able work of the co-ordinator of the contact group handling these questions, Mr. Akkerman. It seems that in general no objections exist to having some provisions in the convention relating to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Thus, compliance measures under the convention would make investigation possible in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons under these provisions. The work of the contact group has so far resulted in two main alternatives in the operative part of the convention, one recommending an explicit prohibition on use in the scope of the convention.

The other approach is mainly to have an explicit reference to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and its direct relevance for the parties to the convention. The legal aspects connected with choosing either of these alternatives seem to be numerous and to some extent difficult to solve. However, in my delegation we are of the opinion that this question will ultimately be solved in a satisfactory way. We for our part we would prefer that it should be solved according to the second alternative, that is by referring only to international law and the Geneva Protocol.

At the same time we have obtained, through the work in the contact group, a very useful list of criteria on what is required in order to make an investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. My delegation is pleased with this development since we consider the provision to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons to be the main reason for including a reference to the prohibition of use in the convention.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The work on the compliance procedure in general has also shown clear progress. We now have a substantial basis on which we can continue our work. It seems to be generally agreed that the procedures for the verification of the use of chemical weapons can also continue to be discussed in this contact group. We hope that it will consider this problem again soon.

The problems which remain with respect to certain definitions and the provisions deriving from them seem to be more difficult than envisaged. This is clear from the work in the contact group. Also, the thought-provoking statement made recently by Ambassador Imai of Japan raises pertinent aspects on the question of definitions.

The problems concern the concepts of chemical warfare agents and the so-called key precursors. It is obvious that these problems are more of a political nature than really technical. However, at the same time they ought to be the problems most easy to clarify, presupposing mutual accommodation.

In this connection we might reflect on another approach, which might prove to be helpful for our deliberations, namely, to draw up a comprehensive and as far as possible authoritative list of the words and concepts being used in our work with the convention. Although such a list would not be complete or agreed upon totally until the convention enters into force, it still might be useful to have provisional versions during our work. Such lists of words and concepts have occurred in connection also with other treaties and are by no means an innovation in themselves. My delegation accordingly suggests that such a provisional list should be worked out as soon as possible by the secretariat, which might have to hire a consultant in order to undertake the job. This work should preferably be ready by the time our work starts next session.

My delegation has also made a suggestion in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for a more comprehensive work method. We described such a method in the Working Group when we presented our idea of supplying structures for the discussions on each key issue, for instance, on the destruction of stockpiles and of production facilities, etc. The suggested structures for such different key issues are not intended to constitute treaty texts but only to keep track of different issues which are interrelated. Take, for instance, the question of destruction of stockpiles. A discussion of this issue requires that the questions of declarations of stockpiles, of their destruction, and of the verification of the destruction process are discussed together and not separately under different headings treating declarations and verification in too general terms. It is our sincere hope that this approach will facilitate our work.

With regard to the Swedish proposal planning, organization and training for the actual use of chemical weapons should also be prohibited, we have already made it clear that we shall come back to this problem when the question of the prohibition of use in the convention seems to be satisfactorily resolved to the benefit of all parties.

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn:

The work on a chemical weapons convention is proceeding very slowly;

Nevertheless, much useful and much needed work is being carried out in the process, work which is indispensable for the ultimate realization of a convention.

Thus, if our work this year brings forward solutions to some of the problems mentioned above, I find that the prospects for the substantial work on the convention next year are indeed good.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Let me now come to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It should be said that the Committee has gone out of its way to provide all possible resources to ensure the green light for negotiations in this priority field. Delegations contribute to the activities of the contact groups and of the Working Group as a whole, dynamically led by the distinguished Ambassador McPhail of Canada. Progress is in the making but it is still not as distinct as one would wish it to be. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons is still faced with the major task of considering and reaching an agreement on numerous unresolved questions. In this situation delegations should demonstrate the necessary flexibility and mutual understanding so as to avoid creating artificial and superfluous impediments leading to the waste of time and hampering progress, as was emphasized by some delegations speaking on the subject at our earlier meetings.

I would like to concentrate on the question of the destruction of stockpiles. This question is one of the most important parts of the future convention to negotiate, and will subsequently be most costly in implementation. It will, however, be conducive to the effective implementation of other provisions of the future convention, such as the non-production of key precursors that could be used for chemical weapons purposes, the destruction of facilities producing chemical weapons, etc. Furthermore, the successful implementation of these measures will increase confidence among the parties to the future convention; it will also encourage other States to join the convention. That is why, in the considered view of my delegation, the successful negotiation of the question of the destruction of stockpiles is of primordial importance. But before we come to that, a number of important elements in this respect must be agreed upon. Among other questions to be clarified and agreed upon are: the form and content of declarations on existing stockpiles of chemical weapons as well as the principles for the verification of the destruction of stockpiles. So far, no adequate solution to the above questions has been found. This, however, should not discourage delegations and hinder them from making progress on many other important questions concerning the future convention. A final agreement on the contents of declarations and on plans concerning the destruction of stockpiles should constitute a good basis for an effective control of their destruction, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The pace and stages of destruction foreseen in their plans should ensure that no party gains a unilateral military advantage.

The process of destroying chemical weapons stockpiles will require the construction or conversion of at least one specially designed facility in a given country. The timing of the construction of that facility should be planned in such a way so as not to allow any party to delay the ratification process owing to its inability to commence the destruction (6 months to 2 years after ratification) of its stockpiles.

The costly process of the designing and construction or conversion of the destruction facility will most probably require an international co-operation with the participation of, inter alia, the envisaged consultative committee. In this context, it is important that the future convention should contain a provision for the possible transfer of chemical weapons to another State party for their destruction, under effective international control. This will require further legal arrangements.

The possibility of the diversion of some chemicals for peaceful purposes constitutes a separate problem. An understanding expressed on that subject in documents CD/112 and CD/334 is being currently contested by some delegations on the grounds that it is not economically feasible. The delegation of Australia has

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

pronounced itself recently in favour of conversion, in agreement with the future consultative committee. Let me express the hope that further discussions on this subject will lead to a satisfactory solution.

Another important problem, which is the subject of difficult negotiations, is the verification of the destruction of stockpiles. So far no solution satisfactory to all has been found. On the contrary, well-known divergencies of views in this respect persist. The important elements for making an optimal decision on the methods for the verification of the destruction of stockpiles should, in our view, include inter alia the following:

- The scope of the duties of international inspectors during on-site inspections;
- The scope and nature of the information to be provided by the national verification body;
- The scope and contents of the plans for the destruction of chemical weapons;
- The degree of automation of the destruction facility and its specifically designed control instruments;
- The scope of the detailed information to be provided before the commencement of each stage of the destruction process;
- Reporting on the destroyed stockpiles in the subsequent stages of the destruction process.

The time is ripe for us to deal as intensively as possible with these specific questions. Any agreement on them could bring us closer to the elaboration of the future convention. It seems that it would be very helpful to the negotiations on the destruction of stockpiles if we could reach a common agreement on the definition of the terms chemical weapons and key precursors and a compilation of two lists of such precursors. One of them should include the key precursors to be destroyed and another one should contain key precursors which could be manufactured under supervision, to ensure their use for peaceful purposes. It is our hope and expectation that the work conducted on these issues in Contact Group D will bring tangible results soon.

Before concluding, let me also say a few words about the activities of contact groups B and C. In group C, dealing with the question of incorporating the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the scope of the future convention, as well as in group B, concerned with the resolution of compliance questions, in our view, meaningful progress has been attained. In our opinion, both groups are close to reaching the stage of the drafting process.

I started by speaking about a green light for negotiations in this priority field. Let me then say that we deplore the recent decision by the United States Senate on further funds to be released for the development of a new generation of chemical weapons. We are afraid that this will add new problems to our negotiations. Such a decision cannot contribute to the creation of confidence, which is indispensable and should accompany our work on the elaboration of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

I would like to conclude, however, by emphasizing that the atmosphere of readiness for constructive action which exists in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons may and should bring further promising results in the whole broad scope of the work of the said Working Group. The Polish delegation will spare no effort to contribute to that end.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

The other two working papers which I have the honour to introduce deal with problems relating to the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention by the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to stress the urgency which Norway attaches to this matter. In our view this is a priority item on the multilateral disarmament agenda. Definitive progress in this field would be most important on its own merits; but it would also be highly beneficial to other multilateral disarmament efforts. We would urge all parties in these negotiations to take full advantage of the momentum which has been created with a view to achieving early agreement on this highly significant disarmament measure.

Norway has closely followed the progress which has been made in the Ad Hoc Working Group and its contact groups. In this connection, our delegation was strengthened for seven weeks this year by the presence of experts. We have noted the increased support for the proposal to include a prohibition on use in the scope of the convention. It is of vital importance that this should not detract from the obligations of States under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. An inclusion of a prohibition on use in the new convention would have the advantage, however, that the non-use of chemical weapons could be effectively verified.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

A primary objective of the Norwegian research programme on the sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions was to focus on the verification problems which would have to be dealt with in the framework of a future chemical weapons convention. The programme which was initiated by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1981 was aimed at using snow samples for verification of alleged use. In particular, the possibility of positive verification some weeks after alleged use has been investigated with a view to finding a realistic time-frame for undertaking on-site inspection under such conditions.

The first part of the research programme was carried out in 1981/1982 and the results were presented in working paper CD/311.

Today I have, therefore, the pleasure to introduce working paper CD/396 on the verification of a chemical weapons convention, which summarizes the results of the second part of the research programme undertaken during the winter 1982/1983. The full report is annexed to the English version of the working paper.

I would like to stress that the programme is based on experiments under field conditions in order to provide as realistic a basis as possible for this research.

As the scientific results of the second part of the research programme were presented to Contact Group C of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons on 1 July, I shall limit myself to the main recommendations in regard to verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons which can be made on the basis of the results of the research programme.

The results of this programme demonstrate the importance of the time factor and proper collection of samples. The samples should therefore be taken as soon as possible after report of alleged use has been received. Further decomposition of the chemical agents in the samples on the way to the analysing laboratory should be avoided by rapid transport and proper handling. To ensure the integrity of the samples, personnel having the necessary knowledge should do the sampling and transportation and be selected by the consultative committee or a suborgan under that Committee. The laboratory or laboratories where the analyses will be carried out should be selected and supervised by the same suborgan. The chemical analyses would require highly trained and scientific personnel and modern equipment.

Several different analytical techniques will be needed. In addition, to obtain maximum reliability of the results, it may also be necessary to apply more than one independent analytical method for each chemical agent.

The regular updating of the procedures for the taking of samples and of analytical methods should be the responsibility of the consultative committee.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to continue to support research in Norway of questions relevant to a future chemical weapons convention and the results of such research will in due course be presented to the Committee.

Finally, I have the honour to present working paper CD/397 on verification of the non-production of chemical weapons in Norway. Such verification should in principle be based on on-site inspections under the auspices of the consultative committee according to a list of key precursors. This list, as well as the criteria for making such a list, should be kept under constant review. The key precursors for super-toxic lethal chemicals and other super-toxic chemicals, listed in the annex to the working paper, document CD/353, submitted by the United Kingdom, would seem to be sufficient for a system of inspection in order to verify that those substances which pose the greatest threat are not being produced in violation of the future convention. In that working paper, the United Kingdom presented a survey of the British production and civil uses of key precursors. It was suggested that other States should furnish corresponding data concerning their civil chemical industries. The third paper which I am submitting today, in document CD/397, contains similar data as regards civil production and uses in Norway. As can be seen from this document, the civil uses of such substances in Norway are very limited and based on import. I hope that these data will be useful in the Committee's further work in regard to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, in my statement today I wish to address the issue of a chemical weapons convention. Our delegation considers the convention not only a matter of the highest priority in our work, but -- like many others in this room -- also the most promising area for achieving the concrete, positive results so badly needed for disarmament as well as for the Committee itself. We acknowledge with satisfaction that in the Ad Hoc Working Group as well as in all contact groups, the work is going on intensively and seriously, and we highly appreciate the skilful guidance and initiative of Ambassador McPhail of Canada as Chairman of the Working Group.

We took note of several suggestions as to how to make the work of the Group still more effective. There is no doubt that procedures can be always improved. However, the main realistic way to bring the work to a positive and reasonably fast end is to take a political decision to clear the way for real negotiations and the drafting of the convention. The idea that the time has come for such work, expressed by several delegations, has full support on our part.

We can only express our regret at the decision by the United States Senate to allocate \$130 million to begin production of artillery shells and aerial "Big eye" bombs for binary chemical weapons -- a decision indicating the direction of real political interests which are far from disarmament measures.

It is only natural to ask what was the main purpose of such a step. Some opinions were expressed that it was intended to put the Committee on Disarmament under pressure to accelerate the work regarding a chemical weapons convention. At the same time, we all know the heavily scheduled time-table of the working and contact groups, and we can all see that even small delegations are contributing to the work in groups with remarkable activity, doing their best to achieve maximal progress. Should we understand that the United States administration has a different opinion regarding our efforts or even a quite different approach to the Committee on Disarmament as such?

Trying to review the most important results and problems of our work on a chemical weapons convention, I wish to point out the following questions.

Some progress was achieved in the solution of the issue of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the convention. Since there is consensus that nothing in the convention should weaken the Geneva Protocol of 1925, one of the acceptable ways certainly could be to cover the prohibition of use by an explicit reference to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and its direct relevance for the parties to the convention, as suggested in the contact group -- though some other formulation could be equally acceptable. In any case the discussion in the contact group brought the views very close together, so that a final solution should not be too far off.

A reasonable amount of work was also done with regard to fact-finding procedures and the nature of the evidence which should be available to justify the initiation of a challenge. In our view, the question of evidence is very important: the experience of unsubstantiated allegations, for instance concerning yellow rain, etc., is a warning, because the political consequences, even of evident fakes, tend to be far-reaching. The text elaborated in the contact group certainly is not the language of the treaty, but, in principle, the procedures suggested are reasonable and can serve as a good basis for actual drafting.

(Mr. Vajvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Renewed attention appears to be attached by several delegations to the scope of the convention and to the definition of chemical weapons, where the introduction of the concept of chemical warfare agents has been advocated.

In military terminology, chemicals which are contained and dispersed by chemical weapons are called chemical warfare agents. As such, they are characterized by qualities important for their military deployment, such as their chemical structure and toxicity, the character of injury they cause, the period of latency, their resistance under environmental conditions, etc. Such characteristics are needed in the first place for an army planning an offensive use of chemical weapons, but of course, they should be known and considered also by those planning the defence against chemical weapons.

The question is whether this evidently military term, and the concept behind it, could become useful in the context of the convention prohibiting the production of all chemical weapons irrespective of the above-mentioned characteristics, and providing for their destruction without exception.

The introduction of the concept of chemical warfare agents was considered already in the very early phases of our negotiations, several years ago. It soon became evident, however, that such an approach would create several difficulties. If we proceeded along such lines, using military concepts and criteria, it could become difficult to avoid formulations resembling more the language of instructions for the use of chemical weapons rather than a disarmament document.

But the main question is if and how the concept could help to make the provisions of the convention more precise.

Providing for a total ban on all chemical weapons, the convention hardly needs to specify them very much. The concept of chemical warfare agents, as we understand it, implies the use of lists of corresponding agents. Speaking in terms of specific agents, however, one can in principle never cover the whole field of potential chemical weapons. Any list would always be only illustrative: there will be troubles with different military code-names, and it will not include chemicals kept in secret or those newly developed in the future etc.

According to such inherent restrictions, the concept could in fact be interpreted in such a way that only known chemical warfare agents, corresponding to all military criteria, should be declared and destroyed, while some others could be omitted. With the complex problem of new multi-component chemical weapons systems in mind, we should like to express our serious apprehension that the chemical warfare agents concept could fail, especially in this most important area of new kinds of chemical weapons.

For all these reasons, with regard to the scope of prohibition, we cannot see any more proper criterion than that of general purpose.

The criterion of toxicity is an additional one. It was adopted for the purpose of the convention later, after it had been recognized that there must be some kind of differentiation in some provisions of the convention (certainly not, however, in the scope): some chemicals are extremely dangerous and should be subject to a very strict regime of verification, while some could be monitored less strictly.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As a matter of fact, the question of reasonably differentiated approaches appears to be one of the most important in the future work on the convention. The discussions in the contact groups go deeper and deeper into individual issues. In the course of such a process there is a natural tendency to reach the highest possible level of perfection of a particular proposed procedure. Doing this one might easily forget the broader context, and fail to see a realistic balance between a given implementation provision and the reasonably evaluated real importance of the given issue.

The destruction of stocks may serve as an example of that problem.

As is well known, some delegations proposed for this purpose a complex of sophisticated procedures. Such a complex would include the monitoring of all the steps of the technological process by a number of sensors and automatically operating television cameras, a continuous on-site inspection performed by a whole group of international inspectors, a great number of laboratory tests, and so on.

All this has been suggested in order to verify that the State which has declared its stocks of chemical weapons really destroys them. I must admit that my delegation has some difficulties in seeing why the declared stocks should not be destroyed. It seems more logical to consider the destruction of declared old stocks of chemical weapons one of the most simple tasks for verification.

At the same time, a real danger for international security could be potentially posed, e.g. by the undeclared production of some chemicals, which could eventually be deployed in multi-component chemical weapons systems, by the civilian chemical industry.

There seems to be little doubt that the only verification measure practically applicable with regard to such a very serious situation would be an on-challenge inspection -- that is something, considered by some delegations as "absolutely insufficient and unacceptable" for such a simple task as the destruction of known stocks. An imbalance between these two approaches is evident.

The issue of precursors might serve as another example.

The concept of precursors is needed in the convention for two main purposes: (1) to cover -- as far as declarations and destruction are concerned -- the chemical components of binary and/or multi-component chemical weapons systems, and (2) to cover the commercial production of chemicals which could potentially be misused for creating new chemical weapons in the future.

From a chemical point of view, precursors are all intermediate chemicals participating in the process of the chemical synthesis of the end-product.

It would be not only impractical but virtually impossible to deal with the whole spectrum of potential precursors, which are innumerable. Also, the interference with the interests of the peaceful civilian chemical industry would be enormous, and many delegations have already expressed their principal objections to any measures which could restrict the free development of the chemical industry.

It seems much more appropriate to choose only key precursors, and of those, only the key precursors of supertoxic chemicals to be dealt with in the convention. Our delegation contributed to this problem in document CD/CW/CRP.83, issued on 19 July of this year, in which we tried to define the main areas where the concept

(Mr. Vajvoda, Czechoslovakia)

of key precursors is relevant and corresponding general criteria for the definitions of key precursors, and proposed a few chemicals which could be included in tentative lists of key precursors to be destroyed and to be manufactured under supervision. We also emphasized that the concept of key precursors should be reserved only for situations of exceptional importance for the security of States.

In this context it is also pertinent to touch briefly upon the issue of lists of chemicals in the convention.

The provisions of the convention reflect different levels of the problem. At the level of scope, for instance, the convention provides for the complete prohibition and destruction of all chemical weapons. Here, the general purpose criterion is sufficient, and by using a list of specific substances its general validity would probably be impaired rather than improved.

In such a specific problem as key precursors, some lists would be appropriate, because they should facilitate the discrimination of areas of the highest importance and the limitation of any unnecessary interference with the peaceful chemical industry.

However, even these lists would be provisional and ought to be periodically revised and brought up to date.

Consequently they should be incorporated in the convention in a way which would (1) give them the necessary authority as an obligatory provision of the treaty, and (2) allow for their appropriate revision in the future.

An annex, revised in the course of the review conference on the convention, might be a reasonable way to meet both requirements mentioned.

There is no doubt that at this stage of the negotiations the lists help to give the discussion more concrete dimensions. Still, we must focus our work on the formulation of general criteria which — being prerequisites for any objective listing of chemicals — would be valid permanently and would therefore be embodied in the main text of the convention.

Only something more than three weeks are left for our work on a chemical weapons convention during this year's summer session. It would be regrettable to use this time for the formalities so often presented in the course of the preparation of the Working Group's report. Our delegation is convinced that all efforts should be given to constructive work on the substance of the convention. I would like to express our conviction that the possibility still exists for us to achieve real progress even during the current session of the Committee.

(Mr. Dubey, India)

Mr. Chairman, I seek your permission to invoke rule 30 of the rules of procedure in order to speak about the subject of chemical weapons. Unfortunately, the current wave of global armament has led to the refinement and amassing of even those deadly weapons which the world thought had been forsworn long time ago. The strange and dangerous dialectic which seeks disarmament through the continuation and intensification of the arms race has, of late, been deployed in support of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons too. However, the nations engaged in such an arms race must be realizing at the same time that chemical weapons do not make much difference to their real security as defined in terms of their own strategic doctrines. It is this realization which constitutes the main hope for making progress in the Committee in the sphere of chemical weapons.

Since the beginning of the 1983 session of the Committee, there has been a promise in the air that the current year would be significant for negotiations on chemical weapons. We are glad to note that by now a considerable amount of substantive technical work has been done which has helped in clarifying concepts and moving towards a consensus on the provisions of a possible convention banning

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Dubey, India)

chemical weapons. This has no doubt greatly improved the prospects for work next year. For this the credit, in no small measure, should go to the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, who, as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, has indeed made an untiring effort to fulfil the pledge he gave at the beginning to "take these negotiations forward during 1983". Valuable contributions have also been made to the work on the subject by the delegations of the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, the United States, Yugoslavia, China, France and the USSR.

At the same time, quite a few problems of a complex and sensitive nature remain to be sorted out. Many of these problems are rooted in the very nature of the technology in the chemical industry as well as the dual purpose -- both military and development -- of the end-use of the products of this industry. In the opinion of my delegation, while continuing to deal with these problems through various contact groups that have been set up for this purpose, it is not too soon to bring together in the form of provisions of a draft convention those elements on which there is already a consensus or near-consensus, as also those on which differences still persist. This will lend greater clarity to subsequent discussions, will enable delegations to see the main provisions of a draft convention in their mutual relationship and bring into relief points on which instructions have to be sought from their governments.

It will be recalled that India has so far not been in favour of including the prohibition of use in a new convention on chemical weapons. This was so because we considered the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to be adequate for prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. As this Protocol constituted a universal legal prohibition against the use of chemical weapons, recognized both in international and customary law, we had apprehensions that the duplication of its provision in another instrument might undermine its legal force and status. My Government has, however, reviewed its position, and I am now glad to inform the Committee that India will be willing to support the incorporation in the proposed convention of a suitable provision for a ban on the use of chemical weapons. We have done so primarily as a contribution to speeding up the work towards negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons. Having said this, I would like to emphasize that the incorporation of a provision on the banning of use in the proposed convention should be done in such a manner as to ensure that the convention supplements and strengthens the prohibition already provided for in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. I am sure that in this connection some of the genuine concerns regarding the status of the 1925 Protocol voiced by distinguished delegates will be taken into account. We are happy to note that the tentative draft prepared by the co-ordinator of the contact group dealing with the subject duly reflects the sensitivities and concerns in this regard.

The importance of the question of verification of compliance cannot be over-emphasized. This question has, therefore, very rightly claimed a large part of the time and attention of the Ad Hoc Working Group. I would not like, on this occasion, to go into the details of the proposals made in this regard. I would simply reiterate my delegation's position that one of the most important considerations to be taken into account in reaching agreement on the verification of compliance should be that the chemical industry in many countries of the third world, including my own, still remains at an early stage of development and nothing should be done in the proposed convention which will inhibit the growth of the civilian chemical industries in these countries. The legitimate desire of these countries to develop their chemical industries for the benefit of their peoples and as a contribution to bridging the technological gap and

(Mr. Dubey, India)

developing self-reliant economic structures must be respected. Moreover, the verification regime which is ultimately agreed upon must be non-discriminatory in character and should be accessible to all States parties to the convention. Finally, we should be careful to ensure that the procedures for the verification of compliance remain fair to the civilian chemical industry and do not put an unnecessary burden on it.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

My purpose in speaking today is to introduce the Egyptian working paper which has been distributed as an official document under the symbol CD/408.

I do not believe that I need stress our eagerness to see the adoption of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In our opinion, such a convention would be among the principal achievements of the Committee on Disarmament. However, for this achievement to become an effective reality, efforts should be made to ensure the global nature of the convention through the accession thereto of all the countries of the world, in order to save this and future generations from the threat of the potential use of such horrifying weapons and to bring about their final disappearance from the military arsenals of the world.

In our view, one of the main prerequisites in this connection is an undertaking by the States parties to work for the achievement of this objective and to act in a manner conducive thereto. Accordingly, the Egyptian working paper proposes that the convention should contain a provision indicating that the States parties undertake to respect the convention, promote its objectives, and observe its letter and spirit in their international relations.

Moreover, in the matter of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, readiness or reluctance to accede to it will be the result of reciprocal influences in the attitudes of States such that, if a particular State or group of States declines to accede to the convention, other States, which initially might have wished to become a party to it, will be disinclined to take such a step. Conversely, the accession of a particular State or group of States might encourage other States to follow their example.

States are most likely to be predisposed towards accession if they have faith in the credibility of the convention and are satisfied that its provisions are conducive to the furtherance of a common interest, namely, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and that their security would not be jeopardized as a result of their accession thereto.

In this connection, the provisions concerning verification and compliance assume particular importance. The greatest inducement for States to accede to the convention would be a feeling of confidence that the convention is capable

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

of enforcing compliance with its provisions. This necessitates the establishment of an effective system to verify the occurrence of any violations, to counter such violations when they occur, and to deal with any situation in which a State finds itself endangered as a result of its accession to the convention and its fulfilment of its obligations in good faith.

At meetings of the Working Group and meetings of experts, Egypt has consistently stressed the need for the convention to incorporate an effective verification system, including the possibility of on-site inspection. It is gratifying to note that the Committee on Disarmament currently appears to be more aware of this requirement.

However, we do not believe that the establishment of an effective verification system would, in itself, be sufficient to inspire the requisite degree of confidence in the credibility of the convention. Provision should also be made, therefore, to deal with situations in which a State party refuses to co-operate with the bodies responsible for verification, or in which a violation of the provisions of the convention is ascertained through the verification procedure.

It might be said that, in such a situation, any injured State could call upon the Security Council to discuss the matter and take the appropriate action. However, with all deference to the Security Council, which plays a commendable and significant role in disarmament conventions, we do not believe that recourse to its authority is sufficient for dealing with situations such as those to which we have referred. Resort to the Security Council is not, in itself, sufficient to inspire the requisite degree of confidence in the credibility of the convention and would not, therefore, encourage the largest possible number of States to accede to the Convention.

I do not believe that we need to elaborate on our reasons for taking this view. In effect, under the Charter of the United Nations, any Member State has the right of recourse to the Security Council and no special convention is needed for this purpose. Moreover, resort to the Security Council is regulated by the provisions of the Charter which cannot be amended by a convention such as the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The right of veto or objection granted to the five superpowers is laid down in the provisions of the Charter governing the work of the Security Council.

We are all aware of the problems encountered in the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council as a result of political considerations and current circumstances. Consequently, we can envisage a situation in which a single State, possibly not even a party to the convention, might be able to obstruct the work of the entire Council and prevent the adoption of a resolution. For this reason, we do not believe that the possibility of resort to the Security Council would, in itself, inspire the requisite degree of confidence in the convention.

In making this assessment, we have taken into account the special nature of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, together with our past experience of the work of the Security Council.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

It should also be noted that the ultimate objective of the proposed convention is the institution of a general legal system under which the various States would give specific, verifiable undertakings. They would assume these commitments on the understanding that the other States parties would follow suit. Voluntary participation in such a system must be based on the conviction of every State party that, in the event of its security being endangered as a result of the non-fulfilment of commitments by any other State party, there would definitely be a body to which appeal could be made. That body could only be the group of States in association with which the injured State entered into specific commitments, on the understanding that the group would be responsible for upholding the convention and ensuring its observance.

To that end, stipulation of the possibility of convening a special meeting of the consultative committee if the fact-finding team is unable to solve a problem relating to the observance of the provisions of the convention, as mentioned in the draft submitted by the United States of America, merely constitutes a proper application of the principle of the collective joint responsibility of the States parties to uphold the convention and endeavour to ensure the observance of its provisions.

However, we believe that the provision concerning the convening of the consultative committee to consider a matter relating to the violation of the stipulations of the convention should comprise an indication of the legal framework within which the consultative committee can act. Since the consultative committee consists of all the States parties, specific provision should be made for a commitment on their part to assist any State whose security is endangered or which is otherwise prejudiced as a result of the violation of the provisions of the Convention by any States party. In parallel, a stipulation should be made to the effect that the State parties must take action to ensure observance of the convention and fulfilment of the commitments specified therein.

Furthermore, it is possible to envisage circumstances in which the convention, the legal system that it establishes or the legal principles that it lays down might be endangered, but not necessarily as a result of a breach committed by one of the States parties. In such a situation the Security Council might, once again, be convened, particularly if the matter relates to a circumstance which poses a threat to international peace or security. In addition, however, it might also be necessary to convene an urgent meeting of the consultative committee. In this connection, we believe that there must be some form of guarantee of the serious nature of such convocation for which we have therefore stipulated the concurrence of a number of States parties, for example, five.

These are the concepts that we believe should be incorporated in the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in order that the convention may acquire the credibility and effectiveness needed to make it truly capable of fulfilling our aspiration, namely, the final elimination of such weapons and the exclusion of their use in any form whatsoever.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation has repeatedly used this tribune to document its particular interest in the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. The exposed situation of my country on the dividing line between contrasting political, social and military systems explains the apprehension which the possible use of chemical weapons evokes. In the Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, chemical weapons are a subject of extensive and serious public discussion. In addition, the Government has been exposed to several comprehensive parliamentary questions on this topic. I would venture to say that there is hardly a country represented in this Committee which is at present conducting a comparable broad public discussion on this particularly barbarous weapons category.

You all know that, as long ago as 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the production of chemical weapons in an international Treaty and admitted international controls verifying the non-production of such weapons on its territory. It is therefore a matter of logic and continuity that we should strive with singular fervour for a universal, comprehensive and adequately verifiable prohibition of all chemical weapons. In the view of my Government, the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban is a matter of extreme urgency.

If we look back upon the long, difficult negotiating years, and especially to the past annual session, we cannot but be struck by the blatant contradiction between the declared will of delegations from all political quarters to arrive at the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, and the relatively minor degree of practical movement in terms of real progress. At the beginning of the session, my delegation nourished the hope that negotiations would bring a breakthrough and that we would be able to present to our public at home concrete results or at least some tangible momentum. In reality, partial agreement in areas of rather peripheral significance is all that we can show. It is a painful insight in this last month of our annual work that the breakthrough has not materialized. This evaluation of our present annual work is particularly disappointing since the preconditions for progress were uniquely present.

Firstly, the Committee on Disarmament had found in Ambassador McPhail a Chairman who has untiringly worked for the further progress of our negotiations, aided by his dynamic personality, his professional competence and a singular degree of commitment. The same can be said of the chairmen of our contact groups, our colleagues Mr. Cialowicz, Mr. Duarte, Mr. Akkerman and Mr. Lundin.

Secondly, the Committee has at its disposal a valuable and detailed array of documentation, providing a comprehensive basis for further negotiations. I would like to cite in particular the comprehensive United States working paper, document CD/343, the Soviet "Basic provisions" as contained in document CD/294 and, as an important background paper, the USSR/United States joint report dated July 1980; the United Kingdom paper concerning verification of non-production, document CD/353, and finally, our own national contributions on issues of verification, documents CD/265 and CD/326. Fundamentally, there is no important part of the future chemical weapons convention which has not been dealt with extensively in the existing working papers. In a different context I have concluded from this state of affairs that the time for additional national papers is now over and that the legitimate quest for profile by various individual delegations should now be replaced by a common effort to register tangible progress at the common negotiating table.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Why have these propitious circumstances faded away before our eyes? Why has progress eluded us? Do we have to choose a different negotiating method?

Looking back upon the annual session, of which so little remains for our work, one is impressed by the fact that one group of States has insistently chosen silence in the face of the essential issues of a future chemical weapons ban. We must seriously ask whether this silence betrays a new policy of delaying the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban, or what else might be the cause for such failure to contribute to our common efforts at bridging diverging positions. There is really no use indulging in ritual affirmations, together with other groups of States, that the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban are promising, if, concurrently, the necessary efforts are missing to move negotiations ahead. It is equally futile to call, in a ritual manner, for the political will in favour of genuine negotiations and for formal drafting exercises if one is not oneself equipped with the necessary political flexibility, enabling one in the interest of necessary compromise to relinquish untenable positions and to move in the direction of new, shared positions. Indeed, it is futile to limit one's own contribution to ongoing negotiations to a sterile rehashing of known views.

My delegation feels strongly that the time has come for an appeal to all participants to show a greater measure of political flexibility and to document such flexibility by practical contributions. That is the prerequisite for progress.

In a recent statement, Ambassador Imai of Japan underlined the priority of the destruction of existing stocks. Indeed, the current decisive danger emanates from existing chemical weapons stocks and from those chemical weapons production facilities which make for the proliferation of stocks, or at least could do so. In consequence, their destruction, reliably verified, constitutes, in our view, the central task for the entire chemical weapons negotiating complex. There is at least a certain measure of agreement among ourselves on this requirement, and there are also in this central area a number of elements which work towards consensus in substance. We should seriously ask ourselves whether it would not be worthwhile to achieve, in the first instance, a solution to these two interrelated problems — the destruction of stocks, and of production facilities. I would indeed suggest that the chemical weapons Working Group should, on a priority basis, concentrate on these elements of consensus, and my delegation would be ready to undertake a compilation containing such elements for the benefit of the Working Group. These elements of consensus could then be "recorded" in the proposed manner. If we do succeed in this central area in achieving partial progress, and registering it in written form, we shall have accomplished a great step, facilitating and accelerating the work of next year's session.

In this connection, I am pleased to comment on the impressive working paper by the delegation of the United States of America in which procedures for the verification of the destruction of stocks are graphically described, based on the example of an existing destruction facility. The particular value of this

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

working paper resides in the fact that it testifies in a particularly practical form to the possibility of effective international surveillance during the destruction process. It makes evident that control by international inspectors entails no undue burden for the signatories to the future convention. My delegation is therefore surprised that the views of Western countries on the destruction of stocks has drawn only critical and rather unhelpful comments from the representatives of socialist States, most recently in the statement of the distinguished delegate of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda, of 23 July 1963. These negative views are, however, developed without the benefit of any constructive counter-ideas on the part of the socialist representatives. This dilatory and superficial treatment of the topic of the destruction of stocks and its verification is in blatant contradiction with the urgency of eliminating those threats that stem from the existence of the present chemical arsenals. We must seriously deal with the issues of the international verification of the destruction of stocks. Here, more than elsewhere, it is totally insufficient to reiterate positions that harbour no consensus potential, and, for the rest, to remain motionless on established positions.

Advocating the concentration of our work on one key problem area of the future convention does not imply any less emphasis upon the important issues of, for example, the prohibition of transfer or other elements, such as, especially, the important issue of non-production and the details of a verification system relating to non-production. However, our position on these issues is well known, since my delegation has in working paper CD/326 submitted detailed suggestions for the verification of non-production. In particular, in these papers, my delegation has developed a control system of a low level of intrusiveness over the industrial production of organophosphorus compounds on the basis of random inspections. For its part, the United Kingdom delegation has shown a pragmatic path towards the verification of non-production in working paper CD/353.

My delegation would counsel seriously against any attempt to solve the problem of non-production by other means than a pragmatic approach. Obviously, a high degree of expert knowledge is required to avoid loopholes in the future convention. On the other hand, we should not unduly blow up the scientific complexities of non-production, thus building roadblocks on the way to the early conclusion of a convention. It appears highly advisable to conduct our discussion on non-production under the auspices of genuine relevance in arms control terms, and to structure our debate in a more goal-oriented fashion.

In contact group C, under the brilliant leadership of our Dutch colleague, Mr. Akkerman, a consensus on the inclusion of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the future convention is imminent. There is now agreement in substance that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

will be included in the future convention, and that the verification system will also cover chemical weapons use. We still have to work out a formulation which will accomplish the inclusion of the use prohibition in the convention in correct relationship to the present rules of international law. One possible solution could consist in a proviso which would juxtapose an unambiguous prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and the acknowledgement that such provision would reaffirm and strengthen the interdiction of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In the view of my delegation it is regrettable that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has, by virtue of the manifold reservations attached to it, de facto degenerated into a prohibition of the first use of chemical weapons only. It would have been a noble task for the Committee on Disarmament to eliminate the many ambiguities which result from the multitude of reservations to the Geneva Protocol by a constructive further development of law in the direction of an absolute interdiction of use. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves that such an evolution was in fact called for by the Geneva Disarmament Conference in the 1930s. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the issue of the further evolution of international law in terms of a categorical prohibition of use -- if indeed a consensus of States to this effect cannot be reached during the current round of negotiations -- should be assigned to a later review conference which could deal with this problem, say, at the conclusion of the chemical weapons stock destruction phase.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that my delegation strongly advocates a negotiation procedure which tackles problems in a manner more clearly structured, gradual, and better adapted to the priorities. This would be a more promising path towards the solution of outstanding problems. Simultaneous work in all areas over-extends the Working Group and the contact groups. This, in our view, is one important lesson of the past couple of weeks. For many years now the Committee on Disarmament has been facing the challenge of working out a comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, aimed at the elimination of this entire weapons category for all time. To this day, we have not responded to the challenge as we should. I would like to appeal to all delegations, in a solemn fashion, to make the utmost effort so that the Committee does not lose its credibility in this crucial domain.

(Mr. Labrador Rubio, Venezuela)

Since there already exists the fairly immediate possibility of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Committee ought to endeavour at once to initiate work on the refining of the basic elements of such an agreement. Objective criteria should be used to elucidate ambiguous concepts which are hampering the negotiations and thus to reach a clear definition of the ideas of "permitted uses", "defensive purposes" (which seem difficult to accept except in the form of the neutralization of the toxic effects of chemical agents) and "precursors" and "key precursors", and agreement should be reached, through negotiation, on the machinery for the declaration and destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and the verification thereof.

(Mr. Berhane Deressa, Ethiopia)

As the representative of Ethiopia, a country which was one of the first victims of aggression through the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons against its defenceless population, some 50 years ago, it is with a sense of great anguish that I refer to the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons that have continued unabated despite our best efforts within the United Nations. We therefore place high hopes on the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. In this connection, even though intensive work has been done during the present session of this Committee, some important differences continue to impede the attainment of our common objective. We must collectively strive to remove these difficulties with a view to achieving the long-awaited conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, there is an item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament which by general recognition draws the greatest attention of its member States. This is the item on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This year we have repeatedly expressed our view on this item, both at the plenary meetings of the Committee and in the course of various bilateral consultations. In addition, of course, there has been the day-to-day participation of our delegation in the negotiations within the Working Group and its contact groups. Nobody will deny that important work has been done during the current session of the Committee. Many new proposals, documents and comments have been submitted, by the USSR delegation among others. In our view, what is of primary significance is the fact that, in spite of well-known attitudes, the Committee has managed in some respects to go beyond sterile academism and general theoretical debates, to overcome in part the formulophobia of some delegations and to start the process of the preparation and consideration on a preliminary basis, where it was possible, of the draft provisions for the future convention. This new working method, used in parallel with the search of solution for outstanding questions, began to prove its vitality and efficiency. There is no doubt that it should be used also in future. It should be noted that the co-ordinators of the contact groups have come to see the merits of such an approach. It is not their fault that it was not possible to adopt it in full measure. In general they have done a good job. We would like also to praise the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador McPhail of Canada, who has supported the initiatives of the co-ordinators and who himself has not ignored new ideas and has displayed enthusiasm, energy and readiness for co-operation.

It is clear that the results of the work on the prohibition of chemical weapons done this summer could be considered as on the whole positive.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Nevertheless, they are considerably below our expectations. I believe that any delegation represented here will agree that much more could have been done.

What are the reasons for this? Of course, the work has been affected, and it could not fail to be affected, by the very unfavourable situation prevailing in the world at present. But specifically, in the context of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is impossible to ignore the fact that at the height of the negotiations on this item during the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Senate of the United States Congress approved allocations for the programme for the production of a new type of chemical weapons -- binary weapons. One frequently hears it argued that the production of binary weapons is necessary to the United States so that it can bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. Those who cherish such illusions should not forget that peace is indivisible and there is such a notion as retaliatory measures. The decision adopted by the United States Senate to allocate in fiscal year 1984 130.6 million dollars for the production of binary munitions, including the creation of the "Big Eye" chemical air bomb and the production of shells for 155 mm howitzers, represents another step in the implementation of the United States \$10 billion programme of preparations for chemical war, and threatens the renewed spiralling of the chemical arms race. The programme, it is known, envisages the mass production of new types of chemical weapons and the working out of methods for their use, as well as the stationing and storage of new types of chemical weapons primarily on the territory of western Europe, near the borders of the socialist States. We cannot view this decision of the American Senate otherwise than as further evidence that the present policy of the United States in the matter of the prohibition of chemical weapons is determined, not by the declared desire of the official United States representatives to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons, but by the desire at all costs to keep a free hand in order to implement the Pentagon's large-scale plans for the stockpiling and building up of the United States chemical arsenal. Of course, this decision adopted in Washington has strengthened the doubts of many States as to the sincerity of the United States desire to achieve agreements in the Committee on Disarmament.

But is it not possible that the very delicate thread of patience in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons may be broken when such things happen, for example, as the following: the Vice-President of the United States comes here to the Committee to advocate the speeding up of the negotiations in order to eliminate the threat created by chemical weapons, and a few months later he gives a decisive vote in favour of the implementation of the programme which could kill these negotiations?

Nor has progress in our negotiations been facilitated by the fact that the same delegation, which submitted to the Committee last spring its version of the basic provisions of a convention and which was prepared in theory to take note of any concurring or similar views on the part of delegations on various aspects of the future convention, has avoided by every possible means the recording of such concurrences in the form of draft wordings for the future convention. As was justly stated by Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil, we badly need formulas recording the results achieved, which could be regarded as "a common basis for the future work of consolidation". Moreover we have even noticed the following trend. The position of the United States delegation has in some respects departed

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

from the Soviet-American agreements reached after laborious negotiations over many years between the USSR and the United States.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly emphasized the tremendous significance of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Pointing out that the problem of the speediest possible prohibition of these weapons, which are one of the most barbaric means of annihilating people, is squarely before us, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, called on our partners at the negotiations to start the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The same view is held by all the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. In the Political Declaration adopted at Prague they stated that they deem it necessary to speed up the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

With this noble goal in mind, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries bend their efforts to finding mutually acceptable solutions. They have always consistently pursued this policy in the Committee on Disarmament and they continue to do so now.

In our view, at this stage of the talks it is of key importance to achieve an agreement on the entire range of questions connected with the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, in other words, the questions entrusted to contact group A, headed by the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Colonel J. Cialowicz. It has in fact already managed to achieve something. But we believe that there have been and that there still are the preconditions for achieving considerably more, in fact for considering the problem of the destruction of stocks to have been solved in a preliminary manner.

It appears that one of the serious disagreements concerns the question of the specific content of the initial declarations by the States parties to the future convention of their stocks of chemical weapons. The Soviet delegation is convinced that at such an early stage of the implementation of the convention i.e. 30 days after it has entered into force, from all points of view the declaration of stocks according to the categories of chemicals would be more than sufficient. That would give a general picture of the state of affairs as regards stocks and provide the necessary level of confidence. It is only natural that during the subsequent stages more detailed data would be submitted for the purposes of verification of the destruction process. However, some delegations, including those of non-aligned countries, have advocated that the States parties to the convention should submit more detailed data from the very start of its implementation.

With a view to resolving this problem, which has been deliberately complicated in many ways, the Soviet Union today proposes that the States parties to the future convention which possess chemical weapons should undertake to declare, not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force, their stocks of chemical weapons, both filled and unfilled, their precursors and the components of binary

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

weapons, by their chemical names and by the toxicity of the chemicals, in metric tons (for example, chemical agent sarin -- 10 tonnes), and their stocks of chemical munitions by types and calibres and the number filled (for example, artillery munitions, 155 mm, filled with sarin -- 1,000 pieces).

We submit this proposal in the belief that it would largely resolve the entire problem of the declaration of stocks of chemical weapons and the declaration of the progress of their destruction at various stages of the process. In addition to the achievement of full agreement on the content of the initial declarations made after 30 days, it would open the way towards mutually acceptable agreements on the content of the general plans for the elimination of chemical weapons stocks which would be submitted by the States parties to the consultative committee, on the content of the periodic notifications concerning the implementation of these plans for the destruction of stocks, on the content of periodic notifications concerning each future stage of the implementation of such plans and on the content of the appropriate declarations after the completion of the process of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons.

Another question connected with chemical weapons stocks which has caused disagreement concerns the international verification of such stocks at the stage up to their elimination. Quite frequently, solutions have been proposed which could not be implemented in practice because they did not take into account a number of specific features connected with this question. In particular, it has been suggested that States parties to the future convention, after it enters into force, should declare the locations of declared stocks of chemical weapons, i.e. the storage places where they may be kept. Such a requirement is purely unilateral and unrealistic, since it does not take into account the possible general use of such places of storage, where chemical weapons are being kept, and might affect the defence interests of States not connected with chemical weapons.

After careful study of this question and some realistic proposals made in connection with it, the Soviet Union proposes that in order to ensure reliable verification of the declared stocks, provision should be made for the creation of store-houses at the specialized facilities for the destruction of these stocks, the location of which would be declared concurrently with the declaration of the destruction facilities mentioned above. At such places of storage, international verification on a "quota" basis would be permitted during the entire period of the destruction of the declared stocks.

Thus this question, too, could be considered to be resolved, with provision for the verification of the entire process of the destruction of all stocks of chemical weapons, on the understanding, of course, that everyone will display a realistic approach to it.

At the current session of the Committee on Disarmament a great deal of attention has also been paid to the question of the direct verification of the process of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. In this connection we would like to state once again that we are no less interested than other States in reliable verification assuring our security and that of our allies. This applies

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

in full measure to the verification of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. But this approach in no way calls for extremes -- the converting of verification into an end in itself.

What kind of approach to the verification of the destruction of stocks would we consider effective and at the same time sufficient and consequently the most feasible? As you know, the Soviet Union proposes the conduct of verification through systematic international inspections on the basis of an agreed quota at the facility (facilities) for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

The level of the quota, which in our view means an agreed number of international inspections per year at one destruction facility or another, could be determined by the consultative committee on the basis of criteria agreed on in advance.

Unfortunately, the rigid position of one delegation on the question of the verification of the destruction of stocks, which up to now has not wished to take into account anything except its own maximalist proposals, has hampered the solution of this problem. We appeal to it in the hope that it will be able to make an objective assessment of the proposals of other delegations too, primarily from the point of view of providing an assurance of the compliance of States parties possessing chemical weapons with the order for the destruction of their stocks which has been elaborated and agreed on.

Is it not clear, for example, that there is no need at all for the permanent presence of inspectors at a facility destroying, for instance, small lots of chemical weapon stocks that are, furthermore, obsolete or of low toxicity, during the entire process of destruction? The stock probably does not represent any significant danger from a military point of view, but rather creates problems for the State to which it belongs, because the time for its storage has expired and it presents a danger for the environment, but under the convention the same close attention would be paid to it as to the latest and most dangerous chemicals.

The Soviet Union proposes a differentiated approach whereby, for the purposes of verification, account would be taken of the quantity of the stocks to be destroyed at one facility or another, their characteristics according to toxicity and danger, the destructive capacity of the facilities, the level of their automation and some other factors. In practice this would mean that in some cases the inspectors of the consultative committee would visit the facility more frequently, and in others less frequently. Nerve gases are one thing and chloropycine quite another.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

All this we have already explained in the course of consultations with other delegations, in private talks, etc., and we are prepared to continue to do so in order to reach an agreement as soon as possible.

The specific feature of the Soviet position consists in the fact that we do not propose any final solutions about arrangements for the application of the quota during verifications, because we believe that this could best be done by joint efforts. It is in this direction that we intend to concentrate our efforts in the future.

This, in our view, is the general state of affairs as regards the problem of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. There is everything necessary in order to advance in the nearest future to its solution and the completion of work on this matter as soon as possible.

There are, of course, certain other questions connected with the elaboration of the convention which require solution. We do not think that it would be correct to wait until a time when all of them are agreed on in principle before starting the drafting of the convention where that is possible. The experience gained at the negotiations shows that the best results are provided by flexibility and a skilful combination of various working methods.

In this connection, we would like in particular to dwell upon the question of the facilities for the production of chemical weapons. During the deliberations in the Committee on Disarmament on the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, different views have been expressed and are still held as regards the time for the declaration of the location of facilities that are to be destroyed.

The Soviet Union and some other delegations, taking into account the possible general use of some facilities producing, in particular, chemical weapons, and the importance of not causing any harm to the commercial interests of the States parties because of their accession to the convention, and a number of other considerations which I shall refer to later, propose the starting of the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities not later than eight years after the convention enters into force, and the declaration of their location not later than one year before that date. Consequently, the initial declarations of States parties would refer only to their existing capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

At the same time we would like to state today that a mutually acceptable solution on the time for the declaration of the location of facilities and

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the beginning of their elimination could be found at a later stage of the negotiations, taking into account the agreements of principle which could be reached, in particular, on the question of the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, the permitted production of supertoxic chemicals and the non-production of chemicals for binary weapons at commercial enterprises.

The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the solution both of the question of the verification of the destruction of stocks and of that of the verification of the production of supertoxic chemicals for permitted purposes, but at the same time it particularly singles out, in the context of chemical weapons production facilities, the question of the verification of the non-production of components for binary chemical weapons at commercial enterprises. The solution of these questions will, to a considerable extent, ensure confidence between the States parties to the future convention, regulate questions of balance and guarantee the viability of the convention as a whole.

The Soviet Union fully supports the relevant proposals of the German Democratic Republic concerning the elimination in the first instance of facilities producing binary weapons and proposes for its part that their destruction or dismantling with partial diversion should begin not later than six months and be completed not later than two years after the convention enters into force. We believe that the number of these facilities should include not only those which are in fact producing binary chemical weapons, but also facilities which are fulfilling contracts on work connected with their production. We also believe that the closing down of these facilities, their maintenance in a state of non-production and their destruction or dismantling with partial diversion should be carried out with appropriate international verification.

Logically, the convention should also include a provision under which the destruction of stocks of binary and multicomponent weapons should start not later than six months and be completed not later than two years after the convention enters into force.

We believe it important to emphasize other specific features of our proposals. They are not discriminatory because they would apply to all States which wished to embark upon the production of binary chemical weapons, they permit the solution of the problem of the time of destruction and declaration of any chemical weapons production facilities, taking into

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

account some other questions I mentioned earlier, and they would not create problems for anyone if binary types of weapons were not commissioned at all.

The Soviet delegation believes that work on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should continue at a considerably more intensive rate than has been the case up to now. The situation can hardly be considered normal when work in the Committee on such a priority item is done during only two or three months of the year, and for the rest of the time there is a recess. This aspect of the matter should be seriously thought over and we should try to improve the situation. We for our part, are ready to continue the negotiations for as long as is necessary to complete as soon as possible, the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In conclusion, we would like to call on all delegations to display real and not sham constructiveness and flexibility. Recently in the Committee the representative of a Western country went out of his way to prove that the group which he represents allegedly displays "pragmatism" and "political flexibility". We would like to ask -- where specifically is it displayed? On what issues have the delegations of Western countries in fact met half-way the positions of other States, including the country which I have the honour to represent? Apparently some in the Committee see their task as the stubborn and, I would say, sometimes obstinate repetition of rigid, inflexible positions and the adoption of a prejudiced attitude to the position of the other side.

Such an approach can only lead us to an impasse. We hope that the example shown by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which have repeatedly displayed during the current session of the Committee their readiness to take into account the reasonable demands of the other participants in the negotiations, will be followed also by those delegations which still do not go further than their declarations about their constructiveness.

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

In concluding my statement, let me turn to the subject of chemical weapons. At the outset of the 1983 session of the Committee it was commonplace to hold the view that prospects for progress, if any, were to be found in the field of chemical disarmament negotiations. Such progress has not materialized. The head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, eloquently elaborated on that disappointing fact a week ago. The delegation of the Netherlands unfortunately has to add its voice to his. It must be clear that if a delegation that opposes the detailed views of another fails to submit a correspondingly detailed proposal of its own, the basic tools for any valuable negotiations are not available.

We are informed -- even more frequently so in recent times -- that it is too early in the day to proceed to the ultimate substantive phase of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. Such an assertion, no matter who makes recourse to it, hardly seems convincing. The Netherlands holds the view that only in that ultimate phase are delegations really forced to see eye to eye on the remaining key problems. Further delay is hard to accept for all countries which, like the Netherlands, have renounced the option of chemical weapons.

This is not to say that some useful work has not been carried out in 1983. No delegation any longer stands in the way of the incorporation of a use prohibition in the scope of the convention. A good deal of progress was made on conditions, structures and mechanisms for on-challenge verification. The problems relating to key precursors have been defined and analysed, so that the basis has been laid for them to be solved in the hopefully near future.

In evaluating the positive results in the chemical weapons Working Group, one must have the greatest admiration for such men as Dr. Lundin of the Swedish delegation, who has worked longer than anyone else in the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors with untiring persistence for the cause of chemical disarmament.

Notwithstanding the advances made on many related issues, a breakthrough in the field of the monitoring of stockpile declaration and destruction was not achieved. The laudable efforts of the Polish delegation which co-ordinated the work on this aspect unfortunately were not matched by sufficiently forthcoming positions of

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Ramaker, Netherlands)

certain delegations. It is therefore with great interest that we have taken note of the positions developed today by the distinguished head of the delegation of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan. We will study them carefully.

If it is realized that stockpile destruction constitutes, together with assured non-production, the main goal of the convention, the seriousness of the situation just outlined is brought to light in all clarity. Furthermore, lack of progress in one area apparently has a spill-over effect on other areas of the future convention. So this lack of progress on stockpile destruction seems to have had an adverse effect on progress in the field of assured non-production.

In an important brochure of the International Federation of Chemical Energy and General Workers' Unions (ICEF) entitled "The Chemical Workers Report on Chemical Warfare", we are once again reminded that chemical weapons were originally derived from civilian industrial research. Chemical warfare agents can be produced without difficulty in the non-dedicated civilian industry. This very fact led, in the early discussions on a chemical weapons treaty, to the rejection of the idea of establishing a list of chemical warfare agents to be banned, since such a list could be easily circumvented and might indeed promote research on non-listed chemical warfare agents. We therefore do not think that the chemical warfare agents approach is a very promising one. It is obvious that some form of assurance by the civilian chemical industry that commercial chemical operations do not conceal the production of outlawed chemicals (which would be a qualitative check) and that they do not produce more than the permitted quantities of dual purpose agents (quantitative check) is necessary.

For these purposes, an obligation to exchange production statistics should be within reach, since, inter alia for environmental reasons, most countries already require that the industry submit such data on the national level. This, however, can only be part of an effective verification system. More intrusive control measures cannot be dispensed with, first and foremost to control the civilian chemical industry that produces key precursors. The United Kingdom, in submitting document CD/353, has rendered us a highly valuable service by dispelling the myth that this is an impossible task because of the sheer size of the chemical industry involved. More difficult is the problem of the verification of non-production in commercial chemical plants that are not declared as producing key precursors but nevertheless can be considered capable of making them. During next year's session, work on these problems should continue and be intensified.

As to the acceptability of the particular measures of inspection of the civilian industry on the territory of the inspected party, the delegations of Australia, Finland and the Netherlands have in past years made proposals that would allow for a lower degree of intrusiveness than often feared. With regard to countries with a traditionally high degree of secrecy, we found it interesting in this respect to note that the ICEF report argues that such secrecy is de facto gradually disappearing, as a consequence of the technology- and products-exchange barter-agreements nowadays existing between the Western world and the Soviet Union. This phenomenon already necessitates vast numbers of foreign personnel to be directly engaged in Soviet industry, and shows that the Soviet concern with secrecy can be accommodated. In so far as on-site inspection will be necessary in the context of a future convention, this may therefore turn out to be likewise manageable and acceptable.

It is the sincere hope of my delegation that after a year in which matters of a procedural nature often seemed to predominate over substance, none the less the stage has been set for fruitful work in 1984 when we will see each other again here in Geneva.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I will devote my statement today to chemical weapons and I should like to begin by expressing the warm thanks of my delegation to Ambassador McPhail and the Canadian delegation for the hard work which they have put into the Chemical Weapons Working Group this year and for the very substantial report which the Working Group adopted last night.

In spite of the unfortunately slow start to our substantive work this year, we have, in the view of my delegation, made some encouraging progress in the field of chemical weapons. We have seen the presentation of a number of substantial working

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

papers, which get down to the real detail that is necessary at this stage of our work. We have also seen agreement on a useful substantive record of the present state of our negotiations. My delegation believes that annex 1 to the Working Group's report sets out clearly the position on many of the substantive provisions that will be needed in a chemical weapons convention, and that it will enable Governments to analyse in depth the areas where an effort to achieve solutions is now required. We can see the shape of a convention emerging and we have an outline for our future work. I should also like, Mr. Chairman, to thank the hard-working co-ordinators of the contact groups for their efforts; the detailed descriptions contained in their reports of common views and of differences of opinion will need to be considered carefully, with the main report of the Working Group, in the preparations to be made for next session.

Mr. Chairman, before going on to review the more positive aspects of our work this session on chemical weapons, I must express a certain disappointment that attempts to come to grips with some key issues of the Convention, and in particular the important area of the destruction of stockpiles, have not met with an adequate response from all members of the Committee. My delegation welcomed the tabling of document CD/387, which offers a practical model of a verification system for the destruction of stockpiles. We hoped that this would provoke a full discussion of all aspects of this important issue. We were therefore disappointed that Contact Group A of the Chemical Weapons Working Group did not make a serious effort to deal with this key issue, but instead spent much of its time examining in depth rather minor points of the Convention, such as the question of the transfer of stockpiles to another State for the purpose of destruction.

Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, in the other Contact Groups more substantive work was done on the central issues with which the Groups were entrusted. My delegation particularly welcomed the elaboration in Contact Group B of fact-finding procedures for use in connection with verification by challenge, together with the further work on the related issue of the structure of a consultative committee. Challenge inspection and fact-finding procedures are clearly vital elements of the verification regime of the chemical weapons convention. They are the safety-net which will allow States to call for international investigation of any problems which they have with any aspect of the convention. We look forward to further work in this area next year.

Interesting ideas also emerged from the work on the question of use of chemical weapons in Contact Group C. We welcome the clear statement which has now been made that all delegations can accept that the convention should ensure that the use of chemical weapons is banned. We are grateful to Mr. Akkerman for his tireless efforts to find a way of expressing this underlying agreement, which will not weaken the Geneva Protocol. This is, indeed, my delegation's own major preoccupation when examining the question of including use in a chemical weapons convention. We are concerned that during the first 10 years of the life of the Convention, when stockpiles are being run down and destroyed, obligations undertaken by States under the existing regime, under the Geneva Protocol, should be preserved and should be extended to States parties to the new convention, which are not parties to the Geneva Protocol. After the 10-year period, when everyone is satisfied that chemical weapons stocks have been destroyed, we would then wish to see all States parties to the new convention subject to an obligation not to use chemical weapons in any armed conflict in any circumstances, regardless of whether they are parties to the Geneva Protocol. We believe that the work of Contact Group C has tried to address this problem, and we hope that all delegations will consider carefully during the

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

recess the type of approach outlined in the Contact Group's report. We should come back next year ready to come to grips with this problem, on which we seem close to reaching agreement.

Under Mr. Lundin's able guidance, Contact Group D also produced some very useful results on definitions, although my delegation was disappointed at the unwillingness of some delegations to become engaged in a serious discussion of a possible list or lists of key precursors. The report, nevertheless, contains much food for thought, not least in the area in which my delegation has taken a special interest, the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. Delegations will by now have seen the working paper my delegation has tabled, showing the information we have so far received, from other delegations to the Committee on Disarmament, and also from non-member States, on the production levels of the key precursors listed in our earlier paper CD/353. We would very much welcome further information in this area from other delegations, and we hope that at the beginning of the next session such information will be forthcoming. It is perhaps too early to draw any firm conclusions from the information received, but the results to date, recorded in the revised table, suggest that the procedures we have proposed in CD/353 would affect only a relatively small number of factories in the world. While delegations are holding discussions with their chemical industries on the question of civil production, we would like to suggest that they should also inquire about any production of super-toxic lethal compounds for civil uses. We would expect such uses to be extremely limited, because the very high toxicity of these compounds makes them difficult to handle. This information would help us to assess more clearly the practicality of proposals already on the table for limitations on the production of these compounds for civil purposes, and to enable us to see whether other means of verifying their production for civil purposes could be devised.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I listened with interest to the statement on chemical weapons made at our last plenary meeting on 18 August by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union; I should like to make some preliminary comments on some of the points he made. My delegation welcomes the agreement by the Soviet Union to include in the future convention a provision for a declaration within 30 days of stocks of chemical warfare agents and munitions specifying the relevant chemical names and toxicities. A requirement for full detailed declaration of stocks immediately after the convention comes into force will contribute to the confidence that will be needed to enable States to ratify the convention, and to sustain it during the long transitional period of 10 years proposed for the destruction of stocks.

Unfortunately, however, the reverse is true of the Soviet proposal that parties to the convention should only be required to start the elimination of facilities for chemical weapons production eight years after the convention comes into force. If we have understood their proposal correctly, the declaration of the location of production facilities would not necessarily be required until a year later, that is to say, nine years after entry into force. During these long periods other parties to the convention would seem to have no assurance that chemical warfare agents were not being produced at these unknown locations. My delegation finds this position hard to square with the proposal of the German Democratic Republic, supported by the Soviet Union, that the destruction of plants for the production of binary weapons should begin within six months, and be completed within two years after the convention enters into force. The components of binary weapons are necessarily immediate precursors in the synthesis of the super-toxic agents they are designed to generate; and, in at least some cases, they are also precursors in the normal

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

route for their synthesis. It seems to my delegation, therefore, illogical that plants for the production of these compounds should be treated differently according to whether the final product is a binary chemical weapon, or a chemical weapon in which the agent is preformed. If the periods of six months and two years are appropriate in the former case, they would seem also to be appropriate in the latter. My delegation agrees with the Soviet view that the declaration and destruction of production facilities, and the verification to provide sufficient confidence to other parties that they have been eliminated, require further consideration.

I was disappointed that the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union was unable to give further clarification of his Government's proposal for international inspection of the destruction of stockpiles on a quota basis. My delegation has always made it plain that we are fully prepared to give careful consideration to the ideas of other delegations, and to work together to find mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which remain in our negotiations; but it is difficult to work for such solutions when one has no more than a general concept of the position of other delegations. If we had a clearer idea of what is meant by inspection on a quota basis, and by the new Soviet idea of a differentiated approach to verification of destruction of stocks, then we would be able to see whether a solution could be found to this important question. My delegation therefore hopes that at the beginning of the next session we shall hear in detail how these approaches to the verification of destruction of stockpiles would be put into practice. Without such clarifications, further progress in this area will be difficult.

Finally, I should like to turn to an important general point. The verification regime of the convention, taken as a whole, will need to provide sufficient confidence to potential parties that its provisions will be strictly observed; in the first place to enable it to enter into force at all; and then to sustain it, through the exceptionally long transitional period of 10 years, and thereafter on a permanent basis. I say, "taken as a whole", because the confidence among parties and potential parties, that the verification provides them with an adequate degree of assurance, that the convention is being fully respected, will need to be built up from several interdependent elements. One element of primary importance must be provision for a system of verification by challenge, which would also provide a reliable recourse to States which are suspicious or dissatisfied about the implementation of the convention by other parties. Nevertheless, we see a risk that the repeated use of challenge could create a climate of distrust, and thus undermine the very confidence which is so important for the continued life of the convention. It seems to us, therefore to be vital that the convention should in addition, include a system of routine inspections which would not involve any element of suspicion or accusation, but would take the weight off the ultimate safety-net of verification by challenge. As my delegation has already indicated in its working paper CD/353, we believe that the system of routine verification should comprise four distinct elements:

Verification of the destruction of stocks;

Verification of the destruction of production facilities;

Monitoring of production of super-toxic chemical agents for permitted purposes; and

Verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

I have already reviewed the substantive discussion that has taken place this year on the first and last of these elements, i.e. the verification of destruction of stocks and the verification of non-production of chemical weapons; but we have not reached any conclusions and a great deal more needs to be done. We have not yet seriously tackled either of the other two elements. Obviously, if the Convention is to permit the production and retention of small quantities of super-toxic substances for protective purposes, this will have to be subject to stringent international control to ensure that this exception is not abused. Perhaps even more important to confidence in the Convention will be the provision of adequate assurances that the existing facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and the super-toxic compounds that go into them, have been definitively eliminated and cannot be used secretly to replenish stocks that have been ostentatiously destroyed. These four elements, along with the element of verification by challenge, will ultimately need to be considered together, because they will, together, be needed to build up and sustain the required level of confidence in the convention that we are negotiating. As confidence is indivisible, so we must look very carefully at the verification regime as a whole. My delegation hopes that this will be the priority task of the Chemical Weapons Working Group at the beginning of our next session. My delegation will give careful thought to these problems during the recess, and we hope that all other interested delegations will come back in February with comprehensive instructions to enable us to make rapid progress in this area, which will be of decisive importance to the success of our joint endeavours.

(Mr. Busby, USA)

Today, I intend to speak only about the Committee's efforts to ban chemical weapons. My delegation's views on the other areas of the Committee's work will be presented at the next plenary meeting. I would like to offer some general comments on the Committee's work on chemical weapons in 1983, then comment on some recent statements made by other delegations, and finally advance some ideas about next year.

Let me begin with some general remarks. The results of the 1983 session in the chemical weapons field have been meagre and quite disappointing to my delegation. This is true despite the best efforts of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador McPhail, and a number of other delegations, including my own.

The accomplishments of 1983 lie largely in the realm of better organization of work. For this we all owe a great deal to Ambassador McPhail. Under his leadership the tendency toward fragmentation of the discussions has been reversed. The Committee has been able to deal comprehensively with key problem areas and to consolidate work on related issues of scope, declaration, and verification in each area. Furthermore, for the first time the Committee has an agreed document which records the areas of convergence and divergence and can thus serve as a generally accepted basis for future work.

Certainly, useful and important work has been carried out by the four contact groups as well. We very much appreciate the efforts of the contact group co-ordinators. Some progress was made in crystallizing and recording convergence where it previously existed only in nascent form. However, except in the area of non-use of chemical weapons, little headway was made in finding mutually acceptable solutions to unresolved issues. It is notable that delegations which have held strong views on the non-use issue have displayed a spirit of co-operation and flexibility to enable progress to be made. We hope this spirit will continue and that remaining issues in this area, as well as others, can be resolved.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Busby, United States)

Having pointed to these positive aspects of our work, I must admit at this point that my delegation is, however, somewhat frustrated. We shared the general optimism that existed at the beginning of the 1983 session, when it was widely believed that great things were possible. Our Vice-President visited the Committee, and we introduced a comprehensive document designed to help intensify the work of the Committee. Later we introduced another major paper and brought a number of experts to Geneva. We participated actively and constructively in the deliberations. And yet, an effective ban is not much closer today than it was a year ago. We should determine the factors which may be responsible for this lack of progress.

Most importantly, some key delegations have not been sufficiently prepared or willing to take an active part in discussion of some of the main issues. This fact has been pointed out eloquently in recent statements by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands and today the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom. My delegation is also deeply concerned about this development. In order to negotiate, delegations must know each other's views.

For our part, we note there has as yet been no detailed reaction by certain key delegations to either of the major papers we have put forward this year. Nor has there been any detailed response to the important proposals made by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/326 and the United Kingdom in document CD/353. Only in the last week, when the work of the contact group on stockpiles had been completed, did the Soviet delegation begin to clarify for the Committee its proposal for verification of stockpile destruction by inspection on a quota basis. It must be remembered that they made this proposal over a year ago, and questions about it have been on the table ever since.

Furthermore, my delegation cannot understand why the Soviet delegation, which ardently professes its interest in completing a convention as soon as possible, refuses to discuss the subject of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. When the Working Group took up this issue, that delegation remained totally silent, neither presenting its own position nor responding to questions from others. The statement of the Soviet delegation on 18 August made quite clear their view that this subject should not even be discussed until all other issues have been resolved. We do not see how such an attitude can help accelerate the Committee's work.

Moreover, a hardening of the Soviet position has been quite noticeable in the last few weeks. We have discovered that matters thought to be agreed, for example, in Contact Groups B and D, are apparently no longer acceptable to the delegation of the Soviet Union.

My delegation is also very disturbed about the failure of the Committee to re-establish the Chemical Weapons Working Group promptly at the beginning of the 1983 session. Matters totally irrelevant to the work on a Chemical Weapons ban were allowed to intrude. Two months of potential work were lost. This must not be allowed to happen again.

In addition, we are concerned that at this session there was a proliferation of meetings, and increasing formality took the place of a more productive form of work. To some extent we seem to be substituting the appearance of activity for real negotiation.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

Let me now say a few words regarding the assertion of the Soviet delegation on 18 August that somehow my own delegation has been holding up progress.

Contrary to the assertions of the Soviet delegation, the lack of progress is not due to United States plans to produce binary chemical weapons. My delegation has fully explained the reasons for this interim measure to protect its national security in the absence of an effective agreement. We have welcomed discussions on our modernization programme and have gone to great lengths to ensure that our own proposals include provisions to ensure that binary weapons are completely covered by the ban, including the verification aspects. The United States has observed a moratorium on chemical weapons production for 14 years. Can the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union say the same for his country? We have made it quite plain that, rather than producing chemical weapons, we would prefer a sound agreement and we are willing to work hard to achieve it. It may be, as the Soviet representative said on 18 August, that the Chemical Weapons negotiations will be killed. But I can assure you it will not be the United States delegation that kills them.

In this connection my delegation deplores the unseemly ad hominem attack on the Vice-President of the United States made in the recent Soviet plenary statement. Such remarks do not belong in the Committee. I hope they will not be repeated.

Furthermore, the problem is not a lack of willingness on the part of the United States delegation to meet Soviet concerns about the intrusiveness of on-site inspection of stockpile destruction. The United States Working Paper of 5 July (CD/387) includes several important new elements for just this purpose. We now recognize the importance of co-operation between national and international personnel. We are now prepared to use data generated during routine facility operations for verification purposes. We have agreed that efforts must be made to minimize interference with the operation of a destruction facility. And, we are now prepared to restrict verification to the actual destruction step. In our view, these important steps to satisfy Soviet concerns seem to have been ignored by that delegation.

Nor is the lack of progress due to United States reluctance to draft treaty texts. Drafting of treaty texts cannot proceed any faster than resolution of key issues. While drafting can sometimes help clarify issues, in this case the issues have been clear for several years. My delegation's concerns about beginning to draft treaty texts at this stage have been explained previously, and I need not repeat them today. I would only say that these concerns have been heightened by developments in Contact Group A, which dealt with stockpile-related issues. In that group drafting of treaty texts on minor questions was substituted for efforts to resolve key questions.

I now want to respond to a number of the substantive suggestions made in the Soviet plenary statement on 18 August.

My delegation recognizes the generally constructive nature of the Soviet remarks on various substantive issues related to chemical weapons stockpiles.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

We welcome Soviet willingness to provide a detailed declaration of the contents of stockpiles, along the lines advocated by a majority of delegations, including my own. It is to be hoped that the remaining unagreed points can be quickly resolved.

We also welcome the Soviet proposal for the establishment of special storage sites at stockpile destruction facilities and for the monitoring of these sites by systematic international on-site inspection on a quota basis. In this connection, we would like to ask the Soviet delegation to clarify which stocks would be located at the special storage sites. In addition, would all stocks be moved to these locations promptly after entry into force? Or would the special storage sites contain only some of the stocks at any given time, for example, those stocks to be destroyed in the next stage of the schedule for stockpile destruction?

We also listened with interest to the explanation of the Soviet concept of inspection on a quota basis for stockpile destruction, particularly the criteria which were given. As outlined in the United States Working Paper CD/387, our conclusions are different. But the criteria on which the United States conclusions are based are similar. For us a major problem with the Soviet approach is that the actual level of verification would not be known until after entry into force. We are being asked to undertake a commitment to disarm without having an agreement on verification levels. We would expect the Soviet delegation to take this concern into account.

On the other hand, the proposals to single out binary chemical weapons stocks and production facilities for specially severe treatment seem to my delegation to be extraordinarily one-sided. They can only be seen as efforts to preserve Soviet Chemical Weapons capabilities while eliminating those of the United States. What else is one to think of the Soviet proposal whose effect would be to eliminate totally United States binary production facilities within two years after entry into force and not even to begin elimination of Soviet Chemical Weapons production facilities until eight years after entry into force? Surely the Soviet delegation recognizes that such proposals cannot advance the work of the Committee.

I promised to make some suggestions for making the Committee's work more productive next year.

Clearly, it will be essential for delegations to come with instructions which will enable them to negotiate on all of the issues. We think that the five-months recess should provide adequate time for thorough preparation.

We believe that the working group should be re-established promptly when the Committee on Disarmament reconvenes, regardless of the status of other procedural issues and other working groups. Work on a chemical weapons ban must not be held hostage to disputes over unrelated issues. We must not repeat the sad experience of this session.

In our view the Working Group must next year try to come to grips with each of the four major problem areas: scope of prohibition, including non-use; stockpiles; chemical weapons production facilities; and non-production of chemical weapons, particularly in the chemical industry. We would favour continuing the type of broadly based contact groups instituted in 1983. The record of the negotiations prepared under the leadership of Ambassador McPhail, and the reports of the 1982 and 1983 Contact Groups should be the starting-point for this work.

(Mr. Busby, United States)

I noted earlier the problems of proliferation of meetings and of increasing formality of meetings. It may be that having fewer meetings would facilitate progress by enabling delegations to focus their attention, rather than being compelled by circumstances to spread themselves too thinly. We would also urge that greater use be made of private efforts by the co-ordinators of contact groups to clarify problems and develop solutions. Such consultations cannot and should not become a substitute for the work of the contact groups or the Working Group, but they may help to overcome obstacles to progress.

Finally, as pointed out by the Soviet delegation on 18 August, consideration needs to be given to how to make better use of the time available. We share that view and I would today like to introduce a formal initiative from the United States delegation designed to facilitate the Committee's work next year.

As you know, my delegation attaches great importance to the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament to find a common approach to verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, which is one of the principal obstacles to agreement. The need to resolve this issue as soon as possible has also been stressed recently by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other member States.

To help accelerate the negotiations, the United States is today inviting member and observer delegations to participate in a workshop to be held at the United States chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. The workshop, which is scheduled for mid-November, will provide a first-hand look at actual procedures used by the United States for destruction of chemical weapons. It is our intention that it will also provide a forum for discussion of various means of verifying destruction of chemical weapons. A working paper outlining the arrangements for the workshop is being distributed today.

In addition to touring the destruction facility and being briefed on its operations, participants will also observe a mock on-site inspection exercise. That exercise will employ actual equipment installed at the destruction facility.

I would like to emphasize that the workshop will not be constructed solely as a platform for United States views. It will provide an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion of all points of view regarding verification of destruction. It could also provide an opportunity for discussion of other issues closely linked with stockpile destruction, including those raised in the Soviet plenary statement of 18 August. To facilitate a balanced discussion we are inviting a number of delegations with particular interest and expertise in this field to make presentations.

We intend to circulate a more detailed agenda and would welcome suggestions from delegations, with a view to making the workshop as useful as possible. Furthermore, we hope that other countries with destruction facilities, including the Soviet Union, will also consider inviting delegations to their facilities.

As we end the 1983 session, I sense that the frustration and disappointment felt by my delegation are shared by others. But I also sense that we all share a common objective and a desire to achieve it as soon as possible. I trust that delegations will return in 1984 resolved and prepared to make it a year of accomplishment. My delegation certainly will.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

My delegation regrets to observe that the Committee, towards the end of the current session, has slid into the same quagmire of lack of purpose and flexibility which was its lot at the beginning of the 1983 session. The Committee has relapsed into a rather untoward complacency which is getting more and more ominous for our future work. We cannot hide our apprehensions when we observe that our early hopes of a rapid elaboration of a Chemical Weapons convention are becoming more and more illusory as the major parties concerned continue to stall negotiations on a future convention that would constitute a major breakthrough and inspire more fruitful efforts in disarmament negotiations.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): As we have indicated to the secretariat in the last couple of days, my intention is to speak both as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and as representative of Canada.

As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group I have the honour to table document CD/416, which has been distributed this afternoon, a few moments ago; it is the result of very strenuous and, I think, laudable efforts of the secretariat facilities which have been put in place since we completed our work last night between 6 and 7 p.m. That document embodies the 1983 report of our Group to the Committee on Disarmament. The report and its annexes have been agreed to by all members of the Working Group and this, I believe, augurs well for future work in achieving a ban on chemical weapons.

I want to comment for a few minutes on what the Working Group has accomplished this session to supplement what the report itself indicates in detail.

You will all recall that General Assembly resolution 37/98 B urged the Committee on Disarmament "as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its session in 1983, the elaboration of ... a convention ... with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date."

The resolution summarizes the collective wish of the international community; and I believe that we have, through the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, clearly shown the measure to which this body has successfully sought this year to fulfil the resolution's purposes.

Translated into specifics, the Working Group's objective can be said to have been defined both substantively and procedurally on the basis of the sentiment that underlies that resolution. Substantively, of course, the goal was to achieve the negotiation of a verifiable convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles and means of production, thus finally eliminating the threat of the use

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

of these weapons for all time. More precisely, our substantive task in 1983 was to achieve further consensus, if not full agreement, on the issues that still divided delegations. Procedurally, our task was to reach agreement on the structure of a convention and on the elaboration of provisions in their proper order so that the process of negotiation could be brought to an early conclusion.

The report of the Working Group reflects the method designed to meet these objectives. Apart from the standard introductory parts, the report does innovate: the Working Group agreed to set out, as it has in an annex, in one single document, the substance of provisions for a chemical weapons convention. This document indicates the consensus reached earlier and during this session, and sets out remaining differences clearly, where further work is needed, so as to reveal how best the Committee can proceed to the final elaboration of a convention. We thus developed an integrated or internally consistent procedure whereby each provision is intended to be presented in a logical hierarchy, progressing from the general to the particular; and whereby each provision is accompanied by an indication of the control or verification measures appropriate to it.

This record, as it now appears in the annex to the Working Group report, is a distillation of the highest common factor of agreement and the lowest necessary index of disagreement; throughout the annex, areas where positions have yet to be reconciled are indicated by indentation.

The text, an integrated and systematic document structured according to a uniform format, thus allows others, in capitals or elsewhere, to see precisely what the situation is. It is, of course, a document to which all in the Working Group have agreed. This gives it particular significance in a negotiating context for our further work. It hardly need be said that, since this document records the provisions of the convention in terms of their concepts, the language it contains is not directly transportable to the final text of the convention itself.

However, simultaneously with the process I have just described, and complementary to it, four contact groups were charged with addressing selected principal areas where consensus was lacking. These groups were as follows:

Contact Group A: Co-ordinator, Mr. J. Cialowicz, Poland, on the monitoring of the destruction of stocks and basic content of declarations required;

Contact Group B: Co-ordinator, Mr. S. Duarte of Brazil dealing with issues related to the resolution of compliance questions;

Contact Group C: Co-ordinator, Mr. J. Akkerman of the Netherlands on the prohibition of Use;

and Contact Group D: Co-ordinator, Mr. J. Lundin of Sweder on definitions.

The reports that these contact groups produced, along with the groups' terms of reference, are also appended to the Working Group's report as annex II. Not only is the substance in the conclusions of those reports reflected in annex I recording the provisions of the convention to which I referred, but the

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

Contact Group reports themselves contain language which can be utilized for the actual drafting of a convention. Here, I want to note -- and do so emphatically -- dedication and skill of all four contact group co-ordinators and the valuable role their groups have played in delivering over-all consensus on the document which is now before us.

I have spoken of process and method. These were aimed at achieving substantive ends. The Working Group did not solve all substantive problems. But here too, there was some progress. In certain areas, the intensive examination of comparable positions revealed greater coincidence of view than had previously been apparent; for example, agreement was reached on the use of chemical names in the declaration of stocks, and the usefulness of on-site automatic instruments in assisting other techniques of verification. In other areas, new proposals came forward, and these were incorporated into our common document. There were, for example, United Kingdom proposals for monitoring of non-production, and separate Soviet proposals on prohibition of use, on prohibition of compounds containing the methyl-phosphorus bonds, and on details required in declarations of stocks. There was a proposal by Egypt on assistance in the event of a violation. There was also the United States detailed views paper, which allowed a comparison to be made with the Soviet text, containing the outline of a treaty, tabled at last year's session. I mention only a few of the many contributions, such as those contained in a Soviet statement last week, which have been made only late in the year and will thus require further examination. The full list of such proposals appears in the Working Group's report.

But I wish to emphasize once more that there are indeed major areas where agreement must be reached for there to be success. These are clearly indicated, I think, in the document before you. The Working Group has not solved these matters, but at least unequivocal agreement has been reached on where work needs to be focused.

I am sure that among us there is no illusion that through process alone disagreements will simply fall away without hard decisions being made in capitals. Moreover, it is natural to expect that when such decisions come, they will be based on perceptions of the balance of advantage, in national security terms, of accepting in whole or in part yet to be agreed provisions which, however difficult in themselves to accommodate, are the necessary price for a greater gain.

In this context, and whatever the substantive or process achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons this year, particular satisfaction should be drawn from the manner in which the Group performed its business. We dealt with problems, facts and issues. The discussion was sober and restrained. In short, the approach was businesslike. This in itself was a necessary confidence-building measure; and this reason alone justifies, I suggest, the effort we have collectively put into the Working Group's activities this year. We must build upon these efforts, and I commend for the Committee's approval, the three steps recommended by the Working Group in the final paragraph of its report, in order that a ban on chemical weapons may be finalized at the earliest possible time. In this respect, I understand that there are consultations now among a number of delegations which, when the Committee considers its own report on this matter, may permit it to have included a recommendation about the precise nature in which the negotiation may be resumed late this year or early next year, and that is a matter to which my delegation intends to revert to when the appropriate portion of the text of the Committee's report is considered.

CD/PV.236

44

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I conclude then this statement with what should by rights have come first: an expression of my gratitude for the unstinting co-operation of all delegations as these complex negotiations have unfolded, and with a very special word of thanks for the secretariat, Mr. Bensmail, his staff and interpreters, whose willing support contributed materially to our endeavour.

...

CD/PV.236

45

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

It is not too much to suggest, then, that a new consensus is emerging which shows that this institution can work -- and work well. I would refer to an interesting supporting phenomenon: we have ceased to hear such frequent appeals for the display of "political will", which often meant the simple rallying by someone to the point of view of someone else; instead we have witnessed true evidence of "political will" in the efforts of those to reconcile different points of view on a balanced basis. In this sense, true political will means not the will to expostulate, but to negotiate.

Our collective will to negotiate in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is an example.

The Working Group was given a mandate to negotiate, and by negotiate, I mean convene with others with a view to obtaining compromise of differences and agreement or commitment. What the Working Group has achieved is significant progress towards the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention through negotiation on matters of substance and form as well as procedure. For the process of compromise to work required each delegation to observe a rule, unwritten though it may be but essential in its observance to the success of any negotiation: that negotiation be conducted with the temptation to engage in debate held firmly in check. That compromise was achieved is all the more remarkable because the issue of chemical weapons is sometimes an emotional one, and perhaps rightly so; and this aspect is matched by the issue's technical complexity.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

No one is fully satisfied, nor should one be. In the Working Group, unresolved issues, some fundamental, remain. There are indeed unresolved issues standing in the way of resolution of issues confronting all our working groups. In one or two of these groups, the issues are so long-standing as to appear to be permanent fixtures, immovable objects, which no procedural lever is likely to pry loose. In such instances, the time is ripe for us to have a hard look at how much further we can go without either insisting on fresh instructions from capitals or else applying more broadly still the unwritten rule of compromise and negotiation I referred to earlier -- the holding in check of debate which is not in itself an ingredient of the negotiating process.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
 Permit me to express on behalf of the Soviet delegation and in connection with the adoption of the reports of the working groups gratitude to the Chairmen of the working groups, Comrade Rose, Ambassador McPhail, Ambassador Ahmad, Ambassador Robles, and Ambassador Lidgard. They did, indeed, no small amount of work and, if we did not achieve the desired results, they are, naturally, the least to blame. But I have not taken the floor merely for an expression of thanks. I was not present for today's statement by the United States delegation

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

devoted to chemical weapons and it is only now that, having been able to familiarize myself with it, I would like to make a few comments. I am doing this not because I seek a confrontation with the United States delegation or with any other delegation, but because we have to continue next year work on the banning of chemical weapons. I am making my comments in a spirit of goodwill and I would like the United States delegation and a number of other delegations that share its approach to try to understand our position too.

Firstly, the United States representative said, in particular, "We note there has as yet been no detailed reaction by certain key delegations to either of the major papers we have put forward this year". Perhaps we have indeed not come forward with a detailed response or commentary to the document from the United States delegation. But permit me to ask the United States delegation and a number of other Western countries the following questions. Why have they what I would call such an ambitious attitude with regard to their own documents? Why are they silent for many years with regard to other delegations' proposals? Why, for example, have the delegations of the United States or of other Western Powers not commented in detail on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the delegation of India? Why have the delegations of Western States not commented on the draft international agreements on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States proposed by a group of socialist countries and by Pakistan? I do not recall there having been any detailed commentary on those, not just working papers, but draft international agreements. The representatives of Western States said merely "en passant" that those initiatives were not acceptable to them, that they were inopportune, and so on. But when there appears a document from the United States delegation or from a number of other Western States, everybody must comment on it in detail. Why? What if our attitude to those documents was, on the whole, negative and we expressed that negative attitude in general form? Why should we be obliged to do it in detail? Are we in a court, that we should have to justify ourselves or submit factual evidence? For our part, we do not make such demands of others. Why, for example, did the United States delegation not present in plenary sessions a detailed opinion concerning the Soviet draft basic provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons? If my memory serves me right, our document was also referred to "en passant".

Another point:

"It must be remembered that we made this proposal over a year ago on the quota and questions about it have been on the table ever since. Only in the last week, when the work of the contact group on stockpiles had been completed, did the Soviet delegation begin to clarify for the Committee its proposal for verification of stockpile destruction by inspection on a quota basis. It must be remembered that they made this proposal a year ago, and questions about it have been on the table ever since."

Well, to begin with, that is inexact. We have explained our position on verification on a quota basis in quite some detail during bilateral consultations with numerous delegations. And it is especially surprising to us that the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

United States delegation, with which we held consultations in particular and openly set out a whole range of criteria and whose reaction we awaited and are still awaiting, should raise this question. The delegation of the USSR has repeatedly emphasized that we have a precise idea of the general principles of verification on a quota basis, and we have repeatedly set out those general ideas. As regards details, we have repeatedly invited all delegations to reflect with us on the most efficient and, at the same time, unobtrusive way of conducting systematic international checks on the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons not on a permanent basis, but on the basis of individual systematic inspections, that is on a quota basis.

A third matter: "My delegation cannot understand", it was said today, "why the Soviet delegation, which ardently professes its interest in completing a convention as soon as possible, refuses to discuss the subject of chemical weapons production and filling facilities". I wish to say that we have a position on this subject and that we have expressed it. We took into account the views of other delegations and we made on 18 August a statement which, of course, everybody will remember. But I have a question of my own: is it not true that the United States delegation has repeatedly declared and continues to declare, including in its statement today, that it will not proceed to the formulation of a draft convention until such time as all questions have been settled? In other words, the entire convention is in suspense. When we say that we wish to suspend one question and are ready to resolve all the others, we are told that it can't be done, that an answer must first be given on the issue concerning which we are proposing the continuation of negotiations.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our negotiations are negotiations among States with equal rights. But some delegations are suggesting to us that such negotiations were conducted in evil colonial times and not in our day.

One more topic, that of binary weapons. According to the distinguished representative of the United States, Mr. Busby:

"On the other hand, the proposals to single out binary chemical weapons stocks and production facilities for specially severe treatment seem to my delegation to be extraordinarily one-sided. They can only be seen as efforts to preserve Soviet chemical weapons capabilities while eliminating those of the United States."

Nothing of the kind. The United States already has sufficient stockpiles of chemical weapons; its chemical munitions total 3 million units. And we are opposed to binary weapons not because we do not have such weapons and find ourselves in a worse position. As you know, the world has already been a witness on several occasions to a situation in which new types of weapons have appeared in the United States and the Soviet Union has, after a while, been obliged to acquire them too. The same could happen in the present situation. And we fear that, because the appearance of binary weapons in the United States -- and that means in other States too -- will inevitably complicate the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Many delegations share this opinion. It is incomparably more difficult to monitor chemical binary weapons; they represent a qualitatively new step in the development of lethal chemical weapons.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

I was far from making an uncomplimentary remark about the Vice-President of the United States, whom I know personally. The only thing that was said was this: here, within the confines of this Committee, the Vice-President of the United States advocated, or spoke in favour of, the speeding-up of negotiations on the elimination of the threat posed by chemical weapons. Isn't that true? A few months later, the same person cast a deciding vote in favour of the implementation of a programme which is killing those negotiations. Isn't it true that he cast the deciding vote for the implementation of a programme which, from our point of view, is indeed killing the negotiations?

Finally, there sounded in Mr. Busby's last statement a note which really made me prick up my ears. I would like to think that I made a mistake, that I misunderstood the United States delegation. It seemed to me that the tone was once again that of an ultimatum: unless all delegations agree on all issues, there will not be any definition, any formulation of a draft convention next year either. Now that makes me prick up my ears.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan.)

In the area of chemical weapons, the most promising field of our activity, forward movement is in evidence inasmuch as the structure of the spade work done last year has been formalized. The areas of disagreement and the lack of consensus on various important elements have been brought into sharper focus, which should provide an opportunity to the concerned Governments to reflect on their positions. The work done this year would best be seen in terms of its utilization next year, when the shape of the proposed convention should begin to emerge.

CD/PV.237

12

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, in my statement on 23 August I welcomed the progress that we had made on chemical weapons; otherwise it has, unfortunately, to be admitted that this has not been a successful year for the Committee on Disarmament. We have allowed ourselves to be dominated by procedural issues to an extent which is to no one's credit. We lost eight weeks at the beginning of our Session over arguments on the agenda. Now, the last three or four weeks have been largely spent in writing reports; first in working groups and then in the Committee itself. With the exception of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, these documents are little more than catalogues of opposing views. This experience has confirmed my delegation in the view, which I expressed in my first plenary statement to the Committee on 4 February, that changes must be made in our procedures. The first necessity is for delegations to recognize that, if arguments have not been convincing in debate, they will not be made more so by trying to force conclusions on a working group, when they are not generally shared. Secondly, it must be recognized that not every view expressed in a working group is worthy of record or indeed of answer. This failure to recognize these facts, and to exercise restraint in the common interest of all, has contributed most to the excessive length of the reports, and to the excessive amount of time which has been devoted to them; the effort which we spend in writing them is out of all proportion to the extent to which they will be read.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Even on the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons, which was generally held to be more promising, the results are also not so satisfactory. It must be recognized that under the experienced guidance of Ambassador McPhail of Canada, ably assisted by the co-ordinators and experts from various countries, progress has been made in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons: more in-depth discussions were held; common grounds have increased and divergences more clearly defined. Yet, on the other hand, nobody denies the fact that some important differences remain unsolved and that there is still a long way to go before a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons can be drafted and concluded.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Chemical weapons represent the success story of the Committee on Disarmament in terms of work done. Over the years, able and energetic Chairmen have taken the Working Group on the long march towards a convention to rid the world of these weapons. We have, despite everything, gone quite far. This year, we must pay tribute to the Ambassador of Canada, Ambassador McPhail for taking us further and to higher ground. His report, with its record of substantive provisions for a chemical weapons convention, lays out the ground ahead in a way that is easily understood. The agreements in it are the basis for future work. The differences of views clearly shown as alternatives are there for priority resolution. The Committee should start in on this work with full purpose. Its working group, which evidently is to have a Chairman drawn from the Group of 21, should be able to commence at the earliest moment in the 1984 session. Preparatory consultations even earlier could greatly help this objective.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

Like most others, my delegation has carefully registered and welcomed the conceptual gains of our work this year in the chemical weapons field. We are gratified with the production of a new consolidated text. There is no intention on our part to downgrade the measure of progress achieved, let alone the dynamic performance of the Chairman of the Working Group and his able associates. The balance sheet, however, is hardly positive.

On 11 August, my delegation expressed its preoccupation with the current state of negotiations, especially if measured in terms of earlier hopes. We observed that one group of delegations among us, the socialist group, showed reluctance to join in overcoming the central obstacles for a future chemical weapons ban.

Meanwhile the distinguished delegates of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, sharing our analysis, have voiced their concern in similar terms. Our own observations, substantiated by a number of facts, were coupled with an urgent appeal to the socialist group to show a greater measure of political flexibility and to document such a flexibility by practical contributions.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation had presented these views against the background of growing apprehension among the population of the Federal Republic of Germany, for whom the prospect of any future use of chemical weapons is particularly terrifying.

Since then, Ambassador Issraelyan has spoken on 18 and 22 August to refute these affirmations. He furthermore submitted a number of technical proposals which my delegation has carefully studied. We have also observed the Soviet delegation's participation in the drafting of the "recording" and of the report of the session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We have examined the Soviet presentations as attentively and objectively as possible. As a result I must state that I can in no respect retract from my statement of 11 August. The position of the Soviet delegation in the recording exercise and the silence on key issues continue to cast doubt on its repeated professions of interest in the speedy completion of the convention.

Our assessment has been reinforced by the impression that there is a hardening of the Soviet line, most markedly as regards the degree of stringency of the obligation to submit to on-site inspections in cases of challenge. Here the Soviet delegation seems to be retreating from positions which we had hoped they had accepted.

There is nothing wrong in analysing critically each other's positions. It is the right attitude towards criticism that counts. The critical remarks of the Soviet delegation on our own negotiating posture will also be examined carefully. We shall use their critical suggestions to reflect on an even greater flexibility on all open issues in order to be well prepared for the next round.

I trust that the Soviet delegation will distinguish between such constructive criticism in the interest of a shared objective, and sterile accusations designed to denigrate the adversary and to mask one's own inability to contribute in substance.

Negotiations need the former; they must avoid the latter. I should like to appeal to the Soviet Union to show more flexibility which would allow us to progress quickly in the next negotiating phase, particularly in the key areas of destruction of stocks, destruction of production facilities and compliance. My delegation firmly hopes that the Soviet delegation will honour our appeal to engage in a serious joint endeavour to overcome the obstacles on the way to concluding a ban on this particularly barbarous category of weapons.

We welcome the initiative of the United States delegation to organize a workshop on verification issues relating to stock destruction in Tooele, Utah. My delegation believes that this endeavour will provide an excellent possibility for all negotiators to acquaint themselves with the problems of verification of the destruction of stocks in a practical manner. My delegation expects to contribute to the workshop in a substantive way. I wish to recall in this context that former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had announced at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the Federal Government would also on its part organize a workshop on the destruction of chemical weapons. That event is now scheduled for 1984, and invitations will be extended to interested delegations in due time. The destruction facility

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

where the workshop is to take place differs from the United States installation in design and throughput. The workshop is therefore expected to yield additional insights. We look upon the United States invitation and ours as being mutually reinforcing.

CD/PV.238

24-25

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

With this, Mr. Chairman, I would like to end my statement as co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries and now make a short statement as head of the Soviet delegation. The other day, a letter was distributed to members of the Committee from the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning two statements made by the Soviet delegation on 4 and 22 February of this year.

As far as this letter is concerned, I would like to state the following.

The crimes against humanity committed by the German fascists constitute one of the darkest and most shameful pages of history. The fact that these crimes were committed has been proven beyond all doubt by, among others, the International Tribunal in Nuremberg which, as everyone knows, convicted the principal Nazi war criminals, guilty of the deaths of millions and millions of innocent people. The German fascist leaders received the punishment they deserved, in accordance with the sentence of the Tribunal.

The many atrocities committed by the Nazis and fully proven at the Nuremberg trials and other trials of war criminals included the use of chemicals to exterminate people. Hundreds of thousands of people of different nationalities — Russians and French, Jews and Poles, Czechs and Belgians — perished in the gas chambers in the death camps at Auschwitz, Majdanek, Buchenwald and Treblinka. Poisonous chemicals were widely used at these factories of mass destruction.

However, in various instances, the Nazis used such substances during military operations. In our statements of 4 and 22 February of this year, we referred to the use of poisonous gases by the German fascist forces in the Crimea in 1942 during military action against units of the Soviet armed forces and civilians defending themselves in the Adzhimushkai quarry.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The French delegation constantly displayed the paramount interest it attached to negotiations on chemical weapons, which were actively pursued in the Ad Hoc Working Group chaired by our colleague from Canada, Ambassador McPhail. I wish here to pay tribute to the remarkable way in which he organized and conducted the work, notably by making the most appropriate use of the method of contact groups. The work was not marked by any significant breakthroughs in the negotiations, but it was none the less useful. It made it possible to achieve a better form and more precise structuring of the negotiating elements. The French delegation hopes that the next session will be marked by substantial, and even decisive progress, thanks more particularly to acceptance by everyone of the forms of international verification specifically required by each of the operations involved.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I regret to have to take the floor again at this late hour in response to a statement by the Soviet delegation. I was surprised to hear this delegation, since the Soviet delegate made extensive reference to a private communication which I had written to a number of members of the Committee. He was not among the formal addressees. I had chosen this way of discussing an issue of fact in a deliberate attempt not to raise the issue to the level of public announcement in this Committee and to keep the discussion factual. Ambassador Issraelyan has broken the privacy of these communications and I am critical of him for this. On the other hand, I understand most intimately his emotional approach to the problems raised and I respect it. Inadvertently, I have resurrected extremely painful, personal memories of his, memories of difficult times, and I understand him the better since I, as a child, in the totally devastated eastern part of my country, saw the same horrors of the war, and in addition, the ensuing horrors of foreign occupation.

The population of my country at this juncture is composed of a percentage of two-thirds of those who were children, at most, at the end of the Second World War. A new generation has grown up. This new generation accepts the responsibility of the history of our country. This generation tries to draw the lessons out of the terrible things that have happened in the name of my country. The lesson we have drawn is the building up of a democratic State of which we are proud. But democracy and freedom also rest on truth and truthfulness. For my generation, which has deliberately accepted the heavy burden of the past without shoving it off to others, it is difficult enough to live with this painful chapter of history, but we also have a right to the truth about our own past. Horrible crimes have been committed and no new crimes have to be invented.

Ambassador Issraelyan has repeated his false allegations about a particular period of the history of the Second World War of which my letter speaks. In order that the records not stand uncorrected I reserve the right also to introduce future documentation, at the same level as his own allegations. At the moment, however, I would like to cite only one paragraph from my letter. I quote: "I have insisted in my letters to Ambassador Issraelyan that my delegation does not feel the slightest urge to defend the German army of the National Socialist period, let alone the National Socialist regime. Whoever wishes in this connection — or in any context — to evoke the war crimes and cruelties committed by the National Socialists before and during the Second World War would find my delegation in the frontline of those who will join in a condemnation of these atrocities. We would equally be among the first to deplore the horrible sufferings of those countries, including the Soviet Union, which had to submit to armed conflict on their soil as well as to foreign occupation. This, however, is not the issue at stake. The much more narrow question is whether or not chemical weapons were used by any of the parties to the Second World War in this case the German army. The issue is not merely of historical interest. I submit that we as negotiators to a chemical weapons ban should be keenly aware of historical precedent". End of quote.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that it is legitimate for anybody from any country to prohibit an inquiry into historical truth and I also submit to you that no single country should claim the right to change the truth and to deflect it. When we deal with history we need precision and scientific rigour. There have been in earlier times, and even in very recent times, claims about the application of chemical weapons in various parts of the world. I am certain that Ambassador Issraelyan would agree with me that scientific rigour and historical truthfulness should be the criteria by which all these allegations are to be measured.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As far as the part concerning chemical weapons is concerned, I do not want to get into any argument because this I consider to be a legitimate part of negotiating postures here in this Committee, but, I have to reject accusations by the distinguished delegate from the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Warsaw Treaty countries in one other respect. He claimed that the Warsaw Treaty countries are constantly increasing their arsenals, including those of chemical weapons. I do not know on which facts he could base this allegation. I know only one thing, that there are, and there have been for 10 years already, negotiations on the limitation of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, in Vienna, and that there, the Warsaw Treaty countries have been waiting for many, many years for a realistic and sensible approach from the NATO countries. In fact, we are waiting still for the substantial answer of NATO countries to our proposals concerning armaments in Europe recently made there by our delegate.



LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



3 5036 01029377 0

