



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


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
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
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ERRATUM.

Page 19, L. 20. dele the word *votes*.

A FULL and CANDID
ANSWER
To a PAMPHLET, entitled,
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
Present German War.

Sapientes, Pacis Causà, bellum gerunt, et Laboris, spe
otii, sustentant. SALLUST.



L O N D O N :

Printed for J. PRIDDEN, at the Feathers, near
Fleet-Bridge; J. BURD, near Temple-Bar, Fleet-
Street; and J. GRETTON, in Old Bond-Street.

MDCCLX.

A FULL and CANDID

A N S W E R, &c.

IT is not to be expected that an Answer to a professed invective against the king of Prussia will set out with any severe reflections against that monarch. The author of the Considerations has introduced his pamphlet with a quotation from a rescript, said to be delivered and printed at the same time by the Prussian minister at London; the sum of which is, “that his Prussian majesty hopes the English nation will not meddle with the domestic affairs of the empire;” and the author archly applies this to the present conduct of the court of London. I shall not take advantage of an observation which every man, who knows the turns of states, may make upon the inconsistencies which the most steady governments, sometimes, run into, when their interests vary: I shall only say, that the quotation of the rescript is by no manner of means applicable to the

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purpose

purpose of the considerer. The empire of Germany is, properly speaking, a republic of sovereigns, and each sovereign that forms it, has a right, independent of the emperor, to make what alliances he pleases with other sovereigns; nor can such alliances be considered as domestic affairs of the empire. At the time his Prussian majesty published the rescript in question, the affair he hints at, might in some measure be looked upon as domestic to the empire, because a dispute lay between the princes of the empire and the electors. Great-Britain had no right to interfere in such a dispute; Great-Britain did not interfere in it; at the same time, if his Prussian majesty was author of that rescript, he might perhaps, with greater propriety, have made use of the word *æconomical*, than domestic.

The author of the Considerations spends the first six pages of his pamphlet in proving, what no body will dispute, that France is superior to Great-Britain in extent of territory, and number of inhabitants; and he brings Voltaire, a good writer, but a most miserable author, to vouch for the vast armies that Lewis XIV. kept on foot. But the author of the
the

the Considerations is mistaken in his first principles. The battles of Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt, were gained by Englishmen, and Englishmen alone : the battle of Minden, which, every thing considered, was more glorious than all the three, was gained by Britons, with a more confessed superiority against them, than there was against the son of Edward the Third, or the father of Henry the Sixth.

There is undoubtedly a principle of political, as well as of commercial, arithmetic ; but the data of the former are extremely hard to be settled. The considerer goes to work in the Cheapside way ; he posts his books, he strikes his balance, but he does not give weight for inches, though he brings forth a most plausible account. I will venture to say that history cannot produce a period of glory that is not liable to exception, if those mechanical calculations are to take place. " From the time, says the considerer, when the whole of France was united to the crown, and the liberties of the states and nobility absolutely subjected to its power, the kingdom of France has been, in the extent of its country, the number of its inhabitants, and the greatness of its revenue, superior to Britain." I admit that France, in the extent of its

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country,

country, and the number of its inhabitants, is superior to Great-Britain; but that its revenue is equal, I totally deny. Great-Britain, properly speaking, has no revenue that is fixed or settled. And let the considerer authenticate the revenues of France for these two years past, and reduce the revenue, or rather the expences of our government, during that time, to French money: let the meanest and most ignorant reader he has, pronounce which is the richest people.

I am aware of a prodigious and popular advantage the considerer has taken in point of calculation; and, at the same time, I will be candid enough to say, that if his data are to be admitted, he might have carried his argument much farther than he has done. He serves his purpose perhaps better in not doing it. But I totally deny and disclaim his data, or first principles. "I never, says he, read the history of the two grand alliances, which were formed by king William against the growing power of France, without feeling the warmest sentiments of gratitude to the great deliverer of Europe. Never did king of England appear with greater dignity, than he did in that great congress held at the Hague in the year 1691, when the emperor and empire, the kings of
Spain,

Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, by their several ambassadors, the electors of Germany by their particular ministers, and several of them in their own persons, with at least fifty of the greatest princes of Germany, all attended to hear him plead the cause of Europe ; and all joined in one common league and declaration against France.”

It is undoubtedly a task equally bold as it is disagreeable, to combat rooted prejudices ; but now that the ridiculous distinctions of Whig and Tory are so justly exploded, a public writer may have some chance for a fair hearing. I do not pretend to deny that king William was at the head of the glorious confederacy ; but I will, with both my hands, deny, that that confederacy fulfilled its engagements : they brought troops upon paper ; they produced them not in the field ; they hired armies, but England paid them. Unwilling as I am to revive party distinctions, I am sorry to say, I never yet saw, though I have taken a great deal of pains in the inquiry, a full and a fair answer to the charge brought by the Tory ministry against the Whigs, at the time of the peace of Utrecht, that the whole stress of the war lay on the shoulders of Great-Britain, and that her allies had failed in, almost, every point
of

of their engagements, as to men, money, and operations of every kind : this, I say, is a charge that the boldest Whig writer never attempted to answer. It is a charge which the German and Dutch ministers, and they had at that time the ablest in Europe, in all their warm memorials and representations, never offered to refute. It is a charge which brought the great prince Eugene over to England ; but far from answering, he endeavoured to palliate, it. The rival ministers, in those times, were composed of, perhaps, the greatest men that England ever saw under any government ; but the Whigs indisputably had resolution, talents, and penetration superior to their antagonists. They never pretended to dispute the fact, that Great-Britain was left in the lurch for the blood and treasure that was expended in the war.

Let not therefore declamation or bold assertions drive us out of the fort of common sense. Let us not imagine, because we are now in a war with France, carried on in Germany, we fight in the smallest degree on greater disadvantage than we did in the times of king William and queen Anne. I shall, in the course of this paper, prove, that the terms on which we now carry on the war, are, nationally speaking, infinitely preferable to those on
which

which we fought before ; I will not except even the last war against France.

Had the considerer been a candid opposer of the present measures of our government, he would not have gone so far back as the reign of king William for an alliance of strength and dignity against France. The late king George was united with the house of Austria, and at last brought the Dutch to take part with him, when the empress-queen might have been said to fight *pro aris & focis*. In what a dreadful situation is an English minister ! There was not, when we entered into that war with France, so popular a topic in the world, as the expediency of maintaining the pragmatic sanction. Its popularity, both within and without doors, arose next to madness ; and had not the ministry given way to the torrent, it would have borne down the barriers of civil government. But, in the event, were we, as a people, bettered by that illustrious alliance ? Did the Dutch and Austrians fight for us in the field ? Did they negotiate with us in the cabinet ? Were not our soldiers butchered by their cowardice ? Were not our councils betrayed by their perfidy ?

“ Every measure, says the considerer, which tends to set the states of Germany, Holland, and

and England, either at war with each other, or amongst themselves, must be a measure calculated for the good of France, and the prejudice of other powers of Europe. For the same reason, every measure tending to the continuance or increase of such a war, must be for the benefit of France, and the prejudice of Europe: because it is a weakening of the rivals of France, and keeping those powers at variance, from whom France can have nothing to fear but in the union."

I have given this passage at large, because I apprehend that it is the corner-stone of the considerer's reasoning; but a very small discussion of facts will discover its futility. Will the considerer say, that Great-Britain is never to make war with France, till such time as all the powers in Europe are united against her? That time, it is believed, never will come, and that time never was. The confederacy of which king William was the head, was the strongest union ever formed against France: but what did it avail England? she was left to bear the brunt of the day; she was obliged to pay the troops, and fight the battles of her nominal allies.

After all, the confederacy formed by king William proved, as all confederacies must be
 against

against one capital power, to be a mere rope of sand. Its continuity was preserved until a certain twist came, which dissolved it. Holland and Germany would undoubtedly have been pleased, had we continued to this day to pay the troops, and fight their battles ; they would in a very cheap manner have mustered their armies, and regulated their contingencies upon paper : but the moment that Great-Britain came to talk of her own interest, then came in the democratic nonsense of public faith, the liberties of Europe, prior engagements, national honour, and a thousand such terms, which meant nothing but money ; nothing but British blood, or British money. It may to some, perhaps, seem too bold an assertion, (but nothing can be too bold that is founded on truth and experience) that had Great-Britain, in all the wars she ever had with France, been single and alone, her expence would have been less, her success would have been greater.

The sum of the considerer's reasoning is, that France is more populous, and therefore more powerful, than Great-Britain. This puts me in mind of the reasoning of the ho-

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nourable

nourable admiral who was so deservedly shot for his cowardice, and who, after weighing a French cannon-ball, hung it up in a cabbage-net at the shrouds of his ship, and demonstrated, as clearly as that three and two makes five, that had he come within reach of that cannon-ball, he and his ship must have been torn to pieces. I will defy the considerer, from all the experience of reading, he, or any man, ever had, to produce a single instance of two nations going to war with one another upon such principles: and this brings me to come to closer quarters with the considerer.

In private life it is but too common, when two parties go to Westminster-hall, for a by-stander, from the weight of their purses, to form a shrewd guess which will have the better in the end. The considerer looks upon the extent of territory, and numbers of men, when two nations goes to war, the same as a long purse is when two parties goes to law. I can by no means be of that opinion; and I can scarcely dip into a page of history, which does not convince me that it is ill founded. Parties who go to law are subjected to its forms, which drain their purses.

Nations

Nations who go to war, have no directory but the sword. But allowing Great-Britain to be as mean and contemptible a power as Corfica itself; (supposing Corfica to be a sovereign state) is she to bear an insult from a neighbouring power, because that neighbour is a garagantua? Sovereign states have no appeal that they can make to their superiors; but a wise state, ever so feeble, will make a struggle in defence of its independency, be its enemy ever so powerful. The consideration, therefore, of inequality of power between Great-Britain and France must drop to the ground, unless it can be proved that the cause in which we fight is unjust: a task which I apprehend the considerer himself will be far from attempting.

The considerer, as if conscious that his general reasoning upon the inequality of force between the two states cannot bear the test of reason, proceeds to shew that Great-Britain is in the wrong to carry on a war in Germany against France. In order to introduce this reasoning, he lays down certain maxims, every one of which in fact, as well as in speculation, are false and trite. Every school-boy knows that France, formerly, again

and again defended the liberties of Germany. The considerer has flourished upon that, but has he informed the public against whom she defended those liberties? Has he told his countrymen, that it was against the encroachments and usurpations of the house of Austria; that tyrannical power, which the government of Great-Britain and her allies are endeavouring, at this very time, to withstand? Had the considerer been candid enough to explain this matter, it might have saved himself and me, and perhaps the public, no little labour. He has taken all advantages of reasoning from the former systems that prevailed in Europe, but he has not told us that those systems exist no more. He has not been ingenuous enough to say, that there is no period in history, before the present, in which the houses of Bourbon and Austria, like Herod and Pontius Pilate, agreed in the crucifixion of public liberty: nor is there in all his pamphlet, a single paragraph upon that subject, though it is the only fair, the only candid, the only constitutional, topic, upon which a considerer on the present German war ought to proceed. If he proceeds not upon that, he says less than nothing. If he proceeds upon that, the conduct of Great-Britain, and her govern-

government must at present appear irreproachable and unblamable.

The considerer, therefore, may figure away to eternity upon his comparative and political arithmetic; but if the facts upon which his data are founded have no longer existence, which is the case, to what does his reasoning tend, but to seduce weak minds, and to break that unanimity, which at present forms the pride, the glory, and strength of the British empire? Were the considerer to bring a million of instances of what France has done, or what Britain has suffered in former times, *cui bono*? What can it avail him, if those instances are not applicable to the present juncture? and applicable they cannot be, unless he can, from history, produce a similarity of circumstances. The considerer, with a true polemic spirit, supposes two powers of Germany at war; "if France, says he, to keep up the contest, should take the weaker side, and add to the power whose force is eight, so as to be superior to ten, the evil is not lessened, but made greater. Should England be so unfortunate as to join in the contest, and send its land forces of fifty into the war, and France thereupon send a force of eighty, the party assisted by Eng-
gland

land would be but little benefited by the alliance ; the English would still be the weaker side, the force of Europe be diminished so much the more, and France only be advantaged. This is a kind of reasoning which must hold invariably just in all ages." I say, that not a single particle of such reasoning ever held good in any age, and there never was a more bare-faced insult, than such reasoning is upon the public understanding.

According to the considerer's apprehension, France, by the dispositions of the powers and differences in Europe, has every thing she can wish or desire. She has had it for these four or five years, at least, ever since we carried our troops into Germany. What has been the consequence ? Is France a greater, a richer, or more successful power, through the blunders of Britain ? Has she enlarged her territory ? Has she increased her revenue ? Has she repaired her marine ? Has she dictated, as formerly, to the British councils ? No. I will give the considerer an answer, that, in one single word, comprehends folios of logic, and reams of reasoning. France, with all the advantages which the mistaken policy of Great-Britain has given her, is now a declared

clared bankrupt to all Europe, and she has declared herself such. Let the considerer get over the fact, and then

‘ To dinner with what appetite he may.’

“ I don’t determine, says the considerer, whether the Germans are likely soon to agree together in any one point; and much in uniting with England and the States-General in a war with France: but till they do thus agree, England has nothing to do with their little internal quarrels.” You don’t determine, Mr. or my lord, considerer; but I do: and I say and affirm from past experience, (I care not what prepossessions may lie against the doctrine) that the fewer allies England has against France, provided those allies, as his Prussian majesty certainly is, are hearty in the cause, Great-Britain is a gainer; she sees the end of her expence, she knows the extent of her operations; which is more than she did in any continental war she ever embraced.

The considerer affects to call the present war a German civil war, and the whole of his pamphlet is levelled against Great-Britain
taking

taking part in it. I deny, in the most direct terms, that the war between the king of Prussia and the house of Austria, or rather Lorrain, can with the least propriety, either of speech or reasoning, be termed a civil war. The quarrel between the king of Prussia and the queen of Hungary has not in the smallest or most remote degree, a relation to that system of political confederacy which constitutes the kings of Great-Britain or Prussia members, or, if the sanguine considerer will have it, subjects, of the Germanic body. It is, in short, either the good or bad fortune of the considerer, that the position he lays down, if admitted, must establish his doctrines, if disputed, the whole appears futile and fallacious. The king of Prussia, as a sovereign prince, is as independent, perhaps more so, than the empress-queen is. Were the considerer to be allowed his own sway, he undoubtedly would carry every thing before him, by the plain self-evident maxim, that Great-Britain is worse than mad to pretend to support one little German prince, against the Germanic body.

But here I must again have recourse to principles, and again observe that our considerer's

derer's principles are fundamentally wrong. The king of Prussia's dominions undoubtedly are in Germany, and our considerer takes advantage of that to treat him, through the whole of his pamphlet, as a German prince, subject rather to the dictates of the emperor, than the laws of the empire. How different must the reasoning resulting from such positions appear, when we consider his Prussian majesty equal, at least in dignity, to the Vandemout family, and in himself an independent sovereign, at the head of the protestant interest upon the continent, and the only natural ally left there for Great-Britain? Were the constitutions of Germany to be examined, it would be found that both the elector of Hanover, and the elector of Brandenburg, without changing their religion, have as good a title to be chosen emperor, as the husband of the queen of Hungary, who *votes, corregentiæ jure*, has.

Will the considerer be mean or wicked enough to say, that Great-Britain at this juncture, ought to abandon all the system and principles of policy upon which her power and independency is formed? If she does not, let the boldest advocate for anti-continental measures step forth, and point out what course she

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could

could have steered different from what she has done? Let the *laudatores temporis aëti* declaim as they please; let the considerer ring his changes upon former measures; but whilst the power of France exists, is not Great-Britain to guard against her ambition? That the power of France exists, is the basis of our considerer's doctrine. That we have not pursued the war upon the principles and measures that directed us in former times, must equally be admitted. But for that reason objects are changed; the same system no longer exists; and the ballance of power, in the point where it formerly vibrated, is now a non-entity. Upon the supposition of this ballance being an entity, the considerer has raised his whole fabrick. The smallest spark of candour would have taught him, that when king William formed the grand confederacy, the support of the house of Austria, upon the continent, was his great object. Why was that his object? Because he reasonably thought that the house of Austria was the grand counterprize, upon the continent, to the ambition of the house of Bourbon; and the house of Bourbon was the power which England and Holland had then the greatest reason to dread. Had they dreaded the house of Austria, king William,

like

like queen Elizabeth, would have directed his attention, and formed his alliance accordingly. Austria and Bourbon are only sounds, the danger resulting from either is the matter.

If the danger resulting from the house of Austria to the liberties of Europe, was an object of attention in queen Elizabeth, that has done immortal honour to her memory; if the forming an alliance against the house of Bourbon, has done the same to the memory of king William, and to the Whig administration under queen Anne: if the boldest advocates for anti-continental measures, never yet pretended that the balance of power in Europe was a chimera; how is Great-Britain, in the present juncture, to behave, when the houses of Austria and Bourbon are embarked in one common cause, the ruin of the protestant interest?

“ But, says the considerer, we happen to have one nominal protestant prince on our side; and therefore the protestant interest has been speciously held out to our view. But in the last war we were fighting for the queen of Hungary, and the protestant prince

had only a popish king of France for his defender. Did we think then the protestant interest at all concerned in that war? And why should we in this? This great champion of protestantism was then universally decried by us, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle."

Drained as the nation has been of late to the very dregs of political writing, I know no man so great a dunce, or Quixote, as to imagine that every prince, and every potentate, does not pursue his own interest, if he can see it, or if he thinks he sees it. A great and a sensible prince can have no principle but interest, because it never can be his true interest to adopt a system of fraud, perfidy, and injustice. If, with Lewis the XIVth of France, he shall adopt such a system, he is no great prince. His greatness is temporary, and, like that of Lewis, it must have an end in his own life-time.

But let us not be deceived by bold sounds and assertions. I deny that our illustrious ally is more a nominal protestant, than the heads of the houses of Austria and Bourbon are nominal papists. The king of Prussia cannot

not be more properly stiled a nominal protestant, than king George the Ist, IId, or IIIId can be. If the considerer can prove, what I think has been never yet attempted to be proved, that the interests he had in view were fundamentally false, unjust, and injurious to any other power, he would then say somewhat to the purpose. But if both his connexions, and those of Great-Britain, were only, as they certainly were, accidental, and not systematical, the considerer is as much wrong in his reasoning, as he is in his facts. The connexions of Great-Britain with the house of Austria, in the times which he hints at, were occasioned by accidents, viz. the death of Charles the VIth of Germany, and the violence which France offered to her own guaranty of the pragmatic sanction. Independent of those considerations, his Prussian majesty had, as we must suppose he thought, a claim of right upon certain dominions, which lie not, as the considerer says, in an obscure corner of Germany, but are well known to every one who knows the smallest tittle of geography or history. I am old enough to remember when this claim was started, and when it was made good. His Prussian majesty supported it by what I must call

call uncontroverted, and therefore I must suppose uncontrovertible, reasons; for I never saw a scrap from the house of Austria that disputed the facts of the family compacts, upon which the claim was founded. It is, therefore, infamous to insinuate, that because the interest of Prussia happened at that time to lead her to side with France, that therefore this protestant prince had only a popish king of France for his defender: the fact is false and unsupported; and all the consideration possibly can gain by his insinuations and assertions, is what I believe no mortal is weak enough to dispute, that, amongst princes, protestantism and popery, and in fact, religion, are words that sometimes signify nothing.

But though I sincerely think, that in the cabinets of sovereigns the popish or protestant religion are words that neither have, nor ought to have, any meaning, yet I think the popish or protestant interests are terms that not only have meaning, but are of the most decisive importance to us, as men and Englishmen. Accidents, as I have already hinted, may sometimes interfere, and give a shock to the vehicle, but it must still in time return to its true and its natural position. Is there a man in
 England

England weak enough to doubt, that while Great-Britain was fighting in conjunction with the house of Austria, the heads of that house were not the most miserable bigots that ever polluted an altar by superstition? And yet those bigots, though not of the protestant religion, fought for the protestant interest, that is, for the independency of Germany and Britain.

That the king of Prussia was ever decry'd by this nation, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle, is a most execrable falsehood. It is equally so, that we, as the considerer affirms, set out in this war with considering him as an enemy to our protestant electorate. It is equally false, that we hired an army of Ruffians to invade him.

Quis tam

Ferreus ut teneat se?

“ What is it, says the considerer, then, that has at once changed him in our opinion, from a despiser of all religion, to the defender of the protestant? But not to insist on this.” Can a man of common sense and honesty sit, with any degree of patience, and hear such
infamous

infamous invectives spewed forth, was his Prussian majesty no more than a private gentleman? The considerer pretends that at the time of the breaking out of the present war, the protestant religion in Germany (for I will contract his argument as much as possible, without weakening it) was in no danger. The considerer amuses us with sounds. Can he produce a rescript, can he produce a scrap of writing from his Prussian majesty, or any protestant power in the world, that ever pretended it was in danger? But I will venture to say, and will defy all mankind to prove the contrary, that the protestant interest was in danger. It may, however, be necessary to clear up the distinction I make between the protestant religion, and the protestant interest. This I cannot do better than by supposing that a power now exists in Europe that professes protestantism, and yet sides with France and Austria in this present war. Such powers, tho' they may pray with protestants, undoubtedly act for papists; though they are of the protestant religion, they are not in the protestant interest. In short, popery and protestantism, unless applied to the great concerns of civil as well as religious liberty, are mere

mere words to gull the populace, and our considerer has applied them accordingly.

I shall not impose so far upon the reader as to quote the identical words of the considerer when he endeavours to prove (as he does in many laboured pages) that, in the present war, religion is out of the question. There is not, I believe, in England, a man so weak to believe it is; not but how does the considerer endeavour to impose upon weak minds, as if the experience of our history did not tell us, that protestants may fight for a popish interest, and that papists may fight for a protestant one? A king in his closet, or his chapel, may make no difference between one religion and another; and he may even despise all religions, and yet true policy, without one grain of religion interfering, may oblige him to adopt religion as the cause of fighting.

In the present case, this consideration turns, perhaps, decisively against our author, and he himself has given rise to the observation. I shall suppose the king of Prussia to be void of religion, but if the king of Prussia has enemies who are wrong-headed enough to carry religious wind-mills in their brain, he and

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his allies has a right to repel all such enthusiastic attacks, in the most effectual manner. In short, the whole of our considerer's argument upon this head is calculated only for the weakest of minds: he knows there neither is, nor can be, the smallest foundation for such insinuations, though he has endeavoured to avail himself of them.

The considerer proceeds, as he does from the beginning to the end of the pamphlet, to take for granted, matters that are no other than unsupported allegations. "An electorate, says he, of the empire, is not to be annihilated but by the destruction of the whole Germanic constitution. For a king of France to make himself e——r of H——r, and eject a whole family out of its rights, would be so great an act of violence, that every member in the empire would rise against it. Sweden and Denmark could not but take the alarm at it."

A writer who grounds his reasoning on such infamous falsehoods, which he endeavours to palm upon his readers as uncontrovertible and indisputable truths, puts me in mind of a malefactor at the gallows. Draw the cart, or kick the stool, from under him,
and

and he remains suspended. Is there the lightest smatterer in history, who is ignorant that electorates, politically speaking, have been annihilated? witness the Palatine, the Saxon, and the Bavarian electorates; some of them, I was going to say, within our own memory, or that of our fathers, without Sweden or Denmark, or any other power in Europe, making the smallest effort in their favour: The considerer, I am afraid, will never be able to persuade any man, who has the least experience in life, to believe that every subject, or, indeed every prince, in Germany, has adequate ideas of his own interests. The states of Greece, a much less complicated confederacy than that of Germany, had not.

“ England, says the considerer, would not have any reason to envy France the impracticable task of defending a country, surrounded with enemies, and separated from all its other dominions. But in reality, the constitution of Europe makes every thing of this kind absolutely impossible. All that France can propose, after the greatest success there, can be only to take a temporary possession of the country during the war, to hold it in deposit, as the king of Prussia did the electorate

of Saxony." Here again happens to be a small mistake in point of fact, which overthrows the whole of the considerer's reasoning. I affirm it, and will appeal to every man of reason and candour, that in the present, unprecedented, conjuncture, when the head of the empire and the French king, are rivetted in a confederacy against the protestant interest, the electorate of Hanover, if wrested from the house of Brunswick, may be bestowed on whom they please; and perhaps it would not be going too far, should we suppose, that, even at this time, some protestant princes of the empire are casting a wishful eye to fill the seat of an electorate. Should this succeed, it is no more than has already happened.

Page 25. the considerer is at infinite pains, (and, indeed, he seems to pique himself upon it, as his fort) to prove that we hurt Hanover, and actually the whole protestant interest in Germany, by making that electorate the seat of war. Here, again, I must affirm, that the fact is false; and I absolutely deny and defy any man to prove, that Great-Britain has, in the least, contributed to make that electorate the seat of war. It was unjustly attacked

tacked by France, and all the sophistry of mankind cannot pretend, that Great-Britain has not acted a just, and, therefore, a wise part, in endeavouring to protect that electorate. Let the considerer and his friend, if they please, recur to prudential, but pitiful, principles; let them say, that a weaker state is to be oppressed by a stronger, and that no intermediate power ought to say to the latter, What dost thou?

This observation brings me to the main beam of our observer's reasoning. He has not endeavoured to prove, that his Prussian majesty was originally wrong in the causes for which he went to war; he has not presumed to say, that Great-Britain had not just provocations to make war upon France. The considerer has not thrown out a single syllable to insinuate, that Hanover was not attacked entirely on account of the French quarrel with Great-Britain in America. This being the case, to what absurdities must our considerer be reduced? even to that, not only of condemning the practice of the greatest and wisest princes in former ages, but of abolishing out of the system of the world, all distinctions between right and wrong, and all resistance,
 where

where injustice and injury are offered. Will the considerer avow that doctrine? I hope he will not; I may almost venture to say, that he dares not; and yet, that doctrine must be avowed, before any one of his positions can be conclusive. Though romance and realities differ, yet, could the most inventive head have devised a tract, which Great-Britain, keeping sight of common sense and common honour, could have followed, but what she has done? The considerer is a professed advocate for submission. Submission to what? to violence, fraud and injustice? Should that doctrine take place, the light of the sun may be said to be extinguished. In this men and communities do not differ in their relations. The law of nature, as Cicero has sensibly explained it, dictates the principles of self-preservation. And every individual, if he consults his own safety, will consult the safety of the whole. Are states to be oppressed more than private men are, merely because they are weak? Does not common interest, as well as common honesty, call upon one state to assist another when oppressed? For what are societies formed, and alliances made, but to defend the weaker against the stronger? How infamous would it be, was Great-Britain allied

allied with a power far more considerable than herself, and bound by every tie of gratitude and faith to support her, should that power tell her, that it is her best course, to give way to superior force, and that a little dragooning will do her no disservice, because the smart will soon be over, and that, was she to receive any assistance, her case would be worse.

But in fact, the public of Great-Britain is abused in nothing more, than in that way of reasoning, which is adopted by the considerer. Where is the nation in the world that ever would have done any thing great, any thing glorious, or indeed wise, had her government made her interest the *only* standard of her honour? A great people knows, that honour, reputation, and dignity, *form* their interest; nor could Great-Britain at this time have arrived to the pitch of power and riches, she now possesses, had she been always mercenary enough, to have made her dignity subservient to any consideration whatsoever. "A small state, says the considerer, (p. 25.) which is invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than itself, is doubtless under a great misfortune; all resistance is useless, and it has

has nothing to do but submit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune; and that is by having another great state, almost equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it. If the country submit, it has but one army to maintain, and may in the beginning yield up terms, which is tolerable; but if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is sure to be oppressed by them both." Had I not given the quotation fairly in the considerer's words, a reader who has the smallest sentiment of virtue and humanity, might have doubted, whether such stuff could have fallen from the pen of any writer who wears the stamp of manhood; in reality, the whole of the performance I am now answering, ought to have been intitled, *An apology for France*; nor is there, from the beginning to the end of it, a single principle, but that Great-Britain ought to dissolve every tye of humanity and justice, and leave France and Austria the unmolested liberty of desolating Europe, and at last of enslaving Britain; for there is not an argument for Hanover's submitting to France, brought by the considerer, that is not with equal, nay, greater, reason, applicable to Great-Britain. If she has an army in her bowels, she ought to submit; she ought

ought not to double her own misery by increasing the number of mouths she has to maintain, or by adding hands to war, that many headed monster, too apt of itself to devour the most innocent and the most unoffending.

But it unfortunately happens, that the considerer's facts are as false as his reasoning. I cannot, by any manner of means, see that Hanover is, at present, oppressed by prince Ferdinand's army; I can see the British nation making glorious, and not unsuccessful, efforts, for saving an electorate, that has been almost ruined, for the sake of Great-Britain. "Did the sun, says the considerer insultingly, refuse to shine, or the river cease to flow, when France was in possession of Hanover?" Philosophers will tell him, they did not; because injustice is the worst inversion of nature's course. As a Politician I answer, that neither of those Phenomenas would have happened, had the French been in possession of London, as well as of Hanover.

The considerer proceeds, in the same insulting strain, to upbraid the Hanoverians for breaking the convention of Closter-Seven.

Here again is a material mistake in point of fact, for it is a most infamous falshood to say, that the Hanoverians did break that convention. His late majesty's rescripts and manifestos made it plain, without the possibility of contradiction, that the French broke it themselves, by insisting upon terms of oppression and injustice, which were not stipulated in the convention. This is a truth, that the French ministry themselves, keen and eager, as they were, at that time, did not pretend to contradict; and his late majesty, whose veracity was perhaps as irreproachable and unimpeached as that of any prince who ever breathed, had the glory and satisfaction to see his conduct, in resuming his arms, approved of by all Europe. I can scarcely except the court of France itself. Before the considerer had thrown out against his late majesty a charge of breaking a convention, made under such tender circumstances as that of Closter-Seven was, he ought to have descended to particulars, and to have refuted the allegations in his late majesty's memorials and manifestos, published on that occasion. Let the public, therefore, upon the whole, judge of an author who offers such an insult to the memory of that venerable head that is now laid in the dust.

dust. In my own life-time I have known judicial sentences past against the revilers of the memory of king William, 40 years after his death; but here is the memory of the greatest and the best monarch that ever Britain had, insulted before his ashes are cold in the grave that receives them. The subject dispenses with ceremony, and even with forms of writing; the fact is false; his late majesty did not break the convention of Closter-Seven. His late majesty avowed his resuming arms; he justified that resumption, and the considerer cannot, without incurring the censure of the blackest calumny, maintain his assertion, that his late majesty was guilty of a most scandalous breach of faith.

The considerer thinks himself excessively strong in his impeachment of the king of Prussia's conduct, when he mentions the great hardships which the electorate of Saxony underwent, when it was in possession of the Prussians. Who doubts it? but who was to blame? Has the considerer offered a single argument, to prove, that the king of Prussia was not well founded, in justice as well as prudence, in his proceedings against that electorate? Has he offered a colour of reason to

prove, that, had not the king of Prussia acted as he did, he and the protestant interest in Germany, must have been totally ruined? Is any power, especially an independent power, to answer for the consequences of another's injustice? If the elector of Saxony, by his iniquitous combination against the elector of Brandenburg, obliged the latter to put the citizens of Leipzig under a severe contribution, the elector of Saxony, and not the elector of Brandenburg, was to blame.

Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.

Talking as men, what heart does not feel for the miseries, losses, and misfortunes of subjects, through the injustice of the princes. I never see a French prisoner, without considering him as the innocent victim of his sovereign's perfidy. All arguments therefore, drawn from considerations of humanity, when inhumanity is practised, are unnecessary, idle, or futile. If the injustice of one prince, makes it necessary for another to proceed with severity against the innocent subjects of another power; he who gives the provocation alone is to blame, and alone is answerable for all consequences. Princes do not
make

make war upon one another's persons or palaces. The most generous and humane, and most virtuous princes that ever lived, have been oblig'd, in justice to their own subjects, to proceed against those of another, in a manner against which their nature has revolted. The most understanding reader in Europe, perhaps, therefore, will be puzzled to find out the meaning of the considerer's reasoning, between the 31st and 38th pages of his considerations; if he has any meaning, it is, that Great-Britain, did not Hanover in Germany, would have no army in Germany.

Again, the fact is false, for before the electors of Hanover were kings of Great-Britain, Great-Britain had armies in Germany; nay what was still more expensive, they had armies in Spain, and in Portugal? for what reason? undoubtedly to maintain the balance of the power in Europe, and, in whatever quarter that balance is indangered, the British arms ought to find business. This is reasoning that never yet has been disputed, it is what has been adapted by every wise minister, and by every patriot that ever England had, nor
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do I remember a prostitute of the pen so abandon'd, as to contradict it.

The considerer enjoys an imaginary triumph, when he pretends to show that Great-Britain fights at a vast disadvantage with France in Germany, and that the preservation of Hanover ought not to be an object of our concern, nor would the French attack it, did we not defend it. He seems to have laid the fort of his reasoning upon those principles, and he has laid them down in a multiplicity of words ; but as usual, every fact is false. The French, before the present war, have again and again, through the mere lust of power, and wantonness of ambition, laid waste German electorates. The liberties of Europe were then endangered, but less than they are now, and Great-Britain interpos'd at a greater expence, and with less efficacy than she does now. If, instead of the electorate of Hanover, a dung-hill was the spot, where the fate of public liberty was to be disputed and decided, we must forfeit the name of Britons, should we abandon it ; posterity would curse us, should we give it up.

“ How,

“ How, says the considerer, did the war begin? The scene in Germany, opened with our being in alliance with the empress queen. And the king of P——a, under the encouragement of France, was threatening to invade the e——te: we looked over all the other parts of Europe in vain, and sent to the farthest North, and agreed to give five hundred thousand pounds to the court of Russia, to march fifty-five thousand men into P——a, in order to find that prince employment at home.” Were the reward of a thousand pounds published in the newspapers, to outdo the falsities contained in the foregoing quotation, scarce a man in England would be found hardy enough to attempt it. Our alliance with the empress queen gave no manner of rise to the present scene in Germany; accidents had thrown the interest of Prussia off its hinges. While the natural system of the politics of Europe subsisted, the houses of Bourbon and Austria liv'd, if not at perpetual variance, at least in perpetual jealousy of one another. The king of Prussia had the strongest reasons to apprehend, that the house of Austria never would forgive his depriving it of Silesia. He naturally sought to strengthen himself,

himself, by an alliance with that power, whose interest it was that the house of Austria, should be kept low, and that power, which was France, as naturally embraced the occasion. His late Majesty, George the second, during all this time, was pursuing the fixt, and till then, unvaried maxims of public liberty, by supporting the house of Austria. France, whose interest it always will be, that Germans should cut one another's throats, most officiously offered to march an army into the empire, in support of his Prussian majesty. Had she done it, there is no manner of doubt that the liberties of the Germanic body, must have received their finishing stroke. Great-Britain was sensible of that, and her ministry strove to prevent it, by entering into one of the cheapest contracts, that perhaps ever was made, with Russia; and a contract, which, at the time it was made, astonished France, but pleased all Europe besides. But with what front hath the considerer said that those Russians were designed to invade Prussia; what term does such an allegation, so base, so injurious, and so unsupported, deserve? His late majesty, by that contract with Russia, prov'd himself equally the father of European, as of British, liberty. The schemes

schemes of the French were thus disconcerted, and his Prussian majesty, with equal wisdom and magnanimity, declared that he was ready to draw his sword against foreign troops, be they Russian or be they French, who should enter Germany.

This was the point precisely, which his late majesty aimed at, and was the true basis of that so much wished for, so much applauded, reconciliation, which happened between him and his Prussian majesty. If the considerer had the smallest grain of candor, or the least spark of information, he would have informed the public, that the violence of the court of Vienna had disgusted his late majesty, long before the differences between France and England broke out. Like a wise and great prince as he was, he concealed the nakedness of the ancient ally of his people and family, as long as he could, consistently with his public faith and common justice. But the demands of the court of Vienna out-run all moderation. I shall not dissemble, that the court of London perhaps did give the empress-queen some hopes of seeing her son made king of the Romans, and undoubtedly as the interest of Europe appeared to be at

that time circumstanced, it was extremely natural for his late majesty to attempt such a measure. Perhaps he did attempt it, and perhaps could it have been carried into execution, without tearing the fundamental constitution of Germany to pieces, he might have effected it. But the court of Vienna never had the smallest regard for that consideration; her ambition must be gratified at the expence of Germanic liberty. His late majesty's penetration and tenderness for that consideration, and the impatience of the empress-queen, made him see what he scarcely could have believed, that the house of Austria now acted upon principles inconsistent with all their former engagements, and that the empress-queen, like another Juno, said,

Flectere si nequeo superos, acheronta movebo.

If I cannot bring the king of England to join with me in the destruction of public liberty, I will call in the French, who, I am sure, will be glad to second me. Let Germany be ravaged, let her constitution be ruined, but let the house of Austria be great, and let her ride in the whirl-wind of public calamity.

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Too many circumstances at that time concurred, to flatter this presumption : circumstances that are without parallel in history. The French, by the weakest, but, at the same time, the most frantic, conduct ever known, took steps to drive the subjects of Great-Britain out of the empire of North-America. Such was the ruling passion of France. That of the empress-queen was to have her son elected king of the Romans, and to be revenged upon the king of Prussia. The ruling passions in both parties coincided in one point. The friendship of Prussia was of less consideration to France, than the empire of North-America was. The regaining Silesia was thought of more importance by the court of Vienna, than all her former engagements, than every tye of gratitude and honour, and, when rightly considered, of interest. Thus an unnatural combination was formed against the liberties of Europe.

The objects which Great-Britain and Prussia had in their eyes, were the preservation of the former's empire in North-America, and of the latter's possession of Silesia. The Germanic constitution, and the balance of

power, were objects in common to both. Ought such facts, or such reasoning, to be suppressed by one who calls himself a considerer on the present German war? Could any, but the most prostitute of all writers, have asked the following question? "Was his Prussian majesty's having fallen upon a protestant electorate, and destroying Saxony, a service done to Britain?" Who ever said it was, or what business have Britons in the affair? A deep-laid scheme, and a treacherous combination was formed against the king of Prussia, in which the elector of Saxony had a principal concern. His Prussian majesty prevented the execution of so infamous a confederacy; nor does it matter a single straw; whether the confederates against him were protestants or papists; the elector of Saxony most undoubtedly is a papist; and it is equally undoubted that, when he gives the nod, the subjects of his electorate must fight in a popish quarrel.

Here I am aware of a poor, though plausible, objection; the head, it may be said, of the landgraviate of Hesse-Cassel, is not a protestant. True, but thanks to the care of his late majesty, and the patriotism of his states, he is a protestant power, and the
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protestant interest in his electorate, is secured so as not to be affected by any temporary or private system of religion, that he has embraced. Is that the case with Saxony? No, the immaterial forms of worship, are not the barriers, or indeed characteristics, of protestantism. In short, nothing is more certain, than that the Saxons did, and may fight in a popish cause, and upon popish principles; and I look upon the barons of England, though they undoubtedly believed in the pope, to have been the best protestants that ever breathed, when they obliged a tyrant to give them their magna charta.

Page 38, &c. The considerer takes pains to prove, that the money we pay to his Prussian majesty, is, properly speaking, a tribute. It is false; it is the cheapest bargain Great-Britain ever made, and the most honourable, as well as wise. The principles of the British constitution have ever been for her maintaining, for her defending, for her adopting the cause of the public liberty, against the oppressors of mankind; the same cause subsists, the same conduct is observed, and the like consequences must follow,

follow, if Britons are not traitors to themselves.

I should be glad to know of the most sanguine patron or abettor the considerer has, what the consequences must have been, and what face Europe, at this time, must have presented, had not England acted as she has done. Must not the protestant interest, by which I mean public liberty, have been abolished on the continent? Must not every port in Europe have been shut up against British ships, and must not every cabinet have excluded British councils, and have declared against British interests? The reasoning brought by the considerer, to prove that the king of Prussia, during the whole course of this war, is acting only for himself, is mere declamation, and if possible, less than nothing. There never was an alliance formed between two powers, who know what they are about, in which one of them did not make its own interest his first consideration, and acted accordingly. I will even go farther, and say, that in the present war, the more selfish, and the more self-interested his Prussian majesty is, he is of the more service to Britain, because

cause he thereby the more weakens her declared enemies.

But, says the considerer, and his advocates, (for I will place their arguments in the strongest point of light) while Great-Britain has so home-felt, so acknowledged a superiority by sea, why should she embark in a German war? But can the considerer, with the smallest shew of propriety or reason, prove that Great-Britain would have had that superiority, had France been at liberty to have employed against Britain those troops, that to the number of two hundred and fifty-thousand men, have, since the commencement of this war, found their graves in Germany? In fact, where does our boasted superiority lie; by sea? No; there never was the least doubt of the superiority of Great-Britain by sea, since this war commenced; the unexpected and boasted advantages we have gained over France, have been by land. We have dispossessed them of North-America, and a more certain fact was never laid down upon paper, than this, that had France been at liberty to send the tenth part of the troops to America, that she has buried in Germany, the English
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nation would not, by this time, have possessed a single foot of land upon that continent.

“ The Hanoverians, says the considerer, may justly come within our compassion ; but for that very reason we ought to separate our cause from theirs, because they are far removed out of our protection. Could the electorate ever have been designed to make a part of us, and to be thus tender to us as the apple of our eye ; it would have been placed under the guard of our front, and not out of the reach even of our hands.” This is a way of reasoning that has more than once brought Great-Britain to the very verge of ruin. The principles upon which it is founded, is directly inconsistent with, and a libel upon, the act of settlement. Can it be supposed that king William, and the patriots who formed that act, did not foresee all the inconveniencies that have arisen, or can arise, from making an elector of Hanover king of Great-Britain ? They, without all manner of doubt, saw that the electorate of Hanover would always be considered by France as a deposit for the conduct of Great-Britain. But that consideration rather confirmed them in, than deterred them from, their resolution ;
they

they kept their eye upon one great object, which was that of maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body; or they thought that their having a German elector to be king of Great-Britain, strengthened the common cause. They were not deceived; the event proved they were not; and while Britons continue faithful to themselves, their reasoning must hold good.

“ But, says the considerer, the two houses of parliament, it is said, have promised that they will defend the electorate. If they were so imprudent as to promise such a thing, we have now found it to be impossible; the fault therefore must be in the making such a promise, and not in the non-performance of it; because no promise binds to impossibilities.”

Here our considerer takes for granted that which he ought previously to have proved, and it opens for him a field of declamation and invective, which, if admitted, would be very little for his own credit, and less for that of the nation. He tells us, the present German war alone, costs more money than the whole sea and land service cost in the duke of Marlborough's campaigns. Though

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this fact is extremely disputable, nay false, if we include our services in Spain, and make proper allowances for the differences of the value of money in the duke of Marlborough's time and the present, yet I shall for once admit what he says to be true. But how different are the complexions of the two wars? In the duke of Marlborough's campaigns, the English had nothing to hope for themselves, but to maintain the ballance of power. In the present war they have indeed the same object, but another, and a solid, consideration is to be added to it, that is the immense acquisitions the nation has made in treasure, trade, and territory, which I can by no means admit she would, or could have, made, had it not been for the diversion which our arms gave to our enemies on the continent of Europe. "The time may come, says the considerer, when the nation, being exhausted by the German war, and perhaps intimidated by that prince it is now upholding, may be forced to give up its own conquests, to buy him a peace." I own I neither understand the propriety, nor the meaning, of this sentence. How is this nation likely to be intimidated by a prince, for whom she is forced to buy a peace? I can as little understand the considerer's

derer's drift a few lines after, that the practicable way of defending Germany, is by attacking the French islands, and thereby securing an ample indemnification for that part of Germany, for which alone we ought to have any concern.

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.

But it is, perhaps, what a British prince, parliament, and people, were Hanover now in the hands of the French, might not think quite so reasonable; especially as the considerer has been at so great pains to prove, that the electorate is of very little consequence to France; a position, which, perhaps, if not carried to extravagance, is the most defensible of any in his book.

From the 46th page of this pamphlet, the considerer employs great pains to prove that no act of parliament has engaged the public faith to the support of the present war; and he labours to shew that the words of the address of the commons to his late majesty, puts the parliament and British nation under no manner of obligation, because they promised what was impossible and impracticable; and

he brings the opinion of Grotius to prove, that under such circumstances, all ties are void. I may appeal to the considerer himself, whether in my representation of his reasoning, I have not done him justice ; and now I shall give the words of the address, quoted by the considerer. “ We think ourselves bound in gratitude to assist your majesty against the insults and attacks that may be made upon any of your majesty’s dominions, though not belonging to the crown of Great-Britain, in resentment of the part your majesty has taken in a cause, wherein the interests of this kingdom is so immediately, and so essentially, concerned.”

Hard must be the fate of any state or prince, depending upon that British honour, which has been always held so inviolable, were such a doctrine to take place. He must know little of foreign concerns, who does not know, that for two hundred years past, the speeches of the kings of England to their parliaments, and the addresses of those parliaments in answer, have been, as it were, the pole stars, that have directed the conduct of Europe. Can any man read the words of the address, as quoted above, and doubt that
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it does not amount to an absolute promise to defend the electorate? And they give a good moral, as well as political, reason for it, "because of his majesty's magnanimous behaviour," a reason that can be applied to nothing less than what I have mentioned. "But, says the considerer, we have taken upon ourselves the whole and absolute defence of them;" and here he is at great pains to find out a difference between assisting his majesty, and doing the thing ourselves, and he has laid out the point, to a degree of the most shameless chicanery. But has that really been the case? No, the considerer himself admits the electorate to have contributed what it can towards its own defence; if so, if his late majesty was ever reduced to borrow, upon his own private credit, two hundred thousand pounds, which he employed upon the defence of that electorate; if the Hanoverians risked, not only their properties, but their lives, and the entire desolation of their country; upon resuming their arms, after the French had broken the convention of Closter-Seven; if his late majesty, as elector of Hanover, avowed that step, and if great part of the troops, which so gloriously drove them out of that electorate, were in Hanoverian pay,

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as undoubtedly they were ; can Hanover be said to have done nothing for herself? Or does what we have done for her, amount to more than the address contains? Had not the parliament given his majesty the assurances they did, I am far from saying, that by his conduct, he would not have equally consulted the honour and interest of Great-Britain. But I will be bold to say, that, without hurting either, supposing Great-Britain to stand upon her own bottom, he could have avoided risking, as he did, his very property in that electorate, and in every other place of Germany. But upon the assurance of parliament, he bravely suffered it to embark, without reserve, in the same common cause.

As to our author's strengthening his reasoning from Grotius, in the first place I take Grotius to be no authority that is to direct the councils and conduct of Great-Britain ; and in the next place, without wasting my readers time in crabbed quotations, Grotius declares flatly against the whole of his doctrine, as applicable to the present circumstances of Great-Britain and Hanover. At the time the treaties of Russia and the landgrave

grave of Hesse were debated in parliament, says the considerer, "all parties expressly declared, that they would not send a man out of the kingdom." I cannot say, that I remember any such express declaration from all parties; but I am candid enough to own, that the professed view of those treaties, (and how that view came to be altered is no secret to the public) was to prevent our sending our troops out of the kingdom. Objects often varied, nay, some were annihilated; and thus a measure, which was not, at that time, perhaps, thought of, became afterwards, first expedient, and then necessary. In short, the considerer will be puzzled to find any period of history, in which councils are not influenced by circumstances, and that materially too, under the firmest administrations. I cannot, however, help observing, that the whole of our considerer's boasted strength falls to the ground, by one single observation, which is, that it was not regarding the king of Prussia, but against the power of France, that the declaration in question was made. The nation, indeed, was somewhat apprehensive of the connexion between France and Russia, but every man of sense in England at that time knew, that all danger from
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the king of Prussia must vanish by the very measure pursued by Great-Britain. It is true, his Prussian majesty at first was not explicit as to his designs; but, in that, he acted as every wise prince in his situation would have done, and the alliance between Prussia and Great Britain soon reduced him to his true interest, which was, against his suffering any foreign troops, be who they will, to enter the empire, and the moment he refused to admit the assistance of France, the electorate of Hanover had nothing more to fear. But this matter has been already explained.

The considerer proceeds to tell us, "that when we promised to defend the electorate against the king of Prussia and the French, the rest of the empire was to have been with us." This is so far from being the case, that the great opposition the measure met with in the house, arose from the queen of Hungary being unable, and the other princes of the empire being unwilling, to assist us; nor had we the smallest encouragement to hope that, that would be the case. "The promise, continues the considerer, was to pay Russians to fight against P——ns; is the paying P——s

P——ns to fight against Ruffians, due to the performance? ” Again I deny, that we did promise to pay Ruffians to fight against Pruffians, but we certainly did promise to defend the electorate by means of Ruffians ; and when those means were taken from us, we, in justice and honour, were obliged to have recourse to other means, which we are now pursuing.

The reader is to observe, that I am now attempting a vindication of the conduct of his late majesty and the British ministry; nor is he to expect, that I am to step out of the way to vindicate the Hanoverian chancery in what they did. Perhaps, if the truth was known, they looked upon themselves, according to the state of parties then in England, to be doomed as victims to a popular outcry. For my own part, I never could approve of the rancour and virulence with which that poor electorate was then treated. The convention of Closter-Seven took its rise from an apprehension, the Hanoverian chancery had, that it was not in the power of their sovereign, to protect them from the miseries that threatened them. This, were it proper and decent; would be no very difficult matter to prove. I will even go so far as to say, that, it is more

than probable, in such a situation of things, the regency, or as the considerer calls them, the chancery of Hanover, considered the interest of the elector, and themselves, in a very different light from those of Great-Britain and its sovereign.

The considerer, about the 55th, 56th, and the subsequent pages of his pamphlet, comes to what he calls his most important point, which is neither more nor less than to prove, that we ought to carry on the war with France by sea; "by which means, says he, we will realise to this nation a revenue of five millions a year for ever, at our enemies expence, and totally disable France hereafter from raising a marine power, which can never be in any degree formidable to Britain." The public of Great-Britain would be extremely obliged to the considerer, if he would point out to them the situation of the French islands, where those five millions, even supposing them French livres, grow. If he means Martinico, it never was worth five millions of French livres to the crown of France, and its importance arose chiefly from its vicinity to the island of Guadaloupe. But are we not, at this time, distressing the French upon that island?

island? Have we not the strongest reason to say, that our government is doing the very thing, so injudiciously and unseasonably pointed out by the considerer, with no view, but to impose upon the ignorant, and inflame the unwary? If he means, that we are to attack the French part of Hispaniola, and to make a conquest of it for ourselves, tho' in trust for our allies, it would not be long before a more pernicious war, even than what he has represented the Germanic war to be, might be carried on against Great-Britain, since the French possessions upon that island are known to be under the protection of Spain, and to be held only in sufferance from her. If he means the poultry distant possessions the French hold at the mouth of the Mississippi and in Louisiana, they are no objects of a national armament; and they could scarcely indemnify the expence of a small squadron of privateers, were they to undertake the conquest. In short, I will venture to say, that all those possessions put together, never were worth to the crown of France, and never can be worth to us, the twentieth part of the sum, at which the considerer has rated them. But, after all that has been said, what authority hath the considerer to

suppose, that any of those attempts have been neglected by our being engaged in a German war? As to the irretrievable destruction of the French marine, has not that been actually effected? And it is time enough for the considerer to rail against our government, when he sees them make a peace that shall leave France at liberty to re-establish it. In short, if the French islands can bring, either to them or to Great-Britain, five millions sterling a year, they are of more worth, than half the revenue of France itself.

“ In the first place, says the considerer, this is a war, in which Britain stands single and alone, to contend at land with France. And how much soever we may flatter ourselves with the notion of our own strength, and the French weakness, France is at this time, and it has been for a century past, superior to us at land.” This is the sum of what the considerer has said on this head, which takes up several pages of his pamphlet. I shall, for once, not dispute this fact, if he means only, that France can bring much greater armies into the field than Great-Britain can; but I must and will affirm, that those armies are nothing comparable in
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a day of action to British troops, nor have they ever been found to be so; and in affirming this, I have on my side the credit of all history, when the troops of the two nations ever fought with one another, in the smallest terms of equality. I shall allow the advantage in point of military discipline, tactics, and military operations, to have been, at certain times, on the side of the French; but I totally deny, that they are in possession of those advantages at present, or have been for some years. A candid writer must allow, that the strength of a state in war does not consist in the number of her own natives she can bring into the field. The Carthaginians could bring but few; yet by the help of commerce they were enabled, at a much greater distance than Germany is from England, to bring Rome to the brink of ruin. I must add, that tho' one state may exceed another in the number of national troops by land, yet the latter may have vast advantages in war, if, to a reasonable number of brave national troops, she shall likewise add a marine too strong for all the naval forces in the world, when collected into one fleet, to look it in the face, which at present is the case of Great-Britain. The considerer may flourish
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away upon former events that happened in favour of France. The present time ought to be the only subject of his consideration; and he can produce no period that can be brought in the least parallel with it, whether we consider our own internal strength, the glory acquired by our troops, the force of our marine, the importance of our conquests, and, what is of more weight than all, the unanimity of the nation; a consideration, which destroys all parallels that can be formed, with regard to the circumstances of this nation, since the days of queen Elizabeth to the present. As to the loss, which the French power sustained by the battles of Blenheim and Ramillies, exaggerated as they are by the considerer, they are in no degree comparable, setting aside the havock of the sword, to the number they have lost in Germany by diseases, fatigue, famine, and every kind of indigence.

In page 60 and 61 of the Considerations, our author employs some very flimsy reasoning, to prove, that we made a very bad bargain with Prussia. "In fact, though we are an ally to him, he is none to us. Our treaty with him, says the considerer, will not oblige
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him to furnish us either with money or troops, should we want them ever so much." Nobody was ever wrong-headed enough to imagine the treaty was made for any such purpose; it was made to prevent the absolute destruction of the protestant interest, upon the continent, and it has hitherto answered that purpose, notwithstanding the formidable and unexpected traverses it has met with.

“ What then (says the considerer in the next page) have we gained by this ally? Two things: the one is, the being obliged to pay him money to enable him to fight his own battles against enemies which Britain has no quarrel with; the other is, the driving the rest of the German princes into a closer union with France, and making ourselves obnoxious to Europe for supporting this ally. Can it be supposed, that Britain is the stronger for either of these? ” In answer to those round questions, I say, that Britain always has had, and that she always ought to have, a quarrel with those powers, who attempt to destroy the liberties of Europe. Supposing the confederacy between the courts of Vienna, France, Saxony, and Russia, who is neither papist nor protestant, and is to be considered rather as an Asiatic, than an European power,

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had been carried into execution, what must have been the consequence? By what I have suggested, how can the prevention of it drive the German princes into a closer union with France, while the latter is so intimately connected with the house of Austria, which has always been their oppressors, when they fled to France for refuge? The extinction of the protestant interest in Germany, it is to be feared, would have extinguished the Germanic constitution itself, while that ambition and bigotry, which has always distinguished the house of Austria, was supported and abetted by the guaranties of the treaty of Westphalia. What supported the liberties of Germany, and consequently of Europe, before the present war broke out, but the enmity between the houses of Bourbon and Austria? That enmity being dissolved, the former ballance of power vanished; and the honour, dignity, and interest of Great-Britain called upon her to form another. She has done it, and she could have done it by no other means, than she has pursued.

The greatest art, which the considerer has employed through the whole of his pamphlet, and which he carries on to an amazing degree

degree from the 62d to the 68th page, is to represent the king of Prussia as a self-interested prince. Were I to speak my own private thoughts, I must say, the greater his self-interest is, he will be the more useful and the more faithful ally to Great-Britain; from whose friendship, after what has happened, he never can find it his interest to depart. I shall speak nothing of gratitude or honour; but while the present war lasts, can it be his interest to abandon his alliance with Great-Britain? I believe, even, the considerer will not be hardy enough to affirm it. Supposing a peace was to take place, would he, after what has happened, throw himself into the arms of France? No; he must be sensible, that while there is a possibility of a misunderstanding arising between Great-Britain and France, his danger recurs, and then he would be in a worse condition than ever, through the renewed connexions between Austria and Bourbon. This must hereafter always be the case. No peace can make Austria lose sight of her claims upon Silesia; or France of hers, for the damage we have done her in this war, and the territories we have taken from her. These are considerations which, however plain and short, I think ab-

folutely deftroys all the declamation employed by our author againft our connexion with Pruffia. The personal inveftives the confiderer has thrown out againft him, are as void of truth, as they are of decency, and deferve no answer.

The confiderer next returns to his old topic of the inequality between France and England, in a land-war between them, on the continent; and he represents all the powers in Europe as being averfe to the caufe we are fighting in. The meaneft coffee-houfe politician knows the reafon. Ruffia has claims, Sweden has claims, upon Ruffia, which have been long quieted by treaties, and are therefore unjust. The fituation of the king of Denmark, between Ruffia and Sweden, with regard to Holftain, has been very ticklifh, and becoming more fo every day, does not admit him to part with a fingle fubject from the defence of his own dominions. The death of the prince and princefs of Orange have given the Dutch government back to the Lovettein faction, who think, that it is their intereft to join with France, and fecretly to abett her againft the rivals of her commerce. Ambition, and the hope of fharing in the fpoils and dignities of two electorates, have
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driven some of the German princes, even protestants, from their true interests, and others are over-awed by the thunders of the aulic council, supported by the power of France. As to the protestants of Saxony, who have taken service with our enemies, perhaps their numbers will not be found to be very great, when we consider, that the inhabitants, at least of one half, of Saxony, are papists. But, be that as it will, no prince, when his conduct is fundamentally right, is obliged to answer for consequences. As to Switzerland, I apprehend, we and our allies have the same right to recruit there, as France has, and a much better title, because we have more money to pay them. As to Italy, Germany, and Flanders, France can recruit in no part of them, but in the territories of the empress-queen, which we may reasonably presume, are already sufficiently exhausted.

Page 69 and 70 of the Considerations is employed in shewing, that the French have more funds to carry on war than Great-Britain has. But as the considerer has his information only from one gentleman, whom

he does not name, and as the distressed state of France and her finances, even to a professed bankruptcy, is well known, and indisputable, the argument certainly lies against him. But even supposing the French treasury to be possessed of the sums the considerer mentions, let us, with the Spanish ambassador in the treasury of Venice, take the candle, and examine where is the root from which those treasures grow. Has not Great-Britain laid the ax to it? Is it not absolutely cut off by the loss of her marine, trade, and possessions in all parts of the world? The reverse of all this is the case of Great-Britain. Look at the state of French prisoners in England, read the remonstrances of French parliaments, consult the best accounts of the state of their provinces, peopled by inhabitants, so dispirited through want, that they think it a happiness to be carried to the less lingering butchery of the field. But the whole of this point is so much against our considerer, in the mind of every man in England, excepting a few austentious, desperats, advocates for the cause espoused by the considerer, that I am safe in resting it here.

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“ Every one who has thought on the subject of war, must have considered the three different kinds of it: a war of offence, a war of equality, and a war of defence. And every one knows, that of these the last is most disadvantageous, and the most difficult.” These are founds, drawn from speculation, paper-staining warriors, and castle-building politicians ; but they are disclaimed by practice and experience. Every war in its own nature becomes offensive, whatever the pretences may have been, upon which it was originally founded. If an army of defence, can offend the enemy, the means of offence becomes the most effectual principle of defence. Strength or weakness, courage or conduct, are all the considerations generals have, whether they fight in a war of offence, a war of equality, or a war of defence, and the meaning of these words vanish, according to events. The considerer says, that neither the duke of Cumberland, nor prince Ferdinand, could force the French to a pitched battle. I understand the battle of Minden to have been a pitched battle, and that we did force the French to fight it in the manner it was fought ; whether the French were forced to fight

fight at Hastenbeck, I know not. But I am convinced, that, superior as they were to his royal highness, in numbers and artillery; had one half of the troops under him been British, he must have been decisively victorious. As to the argument the considerer so long dwells upon, and so affectedly repeats, that France can draw out greater armies than we can, let the battle of Minden answer, whether they can produce so good troops. In short, the number that France can bring to the field, unless they can be proved to be better troops than those of Great-Britain, is an argument against our going to war, that is below all contempt. Is there in this respect a greater disparity between France and Great-Britain, than there was between the Greeks and the Persians, than there was between the Romans and Barbarians, those ancestors of the present French and Austrians?

“Suppose us, says the considerer, to gain a compleat victory, is there any fruit of it to be reaped in Germany.” This is his main question; all that follows on it is but flourish. My answer is, we gain all that we proposed, the freeing a protestant electorate, exposed to all the horrors of war upon our account; we
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weaken the power of the oppressors of Europe, we blunt the swords, that are drawn against the liberties of mankind, and we are, at least, one step nearer towards procuring a peace, which may restore Great-Britain and Europe to freedom and tranquillity. The ideal reasonings that follow the imaginary triumph of the author, upon the above question, deserves no answer, because the facts, supposed in it, never can have any existence, and can have no relation to the present question. It cannot be imagined, that the present government, could be mad enough to pursue such a scheme as the considerer has laid down for the future plan of their operations. British troops are not to follow an enemy into quarters, where British money is already more efficaciously employed; the observations I have already made, of the exhausted state of France, destroy all probability of the French leading us into those wild-goose chases the author has supposed.

The considerer has thrown out sarcasms against our employing a foreign general or generals, in the German war. But, as usual, he has substituted words for realities. The present war, candidly considered, is no farther

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on our part, a German war, than as we fight for our allies in Germany, against our enemies there. We attack no German prince, we support no German measures, farther than as the support of German freedom and independency is connected with the interest of Great-Britain, which it always has been.

Page 90, the considerer falls with great reason, as I think, upon the abuse of public news writing in England; I subscribe to all he says on that head. But, at the same time, I must make a distinction between what comes from the pens of those hirelings of the press, and the authority of the government, and even the parliament, itself. If some pragmatistical politicians, or busy fund-brokers, railed against the king of Prussia, there was not a man of sense in England, who did not bewail the untowardly system that kept him and us divided. The considerer knows well, that there was not, in both houses of parliament, a topic more frequently mentioned, than the expediency of closing, almost at any rate, with his Prussian majesty, and thereby forming a firm barrier, and a natural defence, for the protestant interest. Did the considerer, or any of his friends, in those times,

times, stand up and dispute those propositions, as they were assented to, even by the ministers, against whom they were obliquely aimed. Mr. Pelham himself was again and again heard to declare, that when the circumstances of affairs could admit, not a moment should be lost, in completing so desirable a connexion; and all the other ministers seemed to be of the same mind. When the connexion was formed, the government of England, perhaps, at no time, entered into a measure, that met with so universal an approbation. It may be improper for me to mention, that the great personage, who is now no more, always spoke with regret of the circumstances that kept him at a distance from his nephew, and has been known, with an unusual sharpness, to check the officious courtiers about his person, when they spoke disrespectfully of him.

Even when his Prussian majesty (who, being an inland power, was not extremely well acquainted with maritime affairs) sent over the famous memorial, complaining of the confiscation of his ships; the answer returned, by order of the court of London, was penned with all the politeness due to

a sovereign prince, in alliance with us. Has the considerer forgot what happened after this, upon the same subject? The answer that went from London, was such as convinced his Prussian majesty of the rectitude of our court of admiralty's proceedings, and his Britannic majesty's intentions. What was the consequence? He dropped his remonstrance, and he kept his faith, in paying the interest on the Silesian loan. Upon the whole, therefore, he must have been born but yesterday, who can be imposed upon by the so many repeated assertions in the Considerations, of the detestation his Prussian majesty was formerly held in, by the British nation. Impertinents in politicks we have many, whose knowledge arise out of the fumes of coffee and tobacco; but the talk of such never can be construed into the sense of the people of Britain. I shall not differ much from our considerer, with regard to a certain ribband and title bestowed; but I cannot think it was bestowed, on account of vulgar prepossessions, and on the report of idle, ignorant, news-mongers; they were bestowed at a time when it was thought proper and prudent to give exemplary rewards, even to the *shew* of resolution and resistance.

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The railing of our considerer at the Russian treaty, is frivolous and thread-bare, and yet he is ingenuous enough to own (page 94.) that it was made solely to keep all foreign troops out of the empire. Undoubtedly, as we have observed before, it was. But it is as certain, that, before the treaty was made, the court of France, unknown either to his Britannic, or Prussian majesty, was far advanced in the treaty of Vienna; nay, it was then as good as concluded, and we very soon found, from the chevalier Duglafs's negotiations, on the part of France, at the court of Peterbourg, too much reason to apprehend, that if the Russian troops had got footing in the empire, even upon our requisition, they would have insisted upon their own terms, before they had evacuated it. That the Russians were hired to defend the electorate of Hanover, against all invaders, is admitted. That they were hired to ravage the Prussian dominions, or that the king of Prussia intended to invade Hanover at that time, is denied.

Having said thus much, I must be candid enough to own, before the treaty of London was made, his late majesty (though he wisely

kept it to himself) had great reasons to suspect the intentions of the court of Vienna, and her motives, or rather encouragement, for making certain demands upon him, which in honour, and conscience, he could not comply with. What must become of our author's reasoning, if it should appear that some of those demands regarded even the king of Prussia? Did not the natural season, the *optanda dies*, then present itself, and what treatment must his majesty's ministers have met with from the public, had they not joined the national voice, and concluded the treaty of London. "We had been used to think, says the considerer, (page 95,) the king of Prussia, (I dont say rightly) had shown in his actions, a neglect of all moral obligation, and in his writings, a contempt of every religious principle." Who are *we*? Does the considerer class himself with the officious shatter-brains of coffee-houses? The people of England never thought so of the conqueror of Silesia; they never spoke thus of the author of the Anti-Machiavel. Every man of sense and candour spoke and thought the reverse. They saw the king of Prussia under the disagreeable necessity of maintaining his alliance with France, through the in-justice

justice and obstinacy of the court of Vienna, who forced him to maintain that alliance, though he offered, again and again, to renounce it, and to join in keeping the French out of the empire, provided she would do him justice in his claims upon Silesia. Those claims were, to the people of England, problematical at least, and they neither could, nor did, give them disgust, far less, detestation.

In all political writings, when facts are answered, (and I think I have answered every fact advanced by the considerer) the rest must go for declamation. That is what I cannot answer. The charges against his Prussian majesty, and our own ministry, are repeated over and over again, and spun through a hundred and thirty-seven pages, with an acrimony void of spirit; arguments, that are destitute of reason; charges, unsupported by truth; allegations, not founded on facts; and tautologies, which prove the writer to be no admirer of Tacitus. His declamations and definitions upon continental connexions, and upon the difficulty of understanding them as they ought to be understood, are metaphysical, vague, and idle. Every cobbler, I was going to say, knows what a

continental connexion is, as well as any member of either house of parliament; and though our author represents his splittings of the question to be new and uncommon, yet there has not been perhaps a more hackney'd topic in politicks, since the Revolution; nor has he fallen upon a single division or subdivision, that has not been brushed thread-bare by Tories and Jacobites in their writings against the act of Settlement, and for the treaty of Utrecht. Let the author prove (and then he will say something) that our connexions with Prussia, or, if he pleases, with the continent, at this time, are not as well founded, and as justifiable, and perhaps more necessary, than those formed by king William, by that alliance which the considerer has employed such a needless pomp of language to amplify. Our considerer, again and again, mentions our being without those allies, which king William and queen Anne had: I have given the plain and true reason why we are without them, and probably must be without them, till the protestant confederacy has broken the chains of Europe. I am far from detracting from the merits or abilities of our great deliverer. But what has his conduct or character to do with the present question,

question, unless he can shew, that Great-Britain and Europe were in less danger, at the time the treaty of London was signed, than it was at the time the grand alliance was formed by king William? I am even afraid our considerer has over-strained his complaisance to the memory of that monarch. He has given us a most pompous account of the congress, in which the grand alliance was formed; and such a meeting, composed of so many illustrious parties, all of them enemies to France, never perhaps was known in Europe. I am unwilling to say it, but it is a well known truth, that the splendor and frequency of that meeting, was the greatest misfortune of king William's reign. It suggested to his enemies, a natural and a puzzling question. If so many mighty potentates, are to go to war against France, why is England to pay a greater proportion, in the expences of that war, than all those mighty potentates put together? nay, in fact, the whole of the expence; for man's flesh (unless when it is hired, or let out) has always been very cheap on the continent, especially in Germany,

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While I am upon this head, which I have touched with the utmost reluctance, I am sorry that our considerer's calculation of our expence during king William and queen Anne's wars, obliges me to repeat an observation I have made before; that it is a gross imposition upon the sense of the public, to array the sums of those times against the present; because the intrinsic value of money in Great-Britain is now diminished. The interest which money bears in a state, a commercial one I mean, may be called the pulse, which indicates the health or indisposition of the body-politic. The government in those times gave for money, six or seven, nay sometimes more, per cent. At this time they give at most three and a half. I shall not, from this, conclude, that Great-Britain has, at present, double the money in specie, that she had under king William, or queen Anne; but I will venture to say, however paradoxical it may appear, she is at this time doubly able to bear the expences.

“ To talk, says the considerer, (page 114) of forming a connexion with that, which is in itself unconnected, is a contradiction in terms.”

terms." This is professedly a gingle of words. Was the continent connected in itself, I mean, even against France, in queen Anne's time? Did not king William, even before his death, break those connexions, for which our author so pompously applauds him, so that queen Anne in the beginning of her reign, found Europe as unconnected as it is now? The empire in itself, torn in pieces by the defection of one of its most powerful electors from the common cause, while others of them were more covertly friends to France; Sweden so near declaring against us, that we were obliged to have recourse to gratifying the pride of that monarch, by sending the duke of Marlborough to him, to work upon his private passions, which he did in a manner not altogether becoming the dignity of his mistress and his country. All Spain, and the greatest part of Italy in arms against us, and even the duke of Savoy our friend, only because Britain was the most capable to be his, against the more than insolence of the French monarch; and what was worse than all, Great-Britain, by being then unconnected in herself, gave the enemy double advantages.

"Why, says the considerer, (page 116) should any part of the war, which, as the

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present war, began with a contest about foreign settlements, have its course diverted into a land-war in Germany, for we were always victorious at sea?" I don't dispute our being always superior to France by sea in power, but I cannot admit, we have been so in fortune; neither do I think, that the experiments of descents we have made upon the French coasts, have in any degree answered the plausible principles on which they were founded. The considerer himself furnishes the strongest reason why they have not; because France is extremely populous, and has always a militia, independent of her army. If so, such pelting descents, which are attended with infinite trouble and fatigue to our soldiers, will always be opposed by their militia, who are very little, if at all inferior, to their regulars. This, at least, is the way we argue in England, because the great end of our militia was to guard our coasts against descents, and leave our army at liberty to act elsewhere. Our author goes on to shew, (page 119.) "that if our war in Germany is a war of diversion, it is not an eligible diversion." Diversion is certainly one of the objects of our German war, and notwithstanding all our author's fine-spun arguments, the measure has hitherto been successful. What can

can he mean by eligible diversion? War itself is not eligible, when peace can be equitably preserved. But has our author pointed out, where we could have made a more eligible diversion, or has he proved that no diversion was proper? "But, says he, (p. 120) our German war is no diversion at all for the French forces," though he owns in the same breath, that it employs them. Yes, and I will add, it destroys them likewise, even without the assistance of the sword; so miserably are they supplied. To make out this notable reasoning of his, the considerer tells us, that the French leave not a man fewer upon their coasts on account of their army in Germany. Who says they have? But the considerer will find it no easy task to prove, that since the beginning of the war they have not suffered a loss of men in Germany, which the populousness of France (great as it is) will not be able for many years to repair. He never can persuade any man, who has his senses about him, that France is not become a national bankrupt, by her war in Germany; or that, had she not found diversion, or if the considerer please, employment for her troops in Germany, she might not still have found means to have triumphed over us in America. It will be impossible to

persuade the world, that France can keep a hundred and twenty thousand men in a country, that always has been, and is now, the grave of the French, with as little expence of blood and treasure, as they are at, when they are in quarters or garrisons in their own country, in a time of peace, which admits of their employing themselves in manufactures and agriculture, and in repairing those calamities of their country, which are so feelingly set forth by the remonstrances of their parliaments.

Our author, by his own confession, thinks, that the latter pages of his pamphlet contains a recapitulation, or rather, a repetition of what he had said before; and as they undoubtedly are such, I shall not pretend to answer them, because I have, step by step, answered every argument, without employing that declamation, which he has so industriously made use of; to decry the present government of England, to throw personal abuse, even in descending to personalities, against our illustrious ally.

F I N I S.

