





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

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WAR!

HOW BEST MET, OR PREVENTED;

OR,

A SHORT REVIEW

OF

RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND AMERICA,

AND

A CLOSE INSPECTION

OF

THE BRITISH - ARMY,

WITH REMARKS ON THE LATE MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN INDIA.

BY MILES.

EDINBURGH:

ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK;

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS, LONDON.

1846.

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WAR!

HOW BEST MET, OR PREVENTED.

IT is matter of surprise to foreigners, who have been enabled, by a residence in England, to familiarize themselves with the views and feelings of its inhabitants, that a nation, whose martial achievements occupy so proud a place in the pages of history, should yet remain so ignorant of the science of war.

The thirst for military glory, so general a feeling of our nature, lives with us far more languidly than with any other European nation; it became, indeed, almost extinct at that period of our history, when the martial buoyancy of the Norman character had become acclimatized to the moderation inherent to an insular nationality—when a spirit of mutual conciliation enforced itself on the respective administrations of Scotland and England—above all, when the reformation in our country attracted the minds of men, to the consideration of more domestic and important interests, than the wars in the older days with France and Scotland, and the more recent and transitory engagements of Henry VIII. with Francis I., or Charles V., could well denote.

Nor in enumerating the causes, which to us appear to have been most influential, in inducing the military apathy of our land, should we omit to consider the effect most naturally to be produced upon the heart, by the horrors of the Yorkish and Lancastrian wars; well calculated to impress, from the enormities they engendered, an ineffacable terror of, and immutable antipathy towards, a system which, in any alliance it might form with glory, would seem as the Gorgon's temple bound with the laurel wreath.

The spirit of warlike emulation in Great Britain, was, however, but temporarily repressed; it was never wholly

obliterated ; it arose with its great strength, at times with a hectic glare ; but towards the days of Marlborough, the light was more steady ; the end of the last century saw it rise in effulgence, and at Waterloo our military glory had become brilliant in the extreme : The wars of the Napoleon era ended on that field, and Europe began to say : " our mountain is strong, it shall not be removed," come let us eat, drink, and be merry, here is peace laid up for us many a day.

The feeling was far from inexcusable, and, indeed, would have been quite blameless, had not the ardent desire for peace, allied itself to the too sanguine expectation, that peace was never to be broken. Since the period in question, however, a series of comparatively unimportant military operations, have been undertaken, with various success, by all the great powers of Europe. These have confined themselves almost exclusively to colonial concerns, and thus, happily, the great powers have not been brought into immediate contact with each other ; such, capable of a more ample analysis, is the succinct political history of the last quarter of a century.

There are no symptoms at present visible, however, that can justify the expectation, that this state of affairs is to be lasting, and though, in the style of writing under which the following remarks are classed, it is not unusual to indulge in unsound and fanciful speculations, still, we would think, that by an excessive caution, both in appointing our premises, and deducing our conclusions, these observations may receive the unexpected and welcome approbation of our readers.

It has occurred to us, to premise the remarks soon to be made on the military defences and system of England, with a cursory notice of the corresponding position of our neighbours,—the Russians, the French, and the Americans. It is from these three powers that hostilities, if they come at all, may be apprehended, and, it will be found, that if their social peculiarities may warrant an expectation of an aggressive policy on their part, their present military establishments are not inadequate to give it effect.

Since the peace of Paris, the social and military elements of the Russian power have advanced through many stages of improvement and enlightenment ; an army consisting of 27,000 guards, cavalry and infantry, 381,000 infantry of the line, 44,000 artillery, extra corps 27,000, 87,000 cavalry, 51,000 irregular cavalry, an army of reserve of 90,000,—20,000 officers of various ranks, making a grand total of

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730,000 men, and these capable of the most indefinite increase,—a country rendered impervious to invasion, by the terrible efficiency of the Cossacks, the finest light troops in the world, and shielded by the elemental defence of most severe winters, particularize Russia, as the greatest military power of Europe. Nor is her least promising assurance, that this position will be perpetuated, to be found in the soldierly tastes of a people, physically capable of all the hardships of service, and diversities of climate, enthusiastically attached to their sovereign, and venerating a worship, which, in seasons of national emergency, has not been found inadequate to subdue all meaner feelings, in an aroused self-devotion, and lofty patriotism, than which the page of Roman story can adduce no examples more noble or sublime.

It is also pleasingly the privilege of philanthropy, to remark, in the few years which have lately gone by, an increased intelligence, the effects of a furtively, but irrepressibly advancing communication of ideas, amidst the subjects of the Czar.

It was most true, that the sound which aroused France from its feudal stupor, had not reached Russia—the wild propogandist spirit, could find nothing in the ignorance of the Croat or Serf, or, in the Fouche-like efficiency of the Muscovite police, to tempt the perilous temerity of appointing a Jacobin Club in Mittaw, Grodno, or Khchernigov: but affiliations of the Club at Paris, different heads of the Parent Hydra, were not unfrequent in the country of the Poles, a neighbouring and dependant province. AND among them, there were surely some, whom the recent catastrophe of their country might most naturally instigate to the adoption of the new opinions, or who, refusing to receive them in their full and wild excess, might still carry in their own hearts a picture of that freedom, over which the glowing and significant eloquence of Mirabeau had cast so great a charm. And, by them, did these doctrines of the revolution become disseminated amidst the neighbouring Russians.

But a French war, indiscriminately waged against all, friends or foes, nobles or serfs,—aggressions most fierce and unprovoked, followed close upon the declaration of liberty, and called upon all other people, who might otherwise have identified themselves with Jacobin license, to take up arms for the defence of their country, against a foe, wielding his power with resistless energy, and, for a season, with uniform success.

It was not before the cry of Flanders, and the Italian

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Republics, had gone up, that the partiality to the principles of the French Revolution sensibly declined in Russia, and not long afterwards, the projected invasion of their country by Napoleon, and his patronage of the Poles, united all classes firmly, for the maintenance of the national honour, the independence of their country, and the sanctity of their homes; appeals were then made to the generous feelings of the heart,—arguments employed to confirm the prejudices, old associations vividly revived, and with these, superstition united the might of Russia, to defend the country, and repel the invader from the soil.

A hard and great struggle commenced at Eylau, and closed in the waves of the Beresina, and throughout its chivalrous continuance, gave to the world a lesson, not less of hardy and unparalleged endurance, and animated gallantry, than a holy love and lofty enthusiasm for their monarch.

Mens minds have now settled down, after an excitement so imposing as the salvation of their Fatherland could create. The chimeras of an overwrought enthusiasm,—the transports of an extravagant attachment to their Emperor,—all produced by the critical and sublime emergencies of the period, are now in great part modified or subdued.

To this change, education (though still in Russia most limited in its influence) has, no doubt, contributed much;—the practical spirit of the age has had similar effects; but what has most availed, and which, in conjunction with the others, must some day entail a great political catastrophe on the country, is the barbarous feudalism of the crown and the noblesse.

It is not the object of our remarks at present, to detail minutely the horrors and miseries of this social condition; it is sufficient for us to know, that all that belonged to Norman oppression of the vile and the insolent, is united with the fierce and sullen elements of the Slavonic barbarism, to form a code, at once unnatural, degrading, heinous to God, and intolerable to man. It is sufficient for us to know, that in the army alone, enormities in punishment are constantly perpetrated, to narrate which makes the blood run cold,—for a trivial crime, as related in Colonel P. Cameron's work on Russia, a soldier may have committed, his regiment is drawn up in line,—the front-rank marches three yards to the front, halts, and faces about, by that means facing the rear-rank. Every man of the regiment is then provided with a stick four feet in length, and of the thickness of the middle finger. The unhappy culprit, stripped to the waist, and preceded by

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three comrades, with bayonets fixed to their muskets, and pointed at his breast, to guard against his walking too fast, marches between the lines,—every soldier is obliged to strike him with all his strength; woe to him who does not, for, in the twinkling of an eye, he would be stripped, and have to endure a similar punishment. Exhausted nature cannot usually withstand more than a quarter of the punishment, but, such is the Shylock pertinacity of the Draconic discipline, that the senseless, and often lifeless body, like a mass of raw meat from the shambles, is huddled into a barrow, and taken down the remainder of the lines to receive the remaining strokes. This is called running the gauntlet; but we might instance other varieties of inhumanity. From the days of Ivan the terrible, till now, it would seem as if the Three Sisters had abandoned the service of the infernals, for a more profitable pandemonium in Russia, and in the ranks of an oppressed and unhappy soldiery, to have realized more than the sad fictions of Acheron.

“ Pallentesque, habitant morbi, tristisque, senectus,
Et metus, et malesuada fames, et Turpis egestas,
Terribiles visu formæ : lethumque, laborque :
TUNC CONSANGUINEUS LETHI SOPOR.”

ÆNEID, l. vi. l. 275

The present Czar enjoys the meritorious celebrity of endeavouring to alleviate, inasmuch as he can, the unhappiness of the great portion of his people; various tales, not less true than numerous, could be mentioned, which would prove the Emperor Nicholas to be a man of liberal mind, and imbued with a generous anxiety concerning the poor and the wretched of his people; but the system of government, inherent to Russia, circumscribes philanthropy within a very limited space, and, unfortunately, the more frequent spectacle is presented of a vast ignorance, checquered with the horrors of a fiendish cruelty. Russian despotism has emboldened itself to scorn the aspirations of freedom, and to include in its practical code all the different extremes of cruelty, which monsters in the ancient or modern worlds have been prone to perpetrate.

Not exceeded by Alexander Phœæ, or Dionysius the Younger in stern inhumanity—not by Nero in its wantonness—not by Attila in its wide devastation—not by John Lackland in its treachery—the Czars of Russia bear the uniform and painful reputation of retarding the mental improvement, and perpetuating the degradation of their subjects.

Indeed, the objects of their imperial mission is well accomplished, if, at the end of their reign, they leave their people less enlightened than at its commencement, as if the object of their being were, that the sun should rise, and the sun should set, on universal ignorance and darkness.

But the propinquity of neighbouring provinces, whose inhabitants live not under the same inhuman bondage, and who are not characterized by the same brutal ignorance, has tended to obtrude, in the natural course of time and things, on the minds of their Russian neighbours, the knowledge of their position;—slowly, but with an awful seriousness, are they now learning, that their exclusive use, as designed by their great Creator, is not to agonize on the knout;—to bend in such ruinous subserviency to the lord Verisofts of all the Russias,—to sacrifice to their aristocratic superiors, the hopes of life itself,—to give up their brides to the spoiler, or cause their children, as did the Amonites of old, to walk through the fire to the Moloch baron.

Travellers speak of a movement agitating the mass of the Russian people—many Russian regiments having suffered to the utmost, have lately broken out in mutiny, but the iron hand of power was soon upon them. The appearance of the army is that of worn-out men—of stature and muscular power inferior to the English; clothed well for parade, but when on fatigue, and unemployed on military duties, most wretchedly; of moral influence, there is nothing in this army, but a blind adherence to discipline, and a courage stimulated to the wildest daring, by the awful retribution which, on their return to Russia, attends the least reverse before the enemy. The artillery are most efficient, well mounted, and well equipped, and the cavalry superb. Field days constantly take place, and afford most beneficial exercise for the men; the principles of war are there elucidated, and practically developed in sham-fights, where every one learns something, and many give proof of, and improve great military talents.

A wide field lies open for the Russian soldiery in America, and it is not impossible, that her policy may incline her to favour that nation, which, in the dispute of Oregon, occupies a position so disgraceful to a civilized age—her territories lying on the north of this battle-field of Britain and the United States may tempt the Russian government to interfere in what may be almost reckoned the inevitable struggle; but at her peril, it will be, if she so act. On her first step, the words of her destruction would be written on

the wall. America was the soil, whence, at least, one nation of Europe has already imported the elements of a fatal licence, and another Lafayette may be found to advocate the principles of constitutional and Muscovite reform.

Looking then at Russia, such as she has been here represented, it may not be unreasonable to labour under apprehensions for the future, nor may these be diminished, if her proverbially aggressive policy—her great and splendid army—her daily increasing navy, (which the improvements of steam would enable, like the flotillas of the Vikingi to fall in three or four days on the most defenceless part of our coast,)—if all these circumstances be duly considered, Is there, we anxiously inquire, in the number and efficiency of our army, the materials for the repression of such an enemy? To this question it will be the task of the concluding portions of these remarks to respond.

Since the Peace of Paris, the military power of France has increased so much, as almost to equal its excellence in the days of Napoleon.

Her system of interior and domestic military service, illustrated in that of the National Guard, in conjunction with the military enthusiasm of the people, enables her to extend the knowledge of military science to every member of her vast community. The frequent junction of immense masses of troops on the frontier, and in the fortified towns, gives frequent opportunity for the practice of manœuvres, and extended tactique, an indispensable preliminary to the attainment of proficiency in the art of war—the schools send forth a multitude of officers skilled in every branch of military science, and otherwise of extensive information. The artillery is rendered most effective, by the inventions of Paixhan, and among all ranks of the army, the art of war illustrated by the enthusiastic reminiscencies of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, is fondly cherished and comprehensively studied.

The greatest emulation has also been lately evinced to increase and improve the navy. The beneficial adaptation of steam to this service, early became apparent to the French in the days of Napoleon, and previous to his contemplated descent on the English coast. An adventurer applied to the Emperor for a personal interview, at which he would communicate something that would perfect the French marine—it was granted, and to Napoleon was then disclosed the idea of steam in naval purposes. The Emperor thinking too much of the English fleet, and the channel fogs,

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dryly referred the mechanic to the Minister de la Marine, who was to be the president of a committee to investigate the matter. The committee were not satisfied of the feasibility of the scheme; the Emperor was called away; the immense bodies of troops who had been revelling in the anticipation of London booty, and pretty English maidens, were all at once called off to Austria, to die at Erfurth and Aurstadt, and the capabilities of steam were forgotten or unheeded for the time. As soon as peace became general, the same subject attracted a second time the more serious attention of a restless and vindictive nation, and the steam navy of France is now equal to, if not more numerous than that of England. There is much, however, in this gradual increase of the naval power of France to tempt a few remarks:—during the last fifteen years, the French government has spared neither trouble nor expense, to increase and perfect her marine; this naval restlessness has proceeded during a period of profound peace, and bears no connexion with the mercantile interests of the kingdom, nor does the state of her Colonial affairs offer a solution of the cause.

The publications of the Prince de Joinville, teeming with transports on the riches of our sea-port towns, may have given a premature intimation of the ulterior policy of his country; and whatever His Royal Highness may design the naval service to effect, in the near and probable contingencies of the succession, still it will be unanimously conceded, that the motive of the present establishment, must anticipate an ultimate aggressive policy on the part of France.

It is generally supposed in our country, that on the death of Louis Phillipe, the discordant elements of the French constitution are to fly assunder—spurning all control, and that in the midst of the confusion, different claimants will appear for the throne, somewhat in the manner of Darius, Hystaspis, and the Persian Noblemen. That the Prince de Joinville is to be the successful competitor, no one for a moment doubts; the difficulty of setting aside the Duc d'Orleans' son, is got over somewhat summarily, but unsatisfactorily too—he is to die *natura rerum*, or abdicate, or do something, but the Prince de Joinville is somehow to be King of the French. Now, we deny the correctness of those assumptions.

It is our opinion, that these general apprehensions among the English, of the probability of the Prince de Joinville's succession to the throne of France, are built on no sound foundation—that they proceed upon the assumption of a

spirit among the French people, which their past history has ever, but on one occasion, belied.

At no time, so much as during that of a minority, has the French loyalty been steadfast and energetic:—the natural chivalry and kindness of their disposition, is nobly excited by the contemplation of helplessness, particularly when that helplessness is contrasted with the dexterity of intrigue, and the heartlessness of self-interest, which would aspire to its destruction; it was so in the minority of their Charles VII.; it was so in the minority of Louis XIV.; the wild and fiendish spirit of their republicanism, disgraced their conduct during the few days of the pilgrimage of Louis XVII. But we will hope that that awful period being now passed, France has reverted to the principles of order, and of justice, and humanity.

But whatever measures the death of the present ruler of the French might eventuate, it is impossible to escape the conviction, that the great and rapid increase of her naval power, contemplates the probability of, or has progressed in subordination to, settled and preconcerted measures for future aggression. For what object, or on what strand it is intended to empty her multitude of troops, it is not for us to determine, though the attentive care bestowed of late upon the navy, may be held alarmingly significant; Railroads all diverging from Paris, as a centre, and branching to every important point in the circumference of her extensive coast, are being now projected, and will be soon completed; communications of the same description between the frontier and important cities, will increase and perfect the rapid military movements of the country—in a week an army will have left Paris, have embarked at Dieppe or Boulogne, and unless opposed, will have landed at Hastings or Brightelmstone. A great power, that of Steam, has suddenly arisen among us, and the critical influences which it is calculated to effect upon the system of war, indirectly, if not directly, do not seem to be yet generally appreciated; but a calm unexaggerated detail of these influences may, however, aid to disabuse our national indifference. A few observations on our national defences, by Lord Ranelagh, have proclaimed the alarming inadequacy of our military establishment, to compete with the probable contingencies of future war. We will extract his Lordship's own remarks, than which both from their calm and healthy style, and the air of sincere and urgent truth which animates them, none could be more appropriate; and, if we consider his Lordship's service in the

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army, has superadded to the attractions of his pen, the practical experience which well justifies a dissertation on military subjects, we may rejoice that the inclination, and the honour have been to his Lordship to be the first to bring this subject prominently to the notice of his countrymen:—

“It is impossible,” says Lord Renelagh, stating his apprehensions of the future policy of France, and contemplating the power of that country, “it is impossible to overrate the importance to France, of the application of steam power, to the operations of naval warfare. It is thus stated by the Prince de Joinville, “A fact of immense importance, which has been for some years realized, has given us the means to raise up our decayed naval power—to cause it to re-appear in another form, admirably adapted to our resources and national genius. This fact is none other than the establishment and progress of navigation by Steam.”

“With a Steam Navy,” continued the Prince, “an aggressive warfare of the most audacious nature may be carried on at sea. We are thus certain of our movements—at liberty in our actions—the winds, the tides, will no longer interfere with us, and we can calculate clearly, and with precision, and again, in the event of war, the most unexpected expeditions are possible. Who can doubt, that with a well organized steam navy, we should possess the means of inflicting losses and unknown sufferings on an enemy’s coast, which has never hitherto felt all the miseries that war can inflict; with her sufferings, would arise the evil, till then unknown to her, of confidence destroyed—the riches accumulated on her coasts and in her harbours, would cease to be in security—the struggle would then be no longer unequal; our harbours might shelter a considerable force, which, putting to sea in the obscurity of night, might attempt most numerous and well-organized crusades.” There is throughout these words, an air of so much abstract truth and reason, that it is impossible to deny the general justice of the conclusions.

The subject may well induce anxious reflections on our part, we allude to the probable destinies of France, the unsettled spirit of her people, the instigations and suggestions of the Prince de Joinville, above all, her great military power, the means of a rapid concentration, or distant assembly of her troops, the facility afforded by steam for the embarkation of them, to carry on offensive operations on the English mainland. The army of France consists of 210,000 infantry, 49,000 cavalry, 50,000 artillery, engineers,

his pen, the practical pontonniers, &c. gend'armes 28,500, making a total of 337,500. The navy consists of 40 ships of the line, 50 frigates, 40 steamers, and 190 smaller vessels.

The political aspect of the country, the position of the ministry, the age of the king, are likewise elements for consideration.

The means in our power of efficient defence against attacks from an enemy, will, as before stated, form the subject of the concluding remarks; meanwhile we will take a cursory view of America. There we see a country, differing in its military character from the land of Bunkers-Hill, and Braddocks defeat—civilization has been there, the woods have disappeared, great plains over which the eye can roam for miles have opened out, the occupation of the sharpshooter is gone, and the Yankies will, in future, have to fight like other nations in "*acie instructa*." An army, insignificant in numbers, and scattered in small sub-divisions, over an immense frontier, includes, nevertheless, an artillery by no means inconsiderable in skill, bravery, and esprit de corps. The infantry of the American army amounts to 8000 men, the cavalry to 1500, and the artillery to 3000, the militia if embodied, would amount to 1,100,000. The naval service necessary for the defence of an immense line of coast, is very defective. A return for the year 1845, gives to the United States, a navy of 67 ships; of these 11 are line of battle ships, 17 frigates, 34 sloops, brigs or schooners, and five steam vessels—among the line of battle ships, three were built in June 1845, four not then built, viz. Alabama, Vermont, Virginia and New York—and of the frigates there was a like proportion in dock, at that time.

By the annexation of Texas, the line of frontier, and consequently, of defence, would be considerably increased, but we have heard of no additions to the diminutive army of the present establishment. The arts of peace, and dollar realizing, are, we believe, more congenial to the tastes of Jonathan, than the rude arts of Mars, and a series of splendid cities, facing the Atlantic, give evidence of successful commerce and industry; but the position of these cities on the coast, their exposure to the ruinous bombardment of a superior navy, above all, the ludicrous inefficiency of the American establishment to repel, or, indeed, to sustain the attacks of an active enemy, would induce us to ridicule the warlike tone at present in vogue with our transatlantic friends, if the will of a besotted and ignorant democracy, was not notoriously the influence most tangibly exerted in American

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policy, if it was not known that the mobs of the interior, and Western Provinces of the States, well appreciating the security given to their position and interests, by their great distance from the natural field of operations, and knowing that others would alone experience the devastating hardships of a war, of which they might remain the uninjured spectators, as well as the fiendish instigators—if it was not known, that men like these, pertinaciously and inhumanly, day after day, insist upon the declaration of hostilities, to which their more civilized brethren entertain the greatest repugnance, and not only on these accounts, but also because, it is painfully notorious, that against influence so wanton and diabolical, the arm of the law is insufficient to guard the State.

In anticipation of hostile relations with the United States, which our differences at this season with that country, quite justify our entertaining, and having likewise good cause to apprehend that Russia and France would not remain neutral, or uninterested in such an event, the former in its dangerous proximity to our native land, and our Indian frontier, the latter to our very hearths and altars; how much is therefore excited within us the serious consideration of our means of self-defence, against so many and so complicated dangers.

The Aide Memoire, to the military sciences, forms the commencement of a military Encyclopedia of as succinct, and compendious a character, as the nature of the subject will permit. The performance of this work, so much and so long desiderated in the British Army, has been superintended by a committee of officers of the Royal Engineers, viz. Lieutenant Colonel G. G. Reid, Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Jones, and Captain R. J. Nelson.

The different articles which have appeared in this, the 1st number of the work, (embracing the alphabetical notation of A. B. and C.) commence with Abattis, and close with Contours.

The succeeding number, it is supposed, will appear in February 1846, and the whole will be continued regularly.

Lieutenant Colonel C. W. Smith, R. E., Lieutenant Colonel Reid, R. E., Captain Larcum, R. E., Colonel Lewis, R. E., Major General, Sir J. F. Bourgoyne, R. E., and Major Jibb, R. E., have severally contributed to the work now before us. The style, it is to be remarked, and regretted, is somewhat terse, and in parts difficult to be understood by an army, whose general military education, has

of the interior, appreciating the efforts, by their great numbers, and knowing the devastating hardness of the uninjured —if it was not and inhumanly, of hostilities, to win the greatest but also because, hence so wanton sufficient to guard

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been so limited, as not even to possess the knowledge of the elementary terms and phrases of the art; still, notwithstanding this, and several other defects, (among which we would instance the fact, of no contributions appearing from the officers of the Royal Artillery,) and in particular, in the omission of much information, which a standard military work, (as we hope the said memoir will become,) ought to contain, notwithstanding all this, it is with pleasure, that we welcome the publication of what our literature has so long wanted, namely, a work on the science and art of war.

We said we regretted the omission of several subjects; the words Bastion, Battalion, Brigade, Branches, (of mines) and Chemistry, (military) are, for instance, not included in the present number; and we doubt not other omissions might be detailed. We regret this insufficiency, for though, no doubt, the work is well calculated in itself, to afford a very enlarged knowledge of the military art, yet, still we would have preferred to see a book, to which, upon referring alphabetically, we might either gain the information we desired, or be directed where to seek it.

The French, and other continental military treatises, have constituted the almost exclusive references of this work, for, with the exception of Sir John Jones' sieges, and Sir J. F. Bourgoyne's observations, and the elementary works on fortification, in use at Woolwich, Sandhurst, and Addiscombe, the English can boast, at most, a very imperfect military library.

In the present days of comparative enlightenment, not one officer out of ten, we are assured, would discriminatingly define strategies, strategy, tactics and logistics. Even the common expressions of masking the fire, and turning the flanks of an enemy, are not generally or accurately understood—whence this ominous ignorance in our army of its own art? Whence this palpable and painful inferiority in military and scientific knowledge to the armies of the continent? Surely it is not to be accounted for, in conceding to the French, and German, and Russian mind, a greater aptness in learning, or excelling in the art of war? History could ill reconcile itself to such an assumption. Neither is the cause to be detected in the lack of military literature, nor in the want of military taste, and partialities in the nation, for the French language, a knowledge of which is indispensably necessary now-a-days to complete the education of an officer and a gentleman, teems with bright treatises on the glorious art; and as to the other supposition, it may be remarked,

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that however lethargic the nation may be on military matters, the officers of its army, stand distinguished by an honourable emulation, and esprit de corps. The true cause is to be sought for conjointly, in our military system, and our military education.

Commissions in the guards, cavalry, and infantry, are mostly given to the sons of gentlemen who have interest to procure, and money to purchase them; the immediate payment of the regulation sums, the providing the young man with the uniform of his regiment, and sending him to join the same, on or about a certain day, are the preliminary duties which the "fathers of England" are called upon to perform. The providing his son with a certain allowance, to enable him to support his situation as a gentleman, which his pay alone would not, is another indispensable duty; but the necessity of previous travel on the continent, of the study of fortification, and of the art of war, is never insisted upon, and is entirely overlooked.

The young officer, upon joining his regiment, is sent first of all to learn his drill. This, a sergeant of the regiment superintends; many there are who acquire great proficiency in this, and whose taste is such, as to appreciate the great beauties of the battalion movements, but when this is past, the common routine of garrison duty commences—they are instructed in all the mysteries of court martial, and barrack parades, mess subscriptions, and band subscriptions, but of war, as a science, of the philosophical consideration of a subject, which more than any other borrows from nature and circumstances, which calls for grandeur of design, comprehensiveness of movement, and combination, the equal spirit, the quick eye,—of such a science, the officers of the British army are sadly ignorant. Some youths, indeed there are, who, having been educated at Sandhurst College, and thence being drafted into the line, carry with them the elementary knowledge of fortification; but we believe, that rare indeed are the instances of that information being kept up in after years. The knowledge for a long time neglected, may be revived, by a recurrence to the Straith M'Cauley, and Harness of former days—but such will reap not much advantage who defer a meditative study of this science, to the riper years of life; it must, to be philosophically appreciated, and beneficially useful, be commenced in youth, and form the subject of frequent contemplation through life; it must be illustrated by military manœuvres and employments, other far than so frequently scrutinizing their mens kitts, and

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spending hours in tugging and pulling at pouches and breast-plates; it must be studied with the spade and pick-axe in hand, on the ridges of mountains, and by the sides of rivers;—but, even if inclination was to the Sandhurst youth to pursue the studies, a knowledge of which ensured his commission, still in his case, and indeed in that of the cadets of all our English military colleges, there has been much in their academical education, which in scientific avocations, would place them to great disadvantage.

We refer to the nefarious and scandalous system of cramming youth's, as it is called, for admission to their respective colleges, forcing into their minds the most superficial, fragmentary, and spurious knowledge—all this necessitated by the varied and unreasonable amount of attainments required by the regulations, to be possessed by youths of fifteen years of age—the knowledge of Greek, Latin, German, French, Hindostance—of mathematics, embracing the first three books of Euclid,—Algebra, as far as, and beyond Quadratic equations, the exponential Theorem, history of all times and all people—the ability to make a good sketch at any given time, and on any given subject; all these form the very usual acquirements of the youths of the above age.

But among them, there are many indeed, who include in their bill of fare, the knowledge of Astronomy, Conic Sections, Geology, Mineralogy, Chemistry, and even the differential and integral Calculus itself, whose precocious minds have been tortured and confused by a superficial, yet ostentatious acquaintance with subjects, enough, any one of them, to attract and deserve the isolated study of a mature and persevering genius.

The ruin and prostration of youthful intellect that this system induces, are not to be calculated. The foundation of all information, mathematical, historical, and scientific, has always to be laid anew.

Limited and unfrequent, therefore, are the opportunities of learning fortification, and of studying war as a science.

Nor after an imperfect education is completed, and the army becomes the home of the former Cadet, does the routine of regimental duties at the depot with the line, or that of the battalions and batteries with the artillery at Woolwich, tend much to enlarge his military ideas, or to encourage his military ardour.

To go round the rooms at breakfast and dinner, to hear the rolls called at tattoo, and to attend the morning and evening parades,—to sit occasionally as a member of a court-

martial,—comprise the duties of English subalterns of infantry, and to those the cavalry, and sometimes the artillery; add the daily inspection of the horses, while being groomed and fed.

Is there aught in any of these duties, at all calculated to fit the young Tyro for the field of battle,—to familiarize him to vast stratagical principles,—to impress upon him the knowledge or appreciation of position, natural defence, or efficacious tactique?

Indeed, to any other people but the English, with whom our present military system bears nothing very objectionable in its face, a day's regimental duty of an infantry regiment at one of our garrisons, would appear the most ludicrous pantomime in the range of mummery; and the pantomime is acted day after day, and year after year, similarly. At ten o'clock say, in the morning, a bugler stepping to the front of a parade, blows a blast with his trumpet, continued so long and so piercingly, that there is scarcely a man who hears him, but would not above all things desire to annihilate him, so that such a wailing and awful sound might never again be heard. This call, sets in delirious motion, a battalion of 600 to 700 men, who staggering about with knapsacks on their backs, and guns in their hands, take up at last a regular position, that of open column, say right in front. The voice of generally, a very fat subordinate, called the Serjeant-Major, then shouts out, "stand at ease," an injunction that in consideration of the weight of each man's knapsack, being 20 lb. 8 oz. of his musket and bayonet, 11 lb. of his accoutrements, 4 lb., and of his chaco, 5 lb. more, it may be readily supposed, is more easily given than acted upon. However, a simultaneous movement of the legs, as if a galvanic shock had been communicated to the whole force, is accompanied with a clapping of the hands, as if the men were in extasies of joy to create this military fiction. A soldier standing at ease, has always reminded us of the madmen in the United States' wards, whose arms, whenever the fit becomes violent, and the gestures frantic, are forcibly folded together to form the attitude of calm and lofty meditation. The word, however, being given, forthwith serjeants march to the front of their respective companies, and call the roll over to see that every man is present.

The sound which has filled the parade with so many live souls, has been such as also to draw from their retreat the officers of the barracks, who, on arriving at their companies, and learning from the serjeants, that their men are present,

subalterns of infantry, or otherwise, forthwith commence telling them off,—wheeling them to the right, to the left, to the rear, and, in fact, in every direction, until the poor men scarcely know, whether they are standing on their heads or feet.

A minute inspection of dress then takes place in every company by its captain, or commanding officer. The breast-plate is the subject of most anxious attention. It seems, that its diagonal should be in the line of the buttons of the coatee, the highest angle commencing with the third button from the top. To obtain for the breast-plate this place, is the meritorious ambition of the British soldier; but as in the different evolutions of the drill, or indeed, in the common motion of the body, a change is constantly given to the relative position of the coatee and belt, the most laudable and persevering endeavours are rarely attended with success. The pouches are opened, and carefully inspected to see that no pipes nor tobacco have defiled them by their entrance.

The knapsack or pack, and the rolled coat on the top are next inspected; all these different accoutrements have their exact place on the soldier, but the exactness is so great, the lines of distinction so numerous and well defined, that considerable time is occupied by the captain in arranging all anew. During all this time, we are puzzled to know whether or not, in some mysterious way or another, the government of the army is exercised by some London tailor and cap-maker; and we begin almost to fancy, that the object of military service, is only to be a good blackener of boots,—a good darning of stockings,—and a good hand at “rubbing in” pipe-clay.

Last of all, the bugle rouses from “his warrior’s couch,” the chief himself,—he mounts, rides forward to his regiment, and then commences the only scientific education ever vouchsafed to the British soldier, a series of manœuvres, forming column from line, and line from column, and squares from both, changing position, and sometimes charging and cheering, when they do charge; all which movements are scrupulously detailed in “the book,” form the monotonous and only drill the men receive. These exercises, moreover, generally, if not invariably, take place in a confined space, called a barrack-yard, well levelled, for the purpose of insuring a greater exactness of step, and a more rigid beauty of line, than would be the case, were the regiment exercised on natural ground. Objects which the eye sees every day direct and perfect the march.

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Ground every inch of which is known, is the scene of this artificial education. But rarely do the soldiers enjoy the privilege, or reap the great advantage of practice on an extended field; never are the superiorities of natural position pointed out to them; never are they instructed in the erection of temporary field works, from the occupation of which in seasons of reverse, they might be enabled to retreat, and be comparatively secure from the attacks of an enemy; never are they in the least made acquainted with the duties of the ordnance, whether as regards the service of field, or that of heavy artillery; rarely do they act together in great bodies; rarely with cavalry, and more rarely with artillery.

The very natural consequence of all this is, that though the British soldier presents, from the excellence of his clothing and his stature, and professional customs, a most respectable appearance on a review day, yet he is not to be considered as knowing anything of war as a science, of being at all capable of appreciating the excellencies of a scientific leader, or that great art which lives in the rainy Bivouac, the fording the flooded river,—climbing the rugged hill, or forcing the dangerous pass.

The unskilfulness of our armies in all strategical details, is illustrated in the late affairs in Scinde, and Affghanistan. First of all, the armies ordered to march into these countries, were encumbered by a proportion of Sutlers and camp followers of the most extravagant numerical amount. It is absurd to argue, that an Indian army must be attended by such a locust swarm of thieves and vagabonds; officers of the service have themselves raised their voice against the nuisance; but still, not an army marches forth to conquer, but is accompanied by a proportion of four camp followers, and one camel, for every fighting man. In the next place, instead of making the base of operations the north-western frontier of India, and the scene of the lines of operation, the country of Runget Singh,—(the most direct and natural mode of approaching the hostile territory,) off go the gallant British, a long circuit to Kurachee in the Baloochee coast, and carry their lines up the right bank of the Indus, between which, and the Tatta hills, these lines were most perilously enclosed; then through a disaffected land to isolated forts, Candahar, Cabool, and Jellalabad, &c., their communication all the while, subject to imminent and constant annihilation,—their garrisons left without men, to make any effective demonstration beyond their own cantonments. The late affairs in New Zealand exemplify a simi-

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lar neglect of true military principles,—Powder, it is currently reported, was given cut to the men in barrels, which no two men could carry; and also on the attack upon the Pah, the English did not in the least prepare themselves for the removal or destruction of stockades or abattis, with which they well knew it was strongly defended.

Such are some of the glaring improprieties, in a military sense, which characterize our recent occupation of Afghanistan, Scinde, and New Zealand; and yet, it will be urged, that with all these technical blunders, the British were no less successful in those countries, than in France, at Cressy, and Poitiers, or in Spain, at Tores Vedras, and Salamanca.

But it were sad, should a pleasing national confidence in our past successes, and in the bravery of our soldiery, obscure the fact, that, along with the courage of our men, the inequality in numbers of the French, and the disaffection which prevailed among the men at arms, (soon after bursting forcibly out in the times of the Jaquerie,) in the one case, and as regards the Peninsula in the other, the wasting away by famine of the French armies, and before the enemy from constant Guerilla attacks, must form elements of our consideration.

It were also well to think, betimes, of Bedford, and Joan of Arc, of the precipitate evacuation of France in those days, of Walcheren, and Corunna, and this not for the purpose of depreciating a brave and noble army, but to stimulate the advancement of military science and information.

Now, it is well known, that the service of the colonies and India, employ the greater proportion of the British army in distant countries, and leaves but a handful for Great Britain and Ireland. The returns of the year 1845, give

To ENGLAND,	5 Troops Horse-Artillery, and 23 Companies Royal Artillery.
...	13 Regiments Cavalry, with 6 small Maidstone Depots.
...	21 Regiments Infantry, with 31 small Chatham Depots, and 18 four Company Depots.
To IRELAND,	2 Troops Royal Horse-Artillery, and 8 Companies Royal Artillery.
...	6 Regiments Cavalry, and 15 Regiments Infantry, together with 21 four Company Depots.
To SCOTLAND,	2 Companies Royal Artillery, 1 Regiment Cavalry, with
...	2 Regiments Infantry, and 2 four Company Depots.

The detail of their stations, viz.:—Exeter, Nottingham, Manchester, Weedon, Hull, Leeds, Windsor, Woolwich, York, Edinburgh, Fort-George, Aberdeen, Glasgow, Dub-

lin, Dundalk, Limerick, Longford, &c., discloses the fact, that over a great extent of country, and in isolated and mutually distant points, an army of no greater amount in England, is scattered, than 20,000 men; in Ireland, than 19,000 men; and in Scotland, than 2500 men; the present system entails many sub-divisions of the main bodies, both at home and abroad, who being sent on detachment to various out-posts, leave at head quarters, numbers quite insufficient for the purposes of the common drill parade, nor even were these numbers quite adequate, does the routine of military duty practised throughout the British Empire, afford much time or opportunity, for the purposes of military instruction. The soldier is but a policeman with a red coat, instead of a blue one,—a musket and bayonet, instead of a baton,—his most frequent duty, and the one which wearies his body, and ruins in time, his constitution, is walking the sentry's rounds, perched aloft on hulks at dock-yards and arsenals, where he may be seen discharging all the functions, and none but the functions of a magister'al subordinate; his relief calls him to his barrack room, there to furbish his arms, and cleanse his equipments anew, with the prospect of an inspection of kit before him for the afternoon; and when he has finished that, he is most likely sent as one of a fatigue party. A day or two of this work, with perhaps one out of the seven for drill, and then he resumes the duties, and the wakeful toil of the sentry.

Meanwhile, the young officers, (all of them gallant fellows,) are enjoying themselves as much as their habits and great amount of leisure permit. No one is further from their thoughts, it is true, than Gumpertz or Vauban; but that is not their fault, the system dispenses with the knowledge, which so many would feel proud to acquire, and for the same reason those who possess that knowledge, do not persevere in keeping it up.

Instead of learning how to post piquets, they are busy in arranging breast-plates, and in wandering amidst the perplexing precisions of the "New Conduct Warrant;" and instead of learning how, and where, to construct batteries, where to post infantry to most advantage, where cavalry, how to make, carry, or arrange pontoons, they may be found playing at back-gammon or loo, or in writing poetical fancies in a lady's album.

An army so constituted as this, its officers knowing little of continental literature, which affords all the military information that is valuable, its privates confessedly ignorant ge-

nerally speaking, (though we rejoice to know that their moral education is being now more than formerly attended to,) cannot be expected, even were its numbers adequate to contend successfully, with the science and numerical efficiency of the continental soldiery.

But an impression of most erroneous and injurious application exists, that the insular-position of Great Britain, exempts her from maintaining *an army for the defence of her native territory*, that entrusting this solely *to the navy*, her only object in at all supporting a military establishment, is the conservation of her colonies, and the maintenance of the social equilibrium at home; and, indeed, since the days of William the Conqueror, (if we except some predatory border incursions, and the inroads of David of Scotland,) the people of England have not experienced the evils and horrors of invasion; to this, no doubt, the martial institutions of feudal England, and principally the inferiority of the European navy mainly contributed; but now, no such advantages can be urged. Steam has brought us more, as it were, into the bosom of Europe. The ramifications and dependencies of trade, have confirmed the amalgamation. Russia and France, compete with us for the dominion of the element, with navies, each of which is not to be despised by the whole assembled British fleet. Immense armies lie at the disposal of these governments, thirsting in the one case to retrieve a lost military position, in the other, for glory and conquest.

In the reign of a former Queen of this island, the organizer of as strong a government as was ever recognized in the country, a Spanish fleet was dispersed by the elements, and ship-wrecked on the eve of consummating its hostile purpose, "*Deus efflavit et dissipantur*," were the words at once of humble gratitude to heaven, and of conscious inability without Divine assistance, to have averted or resisted the gigantic attack; and yet, it may be safely affirmed, that the means of defence against Philip's Armada, were far more adequate than ours at present would be, against a similar demonstration.

Let us review the question. The Navy of France, as before stated, amounting at present to 40 ships of the line, 50 frigates, and 40 steamers, increasing at its average rate within the last ten years, will soon far exceed the number of the British establishment; it may therefore not reasonably be supposed, that in a steam navy, the French will soon be most efficient, so much so, as to afford easy means for the transport of 150, to 200,000 troops, in several dif-

ferent detachments of 30 or 40,000: five or six such divisions starting from the French coast simultaneously, secretly, and expeditiously, might wend their way with various success to the British coast.

It would be presumptuous in us to fancy, that the fate of the Spanish Armada, would be found typical of that of these different divisions. A closer attention to the subject might convince us, that the present state of our defensive means, would be not effectually opposed to even one of these divisions, and therefore, the probability is strong, and almost certain, that one, if not two of them would effect a landing after three days sailing from France on the English coast. In such an emergency, what means of defence would yet remain to Great Britain? Her navy would be at the mercy of the waves, unable to penetrate into Portsmouth, or sail up the Thames, while the steam ships of France rode in security in the English harbours.

Her army consisting of a few regiments, would, from their position and numerical insignificance, be incapable of a rapid centralization, or of an effective resistance,—no zero winds and biting snow as at Moscow,—no impregnable sierras as in Spain, would retard or ruin the army of the invaders. The second Battle of Hastings would not be so obstinately contested as the first,—fine open fields would invite the deployment and the combined charges of cavalry,—M'Adamized roads would transport the caissons and the material of artillery, and the disciples of Dr Price might, like Stigand, welcome a second conqueror to the English capital.

The anticipated gallant^d defence of their country, by the Hampshire farmers, behind hedge-rows, would be rendered nugatory by an enfilade or ricochet fire, and the fine old manly exercise of quarter-staff and boxing would be found quite unavailing before a well-directed platoon discharge. The stacks belonging to farms, by being fired around the houses, would cause a hasty evacuation of the premises, if the memory of La Haye Sainte, or the barricades of Paris, should have induced an imitation of the loop-holed defence. Woolwich, its arsenal, all its piles of shot, all its skids of guns, and mortars, and howitzers, and its magazines of powder, would be captured by the advanced guard of the French march. No single bastion, no rampart defends the immense area of that great arsenal,—the calls for the artillery elsewhere, would not leave three companies of that regiment for its defence,—London would fall, England would be para-

lyzed, trade would stagnate, the people, unaccustomed to see, or even vividly to contemplate the calamities of hostile occupation, would be stupified, and sink almost beneath the awful visitation: true, they might possibly arouse themselves, and succeed in repelling the invader; the genius of the European mind is opposed to all mutual and hostile occupations of territory, at least to their durability or confirmation. The Spaniards could not retain the Netherlands, nor could Louis XIV., backed even with Condé and Turenne—the English could not hold Scotland against Wallace, they could not hold France against Charles VII., and the French could not hold Spain against Blake and Wellington, and we do not think that they could long hold England against the brave spirit of the English people. But in the short time of England's abasement beneath a foreign foe, her glory would depart from her, Oromandez would say farewell, and Arimanes would take her to himself, her colonial empire, like the empire of the Netherlands, would pass away to another people, the moral feeling which attracted her dependencies to a venerating alliance with her, would be lost, as Mexico was to Spain. But we will hope that this fate may never fall to the lot of our own country, we will hope, that the necessity for a different system of military establishment, has now enforced itself on the consideration of our rulers.

We were right glad to notice the late circular issued to the Lords Lieutenant of counties in reference to the militia. It is our opinion, that the militia must henceforth act *the most important part in the system* of our national defence. Our island being now, by the discovery and application of steam, incorporated, as it were, with the European community, our national military system must henceforth partake of the character of that of a country, into which a hostile invasion may take place;—the Landwehr in Germany, the National Guard in France, and the soldier-like habits and prepossessions of the Russians, form, in their respective countries, the means of an adequate and interested defence, or the nucleus from which the regular or colonial army may be at all times recruited. But then the existence of this constitutional force, this semi-civil semi-military array, depends in a manner upon the neglect of, or indifference to, those principles of personal freedom, which constitute the birth-right and privilege of Englishmen. It depends, in short, upon nothing more or less than compulsory, though limited enlistment.

It is, indeed, true, that the ballot system adopted in the organization of the militia of our country, is somewhat arbitrary in its influence, but it does so happen, that any principles upon which is based the future enrolment of the militia, must recognize their continual service,—their being ever in the field,—and must, therefore, be more arbitrary, and less palatable, to the men of Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, and the Habeas Corpus. And yet it must not be believed, that, without the feelings of the English, partaking more of a military character than heretofore, the independence of England can be long preserved; the day has now come, when every man must be a soldier, not in name only, but in deed. What measures will be adopted to perfect the militia, or to put them on a more effective footing, we, of course, know not, but we do hope, that it will be such as to disseminate, through three-fourths of the people, high or low, rich or poor, the knowledge and the temporary practise of the military art—a service of five years to each man would contribute to this end, and would constitute a period of time, in which he might gain a good and a sound acquaintance with military principles. We take our leave of this subject; we leave the composition, and the number of the militia force to the decision of as enterprising and useful a ministry as ever held power in this land, confident that all arrangements on the subject, instigated by the palpable necessities of the case will be characterized by ability. But we would aspire to speak on a subject, which, applying to the English regular army, no less than to the militia itself, is most appropriate to the present posture of affairs. We refer to the education of officers and men.

As new elements have now entered into the military system of Europe, as military science is becoming of most difficult acquisition and of great extent, the time has come when the British army may no longer be the resting-place of the fool of the family, and when a soldier's education may not be concluded when he has learned to hold his head up, to keep his kit complete, and his regimentals clean, to know the battalion movements, and to walk superciliously through the streets. The time has come, when military science is to be culled with attention and perseverance from the studies of Jomini, Rogniat, Bulow, Melas, Ferussac, and Deschêl, when its practice is to be pursued in a course of military duties, devoting time, not as heretofore, exclusively to fatigues and sentries, but to the erection of batteries, the selection of sites, the making of hurdles, fascines, &c.

“The Aide Memoire to the military sciences,” and Marshal Marmont’s “Institutions Militaires,” are well calculated to commence, and to accompany an elementary study of the art of war; of the first we have already spoken. Marmont’s “Institutions -Militaires,” is written with the perspicuity and comprehensiveness which distinguish all French military literature, and of this a good translation is before the English public. The gallant author adds to the profoundest reflections, the beautiful application of a retentive memory, and a wide experience of former and eventful years. Some of his passages are fine, his definition of the qualities of a good colonel, ought to be written as a token upon the hands, and as frontlets between the eyes.—“Moins une intrepedité extraordinaire que l’esprit d’ordre, de justice et une “grande fermeté.”—Yet to these qualities add zeal, in which few British officers would be found deficient, and the improvement of the army would be much advanced. Among many passages of fine expression, and epigrammatic soundness, we sped our way in the perusal of the work, nor were we in any one respect disappointed, but much delighted, and much instructed.—“En principe un regiment d’infanterie doit etre instruit pour tous les services,” says Marmont. We do hope this principle will not be lost sight of in the organization of the militia. The Book of the Science of War now lies opened before us, but we would not attempt to discourse diffusely on its golden truths—our time would not permit so pleasing a duty—tactique and strategy are the two great provinces of the art of war, and each is of so much extent, as to range within itself principles of approved and great importance; but our time and space will not justify a digression on these points. The consideration, however, of the minor sub-divisions, of which the science is capable, is more attractive to our present position and apprehensions. Yet the study of tactique and strategy, must not be neglected. In them, the soldier will see war regulated upon its grandest and most imposing scale, its least duties, influenced by a vigilant and comprehensive mind, the climates and the elements, the mountains and the floods, the errors, and even perfections of hostile generals, turned to a great and successful account.

But besides these, a science does exist of greater precision, and more within the range of calculation and acquisition, and at the same time, indispensable in all operations of war, whether on a grand scale, or of trivial importance.

This is the science, a knowledge of which, in the British

service, is monopolized by the Corps of Royal Engineers. It acquaints us with the construction of field-works, their position, and where, and of what description they become most beneficial; also, with the formation of those materials of modern war, the fascine, hurdle, and gabion (all these being variously formed from the common twigs or branches of trees), so as to give, by their application, great strength and durability to parapets:—also concerning the means of impeding or nullifying the attack of an enemy, including, *first*, Stockades (made of long triangular beams of wood, well-pointed at one extremity, the other extremity well rammed into the earth, a series of which being well bound together, and loop-holed, afford a most efficacious defence); and, *2dly*, Palisades, which are staves of the same description as the former, placed vertically in the earth; and, *3dly*, Fraises, the same placed slantingly; and, *4thly*, Abattis, which consist of a tree lying prostrate, with the points of its branches well charred; these, with many others, such as crow's-feet, military pits, inundations, &c. &c., are the means generally adopted of arresting the progress, or weakening the attack of a hostile force, and applied as the different peculiarities of the country, or circumstances of the case may best advise.

The most approved methods for the removal or destruction of these impediments, are all detailed in this science, and it also acquaints us with the modes of preparing hedges for battle, and walls for defence; of fortifying churches, or farm-houses, with the manner of passing or guarding rivers, concerning military bridges, cask and trestle bridges, and ponton bridges. Of military mining it also treats,—of the process of fearful destruction in subterranean warfare—and all this with an exactness, and with rules so many, and so explicit, that success must not in these days of military science be expected, as heretofore, to accrue from the neglect or violation of the art.

Masters of this science, our army would be enabled to act in all the emergencies of attack and defence, at home and abroad; never would the maxim that “knowledge is power” be so fully illustrated. Yet, while we so insist upon this improvement in the army, (which would be principally useful, should our island ever be over-run by an enemy,) we would not wish to shew any indifference to the improvement of the naval power of our land: mariners of England may yet have much to do, and to no profession, to no men could the defence of our coasts be better entrusted; floating batteries, itinerant defences on our leas, protected shores, would sub-

serve many useful purposes, but give them efficiency, make them in every respect adequate, they never can supersede the necessity of a scientific education being impressed upon the British army.

We confess ourselves to be of that party who think that the best guarantee against war, is the possession by each state, of sufficient means of self-defence. Most heartily would we deplore the out-burst of a war, but with so many lowering clouds arround us—so many elements in the old and new world of rancour and discordancy, it is not for us supinely to assure ourselves of the continuance of peace, much less of the available strength of our present military resources—but principally do we contend for a modification and reform of the present “Exercises” of the army. Let the “evolutions” be still practised, but besides them, let our soldiery henceforth enjoy the benefit of a system, which would instruct them, be they cavalry or infantry—be they regular troops or militia—in the construction and uses of facines, stockades, &c.—in the selection of position, and security in the erection of batteries from neighbouring heights, from infilade or ricochet fire, &c. &c.

We would desire to see them marched frequently, not with knapsacks on their backs, but blouses on their shoulders, and spades and pick-axes in their hands, and in the rugged and wild vicinity of their quarters, study their art, apart from the habitations of men—and amidst the beauties and difficulties of nature, gaze on a grander art, devote themselves to a more noble knowledge than can be acquired amidst the tedious regularity of the drill parade, or the dissipation of the canteen.

With a soldiery composed of the regular troops and of militia, their amount, not as heretofore, lamentably inadequate to the defence or safety of their country, and their education and exercises such as we have advocated, England may not fear the world in arms against her.

“Nought shall make us rue,
If England to herself do but be true;”

And whether in America, India, New Zealand, or by her own hearths, her army will be sufficient to repel attacks, and to maintain her honour, and her glory—the myriads of Russia will not in such a case prevail against her—France will not attempt so perilous a struggle—the assumed unreasonableness of American policy, will wither before a British effective force.

But compromise with the advocates of economy the situation she is now called upon to occupy, and her glory and her excellence will pass away. Nor must our remarks be considered as fanciful speculations. Such is ever the character given to these writings or words, which would attempt to stimulate the lethargy of the times. It seems that the picture of national infatuation, is still to remain for the lesson of the human race, that however, as in the Hebrew times, Prophets and wise men shall arise to fore-doom the peoples' apathy, they are still to remain alike heedless, alike stiff-necked, and alike ruined in the latter days—" *Quem tum vates Cassandra moverit.*" But when power is humbled, when the proud Ilium is razed to the ground, when exiles and the Penates linger on foreign shores, the words of the daughter of Priam bring mournful memories with them, and in our case, history may yet weep to chronicle the decline of a second and most grand monarchy, and have to bewail, that the suppression of the military principle has been as fatal to one Empire, as Prætorian supremacy was to another.

SINCE the preceding observations have been put in types, important information has been received from India.

The news from the Punjaub is well calculated, from its calamitous importance, to withdraw the thoughts of the public, for a time at least, from topics of previous and engaging interest.

Though dignified with the name of victory, yet, in all the accounts which have been received from the East,—the great loss of life, and difficulty, with which the Battle of Moodkee has been won, urge, altogether, a stronger call for mourning and tears, than for pride and rejoicings.

When the possession of Hindostan, in the days of Clive and Warren Hastings, was maintained by so imminent and frail a tenure, when the armies then sent into the field for its preservation to our Empire, were comparatively small, when England, besides being engaged in her oriental struggles, had to contend with Transatlantic and European warfare—any national humiliation on the field of battle, might not only be ascribed to, but, in some measure, be excused by, the simultaneous variety of her enemies, more than to their individual prowess,—to her own want of numbers, rather than to her want of courage, to attack or to defend.

But the case becomes painfully different, when, after the elements of general war have sunk to rest, nations have opportunities of waging their own peculiar hostilities uninterruptedly, and *not* distracted by other and nearer aggressions; when, from the arrangements and circumstances of their enemy, they know precisely the particular ravelin or outwork on which he is going to make his attack, and have time and means to provide for his repulsion or destruction.

When defeat befalls a nation so forewarned, it is irritating to be told in excuse, that "our enemies have been undervalued," "our own superiority over-rated,"—that "our numbers have been found inadequate,"—that "the future will bring amends and retribution,"—that "Britons never shall be slaves," and that

"The Flag which has braved a thousand years,
The battle and the breeze,"

will continue fluttering to the end of time.

Our opinion of the whole course of Indian policy, from the day when Admiral Watson's name was forged, when Omichund died a madman, when Nuncomar was hung, when Cheyte Singh was swindled and Benarcs sacked, up to the period of the occupation of Afghanistan and Scinde, is, of course, that a system of territorial rapacity has been fostered and maintained, by more than even Oriental duplicity and falsehood.

We never could exactly see why India was to be the country to which the maxim of "honesty being the best policy" in our conduct, was to be perpetually violated, where injustice, aggression, and cruelty, were to be permitted to ride rampant over national honour and natural humanity: but, in the present instance, it is the misfortune of our country to smart under the consciousness of not only having immorally excited a fierce struggle, or rather a patriotic resistance; but also to see that struggle issue in a questionable victory, in the decimation of our officers, and in the butchery of our troops.

It might naturally have been anticipated, that as the war in the Punjaub had been long contemplated,—as the military powers of the country of Lord Auckland's late Ally, Rungeet Singh, might by this time have been pretty well known, so also would measures of effective precaution have been taken to repel an initiative line of hostile operations, which had also been *precisely* anticipated; (for there can be no doubt, that the passage of the Sikhs across the Sutledge, had been

long expected;) yet we hear, that an army of sufficiently numerical amount, had not been concentrated in the Punjab, and indeed in the strategical arrangements made, as far as we are acquainted with the same, we observe no evidence, either of prudent fore-thought, or of the true application of scientific principles to the exigencies of war.

The passage of a river in the face of a disciplined, though inferior army, is considered by military men, to be a service of great difficulty.

Napoleon experienced his greatest embarrassment in the selection of sites for, and effective protection of, "Têtes du Pont;" and in after days, he always cited his "passage of the bridge of Lodi, as the most hazardous act of his life of perils." Yet, 50,000 Sikhs passed the river Sutledge, in spite of the English army, at least 20,000 strong.

In Scotland, when Hugh Cressingham, with a far superior army to that of Wallace, led his van-guard across the Carron, that hero, having allowed a sufficient number to pass, attacked and defeated them. So he did in detail with the others, and thus he won the battle of Falkirk. But such approved principles of the art of war, not less than of common sense, seem to have been superbly contemned by Sir H. Harding and Sir Hugh Gough, the Octavius and Lepidus of this Actium.

The battle of Moodkee itself, seems to have been fought in a field of blood; and supine procrastination, and arrant incapacity, to have led to the sanguinary catastrophe.

When the enemy had, to a man, crossed the river, taken up a military position, selected sites for their batteries, torn up our battalions and squadrons with an effective artillery, out-manœvered us, and outwitted us in every way, the British were doubled up "pell mell" to see what *brute force* in the absence of Science could do, and, after a few days hateful bayonet carnage, a magniloquent announcement is made, that a great battle has been fought, and the Sikhs have been defeated!

Estimated by its profuse expenditure of human life, the battle of Moodkee may certainly be reckoned a great battle. It has been a perfect Aeldama of blood.

It is no great physical exertion for a battalion to fire a platoon, and strew the ground before it with shrieking and slaughtered men. To charge in line with bayonets fixed, transfixing the helpless or the fugitive, implies neither any great talent in the design, nor gallantry in the execution. We can therefore hear of Sir Charles Napier, killing in

Scinde, "his thousands," and Sir Hugh Gough, in the Penjaub, "his ten thousands,"—of the enemy being driven from their position, and some of their brass guns being captured, without feeling grateful or proud, that the one General has been selected to conquer the Ameers, or the other to strive with the Sikhs.

Our feelings would have been somewhat different, as no doubt would have been the issue of the battle, had the late military operations been regulated more by strategy and science, and the enemy compelled, by superior manœuvring on our part, and the stern necessity of circumstances, more than by such an exterminating engagement as Moodkee, to embrace the alternative of submission and peace.

Every circumstance was in our favour. The whole peninsula of Hindostan,—its three presidencies full of troops, formed our base of operations,—a retreat to Bengal or Bombay, could at any season of reverse be made, and rendered secure. Sir Charles Napier's army could have been moved from Scinde, either to support an unequal combat, or to take the enemy *in flank or rear*. The Sikhs, on the other hand, had to cross the Sutledge, a difficult and hazardous operation. After having done so, *that river was between them and their retreat*. By turning their flank, the British could have destroyed their bridges, inundated or damned their fords, and swept their passage with heavy artillery. Thus intercepted,—checked in their advance,—their retreat cut off,—occupying a hostile, and not very fertile territory—an army composed *principally of cavalry*, and attended by *flocks of camels*, would have seen its operations brought to an end by the want of forage; and its unconditional surrender of arms and persons, necessitated by a skilful and hostile strategy.

The Sikhs could only have adopted one plan of destroying themselves, and ending the war for ever, and that was to have crossed the Sutledge.

That movement has, however, been morally successful; and though we claim a victory, there can be little doubt, that Moodkee will be as the small cloud in the west, no bigger than a man's hand, yet destined to magnify itself into the gloomy expression of hostile opinion, it may be of action, through the length and breadth of India.

The present, along with many military occurrences of the last ten years, invokes some reflections, apart from those induced by the late waste of human life, and the consequent domestic grief of England.

During the period in question, we have seen *all* our wars regulated, and *all* our battles fought with *bull-dog courage*, and *indomitable perseverance*. The conviction has become painfully acute, that military science, implying the comparative humanity of skilful manœuvre has degenerated, and been superseded by the sanguinary ruthlessness, peculiar to single-handed, and gothic warfare. In the former portion of these remarks, we have attempted to account for this, in the lack of professional knowledge, prevalent in the British army.

We still maintain that opinion, and for its support, nothing could be surely more opportune, than the unfortunate battle of Moodkee.

It had been our wish to have addressed ourselves more *minutely* to military subjects, and to have touched upon our interior military policy,—a matter, though of great importance, yet treated with general indifference.

We might have wondered, that the only scientific officers in the army, those of the Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineers, are never selected for command, but almost uniformly have to occupy subordinate situations.

We might have talked of the anomalies of promotion,—the sacrifice of merit, united with poverty,—to wealth united with incapacity. We might have said, and truly said, that the same professional ignorance that characterizes the army, if evinced by a lawyer, would keep him for ever briefless,—by a medical man, would have him indicted for manslaughter.

But these deformities of our military system, are not irremediable; and we hope, that, as in human affairs, improvement often springs from adversity, so from the period of the Punjaub disasters, will arise a glorious era for military science.

