

THE 1997 KOREA/CANADA NORTH PACIFIC
ARMS CONTROL WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS

27 TO 29 MAY 1997

Promoting Peace on the Korean
Peninsula through Arms Control:
Preventing Regional Conflicts

EDITED BY RENÉ UNGER AND F. RON CLEMINSON

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WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS PREPARED FOR

THE NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA



Korean Institute for Defense Analyses
(KIDA)



University of Victoria
British Columbia, Canada

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OTTAWA: SEPTEMBER 1997

**THE KOREA/CANADA NORTH PACIFIC ARMS CONTROL
WORKSHOP - 1997 PROCEEDINGS**

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PREFACE

THE KOREA/CANADA NORTH PACIFIC ARMS CONTROL WORKSHOP 1997 PROCEEDINGS:

Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control: Preventing Regional Conflicts

Even with the termination of the Cold War and its global implications, the two Koreas, hosting large military establishments, stand face to face along a De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) which separates two ideologies and divides a nation. This stand-off constitutes one of the most potentially volatile flash points for armed conflict, both regionally and from a global perspective.

The 1953 Armistice Agreement between the United Nations Command and the North Korean/Chinese combatants was the instrument by which fighting in the 20th Century's third largest war was stopped. Meant to last a year or so as a prelude to a Korean peace treaty, the Armistice Agreement has been in effect for almost half a century. It is one of the last vestiges of the Cold War era.

This series of North Pacific Arms Control Workshops (NPACW), now including participants from China, Japan, Russia and the United States, has been designed with the aim of addressing this dangerous confrontation from the perspective of the role which arms control might play in fostering peace and security in the area and particularly on the Peninsula. With its roots firmly anchored in a low-profile, cooperative, bilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) research programme, which was initiated by Canada and South Korea in 1991, these workshops remain unique — they provide the only regional forum dedicated exclusively to the NACD process and its various adaptations. The core of the process is "result driven" by practical research. It is neither a Track I nor a Track II initiative in the sense of other Asia-Pacific forums. This series of Workshops continues to be hosted by Canada and South Korea in alternate years, using Victoria and Seoul as venues.

Building upon the general theme of "Peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula" and drawing from the practical, realtime experience gained regionally and elsewhere as well as from the proceedings of previous Workshops, the third NPACW acted both as an analytical tool, as well as a catalyst, in the peninsular NACD process. It provided focus for identifying problem areas to be addressed and, by extrapolation, builds upon our existing experience. It will form a basis for the identification of practical solutions and alternatives.

In this proceedings, the Peninsula's peace and stability problem area is addressed from the perspectives of Peninsular as well as non-Peninsular players. The "perspective" papers represent the personal views and assessments of the authors. The "overarching" papers by Dr. George Lindsey and Dr. James Bayer represent useful synthesis of some of the points raised from the perspectives of Peninsular and non-Peninsular players, but are not meant to be a consensus in any area.

If a message emerged from this May 1997 Workshop in Seoul, it is that increased transparency in the military field is a prerequisite to attaining permanent peace and security. Two of the most important processes toward increased transparency are the building of confidence between nations and the effective and impartial on-going monitoring and verification (OMV) of compliance with commitments made under treaties and agreements finally arrived at. These proceedings form a firm basis for continued research in NACD activities on a worldwide basis and for applying that experience to modelling an effective OMV regime related to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

F. Ron Cleminson
Ottawa, September 1997

SECTION I

**ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
THE VIEW FROM WITHOUT**

THE MULTILATERAL DIMENSIONS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM¹

George Lindsey

Introduction

Most of the negotiations which led to the earlier important breakthroughs in arms control, such as the SALT, INF, and START Treaties, were bilateral, carried out between the United States and the Soviet Union, and concentrated on armaments in Europe and North America. Meanwhile, some smaller countries such as Canada have pursued a more multilateral approach to the subject of arms control.

Ever since 1950 the Republic of Korea (also known as the ROK, or South Korea) has been facing a crucial security problem in its relations with the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (also known as the DPRK, or North Korea), something which has extremely serious implications for several neighbouring countries, and in fact for all of Northeast Asia as well as other states on the Pacific Rim. While the question of the reunification of the two Koreas is fundamentally a bilateral matter for the two principals, the question of arms control on the Korean Peninsula has repercussions for the security of so many other countries that its analysis demands a multilateral approach.

To quote retired US Lieutenant-General William Odom,

The Korean peninsula is the only place in the world where a military confrontation directly involved the four great powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan.²

This 1997 Korea/Canada North Pacific Arms Control Workshop (NPACW III) continues the series in which unofficial representatives

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author only.

² William Odom, *Trial After Triumph: East Asia After the Cold War* (Hudson Institute, 1992). p. 46.

from several of the concerned countries discuss the problems of the Peninsula, and explore the utility of such mechanisms as multilateral institution building, confidence building measures, verification and transparency, cooperative security, and preventive diplomacy in addressing these problems^{3,4}. They are well aware that while lessons can be drawn from the institutions and methods that have been successful in Europe, the situation in Asia is very different and its problems will not be solved simply by the direct transfer of solutions which may have proven effective in another region.

In preparation for this session of the workshop, papers have been written by contributors working in Russia, China, Japan, and Canada⁵. These four papers describe the Korean situation as seen from the personal point of view of a member of their own country; someone who is knowledgeable regarding East Asian security problems, but who does not claim to be presenting the official view of their government^{6,7,8,9}.

³ Bon-Hak Koo (ed.), *The Korea/Canada North Pacific Arms Control Workshop: 1995 Proceedings* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 1996).

⁴ Robert Bedeski (ed.), *Confidence Building in the North Pacific: New Approaches to the Korean Peninsula in the Multilateral Context* (University of Victoria and the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, December 1996).

⁵ Dr. Vassily Krivokhizha is the First Deputy Director of Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies in Moscow. Ms. Xiang Jiagu is Deputy Director in the Disarmament Division in the International Organizations Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. Mr. Satoshi Morimoto is a Senior Researcher in the Centre for Policy Research in the Nomura Research Institute in Tokyo, Japan. Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is a member of the Institute of International Relations in the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada.

⁶ Vassily Krivokhiza, "Problems of the Korean Peninsula in the New Geopolitical Situation: A View from Russia", in René Unger and F. Ron Cleminson (eds.), *Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control: Preventing Regional Conflicts* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, September 1997).

⁷ Xiang Jiagu, "The Situation on the Korean Peninsula", in Unger and Cleminson (eds.), *Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control*.

⁸ Satoshi Morimoto, "Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control: Preventing Regional Conflicts", in Unger and Cleminson (eds.), *Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control*.

This paper attempts to combine the main contributions of the four papers into an overall account as seen by non-Koreans vitally interested in the problems of Korea. It will also interject points occurring to this author, cite a few recent pertinent articles, and add a few elements of background for the benefit of readers not well acquainted with the complicated and tortured history of the area.

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the four "perspective" papers, which are not cited in the remaining text.

External Countries with a Close Interest In Korea's Security: Their Recent History Relating to Korea

The central actors in this enduring conflict are North and South Korea, each of which has made longstanding declarations of their intent to unify the Peninsula into a single state. There remain however profound differences as to the terms under which unification would be acceptable, and doubts as to the real desire on the part of either of the two principals, or of their neighbours, for unification to be accomplished in the immediate future. Any analysis of the prospects for unification must begin with the two central players. However, in efforts to identify the prospects for regional arms control together with the general security interests of the entire region, consideration must be given to both the situation which would exist without Korean unification, as well as that after unification, should it occur.

The three most powerful neighbours of Korea are China, Japan, and Russia. North Korea shares a long land frontier with China, and all of Korea was associated with the Chinese Manchu Empire until 1895. North Korea lies adjacent to Russia close to the vital Russian zone surrounding Vladivostok, and all of Korea came under Russian protection at the end of the century. Japan manoeuvred to obtain control of Korea, and after Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905, Korea became a Japanese protectorate. The Peninsula was annexed by Japan in 1910. Thirty-five years later, at

⁹ Jing-dong Yuan, "Building Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula: A Canadian Perspective", in Unger and Cleminson (eds.), *Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control*.

the end of the Second World War, the northern half of the Peninsula was occupied by Soviet troops and the southern half by Americans, thus dividing a Korea which had previously existed as a single nation for over 1300 years.

The other major external power in this region is the United States. Although located far away from Asia, it has waged three hot wars and one cold war on the Western coast of the Pacific Ocean in the last half century. The hot wars were against Japan, North Korea backed by China, and Vietnam. Russia was an ally of the United States against Germany in both World Wars, but its principal opponent (in both Europe and Asia) during the Cold War.

While by no means a major player, Canada has shared the same alignments as the United States during the World Wars, the Korean War, and the Cold War, although it did not participate in the Vietnam War.

Another player with a peripheral role in the Korean problem is Taiwan, mainly through its significance concerning the relations between China and the United States.

Pairs of Countries with Predominately Good Relations

A persistent difference between the security strategies of Asian and Western states has been their willingness to enter into alliances. Asian states have usually chosen to stand alone. However, among the eight participants being considered here for their roles in the Korean problem, the United States has formed alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan¹⁰, and Canada. Less formally, but nevertheless significantly, Canada has excellent relations with South Korea (with which it was a co-belligerent during the Korean War), and with Japan (although they were opponents during the Second World War).

¹⁰Since Mainland China considers Taiwan to be a part of the Peoples' Republic of China, and Taiwan is not a member state of the United Nations, there are objections to the inclusion of Taiwan in a list of sovereign states or "countries". However, Taiwan is a participant of some importance within the context of Northeast Asian security relationships.

While not as close as they were during and following the Korean War, relations between North Korea and China have been generally cooperative.

Thus, of the twenty-eight pairs among the eight players, there are seven pairs of states which are on distinctly and persistently friendly terms. Or, omitting Canada and Taiwan, and counting only the six central players, three out of the fifteen pairs are on consistently good terms. This is not a situation in which disarmament, arms control, or even confidence building efforts are going to be easily introduced.

*South Korea and the United States*¹¹

Although there had been an American presence in Korea during the nineteenth century, the close association between South Korea and the United States began in 1945 when American troops (already deployed in the Western Pacific for the war against Japan) occupied the southern part of the Korean Peninsula as Russians moved into the northern part (after their rapid advance through Manchuria). Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, the United States marshalled and led the United Nations effort for the defence of South Korea. Ever since the armistice of 1953 (which is still in effect today), the United States has stationed significant armed forces in South Korea. The two countries signed a mutual security treaty in 1953.

American and South Korean forces conduct joint military exercises, something which North Korea claims to be in violation of the armistice agreement. For a number of years American tactical nuclear weapons were based in South Korea, but these have now been withdrawn.

Politically, South Korea and the United States are committed to capitalist market economics, which have brought to both states a high level of prosperity. Competition between them generates some disagreements over trade barriers.

¹¹ Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Korea-US Security Relations in Transition", *Korean Journal of National Unification* 3 (1994), pp. 205-35.

Japan and the United States^{12,13}

The extraordinarily rapid and complete transformation of relations between Japan and the United States which followed the end of the Second World War to the present day has been to the enormous benefit of the security of Northeast Asia. Bases in Japanese territory played a vital role in supporting the United Nations operations during the Korean War, as well as the continued American military presence in the Western Pacific throughout the Cold War. A military pact (*The San Francisco Peace Treaty*) between Japan and the United States was signed in 1952, and a *Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation* in 1960. More recently, the importance of the American bases in Japan has increased with the withdrawal of American forces from the Philippines, and would grow even more if there were significant reductions in American forces based in South Korea.

In contrast to the sad history of East Asia prior to the end of the Second World War, the Japanese policy of limiting its own post-war military strength to a relatively small but well-equipped self-defence force demonstrates remarkable restraint. Although Japan has been funding a large and increasing defence budget, this funding has not exceeded about 1.1% of the country's Gross Domestic Product. The numerical strength of the Japanese armed forces has been less than 250,000 and is not increasing.¹⁴ The great economic strength of Japan gives it the potential to expand its military power by an order of magnitude, but it has not chosen to do this. The acceptance and support of American forces has supplied stability, and generous Japanese financial contributions have been extremely helpful for United Nations peace and development initiatives in many parts of the world.

¹² Odom, *Trial After Triumph*.

¹³ James E. Auer, "The Imperative US-Japanese Bond", *Orbis* 39:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 37-53.

¹⁴ In 1995, the sizes of the armed forces of China, USA, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan exceeded those of Japan by factors of 12.5, 6.5, 6.3, 4.7, 2.6, and 1.6 respectively. The percentages of GDP devoted to defence ranged from 3.4% for South Korea to 25.2% for North Korea. See: *The Military Balance 1996/1997* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 306-8.

Increasingly affluent Japanese investors have bought up important assets in the United States, and Japan enjoys a huge surplus in bilateral trade with the United States. As Japan develops into an economic superpower, becomes more nationalistic, and is able to adopt an ever more independent foreign policy, a certain amount of friction with the United States is bound to occur. This could include some resentment concerning the disproportionate burden borne by the United States in the maintenance of a large defence establishment.

North Korea and China^{15,16}

Despite its determined policy of complete self-reliance (*juche*) and isolation, North Korea shares several basic things with China. One is a long common land border. Another is the legacy of the Korean War, in which China intervened in 1950 to prevent the defeat of North Korea. At least a quarter of a million Chinese soldiers died in the course of that war. The two countries signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance in 1961. Today, although Communism has collapsed in the rest of the world, North Korea can still find common ideological ground with China. China has sent food to North Korea, but has begun to demand payment in hard currency for other trade exchanges.

An asset for China in its negotiations with the United States is its residual influence over North Korea. Although China opposes the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea, and does not supply the DPRK with any modern arms or military equipment, it has also opposed the international application of trade sanctions against North Korea, and has counselled for negotiation rather than confrontation. This policy may have been an influential factor in the terms of the accord achieved between North Korea and the United States in Geneva in 1994 concerning the provision of hydrocarbon fuel and nuclear reactors, which seems in many eyes to have been very favourable to North Korea.

¹⁵ Robert A. Scalapino, "The Major Powers and the Korea Peninsula", *Korean Journal of National Unification* 3 (1994), pp.9-47.

¹⁶ Andrew Y. Tan, "China's Strategic Role in Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era", in Odem, *Trial After Triumph*, pp. 31-55.

China's main desire with regard to North Korea is the preservation of stability for the immediate future. Any scenario which foresaw the appearance of an aggressive, reunified and nuclear-armed Korea confronting a Japan which was hastily acquiring its own nuclear deterrence capability would cause considerable apprehension within China.

*Taiwan and the United States*¹⁷

The American association with Taiwan had its origin in the Second World War, with the active military support given by the Allies to the Chinese Nationalist forces under Chiang Kai-shek as part of the war against the Japanese. American sympathies remained with the Nationalists during the civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists under Mao Tse-tung following the defeat of Japan. This support remained intact even as the Nationalists lost the civil war in 1949 and decamped from the mainland to Taiwan. Here the Nationalists maintained that they continued to represent the legitimate government of the whole of China, a position to which the United States gave its support until after President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972. Under the terms of a mutual security treaty in force from 1954 until 1979 the United States committed itself to come to Taiwan's defence if the island was attacked by China.

Today, the United States recognizes Beijing as the legitimate government of the Peoples' Republic of China, and has severed official diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It does, however, continue to support Taiwan in many practical ways. Modern American armaments are exported to Taiwan, including a consignment of 150 state-of-the-art F-16 fighter aircraft. American support for Taiwan was demonstrated as recently as 1996 when China test launched a number of missiles into the Formosa Strait close to the island, perhaps most visibly through the deployment of American aircraft carriers into the nearby seas.

China is resolutely determined to have Taiwan incorporated into the Peoples' Republic. However, Chinese military coercion is deterred by

¹⁷ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1997), Chapter 6.

the military strength of Taiwan and the evident support it enjoys on the part of the United States.

Pairs of Countries with Predominately Bad Relations

North Korea^{18,19,20}

North Korea has set itself on a path of determined self-sufficiency (*juche*), or isolation as a "hermit kingdom". It has also chosen to devote a large proportion of its pitifully low Gross National Product to the acquisition of arms and the maintenance of a large standing army. Its deteriorating economy and recent serious flooding has motivated the regime to accept some foreign assistance in the form of food and energy supplies. Furthermore, some international channels of discussion have been opened up in recent years. However, on balance, it seems that relations between North and South Korea, Japan, and the United States can be characterized as bad. In all three cases there exists a classical conflict of political ideology, reinforced by the sharp contrast between the poverty of North Korea and the affluence of the other three societies.

North Korea and South Korea^{21,22}

The deployment of approximately one million North Korean, over half a million South Korean, and 34,000 American soldiers on active duty on the comparatively small Peninsula, with their main deployments close to

¹⁸ Denny Roy, "North Korea as an Alienated State", *Survival* 38:4, (Winter 1996-97), pp.22-36.

¹⁹ Selig Harrison, "As North Korea Liberalizes, Sanctions Should Be Eased", *Survival* 38:4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 37-40.

²⁰ Norman D. Levin, "Feel Their Pain (If You Like), But Watch Their Actions", *Survival* 38:4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 41-3.

²¹ "Turbulence in the Koreas", in *Strategic Survey 1996/97* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 182-91.

²² "The Korean Peninsula: The Last Throw of the Dice?", *International Security Review 1997* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), pp. 339-74.

a Demilitarized Zone which divides the Peninsula in two, represents the largest long-standing concentration of military strength on earth.

The forty-four years since the end of the Korean War have witnessed a gradual shift in the balance of power between the two states. During the beginning, the North enjoyed the strong backing of China and the Soviet Union, and possessed significant military forces deployed on the Peninsula. The Western powers supporting the South were preoccupied with the threats which the Cold War posed in Europe, the Atlantic, and North America. However, in the ensuing decades the market economies of the West, Japan, and South Korea prospered mightily, while North Korea's command economy flagged. China broke with the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended, and the Soviet Union collapsed. China and Russia sought to improve relations with South Korea, while cooling ties with North Korea. Except for the quantitative advantage of the North Korean army over its Southern adversary, the power balance has moved inexorably in favour of South Korea.

The economic and political stability of North Korea is very much in question, as are their suspected activities in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction together with the missiles intended to deliver them.

Some years ago North Korea produced proposals for arms reductions, but these seemed drastic and precipitous, and were not accompanied by practical suggestions for verification or confidence building measures.²³ Moreover, it is suspected that the leadership of North Korea relies on a strong army both to maintain its power and to serve as an instrument of leverage in international negotiations.

The North Korean government had for a considerable period of time pressed for the replacement of the 1953 Armistice Agreement (which confirmed the separation of Korea) with a bilateral peace treaty between North Korea and the United States, thus excluding South Korea as a participant. However, in 1991 North and South Korea signed an Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and

²³ Suk Jung Lee & Michael Sheehan, "Building Confidence and Security on the Korean Peninsula", *Contemporary Security Policy* 16:3 (December 1995), pp. 267-98.

Cooperation, followed in 1992 by a *Declaration on the Non-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula*.

While both Koreas maintain a publicly stated desire for early reunification, the South does not relish the prospect of having to underwrite the expected enormous expense unification would imply. Furthermore, the North fears that its political system, ideology, and institutions would be overwhelmed by those of the more powerful South.

However, the focus of this paper and this session of the Workshop is on the multilateral aspects of the Korean problem and the roles for extra-peninsular states. Consideration of the bilateral intra-Korean aspects forms the subject of the following session.

*North Korea and Japan*²⁴

The legacy of the Japanese exploitation of Korea provides an unhappy background to contemporary as well as future relations between Japan and North Korea. This is offset to some degree by the large number of North Korean citizens employed in Japan and sending much wanted hard currency back home.

Japan has very understandable concerns regarding North Korea's programs to acquire missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to Japan. The 1,000 km range of the North Korean NoDong I missile would make it possible to reach most of Japan's territory (and more than the range needed to reach any place in South Korea from almost any location in the north). The Tepodong 1 is being developed with an estimated range of 2,000 km. Finally, the painful experiences of 1945 have left Japan, perhaps more than any other country, with a deep abhorrence of the prospect of the detonation of nuclear warheads on its cities.

Japan has good reasons to want stability on the Korean Peninsula. It has not so far employed the bargaining move of providing significant

²⁴ Paul Bracken, "Risks and Promises in the Two Koreas", *Orbis* 39:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 55-64.

donations of food to North Korea. One reason for this is the suspicion that the food would not reach the hungry citizens for whom it was intended. Improvement of the transparency of food delivery would be essential in this regard.

Japan believes that North Korea should be persuaded to engage in some of the activities and organizations designed to foster regional cooperation. The absence of formal diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea remains a barrier to such associations, although some contacts have been made. An important consideration in any such effort is the desire on the part of Japan not to impair its relations with South Korea. However, sufficient trade exists between Japan and North Korea for such trade to remain of great importance for the DPRK, and Japan's wealth could provide the source for the investment and development so desperately needed by North Korea's staggering economy.

North Korea and the United States²⁵

North Korean hostility towards the United States is due to the American support of South Korea, both during the Korean War and with the continuing stationing of American troops in South Korea.

As North Korea maintains that it was the United States which was responsible for dividing Korea in two, it feels that negotiations concerning a peace settlement should be a bilateral matter and not involve South Korea.

Consultations have begun regarding the establishment of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea has attempted to engage the United States in bilateral negotiations over peace arrangements and the issue of missile proliferation on the Peninsula. Talks concerning North Korea's adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty did eventually result in the involvement of South Korea through the 1994 Accord signed in Geneva. The accord addressed the freezing of the North's nuclear program through a Framework Agreement under which South Korea would be a partner in KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

²⁵ Manwoo Lee, "North Korea: The Cold War Continues", *Current History* (December 1996), pp.438-42.

Association), the body tasked with replacing North Korea's gas-cooled graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with light water power reactors.²⁶ Until the new reactors are on-line (estimated to be in 2003) the United States will supply North Korea with alternative energy sources.

A compelling motivation for North Korea to pursue relations with the United States is their critical need for food aid.

*China and Taiwan*²⁷

Somewhat detached from the Korean situation is the hostility of China towards Taiwan. The roots of this hostility stem partly from the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution, and partly from the continuing deep seated quarrels between these two governments over the separation of Taiwan from mainland China, as well as over ideological differences.

Taiwan does not have the millennia of association with China experienced by the regions on the mainland, as it was not absorbed into China until 1683 and was subsequently taken over by Japan from 1895 to 1945. In 1949, when the Communists won the Chinese civil war, a million defeated Chinese Nationalists took refuge in Taiwan under the command of Chiang Kai-shek.

Beijing is adamantly committed to the concept of reunification as articulated within its "One China" policy, and rejects relations with countries which recognize Taipei.

Mainland China bombarded the Taiwanese Islands of Matsu and Quemoy in the 1950s, and as recently as 1996 conducted demonstrations of missile tests close to Taiwan.

A recent agreement between Taiwan and North Korea concerning the storage of Taiwanese nuclear waste has exacerbated Taiwanese relations

²⁶ While both types of nuclear reactor produce electric power, badly needed in North Korea, light water reactors are less suitable for the production of plutonium which could be used for nuclear weapons. Also they are better suited for international verification of the destiny of the plutonium.

²⁷ Bernstein and Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*, Chapter 6, pp.149-65.

with China and South Korea. China considers that the issues of nuclear management and environmental protection are international matters to be managed by sovereign governments and resents the public recognition of Taiwan, which China considers equivalent to a "two-China" policy.

In spite of their disagreements on political matters, China enjoys a steady flow of investment from Taiwan, conducts a healthy level of trade with the island, and accepts Taiwanese tourists and family visitors.

This makes four out of the twenty eight pairs of participants with consistently bad relations. Or, omitting Taiwan and Canada, of the six central states, three (each including North Korea) out of fifteen pairs are persistently unfriendly. A highly reliable verification structure would have to be in place for them to have any confidence in arms control agreements. Unfortunately, today, as in the past, there may not be very much confidence on which to build such initiatives.

Pairs of Countries with Mixed Relations

If we confine the enumeration of mixed relations to the central six players, and subtract the three good and three bad pairs already identified, this leaves nine out of the fifteen relations which can be described as mixed. These will now be discussed.

The Mixed Relations of China²⁸

The last hundred years have seen many violent changes in China's relations with other countries. After a Western "scramble for China" around the turn of the century, Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Holland, and the United States had each acquired rights and territory from a virtually defenceless China under a decrepit Qing Dynasty. China was invaded by Russia, then by Japan, and then saw Russia expel Japan from Northern China and aid China in its post-war recovery. China subsequently quarrelled with Russia, but has restored relations. China was aided by the United States against Japan, opposed by the United

²⁸ Andrew Yan, "China's Strategic Role in Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era", in Odom, *Trial After Triumph*, Chapter 3.

States during the Korean War and over the confrontations concerning the status of Taiwan, but now lives on relatively good (but perhaps deteriorating) terms with this state.

Compared to this turbulent past, the present situation seems quite peaceful. However, there is no guarantee that an 'end to history' and an ensuing lasting tranquillity has arrived.

*China and South Korea*²⁹

While South Korea had every reason to consider China as a major enemy during and for many years after the Korean War, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been established and mutually profitable trade has grown substantially. This level of commerce now far exceeds that between China and North Korea. China probably sees a resolution of the Korean problem as a means by which to prevent the appearance of a new nuclear weapon state on its border.

China has changed from being the ally of North Korea against South Korea and the United States, and is working to prevent the arming of North Korea with weapons of mass destruction. Although China may hope for an eventual American withdrawal from Asia, in the immediate future it probably favours the continued presence of American troops in South Korea and Japan as a stabilizing factor. China's main objective for the Korean Peninsula is to maintain peace and stability, goals which are necessary for the continuation of China's sustained economic growth. China supports the cross-recognition of both North and South Korea by all of the externally interested states, confidence-building measures, consideration for the negotiation of a nuclear weapon-free zone, and the eventual reunification of the two Koreas through peaceful means.

²⁹ James T. Myers, "Issues and Prospects for Cross-recognition: A Chinese Perspective", *Korean Journal of National Unification* 3 (1994), pp. 97-110.

China and Russia^{30,31}

China's relations with Russia, with whom it shares a long and frequently contested land border, have undergone a number of drastic changes. During the nineteenth century, Russia seized control of several pieces of territory which China still claims today to have been unfairly appropriated in "unequal treaties". At the beginning of this century Russia occupied Manchuria, but was driven out by Japan in 1905. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established the state of Manchukuo. During the last days of the Second World War, the Soviet Union entered Manchukuo and defeated the Japanese. However, after the war was over Russia left the area voluntarily. The Soviet Union did not support the Chinese Revolution, but after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 Russia aided in the industrial development of the new Chinese government until 1960, at which time an ideological conflict resulted in their estrangement and the sudden abandonment of many major uncompleted projects in China. Fighting broke out in 1969 over the precise location of several sections of the border. Relations gradually emerged from this nadir during the 1980s.

Although the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) Treaty was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and was driven by concerns over buildups of nuclear-armed theatre missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union also undertook to remove all of its SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles from Siberia. These missiles presented a threat to China rather than to NATO. In 1989 the Soviets began to withdraw their troops from Mongolia. Modern Soviet Su-27 Fighter Ground Attack aircraft were sold to China. An agreement on the border with Northeast China was signed in 1991.

In recent years, while Russia has endured political upheaval and severe economic difficulties, China's economy has enjoyed fast growth. Both countries have reasons to desire stability and a reduction of arms on the Korean Peninsula.

³⁰ Gilbert Rozman, "A Regional Approach to Northeast Asia" *Orbis* 39:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 65-80.

³¹ Odom, *Trial After Triumph*.

*China and Japan*³²

Of all the multitude of historical reasons for resentment between the various states in Asia, China has the longest list. There is plenty to resent regarding Western exploitation, but the behaviour of Japan was no less reprehensible. In 1894 Japan seized Chinese territory in Taiwan and several coastal areas, including Korea. In a long war lasting from 1937 to 1945, Japan annexed Manchuria, established the puppet state of Manchukuo, and occupied large areas of Eastern China.

However, while past indignities may not be forgotten, Japan is now China's largest trading partner. The two countries have no difficulties over land borders, but in the East China Sea there exists the potential for disputes concerning sovereignty over the small Diaoyu islands (Senkakus to the Japanese), as possession of these islands could confer upon the sovereign state control over fishing grounds and potential oil deposits. Since the Korean Peninsula is practically surrounded by China and Japan, these two states enjoy a dominant geostrategic influence over activities in this area. Conversely, neither would welcome the rise of a strong, unified and well-armed power so close between them and possibly possessing nuclear missiles capable of striking Tokyo and Beijing.

A long-term concern for China remains the possibility of the withdrawal of the American military presence in Northeast Asia (which might be welcome in itself), with the probable consequence of a resurgence of Japanese military strength and assertiveness (which would be decidedly unwelcome).

³² Andrew Y. Yan, "Japan's Strategic Role in Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era", in Odom, *Trial After Triumph*, Chapter 4, pp. 56-82.

China and the United States^{33,34}

China's relations with the United States cover an immense agenda, one which extends far beyond the security problems of the Korean Peninsula to significantly affect the security of the globe. As China grows both in prosperity and power, it will be natural for the United States to foresee an Asian region and a world in which China will play a role far more influential than has been the case in centuries past. One can detect within the United States significant support for two sharply contrasting policies concerning China. One, often labelled a policy of "engagement", would see the extension of cooperation on many fronts and would involve a variety of measures, including the pursuit of a relaxation of trade restrictions and the encouragement of Chinese participation in international fora. The opposite approach is often termed as one of "containment", and would regard China as a growing rival for influence and business, a competitor for strategic power, and a delinquent in need of reform with regard to its attitude concerning arms exports, human rights, and the respect for copyrights. China is also a member of the United Nations Security Council, and could use its veto to frustrate initiatives favoured by the United States.

Despite a number of disputes over terms of trade, the United States remains a large foreign investor in China.

China and the United States remain in contention over the status of Taiwan, which, while clearly unable to achieve its goal of making a victorious return to the mainland, covets international recognition as an independent state (with a prosperous population in excess of 21 million). Taiwan is an island caught between two worlds: while it shares a language and culture with China, it remains attached to the economic and ideological values of the West.

The United States has traditionally supported Taiwan against the Peoples' Republic of China. Under the terms of a treaty which remained in force

³³ Bernstein and Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*.

³⁴ David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?", *International Security* 21:2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209.

from 1954 to 1979, the United States undertook to come to the defence of Taiwan in the event of a mainland Chinese attack. As recently as 1996, on the eve of a Taiwanese presidential election, China conducted launchings of M-11 Intermediate Range Missiles aimed to impact close to Taiwanese seaports. The United States responded by despatching two naval carrier battle groups into the area. The United States is also exporting 150 extremely capable F-16 aircraft designed for air defence or attack to Taiwan.

The Mixed Relations of Russia^{35,36}

The strategic upheavals which have occurred in the last ten years have completely undercut the international influence traditionally wielded by the erstwhile Soviet Union. The disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Russian economy have all left present-day Russia with little means or energy to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, particularly on its Asian flank.

With an unneeded surplus of sophisticated weapons, unemployment in its huge armaments industry, and a desperate need for foreign currency, it is easy to understand Russia's incentive to export military goods to buyers who can pay for them. This creates an impediment to international efforts at arms control, non-proliferation, and increased transparency.

*Russia and North Korea*³⁷

North Korea's present relations with Russia are far less cordial than was the case when Russia replaced Japan in North Korea in 1945 and then

³⁵ "Russia: Still Searching For Stability", in *Strategic Survey 1996/97* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 120-131.

³⁶ "Changing Soviet Strategy Toward Northeast Asia", in Odom, *Trial After Triumph*, Chapter 2, pp. 7-30.

³⁷ "North Korea: A Country in Transition", *International Security Review 1996* (Royal United Services Institution), pp. 357-83.

departed in 1947. Russia supplied arms to North Korea on easy terms during the Korean War in 1950-1953 and for considerable period of time afterward. The North Korean leadership observed the collapse of the Soviet Union with apprehension. Russia has subsequently reduced its trade with North Korea, and has begun to demand hard currency for continued supplies of energy.

Russia would not want another nuclear power so close to its border. But neither does Russia desire the collapse of the North Korean regime and the absorption of North Korea into a unified, western-oriented and strong Korean state. Attempts are being made to restore economic links and to conduct joint explorations for oil and gas.

Russia and South Korea

While Russia's relations with North Korea may have been cooling, those with South Korea are improving.³⁸ In 1990 Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea, despite the protests of North Korea.

Trade between the Russia and South Korea is growing, accompanied by a number of joint ventures in both countries. An agreement concerning military-technical collaboration was signed in 1995, and has been followed by the export of advanced Russian weapons to South Korea. However, South Korean investment in China remains over a hundred times greater than investment activity in Russia.

South Korea has offended Russia by proposing an international conference on the security of the Korean Peninsula without Russian participation.

³⁸ Alexander I. Nikitin, "From Red Star to Two-Headed Eagle: Translating Cross-Recognition from Soviet into Russian", *Korean Journal of National Unification* 3 (1994), pp. 79-95.

Russia and The United States^{39,40}

Relations between Russia and the United States, while deeply adversarial throughout the Cold War, have improved to a remarkable degree. Serious domestic political and economic problems continue to absorb most of the energy of the Russian leadership, which is seeking to ensure stability along its turbulent frontiers. Like China, Russia has changed from being a supporter of North Korea against the South to a neighbour desirous of peace in Northeast Asia.

One development which is disturbing Russia's relations with the United States and its allies are Western plans for the expansion of NATO. However, such expansion will occur near Russia's European borders, far from Asia.

While implementation of the bilateral treaties on arms control which are already in force has proceeded as planned, difficulties remain with regard to the ratification of SALT II and the negotiation of SALT III. There are concerns over developments of ballistic missile defence technologies which may not comply with the ABM Treaty. An aspect of ballistic missile defence which may be relevant to the Korean area is the possible deployment of systems for defence against shorter-range (tactical) ballistic missiles, in response to the proliferation of the North Korean missile threat against South Korea and Japan. Although the ABM Treaty was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, now inherited by Russia, it prohibits the transfer of ABM systems to other countries. There are problems concerning the demarcation between defences against ballistic missiles of intercontinental range (which are limited by the ABM Treaty) and defences against missiles of shorter ranges (which are permitted).

³⁹ Odom, *Trial After Triumph*.

⁴⁰ Rozman, *A Regional Approach to Northeast Asia*.

Russia and Japan^{41,42}

Relations between Russia and Japan have generally been antagonistic, beginning in this century with the war of 1904-05 in which Japan captured the Russian naval base in Port Arthur and occupied Russian-held territory in Manchuria. Japan also gained the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which has been a bone of contention between these two countries ever since.

In 1941, at a time when the Soviet Union was concerned over its eastern front and Japan was planning its expansion throughout Asia, the two countries signed a non-aggression pact. This pact was observed until the last days of the Second World War, despite of the fact that the Soviet Union was fighting on the side of the Western Allies in Europe, and Japan against them in Asia. In the last week of the war Russia invaded Manchuria, and occupied the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula, Sakhalin Island, and the Kurile Islands.

After the end of the Second World War, Japan moved into the Western camp while the USSR parted ways with its former Western allies. Japan served as a base for the United Nations operations for the Korean War, while Russia supported North Korea.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has eased the animosity between the two countries, and there has been a modest investment of Japanese capital and expertise in the new Russian Federation. Given the Japanese need for the natural resources of Siberia, there are real incentives for closer economic ties between the two countries. Both Japan and Russia would prefer a stable Korea without weapons of mass destruction. Japan still seeks the return of four of the Kurile Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island (the so-called "Northern Territories") from Russia, and there are disputes regarding fishing rights between the two states.

⁴¹ Masahiko Asada, "Japan and a New Drift toward Confidence Building in the Asia Pacific Region: Retrospect and Prospect", in Bedeski (ed.), *Confidence Building in the North Pacific*, Chapter 7, pp. 121-137.

⁴² Andrew Yan, "Japan's Strategic Role in Northeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era", in Odom, *Trial After Triumph*, Chapter 4, pp. 56-82.

Although Russia has a long eastern coastline, its yearly open seaports are separated from the open Pacific Ocean by the Sea of Japan and the Okhotsk Sea. Farther north, other ports face waters bound by ice during the winter. The southern seaport exits to the Pacific lead between South Korea and Japan (through the Korea Strait), between Japanese Islands, between Japan and southern Sakhalin Island, or between islands of the Kurile chain. It is easy to see why Russia is sensitive to the control of these "choke points".

South Korea and Japan^{43,44}

South Korea shares with North Korea a resentment over its former treatment at the hands of Japan, and has a disagreement with the Japanese government concerning sovereignty over some small islands (the Tok-do or Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan, and the Danjo Islands in the East China Sea). Nevertheless, both South Korea and Japan share concerns over the armaments possessed by North Korea, and wish to retain the presence and backing of the United States in Northeast Asia.

South Korea, Japan and the United States maintain plans for dealing with emergencies in the Korean area. Japanese investment played a significant part in the spectacular growth of the South Korean economy, and investment activity has been followed by an important increase in the volume of trade between these two countries.

Japan would like to see a reunited liberal, democratic, market-oriented Korea, an outcome which would most likely also be sought by South Korea. However, Japan may not be in a hurry to encourage the appearance of another significant economic and military power capable of competing for influence in the Asia of the twenty-first century, particularly if that new state were armed with nuclear weapons.

⁴³ Tetsuro Doshita, "Japan's Involvement in Meeting Proliferation Concerns in the North Pacific", in Bedeski (ed.), *Confidence Building in the North Pacific*, Chapter 11, pp. 187-196.

⁴⁴ Byung-joon Ahn, "Regionalism and the US-Korea-Japan Partnership in the Asia-Pacific", in *US-Korean Relations at a Time of Change*. Report of a conference held in Seoul in September 1994, organized by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, and the Research Institute for National Unification, Seoul. pp. 99-130.

Conclusions

While some coalitions exist among the six principal nations examined in this paper, each state has unique bilateral considerations with regard to each of the others. The history of this region does not provide a promising base on which to promote confidence-building or cooperative measures, although there have recently been some encouraging developments. It seems certain that none of the players will be attracted to disarmament or arms control initiatives unless very reliable measures are put in place to ensure the verification of compliance with any agreements which may be concluded.

The question of the reunification of Korea is a complicated one. Although all of the interested parties express agreement with the ultimate goal of peaceful reunification, they see dangers in any precipitous action and it is by no means clear that they want reunification to occur in the near future.

THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA¹

Xiang Jiagu

Following the end of the Cold War and the bipolar confrontation between the two blocs, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, like those in most other parts of the world, is generally moving towards an environment of relaxation and stability. This has resulted in a number of positive changes.

First, both North and South Korea have adopted a positive attitude concerning the improvement of their relations with the major powers, and have made progress in this regard respectively. South Korea took the lead in breaking the Cold War impasse and established diplomatic relations with Russia and China. The North, for its part, also took positive steps to improve relations with the United States and Japan. The nuclear framework agreement signed by North Korea and the United States on October 21, 1994 signalled that the relationship between the two is shifting from one of antagonism to relaxation. The consultations for the establishment of a liaison office in each other's capital have also registered some progress. At the same time, diplomatic contacts have begun between North Korea and Japan. Sooner or later, diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States as well as Japan will be established. This will add the conclusionary element to the process of ending the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, both North and South Korea are playing greater roles in the issues concerning the Peninsula. In the process leading up to the resolution of the Korean nuclear issue, North Korea succeeded in talking the United States into giving up their idea of sanctions and into negotiating equally with the DPRK, a decision which resulted in the peaceful outcome. South Korea, on the other hand, tends to say no to the United States on a number of issues and seeks to be less dependent on the United States where it deems an issue as vital to its interests.

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the position of the government.

Third, the parties concerned have begun to consider the need for a mechanism which can ensure the maintenance of peace. The existing Armistice Agreement, reached after the Korean War, has helped to maintain balance and stability on the Peninsula. Since 1994, North Korea has pursued the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a "peace agreement" together with the establishment of a new peace mechanism. The reason behind this request is the continual American military support for South Korea and the ongoing joint military exercises between the US and the ROK. Such actions have broken the American commitment to the Armistice Agreement, rendering the Agreement invalid as a peace maintenance arrangement. In April of 1996, the United States and South Korea proposed a four-party peace process. Russia has expressed its support in this regard, and Japan has raised no objection. North Korea is studying this proposal, without saying yes or no, and has demonstrated its interest in hearing an explanation of the intention and the contents of this proposal.² China has expressed the hope that a consensus be could reached through open negotiations concerning such related issues as the pattern of negotiation and its potential participants. China has also demonstrated its willingness to continue to play a constructive role. However, before any new mechanism is agreed upon, the existing Armistice Agreement must be respected by all sides concerned.

In the final analysis, although many differences remain to be ironed out, the parties concerned have manifested greater willingness towards the establishment of a new peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.

Fourth, the goal of non-nuclearization is gradually being put into action. In the Declaration on the Non-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed in December of 1991, both North and South Korea openly declared that they would "not test, manufacture, produce, receive, maintain, stockpile, deploy and use nuclear weapons". The declaration is still valid today and can be viewed as one of the legal bases for the non-nuclearization of the Peninsula.

² Editor's note: The first preparatory meeting for these four power talks occurred in New York on 7 August 1997. Robert Reid, "Korea Talks Fail to Agree on Peace Conference", *Washington Post* (7 August 1997).

A number of concrete steps have been taken following the conclusion of the United States/North Korea Nuclear Framework Agreement. Experts from KEDO have visited North Korea on several occasions for the purpose of possibly setting up a light water reactor.³

On September 27, 1991 President Mr. Bush announced that the United States had decided to withdraw all the nuclear weapons it had deployed in South Korea. On December the 18th, South Korea declared that all the nuclear weapons previously deployed in that country had been withdrawn. Regrettably, the United States has shipped in "Compatriot" missiles which can be deployed with nuclear warheads. Whether the United States will honour its promise to "withdraw all the nuclear weapons it had deployed in South Korea" is still an open question.

The fairly good resolution of the submarine incident last year which had led to some tension among a number of states reflects the policy orientation of parties concerned with the pursuit of stability on the Korean Peninsula. It established a stable basis for the further relaxation of the situation.

However, there remain a number of negative factors which continue to hamper the pursuit of stability on the Korean Peninsula.

First, the lack of trust between North and South Korea hinders the improvement of relations between these two countries. Memories of the wounds of Korean War remain fresh on both sides, and both states remain quite vigilant of one another. This certainly brings a negative influence to bear on the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Second, the lukewarm attitude of the United States toward North Korea is not a helpful element in the improvement of US-DPRK relations and the stabilization of the Peninsula. According to some scholars, with the resolution of the Korean nuclear issue, the United States no longer considers peninsular issues an urgent matter. Its attitude has thus changed from one of engagement to one of passivity. At the same time, North

³ Editor's note: The ground breaking ceremony for the construction of two light water reactors for generating electricity took place on 19 August 1997. Paul Shin, "North, South Korea Break Ground", *Washington Post* (18 August 1997).

Korea maintains that it was the United States which divided the Korean Peninsula and brought the Cold War there. Therefore, direct negotiations with the United States are the only way to solve the principal problem facing the Korean Peninsula. This divide has yet to be overcome by the two parties.

Third, the economic difficulties encountered by North Korea should not be neglected. According to statistical evidence, last year North Korea was once again hit by serious floods. 117 cities and counties suffered from flooding, and the ensuing shortfall in the production of grain has reached 15%-20% of the total grain output for the whole year. This serious situation will undoubtedly affect the well-being of the people of North Korea and eventually the stability of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Fourth, the recent agreement between North Korea and Taiwanese authorities concerning the stockpiling of Taiwanese nuclear waste from Taiwan on the territory of North Korea has created yet another very serious problem. Not only does it raise questions of environmental protection, but it is also a very serious political issue and has led to strong protests from South Korea. Nuclear management is a governmental responsibility for every country in the world. All such transactions are conducted between states. The action which the Taiwanese authorities have taken concerning the disposal of their nuclear waste represents nothing but a concrete demonstration of their attempt to entrench a policy of "two Chinas", or "one China, one Taiwan". This action is designed to undermine relations between China and North Korea and continue to foster obstacles to the improvement and development of relations across the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese government and people are strongly opposed to this move on the part of the Taiwanese authorities and North Korea, and have clearly expressed their opposition to the parties concerned.

What is more, the disposal of nuclear waste must be subject to strict technical requirements. Any mishandling or accident would introduce environmental pollution into the surrounding countries and regions. The Chinese side is therefore highly concerned about this matter.

At the same time, South Korea has strongly demanded that this agreement be annulled. It is said that North Korea plans to bury the nuclear waste in a deserted mine well only some hundreds of miles from South Korea. Now in South Korea, both governmental and the public opinion are completely in agreement concerning the seriousness of this issue. The South Korean government has sworn to do anything possible to stop the transaction. I cannot envisage what kind of reaction South Korea might take if the said agreement is implemented. However, the agreement will certainly increase tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

The Relationship between North and South Korea and the Obstacles to Its Improvement

North and South Korea are the principal parties to the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Their relationship is therefore the most important variable for the resolution of the present situation and the establishment of a stable and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Some progress in relations between them have been made in recent years, but some problems still remain. Decades of political and military confrontation have created an atmosphere of deep mutual distrust, which in turn now constitutes one of the major obstacles to the improvement of North-South relations. It is crucially important for North and South Korea to engage in more contacts, dialogue and exchanges. Such activities would increase levels of mutual understanding and trust, thus gradually improving the relationship and resolving existing problems between the two antagonists.

According to some scholars, both North and South Korea have been enlarging their armaments stockpiles. The South's projected military expenditures from 1996 to 2001 amount to US\$145 billion. Their annual military expenditure is US\$24 billion, out of which US\$4 billion is set aside each year for the purchase of new weapons and equipment from the United States. Moreover, large scale joint military exercises are conducted by South Korea and the United States. The North's military expenditures and levels of armaments cannot match those of the South's. However, the North maintains a quantitative superiority, and more than 60% of its army is deployed in the front area, near the military demarcation line which is only forty kilometres away from the capital

of the South. One million troops from the two sides are presently confronting one another across the Demilitarized Zone.

With regard to the economic situation, little progress has been made in narrowing the gap between the North and the South. There was some assistance from the South to the North last year in the form of rice and the volume of indirect trade between the two Koreas has increased, but a mechanism for full scale economic exchange and cooperation remains to be found.

Diplomatically, it seems that the two sides are still trying to squeeze out and contain one other. On the issue of the DPRK-US Nuclear Framework Agreement and the establishment of a peace mechanism on the Peninsula, the North is always trying to push the South aside. South Korea is seeking to strengthen its negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan in an effort to obstruct the improvement of North Korean relations with the United States and Japan.

A reduction in armaments and personnel would be conducive to the improvement of mutual trust between North and South Korea. If they could reach some agreement in this regard and implement it, such a measure would undoubtedly promote the improvement of the North-South relations.

The Roles and Policy Orientation of Other Countries Concerning the Issues Facing the Korean Peninsula

One of the main characteristics of the post-Cold War international security environment has been the increased significance of regional security issues. Relations between the major powers remain an important ingredient in the security environments of various regions, a fact which is quite evident in Northeast Asia.

It is generally acknowledged that the United States, Japan, Russia and China are the principal major powers whose concerns have a direct bearing upon the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Fortunately, all four powers have expressed their desire to maintain an atmosphere of peace and stability in this region.

The maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula serves as the basic guideline for Chinese policy concerning this region. First, China is concentrating on building its own economy, and the maintenance of a benign security environment on the Korean Peninsula is an essential ingredient for sustained economic growth. Conflict on the Korean Peninsula would directly or indirectly affect Chinese economic development. Second, as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, China is committed to the maintenance of world peace and stability. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is intertwined within the larger Asian context and remains a significant international issue. Efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula may form a part of China's commitment and contribution to the world. Third, the Korean people have suffered from long years of both hot and cold war. As a next-door neighbour and good friend, China would like to see its neighbour enjoy peace and tranquillity.

Obviously, economic growth remains a high priority among the other major powers, all of whom need a peaceful environment and whose security concerns require a peaceful and balanced Korean Peninsula. The maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is both politically and economically beneficial for all the major powers.

In my view, China's approach toward the Korean Peninsula could be characterized by the following three points.

First, there is the issue of the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Such a policy is necessary not only for the prosperity of North and South Korea, but also for the continuation of the process of reform and openness occurring within China.

Second, China wishes to play a constructive role in the "peaceful reunification of the North and the South". This process involves a variety of measures: the support of a process of dialogue between the North and the South, allowing the North and the South to resolve the problem of the Korean Peninsula at their own initiative and will, the support of the non-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and support for the realization of unification through peaceful means.

Third, China wishes to maintain and consolidate its traditional friendship with the North while also developing friendly relations with the South. Any "cross recognition" must be the result of voluntary choices on the part of North and South Korea. Economically, China and South Korea have established a mutually complementary relationship, and a healthy trading and economic relationship between China and North Korea is also developing. Relations between China and North and South Korea are predicated upon the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

The preservation of a cooperative relationship among the major powers is an important element in the attempt to improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Contributions and cooperation are required from all of these powers if their common interests are to be realized. All of the major powers should encourage the process of dialogue between the two Koreas. The process of "cross recognition" should continue. Since Russia and China have recognized South Korea, the United States and Japan should accelerate the pace of improving relations with North Korea. Such a process would imply movement toward the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. However, the present strategic goals of the United States and Japan seem to conflict with those of South Korea. While these states have been intensifying their coordinative efforts, some differences still remain. No matter how they settle these differences, those states which seek to develop their relations with the North solely as a means by which to promote their national strategies will only complicate the resolution of the Korean issue. The military exercises jointly held by the United States and South Korea, particularly the large-scale ones, are not conducive at all to the relaxation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The United States and Korea should begin with efforts aimed at cutting down on the number of such exercises, reducing their scale, and then finally ending such activities.

Meanwhile, initiatives to establish security mechanisms could be considered. Such measures must, of course, be established through a process of full consultations held on the basis of the United Nations Charter and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Confidence building measures could always serve as a starting point for dialogue and cooperation. Naturally, they would require the political will of all parties concerned, particularly those states which would be directly involved. Such political will might not exist for the time being. However, there are

already efforts aimed at building just such a will. In my view, confidence-building measures may begin with measures to increase confidence or trust so as to reduce doubts and suspicion. Such measures could include the gradual withdrawal of military forces on both sides, the reduction of conventional arms and offensive weapons, mutual notifications of military exercises, and periodic communication between North and South Korea.

The Role of Arms Control and Disarmament


Generally speaking, arms control and disarmament measures are conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It is for this reason that they should be encouraged. The most important ones would consist of measures initiated by North and South Korea.

Although the Declaration on the Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is still only a declaration and not an instrument containing legal obligations and procedures for effective verification, it can still serve as a legal basis for the non-nuclearization of this region. It could also comprise part of the effort to establish a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) on the Peninsula. Such endeavours are highly appreciated. The United Nations envisages NWFZs as serving a variety of functions. First, they could establish regional barriers to the outbreak of nuclear war. Second, they could protect regional states from nuclear attack or blackmail by states outside of that region. Finally, they could prevent nuclear competition among those states within the zone. Beyond these immediate objectives, NWFZs can make a global contribution by supporting the process towards the complete abolition of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although both North and South Korea are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NWFZs offer even greater opportunities to restrain nuclear activities. While both seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, there are a number of important differences between the NPT and the existing or planned NWFZs in the South Pacific, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, as well as the 1992 Inter-Korean Agreement on Denuclearization. The following sentences describe some of these differences.

- NWFZs may prevent geographical proliferation. Unlike the NPT, they may ban the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of member states.
- NWFZs may go beyond the NPT in incorporating security assurances, where nuclear weapon states undertake not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against states belonging to a NWFZ.
- Following the South Pacific precedent, NWFZs may go beyond the NPT in banning the dumping of nuclear materials in the oceans bounded by the zone.
- Following the precedent established by the 1992 Denuclearization Agreement between North and South Korea, a NWFZ might ban the production of fissile material within such a zone.
- NWFZ treaties may require long periods of notice for withdrawal, whereas withdrawal from the NPT is possible on a mere three months notice.
- Unlike the NPT, NWFZs are regional confidence building measures. They act in this way by serving as a legal mechanism by which member states may reassure one another as to their peaceful intentions, and also because the very process of creating a NWFZ necessitates mutual regional cooperation. Such processes may foster a habit of dialogue and multilateral cooperation, both of which are necessary conditions to the resolution of other regional security issues.
- NWFZs help marginalize the role of nuclear weapons and thus contribute to the strengthening of global non-proliferation norms.

Other non-proliferation efforts should be encouraged. Those countries outside of the region should honour their commitments to international non-proliferation obligations and exercise restraint in the transfer of nuclear weapons. China has adopted a responsible policy concerning arms transfers and has adhered to three principles in this regard: that the transfer of such weapons should help the recipient country increase its

appropriate defense capacity; that such a transfer must not impair peace and stability either regionally or globally; and that the trade of these weapons should not be used to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. China abides quite strictly by these principles with regard to the Korean Peninsula, which is still a region of tension.



PROBLEMS OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT: A VIEW FROM RUSSIA¹

Vassily Krivokhizha

The last decade of this millennium is increasingly being characterized by obvious qualitative changes in the national and regional balances of power, as well as by the shifting weight of influence as a vehicle for resolving global issues. The sum of these changes suggest that the present level of global and regional development constitutes a period of transition to a new global multipolar architecture, together with the emergence of a new security paradigm for the 21st century.

The overall situation in the Northeast Asian subregion is determined by a variety of regional and global phenomena precipitated by the end of the Cold War. The situation in the subregion could, however, be influenced by a new perception of priorities or "second plan challenges". In this regard, it is necessary to guarantee steady economic development and regional integration. It is also clear that such guarantees can only be implemented through multilateral discussions of regional security problems. Many experts believe that one of the most important and urgent issues for this region is the challenge of supporting an inter-Korean dialogue, as well as addressing the situation on the Korean Peninsula in general. The extraordinary complexity of this problem requires a careful examination of all its aspects. It involves not only the question of the unification of the two Koreas but also touches upon problems in the regional balance of power as well as the vital national security interests of major regional countries, including a number of nuclear club members.

North and South Korean Political Initiatives

The "absorption" principle continues to dominate conceptual approaches to the problem of the unification of North and South Korea. It is also important to keep in mind the fact that since the beginnings of the

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

process of inter-Korean dialogue, both sides have shown an increased interest in finding a compromise which, despite differences in their relative military and economic potential, would ensure a real equality among the two states and establish recognition for their respective political systems. This interest is clearly evidenced in the idea of confederation as elaborated by the North, as well as the concept of a Korean National Community as announced by the South.

The "Great National Consolidation" concept enunciated in 1993 by the late Kim Il-Sung was based on the idea of a confederation of the two Korean states and presented a rather flexible scheme for their unification. This concept took into account the experience of past inter-Korean dialogue and the new environment which had arisen after national-level bilateral talks from 1990 to 1992 resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The concept provided for:

- the creation of a unified confederal state with two distinct social systems and governments. This unified state should be both neutral and non-allied;
- the recognition of each side's ideals, and an insurance of the concepts of coexistence, prosperity and mutual progress despite regional and class differences;
- an end to political confrontation;
- an emphasis upon mutual confidence, together with the elimination of any threat of aggression or absorption which would see one system dominate another; and
- the elimination of obstacles for exchanges and contacts between people and political parties, together with an emphasis upon the value of the continuation of dialogue at all levels.

The "National Community Unification Formula" announced by South Korean President Roh Tae-woo elaborated a somewhat analogous idea of

a transnational community of two Korean countries, and provided for a multistage unification process based upon the accumulation of experience through coexistence.

In 1994 President Kim Young-sam announced the "Three-Phased Unification Formula for Building a Korean National Community" (KNCU formula), thus clarifying some major concepts in South Korea's unification policy. It presented three basic principles:

- the principle of 'independence' — unification should be achieved through the efforts of the Korean people without outside interference. The two Koreas should strive for a unification which was both self-determined and premised upon direct dialogue;
- the principle of 'peace' — unification must be achieved in a peaceful manner, without recourse to war or other violent measures; and
- the principle of 'democracy' — unification should be achieved through a form of democratic integration within which the liberty and rights of every member of the Korean community would be secured.

The KNCU formula proposed a three-phased process of unification:

- In the first phase the two Koreas would recognize one another's system and end their history of mutual hostility and mistrust. At this stage, the two Koreas would maintain peace while still remaining essentially separate. However, they would begin to increase economic, social and cultural cooperation.
- In the second phase, the two states would form a Korean Commonwealth as an interim arrangement toward the goal of unification. During this phase North and South Korea would prepare the legal and institutional groundwork for a unified Korea.

- In the third phase, the two Koreas would integrate their systems within the framework of a single political entity and so create a community of one nation and one people.

South Korea thus views the coexistence of the two Koreas within the structure of a commonwealth as a stage in the process toward total integration. To sum up, an analysis of North and South Korea's attitudes concerning the unification process demonstrate a strong degree of similarity, and share a number of principal goals and approaches. Many experts agree with this statement.

Nonetheless, there exist certain differences between these two countries concerning the most important security issue facing the two Koreas — the normalization of military relations on the Korean Peninsula. The achievement of a military detente is of great importance for a variety of reasons.

- A high concentration of powerful military forces in a geographically limited area consequently invites a high risk of military conflict. There are today more than 1.5 million soldiers stationed on both sides of the border between the North and the South. Furthermore, given American commitments to Seoul, even a small-scale military conflict between the two Korean states could involve American troops stationed in South Korea and Japan as well as the 3rd and 7th US fleets.
- Military confrontations and the ensuing lack of confidence which they would fuel between the two Koreas could lead to a self-sustaining arms race accompanied by economic exhaustion and an uncontrollable increase in social tensions.
- The ongoing military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula inhibits the emergence of a new regional collective security system in Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim.

With these factors together with other issues in mind, the ROK has articulated the following theses:

- the final goal of the arms reduction process is the strengthening of stability on the Korean Peninsula through the establishment of a secure balance of agreed-upon levels of military forces;
- the establishment of such a secure balance must be predicated on the elimination of quantitative differences in military potentials and the pursuit of a mutual and balanced arms reduction process;
- any agreement on military force levels sufficient for self-defence must take into account the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean Peninsula;
- the elimination of the possibility of surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations, together with the reduction of arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, remains a primary task;
- any first phase of the arms reduction process must demonstrate a decrease in the numbers of such offensive armaments as tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, and field artillery;
- the military personnel of both sides may be reduced parallel to other arms reduction efforts;
- foreign troops may be gradually withdrawn in accordance with arms reduction efforts between the North and the South;
- the numbers of military reserve personnel may be reduced simultaneously with reductions in the number of regular troops; and
- strict measure of control should be exercised over any arms reduction effort, including on-site inspections and data exchanges.

Seoul considers that the resumption of direct bilateral talks with the North would be possible only after Pyongyang agrees in principle with these ideas.

The position of the North concerning the terms and procedures of military detente can be summarized by the following preconditions, articulated as early as 1972:

- the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea;
- the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; and
- a reduction of regular military personnel to 100,000 per side.

The present negative attitude on the part of the North to the issues of military detente and reduction is determined in large part by the fact that the army is the only vehicle Pyongyang possesses by which to resolve foreign and domestic problems. Any weakening of this pillar could result in the collapse of the regime.

The Principal Obstacles to an Intra-Korean Dialogue

The present crisis in the process of intra-Korean dialogue is governed by a variety of objective and subjective factors. The principal objective variable is the clear imbalance of power between the North and the South. From their history, it is evident that intra-Korean dialogue has been successful only when both sides "played fair", i.e. observed the principle of the unconditional equality of the two players, where the weaker side was never forced to accept the terms of the stronger one. This fundamental principle has, however, been violated.

At one time Pyongyang outdid Seoul in economic growth. It played a significant role in a variety of regional and even global issues, and enjoyed the support of two nuclear powers — the Soviet Union and China. It was for these reasons that Pyongyang was so adventurous in its proposals to the South concerning the idea of a Korean confederation, as well as other alternatives for the development of an inter-Korean dialogue. Seoul rejected the North's initiatives of that time mainly out of a fear that these measures could have initiated their loss of control over the political situation within South Korea.

The present situation represents a mirror reflection of the past relationship between the two Koreas. The ROK has now become the economic leader on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul has successfully resolved a number of important problems in the foreign policy sphere, including the normalization of relations with Russia and China. South Korea is now a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a significant participant in a variety of regional and international economic forums.

The decline in Pyongyang's influence has been pronounced. The North lost an important diplomatic lever with the international recognition of the two Koreas. Its failure to normalize relations with Washington and Tokyo and to attract foreign investment and technologies represented another setback. The disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the loss of further political and economic support for the regime. Radical changes in the balance of power between the North and the South, together with the death of Kim Il-sung, put the new leaders of North Korea in a very difficult situation and created the conditions for the further isolation of Pyongyang. This not only negatively influenced inter-Korean dialogue, but it also increased the tension on the Korean Peninsula in general.

The progress of inter-Korean dialogue is seriously encumbered both by the unpredictable consequences of these events for discussions concerning unification as well as by the evident unreadiness of both states to accept uncontrolled contact between their two peoples.

The leadership of the DPRK believes that given the present situation, any effort at uncontrolled unification would result in "the suppression of one system by another", something which could lead to a serious inter-Korean conflict. North Korean leaders believe that it is necessary to create a mechanism which could regulate the process of unification so as to prevent any threat to the security and national interests of either of the two sides — even to the extent of ceasing efforts toward unification or returning to initially held positions.

Despite official declarations to the contrary, Seoul's fears are quite similar. This is why South Korea has not yet abrogated a law which forbids contact on the part of South Koreans with their northern

neighbours. Seoul strictly enforces this law, although the United Nations (in 1992), the United States State Department (in 1994) and Amnesty International (in 1995) have all pointed out that it violates human rights. The official position of Seoul is excessively strict in part because the population of the South has no vital need for unification with the North, a factor confirmed by numerous public opinion polls in the ROK.

Some Prospects for the Development of this Situation

The present difficulties in North Korea are creating some difficult choices for the leadership in Pyongyang. They could take steps toward the unification of the North and the South, or they could continue to pursue a policy of "flexible self-isolation", with all of the inevitable ensuing tensions in inter-Korean relations. It seems quite clear that in the short term North Korea is not prepared to deal with a shift in the state ideology, changes to social life or economic reforms. It would appear that the most important thing for Pyongyang at present is to prevent access on the part of the North Korean people to information concerning the ideology and qualitatively different mode of life of the South. The new leadership of the DPRK will adhere to the view that uncontrolled association with Seoul in any form represents a threat to the political stability and security of the existing regime in North Korea, and that such contact would establish preconditions for the absorption of the North by the South. Although Pyongyang is making efforts to respond and adapt to these new conditions, the new leadership can be expected to adopt a conservative attitude regarding any positive steps in the process of inter-Korean dialogue.

Still, there is good reason to believe that the final goal of inter-Korean dialogue — the unification of Korea — continues to remain one of the goals of the new Northern leadership, *but only in the form of a strategic, long-term plan.*

It seems likely that there will be little significant progress in the policies of Pyongyang during the next two years. The principal reason for this is domestic: following the end of the mourning of Kim Il-Sung, the regime must officially elect the new leader of both the party and the country,

as well as effect some rotation in the political leadership and elaborate/ratify a new economic plan.

During this period, the main priority of Pyongyang's foreign policy will be given to the achievement and realization of *tactical goals and tasks*. Among these will be the challenge of normalizing relations with the United States and Japan, optimizing the nuclear program and achieving some mutual understanding with the International Atomic Energy Agency, consolidating political and economic cooperation with China and Russia, and creating an environment conducive to foreign investment for the purpose of stimulating economic development. Together with the new presidential elections in the South, these challenges might ensure a more constructive approach on the part of Pyongyang toward the process of inter-Korean dialogue.

There is reason to believe that Seoul in its turn would also make some effort to revise its policy toward North Korea. It is evident that the leadership of the South did not correctly estimate the situation in Eastern Europe during the post-Cold War period, having believed that it was possible to resolve the Korean problem on the basis of the East European precedent. The desire on the part of Seoul to realize its political, economic and military advantages as quickly as possible ultimately proved to be a serious political miscalculation: the political and economic system of North Korea proved resistant, and Pyongyang consequently played the principal role in discussions with the United States regarding security problems on the Korean Peninsula.

Foreign analysts seeking to forecast the progress of inter-Korean dialogue should recognize that the two Korean states have been in a confrontational relationship for a considerable period of time, and that they cannot easily change their positions for the purpose of achieving some consensus or compromise.

At the same time it should also be pointed out that there is a sound legal basis for further progress in the process of inter-Korean dialogue.

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, signed on December 12, 1991, represented a first attempt at the legal regulation of inter-Korean

cooperation in the political and military spheres, as well as the establishment of a broader cooperative environment between the two countries. It was supplemented in 1992 by the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the two amendments to the Joint Declaration. The adoption of these documents testified to the willingness of both states to comprehend and resolve the problems they faced.

Although no real progress has recently been made in expanding upon this legal framework, its very existence demonstrates a variety of positive elements concerning the bilateral relationship between the two Koreas, as well as broader situation within the region.

- It suggests that the reduction of the risk of war on the Korean peninsula is an important element in the reduction of tension in Northeast Asia.
- It implies that the challenge of ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is an important aspect of the national interest and security of the United States, Russia, China and Japan.
- It suggests that if an agreement on arms reduction is adopted, South Korea must gradually reduce its military potential regardless of the constraining influences of systemic, political or ideological variables.
- It notes that given its economic situation, North Korea has been forced to unilaterally reduce its military potential, and that the continuation of its military rivalry with South Korea could lead to the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. It is the weight of this reality which has compelled North Korea's leadership to engage in clandestine dialogue with representatives of the South, including the "middle level" talks which took place in 1995 between representatives of the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) of South Korea and the Korea Samchonri General Corporation of the North. A second meeting took place in May of 1996 in Beijing, and was conducted "with the blessing

of the PRC leadership and under the regulatory role of the USA".

We can thus say that there are some objective prerequisites for the resumption of the process of inter-Korean dialogue. It is here that external factors could play a positive role.

External Factors in the Development of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

It is quite evident that prospects for inter-Korean dialogue and the situation on the Korean peninsula in general are conditioned not only by the aforementioned domestic factors but also by a variety of external ones. They include the general geopolitical situation in East Asia, and the interests and policies of the leading regional states (the United States, China, Japan and Russia) in Northeast Asia. In their turn, the vicissitudes of inter-Korean affairs influence the relationships among these countries together with their dealings with both North and South Korea.

The "Korean knot" is an integral element in the political and military situation characterizing the Asia-Pacific region as a whole and the Northeast Asian area in particular. The relationship between the two Koreas is of great importance not only as a variable shaping regional security, but also as an ingredient in any forecasts concerning possible future developments in the Asia-Pacific environment. Furthermore, it can also determine future political leaders in the region, and the "Korean game" is played by some states with this very aim in mind.

The Korean problem is of great significance for the *United States*, which is seeking to consolidate its strategic position in the region in light of the possibility that China and Japan might emerge as the new political leaders of Northeast Asia in the 21st century. This concern explains why the United States has been reworking its relations with North Korea: it is seeking to strengthen its ties with this "northern flank" state in addition to maintaining its already firm position in the South. Since 1994, Washington has achieved some definite success in this regard. However, this very success has stirred certain concerns within various other states. The bilateral American-North Korean dialogue has given rise to serious

anxiety and suspiciousness in Seoul. Many Russian and foreign experts consider Washington's initiative to debar Russia from the multilateral talks — something which would create "an isolated channel for strategic cooperation" with China serving as a counterbalance to Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation — as representing a return on the part of Washington to its traditional policy vis-à-vis Russia. Statements on the part of some members of the new American administration concerning American policy in the region have justified this concern. For example, the new American Secretary of Defense W. Cohen declared in the US Senate that taking into account North Korea's threats together with the potential for the development of a crisis in Northeast Asia, the United States "should not only maintain its military presence but expand it".

It is quite obvious that a policy which generates suspicions among countries whose security is dependent in part upon the optimal resolution of the Korean problem can only have negative consequences for the development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

The *Peoples' Republic of China* has had rather stable relations with both North and South Korea, and as a result the Chinese find themselves in a more advantageous position than the Americans. This is why Beijing is conducting a restrained and balanced policy toward the process of inter-Korean dialogue. At the same time, the Chinese leadership believes that the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula has been violated and under these circumstances the inter-Korean dialogue may lead to the "absorption" of the North by the South. This would result in the emergence of a state with the prevailing political and economic influence of the United States or Japan in a traditionally Chinese sphere of influence.

Such a development surely does not meet the interests of Beijing's national security, and China is not interested in witnessing the collapse of North Korea, with all its ensuing consequences. China is obviously interested in reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and in supporting the peaceful and constructive development of inter-Korean dialogue, together with the participation of external guarantors for whom the Korean problem is also a national security concern.

The challenge of reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and stabilizing the process of inter-Korean dialogue are very important goals for *Japan*, as these issues are closely linked to Japan's own national security. Nonetheless, the Japanese position concerning the Korean issue is not a straightforward one. The complex history between Japan and the Korean nation remains a significant political obstacle to the establishment and expansion of contacts with both North and South Korea. The Japanese have for some reason been unable to resolve this tension, something which is often used by both Koreas as a means by which to exert pressure for the purpose of achieving their own political and economic goals. This weakens Japan's position, and Tokyo's policy toward the two Koreas is obviously subordinate to the American strategy concerning the Korean Peninsula. Finally, there is a certain anxiety in Tokyo regarding the potential emergence of a unified Korea, as such a new state could pose a threat to the political and economic interests of Japan in Northeast Asia, as well as the broader Asia-Pacific region. It is for this reason that the continued existence of the two Koreas is preferable from the Japanese perspective. Despite the objective nature of these factors, it is also evident that Japan can positively influence the situation on the Korean Peninsula and that it has a right to participate in any multilateral process concerned with regulating the Korean problem.

As was pointed out above, the real security issue on the Korean Peninsula is that of the mutual security of the two Korean states. While taking into account the objective difficulties in achieving such a goal, it should also be observed that the major powers of Northeast Asia will play an increasingly important role in any attempt to untie this "Korean knot". The only precondition for their effective participation is that of reciprocity in the protection of various national interests and a real desire to resolve one of the most dangerous confrontations in the region.

Russia and the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

The achievement of progress in the process of inter-Korean dialogue is of particular importance for Russia's national security, as the normalization of relations between the South and the North would eliminate a source of constant tension near Russia's borders. This objectively demonstrates the necessity of Russia's active and constructive

participation in the process taking place on the Korean Peninsula. Few sensible policy makers can contest this fact.

Russia's attitude toward the problems of the Korean Peninsula is determined by a variety of objective and subjective factors. There can be no escape from the conclusion that the present political and economic situation in Russia negatively influences Moscow's policy toward the two Koreas. Furthermore, miscalculations on the part of Russian diplomacy during the early years of democratic rule have seriously undermined Russia's ability to exert its influence with regard to the process of inter-Korean dialogue. These facts suggest that Russia should find new approaches to the assessment of the general situation in Northeast Asia, the inter-Korean dialogue and the participants in this process.

It seems that the greatest effort should be directed towards the strengthening of contacts between Russia and North Korea, together with the restoration of good-neighbourly relations with Pyongyang. The resumption of high-level talks aimed at concluding a treaty concerning principles of friendly relations between the Russian Federation and North Korea is of great importance for the two states, and some initial steps have already been made in this regard. A Russian draft of such a treaty was presented to Pyongyang in September of 1995, and the North Korean draft response was received in September of 1996. According to these drafts, bilateral relations would be based upon the principles of mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. In his personal message to Kim Jong-Il in April of 1996, President Boris Yeltsin emphasized that Russia supports the Korean peoples' desire for a peaceful and democratic unification of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, Russia stands for the reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula and constructive dialogue between the North and the South.

Another element in the improvement of relations between Russia and North Korea is the restoration of economic links and the renewal of mutually beneficial agreements between these two countries. There are at present more than forty Russian-North Korean joint ventures in the territory of the Russian Far East. Russian assistance to North Korea for the purpose of exploiting prospective oil and gas deposits under the North Korean shelf have been discussed, and in April of 1996 a bilateral inter-governmental commission on trade and economic, scientific and

technical cooperation was held to further support the expansion of trade opportunities. In November of 1996 an agreement concerning the stimulation and mutual protection of investments was concluded between the two states.

Given its interest in the assurance of its own national security and in eliminating the disparity in its relationship with the two Koreas, Moscow must regulate its military links with Pyongyang according to such principles as reasonable defense sufficiency, commercial interests, and the question of influence over the political and military situation in the subregion. At the same time, Russia's steps should be independent of external subjective factors.

The renewal of the legal basis of Russia's relations with North Korea should conform to the standards of international law, and allow the two countries to develop equal and mutually beneficial relations into the 21st century.

Such a re-establishment of relations between Russia and North Korea would offer Pyongyang a means by which to regulate its internal economic situation and restore political parity to the process of inter-Korean dialogue. Russian-North Korean relations can serve as an important element in the restoration of the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, the violation of which continues to fuel the present crisis facing the progress of inter-Korean dialogue. To put it another way, a new Russian policy towards North Korea would contribute significantly toward the normalization of the process of inter-Korean dialogue.

It is quite evident that the normalization of Russian relations with North Korea should be accompanied by some corrections concerning its relationship with South Korea, firstly in the political sphere. The reason for this lies in the nature of Seoul's policy toward Moscow.

Despite existing legal precedence and active high-level exchanges of views between Russia and South Korea, there are indications that South Korea, whether deliberately or not, uses the potential of bilateral relations between the two countries principally for the purpose of achieving its own aims. The South Korean initiative to establish

quadrilateral talks without Russian participation is a striking example of this approach. Russia has proposed an international conference concerning the security and non-nuclear status of the Korean Peninsula with a large number of participants (the DPRK, the ROK, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency). The South Korean leadership has however sought to raise its own status during the quadrilateral talks while also using Russian concerns to further pursue its own inter-Korean interests, irrespective of Russian security concerns. Despite active efforts to neutralize Russian "discontent", South Korea has failed to persuade Moscow that the saying that "true intentions are judged by deeds and not by words" is an unperceptive one.

The serious violations of declarations made during the early years of the improvement of relations between South Korea and Russia can be traced to Seoul's attitude regarding the development of bilateral economic and trade relations. Despite some increases in levels of mutual trade, there continue to exist artificial constraints in this bilateral cooperation from the South Korean side, as the ROK still refuses to give governmental guarantees to South Korean investment companies seeking to enter the Russian market. The volume of South Korean investments in China is 125 times greater than in Russia (US\$5 billion and US\$40 million respectively).

Taking into account all of the peculiarities of the bilateral relationship between Russia and each of the Korean states, together with the possible development of the situation in Northeast Asia in general, Moscow should pursue the following goals with regard to the Korean Peninsula:

- the strengthening of political and military stability, together with efforts to prevent the emergence of crisis situations and armed conflicts;
- the maintenance of balanced relations, and the development of economic and other forms of mutually beneficial cooperation with both the DPRK and the ROK;
- the support of a constructive dialogue between the two Koreas; and

- the active pursuit of some understanding with China, the United States and Japan for the purpose of finding an acceptable solution to the international aspects of the Korean problem.

Given that the security of the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region are closely interrelated, Russia supports the creation of a new multilateral security regime. Such a regime should be based upon the principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and peaceful coexistence. Particular attention should be paid to those confidence building measures which, given the present situation on the Korean Peninsula, could constitute the basis for a multilateral security regime and create the conditions for the resolution of such complex problems as arms reduction, the creation of non-nuclear zones, etc.

The regional transparency and confidence-building measures used within arms control activities will be difficult to implement here as they discriminate against those states in this region which produce military equipment versus those interested in acquiring them from abroad. If transparency measures could somehow be implemented with regard to the second group of states, producers could hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about making public their inventory.

There is another aspect to this issue. Some of the countries in this region are still using relatively antiquated equipment and could hardly be expected to conduct long-term operations of even a defensive nature against a stronger adversary. Such states would be unwilling to advertise their relative weakness through transparency measures.

Still, given the current situation, more emphasis should be placed upon transparency measures. These measures should include such efforts as the continuation of the practice of high-level bilateral military and political consultations, as well as efforts at openness concerning military doctrine. Transparency measures should also be extended to the acquisition and production of weapons systems critically important to the combat readiness of the armed forces of the region.

Experience demonstrates that high-level consultative activities can serve as an important element in the development of a mechanism for regional

arms control. Such activities assist in this process by enhancing mutual understanding among the parties involved, reducing the potential for hostility, and finally by removing tensions which can periodically reach dangerous thresholds.

These aspects of the challenge of reconciling arms control and national security in the North Pacific have been emphasized in order to better define the potential contribution which such measures as the enhancement of mutual trust, the building of confidence and the preservation of stability can make.

Some arms control effort is necessary for the safe and stable development of this region, particularly given the historical absence of any regional experience of multilateral security cooperation. With this in mind, it is of the utmost importance that China and North Korea be involved in this process.

The adoption of strict measures ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would represent a significant step in promoting stability and mutual trust in the Korean subregion. The United States and the Russian Federation have already taken certain steps in this direction, and there are grounds to hope that China will develop a positive attitude towards such an initiative given Beijing's favourable reaction to the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. Given the ambiguity of North Korea's position regarding such issues as nuclear safety and security, together with the lack of meaningful information concerning the level of its military nuclear research and development activities, dialogue with the DPRK is of utmost importance. The North Korean regime should be assured of the absence of any threat from its more powerful neighbours. Such assurances could underpin the beginning of high-level and constructive negotiations on arms control measures, a process to which Russia is ready to make its contribution.

**PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA THROUGH ARMS CONTROL:
PREVENTING REGIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE¹**

Satoshi Morimoto

Overview

North and South Korea have now deployed more than 1.5 million soldiers along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a strip of land which winds over 250 km through the middle of the Korean Peninsula. This state of confrontation, precipitated by the Cold War, has continued into the post Cold War era.

The issues of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula are deeply intertwined with the national interests of not only North and South Korea, but also the United States, China, Japan and Russia. Consequently, the strained situation on the Peninsula is a serious matter for the entire Northeast Asian region. However, the other nations of the Asia-Pacific region are generally less concerned about the Peninsula than those in Northeast-Asia.

North Korea is principally responsible for the unstable condition on the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, any effort to improve relations on the Korean Peninsula must emphasize the role of the DPRK. Particular attention must be given to the future of Kim Jong-Il's regime, the North Korean Army, and the economic situation within North Korea, including the shortage of food.

Of all its foreign ties, the North Korean regime regards its relationship with the United States as the most important one.

The nuclear development of North Korea has become an increasingly significant concern for the industrialized nations, including the United States, from the late 1980s onwards. The United States and North Korea

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

have recently concluded a Framework Agreement, the terms of which describe the means by which the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will proceed in assisting the North Korean regime through the construction of a light water reactor.

North Korea and the United States are presently engaged in a dialogue concerning missiles, missing American soldiers, and the opening of a trade office between the two countries. Although these talks have demonstrated little progress, both countries share an interest in continuing their negotiations.

Most vigilant nations are concerned as to how the political consequences of the DPRK's Secretary Hwang Jang Yop's defection might influence the North Korean regime. There was also considerable interest as to the anticipated response of North Korea to the Four-way Peace Talks, which were proposed by high-ranking members of the South Korean and American governments in April of 1996.² North Korea has generally attached more importance to supply of food aid, but after Secretary Hwang Jang Yop's defection, North Korea has also reacted positively to the proposed Four-way Peace Talks. Their accedence to these talks was likely based upon the calculation that it would be better not to reject this American proposal so as to maintain the current state of improved relations into the future.

Japanese security strongly depends on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Were the North Korean regime to become destabilized, such a development would induce serious confusions which would fundamentally shake Japanese politics, economy and society. It is for this reason that Japan is very much interested in the situation on the Peninsula. Japan has sought to improve the reliability of the Japanese-American security regime, and together with South Korea and the United States, Japan is seeking to contribute to the formation of an environment of peace and stability on the Peninsula.

² Editor's note: The first preparatory meeting for these four power talks occurred in New York on 7 August 1997. Robert Reid, "Korea Talks Fail to Agree on Peace Conference", *Washington Post* (7 August 1997).

Analysis of the North Korean Situation

Kim Jong-II's manner of political rule follows closely upon the pattern established by Kim II-Sung, and is supported by the army and executives in the party. In this manner, Kim Jong-II enjoys control over the political situation in North Korea.

On the other hand, it is not clear why Kim Jong-II does not take office as President of North Korea or as Secretary-General of the Communist Party, even though he took the position of Chairman of the Defense Committee soon after his father's death. While it is rumoured that he will be given these positions in the latter half of this year, North Korea may not be ready yet for such a transferral of power, given the unstable domestic environment and the country's economic situation.

The North Korean government sought to barter 50,000 tons of grain with Cargill Inc., an American grain trading company, in exchange for attending a briefing concerning the Four-way Peace Talks. However, negotiations with the grain trading firm ended in failure and North Korea consequently did not attend the briefing. Moreover, the North Korean government will be receiving US\$80 million for agreeing to accept Taiwan's radioactive waste into its own country.

While this agreement illustrates the severity of the food situation in North Korea, it does not suggest that North Korea is now predisposed to deal more positively with its neighbouring countries. If his inauguration is going to be held after the 16th of February, the date of Kim Jong-II's birthday, or sometime in July when the three year period of official mourning for Kim II-Sung expires, it is supposed that Kim Jong-II will be compelled to provide sufficient provisions for the populace.

Most Japanese oppose food aid for North Korea, given the prevailing suspicion within Japan that a spy from North Korea kidnapped a girl from the Niigata seashore in 1976. Nevertheless, the Japanese government is now considering food aid as a means by which to prevent the threat of famine and confusion in North Korea and so contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

The defection of North Korean Secretary Hwang Jang Yop must have had a great influence upon Kim Jong-II's regime in North Korea. Prime Minister Kang Sung San was dismissed shortly after Secretary Hwang Jang Yop's defection. Defense Minister Choi Kwang died suddenly after the defection. If these incidents are related to the defection, it could be an indication that members of the North Korean government are trying to purge the regime of individuals who oppose Kim Jong-II's policies. There exists a possibility that efforts are being made to further tighten the reins of control, so that Kim Jong-II's regime will be made stronger in a shorter period of time.

On the other hand, given the evident existence of a considerable number of groups which oppose Kim Jong-II's rule, any such tightening of authority can be expected to result in social confusion in the long-term. In this sense, Secretary Hwang Jang Yop's asylum might represent the early stages of the collapse of the North Korean regime.

There exist, however, other indications that the DPRK is seeking to distance this incident from its foreign relations and is trying to proceed with American, Chinese and South Korean relations in a businesslike manner. The incident has also demonstrated that China is able to exert a powerful influence upon North Korea.

The movements of the North Korean Army represent another source of concern. Since the end of 1995, a variety of unusual actions north of the DMZ on the part of the North Korean Army have been monitored. In 1996, troops from the North Korean Army withdrew from their mission of monitoring the cease-fire line at Panmunjom and invaded the DMZ. In September 1996, a North Korean naval submarine invaded the territorial waters of South Korea, and an effort on the part of North Korean spies to infiltrate South Korea was discovered.

The North Korean Army numbers approximately 1.2 million men, and possesses biological, chemical and missile weapons. Moreover, 80,000 soldiers are members of the DPRK's Special Task Force. The North Korean Army clearly represents a threat to the countries of the Northeast Asian region.

Another Japanese concern are the nuclear and missile development efforts which North Korea has engaged in. If the KEDO project, which is based on the US-North Korean Agreed Framework, is going to make progress, a gradual end to the North Korean nuclear development program is expected. However, a special inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency will not be allowed until the light water reactor promised under the KEDO project is delivered, something which will not occur for eight years. Furthermore, the inspection will not be allowed to examine every nuclear development activity which the North Korean government has engaged in. North Korea has made considerable progress in its missile development program. It has already completed the Nodong 1 (with a range of 1,000 km), and has deployed a number of them. The development of the Tepodong 1 (with a range of 2,000 km) and Tepodong 2 (with a range of 4,000 to 6,000 km) is currently in progress.

Japanese Policy towards the Korean Peninsula

The basis of Japan's policy towards the Korean Peninsula has been to further strengthen its friendship with South Korea, with which it shares common fundamental values.

Japan's ideal future vision for the Korean Peninsula involves:

- progress toward North Korean reform;
- the peaceful unification of South and North Korea; and
- recognition that a unified Korea be based upon the principles of democracy and a market-oriented economic system, similar to the political/economic systems enjoyed by Japan and the United States.

If these goals are to be realized in a peaceful manner, it will be necessary for those countries involved in Korean peninsular politics to cooperate closely with one another. At present, the possibility of the advancement of just such a process must be considered rather low.

However, the possibility that North Korea might invade South Korea must also be considered extremely low too. Such a risky military action could lead to the collapse of both Kim Jong-Il's regime and the North Korean Army. Still, it must be acknowledged that the current food shortage in North Korea could lead to social instability and confusion, thus precipitating a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, North Korea could also engage in acts of terrorism or other destructive manoeuvres through its special task forces.

It is important that we resist any obstruction to the achievement of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula precipitated by confusion within the North Korean regime or society.

To this end, Japan has first been developing a solid and satisfying relationship with South Korea. Both countries are now engaging in close communication and cooperation for the purpose of building peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. This process is similar to the summit conference between Japan and South Korea which was held in January of 1997.

Second, Japan and the United States have been further strengthening the deterrence element of their security regime and have explored means by which to cope with emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula. Both nations are now reconsidering the guidelines for Japanese-US defense cooperation established in 1978.

The Japanese government is also practicing a variety of operations in case of an emergency in the Far East. These operations have simulated the rescue of Japanese citizenry and other refugees from crisis areas, coast guard activities, counterterrorism efforts and a variety of support measures for the United States.

Third, it is necessary to conclude a peace treaty between the two Koreas and normalize the relationship between North Korea and Japan, despite the last suspension of negotiations between these two countries in November of 1993. Japan is willing to resume dialogue with North Korea, but attaches greater importance to its relationship with South Korea. It is for this reason that any Japanese-DPRK links will not be allowed to obstruct Japanese-ROK relations.

Arms Control and Confidence Building on the Korean Peninsula

The principal source of obstructionism in the relationship between the two Koreas is generally taken to be the politically and economically disadvantaged position of North Korea, together with the fear that any dialogue with South Korea would inevitably lead to the ROK assuming a dominant negotiating position. It is for this reason that the sources of North Korean distrust must be addressed before any dialogue between these two countries can begin.

In this regard, it is imperative to inform the North Korean government of Japan's intentions through Track-II dialogue as well as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue forum.

Political as well as moral concerns underlie the necessity of supplying North Korea with food aid. However, there are concerns that this aid would be delivered only to the North Korean Army and the Communist Party, and not the general population. It is for this reason that transparency in food aid delivery is essential if such a cooperative effort is to be carried out. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to channel food aid through the WFP (World Food Planning), with the added assurance of investigations where necessary.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which North Korea is hoping to join, should impose a requirement upon the Pyongyang regime to resume its dialogue with South Korea and fulfil all agreements concluded to date, including the terms of the ARF Chairman Statement.

China can play an important role in encouraging North Korea to develop a more positive attitude regarding the subject of regional stability. China has always asserted that it possesses no real diplomatic or political authority over North Korea, but China is now the only source of support for the North Korean regime. While we should not overestimate China's leverage, it seems clear that China's cooperation is an indispensable element in reshaping North Korean attitudes.

Any proposal for arms control on the Korean Peninsula must contain the following elements:

- It must encourage North Korea to accept the Four-Way Peace Talks, including the dialogue with South Korea through the United Nation's Security Council as well as the ARF and APEC conferences;
- It must persuade North Korea to accept professional investigation and guidance in the amelioration of the food situation, in exchange for food aid supplied by international organizations;
- It must establish an Asia-Pacific regional cooperative organization to support disaster or food crisis delivery in North Korea;
- It must establish a hotline between North and South Korea, and operate a joint patrol in the surrounding maritime region;
- It must ensure the participation of North Korea in the ARF and support dialogue with the North Korean security authorities; and
- It must encourage North Korea to participate in the Northeast-Asia Cooperation Dialogue. To that end, a mission should be dispatched to North Korea to explain the achievements and benefits of the Northeast-Asia Cooperation Dialogue.

BUILDING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE¹

Jing-dong Yuan

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has yet to bring about real changes on the Korean Peninsula. In comparison with the drastic transformation of East-West relations on the European continent from ideological hostility and military confrontation to arms reductions and security building (e.g., the Vienna Document, and the CSCE/OSCE framework), the progress in promoting peace and stability in the Korean context remains slow, sporadic, and on occasion retrogressive. It is true that since the late 1980s a number of encouraging developments have taken place, prominent among which are the simultaneous accession of both North and South Korea to the United Nations in September of 1991, a series of Prime Ministerial meetings between 1990 and 1992 which resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (the 'Basic Agreement'), the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in December of 1991, and more recently, the October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework. However, while these measures address to a certain degree some of the more urgent issues affecting security in this region, significant obstacles remain and impede the objective of achieving lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Indeed, the current situation does not bode well for both the resumption of high-level inter-Korean dialogue or the transition from crisis management to effective arms control and eventually to peace building on the Peninsula. Since the signing of the Agreed Framework, North Korea has followed a policy of excluding South Korea from negotiations concerning arms control and security issues. Pyongyang has attempted to deal with Washington only in addressing the nuclear issue and has refused to engage in North-South dialogue as stipulated in the Agreed Framework; in addition, it also has demanded the replacement of the

¹ The views expressed in this paper are the author's alone.

current Korean Armistice Agreement with a North Korean-American peace treaty by withdrawing its delegation from the Military Armistice Commission (and obliging China to recall its delegation as well), expelling the Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and in the process putting into jeopardy the armistice regime on the Peninsula.² The recent defection of Hwang Jang Yop, a high-ranking North Korean official, to South Korea has cast an even darker shadow over the already rocky Seoul-Pyongyang relationship. This has made it difficult to resume inter-Korean talks, and may be used by North Korea as an excuse to stall such dialogue.³ As the transition of power within North Korea has yet to be completed following the death of Kim Il-sung almost three years ago, this event may further strengthen the hand of hard-liners within the ruling elite in Pyongyang and make any conciliatory move from the DPRK exceedingly difficult, given the country's deep political and economic crisis.

Meanwhile, even as regional powers clearly want to see a positive development on the Peninsula toward greater reconciliation, peace and stability, the extent to which they can influence events is limited. At the same time, it must be recognized that the Korean question comprises part of these countries' respective foreign policies, and promotes an evolving security order in Northeast Asia serving the various national interests of China, Russia, Japan, and Canada.⁴ In this context, an appropriate and workable multilateral approach to peace and stability on the Peninsula is at once both highly desirable and lacking.

However pessimistic this initial assessment appears, there are opportunities which, if seized at opportune moments, can contain any further deterioration of the situation, facilitate the resumption of the process of confidence building, and build upon existing as well as

² Byung-Hyo Choi and Seo-Hang Lee, "Approach to Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia: ROK's Policy", in Seo-Hang Lee, ed., *Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula and the Roles of Regional Power* (Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1996), pp. 86-7.

³ *Washington Times*, (12 February 1997), p. 1; Robin Ajello, "War and Peace: Can Pyongyang swallow a high-level defection and sit down with Seoul?", *Asiaweek* (28 February 1997), pp. 16-8.

⁴ For a discussion of the US perspective, see Todd Rosenblum's contribution to this volume.

introduce new confidence building measures (CBMs). Such measures could gradually precipitate movement toward the designing and putting into place of a long-term security and peace regime which would address politico-economic as well as military issues, with the ultimate goal of eventually achieving the unification which the Korean people both desire and deserve after over fifty years of separation. These conceptual and policy-relevant measures should be firmly grounded first and foremost in the inter-Korean context, with regional powers providing the necessary support and encouragement.

Inter-Korean Relations

The current state of inter-Korean relations is an unfortunate legacy of the Cold War. The artificial demarcation along the 38th parallel following the close of the Second World War prevented the opportunity of national unity. The 1950-53 Korean War resulted in the permanent separation of the Korean nation into two hostile states with diametrically-opposed political and economic systems. The end of the Cold War has had only a minor impact upon the Korean Peninsula, where distrust and animosity remain the defining characteristics of inter-Korean relations. The process generated by the *de facto* mutual recognition by Pyongyang and Seoul of one other's existence and the high-level dialogues leading to the Prime Ministerial meetings of 1990-1992 proved a short one and was effectively terminated by the revelation of North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program and the ensuing crisis. The Agreed Framework, while addressing Washington's (and Seoul's, for that matter) concern over North Korean nuclear proliferation, has failed to be followed by the resumption of inter-Korean high-level contacts, let alone talks.⁵ Indeed, there have been criticisms that the Framework serves as an impediment rather than a window of opportunity in this regard. Pyongyang has been charged with trying to strike a wedge in the United States-South Korean

⁵ See, for example, Man-Kwon Nam, "Security and Arms Control: A Peninsula Approach", in Bon-Hak Koo (ed.), *The Korea/Canada North Pacific Arms Control Workshop: 1995 Proceedings* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, May 1996), pp. 1-2; Samuel S. Kim, "North Korea in 1994: Brinkmanship, Breakdown, and Breakthrough", *Asian Survey* 35:1 (January 1995), pp. 18-23; Manwoo Lee, "North Korea: The Cold War Continues", *Current History* (December 1996), pp. 438-42.

alliance⁶ in addition to undertaking a risky policy to procure political and economic rewards (establishing direct dialogues with Washington, and receiving crude oil and procuring light-water reactors, respectively). In other words, North Korea has received what it wants without any fundamental change in its policies.

On a host of issues ranging from arms control to peace building, the end of the Cold War has brought with it no fundamental change in the policy stances of either Pyongyang or Seoul. The North has continued to stick to its grand-scale disarmament proposal: the reduction of each sides' arms forces to 100,000 troops without taking into consideration reserves, geography, and the yet-to-be resolved nuclear issue. The South, of course, contends that such drastic disarmament measures (from the North's current level of 1,111,000 troops and the South's 750,000 troops) without concurrent and meaningful political and military confidence- and security-building measures are simply unrealistic and could prove destabilizing.⁷ Indeed, Seoul's suspicion concerning Pyongyang's true intentions have been borne out by the latter's secretive nuclear weapons program⁸, although the analysis of the motivations behind the North's pursuit of nuclear weapons may be subject to interpretation and debate.

Underlying South Korea's different approaches to conventional arms reduction is a deeply-held distrust of North Korea's true intentions, coupled with an uncertainty regarding Pyongyang's likely course of action in the years ahead. Given these considerations, a continued emphasis on deterrence, together with concrete proposals for military CBMs and increased political and economic exchanges seem to represent

⁶ Shim Jae Hoon, "Who's Sorry Now?", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (12 December 1996), p. 23.

⁷ Andrew Mack, "North Korea and the Bomb", *Foreign Policy* 83 (Summer 1991), pp. 99-101; Suk Jung Lee and Michael Sheehan, "Building Confidence and Security on the Korean Peninsula", *Contemporary Security Policy* 16:3 (December 1995), pp. 267-98.

⁸ Ronald F. Lehman, "A North Korean Nuclear-Weapons Program: International Implications", *Security Dialogue* 24:3 (September 1993), pp. 257-72; Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula", *Asian Survey* 33:4 (April 1993), pp. 339-59; Darryl Howlett, "Nuclearization or Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula?", *Contemporary Security Policy* 15:2 (August 1994), pp. 174-93.

a policy of assurance and insurance for the government in Seoul.⁹ This line of analysis follows from the assessment of North Korea's past behaviour and the current crisis which Pyongyang is undergoing, together with the consequences such economic difficulties imply for the DPRK regime's survival. In other words, Seoul must base its policy firmly on its ability to foresee a number of likely scenarios and its ability to deal with them.¹⁰

Pyongyang and Seoul are equally far apart with regard to the issue of peace regime-building. North Korea has pushed for the replacement of the current armistice regime with a direct DPRK-US peace treaty.¹¹ Pyongyang argues that the existing armistice mechanism only prolongs the status of separation on the Korean Peninsula and that its removal would facilitate national unity. As previously mentioned, Pyongyang has already moved in the direction of effectively dismantling the current armistice regime by withdrawing its delegation, calling for the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. At the same time, North Korea has insisted on dealing solely with the United States and excluding South Korean participation in any negotiations. It is interesting to note that while Pyongyang seems to imply that the armistice regime stands in the way of inter-Korean negotiations toward national reconciliation and unification, it has not presented any convincing objection as to why the inter-Korean Basic Agreement and a host of bilateral CBMs already in place cannot be used to advance apparently similar objectives.

⁹ Tong Whan Park, "Arms Control between the Two Koreas: Seeking the Path to a Deterrence-Based Détente", *Contemporary Security Policy* 17:1 (April 1996), pp. 113-26; Kan Choi, "Inter-Korean Confidence-Building", *Asian Perspective* 20:2 (Fall-Winter 1996), pp. 91-116.

¹⁰ Chung Min Lee, "Crises and Conflicts Short of War: The Case of Korea," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 8:1 (Summer 1996), pp.31-53; Man-Kwon Nam, "Scenario for Limited Force Deployment Zones (LDZs) in Korea: A Conceptual Development", in Robert E. Bedeski (ed.), *Confidence Building in the North Pacific: New Approaches to the Korean Peninsula in the Multilateral Context* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1996), pp.7-27.

¹¹ Jin-Hyun Paik, "Approach to Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula", in Lee (ed.), *Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula and the Roles of Regional Powers*, pp. 3-21.

Seoul, on the other hand, adopts a different approach for obvious reasons. A fundamental principle remains that any resolution of the difficulties facing the Korean Peninsula must involve the participation of both North and South Korea. Any attempt to exclude South Korea from this process is completely unacceptable. Indeed, South Korean analysts are becoming increasingly concerned with the North's apparent efforts to this effect.¹² Similar concerns are being echoed in Western analyses, suggesting that the United States would be well-advised to confine the mandate of the Agreed Framework solely to the nuclear issue and that any broader security-related issues must involve inter-Korean efforts.¹³ In addition, Seoul believes that the current armistice, however imperfect as it stands now more than forty years after the conclusion of the Korean War, has served a useful function in defusing serious incidents, preventing misunderstandings, and containing potential crises. It should for this reason remain functional until a true peace regime is put into place. The important issue here is to design and build a long-lasting peace rather than to hastily conclude a peace treaty.¹⁴

The different approaches and the divergent policy stances of North and South Korea reflect to a great extent deeper threat perceptions on the part of these two states. By any account, the end of the Cold War has weakened North Korea's position within both the Northeast Asian regional system as well as vis-à-vis South Korea. In the past several years, North Korea has endured a series of events, each one of which could be considered regime threatening. The failing economy has proved to be the most destabilizing element. The *juche* ideology of self-reliance, carried to the extreme and coupled with natural disasters, has essentially bankrupted the economy and endangered the country's very survival. A comparison of the North Korean economy with that of the South, with the DPRK possessing a bare US\$22 billion in GNP as against the South's US\$452 billion, serves to place in sharp focus the deplorable economic circumstances of the North. Recent flooding has caused an estimated

¹² Nam, "Security and Arms Control".

¹³ Scott Snyder, "A Framework for Achieving Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula: Beyond the Geneva Agreement", *Asian Survey* 35:8 (August 1995), pp. 704-10.

¹⁴ Paik, "Approach to Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula".

US\$15 billion in damage and has led to severe food shortages.¹⁵ While the internal economic situation is worsening, the international environment has proven equally difficult for North Korea. Russia and China, Pyongyang's erstwhile allies, are no longer willing to bankroll North Korea and are cutting back on their assistance to the regime. The death of Kim Il-Sung in July of 1994 occurred at a particularly difficult time for North Korea and dealt another blow to the country. The fact that the heir apparent, Kim Jong-Il, has yet to assume supreme leadership speaks volumes regarding the uncertainty surrounding the smoothness of the leadership transition process. Given their apparent weakness vis-à-vis South Korea on virtually every front, from the economy to diplomacy, it becomes possible to imagine how Pyongyang would find it difficult to deal with Seoul directly and would take any opportunity to boost its legitimacy. Such concerns would explain North Korea's apathy toward the South as well as its eagerness for a North Korean-American détente in the wake of the nuclear crisis. An extremely insecure DPRK regime could not be expected to be confidently and actively engaged in expanded contacts with the outside world, let alone with South Korea, if for no other reason than a deep concern for its survival. Placed in this context, North Korea's policy toward South Korea is understandable, even as it casts a shadow over steps toward the building of peace and stability on the Peninsula.

South Korea's perceptions of the North range from the traditional and deeply-held ones of an aggressive, expansionist, and irrational totalitarian state bent on communizing the Korean Peninsula and seeking unification through the use of force, to a more cool-headed, albeit minority view of the DPRK as an alienated, unsure and isolated state struggling to ensure the survival of its regime under difficult security conditions.¹⁶ The policy prescriptions derived from these competing "images" are of crucial importance. The key questions to be asked are whether North Korea will

¹⁵ Lee, "North Korea: The Cold War Continues", p. 438.

¹⁶ These different perceptions of North Korea are summarized in, among others, David C. Kang, "Rethinking North Korea", *Asian Survey* 35:3 (March 1995), pp. 253-67; Denny Roy, "North Korea as an Alienated State", *Survival* 38:4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 22-36; Norman D. Levin, "Feel Their Pain (If You Like), But Watch Their Actions", *Survival* 38:4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 41-3.

be more reckless and risk-taking and therefore highly destabilizing¹⁷ as the traditional view would have us expect, or whether it is less capable of aggressive adventures due to diminishing (or long-lost) "windows of opportunity", and so cannot halt the continuing asymmetry in the inter-Korean economic and military balance.¹⁸ There seems to exist a guarded confidence that precludes the potential for an outbreak of war and instead places more emphasis on preventing low-intensity conflicts or the possibility of a North Korean implosion as a result of economic crises and the breakdown of domestic authority. However, for domestic political reasons, South Korean policy stance toward the North cannot be too accommodating.

The Regional Context

The policies of the three regional powers, China, Japan, and Russia, are at once apparent and not given. Obviously, all would like to see peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, albeit for different reasons. What is certain is that none of these states wants to see a return to confrontation and direct military conflict. Neither are any of these states interested in the collapse of North Korea, with the predictable consequences of massive refugees and chaos. Yet another commonality among the three states is that all seem averse to the use of coercive measures against North Korea. However, other than these concerns, national interests, specifically broader foreign policy considerations with regard to the evolving Northeast Asian security order, will inform and condition the respective policy stances of Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow concerning the Pyongyang government.

¹⁷ South Korea and the United States are increasingly concerned with North Korea's chemical weapons capability, now that both Seoul and Washington have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) while Pyongyang has not. See: Kim Kyung-ho, "N.K. chemical weapons pose renewed threat to South Korea", *The Korea Herald* (26 May 1997), p. 2.

¹⁸ On analyses inclined toward the latter assessment, see: David C. Kang, "Preventive War and North Korea", *Security Studies* 4:2 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 330-64; and Stuart K. Masaki, "The Korean Question: Assessing the Military Balance", *Security Studies* 4:2 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 365-425.

Russia

Russia, one of the erstwhile allies of North Korea, has taken dramatic policy changes with regard to the DPRK since the late 1980s. Despite North Korea's vigorous protests, Russia established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1990. Indeed, there have been suggestions that this perceived desertion by Moscow convinced Pyongyang that it could only trust the assurances of nuclear weapons if it wanted a means to ensure its national security.¹⁹ The Soviet Union, and following its demise, Russia, have drastically reduced economic aid to North Korea and now requires payment in hard currency for the continued supply of such energy sources as crude oil. These developments have, of course, alienated Pyongyang and greatly reduced Moscow's leverage as well as its credibility. Recent gestures on the part of Russia, including a declaration that it would fulfil its obligations under the 1961 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea and come to the aid of North Korea should it be attacked without provocation, as well as a new treaty on Basic Friendly Relations drafted by the Russian side, may prove "too little and too late" for any effort to improve relations between the two states. There exists the possibility that such efforts could be interpreted as simply representing Moscow's political need not to appear too accommodating to American policy interests and ignoring Pyongyang's fundamental concerns.²⁰

Russian policy initiatives toward the Korean Peninsula will to a significant degree probably have to play second fiddle to its more immediate concern regarding the issue of NATO expansion. Moscow has limited influence in this bilateral peninsular context and has opted instead for a multilateral approach. It has called for the convening of an

¹⁹ The DPRK Foreign Ministry released a memorandum stating that should Moscow go ahead with establishing diplomatic relations with Seoul, Pyongyang would have "no other choice but to take measures to provide for ourselves some weapons for which we have so far relied on the alliance". Pyongyang KCNA, in English, 18 September 1990, cited in Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula", p. 342.

²⁰ Kim, "North Korea in 1994", p. 23; Valentin I. Moiseyev, "Russian Position and Perspective on Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula", in Lee (ed.), *Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula and the Roles of Regional Powers*, pp. 71-2.

international conference comprising the so-called eight-party states (the five United Nations Security Council permanent members, the two Koreas and Japan) to discuss CBMs in the military field, but this idea has received only a lukewarm response from Pyongyang. Other proposals, including suggestions for the promotion of the implementation of the inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the reduction of armaments on the Peninsula may serve more as an expression of Russia's interest (or concern) not to be left completely out of the multilateral process of building peninsular peace and stability. If Russia is to enjoy a significant role in such a process, much work must first be done to rebuild the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship.²¹

Japan

Tokyo's policy toward Pyongyang remains hamstrung by the absence of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, Japan's continued alliance with the United States, and its concern regarding the impact (in terms of both scope and pace) of Japanese-North Korean dialogue for Japan's relationship with South Korea. While bilateral negotiations between Japan and North Korea took place from 1991 and 1993, fundamental differences prevented any breakthrough. The revelation of a North Korean nuclear weapons program only confirmed Tokyo's view that the DPRK could not be trusted and indeed continuously poses a most serious threat to Japanese national security.²² These constraints condition Tokyo's policy options. Tokyo does not have the luxury of undertaking policy initiatives regarding the Korean question. If anything, recent Japanese-Korean relations have witnessed increased security dialogue and policy coordination between Tokyo and Seoul, something which may in turn further tie Japan's hands with regard to North Korea.²³ These

²¹ Moisheyev, "Russian Position", pp. 72-9; Sophie Quinn-Judge, "Fancy Footwork: Moscow tries to rebuild ties with Pyongyang", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (27 February 1997), p. 23.

²² Oshima Kenzo, "Japanese Position and Perspective on Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula", in Lee (ed.), *Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula and the Roles of Regional Powers*, pp. 57-59; Eugene Brown, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era", *Asian Survey* 34:5 (May 1994), pp. 437-38.

²³ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's subregional security and defence linkages with ASEANs, South Korea and China in the 1990s", *The Pacific Review* 9:2 (1996), pp. 238-40.

constraints explain why Tokyo's approach to the subject of peninsular stability tend to be multilateral and sub-regional in its conception and practice. The choice of this approach is largely understandable; Japan has yet to outgrow its Tokyo-Washington security relationship and so cannot advance its own vision for regional security without addressing the subtle and painstaking act of balancing governmental concerns in Washington, Seoul, Beijing, and Moscow, not to mention the qualms of the ASEAN countries.²⁴

China

Of the three regional powers, China is viewed as the only one still retaining some, albeit gradually diminishing, influence over North Korea. This influence derives in part from Pyongyang's reliance on Beijing for moral if not material support and Beijing's need to sustain one of the few remaining socialist countries following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the demise of the former Soviet Union. From a security perspective, Beijing continues to regard the issue of stability on the Peninsula as crucially important to its own national interest. There are, however, broader national interests to be served through an effective management of the Korean issue. China increasingly looks to South Korea for expanded trade, investment, and technology transfers. This requires a subtle balancing act which addresses South Korea's security concerns (e.g., North Korea's nuclear weapons program) without unduly alienating North Korea. Beijing's handling of the Hwang Jang Yop defection reflected a conscious effort on the part of the Chinese government to sustain a carefully crafted policy of "equidistance".²⁵ A third consideration is that Beijing increasingly recognizes the utility of using the Korean issue to advance its fundamental national interests on a broader level, including its dealings with the United States. These

²⁴ James Shinn, "Japan as an 'Ordinary Country'", *Current History* (December 1996), pp. 401-07.

²⁵ Shim Jae Hoon, "Man in the Middle", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (27 February 1997), pp. 14-15.

multiple and often competing interests explain to a large extent the equivocal nature of Beijing's Korea policy.²⁶

Beijing's approach toward the Korean nuclear crisis is illustrative of this sometimes contradictory positioning. Notwithstanding its declared position calling for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, Beijing steadfastly objects to the use of coercive measures, including sanctions, against North Korea, as well as any implied threat of veto through a United States-sponsored United Nations Security Council resolution condemning Pyongyang. China has insisted that the parties involved must remain level-headed and seek resolution through negotiation rather than confrontation. China's stance has to a certain degree served Pyongyang's interests: Pyongyang has achieved a sort of breakthrough in direct United States-North Korean talks. However, as long as the general principle of nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula remains compatible with China's overall security interests, Beijing will likely continue its support of the outcomes brought about by the Agreed Framework, although its suggested tactics may be at odds with those preferred by such Western powers as the United States. Indeed, there are strong indications that Beijing is highly interested in seeing the Framework fully implemented.²⁷

China continues to support North Korea's efforts at seeking recognition from the United States and Japan, which it regards as a necessary step toward reducing Pyongyang's sense of isolation and insecurity as well as its concerns regarding legitimacy. In the immediate term, China is concerned with North Korea's internal developments and will understandably oppose any overt actions which could exacerbate the present crisis and lead to the collapse of the DPRK regime. In this regard, China advises assistance on a humanitarian basis and advocates the resumption of economic and political contacts between the two Koreas. Interestingly, China is actually selling its own version of engagement. At the same time, there are identifiable areas of common

²⁶ See, for example, Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu: Chinese Assessments of North Korea", *Asian Survey*, 35:6 (June 1995), pp. 528-45; Robert E. Bedeski, "Sino-Korean Relations: Triangle of Tension, or Balancing a Divided Peninsula?", *International Journal* 50:3 (Summer 1995), pp. 516-38.

²⁷ Garret and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu", pp. 544-45.

interest and understanding between Beijing and Seoul on issue of the role of the armistice regime, the need for direct inter-Korean dialogue, and the undeniable role for the South with regard to the implementation of the Agreed Framework.²⁸ This said, China's support in all of these areas is by no means given; witness the recall of the Chinese delegation from the MAC.

Clearly, collective regional measures will not be easy to come by. Notwithstanding their common interest in seeing a peaceful, stable and eventually unified Korean Peninsula, the extent to which the regional powers can play any constructive role will likely be determined by their respective national interests, policy priorities, and their ability and willingness to expend the necessary politico-economic capital with regard to the Korean issue. If the Agreed Framework represents a "purchase" of nuclear peace as much as a demonstration of political will on the part of the United States, then neither Russia, Japan, nor China are in a position to compete for the lead role. Russia's lack of political credibility in Pyongyang's eyes, coupled with its own economic difficulties, makes it less of a contender in the Korea management game. While Japan enjoys a level of economic prosperity which could assist North Korea's failing economy through trade, investment, and development assistance, it lacks the necessary political channels to carry out such efforts and so must limit its role to the humanitarian sphere through the provision of rice and other emergency relief efforts. China has thus far managed to maintain a workable relationship with both Koreas; however, it has deliberately maintained a policy of aloofness and detachment, ostensibly to retain the maximum flexibility and bargaining chips in dealing with other interested parties.

North Korea's attitude toward participation in multilateral security forums is a significant impediment to collective regional efforts. Pyongyang has in large part shunned even such "track two" initiatives as

²⁸ Ji Guoxing, "Chinese Policy for Peace and Stability in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia", in Lee (ed.), *Peace Regime-Building on the Korean Peninsula and the Role of Regional Powers*, pp. 119-31.

the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).²⁹ It certainly is averse to taking part in the Seoul-proposed "Northeast Asia Security Dialogue". Nor has Pyongyang shown much interest with regard to participation in the "two plus four" process (the two Koreas, plus Russia, Japan, China, and the United States).³⁰ This reticence has so far precluded the multilateral model as a mechanism by which to discuss and pursue solutions to the Korean issue. Recent developments have however evidenced some hopeful signs. North Korea apologized for a submarine intrusion into the South, and Pyongyang has indicated that it would give further study to the American-South Korean proposal for four-party talks (involving the two Koreas, China and the United States). The two Korea Red Cross associations have also reached agreement with regard to the direct shipment of food aid from the South to the North.³¹

Canada and Security Building on the Korean Peninsula

Ottawa's concern in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula stems from a recognition that the growing ties between Asia Pacific and Canada in the areas of trade, investment, and immigration increase the significance of that region's security with regard to Canadian geopolitical and economic interests.³² Canada believes it should and can play an active role in building a framework for addressing regional security issues. Understandably, the avenue that Ottawa advocates is one of

²⁹ There have been some encouraging developments of late. North Korea sent two representatives to the January 1997 CSCAP meeting. Pyongyang also joined the briefing session involving the US, South Korea, and North Korea in New York this past March. I am grateful to Dr. Kyung-Ae Park for drawing my attention to these developments.

³⁰ Editor's note: The first preparatory meeting for these four power talks occurred in New York on 7 August 1997. Robert Reid, "Korea Talks Fail to Agree on Peace Conference", *Washington Post* (7 August 1997).

³¹ Tim Healy and Laxmi Nakarmi, "Closer to Peace Talks", *Asiaweek* (17 January 1997), pp. 21, 24; Nigel Holloway, "Forced to the Table", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (20 March 1997), p. 16; and *The Korea Herald* (27 May 1997), p. 1.

³² Paul M. Evans, "The Emergence of Eastern Asia and Its Implications for Canada", *International Journal* 47:3 (Summer 1992), pp. 504-28; and Brian L. Job and Frank Langdon, "Canada and the Pacific," in Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule (eds.), *Canada among Nations 1993-94: Global Jeopardy* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), pp. 266-94.

multilateralism and cooperative security.³³ Equally important are such arms control measures as confidence building, verification, and transparency, all of which can contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and should comprise key elements of any such process.

Multilateralism and Cooperative Security

The genesis of this approach lies in a belief that the post-Cold War environment requires both a reassessment and a movement beyond of the traditional notion of security as comprising the state's ability to defend itself against external military threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such a reassessment must introduce a concept of cooperative security which envisages a process of multilateral institution building through dialogue, confidence building and preventive diplomacy. It should demonstrate how multilateralism, with its key principles of nondiscrimination, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity, encourages and facilitates international cooperation. Multilateralism has long been credited with promoting international cooperation in trade (e.g., GATT/WTO). It has of late also attracted considerable attention among policy makers and academia alike as a useful approach in dealing with both traditional security and emerging non-traditional security issues. Such methods have explored the following activities:

- dialogue at both the governmental (Track I) and non-governmental (Track II) levels;
- confidence building efforts, including both traditional and minimalist concerns regarding access to military information, as well as potentially more fruitful transformational activities designed to engender among policy makers some fundamental (albeit gradual) changes in their conceptualization of security as well as the means for its preservation;
- preventive diplomacy; and

³³ Stewart Henderson, "Zone of Uncertainty: Canada and the Security Architecture in Asia Pacific", *Canadian Foreign Policy* 1:1 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 103-20.

- conflict management and/or resolution within the parameters of agreed-upon norms and established procedures.

These methods reflect a genuine belief that, together with serious effort and through regularized dialogues and institution-building activities, existing (and potential) regional conflicts can be more effectively managed — if not resolved — without recourse to threats or coercion.

While Canada remains mindful of the fact that the absence of multilateral alliances in the Asia Pacific area has left it with few building blocks from which to reorient the post-Cold War regional security structure, it has been equally cognizant of the fact that the unique setting of the Asia Pacific region suggested that efforts towards multilateralism should take into consideration the region's particular characteristics. It is the spirit of the European/CSCE models rather than the models themselves which presents an alternative and in the long term more viable means by which to promote security in this region. Indeed, the Canadian North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue initiative took as its point of departure an acknowledgement that the Asia Pacific region is different from the European environment. It has therefore advocated a gradual approach, emphasizing dialogue and inclusive participation rather than the direct transplant of institutions as its initial focus. The project deliberately "envisioned a more gradual approach to developing multilateral institutions, recognized the value of existing bilateral arrangements, and encouraged ad hoc, informal dialogues (habits of dialogues), and inclusive participation until conditions mature for more formal institution-building."³⁴ In such contexts, both CSCAP and the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) can serve as useful multilateral fora by which to engage North Korea, and Canada has been playing an active facilitating role in this regard.

Confidence Building Measures

Confidence building measures (CBMs) are an important element in multilateral cooperative security efforts, both as a process and product. The process of confidence building is well under way in the Asia-Pacific

³⁴ David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security", *The Pacific Review* 7:1 (1994), pp. 1-15.

context, although one should take note of the fact that not until the early 1990s have there been a number of proposals for regional security frameworks and only since then has there existed a general trend toward discussing how confidence building could be usefully applied in the promotion of cooperation on regional security issues. Today, there are a multitude of security dialogues at various levels, alternatively described as "multiplex", "multi-layered", or "multifaceted" activities designed to promote confidence building.³⁵ Given their relatively recent nature (compared, for example, with the CSCE/OSCE process, which has been more than twenty years in the making), it is understandable that Asia-Pacific confidence building efforts remain at the stage of formulating and implementing CBMs for the management of existing and/or potential conflicts. Still, the very process (e.g., the ASEAN Regional Forum, and various Inter-Sessional Group workshops) is clearly in the interest of regional peace, security, and stability. In the Korean context, CBMs should focus on their traditional objective of reducing military conflicts due to misunderstandings and distrust, as well as gradually move toward supporting greater inter-Korean political and economic contacts.

Verification

Verification activities, including on-site inspections (OSI) and transparency measures, comprise an important element in the process of confidence building and CBMs. This is equally true for regional security frameworks and arms control and disarmament activities in general. In the latter case, one may suggest that the very success of all non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) agreements are dependant upon the compliance of all parties, both in spirit and in letter. As a recent study suggests, "an arms control verification regime consists of the totality of measures, procedures and methods for acquiring the information necessary to assure compliance, deter non-compliance and/or resolve ambiguous events on the part of the parties to an arms control

³⁵ Paul M. Evans, "The Dialogue Process on Asia Pacific Security Issues: Inventory and Analysis", in Evans (ed.), *Studying Asia Pacific Security* (Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 1994), pp. 297-316.

agreement".³⁶ Verification itself does not imply distrust; rather, it is both a norm enforcer and a confidence building measure. The key challenge lies in understanding how to use various verification mechanisms in the least intrusive and least expensive way so as to achieve the maximum benefit in collecting that data which is most relevant to the reliable and accurate assessment of compliance with the agreement in question.

Transparency

Transparency constitutes another important element of confidence building activities. As Alan Crawford has suggested, the concept of transparency can be both narrow, focusing exclusively on exchanges of information about military activities, and broad, referring to the availability of information on all security-related matters.³⁷ Recent years have seen a number of initiatives aimed at increasing transparency in military issues as well as in the wider sphere of security. States may make their security-related activities more transparent by publishing defense white papers and providing accountable, itemized defense budget information. However, such measures are few and far between, and the notion of transparency has yet to overcome the still strong resistance among many states against exposing "secrets", the protection of which is regarded as imperative for the purpose of protecting national security. It must also be emphasized that transparency must be seen as a process, the aim of which is not so much to access exhaustive amounts of information concerning things military than it is to demonstrate the willingness (or the lack thereof) to share information for the purpose of promoting trust and building confidence.

In the Korean context, Canadian initiatives have produced mixed results. Canada and South Korea hold annual arms control workshops, the membership of which has expanded from participants belonging to the original two states to now include participants from all regional powers. Broad conceptual analyses of Korean security issues and specific arms

³⁶ Patricia Bliss McFate, et al., *The Converging Roles of Arms Control Verification, Confidence-Building Measures, and Peace Operations: Opportunities for Harmonization and Synergies* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), 1994.

³⁷ Alan Crawford, "Transparency and the NACD Process", mimeo, January 1997.

control and confidence building measures are exchanged between academics and government officials. There are no lack of proposals covering a wide range of issues of concern to the Koreans as well as the other interested parties. However, the one noticeable omission remains the absence of North Korean representation at these gatherings. Unless and until the North Koreans take part, peace and security building efforts will remain at the discussion stage. While Canada has had contacts with North Korea in the form of exchanges of visits, these contacts remain both non-official and few and far between. Given Canada's limited resources, its role will continue to reside mainly in generating ideas and canvassing for support for its multilateral approach to arms control and security building from among the regional powers.

Looking into the Future: Challenges and Opportunities

The US-DPRK Agreed Framework has attenuated if not completely removed the nuclear issue from the peninsular scene. The challenge, however, of faithfully implementing the provisions of the accord and facilitating the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue remains a concern. It has been suggested that the obligation for their implementation rests as much upon North Korea as it does upon the United States. Indeed, one of the arguments being put forth suggests that the subject of peninsular nuclear weapons proliferation is a symptom rather than the cause of insecurity in this region, and should be addressed as such. Any package deal, such as the Agreed Framework, should serve as a means by which to "lure" North Korea away from the nuclear gamble and serve as a building block for the improvement of inter-Korean relations.³⁸ This leads into the medium-term task — encouraging the two Koreas to implement the arms control and confidence building provisions provided for in both the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration. It is through such efforts that a long-term and lasting peace is possible, a peace that could eventually pave the way to national reconciliation and reunification.

³⁸ Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea", *International Security* 20:2 (Fall 1995), pp. 92-122; and, Selig S. Harrison, "As North Korea Liberalises, Sanctions Should Be Eased", *Survival* 38:4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 37-40.


However, obstacles still stand in the way of the achievement of these objectives. North Korea remains a country of insecurity and paranoia, and the widening gap between the North and South in terms of military and economic capabilities only intensifies such fears. At the same time, the transition of political power within North Korea has yet to be completed, and concerns regarding regime legitimacy and survival will preclude the issuance of any policy initiative from Pyongyang which appears accommodating. Taken as a whole, the Korean Peninsula appears to lack the necessary conditions under which confidence building could transform the security perspectives of the parties concerned.³⁹ Patience is therefore necessary.

Obviously, efforts should be made to dispel concerns within Pyongyang that the rest of the region is awaiting and even working towards its collapse. The violent demise of the DPRK regime is hardly in the interest of all concerned parties. The Geneva Accord has demonstrated a resolve on the part of the international community to seriously address the nuclear issue; concerted efforts to confront Pyongyang's sense of alienation and insecurity should be equally resolute. It is here that Canadian idea of cooperative security, that is, the pursuit of security with rather than against one's potential adversaries, must be explained to the DPRK. Pyongyang's concerns regarding regime survival should be appreciated but not tolerated as an excuse for irresponsible actions. Eventually, it is the linkage between humanitarian aid, gradual and expanding economic contacts, and a mutual understanding that interdependence and dialogue can promote political trust that will provide the key to untying the knot of insecurity and fear which characterize this region.

³⁹ James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996).

SECTION II:

**ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
THE VIEW FROM WITHIN**



PERSPECTIVES FROM INSIDE THE PENINSULA¹

James Bayer

The aim of this presentation is to outline the positions of North and South Korea on issues of conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula and to assess the extent to which there exists a common basis for agreement between them. The first section of the paper, which compares the positions of North and South Korea towards conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula, is based on three short papers written by regional experts expressly for the North Pacific Arms Control Workshop. These include Bon Hak Koo's *"Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula: A South Korean Perspective"*; Hideya Kurata's *"Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula Through Arms Control: North Korea's Perspective"*, and Kim Myong Chol's *"The DPRK's Perspectives on Arms Control"*. The comparative analysis in the first section is structured around a series of key issues. These include:

- determining what each side sees to be the desirable state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula;
- determining what either side sees as being the key issues that must be resolved in order to allow for arms control negotiations to begin;
- outlining the conventional arms control measures proposed by each side to reduce tensions within the area, including weapons of mass destruction;
- assessing the attitude of both sides towards verification; and
- determining the role which both parties feel other powers in the region can play in helping to achieve inter-Korean reconciliation.

¹ The views as expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

The second section of the paper examines a number of critical obstacles to arms control on the Korean Peninsula and assesses the prospects for agreement in light of the major differences between North and South Korea.

Conventional Arms Control: The View from North and South Korea

The Desirable State of Affairs on the Korean Peninsula

North and South Korea have both expressed the view that the most desirable state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula would be one in which there was a reduction in tensions, a return to peace and stability, and the eventual unification of that divided nation. Moreover, both see arms control as a critical means by which to achieve these ends. Agreement on this notwithstanding, each is also firmly convinced that the other is not seriously intent on working cooperatively to achieve these goals. The South believes that Kim Jong-Il has no interest in seeking Korean unification, except through the use of North Korean arms, and that he has no intention of entering into serious arms control negotiations for fear of undermining the survivability of his regime. At the other extreme, the North is equally convinced that, for reasons of self-preservation, the regime in the South has no real interest in unification or arms control except for propaganda purposes. They see the existence of the South as dependent on militarism, anti-communism, political coercion, and the presence of American military forces, and they believe that arms control negotiations would eventually deprive that regime of the American presence, its mantle of legitimacy, and its *raison d'être*. The suspicions concerning intentions and the denials of legitimacy which mark each side's perception of the other have critical implications for the future of arms control on the Korean Peninsula.

Issues Requiring Resolution Prior to Arms Control Negotiations

Both North and South Korea hold out arms control as the principal means by which to diffuse tensions, promote peace and stability, and bring about the eventual political unification of the Korean Peninsula. At

the same time both sides have a lengthy list of prerequisites and issues which must be met or resolved before arms control negotiations can be started. Yet there is no common agreement on what these issues are. More often than not, they reflect the long held suspicions, deep ideological divisions, and bitter grievances that have characterized relations between the two since the Korean war.

The issues which the North Koreans want resolved before they agree to conventional arms control negotiations with the South Koreans include:

- the signing of a peace treaty between the United States and North Korea which would replace the 1953 Armistice;
- the normalization of US-North Korean relations, as called for in the 1994 Framework Agreement;
- the formation of a "coalition government" in South Korea that is not hostile to North Korea; and
- measures for South Korea to be given operational control over its own armed forces.

These demands could serve as a permanent block to the opening of North-South conventional arms control negotiations, for they reflect perceptions and attitudes that are difficult to reconcile with reality. These include the assumption that it is American troops stationed in South Korea which are responsible for the tensions in and division of the Korean Peninsula; that it is the US forces which represent the major threat to the DPRK; that South Korean forces are structured so as to supplement American forces; and that it is the presence of American forces in the South that requires Pyongyang to divert all available resource to the modernization of its armed forces, the arming of its whole population and the development of its strategic missile forces. The North's preconditions for negotiations also reflect the belief that the American-backed regime in Seoul would continue to promote confrontation with the North and reject arms control proposals that could introduce peace and stability on the Peninsula until such time as American power was either removed, reduced or neutralized by a bilateral US-DPRK peace treaty which would bring an end to the Korean

war. Finally, their demands reflect the assumption that once a peace treaty robbed the United States of its pretext to keep forces in South Korea and deprived the puppet regime in Seoul of its *raison d'être*, a more independent government possessing the confidence to enter into serious arms control negotiations with the DPRK would be likely to emerge in the ROK.

The issues which the South Koreans want resolved before they agree to conventional arms control negotiations with the North are equally formidable in scope and number. They insist that:

- North Korea must alter its political system, end its military aggressiveness towards the South, and renounce its policy to reunify the Peninsula by force;
- North Korea must accept the South Korean government as a legitimate and equal arms control negotiating partner and abandon its policy of trying to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea; and
- Pyongyang must agree to participate in Four Party negotiations that include China, the United States, the DPRK and the ROK, for the purpose of concluding a peace treaty to replace the 1953 Armistice which ended the Korean war.

The South Korean preconditions for negotiations also reflect a basic view of the world that could prove problematic in terms future arms talks with the North. The South insists that arms control negotiations are not possible until the North alters its political system to one that is less hostile towards the South. However, from the South's perspective, the chances of Pyongyang doing this are next to zero because such a move would undermine the power base of the ruling elite and result in a situation that would seriously challenge the stability and survivability of the present regime. Since no regime would jeopardize its survival simply to promote arms control, the South argues that there is only one conclusion to be drawn: that North Korean arms control proposals are put forward for propaganda purposes only, and not from a genuine desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement which would reduce tensions and increase stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Conventional Arms Control Measures Outlined by Either Side

The lack of progress in conventional arms control between North and South Korea is not for want of official proposals. Over the last twenty years, both sides have made a series of detailed proposals aimed at reducing armaments and building mutual confidence in what is now the most dangerously armed region on the planet.

In North Korea's view, a number of substantive arms control measures could be implemented by the South-North Joint Military Committee, under the terms of the 1992 North South Basic Agreement, once the United States signs a peace treaty with the North and a less anti-Pyongyang government comes to power in the South. The arms control measures proposed by North generally fall into two broad categories: those that would need to be put into place in the early stages of building an arms control regime for the Korean Peninsula, and those that would be put in place over a longer period of time.

The immediate measures proposed by the North generally relate to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the 38th parallel and involve operational and structural arms control measures aimed at increasing mutual confidence and reducing the threat of war through miscalculation or misperception. They include:

- the detargeting of all missiles aimed by one side at the other;
- the removal of artillery and rockets from the border area;
- the dismantling of all military equipment and facilities in and along the DMZ;
- the removal of all mines from the DMZ and adjacent areas; and
- the ending of all military manoeuvres.

The longer term measures proposed by Pyongyang focus on a four step plan to reduce troop strengths to a ceiling of 100,000 over a ten year time period. The four steps are:

- Year I: both sides make internal preparations to assist those sectors and interest groups that are most likely to be adversely affected by dramatic force reductions;
- Year II-IV: both sides reduce forces to a common ceiling of 300,000;
- Year V-VII: both sides reduce force to a common ceiling of 200,000;
- Year VIII-X both sides reduce forces to a base level of 100,000.

The proposal does not address the question of American forces presumably because the issue would already have been resolved in bilateral peace negotiations with the United States.

The South Korean proposals for conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula differ in a wide variety of ways from those put forward by the North. Generally speaking, the South Korean approach to arms control is much more graduated and deliberate than the North's. Seoul places a much greater emphasis on the need to implement perceptual arms control measures in the early stages of building an arms control regime for the Peninsula. Perceptual arms control measures differ from operational or structural measures in that they are intended to increase transparency and build mutual confidence but do not involve the placing of constraints or limits on the possession or use of military forces. Perceptual arms control is an attractive approach to arms control between two highly antagonistic states engaged in the early stages of negotiations because it allows each adversary to test the other's sincerity without undue risk to the balance of power, strategic stability, or national security. The perceptual measures proposed by the South Koreans include:

- prior notification and cross border observation of military movements and manoeuvres;
- exchange visits by top ranking military leaders;
- the exchange of information and data with regard to size and structure of military forces; and

- the establishment of a hot line between the two capitals.

These perceptual arms control measures would be followed by operational measures focused mainly on the DMZ and aimed at decreasing tensions and at increasing stability and transparency in this highly volatile region. It is here that one can find the greatest similarity between the proposals put forward by North Korea and those put forward by the South. The South Korean proposals have included:

- a prohibition on any increase in armaments in the DMZ;
- true demilitarization of the DMZ through the removal of all military equipment from the zone;
- the establishment of deployment limitation zones outside the DMZ; and
- a security assurance to cover each other's capital region.

The South Koreans, like the North, also see the final step in building a conventional arms control regime for the Peninsula as one which focuses on structural arms control measures. But unlike the North Korean plan, which focuses exclusively on manpower reductions, the South Korean proposal is centred on the reduction of offensive weapons. From Seoul's perspective, a reduction of offensive weapons represented a more effective means by which to prevent a surprise attack and introduce stability and predictability into the North-South arms competition.

Specifically, the South Korean proposal calls for selective armament reductions in two phases.

- The first phase requires North Korea to reduce its offensive weapons systems down to levels equal to those in the South. The categories of offensive weapons to be reduced appear to be the same as those reduced under the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement. These fell into five distinct categories: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft.

- The second phase entails equal reductions in offensive weapons capabilities down to mutually agreed-upon common ceilings.

A structural arms control regime which focused exclusively on the reduction of manpower was seen by the South as favouring Kim Jong-Il's forces. As long as the issue of North Korean military equipment remained unaddressed, there would always be a grave risk that Kim might suddenly re-mobilize his troops and launch a decisive surprise attack against the South. In such circumstances the defeat of South Korea would be certain.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

This was not an issue which either side stressed in the context of conventional arms control proposals. This could be partly due to the fact that chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are the subjects of major international treaties like the BWC, CWC and NPT, as well as the fact that the question of North Korean nuclear weapons was covered by the US-DPRK October 1994 Nuclear Framework Agreement. The North Korean position is that weapons of mass destruction should not be an issue with South Korea as neither side possessed them, although Pyongyang indicated that it was keeping open its option to build nuclear weapons should the United States not live up to the terms of the Framework Agreement. In the meantime, Pyongyang favoured the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone on the Korean Peninsula, presumably as a means by which to keep American nuclear weapons out of the region.

The South Korean position on weapons of mass destruction is less sanguine. Seoul clearly suspects the North of having a chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capability and feels that the elimination of this capability is essential to the establishment of security and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Yet there is little discussion on how or when this should be done beyond the fact that it must be carried out either bilaterally, using the North-South Denuclearization Agreement, the North-South Basic Agreement, and the US-DPRK Framework Agreement, or multilaterally, using international treaties such as the CWC, BWC, and the NPT.

Verification

North and South Korea appear to be in agreement on the broad measures and techniques that would be required to verify a conventional arms control treaty involving significant operational restraints and force reductions. The North sees it as the task of the Joint Military Commission and the Military Committee, established by the 1992 Basic Agreement to develop, implement and verify arms control measures for the Korean Peninsula. They also recognize that to verify such a treaty at the high level of confidence required would necessitate the use of a variety of techniques, including on-site inspection and satellite reconnaissance. Specifically, the North Koreans have proposed:

- On-site inspection by joint teams of North-South observers to verify the dismantling of military bases in the DMZ;
- UN observers to monitor troop reductions;
- International (neutral) observers to monitor the reduction of military facilities, bases and mines; and
- US, French and Russian "spy satellites" to assist in the overall monitoring of the agreement.

The acceptance of third party intelligence by the North was particularly surprising, given Pyongyang's extreme reaction to the IAEA's use of third party intelligence regarding the nuclear question of 1993.

The South Korean proposals on verification are not as specific as those put forward by Pyongyang, but they appear to be in general accord with at least the spirit of the North Korean proposals. There is a recognition that the Joint Military Commission and the North-South Military Committee would serve not only as the official bodies for developing conventional arms control proposals but also for devising and implementing the necessary verification measures. The South Koreans also agree that the verification techniques and measures required by a treaty involving radical reductions in equipment or manpower would have to be as detailed and intrusive as those contained within the CFE Treaty.

Role of Outside Powers

Both the North and South envisage nations outside of the Peninsula as having a role to play in conventional arms control negotiation — if not directly, then at least in helping to create the conditions necessary for such talks to take place. From the North Korean perspective, the most important extra-peninsular player in terms of helping to realize the preconditions necessary for negotiations is the United States. Its significance is seen to stem from a number of factors: South Korea's historical dependence upon the United States; Washington's alleged responsibility for the division of the Korean Peninsula; the 37,000 American troops stationed in South Korea, and the United States' superpower status in the Pacific region. Other regional powers are seen as having a far less critical role to play. Japan is viewed as having a possible role in helping to broker peace between the United States and North Korea, but only after Tokyo apologizes and compensates North Korea for past misdeeds and Japanese atrocities. Pyongyang sees China and Russia as having no role to play in negotiations other than to support the goal of reconciliation between North and South Korea. Opposition to Chinese participation in peace talks with the United States appears anchored in the concern that it would dilute the stature and prestige which the North stands to gain through a one on one agreement negotiated with Washington.

From the South Korean perspective, the United States and China have a major role to play in helping to create the conditions necessary for arms control on the Korean Peninsula, particularly with regard to the Four Power talks to negotiate a peace treaty to end the Korean War. Beijing's participation in these talks is not only seen as necessary in view of China's status as a regional power and its role a major combatant during the Korean War, but also desirable in light of its perceived ability to exercise a moderating influence on North Korea should Pyongyang become extreme and intransigent during the negotiations. The participation of the United States in the talks is viewed as essential, given America's leadership role in defending South Korea during and after the Korean War, its stake in the balance of power in the North Pacific region, and its ability to offer North Korea the commercial and diplomatic rewards it so adamantly desires. Other regional powers like Russia and Japan are seen as having a primarily passive role to play,

supporting the notion of quadripartite peace talks rather than the bilateral talks desired by the North Koreans.

Prospects for Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

In order to gain a realistic perspective on the current prospects for arms control on the Korean Peninsula and the changes that would be required before progress can be made, it would be valuable to review the general aims and objectives of arms control, as well as some of the prerequisites for and obstacles to its success. This is necessary in order to avoid setting goals for arms control that are unrealistic, and which in turn could result in decision makers and the public becoming disenchanted with the process. Arms control must not be held up to be something it was never intended to be, any more than it should be condemned for not achieving results it was never intended to achieve.

Arms control has been defined as comprising mutually agreed measures to constrain capabilities, intentions, and the use of military forces between hostile countries. Arms control is not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. This end is to maintain a balance of power by introducing restraint, predictability and transparency into the arms competition of rival states. As such, arms control is only one of several techniques used by states to maintain the balance of power. The other technique most widely used to reinforce the balance of power is the use of military force to deter or defeat aggression. A number basic prerequisites must be present for arms control negotiations to work:

- no one member within the system can have as its foreign policy objective the destruction of the balance of power system;
- each member of the system must recognize the right of others within the system to exist;
- a nation should not be left in a weaker position relative to its adversaries as a consequence of an arms agreement than it was before the treaty was negotiated;

- arms control measures should not seek to undermine national security or relegate an adversary to a position of permanent military inferiority; and
- arms control measures must complement rather than compete with other techniques used to maintain the balance of power, particularly military policy. The desire for arms limitation, for example, must not undermine the requirements for stable minimum deterrence, while weapons acquisition policy must not determine the scope and limits of arms control policy.

Indeed, if arms control negotiations are to be successful, they must satisfy the security needs of all the parties involved, and not just one.

The proposals put forward by North and South Korea violate so many of these basic prerequisites that agreement will be impossible unless attitudes change and compromises can be found. One of the most serious breaches relates to the relationship between arms control and the balance of power. Inherent in the ability of arms control to reduce tensions and stabilize a regional or global balance of power is the assumption that those entering into negotiations have a *de facto* desire to preserve the balance of power system of which they are a part, and that their foreign policy objective is not the destruction of the other side's political, social, or economic system. This means that until a minimum degree of political reconciliation is reached whereby the protagonists can accept the balance of power system together with the right of the other side to exist, there can be no arms control arrangements between them beyond the possibility of crisis management agreements. It would make little diplomatic or military sense for a state to enter into operational or structural arms control agreements with an adversary bent on its destruction. Political reconciliation must precede arms control negotiations, at least to the degree where the two rivals can accept the balance of power system and the right of the other side to exist. This does not prevent the possibility of systems change through mutual consent and negotiations; it only precludes the possibility of unilateral change through the use of force.

Both North and South Korea appear to be a long way from achieving the level of political reconciliation necessary to build an arms control

regime. Both sides still perceive the foreign policy objectives of one another to be ideologically motivated and aimed at the destruction of their respective domestic political systems. These perceptions are reinforced to a great extent by the preconditions which both sides have placed on the opening of arms control negotiations. The North Koreans see little point in initiating arms talks until the "puppet" regime in Seoul is replaced by a coalition government which is independent of the United States and more sympathetic in its outlook to North Korea. Pyongyang's refusal to accept South Korea's participation in peace talks with the United States only serves to reinforce the perception that North Korea does not accept the South as a legitimate or equal negotiating partner. At the same time, the South Korean position demanding changes to the DPRK's social and political structure as a precondition for arms talks has likely reinforced Pyongyang's perception that the aim of the Seoul is to overthrow the Northern government. Until each side accepts the right of the other side to exist, little if any progress can be made in conventional arms control negotiations on the Korean Peninsula.

Assuming a change in attitude whereby both sides accept one other as legitimate negotiating partners, there are a still number of problems inherent in the approaches to arms control proposed by both sides. First, there is a very important dimension missing in the North Korean proposal: incrementalism. Arms control works best when it follows a strategy of "creeping incrementalism", or a building block approach, where one begins with relatively modest understandings that marginally increase the mutual comfort level between the two adversaries. From this, one can gradually enter into more complex and substantive understandings as past agreements are implemented, hostility, tension and suspicion are reduced, and mutual trust is developed. This strategy of creeping incrementalism would seem particularly advisable in the Korean context, where the two parties have no past history of working cooperatively together but have instead been intense ideological rivals seeking one another's destruction almost from the moment they came into existence as separate states. In this regard, the North Korean arms control proposals which begin with immediate steps to detarget missiles, and remove military equipment, bases, and facilities from the highly sensitive DMZ, require a much higher level of trust and cooperation than currently exists between the two Koreas. They also entail a higher level of risk than either side may be willing to take. Rather than hazard the

possibility of deadlock and failure, the two sides would be better advised to pursue simpler measures which establish the principle of cooperation and create mutual transparency with regard to both capability and intent. These could include the CBMs proposed by the South Koreans, including the prior notification of military manoeuvres, the exchange of military information, exchange visits by military leaders, and the establishment of a hot line between the two leaders. Even more productively, both sides could implement the measures agreed to in the 1992 Basic Accord — measures designed to help the two states recognize and accept one another's systems and not slander or vilify each other. Nothing would better improve the immediate atmosphere between the North and South and weaken the culture of confrontation than an end to ideological attacks and name calling.

A second problem with the arms control proposals put forward by the North and the South is that they seem more intent on preserving existing military advantages than reaching a balanced agreement mutually beneficial to both sides. The North Korean proposal to focus structural reduction efforts on manpower rather than armaments is a case in point. Not only would such an agreement do little to introduce predictability and stability on the Korean Peninsula, it would be almost impossible to negotiate and even more difficult to verify. For South Korea, a conventional arms control agreement must guarantee increased security from a sudden attack by the numerically superior North Korean forces, particularly against the exposed Seoul region. Any arms proposal that focuses on deep manpower reductions fails to do so because it leaves North Korea with its offensive armaments intact. The DPRK would then be free to exploit its superior mobilization capabilities for the purpose of launching a lightning strike against the exposed South Korean capital. Secondly, manpower reductions are extremely difficult to negotiate, let alone verify. The MBFR talks in Vienna tried without success for over fifteen years to find a consensus on NATO-Warsaw Pact troop strengths in Central Europe in order to establish a baseline from which subsequent numerical or proportional cuts could be measured. The problem is that manpower numbers are extremely difficult to verify with any degree of confidence, even with sophisticated and intrusive forms of on-sight inspection. The issues related to unit identification are too complex and the deliberate concealment of forces is too easy to make manpower reductions an attractive alternative to reductions of offensive weapons.

The advantages of a structural arms control agreement which focuses on the reduction of offensive armaments are twofold. First, such an agreement would be easier to negotiate and verify: secondly, it would result in the destruction of surplus equipment, making a quick break-out from the treaty more difficult for either party. This would introduce greater restraint, predictability and stability into the arms competition process.

Reductions in armaments may be a more preferable arms control approach than reductions in manpower, but this does not mean that the South Korean proposal is free of problems. On the contrary, it contains a number of features which are likely to be troubling for North Korea. In particular, the proposed reduction of armaments to equal ceilings, combined with a lack of restraint on force modernization, may prove to be unacceptable to the North Koreans, not only because it imposes disproportionate cuts in weaponry on them but also because it could lead to South Korean military superiority. Traditionally, the North Korean military has attempted use numerical superiority to offset its technological inferiority relative to South Korea's armed forces. The South Korean arms control proposals would block this possibility while still leaving Seoul unconstrained and free to exploit its greater economic wealth and its closer contacts with the United States for the purpose of continuing an armed forces modernization programme which the impoverished North could only dream of matching. Such an arrangement would inevitably lead to the military superiority of the South Korean armed forces, a situation which would clearly be unacceptable to North Korea. If arms control is to take hold on the Korean Peninsula, it will have to be on the basis of equality of advantage.

Perhaps the single greatest obstacle to arms control on the Korean Peninsula is the lack of political will on both sides of the 38th parallel to make it happen. This lack of will appears rooted in a number of interrelated factors. There is the culture of confrontation, hostility and suspicion, so deeply ingrained in both societies after 50 years of relentless ideological warfare that the natural inclination of both states is to rely on military power — the tried and tested traditional method of ensuring national survival — rather than risk a new approach — arms control — which requires instead an attitude of trust and cooperation. There is also the issue of the siege mentality existing within North

Korea, an attitude held by a leadership that is increasingly reluctant or unable to enter into arms control agreements for fear of unleashing an uncontrollable chain of events which could imperil the very existence of the regime. Finally, there is the mood of growing confidence among South Korean leaders; a sense that time is on their side; that there is no need to negotiate with the North; that South Korea is outstripping the North in all meaningful indices of power; that all Seoul need do is wait for the inevitable implosion of the North Korean regime under the weight of a decaying economy and a starving population.

The Road Ahead for Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

The road ahead for conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula appears bleak. Too many basic differences currently divide the North and South to allow for even elementary progress. Neither side is prepared to accept the political existence of the other or endorse the current regional balance of power. Even worse, there appears to exist a lack of political will on either side to overcome these basic differences. Until these attitudes change and the basic issues are resolved, the two sides will not be able to begin the process of narrowing the gulf that separates their respective visions of a conventional arms control treaty, let alone overcome the myriad of issues that will surface over the design, development and implementation of the highly intrusive verification system needed to underpin such an effort. Arms control may generate trust and good will between adversaries, but it is not a substitute for miracles.

There are however some faint signs of hope. In early 1997, a number of small but positive developments took place which might eventually lead to the fundamental changes in attitude so desperately required if progress is to be made on the arms control front. First, after years of insisting that peace treaty could only be negotiated bilaterally with the United States, the North Koreans now appear interested in accepting an invitation to attend four-way peace talks aimed at forging a new security arrangement to replace the 1953 Armistice. To this end, a high ranking North Korean delegation attended a series of exploratory meetings in New York, together with counterparts from the United States and South Korea. The meeting reportedly occurred against the wishes of top-ranking military

leaders and notwithstanding the fall-out from the defection of Hwang Jang-yop. By late April of 1997 the only obstacle reportedly preventing the North from accepting the invitation was a disagreement concerning the conditions and timing surrounding the delivery of badly needed food aid.² The North, feeling that it had not received all the food aid it was promised in return for attending the exploratory meetings, adopted its normal tactic of demanding that the United States guarantee food aid as a condition for joining the talks; the United States refused, reportedly wanting to discuss food aid within the context of the four way talks.³ If the North ultimately agrees to join the talks, a major obstacle to arms control negotiations may have been overcome.⁴

The second positive sign in April was the mellowing of North Korean press attacks on the Kim Young Sam's government, both in terms of frequency and ferocity. The phrase "Kim Young Sam group", for example, all but replaced "fascist", "traitor", or "puppet" as adjectives used by the Korean Central News Agency in April to describe the Seoul government. This softening in tone could well suggest an impending shift in the DPRK's policy toward South Korea, possibly in conjunction with a North Korean acceptance of participation in the four way peace talks. If so, it would be a clear indication that the North is preparing to accept South Korea as a legitimate and equal negotiating partner. This would be of tremendous value in forwarding the arms control agenda on the Korean Peninsula.

² "Peace Negotiations Stalled, US and Seoul Envoys Report", *The Chicago Tribune News Service* Web-posted, (21 April 1997). See also: "North Korea to Decide Soon on Peace Talks", *CNN World News* Web-posted, (8 April 1997).

³ "Food aid, 'quad talks' are different things - DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman", *Korean Central News Agency* Web-posted, (12 April 1997).

⁴ Editor's Note: The first preparatory meeting for these four power talks occurred in New York on 7 August 1997. Robert Reid, "Korea Talks Fail to Agree on Peace Conference", *Washington Post* (7 August 1997).

Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula through Arms Control: North Korea's Perspective - With An Emphasis on Its International Framework¹

Hideya Kurata

Preface: North Korea's New Diplomacy for Promoting Peace

Ever since the "Agreed Framework" between the United States and North Korea was signed in October of 1994, the focal issue of the Korean problem has become the replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement (signed on July 27, 1953) with a peace agreement. During the nuclear controversy, North Korea proposed the "New Peace Arrangement". It insisted that the Armistice Agreement be replaced with a peace agreement between North Korea and the United States. The United States has negotiated with North Korea in order to reverse the latter's declaration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), while the DPRK has attempted to improve its overall relations with the US. North Korea has asserted that the United States and North Korea, *de-facto* signatories to the Armistice Agreement, should replace this document with a peace arrangement in order to facilitate the termination of their 'hostile' relations.

In the last days of the Kim Il-Sung regime, North Korea took several measures to paralyze the Armistice mechanism. The withdrawal of the delegation of the Korean People's Army from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) (April 28, 1994), the eviction of delegations from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) (the Czech delegation on April 3, 1993, and the Polish delegation on February 28, 1994), and the creation of the "Korean People's Army's Mission at Panmunjom" (May 24, 1994) were all designed to bring about favourable preconditions for the establishment of the "New Peace Arrangement". Even after Kim Il-Sung's death on July 8, 1994, North Korea's posture remained consistent with the pursuit of the "New Peace Arrangement". In the absence of the Great Leader, North Korea expelled the delegation

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the writer alone.

of the Chinese People's Volunteers Army from the MAC (the decision was taken on September 1, 1994, and the Chinese withdrawal occurred on December 15, 1994), while reaching agreement on the "Agreed Framework" with the US.²

The "New Peace Arrangement" is a very clear violation of the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation between the North and the South" (the "Basic Accord", adopted on December 13, 1991 and entered into force on February 19, 1992). The "Basic Accord" stipulates that the North and the South would make an effort to transform the Armistice system into a peace system (Article 5), while forming a North-South Joint Reconciliation Commission to implement the pledge of building a peace regime in Korea. The "Basic Accord" also envisioned a variety of confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as exchanges of military personnel and the installation of a hotline between "military authorities", for the purpose of implementing the pledge of inter-Korean non-aggression (Article 7). The North-South Joint Military Commission was formed to institutionalize the pledge of non-aggression and to implement the CBMs.³

The "Basic Accord" provisions addressing the 'localization' of arms control on the Korean Peninsula have been paralyzed since North Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the NPT. The proposed 'New Peace Arrangement', was therefore contradictory to the "Basic Accord" in the context of arms control on the Korean Peninsula. It reveals that

² For further details of the measures taken by North Korea in the name of the 'New Peace Arrangement', see Hideya Kurata, "The International Context of North Korea's Proposal for a 'New Peace Arrangement': Issues after the US-DPRK Nuclear Accord", *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* VII:1 (Summer 1995); see also Kim Byung Hong, "Conference Paper: North Korea's Perspective on the U.S.-North Korea Peace Treaty", *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* XIII:4 (Winter 1994).

³ For the significance of the 'Basic Accord' in the 'localization' of Korean arms control, see Hideya Kurata, "Progress Toward a System of Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula", *Japan Review of International Affairs* 6:1 (Spring 1992); See also Hideya Kurata, "Political Prerequisites and Prospects for the Application of the European Experience on the Korean Peninsula", *Les Cahiers de L'ifri: Security in Europe and North-East Asia-Pacific* Volume 2 (Paris: Institute Française des Relations Internationales, 1993).

North Korea's perception of the arms control framework has reverted to its pre-"Basic Accord" position.

Proposal of the 'Interim Agreement': A 'Division of Labour'

Unlike in previous years, the "New Peace Arrangement" has failed to obtain the support of neighbouring powers. Even China, which had consistently supported North Korea's proposals in the past, was apparently negatively predisposed toward the "New Peace Arrangement". In fact, China went so far as to state that North Korea's attempt to conclude a peace agreement with the United States was "unrealistic, unreasonable and impossible".⁴ It was the first occasion in which China made it clear that its approach to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula differed from that of North Korea's.

Given this unfavourable international environment, North Korea seems to have been forced to revise the "New Peace Arrangement". In the autumn of 1995, the readjustment of the "New Peace Arrangement" was for the first time conveyed to the United States through Selig S. Harrison, then-Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, when he visited North Korea in late September 1995. This readjustment is worth noting in that it revealed how North Korea perceived arms control on the Korean Peninsula within the context of its relations with the United States. According to Harrison, General Ri Chan-bok, the representative of the Korean People's Army's Mission at Panmunjom, made a proposal for a two-track peacekeeping system to transform the Armistice mechanism. First, North Korea and the United States would organize a "Mutual Security Commission" consisting of representatives of the US and North Korean Armed Forces. After the Commission was agreed upon, the North-South Joint Military Commission would be activated. North Korean officials have

⁴ Gong Ro-myung, the South Korean Foreign Minister, revealed at a press conference at the 50th UN General Assembly in September of 1995 that China had notified South Korea of its principles concerning the building of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in the previous month. The principles included China's position of implicitly opposing North Korea's 'New Peace Arrangement'. *Korea Herald* (September 27, 1995).

reportedly commented that North and South Korea have already agreed on the principle of North-South non-aggression in the "Basic Accord".⁵

By establishing the North-South Joint Military Commission, North and South Korea have certainly agreed on the principle of non-aggression as articulated in the "Basic Accord". However, as shown above, the "Basic Accord" also includes a pledge to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The North-South Joint Reconciliation Commission was supposed to implement this peace-building pledge. The reported two-track peacekeeping proposal included the North-South Joint Military Commission without referring to the North-South Joint Reconciliation Commission, thus indicating that North Korea's position of not regarding South Korea as a legitimate party in the building of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula has remained unchanged. In other words, North Korea has advocated a sort of a 'division of labour' between 'peace' and 'non-aggression', where a peace regime should be built between North Korea and the US on the one hand, while non-aggression should be guaranteed between North and South Korea on the other.

North Korea's proposal of a US-North Korean "Interim Agreement" on February 22, 1996 was an extension of this reported readjustment. North Korea proposed the US-DPRK "Interim Agreement" supporting a "Mutual Consulting Commission" before any conclusion of a peace agreement in order to prevent the occurrence of accidental military clashes in the truce village of Panmunjom.⁶ The proposal of the "Interim Agreement" may be regarded as a 'retreat' from the "New Peace Arrangement". However, North Korea intentionally heightened military tensions at Panmunjom from late March to early April 1996 by deploying armed forces in the Joint Security Area (JSA) of the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). This escalation of pressure can be considered a message designed to persuade the United States that some measures must be taken to ease

⁵ Selig Harrison, "The Korean Peninsula: Current Problems, Future Prospects", in William Clark, Jr. and Ryukichi Imai, (eds.), *Final Report of the U.S.-Japan Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation After the Cold War: Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation* (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 37; see also the report of his trip to North Korea in *Chungang Ilbo* (September 28, 1995).

⁶ *Rodong Shinmun* (February 23, 1996). The 'Mutual Security Commission' in Harrison's report was referred to as the 'Mutual Consulting Commission' in the proposal for the 'Interim Agreement'.

the tensions in this region. With regard to South Korea's role in this process, North Korea's proposal referred to the "Basic Accord" as an agreement on non-aggression. It implied that South Korea's role must be confined to the sphere of non-aggression. North Korea feels that while it has not rejected North-South dialogue, any talks with South Korea must be preceded by dialogue with the United States.

The Four-Party Talks as a 'Process'

On April 16, 1996, ROK President Kim Young-sam and US President Bill Clinton made a joint proposal to hold the Four-Party Talks involving North and South Korea, the United States and China for the purpose of enhancing the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The two Presidents reaffirmed their shared position that the Armistice Agreement must be replaced with a peace agreement between the North and the South, although such an agreement might take on multilateral characteristics. As seen from the ROK-US Joint Announcement which stated its intention of "initiating a *process* aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement" (Item 6, emphasis added)⁷, the aim of the Four-Party Talks does not lie simply in the convening of a multilateral meeting but rather in connecting such a meeting to the North-South dialogue on building a peace regime.

It should be noted that the two Presidents agreed that the "peace process also should address a wide range of tension reduction measures" in the Joint Announcement (Item 7). Minister Kwon O-ki of the Ministry of the National Unification also stated that the proposed talks should be conducive to the implementation of the "Basic Accord", implying a willingness to revive the CBMs envisioned in the "Basic Accord".⁸ On May 13, 1996, South Korea, the United States and Japan held a policy coordination session and agreed that military CBMs, such as the prior notification of military exercises and a pullback of troops stationed in the

⁷ "ROK-US Joint Announcement Proposal to Hold a Four Party Meeting to promote Peace on the Korean Peninsula, April 16, 1996", *Information Service on the Unification Question of the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Ministry of National Unification, May 31, 1996), pp. 87-8.

⁸ *Seoul Shinmun* (April 17, 1996).

vicinity of the DMZ, should be taken once North Korea joined in the Four-Party Talks. They also reportedly agreed that reduction and modification of the US Forces in Korea's (USFK) status should be included in the measures.⁹

South Korea's attempt seems to have succeeded in that it has obtained the support of China. Immediately after the joint proposal, Chinese President Jiang Zemin sent a letter to Kim Young-sam saying that China was willing to make a "positive and affirmative contribution" to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, North Korea's posture remained vague on whether or not it would accept the Four-Party Talks. North Korea has demonstrated a willingness to engage in talks with the United States by urging the US to explain the agenda of the Four-Party Talks, even as the DPRK asserted the "New Peace Arrangement" and its revised version, the "Interim Agreement".¹⁰ On the 15th of July, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland released a statement saying that the Kim Young-sam administration was virtually the only administration ever in South Korea not to have engaged in effective communication with the North and that it had made no accomplishments with regard to the process of North-South dialogue.¹¹ The North Korean Central People's Committee decided to designate the Armistice Anniversary (July 27) as "National Congratulatory Day",¹² a decision which implied that North Korea had made it clear domestically that improved relations with the United States were vital to the survival of the DPRK regime.

North Korea Between the Tripartite and the Four-Party Formula

The question of the USFK remains one of the critical arms control issues facing the Korean Peninsula. After the Four-Party Talks were proposed,

⁹ *Seoul Shinmun* (May 15, 1996).

¹⁰ See, for example, the remarks of the Spokesman of North Korea's Foreign Ministry issued in *Minju Chosun* (May 8, 1996).

¹¹ *Rodong Shinmun* (July 16, 1996).

¹² *Minju Chosun* (July 26, 1996).

North Korea made two contradictory arguments concerning the USFK. On the one hand, Lee Jong-hyok, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Asia-Pacific Affairs in the Korean Workers' Party, stated in Atlanta on the 29th of April that North Korea would not oppose the presence of the US forces, on the condition that they were stationed as peacekeepers distinct from the North and South Korean forces.¹³ On the other hand, a statement by the Spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry on the 2nd of September made it clear that if the United States was not ready to discuss the issue of the withdrawal of its troops from South Korea, the proposed Four-Party Talks would be meaningless.¹⁴

It is possible that North Korea will insist on including the withdrawal of the USFK within the agenda of the Four-Party Talks. However, North Korea's insistence on the withdrawal of the USFK should not be taken at face value. North Korea has insisted that they be permitted to inspect the US bases in South Korea, a goal which was realized in the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" on the very last day of 1991 (it entered into force on February 19, 1992). This agreement indicates that North Korea has admitted the existence of the US bases in South Korea, at least for the time being. As stated in the *Chosen Shiryō*, the Japanese pro-Pyongyang journal, North Korea's assertion that the agenda for the Four-Party Talks should include the subject of the USFK withdrawal must be understood as a pressure tactic designed to urge the United States to explain the contents of the Four-Party Talks.¹⁵

However, North Korea has been consistent in pursuing the dissolution of the United Nations Command (UNC), which seems to be one of the reasons why North Korea remains undecided on the matter of the Four-Party Talks. Should North Korea reject the talks, it would lose an effective means by which to communicate its desire for the dissolution of the UNC to the United States. North Korea frequently refers to UN

¹³ *Seoul Shinmun* (April 29, 1996).

¹⁴ *Rodong Shinmun* (September 3, 1996).

¹⁵ Tae Suk-shin, "'Sensuikan-Jiken' Kaik etsu-go no Chose-Hanto Josei (Korean Affairs after the resolution of the 'Submarine Incident')", *Chosen Shiryō* 37:2 (February 1997), p. 37.

Secretary General Boutros Beatrice-Ghillies letter to North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Yang-nam on June 24, 1994, in which the Secretary-General stated that the UN Security Council did not establish the unified command as a subsidiary organ under its control but rather specified that it be under the authority of the United States.¹⁶ North Korea's concern with the UNC is 'legalistic', in that it insists that the continued existence of the UNC remains a legal obstacle to the transformation of the Armistice Agreement into a peace agreement with the United States.

In its search for dialogue with North Korea, the UNC has attempted to consult with the DPRK over the restoration of the MAC mechanism. On May 19, 1995, the UNC proposed a general officer level meeting within the framework of the MAC with the UNC side represented by a US major general and officers from Britain, Canada, and South Korea,¹⁷ but North Korea rejected the proposal. A memorandum issued by North Korea's Foreign Ministry on the 46th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War stated that as only the US forces remained in the UNC, it was necessary for the United States to announce its dissolution.¹⁸ Once this body was dissolved, North Korea would then be able to engage in direct talks with the United States outside the UN framework. The dissolution of the UNC is an indispensable ingredient of the "New Peace Arrangement" or in its revised version, the "Interim Agreement". North Korea's demand that a separate military negotiation channel be opened with the US representing the UNC has remained unchanged, even during the controversy over the briefing on the Four-Party Talks. At a meeting to exchange lunar new year's greetings in February of 1997, North

¹⁶ Referred to, for instance, in the memorandum of North Korea's Foreign Ministry released in *Rodong Shinmun* (June 30, 1995).

¹⁷ South Korean Major General Hwang Won-tak, the UNC chief representative, was supposed to be absent. See: *Korea Herald* (May 23, 1995).

¹⁸ *Minju Chosun* (June 26, 1996); see also the commentary in *Minju Chosun* (June 30, 1996); see also Kim Byung-hong's recent article in *Kulloja* (August 1996) (the Japanese translated version appeared in the *Chosen Shiryo* 37:2 (February 1997), p. 77.)

Korea made an informal probe concerning its earlier proposal to open the military talks which had excluded South Korea.¹⁹

With regard to the international framework, it is hard to imagine that North Korea, which expelled the Chinese delegation from the MAC, would be willing to involve China in the peace-building process. Although a tripartite briefing meeting involving North Korea, South Korea and the United States is being arranged for the purpose of exploring the process for arranging the Four-Party Talks, North Korea has not apparently regarded the discussions as existing for this purpose. Contrary to the intentions of the US and South Korean negotiators, the North Korean team seems to have viewed the briefing as a stepping stone to a substantial meeting designed to conclude a peace agreement with the United States. At the same time, North Korea attempts to make the exclusion of China a *fait accompli*. It is noteworthy that the *Rodong Shinmun* carried an editorial saying, "the US must be insane to ask for assistance in persuading us (North Korea) regarding the Four-Party Talks and the North-South dialogue," adding that, "persuasion by or the intervention of a third party will not be a solution to the problem".²⁰ The editorial did not name the 'third party': however, it is suspected to be China, as the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher paid a visit to China and asked his Chinese counterpart for cooperation in realizing the Four-Party Talks immediately before the date of the editorial. This process is reminiscent of the Tripartite Talks offered by North Korea in January 10, 1984, which involved North Korea, the United States and South Korea. The only difference lies in the fact that the Tripartite Talks advocated the adoption of a North-South non-aggression declaration, while the recent "Interim Agreement" urges the implementation of the agreed "non-aggression accord".

¹⁹ The UNC rejected North Korea's demand. See *Pacific Stars and Stripes* (February 14, 1997).

²⁰ *Rodong Shinmun* (November 16, 1996); see also the commentary of Radio Pyongyang, aired on November 18, 1996 (the gist of the commentary appears in *Radio Press Kitachosen Seisaku Doko* (North Korea Policy Trends) 14:254 (1996), p 28.

Conclusion: '3+1' Formula in the Four-Party Framework?

North Korea's vision for an international framework to promote peace is tangled up with the old framework. North Korea's framework for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula has reverted to the position taken during the Tripartite Talks, and demonstrates an unwillingness to accept China's participation in peace-building efforts in this region.

One of the clearest indicators of this position was the North Korean counterproposal for a "3+1" (North Korea, South Korea, the United States and China) formula presented during the reopened briefing session in April of 1997. While the session — disrupted by this counterproposal — eventually reached an agreement to include the Chinese within the June preliminary session to the Four-Party Talks, it is hard to imagine that North Korea has accepted the fact that China has a role to play in peace-building efforts on the Korean Peninsula. At the outset of the briefing session, the North Korean representative Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Gye-guan revealed his anxiety concerning the imbalance in diplomatic status existing between North Korean-US and South Korean-Chinese relations.²¹ By expressing his view that the two bilateral relations were imbalanced, he might have been implicitly suggesting that North Korea would find it difficult to promote the "New Peace Arrangement" so long as China remained supportive of the positions of South Korea and the United States, and opposed to the North Korean peace proposal.

Another indicator is a statement on the part of Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Lee Gun prior to the agreement. He suggested that North Korea would drop the "3+1" Formula as a condition for DPRK participation in the Four-Party Talks. However, attention should be paid to the fact that while he expressed a willingness to engage in bilateral talks with South Korea and the United States or trilateral talks among North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, he failed to mention either talks involving China or China's role in the peace-building process on the Korean Peninsula.²² Furthermore, the *Rodong Shinmun* and the

²¹ *Chosen Shiryo* 37:6 (June 1997), p. 36.

²² *Chosun Ilbo* (May 29, 1997).

Minju Chosun carried editorials supporting the "Interim Agreement" on the 47th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War.²³

Viewed from these standpoints, the Four-Party Talks, if convened, might develop into a forum quite different from the concept originally conceived. The proposed Four-Party Talks envisioned not only peace-building issues, but also "a wide range of tension reducing measures". However, when the peace-building process proceeds to the extent where "tension reducing measures" are discussed, China's role will certainly diminish. It seems difficult for China, forced to withdraw its delegation from the MAC, to now play an role equivalent to that of the United States, given the presence of US troops in South Korea and their war-time operational control over the South Korean Army.

The consequences of North Korea's tentative acceptance of the Four-Party framework for the first time in the long history of its peace-building proposals should not be underestimated, although China's role within that framework will be a limited one. South Korea and the United States must now increase the roles of North and South Korea within the peace-building and tension reduction process without overestimating China's role. To that end, South Korea and the United States must support the CBMs within the North-South Joint Military Commission in a way which assists the activation of the North-South Joint Reconciliation Commission in the building of a peninsular peace regime. As demonstrated by the South Korean-US-Japanese policy coordinative effort in May of 1996, this agenda must include such military CBMs as the prior notification of exercises, the pullback of troops in the vicinity of the DMZ, and the modification of the status of the USFK.

²³ *Rodong Shinmun* (June 25, 1997), and *Minju Chosun* (June 25, 1996).

THE DPRK'S PERSPECTIVES ON ARMS CONTROL¹

Kim Myong Chol

It is the long-standing position of the DPRK that two major reasons warrant arms control on the Korean Peninsula. One is in the immediate interest of states in defusing one of the world's most volatile flashpoints and promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The other is the long-range cause of bringing North and South Korea together into a reunified state. The foremost goal of arms control efforts on the Korean Peninsula is not simply to create a peace between separate Koreas, but to allow Koreans to live eventually together under one reunified Korea possessing a combined defense force. It is this which distinguishes arms control on the Korean Peninsula from similar efforts involving hostile countries — for example, the United States and Russia, or Israel and the Arab countries.

Requirements To Be Met for Arms Control

Policy planners in Pyongyang, however, think that North-South Korean arms control will remain an elusive goal until two major requirements are satisfied. The first is the creation of a totally independent and democratic government in Seoul with full operational control over its armed forces. The other is full diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the US, together with a peace treaty between these two former enemies, which allows both sides to put their past experiences of belligerency behind them. For all intents and purposes, the ROK is a highly militarized second-class ally of the United States, as is often the case with client states.

What underpins the DPRK stand is the perception that the division of Korea by the United States and the US's subsequent intervention are the cause of military tensions whose removal, reduction or neutralization is much more important to the building of peace. In other words, removal of the part affected by cancer or tumour is undoubtedly important, but

¹ The views as expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

surgery will be repeatedly required unless the carcinogenic source is located and removed or neutralized.

This is why Pyongyang feels that ending the state of war with the United States and improving relations with this state remains the principal issue, while dialogue with Seoul remains a secondary one. As the American forces are regarded as the principal enemy, the DPRK has diverted all available resources to modernize its armed forces, fortify the whole land, arm the entire population, and develop strategic missile forces capable of hitting American targets abroad. The South Korean armed forces are structured so as to supplement the American forces.

Such perceptions have been vindicated in past rounds of North-South contact. The South Koreans can agree on a general framework but stop short of going into specific details needed to implement them. The promotion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through any arms control agreement with the DPRK would be tantamount to depriving the South Korean regime of its long-standing fundamental *raison d'être* and mantle of legitimacy. The successive regimes in Seoul have rested and thrived on militarization, anti-communism, confrontation with Pyongyang, and a denial of democracy, as well as an American military presence: this is the way the ROK government has existed in the past and the present.

In other words, extensive arms control efforts would subsequently dismantle the Seoul regime, establish a democratic government in its place, rehabilitate those previously arrested, imprisoned and executed on charges of violating the National Security Law, offer survivors proper compensation, and most significantly, rob the Americans of any pretext to maintain their armed forces in South Korea. What happened in Eastern Europe following the demise of socialism is bound to be reproduced in South Korea, and will be the last thing the Americans want to see unless they hammer out full diplomatic relations and a peace treaty with the North Koreans.

Pyongyang and Seoul issued a joint statement in 1972 pledging their desire for an independent and peaceful reunification through national unity and mutual troop reductions, together with a Joint Military Commission. Twenty years later, Pyongyang and Seoul signed a

landmark agreement on non-aggression, reconciliation and exchanges with a Joint Military Commission once again formed. At first the Americans blessed those agreements, but they soon changed their minds and conspired to have them scuttled before they were put into force. A government of the French or Filipino type in Seoul could feel competent enough to discuss such details of arms control as those which would involve the subsequent withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. This kind of independent and democratic government can be organized only after the United States both establishes full diplomatic relations with the DPRK and concludes a long overdue peace treaty with it, or when the significance of this eventuality has come home to the South Korean peoples.

The 1991 North-South Korean non-aggression pact, designed to terminate the state of war between North and South Korea, does not address the issue of ending the state of belligerency between North Korea and the United States. As expected, the agreement has never been translated into practice. The major military threat as perceived by North Korea stems not from the South Korean armed forces but from the American forces, the sole superpower in the world. In this crucial sense the North-South Korean non-aggression pact is irrelevant in the eyes of the North Koreans, given the absence of a peace treaty between Pyongyang and Washington or a working peace mechanism to prevent the resumption of hostilities between these two states.

Conditions Likely Before 2003

At long last, the satisfaction of these two key requirements — necessary for the achievement of significant arms reduction on the Korean Peninsula — is in sight with the signing in Geneva of a Framework Agreement October 21, 1994, after marathon talks between North Korean and American diplomats. It is most likely that the required conditions will be put in place before 2003, the target date specified in the Geneva agreement. It has been quite obvious from the beginning why the Americans offered to name the deadline for the turnkey delivery of lightwater nuclear reactors, simply thinking that it would take an average of ten years to build a nuclear reactor. While their plan was made partly to appease the North Koreans for a time, it was also designed partly in

anticipation of the collapse of the North Korean regime, probably before that target date. The South Korean regime of Kim Yong Sam, partly sharing this collapse theory, imagined that the lightwater reactors, the construction of which they would be financing, would be back in their hands following the fall of the Pyongyang regime as a result of either self-implosion or of what the ROK regime calls the five-stage operation plan 5027.

However, this collapse theory is fatally flawed, because of lack of proper attention to what forms the DPRK population's identification with the government of Marshal Kim Jong-Il. The North Korean people see their leader as a father figure, gallantly fighting against heavy odds to keep them free and independent in a permanent farewell to colonial subjugation: a double image of George Washington during the Revolutionary War and Moses in the Exodus to the Promised Land. The North Korean people will rally behind Marshal Kim Jong-Il all the more closely because they perceive the outside world as bullying their country.

The DPRK's spectacular diplomatic conduct in outmaneuvering the Americans during the nuclear talks have added to the long-smoldering nationalist pride in Korea's cultural heritage and its traditional values. The North Korean people view two successive years of floods as temporary natural disasters, capricious acts of God beyond their control, something which explains their unquestioning unity behind Marshal Kim Jong-Il. As during the Korean War and for the past 50 years, the Pyongyang regime will survive the current ordeal to emerge even stronger, leaving decision-makers in Washington and Seoul terribly disconcerted.

Logically, the successful implementation of the 1994 Framework Agreement will establish full diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Washington with two presidents signing a peace treaty in their capacity as the supreme commanders of their respective armed forces. In a worst case scenario, an American failure to meet the 2003 deadline — an impossible goal, however hard the Americans and the South Koreans race against time — is certain to unravel the nuclear agreement and provide the North Koreans with the most effective ammunition to resume their once frozen nuclear activity and imply a threat to manufacture nuclear weapons along with the intercontinental means of their delivery.

The Americans will be left with two options. One is to resume hostilities in Korea at the risk of starting a third world war and bomb the booming economies in Japan and South Korea back to the Stone Age. The other is to mollify the North Koreans. The only card available to coax the angry North Koreans into cooperation would be an offer to upgrade bilateral relations to the full diplomatic level earlier than scheduled and replace the ceasefire agreement with a peace agreement.

This political step costs very little but will go a long way and generate far-reaching political implications for the region as a whole. As South Korea's leading conservative journalist Cho Kap Je remarked, Korean history will have the third leader who ever decided to fight a war for national reunification: Kim Jong-Il, after Silla's King Kim Yu Sin 1,300 years ago and the late Kim Il-Sung. His credentials as the Korean nation's supreme leader will become complete and impeccable.

This state of affairs will render North-South confrontation and tensions irrelevant. It will make immaterial the government expected to succeed the present Kim Yong regime next February, and set the stage for the establishment of a new democratic coalition government representing the real will and interests of the South Korean people. The new regime in Seoul will reassert full South Korean independence by pressing for amendment of the Status of Forces Agreement and the return of operational control over the South Korean armed forces. The DPRK government will not pressure the new democratic counterpart in Seoul to demand the abrogation of its defense treaty with the United States or the American military disengagement from Korea in any way that would create a power vacuum in the region.

Political and Military Reconciliation

The emergence of an independent, democratic government in Seoul will produce the climate for North-South political and military reconciliation. The independent government will be more responsive to North Korean overtures for peace and reunification and will hold a series of summit meetings with the Pyongyang regime to discuss the matter of dismantling the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in preparation for both expanded North-South contact and eventual confederation. The

two sides will agree to reconfirm their commitment to the December 1991 North-South Korean agreement concerning non-aggression, reconciliation and exchanges.

Consequently, arms control on the Korean Peninsula will become an increasingly popular agenda item in several years, a matter of great concern not only to the neighbouring countries but also to the rest of the world. The way it will be achieved will have a serious impact on the American military presence in the Asia and Pacific region as well as Japan's rearmament. The DPRK target will be a quiet, negotiated phased reduction of the American military presence in South Korea. The DPRK will not ask the American troops to leave the Asia Pacific region.

In a post-armistice environment, with the fundamental source of confrontation gone, the North and South Koreans could feel free to discuss and implement mutual troop reductions to 100,000 troops or less each within a timeframe of ten years before they form a confederation based on the shared guiding principle of mutual respect. The two sides would agree to create a joint defense command and a joint defense force. A standing force of approximately 200,000 volunteers is an appropriate size for a country with a population of 70 million.

The North-South Joint Military Commission, chaired by two defense ministers, must be reactivated to address the issue of overseeing and verifying the ongoing force reductions. This must be carried out by spending one year for force reduction preparations, then reducing troop strength by one third in three years, by another one third in another three years and then to 100,000 men or less in the last three years.

A special task force will be created in Pyongyang and Seoul to cushion the impact of the extensive demobilization of troops on their respective economies and societies, the task of which will be to plan and implement crash programmes to properly resettle all demobilized soldiers, scrap surplus equipment and weapons, find productive, cultural or educational uses for vacated military facilities and bases, and convert munitions plants into producers of industrial products.

Under no circumstances must any number of dismissed soldiers become unemployed, left to generate new sources of social unrest. Both

governments must appreciate the great services these individuals have made to national defense. The governments must organize a nationwide drive to help them smoothly reintegrate themselves into society by establishing public-funded vocational training centres to prepare them for civilian jobs and providing them with sufficient unemployment benefits until they get new occupations. Companies or other entities that will hire demobilized servicemen should be entitled to a series of incentives, including lower taxes or a tax break.

Several subcommissions, each co-chaired by generals from the two sides, will be required to prepare detailed plans for force reductions involving three services on both sides for submission for approval by the Joint Military Commission. The agreed upon plans would be implemented in a thorough way. The land forces will be axed because they account for most of the troop strength.

The force reduction project must begin with executing three immediate tasks of critical urgency; the detargeting the North and South Korean missiles against each other, the withdrawal of their artillery and rocket pieces from the border areas, and the dismantling of all military facilities and equipment in and along the Demilitarized Zone. All mines must be cleared from the DMZ and its adjacent areas through a crash program.

The first will be an easy but symbolic job, while the second will appear most dramatic. The third will prove most time-consuming. However, the task of mine detection and demolition or removal should be quite feasible, firstly because each side must still keep maps or other information showing the location of at least some minefields, secondly because most minefields are in and along the DMZ, and thirdly because the other mines are planted along expected routes of invasion.

The tragedies of death and amputation which so often occur after wars, sometimes caused by the accidental triggering of anti-personnel mines, should not be allowed to be repeated in Korea. North and South Korea must combine their resources to completely free the DMZ and its neighbouring land from mines and, if necessary, seek international cooperation in their clearance. Post-armistice arms control and reconciliation would however be complete even without all mines having been completely removed.

The two sides must inform one another of the progress made in their arms reduction efforts, and have it verified by a joint team of on-spot observers stationed on their military bases, with an equal number from either side. Scenes of force reductions and dismantlement should be available for live TV broadcast and for viewing by ordinary Koreans. The UN organization should be invited to send a team of observers to monitor the troop reductions in North and South Korea. Spy satellites operated by the United States, Russia, China and France may function as round-the-clock international aerial monitors.

Progress in force reductions, including the dismantlement of military facilities and bases as well as mine-removing operations, must be announced on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis. International monitors would also be required to reveal the results of their observations.

Unlike the United States and Russia, with their huge strategic nuclear forces, neither North or South Korea have any weapons of mass destruction such as a nuclear-tipped ICBMs or IRBMs, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers or submarines. Despite its heavy fortification, the Korean Peninsula is very small when compared to the United States or Russia. Neither side will see any reason to conceal military bases from monitors.

Since they have no longer any good cause to remain hostile to each other, North and South Korea should not engage in military manoeuvres, except those jointly conducted for common defense operations and predicated on the assumption that these forces will ultimately be integrated into a single Korean confederal defense force.

The Role of Neighbouring Countries

There is no denying that the United States, Japan, Russia and China each have a stake in the Korean Peninsula. The Americans are responsible for the division of Korea and have been deeply involved in peninsular affairs. Japan once colonized Korea. China has been historically involved in Korea and sided with North Korea to fight the Americans during the Korean War. Russia is partly responsible for the division of Korea.

Among these countries, the American role is critical. The Americans could set the stage for North-South political reconciliation, once they cease to be the cause of North-South tensions and confrontation, by signing a peace treaty and establishing full diplomatic relations with the DPRK in strict accordance with the 1994 framework agreement. As described above, the United States is now duty-bound to play that role sooner or later under the agreed framework. The United States should not try to engage in any delaying tactics, which will result in wasted effort in the final analysis.

However, the United States can expedite this course of events by frankly acknowledging their preordained role, the sooner, the better. The Americans must recognize that normalizing relations with the DPRK and ending the state of war with their former enemy will not lead to the immediate military disengagement of US troops from Korea nor to their loss of their political and economic stake in this country. On the contrary, it will lead to a revised but predominant role in a post armistice Korea.

As for the Japanese role, the Tokyo government ought to learn that the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington and revision of the American role in Korea are simply a matter of time. Their first duty will be to come to terms with their past wrong-doings with regard to the Korean people, including military prostitution, express a formal apology to them, and offer compensation to the victims as well as reparations to the DPRK. They should adopt an equidistant policy toward North and South Korea, and should not try to justify their arms buildup by citing the alleged threat from North Korea.

If the Japanese are to atone essentially for their past wrongs done against the Korean people, they should offer to broker peace between the DPRK and the US and then between North and South Korea. However, they have demonstrated their lack the political and moral integrity necessary to play this potential peace-making role by settling for a minor role in deference to the Americans.

The North Koreans doubt that either the Chinese or the Russians can play any significant role in helping achieve inter-Korean

reconciliation. These two states are expected to support any movement toward that goal, and nothing more.

Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula: A South Korean Perspective¹

Bon-Hak Koo

Introduction

Under the post-Cold War security environment, arms reductions have been implemented in Europe through the conclusion of a series of treaties, including the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE I) in 1990, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) in 1990, and the START II Treaty in 1993.

In this changing security environment, North and South Korea have launched High-Level Talks in September of 1990, and concluded an "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between North and South Korea" (the so-called "Basic Agreement"), together with separate protocols. They have also agreed on the establishment of joint commissions for the further development and implementation of the Basic Agreement. In the Basic Agreement, North and South Korea have agreed to discuss confidence building measures with regard to military affairs, arms reduction and verification activities. However, official dialogue between North and South Korea concerning the implementation of the Basic Agreement has stalled after the abrupt refusal of the North to hold the 9th High-Level Talks in December of 1992.

In the meantime, the Korean nuclear issue has provided North Korea with an opportunity to approach the United States. After a series of bilateral talks, North Korea and the United States concluded an "Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the so-called Agreed Framework)", leading to a direct channel between these two states.

There has not been any arms control experience on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, each side has paid much attention to the building up

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

of its armed forces. North Korea had sought to communize the entire Peninsula on its own terms, and South Korea should be prepared to cope with the military threat posed by the North.

In this regard, I would like to: (a) explore the reasons why arms control efforts on the Korean Peninsula have not made any progress, even within the post-Cold War security environment, from a theoretical perspective; (b) elaborate upon the arms control proposals made by North and South Korea, including a discussion of their major differences; (c) identify those elements which hinder the implementation of arms control on the Peninsula; and (d) present arms control alternatives for peace and security in this region.

Structural Constraints of Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

During the Cold War period, the following structural problems constrained the development of arms control on the Korean Peninsula.

First, the experience of the Korean War and the subsequent heightened hostility, distrust and confrontation which existed between the North and the South emphasized arms competition rather than arms control between the two countries. However, North Korea was more active than South Korea in making peninsular arms control proposals for the purpose of political propaganda. North Korea's military superiority over the South with regard to its offensive weapons systems, geo-strategic situation and capacity for mobilization left it in a more favourable position with regard to such proposals. At the same time, North Korea continued to commit limited armed provocations and terrors against the South. It is for these reasons that South Korea has recognized North Korea's arms control proposals as merely a political scheme designed to weaken South Korea's defense preparedness.

Second, the past Cold War international security structure defined by the United States and the Soviet Union shaped relations between the North and the South. While arms control in Europe proceeded between the two collective security systems of NATO and the WTO, there exist no such organizations in Northeast Asia — instead, the bilateral security

relationship between the United States and the former Soviet Union has dominated this region. Under this bipolar environment, arms control negotiations between the North and the South could not proceed.

Third, it must be recognized that arms control activities are related not only to military affairs, but also to domestic political and economic issues. Such European arms control agreements as the Stockholm Document (1986), the INF Treaty (1987), the CFE I, START I/II, and Vienna Documents were successfully concluded only after the emergence of Gorbachev's *Perestroika*. The division of the Korean Peninsula not only heightened the defense burdens of the North and the South, but it also changed their respective domestic social and political systems. Therefore, any arms control efforts which carried with it changes for the domestic social and political systems of North and South Korea would be difficult for them to accept.

Given these structural problems, it becomes evident that peninsular arms control efforts will be both hard to develop, and that proposals made by each side were considered as political propaganda.

Arms Control Proposals by North and South Korea

North Korea has made arms control proposals since the early 1960s. However, most of these proposals emphasized the need for the withdrawal of the American forces stationed in South Korea. More realistic proposals began to appear in the late 1980s. In July of 1987, North Korea advanced a "Phased Arms Reduction Proposal" which included the reduction of each side's armed forces to 100,000 troops, together with a phased withdrawal of the American forces in South Korea. In November of 1988, North Korea proposed a "Plan for Comprehensive Peace on the Korean Peninsula" which included the reduction of each side's armed forces to 100,000 troops, three-party talks between the United States, North Korea and South Korea, high-level political-military dialogue between the North and the South, and confidence-building measures designed to resolve military confrontation between the two sides.

In May of 1990, North Korea announced a "Proposal on Arms Control for Peace on the Korean Peninsula". The proposal addressed a variety of issues, including confidence-building measures, an arms reduction plan, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Peninsula, and assurances of peace on the Peninsula after the implementation of arms reduction activities.

In contrast to North Korea, South Korea has been relatively passive in advancing arms control proposals for the Korean Peninsula. South Korea recognized that arms control efforts might jeopardize its own security by allowing North Korea to maintain its military superiority over the South. South Korea has also maintained a negative attitude toward what it considers to be North Korea's real arms control objective — the weakening of public support for South Korean military development plans.

Nonetheless, South Korea has proposed arms control measures as a part of unification policy. On August 15, 1970, South Korea called upon North Korea to abandon its policy of pursuing unification through coercive means and reduce tensions between the two sides. In 1972, South Korea proposed the withdrawal of all military equipment and facilities from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and called upon North Korea to renounce the "Four Military Guidelines" in February and March respectively. Since this proposal, South Korea has merely countered North Korean proposals on a case by case basis.

The major characteristics of the arms control proposals made by North and South Korea are as follows:

First, there exist differences in the basic arms control approaches of North and South Korea. South Korea has so far presented a graduated approach through confidence-building, operational arms control, and structural arms control activities. It has specifically emphasized the importance of confidence-building measures. South Korea has firmly maintained that military confidence-building or arms reduction efforts could not be made possible without the prior establishment of mutual trust and cooperation. It is for this reason that South Korea believes that North Korea's position, which primarily emphasized arms reduction

efforts, represents political propaganda aimed at securing the withdrawal of the American forces from South Korea.

South Korea's phased approach is based on a strategic realism learned from the European arms control experience. It focuses on maintaining strategic stability through sufficient deterrent capability. South Korean confidence-building measures in political affairs include, among other things, mutual recognition of each side's own political system, a renunciation of the vilifying and negative propagandizing of the past, an exchange of large-scale communication channels, and the establishment of liaison offices in one another's capital.

North Korea advocates military confidence-building and arms reduction activities which exclude political confidence-building measures and ignore the issue of their order of implementation. North Korea has placed more importance on the sudden implementation of all arms control measures at once. However, Pyongyang has also mentioned such preconditions as the withdrawal of the American forces from South Korea, the abrogation of the Team Spirit exercises, and the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States. In this light, North Korea's position on arms control is based on the understanding that only a comprehensive disarmament agreement can secure a permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, North and South Korea have both included military confidence-building measures within their proposals. With regard to the issues of the prior notification of military exercises, the establishment of a hot-line, and the removal of military equipment and facilities from the DMZ, North and South Korea have maintained a somewhat similar position. However, South Korean military confidence-building measures have focused on enhancing military transparency and predictability by including visits and exchanges of high-level military officials, as well as exchanges of military information. In contrast, the North Korean proposals emphasize the abrogation of military exercises with foreign troops and the prohibition of military exercises by foreign troops on the Peninsula.

Third, broad differences exist between the arms reduction proposals of North and South Korea. South Korea has placed its first priority on the

reduction of armaments, with the implementation of troop reductions following in accordance with armament reductions, to be then followed by reserve force reductions as appropriate. The South Korean proposal is aimed at reducing North Korea's military superiority. North Korea, however, has placed more importance on troop reductions, with reductions in armaments following upon this measure. Since the mobilization of manpower is relatively easy to accomplish within the North Korean social and political system, North Korea has sought to maintain its numerical superiority in armaments.

Fourth, with regard to arms reduction, South Korea has advocated the principle of maintaining equal number of armaments. South Korea has suggested that the numerically superior side should reduce its level of armament so that it becomes equal to the previously inferior side: with this accomplished, both sides could then proceed toward a mutually balanced reduction in armaments. North Korea has, however, proposed that each side reduce its troops to 300,000 at the first stage, 200,000 during the second stage, and 100,000 at the final stage.

Fifth, North Korea has advanced detailed proposals concerning assurances of a permanent peace on the Peninsula after the reduction of arms. South Korea has proposed that, in light of the needs of a unified Korea, the two sides maintain their armed forces at a level determined through mutual consent. North Korea has however suggested more detailed proposals, including the deployment of inspection teams drawn from neutral countries, the operation of the North-South joint military commission, declarations of mutual non-aggression, and a US-DPRK or three-party dialogue aimed at concluding a peace treaty.

Clearly, the arms control proposals made by North and South Korea demonstrate a wide range of differences in their basic approaches, priorities, and arms control objectives for the Korean Peninsula. South Korea's goal has been to achieve a prior reduction of offensive weapons, through confidence-building activities between the North and the South. North Korea's goals have focused on a rapid reduction in troops, the withdrawal of the American forces in South Korea, and the holding of either high-level US-DPRK or three-party talks for the purpose of concluding a peace treaty.

Difficulties for North-South Arms Control

Arms control consists of mutually agreed measures to constrain capabilities, intentions, and the utilization of military forces between hostile countries. Therefore, for the successful implementation of arms control measures, hostile countries should at the initial stage of such activities accept the necessity of some measures designed to constrain military forces. In this sense, arms control requires changes in decision makers' attitudes concerning hostile countries as well as to their larger security environment. Shifts in domestic political, economic and social situations and external environments, coupled with changes in the attitudes of decision-makers toward hostile countries, are prerequisite elements for the successful implementation of arms control measures.

Arms control efforts on the Korean Peninsula have not been successful, although North and South Korea began to negotiate from the early 1990s. The following issues have all contributed to the problematic nature of arms control on the Peninsula.

Strategic Asymmetry

Strategic asymmetries among countries hostile to one another often hinders arms control negotiations. Assessments of strategic symmetry are shaped by such variables as the geographical context, military traditions, strategic concerns and the relative technological advancedness of a country's military. It is generally very difficult to proceed with arms control efforts where the strategic relationship among hostile countries is characterized by degree of asymmetry. If there are wide differences in the military capabilities of hostile countries, the state enjoying the superior position will not admit to the necessity of reducing its military capabilities for the security of all the states concerned.

In this light, it will be difficult to realize arms control efforts on the Korean Peninsula because of the strategic disparity between the North and the South. North Korea has maintained a level of military superiority over the South. The military superiority of North Korea has led it to adopt an active position with regard to arms control for political purposes, largely because arms control measures would guarantee the continuous military superiority of the North. Given its military

superiority over the South, North Korea has proposed numerous arms control alternatives, including the reduction of troop levels to 100,000 troops and the prohibition of the importation of armaments from foreign countries. These terms would be difficult for South Korea to accept. In this manner, North Korea has maintained a leading role in arms control proposals on the Korean Peninsula.

In conclusion, with regard to the issue of strategic symmetry, a military balance is a prerequisite for the implementation of arms control measures on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's proposals would be more practical if they sought to shift the structure of military competition on the Peninsula toward some form of military parity between the North and the South.

Ideological Confrontation

Ideology shapes a country's perception of other countries. Negative perceptions on the part of the South toward the North are deeper than those of the United States toward the former Soviet Union. South Korea believes that arms control efforts on the Peninsula will be possible only after North Korea changes its political system or abandons its attitude of military aggressiveness toward the South. This is a clear reflection of South Korea's image of the North. North Korea also maintains a negative image of the South. North Korea has not been recognized by the South as a legitimate government on the Peninsula. This is the reason why North Korea tries to avoid a dialogue with the South, preferring instead to pursue direct talks with the United States.

At the same time, if one country is losing confidence in its ability to maintain its own political system, that country will not engage in an arms control dialogue with hostile countries. North Korea is at the crossroads of system survivability. For this reason, it is hard to expect that North Korea will change its political system or abandon military adventurism toward the South.

The ideological confrontation between North and South Korea has created mutually negative images in the minds both sides, something which has had a further detrimental effect on arms control efforts on the Peninsula.

Experience of War

The experience of war distorts a country's perception regarding the enemy. In addition to the ideological confrontation between North and South Korea, the Korean War has further deepened the negative images which each side has of the other, thus making arms control efforts between the two sides more difficult.

Military competition between the North and the South has been motivated by mutual suspicion, distrust, and animosity, much of which resulted from the Korean War. Coupled with the initial differences in their respective political systems and fundamental ideologies, this sense of animosity has further intensified military competition between the two states.

This animosity has produced a "enemy image" which will not be overcome in the near future. North and South Korea have identified one other as an enemy, and see themselves as unable to live together. North Korea has described the South as a puppet regime of the United States, a regime which represented the interests of the United States rather than the concerns of the Korean people. The ultimate aim of the North is to liberate "their southern brethren" from the domination of the Southern proxy regime, and to complete national unification by force.

This enemy image is reflected in North Korean attitudes toward the resolution of the conflict on the Peninsula. North Korea has tried to exclude South Korea from the negotiation table, and has insisted instead on direct talks with the United States. Under such circumstances, where North Korea would not admit South Korea as a legitimate dialogue partner, arms control efforts on the Peninsula could not find the support necessary for progress.

South Korea has sought to encourage the building of confidence between these two states in order help overcome the North's ignorance of the South, and so establish a firm ground for the successful implementation of arms control measures on the Peninsula.

System Survivability of North Korea

The formula of "self-defense in national security", one of the four principles of the *Juche* ideology, suggests that it is imperative that North Korea continuously strengthen and modernize its armed forces. From another point of view, the regime must place its first priority on strengthening military capability in order to maintain the *Juche*-based political system through the use of the armed forces. In other words, the political leadership cannot but help depend on the military for the survival of the political system. This makes it difficult for North Korea to implement a practical arms control agreement with the South.

As the concept "self-defence in national security" has been utilized to secure the stability of the political system, the political leadership cannot engage in any initiatives which would reduce the armed forces, as such a move could meet with the opposition of the military.

Political Status of the Military in the North Korean Politics

As the military has been the dominant force in the North Korean politics, North Korea has continuously maintained an aggressive policy toward the South. The European experience demonstrates that arms control efforts cannot be realized without the securing of support from the military. However, a military may not support arms control measures which threaten to reduce its political influence and various interests.

In North Korea, military support represents a crucial element for the succession of Kim Jong-Il. It is therefore inconceivable that Kim Jong-Il will take measures which reduce the political influence of the military. The conservative and aggressive policy positions of the military leadership, together with the enhanced political influence of the North Korean military under Kim Jong-Il, will ensure that the military will be in a position to hinder any arms control efforts on the Korean Peninsula.

Diplomatic Isolation of North Korea

North Korea began to experience difficulties in its foreign relations from the early 1970s onwards. This development was due in part to a shortage of foreign currency on the part of the regime. From the 1980s onwards,

these difficulties were further exacerbated by fundamental changes in the international environment and the successful implementation of South Korea's so-called northern *Politik*. While North Korea has attempted to improve its relations with the United States and Japan in order to help break this diplomatic isolation, it has experienced little success in this regard.

Another alternative for North Korea has been to engage in a hard-line policy toward the South while pushing for a US-North Korean dialogue through a strategy of brinkmanship. With this strategy, North Korea will make every effort to receive concessions from the South through the vehicle of military aggressiveness. Given this current situation, it is hard to imagine that North Korea will come to arms control negotiation table.

Arms Control on the Peninsula: The South Korean Approach

The future of arms control on the Peninsula is closely linked to the progress of American-North Korean and North-South Korean relations. From the process of the US-DPRK negotiations on nuclear issues, North Korea has demonstrated that it could change its position regarding North-South Korean relations wherever it felt it could secure sufficient benefits. With this in mind, it is conceivable that the North-South Korean arms control dialogue could be resumed, following upon a commensurate improvement in American-North Korean relations.

However, progress in North-South Korean arms control may not be possible without a concomitant improvement in the relations of these two states. Arms control cannot precede political confidence-building measures, exchanges or cooperation in social and economic areas. The subject of arms control between the two Koreas must go beyond the question of their strategic relationship to examine their mutual perceptions of one another, as well as their broader political relationship.

Presuming a change on the part of North Korea with regard to its attitude toward the ROK together with decision on the part of the North Korean leadership to proceed with CBMs, South Korea could pursue the following arms control activities.

Military Confidence-Building Measures

The confidence building measures implemented in Europe have pertained mainly to the exchange of information, the opening of channels of communication, and constraint measures. The first two CBMs have included information measures (information concerning armed forces, facilities, structure and activities), experience measures (exchanges of military personnel), communication measures (the establishment of a hot-line), notification measures (notifications of military exercises), and observation measures (observations of military movement). The latter CBM includes inspection measures (inspection on military equipment, facilities, structure, and activities), verification measures, activity constraint measures, deployment limitation measures and technology constraint measures.

North and South Korea may at first establish information and communication measures with regard to military confidence-building efforts. As agreed within the Basic Agreement, the establishment of a military hot-line, the exchange of military information, and/or the notification of military movements or exercises may be implemented relatively easily during the initial stage.

Operational Arms Control and Selective Reduction

The implementation of operational arms control and reduction measures would presume an improvement in the US-DPRK as well as the North-South Korean relationships. Such measures as the prohibition of increases of armaments in the DMZ, the abandonment of unlawful surveillance activities, and security assurances for the capital regions could be discussed at this stage.

In the area of operational arms control, North Korea has been active in proposing the suspension of ROK-US joint military exercises, the removal of military equipment and facilities from the DMZ, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Peninsula, and the redeployment of the American forces in the rear area of the South. South Korea has proposed the removal of military equipment and facilities from the DMZ, together with its peaceful utilization, the establishment of a deployment limitation zone, and the redeployment of military forces.

Thus, the past arms control proposals made by the two suggest that some operational arms control measures could be implemented within the context of an improvement in the US-North Korean as well as the North-South Korean relationships.

Structural Arms Control

With regard to the issue of structural arms control, South Korea has advocated a prior reduction of armaments, whereas the North has insisted on reductions in troops. These differences in their reduction priorities are reflected in the differences in the composition of their armed forces, their threat perceptions, and their different mobilization systems.

South Korea maintains that any initial reduction effort should begin with armaments levels, in order to curtail the numerical superiority of the North Korean forces and establish military parity between the two sides. In addition, verification efforts concerning armaments are relatively more easy to implement than activities designed to monitor troop reductions, principally because of the nature of the mobilization system of the North.

South Korea has also suggested a reduction in the number of offensive weapons, so as to lower the possibility of a surprise attack by the North. Given Seoul's geographical proximity to the DMZ, North Korea's numerical superiority in offensive weapons represents a grave threat to South Korea. Thus, South Korea believes that if military tensions are to be reduced between the two sides, North Korea should reduce its numbers of offensive weapon systems first.

North Korea, however, has placed its first priority on the reduction of troop levels. North Korea has continuously suggested a three-tiered troop reduction effort, with both sides reducing their numbers to 300,000 at the first stage, 200,000 at the second stage, and 100,000 at the final stage. This proposal looks attractive, but is too drastic and unrealistic. South Korea, on the contrary, has maintained that North and South Korea must first decide upon a ceiling for troop numbers, and then reduce those in excess of this figure according to an equal ratio during a certain period of time. This is more rational and realistic.


Conclusion

It is difficult to expect that North Korea will change its attitude, perceptions, and policy position concerning South Korea at this time. Although North Korea faces serious economic and diplomatic problems, it refuses to live together with the South. It is instead attempting to approach the United States in order to ensure the survival of its system.

Nevertheless, in the search for a permanent peace and a stable Peninsula, North Korea should accommodate itself to the changes which have occurred in the international environment. Time is clearly on the South Korean side. Until North Korea comes to the negotiation table, South Korea should make a strenuous effort to achieve military parity with the North. Only after South Korea achieves military parity with the North, will North Korea accept the South Korean arms control measures. This will ensure peace and stability together with the ultimate goal of the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

SECTION III

**ARMS CONTROL ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
RELATED ISSUES**



ARMS CONTROL ISSUES FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA: A US PERSPECTIVE¹

Todd M. Rosenblum

Americans, like their counterparts in other countries, cannot predict what will happen on the Korean Peninsula with a great deal of confidence, and are studying different ideas for reducing tensions in Korea. As part of that effort, American policy makers are considering a variety of arms control options — along with continued military preparedness and diplomatic engagement — to lower threats and enhance stability on the Peninsula.

Arms control has been, and continues to be, a crucial element in encouraging positive change in several regions of the world, including Northeast Asia. In the Middle East, for example, confidence building measures — which are often the first step in the development of formal arms control accords — have been crucial to the prevention of war in the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. It is widely acknowledged that the role of international observers, multinational peacekeepers, communication mechanisms, and verification technologies have played a critical role in increasing confidence and paving the way for formal peace arrangements in that region, at least between Israel and Egypt. Because the antipathy and mistrust between Arabs and Israelis is probably at least as high as that between North and South Koreans, there is hope that, if the parties on the Peninsula are committed to greater stability, they too can use arms control mechanisms in order to enhance confidence in this region.

Arms control often has been used as a mechanism by which to promote openness and gradual reform. Indeed, the United States and the former

¹ The views expressed in this paper are the private views of the author and in no way represent those of the United States Government. The Workshop organizers are indebted to Mr. Todd Rosenblum for this contribution. The US is in a unique position of being, in a sense, both outside the Korean Peninsula and within it. While the US, like other extra-Peninsular countries, can view Korea from "without", policy makers must also recognize that having front-line American troops stationed just south of the DMZ brings with it a second perspective from "within". For this reason, the US perspective is included under Section III of these proceedings.

Soviet Union used arms control discussions in the late 1960s to begin the long and sustained process of constructive engagement on a broad range of issues. Some in the United States have pointed to the Agreed Framework as an example of how North Korea can be induced, with the right incentives, into entering arms control obligations, reducing its isolation, showing flexibility, and engaging openly with the rest of the world in a responsible way.

There are numerous schools of thought in the United States on how to enhance stability on the Korean Peninsula. The current approach of emphasizing carrots and sticks, and mixing military, diplomatic and arms control measures has played a vital role in ensuring stability on the Peninsula. While the strong American and South Korean defensive posture on the southern side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) has deterred military aggression by Pyongyang, arms control has also played a role in enhancing stability on the Peninsula. This analysis focuses on the arms control component of that approach.

The Centrality of US Support for South Korea

In any analysis of arms control proposals for the Korean Peninsula, it is vital to understand the U.S. role in a Korean negotiating process. The United States will not be a neutral party to the process; the United States is allied with South Korea and will support Seoul throughout arms control talks. Thus, the United States should *not* be perceived as a neutral mediator between the two Koreas, but rather a supporter of South Korean positions. This assumption shapes American arms control views concerning the Peninsula and tends to reinforce agreement between Seoul and Washington in arms control fora with Pyongyang.

Conventional Arms Control and the Korean Peninsula

Conventional arms control could be used to address North Korea's offensive, first-strike force posture near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), increase American and South Korean strategic and tactical warning time, lessen the chance that small skirmishes along the DMZ will escalate into large crises, and lead to reductions in armaments on the Peninsula. It is

important to note, however, that Seoul's proximity to the DMZ and North Korea's provocative force deployments place the burden of initial reductions largely on Pyongyang. NATO and former Warsaw Pact states argued for years on the equity of asymmetrical reductions, but ultimately agreed on their utility, and thus codified unequal force reductions in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which has benefited the security of all participants.

The United States cannot afford to isolate arms control policy making from the rest of its North Korean initiatives. Arms control, as mentioned earlier, has been used to successfully engage North Korea in a dialogue on freezing its nuclear weapons program. Arms control confidence building measures were a central tenet of the 1991 North-South statement on nonaggression, even if North Korea failed to live up to any of its obligations in that statement. Hopefully, the slowly developing US-North Korean missile talks also can lead to progress in reducing the likelihood of future North Korean missile deployments on the Peninsula as well as the proliferation of North Korean missiles to other countries of concern. Unfortunately, conventional arms control has not played an historically prominent role in American approaches toward North Korea, despite its centrality to military tensions on the Peninsula. There are signs, however, that the time may now be ripe for engaging North Korea on a conventional arms control dialogue.

Approaching North Korea: Carrots and Sticks

North Korea is an extremely difficult negotiating partner. While all countries seek to maximize their leverage in negotiations, North Korea's willingness to regularly invoke brinkmanship often poisons the spirit of dialogue and unnecessarily weakens trust. Indeed, the Agreed Framework would not have been possible without the patience and tactical flexibility of the American negotiators. Approaching North Korea on conventional arms control, no doubt, will be equally vexing. As North Korea probably will see little gain in the initial stages of conventional arms control discussions, negotiators will have to be prepared to use non-traditional levers to induce North Korean acceptance of both the proposals and the need to hold negotiations.

North Korea also may be more receptive to beginning the conventional arms control talks if the talks first focus on small steps, rather than broader measures, even if the rewards are significantly less for smaller steps. Some small steps that might be useful to increase North Korea's confidence in the utility of arms control could include notification of troop movements and exercises, military officer exchanges, the establishment of "hot-lines," and the publication of defense information, such as information on budgets, weaponry, and doctrine. While some may argue that these steps have limited military significance, they would, at a minimum, establish a basis for greater confidence and for more militarily meaningful steps in the future. North Korea should be told up-front, however, that these measures are minimal first steps and that significant sanctions relief cannot occur until after it implements more comprehensive conventional arms control steps later in the process.

"Harder", more militarily significant proposals should be introduced as soon as North Korea's acceptance of the conventional arms control process becomes apparent. These measures could represent the core of conventional arms control for the Peninsula and be designed to dramatically reduce the North Korean military threat. Clearly, negotiators would have to be prepared to make considerable concessions on sanctions relief and humanitarian aid if they want North Korea to adopt the more far-reaching measures. Some of these steps might include a requirement that North Korea pull back its heavy artillery and multiple rocket launchers deployed along the DMZ to rear areas, as well as redeploy its missile systems and attack aircraft to rear-area bases. These pullbacks would have to be sufficiently far back that any attempt by North Korea to move these systems back toward the DMZ would be easily detectable and time consuming enough to allow American and South Korean forces to take decisive counter-steps. The arms control package of the Bosnian Peace Accords offers a precedent for hostile forces agreeing to artillery systems pull-back zones. More comprehensive measures could include the verifiable destruction of North Korea's offensive military assets, including large numbers of tanks, small submarines, missiles of short-, medium-, and long-range, artillery, ground attack aircraft and command and control centres. Even longer-term objectives could include the conversion of defense production facilities, a large-scale demobilization of the Korean People's Army (KPA), a total reorientation of North Korean military doctrine, and the

adoption of a defensive force posture by Pyongyang. Again, the approach taken to arms reductions in Europe offers a possible template for Korea. Aspects of the Sino-Russian troop reduction agreement also have some applicability for the Korean Peninsula.

Unconventional Conventional Arms Control Incentives

One unconventional lever applicable to conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula is sanctions relief. North Korea is negotiating today largely because of its dire economic situation. Having demonstrated a willingness to trade military capabilities for economic benefits in the Agreed Framework, North Korea might be willing to do so on conventional arms control. A decision to trade sanctions relief for conventional arms control concessions could have the dual effect of enhancing stability on the Peninsula and forcing more openness within North Korea. Some argue that lifting sanctions would help open up North Korea to the outside world and thereby further expose the regime's backwardness, repressiveness, and defunct economic system to the North Korean people.

Given North Korea's dire food shortage, it is appropriate to ask whether the United States and others should link food aid to conventional arms control concessions, especially given that the humanitarian needs of the North Korean *people* are clear, but the humanitarian needs of the *regime* are not. The United Nation's World Food Program reported in May 1997, for example, that North Korean soldiers are receiving *seven times* the food rations allotted to civilians. Also, the U.S. State Department spokesperson stated on May 6, 1997 that the "North Korean military has priority to all resources, including food". Korea-watchers need to continue monitoring this imbalance; of course food aid, provided directly to the people of northern North Korea by international organizations, should continue regardless of the regime's actions.

Track II and Nongovernmental Initiatives

A large hurdle to overcome in conventional arms control talks with North Korea, indeed in any talks with North Koreans, is the regime's

historical rigidity and isolation. In the area of conventional arms control, therefore, it is important to ease North Korea into an acceptance of arms control processes and substance. There is scant evidence that North Korea accepts either the "win-win" premise of arms control or the action-reaction phenomena of arms races. It is essential, therefore, to engage North Korea in conceptual discussions of arms control, both on an official and an unofficial level.

Unofficial arms control exchanges could help encourage North Korea to better accept arms control principles and processes. Unofficial "Track II" dialogues, such as the North Pacific Arms Control Workshop and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue where government and non-government experts speak in their private capacity, are good examples of existing fora that could move North Korea in a positive way. Participating in these dialogues would allow Pyongyang to participate in multilateral discussions on regional security and better understand regional dynamics in an informal way. Sandia National Laboratory's Cooperative Monitoring Centre (CMC) in the United States is another excellent forum for engaging North Korea in conceptual arms control issues. The CMC has considerable experience running arms control workshops with states in the region and could usefully introduce North Koreans to multinational approaches to arms control monitoring, from a private American perspective. North Korea must of course agree to participate in these dialogues and recognize that they are not negotiating bodies, nor can they be used as leverage against official negotiations.

Regional Arms Control and the Korean Peninsula

There is a clear role for regional arms control fora — such as the ASEAN Regional Forum — and for states not directly involved in the Four Party Peace Talks, although that role must be tempered by practical concerns. North Korea must not be led to believe that it could avoid direct negotiations with Seoul, and states and entities outside of the Four Party Peace Talks must be careful to avoid giving Pyongyang the impression that it has options other than direct talks with the South. The United States and China have defined roles in the Four Party Peace Talks, but even they are not neutral mediators between North and

South Korea and should not offer to serve as communicators between Pyongyang and Seoul.

Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for keeping other states and entities interested in the talks fully informed throughout the process. Japan, China, Russia, the United States and the ASEAN states are all likely to be central to the successful implementation of peace accords on the Korean Peninsula, including possibly the provision of financial assistance to Korea. They may also play a role in implementing conventional arms control accords on the Peninsula, possibly by providing sanctions relief and/or security assurances. Moreover, distancing the states and entities not directly involved in the talks could lead them to make counterproductive proposals if the talks bog down on difficult issues.

The Agreed Framework and KEDO provide strong examples of how multilateral mechanisms can support the implementation of arms control arrangements on the Korean Peninsula. There is no reason multilateral mechanisms could not play a similarly supportive role in the implementation of conventional arms control accords in this region as well.

Conclusion

The need for conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula is increasingly obvious. North Korea maintains an unstable, offensive force posture that perpetuates a high state of alert on both sides of the DMZ. Conventional arms control could help ease military tensions, even in the absence of significant progress on political and economic issues between North and South Korea. It is critical that government officials and non-government bodies engage North Koreans in arms control concepts and principles in order to increase Pyongyang's comfort with regard to conventional arms control. North Korea, of course, must accept offers already on the table to begin that dialogue.

Conventional arms control can work on the Peninsula, although it could only effect change if North Korea is prepared to accept asymmetrical draw-downs. For their part, South Korean, American and other

negotiators must be willing to use non-traditional incentives, such as sanctions relief, to keep North Korea at the negotiating table and gain its acceptance of such proposals.

North Korea is in a weakened state and its ability to survive as a viable independent entity is in doubt. Arms control, as used in many other cases, can help secure commitments on weapons reductions before major crises occur. Arms control accords also have the benefit of establishing norms and procedures for managing tension. While arms control accords are unable to guarantee that agreements will not be violated, they do increase the visibility and penalty of violations. In the case of the Korean Peninsula, conventional arms control could make a substantial contribution to the establishment of norms which do not exist today.

Military Confidence Building on the Korean Peninsula: Possible First Steps Toward Cooperation¹

Michael Vannoni²

The Korean Peninsula is the site of the world's most tense military confrontation. Nearly two million North Korean, South Korean, and American troops face each other along the 255-km long military demarcation line. Confidence building measures (CBMs), particularly military ones, that address the security needs of both countries could decrease the danger of conflict and help create an environment where a peace regime might be negotiated. In spite of the present high level of mutual distrust, steps can still be taken that could help prepare for the future development and implementation of CBMs. This paper defines some simple and specific first steps toward CBMs which might be useful on the Korean Peninsula.

A Summary of Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

Inter-Korean relations have been quite volatile since the 1953 armistice. Relations have cycled between outright hostility and Ministerial-level agreements for cooperation. In the period between 1954 and 1985, North Korea made 205 arms control proposals and South Korea made 55.³ The proposals have included CBMs, operational and structural arms control measures, and disarmament initiatives. In some cases, the two countries made proposals more for political propoganda purposes than for the advancement of arms control. None of these proposals resulted in concrete actions because of the political conditions in the two countries. The December 1991 "South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

² Mr. Vannoni is with Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogramme laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy under Contract DE-ACO4-94AL85000.

³ Young-Koo Cha, "Arms Talks on the Korean Peninsula: A Korean Perspective", *Korean Journal of International Studies* XXI:2 (Summer 1990), pp. 231-48.

Aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation" (known as the Basic Agreement) seemed to represent a diplomatic breakthrough in this process. The Basic Agreement, which contains provisions for confidence building, military transparency, and operational arms control, however soon became deadlocked and has made little further progress.

There is a consistent philosophical difference between South and North Korean proposals for arms control. South Korean, European, and American analysts have examined the history of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and have promoted the applicability of CBMs and other operational arms control measures to the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, Chung-In Moon has described North Korean thinking about arms control as being based on Europe's experience during the 1920s with little analysis of the last 20 years in Europe.⁴ The South has argued that confidence must be built before structural arms control or disarmament efforts can take place. The North has argued that arms reduction, primarily in the number of active military personnel, will result in increased confidence.

Opportunities For Military Confidence Building

Extrapolations of the European experience to the Korean Peninsula should be carried out in a selective manner. One feature of arms control in Europe which may enjoy relevance to the Korean context is that of "transparency". The fundamental purpose of transparency measures are to share selected information concerning activities which previously were shrouded in secrecy. Transparency measures need not be limited to military activities or resources. Transparency measures can be part of a formal agreement, or they may be performed on an as-needed basis as a confidence building measure. Techniques to achieve transparency fall into two broad categories: *non-technical* (e.g., declarations, on-site observers) and *technical* (e.g., the use of sensors to monitor activity, analysis of physical samples). The use of technical tools to implement transparency is often called *cooperative monitoring*. A side benefit to implementing transparency measures is that direct contact between

⁴ Chung-In Moon, *Arms Control On The Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1996), pp. 36-41.

adversaries helps to counter the dehumanizing effects of prolonged hostility.

James Goodby has assessed the evolving South-North positions with regard to operational and structural arms control issues.⁵ Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi have examined the efficacy of transparency measures along with other potential CBMs for the Korean Peninsula.⁶ Both studies found a number of similarities in the positions of South and North Korea. South and North Korea agree on the basic principle of constraining certain military operations and dispositions. Their differing views of the nature of the threat to peace on the Peninsula, however, have resulted in very different applications of that principle. In spite of these different perceptions, the two sides agree that:

- The demilitarized zone (DMZ) should be truly demilitarized and made a zone of peace.
- Communication links should be established to avoid inadvertent conflict.
- Military exercises should be declared in advance of performance.
- Both governments should mutually declare their intention to avoid the use of force.

Cha and Kang concluded that transparency measures, accompanied by some constraint measures, are the best choice for future initiatives to develop military confidence between South and North Korea. They recommended that transparency measures be introduced first because excessive secrecy about military status can damage relations by fostering even greater suspicions. Measures that provide transparency in pertinent

⁵ James Goodby, *Confidence and Security Building in the Korean Peninsula: The Negotiating Agenda* (Project on Arms Control and International Security, proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) annual meeting, Washington, D.C., June 11-14, 1992), pp. 171-94.

⁶ Young-Koo Cha and Kang Choi, "Land-based Confidence Building Measures in Northeast Asia: A South Korean Perspective", *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* VI:2 (Winter 1994), pp. 237-60.

areas of military affairs help reduce suspicions by providing opportunities for communicating non-hostile intentions.⁷ Still, while transparency measures may serve as an excellent first step, they are not a cure-all nor do they change military realities. The goal of transparency-inducing activities should be to seek a balance between secrecy and the acknowledgment of legitimate mutual security concerns.

To date, North Korea has been resistant to transparency in military matters. On-site inspection of military activities has been rejected as an infringement on sovereignty. Only strong international pressure convinced North Korea to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with access to its nuclear facilities. Given the centrally controlled nature of the political system in North Korea, transparency measures that are not carefully defined may be perceived by the leadership of the state as representing a threat to the state. Proposals made to North Korea concerning the implementation of specific transparency measures should therefore demonstrate pragmatic benefits. Including a justification along with the transparency proposal would help North Korea recognize the potential benefits of selective openness in military activities.

Four Conceptual CBMs for the Korean Peninsula

Relations between South and North Korea are poor but have been worse. Bilateral contacts still occur. The multilateral KEDO project to build nuclear reactors is progressing. South Korean companies continue to establish commercial links with the North. The potential for military confrontation, however, remains a serious risk. Given the suspension of direct official talks between South and North, are there steps that either state might take which would contribute to the long-term goal of building confidence?

Four conceptual transparency measures for military activities are presented here, based on the analysis of Cha, Goodby, et. al. regarding common themes in South and North Korean arms control proposals.

⁷ Daviniv Proslav, "Opening Statement", *National Security and Confidence Building in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Disarmament Topical Paper No. 13, New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 6.

After the presentation of each conceptual CBM, the section describes a possible first step which South Korea could take in carrying this CBM out. Further potentially cooperative steps concerning the proposed CBM are also described.

The communication of these first steps to North Korea is possible, despite current political tensions. Formal diplomatic interactions are often concerned with setting legalistic precedents. For many years, North Korea rejected direct official interaction with South Korea because of the implication that such activity suggested recognition of South Korea as a sovereign entity. There are, however, alternatives to traditional forms of diplomatic communication. Third parties, including the news media, can function both as communication channels and advocates. An independent review of confidence building proposals by a credible third party may contribute to North Korean acceptance of various diplomatic initiatives. The Internet offers a new mode of communication which can be used both discretely and unofficially. All the information associated with the second step of the conceptual CBMs presented in this paper can be transferred unilaterally through the Internet. North Korea could then access the information without any obligation to make comment.

The analysis of the following and other options for military transparency may present an opportunity for political confidence building. North Korean academics and technical experts might be invited to participate in a joint study of military confidence building options. Alternatively, North Korean academics could perform such analysis independently but present the conclusions in a multilateral forum.

1. Reducing Dangerous Military Activities In The DMZ

ISSUE: Military incidents within the DMZ are a frequent source of tension.

CONCEPTUAL CBM: Restrict troops to observation posts in the DMZ and declare travel to those posts.

COOPERATIVE MONITORING OPTION: Use ground sensors to perform the functions previously carried out by military security patrols.

POSSIBLE FIRST STEP: Establish an experiment to assess the performance and reliability of a variety of intrusion detection sensors in a realistic Korean environment.

BACKGROUND COMMENTS: Security patrols operate routinely in the DMZ, and these patrols have sometimes led to military intrusions which violate the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Such incidents are relatively common and adversely affect bilateral relations. An accidental violation of the Armistice may be interpreted as being of greater political significance than its military import might otherwise suggest. If security troops in the DMZ were restricted to observation posts, there would be far less potential for conflict between rival patrols. The security troops could continue to function as observers from their posts as well as forming a rapid-reaction force to respond to potential violations.

An experiment in monitoring with sensors would contribute to the development of options for transparency. There are several direct benefits associated with monitoring experiments:

- The preparation of options for application when future political conditions are more favourable.
- The development of indigenous technical capabilities.
- The creation of an opportunity to assess operational issues in monitoring.
- Increased confidence with monitoring technologies and procedures.

Such an experiment should operate for an extended period (six months to a year) for the purpose of evaluating the effects of climate and aging on the monitoring hardware. The experiment should also test alternative modes of communication for the transmission of data to a monitoring centre for evaluation.

POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE STEP: Establish communication links with interested parties and share data from the experimental system.

This step would serve to acquaint the North Koreans with the principles of cooperative monitoring and transparency. An impartial review of the experimental system and the provision of test results by a credible party should make the transparency option seem more realistic to North Korea. Such an independent review might encourage North Korea to participate in future experiments.

2. Transparency in the Storage of Heavy Weapons

ISSUE: Uncertainty about the location and status of heavy weapons raises concerns regarding the potential existence of aggressive intentions.

CONCEPTUAL CBM: Declare heavy weapons in storage sites and announce the subsequent emplacement or removal of such weapons.

COOPERATIVE MONITORING OPTION: Monitor the perimeter around a storage site for the detection and reporting of the movement of heavy weapons in or out of the area.

POSSIBLE FIRST STEP: Establish an experimental system at a realistic site so as to assess sensor system performance and reliability.

BACKGROUND COMMENTS: The status and location of heavy weapons (e.g., tanks, artillery, rocket launchers) represents a security issue, in that uncertainty as to the purpose of exercises or routine military movements may precipitate concern as to the potential likelihood of an attack. A declaration of pending movement is a declaratory CBM. This cooperative monitoring option enhances stability by providing transparency concerning the location and status of heavy weapons. Such measures leave the number, capability, or deployment potential of these weapons unaffected. Canada pioneered monitoring concepts for stored weapons as a NATO-Warsaw Pact CBM in Europe.

The strategy for this experiment is similar to the previous one. The type of monitoring sensors would be different but the experimental system should operate for an extended period so as to evaluate performance and reliability. The ability to credibly distinguish significant events from

unimportant background activity and report that information to a monitoring centre is of great importance.

POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE STEP: Establish communication links and share data from the experimental system with interested parties.

The strategy is the same as with the previous CBM for defusing dangerous military activities. Third parties could again perform the role of a neutral reviewer of the experimental system.

3. Transparency in Military Movements

ISSUE: Military movements raise concerns regarding the potential for disguised attack preparations.

CONCEPTUAL CBM: Permit regularly scheduled or challenge aerial overflights to monitor ground activities.

COOPERATIVE MONITORING OPTION: Install commercially available sensors on an unarmed aircraft.

POSSIBLE FIRST STEP: Perform analysis of sample imagery to determine what capability is necessary.

BACKGROUND COMMENTS: Large military training manoeuvres and movements introduce an element of instability where relations between countries are characterized by a low level of trust. Aerial overflights may provide a means by which to implement transparency without restricting the military capability of the concerned states. Aerial monitoring is less intrusive and creates fewer political complications than ground-based sensors or observers. The *Open Skies Treaty* between members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact and the 1991 bilateral agreement between Hungary and Romania are useful precedents.

Several papers have investigated the concept of cooperative aerial monitoring in Korea.⁸

Any country contemplating the use of aerial monitoring must understand that technical capability is an important element in any substantive contribution to transparency. A useful first step would be to assess various methods of aerial sensing for the purpose of deciding which ones should be used. Although the Open Skies Treaty is frequently cited as an example, the monitoring techniques used were negotiated specifically for that treaty. The sensors accepted by the Open Skies Treaty should not be viewed as the only technical option open to negotiators nor as an indication of the upper limit of sensor capability. Commercially available airborne monitoring equipment today has a capability greater than that available during the Open Skies negotiations. Higher resolution synthetic aperture radar may be particularly relevant to the Korean context because the climatic environment of this region is typically characterized by the presence of rain, snow, fog, and haze.

POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE STEP: Publish and distribute analysis of sample imagery.

The concept of negotiated reciprocal aerial overflights for the purpose of monitoring is not beyond the realm of possibility since North Korea opened three commercial air routes over its territory in 1996. Even if motivated solely by the desire for financial remuneration, this action is unprecedented in North Korea's history.

A South Korean publication containing a study of various sensors and imagery analysis would contribute to North Korea's understanding of this option for transparency. Such a document could be directly or indirectly distributed to North Korea for review. Third parties could again play a useful role as independent reviewers of the contents of this publication.

⁸ Bon-Hak Koo "Open Skies in the Korean Context", in James A. Boutlier (ed.), *Arms Control in the North Pacific: The Role for Confidence Building and Verification* (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs and International Trade, April 1993), pp. 128-41; Amy Smithson and Seong Cheon, "Open Skies' Over the Korean Peninsula: Breaking the Impasses", *Korea and World Affairs* (Spring 1993), pp. 57-77.

The United States performed a similar project for the Open Skies Treaty. The Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) produced a book containing actual imagery along with a description of the monitoring equipment and procedures used to collect the images.⁹ The United States distributed the book to interested parties in order to increase understanding of the Treaty as well as to provide a reference tool.

4. Transparency in Missile Production

Transparency measures are potentially applicable to topics as controversial as the production of long-range missiles. Both South and North Korea have an interest in ballistic missile production. The United States has held bilateral talks with North Korea on the subject of missile development, production, and sales, with the goal of persuading it to accept the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).¹⁰ The 1980 ROK-US missile development agreement restricts South Korean missiles to a maximum range of 180 km. South Korea has cited the need to modernize its aging ballistic missile force for defensive purposes. This program would involve indigenous development and production. After meetings with South Korean representatives in 1996, the United States has indicated that it would relax the restrictions of the 1980 agreement and support South Korea's entry into the MTCR.

ISSUE: The production of long-range missiles raises regional concerns regarding perceptions of aggressive intent.

CONCEPTUAL CBM: The MTCR does not limit domestic deployment of long-range missiles or reduce regional concerns regarding their use. *A significant CBM would be for both South and North Korea to renounce the possession and production of long-range missiles.* Long-range

⁹ Defense Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), Arms Control and Test Limitation Division *Open Skies Imagery Portfolio* (Alexandria, Virginia, November 1994).

¹⁰ The MTCR was created in 1987 to define common export guidelines for missiles and related technologies. The original threshold for control was a ballistic missile or unmanned aerial vehicle capable of delivering a 500 kg payload to a range of 300 km. In early 1993, this threshold was lowered to include any missile believed to be intended to deliver a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead.

missiles could be defined by the MTCR guideline as those missiles possessing a range in excess of 300 km. Under this framework, production of the North Korean SCUD-B missile and the proposed replacement for the South Korean NHK-2 missile could conceivably be permitted. North Korean Production of SCUD-C, No Dong, and Taepo Dong missiles would be banned.

COOPERATIVE MONITORING OPTION: Install sensors at production facility gates to distinguish between short and long-range missiles.

POSSIBLE FIRST STEP: Conduct a study to define the physical characteristics of missile systems which comply with the range restriction and assess how these characteristics could be detected and measured by sensors.

BACKGROUND COMMENTS: Monitoring technology, given appropriate levels of intrusiveness, can successfully survey missile production. The 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union provides a useful precedent for the selective monitoring of a missile production facility. Intrusiveness is the key factor in any missile production monitoring system. A study to identify and define the physical characteristics of missiles consistent with a 300 km range limitation would make possible the identification and proposal of production monitoring opportunities.

POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE STEP: Publicly demonstrate the options for monitoring missile production identified in the study through a functional model.

A "laboratory-scale" experimental model to demonstrate the procedures and technologies of a conceptual missile production monitoring system would serve to inform individuals as to the utility of such systems. It would demonstrate how much intrusiveness would be present and how much transparency could be achieved. Such models can serve to educate leaders as to the role of monitoring in a very intuitive way. The United States built just such a detailed and functioning table-top model of a proposed missile production monitoring system as an orientation tool. This model was shown to the Soviets during the negotiation of the INF

Treaty. The INF model was also demonstrated to President Reagan in 1987.

Conclusions

A number of regional security analysts see opportunities for a variety of constructive measures to decrease military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, political conditions to date have not permitted the successful negotiation and implementation of any significant measures in this regard. This paper presents four conceptual options for CBMs, with first steps which could lead to larger South-North cooperative activities. The concepts for the military CBMs presented in this paper are intended to stimulate discussion and require further study.

Parties can experiment with cooperative monitoring concepts to achieve transparency before entering into either formal or informal arms control activities. Experiments familiarize participants with both the procedures and technology for monitoring and can be a form of confidence building in themselves. Collaborative efforts can provide neutral ground for interaction among technical communities and produce results which could aid national leaders in the implementation of potential future agreements.

The collegial relationships which often develop among participants could also contribute to confidence.

Progress in building confidence is more likely to occur when all parties understand that they will not necessarily be worse off after participating in military transparency efforts. An explanation of key concepts and assumptions should be included with all such proposals. Already existing alternatives to the process of formal diplomatic exchanges — the Internet, for example — may permit a quiet, yet effective, process of information exchange and consensus building.

**CHINESE AND RUSSIAN CONFIDENCE
BUILDING MEASURES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA¹**

Robert E. Bedeski

Introduction

The Sino-Russian relationship was one of the most important variables of the Cold War. Once both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and adequate delivery systems, the military equation remained fairly stable. As long as both powers were willing to provide their military machines with technology and advanced weapons, relatively little change occurred in the balance of power. Competition occurred at the edges, often in the form of conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The Sino-Soviet rift not only challenged the monolithic image of world communism, it also created a new security threat to the huge land mass of the Soviet Union, as well as a second pole of leadership in the communist movement. Beginning in 1986, the Soviet Union took steps to heal this breach, and in 1996 Moscow signed a treaty with Beijing to further reduce tensions. More recent developments in their relationship indicated a diplomatic strategy of countering American hegemony and attempting to counteract the expansion of NATO.

Sino-Russian relations have been and are destined to remain a vital dimension of global politics, and a force of particular relevance for the Eurasian states. Recent developments between Russia and China have, however, added another more pragmatic dimension to this relationship — a process of seeking to reduce the tensions which exist between them. This process of searching for agreement is one that should be analyzed in terms of its implications for reducing tensions between other adjoining states — particularly South and North Korea.

The process of reducing conflict is relevant to a wide range of phenomena. In the area of arms control and verification, it is crucial not

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.

only in reducing anxieties concerning an opponent's capabilities, but also with regard to their intentions as well. Verification is one of several types of confidence building measures, or CBMs.

The four years of negotiations leading to the Shanghai Agreement (April 26, 1996) are therefore important in understanding the intentions of the Russian and Chinese governments. By understanding these intentions, we can have a better sense of the reasons underlying what is included and excluded in recent agreements.

The first step is to establish a paradigm for approaching and analyzing the phenomenon of Sino-Russian détente and its expression in the Shanghai Agreement. This can be done in part by reviewing its historical background, and by weighing various variables over time.

Second, an accurate assessment of CBMs is necessary in order to separate the essential from the symbolic, and the narrow specifics from the broad, open-ended opportunities and dangers. At this stage, we must also examine the practical tools available for implementation.

Third, we can then apply the CBM paradigm to other cases — specifically the challenge of Korea.

Paradigm for Analysis

The following list of questions is suggested as a preliminary stage of departure: the proposed approach is to understand the place and utility of CBMs by approaching them from the perspective of conflict resolution.

1. *Areas of Mutual Agreement*

- a) What points of mutual interest can be identified?
- b) Can these be further expanded to touch upon and include other issues?
- c) Can discussion and resolution of minor disputes be extended to other related issues?

- d) Can a process be identified to insure confidence of both sides in fairness?
- e) How can transparency be expanded?
- f) What is the role of hostages in insuring good behaviour and conformity to agreements?
- g) Is perception of a mutual enemy helpful in bringing parties together?
- h) Can low-level projects of cooperation provide a learning device for cooperative CBMs?

2. *Relative levels of military strength*

- a) How does the disposition of military forces affect mutual perceptions and assessments?
- b) How can transparency efforts within military forces lead to reduction of tensions?
- c) How can verification agreements be negotiated and implemented?
- d) What can be the role of overhead monitoring?
- e) What technology can be introduced to enhance the credibility of agreements?
- f) What are the successful precedents of arms control and verification that can be applied to a particular situation?
- g) What treaties — bilateral, multilateral and international — are already in place as precedents for arms control verification?

3. *Incentives and disincentives to reach agreement*

- a) Does a particular dispute have ramifications at local, regional, and national levels? Can it be resolved at one level or does it require resolution at all levels simultaneously?
- b) What benefits can be identified for both sides in resolving a conflict?
- c) Where one or both parties to a conflict are in disagreement among themselves, how are intramural disputes usually resolved? What are the chances of a faction acting as spoiler?
- d) To what constituencies are bargainers accountable?
- e) How much latitude is allocated to negotiations?
- f) What are the short-term and long-term consequences of a proposed resolution?

- g) Will resolution of a conflict disable or weaken one or several sub-groups? How can this — and should it be — ameliorated?

4. *Short-term and long-term objectives of each side*

- a) What are the short- and long-term objectives of the contending groups and their component members? Is there consensus on each side?
- b) How can agreement be reached to serve short-term objectives?
- c) Does stalemate between disputing parties reflect stalemate within a party?
- d) What trade-offs are possible between short-term and long-term objectives?
- e) How can long-term objectives be incorporated into an agreement and serve the mutual interests of the conflicting parties?

5. *Role of third parties — direct and indirect*

- a) Are there any countries or international agencies trusted by both sides to play an impartial role?
- b) Can third parties facilitate resolution of a dispute through resource transfer, threat of force, or other means?
- c) Can third parties mediate a conflict and serve as guarantor of an agreement?
- d) Is there a role for third parties as peacekeepers or monitors?
- e) Can third parties helpfully underwrite an agreement?
- f) What external third parties might have an interest in the *non-resolution* of a dispute?
- g) When is non-resolution more desirable than resolution?

The Sino-Russian Security Relationship

A brief survey of the Sino-Russian relationship follows as a background to further analysis.

Sino-Russian Conflicts Since 1949

Relations between China and Russia have oscillated between alliance and hostility over the past fifty years. These changes in the nature of their relationship have been a consequence of shifts in ideology, together with changes in foreign policy goals at the regional and international levels. Their relationship was also based on mutual responses to actions taken by their respective leaderships. While Soviet power transferred to successive individuals, Mao remained at the helm in China.

In 1950, the Soviet Union and the new Peoples' Republic of China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance. The mutual border was not problematic at the time, and economic and cultural exchanges between the two allies expanded.² The Soviet Union gave up its naval base in Manchuria, returned Soviet shares in joint stock companies to China, offered US\$130 million in new credit, and pledged aid for the construction of fifteen new large scale industrial enterprises. Agreement on the construction of a rail line connecting the two nations through China's northwest provinces was also reached. Moscow also offered limited access to Mongolia.³

These good relations continued in 1956-57 with the Soviet Union sharing its nuclear technology with China. In 1956, China began construction of its first MRBM rocket-assembly factory, probably with Soviet approval and technology.⁴ However, while Khrushchev might have been attempting to gain Mao's support by sharing technology and encouraging Soviet trade with China, on the domestic level the seeds of conflict were already sown. The United States was busy building its nuclear arms arsenal and encouraging development in the capitalist world through the

² Alexi D. Voskressenski, *The Difficult Border* (Nova Science Publishers, 1995), p. 90.

³ Harvey W. Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 18.

⁴ There was confusion over why the Soviets would share such information. A viable reason was that Khrushchev needed China's support when his domestic power was dwindling. He probably assumed that China would gain nuclear knowledge eventually, so he could at least maintain their support even if it resulted with China achieving nuclear knowledge a bit sooner. During Mao's visit in 1957, he declared the USSR to be the supreme leader of the socialist bloc. Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, p. 24.

Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, as well as establishing defences throughout the Asian Pacific region. Khrushchev's policies were more moderate than those of the Stalin years. At Geneva in 1955, Camp David in 1959 and in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, Moscow cooperated in reducing the tensions which characterized the Cold War.⁵

Conflict between the two allies began at the ideological level, with China's shock over Khrushchev's secret speech to the 20th Congress in 1956, in which he denied Stalin's positive role without engaging in any previous consultation with the other Communist parties.⁶ At the time Mao had supported Khrushchev, but in 1958, Mao revised his stance. Mao sought to oppose any denunciations of Stalin, probably in an attempt to prevent any move to revisionist thinking which could in turn lead to a full-scale attack on Communism. Mao also wanted to avoid any comparison between himself and the mistakes that Stalin may have made. Therefore, the Chinese stance declared that Stalin, for all his "mistakes", was an "outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter" who had defended Lenin's line of industrialization and collectivization against the enemies of Communism. This position was taken to ensure that Khrushchev's attack on Stalin did not lead to a widespread domestic reaction against Maoism.⁷ Beijing also used this opportunity to pose the question of how China could maintain confidence in a Soviet leader who could undertake such a major initiative without prior consultations with other Communist parties and apparently without any plan of how to address the inevitable adverse consequences such pronouncements would generate.⁸

The first public signs of a split occurred during the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958. Beijing concluded that the Sino-Soviet alliance could not be invoked on behalf of Chinese strategic interests and that it appeared to be principally designed to benefit the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union in turn calculated that China might draw the Soviets into conflict with the

⁵ Jonathan R. Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (USA: Harper and Row, 1989).

⁶ Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 42.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 44-5.

⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 47-9.

United States, something which did not suit the Soviet national interest. The crisis contributed to the 1959 Soviet decision to renege on the nuclear sharing agreement with the Peoples' Republic of China.⁹ The Soviets also failed to support China in the 1959 Sino-Indian border incident.¹⁰

By 1958, the foreign and domestic policies of China and the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly divergent. Khrushchev wanted an understanding with Washington, whereas the Chinese had broken off talks with the Americans.¹¹ This period also saw the beginning of the Great Leap Forward and the development of peoples' communes, policies which expressed China's rejection of the Soviet model of development and symbolized a determination to follow its own path to communism.¹² In 1960, Khrushchev decided to reduce the numbers of Soviet technical advisors in China.¹³ By 1961, relations between the two states had collapsed.¹⁴ The division was further deepened with China's successful 1962 attack against the Indian army in the Himalayan border region. The first serious border clash in this area took place in September 1959, followed by minor incidents which would culminate in a major Chinese offensive along much of the border in September and October 1962. The Indian army was routed, and China declared a unilateral cease-fire in November. Khrushchev broke the precedent of supporting socialist bloc allies by adopting a neutral position. Furthermore, in 1961, Soviet non-military loans to India amounted to more than twice the total amount provided to China during the years from 1949-1961. Khrushchev's support for India was influenced by American support of Pakistan. Soviet military assistance to India would help assure that Pakistan's armed forces would continue to be deployed to the south and west rather than

⁹ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, pp. 40-5.

¹⁰ Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 160.

¹¹ R.K.I. Quedsted, *Sino-Russian Relations* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1994), p. 122.

¹² Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 160.

¹³ Roy Medvedev, *China and the Superpowers* (New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), p. 34.

¹⁴ Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 160.

toward the buffer state of Afghanistan. Given the sensitive location of Afghanistan, the Soviets thought it important to prevent American and Pakistani pressure on this state turning the Afghani regime pro-western. At this point the Soviet Union was Afghanistan's major trading partner.¹⁵ Therefore, Russia's foreign policy in this area was motivated by concerns about American power. This sensitivity was compounded by Russia's retreat in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, an event which provoked Mao's disapproval and further led to his break with Khrushchev.¹⁶

Incidents along the Sino-Soviet border became quite frequent during the period from 1956 to 1959, and their severity increased in 1960. In May 1963, the Soviets agreed to hold consultations concerning the demarcation of a more precise border. Talks were held from February 25 to August 22 of 1964. While Moscow interpreted these talks as representing diplomatic process, China viewed them simply as border negotiations. A number of other rounds were scheduled but the Cultural Revolution and ideological splits prevented them from being held.¹⁷ Ultimately, military confrontations occurred along the border as talks failed. Mao claimed 1.5 million square kilometres of Soviet territory, and the 1962 boundary treaty with Mongolia indicated Beijing's attempt to regain influence in the area, even though a close alliance between Mongolia and the Soviet Union had been evident long before its June 7, 1962 admission to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.¹⁸

In January of 1960, Beijing declared its independence in the nuclear field by proclaiming that China would not be bound by arms-control arrangements made by other countries. China proposed the total nuclear disarmament of all nations a week after the American-Soviet atmospheric test ban treaty was formalized on July 25, 1963, and has continued to advocate this position. On October 16, 1964 (the day the Soviet Union announced Khrushchev's dismissal), China tested its first atomic device.

¹⁵ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, pp. 55-60.

¹⁶ Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 162.

¹⁷ Voskressenski, *The Difficult Border*, p. 91.

¹⁸ Ram Rahul, *Afghanistan, Mongolia and China* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1992), p. 39.

Mao was convinced that China could no longer benefit from the bipolar system of international relations. His requirements for an independent foreign policy would inevitably arouse the hostility of both superpowers.¹⁹

Brezhnev's rise to power did little to reconcile relations with China, and instead encouraged a situation that was already on the verge of military confrontation. Brezhnev decided to strengthen the disposition of Soviet forces in Central Asia and the Soviet Far East. The Chinese government had closed much of the northwest border with the Soviet Union, but Beijing did not initiate any buildup of troop levels there. Brezhnev's decision to strengthen force levels in the region seemed to have been prompted primarily by Mao's claims to vast areas of Soviet Central Asia and Siberia. Moscow also took a much stronger interest in the Vietnam War and tried to capitalize on that conflict to make gains against both China and the United States.²⁰

These border concerns, which were inflated by the Chinese in the 1960s, became a significant part of bargaining process in the 1980s when Gorbachev attempted to rebuild Sino-Russian relations, particularly within his Vladivostok speech (discussed below). The Chinese had several objectives in mind when pressing the border dispute with Russia. The disputes placed Moscow on the defensive in the eyes of other communist nations, and served as a unifying point and scapegoat for a population demoralized by the famine precipitated by the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Furthermore, the Chinese government may have hoped to put an end to the intrigues concerning the Soviet manipulation of the non-Han peoples in northwestern China by calling attention to Chinese claims in the region.²¹ At this point, the conflict moved from the level of an ideological dispute to become a question of sovereignty.

A series of military build-ups and conflicts began along the Sino-Russian border. The Soviet Red Army build-up was initially modest, expanding

¹⁹ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, pp. 57-60.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

the number of divisions to approximately seventeen by 1966. While this expansion established a significant border force, it was far short of the strength needed to present a credible invasion threat against China. The number of additional Chinese troops was estimated at only twenty thousand by 1966. In the spring, Beijing announced new navigation regulations governing the movement of Soviet vessels on border rivers. A number of skirmishes occurred at various places along the Soviet and Mongolian borders. China claimed that a total of 4,189 border "incidents" occurred between the period from when talks were broken off in October of 1964 to the serious clashes of March of 1969. These activities could probably be best described as mutual intimidation tactics. The deployment of the first SS-4 and SS-5 MRBMs to the Soviet Far East in 1966 were perceived by Beijing as representing a national security threat, particularly as they were soon accompanied by short range rockets which would only be usable against China and not other targets in Northeast Asia. While the Soviet leadership underwent a dramatic change during these first years of the 1960s, political stability under Mao's regime was not as secure as it had once been. The Great Leap Forward had not been successful, and 1963 saw a terrible harvest which forced China to purchase three million tons of grain from abroad.²² Formal border talks occurred in February of 1964, but both sides were unable to agree on a common approach. In July of 1964, Mao made his first reference to the militarization of the Sino-Soviet dispute.²³ In 1967 China tested its first hydrogen bomb.²⁴

As the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution gathered momentum during the autumn of 1967, so did the Soviet troop build-up in the Far East. By early 1969, the Soviets had deployed approximately 27 divisions on its territory in this region of their land and two or three in Mongolia. The eastern littoral of Siberia contained more Soviet tanks and artillery pieces than East Germany.²⁵ Troop build-ups on the border occurred simultaneously with political changes on both sides.

²² Quested, *Sino-Russian Relations*, p. 131.

²³ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, pp. 66-69.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 72.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 70.

The Cultural Revolution generated new confrontations. Ambassadors were recalled, and the Soviet embassy remained under siege for several weeks during 1966. At this point, the Soviets considered Mao's policies mad and were apprehensive of China's nuclear capabilities.²⁶

On March 2, 1969, China sprang a carefully prepared ambush on Zhen Bao (or Damansky in Russia) one of the larger islands along the Ussuri River. Estimates suggest that about 30 Soviet border guards were killed.²⁷ On March 15 Moscow took revenge during a large clash at the same location.²⁸ Chinese losses were estimated in the hundreds.²⁹ Mao's decision to attack probably represented an attempt to unify China after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.³⁰

The Soviets contemplated the possibility of striking at China's nuclear weapons bases and manufacturing facilities. The United States, under the leadership of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger objected to this plan, something which possibly halted the launch of such an attack and may have increased conventional forces along the border instead.³¹ Although the Soviets considered all forms of attack against China, their conclusion was that a Soviet attack could incur unacceptably high military, political and economic costs, as well as universal condemnation.³² Furthermore, Brezhnev was unable to gain support from its Warsaw Pact allies, who believed that the alliance was restricted to European conflicts. Brezhnev made another attempt to rally regional support by suggesting the idea of a multilateral Asian Security Agreement during the Moscow Conference of June 1969. This proposal

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 72.

²⁷ Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 276.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 198.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 276.

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 276.

³¹ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, p. 73.

³² Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 280.

was aimed in part at containing and perpetuating China's isolation in Asia. Still, while China had already alienated its allies with its xenophobic Cultural Revolution, the other regional powers were hesitant to involve themselves in the Sino-Soviet dispute.³³

By 1980, the Brezhnev regime still found itself unable to normalize its relations with China. Moscow's refusal to treat Beijing as a major power, its insensitivity to past slights, its invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and most of all its massive military build-up all exacerbated the gulf between these two states and eventually drove China into the arms of the United States.³⁴ The United States skilfully played the China card in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Visits and communication between China and the United States increased as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated.

China and Russia continued to vie for power in other regional areas. In the sub-continent China continued to back Pakistan, and the Soviet Union supported India. India — with Soviet approval — triumphed over Pakistan during the war of December of 1971, a conflict which saw the partition of Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh. While this new state followed a slightly pro-Chinese orientation for some years as a safeguard against India, the Soviet Union supplied over four times more aid to it than did China. China's aid to Pakistan stopped well short of a friendship treaty of the kind binding India and the Soviets since August of 1971. Pakistan received about one-third more aid from Moscow than from Beijing. Still, although the Sino-Indian border dispute remained an issue, both India and Pakistan wanted to limit Soviet influence, something which thus somewhat improved relations between the two South Asian powers.³⁵

On March 20, 1972, Soviet negotiators returning to Beijing to re-open the talks bore an important new concession: Moscow's willingness to establish relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-

³³ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, p. 75.

³⁴ Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 199.

³⁵ Quested, *Sino-Russian Relations*, pp. 148-149.

existence. This new approach signalled Soviet acceptance of the Chinese ideological position of November of 1970. This concession was clearly aimed at achieving some results in the period between Nixon's February 1972 visit to Beijing and his projected May visit to Moscow. The package was turned down by China because at no time did the Soviet Union offer to pull back its forces in the border regions.³⁶

By 1973, border relations had still not improved. The Soviet build-up had reached 44 divisions along the border — almost three times the 1967 level. The Chinese refused to normalize relations and compared Brezhnev to Hitler. Furthermore, Moscow turned down a Chinese call for a non-aggression pact and Soviet troop withdrawals from the border in 1974.³⁷ On December 27, 1975, in a sudden conciliatory move, the Chinese released the imprisoned crew of a Soviet helicopter which had violated their frontier in March of 1974. However, this release was accompanied by renewed Chinese propaganda blasts against the Soviet Union, leading many observers to connect the two events to infighting within Beijing political circles.³⁸

Changes within China were posing a variety of domestic and international problems. As Mao aged and became infirm, his declining influence brought many contenders to the forefront as they contended for power. His death on September 9, 1976 brought Hua Guofeng to power, but by 1979, he yielded his authority to the reemergent Deng Xiaoping. The death of Mao brought an end of many of his policies and witnessed a shift toward pragmatism and modernization.

With a new leader in China, there existed the prospect of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. In July of 1977, the Soviet Union announced its agreement to an understanding between Soviet and Chinese authorities. The agreement allowed Chinese civilian vessels to pass Khabarovsk by means of internal Soviet waterways at times when the Kazakevich Channel, which lies on the border, was too shallow to permit

³⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 152.

³⁷ Adelman, *The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 199.

³⁸ Quested, *Sino-Russian Relations*, p. 152.

navigation. This arrangement began to operate from the 1st of September onwards, and talks on other border issues continued into 1978.³⁹

However, activities within the Asian region once again provoked Sino-Soviet hostilities. In the spring of 1979, a group of Kampuchean patriots turned to Vietnam for help against the forces of the Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese quickly destroyed the main forces of the Khmer Rouge and established a government friendly to Vietnam in Kampuchea. However, China sternly opposed Vietnam's action and, in a decision which was both illegal and ill prepared, ordered 600,000 regular Chinese troops to invade and punish Vietnam. The Chinese army was equipped with outdated equipment and its troops had no real fighting experience. China's invasion was unsuccessful as the Vietnamese leadership, which controlled experienced, well-trained, and well-equipped soldiers, repelled the Chinese invaders. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam precipitated a worsening in Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet troops on the border were put on full alert, and the Soviet government made it clear that if China widened its aggression against Vietnam, the Soviets would be compelled to take action.⁴⁰

Regional dilemmas continued to affect Sino-Soviet relations. In April of 1978, the first pro-Soviet coup took place in Afghanistan. In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, thus bringing American/Chinese strategic co-operation to a peak. Among other efforts at cooperation, the United States Defense Secretary of State Harold Brown offered to sell American arms to China.⁴¹ Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, as well as China's growing trade ties with the United States, enabled China to make some progress in the global political arena. Despite their disagreement over Taiwan, the Peoples' Republic of China and the United States grew closer than ever before.

Gorbachev's rise to power on March 11, 1985, as well as Deng's ability to maintain a secure domestic position resulted in the creation of a new

³⁹ Medvedev, *China and the Superpowers*, p. 60.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-66.

⁴¹ Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity*, p. 107.

political climate amenable to the resolution of the Sino-Soviet rift. Gorbachev's initiatives in 1986 marked the beginning of a new era in Sino-Soviet relations.

Major Security Issues Resolved

The resolution of security issues and conflicts began in the mid 1980s. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of July 28, 1986 was significant in the process of mending relations with China. The domestic political climate for both the Soviet Union and China was characterized by a desire for progress and change. The Soviets saw that the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region was growing stronger. For this reason, China seemed less threatening as a friend than the thought of increased Sino-American ties without any Soviet affiliation. The earliest attempts at resolving Sino-Soviet security issues were made during First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov's visit to Beijing in December of 1984. Further meetings during that visit, as well as subsequent visits to Beijing in March of 1986 and Moscow in July of 1985 established the basic institutional framework for a resumption of long term Sino-Soviet scientific, economic, and technical cooperation.⁴²

However, China maintained that relations between the two countries could not move forward until the "three obstacles" were overcome. It was Gorbachev's references to these obstacles that made his Vladivostok speech an important milestone. According to the Chinese, the three obstacles were:

- The high level of Soviet military deployments along the Soviet-Chinese border;
- Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; and
- Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea.

⁴² Gary Klintworth notes that the Sino-Soviet thaw began after the Li Peng-Gorbachev exchanges at Chernenko's funeral in Moscow in March of 1985. "Gorbachev's China Diplomacy", in Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (eds.), *The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's Vladivostok Initiative* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 19-37.

The most significant issues that Gorbachev addressed in this speech were:

- That the official Sino-Soviet border on the Amur River could pass along the main channel (rather than to follow the south bank to China's disadvantage);
- That the Soviet Union was examining the question of withdrawing a considerable number of Soviet troops from Mongolia in consultation with the leadership of that country;
- That the Soviet Union would start to withdraw from Afghanistan; and
- That the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss with China specific steps aimed at a balanced reduction in the level of land forces along the Sino-Soviet border.⁴³

Soviet-Chinese relations improved in 1987-88 and were facilitated by Soviet flexibility in discussions concerning the disputed border, the reduction of Soviet forces along Mongolia's border with China, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and strong Soviet support for "national reconciliation" talks aimed at ending the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea.⁴⁴ In May of 1989, Gorbachev and Deng held summit talks in Beijing, and a number of new proposals were made to improve relations.

Gorbachev's proposals encouraged agreements to establish deliveries of Soviet industrial products in exchange for Chinese agricultural produce, as well as understandings concerning the improvement of transportation links and the development of further commercial, economic, scientific and technical ties. An agreement made regarding a joint coal mining development in Inner Mongolia was followed by an arrangement for a joint venture to develop hydro-electric-power resources on the Amur

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁴⁴ See the Joint Soviet-Chinese Communiqué (May 17, 1989), in Gordon Livermore (ed.), *Soviet Foreign Policy Today: Reports and Commentaries from the Soviet Press* 3rd ed (Columbus, Ohio: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1989), pp. 130-1.

River. In November of 1986, China signed a 410 million ruble barter contract with the Soviets for ten 210MW thermal-power generators, and announced that this was only the first part of an agreement under which Moscow would supply generating equipment with a total capacity of 6,800MW over the next six years. The following month saw the opening in Beijing of a major Soviet trade exhibition.

Gorbachev made an official visit to China (May 15 to 18, 1989) and met with Deng. The discussions between the two leaders focussed upon the following points:

- a statement that Soviet-Chinese relations were useful, and that this summit meeting signified a normalization of relations which was not directed against and did not involve any third country;
- a declaration to develop interstate relations based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equity and mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence;
- a willingness to resolve disputes through peaceful negotiations, and not to resort to force or the threat of force against each other in any territory, territorial waters or airspace or third county contiguous to the other side.

The leaders reaffirmed the February 6, 1989 statement on the part of their respective Foreign Ministers concerning the Kampuchean problem, as well as their desire to conduct a comprehensive exchange of opinions regarding the settlement of this issue. Furthermore, both sides agreed to complete the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops by the end of September of 1989 under international supervision. Both sides also would respect the outcome of a general election by the Kampuchean people. The statement also witnessed the following initiatives:

- both sides reaffirmed that they will take steps to reduce armed forces in the area of the Soviet-Chinese border to a minimal level;

- both sides hope to increase trade at both the economic and technological levels;
- China opposed any attempts at creating "two Chinas" with respect to Taiwan; and
- both sides reaffirmed their desire to approach the subject of international relations through new political thinking, and the Chinese favoured the establishment of a new international order based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Both these speeches, together with the results of Gorbachev and Deng's meeting, indicated a willingness to normalize relations after decades of hostility. However, with hindsight, it is possible to conclude that both leaders were aware that unless significant measures of reform were initiated at the domestic and international levels, both countries could face a potentially massive political crisis. By making concessions and engaging in peaceful negotiations at the international level, both leaders were able to deflect in part the issues which were generating conflict at the domestic level.

By the end of 1989, it was assumed that relations between China and the Soviet Union had essentially reached a state of normalization. However, it was pointed out in 1989 that this normalization had in fact been accomplished without formally satisfying of any of the previously mentioned conditions, particularly China's definition of the "three mentioned issues, particularly China's definition of the "three conditions". This suggested that these conditions represented the vicissitudes of domestic Chinese debate, and the fact of more public Soviet concessions, both real and ephemeral, reflected China's greater need not to appear weak. Domestic and other foreign policy considerations dictated that China appear resolute; weaker powers can afford fewer concessions.

The demise of the Soviet Union came in 1991. Analysts warned in 1990 of its pending breakdown through a variety of statements. Motyl stated that "the current Soviet leadership is treading on thin ice because Gorbachev's program of Perestroika combined all the necessary ingredients for an acceleration of national Communism and contextually

nationalist behaviour". Galina V. Starovoitova spoke of "a fundamental shift that has taken place as important political conflicts and power struggles no longer occur in the centre but in the republics". Many observers regarded the breakdown of the Soviet system with the assessment that while Gorbachev was fairly successful in dismantling the old system, he failed to create a viable new one to take its place.

Li Peng visited Moscow in April of 1990. This was the first such visit since 1964. Agreement was reached on a number of issues concerning economic, trade and industrial relations, and an agreement on mutual armed forces reductions and confidence building in the border area was also achieved. While the Soviet Union readily announced its force reductions, there was little information to suggest that any similar reduction on the part of China's Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) actually took place (the last one occurred as part of a long-term PLA reorganization from 1978 to 1985). In March of 1990, Deng stepped down from his position as Chairman of the State Central Military Commission, although he still enjoyed significant influence. Martial law was lifted on January 1, 1990, and in May of 1990, the United States renewed China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status.⁴⁵ In April of 1990, the Agreement on the Guidelines of Mutual Reduction of Forces and Confidence Building in the Military Sphere in the Soviet-Chinese Border Area was signed in Moscow.⁴⁶

August 19, 1991 witnessed an attempted coup, led by eight high-ranking Soviet officials, against Gorbachev. However, their attempt to seize power had collapsed less than seventy-two hours later. Soon afterwards, the Communist Party which had ruled Russia since 1917 was suspended and dispossessed. Five months after the coup, the Soviet Union itself had ceased to exist, and was replaced by the CIS. President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree in May of 1992 establishing the Russian Armed Forces and a Ministry of Defence. By June 1992, the armed forces of the CIS

⁴⁵ "China", *Military Balance 1990-1991* (IISS. London: Brassey's, Autumn 1990), p. 148.

⁴⁶ Leonid P. Moiseyev, "The Prospects for Force Reductions in the Zone of Application of the CBM Agreement between China and Russia", in Robert E. Bedeski (ed.), *Confidence Building in the North Pacific: New Approaches to the Korean Peninsula in the Multilateral Context* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1996), p. 197.

had been reduced to the Strategic Deterrent Forces, ABM defence, and Space and Border Troops. The Soviet withdrawal from East Germany continued.⁴⁷ Withdrawals from Mongolia were completed in September of 1992.

Relations between the Chinese and Russian governments continued to improve. A visit by a Russian delegation led by Igor Rogachev in September of 1992 emphasized the attempts on the part of both sides to build further relationships. His praise for the growth of Xinjiang, and suggestions for increased Russian interest in the area, indicated a strengthening of relations. Interestingly, the volume of border trade in the first seven months of 1992 amounted to the total for the previous three years.⁴⁸

In November of 1992, China reiterated its foreign policy goals in a statement by Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and Director of the Foreign Ministry's Policy Research Department Yang Chengxu to the *People's Daily* entitled "Strive to Ensure a Long-Term Peaceful International Environment". The specifics of the article included the following remarks:

- China would further consolidate and develop good neighbourly and friendly relations with surrounding countries, and was committed to the peaceful settlement of border disputes;
- China denies allegations that the dispute over the South China Sea islands represents an attempt on the part of China to "fill up the vacuum", or that China should be viewed as a threat by any nation;
- China enjoyed friendly relations with over forty other countries including the normalization of relations with Vietnam and the advancement of relations with India;

⁴⁷ "Russia", *Military Balance 1992-1993* (IISS. London: Brassey's, Autumn 1992) pp. 89-92.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Broadcast Information Service China* (September 15th, 1992), p. 7.

- China emphasized its dedication to peaceful economic growth and political stability. China also believed that it had made significant steps in accelerating the pace of reform and in achieving breakthrough progress in foreign economic relations; and that
- China advocated arms control and disarmament, and reiterated that it's nuclear capabilities were for self-defense purposes only.⁴⁹

In 1993 and 1994 Russian attention was focussed upon domestic issues, particularly the strength of the Russian Federation and Russia's relationship with other members of the CIS. Russia had many serious differences with its neighbours, and tensions increased with the breakaway of Chechenia from Ingushetia. While a number of agreements of a military nature were reached by the CIS during the early part of 1992, the number of republics signing each agreement has significantly decreased. Weapons production levels have been significantly reduced in comparison to the levels of even two years earlier.⁵⁰ In 1994, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces reported that they would cut the Armed Forces and planned to establish thirty military bases in all members of the CIS, with the exception of the Ukraine. According to reports, CIS members which had initially opposed the presence of Russian troops have changed their minds in light of difficulties experienced in establishing their own armed forces.⁵¹

China, for all its previously reported commitments to arms reduction and peaceful growth, has faced increasing criticism and suspicion in the international arena. China's refusal to join other members of the international community in pushing arms control measures have taken on a new significance. Beijing continued to test nuclear weapons in 1994, thus putting at risk the prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as well as disrupting the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review

⁴⁹ *FBIS* (November 10, 1992), p. 7.

⁵⁰ *Military Balance 1992-1993*, p. 98.

⁵¹ *FBIS* (March 2, 1994), p. 7.

conference. Further international concerns were expressed with regard to Chinese arm sales to Pakistan, enriched uranium sales to India in January of 1995, and nuclear links with Iran.⁵² In February of 1994, China and India conducted three days of talks on border troop reductions.

Chinese-Russian relations have continued to improve. In July of 1994, Russian and Chinese defence ministers signed an agreement to avert military accidents. In September, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a visit to Russia, and Chinese and Russian ministers have signed agreements demarcating a part of their mutual border. However, Russian border troops shot two crewmen on a Chinese fishing boat in the southern Kuril Islands.⁵³ A long series of visits by negotiating teams, arms-export teams, and senior defence and foreign ministry officials culminated in a visit by Jiang Zemin to Moscow in June of 1995. The Chinese and Russians rejected what they saw as American interference in their internal affairs. The Chinese continue to buy Russian arms, but have left unanswered questions regarding China's future stability, its long-term ambitions in Central Asia and cross-border migration in the Far East — all factors which raise doubts with regard to the steadiness of their partnership.⁵⁴

The 1995 Taiwan Straits crisis increased tensions between China and the United States. Military exercises by China in the Taiwan Straits and a publication of the Chinese White Paper on defence made many uneasy about dealings with China. However, Russia reportedly agreed to sell more aircraft to China, and to transfer the technology for the construction of such aircraft. Further progress was made by both sides during border talks, but Moscow postponed the formal signing of the agreements concerning CBMs along the frontier. This decision was

⁵² "Uncertain Weather Ahead in China", *Strategic Survey 1994/95* (IISS. Oxford: Oxford University Press, May 1995), pp. 166-9.

⁵³ footnote unclear: "Chronologies", *Strategic Survey 1994/95*, pp. 243-7.

⁵⁴ "Troubled Times for Russia", *Strategic Survey 1995/96* (IISS. Oxford: Oxford University Press, April 1996), pp. 120-3.

probably the result of concerns regarding a massive influx of Chinese across the frontier.⁵⁵

On April 26, 1996, the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a military agreement in Shanghai designed to reduce tensions along their 7,500 kilometre-long common border. The agreement was negotiated over four years, and contained a variety of CBMs. It restricted the scale, scope, and frequency of military exercises, and required each side to inform the other of any major military exercises within roughly 100 kilometres of the border. On November 29, 1996, China and India signed an agreement that also contained important CBMs and transparency measures.

Significant steps have been made in the improvement of Sino-Russian relations. Their relationship appears to be progressing at a very positive level, and the signing of several agreements in both military and trade areas solidify intentions by both sides to improve this friendship. One of the most significant documents has been the above mentioned Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the People's Republic of China on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area. However, such progress in establishing friendly relations is only as secure as the changing international environment. Should one side be provoked or enticed into confrontational behaviour, the ensuing decline of these relations could occur just as quickly.

Remaining Issues and Their Potential Elements of Conflict

In recent years, the debate over NATO expansion has focused Russian attention on its Western frontier. The Baltic states and the former satellite Republics of Eastern Europe are anxious to join NATO and enjoy the security that membership in the American and Western European alliance would provide. Trade and other economic benefits would presumably follow.

⁵⁵ "China's Edgy Vigil", *Strategic Survey 1995/96*, pp. 176-80.

From the Russian perspective, this prospect revives the vision of the 'Cordon Sanitaire' which was set up after the First World War to contain the Bolshevik revolution. Although NATO has tried to assure Moscow that no hostility is intended, there is little doubt that Eastern European membership in NATO will diminish Russian influence in Europe. China is also facing American challenges. American support for Taiwan, criticism over human rights in China, the annual review of China's MFN status, and numerous other issues have left the Sino-American relationship insecure. Addressing the American challenges to their respective influence represents a common interest which the one-time allies share. As China and Russia have reduced mutual tensions, their ability to cooperate has increased. The United States, however, does not consider this rapprochement as representing a serious threat. After all, Russian power has declined rapidly since 1990, and while China has been rapidly modernizing its military forces, it still does not represent a significant threat to the American presence in the Asia Pacific region. However, should Sino-Russian cooperation proceed, difficulties for the United States could increase in Asia. The American oil pipeline in Central Asia, for example, would be vulnerable to Russian pressures. A renewed Sino-Russian alliance could make Japanese security even more dependent upon the United States. The fate of the Korean Peninsula will increasingly depend on cooperation with Russia and China, as their interests converge. Finally, the transfer of Russian weapons and military technology to China represents a disturbing trend.

It is important to note the reversal of the Chinese and Russian roles which has occurred since 1990. In the first three decades of the existence of the Peoples's Republic of China, the Chinese state was poor and undeveloped, while the Soviet Union, despite the destructive legacy of the Second World War, was a mature revolutionary and industrial state leading world communism. Today, while Russia is undergoing reverse development, China has become a dynamic industrial economy. China has become the new centre of militant developmentalism, eclipsing Russia as the dynamic challenger to the post-Cold War order within the Asia Pacific region.

China is also currently using CBM diplomacy as a vehicle for enhancing leadership in Asia. The signing of protocols with Russia and India has served to reduce tensions along its continental borders, and has also

reduced the dependence of India upon Russia. There are a variety of implications for these developments.

Individual CBM agreements are important at least at two levels:

- Explicitly, at the treaty level, they serve to reduce tensions between states. They relieve some of the psychological tensions which make hostilities dangerous. They help to prevent overt actions which can escalate to war.
- At the diplomatic level, they can serve as a tool of national policy by transforming enemies into neutral parties and so paving the way for further cooperation or even alliances. Still, we live in a world of nation-states where war has been a frequent means of interaction. CBMs have become an instrument by which to prevent wars; however, they can also serve to strengthen societies by relieving them of tensions on one front in order to prepare defences for another.

Other Remaining Issues and Potential Elements of Conflict

- The border republics remain an area of tension. Xinjiang separatists in Uzbekistan continue to be an irritation to Chinese authorities.
- Not all borders are clearly demarcated to the satisfaction of both Russia and China. In the extreme northeast corner of the country for example, China is denied access to the Sea of Japan by a five kilometre strip of land which the Chinese claim was taken by the Russian tsar from the Chinese empire. This places Chinese participation in the Tumen River Project at a disadvantage.
- Russia remains concerned about Chinese nuclear testing, although such tests have now been halted.
- Mongolia could become a Sino-Russian issue if it allies itself more clearly with one side or other.

- There remains also the issue of illegal Chinese immigrants. While this has not yet become a contentious issue, it will have to be dealt with later.

CBMs Between China and Russia

On April 23, 1997, Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin signed a Declaration on a Multipolar World and Formation of a New World Order. It called for a greater peacekeeping role for the United Nations, a strengthened United Nations Security Council, and a new conception of international security. The next day, Jiang, Yeltsin, and the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement concerning the reduction of border forces, with its basic feature consisting of a reduction in regular troops, but not border guards or strategic forces, within a 100-kilometre zone on either side of the former Sino-Soviet boundary. The new limit of 13,400 soldiers on either side is believed to be close to the numbers now deployed, and the troop-reduction treaty does not create a demilitarized zone.

Applicability of the Sino-Russian CBMs to the Two Koreas

A Comparison of China-Russia to South-North Korea in Security Matters

The most significant difference between the Sino-Russian and South-North Korean relationships lies with the issue of sovereign identity. China and Russia have interacted as empires and then states for centuries. There has never been any possibility of one absorbing the other — although both were part of the Mongolian empire in the late 13th century. Sino-Russian hostilities from 1960 onwards have been over territorial borders in areas of low population density. The long border has also meant that defence efforts have emphasized mobility over fixed emplacements. Finally, the presence of diverse ethnic groups which live across these borders has added a further dimension to frontier anxieties.

Politically, China and Russia see themselves as inheritors of proud world civilizations, challenged by Western Europe and the United States. Their

conversion to Marxism-Leninism affirmed their opposition to the perceived imperialism of Western industrial society, and today, a new alliance may be forming in opposition to the West as NATO expands into Central and Eastern Europe.

In contrast, the Korean impact upon the world has been much less. While the two Koreas act as totally sovereign and separate entities, both agree that their reunification will occur sometime in the future. They share a single linguistic, cultural, and political heritage, but are divided by state systems distinguished by ideology, economics, and politics. Their respective formation was due to the strong Cold War alliances which affirmed and defended their sovereign existences. While their security is insured by the absence of any immediate populated frontier (the DMZ), their collective well-being is paradoxically held hostage by the divided peninsula. Defences on both sides of the DMZ are highly concentrated and based on fixed defensive positions far more dense than any along the Sino-Russian border. Finally, neither North or South Korea can enjoy adequate security and full sovereignty until the other is eliminated and absorbed, thus giving both sides an incentive to pursue the elimination of the other.

Options for Applying the Sino-Russian CBM Regime to the Two Koreas

Several factors must be considered in negotiating a CBM regime:

- Do the parties have mutual interest in stabilizing the existing status quo?
- Is the international situation conducive to negotiation and maintaining the CBM regime?
- How will the envisaged CBM regime affect short-term security goals? How will it affect long-term military and political relations?
- What is the role of third parties? What is their involvement? Who are the major suppliers of weaponry?

- What verification mechanisms are appropriate to the CBM regime?
- What sanctions are available in the event of non-observance?
- What constitutes an appropriate timetable?
- Where does introduction of a CBM regime begin — with non-military issues? Major weapons? Minor weapon systems?
- What agencies and organizations will monitor or enforce the CBM regime?

A further phenomenon for study would be the impact of suspending the Team Spirit exercises by the United Nations on the Korean Peninsula. Such a suspension could serve as an important CBM, and it would be useful to examine whether any such halting would have an effect on North Korean behaviour.

Applying the Sino-Russian Precedent in Northeast Asia in the Post-Unification Era: The Viewpoint of a Unified Korea

Major Security Issues of the Northeast Asia Region in the Post-Unification Era

Unification outcomes depend upon several factors. A unified Korea would be a new actor in Northeast Asia, and the Sino-Korean relationship will be a central axis.

Trade will be the primary nexus of the Sino-Korean relationship, but a cooperative security link is also likely. A unified Korea would be under great pressure to coordinate its security policy with China. If Chinese economic development continues along present lines, Korea may be dominated by the Chinese market, along with growing interests in Russia.

Under any circumstances, a unified Korea should maintain close links with the United States and Japan in order to avoid domination by any

Sino-Russian combination of influence. However, it may be unlikely that China would allow North Korea to collapse — such an event would reduce Chinese influence over the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, the present division may be the most feasible alternative given the present state of international relations.

POTENTIAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES ON NUCLEAR ISSUES IN ASIA¹

John Olsen

Introduction

Cooperation on nuclear issues is receiving increased attention in Asia. In Northeast Asia, where the nuclear industry is well-developed, cooperation in the "back end" of the nuclear fuel cycle could help deal with such issues as the disposition of spent fuel and long term storage options. In Southeast Asia, where countries are just beginning to introduce nuclear energy programmes, cooperation would be useful in developing standards for the nuclear industry. Throughout Asia, nuclear research and power activities can raise concerns about safety, environmental pollution and proliferation. The sharing of relevant information, i.e. cooperative monitoring², will be an essential element in addressing these issues.

We may summarize the nuclear status of the Asian states as the following:

- **Japan.** Japan has invested heavily in the nuclear power industry and generates one third of its electricity from fifty reactors. Energy security is an important goal for Japan; consequently, Japan maintains research efforts concerning the plutonium fuel cycle. Although Japan has renounced the development of nuclear weapons, other states have expressed concern about present and future accumulations of plutonium which Japan has earmarked for future reactor fuel.

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author above. Mr. Olsen is a member of Sandia Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogramme laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

² We define cooperative monitoring as the collection and exchange of agreed information among parties to an agreement. Technologies used for cooperative monitoring must be available to all parties; all parties must receive equal access to the results of cooperative monitoring.

- **China.** Although a nuclear weapons state, China has only three power reactors operating and two more under construction. However, last year China has announced plans for a ten-fold expansion of its nuclear power generation over the next fifteen years. The Chinese government is also considering the expansion of its plutonium fuel cycle research facilities.
- **South Korea.** With nine reactors operational and seven more under construction, South Korea is pursuing nuclear energy vigorously. As part of the 1992 "Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" with North Korea, South Korea has renounced enrichment and reprocessing facilities. South Korea will be heavily involved in the supply of two reactors to North Korea under the "Agreed Framework."
- **North Korea.** In exchange for the promise of two light water reactors, North Korea has suspended construction of a gas-cooled, graphite reactor and closed a reprocessing plant and associated research reactor. Safeguards against material diversion and provisions for safe operations are included in the agreement under the auspices of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The recent agreement to store low level radioactive waste from Taiwan has aroused further controversy. Neighbouring states remain concerned about both environmental and proliferation issues.
- **Russia.** Most of Russia's weapons and power reactor industries are in Europe and Central Asia, but the Far East nuclear navy is based at Vladivostok. Dumping of low level nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan (East Sea) has been a concern previously. There are also four reactors in the far North which are of concern to Canada and Alaska.
- **Taiwan.** The vigorous growth of nuclear power in Taiwan has recently led to a controversial, landmark agreement to store low level wastes in North Korea. Taiwan is one of the first states to find the "back-end" of the fuel cycle in danger of choking the "front-end". This may be an important precedent.

The states of Southeast Asia are preparing the technical basis on which to build nuclear industries. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and Australia are all currently operating research reactors. Technical interactions between developed North Asian states like Japan and South Korea and their Southeast Asian colleagues will both accelerate this development process and establish precedents for regional cooperation which will be important in the years to come.

In fact, a number of regional interactions with regard to nuclear issues are already occurring. These range from training exchanges sponsored by the more advanced states to participation in the environmental monitoring of the East Sea (Sea of Japan). Several states are considering sharing information from their nuclear facilities; some exchanges of radiation data are already in place. Of course, the KEDO reactor project will involve close working relations between the nuclear experts of South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and the United States.

Potential Applications for Cooperative Monitoring in Nuclear Issues

The Northeast Asian nuclear industries are vigorous, comprehensive and modern. However, potential problems regarding safety, the environment, or proliferation have raised a number of concerns. These may be summarized as:

- *Nuclear Facilities* - concerns about the operational safety of these facilities, measures to ensure environmental protection, nuclear material protection and proper accounting procedures.
- *Material Control* - concerns regarding the safety of fuel shipments, the long-term storage of spent fuel and waste, and accumulations of plutonium.
- *Regional environmental protection* - concerns about the release and transport of air- and water-borne radioactivity, something which is an inherently international problem.

In the following sections, we will explore opportunities for the sharing of information about nuclear facilities to demonstrate that their operations are safe, that the environment is protected, and that nuclear materials are protected from loss.

For Northeast Asia we highlight opportunities for light water reactors (LWRs), which are the basic technology of nuclear power generation. South Korea and North Korea will have LWRs of the same design (originally by Combustion Engineering in the US). China, Japan and Taiwan have generically similar, pressurized-water reactors that present closely similar monitoring options. Finally, Russia has four smaller graphite-moderated reactors in Siberia far to the North; although of dissimilar technology, the plant operators have shown an interest in international cooperative efforts.

In Southeast Asia the wide-spread operation of research reactors offers the possibility for cooperative activities encompassing those states as well.

We will conclude with a concept for a regional collaborative effort to monitor airborne radiation levels. The purpose of this exercise would be to begin development of regional capabilities for the monitoring of environmental safety and the support of regional emergency preparedness measures. This approach to building nuclear cooperation may be feasible because the countries of Northeast Asia already have many of the necessary technologies in place for their own internal environmental monitoring programs.

Cooperative Measures at Civilian Nuclear Facilities

We have developed an analytical framework for evaluating options for sharing information on nuclear facilities, as shown in Figure 1:

Information Sharing

	Relevance	Sensitivity	Methods	Benefits
Operational Safety
Environmental Protection
Material Protection

Figure 1. A framework for evaluating options for sharing information from nuclear facilities.

When assessing options for sharing information on a particular topic — operational safety, environmental protection, or material protection — we need to address the following questions:

- 1) What information is relevant?
- 2) Can this information be shared, or is it too sensitive for proprietary or security reasons?
- 3) What are the best methods for sharing the information, e.g., document exchange, site visits, or remote monitoring?
- 4) What are the benefits of sharing the information?

Information may be shared within a single facility, among multiple facilities within one country, or among multiple countries. In fact, we may find that improving internal information exchanges within a single country may represent a practical first step that allows local technical

experts to become familiar with new technologies before embarking on external collaborations.

Operational Safety

Operational safety cooperation involves sharing information that could build confidence regarding the safety of civilian nuclear facility operations. The following discussion will identify the relevant operational information, suggest ways to share the information, and illustrate how shared operational data could be used.

Civilian nuclear facility accidents can have a regional impact through the release of radionuclides. Overall poor operational safety can manifest itself in a variety of ways, e.g. poor equipment test performance, poor record keeping, messy housekeeping, and numerous reactor or turbine interruptions and extended outages.

Given these observations, *information about regulatory oversight, self-assessments, test and maintenance activities, safety functions and equipment, and the availability of back-up safety equipment* is relevant in ensuring operational safety cooperation. This information could contribute to regional confidence that civilian nuclear facilities are being operated safely. The correction of any problems identified through such cooperative measures could reduce the probability or consequences of the accidental release of radionuclides from these facilities.

Document exchanges are an effective method of sharing certain types of information. Information from operational records includes unusual occurrence reports, test and maintenance records, and operational logs. Information from on-site inspections includes observations of test and maintenance activities, annual inspections, and occasional unannounced, focused inspections. Information from regulatory or oversight records includes operator recertification records, inspection reports, and requests for regulatory exceptions. The regulatory records could be reviewed to develop confidence that safety regulations are being followed and that the regulatory body is being watchful. This process could also identify regulatory or operational processes that need to be improved, thus

leading to improved operational safety with less risk of accidents which could have a regional impact.

Informal visits and personnel exchanges are a second method of sharing information of a less quantitative nature. Visiting experts can evaluate by informal inspection such characteristics as housekeeping, maintenance, and staff competence, all of which are key elements in the maintenance of operational safety.

Cooperative monitoring is a third method for sharing information. A broad range of information is measured routinely and displayed at the operators' control room at the reactor and could be shared electronically. Information about key safety functions and equipment include the status of selected reactor and coolant systems, the containment status, effluent and meteorological data, and the availability of back-up equipment. It would be simple to communicate some part of this operational database by electronic means to other organizations as a cooperative measure which could function automatically. In fact, many countries monitor these critical quantities at their national regulatory authority already.

Environmental Protection

Environmental cooperation involves the sharing of information that could build confidence that civilian nuclear facility operations are environmentally sound. Moreover, prompt dissemination of this information could help reduce the consequences of accidental releases of radionuclides into the environment. The following discussion will identify the relevant environmental information, suggest ways to share this information, and illustrate how shared environmental information could be used.

The primary regional environmental issue associated with civilian nuclear facilities and operations is the release of radionuclides, not hazardous chemicals or thermal effluents. Thermal effluents or a release of hazardous chemicals tend to have local impact; a release of radionuclides has the potential for a regional impact. Regional radionuclide transport can occur with airborne or waterborne pathways.

Given these observations, *information concerning radioactive effluents or accidental releases from civilian nuclear facilities or transportation operations* is relevant to regional environmental cooperative efforts, since these effluents or accidental releases are the source term for potential regional transport. *Information about and from airborne and waterborne radionuclide sensors* is relevant to regional environmental cooperation since these sensors can measure radionuclide concentrations within potential transport pathways.

The information that could be shared includes the location, inventory and chemical species of radionuclides in the facility. Similar information for effluents from the facility would be of interest. Shared information about effluents from and transport around civilian nuclear facilities could be used to model the regional transport of effluents and evaluate whether they could have a regional impact. In addition, this information regarding effluents and transport parameters could be used to test model predictions by comparing them with observed airborne and waterborne concentrations at various locations. In this case, the specific benefit could be the building of regional trust in the models used by the respective national authorities.

Information about civilian nuclear material transportation operations could include packaging, radionuclide inventory, transportation routing and transportation operations. Shared information about material transportation operations could be used to assess risks of, or bound the consequences of, spills or leakages into air or water transport pathways and to evaluate the potential for regional air or water transport. In this case, the specific benefit could be a common understanding of the risks involved in transportation operations. In addition, satellite communications can be used to track the location and status of nuclear material shipments around the world. The electronic exchange of this data could also serve as a real-time cooperative measure.

Shared information could include design and sensitivity data regarding radionuclide sensors, as well as airborne and waterborne radionuclide concentrations for selected locations. Reactor facilities normally measure radiation within the closed loops of the facility, in the cooling loop discharges, and at selected sites around the facility. Air and water samples are commonly available in real time, whereas soil sample results

are updated manually and less frequently. Shared information from the sensors could be used to provide early warning of an impending radiological emergency, as well as to compare predictive models developed for emergency response management. The benefits of sharing such information include the more prompt application of public health procedures and reductions in both public health and economic consequences of a radiological emergency.

Other facilities, like fuel fabrication, waste vitrification, and reprocessing plants and research reactors, all monitor radiation at critical locations around the site and within the neighbouring areas. Exchanges of information that would not be directly comparable could also be proposed for these facilities. While seemingly more difficult, the benefit of such exchanges would be that more states could participate in the cooperative process.

Different methods of sharing information have different characteristics. For example, sharing airborne radionuclide sensor information by mailing monthly documents between two or more organizations introduces a time delay of weeks to more than a month between the time of measurement and the availability of the information. Sharing airborne radionuclide sensor information by remote monitoring introduces a time delay of seconds to hours, depending on measurement and communication techniques. If one of the motivations for sharing this information was to provide early warning of a developing radiological emergency, the more timely, remote monitored information would be higher value information. If the motivation for sharing the information was to evaluate predictive models, then the document exchange method would be adequate.

After considering cooperative measures in nuclear material protection in the next section, we will return to the subject of environmental opportunities for a final concept. There, we consider wide-area, airborne radiation monitoring activities which might be tied into a regional system.

Material Protection

Cooperative efforts for material protection involve the sharing of information that could demonstrate that nuclear materials are safe from theft, diversion, or accidental loss. Confidence in material protection can address concerns about nuclear proliferation and potential nuclear terrorism. In this section we outline the relevant information and how it might be shared.

Loss of nuclear material could occur during any period of access. Thus, information regarding *opportunities for access* to material is relevant to material protection. In a pressurized light water reactor, for example, access can occur only during refuelling. After removal from the reactor, the spent fuel may be vulnerable during shipment or short term storage. Long term storage poses another potential opportunity, particularly because the cooled fuel rods are less hazardous.

Protective measures are already in place at most facilities. While the details of these procedures might be sensitive, the *general plans for protection of facilities and shipments* would be relevant and could be shared. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards protect nuclear materials by specifying material accounting procedures. Safeguards inspection results are normally held as confidential; however, the *IAEA reports* would be relevant and might be shared, subject to IAEA approval.

Access to facilities and material movements during access would certainly be relevant to material protection. Some of this information may also be sensitive; however, cooperation with regard to the technology necessary to monitor access and material movement, as noted below, may be possible.

Because documentation is required extensively in material protection activities, cooperative measures could focus on exchanges of:

- 1) records of storage or shipping;

- 2) notifications of refuelling or other material movement activities;
or
- 3) certain safeguards documentation (after modification of the IAEA Facility Agreement).

Physical protection methods could be shared through the exchange of documentation; however, exchanges of visitors expert in the subject of protective measures might be more effective. Such exchanges could both build confidence between countries and allow peer experts to share operational experiences that might improve protection performance.

Monitoring technologies can play a role in cooperative efforts for material protection. For example, in reactors, normal operational data such as power, temperature, or pressure can show that no unscheduled refuelling has occurred. This data could be shared by electronic means. Beyond the existing operational monitors, additional sensors could monitor access events by means of motion, movement or tamper detection. The addition of event-activated video cameras can help operators assess the nature of activities that have been detected by the sensors. At Sandia we have an international programme designed to demonstrate that these technologies can be useful in monitoring and assessing certain activities in nuclear facilities. Current cooperative efforts involve nuclear facilities in Europe, Asia, South America and the United States. A laboratory in Japan is participating now and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is considering a future role.

These options for nuclear cooperation have emphasized measures that would focus on specific facilities. In our final section we consider an environmental measure that does not have to be located at a particular facility. The measurement systems are in wide use already, which could allow cooperative efforts to focus on improvements, communications and data applications.

Regional Radionuclide Monitoring

The detection of airborne radiation is a subject for environmental cooperative efforts because of the obvious transborder impact of a

nuclear accident anywhere in densely populated Asia. The data obtained would be useful in assuring public safety, countering unfounded rumours about nuclear accidents, and increasing the modest level of nuclear cooperation already present in the region. Moreover, airborne data can be acquired over regional distances, which allows measurements that are useful, but not intrusive and not specific to a particular facility.

The technology necessary to measure radionuclides in the air is available world-wide at varying levels of sophistication to support a wide range of potential regional goals. If the immediate goal is emergency warning and monitoring of routine emissions, then a simple measurement of the total number of gamma rays might be an appropriate technique. These systems are inexpensive, may be solar powered for remote fielding, and can include basic meteorological observations. Because the total gamma rate is adequate for public safety but does not reveal any process details, such monitoring activities are not highly intrusive. Los Alamos National Laboratory has fielded a system of this type in Northern New Mexico as a local transparency measure designed to address community concerns about the safety of Laboratory operations. The system features automatic, electronic reporting for Internet retrieval.

The Los Alamos system monitors gamma rays from airborne radionuclides with sixteen stations around the laboratory and in the surrounding communities. Each station combines radiation data with local wind speed and direction, and possibly other meteorological qualities. The entire station is solar powered and a small radio transmitter sends the data off every four hours. Thus, the station can be placed anywhere, without concerns about the availability of electricity or telephone lines. Unique to this system is the idea of making the data available on the Internet for easy public access.

Measuring the energies of the gamma rays and associating them with specific radionuclides can yield much more information. Portable units capable of moderate resolution of the isotopic species that are emitting gamma rays are widely available. Higher resolution is also available by adding a refrigerated detector and a high flow air filtering system. These are laboratory quality devices that draw significant power and provide very detailed information.

Finally, at the very top of the scale are the radionuclide monitoring devices required for the world-wide International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These are essentially upgraded laboratory units with higher air flow, faster data sampling, and automatic reporting capabilities, together with twenty four hour reliability.

Whatever detector system is selected, the key to regional cooperation in any radionuclide monitoring effort will be in tying the system together with communications systems that are reliable and prompt. Given the short distances involved, an effective public safety measure should feature automatic reporting of radiation levels together with such basic meteorological indicators as wind speed and direction, temperature and air pressure. If reports were forwarded to a regional facility where experts could meet to discuss the data, misunderstandings could be avoided and new cooperative undertakings could be discussed in that forum.

Countries may prefer to exchange information first by document, rather than by participating in an automatic transmission network. This would work satisfactorily for a cooperative project focusing on the development and testing of regional predictive modelling capabilities. However, if there is to be an emergency response component, parties should consider processes to accelerate information exchange whenever unusually high readings occur.

All Asian states with nuclear facilities have some expertise in radionuclide monitoring. Of course, the states with nuclear power reactors have more comprehensive networks than those with research facilities only. A regional cooperative project could build on these capabilities. If countries are interested in developing better capabilities in radionuclide monitoring, but are not yet ready for regional cooperation, coordinated projects in individual countries could

represent a first step. The projects could also help establish the infrastructure necessary for possible future regional cooperation.³

Acknowledgment

Richard Lincoln, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, initiated the study of cooperative measures at facilities and formulated the framework discussed in connection with Figure 1. His full study is available separately.

³ The CMC would be happy to work with Northeast Asian countries as they assess their options for nuclear cooperation. We can help define technical options for exchanges and the associated cooperative mechanisms. For more information please contact John Olsen at (505) 284-5052, fax (505) 284-5055, or email to jnolsen@sandia.gov.

**INTEGRATING NON-TRADITIONAL
SECURITY ISSUES: A PRELIMINARY
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION¹**

Robert E. Bedeski

Introduction: The Notion of Non-Traditional Security

Non-traditional security addresses the well-being of existing states and their citizens, together with the growing responsibility of states to their inhabitants as well as to their larger international community. There is a growing awareness that modern states can preserve themselves only by cooperating with other nations and by taking actions only in concert with the international community. Unlike *traditional security*, which focuses narrowly upon the military protection of the state and its territory, *non-traditional security* proceeds from the observation that states are threatened by a broad range of challenges — some of which are generated within the state and society. There is also an implicit recognition that the nation-state has been the major unit in the social and political development of the modern period, as well as the basic unit of international relations. It is not likely to be replaced by any global organization or regional groupings. While the modern nation-state has serious flaws, it is accepted as the dominant form of political organization in the world today.

Non-traditional security seeks to identify the non-military challenges to the proper functioning of modern nation-states, and to elicit responses appropriate to the maintenance of gains in their well-being without creating new threats to either external citizens, or the future generations which will have to bear the costs of current prescriptions and cures.

Another element of non-traditional security is that the resolution of non-military threats is dependent upon international cooperation rather than confrontation. Dialogue and the search for cooperative solutions is

¹ The views expressed in this paper are those of the author only.

increasingly warranted by the transnational character of non-traditional security challenges. Although this manner of bilateral or multilateral approach appears to infringe on sovereignty, it proceeds from a calculus of self-interest and is no more a threat to sovereignty than are treaties.

The Canadian government introduced the concept of non-traditional security during the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) initiated by Canada in 1990 in order to broaden the traditional concept of security. The term traditional security generally refers to the project of protecting states, groups and individuals from military threats. The threshold of force and violence is usually clear, and the national and international institutions for dealing with these threats have been developed over centuries, although with frequent updating.

Non-traditional security, on the other hand, has no similar definitional clarity, nor any specific institutions designed to maintain it. Still, we are becoming increasingly aware of a growing grey area comprising threats to the national well-being which possess no direct military component and cannot be adequately addressed through military responses.

We can suggest the following as a working definition of non-traditional security:

those non-military issues which disturb the national well-being, regional tranquility and international peace. As we subdue military threats through arms control, CBMs, and multilateral diplomacy, we can expect non-military threats to play a wider role as sources of international friction. An important task will be to identify these potential problems and suggest future policy initiatives which governments can pursue in their amelioration. International euphoria over the passing of the Cold War was short-lived, and has been replaced by the cold reality of ethnic nationalism. The era of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) has been replaced by new insecurities, including the breakup of the Soviet Union, the economic decline of a number of regions, new waves of population migration, and growing environmental crises. The Soviet-American standoff had effectively inhibited our addressing these non-military problems.

The idea of non-traditional security can provide insights into problems which have not been addressed adequately. The concept proceeds from the observation that threats to national security can originate from sources other than military confrontation.

Traditional Versus Non-Traditional Security

Traditional security challenges are distinguished by several characteristics:

1. They usually involve the explicit employment of military forces, typically through either the use or threat of coercion.
2. They are usually intentional, and governments commit resources to acts which have the force of the state behind them.
3. They generally have recognizable goals, which when achieved will result in some reorganization of the threat mechanism. After a successful invasion, for example, an army of occupation will replace the army of attack.
4. The resolution of the threat will usually involve a redefinition of relations between two or more states.

Non-traditional security challenges, in contrast,

1. arise out of the normal, non-military activities of individuals, groups and states;
2. are cumulative and usually not perceived as threats, at least in the short run;
3. affect the ability of governments to maintain stability and enhance living conditions within state borders; and
4. represent neither explicit nor purposeful threats on the part of governments.

It is this last characteristic which leaves non-traditional security challenges so difficult to identify and resolve. There exists yet another obstacle to their resolution — the question of the threshold of threat perception. At what point does a non-traditional security problem become a threat requiring the significant expenditure of national wealth and resources? Furthermore, when threats occur, how can domestic lines of responsibility be established in order to meet these challenges?

The principal difference between traditional and non-traditional security threats is that the latter are typically generated by the daily and mundane activities of production, living, work, travel, interaction and procreation which characterize human life. While these activities are being increasingly observed and measured by governments, they are generally not controlled by the state. The very ordinariness of these human activities often makes it difficult to perceive and quantify their nature. Human activity has been dangerously successful in the reshaping the environment to suit its purposes, and now industrial and electronic technologies are amplifying the consequences of these actions.

Technology allows for unparalleled levels of accelerated efficiency in human interaction, as well as in our ability to control the natural environment. In some sectors of activity, human excesses are leading to a level of activity where the well-being of individuals, societies, and states are beginning to become unravelled. While governments have thus far been able to manage some of these changes, we are only seeing the beginning of a new range of problems, from over-population to global warming. More international cooperation is needed to manage these non-traditional security challenges.

Approaching crises will impose definite limits on humanity's well-being and influence the distribution of wealth among all societies. The issue of non-traditional security addresses another aspect which remains to be explored — the inevitable disruption of the political order and social stability. To address such issues of stability, national governments will have to act quickly and responsibly. Despite the expanding capability and ambitions of international organizations to act on security issues, nothing can be done without the participation and support of individual states, given that the state remains the most effective agent in the maintenance of international security.

Areas of Non-Traditional Security Challenges

Economic Security

A persistent belief and working assumption of idealists in the twentieth century has been that poverty and deprivation are the root causes of social and international conflict. Numerous theories have been proposed which purport to offer remedies, but most share two common assumptions. The first is that amount of wealth in the world is relatively fixed; the second is that the solution to resolving the unequal distribution of wealth is necessarily some form of redistribution. Theories of dependence typically proceed from these assumptions.

A variation on most dependency theories is that the misappropriation of wealth for arms production or purchases also represents a source of deprivation. Such misappropriations includes not only the production or purchase of military hardware, but also the allocation of human talent to non-productive military activities. In this regard, the effective reallocation of the "peace dividend" should provide for an increase in usable wealth within the United States and the former Soviet Union.

Another aspect of this approach is the view that wealth is created through the interaction of labour, capital and technology. These variables are presumably present in all societies, albeit in a variety of forms and admixtures. Supply-side theorists considering the record of the past century, with its phenomenal growth in the amount of gross wealth, see evidence in support of this view.

In the final decade of the twentieth century, we have amassed considerable evidence as to what works and what doesn't with regard to the expansion of wealth. To simplify, central planning, economic autarky and suffocating levels of state intervention interfere with the achievement of prosperity and economic growth. Export-oriented industrialization, market economies, flexible adaptation, and some degree of intelligent government coordination have, on the other hand, all proven conducive to economic growth. There has also been a high degree of correlation between respect for private property and freedom, and successful economic development. In the twilight of twentieth century, socialist

models of economic development together with large public sectors are becoming increasingly uncompetitive.

With the end of the Cold War, we also have a historical opportunity to shift arms spending toward more peaceful economic activities. With regard to security issues, a nation and a peoples' interest concerning natural, human, and investment capital creates a national will to preserve this wealth in the face of a threat to a nation's sovereignty and its way of life. When all benefit from economic well-being and participate jointly in distributive justice, the social and political fabric of a nation is strengthened.

The generation of domestic wealth in an interconnected world increasingly carries with it a responsibility to assist less-developed countries, if for no other reason than self-interest. Poverty creates instability and resentment, which then erodes international peace. Trading partners will buy more products and services if they are well off rather than desperately poor.

Environmental Security

The combination of economic growth, population growth, and technology is leading to environmental degradation, both locally and on a global scale. If the dire predictions concerning ozone depletion and global warming materialize, these developments will affect everyone everywhere and will change weather patterns in unknown ways. Oceanic pollution has increased rapidly with industrialization, urbanization, and the expanding use of chemical fertilizers. This will endanger the continental shelf waters which are often the richest waters in terms of sea life.

Burned hydrocarbons, acidic effluents, urban sewage, and chemical fertilizers are but a few of the products which end up on land as well as in the air and water. With ever-increasing levels of industrialization and a burgeoning global population, patterns of environmental degradation and destruction will accelerate. Atmospheric pollution is becoming a serious problem in industrial states around the world. Ocean currents and winds carry these pollutants far afield. Chernobyl's radioactivity in the Ukraine went not only to Eastern Europe, but was detected in Western Europe as well. These kinds of problems will only grow larger, and will

require transnational efforts. Human experience has increasingly recognized the environment as an indirect instrument of war, from the American use of Agent Orange in Vietnam to Iraq's torching of the oil fields in Kuwait. These are non-traditional security threats originating in traditional acts of war.

Finally, the transportation revolution has combined with the growing ease of travel to erode the ability of nations to maintain their separate existences.

Resource Security

Even in our much-touted "information age", material resources — particularly fossil fuels, food supplies and manufacturing substances — cannot be foregone. Populations require food, clothes, fuel, and a multitude of other items in order to sustain their survival and growth. Even though industrialization requires access to resources, the simple possession of raw materials does not guarantee economic development. Furthermore, international trade and the modern revolution in transportation — including containerization — have facilitated development where few natural resources exist. However, basic survival and economic growth cannot take place without access to resources. Industrial as well as developing societies must procure these resources in ever-increasing quantities. The transnational usage of resources has been expanding for years, but resistance to overseas appetites will emerge as societies claim their dwindling resources for their own industrial purposes. Technology continues to discover new uses for old and new resources. Previous waste products find a place in the new industrial economy as substitutes for traditional resources.

The working assumption concerning the acquisition of resources in the post-Second World War era has been that market forces will assure steady supplies at reasonable prices. Supply and demand should preserve some form of equilibrium. However, the vulnerability of petroleum supplies to the OPEC cartel was demonstrated during the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Oil is one of many resources underlying industrial economies. Until other renewable sources of energy are fully developed, the dependency of many modern industrial economies upon this resource will remain a fact of life. For the industrial nations, strategic interference

in the flow of oil or other vital materials may even constitute an act of belligerence. International dependence is a fact of life, and the depletion and exhaustion of resources will create threats to the well-being and existence of modern societies. Manufacturing, technology and trade are the media which transform natural resources into usable goods. Education is vital in allowing a society to adapt, implement and continuously upgrade its technology. As populations increase in size and living standards improve, the consumption of all resources will also increase. At some point, primary and secondary resources will become scarce and even depleted. While the market mechanism will make adjustments and technology may produce substitutes, disputes regarding the allocation of these resources will be inevitable and we must begin thinking about the consequences of such disputes now.

Food is a special category of resource, and each country demands food security — even at the cost of subsidizing inefficient agricultural practices in some instances.

Human Security

Human security is also part of non-traditional security. Individuals represent the foundation of human society, and any policy which omits them is not only incomplete but dooms social discourse to failure. The study of international relations stresses national and collective entities, often at the expense of the individuals which inhabit the state. It is routine to link the terms "national" and "security", as if the well-being of the sovereign state addresses the major questions underlying international peace. However, if states possess the right of non-interference from other states, shouldn't individuals enjoy security from the state as well? This has been the basic proposition of democratic thought as early as the European Enlightenment. It was reinforced with the modern refinement of the liberal state, and grew with the industrial revolution. Individual security against the state represents the underlying premise of international agreements on human rights, agreements which most countries have signed. The concept of human rights, in the Western legal sense, comprises the expression of human security from the state.

A nation's security can rest on a firm foundation only when the security of individuals is both recognized and protected. This concept possesses

both economic and legal-political dimensions, and contains a variety of pragmatic consequences as well. Where citizens perceive their personal security as protected, they will not seek emigration as the only means of achieving dignity and prosperity, but instead will remain home to contribute to the wealth and welfare of their own country.

Human security includes the recognition of individual and minority rights. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, we have seen how the past repression of dissent and ethnic identity has contributed to explosive violence when the old order dissolves. The era of the sovereign state as legally immune to external influence and pressure is passing. States, through a number of treaties and conventions, have voluntarily accepted restrictions on their domestic activities. It is in the interest of international community to advance standards of citizenship in the form of reciprocal rights and duties between governments and individuals.

Security from Illicit Activities

The subject of non-traditional security also includes illicit activities — narcotic trade, smuggling, piracy and terrorism. These ventures flourish where normal legal and police powers are weakest, although they may also be tolerated by the state and operate in a subrosa context. More the concern of police than of military forces, these activities are often transnational in nature and challenge the authority and ability of governments to maintain order. In some societies, these organizations flourish to the extent that their practitioners constitute a state within a state. The drug cartels in Colombia, the "Shining Path" guerrillas in Peru, the *yakuza* in Japan, gangs in Canada and the United States, and the Mafia in Italy are all examples of powerful organizations engaging in illicit activities.

Such organizations have the ability to generate wealth and attract support while preying on human weakness and poverty. The growth of organized illegal activities is often a symptom of a state's inability or unwillingness to challenge such associations. State-sponsored terrorism exists as a special example of organized crime, and is often an indirect instrument of foreign policy.

In other areas, the international drug trade is often the product of supply and demand. It exerts a debilitating influence upon millions of individuals, drains societies of their wealth, and builds organizations which may ignore or challenge state authority. Acts of piracy tend to be small-scale enterprises, consisting of individual boats and crews preying on vulnerable people. Smuggling ranges from individual travellers to sophisticated organizations transshipping narcotics or any other commodity which might find a market outside legal channels. High tariffs and taxes on legitimate items may encourage smuggling efforts designed to avoid these costs.

Among non-traditional security threats, these illicit activities *appear* to be the easiest to resolve, because more policing and the low-level use of military forces can make a difference. However, some organizations possess sophisticated structures which penetrate and influence governments up to the highest levels; others are urban-based or enjoy widespread rural support. Such organizational structures make the challenge of removing these threats a difficult proposition.

Population Stability

Nineteenth century social Darwinism viewed population growth as a test of a nation's or race's vitality in the struggle for survival. Imperialism was justified in terms of 'lebensraum', or the pursuit of territory for an expanding population. While today's industrial societies have slowed their levels of population growth, the developing societies are experiencing considerable demographic expansion at levels usually greater than what economic growth can sustain.

Numbers alone do not precipitate crises. Demographic bulges among the very young or very old represent victories of public health services. They indicate that infants are surviving into adolescence, and that people are living longer. However, these groups also represent the pre-productive and post-productive sectors of society, demographic groups which must be nurtured at the expense of the working population. In the GNP ledger, the low and high-end age cohorts are greater consumers than producers of goods and services. As China and India have discovered, a large population is not necessarily a positive resource in terms of economic development. Optimists claim that people are a

country's best resource, and under certain circumstances this can be true. Where a populace is educated, motivated, in general good health, and possessing an age mixture where production and accumulation can be optimized, a large demographic base can certainly be an asset. With the growth and expansion of the welfare state now included among the benefits of industrialization, the demands upon the working population have also increased. There are pressures for expanded food supplies, living space, and almost all material resources in this development curve.

Population growth expands the demand for education, employment, and welfare benefits within each state. Unless there is commensurate level in economic growth and equity, there will be rising and possibly destabilizing levels of public dissatisfaction. Emigration may provide a safety valve, but often it means the loss of the more adventuresome and entrepreneurial elements of a society — individuals who are needed as the catalyst for further growth.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the challenge of non-traditional security issues are to clarify them, identify their sources, and then design and implement solutions. Unlike military security challenges, non-traditional security problems require cooperative solutions — acts which defy the logic of alliances, and may even contradict alliance rationality. The calculus of non-traditional security may overlap with the logic of arms control in that political and military hostility has less priority than the need for cooperative solutions. Moreover, the technologies of arms control and verification — including aerial surveillance and atmospheric monitoring — can possess a direct application to non-traditional security problems if we pursue their implications. It will be important to integrate non-traditional security approaches with arms control and verification as conceptual tools in the reduction of tensions, as well as the enhancement of the broader security of all parties. The next task will be to move beyond theory, identify the appropriate technologies and processes, and chose an area for the selective application of concepts and practical approaches.

While modern science and technology is certainly no panacea for contemporary problems, neither is it the sinister Frankenstein implied by romantic environmentalists. The notion of security is fundamentally conservative, in the sense of preserving and/or restoring the status quo of a society. In this project, the application of non-traditional security approaches can be crucial.

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