





Canada. Parliament. House  
of Commons. Standing  
Committee on External  
Affairs, 1966/67.

Minutes of proceedings  
and evidence.

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HOUSE OF COMMONS  
First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament  
1966

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STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON  
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 1

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1966  
MONDAY, APRIL 4, 1966

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RESPECTING  
Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

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WITNESS:  
The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1988

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and Messrs.

Allmand,  
Asselin (*Charlevoix*),  
Basford,  
Brewin,  
Chatterton,  
Churchill,  
Faulkner,  
Forest,

Foy,  
Groos,  
Harkness,  
Klein,  
Laprise,  
Macdonald (*Rosedale*),  
Macquarrie,

McIntosh,  
Pilon,  
Stanbury,  
Thompson,  
Trudeau,  
Wadds (Mrs.),  
Walker—24.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

RESPECTING

Main Estimates 1986-87 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUBAIL, P.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1986

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
MONDAY, February 7, 1966.

*Resolved*,—That the following Members do compose the Standing Committee on External Affairs:

Messrs.

Allmand,	Groos,	McIntosh,
Asselin (Charlevoix),	Harkness,	Nesbitt,
Basford,	Klein,	Pilon,
Brewin,	Laprise,	Stanbury,
Chatterton,	Lind,	Thompson,
Dubé,	Macdonald (Rosedale),	Trudeau,
Faulkner,	Macquarrie,	Wadds (Mrs.),
Forest,	Mandziuk,	Walker—(24).

WEDNESDAY, February 16, 1966.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Churchill be substituted for that of Mr. Macquarrie on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

TUESDAY, March 22, 1966.

*Ordered*,—That, saving always the powers of the Committee of Supply in relation to the voting of public monies, the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1966-67, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the Committee of Supply and referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, March 30, 1966.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Foy and Macquarrie be substituted for those of Messrs. Lind and Mandziuk on the Standing Committee on External affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*





## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, February 17, 1966.

(1)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met this day at 10:35 a.m. for purposes of organization.

*Members present:* Mrs. Wadds and Messrs. Allmand, Asselin (Charlevoix), Basford, Brewin, Chatterton, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Groos, Harkness, Klein, Laprise, Macdonald (Rosedale), Mandziuk, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Stanbury, Trudeau, Walker (22).

The Committee Clerk attending, and having called for nominations, Mr. Basford moved, seconded by Mr. Nesbitt, that Mr. Dubé do take the Chair of this Committee as Chairman.

On motion of Mr. Groos, seconded by Mr. Forest,

*Resolved*,—That nominations be closed.

Mr. Dubé, having been declared elected as Chairman, thereupon took the Chair, and thanked the Committee for the honour conferred upon him.

On motion of Mr. Macdonald (Rosedale), seconded by Mr. Mandziuk,

*Resolved*,—That Mr. Nesbitt be elected Vice-Chairman of this Committee.

On motion of Mr. Basford, seconded by Mr. Groos,

*Resolved*,—That a Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure be appointed, composed of the Chairman and a number of members to be appointed by him after consultation with the Party Whips.

After general discussion on the order of business to be followed when the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs are referred to the Committee, the Committee adjourned at 10:55 a.m. on motion of Mr. Groos.

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MONDAY, April 4, 1966.

(2)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 10:10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Mrs. Wadds and Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Chatterton, Churchill, Dubé, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Laprise, Macdonald (Rosedale), McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Stanbury, Walker (16).



*Also present:* Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence: Messrs. Carter, Deachman, Fane, Foy, Grills, Lambert, Lessard, Matheson, McNulty, Stefanson, Rock.

*And also:* Messrs. Gundlock, Johnston and Matte.

*In attendance:* The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Messrs. R. E. Collins and H. B. Robinson, Assistant Under-Secretaries.

The Chairman read the *First Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure* which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Friday, March 25, 1966, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dubé (Chairman), Brewin, Macdonald (Rosedale), Nesbitt and Thompson.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend as follows:

- (a) That the Committee sit on Monday, April 4, 1966, to commence consideration of the Estimates and at that time will hear a statement by the Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
- (b) Following Mr. Martin's statement, your Sub-Committee will meet again to draw up a programme of priorities, specific areas which the committee wishes to explore by further questioning, and witnesses to be called;
- (c) During the Committee's consideration of the Estimates, the procedure outlined hereunder is recommended.

1. The first item (Departmental administration) be called, and that discussion and questions of a general nature be permitted, but questions that clearly relate to specific items be postponed until the appropriate item has been reached;

2. When the general discussion is completed, the first item be allowed to stand for further consideration and the Committee proceed to consider and approve the subsequent items;

3. Only Members of the House of Commons, who have been officially designated to the Committee, may be permitted to carry on the initial questioning respecting each item, but, prior to the approval of each item by the Committee, other members of the House of Commons also may have an opportunity to pose questions to the witnesses;

4. When all of the items have been approved, except the first item, the Committee will return to further consideration of that item, at which time all unanswered questions may be dealt with and unfinished business completed;

5. The first item of the estimates will then be approved, or otherwise dealt with, and the Committee will proceed to prepare its Report to the House.

On motion of Mr. Walker, seconded by Mr. Groos, the report was approved.

On motion of Mr. Nesbitt, seconded by Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*),  
*Resolved*,—That the Committee cause to be printed 1500 copies in English and 750 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence.

The committee then proceeded to consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs in accordance with the order of reference of March 22, 1966.

The Chairman called the first item of the estimates:

1. Departmental Administration . . . \$15,403,400, and invited the Minister to make an opening statement.

Mr. Martin first made an announcement regarding Canadian aid to India.

The Minister then made a statement on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and referred particularly to an exchange of aides-memoires between France and Canada concerning the French decision to withdraw from the integrated defence arrangements.

*Ordered*,—That the texts of the aides-memoires referred to by the Minister be included as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendices A, B, and C.*)

Following the Minister's statement on NATO, copies of a book entitled "NATO—Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", published by the NATO Information Service, were distributed to members of both committees.

Mr. Martin then made a statement on the situation in Vietnam and tabled copies of an exchange of correspondence between the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Canadian Prime Minister.

*Ordered*,—That the letters exchanged between the President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Rt. Hon. L. B. Pearson be included as appendices to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (*See Appendices D and E.*)

At 11:45 a.m. the committee took a brief recess and reconvened at 11:55 a.m.

Mr. Martin then made a statement on Southern Rhodesia, and a limited number of copies of a blue book entitled "Documents relating to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments" were made available to members requesting them.

The Minister was questioned briefly.

At 12:30 p.m. the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*





## EVIDENCE

MONDAY, April 4, 1966.

● (10.10 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. We now have a quorum.

First of all, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the members of the Standing Committee on Defence who are here this morning to hear the presentation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I trust that the same arrangement can be made when the National Defence Committee hear the presentation of their Minister so that those of us who wish to attend can be present.

Your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on Friday, March 25, 1966, and I would like to read to you its first report. (*See Minutes.*)

The CHAIRMAN: You have heard the first report of the subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure. Gentlemen, what is your pleasure?

Mr. WALKER: I move that the first report of the subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure be adopted.

Mr. GROOS: I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: At this time a motion is also required for printing. Last year the committee caused to be printed 1,000 copies in English and 500 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to the estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, were the 1,000 copies disposed of last year?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Walker, it appears that all copies were disposed of.

Mr. NESBITT: Was there on any occasion a greater demand for these than the supply on hand?

Mr. PILON: Yes, there was.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Mr. Chairman, in the long run, I think there was a shortage of copies, particularly on the question of hate literature; in other words, there was a greater demand than supply.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, in view of an increased interest in foreign affairs we might increase the number somewhat.

Mr. WALKER: I would suggest 1,200.

The CHAIRMAN: Would it be agreeable if we caused to have printed 1,500 copies in English and 750 copies in French?

Mr. NESBITT: Yes.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Yes.



The CHAIRMAN: Would someone make the appropriate motion?

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I move that this committee cause to have printed 1,500 copies in English and 750 copies in French of its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence relating to the estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): I second the motion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: I now will call the first item of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs, which is item number 1, departmental administration.

Department of External Affairs

Item 1.

Administration, Operation and Maintenance including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of commissioners (International commissions for supervision and control in Indo-China), secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependents; Canadian participation in the Commonwealth Arts Festival to be held in Britain in the fall of 1965; payment to the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission for the purposes and subject to the provisions of the Act respecting the Commission established to administer the Roosevelt Campobello International Park; a cultural relations and academic exchange program with the French community and grants as detailed in the estimates. \$13,176,800.

The CHAIRMAN: With your permission, I will ask the Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to make an opening statement.

Hon. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): Mr. Chairman, I understood from you that the steering committee wished me to open the departmental estimates by—

Mr. NESBITT: Excuse me, Mr. Martin. I do not know whether or not the sounds system is working. I am finding it difficult to hear the Minister and perhaps other members farther back in the room might not be able to hear him.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I understood from you, Mr. Chairman, that the steering committee wished me, on the first item, to make a statement on the general position that Canada has taken on some of the vital problems facing the international community to-day. I think it would be useful to discuss three that are of major concern to us in Canada: NATO, Viet Nam, and Rhodesia. If it was agreeable to the committee I would proceed to give the government's views with regard to these three problems, and in that order.



Before doing that I wonder if I could take advantage of this meeting of the committee to recall that on March 23, I announced that the government proposed to ask Parliament to approve a major expansion in our food aid program for India in the coming year, we had decided to play our part in helping India to meet its current emergency by providing one million tons of food to that country. There is to be a meeting in Washington late today or tomorrow morning, and I would like to make a further announcement in this connection.

I now wish to advise the committee the government proposes to take an additional step to assist India. A sum of approximately \$19 million remains to be paid by India as principal and interest on two loans which the government made in 1958 to cover the purchase of Canadian wheat and flour. It is proposed to forgive the remaining payments on these two loans as a means of providing additional help to India in its difficult balance of payments situation which has deteriorated significantly as a result of foreign exchange costs caused by drought and other factors. The first of the remaining payments was due on March 31. My colleague, the Minister of Finance, has signed agreement with the Indian High Commissioner to postpone this payment pending approval by Parliament to cancel the full amount of \$10 million which is outstanding. The agreement provides immediate relief in the amount of approximately \$3.7 million, which this payment represents. The cancellation of the outstanding debt will be additional to the food aid for India to which I have referred and which will cost about \$71 million in this calendar year.

I am sure that members of the committee will agree that this represents a significant Canadian response to the very serious emergency that prevails in India at the present time. We hope that at tomorrow's meeting there will be a comparable response from other countries to the serious situation that faces the Indian nation.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity of laying before the committee the Canadian view on a number of issues in this critical period. I would like to discuss the NATO situation as frankly as I can with members of the committee. It will be understood, of course, that there will have to be bilateral negotiations between the government of Canada and the government of France. There will also have to be negotiations between the 14 other member states in the organization and France. There will therefore be areas where it will not be possible for me—and, I am sure this will be understood—to reveal a Canadian position or, in some cases, to have a firm Canadian position until such time as there has been the fullest consultation between the 14 member states which are involved in this negotiation with the government of France.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But, you have to have a position if you are going to consult.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, there are some positions that the government has taken but before it can reveal what these positions are it would want to advise its partners. There will be other situations where there will be no position taken until such time as there has been consultation and agreement. For instance, what happens to SHAPE? That is a matter for the 14 members. The position the government of Canada takes with regard to particular bases that it has occupied is a matter for Canada.



Article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty permits signatories to opt out in 1969, the 20th anniversary of its conclusion. The year 1969, for this good reason, has been regarded as the year for stocktaking. It was with this in mind that in December, 1964, I proposed on behalf of the Canadian government, at the NATO ministerial meeting, that the North Atlantic Council should undertake a review of the future of the alliance. Although this proposal was approved by the 14 other members of the NATO alliance, nevertheless, the idea was not pursued because the President of France had begun to articulate his nation's dissatisfaction with the NATO organization and no one wanted to precipitate a premature confrontation.

It is now less than a month since the French government first formally informed their NATO allies of their decision to withdraw from the integrated defence arrangements. I have given the House the text of the two notes setting out the French position. I have copies of these notes available, and they easily can be distributed to members of the committee, together with the text of the Canadian reply to the first French note. We have not replied yet to the second note.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Martin, will they be supplied without asking for them?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. If it is your wish, it may be convenient that the notes be made an appendix to today's proceedings, so they will be fully available for examination by members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that agreed?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I also have arranged to distribute a book entitled "NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", with which some of you undoubtedly are familiar. This book is available in English and French. I think you will find it a very useful source of information. It also includes a collection of basic documents including the North Atlantic Treaty and the highly complex set of agreements known as the London and Paris agreements of 1954, which govern Germany's participation in NATO.

My view and that of the government of Canada is that NATO has served a useful purpose. I take it from the reaction the other day to the Canadian position on the French announcement that this view generally speaking reflects the opinion of the political parties in Parliament. We have only to cast our minds back to the immediate post-war period; Europe was then unsteadily extricating itself from the morass left by the second world war and Stalin was pressing in every way to extend his influence through western Europe to the Atlantic. The picture has now changed, as President de Gaulle has said. It is not unreasonable to ask: "Is the alliance still necessary? Is General de Gaulle right in advocating the end of the integrated military organization of the alliance? Is the strategic concept of the alliance still valid? Is it time to leave the defence of Europe to the Europeans?" These are questions that are being asked at the present time, and they are fair questions. Naturally, by virtue of my own responsibilities, I have been asking myself some of these questions. It may be helpful if I began what I have to say on the situation in NATO resulting from



the French action by summarizing the main elements of the position now taken by our NATO ally, France. These comprise:

(1) a decision to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated military structure and French officers from the integrated headquarters, these decisions to take effect on July 1, 1966;

(2) a decision to require the removal from France of the two integrated military headquarters known as SHAPE and the Central European Command. France has proposed that the removal be completed by April 1, 1967;

(3) a decision to require the withdrawal from France of foreign forces and bases. France has proposed that the United States and Canadian bases be withdrawn by April 1, 1967;

(4) France has indicated a wish to retain its forces in Germany, while transferring them from NATO to French command.

(5) France intends to leave its forces in Berlin, where they are established on the basis of occupation rights and where there is a tripartite command.

(6) France has indicated a willingness to negotiate arrangements for establishing, in peacetime, French liaison missions with NATO commands.

(7) France has indicated a readiness to enter into separate conversations with Canada and the United States to determine the military facilities which the respective governments might mutually grant to each other in wartime.

(8) France intends to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and to participate in the activities of the NATO Council. This, as I understand it, is the position taken by the government of France.

● (10.30 a.m.)

It is only fair to note that these positions have been previously stated, in one form or another, by the President of the French Republic during the last two years.

This last element of the French position is naturally welcomed by the Canadian government as an indication of France's desire to continue its formal association with the other parties to the Treaty. It will, I need hardly add, be the concern of the Canadian government to encourage French participation to the greatest extent feasible.

It is evident that some of the French objectives can be attained by unilateral action; for example, the withdrawal of French troops from SACEUR's command and of French officers from the combined headquarters. Some other objectives will require negotiations over modalities and the timing; for example, the withdrawal of NATO headquarters and of foreign bases from French territory. Finally, some proposals depend on working out arrangements with other members of the Alliance and will involve negotiations on substance; for example, the presence and role of French troops in Germany and the liaison arrangements which might be established between French and NATO commands.

It must be clear to the members of the committee that the French proposals raise a host of problems, the range of which has not been fully determined. They raise questions with political, military, financial, and legal implications. We are examining these questions with our allies, informally with the 14 other than France and, where appropriate, with France and the 14. We are, as well,



engaged in an examination of the contractual situation, and the documentation in that connection is now being carefully examined by our legal officers.

The first French aide-memoire also sets out briefly the reasons which, in the view of President de Gaulle, justify the position which he takes. The following arguments are listed:

First, he argues that the threat to Western Europe has changed and no longer has the immediate and menacing character it once had; he says that the countries of Europe have restored their economies and recovered their earlier strength; he argues that France is developing an atomic armament which is not susceptible of being integrated within the NATO forces; that the nuclear stalemate has transformed the conditions of Western defence; and that Europe is no longer the centre of international crises.

These are observations with which I imagine we are all more or less in agreement. But do they, singly or jointly, justify the conclusion drawn by the French government that integrated defence arrangements are no longer required for the defence of Western Europe?

Let me examine each of the French arguments in turn:

First, the threat to western Europe. Over the years the Soviet Union has steadily strengthened its military forces in eastern Germany and in the European area in general. These forces are now stronger than at any time since the end of the Second World War. While I recognize that the likelihood of an actual attack has diminished, the effectiveness of NATO's defence arrangements has been, and remains, a factor in this favourable turn of events. Moreover, it is considered prudent to base defence policy on the known capabilities of a possible enemy rather than on his declared intentions, or even his supposed intentions as we may rightly or wrongly assess them. To avoid any possible misinterpretation, I also want to make clear my conviction that NATO countries should avoid provocation of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Canada strongly favours the promotion of better understanding between the Soviet Union and the western countries. But, as the Cuban experience of 1962 demonstrated, progress towards better relations may be greater when it is clear that there is no alternative to accommodation.

Secondly, Europe's recovery: It is, of course, true that the European countries have greatly strengthened their positions in every way. We applaud this development. We know that the generosity of the United States, through the Marshall Plan, greatly contributed to this happy consequence. We have, in fact been assuming that this would in time enable the western European states to take on increasing responsibility for European defence, possibly within the framework of new co-operative arrangements among the European members of the Alliance. The French action may have set back this prospect, as it has the immediate effect of dividing the countries of Europe over what their defence policies should be.

Thirdly, it is a fact that France has developed an independent nuclear force. But, as we see it, this is not an argument against the integration of other forces. The United Kingdom has demonstrated that the acquisition of a strategic



nuclear force does not require the withdrawal of other national forces from the unified command and planning arrangements.

Fourthly, it is true that a nuclear stalemate had developed in place of the earlier United States nuclear monopoly. But this is not new. It has been the case for ten years. Moreover, this fact has not diminished the need for unified planning, if the European countries are to make an effective contribution to the defence of Europe.

Fifthly, I also acknowledge that Europe is not at present the centre of international crises. But until there is a political settlement in Central Europe, it will remain an area of potential crisis, particularly if the arrangements which have brought about stability in the area should be upset.

In my judgment, and in the judgment of the Canadian government, the arguments presented in the French aide-mémoire do not support the conclusion that unified command and planning arrangements are no longer necessary for the defence of Western Europe.

It is striking that all of the other members of NATO have joined in reaffirming their belief in the need for unified command and planning arrangements in a declaration, the text of which I communicated to the House of Commons on March 18. I expect members of the External Affairs committee and the Defence committee will be interested to know that the strongest support for the integrated military arrangements has come from the smaller members of the alliance, who consider that the only way to assure their defence is by pooling their contributions in a common effort. It seems to me that, if the principle of an alliance is accepted, the experience of the last two world wars and the requirements of modern weapons demonstrate the need for unified command and joint planning. Indeed, one of the most remarkable successes of the post-war world has been the development within NATO of effective peace-time arrangements for military co-operation.

I have explained why we and other members of NATO are not persuaded by the French arguments. I wish now to examine the implications of the actions which have been taken by the French government.

Providing NATO itself does not disintegrate—and I see no danger of that happening—the immediate military consequences of the French action are thought to be manageable. France has already withdrawn from NATO command, during the last six years, most of its previously integrated forces. The net loss in forces available to NATO from the announced withdrawal, while significant, will not be too serious, particularly if workable arrangements can be devised for maintaining French troops in Germany. But the loss for practical purposes of French land and air space has strategic implications for the defence of Western Europe, which will have to be carefully studied.

Even more worrying to my mind are the possible political implications. These consequences are, of course, still quite uncertain so that it is possible to speak only in the most general and cautious terms. But it is obvious that the French actions may weaken the unity of the Alliance. This would, in turn, jeopardize the stability of Central Europe, which has been built on allied unity



and particularly on French, British, and American solidarity in Berlin and in Germany. I do not want to elaborate, but it is possible to anticipate that French bilateral relations with some of the NATO allies, particularly those who carry the larger burdens, will be put under strain. The balance of forces within the Alliance will of necessity be altered. Finally, France's example could stimulate nationalist tendencies which have been encouragingly absent in Western Europe since the last war.

The Canadian government is not unsympathetic to many of the considerations which underlie the French wish for change. We know that circumstances in the world have changed since NATO was established. We have long believed that members of the Alliance particularly those such as France which have spoken of the need for change, should present concrete proposals to encourage consultation within the alliance.

It is reasonable to look towards a greater acceptance of responsibility by Europeans for the defence of Western Europe. However, any North American move to disengage militarily from Europe will be dangerously premature until the European countries have made the necessary political and institutional arrangements to take over the responsibilities involved. It follows, at this time of uncertainty about NATO's future, that Canada should avoid action which would create unnecessary strain or otherwise impair the solidarity of the alliance. This need not and should not preclude us from making adjustments, in the interest of economy and efficiency, in the manner in which we contribute to European defence. And we should seek to ensure that there is a constructive evolution in the organization of the alliance; and we should take advantage of the actions taken by the government of France to do exactly what we ourselves proposed in the fall of 1964, which is to engage in serious examination of the state of the alliance.

In so far as the Canadian bases in France are concerned, the government of France has taken unilateral action. It appears to be a final decision. At any rate, it has stated that it would like to see the Canadian bases withdrawn by April 1, 1967. Although I express the hope, and have no doubt, that the French government will be prepared to negotiate mutually acceptable arrangements, including compensation and dates for the withdrawal of the bases. Since the objective of sending Canadian troops to Europe was to contribute to the integrated defence arrangements from which France is withdrawing, this government has accepted the logic that Canadian forces in France cannot outstay their welcome. They will have to be moved elsewhere.

I referred earlier to the determination of other members of NATO to preserve the effective arrangements which have been worked out for joint planning and unified command. This is only prudent and Canada fully shares this determination. This will provide a continuing defence against the Soviet military capacity still directed at western Europe. It will help preserve the precarious stability in Central Europe. Moreover, under the present integrated defence arrangements, there being no German general staff, Germany has placed all its troops directly under NATO commanders. The dismantling of the existing structure would lead to the reversion of all European forces to national command.



● (10.50 a.m.)

Inevitably our attention in the near future will be taken up with handling the immediate consequences of the French action. But we shall not lose sight of the need for NATO to adjust to the changing circumstances since the Alliance was concluded. Indeed, the adjustments which the French action will require of the existing military arrangements provide opportunities, as I said earlier, which we intend to take to examine with our allies the possibilities for developing improvements in the NATO structure and to consider how the Alliance should develop in the long run, and also to consider what reductions and what savings can be effected without impairing the efficiency of the organization, or of our contribution to it.

Although I am speaking about NATO, I wish to emphasize that—to the extent this depends on Canada—we will not allow our disappointment to affect Canada's bilateral relations with France. The Canadian Government has been working steadily to improve and intensify our relations with France. For our part we will not interrupt this process. Differences over defence policy need not impair the development of our bilateral relations in the political, economic, cultural, and technical fields.

For instance, we are sending an economic mission to France within the course of a few weeks, which will be representative both of government and of business, designed to encourage further trade relations between France and Canada. There certainly will be no interruption between these and other contacts that we have established and continue to establish with France. These are matters which can and should be kept separate from defence arrangements within NATO. In all this, we assume that the French government agrees that this is a desirable approach, and we have no reason to doubt that this is their view.

I want to conclude this part of my statement by referring again to the objectives which the Canadian government intends to follow in the situation created by the French action.

In NATO, our policy will be, firstly, to seek, in consultation with our allies, including France as far as possible, to limit the damage to the unity and effectiveness of the Alliance, and to recreate a relationship of mutual confidence among all the members; secondly to help preserve the essential features of NATO's existing system of unified command and joint planning for collective defence; thirdly, to continue to maintain an appropriate contribution to NATO's collective defence system; fourthly, to take every opportunity to examine with our allies possibilities for developing improvements to the NATO structure and to consider the future of the Alliance in the long run.

With regard to France, the Government will firstly, negotiate with either bilaterally or multilaterally as appropriate, fair and reasonable arrangements for those adjustments which may be required as a result of French withdrawal from NATO's integrated defence arrangements; secondly, leave the door open for the eventual return of France to full participation in the collective activities of the Alliance, should France so decide. Finally, we will continue, notwithstanding NATO differences and with the cooperation of the French authorities, to develop our bilateral relations with France.



This, Mr. Chairman, concludes my statement in chief on the NATO situation. I can go on with my statement or I can permit an examination on what I have stated so far by members of the committee, as you wish.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it the wish of the committee to pose questions now on the NATO aspect of the Minister's statement?

Mr. HARKNESS: I think so. I think it would be better to deal with each of these topics as they come up.

Mr. BREWIN: I personally feel differently from Mr. Harkness, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that we should hear the full statement on the various subjects and have time to consider the statement that is made. Then, after the advantage of thought and study, our questions can perhaps be more to the point than if we proceed immediately.

I only suggest that course, Mr. Chairman. If members of the committee wish to proceed now, that is fine; but that is my personal view.

Mr. MCINTOSH: May I suggest that if we follow Mr. Brewin's suggested course we may not finish with all three today and we may lose continuity in the questions we are going to ask in regard to each topic. We may only finish dealing with NATO in the time allotted to us.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): I think there is merit in Mr. Brewin's point of view. I think it is fairly obvious that we are not going to dispose of even these three subjects to which the Minister has referred this morning. I think it would be of advantage to have the Minister's statement on the record to be examined when the committee reconvenes. Therefore, my recommendation will be that the Minister deal with each subject.

Mr. MATHESON: In view of the grave importance of some of the things the Minister has referred to, I personally would like additional time to prepare questions. I think this is most important. We can proceed to other topics presently available.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, if the Minister has a prepared text on the Southeast Asia question, I think to have that on the record in one volume, together with his remarks on NATO, would be very valuable indeed to the committee because a number of us like to distribute copies to people who have been writing to us about it.

I would agree with what Mr. Brewin, Mr. Macdonald and others have said.

Mr. CHURCHILL: When do we meet again, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MARTIN: I could meet tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN: We could continue tomorrow morning.

Mr. NESBITT: In that case you would not have the copies of today's meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: There might be a problem about meeting tomorrow. The clerk tells me that there is a possibility the committee rooms may not be available tomorrow because there are five other committees meeting. However, we will try to find a room for tomorrow.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that as there may be some difficulty about meeting tomorrow, and as there will be an intervening ten-day period it would be better to have the complete statement on this and the other two topics. Then, when we come back after Easter we can take them up one at a time.

The CHAIRMAN: It does appear to be the wish of the majority that Mr. Martin should continue with his statement.

Mr. MARTIN: When I came before the committee on June 10 of 1965 I gave a detailed account of the developments which had led up to the situation at that time in Viet Nam. I said I thought it was difficult to form a judgment of that situation without examining in its proper historical perspective the problem in Viet Nam. I believe the situation is no less true today than it was a little less than a year ago. I know there are interpretations other than that which the Canadian government has placed on the course of events in Viet Nam. Indeed, a great deal of the discussion and dissent which have developed in relation to Viet Nam have focused on the history of the conflict itself. I think, however, that no useful purpose would be served by going again over the ground which we covered last year, but in that context I wish to make two comments.

First, I would like to remind the committee that while there are differences over the antecedents of the present conflict in Viet Nam, the assessment which the government has formed on this subject is an independent assessment resting on a long record of first hand Canadian experience in Indo China. Secondly, if our foreign policy is to have any impact on the present situation, I believe we must now cast our thinking forward rather than backward. I also believe we are unlikely to achieve anything useful by a policy of denunciation which is sometimes being urged on the government by those who take issue with our position.

What we must do is to map out a course which we regard as right and realistic, which takes account of the facts as we know them and which has some prospect of contributing to a peaceful settlement. And this is what we have been trying to do.

There is one matter with which I should like to deal before giving the committee some indication of recent developments in the Viet Nam situation. This is the matter of Canadian participation in the International Commission in Viet Nam.

Members of the Committee will recall that this was the only issue on which the House divided when the estimates of the Department of External Affairs were considered on February 8. I do not pretend—and I do not suppose anyone would pretend—that the Commission is in a position, in present circumstances, to do justice to the mandate with which it was charged by the Geneva powers in 1954. That is not in any way the fault of the Commission which was set up to supervise a cease-fire and not to control an armed conflict. Nevertheless there are—and there will continue to be—a number of good reasons for maintaining the Commission's presence in Viet Nam. Some of these reasons I will be prepared to deal with in interrogation; some of them I will not be able to discuss.



First, none of the interested parties has at any time suggested that the International Commission be withdrawn or its mandate cancelled. Not even the Chinese People's Republic has made this suggestion. On the contrary, it has been confirmed to us within recent weeks both by the Secretary of State of the United States and by senior personalities of the Government of North Viet Nam that they attach importance to a continued Commission presence in Viet Nam. Indeed, the committee might be interested to know that when Victor Moore, our new Commissioner on the Control Commission, made his introductory calls in Hanoi about three and a half weeks ago, it was represented to him that the North Vietnamese government would like to see the Commission hold more of its meetings in Hanoi than has been the case in recent years. I understand that this matter has since been discussed among the Commissioners and that there appears to be general agreement to act on the North Vietnamese suggestion.

I think this would be a good decision, and it would not be establishing a precedent. The Commission at another period has spent more time in Hanoi than it has during the past few years, so there would be no precedent involved in spending a longer period in Hanoi.

Secondly, both North and South Viet Nam continue to look to the Commission to consider and adjudicate their charges of violations of the Cease-Fire Agreement. While there can be legitimate argument over the usefulness of such a procedure in circumstances where the prospects of remedial action are limited, the fact is that the parties do attach importance to this function of the Commission and to the public presentation which the Commission is able to make on the basis of its investigations of breaches of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

Thirdly, if members of the committee examine the Cease-Fire Agreement which was concluded in Geneva in 1954, they will find that the Commission is, in fact, the only tangible instrument of the Geneva settlement as it affects Viet Nam. Even if we were to consider, therefore, that the Commission's presence in Viet Nam in present circumstances is of largely symbolic significance, we cannot, I think, discount the importance of the Commission as a reflection of the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in a situation which engages their international responsibilities.

I may say just by way of parenthesis, to Mr. Harkness, he will remember that during the debate on February 8 he asked me, in a constructive manner, whether perhaps the time has not come when the Commission's role might be abandoned. At that very time I was engaged in considerations that I will later discuss which caused me to feel that the future role of the Commission might indeed prove to be very great.

Mr. HARKNESS: I might just interject, Mr. Chairman, that my suggestion was that the number of control teams, and therefore the number of personnel, might be reconsidered in view of the fact that these control teams are not being allowed to carry out the function which it was anticipated they could carry out when they were sent there.

Mr. MARTIN: That is right; you made that point.

Mr. HARKNESS: That was my suggestion, rather than to do away with it altogether. I think this was my main contention or suggestion.



Mr. MARTIN: Yes.

I think it is fair to say that the elimination of the Commission from the Viet Nam scene in present circumstances would only serve to complicate what is already a situation which is fraught with serious risks for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fourthly, we have always thought it right to keep open the possibility that the Commission might be able, in the right circumstances, to make a positive contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam issue. I think I can say to the committee, without exaggeration, that this possibility has played an increasing part in our thinking about the Viet Nam conflict. I am satisfied that we would be ill advised at this stage to discard an instrument which may yet have a part to play in bringing this issue from the battlefield to the conference table; I am strengthened in this view by the attitude taken by a number of parties concerned and by the strong position taken by the Secretary General of the United Nations.

● (11.10 a.m.)

I now shall turn to some recent developments in the Viet Nam situation. I would like to say something about the pause in the bombing of North Viet Nam which began on Christmas Eve and continued for 37 days until the end of January. The position of the Canadian government for some time previously had been that such a pause could represent a useful opening for a peaceful solution of the Viet Nam issue. It was with this consideration in mind that the Prime Minister had suggested the possibility of a pause in April of last year. The pause which took place in the following months was shortlived and did not produce the results for which we had hoped. When a further pause was initiated by the United States in late December we welcomed this as a genuine contribution to peace and we did what we could, through diplomatic channels, to reinforce the many efforts that then were being made to turn it to good account.

I do not intend to recapitulate those efforts except to say it was a matter of disappointment to us that the prospect of some break in the situation, which the pause might have offered, did not materialize. Nevertheless, we took the view throughout the pause that we hoped it might be extended until all reasonable possibilities of eliciting some response from the other side had been exhausted.

Toward the end of the bombing pause the President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam addressed a series of letters to other governments, including the government of Canada. We have studied President Ho Chi Minh's letter with the greatest care and consideration to see, in particular, if it offered any hope of a reversal of the present grave situation in Viet Nam. While it did not appear to us that there were, in fact, new elements in that letter we nevertheless felt it provided a basis on which time it might be possible to explore the position of the North Vietnamese government in greater detail.

That is one reason we decided that the time might be opportune to send a special representative of the Canadian government to Hanoi to present the Canadian reply and, at the same time, to probe the views of the North Vietnamese government on the prospects for a settlement of the Viet Nam issue through other than military means.



I can table the text of our reply which was presented in Hanoi on March 8. This is the reply by the Prime Minister of Canada to President Ho Chi Minh and, if it is your wish, we might make that part of today's records.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that agreed?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could you table both letters, Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. The letter of Ho Chi Minh has been tabled in the House but we can well make that part of this record, if you wish. It would be more convenient.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed to table both letters?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Perhaps I should say we did not think it profitable at this stage to enter into a controversy with President Ho Chi Minh over the interpretation of events in Viet Nam which was contained in his letter. Rather, we availed ourselves of this opportunity to re-state the Canadian view that there could be no lasting solution of the present conflict other than through negotiations and to suggest, at the same time, that there might be a contribution which the members of the International Control Commission in Viet Nam could make to that end.

The Viet Nam question was placed before the Security Council at the beginning of February. There has been a good deal of discussion about the wisdom of this step with particular reference to its timing after the bombing of North Viet Nam had been resumed. As far as this government is concerned our position on this matter has remained unchanged. I said in the General Assembly last fall that the United Nations was the place, or one of the places, where the question of Viet Nam should certainly be discussed. We have been aware, of course, that the prospects of the United Nations playing a direct part in relation to the Viet Nam issue in present circumstances was very limited. This is not only because three of the principal parties to the Viet Nam conflict are not members of the United Nations but also because there has been a reluctance on the part of some countries to have brought before the United Nations an issue such as this which directly engages the interests of the great powers.

Nevertheless, it would have been entirely inconsistent with Canadian attitudes and policies to deny, as I say, the right of the United Nations to pronounce itself on an issue which involves the maintenance of international peace and security perhaps more than any other issue at the present time. In our view, the provisions of the Charter in this matter are clear. It is regrettable that the Security Council should not have taken the opportunity of at least recommending to the parties that they seek a peaceful solution of the Viet Nam conflict through the machinery for which they themselves have expressed a clear preference; that is to say, the machinery created in Geneva in 1954.

The inability of the Security Council to deal with this issue has reinforced the judgment which we had formed some time ago, and which was in my mind when the debate in the House of Commons took place in February, that we should look to the International Commission in Viet Nam to see whether, in the



right circumstances, there was not a role which it could play toward bringing about a peaceful settlement of the issue there. This is the direction in which our thinking has been tending since last December, and it is to this aspect of the Viet Nam problem that I want to turn.

The first question that arises is why it should be thought that the International Commission might be able to make a positive contribution to a solution of the Viet Nam conflict. The Commission was brought into being by the Geneva Conference of 1954. We have served on that Commission since that time, along with India and Poland and, as well, we have served on the comparable commissions in Cambodia and Laos. In a sense, the Commission may be said to represent the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in the Viet Nam situation. It is now clear that when the time comes any negotiation of the Viet Nam conflict is likely to be conducted within the Geneva frame of reference. It is natural, therefore, to think of the Commission as an instrument which might be brought into play in preparing the ground for an eventual negotiation.

The question has been raised in our contacts with interested governments whether there is anything in the Geneva cease-fire agreement which confers on the Commission a mandate on the lines we have been considering. I must say that on a strictly legal interpretation of that agreement the answer must be in the negative. But, I do not think anyone who is concerned about the course of developments in Viet Nam would feel justified in looking at this issue only in legalistic terms. We have never looked at it that way. We have never thought of the commission as possessing a role purely on the basis of powers extended to it under the Geneva agreement of 1954; nor, on the other hand are we thinking of any fresh mandate being conferred on the Commission either by the Geneva powers acting collectively or by the Soviet Union and Britain acting jointly in their capacities as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference.

We have informed the Soviet Union; we have informed the United Kingdom government; we have informed other governments of our views as to the role that the Commission might assume, but we have not thought it was necessary to get their authority for making our suggestion. What we have had in mind is something modest and informal; we continue to believe however that our proposal has potential merit. Our proposal was really in the nature of a good offices assignment which would be undertaken not necessarily by the Commission as such but by the three Commission powers acting as sovereign nations, which have been associated with the Viet Nam problem for the past 11 years, and which have established a fair record of co-operation between them. It is our view that the knowledge and experience of the Viet Nam problem of the three Commission powers and the ready access they command to all the interested parties would make the Commission powers a particularly suitable group to carry forward the search for peace in Viet Nam. This is the common objective of the three members of the Commission.

There have been notable attempts made to try and bring about peaceful negotiation in Viet Nam: attempts made by the British; by a good offices body of the Commonwealth; by individual intermediaries, some publicly known and some not; by concerted action on the part of a group of countries, including



Canada; action by Canada itself, for instance, in the visit that Mr. Blair Seaborn made in June, 1965. But, for none of these, other than the visit of Mr. Blair Seaborn, did the mediators know in advance that it would have access both to the government in Saigon and to the government in Hanoi. It must not be forgotten in appraising the role of the Commission that it has direct access to both capitals in the two belligerent areas in the regrettably divided country of Viet Nam. We have of course for some time been supporting in general terms the re-convening of the Geneva Conference. In fact, about a year ago we specifically urged that the Geneva Conference be recalled. Britain herself, as one of the co-chairmen has urged the Geneva powers to meet.

Recently the British Prime Minister discussed this matter with Mr. Kosygin when he suggested that they both might agree to calling a Geneva Conference.

However I should like to make clear that we are not now proposing the calling of a Geneva Conference. We hope the time will come when this will be practicable and possible. I want to make as clear as I can that the proposal we have made for a use of the Commission should not be regarded as an effort to call or persuade the two chairmen of the Geneva Conference to call an immediate conference. We are not pressing such a move at this time because we are certain that such a call in present circumstances would not produce results. Also, we do not think that this is the right approach for the Commission powers at this stage. A reconvened Geneva Conference is and remains, of course, the end result of the development we hope to be able to set in train, but it is not the first step. Indeed, I would be afraid, if we tried to make it the first step, that we are more likely to exhaust than to establish such influence as we may be able to have with the parties principally concerned in the Viet Nam conflict. I have made this clear in talks that I have had with particular parties concerned. Certain propositions have now been put forward on both sides with respect to a settlement of the Viet Nam conflict. There are the four points of the government of Hanoi, the 14 points of the government of the United States, and the four points of the government of South Viet Nam. In a sense this represents the beginning of a process of negotiation. But such a process can be carried only so far by way of public pronouncements. The gap between the positions, particularly of the United States and of the government of North Viet Nam, is still very wide and something will have to be done to narrow it. There is also a barrier of distrust and suspicion that will somehow have to be overcome.

● (11.30 a.m.)

It has seemed to us that this is something which could be pursued cautiously and discreetly by the Commission powers. We are not thinking at this stage of anything other than a good office exercise. The object of such an exercise would be to try to bring about conditions in which the parties themselves might find it possible to engage in direct discussions as a prelude to formal negotiation. In essence, therefore, what we have in mind is an unblocking of channels which, in the absence of such action, are likely to continue to remain closed.

I have already indicated, in general terms, that we have had a series of exchanges about a possible Commission initiative along these lines with India and Poland who are our partners on the Commission. We have put our



position to Britain and the Soviet union as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. I have also taken the opportunity personally to discuss the matter with the Secretary General of the United Nations, with Secretary of State Rusk and, through others, with the government of South Viet Nam and the government of North Viet Nam.

Our exchanges with India and Poland must necessarily remain confidential. I think I can say that one common point in their initial reaction had to do with the timing and the circumstances in which any Commission initiative might stand a chance of being acceptable to the parties on the ground. That was one of the considerations we had in mind when we decided to ask Mr. Chester Ronning, a distinguished former member of our foreign service, to pay special visits to Saigon and Hanoi early last month. I know that the members of the committee will not expect me to go into details about his mission, or his future participation. It must be apparent that this is a significant assignment.

On these visits he had a full opportunity of discussing with senior personalities in both capitals their views of the present Viet Nam situation and the possibility of the Commission powers playing some part in opening up avenues which might ultimately lead to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. You will appreciate that it would not be helpful for me at this stage to disclose the contents of the discussions which Mr. Ronning had on his visits to Saigon and Hanoi or even the possibilities which they may help to open up. All I would like to say is that the results of these visits have in no way seemed to me to foreclose a Commission role in the right circumstances. In the meantime we are continuing our exchanges with India and Poland in response to their own indications that they would like to see these discussions carried forward.

Turning to another aspect of the Viet Nam problem the significance of the meeting in Honolulu between U.S. and South Vietnam leaders was that it laid the groundwork for a comprehensive program of social and economic reform in South Viet Nam. All of us recognize, I think, the very great problems which the implementation of a program of this magnitude poses in any developing country. These problems are bound to be even greater in a context of continuing armed conflict and in circumstances where positive results can so easily be negated. Nevertheless, we believe that the renewed emphasis that is now being placed on the social and economic aspects of the problem in Viet Nam is the right emphasis. It is calculated to contribute to a more stable and progressive society in which the ordinary Vietnamese may be able to feel that his interests are actively engaged.

Recent developments in South Viet Nam have underlined once again what I regard as the crucial problem in that country, which is that of achieving a stable political basis. This is not a problem that is confined to that country; it is a problem in many of the new countries which lack the resources to meet the mounting aspirations of their people for a better life. But it is aggravated in South Viet Nam by the disruption which has been caused by subversion and armed conflict.

It is my understanding that the tenor of much of the current protest in South Viet Nam is to the effect that only a broadly based civilian government will provide a basis on which the South Vietnamese can be expected to take the



decisions which are certain to face them in the months and years to come. We must be careful, however, not to draw false inferences from what is currently going on in South Viet Nam. In particular, I think it would be wrong to conclude that these manifestations of political dissent are based on support for the concept of a government which was composed of representatives of the Viet Cong or which included their participation. There are many strands to the current dissent in South Viet Nam but that, according to the best information available to me, is not one of them.

There is a great deal of public concern in Canada, as in other countries, with the situation in Viet Nam. As I interpret this concern, it is based on the risks that are inherent in the present situation and on the desire to see a fair and equitable peace established in an area which has been convulsed by conflict for the past twenty years. We share this concern. As a member of this Commission, with special responsibilities, we have felt that our position was not precisely that of other countries and of other governments. We feel very strongly that, if we are going to reach a settlement in this matter, every instrument that is capable of being used to encourage negotiation must be used.

We are strongly of the view—and we are not without considerable encouragement and support for this view—that the Commission has a role and that we, as a member of that Commission at the present time, have a role, and we are seeking to take advantage of this opportunity to the fullest extent possible.

I want to acknowledge that there have been other proposals made by a number of governments. One of them was a proposal made by His Holiness Pope Paul VI. I told his spokesman, on behalf of the government of Canada, that his proposal for entrusting to the alliance of NATO powers the responsibility of arbitration was one that would receive Canadian support. Unhappily, for practical reasons—and I suppose these included the fact that the offer was not accepted by the other side—the proposal was not realized. But I wish now to acknowledge a note that we have had from the Secretary of the Vatican State, indicating their approval of the Canadian initiative.

I want to acknowledge, as well, the efforts being made by other bodies and other agencies, and I wish to say that Canada is prepared to support any effort that will help to bring about the beginning of negotiations.

That is all I have to say on Viet Nam.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I suggest at this point, Mr. Chairman, that we take a short recess.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes; we will break for five minutes.

On resuming.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. MARTIN: It is to be expected that, although we have had debate in the House of Commons, there should be a government statement on the Rhodesian situation as we see it in this committee.

This declaration of independence has precipitated an African crisis which could have the greatest implications for the Commonwealth. The illegal regime



in Rhodesia is attempting to perpetuate a system whereby the white settlers, who are 1/16 of the population, maintain effective political domination over the black majority who are 15/16 of the population.

● (12.00 noon)

This has naturally placed a severe strain on relations within the multiracial Commonwealth and between the West and African states.

I should emphasize at the outset that Rhodesia is British territory. The illegal declaration of independence of November 11, 1965 has not been accepted by Britain, or any other state, and the British Government remains responsible for this territory and for the conditions to govern Rhodesian independence. Negotiations between the British and Rhodesian governments went on for several years before the illegal declaration of independence last November by Mr. Smith. The negotiations were broken off by the Rhodesians. It then fell to the British Government to decide how to restore a legal situation in Rhodesia, and the decision was to employ economic measures rather than force. Throughout, Britain has clearly had the primary responsibility for Rhodesia. It is the colonial power.

At the same time, in view of Rhodesia's importance to race relations in Africa, and, in view of the multi-racial nature of the Commonwealth, Britain has fully recognized that the Rhodesian question is a matter of legitimate and strong Commonwealth concern. At the 1964 Prime Ministers' Conference, there was an extensive discussion of Rhodesia and a lengthy reference to the question in the communiqué, which includes a statement of the view of Commonwealth Prime Ministers that independence should take place on the basis of majority rule and that a unilateral declaration of independence would not be recognized. The issue was discussed in 1965 and again referred to in the communiqué in which the Commonwealth Prime Ministers reaffirmed—all of them—that they were "irrevocably opposed" to any U.D.I.

Up to last November, Canada had normal relations with the Rhodesian government, and the Canadian Government had already sent a confidential message to the Rhodesian government some time before the 1965 Conference pointing out the grave consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. This warning was repeated again in the succeeding months.

I myself received representatives of the government of Rhodesia during the last two and a half years prior to U.D.I. and explained our position, as have other governments in and outside the Commonwealth.

After the unilateral declaration of independence, many Commonwealth countries reacted very strongly, as had been generally anticipated. Various African governments argued that Britain should use force in putting down the illegal Smith régime, as Britain had already done in dealing with civil disorders and revolts in other colonies and dependencies. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity passed a resolution early in December calling on all member states to sever relations with Britain if the Smith régime was not "crushed" before mid-December. Following this resolution, various countries, including two Commonwealth members, Ghana and Tanzania, withdrew their Missions from London. In an attempt to minimize the damage of this breach, Canada assumed the role of protecting power for Britain in Tanzania and for



Tanzania in Britain. Ghana has since restored diplomatic relations. It is a matter of great significance to Commonwealth unity when action of this kind takes place.

It was in these circumstances that the Nigerian government took the initiative in proposing a special Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia. As in the past, one of the purposes of the Conference was to discuss differing opinions on how to deal with the Rhodesian issue so that these differing opinions should not result in a split in the Commonwealth along racial lines.

I would not want to disguise in any way our concern as of last December about what the action of countries in withdrawing missions from a Commonwealth country could mean to Commonwealth unity. We are heartened, however, by the fact that President Neyerere did indicate that in withdrawing his mission from London there was no intention on the part of Tanzania to withdraw from the Commonwealth. Our concern about this Rhodesian question was not fully but largely based upon our concern for the continued integrity and unity of the Commonwealth, an organism which we believe plays a very vital role at the present time.

At the Lagos Conference, Britain welcomed the proposal of Prime Minister Pearson which led to the establishment of two continuing Commonwealth committees. The most important of these, the Sanctions Committee, now chaired by the Canadian High Commissioner in London, is maintaining a review of the sanctions against Rhodesia and considering ways and means of making them more effective. When he was in Ottawa last week, Mr. Chevrier and I had a very useful discussion and reviewed the work of the Committee. It is due to meet again this week. Its tasks include co-ordinating aid to Zambia which, of course is an integral aspect of the Rhodesian situation. A second Commonwealth committee is planning a large-scale program of training for Rhodesian Africans which will come into effect when constitutional government is restored. This will help to prepare the ground for a viable independent state under a multi-racial administration by training for their new responsibilities leaders, officials, and technicians from the African majority. These committees are a new type of Commonwealth machinery in that they have been established by the Prime Ministers for a limited and finite purpose and with some duties which are of a rather wider and less technical nature than those normally carried out by Commonwealth institutions.

The work of these committees was naturally among the subjects discussed with the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Arnold Smith, during his visit to Ottawa last week. This was a valuable opportunity to discuss many aspects of the Rhodesian question, particularly from the point of view of its implications for the Commonwealth. I may not agree with the kind of emphasis that Mr. Arnold Smith gave to this question, but I will agree that the implications of the Rhodesian problem for peace in the world are very great.

Rhodesia is not, of course, of concern only to the Commonwealth and to Africa.

World concern about Rhodesia has been expressed through the United Nations, and the Rhodesia problem has been before the General Assembly



and Security Council of the United Nations a number of times in the past three or four years. The issues involved must be understood in the light of developments in modern Africa with its many new sovereign independent states.

After the unilateral declaration of independence, it was the British Government itself which raised the issue in the Security Council. Britain asked the members of the United Nations to join with her in making effective the economic measures taken against Rhodesia. It was obvious that the co-operation of other nations, particularly the principal trading nations of the world, was necessary if the economic sanctions were to be effective.

The experience of the international community with sanctions is very limited. In fact, I think this is the first instance where a program of economic sanctions, even though on a non mandatory basis, has been imposed unless one were to include the decisions of the Security Council in August of 1963 urging member states of the United Nations to take action in regard to the situation in South Africa.

On November 20, the Security Council adopted a resolution by ten votes to none with one abstention recommending the severance of all economic relations between member states and Rhodesia, including an oil embargo.

Canada has acted in support of Britain's policy of ending the illegal situation by non-military means; and, as a member of the Commonwealth, has acted in concert with Britain and other members of the Commonwealth and through Commonwealth institutions. Canadian economic measures have been taken together with other major trading countries, including the U.S.A., and Western European nations, and in compliance with the Security Council resolution of November 20. This is in accordance with the basic Canadian policy of strong support for the U.N. in grave situations of this kind.

The Canadian belief in multi-racialism and non-discrimination has also been a reason for action over Rhodesia.

I am sure that, if such a stand were not taken by a Commonwealth country or by the Commonwealth as a whole, the integrity and the unity of the Commonwealth would be impaired as it has never been before. Canada opposed the unilateral declaration of independence because it was designed to perpetuate a system of racial inequality and discrimination wholly inconsistent with the basic principle of the new multi-racial Commonwealth. If the Commonwealth is to be maintained, I repeat, Canada cannot give comfort to those who support racial discrimination.

I can very well understand that there may be views of members of the committee that are not completely consistent with government policy but that nevertheless appear to give recognition to the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth.

The Canadian government sincerely believed that Rhodesia should not become independent on the basis of the 1961 constitution unless it was substantially modified. In theory, the 1961 constitution could eventually produce majority rule in the country, when sufficient Africans reached the required property and educational level to obtain the franchise for election to 50 out of



the 65 seats in the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly. These educational and property qualifications are so high in terms of conditions in Rhodesia that only a very small percentage of the Africans in Rhodesia qualify to vote for these 50 seats. The qualifications of the remaining 15 seats are lower and all but one are now occupied by Africans. However, 14 seats out of 65 is a long way short of a majority. Mr. Smith and his followers have made it plain that they did not expect Africans to become the majority of the electorate in their lifetime. It seems clear that the Smith government made its illegal declaration because Mr. Smith and his followers were unwilling to accept the basis which would assure the attainment of a fair political voice to the majority of the population within a reasonably short period rather than the very long and indefinite period desired by the illegal government of Mr. Smith. They knew that the consent of the people of Rhodesia as a whole required by Britain would not be given to independence based on the 1961 constitution as it stood.

Public opinion in Canada and other Commonwealth countries could not contemplate as a fellow member a country which practised discrimination not only through the franchise but in a variety of ways. Rhodesian legislation keeps for the exclusive use of white settlers much of the best agricultural land in Rhodesia. The illegal régime has imposed press and radio censorship of increasing intensity. Hundreds of Africans, and one white Rhodesian, have been interned or restricted without trial for political reasons.

I should point out that the Rhodesian crisis threatens not only relations within the Commonwealth but also Western relations with Africa in general, good relations between the races all over Africa, and stability within African countries. Economic development is being threatened by this instability and by trade dislocation resulting from the necessary economic sanctions. This is not only damaging to Africa but to Western economic relations with that continent both in the short and long term.

Another basic reason why Canada is applying economic sanctions to Rhodesia is that such means are much preferable to the use of force which is always to be avoided if possible.

I can say to the committee that the possible use of force in certain situations in this matter must be regarded with the gravest concern. It is not merely a question of police action; this is a situation that could have implications and consequences far beyond the mere exercise of police power.

Military operations could have explosive effects on the whole of Africa and grave international repercussions. The British have not precluded the use of force to restore law and order in Rhodesia, but the British government has declared that it is unwilling to use force in existing circumstances, and this is a matter where the British government alone is constitutionally responsible.

The sanctions campaign against the illegal régime which has only been in operation for a relatively short time, as I stated in the House of Commons, has not produced the swift results that some had expected but there is no doubt that the sanctions are adversely affecting the Rhodesian economy. How long it would take for this campaign to produce the desired result I do not know. It is a field in which predictions are inherently difficult. In this case also, the result



may well be obtained at a point well short of economic collapse. When Mr. Smith's followers realize that the growing economic dislocation resulting from the UDI is not a temporary phenomenon but rather that their trade will continue indefinitely and progressively to be damaged by sanctions and that their economic prospects are distinctly bleak, they should realize their mistake in backing his illegal action. It is therefore very important to keep up the economic pressure on the illegal régime to make clear to its supporters that there is to be no slackening but rather an increase in the efforts of countries applying the sanctions. We attach importance to the general embargo on exports to Rhodesia by the United States on March 18.

What action will be taken in the United Nations if the sanctions do not give evidence of greater success remains to be seen. Action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter could be confined to oil sanctions, or it could be confined to other sanctions.

Speaking for the Canadian government and knowing what this means to the Commonwealth as a whole, we cannot in any way relent in our conviction and in our effort, within the limitations that we have prescribed for ourselves, to see this matter through. Nothing less than the interests of the Commonwealth is involved in this situation.

A major Canadian contribution, apart from the total embargoes on exports and imports that we have authorized, has been the Canadian contribution to the Zambia airlift. This airlift was necessitated by the action of the illegal regime in cutting off the supply of oil products to Zambia in December of last year after the embargo commenced against Rhodesia. Zambia was almost wholly dependent on Rhodesia for oil products from the refinery inside Rhodesia.

● (12.20 p.m.)

Now, far from being ineffective, this airlift has enabled Zambia to maintain and build up its oil stocks to the point where, with increased use of road transportation, the airlift itself may be reduced or become unnecessary in a few weeks time. This has been a useful undertaking and one most effectively carried out by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Our participation was originally intended for a period of one month, starting late in December. We subsequently agreed at the request of the British and Zambian governments to continue the airlift until the end of April. The position now is being reviewed. I might say that the airlift has cost Canada up to March 31, \$1,125,000. I have thought it desirable to emphasize the effectiveness of this particular effort because of the criticisms that have been made over the weekend about it.

We have to consider the question of Rhodesia alongside other questions that require settlement at this particularly difficult period in our relations with other countries in the Commonwealth, in the United Nations and outside. Our policies in respect of all of these questions is a reflection of the responsibility of any state in the interdependent world in which we live to make its contribution toward removing international sources of friction and to the establishment of peace in the world.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Martin, I intended to ask a question on orders of the day but this was prior to the knowledge I had that this meeting was to take



place. If I can ask this question now rather than in the House I would like to do so at this time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have no objection to answering questions for the remainder of our meeting.

Mr. McINTOSH: My question arises out of an article that appeared in the *Toronto Daily Star* on Friday, March 25, written by J. L. Howson, a Toronto freelance writer. Before I make reference to this may I say that what you have told us this morning has some bearing on it. I was surprised to hear you say that the matter of Rhodesia getting out of the Commonwealth was a responsibility of the Commonwealth rather than the concern of the Commonwealth because when South Africa, Ghana and Tanzania got out I would say that was a concern of the Commonwealth and not a responsibility of the Commonwealth. This writer makes reference to the Lagos conference held in January. I will read only those parts I have underlined:

It was launched in mid-February with the opening of the third British-Canadian radio transmitter for propaganda bombardment.

Command of all three transmitters, and their unusual schedule of programs, is centred in distant Lagos and London, at the newly established Commonwealth Secretariat, as proposed, ratified, and co-financed by the Canadian Prime Minister at the Lagos Conference in January.

Now, with regard to these programs, according to the writer;

One voice specializes in techniques of knifing and throat-cutting, and in how, and where, to stab what part of the body, when only kitchen knives are available. At all hours, they give explicit do-it-yourself instructions in all three languages. A knowledgeable specialist carefully analyzes the easiest ways to make a petrol bomb. Certain broadcasters specialize in techniques of arson,—

Now, is Canada in any way contributing financially to these programs?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. I know nothing whatsoever about these programs. The C.B.C. international service advised us that it has not carried any broadcasts attacking Rhodesia as such. In its news broadcasts it has, of course, carried items on Canadian policies toward Rhodesia. However I know nothing about these broadcasts you mention and, in so far as the Canadian government is concerned, it has not authorized and has not contributed to these programs if, in fact, they exist.

Mr. McINTOSH: The same writer goes on to suggest that Mr. Pearson, our Prime Minister, has made a private deal with Mr. Harold Wilson to force a switch of London tobacco buying into Canada. Is there any deal between our Prime Minister and Mr. Harold Wilson in this regard?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, on your behalf, it is my pleasure to thank Mr. Martin for his presentation.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, it is almost 12.30. I know there are a number of other things to be discussed but perhaps we could start a question period at this time.



The CHAIRMAN: I should add that Mr. Martin will be available tomorrow, if we should decide to hold a meeting. But, there are many problems involved. There are five other committees meeting tomorrow, plus the Parliamentary Association, and this means that we might have some problems, first of all, in getting a quorum and, secondly in locating a room. Perhaps it is the wish of the committee to have the next meeting with Mr. Martin after Easter, at which time we will have copies of his statement available. Is that agreeable?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Could I have a motion for adjournment?

Mr. LAMBERT: Mr. Chairman, although I am not a member of your committee I think for the purpose of the Defence Committee, it would be most instructive, in the light of most recent developments, if Mr. Martin could give us a statement on Cyprus and I would ask that this statement be given at a very early date.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You mean right now?

Mr. LAMBERT: No, at your next meeting.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, sure.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, may I say that I looked a little closer into the matter of this committee meeting tomorrow morning. The situation is that there is space available only in room 371 between 9.30 and 11 o'clock and the committee could be accommodated during that time. During that time there would be an overlapping of committees for only two of your members. I realize this is a pretty tight situation but that is all that is available for us. I will leave it to you, Mr. Chairman, to decide whether or not you should avail yourself of that time or whether you feel it would be more advantageous to wait until after the Easter recess.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall someone make a motion that we adjourn to the call of the Chair?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Chairman, may I make one comment. I do not know what Mr. Lambert had in mind with regard to Cyprus, but I want to make it clear that there is no impairment of the effectiveness of the United Nations force in Cyprus, even though there has been a withdrawal by one country of its forces since the renewal of the mandate.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I move we adjourn.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we adjourn may I say that the Department of External Affairs has made available a small supply of blue books on Rhodesia and I would ask those of you who are interested in Rhodesia to pick up a copy from the Clerk.



## APPENDIX "A"

## NATO—AIDE MEMOIRE FROM FRANCE TO CANADA OF MARCH 10, 1966

For some years the French Government has stressed on many occasions, both publicly and in conversations with Allied governments, its view that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization no longer meets, as far as the French Government is concerned, the conditions which prevail in the world at the present time and which are basically different from those prevailing in 1949 and the following years.

2. In fact, the threat which weighed upon the Western world, particularly in Europe and which was the reason for the conclusion of the Treaty has changed in nature. It no longer presents the immediate and menacing character it once had. At the same time, the European countries have restored their economies and, as a consequence, are recovering their former strength. France in particular is developing an atomic armament, which, by its very nature, precludes its integration. In the third place, the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States of America which has replaced the monopoly held by the latter, has transformed the general conditions of Western defence. Finally, it is a fact that Europe is no longer the center of international crises. This center has moved elsewhere, notably to Asia, where the Atlantic Alliance countries are as a whole not evidently involved.

3. This evolution in no way leads the French Government to question the Treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. In other words, and barring developments which, in the years to come, might basically modify relations between east and west, it does not intend to avail itself in 1969 of the provisions of Article 13 of the Treaty, and it considers that the Alliance should remain in being as long as the need appears evident.

4. The above position having been stated unequivocally the problem of the Organization itself arises, that is to say all agreements, arrangements and decisions subsequent to the signing of the Treaty, whether they be multilateral or bilateral in form. The French Government considers that this Organization no longer corresponds to what in its opinion seems to be required.

5. One could undoubtedly have envisaged that negotiations could have been undertaken to modify by common consent the provisions in force. The French Government would have been happy to propose this had it had reason to believe that such negotiations would have led to the result it has in mind. Unfortunately everything indicates that such an attempt would be doomed to fail since all of France's partners seem or profess openly to favour maintaining the status quo, or reinforcing all that which is henceforth unacceptable from the French point of view.

6. France accordingly is led to recognize the consequences for it in this situation and to take the measures which seem required and which in its opinion are not in the least incompatible with its participation in the Alliance,



nor in military operations with its Allies should the need arise. Already in the past the French Government has taken steps of this nature with regard to its naval forces serving with NATO whether in the Mediterranean or in the Atlantic. What is now in question are its land and air forces stationed in Germany and assigned to the Allied Command in Europe. France intends to bring their assignment to an end. This decision will entail France's simultaneous withdrawal from the two integrated commands under which its forces are serving and to which it is contributing within the framework of NATO, i.e. the Supreme Allied Command in Europe and the Central Europe Command, and consequently the transfer of the headquarters for these two commands outside French territory. The implementation of all these measures raises of course a number of problems, which the French Government is now prepared to discuss with its allies. There will be a need to consider the liaison which should be established between the French Command and NATO Command as well as to determine the conditions under which French forces, particularly, in Germany, would participate in wartime, should Article 5 of the Washington Treaty be evoked, in joint military actions, with reference to Command and operations themselves. This implies in particular that French land and air forces which are stationed at present in Germany would be maintained in that country under the agreements of October 23, 1954. This for its part the French Government is disposed to do.

7. Consideration should be given, on the other hand, to problems which may present themselves to France with regard to the Military Committee and the Standing Group, including the problem of liaison between these bodies and the French Command.

8. Such are the broad outlines of measures contemplated by the French Government which it regards as necessary to adapt to new conditions the modalities of its participation in the Atlantic Alliance. It is prepared to enter discussions with regard to the implementation of these measures, and it hopes that appropriate arrangements may be agreed upon by all its Allies.

9. Multilateral problems are not however the only ones to be considered as far as Canada and France are concerned. Both countries have concluded agreements in the past concerning the construction and the operation of airports on French territory intended for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

10. The French Government considers that these agreements no longer meet present conditions, which lead it to recover the full exercise of its sovereignty on French territory, or in other words no longer to accept that foreign units, installations or bases in France should in any way be responsible to authorities other than French. It is ready to examine, and eventually to settle with the Government of Canada, the practical consequences this policy entails.

11. Moreover the French Government is ready to discuss the military facilities which could be placed at the disposal of the Government of Canada on French territory in the event of a conflict to which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance. These facilities could be the object of an Agreement to be concluded between both Governments.

APPENDIX "B"

AIDE MEMOIRE

(Handed on the 29th of March to Mr. Hervé Alphan, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Mr. Jules Leger, Canadian Ambassador to France.)

The Canadian Government acknowledges the receipt of the French Aide Memoire of March 10, setting out the French Government's general views and intentions with regard to NATO's military arrangements and to arrangements between Canada and France concerning the stationing in France of Canadian forces assigned to NATO command. The Canadian Government is examining the implications and consequences of the French position which, while not all entirely clear, will evidently require allied consultation. The Canadian Government will make known its own views in due course.

9. Such are the broad outlines of measures contemplated by the French Government which it regards as necessary to adapt to new conditions the modalities of its participation in the Atlantic Alliance. It is prepared to enter discussions with regard to the implementation of these measures and it hopes that appropriate arrangements may be agreed upon by all the Allies.

10. The French Government considers that these agreements no longer meet present conditions, which lead it to re-examine the full exercise of its sovereignty on French territory or in other words no longer to accept that foreign units, installations or bases in France should in any way be responsible to authorities other than French. It is ready to examine and eventually to settle with the Government of Canada the practical consequences this policy entails.

Moreover the French Government is ready to discuss the military facilities which could be placed at the disposal of the Government of Canada on French territory in the event of a conflict to which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance. These facilities could be the object of an agreement to be concluded between both Governments.



## APPENDIX "C"

## AIDE-MEMOIRE FROM FRANCE TO CANADA OF MARCH 29

In an aide-memoire dated March 10, the French Government informed the Government of Canada of the measures it was led to take, as far as it was concerned, because of the impossibility of modifying by common consent and under satisfactory conditions the arrangements in force within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This impossibility has just been confirmed by the Declaration issued on March 18 by fourteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, including Canada itself.

The French Government has the honour of giving fuller particulars below concerning the measures contemplated.

1. The French Government has announced that it proposed to end the assignment to the Allied Command, Europe of French land and air forces stationed in Germany. It has the honour to inform the Government of Canada that this assignment will come to an end on July 1.

2. The restoration of solely national command over French forces will entail the withdrawal, on the same date, of French personnel assigned to the Integrated Allied Commands. These are the Supreme Command, Allied Forces in Europe, the Central Europe Command, the Southern Europe Command and their subordinate Commands, as well as the NATO Defence College. The staff personnel and the French students of the NATO Defence College will be withdrawn following the current term, which ends on July 23.

The French Government believes that, after French participation has ceased, it would be appropriate to establish liaison missions to the headquarters concerned. French officers would thus be on hand, more particularly to assist Allied general staffs in operations concerning the withdrawal from French territory. The establishment of these liaison facilities with the Allied Commands would also facilitate the study of conditions under which French forces, particularly in Germany, should they remain stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic, could participate in wartime in joint military actions, both with regard to command arrangements and to operations proper. It is specified, in this connection, that on the hypothesis envisaged, the French forces would be stationed in Germany under the Convention of October 23, 1954 concerning the stationing of foreign forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. The withdrawal of French component units assigned to the Allied general staffs (Supreme Command and Central Europe) and to the NATO Defence College entails the transfer from French territory of the headquarters of these organizations.

It seems that a period of one year would allow the necessary measures to be taken to this effect and that by April 1, 1967 the whole operation could be completed.

Consequently the French Government, under Article 16 of the Protocol of August 28, 1952 on the Status of International Military Headquarters, will notify the Government of the United States of the termination of this Protocol, which will cease to be in force on March 31, 1967.

4. Of course, the above indications are far from a complete list of the problems to be settled concerning NATO. The French Government is ready to discuss these other problems, on a bilateral or a multilateral basis, whichever seems appropriate.

5. The French Government, in its earlier message, informed the Government of Canada that it considered that certain bilateral agreements between France and Canada were no longer in accord with present conditions, which lead it to recover the full exercise of its sovereignty on French territory. Moreover, these agreements would no longer be applicable in their essence, in view of the measures taken by the French Government concerning its participation in the Atlantic Organization. It seems, in a general way, that this same date of April 1, 1967 would be appropriate to complete the necessary operations, such as the transfer of various installations intended for the Royal Canadian Air Force.

The French Government is ready to open conversations immediately with the Government of Canada concerning practical arrangements which would be desirable on these various points relating to bilateral agreements.

Finally, if the Government of Canada so desires, the French Government is also ready to enter into conversations to determine the military facilities, mentioned in the aide-memoire of March 10, that both Governments could mutually grant to each other in the event of a conflict in which both countries were engaged through the Atlantic Alliance.



APPENDIX "D"

(Translation)

President  
of the Democratic Republic  
of Viet Nam

Hanoi, January 24, 1966

H. E. Mr. Lester Bowles Pearson  
Prime Minister of Canada,  
Ottawa  
Your Excellency,

I have the honour to call Your attention to the war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists in our country, Viet Nam.

Over the past 11 years and more, the United States has been seriously sabotaging the 1954 Geneva Agreements and preventing the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam in an attempt to turn South Viet Nam into a U.S. new-type colony and military base. It is now waging a war of aggression and barbarously repressing the patriotic struggle of our fellow-countrymen in the South. At the same time, it tries to draw experiences from this war to repress the national liberation movement in other countries.

In an endeavour to get out of the quagmire in South Viet Nam, the U.S. imperialists have massively increased the strength of the U.S. expeditionary corps and sent in troops from a number of their satellites to wage direct aggression in South Viet Nam. They have also launched air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, an independent and sovereign country.

While intensifying and extending the war of aggression in Viet Nam, the U.S. imperialists are clamouring about their "desire for peace" and their "readiness to engage in unconditional discussions", in the hope of fooling world public opinion and the American people. Recently, the Johnson Administration has initiated a so-called "search for peace", and put forward a 14-point proposal. As an excuse for its war of aggression in South Viet Nam, it claims that it is "keeping its commitments" to the Saigon puppet administration; it slanders the patriotic struggle of the people of South Viet Nam, calling it "an aggression by North Viet Nam". This deceitful contention can in no way rub out the solemn declaration made by the United States in Geneva in 1954 that "it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them (i.e. the Geneva Agreements)". Still less can President Johnson's hypocritical allegations conceal the U.S. crimes in Viet Nam.

The United States talks about respecting the Geneva Agreements. But one of the main provisions of the said agreements bans the introduction of foreign troops into Viet Nam. If the United States really respects the Agreements, it must withdraw all U.S. and satellite troops from South Viet Nam.



It is crystal-clear that the United States is the aggressor who is trampling underfoot the Vietnamese soil. The people of South Viet Nam are the victim of aggression and are fighting in self-defence. If the United States really wants peace, it must recognize the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Viet Nam, and engage negotiations with it. In accordance with the aspirations of the people of South Viet Nam and the spirit of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam, the National Front for Liberation is fighting to achieve independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Viet Nam, and to advance towards the peaceful reunification of the fatherland. If the United States really respects the right to self-determination of the people of South Viet Nam, it cannot but approve this correct program of the National Front for Liberation.

The 14 points of the United States boil down in essence to this: the United States is trying hard to cling to South Viet Nam, to maintain there the puppet administration rigged up by it, and to perpetuate the partition of Viet Nam.

In his January 12, 1966 message read before the U.S. Congress, President Johnson affirmed that it was the policy of the United States not to pull out of South Viet Nam, and he forced the Vietnamese people to choose between "peace and the ravages of a conflict". That is an impudent threat, an attempt to impose on the Vietnamese people the conditions of the so-called U.S. "unconditional discussions".)

The Vietnamese people will never submit to the U.S. imperialists' threats.

At the very moment when the U.S. Government puts forward the so-called new "peace efforts", it is frantically increasing the U.S. strength in South Viet Nam. It is stepping up the terrorist raids, resorting to the "scorched earth" policy, burning all, destroying all, killing all, using napalm-bombs, poison gases and toxic chemicals to burn down villages and massacre the civilian population in vast areas of South Viet Nam.

I strongly protest against such extremely barbarous methods of warfare. I earnestly call on all peace-loving governments and peoples the world over to resolutely stay the hands of the U.S. war criminals.

The United States keeps sending its planes on espionage flights in preparation for new air attacks on the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

On the other hand, it is launching air attacks on many areas in the Kingdom of Laos, and multiplying armed provocations against the Kingdom of Cambodia, thus posing an even more serious menace to peace in Indo-China.

Obviously, the U.S. "Search for peace" is only designed to conceal its schemes for intensified war of aggression. The Johnson administration's stand remains: aggression and expansion of the war.

To settle the Viet Nam question, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has put forward the four-point stand which is an expression of the essential provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam. This is a stand of peace.

Having gone through over 20 years of war, the Vietnamese people desire peace more eagerly than any one else to build their life. But real peace can by



no means be dissociated from genuine independence. So long as the U.S. army of aggression still remains on our soil, our people will resolutely fight against it. If the U.S. Government really wants a peaceful settlement, it must accept the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and prove this by actual deeds; it must end unconditionally and for good all bombing raids and other war acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. Only in this way can a political solution to the Viet Nam problem be envisaged.

Your Excellency,

Canada is a member of the International Commission for the Supervision and Control of the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.

In face of the extremely serious situation brought about by the United States in Viet Nam, I hope that Your Government will fulfil its obligations under the Geneva Agreements.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

HO CHI MINH

President

of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam

#### FOUR-POINT STAND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

The unswerving policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam is to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam, and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Reaffirmation of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people: peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. In accordance with the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. Government must withdraw from South Viet Nam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its "military alliance" with South Viet Nam. The U.S. Government must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Viet Nam. In accordance with the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. Government must stop its acts of war against North Viet Nam, cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Viet Nam, while Viet Nam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam must be strictly respected: the two zones must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, and there must be no foreign military bases, troops and military personnel on their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Viet Nam must be settled by the people of South Viet Nam themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Viet Nam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

This stand unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam holds that the above-mentioned stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Viet Nam problem. If this basis is accepted, favourable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference of the type of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Viet Nam.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam declares that any approach contrary to the above stand is irrelevant; any approach leading to a U.N. intervention in the Viet Nam situation is also irrelevant, because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet Nam.

*(Excerpts from Prime Minister PHAM VAN DONG's Report to the D.R.V. National Assembly—April 8, 1965)*



APPENDIX "E"

Ottawa, February 28, 1966

His Excellency  
Ho Chi Minh,  
President of the Democratic  
Republic of Vietnam.

Dear Mr. President,

I have read with interest your letter of January 24 which was addressed to Canada as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam.

You will not expect me to share the interpretation of the nature of the problem in Vietnam and the origins of the present conflict which is set forth in your letter. I do not believe, however, that it would serve any useful purpose at this time to dwell on our differences, other than to note that they exist.

What concerns me, as it does the people of Canada, is the tragic toll in human suffering and the threat to international peace which the continuation of the conflict in Vietnam involves.

I am convinced that the use of force is not an acceptable means of attaining political objectives in the world as it is constituted today. That is why Canada has urged all parties to the conflict in Vietnam to pursue a course of negotiation. It is in this direction that we see the prospects of a fair and lasting settlement which will take account of the freely expressed aspirations of all the people of Vietnam.

For these reasons I have been deeply disappointed by the failure so far of all efforts to promote unconditional discussions on Vietnam. I have carefully studied the positions which have been put forward by the main parties to the conflict. While these positions are still very far apart, I believe that they show some common elements on which a foundation of peace can be built.

It is not for Canada to prescribe to the Vietnamese people how they shall order their political life and institutions. That is for the people of Vietnam themselves to decide freely when the time comes. But the present course of developments in Vietnam is a source of legitimate concern to the international community and it is my firm hope that it can be reversed before all avenues to a peaceful settlement are closed.

In your letter you refer to the obligations which the members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control have in the serious current situation in Vietnam. As a member of that Commission Canada has at all times endeavoured to carry out its obligations in a spirit of objectivity and impartiality towards the facts as we know them. I can assure you that we will continue to do so to the best of our capacity.







April 4, 1966

I also hope that the International Commission may be able to play some part in helping to restore peace in Vietnam. It seems to me that by virtue of its long association with the problem and the advantage of access it has to all the parties to the present conflict, the Commission is in a unique position to play such a part. As far as my Government is concerned, it is prepared to explore all possibilities that may be open to the Commission in present circumstances to exert its efforts in the direction of peace.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Lester B. Pearson





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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*



First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

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ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 2

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1966

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.

QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY

OTTAWA, 1966

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Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

CORRECTION (English copy only)

PROCEEDINGS No. 1

Thursday, February 17 and Monday, April 4, 1966

*In the Evidence:*

Page 10:

Delete lines 12 to 31 inclusive, and substitute the following therefor:

Item 1.—Administration, Operation and Maintenance including payment of remuneration subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the Estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those Organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependants; payment to the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission for purposes and subject to the provisions of the Act respecting the Commission established to administer the Roosevelt Campobello International Park; a cultural relations and academic exchange program with the French community; payment to the Gut Dam International Arbitral Tribunal, and grants as detailed in the Estimates, \$15,403,400.

Page 26, line 25:

Amend "the alliance of NATO powers" to read "the non-aligned powers".



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, April 21, 1966.

(3)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9:35 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Klein, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pilon, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker.—18

*Also present:* Mr. Langlois (*Mégantic*).

*In attendance:* The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; *From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary, Messrs. R. E. Collins and H. B. Robinson, Assistant Under-Secretaries.

The Chairman drew attention to an error in Issue No. 1 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, and the Committee agreed to the necessary correction.

Mr. Nesbitt drew the attention of the Committee to the presence in Ottawa of a Mr. Eric Butler, an Australian writer and lecturer who has recently visited Rhodesia, and suggested the committee might wish to call Mr. Butler to appear to question him on the subject of Rhodesia. Since Mr. Butler is only to be in Ottawa for a few days, the Chairman asked the members of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure to meet in his office at 2:00 o'clock today to consider the advisability of calling this gentleman.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-67.

The Minister was questioned on the subject of NATO.

At 11:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair, on motion of Mr. Harkness.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*





## EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, April 21, 1966.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I see a quorum. First, I would like to ask the approval of the committee to make a correction in the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence number 1 at page 26, line 25. The words: "the alliance of NATO powers" should be corrected to read: "the non-aligned powers". Does the committee agree to this correction?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, at our first meeting we were considering the 1966-67 estimates of the Department of External Affairs, item number 1.

### *Department of External Affairs*

1. Administration, operation and maintenance including payment of remuneration, subject to the approval of the Governor in Council and notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian Government of Canadians to the staffs of the International Organizations detailed in the estimates, and authority to make recoverable advances in amounts not exceeding in the aggregate the amounts of the shares of those organizations of such expenses, and authority, notwithstanding the Civil Service Act, for the appointment and fixing of salaries of Commissioners (International Commissions for supervision and control in Indo-China), Secretaries and staff by the Governor in Council; assistance and repatriation of distressed Canadian citizens and persons of Canadian domicile abroad, including their dependants; payment to the Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission for the purposes and subject to the provisions of the act respecting the commission established to administer the Roosevelt Campobello International Park; a cultural relations and academic exchange program with the French community; payment to the Gut Dam International Arbitral Tribunal, and grants as detailed in the estimates, \$15,403,400.

The CHAIRMAN: The secretary of State for External Affairs covered three topics: NATO, Viet Nam, and Southern Rhodesia. I presume members of the committee will wish to put questions to Mr. Martin and, if you are agreeable, perhaps we should proceed in the same order as was followed by Mr. Martin; that is to say, perhaps, first of all, we should exhaust all questions on NATO, then move on to Viet Nam and finally, Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, before we begin putting questions to the Secretary of State for External Affairs there is a matter I would like to bring to the attention of the committee for consideration at this time.



In the city of Ottawa at the present time there is a Mr. Eric Butler from Australia. Mr. Butler is a writer and lecturer on international affairs and he has written articles for the Melbourne morning newspaper called *Argus* and, perhaps, other papers. Mr. Butler has visited Rhodesia on a number of occasions and has spent considerable time there since the unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian government. He has interviewed a number of people in Rhodesia, including Mr. Smith and the leader of the opposition party, Mr. Gondo.

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be of great interest to the committee if we could arrange to have a meeting, perhaps later on today or tomorrow, so that members of the committee would have the opportunity of hearing from Mr. Butler and then putting questions to him. As we all know, the information on this situation that we have on hand in Canada is very limited and, in my opinion, it may be of interest to the committee to do what I have suggested.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any further comments?

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Mégantic*): Yes. I would agree with Mr. Nesbitt, that it would be in our best interests to gather all possible information on the Rhodesian situation because it would be very wise to have this at our disposal if or when we are called upon to make decisions on this problem. In view of this, I would agree that perhaps we should question Mr. Butler, who has been mentioned, in order to see what his views are. As Mr. Nesbitt stated, Mr. Butler has been there and, I presume, he has had the opportunity of speaking with quite a few people in that country, including some quite important people.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, with regard to this whole Rhodesian question there has been very little writing, if any, that I know of, by people who have been there, looked into the situation and come up with some viewpoint or stand on the matter. But, Mr. Chairman, I would hate to have presented to this committee the views of one man as the whole and total truth about Rhodesia. I do not know this gentleman and I do not believe I have read any of his articles. I do not know whether he is pro-Smith, anti-Smith or neutral-Smith. I think, if we are going to invite one person here, we should make sure that we arrange to have the views of all sides presented to this committee rather than just one point of view. I ran into a man on Sunday who was kicked out of Rhodesia and I am sure he could bring an interesting point of view to anyone who felt we should go in and aid Mr. Smith, for instance, with troops. We must have a balanced presentation and, I think if we do this, it might be of considerable interest to the members of this committee. But, as I said, I think we should have all points of view.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Mégantic*): Under the circumstances, Mr. Chairman, I think it would be wise to obtain some information on this whole subject. As we all know, the information we have been able to acquire has been very limited. I do agree with Mr. Walker that it would be in everyone's interest to hear both sides of this question. I, for one, certainly would be interested in hearing the opinions of Mr. Butler who, as Mr. Nesbitt stated, has been in Rhodesia. There are no Canadians in Rhodesia who are in a position to give us first hand information at the present time. Also, we have the Minister with us this morning and possibly he would be able to give us some information on this question. I do think there



are other points of view which certain people would like to put forward. If Mr. Walker has anyone in mind who he thinks should come before this committee I would be quite willing to hear from such a person. The more information we can get on this situation, the better.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I agree with Mr. Walker. I do not think we should invite people to come before this committee to give their points of view until their qualifications have been checked. However, we are here to obtain all the information we can with regard to this situation. I have checked on Mr. Butler's qualifications and have found that he has quite a number. I do not know what his viewpoint will be but I do think it might be a good idea to give the members of this committee an opportunity of hearing someone who is reasonably qualified to speak. If Mr. Walker and others come up with qualified persons who can speak on this matter I would be delighted to hear them.

The CHAIRMAN: How long will Mr. Butler be in Ottawa?

Mr. NESBITT: Just two or three days and then he is going to the United States.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps in that case the steering committee could meet very briefly this afternoon on that matter and come up with a decision.

Mr. GROOS: Mr. Chairman, I was going to suggest that we refer this matter to the steering committee because there must be any number of people who would be willing to appear if we wished them to come. Also, I think the steering committee could look into Mr. Butler's qualifications at the present time. As has been stated, Mr. Butler is a newspaper correspondent and, therefore, he must have written something. Perhaps after the steering committee has taken up this matter we will be able to arrive at some decision on whether or not Mr. Butler should be invited to appear. However, I do think we have to be careful about how many people we invite to the committee. There might be others more qualified than Mr. Butler to speak. I am agreeable to leave this question to the steering committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we agreed to leave this matter to the steering committee?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: In that case, Mr. Martin is at your disposal to answer any questions you may care to put.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Chairman, I take it we are dealing first with any NATO questions we may wish to put. Generally, I think, we all have been very concerned with the aide memoire sent forward by France that she will withdraw her officers and forces from NATO and wants the NATO headquarters and so on moved out of France. In the aide memoire one of the paragraphs under number 3 is that the French government, under Article 16 of the protocol of August 28, 1952, on the status of international military headquarters, will notify the government of the United States of the termination of this protocol, which will cease to be in force on March 31, 1967.

Mr. MACDONALD (Rosedale): Mr. Chairman, that is the second aide mem-



Mr. HARKNESS: Yes. Since our last meeting the United States government has delivered a note to France which, in effect, as I understand it, rejects this position and states that they would require something in the neighbourhood of two years to make this move. First of all, I would like to know whether this statement by the French government is proper and provided for under the general agreement which is to run to 1969?

Mr. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): What is your question again?

Mr. HARKNESS: I want to know whether there is any actual provision for what you might call a unilateral end to the general agreement with regard to these matters which are supposed to run to 1969.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, of course, the agreements with Canada and the United States are different. There are five bilateral agreements between the United States and France and one between Canada and France. The United States agreement has a termination clause permitting denunciation within a period of two years. The United States suggests that this clause, which is in only one of the agreements, exists by implication in all of the others.

We do not have in our bilateral agreement any such termination clause permitting a denunciation within a period of two years. However, we have taken the position that since this is what the French government wants nothing is to be gained by saying that we would take issue with a unilateral declaration and, in fact, it is that. We would hope that if we cannot do the necessary cleaning up or withdrawal operation by the required time we could ask for more time. In any event, our position, without having made any final commitments as yet either individually or collectively, is that we are prepared to recognize the decision of the government of France. We do not want to provoke a greater issue between ourselves and France than in the circumstances is absolutely necessary.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, what now appears to be the course the United States is going to follow, of taking some two years to make this move out of France, is not being followed as far as we are concerned; your intention is to get out within the year.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): As I suggested, there is a principal difference between the Canadian and U.S. responses to the French note. I should say by way of parenthesis that we have not made a formal reply to the second aide memoire. Our ambassador has been instructed simply to advise the French government that we have received the second note. That is the extent of our reply at the moment.

The United States reply indicated that the American government would agree to termination of the France-American base agreements in two years; whereas we are not yet in the position to discuss a date for withdrawal since we have not made plans for the relocation of our aircraft and men. As I said, we have only one agreement with regard to the two bases, which has no termination clause, and we are not in a position to make the kind of reply that the United States has made.

Another reason is that the United States has facilities in France which are much more extensive than ours and more varied too. Their relocation is consequently more complex and more difficult. But I have a strong feeling, Mr.



Harkness, that it is wise to recognize the inevitability of the French decision and to relocate just as quickly as possible. If we cannot do it by the required date we will advise the French government of this. I would anticipate that our difficulties would be understood; at least, I would hope that would be the case.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has there been any estimate made of what the cost of this relocation will be so far as Canada is concerned?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. We now are making an examination of the bilateral agreement and this has not, by any means, been completed. There may be some argument about the question of compensation, both as to the legality—

Mr. HARKNESS: If I may interrupt, Mr. Martin, that was to be my next question. What claim would we have for compensation for this enforced move?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot give you a definite answer on that because we ourselves have come to no definite conclusion. The lawyers in the government service now are examining this; we have set up an interdepartmental committee to study the implications of the agreements and to determine whether or not there is a legal argument for compensation. Depending on the result of that study we would then consider whether, in fact, a claim for compensation would be made.

I would not want this statement to be interpreted as saying we will not make one, but I want to know the facts and discuss them with our allies. We have agreed that before announcing final decisions we will consult the 14 countries other than France so that the implications of national decisions will be examined in the common interest.

Mr. LANGLOIS (*Megantic*): I have a supplementary question. Are the other NATO countries—and I am thinking particularly of the United States—studying this problem of legality as well?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh yes. They have, as I said, a specific termination clause, and there is some dispute now, I gather, between the two parties as to the meaning of those termination clauses. In answer to your question I would say yes, they are studying it closely, and we are having consultations with them as well as with the other 12 nations.

Mr. HARKNESS: From this point of view, what is the situation with regard to the very extensive logistic organization, the pipe lines and so on, which the NATO organization as a whole has set up in France? Is this to go to France as just a straight national asset or is to be paid for by France to the NATO organization as a whole to enable it to set up comparable facilities elsewhere. Also, is there any arrangement on whether it would be available to NATO as a whole in the event of the threat of war?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In answer to that, Mr. Harkness, something of the order of \$750 million or \$800 million has so far been spent in France on the construction of fixed facilities.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, pipe lines and so on.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Pipe lines, air fields, storage depots and so on all come under the NATO common infra-structure program. This program has been financed by NATO countries on the basis of a cost sharing formula, as you will recall, and the French government has thus contributed to this infra-structure.



It has also contributed substantial sums to the construction of infra-structure facilities located in some other NATO countries. In addition, a number of countries, including Canada, have supplemented the commonly financed infra-structure in France for the use of their own forces, and expenditures in this category, incurred by Canada mainly for certain fixed facilities at Metz and Marville, total something in excess of \$11 million.

● (10:00 a.m.)

Mr. HARKNESS: This is essentially for barrack blocks and schools and things of this kind, I understand, or is that for the improvement of the air base and so forth?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Both. Now, the cost sharing formula—

Mr. HARKNESS: I wondered about that because I remember that the development of the air field and of facilities of that kind was part of the general NATO infra-structure, but that we spent extra money for barrack blocks, schools, and things of this kind.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, that is right. Now, this cost sharing formula applying to the common infra-structure program has, as you know, been renegotiated at three to four-year intervals. It would take a long time to give all the details of this but, as a reasonable, representative sample, the following are the shares which were agreed to for the infra-structure program in the period 1961 to 1965. You may like to have these: Canada, 5.15 per cent; U.S.A., 30.85 per cent; Britain, 10.5 per cent; Germany, 20 per cent; France, 12 per cent. You are probably familiar with those figures.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but the basic point is that the other NATO countries have a very considerable stake in this \$700 million odd which has been put into the NATO infra-structure in France. I think those are the two major questions which are of concern to us because of our own stake in it as a country. First of all, is the matter I mentioned concerning what compensation is to be paid for this, what is going to be built to replace this, at France's expense rather than at ours? Secondly, there is the matter of whether any arrangements have been arrived at or any discussions have been undertaken on the extent to which all of this logistic set-up in France would be available in the event of a threat.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This will all have to be done by negotiation. I may say that what is happening now is that the NATO council has had a number of meetings, in fact it is having a meeting today. Working groups have been set up to deal with specific problems and individual countries are examining their own positions, particularly Canada and the United States as the two countries that have bases in France. It would take some time before our government and the 13 other governments will be in a position to take preliminary positions in negotiations with France on a number of these questions.

Mr. HARKNESS: I can appreciate that you are in no position to say what the position of various countries might be, but are you in a position to say what position Canada will take in regard to these two questions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, we are not in a position yet to say what our final attitude will be. This has to be studied very carefully; we are not in a position yet to say, for instance, what compensation we expect. Frankly, we did not



anticipate the announcement at the particular time that it came. It has taken all countries somewhat by surprise although the French policy does not involve any declaration of policy that had not previously been envisaged.

The problem that M. Couve de Murville, the French minister, and Mr. Schroeder had been discussing at Bonn in the last few days, the position of German forces now part of the integrated compound structure in Germany, is being discussed by these two representatives of France and Germany. A committee of three powers has been set up to examine this problem, and it will ultimately be placed before the 14 for consideration. Of course, this problem envisages an agreement for the maintenance and continuation of the French groups in Germany. Under what conditions will the French agree to keep their two divisions there, plus their air force establishment? To what extent will the proposed agreement be in keeping with the agreed position of the 14 on the basis of the concept of what is thought to be the right kind of military organization for NATO? All of these questions will have to be discussed in the preliminary stages by the parties concerned, and then before the NATO group as a whole because of the collective interests.

We will have to give consideration to the location of the Council itself. Is it to stay in France; is it to go to some other country? We will have to consider the location of SHAPE itself. Are SHAPE and the Council to be located in different countries? All of these kinds of questions—very important questions—are going to have to be resolved.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has Canada come to any conclusions as yet in regard to the place to which SHAPE should be relocated or to the more general question of whether SHAPE and the Council should be located in the same place?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, we have not reached any conclusion. Actually, there has not been any serious discussion among the 14 on this point as yet; we have just not reached that point. This will be one of the matters that will be studied in the groups that are being set up.

You might be interested, Mr. Harkness, in the following topics being dealt with in specific groups. There are seven groups dealing with the following matters: one, the military consequences of the withdrawal of French forces from the NATO command; two, opportunities for re-organizing and streamlining NATO; three, the question of continued French participation in the infra-structure program and in the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment, NADGE; four, problems related to the relocation of the NATO headquarters; five, financial implications of any action required as a result of the French decision; six, withdrawal of French forces in Germany from NATO command; seven, withdrawal of French forces from the NATO military headquarters.

Mr. HARKNESS: Are these questions being studied jointly in the NATO Council or are they being studied both there and in the military committee as well as in other places?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There has been a preliminary discussion of these among other problems that have to be resolved.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is that in the Council?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It was brought that the best way to proceed to an examination of this problem was to set up working groups, and that will be done. In addition to that, each country, I suppose, is now examining at home its own position on these various subjects, and we are doing that here in Ottawa through an interdepartmental committee which has been set up, including the departments of External Affairs, Defence, Justice, Finance and Industry.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has a decision actually been made in regard to the NATO Defence College? I saw in a newspaper some place that it was to be moved from Rome.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No decision has been made. It has to leave France but we do not know where to. No decision has been taken about locating any of the components of NATO. Some countries have proposed the establishment of some of these organs in their own territory. At this stage I would not want to say which countries have proposed this because it is still a matter of negotiation.

Mr. HARKNESS: In this report you put it down as speculation.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is no doubt it has to leave France.

I would like to emphasize one thing, Mr. Harkness; since we met last, two important statements have been made by the French foreign minister and by Mr. Pompidou, the French prime minister, both of which have emphasized that France does not intend to denounce the alliance; it proposes to stay in the alliance. I think this is the important thing for us to note. Secondly, it was stated by Mr. Pompidou, the French prime minister, that this decision of France does not in any way mean a change on the part of France in its desire to promote the interests of the west in relation to the Soviet Union or to the communist world. I made this last comment because in my last statement I do not think I emphasized this aspect of it.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Martin to elaborate on a few of the statements he made to the committee on April 4. The first point I want to ask him about is that he reminded us that in December, 1964, he proposed that the North Atlantic Council should undertake a review of the future of the alliance. He then told us that this proposal, although approved by the 14 other nations, was not pursued because of the uncertainty of the French view. Now that uncertainty has, to some extent, been cleared up, and I gather from what you said, Mr. Martin, that you are suggesting that now the opportunity has arisen for a review—and you use the very broadest term—of the future of the alliance. I wonder if you could tell us about any machinery for the review, whether it is in prospect, and what form of review you had in mind when you made this reference both in December of 1964 and the other day.

Mr. MARTIN: By the way, I want to thank you for sending me the statement that you made the other day in Paris which covered some aspect of this very problem.

In December of 1964, as you say, I did urge in the Council an examination of the state of the alliance. What I had in mind then was some of the positions that were being taken by the government of France. Discussions were current on the particular proposals, such as the multilateral nuclear force and the allied



nuclear force. There was also the recognition that NATO—then in being about 15 or 16 years—had more than justified its existence but that it was only natural to assume that after such a long interval it would be worth while to make a serious examination to ascertain whether particular operations could be eliminated and what steps could be taken to make NATO more effective.

● (10:20 a.m.)

In other words, we thought the time had come when there should be an examination, not of its purposes, but to meet many of the complaints, and to permit countries to examine their own positions and commitments; and there was general approval, at the time, of this Canadian position.

However, in the meantime the government of France, through the President, had taken a pretty strong position publicly, and it was thought that, rather than exacerbate the situation, it might be better to avoid discussion of matters that would involve a consideration of some of the positions taken by France, in the hope that there would be no final decisions taken by France about them.

We bowed to this request, but now that the government of France has made the announcement, we regard this as a good opportunity to accelerate the study which we had urged in 1964. I think that there will be a real desire on the part of all countries to make this kind of examination now. It is not our fault that it was not made earlier. I think it is regrettable that it was not made earlier.

Mr. BREWIN: I take it you do not agree with the position indicated in the aide memoire from France, to the effect that conditions have radically changed since 1949, and that this, in turn, necessitates some changes in the alliance structure?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I would want to make sure, of course, that I understood clearly what the French government had in mind.

Of course things have changed greatly since 1949, but we must not attribute these changes to a quality that is not there. In Europe all the major political problems that divide east and west continue to be unresolved. There has been very considerable improvement in east-west relations, but this improvement in posture has not been followed by any improvement in, or any solution of, the major political problems that divide Europe itself—that divide east and west. Germany continues to be a divided country; Berlin continues to be divided; and until this major problem is solved it would be wrong to say that there has been any fundamental change since 1949.

I dealt, in my earlier statement at the last meeting, with the military position which military advisers ask us to bear in mind so far as Soviet Union military strength is concerned. I do not want this to mean that we do not recognize that at some point we must have an accommodation with the Soviet Union in the interest of world peace, in the interest of European peace, in the interest of European unity.

In the spring of 1964, I think I said, in answer to a question in the House, that we would not oppose the examination of some improvement in the position between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers subject, of course, to our obligation to the alliance, and also taking into account that any such arrange-



ment must not be prejudicial to the position that members of the alliance take with regard to divided Germany and, particularly, East Germany. Any arrangement, or any discussion, or any given accommodation, or any co-operative movement, of any of the Warsaw Pact powers must not involve the recognition by them of the separate national status of East Germany.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to Mr. Martin that I think we all agree with some of these generalities, but I wonder if I could ask him to be more specific on a number of matters. I will put them in a fairly extended question because they can probably all be answered together.

On page 16 of the evidence at the last meeting Mr. Martin said:

We have long believed that members of the alliance particularly those such as France which have spoken of the need for change, should present concrete proposals to encourage consultation within the alliance—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to ask Mr. Martin if he has any information that France is going to make any concrete proposals, or that there are any concrete proposals that Canada intends to put forward in this situation and on the need for change. Will you be more specific on that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes; we have some ideas of our own. First of all, we hope to be able to discuss these with our allies, and then if that consultation permits I will have an opportunity of dealing with them more specifically when the NATO foreign ministers meet on June 6 in Brussels.

Mr. BREWIN: Would it be possible for this committee to know what some of these ideas of our own are? It would be interesting.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that until such time as our consultations with our allies have been completed you would appreciate that I could not do that.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps the same answer might apply to my next question, but I would still like to ask it. In the second clear paragraph, about half way down page 16, you are referring to the fact that we must avoid action that creates unnecessary strain.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Then you continue as follows:

This need not and should not preclude us from making adjustments, in the interest of economy and efficiency, in the manner in which we contribute to European defence. And we should seek to ensure that there is a constructive evolution in the organization of the alliance—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Again, I think the committee would like to know, if you can tell us, what are the evolutions in the interest of economy and efficiency that might be suggested, and the manner of our contribution, and what is the constructive evolution that you have in mind; because, after all, Mr. Martin, these general words are easy, but the specific problems are more difficult and, I think, perhaps more interesting and more important.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, they are general, but I am sure you will appreciate that they cannot be anything else. We could not spell out at this stage, without consultation with the other members of the alliance, what might be done.

I say, as you point out, "This need not and should not preclude us from making adjustments in the interest of economy and efficiency—". This would enable us to examine the nature of our military commitment to NATO, to what extent it has to be maintained at the present level, to what extent it can be reduced without going back on our commitment. We have several ideas about that. This is a very delicate matter and it is not possible to do anything more than to indicate what we have in mind with respect to it.

Mr. BREWIN: Does it not make the proceedings of this committee a little futile if we are just to be told in general terms of the changes and adjustments and the evolution and so on which are necessary, without any indication at all from you of what these adjustments and changes and evolutions and so on are going to be?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the first place, our own decisions are not complete by any means. It would make futile NATO itself if, before discussion with our allies, we were to expose matters that clearly involve them as well as ourselves, and involve the alliance. I am sure that even if I were in a position today to give you, in final form, the results of this examination—which I am not—you would understand that I could not do it.

Mr. BREWIN: I just want to put it to you that there may be a half way house. I can quite understand that you are not in a position to give us details—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I could not even go that far.

Mr. BREWIN: You could not go farther than just these very general words?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. BREWIN: On just one aspect of it, could you say whether, in the various ideas for the improvement of the structure of NATO, and in regard to consideration of the future of NATO, you have in mind any east-west negotiations with NATO along the line of the NADGE Plan, or some form of disengagement, or nuclear freeze, or any concrete steps to eliminate the rather unreal tension that exists in Europe at the present time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I am prepared to deal with this question. I would like to point out, in the first place, that those are political problems that do not arise necessarily out of the examination which is now being made of NATO as a result of the French position.

Whether or not France had taken the course that it has, we in Canada, and, I think, NATO as a whole, as well as its members, would have sought to take measures that would bring about greater stability in Europe. I think it is wise for us to examine now whether or not the decision taken by France is calculated to meet those objectives.

Mr. BREWIN: If I can put one other question—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): May I just finish what I am saying?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): General de Gaulle has stated, or his government has stated, that the way to promote European unity is to recognize the nature of the alliance, and the desirability of its being in alliance composed of individual national bodies in control of their own military apparatus. He believes that a flexible position is better calculated to provide for an improvement in east-west relations, better calculated to bring about national unity and better calculated to bring about disarmament.

Our position is somewhat different—and it is supported by the other 13 countries. While there has been an improvement in east-west relations, particularly since Cuba, would we be any stronger in negotiating, for instance, on disarmament, or would we be any stronger in promoting European unity, if NATO were not as effectively organized as it is?

Now, that is the issue. We believe that the Soviet Union, for instance, will respect the west more in present circumstances with a NATO organized basically on the present lines. We believe that disarmament discussions, if they are to provide some progress, will be more effective if the Soviet Union realizes that it is dealing with peace-minded countries that are organized co-operatively and able to give effect to positions that they take.

There is a difference of view, but I think it is misleading to think that we are going to be able to improve east-west relations simply by abandoning the concept of an integrated force or an integrated command structure in NATO.

I think that there has been a great improvement in East-West relations. We want it to continue; we want to avoid war; we want to reach the position where we have closer and closer relationships and a firmer understanding with the Communist world. But at this stage in international development we believe that there is strong reason for continuing NATO in its present military, organized form, subject to the modifications that will be agreed following the examination that will take place.

All of this has not prevented our doing the very kind of thing that you have urged. Individual countries have, in varying ways—in differing ways—extended their relations with the Communist world. Canada, notwithstanding its participation in NATO, has had growing relations with eastern European Communist countries, beginning with Poland right at the end of the war. We have carried out some large measure of trade with some of these countries. We are now engaged in considering, with two countries in eastern Europe, the establishment of trade relations. If we can get from them the kind of recognition of our position with regard to claims made by Canadian nationals on them, we may be able to proceed with the establishment of diplomatic relations with, for instance, Roumania.

There has been improvement in relations between the east and the west notwithstanding the existence of NATO. Our determination to see NATO carried on with its present basic structure does not mean that we cannot improve these relations. I think we can, and I think we have a better chance of improving them if we are strong in this way than if we allow ourselves to be separated and uncoordinated.

Mr. NESBITT: In view of the fact that the minister has just mentioned something of considerable interest, I wonder if I might have Mr. Brewin's permission to ask a question?



Mr. BREWIN: I have just one more question, if I may, and I know I have taken a fair amount of time. I wanted to, perhaps, summarize my line of questioning by asking the Secretary of State for External Affairs this question: Is there not a third course? We can disagree with the French idea of going it alone and having unco-ordinated defence arrangements, but another alternative, and one which, I think, could be equally bad, would be a freezing of NATO on its present line without any change at all. In that connection, I just wondered if I could not make a last appeal to the Minister and ask him to give us a clear idea of some of the initiatives that Canada might take to change the structure of NATO and to adjust to the situation, because the "cold war" in Europe is a totally different proposition from what it was before. Attitudes which were appropriate then are not appropriate now. Is there no initiative in the field of disarmament or political arrangement that Canada can take as a member of NATO to prevent us from going into a go-it-alone proposition, as the French have suggested, or are we just going to go along with the same old policies that we have had in the past. I would like to have your thinking in as specific terms as possible on these matters.

● (10:40 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think that is fair enough. I do not think that our position on these matters is in any way inhibited by our participation in NATO or in the integrated military structure.

NATO is an organization of freedom loving states and one of the consequences of this is that our nation is not precluded from pursuing its own foreign policy.

Now, it is quite obvious, if you are going to be in an alliance and if you have taken a position on a particular aspect of foreign policy—unless the alliance is going to be meaningless—you are not going to overlook the basic commitments you have made to that alliance. This must be an elementary consideration. If each nation in the alliance were to go its own way, with complete disregard for others, then the alliance could not help but disintegrate. I suppose this is one of the reasons the 14 countries in NATO were somewhat disturbed by the suddenness of the French decision.

On the question of disarmament, Canada does take a particular position. I would hope that this year would see some progress being made in an agreement for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet attitude at the beginning of the 18 power group in Geneva sounded a note of optimism.

We have put forward a draft agreement on non-proliferation and we have discussed this with our NATO partners. The United States and Great Britain, the major nuclear powers in NATO must, naturally, if we are going to get anywhere on this matter, be recognized as having a position that has to be given due consideration not in the sense that we must bow to their every opinion, but that if we are going to have a non-proliferation agreement we have to recognize that you cannot have it unless they are actively participating. In the 18 Nations Disarmament committee we have supported the western position on non-proliferation put forward by the United States. However, we take the position that there are many improvements that could be made in the agreement that has been put forward by the major western powers. We hope, if we can get a



minimal agreement on the basis of their draft with the Soviet Union, that this will mean a great deal of progress, and we would continue to put forward some of our own ideas on future occasions.

These are very complicated matters and they cannot be resolved overnight. You have to go sometimes at a snail's pace to reach any measure of agreement; but, if we can get some agreement on the question of non-proliferation we will have made great progress.

In another area, as I said, we have not hesitated to say, long before it was generally accepted by other nations, that we should deal with Communist powers, that we should trade with them extensively, and that we should not hesitate to establish diplomatic missions regardless of what position was taken by our allies. This has not stultified, in any way, our individual position. We have taken advanced positions on the desirability of working things out, subject to the conditions I mentioned earlier—with the Warsaw Pact powers. We are seeking to promote greater and greater contacts with the Soviet Union. For instance, we look forward this summer to the visit of perhaps the most important political personage that ever has come to Canada from the Soviet Union, Mr. Polyansky, a very important member of the governing body of the Soviet Union. I, myself, hope to be able to take advantage of an invitation that has been extended to me by Mr. Gromyko to visit the Soviet Union. Other ministers have been to the Soviet Union and we believe that these contacts are increasingly desirable. We have close contacts, for instance, with Poland, as a member of the International Commission for Supervision and Control. These are areas where an endeavour is being made by Canada, apart altogether from its obligations in NATO, to pursue a course individually which it believes to be in the interest of world peace.

Your question suggested to me that no initiatives are being taken by Canada; that because we are a member of NATO we feel ourselves hemmed in by our NATO obligations, hemmed in by the virtue of the fact we are a neighbour of the United States and cannot do anything without consulting our neighbours. That was the kind of implication I found in your question, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Martin, I think you are being a little over-defensive.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I may be, but I want to establish as clearly as I can that Canada—and I am not saying this because I happen to be the spokesman for the Canadian government at the present time; this was true under the former regime and it will be true under any Canadian government—does determine its own foreign policy position. This does not mean to say that we do not take into account the position of our friends, members of an alliance. Of course, we do. But, we do so, on the basis of national self-interest, just as the great powers do, just as the United States must take into account the position of its allies, just as it must take into account its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, just as the Warsaw Pact powers must take into consideration their relations with the Soviet Union. But, I have taken advantage of your question. I am not saying you were saying we had no independent policy. But there was implied the suggestion that we did not seem to be taking any initiatives in these areas. Well, to the extent that we responsibly can do it we do take an initiative.



Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps I should clarify what I was attempting to say. I was thinking of initiatives in the field of changing the structure of NATO, the nature of NATO and its position in Europe, and the need to adjust to changing circumstances. That is what I was referring to when I spoke of general Canadian initiatives.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is it not a fact that there have been constant adjustments in NATO ever since it was formed in 1949, particularly from the point of view of military arrangements and things of that kind?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Certainly. There are continuing adjustments going on. But, I think it is only fair to reiterate having in mind Mr. Brewin's question, that we in Canada—and I think this would have been your position—would have been happy to see a serious examination made of the state of the alliance at the time we proposed it. We all hope now that the obligation that faces us as a result of the French decision will enable us to make the kind of examination of changes in the structure of NATO that are desirable.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you a question, Mr. Faulkner?

Mr. FAULKNER: I would like clarification of the last point the Minister made. The emphasis so far seems to be on structural change. Along with these structural changes is any consideration being given to the broad purpose and objectives of NATO in spite of the French decision. I can appreciate that structural changes involve structural revisions of the common structure, possibly deployment of military personnel and so on. But, I think Mr. Brewin's point would have been my point. Are we using the present occasion to examine or review the purposes of NATO, the objectives of NATO and possibly bringing them in line, assuring they are not—they may be but I suspect they are not—with the political situation in Europe as of 1966.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, first of all, what is now being examined has to do with the military structure of NATO.

Mr. FAULKNER: I agree.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): And, our basic concentration is on that. However, that does not mean to say that when we meet, for instance, in Brussels or when the NATO council meets, as it continuously does, governments do not give expression to views that go far beyond the structure such as the promotion of European stability, the promotion of peace in Europe and in the world. Of course, we must do these things. We must seek through our respective diplomacy foreign policy objectives that we hope some day will mean that we can go back to the Charter of the United Nations from which NATO itself sprang. That is what I mean when I say I hope that we can so work out our arrangements with those who take ideological issue with us that we can make it less necessary to depend on military alliances. That is what we are seeking to do.

You may have had in mind as well Article II.

Mr. FAULKNER: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, there is no doubt that Article II has not been used as we had hoped it would be used. To understand what the purposes of NATO are we must recall the circumstances that brought NATO into being.



We had joined the United Nations and we hoped that it would be not only a body that would provide for satisfactory international political decisions but that it would possess the military sanctions to give effect to these decisions. However, the fact is that the Soviet Union in the early days of the United Nations took what I regard as an intransigent position with regard to Article XLII of the Charter. Western nations found themselves in a world organization which could not provide for their security in the face of the armed strength that the Soviet Union had developed. Therefore, the proposal was made by Monsieur St. Laurent and Senator Vandenberg that there should be established a defensive alliance within the meaning of Article LII of the Charter to do what the United Nations was unable to do notwithstanding the expectations of San Francisco. This is how NATO came into being. I hope by individual national effort and collective effort we can so improve things in Europe and in the world that sometime in the long term future it will not be necessary to have NATO and we can depend on a strengthened United Nations. That is the purpose of diplomacy of the government of Canada and it is, I am sure, the purpose of all other members in NATO, including France.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, there is one question I would like to ask the Minister, in view of the matter that was mentioned, namely the claims of Canadian citizens, formerly central Europeans—and I have in mind particularly Polish Canadians. As you know, arrangements have been going on for some time with respect to indemnification of a number of people who are now Canadian citizens with regard to property which has been expropriated or taken for one reason or another by the Polish government.

Mr. GROOS: Mr. Chairman, have you a list of those who wish to put questions. I have been here some time and have not had an opportunity to question the Minister.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. Thompson, Mr. Foy, Mr. Groos, Mr. Faulkner, Mr. Pilon and Mr. Nesbitt. But, I gather the questions which are being put forward at the present time will be short.

Mr. NESBITT: My question related to something the Minister brought up and I would like to know if the Minister could tell us at what stage the negotiations are at the present time for the payment of indemnification to Canadian citizens from the government of Poland.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that this goes beyond the question of NATO, which we are now discussing.

Mr. NESBITT: Well, the Minister brought up the matter.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): He did not really; he made reference to it in passing. But, it seems to me you are requiring a detailed answer at the present time, and this is something that goes beyond the subject we are now discussing.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would be glad to deal with that but, perhaps—

Mr. NESBITT: You could do it at some future time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, I would like to look into that to ascertain what stage of the negotiations we have reached, and I would be pleased to let you know.



Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I do not know if there is too much use in asking the questions I had in mind because of the defensive position taken by the Minister with regard to questions posed by Mr. Brewin. But, there are just a few comments I might precede my few questions with, and I will attempt to be as quick as I can and to the point.

The issue right now centres around the fact that France has taken what is stated to have been an unexpected action. But, this action taken by France is not something that just came out of the blue; she has been developing this in the last several years, and ever since France has laid out this unexpected policy I think this type of action has been inevitable. The real reason we can say it is unexpected is that we are unprepared for it. The Minister has said that our problem now is a military structural situation but I do not think it is just that. He said in his statement the other day very clearly that he had considered a review of the whole future of the alliance as being necessary sometime ago. What I am concerned about is that we tend to go along with what is the status quo as long as it is quiet and at peace, and these initiatives that we say we are supposed to take just do not take form or result in any action. At the present time France's move has caused a critical situation. The Minister has said this without any equivocation at all. He said that France's withdrawal from NATO may harm central Europe. On the other hand, he seems to admit the inevitability of following along with the present situation, and we are talking in terms of bases and pipe lines in dollars and cents. This is necessary at this time, but surely there is a place for Canadian initiative to try to work out some alternative which will bring this long-range review of the future of the alliance into some clear perspective and action.

● (11:00 a.m.)

I agree with the Minister that no one determines our own foreign policy; I think that has become quite clear. However, what I am concerned about is not who determines our foreign policy but just how we determine it and how much initiative we put behind it. I do not think that diplomacy and being "good fellows" are any substitute for lack of decision, action, or even conviction.

I believe, Mr. Martin, that you have a unique position today in NATO. I think you carry the confidence of the French government. I believe that the United States, even in its stiffening attitude towards NATO, regards Canada's position with respect, as well as your own role in that position.

However, what I would like to hear from you is some assurance, rather than just generalities, that we are doing something more than just attending Council meetings; that we are actually moving into the picture, as it relates to France, with some attempt to use our influence; that we are using this particular circumstance to try to bring to a head a total re-assessment of what is the role of the alliance.

We are talking about moving our bases to Belgium; we accept the inevitability that this has to happen. I wonder if our forces have to be in Europe in just the same strength in which they have been up to now. I think that our influence with these 13 other nations is something which is very important, and I would like to know—as I am sure other members of the committee would like to



know—whether we are actually attempting to do something rather than just solving a crisis and continuing the status quo. Surely we are a group of freedom loving nations, but we do not maintain freedom by sitting back and waiting for events to develop. I know it is difficult to get agreement, but it seems to me that there is a position that Canada should be taking. We should be taking the initiative in trying to meet not just this immediate problem which has come from France's decision but the over-all problem of trying to come to some clear decision on what is the position of NATO in the future. We should not reject the past; it is nice to go back and outline what NATO has achieved up to now. We agree that NATO has had a very important role. However, NATO's present pattern of development does not necessarily meet the need for the future, and therefore, as we face the present situation, I would like to hear from the Minister, what certainly would develop our confidence, that we are doing something more than just going along and trying to butter over here and placate differences there instead of coming right to grips with the problem.

My questions are therefore somewhat in line with what Mr. Brewin has said. I would like to know whether or not there is any attempt by the Minister or by the government to move into the picture before the Council meeting.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What picture?

Mr. THOMPSON: The situation that has developed now because of France's decision. Have we contact with the French government? Are we trying to influence a pattern that might develop when the Council meeting takes place?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There must be some misunderstanding. I have listened to your interesting statement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We must not be too complimentary around here; we are here to examine the Minister and not exchange compliments.

Mr. THOMPSON: I am not exchanging compliments; I am trying to get the Minister to come out of the circles and to come to a point.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You said he was most influential with France and with the NATO countries, and yet we have not had evidence of that.

Mr. THOMPSON: What I am asking him is whether he uses that influence, as I would be concerned if he were not.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think as Mr. Thompson has said, and as I said to Mr. Faulkner, we have to realize what is at issue here. This is a particular problem involving the military organization of the Alliance.

Mr. THOMPSON: But that problem is symptomatic of something that is a much bigger problem.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Of course, but nevertheless it is a very serious problem in itself and it involves, as Mr. Harkness's questions indicate, the examination of a series of arrangements involving expenditure over 17 years, involving considerations that are vital to the preservation of our national security. A government charged with responsibility has to proceed with great care in the course that it is pursuing, and that is what we are trying to do. To suggest that because this problem has arisen we are not interested in the other



problems, is not justified, I think your emphasis has given me the opportunity that I wanted.

You ask about what we are doing regarding our relations with France. I have indicated quite clearly, long before this issue arose, that NATO without France would not be the alliance that was envisaged when it was established. I am glad to see emphasis given to this in the recent statement made by spokesmen of the United States government. In our public utterances, and in our private negotiations that are under way now, we are doing everything we can to make sure that the settlement that we ultimately make will be one that will be satisfactory to France to the extent that its recent decision makes this possible. This particular problem has nothing to do with whether or not NATO or the individual members of NATO are seeking to exercise in a wider area their influence towards a settlement of the European problem, the problem between the east and the west.

Since you asked it, let us frankly recognize that the main obstacles which stand in the way of a settlement in eastern Europe is the continued occupation of East Germany by Soviet forces and the reluctance of the Soviet government to see the German problem resolved by permitting the German people to determine for themselves whether they wish to be re-united. This is a fact with which the German people have had to live, and we shall have to be similarly patient. I can tell you that this situation creates problems for all members of NATO. We have to make sure, and this is part of our Canadian diplomacy, that there will be no weakening of NATO to the point that would create, as a result of this weakness, very serious problems for Europe itself and, in consequence, for Canada.

We are not thinking in terms of resolving this problem of Germany, or any other problem, by the use of force. The only other course now open—to acquiesce, as the Soviet Union proposes—in the present division of Germany, could never bring stability in Europe. We have to ask the government of France to think carefully, as I am sure it will, of the implications that could arise if the full collective interest in the German problem is not borne in mind. I ask you to think what would be the consequence of a popular uprising which would risk provoking a major war and an east-west confrontation. We must live with the problem of a divided Germany and a divided Europe until a solution acceptable to both sides can be found. We cannot hope for any sudden disappearance of our differences with the Communist world. There are not going to be any instant solutions to the major political problems which continue to divide peoples.

France and other members of NATO are happily in full agreement in looking only for gradual improvement. Such improvement, we must hope, will eventually bring about a situation in which the problems regarding which no solution can now be seen will become more manageable. Admittedly, the European countries are most directly involved. As the stage is approached for tackling these problems directly, I would hope that these European countries could themselves play an increasing role in trying to resolve them. We want to see Europe take a greater share in its own defence arrangements, but Europe and ourselves have to be practical in the face of the present military stance that confronts us.



The French government has said that France wishes to remain in the Alliance after 1969. It has indicated its desire to work out liaison arrangements with the NATO command to permit joint military action in the event of conflict. Unfortunately, however, the French action in withdrawing from the French command and control arrangements creates for the alliance certain major short-term problems which we have to resolve, as I said to Mr. Faulkner, if the defensive capacity of NATO is to be maintained. Without adequate defence arrangements which would preserve stability in Europe, there could be no solid ground on which to work towards a policy for a settlement in Europe.

In the early days of NATO we had to concentrate on the building of the necessary defences. This made possible the achievement of very significant improvements in east-west relations in the following decade, and that improvement is continuing. However, what I am seeking to establish is that I do not believe this trend will continue unless we have a strong NATO at this time. We must make sure that the decision of the French government does not weaken it. In the face of the problems which remain to be resolved, there is a natural inclination, I suppose, to overlook the progress that has been made. We need only compare the present atmosphere with the past. Fifteen years ago Stalin was still alive and the Soviet Union menaced the whole of Europe. Ten years ago the first important east-west contacts were shattered by the Hungarian uprising. Five years ago the Berlin crisis was at its height. Today, although Europe is still divided, there is no longer an air of crisis. Let us not forget that this atmosphere has been maintained in spite of the fighting in Viet Nam. The credit for this must include the contribution made by NATO. We can be confident, against this background I think, that effective defence arrangements far from being an obstacle to the development of good relations with the Soviet bloc countries can actually promote better solutions. It will be our concern to make sure that any new arrangements which are developed in NATO meet this standard—which is essential if we are to move towards a lasting settlement in Europe.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say that if what the Minister has outlined is so—and I accept it as being true—it seems to me we are in a crisis, and that crisis is France's unilateral action. The Minister has said that we have to ask France if she has considered the full implications of her action in the defence of Europe as it relates to the objective of the Alliance. My question is: Are we asking France? There has been a conference between the foreign ministers of Germany and France in the last few days. Has there been any attempt by Canada to emphasize to France the very thing the Minister has been outlining to us?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Of course.

Mr. THOMPSON: You were speaking about European countries playing a more direct role. Are we consulting them?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I did not say it was more their problem but since there is a disposition on their part, and particularly on the part of the government of France, to play a greater part in the defence of Europe, this is



something that ought to be encouraged. I do not think it is to be expected that Canada, for instance, should go on for all time in helping to provide for the defence of Europe.

I certainly do not think the time has come when we can cut down on our obligations, but it is only natural that we should emphasize the importance of European nations doing all they can to provide for the defence of Europe. However, we must recognize that the defence of Europe is also our defence. We are in continuous consultation with the government of France through their mission here and through my own contact with the French foreign minister. I have made it my business to have at least two meetings with him every year, altogether apart from the NATO sessions.

We are in continuous contact with one another. Our position and our views on these matters is well known to the government of France, and our discussions with France are very frank and very cordial.

I suppose, partly because of the fact that we have so many French speaking people in our own country, we seek to put forward to our colleagues those considerations regarding French policy that we believe should be noted in the policy of France. I do not want to overemphasize the role of intermediary. Mr. Churchill once said that during the war Canada did play a very important part in interpreting British opinion in the United States, but I do think that there are situations where Canada can help, and where Canada is helping, in trying to bridge the position between France and the others including ourselves.

Mr. THOMPSON: I do not want to take up more time of the committee, but I will ask the Minister—in view of the crisis that I think we agree has developed over France's action—whether, in the forthcoming council meeting's negotiations about the changes that will take place in the structure of the military establishment, he contemplates any direct consultation with the government of France, prior to that Council meeting or with any of the other governments of the 13 powers which are more or less in agreement with the stand Canada has taken, in an effort to try to convince France?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We are having consultations now.

Mr. THOMPSON: I am speaking of a direct contact with the foreign ministers.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, there are consultations in which we participate.

Mr. FOY: Mr. Chairman, a great number of my questions have been answered, but, to get into a lighter vein, I was wondering if the Minister could tell us about the relocation of NATO, which is a matter of great interest. I was wondering if the Minister could describe the problems that might arise with the different NATO members. Will there be conflict of opinions on where the location should be, and have we any definite thoughts on it? Could you describe the problem to us?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We ourselves have not settled in our own mind where SHAPE or the Council should be located. We are examining this problem but we have come to no final decisions on the matter.



● (11:20 a.m.)

These questions are being discussed every day through our representatives on the Council, and the positions, or course, that our representatives on the Council take are the positions which the government takes. But there are a number of preliminary facts that have to be known before such decisions can be taken. First of all, what countries would be prepared to take the Council, or would be prepared to take SHAPE? What countries would provide the necessary ground for the operations of armed forces that are now being deployed in France? These are questions of fact that are being examined, and not enough time has elapsed. This is going to take many, many months.

Mr. Foy: Would there be any advantage to the organization considering a non-member country as a base, under long-term agreements?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have never heard that suggestion. I would say, right offhand, it seems to me a rather unusual suggestion.

Mr. GROOS: Mr. Chairman, I hope it is significant that the French, having denounced most of the military arrangements of NATO, or the North Atlantic Alliance, have not denounced the alliance itself. This surely leaves the door open to pursue some of the political and economic aspects of the North Atlantic Alliance, which have not hitherto been proposed; and these, I think, are, perhaps, becoming increasingly important.

I do not know whether you agree with that point of view—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do.

Mr. GROOS: I would like to hear your observations on this matter. For myself, I support the position of our government in acquiescing in what I think is obviously the inevitable result of the French action. I would not say that I would accept that it would continue to be inevitable; but under the present administration I think it is very important to keep lines of communication open.

I am very interested in some of the nuts and bolts of the aide memoire of March 10, particularly what appears in paragraphs 6, 10 and 11. The French are considering the liaison which should be established between the French command and the NATO command, and they are talking in paragraph 10 of the practical consequences of their change in policy; and in paragraph 11 they talk of the military facilities which could be placed at the disposal of the government of Canada on French territory in the event of conflict.

I listened quite carefully to the problems that were being studied by these specific six or seven groups which you outlined, and did not find in there a group which would be studying these nuts and bolts that I am going to refer to.

I am thinking of the arrangements which have sprung up between the NATO countries, which have given such strength to the alliance, and I am thinking, in particular, of the standardization of equipment, the compatibility of equipment. These are all military matters, but any military situations which we can continue in the future under these liaison arrangements have got to be carried out, I presume, under some diplomatic commitments. This is a matter on which Canada will have to be laying down some ground rules with the French. It seems to me, in view of the indication of the seriousness of the French intention, that we should have some ground rules which will ensure that in the



event that Canada or the alliance is called upon to defend itself the French, in particular, should be able to co-operate with the other members of the alliance, with their equipment being compatible and so forth.

I think, also, it is very important that we should know what the state of preservation will be of the infra-structure which has already been installed in France. These are military matters, but until the ground rules are laid down on the diplomatic side we will not be able to get very much help with these.

I was going to ask: Are you able to say what Canada's position is with respect to these matters in our negotiations with France?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Not at this stage.

First of all, these matters are covered by working groups No. 1 and No. 3 which I read out to Mr. Harkness. The first one is dealing with the military consequences of the withdrawal of French forces from the NATO command, and the third with the question of continuing French participation in the infra-structure program and in the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment, NADGE. The considerations that you have properly put forward, which are military questions, are questions which will be covered in the working groups. They are going to take quite a long time. Amongst the questions are the use of French air space, the nature of the arrangement to be made between Germany and France with regard to the two military divisions in Europe—and the question of communications.

Mr. GROOS: It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we are in a particular position here inasmuch as since we are not on the continent of Europe these communications are just as vital for us as they are for the United States.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Quite.

Mr. GROOS: This is a problem that might not be pushed so much by the other partners in NATO; but it is something we have got to be very sure about.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is very true and very important.

Mr. PILON: In the testimony which you gave on April 4, 1966, at page 15, in the second last paragraph, in discussing the implications of actions which have been taken by the French government, you said:

The net loss in forces available to NATO from the announced withdrawal, while significant, will not be too serious, particularly if workable arrangements can be devised for maintaining French troops in Germany—

There have been reports since that date that the Germans were going to request the French troops to leave Germany. I want to know if these reports are correct, and does this increase the seriousness of the situation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have said several times this morning, and I said a few moments ago, that what happens to the two French divisions in Europe and the air personnel in Germany is now the subject of discussion between the French foreign minister and the West German foreign minister. In addition to that, there is a committee of the three powers working to consider the implications of this problem. The decision ultimately to be taken will be one that will be taken by the NATO council as a whole.



I think it would be wrong to say that the Germans want to see the French leave Germany. I am sure that is not the case. But the arrangement for their continued presence is one that has to be worked out in a manner consistent with the NATO pattern and with the NATO security interest.

Mr. KLEIN: Mr. Martin, would the actions of France be apt to cause the NATO authorities to give nuclear arms to West Germany, and, if so, what would Canada's position be, and would this be considered a threat to France?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): If we were in secret session I might be able to expand my answer.

The question of a share in nuclear planning is now being discussed by an open-ended committee of the defence ministers. There have been proposals for a greater share of nuclear strategy—proposals such as MLF.

Mr. KLEIN: Would it be a threat to France.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think so; but when I say "I do not think so" I am relating my response to your question.

Mr. KLEIN: What would Canada's position be if the question arose about supplying West Germany with nuclear arms, in view of France's position in NATO?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, as I said before, if we were in a restricted session I would feel free to deal with this question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have two questions to ask the Minister, and I will not indulge in a speech, as some members of the committee have been doing.

When the Minister was stirred up a little bit by Mr. Brewin's suggestion that initiatives were not being taken, he took some pride in making the statement that Canada, in the disarmament field, was pressing very strongly for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I wonder if this would not be interpreted by other nations attending the disarmament as the height of hypocrisy in view of the action of this government in not negotiating itself out of nuclear weapons?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that that question is intended, in the face of the very important question we are discussing, to be a constructive one, and that it is intended—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wondered why you took such pride in mentioning this particular view. Perhaps you may not want to answer the question.

My second question is: In view of the re-assessment of the position of NATO, has the Minister of External Affairs discussed with the Minister of National Defence an alteration in our commitment over there that would, perhaps, be less expensive than the present plan which we now have to move some of our forces personnel? Is there not an opportunity open here to Canada to utilize the mobility which the Minister of National Defence now tells us is available, and instead of maintaining families overseas for our service people could we not, on the basis of mobility, move our forces from Canada to positions in Germany or elsewhere at two-month intervals? This would save the expense of maintaining families overseas and, at the same time, maintain our commitment, or military strength, in the NATO organization.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, you say "Could we?" Of course, the answer is that we could.

However we are now examining a whole series of related questions. But I should emphasize that whatever modifications are made we would not, I would hope, want to take any steps that would in any way contribute to a lowering of North American interest in the defence problems of Europe at this time.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not want the Minister to let that statement go on the record, because it is not what I suggested at all. In my question I stated that we would maintain the strength of our military commitments—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I was not suggesting that you had suggested that at all, Mr. Churchill. I was simply saying that I agreed with you that we could examine this question and that we will be examining this problem. But I would hope that in saying that I would not be giving the impression that we had decided to take any position that would have the result that I spoke about a moment ago.

On page 17 of my statement I said as follows:

Inevitably our attention in the near future will be taken up with handling the immediate consequences of the French action. But we shall not lose sight of the need for NATO to adjust to the changing circumstances since the Alliance was concluded. Indeed, the adjustments which the French action will require of the existing military arrangements provide opportunities, as I said earlier, which we intend to take to examine with our allies the possibilities for developing improvements in the NATO structure and to consider how the Alliance should develop in the long run, and also to consider what reductions and what savings can be effected without impairing the efficiency of the organization, or of our contribution to it—

I was not suggesting that you were trying to make these suggestions with the idea of impairing our efficiency.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I just ask one final supplementary question? We are faced with the shifting of two air bases from France elsewhere. Could we not now consider saving on the infra-structure aspect of it by arranging for rapid air transport of the air personnel required to man those two bases when they are relocated, rather than setting up the situation that has prevailed in the past, and which was necessary at the time, of having families and dependants overseas with our forces.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Of course we could; and this question will be examined. What the result will be I am not in a position to say.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I was asking if you had consulted with the Minister of National Defence. You might get a better answer from him than I would.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We are in continuous consultation, as you, a former distinguished Minister of National Defence know.

The CHAIRMAN: Are these all the questions on NATO?

Mr. WALKER: In the second chapter of the book on NATO it says that it is a treaty or an alliance for the defence of the nations which are signatories, but



that it also calls for co-operation in the political, economic, social and cultural fields. Do we have any annual dollar cost, or investment, if you will, broken down into these areas to show what is the annual dollar contribution of Canada in those four areas? For instance, is it ten to one for our military expenditures or is it eight for military and, say, two for contributions in the economic and social fields? I think it would be more helpful to me if I knew. Also, I would like to know if there was a shift in emphasis on our dollar expenditures for the alliance. I am interested in those four fields as well as knowing Canada's investment in these things.

● (11:40 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, on the military side some of these things are restricted, I have given you the share of the commonly financed infra-structure program; I have given you these percentages. Now, with regard to the economic and cultural fields the situation is that NATO has developed essentially into a defensive military organization.

Mr. WALKER: I know.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Canada has always taken the position that more effect should be given to provision for economic co-operation. We were really responsible for the inclusion of Article II and we thought, in addition to the objective of military co-operation among the 14 members, there should be the widest economic co-operation. We always have complained about the lack of this and never have lost the opportunity of expressing our regret at the lack of progress in developing economic co-operation within the NATO. But, I must say that since the establishment of another organism, the OECD, there has developed a form of economic co-operation among the countries of that organization, all of whom are European states except one, Japan. There exists in the OECD a wide measure of the kind of economic co-operation that was envisaged in Article II.

Of course, on the cultural side arrangements are provided for in the international organization of UNESCO and in the bilateral arrangements that exist between certain countries within the NATO group. For instance, Canada recently completed a cultural agreement with France and we have under development now similar arrangements with some other countries. Of course, there is continuous political collaboration in the NATO council. There are two meetings each year of foreign ministers of NATO and a meeting once a year at least of the defence ministers. In addition to that, we have with the United States an annual ministerial meeting on economic trade and foreign policy questions. Then we also have an annual meeting with American ministers on defence and related matters. In addition to that we have the United States-Canada parliamentary group. We now have the Canada-France parliamentary group which was established last September and, more particularly, we have the NATO parliamentary group in which we participate. These are some of the means by which political co-operation is promoted between the various member of the organization.

Mr. WALKER: Then, I take it that actually Canada's dollar cost, as it relates directly to the alliance—and I am not referring to all the associations within the alliance—with regard to military co-operation policies, takes practically 100 per



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

April 21, 1966

cent of our total contribution, in spite of our wishes that are otherwise to date; in other words, the great bulk of any money we put into the alliance goes for military co-operation policies rather than any programs or projects under economic or other fields. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

The CHAIRMAN: If you are through, Mr. Walker, it is now 11.45. Is it the wish of members of the committee that we proceed to discuss the Viet Nam situation or would it be desirable to adjourn at this time? Perhaps it would be your wish to take a break. May I have your comments.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think we should adjourn.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, the Minister has had a quite a long morning. It is now 11.45. There is a conflict of committees among many of the members. I think we have done a very thorough job on NATO.

The CHAIRMAN: Then there will be a meeting of the steering committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon in room 440-C.

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PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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1961 S. LEON J. RAYMOND  
The Clerk of the House.

WITNESS:

Mr. Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

...of our total contribution in spite of our wishes that are otherwise to date...  
 ...the great bulk of any money we put into...  
 ...military co-operation...  
 ...economic or other fields...  
 ...it is not right for us to say...  
 ...Mr. MARTIN (East): That is right...  
 ...The Chairman: It would be desirable to adjourn at this time...  
 ...situation or would it be desirable to adjourn at this time? Perhaps it would be...  
 ...Your wish to take a break. May I have your comments.

Mr. CHURCHMAN: I think we should adjourn.  
 Mr. CHURCHMAN: The Minister has had a long morning. I think we should adjourn.

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
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**LÉON-J. RAYMOND,**  
*The Clerk of the House.*

Of course, on the cultural side...  
 international organization of UNESCO...  
 exist between certain countries within the NATO group. For instance, Canada...  
 development now similar arrangements with some other countries. Of course, there is continuous political collaboration in the NATO group. There are two meetings each year of foreign ministers of NATO and a meeting once a year at least of the defence ministers. In addition to that we have with the United States an annual ministerial meeting on economic trade and foreign policy questions. Then we also have an annual meeting with American ministers on defence and related matters. In addition to that we have the United States-Canada parliamentary group. We also have the Canada-France parliamentary group which was established last September and, more particularly, we have the NATO parliamentary group in which we participate. There are some of the means by which political co-operation is promoted between the various members of the organization.

Mr. WALKER: Then, I take it that actually Canada's defence cost, as it relates directly to the alliance—and I am not referring to all the expenditures within the alliance—with regard to military co-operation policy, takes practically 100 per



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

Dorothy F. Ballantine  
Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

PROCEEDINGS No. 23 THURSDAY, April 21, 1966

In the Evidence:

Page 55:

Delete the word "not" on line 28. The first part of Mr. Brewin's statement should read "I take it you do agree with the position indicated in the side memoire....."

THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 1966

Page 57:

Delete the word "BADGE" and substitute the word "TAPACKI" therefor.

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

The question beginning on line 29 and attributed to Mr. Pilon was made by Mr. Allmand.

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt  
and

- |                                    |                 |                  |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                       | Mr. Foy,        | Mr. McIntosh,    |
| Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ), | Mr. Groos,      | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Basford,                       | Mr. Harkness,   | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Brewin,                        | Mr. Klein,      | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Chatterton,                    | Mr. Laprise,    | Mr. Trudeau,     |
| Mr. Churchill,                     | Mr. Lind,       | Mrs. Wadds,      |
| Mr. Faulkner,                      | Mr. Macquarrie, | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Forest,                        |                 |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

CORRECTION (English copy only)

PROCEEDINGS No. 2—THURSDAY, April 21, 1966.

*In the Evidence:*

Page 55:

Delete the word "not" on line 22. The first part of Mr. Brewin's statement should read

"I take it you do agree with the position indicated in the aide memoire....."

Page 57:

Delete the word "NADGE" on line 31 and substitute the word "RAPACKI" therefor.

Page 69:

The question beginning on line 29 and attributed to Mr. Pilon was made by Mr. Allmand.

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs



MINUTE BOOK

ORDER OF REFERENCE

MONDAY, April 25, 1966.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Lind be substituted for that of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
The Clerk of the House.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Paulkner, Forest, Harkness, Lapine, Nesbitt, Thompson and Trudeau (10).

In attendance: The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, from the Department of External Affairs; Mr. M. Collins, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

Mr. Allmand drew attention to an error in issue No. 1 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. Mr. Brewin drew attention to two additional errors in the same issue. The Committee agreed to the three corrections.

The Chairman read the Second Report of the Sub-Committee on External Affairs which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Thursday, April 21, 1966, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Paulkner (Chairman), Brewin, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Nesbitt and Thompson.

Your Sub-Committee considered the suggestion that Mr. Eric Harley, an Australian writer and lecturer at present visiting Ottawa, be asked to appear before the Committee to be questioned on the subject of Rhodesia as he has recently come from that country.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend that:  
(a) in view of the fact the Committee has not finished hearing the Minister, no other witnesses be heard at this time; and  
(b) Your Sub-Committee will meet again after the questioning of the Minister has been completed to decide what other witnesses will be called on specific issues.

On motion of Mr. Nesbitt, seconded by Mr. Paulkner, the report was approved.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1965-1966.

The Minister was questioned on the subject of Viet Nam, including reference to Canadian medical assistance and other economic aid, the possibil-





EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, April 28, 1966.

(4)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9:45 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Harkness, Laprise, Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Thompson and Trudeau (15).

*In attendance:* The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; *From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

Mr. Allmand drew attention to an error in Issue No. 2 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. Mr. Brewin drew attention to two additional errors in the same Issue. The Committee agreed to the three corrections.

The Chairman read the *Second Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure* which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Thursday, April 21, 1966, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dubé (*Chairman*), Brewin, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Nesbitt and Thompson.

Your Sub-Committee considered the suggestion that Mr. Eric Butler, an Australian writer and lecturer at present visiting Ottawa, be called to appear before the Committee to be questioned on the subject of Rhodesia as he has recently come from that country.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend that:

- (a) In view of the fact the Committee has not finished hearing the Minister, no other witnesses be heard at this time; and
- (b) Your Sub-Committee will meet again after the questioning of the Minister has been completed to decide what other witnesses will be called on specific issues.

On motion of Mr. Nesbitt, seconded by Mr. Faulkner, the report was approved.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-1967.

The Minister was questioned on the subject of Viet Nam, including references to Canadian medical assistance and other economic aid, the possibili-

ty of reconvening a Geneva conference, consultations with Australia and New Zealand, and the functions and personnel of the International Control Commissions.

At 12:25 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair, on motion of Mr. McIntosh.

Hugh R. Stewart,  
Acting Clerk of the Committee.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 8:45 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dube, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allmand, Asselin (Charlevoix), Brawn, Charlevoix, Dube, Faulkner, Forest, Harkness, Laprise, Macdonald, Nesbitt, Pilon, Thompson and Trudeau (13).

In attendance: The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; from the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

Mr. Allmand drew attention to an error in Issue No. 2 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. Mr. Brawn drew attention to two additional errors in the same issue. The Committee agreed to the three corrections.

The Chairman read the Second Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Thursday, April 21, 1966, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dube (Chairman), Brawn, Macdonald (Rosebald), Nesbitt and Thompson.

Your Sub-Committee considered the suggestion that Mr. Eric Butler, an Australian writer and lecturer at present visiting Ottawa, be called to appear before the Committee to be questioned on the subject of Rhodesia as he has recently come from that country.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend that:

- (a) In view of the fact the Committee has not finished hearing the Minister, no other witnesses be heard at this time; and
- (b) Your Sub-Committee will meet again after the questioning of the Minister has been completed to decide what other witnesses will be called on specific issues.

On motion of Mr. Nesbitt, seconded by Mr. Faulkner, the report was approved.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-1967.

The Minister was questioned on the subject of Viet Nam, including references to Canadian medical assistance and other economic aid, the possible



### EVIDENCE

THURSDAY, April 28, 1966.

● (9:45 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Mr. Allmand, you have a correction to make?

Mr. ALLMAND: Yes, there is a correction that I want to make in the minutes of the last proceedings at page 69. I asked a question which is attributed to Mr. Pilon at the bottom of the page.

The CHAIRMAN: It should be under your name?

Mr. ALLMAND: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BREWIN: In the middle of page 55, I asked Mr. Martin a question which quotes me as saying: "I take it that you do not agree", where I think I said "that you do agree". However, I do not know that it affects Mr. Martin's answer very much.

Then, on page 57, 10 lines from the bottom I say: "On just one aspect of it, could you say whether, in the various ideas for the improvement of the structure of NATO and in regard to consideration of the future... you have in mind any east-west negotiations with NATO along the line of the NADGE Plan." I am not quite sure of what the NADGE Plan is, but I was not referring to it. I was referring to the Rapacki plan. Maybe I should have been referring to the NADGE plan, but I do not know anything about it.

Mr. MARTIN: NADGE is a category of NATO and stands for 'North American Defence Ground Environment'. It should be Rapacki.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we agreed to both the corrections of Mr. Brewin? Agreed.

I have a report of the sub-Committee. It is the second report of the sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure. It reads as follows: (*See Minutes*).

Will someone move to approve the report of the sub-committee on Agenda and Procedure?

Moved by Mr. Nesbitt and seconded by Mr. Faulkner that the report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure be approved.

Motion agreed to.

The Committee will now resume consideration of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-67. At our last meeting we were questioning the Minister on NATO and I believe that we had completed our questions on NATO. The other two topics raised by the Minister were the subjects of Vietnam and Rhodesia. Are we agreed that we should proceed now with the questions on Vietnam?

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I was wondering Mr. Chairman, in the light of certain reports of reaction to some of the Minister's comment on the NATO section as of



the last meeting, if he would like the opportunity to make any further statement or amplification on the references. I think he will know to which one I refer.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Do you mean with regard to the misunderstanding at the last meeting?

No, I think that we have cleared that up in the House of Commons. I do not think that there was anything that took place in this Committee that warranted the report that had been made.

Mr. NESBITT: I would like to ask a few questions on the subject of Vietnam. During the last debate on the subject of External Affairs in the House, a number of members asked questions of the Minister at the time, as to whether or not any type of medical assistance was going to be sent by the Government to South Vietnam. I was wondering if the Minister could enlighten us further at this time in that regard?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, Mr. Nesbitt. I should say that we have available for external aid to South Vietnam about a million and a half dollars. We increased our assistance to South Vietnam about a year and a half ago by some half million dollars. Naturally, we are anxious to do all that we can to assist that country by way of external aid, but generally speaking because of the conflict raging in that divided country, this has not been possible to the extent that we would like. In addition to the aid that is available, by way of external aid assistance,—

Mr. NESBITT: Excuse me, Mr. Martin, does that refer to economic aid?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. External aid can take many forms, it can take the form of capital grants, the form of technical assistance or the form of specific projects such as the medical assistance program. In addition to all this of course, there is the commitment of the Canadian Government to join with the Government of the United States and other governments in the programme for the development of the Mekong River basin.

With regard to your specific question, we have already approved an expenditure of 130 thousand dollars to build and equip a small hospital known as the Quang Ngai T.B. clinic. This was a project that was put to us by a Canadian medical adviser whom we had sent to Vietnam, Dr. A. Vennema. We are now proceeding with financial and administrative arrangements for this project and we expect to have it under way shortly. In our future planning, we are also keeping in mind that this project which is affiliated with the provincial hospital at Quang Ngai might provide the nucleus for further Canadian medical programs in this region.

In addition to this, as you know, Dr. Gingras of Montreal, a well known specialist in rehabilitation, was asked to proceed to Saigon and to prepare a report for the consideration of the Canadian and Vietnamese authorities regarding the establishment of a children's rehabilitation center. I regret to say that the Vietnamese authorities after a number of weeks of deliberation have not supported much of the proposal of Dr. Gingras and have suggested that the center be operated on an out patient basis only rather than as a combined out patient- in patient facility as was conceived by Dr. Gingras.



We had another problem with this rehabilitation center and that was in connection with the site for the planned center. Dr. Gingras had originally selected a particular building which we have now been advised could not be made available by the Vietnamese Government. A second possibility was to locate our project in the existing national rehabilitation center. The Vietnamese are now proposing that this project be within the framework of the existing military rehabilitation complex. This would create some problems because of the military atmosphere of the building. Our project as initially planned was expected to cost approximately 500 thousand dollars in the first year, plus 300 thousand dollars annually thereafter until a transfer of the facilities could be made to the Vietnamese Government in 3 to 5 years. I may say that these costs have gone up very considerably. I do not know whether we are going to be able to make any progress now in this rehabilitation concept of Dr. Gingras. In any event, the key decisions do not rest with us.

We have in addition packaged a number of emergency hospital units for Canadian civil defence purposes which could be made available quickly for use in Vietnam. This project is of a type specifically encouraged by the Vietnamese and by others. Each unit consists of medical supplies and equipment for servicing of up to 200 beds, and features operating, x-ray, receiving and dispensary facilities and power sources.

You ask me whether they had been sent? No they have not been sent but we are now seeing whether or not this will not be acceptable. These are estimated to cost about 70 thousand dollars per unit. We think that we can make up to ten of these units available but it just is not easy to get these external aid projects realised, and I think that the Committee will understand that because of the confusion that exists in Vietnam at this time, this is not unexpected.

We have also been asked to consider the provision of one or more medical teams for service in Vietnam and we have indicated that we would be prepared to consider doing so. The kind of team that we would like to be able to send would be a team consisting of three doctors, and a supporting staff of 12, including orderlies and medical technicians. The cost of such a team would be roughly 400 thousand dollars a year. We have indicated our interest in this, but there again we have not been able to get the kind of clearance and finalize the kind of arrangements that make it possible to set this project up.

We have, as I have said, a substantial program in preparation for the provision of a T.B. clinic. We have also told the Government of Vietnam that we would be pleased to assist in the printing and the distribution of text books that are badly needed. We would be prepared to assist in the production of about 460 thousand copies of a social study text book for use in Vietnamese schools. The cost of the production of such books in Canada would probably exceed a million and a half dollars. We would like to assist in this work. Australia is also prepared to give help in a similar project. We have not yet made, however, any final arrangements.

Mr. NESBITT: There are one or two questions that I would like to ask the Minister arising out of his statement. The hospital units that he mentioned costing around 70 thousand dollars each, would they be available for civilian use or military use or a combination of both?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They would be available for civilian use. We have not been asked nor have we considered giving military assistance of any kind.

Mr. NESBITT: The Minister then considers that any hospital or medical units of any kind would only apply to civilians of Vietnam and not to the American, or Australian, or New Zealand military personnel that might require treatment?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have never been asked to give that kind of assistance.

Mr. NESBITT: It would not be the intention of the Government to offer such assistance?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Could I ask a supplementary at this point? When you speak of these hospital units, are you referring only to material supplies or is any personnel involved?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There could be personnel as well.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Will they be Canadians?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would they be in charge?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, it all depends on the arrangement. We would not object to working with Vietnamese doctors at all.

Mr. HARKNESS: The hospital units that you are mentioning—the 70 thousand dollars involved concerns the personnel is that correct?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, the project would come under our external aid funds.

Mr. HARKNESS: Beds, instruments and so forth?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I also indicated that we would be interested in helping them with a glaucoma clinic which is badly needed.

Mr. NESBITT: Would the minister consider that any medical aid which could be made available to the military personnel of the United States, Vietnamese or other armed forces, such as the South Korean, Phillipines, or Australian forces, that the offering of medical aid to military personnel would jeopardize our position on the Control Commission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I prefer simply to say that we have not been asked to provide this kind of medical care for military personnel.

Mr. NESBITT: Would the Minister think that it might jeopardize or would jeopardize our position on the Control Commission if such aid were made available?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that a lot would depend on the circumstances, where it was and so on.

Mr. NESBITT: If such type of medical aid were to be made available, would the Minister think that it might give some encouragement to our friends in the United States, Australia and New Zealand, to show that we had some interest in what happened to their armed forces personnel there?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that at the present time there would be more interest in the United States in the efforts of Canada as a member of the International Control Commission to assist in trying to bring about a negotiated settlement. That is where at the present time the main interest, in Canadian policy lies, not only in the United States, but elsewhere.

Mr. NESBITT: That may well be Mr. Minister, but are the two projects mutually exclusive and would the Minister not think that there has been considerable criticism of Canada in the United States of our failure to be of assistance to them. I realise that some of this criticism was perhaps not too well informed, but would the Minister not think that at least medical assistance and perhaps some military medical personnel such as army doctors and . . .

• (10:00 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think that you can make foreign policy simply to avoid criticism. I do not think that I can amplify my reply any further. I am not aware that there is any substantial criticism of Canada in this area. I do know that the Government of the United States, as well as other Governments, is interested in what Canada and others are seeking to do with regard to trying to bring about a negotiated settlement.

Mr. NESBITT: I agree and that is a very important aspect of it. It is my understanding that the Government supports the general policies of the Government of the United States in Vietnam. Does the Minister not think that at least some outward and visible sign of encouragement or of moral support by means of medical personnel which could help treat injured and wounded members of the armed forces there would be of some help?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have gone over this two or three times, I do not think I can say anything more that would be helpful.

Mr. NESBITT: One more question in that regard. Since apparently the Minister said that there is some difficulty, administration wise, in obtaining locations for medical support such as hospital units and the like, and locating them, has any further consideration been given to sending a small hospital ship to the area? There would be no trouble locating that, it could be anchored in the harbour.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have looked into the idea of a hospital ship not only for Vietnam but for external aid purposes generally. We have not found this to be a practical proposal.

Mr. NESBITT: Could the Minister give some indication as to why it would not be a practical proposal in view of the fact that the West German Government is sending a hospital ship, "The Heligoland", I believe is the name.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Have they decided that they are sending it?

Mr. NESBITT: I am informed by the German Embassy that the Heligoland will ship 3 thousand tons, will be completely outfitted with their medical personnel and will be sailing to Vietnam in the early fall of this year.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I did not know that.

Mr. NESBITT: I thought that in view of that perhaps that further consideration might be given; having some experience—



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I will be glad to have this looked at again.

Mr. NESBITT: I was just going to mention sir, that in view of previous experience some years ago, the idea of a hospital ship might be very practical indeed.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not have the details fully in my mind, but I do know that we did examine—not in the Vietnam context, but with the idea of providing health assistance to countries who are receiving external aid—we did look into this idea, and it was not thought to be a practical scheme. I forget the details at the moment. I would have to look into it again and brush up, but I would be glad to do that.

Mr. NESBITT: It is difficult to understand why it would be impractical, particularly in that area where it is so difficult to find a place to park, so to speak.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): These things look very good, but if you are going to try to give medical assistance, let us say; to Asia—

Mr. NESBITT: We are talking about Vietnam at the moment.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know why you would want to do it by way of a medical ship.

Mr. NESBITT: Well, the Minister himself was pointing out there was some difficulty with Vietnamese authorities in finding suitable location for other things. This would be no problem, they could move it around from harbour to harbour where it might be needed to service civilians and children and the like.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would be very surprised if that was practical in Vietnam at the present time.

Mr. NESBITT: The Germans seem to think so.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am going to look into that, but that is not my information.

Mr. NESBITT: I was informed of that by the German embassy only yesterday.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I find that you and I had some questions about this in the House. I cannot add anything to this.

Mr. HARKNESS: If I might just ask a question at this point Mr. Chairman, what is the total estimated cost of this military and other economic aid for the current fiscal year, as far as Vietnam is concerned?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have about a million and a half dollars available.

Mr. HARKNESS: Is that to cover whatever medical assistance might be sent and other economic aid?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, we would have enough funds to provide substantial medical aid if we could get the doctors, if we could get the agreement, if we could get the facilities. We have now about three projects.



There are the two T.B. clinics that I mentioned. I mentioned the glaucoma clinic, and we think that it is a very useful thing to set up there.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have heard you setting the estimates and I wondered what the total estimated cost of these various things that you have mentioned might be?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They could come within our allocations—

Mr. McINTOSH: I have a question on that. Would that include the cost of Canada's participation on the International Control Commission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, that is quite a different operation, and Mr. Harkness advised me some time ago that he wanted to discuss that. Those expenditures are completely separate.

Mr. HARKNESS: I might come back to that whenever we have the chance.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would be honoured.

Mr. ALLMAND: Mr. Chairman, in the Minister's statement of April 4th, at page 24, he says:

A reconvened Geneva Conference is and remains, of course, the end result of the development we hope to be able to set in train, but it is not the first step. Indeed, I would be afraid, if we tried to make it the first step, that we are more likely to exhaust than to establish such influence as we may be able to have with the parties principally concerned in the Vietnam conflict.

My question is this: In view of the lack of progress in reducing or bringing about an end to the conflict in Vietnam, I am wondering what influence we would be exhausting if we were to immediately attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference. It would seem to me that the International Control Commission has been unable to enforce the 1954 Geneva agreement and has been making no progress in this respect, and perhaps we should try to reconvene the convention immediately.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Allmand, I think that there is some confusion here about the role of the Commission and its authority in regard to the calling of a conference. I wonder if I could seek to put this important question of yours—which is at the heart of the whole problem of course—in proper perspective, as I see it.

The International Control Commission was not set up to enforce the agreement. That was not the purpose of these control bodies in any one of the three Indo-China countries. They were set up to supervise and to report on the extent to which the signatories, the parties concerned, lived up to the cease-fire agreements. That was the only purpose of the Control Commissions. They neither had the authority nor did they have the facility for seeking to enforce the agreements. They were set up as supervisory bodies charged with reporting on the extent to which the agreements were being adhered to, on the extent to which the signatories—that is, the parties concerned—lived up to the Geneva agreements. That was the only purpose of the Control Commissions. They neither had the authority, nor did they have the facility, for seeking to enforce the agreements. They were set up as supervisory bodies to make findings and to



report on the extent to which the agreements were being adhered to. Now, the calling of a Geneva Conference to permit a discussion of the dispute in Vietnam is the objective to which the Government of Canada certainly is strongly committed. The Conference can be called at the instance of the co-chairmen, the co-chairmen being the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Soviet Union. On two occasions we have joined with others in urging the two co-chairmen to call a conference of the Geneva powers to discuss the possibility of bringing an end to the war in Vietnam, but we have not succeeded in persuading the Soviet Union to join with the British in the calling of such a conference. Mr. Wilson, the British Prime Minister, went to Moscow in January, and this matter was discussed again with the same results. Now, we have decided in Canada to look at the realities of the situation, and while we believe it is desirable that a conference should be called our judgment is that there is not going to be a Geneva Conference called in the foreseeable future. I regret this, but that is a fact. It is a fact based on discussions that we have had with all parties concerned. And it was a factor in the proposal that Canada made to the Government of Poland and the Government of India, our two colleague members on the International Control Commission.

● (10:15 a.m.)

Mr. NESBITT: Was there unanimity amongst the Control Commission on this initiative?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I want to be very fair to India and Poland in this matter, and this is a very vital matter that we are engaged in. We have had full—I might say that, so there will be no misunderstanding—we have had very full co-operation from both Poland and India, but this is a very vital matter. It is not a simple matter. I was dealing with the question of the Conference. I do not believe, much as I would like to think the situation is otherwise, that it is practical to envisage that a Geneva Conference on this question can be called with any hope of there being anything like a full participation of all the parties who would be necessary to make the conference a useful venture. It was for this reason that we made the proposal. On April 4, I explained our conception of a Commission role. I do not want to go over the same ground again, except to say that what we had in mind and what we have in mind at the moment is not the calling of such a conference for the reasons that I stated. I say that because it is our judgment that such an appeal would not meet a positive response in present circumstances. The public positions of the parties are still too far apart to make possible a beginning of useful talks. It is toward the possibilities of narrowing these gaps that we have been directing our thinking. In a complex situation like this one, there is no magic formula which would result in an immediate cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations. The beginning of negotiations depends on the extent to which the parties to the conflict are prepared to negotiate, and there is no way in which third parties can bring them together against their will and at a time which they do not themselves judge to be right.

Mr. ALLMAND: May I ask a question, Mr. Martin? Which countries do you think would not give a positive response to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I do not believe, in view of our interest in this proposal that I would want to be quoted as complicating the picture. We are having discussions now with a number of countries, and I do not think it would be much use for me to try to apportion blame at this particular stage. I simply want to say that I am sure that at this point, insofar as the Vietnam situation is concerned, we have not reached the point where conditions are ripe for the calling of such a conference. It is for this reason that we have thought that there is a job to be done in clarifying the positions of the parties to see whether it might be possible to establish some element of common ground between them. Now, this is a process that takes time and a great deal of patience. We do not intend to give up because progress is slow or because everything does not fall into place at once. In diplomacy, things just do not happen that way, and we never had any expectation that they would happen that way. I can only say, having in mind the desirability of a Geneva Conference, that our discussions are continuing, and that nothing we have learned as a result of these discussions has discouraged us or dissuaded us that the Commission may not, at the right time, be able to play the sort of role which we believe would be possible. I have had an opportunity of reviewing this matter again with authorities at the United Nations, and with representatives of the Government of the United States. I discussed this matter last week with Mr. Harriman. I have had an opportunity of discussing this matter with the Soviet Union, with spokesmen for India and Poland, and with others, and I believe that this very difficult situation in Vietnam will be resolved only through some process such as the one that we have been thinking about. It should not be forgotten, and must not be forgotten, that the Commission is the only body that has direct access to the Government in Saigon, and to the Government in Hanoi. We are not wedded to any particular instrument to bring about negotiations. Senator Mansfield the other day proposed not a Geneva type of conference, but a conference of the Asian powers along with the United States. We now know that this proposal is not acceptable. We would certainly have strongly supported that proposal if it had been accepted. It was not acceptable to both sides. There are some who believe that the United Nations is the instrument by which these conflicting sides will be brought together. I would like to think that was the case, but I do not believe it is the case. We now know from Hanoi that it is not the case. This is the view of the Secretary General of the United Nations himself, who feels that at the proper time the Geneva framework might be used. When we asked one of our former High Commissioners, Mr. Chester Ronning, to go to Hanoi about six weeks ago, where he was well received, I should like to underline that he went there not as a member of the Control Commission. The visits which he undertook were not a direct part of the operation which we envisage for the Control Commission in due course. All I can say about these visits at this time is that they were intended to explore the positions of the two governments in Vietnam without whose acquiescence, if not active co-operation, an eventual Commission operation could scarcely be carried forward with any prospect of success.

Mr. ALLMAND: Mr. Martin, if we could convince, if the three members of the Commission could be convinced that the Geneva Conference is a desirable



goal, would not the recommendation of the three to the co-chairmen have considerable influence in actively bringing about such a conference? Are we working on the other two members to do this, and what is their attitude? Mr. Faulkner asked if there was unanimous agreement among the three that this was a desirable goal?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I regret that at this stage, I really cannot discuss what the position of Poland or India is on this matter. I do not think that I should be pressed any further as to what they think. I simply said that I do not believe that the time is now ripe to call a Geneva Conference. I wish it were otherwise. I think a great deal of groundwork has to be undertaken. We are engaged in doing that. It would be easy to make an appeal to the powers to call a conference. We have done that at a time when we thought that appeals were useful. It has been made not only by Canada but by many other countries. It was made by the Commonwealth itself. I am satisfied, without any doubt, that appeals by themselves at this time will not bring about the calling of such a conference.

Mr. ALLMAND: So, is it not possible that this might escalate into something much worse? Do we not need some new means of trying to bring about a settlement if the other means are not working?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, that is exactly what I have been trying to say for the last few minutes. We are engaged in what we believe is the only effective instrument to try and bring about an accommodation in this matter. Every effort has been made, appeals, all sorts of peace missions, intermediaries of various sorts. Many countries have tried. The United States in January put forward a resolution in the Security Council in the hope of having the United Nations become an effective instrument in this matter. Our own view was that the United States certainly had every right to bring this matter to the Security Council. We never felt ourselves that the United Nations could prove to be the instrument of bringing the parties together for the simple reason that many of the parties concerned, are not members of the United Nations and they would not heed any request. We are aware of the position of the Secretary General himself in this whole matter, altogether apart from the Security Council. It was for this reason that we decided that the International Control Commission, made up of three countries, with a wide body of varied world opinion behind the three, with a pattern of operations in Indochina now for eleven years, with access to the capitals of both countries, might prove to be a useful instrument; there might be an effective role for it to play in bringing about the kind of negotiations that could lead to a settlement. We have recognized that the three must act together. This is not the kind of a role in which only two could act, or one. This does not mean to say that Canada is not prepared to act alone; it does not mean to say that Canada is not now engaged in doing what it can as an individual country, because we are. But, this is a very complicated matter. There are many national interests involved. I can only say that our negotiations with India and Poland continue to revolve around a role for the Commission in the right circumstances at the right time.

The CHAIRMAN: I have Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Brewin. If Mr. Allmand has finished, we will follow the order and proceed to



Mr. McIntosh. Members will be free to ask questions again on the International Commission.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, at a former meeting of this Committee, you made a statement that if Canadian foreign policy is to have any impact, it must be on the future rather than on the past. I agree with that. However, I do not believe that we have enough history of this conflict, and I am talking as a Canadian citizen and this possibly was one of the reasons we tried to press you during the debate on your Estimates earlier this year to issue a White Paper on this conflict in Vietnam. Now, I am concerned with the history and how it affects two other members of the Commonwealth namely, Australia and New Zealand. Has your Department been in contact with these two other members of the Commonwealth as to their concern in this conflict? And I want to go just a step further. From other information which I have received I understand and I understand this—generally, that Red China has designs on the continent of Australia. Now, this is taken from writings of Chinese leaders and, apparently, someone has copies of these. I wonder if your Department has this information. I understand they say that they believe in these revolutionary wars and they will help them morally as well as materially. And, the inference is given that this war in Indochina at the present time is just a stepping-stone to Australia. Can you give us the information that you have within the Department on that, or any communications, between the Australian Government, the New Zealand Government and the Canadian Government with regard to this aspect of the conflict?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essx East*): Mr. McIntosh, on June 10, 1965 I put on the record our assessment of the historical situation, as you refer to it. In January of this year in Parliament I did the same thing again. I think you will find in Parliament last year there were two statements along these lines. And, we have had considerable discussion in this Committee about the majority report of the Commission in 1962 and the minority report of the Commission of February 1965, so that we have placed on the record our analysis of this problem so far as we see it. Of course we are in touch with the Commonwealth countries of Australia and New Zealand. We have continuous consultation, of course, with all the Commonwealth countries all the time, on all conceivable subjects, just as we have on various matters with governments who have missions here in Ottawa. We have had very close consultation with Australia and New Zealand on this, I assure you, and I have placed on the record—I do not know whether it was in this Committee or in *Hansard*—I think it was in this Committee—a statement, an analysis of this problem, by Mr. Paul Hasluck, the Foreign Minister for Australia. We are very conscious of the position of the Commonwealth countries, and we have had discussions with these two and other countries about the matter that I was discussing a few moments ago in answer to Mr. Allmand's question. I can say that only the day before yesterday our own people had discussions with a senior official from Australia's Ministry of Defence. What I am anxious to have the Committee appreciate is that at the moment Canada, with the approval of the United Nations, of the Governments of the United States, of Poland, and of India, with the knowledge of other governments—and I am using my words as carefully as I can here—is engaged in an effort to try and bring about some basis for negotiations, and, I am not



anxious, by anything that I say, to cause this assignment to have greater difficulty in being realized. That is why I am sure that the Committee will understand why I have answered Mr. McIntosh's question in the way I have.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I am not quite satisfied with the Minister's answer. I will rephrase it so you can answer it yes or no.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not anxious at this stage to engage in the examination of a problem which would render difficult the role that Canada is now seeking to play.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I only have two questions, and I will make them brief. So far as the Canadian Government is concerned, are we aware that Australia and New Zealand are concerned about the designs of Red China on—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): On the first, yes—

Mr. MCINTOSH: The answer is yes?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): On the 10th of June, 1965, I put on the record of this Committee a statement on the Prime Minister of New Zealand with regard to that government's view, together with a statement of the Foreign Minister of Australia, Paul Hasluck. We are fully aware of their position.

Mr. MCINTOSH: They are concerned about it?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Everybody is concerned, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I mean about the designs of Red China.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I thought you were talking about the war in Vietnam.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No, no. Oh, no.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I thought we were talking about their participation in the conflict in Vietnam.

Mr. MCINTOSH: No. I said that we have to go back on the history of it. Now, have you any information that Red China has designs on New Zealand or Australia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I don't think it is a secret what the Chinese Government has outlined as its policy. The views of the Government of China are well known.

Mr. MCINTOSH: So far as I am concerned it is a secret right now unless you tell us that you have information.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think it is a secret. I think that the declarations of the Chinese Communist Government are well known.

Mr. MCINTOSH: And that they have designs on Australia and New Zealand?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, you say designs, they have a desire, naturally, in one sense, they wish to see their form of life predominate and they have been giving encouragement to the wars of liberation designed to bring that about. But that is one of the reasons why there is the ANZUS Treaty and other groupings of power in Asia.



Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, it is not my intention to embarrass you or to try to get you to say something you do not wish to.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, no, you are not embarrassing me. I just want to answer your question.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am just trying to get as much information as possible for the Canadian people on the history of this conflict. Now, you have been skating around my questions and actually not answering them.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think you will agree that there was a lack of clarity in the questions that did not bring the specific response that you are asking.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am trying to make it as simple as I possibly can.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You are asking me if it is well known that China wants to gobble up Australia?

Mr. McINTOSH: That is one way of wording it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can only repeat the intentions of the Government of China have been stated over and over again. They were not stated in those precise words.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, what were their intentions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I ask you to read the declaration—

Mr. McINTOSH: No.—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Just a few words. I think you must realize, Mr. McIntosh, that foreign policy does not lend itself to simplification.

Mr. McINTOSH: As I said before, I am not trying to embarrass you.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You are not embarrassing me. My effort is to try not to embarrass you.

Mr. McINTOSH: That might be very simple and easy to do. But as I understand it, then, that is all the information you can give us.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You may be interested to know that in 1954, the Australian Government passed an Act of Parliament to ratify the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, and the preamble of that Act, which was carried unanimously, reads as follows:

Whereas the independence and integrity of the countries and territories of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific are threatened by the aggressive policies of international communism, and whereas those communist policies have already shown themselves in Korea, Indochina and elsewhere by armed aggression, by armed insurrection assisted from without and otherwise, and whereas those communist policies represent a common danger to the security of Australia, and to the world generally, and are a violation of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

But, you and I knew that, of course, without having had it called to our attention by your question.



Mr. McINTOSH: I may have read that some place in the paper but I did not get it from the Minister of External Affairs before. Thank you for your answer.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back to two aspects of the immediate situation in South Vietnam at the present time. The first relates to the International Control Commission's activities at the present time. Can the Minister inform us just what activity the I.C.C. is involved with at this time? Is there any effort being made to bring forth some substantive action, or is it just a wait-and-see situation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You mean in respect of what? Do you mean in respect of the functions under the Geneva Agreement? Or in respect of its functions under the proposal made by Canada?

Mr. THOMPSON: Either one.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They are two separate functions.

Mr. THOMPSON: Yes, but I am speaking of the I.C.C. generally—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I want to know exactly what you mean because this is a very important matter. If you are asking me about what is happening to the members of the body in terms of the Canadian proposal, I have already dealt with that to the extent that I feel I can at this time. With regard to the functions of the Commission, pursuant to the Geneva Agreement, the Commission obviously is not to carry out its functions as fully as it would like. For instance, the team sites in the north have been withdrawn at the instance of the Government of the north, but the Commission continues to make periodic visits to Hanoi. Normally the Commission is in residence in Saigon. It will be moving to the north very soon again, when our representative on the Commission, Mr. Victor Moore, will be in Hanoi, but it must be obvious that the Commission in the present state of conflict in Vietnam is not able to discharge its functions as it is expected under the Geneva Agreement to do. The Commission in Cambodia has not been very active. However, their Government invited the Commission there to engage in a control of the border area. The Commission in Laos has had a very busy time, within the past eight or nine months when its responsibilities have been as active as they were at any time before. Did you want me to give you some idea about the Commission—

Mr. THOMPSON: I was specifically concerned as to whether or not the Commission, particularly our members on the Commission, are able to have any rapport or dialogue with responsible leaders in Cambodia and Laos, and more important, in North Vietnam, or is there no opportunity?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh yes. There is the greatest opportunity. I have been saying that the Commission is the only body that has access to both capitals. Our representative on the Commission has had, within the past seven weeks, two useful exchanges in Hanoi. In addition to that, Mr. Ronning, about six weeks ago, paid a visit to Hanoi and had discussions with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Because of the frustrations that exist and the lack of opportunity for the Commission to discharge its Geneva Agreement functions, this is the *raison d'être*—the reason for our belief that there is, or that there might be, a useful future role for the Commission in bringing about a



negotiated settlement. I am not saying that it is the only means of contact, but it is the only known means of contact with both sides.

• (10:50 a.m.)

Mr. THOMPSON: On that basis, then, there is some justification for the impression that you have conveyed that what Canada is involved in has some hopeful objectives in mind.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not want to say anything that will exaggerate what could happen, but I am simply saying to you, Mr. Thompson, that from the beginning, we believed that a military solution of this problem alone was neither practicable nor desirable, and we have been convinced right from the beginning of the desire of the Government of the United States to enter into peace talks, and to enter into peace talks without pre-conditions. This policy of the United States was announced after the appeal that had been made by the seventeen unaligned nations in April of 1965.

Realizing that it was the policy of the United States, we have tried various devices ourselves, alone and in concert with other countries, all to no avail. And it was in December last year that we began to think that the time had come when we might seek to ascertain if there was a role for the Commission, for the reasons that I have stated, and nothing that has happened has in any way influenced us to think that this was not a correct judgment. Whether it succeeds, no one can tell, but there is no hope at the United Nations, the possibilities of the calling of a Geneva Conference to deal with Vietnam are not promising, as I have indicated, the hope of calling a conference on Vietnam indirectly by discussing Cambodia, the problems of guaranteeing the borders of Cambodia or a conference on Laos for the same indirect purpose—all of these have led nowhere. There have been discussions in the United Nations. They have led nowhere. And it was after preparing the ground carefully that we have put forward the view that while there is no authority in the Geneva Agreement for this kind of role for the Commission, it seems to us very strongly that it would be a great waste if these three countries, with their experience in Indochina over a period of eleven years could not be used to try to bring about the beginning, or to explore, as a body, the possibilities of ascertaining whether there is a basis for negotiation. We continue to believe that this is a constructive course to take. We are supported in this, I assure you, on a very wide front.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the Minister one or two questions in regard to the present situation as it is in Vietnam now. I believe reports would indicate that there is a deteriorating situation; first of all, because of the Buddhists and, their struggle with the Government, the growing anti-American attitude; the slow-down in ground warfare and also the escalation in the last few days of the air war as it relates specifically to North Vietnam. Then there was a report of the growing strength of the insurgency movements in North Thailand. All of these enter into the current picture of the last week.

The Minister has informed us that he has, in recent days, been in consultation with Averell Harriman, that he has been in constant contact with the Secretary General of the U.N., and with the Secretary of State of the United States. Can he inform us whether or not this situation is in any way



changing American policy? Are there any new developments as it relates to the American effort there, that throw any light on the situation or on U.N. policy?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I find that a very difficult question to answer in the terms in which it is put. According to the best information available to me, for instance, the B-52 attacks have been directed at the lines of communication which are known to be used by the North Vietnamese in sending men and supplies to South Vietnam. I have in mind specifically the Mu Gia Pass, which is one of the important entrances to the Ho Chi Minh trail running down through Laos. As far as targets for U.S. aerial attacks are concerned, there is no evidence thus far of any new departures in United States policy. There have been recent strikes against the power plant outside Haiphong, but this target was struck some months ago. Similarly, the recent strikes on the missile site, some distance outside Hanoi, do not seem to reflect any new military decisions, although it would appear that some of these sites may be somewhat closer to Hanoi than those that have been hit before.

I was interested in the comments made a few days ago by the Deputy Defence Secretary of the United States, Mr. Vance, when he was asked about United States military action in the vicinity of Hanoi.

He is reported to have said, "We have been attacking targets in the Hanoi area, military targets, bridges, roads, and that type of target, for a considerable period of time. It certainly does not mean that we are going to attack Hanoi." That is the statement that is reported and attributed to Mr. Vance. I do not know that I can say much more in answer to that question.

Mr. THOMPSON: Is there any danger of a further political upheaval or breakdown as far as the Vietnamese government is concerned?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know that I can deal with or give you any satisfactory information on the situation.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if Mr. Martin would comment on a statement at page 19 of the evidence on April 14. I think perhaps what he said is capable of misunderstanding. He said: "I also believe we are unlikely to achieve anything useful by a policy of denunciation which is sometimes being urged on the government by those who take issue with our position." I know the Minister chooses his words very carefully, and I wondered if he drew a distinction between a policy of denunciation and a policy of moderate and reasoned disagreement with the policies of the United States. You were not referring to criticisms of certain policies of the United States similar to those made by distinguished Americans, were you, in this context of policy?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. I was dealing there in the remarks that I made—and I hope Mr. McIntosh did not misunderstand me—with my answer to his question. I was saying that I was trying to avoid being drawn into a situation that was not going to help what Canada is seeking to do in its particular initiative. That is what I had in mind.

Mr. BREWIN: I think you do recognize that it is possible for Canadians as well as for Americans to disagree in pretty good faith with American policy and to say so.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, I think there is no finer demonstration of democratic freedom than the great debates that have been taking place in the United States itself. I think the United States has given to the world the finest example of democracy in action in the way in which, in the face of the heavy responsibilities that attend that nation and its government, there has continued to take place in its Congress, the kind of debate that has taken place.

Mr. BREWIN: Presumably in Canada we have exactly the same, or similar freedom to have differences of opinion.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, then, if I may go on with the questions on to the general situation, I noticed the other day that there was a reference by, I think, Kenneth Younger in an article, to the war in Vietnam as bedevilling the whole world relationship, in connection with, I think he said the non-dissemination proposals and treaties and discussions, and in particular the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. relationship. Would you agree with that? Is it a fair description of what is happening as a result of the continuation of this war—the bedevilment of the relationships between the different great powers?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I don't know that I would use Mr. Younger's words exactly. I know Mr. Younger's point of view. Undoubtedly if the conflicts of the world were reduced to a minimum, it would encourage a greater measure of agreement between the most powerful nations in the world at the present time; but I want to say that in spite of the war in Vietnam, I am somewhat optimistic about the possibility of some agreement in the Eighteen-Power Disarmament Committee, but there is no doubt that the war in Vietnam and all of its involvement renders more difficult the solution of international problems in particular areas. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder, Mr. Martin, if you would agree with this proposition—I think you have said this before, and I think we would all agree—that the ending of this war is not likely to come out of the military success of either side, but is more likely to result, and can perhaps only result, from negotiations. Is that your view?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is my view, and that is also the view of the Government of the United States as declared by that government.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, then, is it the problem about fruitful negotiations that either one side to the conflict, or the other, insists upon unacceptable pre-conditions before they will enter into any negotiations?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, at the present time, on the basis of the fourteen points put forward by the Government of the United States, the five points put forward by the Viet Cong, the four points put forward by Hanoi, I think there is some basis for your statement, but I do not think that this should preclude negotiations that could examine whether or not there is a basis for negotiations on these very points.

Mr. BREWIN: Would it be possible to reduce or refine or change some of these pre-conditions to the point that negotiation then becomes possible?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the case of the United States, there are no pre-conditions—



Mr. BREWIN: Well, if this is so, I noticed that Senator—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): —except presence of the United States forces until such time as the situation has improved.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps you could elucidate for me, then, something on that, which perhaps, I misunderstood. Senator Robert Kennedy, I understand, in the Foreign Relations Committee, made a statement in reply to questions which suggested that it was necessary, in order that the negotiations be fruitful, to recognize that the so-called National Liberation Front did control part of the country and might form part of some interim government while negotiations went on. Has this view been expressed by the American Government, or is this just Senator Kennedy's suggestion?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not aware of Senator Kennedy's suggestions. I would like to look at them before I commented on them.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Martin, you say you are not aware of his suggestions. Might I ask you if it is your understanding that the American Government has expressed, or does express, any willingness to see some representatives of the National Liberation Front as part of an interim government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): May I say first of all, so that there will be no misunderstanding with regard to your previous observation, that the position of the Government of the United States is that it is prepared to negotiate without any pre-conditions. This was the essence of the appeal made by the unaligned powers in April of last year, and this was accepted by President Johnson and has continued to be the policy of the United States. I have made a qualification by saying that, of course, there was a pre-condition, and that is that the United States Forces proposed to stay in Vietnam until there had been a settlement of the problem. But, with that exception, there are no pre-conditions.

Now, I am not in a position to say what the policy of the Government of the United States will be with regard to the representation of the Viet Cong. The position of the Viet Cong at any future negotiating table has, of course, been the subject of considerable public discussion. I myself do not believe that it is a key issue at this stage in the sense that negotiations would begin to-morrow, if only the United States accepted the Viet Cong as an independent participant in a conference such as is proposed by the other side. What seems to stand in the way of a conference is not this. It is the very wide gap which separates the positions of the various parties on the fourteen points and on the four, and on the five points of the Viet Cong.

Mr. BREWIN: Could you tell us in outline—I know you would not want to go into detail—what does separate the parties and their differences. I mentioned what Senator Kennedy mentioned.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, the North has indicated that it has four conditions that must be accepted. I do not know whether you want me to read them.

Mr. BREWIN: You do not need to, Mr. Martin, because I am familiar with them. But I want to ask you: Is there complete rigidity on those four conditions or have the explorations of our government and those of the International



Control Commission—led to the belief that there might be some modification of those four conditions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Now we get into territory in which you must recognize I have to be very careful. This is the area that I think has to be carefully explored. I believe that the differences in the various positions are not necessarily as rigid as they appear, and that the conditions and the timing when some of these conditions are to be implemented are very important. It is for this, among other reasons, that I feel that a mild and informal sort of probing by a body such as the Commission might be able to play a very great part.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Martin, you have mentioned before—I think you mentioned it on April 4—the fact that Mr. Ronning, a very distinguished Canadian, was in Hanoi, and I know he has had a lot of experience, particularly in the East, and that you once, I think, told Mr. Nesbitt in the House in answer to a question that he was not at that stage, if I recall the words right, available as a witness before this Committee.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, no, he would not be available at this stage.

Mr. BREWIN: Not at the present stage. Would he be available at a future stage? Because I am sure he could throw some light on the—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would hope that the time would be when Mr. Ronning could come to the Committee, but beyond that, at this stage, I do not want to say anything.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps you could let the Chairman know if he does become available, because I am sure the members of the Committee would very much like to hear from Mr. Ronning.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would hope that developments would take place to make that possible. This will depend on the events in the future.

Mr. BREWIN: Just one further question. Have you any information for the Committee on the proposed elections in South Vietnam? We are all aware, and I think you referred to it before, of the number of disturbances in South Vietnam that made the condition of the military government there somewhat in doubt. Have you any knowledge as to whether these are to be genuine elections? Are they to be carried out and in your view are they likely to change the situation in South Vietnam at all?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have no reason to believe that the elections would change the situation in a manner that would affect the presence of United States forces in that country.

Mr. BREWIN: You understand that the election will proceed? There is no international body involved—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Just a minute, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Is it your understanding that conditions in South Vietnam are such as to make some sort of election meaningful?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, I think so. I think that in itself the democratization of the situation there meets with popular approval and demand, and there is to be a commission set up to establish the conditions under which



the elections will be held, and to guarantee that it will be a free election. This is what I understand to be the situation.

Mr. BREWIN: Can you tell us anything about who controls the commission? Is it the present military authorities, or—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot tell you. I am just giving you the benefit of our despatches. I suppose the exact composition of the commission will be a matter to be negotiated between the various parties in the South—the Buddhists, the Catholics, and others.

Mr. BREWIN: Is it feasible to intrude in the elections in parts of the country which, we understand, are under the control of the Viet Cong?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know.

Mr. BREWIN: That is all.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Martin, there is a good deal of confusion, I think, in the minds of Canadians generally as to the exact functions of the International Joint Commission in Vietnam. You noted in your presentation at our first meeting that the Geneva Agreements had set up the Commission, but that they did not confer on it the powers which legally would enable it to arbitrate or settle disputes, which is something which, I think, a lot of people did not realize previously and probably don't still, but nevertheless you have now made that point clear. Now, could you tell us what exactly are the functions which the Commission is supposed to perform in Vietnam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In Vietnam and Laos, the main function of the Commission, generally, is the carrying out of investigations of reported breaches of the agreements, which the Commission are supervising. That is revealed in the nature of the majority report of 1962 and in the 1965 minority report, but as I told Mr. Allmand, the Commission is not there as an enforcing body. It has neither the authority nor the military personnel nor the power to carry out such a function. It is just there as a presence—an international presence—to report on the way in which the Agreement is being carried out by the parties to it. We proposed that the three members of the Commission, serving as a Commission body, might undertake the function of trying to carry on a probe with the parties that might lead to a negotiated settlement. We were told at one point, I may say, by one of the great powers that was engaging in a friendly discussion with us about the matter; "But there is no authority in the Geneva agreement for the three countries to assume this role. And we acknowledge this at once; but our proposal was simply this, that here is a Commission made up of three members with this access; why would it not be useful for these three countries, sitting as a body to exercise whatever function they could trying to bring about a negotiated settlement. Surely no one was going to allow legalism to stand in the way of bringing about the possible role that was being envisaged for the commission. And I may say that no country has taken the position that there was probably not a potential role worth examining simply because it has not been entrusted to us, with formal authority, under the agreement.

● (11:25 a.m.)

The point is that the Commission's chief purpose or function there was to report on breaches of the agreement. Now is it carrying out that function at the



present time, or can it carry out that function? It cannot carry it out fully by any means.

Mr. HARKNESS: You cannot carry it out by any means. As I mentioned about a year and a quarter ago, the government of the North, for allegedly security reasons, and security reasons in so far as the Commission was concerned, asked for the withdrawal of the key sites; obviously they are not carrying out the job there. There are many other areas where obviously because of the conflict they cannot carry out their full functions, but they are carrying out their functions to the extent that the particular situation permits.

Now I might like to deal with that. This brings me to the matter which I raised when we were discussing the matter in the House as to whether it is worth while in keeping the number of personnel there whose function really is to close check on these control teams. The control teams are not able to operate and therefore what is really the purpose of maintaining the number of personnel there which we are maintaining seeing that they are not able to carry out the functions for which they are there. The only functions that they are still carrying out as far as I can see, Mr. Chairman, is to some extent to act as a channel of communication between Hanoi and Saigon and to maintain some contact with North Vietnam which was not supposed to be their function at all but this seems to be the only thing which they are usefully doing at the present time. And under these circumstances could this not be done by Mr. Moore and one or two other people and the military personnel and others who are engaged in these control teams be more usefully employed in other activities.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that that is an understandable comment for you to make and I would like to deal with it. I think that the fact that the Commission has had this access is something that must be underlined as being very important, in view of our desire shared by so many others to see a negotiated settlement. We do not want in any way to impair the usefulness of this and I know that you do not want that to happen. You say: But is it necessary to maintain the personnel that is there now to do this job?

In the first place, I think I would like to give the personnel. You had asked me this earlier. On the Vietnam Commission there are: fifteen civilians, comprising three foreign service officers and twelve foreign service employees; forty-five military personnel, made up of twenty-four military officers and twenty-one N.C.O.s. Mr. Churchill is excited, but when he hears what the other countries have, he will understand that these things always must be examined not a priori but a posteriori. On the Laos commission there are—

An hon. MEMBER: That means it is just where they are sitting.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You are entitled to take whatever meaning you like from that.

An hon. MEMBER: Posteriore!

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): On the Laos Commission, there are eight civilians including three foreign service officers; I am going to tell you what they are doing. I am surprised at you, Mr. Nesbitt, you of all men, you know what they are doing there. You had more to do with this than I had.



Mr. NESBITT: I certainly do not know—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The Laos Commission has eight civilians comprising three foreign service officers, and five foreign service employees; twenty military personnel comprising twelve military officers, and eight NCO's.

In Cambodia, there are four civilians: one foreign service officer and three foreign service employees. In Cambodia, there are no military personnel assigned permanently to this commission. There is a request now, I may say, that we are now examining for transfers and intertransfers from the commission in Vietnam to Cambodia to meet a particular situation that we may have to face. Our people out there are very much opposed to doing this. These statistics represent a substantial commitment of Canadian military and civilian personnel, but our position is not out of line with the Indian and Polish delegations.

In the Vietnam commission, for example, the Indian delegation comprises three civilian officers, and twenty-five military officers. This does not include the delegation NCO's, nor other personnel required because of the special Indian responsibility—in communications, finances and administration—as the administering power of the commission as a whole. The Polish delegation in Vietnam consists of six civilian officers, eighteen military officers and an additional staff of about twelve civilian interpreters.

In Laos, the comparative strength of the three delegations in terms of military officers is as follows: Canada, ten with the delegation and two with the secretariat; India, thirteen with the delegation, five with the secretariat; Poland, eight with the delegation, one with the secretariat.

I should point out that the Polish delegation in Laos is currently rotating its military officers and when this has been completed its officer strength will be brought up to a total of sixteen.

In Cambodia, the commission is small. The Canadian delegation there consists of only civilian officer and a clerical staff of three. There are no Canadian military personnel in Cambodia at the moment. They are seconded to the Cambodian commission from our establishment elsewhere but it may be difficult for us to do this from the Vietnam group, for reasons that I will in due course indicate.

Now, we made reductions in the size of the Canadian military commitment in Vietnam about a year ago, following the withdrawal of the commission's teams from North Vietnam at the latter's insistence and we are now looking whether or not further personnel reductions can be made.

In order to determine whether or not the personnel is excessive, I think we have to look at some of the division of responsibilities. In the Vietnam commission, the Canadian officer personnel are employed in the following way. The Commissioner, Mr. Moore, who succeeded Blair Seaborn, has an advisory and operations staff of two civilian officers and five military officers including the Senior Military Adviser who happens to be Brigadier Danby, and who is the deputy. These staff members are responsible for advising the Commissioner and for reporting to Ottawa on all aspects of the Canadian government's responsibilities in Vietnam. And I would say this, that outside of NATO, I do not suppose that there are as many messages being communicated as there are from this particular area involving all kinds of questions.



These involve analysis of reports and preparation of material relating to cases being considered by the Commission. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to follow closely local developments, both political and military, since no Commission problem can be isolated from the political and military situation in Vietnam as a whole. I need not point out that we have no diplomatic mission there. The personnel is engaged in doing, in addition to its own work, the kind of work that normally would be carried out by diplomatic missions, contacts with ambassadors and all sorts of responsibilities that are being imposed on the delegation because of the current situation.

On the administration side, the Canadian delegation comprises six officers, all of them military. These six comprise the commanding officer, the medical officer whose professional services are available to all Canadians serving in Indochina, and a paymaster, who, while assigned to Saigon, performs certain services for military personnel in Laos as well. The three remaining officers perform a variety of functions relating to rotation of team site officers, and other staff movements including arrangements with the Commission's chartered air line which provides a necessary link between all three Indochina Commissions and regular access to Hanoi. They also look after local transportation, and the provision of accommodation, all in co-operation with the local authorities in Vietnam.

Canada also fills one of the three Deputy Secretary-General positions on the Commission's Secretariat. This officer is in charge of all of the Commission's operational responsibilities. He reports directly to the Indian Secretary-General rather than to the Canadian Commissioner.

Finally, there are the 12 teamsite officers to man the Commission's team. These are located at Hanoi where there are 2 positions, at Saigon, and at Gio Linh, at the demilitarized zone where there are 2 positions, and they are located at Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang and Vung Tau. We have to be represented in all these teamsites.

Teamsite duty is on a rotational basis. Extra officers—that is 12 for 9 positions—are required to provide for rotation time, leave, special investigations, briefing and debriefing in Saigon between teamsite assignments. That is the situation in Vietnam.

In Laos, much the same pattern applies. I do not think I will have to go into all the details. I have made inquiries and I am told that this is the minimum personnel that is required. And I could give you the cost.

Mr. HARKNESS: The point is this. You have these 12 teamsite officers, but these teams are not able to do anything at the present time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But they have a duty to perform.

Mr. HARKNESS: They had a duty to perform when the thing was set up, but the way the situation has developed in Vietnam they are no longer, as you said yourself, just a short time ago, able to perform this function, which they are supposed to perform, but there are reported breaches in the agreement and so on—there has been a constant continuous breach, and so forth. There is a war going on there at the present time, and therefore these people are not performing the function they were sent in for, and as far as I can see, it is just a complete waste of time and effort and money to maintain them there.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot agree, Mr. Harkness, I said they were not able to perform their full functions, and they are not. They are not able to perform their full functions, they were not even able to perform their full functions before the conflict was intensified but for other reasons. Nevertheless, under the assignment that they have accepted they must engage to the extent that they can, in reporting on what is transpiring and at these twelve key sites, they are reporting on what is happening. We cannot, as a country, it seems to me, having accepted the responsibility in 1954, take a position different from Poland and India and say, "because we are not able to perform our functions fully, we are going to withdraw our personnel." We cannot take that position.

Mr. HARKNESS: Why can't we?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, because we cannot; it would be contrary to the Geneva Agreement, contrary to our acceptance, and contrary to the tradition that Canada has maintained, in any international commitment we have assumed.

Mr. HARKNESS: Have you discussed with India and Poland the matter of doing away with these team-site officers who are performing no useful function?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have had discussions with them all on this, and I can assure you that all three countries take the view that having accepted this responsibility, we must carry on as we are doing. Let me say, that at one time—I think I said this to the Committee last year—because of difficulties on the Commission that had nothing to do with the war, I wondered whether or not we might vacate this position. We gave consideration to that. I am satisfied that I was wrong at that time in the view that I took, that I was taking. I am sure now, and certainly in the light of the initiative that I had been talking about earlier, that it would have been regrettable if we had taken that course, but I am sure that we have got to carry on as we are for the time being.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Martin, I interrogated a considerable number of the military officers who served in Vietnam, and I think I can say that without exception every one of them to whom I talked who had returned from Vietnam, was of the opinion that to a very large extent, he had been wasting his time during the time that he was there, and not performing any very worth while function. I think also everybody certainly that I have talked to who has been posted to this Commission in Vietnam, has been of the opinion that anything useful that might be carried on there, could be done by probably about a tenth of the number of personnel who are presently employed in that way. It would seem to me only reasonable, under the circumstances which exist, that we should cut down the number of personnel to some reasonable proportion. Partly, this Commission of course, and the numbers, feed on themselves—it is an example of Parkinson's law. Because you have the number of people that you have there, you have to have paymasters, you have to have administrative officers and various people along these lines. If you had what I would consider sufficient personnel, say five or six, to carry on the only real function they can carry on, which is to keep in touch with the situation, to keep open a line of communication to Hanoi you would not need all of these administrative personnel, such as paymasters and people along that line. For the life of me, I



cannot see that this would not be the reasonable thing to do. If the matter were actively pursued with the Indians and Poles, I would be surprised if they would not be of somewhat the same opinion.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You speak as a man with some experience, and I respect this experience. Your views will undoubtedly come to the attention of others and it will be noted, but I have gone into this. I am satisfied that substantially this personnel commitment, for the reasons I have indicated, has got to be maintained.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think the situation here is somewhat the same as the instance we saw in the papers a while ago of the two soldiers who were posted at some point in London, to hold the Duke of Wellington's horse when he had to dismount. I think that is the situation as far as a lot of the personnel in this Vietnam Commission are concerned. They were posted there some years ago to discharge a function which existed at that time. That function has now disappeared, but they are still posted there.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think I had better, in fairness to personnel there, deal with your understandable condemnation and the suggestion you made, we are in there by virtue of an international agreement. We have accepted an international responsibility. It is costing considerable money to maintain this commitment, but we are doing it and I believe we have the duty to continue to do it. Our personnel is comparable as I have indicated, with our two colleague countries and we could not effect reductions without the closest examination being made by the two co-chairmen to whom reports of action are made. These men are there to do a job which may not be capable of being done at a particular moment, but the international commitment is such, it seems to me, that they must be ready. They must be endowed with the capacity to discharge the function. The situation is a very serious one. It could lead to an extension of the conflict and Canada, it seems to me, must not do anything that is going to reduce its commitment, or to put it in a position not to be able to discharge its role fully if the opportunity arises. About the views of the men who have been there—I don't agree. I have talked to personnel. I talked to one last night, because I knew of your interest in this problem. I am satisfied that the country and the cause of international co-operation owes all of the Canadian military and civilian personnel who have served on these Commissions, a great debt of gratitude. I am not suggesting that you have not, but I want to make this statement because what Mr. Harkness has said will go about and around. I am satisfied that both our civilian and our military personnel on these Commissions have rendered a very great service in the role that Canada has assumed in Indochina. In the Department of External Affairs—I don't know what the percentage is—right from the Under-Secretary down, there are many officers who have served under the greatest sacrifices and difficult conditions as you know, and some have come back very ill as a result of their service there. This has applied to soldiers, too. Now I am not trying to suggest, Mr. Harkness, that your examination of this is irresponsible—I am not suggesting that at all. I just wanted to outline my belief that, while they are not all able to perform their functions fully, in view of the arrangement, the commitment, I don't think that the suggestion that they are not performing any useful purpose there can be substantiated.



Mr. HARKNESS: I used that just a little while ago—a moment ago—that they had to be ready, ready for what? And furthermore if you think the situation is going to, at some time in the future, get back to the point where these control teams could operate satisfactorily, there is no need with present means of communication of keeping them sitting there in Vietnam to be ready to go ahead with those things. With the air transport which exists at the present time, they could be there within 48 hours anyway. The idea of keeping that number of personnel there, most of them, in effect, doing nothing useful so that they will be ready for some future thing is not reasonable.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would not agree that they are not doing something useful. Even if they were there just observing or waiting for the opportunity for more effective observation, I would not say that they were there doing nothing. They are there at these various sites, with their opposite numbers from Poland and from India, and what you are suggesting is that the Canadians should withdraw from these team sites. I can not agree with that.

Mr. McINTOSH: May I ask a supplementary question. Mr. Minister, you said that the Control Commission are not able to perform their full function. You also said that the future value of the Commission would be the unblocking of channels.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is so important, Mr. McIntosh, you are now confusing the role of the Commission under the agreement with the role which Canada has proposed for the Commission members in respect of another matter altogether, namely, the promoting of a negotiated settlement in the war in Vietnam. The latter proposal is so important. I hope there will be no confusion between what Mr. Harkness and I have been discussing, and our proposals.

Mr. McINTOSH: This is what I have been trying to get straightened out, if possible. Let me finish my question. I did not get to the question. You also made another statement, you said the volume of the reports that you are receiving here in Canada, is second only to those of NATO. Now, my question is: is this information necessary to Canada, and who should this control team of ours be reporting to, in the first place?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They report to me as Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Mr. McINTOSH: All to you.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It comes to the Department and we have—

Mr. McINTOSH: That is not their function of being in Indo-China?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It certainly is their function.

Mr. McINTOSH: Who set up the control Commission in the first place?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It was set up by the Geneva powers.

Mr. McINTOSH: Should they not report to the Geneva powers?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They do report to the Geneva powers, but each country reports to the Government which it represents.

Mr. McINTOSH: Besides reporting to the Geneva powers?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Certainly, the Indians report to the foreign minister of India, the Poles report to the foreign minister of Poland, and the Canadian reports to the Minister in charge.

Mr. McINTOSH: In other words the three countries that have representation on that Commission have more detailed information than any other country concerned with this conflict?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Not concerned with this conflict, concerned with the discharge of the role of the Commission under the Geneva Agreement of 1954.

Mr. McINTOSH: What I am trying to get at is, under a normal function, would they not report direct to the powers concerned, rather than to the countries, which in my opinion, would be a secondary function, and now you are saying that their secondary function has become a major function.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not understand.

Mr. McINTOSH: What I am getting at is it necessary for all these reports that you are talking about, is it second only to the reports that you receive from NATO coming to Canada?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I assure you it is necessary.

Mr. McINTOSH: And you would be getting a similar number of reports if they were doing the function that they were set up to do—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The reports that come to me do not come from all of the personnel. They come from our representative on the Commission, but he reports generally on the operations of the Commission as well as on many other things.

Mr. McINTOSH: And it is necessary to have that number of personnel in Indochina so he can get the information to report to you?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): For the reasons I stated, yes, and to discharge international commitments.

Mr. BREWIN: Could I just ask a supplementary?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have been waiting here for quite a while, about 2½ hours.

Mr. BREWIN: I will be first, Mr. Churchill, and it is on this very point. It is just the one question. Mr. Martin, is it your view, I gathered it was, that the peace keeping function or a possible conciliation function that you see in the International Joint Commission is linked with the maintenance of the other supposed functions under the Geneva Agreements, and that you cannot carry out the conciliation function unless you maintain the machinery of the control commission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, not necessarily. My response to Mr. Harkness arose out of the commitment that we have to the Geneva powers to carry on a dual job of reporting. We could persist in the proposition that we have put to Poland and to India and to other countries, regardless of the military personnel that we have at the team sites or at the centre. They are two distinct functions altogether.



Mr. BREWIN: If they are distinct functions is it not a fact that the reporting function as such has long ago ceased to have any significance whatever?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, by no means. There is the obligation under the Geneva agreement to report on violations of the agreement, and this is done continuously. I tabled a Laos Commission report last December and there will be others. The Commissions and their advisory staffs are our main sources of first hand information and assessment of all aspects of the situations in the three countries. We have to rely on the reports we receive from these posts, on military, political and economic matters in forming our assessments of what is happening and in formulating Canadian policy.

With regard to staffing the teamsites, we have to be ready to go back; our position with both the government at Saigon and the government at Hanoi is that we feel that we have to have team sites at certain places. Some of these have been vacated but the position of the Commission is that it should be allowed to go back to these team sites to discharge its functions more completely.

Mr. HARKNESS: What do these people do at these teamsites at the present time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can give you an example. In 1956, I went to Indochina myself.

Mr. HARKNESS: We are not talking about 1956—we are talking about 1966.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is the same kind of situation.

Mr. HARKNESS: No, it is not. There is a great difference.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think perhaps I am the only Minister that has ever seen a teamsite in operation. I went to different states and I went to Laos, and I saw one of the teamsites, I spent two days with them, away in the Laotian hills, on one side were the forces of the Royal Government and on another hillside, were the Pathet Lao.

There was no action at all during that time, it was very good for me that there was not. But will anyone say that because the personnel of the teamsite was inactive, that it was not performing a very important function. Its very presence was an important function, and that was at a time when there was fighting going on, very severe fighting in Laos. The situation is a simple one, Mr. Harkness. They are there by virtue of an international commitment from which we cannot honourably, in my judgment, withdraw. You say there are too many people. We say, we do not think there are too many. Is that it?

Mr. HARKNESS: I asked the question, what do the 9 teamsites do at the present time? Take the one at Nha Trang, I think you mentioned. Here is Nha Trang, there is an area under the control, at the present time, of American troops and they are holding a perimeter around there and they are constantly making forays into Viet Cong held territory, and the Viet Cong are doing the reverse. What does the team on that site do? What particular useful purpose do they serve?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I will tell you what they do. On that particular site there have been charges, I had better not identify the dates, of infiltrations



from certain sources, made by one side against the other and they are now in the process of examining, under the most difficult circumstances, whether these infiltrations have taken place and if they have taken place, this would be contrary to the Geneva Agreement.

● (11:55 a.m.)

Mr. HARKNESS: The whole thing is contrary to the Geneva Agreement. This is accepted, but these various infiltrations from one side to the other are reported in the papers every day by the American correspondents and other correspondents who were there. I cannot see any useful purpose that the team plays in reporting these again.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is a difference between a report by a journalist to the world, and a report by an international body established for that purpose to the co-chairman of the Geneva powers. They are quite different kinds of reporting.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not know how long the Committee is going to continue. The Minister has pretty well talked me out of my questions. How long are we going to continue?

The CHAIRMAN: As I understand it, you would be the last member to ask questions. No others have signified their intention to ask questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would it be wise next time to have a clock in front of the Minister so that he would have the same information as we have when we are sitting here as to the lapse of time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Perhaps you could tell me. Could we not finish Vietnam now?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not mind sitting here a few minutes longer.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Could we do that now?

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any more questions besides those of Mr. Churchill? If Mr. Churchill is the last one, perhaps we can finish Vietnam today.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have one or two other questions.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Let us do it now.

The CHAIRMAN: Are we agreed to continue?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will make my questions briefer than I had intended. First, I would like to say that the Minister has been completely unconvincing with regard to the activities of our representation on the International Control Commission in Vietnam. I think it is absolutely ridiculous keeping all those military personnel there when the Minister of National Defence in this country is suffering a steady loss of military personnel every day. I do not see that they are performing any useful function, and they are subjected to living conditions which are not the best in the world as the Minister has mentioned. They suffer from serious diseases. Why should they be subjected to that when there is no real function for them to perform at the present time. I do not accept the Minister's statement as being convincing with regard to this operation. I think he should review it again. I want to ask a second question.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): May I just make one comment, Mr. Churchill. If I thought that I could convince you on most things, I would be the most surprised man in the world. But I simply want to say this to you. The Commission acts on complaints as these relate to breaches of the Geneva Agreement and these cover in turn the use of territory of one party for acts of hostility against the other, the introduction of, either overt or covert of military personnel, infiltration either overt or covert of arms, equipment and military personnel. The Commission acts on the basis of investigations conducted by it, and by its teams on the ground. We feel that this personnel is needed. You and Mr. Harkness say no.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is right.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know, but we can argue this endlessly. That is your position. If you want us to review it again, we will continue the argument.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You are the one continuing the argument. I just made my statement. You are continuing the argument. I tell the minister he is not convincing a great many people in this country either. Although the condition of the International Control Commission was recognized and understood several years ago, and he gave us an example, there is a war going on in South Vietnam, and the Commission obviously cannot operate when there is a war going on. It is nonsense to suggest to us that they are reporting on infiltrations when there is a war on. There is a conflict raging there of major importance.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What you are saying in effect—I do not mean that you intend this—notwithstanding the difficulties, Canada should not continue in the face of great difficulties to discharge an international responsibility which it accepted eleven years ago. That is what you are saying, and I cannot agree with that conclusion, and I do not agree.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Minister uses the guarded language of diplomacy when he is talking for general consumption, but when he speaks to me, he gets right down to the proper level. I am not saying that at all. I want the Minister to know that, as I said in the past, "all right, let us maintain our position on the International Control Commission." I am objecting to, as Mr. Harkness did and others, the maintenance of too many military personnel there who have no real function to perform because the International Control Commission cannot perform the function that it is asked to do by the Geneva Powers.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I understand that position and I respect that position. I do not agree with it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I want to ask a question about one or two other matters. I have been following very closely the United States public debates and reports from the United States with regard to the conflict in South Vietnam. Can the Minister give us any indication in any of those, and I may have missed something, where the United States has placed any reliance on the International Control Commission to perform any useful function.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Do you mean in the sense of a future role?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, some public statement.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): First of all, when we conceived of the idea of the Commission's future role, I went to New York and saw the Secretary General. It was at a time when the Security Council was considering this matter, based on an initiative that the government of the United States had put forward. The Secretary General told me, as is now public knowledge, that he believed that there was a role for the commission. He thought that the whole matter of the conflict in Vietnam had to be brought within the framework of the Geneva Agreement and he has since reiterated this in public. The same day, I saw the American Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, who by the way is coming here two weeks from Monday for some talks with us, and he assured me as he has since publicly stated about ten days ago—you may have seen his statement—after he had seen the Prime Minister of India, that his government would welcome a role by the Commission along the lines indicated. The next day I conferred in Washington with Mr. Rusk and two weeks later, you may recall, at the Canadian-American ministerial meeting, Mr. Rusk referred to this initiative in terms of approval. Likewise, we have had discussions with the Soviet Union, Poland, with India and other countries. There is the widest measure of agreement that we should seek to give the Commission a role designed to enable it to see what can be done by this body in bringing about an examination that might lead to negotiation.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am not suggesting for one minute that the Minister has not been making worthwhile efforts, and I would be the last one to suggest that any of these statements by Mr. Goldberg or Mr. Rusk were inspired by any questions from the Minister. That would not have entered my mind, but what I was talking about was the public debate that has been going on in the United States regarding the war in South Vietnam. I have not run across any statements by the members of the Senate or the House of Representatives there and others who referred to the International Control Commission as a possible medium through which peace could be achieved. That was the question that I was asking. May I ask another question?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think you will find that you are wrong. I do not like to point out where you are wrong in these things, but I think you will find out that Senator Mansfield, Senator Cooper and Mr. Fulbright—Mr. Fulbright, I think, in a statement he made in Philadelphia not very long ago. There may be others, but I do not have time to—

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Minister, in the course of his remarks in the House and at our meeting here—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But I hope that this does not mean, Mr. Churchill, that you do not subscribe fully to this effort, because I assure you that the country has never been engaged in anything more seriously than it is at the present time in this area.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I appreciate the seriousness of it. In the debates in the House and here in the committee, and today, the Minister spent a great deal of time emphasizing the importance of the future role, as the role he would like to see International Control Commission adopt. He was unable to give a satisfactory answer to Mr. Faulkner's question as to whether there was unanimity among the members of that Commission. I think that perhaps this is



one of the weaknesses of the Commission that there is not unanimity with regard to adopting this particular role.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is so important, that I hope you do not mind if I was very exacting in this area. Do I understand you to say now that there is some lack of unanimity now on the part of India and Poland about our future role. Is that what you said?

Mr. CHURCHILL: You left a doubt in my mind that there was that unanimity towards adopting this role.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Again I repeat that this is a matter of the greatest consequence. I know that you would not want to play with a matter like this lightly, and I cannot speak too strongly about this. You were wrong in suggesting that Poland and India have not recognized the importance of this proposition. The other day I was asked in the House by Mr. Lewis if it was true that Poland was not cooperating in the proposition that had been put forward by Canada. I found it necessary to say, as I say now, that that statement is untrue. The Prime Minister of India, the other day, when she met with Mr. Goldberg in New York spoke of the role of the Commission and I would not want anything to leave this committee that would indicate in any way that there was not on the part of all of us a recognition of a role for the Commission in appropriate circumstances.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, then may I ask this question. If the Commission is unanimous with regard to this particular role and as you have stated it has direct access to both Saigon and Hanoi, why was it necessary to send Mr. Ronning to those places just recently? Could the commission not have fulfilled that function equally well?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I could tell you why it was necessary but because of what we are seeking to do you would not insist that I tell you and I cannot. But, I assure you that there were great reasons, most useful reasons, for our doing this. The Canadian Government did not just indulge in this as a matter of luxury. There is a vital situation in the world that requires a solution, and while we are only one country, we feel we have a responsibility as well as an interest and we are seeking to discharge that responsibility. I assure you that there was a most compelling reason for asking Mr. Ronning to go to Hanoi.

● (12:10 p.m.)

Mr. CHURCHILL: I cannot think of a better person to go than Mr. Ronning and I raise no objection to that, but I am suggesting that the role that you have been putting forward has not been adopted as far as we can see by the International Control Commission with access to both capitals.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There again, I must ask you to be careful of what you say. Mr. Churchill, because what you say will go out, and in spite of your good intentions what you say may possibly have a very unfortunate result. I clearly indicated at the outset that this is a complicated difficult matter. No one for a moment thinks that because a good idea is put forward that it is realizable at the outset. There are complications here of the greatest kind, but the stakes are of the greatest kind. But I can assure you that to suggest that



merely by our having proposed this, that this would provide an end or an acceptance of our objective is belittling a proposal that has the greatest significance. I cannot let any other impression be created whether it be by way of positive statement or by way of interrogation because too much is at stake here. We may not succeed in this endeavour but if we do not, it will not be because Canada has not tried.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I am not suggesting that Canada is not trying, and I am glad to get more positive statements from the Minister in response to my questions. I am going to end with one final question. In the appendix to the April 4th meeting, we have a letter from Ho Chi Minh. I refer to page 41 and the reply on pages 43 and 44 from Canada, and Ho Chi Minh in the second last paragraph says: "In face of the extremely—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Just a minute please, I do not have the page.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Page 41. It is a postscript to his message. "Canada is a member of the International Commission for the supervision and control of the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam." And then he goes on to say: "In face of the extremely serious situation brought about by the United States in Vietnam, I hope that your Government will fulfil its obligations under the Geneva Agreement". Then in the reply from Canada on pages 43 and 44, you point out that Canada is fulfilling its commitments under the Geneva Agreements, and you end with a paragraph expressing the hope that the International Commission may be able to play some part in helping to restore peace in Vietnam, and some more words following. My question is this—With the opportunity of communicating directly with Ho Chi Minh why were you not able to suggest to him that the International Control Commission in addition to its supervisory role under the Geneva Agreement, might also play a part in attempting to solve the present difficulty? You hint at it in the last paragraph, why did you not put it in clearer language and then let Mr. Ho Chi Minh make a reply.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I ask you to look at the date of that letter. It is dated February 28, and we were having and are having discussions with certain countries. That ought to be clear enough.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Was there not a chance there to get his expression of opinion with regard to the other function that the International Control Commission might perform in addition to its supervisory activity?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It would have been possible to do it, but at that time—having in mind that date—in the light of our negotiations, it would not have been a desirable thing to do. Some day we may be able to explain the reasons.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you again, Mr. Martin.

Mr. NESBITT: There is one question I would like to ask. I think I can safely say that myself and my colleagues here in general terms agree with the Government's objectives in Vietnam, although perhaps not all the methods, in support of the United States, there is a great deal of public controversy and debate in Canada concerning the policies of the Canadian Government vis-à-vis Vietnam.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Policies of the government or of the opposition?

Mr. NESBITT: Policies of the Government vis-à-vis Vietnam. The Official Opposition in general terms agree with the objectives of the government in Vietnam, but what concerns me is this. One of the principal organs of public information in Canada is the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as well as the other public media of information such as the press. And, certainly the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, for the last number of years and the last year or two in particular, has never at any time attempted to emphasize or explain adequately—I am a constant listener to the CBC and its public affairs program—the position of the Canadian Government vis-à-vis Vietnam or that of the United States. In fact, I have never heard anything at any time ever favourable or complimentary over the CBC of the position of the United States.

Now I know, of course, the Minister and the Government is in no position to instruct the CBC as to what to do, but what I am inquisitive about is this: Since those who direct the public affairs programs in the CBC and select the commentators and speakers, has any attempt been made by the information section of the Department of External Affairs to provide and brief adequately on these policies the senior personnel of the CBC by means of communications, letters or offering to send members of the Department over to more clearly explain these matters?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, we have had contacts with these sources, not only the CBC, but all news media; we have briefing conferences to which they are invited.

Mr. NESBITT: In view of the fact that the CBC has been virtually doing nothing but to express one side of the view, and that view is not the one that the Government takes generally, I was wondering if there might be further efforts made in that regard to inform those in the CBC who are responsible for the public affairs programme of the Government's position. Public opinion is very important in this country, in this regard. We should have a more balanced view of the Government's position which it certainly has never received to date from the CBC.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would the Minister consider issuing a White Paper on such subjects as Vietnam and Rhodesia.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, I will give consideration to that, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. McINTOSH: If the CBC do not give it out, then possibly it will get out through other means, I think that the Canadian public are entitled to the information or as much information as you can reveal on both sides of the issue.

Mr. HARKNESS: There is one other question that I wanted to ask. In your original statement, Mr. Martin, you said that the purpose of the Canadian Government now was to unblock channels of communication. What channels of communication are you referring to there that you are trying to unblock?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Between the parties concerned.

Mr. HARKNESS: Which parties? Do you mean China, North Vietnam or what parties?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): All the parties concerned would include China.

Mr. HARKNESS: There is another statement that you made in connection with this about the parties chiefly concerned. Whom do you consider the parties chiefly concerned?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Obviously, the parties—I am giving care to my reply—the parties concerned of course are the government of North Vietnam, the government of South Vietnam, the United States, the government of the Soviet Union, the government of China. These are the countries that are principally concerned.

Mr. HARKNESS: All right. Then, what are the channels that you are referring to that you want to unblock?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot give you that information. I would be glad to discuss this with you.

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, this ends the discussion on Vietnam. I presume at our next meeting, we will again have Mr. Martin and discuss the third and final topic of Rhodesia, perhaps next Thursday?

The committee is adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Mr. MARTIN (Essex East): All the parties concerned would include China, Mr. HARRISON: There is another statement that you made in connection with this about the parties chiefly concerned. When do you consider the parties chiefly concerned? (pause) (to end) (it is an erroneous title but mainly)

Mr. MARTIN (Essex East): Obviously, the parties—I am giving care to my reply—the parties concerned of course are the government of North Vietnam, the government of South Vietnam, the United States, the government of the Soviet Union, the government of China. These are the countries that are principally concerned.

Mr. HARRISON: All right. Then, what are the channels that you are referring to that you want to unblock? (pause) (to end) (it is an erroneous title but mainly)

Mr. MARTIN (Essex East): I cannot give you that information. I would be glad to discuss this with you. (pause) (to end) (it is an erroneous title but mainly)

The CHAIRMAN: Well, gentlemen, this ends the discussion on Vietnam. I presume at our next meeting, we will again have Mr. Martin and discuss the kind and final topic of Rhodesia, perhaps next Thursday. (pause) (to end) (it is an erroneous title but mainly)

Mr. MARTIN (Essex East): Yes, we have had contacts with these sources, not only the CBC, but all the news media; we have briefing conferences to which they are invited.

Mr. HARRISON: In view of the fact that the CBC has been virtually doing nothing but to express one side of the view, and that that view is not the one that the Government takes generally, I was wondering if there might be further efforts made in that regard to inform those in the CBC who are responsible for the public affairs program of the Government's position. Public opinion is very important in this country, in this regard. We should have a more balanced view of the Government's position which it certainly has never received to date from the CBC.

Mr. McLEOD: Would the Minister consider issuing a White Paper on such subjects as Vietnam and Rhodesia?

Mr. MARTIN (Essex East): Yes, I will give consideration to that, Mr. McLeod.

Mr. McLEOD: If the CBC did it, would it give the other side of the view? (pause) (to end) (it is an erroneous title but mainly)

Mr. HARRISON: There is one other question that I wanted to ask. In your original statement, Mr. Martin, you said that the purpose of the Canadian Government now was to unblock channels of communication. What channels of communication are you referring to that that you are trying to unblock?

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Mr. HARRISON: Which parties? Do you mean China, North Vietnam or what parties?





The first part of the book deals with the early history of the American people, from the time of the first settlers to the beginning of the American Revolution. It covers the period from 1607 to 1776, and is divided into three main sections: the first section deals with the early years of settlement, the second section deals with the growth of the colonies, and the third section deals with the American Revolution.

The second part of the book deals with the history of the American people from the beginning of the American Revolution to the present day. It covers the period from 1776 to 1900, and is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the early years of the American Republic, and the second section deals with the American Civil War and Reconstruction.

The third part of the book deals with the history of the American people from the beginning of the American Revolution to the present day. It covers the period from 1900 to the present day, and is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the American Civil War and Reconstruction, and the second section deals with the American Civil War and Reconstruction.

The fourth part of the book deals with the history of the American people from the beginning of the American Revolution to the present day. It covers the period from 1900 to the present day, and is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the American Civil War and Reconstruction, and the second section deals with the American Civil War and Reconstruction.

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
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*The Clerk of the House.*



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 4

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THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1966

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Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

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WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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*Vice-Chairman:* Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Foy,	Mr. Macquarrie,
Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ),	Mr. Groos,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Basford,	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Pilon,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Klein,	Mr. Régimbal,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Laprise,	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Faulkner,	Mr. Lind,	Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Forest,	Mr. Macdonald ( <i>Rosedale</i> ),	Mrs. Wadds, Mr. Walker—(24).

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

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THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1966  
*The Clerk of the House.*

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WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUBAMIEL, P.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966



MINUTE TALKINGS  
ORDERS OF REFERENCE

TUESDAY, May 3, 1966.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Régimbal be substituted for that of Mr. Chatterton on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, May 4, 1966.

Ordered,—That the name of Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) be substituted for that of Mr. Trudeau on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

In attendance: The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, from the Department of External Affairs; Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Chairman presented the Third Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Wednesday, May 4, 1966, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dube (Chairman), Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), and Nesbitt.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend that:

(a) The Committee recommend to the House that its quorum be reduced from 15 to 10.

(b) That departmental officials be called as follows:

Mr. E. O. Moran, Director General of the External Aid Office, on Thursday, May 12, 1966.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and other departmental officials at subsequent meetings.

The Chairman stated that, with regard to recommendation (b) of the report, it has been learned that Mr. Moran is out of town and is not expected to return until May 14th. He therefore proposed to ask the Sub-Committee to report on the question of calling of witnesses.

On Motion of Mr. Nesbitt, seconded by Mr. Laprise,

Resolved: That the recommendation by the Steering Committee that the Committee have permission to reduce its quorum from 15 to 10 be approved.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1964-67.

Mr. Laprise was questioned on the subject of Rhodesia.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

MAY 5, 1966.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs has the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT

Your Committee recommends that its quorum be reduced from 13 to 10 members.

Respectfully submitted,

JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ,  
Chairman.

- |               |               |                 |
|---------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Mr. Gwynne    | Mr. Groves    | Mr. Macdonald   |
| Mr. Basford   | Mr. Harkness  | (Rosedale)      |
| Mr. Brewin    | Mr. Klein     |                 |
| Mr. Churchill | Mr. Laprise   |                 |
| Mr. Faulkner  | Mr. Lind      |                 |
| Mr. Forest    | Mr. Macdonald |                 |
|               |               | Mr. Walker—(24) |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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The questioning continues, the Minister stated that he could make himself available to the Committee for further questioning on Thursday, May 12th.

The Chairman stated that the Committee agreed to the Chairman's proposal, as Acting Chairman of the Committee, in the event that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman are away.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 5, 1966.

(5)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.20 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Klein, Laprise, Lind Macdonald (*Rosedale*), McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Régimbal, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (18).

*Also present:* Mr. Lambert, M.P.

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Chairman presented the Third Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Wednesday, May 4, 1966, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dubé (Chairman), Laprise, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), and Nesbitt.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend that:

- (a) The Committee recommend to the House that its quorum be reduced from 13 to 10.
- (b) That departmental officials be called as follows:

Mr. H. O. Moran, Director General of the External Aid Office, on Thursday, May 12, 1966;

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and other departmental officers at subsequent meetings.

The Chairman stated that, with regard to recommendation (b) of the report, it has since been learned that Mr. Moran is out of town and is not expected to return until May 14th. He therefore proposed to ask the Sub-Committee to reconsider the question of calling of witnesses.

On Motion of Mr. Nesbitt, seconded by Mr. McIntosh,

*Resolved*,—That the recommendation by the Steering Committee that this Committee seek permission to reduce its quorum from 13 to 10 be approved.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-67.

The Minister was questioned on the subject of Rhodesia.





## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, May 5, 1966.

● (11.15 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum.

First of all, may I present the third report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure (*See Minutes*).

With regard to recommendation (b) of the report, with reference to Mr. Moran, it has since been learned that Mr. Moran is presently out of town and is not expected to return until May 14; he will therefore be unable to appear before the Committee on May 12, and I would ask the steering committee to reconsider the question of calling witnesses. Under the circumstances I would ask for a motion to approve only recommendation (a) namely, that the Committee recommends to the House that its quorum be reduced from 13 to 10.

Mr. NESBITT: I so move.

Mr. McINTOSH: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been moved by Mr. Nesbitt and seconded by Mr. McIntosh that the report of the subcommittee be approved.

Mr. McINTOSH: There has been a lot of comment in the House on this question of quorums so we are going to have trouble getting it through. I would not like to hold up the whole report but I do not think we should spend the whole afternoon discussing whether the quorum should be reduced. Have any meetings been held up because you have not had a quorum?

The CHAIRMAN: Not held up, but we have had some problems in commencing our meetings. It is easy enough to have eight, nine or ten, but beyond ten, eleven, twelve or thirteen we run into difficulty. At the last meeting our quorum disappeared, we had sort of a floating quorum, people were coming in and going out. At one time we had only eight or nine, but we still continued. That seems to be the problem with all committees.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, if in presenting your report you run into trouble in the House—and it looks as though we are going to have a long discussion on whether we should reduce our quorum—would the Committee give the Chairman the right to withdraw this particular recommendation for the reduction of the quorum. After the Minister has finished you are going to have more difficulty in getting a quorum than you are having at the present time.

If the presentation of this report leads to a whole afternoon's discussion in the House can the Chairman be given the right to simply withdraw that recommendation about the quorum?

Mr. NESBITT: The Chairman should use his discretion in view of the discussion yesterday. Two committees requested it yesterday namely the Justice



Committee and the Public Accounts Committee and both got it. I thought that today we might have a little less difficulty because everything that could be said was said yesterday but we could leave that to the discretion of the Chairman.

Mr. GROOS: Well my impression from yesterday was that some of the speakers said: "O.K. these two, but do not bring in another one or we will dig our heels in on this whole question of quorums." However, I do not want to waste too much time so long as the Chairman can use his discretion.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: With reference to part (b) of the report, I have just learned that Mr. Cadieux, the Under Secretary of State, will be available this coming Thursday.

We are now resuming consideration of Item No. 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs for 1966-67. In the past two meetings questions had been asked of the Minister. At the last meeting we were dealing with Vietnam and the last topic was Rhodesia. However if, after having dealt with Rhodesia there are other questions which members feel like asking of the Minister, he is available to answer any and all questions. I believe we should start with Rhodesia and then move on to other topics.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few remarks on this subject on which I will put a few questions of a somewhat general nature to the government and hope that I will have some forthcoming answers. I might say at the outset that since negotiations are apparently now going on between the government of United Kingdom and the *de facto* government of Rhodesia perhaps a number of things that might have been said at this Committee or a number of inquiries probably should not be said or made at the present time. I am sure that none of us would want to say anything here that would either directly or indirectly affect the course of the negotiations which are now going on and which we hope will prove successful. Having said that, however, there are a number of things I would like to put on the record. Again, I would like to register the disapproval of the party of which I am a member with respect to the methods employed by the government in placing sanctions against the *de facto* government of Rhodesia. It has been said in another place this is a brand new step in our foreign policy. I mean by that it is a brand new step inasmuch as we are in fact raging economic warfare against another country on the grounds that we do not like the methods by which it has obtained its independence, and because of the fact that we do not like the faulty internal policies of that government. In this regard I refer to the remarks of the Minister at the opening meeting of this Committee, at page 29, where he said, at about the middle of the page, in one sentence set off by itself, and I quote:

The Canadian belief in multi-racialism and non-discrimination has also been a reason for action over Rhodesia.

And on the following page, page 30, again the Minister says:

Public opinion in Canada and other Commonwealth countries could not contemplate as a fellow member a country which practised discrimination not only through the franchise but in a variety of ways.



The quotation then goes on to cite some examples of discrimination by the present government of Rhodesia. I am quite sure that everybody in the Committee, and elsewhere, would agree with the Minister's expression of view on Canadian beliefs, I think we all agree with that.

● (11.30 a.m.)

I use this example to show that this was one of the reasons for our action in placing sanctions against Rhodesia. The sanctions were initially placed, as was I believe as stated by the Minister in another place, and more recently by the Minister of Trade and Commerce in the House of Commons—these actions were taken by the government of Canada at the request of the United Kingdom not because of the actions of the United Nations. Now I would say in this regard—I am not going to repeat all the arguments which have been made in another place—we feel that the use of the Export-Import Control Act is certainly of a most immoral nature because this act was in no way intended for purposes such as this. The strict legality of the measures used is highly questionable. It is all very well to say that the law officers of the Crown were consulted—I have no doubt they were—I am quite sure of that—but the fact that members of the legal profession do suddenly become members of the civil service does not make their views sacrosanct or correct. In legal circles, as the Minister who is a member of that profession well knows, any lawyer can present—that is part of the business—an argument which will justify almost any action. These arguments, of course, are matters of opinion and not a fact. I have heard many other expressions of view from prominent legal counsel whose judgment I would certainly have great regard for, perhaps even more regard than for the law officers of the Crown in this respect, that the actions of the government were illegal.

In any event the most kindly interpretation that can be placed on the legality of the action is that it may have some basis in legality but this is highly open to question.

Now, because of the fact that this is a brand new step in our foreign policy, something we have never done before, and because of the fact that the legality of the measures are certainly open to question, we feel that the government should have called Parliament together at the time these sanctions were put in, in late December of last year. All the writs of the election had been returned by that time and Parliament should have been called for a day or two days to give approval, or disapproval as the case may be, to the government's action. This was done at the time of the Suez crisis. I agree there is a slight difference there inasmuch as troops were being employed. Basically the reason for calling Parliament was to justify Canada's actions, and I think it should have been done in this case. However, the government did not choose to do so, and I hope that if any future occasions of a like nature arise the government will do so and give Parliament a chance to discuss the matter.

I also feel had Parliament been called I think the government should have presented to members of the House of Commons a white paper on the situation in Rhodesia and I think the government still should do so, although if negotiations work out this may not be necessary. The facts that have been given to us so far on Rhodesia—certainly the more recent facts because we no longer have any direct representation in Rhodesia—have been second hand or third



hand. As I recall, one or two other members of the House mentioned in previous debates that facts be given. Newspaper men are very good at getting facts, but even some newspaper men sometimes present a somewhat coloured view of so-called facts, and all we have been presented with so far is material that presents arguments on only one side of the question. I think that any one who has been in public life for any length of time knows that there is usually more than one side to a question and I think that certainly members of this Committee should be apprised of the facts on both sides. Perhaps at some future date we could arrange to have witnesses called who could give us more factual information with regard to the situation in Rhodesia. I presume that recently we have been obtaining our information from the United Kingdom as we no longer have any representation in Rhodesia. The United Kingdom, of course, has its own reasons for its policies in Africa and they are not necessarily our reasons at all. The United Kingdom has its own fish fry in Africa, so to speak, and has its own reasons for its policies. Consequently, I cannot help but think that perhaps some of the information might not be entirely unbiased that we have been receiving from that source.

I realize that facts are very hard to get. I suggest that perhaps at some time we might invite members of the British Parliament to come here. If Mr. Selwyn LLOYD were available—he has been there on a fact finding mission—we could hear more than one side of the question. If this is not possible and the situation is not resolved by negotiation I think perhaps serious consideration might be given to the government sending some representative or representatives from Canada on such a fact finding mission.

It has been intimated by the government—the government has not stated this I know but it certainly has not entirely denied it either—that if negotiations do not work out between the government of the United Kingdom and the Smith government that further actions against Rhodesia might be necessary. We do not know just what these actions might entail but if this is to be the case I certainly think we should be better informed on the subject than we are at the moment.

May I give you one or two examples in this regard. The information I have been able to obtain—I might say that I have done a great deal of digging in this regard trying to get information, not from biased tracts that a great many of us have been receiving, but from other sources—indicates that the standard of education among children of African origin is to my mind surprisingly high and on a surprisingly high level.

I have the facts available here, they are presumed to be facts. I cannot prove them, but this is the information I have. From the information here I was quite surprised to find that something of the order of five million—that is not correct. I will provide this information later on. There was a surprising number of children of African origin who were receiving quite good educations which is a necessary requisite for people who are completely turned over to running their own affairs. I know it has been said by some other members that the Europeans have no business in there; they should get out immediately and turn over the country to the Africans. If they want to have turmoil let them have it and blood letting if they wish. I was rather astonished by this remark because whether we like it or not the Europeans are responsible indirectly over the years for the present situation in Africa. Since one has some responsibility for



these things, one just cannot withdraw. You saw what happened when the Belgians drew out of the Congo without proper separation and it was a pretty ticklish situation for all of us. I have some knowledge of this because I had some responsibility in these matters at that time.

In the event the negotiations do not work out—we hope they will, but there is certainly some chance that they may not—we hope that the Canadian government will not decide to use force against the government of Rhodesia. Then there have also been questions asked about whether sanctions might be applied to Portugal and South Africa, and I think the government should give very careful consideration to the matter before doing anything in this regard because we are having trouble in NATO already and Portugal has certainly evinced displeasure at some of the actions of her NATO partners and if actions of this kind were taken, I think it may well be the end of NATO as it stands at the moment. I know the Minister will be taking that into consideration.

Another thing I think we should have done earlier in this matter is to offer the good offices of Canada to try and do something to settle the matter. This is a policy which the present Prime Minister has advocated over the years and he has taken a very active and successful part on various occasions in this regard. I am astonished we did not make a greater effort in this way. The Minister himself has taken a very active part. I have some personal knowledge of some of the very successful negotiations he has carried out bringing countries into the United Nations and other things. I think this is something we should have done. I do not think this is now possible because of the strong stand the Canadian government took and I think, shall we say, soiled our door mat so to speak and now we cannot do this.

May I say in conclusion to my remarks, we hope the negotiations that are going on will be successful and some of the eventualities which I have mentioned will not come up. But, I think it is something that should be borne in mind in the event they do.

● (11.45 a.m.)

This leads to a much more fundamental principle and a much more fundamental question with respect to our whole foreign policy. Rhodesia is merely an example. The fundamental question I think is this: Just how far is the government prepared to go in interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. This is something we have to give very careful thought to. I would like to know what the government's policy is in this regard, if indeed there is any specific policy, because it has been said we interfered in Rhodesia because we did not like the policies of the government.

Mr. STANBURY: I would just like to ask you how you reconcile the action today as being interference with the internal policy of Rhodesia as opposed to the very admirable stand that Mr Diefenbaker took at the conference of Prime Ministers in calling for the expulsion of South Africa on the grounds of apartheid?

Mr. NESBITT: I would be very glad to answer that, Mr. Chairman, but the member should perhaps get his facts a little straighter.

The fact of the matter is that on that occasion when the Union of South Africa decided to become a Republic it automatically left the Commonwealth



and had to re-apply for admission to the club. As I understand it, it was made clear to South Africa that if no steps were going to be taken by that government to improve its internal policies with respect to apartheid that it would not be found acceptable as a club member, in plain language. That is, in fact, what happened. It was a totally different situation from the one taking place in Rhodesia. Here we are waging economic warfare against another country because we do not like its internal policies. I think there is no comparison between the two situations at all.

Now, what we have to do is decide how far are we going to interfere in other countries. I can think of a great many examples as I am sure everybody here can. I do not think we cared particularly about the internal policies of Hungary at one stage about ten years ago, but we did not do anything about that. I can mention a good many more but I think further examples are unnecessary, I am sure we can all think of a good many. So from a purely practical point of view—I hope the government has given consideration to this—there are certain countries in the world which are not entirely friendly to Canada and they might use this as a good sample to bring up a number of things we might find unpleasant. For instance, our own treatment of the Indian people of Canada, and the Eskimos and a few other things. Our own efforts are not entirely clean in this matter. I do not think it behooves us too well to be running around lecturing other people. I can well remember one instance at the United Nations when the foreign minister of South Africa made a speech—

The CHAIRMAN: I do not like to interrupt you but perhaps you could pose your questions directly to the witness.

Mr. BREWIN: I want an answer from Mr. Nesbitt—he seems to be—

The CHAIRMAN: You ask answers of the Minister and not of another member. Does Mr. Nesbitt have a question? If so he should ask it now.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Nesbitt has made sweeping statements and I should like an opportunity to question him on some of them.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Nesbitt suggested he is speaking on behalf of the party of which he is a member, and in view of some of the statements he has made I think, at least for clarification, he should answer questions. If this is an official pronouncement of the party of which he is a member, then I think at least it should be clear.

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Nesbitt should address his questions to the Minister.

Mr. FAULKNER: I agree with that.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, it was the Minister to whom I was addressing them.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we could have questions now: we have had the introductory period.

Mr. NESBITT: Well we have had the introductory stage but there are one or two other observations which would lead to direct questions to the Minister. Now I will omit the exactness in order to shorten the statement. We would like to know what government policy is in this regard, just how far the government



of Canada is prepared to go in interfering with the internal matters of other countries. This points out certain eventual dangers to us because of some of the things that have gone on in this country.

Then this, of course, leads to some other policies in the United Nations. How far should Canada go in the United Nations in supporting interference in the internal policies of other countries. I am sure members of the Committee are aware of the two conflicting articles in the charter of the U.N. in this regard. One states in effect that the governments of member states will not be interfered with in so far as internal policies are concerned. The other article points out that member states must subscribe to certain principles of freedom, equality and lack of discrimination, and the like. The two, of course, frequently come into conflict and there is a double standard of morality at the United Nations. I know, for instance, that South Africa has been severely castigated there, and I think quite properly so in many ways. On the other hand, the fact that human slavery and human slave markets are carried on in one or two Arab countries has never been brought up, or certainly with the acquiescence of the governments of those countries. This is never brought up at the United Nations for reasons which I think are fairly obvious. So long as there is one vote for one country the situation will continue to exist, and if anything is as bad as apartheid, or worse, I think, as slavery is.

I have almost reached the conclusion of my remarks but these are things I think we should get an answer to. Just how far are we prepared to go in interfering in the internal affairs of other states? I know the Minister may very well say, "Well, each situation may depend on the facts" and I would agree that in international affairs this is very often the case, but I do think there should be some standard, some measuring stick, guidelines I think is the popular term these days, which we should have in making these policies and I think it would be a very good idea if the Minister would give us some guidelines that he and colleagues have in this regard.

I might have some further remarks to make at a later stage but I wanted to make sure that these views were made clear to the Committee on the questions I wish to put to the Minister.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I should like to say first of all in answer to what I suppose was the first question, that there really are no negotiations under way at the present time between the government of Britain and the illegal regime of Mr. Smith. When the Prime Minister of Britain announced that there would be talks he was careful to point out that this did not mean that negotiations were about to begin between the government of Britain and the government of Mr. Smith—the illegal government of Mr. Smith. What was proposed was that there would be undertaken on the officials level some conversations to find out whether or not there would be a basis for possible further discussions. These preliminary conversations on the officials level have not yet begun; they are supposed to begin and they are supposed to take place in London, but why they have not begun is not clear to us. It could be that there are some internal troubles in Rhodesia about which we are not aware.

Mr. Nesbitt spoke of disapproval of the methods taken by the government of Canada. He and I of course have discussed this before in the House. I have



explained that the course that we took had to be taken immediately in order to be effective. It was carried out under the Export and Import permits act on the basis of advice given to us by our own departmental lawyers and by the law officers of the Crown. It may be argued, as Mr. Churchill has argued, that the act was never intended for that purpose. This was an argument that he made rather ably again the other day on Mr. Winter's estimates. Of course, I would take issue with that interpretation of the function of a law. Once Parliament has based a law in the specific terms prescribed, what the law makers may have had in mind has nothing to do with the law itself in that. The legal question which is elementary in any legal consideration, is whether the law in the terms used permits a particular course of action.

In any event, we did seek advice and we did act under that act. It would have been preferable for Parliament to have been in session and for the government to place this before Parliament, of course, but Parliament was not in session and we had to act quickly. I think the course we took was a wise one and I think it will generally commend itself. We were not the only ones who acted quickly but we were the first, and I may say that if Canada had not taken this position, it might have been very difficult to convince certain other Commonwealth countries, and countries outside the Commonwealth, that action had to be taken in order to deal with the situation effectively.

Mr. Nesbitt says that the course that we have taken represents a new departure in Canadian foreign policy; that we have now embarked on a form of economic warfare against another state; that we are now interfering in the internal politics of another country. I will admit that this does represent, not a first departure, but a new development in Canadian foreign policy. I think it represents, in the light of the kind of world in which we now live, a desirable departure. It certainly is a long way from the position we took with regard to article 15 of the covenant of the League of Nations in 1921; it is a long way from the position that we took later on the proposal made by a Canadian spokesman who acted without authority, though commendably, with regard to the imposition of oil sanctions against Ethiopia. It certainly is a different position from that taken by Canada at the end of the second World War when we dealt with the indictment made against South Africa in the United Nations by Mrs. Pandit. At that time, Mr. Nesbitt will recall, the position of the Canadian government was that in view of article 2 para 7 of the U.N. charter perhaps the wisest course would be to refer the matters to the International Court of Justice for an opinion. Article 2 para. 7, contains a clause providing for recognition of the fact that the United Nations is made up of sovereign organizations, sovereign bodies, and that there must be no interference in their internal affairs. This might seem to be in contradiction with the articles of the charter which deal with respect for human rights. We have gone a long way since then; that is 20 years ago; the world has become more interdependent, particularly in this nuclear age. The recognition of this interdependence now becomes a matter of practical necessity for all countries.

What was involved in the Rhodesian situation was not interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. There was no violation here of article 2 para. 7; Rhodesia was not and is not a sovereign state. No, it is not even a *de facto* sovereign state; Rhodesia is a jurisdiction that is subject to the colonial power



in respect of very fundamental aspects of its affairs, and until such time as Rhodesia has been accorded by the Parliament of Britain the right of independence it could not be regarded as a sovereign entity.

Mr. NESBITT: It may not be *de jure* but it is a *de facto* one.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, the use of these Latin phrases sometimes frightens me, but what I want to point out is that, in this situation, Mr. Nesbitt—and I think you would agree because I know all of us at this table strongly support the concept of the Commonwealth—what was involved was the preservation of the Commonwealth itself. This was my judgment, and the judgment of my colleagues. Long before the Smith government made known its intentions unilaterally to declare independence we indicated to the government of Rhodesia that this would be an unwise course. On two occasions long before the Prime Ministers' conference of last summer, I had discussions in Ottawa with two different members of the Smith government. We discussed the Canadian attitude to this matter; we pointed out, as Australia also had in a private way, the dangers involved for the Commonwealth, and we indicated to them that if they intended to persist in this course they must not count on Canada because we would join with other Commonwealth countries in repudiating a unilateral declaration of independence. So they were forewarned long before the event, long before the action taken by the prime ministers at the Prime Ministers' Conference. Every effort was made in our discussions here to convince them that the course they were adopting was dangerous not only for the Commonwealth but dangerous for the peace of Africa and perhaps the peace of the world. These views which we expressed to them pretty strongly, however, were not accepted. Before the Prime Ministers' Conference there were further exchanges between the two governments as well as exchanges between the Prime Minister of Canada and Mr. Smith himself. At the Prime Ministers' Conference Canada joined with all of the Commonwealth countries without exception in repudiating the unilateral declaration of independence.

● (12.00 noon)

We have to look now at the Commonwealth as it is composed. It is made up not only of the traditional members of the Commonwealth, including India, Pakistan and Ceylon, along with Australia, New Zealand, ourselves and Britain, but is made up now of important countries in the British Commonwealth, in the Caribbean, who have recently got their independence. It is now supported on the periphery by other Commonwealth jurisdictions in the Caribbean that are about to get their independence. It is made up now of a number of independent sovereign body states in Africa—countries like Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia. The Commonwealth would not have been able to maintain its integrity and unity if there had not been a recognition by countries like Canada and by Britain of their opposition, to the form of discrimination being practised by some 300,000 whites as compared with some 4 million blacks in Rhodesia.

The world has moved a good deal in the past two decades. There is now the strong recognition that the revolution of the black man has succeeded, and I personally believe it is well that it has succeeded. Any effort on the part of any administration, to thwart that is bound to create a situation that must bring on it the censure of other countries.



Mr. Nesbitt says why did we not interfere in other situations, for example, in Hungary. Well, that is a rhetorical question, but it is not, I do not believe, a question that is fully relevant. Undoubtedly there was an interference by the Soviet Union in the affairs of that Christian country in a way that aroused the resentment of people all over the world. But there were certainly implications in that situation that are not present in the particular situation that we are discussing. If it had been possible to resist, the only way in which action involving intervention in Hungary could have come would have been by the United States, in particular. I think to raise that question is to raise something that is important, but something that is not fully relevant to this situation.

I do not want my remarks to be interpreted as meaning that we in any way condone what has happened in Hungary. We certainly do not. In self-respecting nations today there are many who honestly feel that country continues to be a satellite; that it continues to be denied what they would consider its sovereign rights.

Now, how far are you prepared to go in interfering in the affairs of other countries? I think Mr. Nesbitt has answered that question himself. That depends on each situation. We, for a long time at the United Nations—

Mr. NESBITT: I said that I agreed with that, but could you not give us some sort of guide-lines. You must have some kind of principle which we follow.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): For a long time at the United Nations we took the position that Article 2 (7) should be interpreted to mean that the UN was made up of sovereign states and that there could be no interference with internal situations. We sought to have the United Nations adequately interpret the implications of that article, particularly in relation, as I said earlier, to the provisions of the human rights clauses of the Charter. But some three years ago we confirmed a change in our course at the United Nations. We have since condemned apartheid, for instance, as practised in South Africa. In earlier years we felt that we could not support any resolution that was directly applied to South Africa. We refused, over a long time, the government of which you were a supporter, as well as the previous government, to support any resolution because of Article 2(7) that condemned apartheid in South Africa. But we later decided to vote for a resolution condemning that kind of racial discrimination. Some three years ago a change was confirmed.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, you said that Article 27, which has to do with voting—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, article 2(7) is the jurisdictional clause. Article 2, subparagraph (7).

Some three years ago the government instructed our delegation to vote specifically to condemn apartheid as practised in South Africa. Now, that was a change, and we took that course because of all the development that has taken place, and the consensus that has evolved in the international community. Thus the authority of the United Nations to interpose itself in situations that violate its concept of human dignity, in situations which, unless dealt with are considered to threaten the peace and, in some cases, do indeed threaten the peace, is now accepted.



I believe that the course we have taken in Rhodesia was the correct and only course. Now, I just want to make one observation. I said that this was a departure in Canadian policy. I want to emphasize it was not the first departure. It is a long way from the course, the somewhat isolationist course, that Canada pursued for a long time, in relation to the covenant of the league and in some respects in relation to the Charter. But the first real case was in 1963, when the Security Council passed resolutions recommending that all states should cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunitions and military vehicles to South Africa. Now that was a resolution of the Security Council passed in August of 1963, recommending to all states that they should cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. We accepted that, we observed that. For instance, in 1964, there was an international call by South Africa for tenders for certain military vehicles and because of this resolution, which was a non-mandatory one, we took the position that no Canadian company should respond to this call for tenders even though this meant a possible loss of the sale of almost 10,000 units that might have gone to a Canadian automobile company. We took that position because of this resolution, because we were a member of the United Nations, and felt that we should observe it. We have observed it.

Mr. CHURCHILL: These were just trucks they were not military vehicles.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They were trucks, Mr. Churchill. The tenders were called for by the Defence Department of the government of South Africa and they were clearly, on the basis of all the evidence before us, trucks that could be used for military purposes. We felt—and I may tell you that this was not an easy position for me—we felt in conscience that this was the only course we could honorably take, and we did take it.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to take brief advantage of the precedent set by Mr. Nesbitt in prefacing his very searching question with a sort of statement of his view. I propose to do so very briefly, Mr. Chairman, I assure the Committee.

Mr. NESBITT: I do not think it is a precedent; it has always been done on other occasions.

Mr. BREWIN: No, it is not a precedent, but it is a good idea so I adopt it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is one case where Mr. Brewin will be following the enlightened lead of the government of Canada in international affairs.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, wait and see.

The only thing I do not like is the word "following", Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We are pursuing a parallel line.

Mr. BREWIN: You are giving an enlightened lead, perhaps, partly, because we persuade you to. We would hope so, at any rate.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to repudiate fairly vigorously, if I may, what I understand to be implicit in the questions put by Mr. Nesbitt. He put this question: "How far is the government prepared to go in interfering in the internal affairs of other countries?" He put it in connection with the imposition



of economic sanctions in Rhodesia, which we are discussing. I would like to point out to the Committee that I do not think, in his questions, he once referred to the fact that the Security Council of the United Nations, I think on November 10, if my recollection is right, voted 10 to nothing with one country abstaining, I believe it was France, in favour, not of obligatory economic sanctions but indeed of the imposition of economic sanctions.

Mr. NESBITT: Just one moment, please, Mr. Chairman. I do not like interrupting other speakers but since Mr. Brewin perhaps did not hear what I said. The basis of the Canadian sanctions,—that was made quite clear by the Minister of Trade and Commerce the other day, and I believe by the Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs—was an agreement with the government of the United Kingdom and not as a result of any actions—

An hon. MEMBER: I would not agree with that.

Mr. McINTOSH: I do not think you stated the law correctly, if I do say so.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Mr. Brewin has the floor.

Mr. BREWIN: As far as I am concerned—

Mr. McINTOSH: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I think that Mr. Brewin's question was to one of the members of the Committee and that is not what we are here for. We are quite prepared to support the stand or the statement that Mr. Nesbitt has made as far as our party is concerned. If you want him up there as a witness, that is quite all right. I came here this morning to hear the Minister answer certain questions, not to hear other members ask us questions—

Mr. BREWIN: Why did you not complain when Mr. Nesbitt made a general statement then.

Mr. McINTOSH: I am not objecting to your making a general statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. May I ask Mr. Brewin to pose his questions directly to the witness through the Chairman.

Mr. BREWIN: I will, Mr. Chairman, but I just want to say whether Mr. Nesbitt said it or not there is a very clearcut distinction between intervention on behalf of the international community, or in accordance with the request of the international community represented by the United Nations, and unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of other nations without such a sanction. I put this question. How can the United Nations and its developing role ever be effective if its decisions are not loyally supported by member states. I put the question to the Minister. I have a series of questions but I do not want to put them all at the moment.

One further question, does the Minister not believe that as we develop effective sanctions behind the decisions of the United Nations so we develop a possibility of the rule of law in a peaceful world. Is it not vitally important that we do render moral support to the decisions of the United Nations and is that not relevant to the question of economic sanctions.

● (12.15 p.m.)

Secondly, Mr. Chairman, the Minister has already said this—and I want to put it again to the Minister. Is it not the Minister's opinion, certainly it is mine,



that it would be quite impossible to maintain a multiracial Commonwealth at all unless we agreed with Commonwealth policy in this matter. Has it not been made absolutely clear that it is Commonwealth policy to oppose by support of economic sanction at least the unilateral, illegal declaration of independence by the Rhodesian regime. I put that to the Minister and I ask him again: can we maintain the Commonwealth at all? Is it not tantamount to saying that we are not going to support this decision; we are in favour of actions that would destroy the Commonwealth as an effective organization? The next question I want to put to the Minister has to do with economic sanctions. Is it not true that if you do not impose effective economic sanctions in a situation of this sort and make them effective by perhaps partial or very modified use of force you may be confronted with an outbreak of force in a larger and perhaps eventually a chaotic situation developing in Europe. I put that to the Minister that in this situation that has developed in Rhodesia the effective present imposition of economic sanctions and whatever is necessary to make them effective is an instrument to prevent a further outbreak and spread of force in the situation. Another question, perhaps more in detail, which Mr. Nesbitt referred to—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Would you like me to answer those three before I forget them?

Mr. BREWIN: All right; I do not want to forget my other one either.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Go on, I will try to remember. I remember the three now but whether I will after the next intervention I do not know.

Mr. BREWIN: I just have one more question. Is it not true that the Smith regime, so called, in Rhodesia, has committed itself to a course of policy which would maintain racial domination in that country. Mr. Nesbitt referred to education in some detail. Is it not a fact, perhaps the Minister can tell us this, that the amount spent by the Rhodesian government on the education of each European child is ten times as much as that spent on each African child. That out of a thousand African children about 980 started school, 80 reached secondary school. Practically none of them go on beyond the third form in secondary school. Is it not a fact that the Smith regime in the negotiations with the British government leading up to the declaration of independence refused to accept proposals by the British government for the gradual improvement of education and indeed an offer of aid from the British government on a large scale program of African education. Is it not, therefore, a fact that the continuation in part of the present regime in Rhodesia is likely to lead to a perpetuation of the domination of a particular group or minority in that country.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that, in answer to your last question, your statement of facts generally represents what I believe to be the main elements in the discrimination that has been practiced. There are other discriminatory features, the franchise, and other particulars.

The question of sanctions and their relation to the use of force is something that I think has got to be carefully considered. Undoubtedly, sanctions do involve an element of compulsion particularly if they are under the mandatory provisions of Chapter 7 of the Charter. But, we have a lot to learn yet about the whole question of sanctions. The first time sanctions were imposed by the



United Nations was in the case of South Africa in the resolution that I referred to in 1963. The recommendations were that member states were urged to take particular courses; they were not obliged, to do so. This is really the first time that an effort has been made to develop a program of sanctions against a recalcitrant country. The first time when sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII was recently in regard to the request of the government of Britain to stop the clandestine transfer of oil through Beira in Mozambique. But, undoubtedly, you are right in saying that the development of the rule of law in the international community presupposes the development of sanctions in order to make the law effective. Economic sanctions are one form of sanctions that we are now trying but I must point out that there are economic considerations that have to be borne in mind in considering the effectiveness of sanctions particularly if they are to be made more all-embracing than in the situation that faced Britain when ships of Greek registry in the first instance and later Panamanian registry sought to get oil into Rhodesia.

We will have to give careful study to whether or not sanctions on a wider front can in any particular instance be applied. I do not say that we should not examine such questions but we have to give careful consideration to each situation. I fully subscribe to what you say about a recognition that the course practised in Rhodesia was a course that could not be sanctioned by any Commonwealth country, and that the failure of Canada or the other predominately white portions of the Commonwealth would have occasioned the greatest crisis in Commonwealth history.

Last December, on December 16, to be exact, it will be recalled the government of Tanzania and of Ghana decided to withdraw their missions in London. This was a very serious decision on the part of Commonwealth countries. We were all greatly disturbed by this act. It was this act on the part of these governments and the threat of other Commonwealth countries to take a similar course that brought about the Lagos conference. You are quite right in saying that if there had not been support for the position of the British government in this matter, the unity and the integrity of the Commonwealth stood in great jeopardy.

Mr. KLEIN: My questions were really for Mr. Nesbitt and if you are not going to permit any questions of Mr. Nesbitt I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN: You must direct your questions to the witness.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Walker sent me a written question asking me if sanctions are interference with the internal affairs of a country.

Mr. WALKER: May I just elaborate on that for a moment. The premise of the remarks of one of the members was, I believe, a false one, as far as I am concerned. The premise being that economic sanctions constituted an interference in the internal affairs of a country, and I just want to know if the Minister felt that in this way economic sanctions were almost tantamount to, or the same thing as, military intervention right within a country.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, in the first place, there have been no general mandatory sanctions yet imposed against Rhodesia. The mandatory sanctions that were taken by the Security Council the other day were with regard to a particular situation. It enabled the British government to use



forceful action to prevent the transmission of oil from one area to Rhodesia. But on your question in principle I do not think that sanctions in themselves are necessarily interfering in the affairs of a country—

Mr. WALKER: Well what are they there for?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): —and in particular in the case of Rhodesia we cannot argue this question of interference in the internal affairs of another country, because Rhodesia is not a sovereign power. The sovereign power in Rhodesia at the present time is the government of Britain. My hon. friend is a lawyer and he knows that this is a correct statement of the constitutional position—Rhodesia was not a fully governing sovereign body. It did not have control of its foreign policy in the final sense and it could not qualify for membership in the United Nations. Rhodesia before the unilateral declaration of independence or now could not apply for membership in the United Nations because it is not a body having the sovereign attributes, it has not the sovereign attributes of a country like Dahomey for instance. So, to argue about interfering in the internal affairs of another country is to invoke an argument that has no application here at all.

Mr. WALKER: I have a supplementary on that. Is it a fair statement to say then that economic sanctions could be interpreted as being a vehicle for the expression of world opinion or world conscience about an issue within a country that affects the whole world—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Undoubtedly.

Mr. WALKER: —rather than being an interference in the purely political internal affairs of a country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I hope that what we are engaged in now in the international community is that we are slowly building up an international organization that will have the components of legislative consideration, judicial review and the capacity, with the development of the rule of law, to enforce its decisions. This is a slow process, but it is an inevitable process. We are engaged in that process now. I do say to the Committee that because of situations that may develop, that while we may agree that sanctions should be imposed in order to give effect to the policy that most nations subscribe to today, in given situations the application of sanctions in a wider area may be very difficult for many reasons that I am sure are in the minds of all of us, and certainly are now being carefully studied by the Canadian government.

Mr. WALKER: Well, Mr. Chairman, I was just a little troubled by the Minister's meaning put in his last statement. I would like to ask two brief questions: Firstly, would the Minister agree that in light of the recent statement by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Mr. Smith, and in light of other developments, that there is in a very real sense a great deal of urgency about the problem of sanctions, particularly the effectiveness of sanctions, and if it is true to say that economic sanctions up to this point have not been effective.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think they have.



There has been only one mandatory sanction imposed thus far, and that was the mandatory sanction with regard to the situation at Beira in Mozambique. That sanction has proven effective but that was a mandatory sanction addressed to a particular situation.

● (12.30 p.m.)

Mr. FAULKNER: Would the Minister say that amongst the members of the Commonwealth there is a general agreement that sanctions up to this point have been effective and that there is not any compelling need to reconsider the degree and level of sanctions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. I think that one of our difficulties here, Mr. Faulkner, is that we are confusing mandatory sanctions under the United Nations with the steps that individual countries have taken in the form of trade embargoes both in exports and imports. In the case of Canada we have placed a total embargo on our trade with Rhodesia. One can regard that as a sanction. I have been speaking of sanctions here this morning in terms of either the voluntary or the mandatory sanctions envisaged by the Charter of the United Nations.

On your specific question, I think that disagreement does exist at the present time in the Commonwealth on whether or not the actions taken by countries in the Commonwealth and outside have resulted in a state of affairs in Rhodesia where we can say that the economic sanctions imposed by individual countries have succeeded. But our appraisal of the situation to date is this: While the sanctions program has not been effective in accordance with some announced schedules, they are proving to be working. I believe the very fact that these have been proposals for official discussions in a preliminary way, as outlined by Prime Minister Wilson the other day, is a good indication that the sanctions are having their effect. In any event I hope that time will be allowed to prove their further effectiveness. I would be greatly concerned, speaking for the government of Canada, about the use of force, as opposed to the use of military forces for police purposes. I would be greatly disturbed about the dangers of the use of force, particularly under the United Nations at the present time.

Mr. FAULKNER: I think we all probably share that misgiving but perhaps I could put my question and my thoughts in a different way. Would the Minister be prepared to outline briefly the objective to be achieved by sanction; what are the purposes of sanction? This may be old hat to some of you but what are we attempting to achieve and are we going to achieve it?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well the purpose is to bring to an end this illegal regime.

Mr. FAULKNER: And is it your expectation that sanctions, as they are presently constituted, will in fact achieve this objective?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well no one can say finally whether they will or not. On the basis of the evidence that I have had put before me I feel that they are having a real effect, and I would hope that it would be agreed that we should allow more time to run before reaching a negative conclusion.



Now, I do not hesitate to talk about this because Mr. Wilson made clear that these exploratory discussions on the officials level would take place without any commitment and without any interference in the sanctions program. The sanctions would go on; that is to say, the individual national sanctions would go on, even if the talks take place and while they take place.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Martin, I was very interested in your statement when you said it is a desirable departure from former Canadian foreign policy. I am not just sure whether I got your meaning of what that departure was.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, what I meant by that, Mr. McIntosh, was that while Canada subscribes, for instance, to the covenant of the League of Nations of 1919, there was a strong disposition during that period to reserve our position on various articles and this in my judgment tended to reduce our support for the League of Nations.

Likewise, in the case of the Charter of the United Nations. At the beginning we, I think properly, took a rather legalistic interpretation of some of the Charter provisions, notably article 2, subsection 7. Since that time the world has evolved, more sovereign nations have come into being; the membership of the United Nations has increased substantially; we now have the dangers of nuclear warfare; we have now a general recognition of the obligation of states to encourage an improved situation respecting human rights, and there is now a consensus that the international community, in order to maintain peace, has to take a greater interest in the practices of other countries. That is what I meant by saying that I think the departure is a desirable one. I think it is one in keeping with the character of the world in which we live. It has taken us from a relative position of isolation into full participation into the international collective effort of our day.

Mr. McINTOSH: Even going so far as to interfere in the domestic affairs of any country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not think I said that.

Mr. McINTOSH: No, I am asking you if this is what this new departure means.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not think it means that. It does not mean that countries must have their domestic programs interfered with, but it does mean that if we are going to maintain peace in this interdependent world, acts of individual governments that threaten the peace elsewhere must be regarded as matters that come within the concern of international bodies, such as the United Nations. The action taken in Rhodesia of discrimination against human beings who are black was an act that was calculated to stir up the whole of Africa into a situation that would threaten the peace.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you elaborate on what you mean by discrimination in Rhodesia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would be very glad to provide an examination of this.



Mr. McINTOSH: What I am trying to get at, Mr. Martin, is article 2, subsection 7, says:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. McINTOSH: But what I am trying to get at is that with this new departure do you feel that Canada now can interfere in this or the United Nations can interfere in this type of matter?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well in the particular case that we are discussing we must recognize that article 2(7) has no application; Rhodesia is not a member of the United Nations. It would not qualify. We are not interfering in the affairs of a sovereign body; what we are doing is interfering in the affairs of a nation that had not yet acquired independence and that had acted in an illegal way to the point where its authority, in international law and constitutionally, had been transferred from itself to the colonial power; in this case Britain. And the "interference" in this case is with British approval and, in fact, with British connivance.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well you were looking at your definition of discrimination.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is a very good term, Mr. Nesbitt, if you would only look up the etymology of it.

Mr. NESBITT: I know, but the connotation is a bit different.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Martin, will you elaborate on the term "discrimination" in Rhodesia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. Well, for instance, the 1961 constitution in Rhodesia could, I agree eventually produce majority rule in that country, when sufficient Africans reach the required property and educational levels to obtain the franchise for election to 50 out of the 65 seats in the Rhodesian legislative assembly. However, these educational and property qualifications are so high in terms of conditions in Rhodesia that only a very small percentage of the Africans of Rhodesia qualify to vote for these 50 seats.

Mr. WALKER: How many whites qualified?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Every one.

Mr. WALKER: Not every one.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, every one.

Some hon. MEMBERS: No, no.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, there are property qualifications, naturally. In other words, they can qualify provided the necessary conditions are there; whereas the blacks cannot qualify on the basis of equal provisions applied to them.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you mean to say that this qualification does not apply to the whites in Rhodesia? This is the point I am making.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is no discrimination in theory between the qualifications extended to the blacks and whites, but there is a discrimination in practice in the qualifications imposed against the blacks in comparison to the whites, in a country where 300,000 people only are white and where 4 million are black. It would be the same as saying in Canada that people in only one section of the country shall have the right to vote under certain conditions. Now that in itself may not cause an international situation but, in Africa, where there has been a resurgence and a recognition of equality among the countries of Africa, this does create a situation that threatens the peace and thereby does become a matter that concerns the international community.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well we do have situations in Canada where people are not allowed to vote—it is a qualification too. I want to ask another question—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But it is not on a discriminatory basis.

Mr. McINTOSH: That is debatable. Was there a recent resolution passed within the United Nations sanctioning the use of armed forces to bring down the peaceful government of Rhodesia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. McINTOSH: There was no resolution passed?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. There was a resolution last November urging member states—that is members of the United Nations—to take economic action to bring down the illegal regime, but that resolution was simply a recommendation to countries to act. However, a few weeks ago, because of the situation of the two ships that were carrying oil that was presumably destined for Rhodesia, the British government moved in the Security Council for the imposition of a mandatory economic sanction that would enable it to prevent those ships from carrying their cargo to the proposed destination. Now that was the only sanction of an obligatory character proposed yet by the United Nations. There has been talk of possible further action, under chapter 7, in the United Nations. Whether that action will be taken or not remains to be seen.

● (12.45 p.m.)

Mr. McINTOSH: My next question, Mr. Martin, is a follow-up, I think, on one that Mr. Nesbitt was trying to get an answer to, and in my opinion he did not get it. It was also based on the United Nations Charter, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and belief that the main purpose in the United Nations charter is to provide peace and security to the world and I think that is in article 1(1).

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The preamble, I think.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would the Minister comment on the charge, and this has been prevalent in publications and so on, that there now appears to be a double standard applied by the United Nations. In the case of Rhodesia, they are interfering in what we call domestic affairs, and in the case of Vietnam they are not interfering in the manner in which they have the power to under the charter. There seems to be that double standard and there has been this charge made. Now, may I ask this question. While one side it appears that it is being applied by the United Nations, in the domestic affairs of Rhodesia where there



is no war nor any attempt or intention of aggression. On the other side an entirely different standard is being applied by the United Nations in the refusal or the failure to deal with any actual conflict in Viet Nam.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, if I understand your question, my reply would be in the case of Rhodesia I have given you the two instances where the United Nations Security Council has acted: One where it provided for a recommendation to members states to take particular national courses of action; the other where there was a mandatory sanction on oil for a particular purpose that was imposed. The other action taken by the United Nations with regard to Rhodesia has been the discussions in the colonial committee within recent days at the United Nations and the general discussions of the problem of Rhodesia in general debates in the General Assembly.

In the case of Viet Nam the Security Council was seized with a resolution on Viet Nam. The problem of Viet Nam has been discussed in the General Assembly. It has not been possible to take any decision whatsoever in the case of Viet Nam in the Security Council because the nations concerned are not all members of the United Nations. No effective action could be taken—China is not a member; South Viet Nam is not a member; North Viet Nam is not a member,—

Mr. McINTOSH: Rhodesia is not a member

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But the British government is and Rhodesia is not a sovereign state. That is the point that I have made before; Rhodesia is not a sovereign body. Now, if there was action, no one has suggested that the United Nations has reached that stage of perfection where it can deal with all situations in the world, of course it has not; it has only been in existence 20 years. And if there was some way by which we could deal with the situation in Viet Nam, I think it would be a very very happy development, but there is no way of dealing with that situation because of the character, because of the nature of the circumstances, because of the participants involved. In the case of Rhodesia it is possible to take corrective action because of the nature of the problem. That is the only explanation one can offer at this stage of international development.

Mr. McINTOSH: Can I ask you this Mr. Minister. Maybe you cannot answer it, maybe you do not want to answer it; in your opinion how far is the United Nations willing to go to use force in regard to these sanctions? Will they use armed force, and further to that, in regard to the new policy of Canada, how far is Canada willing to go to pursue her new policy, will she use armed force?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I have made it clear today and I have made it clear in discussions in the House—I was asked this question, and Mr. Churchill will recall asking me this question a number of times—that Canadian policy did not envisage the use of force. No one can speak of what will happen in the future, but I would think that this problem of Rhodesia can be resolved without the use of force. I think it would be most dangerous—I cannot emphasize this too strongly—to contemplate the use of force in this situation. We have got to take into account all that would flow from the use of force.



Now, there are many disadvantages to the use of force. These include the fact that first of all, in my judgment, it would not necessarily provide a quick solution; the danger of a more general conflict developing which might involve racial strife and grave international repercussions, and the damage, economic and political, from the use of force to an independent multi-racial Rhodesia, and it would have very serious effects on the future well-being, for instance, of Zambia. I hope that the issue in Rhodesia will be resolved by peaceful means. I believe it can be resolved by peaceful means.

Now, the government of Britain, the colonial power, the government that alone has the constitutional authority on this matter, has not precluded the use of force to restore law and order to Rhodesia; but the British government, I think wisely, has declared that it is unwilling to use force in existing circumstances, and I believe that the course that has been taken, together with the exploratory talks that are envisaged, will lead to an eventual solution of this matter.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, my last question is a follow-up I think from one that Mr. Brewin asked and I did not hear the Minister's answer, if he did answer, or by silence he agreed with Mr. Brewin with regard to education in Rhodesia, but the implication that I have was that it is a very low standard of education in Rhodesia. The information that I have, and I would ask the Minister to confirm it, is that one in every six Rhodesian people is at school, while in Great Britain there is one in every five. In Rhodesia 50 per cent of the population is under 17 years of age.

Mr. MARTIN: (*Essex East*): Well, I know I have—

Mr. McINTOSH: In Great Britain three adults pay taxes for one student, while in Rhodesia only one adult pays taxes. This is the difference between each country. My information is that the Africans are advancing in education faster in Rhodesia than in any other country in Africa. This has been all published. There are figures here showing the number of schools in existence last year and the number this year, and they are not to be compared with any other country.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We could get into a long discussion on this. I do not think that this is an area that would be very fruitful, Mr. McIntosh. The important thing in this if I may emphasize, because of the time question now, the important thing surely is this: there is a situation in Rhodesia that does offend the sense of justice of all the countries in the Commonwealth, including the African countries. That is the fact. In the face of this situation, this government, which is not an independent sovereign body, has taken a course which is calculated to disturb the peace in a way that warrants concern and action by the international community—as in the restricted mandatory Security Council resolution of a few weeks ago. And all of the Commonwealth countries, because they want to preserve the British Commonwealth, because they recognize it as a very indispensable and valuable instrument in the international process that is developing in our time, have taken this course because of the discriminations practised by a country that is composed of 300,000 people as against the position of some four million. Now, we are not living in the world of Kipling, we are not living in the world of Mackenzie King, we are living in a new world altogether, and if we are going to maintain the peace of the world in



this interdependent period when Africa has emerged now as a vital, forceful continent, we have got to recognize the sensitivities and the demands and the proclamation of rights of these new people; otherwise we will not hold the Commonwealth together; otherwise we will create situations that will threaten the peace and call for much more violent action, and that is the situation as the government sees it. Now, if you do not accept this view, I can only say to you I think that the course that you are pursuing, and I am sure it is a well intentioned course, is a course that will bring to an end the Commonwealth. It is a course that will create situations in the world that will become very serious indeed.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, I can only say to you that maybe the course that I am pursuing is your fault because you have not issued a white paper that we asked for.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I would hate to be blamed for a world war because I did not issue a white paper.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you are not going to be blamed for a world war, but some of your statements are not correct.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Even Mr. Churchill concurred—

Mr. McINTOSH: I would ask were all the Commonwealth countries represented at the Lagos Conference, and if they were not, why not?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Ghana was not there, Tanzania was not there.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was New Zealand there?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): New Zealand had an observer there, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Why did they have only an observer?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know why; you will have to ask the New Zealand government. I do not know whether the New Zealand High Commissioner is here today, but—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you must have asked some why they were not there, you are the Minister for External Affairs.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, that does not mean that I know everything. I am wrong, the New Zealand government was represented. Australia had an observer. The reason at that time I had better not go into that now.

Mr. THOMPSON: The time has gone by now. It would seem to be unwise to initiate a few questions which have not been mentioned, I would like a discussion on these things because I have some personal familiarity with the problems there and as I listen to the beautiful statements of the Minister I have a feeling that although—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Do not tell me that you disagree with that.

Mr. THOMPSON: They sound very nice. I think that our commitments to the African and the Rhodesian situations are so great at the present time that we had better be considering a little bit about how we are going to get the spoon into our mouth. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, in view of that would it be wise to pose any questions now?



The CHAIRMAN: Are there any others who wish to pose questions to the Minister? If there is only one item left would the Minister feel like completing the discussions today? If there is more than one, then in that case we will have no choice but to adjourn.

Mr. THOMPSON: I have listened very carefully now for an hour and a half, and I do not see that the time will permit us to go on.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe Mr. Thompson wants to continue his questions at the next meeting.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I am in the hands of the committee. I am a servant of the public.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Thompson has had some experience in Africa. I think most of us would be interested in hearing his observations.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): He had some valuable service in Africa which you condemned on one occasion.

Mr. NESBITT: I did not condemn it, I just said that the Minister stated that Mr. Thompson was there on a basis that he was not.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it the wish of the committee to continue now or to adjourn?

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, let us be fair. How many other members have questions with regard to Rhodesia? Can we clear up Rhodesia today?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions about this but we have the Minister here. He has spoken to us on three subjects now which were the main subjects of his initial statement. It may well be that other members of the Committee will want, before we get on with other things, to ask him about a few other subjects that are not within—

The CHAIRMAN: Well what is Mr. Brewin asking now—

Mr. BREWIN: I will not ask any more about Rhodesia.

The CHAIRMAN: Well in that case we will have to meet again next Thursday.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, will the Minister be able to be with us next Thursday?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can Thursday.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been our practice to meet every Thursday and it has proven to be satisfactory.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That will give you a chance to stir up some contradictory statements you can put on the record.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The most salutary thing about this meeting, Gordon, is that you did not ask me any questions.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, might I just pose a question that we might be thinking about until our next meeting. I think it is obvious here this morning that we are talking about a problem that very few of us—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let us stop; I do not want to hear another speech.

Mr. THOMPSON: Now, just a moment, please.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, no, either we go on or we stop.

Mr. THOMPSON: I am not making a speech and I have listened while your party has spoken and I would appreciate if you would give me a minute to speak now.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well one minute is 60 seconds.

Mr. THOMPSON: It is this. We are speaking about things that we do not have very much background in and yet we are committed, we are committed to the hilt, and I wonder if it would not be good for the Committee to be considering whether or not it would be a very profitable exercise for a representative committee or group to plan a visit to Africa, particularly to Rhodesia, but also to a few other areas where I think we would all benefit by having some first hand knowledge. I am not asking for an answer I am just suggesting we might think about it.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps that is a proposition that might be submitted to the steering committee.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would simply want to make this observation, Mr. Thompson. I assure you that Canadian policy is based upon an examination of a very wide knowledge in the department and from other sources. Our policy does not represent a commitment that is not based on facts.

Mr. McINTOSH: You would save a lot of money if you accept the Minister's statement.

Mr. THOMPSON: It would be nice if we could save the situation in Africa on the same basis.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen in that case we will—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I say that without deprecating your great experience and knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN: We will pursue the discussion next Thursday but before we do adjourn may I say I will be absent Thursday. If Mr. Nesbitt, the Vice Chairman is present, of course, he will chair the meeting. There is a possibility he might be absent too and in that case I will use my authority now to appoint Mr. Macdonald of Rosedale to act if the Vice Chairman and Chairman are both absent.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. JEAN-EUDE DUBÉ  
OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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LÉON J. RAYMOND,

The Clerk of the House.

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUBÉ, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

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The CHAIRMAN: Copies and complete sets are available to the

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*The Clerk of the House.*



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

1966

THURSDAY, May 12, 1966.

(6)

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

Chairman: Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 5

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1966

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

Mr. Allmand,	Mr. Groos,	Mr. McIntosh,
Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ),	Mr. Harkness,	Mr. Pilon,
Mr. Basford,	Mr. Klein,	Mr. Régimbal,
Mr. Brewin,	Mr. Laprise,	Mr. Stanbury,
Mr. Churchill,	Mr. Lind,	Mr. Thompson,
Mr. Faulkner,	Mr. Macdonald	Mrs. Wadds,
Mr. Forest,	( <i>Rosedale</i> ),	Mr. Walker—(24).
Mr. Foy,	Mr. Macquarrie,	

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

LEON J. RAYMOND,  
The Clerk of the House.

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 12, 1966.

(6)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.10 a.m. this day, the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt, presiding.

*Members present:* Mrs. Wadds and Messrs. Asselin (Charlevoix), Brewin, Churchill, Faulkner, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Klein, Lind, Macdonald (Rosedale), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Regimbal, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (19).

*Also present:* Mr. Matheson, M.P.

*In attendance:* The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-67, and continued questioning the Minister on the subject of Rhodesia.

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

At 1.15 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11.00 a.m., Thursday, May 26th, 1966, at which time it is expected that the witness will be Mr. Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*





## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, May 12, 1966.

● (11.10 a.m.)

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, I think we have a quorum, and the meeting can come to order. Last week, we were discussing Rhodesia and its problems, and a number of questions were put to the Minister on that occasion. The last speaker, I believe, who had just commenced to ask some questions, was Mr. Thompson.

Do you have any questions to put to the Minister, Mr. Thompson, or any statements that you wish to make?

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Minister, just at the close of last week's session I had made the suggestion that I hoped the Committee might consider sending a representative delegation to some of the areas of Africa, including Rhodesia. It is my impression that, as we have gone on with the discussions, we are perhaps talking about something, and are becoming involved in something for which we do not really have the background. In dealing with this, our commitment is leading us into a very prominent position so far as the Rhodesian problem, specifically, is concerned. I would hope that the Committee might consider this. I think it is equally important, if not more so, that we be informed on some of the events that are taking place as they concern external affairs as we are on some of the other areas that committees are seeking to acquaint themselves with by direct contact and observation.

Mr. Chairman, as one who has had some experience in Africa, and knows at least the background of the problems that we are concerned with in Rhodesia, my own fear is that in following a policy that probably is not defined toward its objective as it might be, the situation in Rhodesia might on one extreme be pushed into apartheid, something that would be a tragedy for the growing independence and self-determination of Africa; or, on the other hand, might be pushed into what could be a bloodbath that would make what happened in the Congo look insignificant.

Therefore, it is my own opinion that Rhodesia today is at the very fulcrum of events as they develop in the continent of Africa. I have a few questions that I would like to place before the Minister that relate to this situation as I have briefly referred to it. The British press has persisted in reports that the British government has continuously planned for armed force against Rhodesia. These reports claim that there are two brigades ready to be flown to Rhodesia, if necessary, from the army at the Rhine. Does the Minister have any information whether such action has been contemplated in the apparent view of the effective use of sanctions against Rhodesia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The position of the British government, Mr. Thompson, as stated up to the present time, is that it would be dangerous to



contemplate the use of force, apart from in certain circumstances, possible police action to maintain law and order. That is—as I stated it last week—the position of the Canadian government. Undoubtedly, if the British government wanted to use force it would have an opportunity of calling upon its military manpower as stationed in that particular locality or elsewhere. But I know of no action that is contemplated along those lines by the British government. At any rate, none has been communicated to us. The discussions that we have had are along the lines that I have indicated, that of giving the sanctions program an opportunity of running its course. I have expressed the view that that program will bring about results. I have suggested that the exploratory talks that are now underway might be reasons for confidence in the outcome of that program.

Mr. THOMPSON: Referring to sanctions, Mr. Chairman, might I ask the Minister if it is his impression that sanctions thus far have been effective?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): As I have stated, it is not possible to say at this moment that they have been effective in the sense of bringing the regime down; but our judgment is that, notwithstanding some difficulties, their effectiveness is being proven. That is not to say that they are finally effective now or to guess when they will be finally effective; no one can give a final judgment on that.

Mr. THOMPSON: In my own experience, Mr. Chairman, as it relates to the League of Nations and the ineffectiveness of sanctions against Italy at the time of the Ethiopian crisis,—and there are other illustrations that can be cited since then—sanctions really never have proven effective in bringing about the intended objective. Might I just cite this example? That tobacco crop apparently has been sold without any difficulty at all, albeit that it was covert. Reports are that Britain and the United States and Russia, have all partaken in the purchasing of that tobacco crop.

● (11.15 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is not my information, in those precise terms.

Mr. THOMPSON: Not officially, but another element is that there are reports that the trade between Zambia and Rhodesia is continuing on quite a normal pattern. In fact reports say that some of the oil assistance program, unofficial as it is, coming out of South Africa is actually moving into Zambia. With the tremendous interdependence of the two countries on trade with each other—in fact, the President of Zambia said the other day that Rhodesia and Zambia were Siamese twins as far as trade is concerned—is there any hope of sanctions ever reaching their objectives, in view of these developments.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I believe there is. With regard to the normalcy of trade between Zambia and Rhodesia, we must recognize the fact of geography; we must recognize, for instance, that the Kariba dam serves not only Rhodesia but serves Zambia as well; that there is a common railroad, but this does not mean to say that Zambia is not playing its part, having in mind the difficulties, in trying to bring about the objective on which all Commonwealth countries are united.

Mr. THOMPSON: Does the Minister have any figures on the number of black Africans who have immigrated into Rhodesia from Zambia, from Malawi, from



perhaps other neighbouring states, for work opportunities since the declaration of U.D.I.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not have any final figures, but we do have estimates, and we also have estimates of the number who have left Rhodesia since the unilateral declaration of independence.

Mr. THOMPSON: Of those who have left, are some of them white residents of Zambia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. White residents of Zambia, white residents of Rhodesia.

Mr. THOMPSON: What is the difference in figures between the influx of new immigrants as compared to those who are emigrating; is the balance not in favour of those coming into Rhodesia, both black and white?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That would not be my estimate.

Mr. THOMPSON: Another point in this regard as it relates to the economic side is, does the department have reports in regard to the slowdown in work of white miners within Zambia since U.D.I.?

I am speaking of copper production. I have seen reports where the slowdown in copper production has amounted to as high as \$700,000 a day. Are the figures available on that, and how is it affecting the tremendous need of copper by Britain from the Zambian copper mines?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have no figures on that. Perhaps my officials might have some information.

Mr. THOMPSON: My concern here is that, actually, sanctions are having the adverse effect of bringing Rhodesia to its knees or accomplishing the economic pressure that they are intended to effect as far as trade within the continent, and particularly with neighbouring countries, is concerned, and as it relates to immigration as well because it would seem that there are reports coming out of Rhodesia that indicate that neither the majority of blacks nor whites, are opposing Smith's stand.

I can only say that, except for rebel elements, or revolutionary elements coming in from the outside, people within the country are fairly well satisfied.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can only repeat, Mr. Thompson, that my assessment based on information that is supplied to me is that the sanctions program is having its effect. I do not say when this effect will be final and complete, but I do not share your pessimism about the outcome of this program. I give as an indication, apart from other facts that are supplied to us on a confidential basis, the exploratory talks themselves, how they were initiated. Together with other information supplied to me they lead me to this conclusion.

Mr. THOMPSON: Turning just briefly to the political side, I believe the Minister agrees that, actually inherent within the 1961 Constitution, is self-determination of government for the majority somewhere along in the future. I do not want to give the impression for one moment that I am not in favour of a majority government and of the need for the African to assert himself and his own influence in the development of the democratic process in Africa. Again I come back to the point that we are becoming involved in a policy that I think might have dangerous effects. One is the possibility of swinging Rhodesia into



apartheid, which I do not believe it is at the present time, and the other is of the use of force and probably what can be termed only as a tremendous loss of life, if not a bloodbath, that can develop as it did in the Congo.

Therefore, on the political side, does the Minister consider that the results of the recent South African election, where the nationalist party took some 20 seats away from the United Party's representation and strengthened apartheid more so than ever before, was a reaction that was greatly influenced by events that were taking place in Rhodesia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have seen it suggested that that was the case. Whether it is the case, I do not know.

Mr. THOMPSON: Does the Minister have any information, as far as the position of South Africa is concerned, that in the event of disaster, shall we say, in the use of armed forces in the implementation of sanctions, to indicate that that country is preparing to back up and support Rhodesia's position? Again, I am thinking of the possibility of apartheid reaching into Rhodesia, something that would be a tragedy for Africa.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What the South African government plans to do in those circumstances, I do not know. But there are estimates, there are views as to what she would do. I do not know that it would be useful for me to speculate hypothetically, but in saying that we must give the sanctions program an opportunity to evolve, I have in mind the great desirability of avoiding that kind of situation.

Mr. THOMPSON: We are—and when I say “we”, I mean our representative in the United Kingdom, Mr. Chevrier, who is the chairman of the Sanctions Committee—this places us in a very responsible and important position. It indicates just how much we are involved in this. Just a few days after President Kaunda had said that Rhodesia and Zambia were Siamese twins economically, he also stated that Zambia perhaps would have to take the initiative if Britain's attempts to bring a solution in Rhodesia failed, or some agreement were to come out of the present exploratory talks. Have we in Canada had any discussions with Zambia and with their authorities in regard to what our policy would be if Zambia or if other neighbouring African countries might move into force action.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. The week before last we had the foreign minister of Zambia here, and I had some talks with him about many aspects of the Rhodesian problem, useful talks. He was in London the other day and an opportunity was presented for further discussion of some aspects of this problem but I may say that our talks here were very useful.

Mr. THOMPSON: Has there been any discussion with Zambia or with Tanzania—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think you met him, did you not?

Mr. THOMPSON: Yes. I was very grateful for the opportunity—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think Mr. Macquarrie met him.

Mr. THOMPSON: Have there been any talks in regard to Canada's role in helping to construct the railroad from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania through to Zambia which would obviate the problems that Zambia faces in regard to transportation?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have agreed to participate along with the British government in a feasibility study. I think our contribution to this study represents an expenditure of some \$350,000. However, I would want it to be understood that the fact that we are participating in this feasibility study along with Britain is in no way to be construed as a commitment, if the feasibility study should be positive, that we were going to undertake to share any responsibility in the building of the railroad.

Mr. THOMPSON: Is that commitment in terms of dollars, or is that in terms of personnel who are actually taking part in the feasibility survey?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, the total cost of our participation in the feasibility study represents an estimated contribution of \$350,000.

Mr. THOMPSON: Do we have Canadian personnel taking part in that at the present time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, we do.

Mr. THOMPSON: How soon is it expected that this survey will be completed?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, I think it will take some time; another half a year or so.

Mr. THOMPSON: Continuing this problem of transportation,—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Perhaps I could tell you that it is estimated that the public survey will cost \$501,000. Our share will likely be about \$276,000, although we have the appropriation that I mentioned. The Ottawa firm of Canadian Aero Service Limited has been selected to carry out the Canadian portion of the project which is an engineering feasibility study of the proposed route by aerial photography, air photo interpretation and ground survey. The study will determine the route which the railway should follow.

The British portion of the project involves an economic study of the railway and of the port of Dar es Salaam. The project is restricted to the survey of the proposed route of the railway, and, as I said, in no way involves construction. Whether the railroad will be built, of course, will be a matter for later consideration by the governments of the African states involved.

Mr. THOMPSON: Does the Minister have any information about plans for the building of a separate railway link from South Africa to Rhodesia, by passing Bechuanaland?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have no information on that.

Mr. THOMPSON: There are reports that such a feasibility survey is now under way from the South African end.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have read reports to that effect. I have no information before me, but I have read these reports.

Mr. THOMPSON: Continuing on the political side, there are reports that transmitters in Zambia are beaming broadcasts into Rhodesia to this effect, in fighting black Africans—I am quoting now from a report that I saw the other day—"to kill, to burn down farms, to destroy property, to maim cattle." Is this type of sanction being applied today from Zambia?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know whether this is the fact. However, you will remember that on April 4, I said in the Committee that as far as the Canadian government is concerned—this is in answer to a question by Mr. McIntosh, I think—we have neither authorized nor contributed in any way to such broadcasts. The suggestion that Canada has participated with Britain in the construction and operation of radio transmitters for propaganda broadcasts against Rhodesia is, of course, completely untrue. As far as I am aware, the only British transmitter which aims broadcasts at Rhodesia is in Bechuanaland, and it certainly does not broadcast programs of the type that has been referred to in the public press in this country.

Mr. THOMPSON: What are our present trade statistics with Rhodesia? Has Canada's trade been completely cut off?

● (11.30 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON: Both ways?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Both exports and imports. There is a suggestion that there was some corned beef on the shelves in Canada. To the extent that I have been able to complete our examination of this it would seem that this represents commodities that were in Canada before the embargo became effective and that—

Mr. THOMPSON: I thought that you might announce to us that such reports were "corny" but—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): If I had done that it would have been a "corny" observation.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Mr. Chairman, is it true that the report was "baloney"?

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, do we recognize Rhodesian postage?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I will have to check on that, Mr. Chairman. I would have thought that there was no doubt that we do not.

Mr. THOMPSON: Might I ask the Minister, Mr. Chairman, if we have any observers at the present time—I understand that we do not have any official representation—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In Rhodesia? No; we have had people visit Salisbury, one quite recently.

Mr. THOMPSON: Would the Minister give serious consideration to the suggestion that it might be well for a representative delegation of this Committee not only to visit Rhodesia, but also to visit neighbouring areas of Africa. I am thinking of such countries of major importance—concerned with us economically—such as Ghana and Nigeria.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I am sure that any opportunity that would be given to Canadians to understand the problems of Africa better—to know more about Africa—would in principle be something that we would all applaud. In regard to this Committee going to Rhodesia, I would be inclined to view it as an inappropriate thing to do at the present time. The role of such a visiting group



might also be misunderstood as an attempt of some sort at mediation. Such mediation between Britain and an illegal regime in a British territory, would seem to me, to be an entirely inappropriate and improper role for Canada. That is a matter for the British government.

Also, I would be afraid that at this time such an intervention might be regarded as undesirable in view of the informal exploratory talks that are now beginning in London between British and Rhodesian officials.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, may I remind Mr. Thompson of what happened to a couple of U.K. members of Parliament who went there and came home with thick lips and black eyes. We had better go into training if—

Mr. McINTOSH: Liberal or Social Credit?

Mr. WALKER: These were U.K. members, they were—

Mr. THOMPSON: I would hope, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): On the other question, a general visit; our High Commissioner in Ghana has been in touch with me recently. Other heads of missions in Africa also have urged on us the desirability of increasing our contacts, parliamentary and otherwise, and I would hope that in due time this sort of thing might be possible. I cannot make any commitment but it becomes increasingly evident that Africa is going to play an important role in the international community and that we ought to have as great a knowledge of that great and emerging continent as possible.

Mr. THOMPSON: Well, I appreciate that statement very much because I think we have a very important role to play in this developing role of African world affairs. I am also sure that the Minister agrees that we do not want to see either extremes take place in Africa; if possible, there must be some peaceful way of working this out. My concern is that we take the right initiative at the right time to avoid a crisis that would force some action of a kind that we have found ourselves taking in our important role as a peacekeeping force in other areas. When the governments of Ghana and Nigeria changed earlier this year apparently the government adopted a policy of continuing recognition which is sort of a difficult thing to understand but, apparently, like the Commonwealth it worked better than you can define it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No; that is not precisely the situation. What happened was that when Mr. Nkrumah was brought down, and his government ushered out, there was an interval of almost a week—I am speaking now from memory—before there was any step taken informally to recognize the new regime. There was a delay not only by Canada but by Britain herself, by some of the other Commonwealth countries and by the United States. After an interval we did inform our High Commissioner that he should indicate to the head of the new government that we would carry on normal relations with the new regime in Ghana.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I have a question at this point; it is one that I brought up in the House. What was the position of our Canadian military training mission during that week?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It carried on without any impairment whatsoever.



Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, these people remained attached to the various units of the army which was engaged in the takeover.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, pursuant to our contract, of course, they could not and did not in any way become involved in any political act. They were not withdrawn. We had given consideration—

Mr. HARKNESS: They remained with these units to which they were attached, advising them on military activity?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): None of the units which were involved in the takeover were in any way related to our participation.

Mr. HARKNESS: But we had military advisers attached too.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But they were not in any way a party to the change of government or to the fall of the Nkrumah regime.

Mr. HARKNESS: But you said previously they carried on in the same way that they had been doing, so they must have been continuing to give military advice to these people in the operations they were carrying out.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We carried on just exactly as the British. The British kept their people there and we conferred with one another. We thought this was a wise course and, looking back now, it clearly was.

Mr. HARKNESS: Was this not rather an anomalous situation for our military advisers to continue in their advisory capacity to an army which was in the process of taking over the government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No; if our people were in any way involved in the overthrow it would have been most inappropriate but they were not.

Mr. HARKNESS: But you said they continued in a normal advisory capacity, so they must have been advising these people on where was the best place to deploy troops, and so on, for the takeover.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I do not think I can add any more to what I have said.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was just going to suggest it was a situation which was not very explicable.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Were they ordered not to be involved with the new regime at the time the military people were on the staff?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: I would just like to point out to the members of the Committee that we are now on Rhodesia and while I realize that the situations in Ghana and Nigeria and elsewhere are perhaps in some way related, any questions in this regard perhaps we might save for a little later on in the meeting. Let us see if we can complete our questions on the subject of Rhodesia as such.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I just have one or two other questions. One question I would like to ask relates to the fact that we were part of—I do not know how to describe it—a continuing policy that bridged the problem of the military takeover in both Ghana and in Nigeria.

Now, assuming that it is our objective, and I am sure that it is, that we work for the peaceful settlement of these problems, do you think it is a



consistent policy that we should allow ourselves to get into a position where we absolutely cut ourselves off completely from any such role? Are we not becoming a tool of those who do not want to fight their own battles? Are they using us to fight them instead?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is not my view. I stated my position, the government's position, last week, a position that is concurred in by all of the Commonwealth countries without exception; that we felt that the dependent jurisdiction of Mr. Smith was acting in a manner contrary to the interests of Rhodesia which was still subject to the final authority of Her Majesty's government in Great Britain. It was acting contrary to the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole in the face of the evolving state of international opinion at the present time.

I can only repeat, Mr. Thompson, I am sure that if the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had not taken the position which they did take in rejecting the proposed unilateral declaration of independence, the unity of the Commonwealth would have been very seriously impaired.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, the hon. Minister said just as recently as several weeks ago there was unanimous agreement of all Commonwealth countries. Would the Minister inform us whether or not New Zealand and Australia are supporting the situation in the same way that Canada is, morally if not physically?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Morally, certainly. I do not believe that the embargo in the case of New Zealand is as complete as ours.

Australia has strengthened its embargo since the change of the head of government in Australia.

Mr. THOMPSON: Since the lack of direct participation in the Lagos conference by those senior members of the Commonwealth, is the Minister convinced that Australia and New Zealand—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Australia had an observer there.

Mr. THOMPSON: Yes, but—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But New Zealand was fully represented and so was every other country, except Ghana and Tanzania, and we had not hesitation in letting it be known at the outset that we would attend such a conference. I think, in looking back, the position the Canadian government took was a very essential one. The Lagos conference developed out of a situation that had been posed by the threat of Tanzania and Ghana to withdraw their missions in London. This was a very serious development, to find Commonwealth countries saying to Britain unless you take a particular course of action we are going to withdraw our diplomatic mission. This was an action taken by a Commonwealth country against Britain. We felt, in Canada at that time, that it was a very serious development and we took it on ourselves to urge with respect to the heads of the governments in those countries the possible serious implications of such a course.

You will remember that it was suggested by those countries that if by December 15, 1965, Britain did not take more effective action they would withdraw their missions. We were in close consultation at that time with other



Commonwealth countries, both in Africa and elsewhere, and we strongly supported the suggestion of the Prime Minister of Nigeria that in the case of this development there should be a conference of Prime Ministers in Lagos. We, I think, were one of the first countries unhesitatingly to accept the suggestion of the Nigerian Prime Minister, which we thought was a constructive suggestion, one that was designed to try and avert the action that was proposed to be taken by certain Commonwealth countries with regard to their missions in London itself. I am sure the conference at Lagos proved to be a very vital development in the interests of Commonwealth unity. I am happy to say there are indications about the restoration of diplomatic intercourse between certain Commonwealth countries and the British government.

● (11.45 a.m.)

Mr. THOMPSON: Does that include Ghana and Tanzania?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Ghana has restored her relations, it does include Tanzania.

Mr. THOMPSON: I have just two minor questions, Mr. Chairman. Is there any evidence that Chinese Communist trade or arms infiltration is reaching into the surrounding countries of Central Africa?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is no doubt that China has pursued a vigorous policy of sending its technicians, in some cases in very large numbers, to African countries; with what results no one can say with any finality.

It would seem that China has suffered some diplomatic reverses in her relations with African countries notwithstanding these infiltrations but they do exist. Some of these African countries, because of their low standard of living, naturally are looking for assistance wherever they can get it. They get assistance from western countries; they get some assistance from Canada, they get assistance from the Soviet Union and they get assistance from China.

As you know, we are providing some military assistance to a Commonwealth country, Tanzania. There were, and I guess there still are, some Chinese technicians in that country.

Mr. FAULKNER: You mentioned technicians. What about broadcasting? What are the Chinese doing in the way of broadcasting? Do they have facilities for the transmission of programs to countries like Rhodesia? Is there any suggestion or thought they may be involved in the sort of broadcasting Mr. Thompson earlier alluded to?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You mean from China itself or within the territory?

Mr. FAULKNER: Within the territory.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not believe there is any broadcasting within the territory. Undoubtedly, there is broadcasting from China itself.

Mr. THOMPSON: Just one more question. I wish that the picture of Rhodesia and this whole problem were as clear cut and as easy as the Minister gives his answers.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I assure you I do not think it is as clear cut as that. It is a very complicated question, but I want to make it clearly understood



that we acted in Rhodesia as we did because we believe that the consensus of world opinion today is that the peace of the world hinges in part on the treatment by majority in individual states, particularly where the question of colour is involved. We acted also because we believed that the unity of the Commonwealth was vitally involved. It was not an easy matter for Canada to take the action that it took at the outset against Rhodesia. But, there were no alternatives, in our judgment, and in the judgment of all the Prime Ministers when they took this action. I am sure the course we have followed was the right course.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Martin, I am sure also the peace of the world as it relates to Africa relates very very directly to how quickly some of these areas are going to be able to assume responsible government, and whether our quest for peace might defeat its own purpose by forcing actions that I am sure none of us want to see happen. What I fear in asking my questions this morning is that the motive behind it is that we might be pushing Rhodesia into one extreme or another that would make our problems far greater than what they are at present. But just one last question—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is always possible, but I ask you to consider what would have happened if the action taken by the British government, by the Canadian government and by other Commonwealth governments and other western powers and other countries in other parts of the world had not been taken. I ask you to consider what would have happened in Africa.

Mr. THOMPSON: Well, I agree with that and I think that we have considered it very carefully. What I am more concerned about now is not past tense but present tense; that our actions now are working towards the same objectives. But not to confuse the picture, in asking this last question may I just draw it out to give evidence of how confusing the thing is.

It is a well known fact that Russia has a heavy trade pattern with South Africa, and that included in the trade to South Africa in recent months has been dynamite and small arms. I wonder if some of this dynamite and small arms has been finding its way into Rhodesia. Perhaps you do not have an answer for us, but certainly this is just how difficult the situation is and I would hope that what we are doing is not just on the assumption that what we are doing is right but we have the facts and we understand what is taking place before we commit ourselves to folly.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Might I say at this point that I do not wish to restrict anyone's questions, but I would like to point out at the present time that the next speaker on my list is Mr. Churchill, followed by Mr. Walker, Mr. McIntosh and Mr. Regimbal. Is there anyone else who would like to ask the Minister questions on Rhodesia?

Mr. HARKNESS: I was hoping to ask some at the end of the last session.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Is there anyone else in addition to the list. I would like to have an idea, Mr. Macquarrie. Mr. Churchill would you like to ask some questions of the Minister now?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Before we go on, Mr. Chairman, I thought it was understood when the Committee was formed that we would not interject with supplemen-



tary questions. It interferes with the line of questioning of the person asking the questions; it throws the Minister off and it holds up proceedings, in my opinion.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Well I would agree, Mr. McIntosh, if members could restrain themselves as much as possible from putting in supplementary questions. But, again, it is a question of judgment. If the occasional supplementary question which is very brief and right on the point is asked the Chair will entertain them. But, if the supplementary questions intend to be supplementary and supplementary, I am afraid that the Chair will not entertain them. Again, it is a question of judgment. Now, I will ask Mr. Churchill to put his questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a preliminary remark and express my regrets that the proceedings of our Committee are not available to us earlier. If there is a priority given to, say, the Broadcasting Committee of the House of Commons I would question very much why any Committee of the House should have a priority. Surely the matter that we are considering here is as great and of as much interest to everyone as the work in other Committees. I think that it is most regrettable that the last two meetings recorded here are not available to us. I record that objection.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: I was just going to say in that regard, Mr. Churchill, that I referred that matter in the House the day before yesterday to the Secretary of State whose responsibility it is, and I was assured the matter would be looked into. The secretaries, Miss Ballantyne tells me, explained there were certain technical difficulties and likewise the Minister has just indicated the same. We hope these reports will be out very promptly because we certainly need them to refer to.

Mr. CHURCHILL: At the last meeting the Minister spent a great deal of time—of course I have not the actual record now, but I made some notes—pointing out that Rhodesia is the responsibility of the British government, it being a colony, and suggestions were made that we should not take certain actions and it was indicated that we could not intervene with regard to a territorial possession in which the British government was responsible. Suddenly then we were rather active and quick in taking action when this trouble developed, and I do not see how you can reconcile the two positions. If we are going to take action in regard to a colony of Great Britain, are we to restrict it only to Rhodesia? There are other colonies of Great Britain in the world where action might be requested.

The United States of America happens to have territorial possessions outside the United States that might be termed colonies. Are we to intervene there if trouble develops? I was not at all clear on the Minister's argument with regard to that particular question. If his statement is correct, then are we not exceeding our jurisdiction in intervening in any way with regard to a colony of another country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is a fair question, Mr. Churchill. I appreciate that point of view. I do not share that point of view but I can appreciate it being raised. I think there are a lot of people feel as you do about that and while it was not the first departure in Canadian foreign policy certainly it represents a very important departure. We were not acting as though the matter had not been carefully considered. We had, as I mentioned last week,



discussions with two of the ministers of the government of Mr. Smith here in Ottawa. The Prime Minister had addressed communications to Mr. Smith, and indeed to his predecessor, and then there had been discussions at the Prime Ministers' conference before the one of last summer. We have had very considerable discussions in the Commonwealth group at the United Nations in which I myself have participated. So we had given forwarnings, and our position and that of the other sovereign bodies in the Commonwealth were well known, for the reasons I have already given.

● (12.00 noon)

Now, your question is followed up by another one. Are we to act in similar situations with regard to other dependencies either in the Commonwealth or in the United States. I can only say that we have to examine each situation in the light of the circumstances that are presented.

In the case of Rhodesia we acted as we did for the reasons I have given, supported by the fact that there was a resolution of the United Nations Security Council recommending to all states that action be taken against the regime.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would you give us the dates on that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The resolution was November 20. Now, that was not a resolution under chapter 7. It did not mean that a nation had to act, but there was a recommendation by the United Nations that this action should be taken. I am sure if we had not taken this action we would have had a very serious situation today.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, just for the historical record then, the Minister has adopted the "ready, aye ready" stand when Great Britain makes a request.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not think that there is any comparison between the Chanak situation and Mr. Meighen's statement about "ready, aye ready" and the Canadian position at the present time. The "ready, aye ready" formula that played such a part in Canadian political history before you and I came on the scene actively, Mr. Churchill—

Mr. CHURCHILL: I just added it as a historical—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Because of the historic inaccuracy I would like to put the situation in proper perspective. That was a suggestion that Canada should automatically be involved in a war in which Britain was engaged. Now, that is not the situation today. We were not automatically obliged to take action but because we believed in the strength of the Commonwealth at the present time and because we believed the Smith regime was acting contrary to international interest, we unhesitatingly took the course that we did in supporting the British government. We were not alone on doing so. We had every other Commonwealth government in agreement in principle.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I move on to something else. I think that throughout the course of this discussion on Rhodesia the Minister has tended to take what I call an alarmist's point of view, suggesting to us that terrible things would have happened or might still happen unless sanctions were continued to be applied to Rhodesia and unless we were very much involved in the issues. I suggest to the Minister, and I would like his comment on it, that when he stated last week, and I have his words copied down here, that there was a danger—and



these are his words—that this action of Rhodesia would “stir up the whole of Africa” and we have had suggestions from the Minister today that the gravest problems might arise with regard to Africa as a whole. I wonder what substance there is in that alarmist attitude. Now I will ask this question: Has the Minister—co-operating once again with the Minister of National Defence—a military appreciation of the situation in Africa? Before he answers may I suggest to him this: that from a military point of view I doubt very much whether any country in Africa, exclusive of the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and South Africa, has a military force or the competence in military matters to launch an effective attack against Rhodesia, and that Rhodesia herself has an effective military force—air as well as army—to repel any invasion. So why alarm us with the suggestion that all Africa would be stirred up and there would be a tremendous bloodbath or something of that nature?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, no man holding this job wants to be extravagant in his portrayal of the dangers, and I endeavour to be as responsible in these things as I can because of the implications, but I assure you that the situation is precisely as I have stated it, in my judgment and in the judgment of other countries whose interest in this is not less great than Canada's. I would remind you that before the meeting last December there was a meeting of all members of the organization of African states, some 36 countries, in Addis Ababa, under the chairmanship of the Emperor of Ethiopia, a man whom we all know to be a responsible ruler. We know that 31 African countries recently presented a draft resolution to the Security Council.

In addition to this, through our own diplomatic exchanges, through our conversations with Britain, with Commonwealth countries generally, in Africa and elsewhere, with information from the heads of missions in various parts of the world, we have every reason to believe, and we have every reason to continue to believe, that this particular situation in Rhodesia will require careful attention, and that every effort will have to be made, I hope within the bounds of persuasion and economic action, to bring this situation in Rhodesia to an end. Otherwise, we do run into the danger of great trouble in Africa, which could well be fanned by those whose ideological interests are not our own.

Mr. Thompson asked me about the penetration of interests from mainland China; we know of other penetrations as well. So that I do not think it could be said justifiably, in the light of the assessment that we are obliged to make, that our judgment was not a fairly accurate one.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, may I direct the Minister's attention then to the book called “Military Institutions and Power in the New States”, written by William Gutteridge and published just, I think—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Professor Gutteridge of Cambridge.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I know the book.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I just quote from page 161, referring to the conference which you mentioned:

At the Addis Ababa summit conference in May 1963, consideration was given to the possibility of pan-African action against South Africa



but there was no overt discussion of direct military aggression for the proper reason that it appeared to few of the delegates to be a practical possibility.

At that conference the leading proponent of military action against South Africa happened to be the state of Ghana which is now apparently ineffective with regard to leadership in Africa at the present time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It was in 1963—

Mr. CHURCHILL: If the Minister would refer to the debates which took place in the House of Commons at Westminster just recently, he would find considerable discussion with regard to the military aspects in South Africa. I refer to *Hansard*, the parliamentary debates, House of Commons, Westminster, April 27, 1966, when several speakers dealt with this military aspect and pointed out the ineffectiveness of any military action that could be taken by the African states with the exception of the three major powers in Africa that I mentioned. I suggest to the Minister that his thinking with regard to that should be revised and that the alarmist attitude should be softened down. I do not see that grave danger that he has been emphasizing.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I understand your position. I made mine known and I have no reason for withdrawing the views that I hold.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I—Well, on the same thing?

Mr. BREWIN: On that same thing about the military threat. Was it your point, Mr. Martin, when you were discussing this before that we supported the actions of sanctions merely because of an immediate military threat?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. BREWIN: When you were talking of a threat were you talking of the evolution for the future in Africa, not on just an immediate military basis.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is quite right. I was thinking not only in those terms, I was thinking of how a failure to resolve this problem would bring the majority, if not all, of the states in Africa, against not only Britain, but against any country that did not sympathize with their objective to see discrimination removed. And, not only would there be such dangers from these countries with admittedly limited military capacity, but there could be contributions from other sources in Africa and outside Africa.

I can assure you, Mr. Churchill, when the Canadian government agreed to undertake, to the extent that we have, the responsibility of assisting in the military and air training of forces in Tanzania, that was done because we thought that it should be done by a Commonwealth country. I can go no further than that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My only suggestion was—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In addition to all this, we were concerned that African countries would leave the Commonwealth and not only African countries, I may say, we were also concerned that moderate leaders in Africa might be overthrown. We were concerned that racial conflict would be considerably exaggerated; we were greatly concerned that Communist influence might be significantly facilitated. I think that you will appreciate what I am saying in that regard.



Mr. CHURCHILL: I do not object to the emphasis on Communist influence in Africa and perhaps you might have had more information along that line. My point simply was that the African states themselves are not in a position to take military action against Southern Rhodesia.

Now, there are two more points, Mr. Chairman. One has regard to sanctions. The Minister keeps on saying that the effectiveness has been proven. He used those words this morning and that he continues to believe in them. That is not the information that I derived from the extensive debates at Westminster; the information that I get from that is that the sanctions have been far from effective and, consequently, I welcome, and I presume the Minister does now, the opening of these exploratory talks we advocated when we spoke on this subject. Members of the Opposition advocated it when we spoke on this subject in the early part of this session. But, to suggest to us that the sanctions are being effective I think runs contrary to the point of view that we are deriving from other sources. May I just say with regard to that: Would it not be more helpful here in External Affairs matters where the over-all hope is that we present to the outside world a unified policy, would it not be more helpful if we had both sides of the questions with regard to Rhodesia presented in greater detail by the Minister of External Affairs rather than simply the one side which has been, in my opinion, over-emphasized.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In my opinion, the principle involved in the Rhodesian dispute is clear to everyone and that this matter has been discussed persistently now for a number of years. I should not have thought that there was any dispute about the facts. With respect to the basic and essential issue I can understand that there is a difference of opinion. There is a difference of opinion on this matter in the British Parliament and this difference of opinion, I suppose, arises out of personal views as to the state of national responsibility. That is all I can say about that.

● (12.15 p.m.)

On the question of the effectiveness of sanctions, I made it clear that no one can be certain as to what the outcome will be. At the beginning, there were declarations of anticipation by the British government. They suggested that the sanctions program would work more effectively than it was thought to be the case by some. Looking back now, it is inconceivable that this kind of program could have worked successfully within a few months. My own assessment, based on the information before me, is that the program is having a very important effect the industrial and economic life of Rhodesia. But when the regime will feel this fully I cannot say. But I am concerned to make sure that the sanctions program is given an opportunity to operate; otherwise I fear that an effort would be made to take steps that could have more serious implications.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Just one final question, Mr. Chairman, to complete my questioning; would it not be helpful in a positive sense for Canada to be prepared to offer to Southern Rhodesia substantial help in greater measures than we have given in the past, in order to get to the root of the trouble in Rhodesia, namely the education of the native population plus the economic advancement of that country, because the two go hand in hand. If the Rhodesian native population is educated to become a useful force economically within the country, then they can move forward progressively towards in-



dependence or the complete participation of the native population in the government of the country. If Canada took some step along that line, would it not be helpful?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have been giving some assistance to Rhodesia in external aid. I am sure there is a lot more that could be done, as is the case in all countries that are the beneficiaries of our program, but I believe that it is wrong to say that the ultimate restoration to Rhodesia of a high standard of living for the blacks would have been a more effective way than Canada's efforts to try and resolve this problem. The fact is that the Smith government would not take those measures which were designed to remove discrimination at a pace that would be generally satisfactory. The British government urged Mr. Smith to avoid a unilateral declaration of independence, as we did. He insisted on taking this course and thereby created an inevitable international issue and there was no other course for us to resort to.

Now, on the question of aid, you may be interested that the Prime Ministers in Lagos in their communique said the following: "The Prime Ministers were agreed that planned assistance to a lawfully constituted government of Rhodesia should begin at once." They approved the establishment of a special Commonwealth program to help accelerate the training of Rhodesian Africans and directed the Secretary General to arrange as soon as possible a meeting of educational and technical assistance experts and to consider detailed projects of aid by Commonwealth countries including the early establishment of an administrative training centre in Rhodesia. We have indicated that we intend to participate actively in the plans for special educational assistance to Rhodesia, working in co-operation with other members of the Commonwealth, and to support the project which will be devised for making available professors, teachers and advisers in Rhodesia and the acceptance of trainees for special studies in Canada.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is that dependent upon the change of attitude on the part of Mr. Smith?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. We brought our aid program to an end after the unilateral declaration of independence. We had thought of continuing it in spite of all that happened because it was of benefit to both segments of the population, but for security reasons it was decided we should do this.

Mr. HARKNESS: For security reasons?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, security reasons, because lives were in danger. We had a number of people there, and they thought and our collective judgment was that it would be better for them to come back. However, we continue to train Rhodesian students in Canada. There are 21 trainees here at the present time from Rhodesia and we continue to provide their training under the external aid program. But, they are in Canada. We had nine teachers in Rhodesia and they were withdrawn after the unilateral declaration of independence.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Before calling on Mr. Walker, I was wondering if the Minister would care to make some comment on the events that are taking place right at this moment with regard to the activities of a number of African countries in the United Nations concerning Rhodesia and also the Common-



wealth sanctions committee, an emergency meeting which I believe, is to be held tomorrow. Is the position of the Canadian government that of supporting the government of Great Britain—who at the moment is trying to discourage these two meetings, these two initiatives I should say—or is the position of the Canadian government that of supporting the African states?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, first of all, regarding the meeting tomorrow, the meeting on May 13, it was suggested this is an emergency one resulting from African pressure. This is not an accurate report. The sanctions committee meets regularly. The last meeting was held on May 6. At that time it was considered desirable to have another meeting in about a week's time, and to continue the regular review of sanctions against Rhodesia. There have been discussions at these meetings about the possibility of further Security Council action and I have no doubt that this matter will come up again tomorrow when the sanctions committee meets.

Now, you referred to the action in the colonial affairs committee of the United Nations. In answer to that, I would say, that a number of African countries have proposed an early meeting of the Security Council to consider further mandatory sanctions. We, of course, are not a member of the Security Council, and on that account we would not be directly involved. I do think, however, that it would not be desirable to have further and wider mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council under present circumstances. It is by no means certain that such action in these circumstances at the present time is the best means of making sanctions more effective. Up to now some success, I think, has been achieved in this field through diplomatic approaches made by Britain to the principal trading partners of Rhodesia. This may be the best way to close some existing gaps. In any case, the present system of widespread voluntary sanctions and limited mandatory sanctions is taking effect, as I have sought to indicate this morning. I think that the Smith regime's willingness to have these unconditional talks, now taking place in London, shows that the economic pressure is beginning to tell on them. More time will have to be allowed for the present sanctions to work.

For another thing, the further action under Chapter 7 could lead to the extension of the dispute to the whole of southern Africa and to proposals for sanctions against Rhodesia's neighbours. Such proposals raise very serious issues for Canada and for other countries, particularly Britain. Moreover, some proposals which have been made raise again the question of the use of force. I have indicated a number of times that in the view of the Canadian government, in the present situation, the resort to force on the Rhodesian issue could have serious implications for the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth. Therefore, our view at the present time is that the Rhodesian question should be dealt with without the use of force. It would be much better if we could focus attention on economic measures against Rhodesia which are having some effect. Therefore further Security Council action at present seems undesirable. It could adversely affect the exploratory talks between the British and Rhodesian officials and it could simply strengthen the hand of white extremists in Rhodesia who would like to see these talks fail.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Walker, you are next.



Mr. WALKER: Have any of the Commonwealth countries that were a party to the agreement on sanctions withdrawn or pulled back from their original commitments?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. WALKER: Have any of them extended their original sanctions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. WALKER: In other words, the export as well as import—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There have been no withdrawals and there has been some strengthening of their embargo programs.

Mr. WALKER: Do you consider—and this is in the future and maybe you do not care to reply—blockades part of peaceful economic sanctions or a military operation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): If it was an economic blockade?

Mr. WALKER: Yes. An economic blockade with whatever machinery is necessary to force an economic blockade. Is that considered part of a military operation or an extension of a program of economic sanctions?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It all depends on its extent. You certainly could not have a complete economic blockade without military sanctions.

● (12.30 p.m.)

Mr. WALKER: Yes. If the sanctions work, if the present operations of the other Commonwealth members as well as ourselves work against Rhodesia, and we talk of the collapse of this illegal regime, what happens then? What do you see happening? I am sure they must be thinking in these terms or we would not be insisting that the economic sanctions—that there is optimism for the effectiveness of the present program. What is the purpose, what happens when this is successful?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In so far as the legal authority is concerned, I would assume that the government of Britain would join in the re-establishment of as much local government as possible; maintaining, I suppose, in the field of foreign policy and defence its present policy and then with this done we would have to embark—they would have to embark—on a program of economic aid in which Canada has indicated that we would assist.

With regard to the first part of your question, I would remind you, Mr. Walker, that in the British House of Commons on January 25 the British Prime Minister stated: "Assuming there is a speedy and peaceful return to constitutional rule, the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the governor to form an interim government of Rhodesians, responsible to him, comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative government for reconstruction. During this period the police and military forces will come under the responsibility of the governor." And he added: "the interim government was never intended to be direct rule from Whitehall or Westminster."

Mr. WALKER: Just one further question on Canada's participation in attempting to settle the Rhodesian question: Is it based primarily on whatever obligations we have as a member of the Commonwealth, or is it based more on



our commitments to the international community as regards eventually, one vote, one man, or one man, one vote.

The thing that I am afraid of—and I think we may be drifting into this—is that there is such a different outlook on what is happening in Rhodesia. One outlook is that this is purely a question of the conflict between whites and blacks and other is that, no this is a question within the Commonwealth of how do we deal with an illegal regime? I suppose these two drift into one another's spheres. I presume we originally made our commitments because of our membership in the Commonwealth and I am wondering if this posture is changing, if this problem has grown beyond this now—if it is lining up as a conflict between whites and blacks in Rhodesia and in Africa.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, the Canadian action is based first of all on our concept of Commonwealth interests and obligations. It is based likewise on our assumption of duties as a member of the United Nations. It is based on our bilateral relations and on the contemporary view of the international community of mankind; of the place of human rights in society. Whether we would have acted independently in any of these situations is speculative, but with a combination of all these, I am sure that there was no other course for us to take.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Are you finished, Mr. Walker?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We tend to use the word "Commonwealth" perhaps without fully appreciating the significance, but the Commonwealth does mean something very vital in the current international conflicts. For Canada it means very close contact with Africa and with Asia as well as with Britain and Australasia. The Commonwealth, as presently constituted, is a vital factor in the international process and in the movement for eradication of wars as an instrument of national policy. It would have been a matter of the most serious consequence if we had not taken action which would have maintained the unity and the integrity of the Commonwealth. I assure you I do not exaggerate the danger and I do not exaggerate it now when I say that the solution of this problem will go a long way to maintaining unity of the Commonwealth as presently composed, and, not only of African countries but of other countries.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Minister, when you referred to the present government of Rhodesia you referred to it as an illegal regime; when you referred to the present government of Ghana you referred to it as a new regime. How do you differentiate between the term "illegal" and "new."

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, in the case of Rhodesia it was illegal because they made a declaration of independence without having the constitutional authority to do so. This could not be done except with the approval of Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom. That constitutes the act of illegality. In the case of Ghana, it is just a new government.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, how do you reconcile your statement with the statement here that says "both international law and the United Nations Charter provide the recognition of a *de facto* government once it has been accepted by the people."

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know how that relates to Rhodesia because Rhodesia—the regime of Smith—has no standing whatsoever in the



United Nations. It is not a sovereign body; it is not a member of the United Nations.

Mr. McINTOSH: But it has been accepted by the people, has it not?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, it is the dependent people of Rhodesia. It has been accepted by 300,000 people—

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, just a moment. You are referring to the blacks. It said in this regard, Canada said that the following statement by the chiefs who are the traditional leaders of Rhodesia's African people made to the British government early in 1964 echo the views as the majority of black Rhodesians. Now, do you accept this statement or not. This is what they say. "We would press for immediate independence for Southern Rhodesia in terms of the existing constitution which allows for evolution and forward development." Now, this is supposed to be the spokesman for the black people of Rhodesia. We know from press reports that the white citizens of Rhodesia, almost 85 per cent of them, support Smith's stand on this. Therefore, can Canada say that it is an illegal government when the United Nations will accept it and international law will accept it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): With great respect, Mr. McIntosh, I think there is confusion in your mind. The government of Rhodesia was not a fully self-governing unit. It was a dependent territory. To appreciate the situation fully you have to recognize our own constitutional evolution in Canada. We have grown from colony to nationhood through a process of negotiation and consensus, and finally, approval, with the government of Great Britain. The illegal government of Mr. Smith had gone through that process up to the point of still having authority in foreign policy and in defence, finally decided on by Great Britain. And, under the constitutional arrangements, its dependence consisted in not being able to have final authority in these areas until the government of Great Britain consented; and the government of Great Britain would not consent. It simply said, we are not going to let you be fully independent, continuing your loyalty to the crown, continuing as a legal entity of the Commonwealth, until you remove some of the discriminations against the majority of the people in the country. That is the situation; and, because the Smith regime would not do that, Britain would not accord it its independence. So, one day Mr. Smith said, "Well, I am making a unilateral declaration of independence", thereby constituting an act of treason—an illegal act.

Mr. McINTOSH: —Colonial Stock Act and the international treaty obligations. say in domestic affairs under the constitution of 1961 with exception of the—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Defence and foreign policy.

Mr. McINTOSH: —Colonial Stock Act and the international treaty obligations. Therefore, how did the British government maintain that they had any say in the domestic affairs of the country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I did not say they had. Britain continued to have the final, only, constitutional authority of giving Rhodesia its independence and it maintained a residual interest in foreign policy and in defence matters.

Mr. McINTOSH: She laid down five principles that she asked the Rhodesian government to accept.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: And the Rhodesian government did not deny any one of the five, therefore how did this dispute arise. I could name you the five conditions—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. I have them right here.

Well, the dispute arose out of the act of the illegal government. It simply said, "We are going to declare ourselves independent whether you like or not." Britain said: "You cannot do it, you have no authority to do it, and we will not recognize you. We will regard the act as a treasonous one."

Canada, and the other Commonwealth countries without exception, joined in supporting this view.

Mr. McINTOSH: The point I am trying to get at; why did the British say, what you have said they have said, if Rhodesia said they would negotiate on those five principles. They were not in disagreement with any of them.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, regrettably they made a unilateral declaration of independence. That is why Britain has taken the course that it has. If the Smith government had not taken this course the negotiations, I am sure, between the Smith regime, government of Rhodesia, and the government of Britain would have continued.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, in December of 1963, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations wrote to the then Prime Minister of Rhodesia, and he said, "The granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia is, of course, a matter which has to be settled between the British government and the government of Southern Rhodesia." Now, do you agree with that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The Smith government, Mr. McIntosh, made an illegal declaration because it had become clear to them, after lengthy negotiations with the British government, during which successive British governments, Conservative and Labor, went to great lengths to explore every avenue of compromise. These governments clearly indicated that the British government was only prepared to grant independence on a basis which would assure the attainment of majority rule in a relatively short period rather than the very long, almost infinite period, contemplated by Mr. Smith and his colleagues. The British also insisted that any arrangements for independence would have to receive the consent of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. This is the result; they just would not accept that.

Mr. McINTOSH: The point that I am getting at is the Rhodesian government said they would accept that. Now, what period are they talking about, whether it is long or whether it is short—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No; that is not the fact. They did not say that. Mr. Smith made the grave mistake of defying the constitutional authority of Britain and seizing independence in spite of warnings by all Commonwealth governments that this would not be recognized and that the allegedly independent state would not be accepted in the Commonwealth.

Mr. McINTOSH: What I am trying to get at is why he did this and what is Canada's explanation of his actions? What did they accept; the British government's statement that they would not accept it or Smith's statement that they would accept it?



● (12.45 p.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think there is some confusion here. All we know is that one day Mr. Smith did declare that they were going to have a unilateral declaration of independence. That is the act, that is the provocation. If it had not taken place we would have continued, of course, to urge Mr. Smith to recognize the desirability of removing the discrimination, of accelerating the program of equalization, but we would not have had any constitutional authority to interfere ourselves. That would have been a matter between the government of Rhodesia and the government of Britain. If there had been any complaint in the United Nations on the grounds of a violation of human rights, that would have been a matter involving the United Nations and Britain as the member state responsible.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, why did Canada make a commitment before there was consultation between say, Canada, Rhodesia and Great Britain.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What commitment?

Mr. McINTOSH: The commitment to support the Smith government with the illegal regime.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The moment the declaration was made we joined with Britain—we would have been criticized I am sure if we had not by many who now criticize the government—and with other Commonwealth countries, and with countries outside the Commonwealth, in trying to bring this regime down because it had acted illegally, thereby impairing the unity and the integrity of the Commonwealth and creating situations that had potential danger.

Mr. McINTOSH: On what basis do you say that they acted illegally, just because they said they would not—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They had no authority, it was a dependant territory. It would have been just like Canada in 1909 saying it was going to assume full powers of government in the international field and in defence, and if we did not get that we were going to withdraw.

Mr. McINTOSH: Just like the United States.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, there is a difference between the United States and the situation in Rhodesia. The 5½ percent of the people of Rhodesia under Smith run that country; whereas in the United States you had some expression, at any rate, of democratic will.

Mr. FOY: My honourable friend is saying it is somewhat like the United States Declaration of Independence, which was the first government of the United States which would be considered illegal in Great Britain. But they had to have a war of independence to back it up. This is how they won their independence. Well the problem today is that you do not want a war in Rhodesia.

Mr. McINTOSH: As far as Canada is concerned they are going to have that war before they will support that government.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Do you recommend that war?

Mr. McINTOSH: That is a very facetious remark, Mr. Macdonald.



Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Well it seems to me that the course of action you are proposing to the members would lead to that.

Mr. McINTOSH: That I propose any action?

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Right. Your proposal of inaction seems to carry that implication.

Mr. McINTOSH: You are the parliamentary secretary, you are supposed to give this information rather than to make statements. I am here to get information on why Canada participated as she did.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): I am under no disability to make statements in this Committee.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you are making them anyway.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Yes, I will make them if I wish.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, you should not as parliamentary secretary.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): I do not think that is true, at all.

Mr. McINTOSH: I will ask the Minister. Mr. Martin, my last question: Would Canada refuse to participate in the use of military force to settle the Rhodesian problem.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I believe that this problem can be resolved without the use of force. I would be concerned about the use of force in this situation. The only way that force could be used under the United Nations would be if the Security Council, acting under Chapter 7, were to establish mandatory action on a wide front, including wider economic and additional military measures.

I believe that this would be a regrettable action in present circumstances and we are bending every effort we can to see that that kind of eventuality does not happen. But there are strong pressures now in the United Nations for this course and we are counselling against it.

What would happen, if after an obvious period had expired and the economic sanctions did not prove effective for the purpose, will have to be examined. I do not believe that I can anticipate that situation until it does arise; but I do say Canada is now engaged in urging responsible action which we believe will, in due time, be effective.

Mr. McINTOSH: But you would be prepared to give this Committee assurance that Canada would refuse to participate, as I said, with military force?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I clearly indicated my view on the undesirability of force in the sense in which I have been speaking about this.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Mr. Chairman, I am still concerned and confused about the reason given for the justification of our participation in the program of sanctions. I do not think I am the only one because Mr. Thompson mentioned this morning, for instance, that he had not seen that our policy had been clearly defined; Mr. Walker wonders if this is a racial thing or is it a Commonwealth thing. The general tenor of the questions this morning would indicate that I am not the only one.



I am wondering if the source of confusion is not in one statement that you made a few minutes ago about our participation being based on a combination of a series of factors. I wonder if this is not the precise source of our confusion, whether we would not be better off to define and pinpoint our position right now. For instance, earlier you mentioned that first it was the consensus of world opinion that therein hinged the factors of world peace.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The world opinion against discrimination as practised in Rhodesia.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Right. Now I believe that the unity of the Commonwealth was involved.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right. Well by that I meant simply that, if we had not taken that action, we would have displeased a very substantial portion of the Commonwealth and in my judgment this would have meant withdrawal of a substantial portion from the Commonwealth. That is what I meant.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Could we question the advisability possibly of Commonwealth nations ganging up on what could be a potential full-fledged member of the Commonwealth by this action? Rhodesia would, like most of the other nations, apparently eventually get its own independence. By ganging up on it now as a Commonwealth measure are we not compromising any possibility of that? I would have to reconsider this.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The Commonwealth now is made up not only of Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; it is made up of a whole group of new states in Africa, as well as India, Ceylon and Pakistan—it is made up of a whole group of dependent territories and two independent sovereign governments in the Caribbean where the majority of the people are not white. Now, I ask this Committee, is it reasonable to conclude in the face of world opinion about discrimination on the basis of colour, would it have been reasonable to assume that these countries in the Commonwealth would have stood back if the white members of the Commonwealth had not strongly given evidence of support for the principle of non-discrimination.

That is the issue. That is the issue of the United Nations on a wider front, and we are not going to contribute, it seems to me, to an improvement in international relations unless we recognize this fact which is one of the dominant facts in the world at the present time, even on this continent. Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, have not failed to accept the position of the majority of members of the Commonwealth. Otherwise, it is perfectly obvious what would have happened.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: I am reasonably sure the discrimination in Rhodesia was not born on November 20; there was certainly some form of discrimination going on before that date. Did we apply any pressure at that time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes; I said two years before. We had talks in Ottawa with members of the Rhodesian government; there were talks on the question when the present Leader of the Opposition was Prime Minister and attended the last meeting of the Prime Ministers' Conference in his day, just as there were discussions with the present Prime Minister at the Prime Ministers' Conference prior to that of last June. As I said, there have been repeated



conversations and discussions about this matter in the Commonwealth meetings and at the United Nations, and I am sure our Chairman here, who was there, probably himself has participated, in some of those, as have my predecessors, when we urged the government of Rhodesia to recognize the dangers of its policies just as we have urged South Africa to recognize the dangers of its policies on Africa.

This is a vital question, this question we are talking about now and I am sure for the establishment of peace in the world it is a vital one to try to resolve.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: But, sir, I am still wondering if this is not the source of confusion now. This situation has existed for a long time and efforts have been made to make it one of the main features in this particular set of circumstances. Is not the bringing in of the discrimination angle, the sugar coating on the pill, which is real Commonwealth solidarity. We will find all kinds of support for that.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is a situation that Mr. Smith has created. What we are seeking to do here is to consider the setting up of a new state; a new sovereign state in Rhodesia. The British government has said we are not going to give you the power which we alone possess of independence unless you remove some of the discriminations which are, in the state of present world opinion, offensive to such a large section of world opinion; that are contrary to the provisions of respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights under the United Nations charter.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Well, if this is main point do we not just say so. If Commonwealth solidarity is the point, why do we not just say so? If the military threat that was mentioned a while ago is the point, why do we not say so. If the political threat—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): These are all reasons why we acted. That is what Mr. Walker asked, what was the reason; were there many reasons or was there just one? I pointed out there was a racial one, there was a human rights one, there was a political one, there was a military one—there was the danger of Communist penetration; these are all reasons why we have acted.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Which is all a source of confusion to us if there are so many reasons now.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I do not know what you mean by that.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: I am sorry. One last question; is it not sad and a bit alarming. Suppose the situation in Rhodesia had come up in a different way, through a military coup or a take-over by another group, even say, a coloured group, possibly we would have recognized them; we would have been forced to recognize them. But in that situation the political unit would have been recognized; whereas now, it is not.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think that in these matters you are proposing a hypothetical situation. I do not know that there is any comment I could make on that.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Mr. Asselin.



(Translation)

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): I was saying that Canada, of course, has got very serious reasons for its attitude regarding the unity of the Commonwealth, the preservation of the basic principles of the independence of people. What worries me is that this is the only question you are raising. As you know, I have taken part in several sessions of the United Nations in 1960.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You went to Africa did you not?

Mr. ASSELIN: Yes I did.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You were a very good representative.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Thank you. The African countries had tremendous confidence in Canada, and I hope they still have.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They do.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): When we were at the United Nations we had contacts with them. I even went to Africa myself. I think those countries felt that Canada would be a lot more co-operative sort of country, both socially, educationally and economically speaking. But, at the present time, because of your attitude and that of the other countries of the Commonwealth, do you not think that the prestige of Canada is suffering a bit?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I would not think so. I would assure you certainly that if the Government of Canada had not taken the stand which we have taken, we would not be particularly popular. We would not be persona grata with those African countries; and when you refer to our influence, our influence has been great because of the stand we have taken. I am certain that if we had taken a negative stand, we would have lost practically all our influence.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): But the present meeting of African countries who are asking for more vigorous action there on the part of the Commonwealth—they include our country in that, that is our Government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We would have had no influence at all as a result of our moderate attitude, if we had not already taken action of a kind which we took. Is that what you are saying? If we had not acted as we did in December and January last?

(English)

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Have you finished, Mr. Asselin? Mr. Klein.

Mr. KLEIN: Do you consider that the prestige and the authority of the Royal family has now been irreparably damaged by the action of the Smith regime?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not. What the situation among particular groups in Rhodesia may be I do not know, but I think the Crown continues to be a very vital institution demanding our respect and our loyalty.

Mr. KLEIN: You do not consider that this is what we might begin to see as the beginning of the end of the Royal family in England?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not see that at all. I do not feel that that is really directly involved.



Mr. KLEIN: Well they are defying the Governor General in Rhodesia, as I understand it; he has no standing at all. Would you not consider this a very, very dangerous precedent.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, it is not a happy development.

Mr. KLEIN: Pardon?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is not a happy development and that is why we have acted against it—it may have the effect of being a revolt against the Crown.

Mr. KLEIN: Treason as I understand it is not against the British government, treason is against the Crown.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But you asked me about the position of the Crown, and the Crown, as I say, is a very vital institution in the Commonwealth. It commands our respect and our loyalty.

Mr. KLEIN: Is this action of the Smith regime not an extension of the vilest form of colonialism that we are trying to get away from?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Certainly.

Mr. KLEIN: In this era of competing ideologies, particularly in Africa, would it not have been the most dangerous thing for the Commonwealth to have supported the Smith regime?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is no doubt about that in my judgment.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Klein's question about the vilest form of colonialism—I think is extravagant.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In a contemporary setting I think it is not a very happy form of discrimination.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: If everyone is finished on Rhodesia—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Harkness had hoped to ask four or five questions, but he had to leave for an appointment at one o'clock.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: What I was going to suggest, in any event, is that there will be no meeting of the Committee next week for two reasons. One is that there is no Committee rooms available, which is a very practical reason. The other reason is that a number of members of this Committee, including myself, the parliamentary secretary and one or two others, will be absent on government business.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can give you another reason. I could not be here. Next week we have—

Mr. BREWIN: It is awfully complicated when you give more than one reason.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Order, please.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Next week we have the United States delegation to the United Nations coming here, under Mr. Goldberg's chairmanship, for a two day discussion with us. On Wednesday, we have two British ministers here to discuss certain problems with us, and then, on Thursday and Friday, the



British delegation to the United Nations will be here reviewing some matters with us. I could not be here.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn; with regard to that last statement I do not think that this External Affairs Committee can accept that adjective "vilest" form of colonialism. I hope that it will not go out to the world that this Committee is in agreement with that statement. I hope that the Minister of External Affairs himself, as representative of Canada, would not indulge in accepting that term because of the implications at the present time when something is going on over this problem.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would not want Mr. Churchill to misrepresent what I said. What I said was that the way I would describe it was that it was not a happy form of discrimination.

● (1.10 p.m.)

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Order, please. It is now 10 minutes past one. I said that there will be no meeting next week. The next meeting of the Committee will be on May 26. At that time it is suggested subject to the approval of the steering committee, that the Under Secretary, Mr. Cadieux, appear and that Item I, of course, be held open for a later appearance by the Minister as there are a number of other items such as the Organization of American States, Caribbean policy and the like which I know a number of people have plenty of questions to ask about; and then, perhaps Rhodesia again.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if there was any possible chance of having a witness who could give us the Rhodesian side of this question.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: That has been brought up before, and has been considered; I think the steering committee considered it. As I recall, at that time we thought after the Minister had completed his testimony, we would then give it further consideration in the steering committee.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Well, I think it is also fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that there is no evidence that there is a qualified witness available to present recent Rhodesian views.

The Committee might give some thought to someone who might be invited here.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: As I recall, the decision of the steering committee, which was concurred in by the Committee at the time, was that until the questioning of the Minister had been completed the matter would not be considered, but after the Minister's questions were completed it would be reconsidered by the steering committee and recommendations made to the Committee as a whole.

I am informed by the secretary that the estimates of the committee will be distributed to members between now and May 26th when the Under-Secretary, Mr. Cadieux, will be with us, as arrangements presently stand. If there are any changes, of course, the Committee members will be informed.

Mr. BREWIN: Did you say that we will now consider the detail of the estimates? Is that the idea?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: That was the thought. I said that if there was any objection I am sure the steering committee could have a meeting.

The reason I mention that, I might say, is that Mr. Moran who we thought might be here will be available in the middle of June and Mr. Cadieux will not be available—

Mr. BREWIN: Before Mr. Moran, I want to question Mr. Martin on external aid. I am not too interested in detail but with the over-all problem.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: The Minister will certainly be back.

Mr. MARTIN (Essex East): I would not want to discuss the steering committee at this time. I would like to see the steering committee in a meeting with the Minister and the Under-Secretary. I am not too interested in detail but with the over-all problem.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: The Minister will certainly be back.

Mr. BREWIN: Before Mr. Moran, I want to question Mr. Martin on external aid. I am not too interested in detail but with the over-all problem.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: The Minister will certainly be back.

Mr. MARTIN: I was wondering if there was any possibility of having a witness who could give us the background of this question.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: That has been brought up before and has been considered. I think the steering committee considered it. As I recall at that time we thought the Minister had testified his testimony we would then give it further consideration for the steering committee.

Mr. MACDONALD (Rosebush): Well, I think it is also fair to say Mr. Chairman that there is no evidence that there is a planned witness available to present recommendations. I am not sure if it is a question of a witness or not. The Committee might give some thought to someone who might be invited to present testimony and to someone to whom a list of names might be given.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: As I recall, the decision of the steering committee which was concurred in by the Committee at the time, was that until the question of the Minister had been completed the matter would not be considered but after the Minister's questions and recommendations made to the Committee in a whole.

I am informed by the secretary that the estimates of the committee will be distributed to members between now and May 20th when the Under-Secretary, Mr. Cadieux will be with us as arrangements are made in these areas.

Of course the Committee members will be interviewed before all of the changes are made. We will now contact the detail of the estimates? Is that the idea?



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. J. S. GARDNER

OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES

OF

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MAY 22 1966

The Clerk of the House.

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS

Mr. H. O. Moran, Director General, External Aid Office

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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

MONDAY, May 23, 1966

STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON  
**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 6

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1966

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Mr H. O. Moran, Director General, External Aid Office

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

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Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

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| Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ), | Mr. Harkness,        | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Basford,                       | Mr. Klein,           | Mr. Régimbal,    |
| Mr. Brewin,                        | Mr. Laprise,         | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Churchill,                     | Mr. Lind,            | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Faulkner,                      | Mr. Macdonald        | Mrs. Wadds,      |
| Mr. Forest,                        | ( <i>Rosedale</i> ), | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Foy,                           | Mr. Macquarrie,      |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

THURSDAY, MAY 28, 1968  
The Clerk of the House.

Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

Mr. H. O. Moran, Director General, External Aid Office



MINUTE BOOKINGS  
ORDER OF REFERENCE

MONDAY, May 16, 1966.

Ordered,—That the quorum of the Standing Committee on External Affairs be reduced from 13 to 10 members.

Attest. Mr. Dube, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Allsand, Brown, LéON-J. RAYMOND, Groo, Harkness, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (No. 1), Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (16).  
The Clerk of the House.

In attendance: Mr. H. O. Moran, Director General, External Aid Office.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman called Items 30 and 35:

Salaries and expenses, External Aid Office—\$1,000,000.

Economic, technical, educational and other assistance—\$34,100,000.

Copies of "A Report on Canada's External Aid Programs" for the fiscal year 1965-68 were distributed to the members.

Mr. Moran made a statement on Canada's external aid programs, and was questioned.

Items 30 and 35 were approved.

The Chairman called Item L25:

Special loan assistance for developing countries in the current and subsequent fiscal years—\$50,000,000.

Item L25 was approved.

The Chairman thanked the witness on behalf of the Committee, and indicated the order of business and witness for the next meeting.

At 1:23 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 2, 1966, at 11:00 a.m.

Dorothy F. Buchanan,  
Clerk of the Committee.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Monday, May 16, 1906

Ordered—That the quorum of the Standing Committee on External Affairs be reduced from 12 to 10 members.

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Baptiste Dubé

Attest

LEON J. RAYMOND,

Chief Clerk: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

The Clerk of the House

- |                          |                |                 |
|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Mr. Allmand              | Mr. Groce      | Mr. McIntosh    |
| Mr. Asselin (Charlevoix) | Mr. Harkness   | Mr. Pilon       |
| Mr. Basford              | Mr. Kahn       | Mr. Reginald    |
| Mr. Brewin               | Mr. Laprise    | Mr. Stanbury    |
| Mr. Churchill            | Mr. Lind       | Mr. Thompson    |
| Mr. Faulkner             | Mr. Macdonald  | Mrs. Wadds      |
| Mr. Forest               | (Rosedale)     | Mr. Walker—(24) |
| Mr. Foy                  | Mr. Macquarrie |                 |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 26, 1966.

(7)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dube, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Brewin, Churchill, Dube, Forest, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), McIntosh, Régimbal, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (16).

*In attendance:* Mr. H. O. Moran, Director General, External Aid Office.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman called Items 30 and 35:

Salaries and expenses, External Aid Office—\$1,660,200.

Economic, technical, educational and other assistance—\$84,100,000.

Copies of "A Report on Canada's External Aid Programs" for the fiscal year 1965-66 were distributed to the members.

Mr. Moran made a statement on Canada's external aid programs, and was questioned.

Items 30 and 35 were approved.

The Chairman called Item L25:

Special loan assistance for developing countries in the current and subsequent fiscal years—\$50,000,000.

Item L25 was approved.

The Chairman thanked the witness on behalf of the Committee, and indicated the order of business and witness for the next meeting.

At 1.22 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 2, 1966, at 11.00 a.m.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, May 26, 1966

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dube, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Ailmond, Brewin, Churchill, Dube, Forest, Foy, Gros, Harkness, Lapsis, Lind, Macdonald (Rosebale), McIntosh, Réginbal, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (16).

In attendance: Mr. H. O. Moran, Director General, External Aid Office.

The Committee resumed consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs.

The Chairman called Items 30 and 31:

Salaries and expenses, External Aid Office—\$1,880,300.

Economic, technical, educational and other assistance—\$34,100,000.

Copies of "A Report on Canada's External Aid Programs" for the fiscal year 1965-66 were distributed to the members.

Mr. Moran made a statement on Canada's external aid programs; and was questioned.

Items 30 and 31 were approved.

The Chairman called Item 135:

Special loan assistance for developing countries in the current and subsequent fiscal years—\$20,000,000.

Item 135 was approved.

The Chairman thanked the witness on behalf of the Committee, and indicated the order of business and witness for the next meeting.

At 123 p.m., the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 2, 1966, at 11.00 a.m.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

MAY 26, 1966.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum.

Before we proceed with the estimates, there is a note from the co-ordinator of Committees, which I would like to read to the Members.

"Almost all Committee proceedings are now being recorded on tapes. Some technical difficulties are being experienced in which we, as Chairmen of Committees, can help, in the following way: 1. Chairman should announce each speaker's name clearly so that it can be recorded. In some cases statements are being wrongly attributed because the voice of the speaker cannot be identified. Members should be cautioned to speak towards the microphone on the table. In some cases statements are being lost as speakers turn from the mikes or lean back in their chairs."

This morning we are resuming consideration of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966 and 1967.

The Steering Committee has agreed that this morning we should deal with External Aid.

External aid is included under two items in the Estimates—Item 30, salaries and expenses, and Item 35, economic, technical, educational and other assistance.

We have with us here this morning Mr. Moran, who, as you know, is Director-General of the External Aid Office, and he will make a statement covering, I believe, these two items, and a third one, L25.

If it is agreeable, the committee will proceed with the statement of Mr. Moran. Mr. Moran will receive questions, and then I will ask if the three items, one after the other, are carried. Mr. Moran.

Mr. MORAN (*Director-General, External Aid Office*): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have placed in the hands of the secretary, for distribution to members of the Committee, copies of a report in the same form as in other years, which summarizes Canadian aid activities in the fiscal year 1965-66. This document, which is the green-covered book, is basically statistical in form, because we had expected that an illustrated brochure describing the Canadian aid program in general terms would have been available for distribution at this same time. The text was actually placed in the hands of the printer in mid-March, but due to a heavy volume of printing work he has been unable to get around to our booklet. He has promised it for early June, and we will see that Members of this Committee receive a copy, which we hope will be a useful supplement to the statistical report that has been circulated this morning.



The past fiscal year has been one of continuing progress in the Canadian development assistance program, and among the highlights I might mention, first, that there has been another increase in the level of parliamentary appropriations; an expansion in the size of both the bilateral and multilateral programs; the implementation of the new development loan program; record levels of recruitment and training in the field of technical assistance; emphasis on food aid in response to urgent requests from abroad; further improvement in the terms of Canadian aid; and charter membership in the new Asian Development Bank.

● (11.15 a.m.)

In these introductory remarks I will dwell mainly on bilateral assistance, because the bulk of our funds is used in that way; but I think it is also important to remember that Canada is one of the principal contributors to the programs of the United Nations Specialized Agencies. These contributions to multilateral organizations increased significantly during the year that we are reviewing and included a doubling of Canada's subscription to the International Development Association and a pledge to quadruple the contribution to the FAO World Food Program, making Canada its second largest supporter.

With regard to the bilateral programs, it will be recalled that at the end of 1964 Parliament approved a new development loan program under which \$50 million a year would be authorized for loans on highly concessional terms. The remaining months of that fiscal year were devoted to examining with eligible recipients projects suitable for this type of financing. In the fiscal year commencing April 1, 1965 the loan program moved rapidly with the result that \$98.3 million of the \$100 million appropriated during the past two years has now been committed to projects in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. These projects range widely in both size and nature—from the \$22 million Idikki Hydro Electric Dam in India to a \$750 thousand project for the construction of schools in Jamaica; but all, we believe, will make an effective contribution to long-term economic and educational development in the countries concerned.

Canada continued to offer assistance under its long established grant aid program. This type of financing is particularly appropriate for educational and technical assistance activities which have been, incidentally, the fastest growing segment in our total aid effort. Canada sponsored training programs and courses of study for some 2300 students from over 60 different countries during the year and recruited more than 800 teachers, professors and technical advisers for service abroad. Five years ago there were only 700 overseas students in Canada and 83 Canadian experts were serving abroad. This indicates something in the order of more than a tenfold increase in the number of Canadians who are now in the field under the program. The personal and professional qualities of the Canadians who have gone out under the program have brought credit to our country as evidenced by tributes we have received from the overseas countries. A typical comment was one received recently from the Jamaican Government which said: "We were impressed by the enthusiasm and willingness of these people whose work went well beyond their normal terms of reference. Without exception, these Canadians gave freely of their leisure time".



Because of the nature of capital assistance, which includes large infrastructure projects, like power stations, irrigation projects, refrigeration plants, and so on, this program will continue to dominate the expenditure pattern.

I will not attempt to cover all of the projects which are now underway, but you might be interested in a brief review of some of the main undertakings in the past fiscal year. Among the long-term projects concluded during the year were: In India, Powerhouse No. 4 of the Kundah Hydro Electric scheme was completed. Mr. Churchill will remember that he represented Canada at a handover ceremony in 1961, I believe it was, when Powerhouse No. 3 had been completed. To date Canada has contributed \$45 million to this project, and the host government has matched this amount in local currency in order to bring into being one of the main hydroelectric schemes in Southern India, and the largest project ever financed under the Canadian aid program. It is designed to provide not only cheap power for industry, but also to facilitate rural electrification and irrigation.

In Rwanda additional staff and equipment were supplied to the National University, where a larger number of Canadians are now serving than in any other single educational project.

In Nigeria we completed the \$3½ million aerial and topographical survey which will form the basis of economic planning in the fields of land utilization, water control and transportation.

In Pakistan, we concluded a forest inventory which will aid in determining the best ways to utilize the forest resources of the Chittagong Region. This inventory required a relatively modest expenditure but is typical of the smaller projects which also have a very important place in economic development.

During the year we also began a number of new projects and a few examples are: We co-operated with the British Government in a railway survey to determine the best route to link Zambia with a coastal seaport.

In the education field we undertook the construction of primary and secondary schools in Antigua and Dominica. We are assisting Guinea in its production of textbooks for primary, secondary and adult education and we are supplying technical school equipment to Malaysia, Thailand, Ghana, Gabon and Nigeria. Canadian help in creating university faculties continues in a number of countries in Asia and Africa, while our assistance to the University of the West Indies will be considerably increased in the current fiscal year.

In the Cameroun a start has been made on the establishment, over a period of five years, of animal feed manufacturing plants, cattle spray races and veterinary clinics.

In Tunisia a program of support for the Children's Hospital, including equipment and medical personnel, is under way.

In Ceylon we commenced construction of an airport terminal and completed runways capable of handling heavy jet traffic. As a result, the number of flights at this airport rose from an average of forty per month to as many as ninety per week, this giving some relief to Ceylon's difficult foreign exchange position through increased tourism and the more rapid movement of goods. We have received a number of favourable comments on this undertaking both from the Ceylonese authorities and from visiting Canadians. One of the latter has



reported to us that "Canada has received more goodwill from this single project than from any other single aid undertaking in Ceylon."

I referred earlier to the rapid expansion of food aid in response to urgent requests from needy countries, particularly India. From the inception of the Colombo Plan in 1951 until 1964 Canada had contributed \$155 million of foodstuffs to feed hungry people in South East Asia. In that year 1964 the Canadian Government introduced a separate food aid program so that the expenditures for foodstuffs would not be a charge on the monies voted for economic development purposes. The initial allocation for this new program in 1964-65 was \$22 million. Last year it was increased to \$35 million. In early 1966, Canada was one of the first nations to respond when India, afflicted by its worst drought in this century, was faced with a critical shortage of food. A supplementary estimate was sought in the amount of \$15 million for the immediate provision of urgently needed foodstuffs. In the Estimates which you are now considering is an item of \$75 million under the Food Aid vote, which will make it possible to ship to India during 1966 a total of one million tons of wheat, thus moving Canada ahead of the United States as a contributor of wheat to India on a comparative basis of either population or gross national product.

In addition to the gifts of food for immediate consumption, Canada has been furnishing aid designed to increase the food-producing capacity of overseas countries which have been experiencing a chronic agricultural problem. In the case of India, for example, of the \$300 million of grant funds which Canada has allocated to that country since 1951, a large portion has gone to the agricultural sector.

During the fiscal year under review we devoted approximately 16 percent of bilateral aid to overseas agricultural development, through the improvement of irrigation facilities and rural electrification, the provision of pesticides, fertilizers and fertilizer components, the equipment of a food research laboratory, the supply of bakery units, the conduct of resource utilization surveys, fisheries development, and the training of selected personnel in soil and plant research, animal husbandry, farm extension work and agricultural co-operatives. Through this type of assistance Canadian agricultural colleges and manufacturers of fertilizers and farm machinery are taking their place with the Canadian farmer in the front line of the international struggle against hunger.

I feel we should keep in mind that although the current food emergency in a number of countries has resulted in part from drought conditions, a major factor has also been the alarming increase in the number of food consumers. For example, on the basis of the present annual population increase, India has 1,400 additional mouths to feed each hour. Population growth is one of the principal impediments, in my experience, to economic advance in many of the developing countries. Figures of annual percentage increase of 2.5 or 2.8 become significant only in terms of the population base to which that percentage is being applied. The true situation is revealed more vividly by calculations like these:

Forty-five percent of Pakistan's population of 110 million is below the age of 15, a group which consumes without producing.

In the past 15 years two-thirds of the increase in Pakistan's national income has been pre-empted by the growth in population.



The population density in East Pakistan is approximately 1,200 per square mile. In Ontario it is 18 and in Quebec it is 10; even allowing for our unsettled expanses in the North this is a striking contrast.

● (11.30 a.m.)

It has been estimated that on current trends the population in both India and Pakistan will double by the end of this century, which, in the case of India, will mean one billion people.

The growing burden of debt-repayment is another critical problem for an increasing number of these countries. Repayments being made by the less developed nations on external loans already represent about one-half of the value of the aid they are receiving from outside sources, and if this aid continues at about its present level and on the same terms, it is estimated that by 1980 the repayment outflows will be as great as the incoming assistance. In other words, the foreign aid available at that time will be sufficient only to balance off the debt repayments.

This situation is due in part to heavy borrowing by the developing countries, but it is mainly because the credit offered by a number of the industrialized nations has not been on sufficiently favourable terms. Canadian aid from the outset has been predominantly in the form of outright grants, because Canada concluded that the most effective assistance it could offer would be the transfer of some of its resources to the developing countries without placing any future claims on their scarce foreign exchange. This same consideration influenced the Canadian decision to provide interest-free loans with a ten-year grace period, when a long-term loan program was introduced two years ago for countries in a position to accept that type of financing. Until last summer, when Britain announced its intention to introduce a similar program, no other aid-giving nation had offered loans on such highly concessional terms.

When Mr. Asoke Mehta, the Minister of Planning in the Indian government, visited Ottawa earlier this month, he described Canadian assistance as among the most valuable his country is receiving today because of the terms on which it is given.

Each year, when compiling statistics on the aid efforts of individual member countries, the Development Assistance Committee of OECD includes both official government funds and the resources made available through private channels. Canadian private investment in the developing areas, as all of us know, is minimal and is likely to remain that way in the years immediately ahead. On the other hand, the contributions of the many voluntary agencies in Canada are steadily growing in volume. Figures we have been given reveal that a number of the larger and longer established agencies which rely on private subscriptions have been more successful in fund raising in 1966 than in recent years.

This is an encouraging sign, because there has been a tendency by some of the smaller organizations to look to the Government for financial support; but when these private groups make demands on the Government's available aid funds there is no net gain to the countries that Canada is trying to help. However, to the extent that the voluntary programs are indeed supplementary to the official efforts, then there is a corresponding increase in the overall Canadian contribution. That is why it is heartening to see the Canadian public



not only recommending increases in the official aid program but also making larger donations themselves to the non-governmental programs.

During the past three years the parliamentary appropriations of development assistance funds, for which the Secretary of State for External Affairs has the primary responsibility, have almost tripled in size. This sharply expanded program has been based on a number of important principles which, in my judgment, should continue to be observed in the years ahead. For example:

The quality of our aid, which is every bit as important as quantity, must be maintained. This can be achieved through the careful selection of advisers and teachers, the expert assessment of projects and the strict observance of accepted priorities.

Full account must be taken of the human factor as an element just as important in economic growth as natural resources or capital. This will require continuing emphasis on both academic and technical training, including the establishment of educational facilities in the overseas countries. At the same time the number of students receiving degrees and diplomas must not outdistance too rapidly the creation of job opportunities and, therefore, the expansion of educational assistance must be related to other forms of development.

Emphasis must continue to be placed on agricultural production, not only because the land provides employment for the great majority of the people but also because in many of the developing countries food output is not keeping pace with population growth.

Maximum effectiveness under Canada's bilateral program can best be achieved through close co-operation with other donor nations and through participation in international committees and forums. Among the latter I would include the Development Assistance Committee of OECD, composed of all the major aid giving nations of the West and designed to facilitate exchanges of information, standardization of procedures and the improvement of the terms and performance of the collective effort; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, popularly known as the World Bank, whose sponsorship of consortia and consultative groups for particular countries has made it possible for external assistance to be extended in a more orderly way and to be more carefully directed to planned long-term economic growth. Regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank which is closely involved in our Latin American program, and the Asian Development Bank to which Canada has pledged \$25 million over the next five years.

While a long list of countries should remain eligible for Canadian assistance, our effort, I believe, should be concentrated in selected countries where Canada has important interests and which have demonstrated a willingness and ability to make effective use of the resources available to them, so that the impact of Canadian aid will not be weakened through a proliferation of small projects in a large number of countries all over the world.

The Canadian business community has become, and should continue to be, a major participant in Canada's development assistance activities. Last year more than forty Canadian engineering and construction firms were engaged on projects abroad under the aid program. Several hundred manufacturers and producers were suppliers of machinery, equipment and commodities purchased



with Canadian aid funds. Some 350 companies received supplier contracts on one capital project alone. It has been estimated that \$1 million of foreign aid expenditure generates 120 man years of work in Canada.

These professional and commercial groups have played a helpful role in identifying projects appropriate for aid financing, but they might be further encouraged to make contributions of their own by the provision of technical know-how and by investment in plants in the overseas countries.

The close working relationships between the External Aid Office and the principal voluntary agencies engaged in the field of aid should be maintained and expanded to reach those smaller organizations which might desire our advice and guidance. While government officials must never attempt to influence the direction or content of the voluntary programs, the replies to the questionnaire circulated to organizations across Canada by Dr. Grace Maynard, the Liaison Officer in the External Aid Office, have clearly demonstrated a willingness on the part of those organizations to furnish the External Aid Office on a regular basis with operational details which will in turn enable us to record in international forums this most impressive and valuable supplement to Canada's official program.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I might be permitted a personal comment. In the late 1940's I appeared frequently before this Committee as a departmental witness in my capacity of Assistant Undersecretary of State for External Affairs. Since my return to Canada in 1960, I have had the privilege each year of reviewing and discussing with Committee members Canada's development assistance program. This morning I come before you for the last time, and I cannot let the occasion pass without expressing my gratitude for the most helpful co-operation I have consistently received from Members of this Committee and from other Members of Parliament.

The establishment problems, on which I have reported in earlier years, have not been completely overcome, but we do have in the External Aid Office today a group of able and dedicated people who have been experiencing the unique problems and the inevitable frustrations which surround foreign aid work in any country. They would wish me, I know, on their behalf, to convey to this Committee their appreciation of the support and encouragement which you have provided.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Moran. I also wish to seize this occasion of your departure to thank you, on behalf of all the Committee members, for your statement this morning and for your very valuable services in the past.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I, too, on behalf of the Committee, would like to say that we do very much appreciate not only what Mr. Moran has told us today but the leadership he has given in this field over the years. With your permission, I propose to ask some questions which may be of a critical nature, but I would like to make it clear that my criticism is not directed either at the idea of maintaining a foreign aid program, or at the work that has been done, and is being done, by Canada through this deal; nor is it directed at Mr. Moran in any sense or form. My criticisms would be more of those who are responsible perhaps for limitations on the work, and are designed to suggest that there are certain crucial gaps and inadequacies in the program. One feels that when one



draws attention to gaps or inadequacies one may be thought to be running down the effort that has been made, and that certainly is not my intention.

One of the points is the inadequacy of our overall contribution and I would like to deal with that.

In the June 1965 report, at page 5—I don't know whether Mr. Moran has it available—there is a summary of the total Canadian effort. In order to see whether we are growing or expanding, or what we are doing in this field, I would like to see a similar summary, which I could not find in the report with which we have been furnished today, for the fiscal year '65-66.

I would also like to have the figures for 1966-67 which we are now considering—the comparable figures.

● (11.45 a.m.)

The summary, Mr. Chairman—and Mr. Moran will be familiar with this—showed, in the year '64-65 the total aid, only the first three of which were, perhaps, under the direct responsibility of the External Aid Office: Bilateral grant aid 60.6 million; bilateral development loans, \$50 million; food aid, \$22 million, including \$7 million supplementary; bilateral export credit, \$76 million; multilateral grants, 9.6; subscription to I. D.A. 7.9; for a total of 226.1.

Is it possible that we could have the figures for the total actual effort in '65-66, and, from the Estimates we are now discussing, the projected total aid summarized in this way for 1966-67 so we can get a look at it?

I appreciate that some of these are not under your jurisdiction, Mr. Moran, but no doubt this information is available.

Mr. MORAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I can give you those figures now, if you wish. They are not in the book this year because we do not have the final figures for export credits. This, as you pointed out, is not a responsibility of ours, and they work on a different year basis than we do. Ours is based on the fiscal year.

What is the first figure, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: The first figure was bilateral grant aid, 60.6.

Mr. MORAN: I want to make sure it is in the same form as in last year's report. I am afraid that the difference is that I have food aid included in the bilateral grants, rather than separated out, as I gather was done in the report you are quoting. But the figures would be: Bilateral grants, 1964-65, \$75.6 million; in 1965-66, they had risen to 83.6 million; and in the Estimates for 1966-67 they are 123.6 million.

The bilateral loans remain steady at \$50 million through each of those years. There is no change.

The multilateral was 24.51 in 1964-65; increased to 31.67 in 1965-66; and further increased to 36.94 in 1966-67. These are contributions to multilateral organizations, mainly the United Nations.

Mr. MACDONALD: Do these incorporate the ECIC part?



Mr. MORAN: No. We are not in a position to give the final figures for last year except to say that the Export Credits Insurance Corporation has authority to loan one hundred million dollars each year under section 21(a) of the Export Credits Insurance Act. These amounts fluctuate because they depend on applications from the overseas countries for that type of financing, and they vary from year to year.

Therefore, on the three items which you are considering this morning you come up with the following totals: 1963-64, \$66.37, in 1964-65, \$150.11 million; in 1965-66, 165.27 million; and in 1966-67, 210.54 million. To get the picture of Canada's overall economic assistance effort there would have to be added the flow of the long-term credits under section 21(a).

Mr. BREWIN: You have not got them?

Mr. MORAN: I have not got them. Last year I believe the figure was 76 million.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes; at least, that was shown in the '64-65 figures.

Mr. MORAN: That is right.

Mr. BREWIN: I note, although I have not the figure—and perhaps we can get it somewhere else—that in this year's estimate this has been a decreasing—

Mr. MORAN: I would think this is quite likely. It is a fluctuating figure. Two years ago it was in the neighbourhood of \$40 million; last year I think the figure was \$76 million; and this year it will be anything up to one hundred million—it cannot exceed one hundred million because that is the extent of their lending authority. But if it was \$50 or say \$70 million you would add that amount to come up with a total Canadian effort of \$200 million odd.

Mr. BREWIN: I have just one or two questions.

I know that your administration is not responsible for this, but it is a fact, is it not, that a number of international organizations, including the United Nations, have recommended, as a target, at any rate, one percent of the gross national product as the figure at which the various developed nations should aim in order to produce an adequate total effort. Is that right?

Mr. MORAN: Some have, yes. This was originally introduced in the United Nations. I think it was four or five years ago that the Indian representative suggested this percentage as an appropriate target for economic assistance from the advanced countries.

Other organizations have accepted this target in a variety of forms. DAC, for example, has accepted it as a reasonable target, with adjustments being made for particular circumstances in particular countries. UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which met in Geneva specifically to study the relationship between trade and aid, has recommended, as an appropriate target for the advanced countries, one percent of gross national product at factor cost which, as you know, is a figure something different from the one published in the press as the Canadian gross national product, with due allowance being made for nations which are net importers of capital, which of course, includes Canada.



I think one thing that perhaps has not been made clear in Canada—and it is the point I was attempting to make in my opening statement—is that this percentage figure is made up of official contributions and private flows, and in the case of Canada there is almost no private flow—it is a completely incidental figure; whereas in the case of the United States the amount moving through private channels is .2 percent of their gross national product, and in the case of the United Kingdom it is .3 percent.

Most international organizations have abandoned this statistical method of trying to compare individual countries, efforts since it is an unrealistic approach. I have never been able to have anyone explain why the figure of 1 percent of gross national product was selected. Why is it not a percentage of our exports? Why is it not related to our foreign exchange position? Someone one day said, "This would be a nice, tidy, round figure".

DAC has abandoned the percentage system of comparison because of the weaknesses of using completely unrefined statistics to come up with a logical conclusion. For one thing, there has never been an accepted definition of what constitutes aid, and therefore there is no common yardstick with which to measure an individual country's effort.

I do not think any table of statistics is meaningful unless you can look behind the figures and see what they represent, and this is why I have been trying to stress over the years, and again in this statement, how important quality is. If we want to abandon quality and just go out and dump bags of money around the underdeveloped areas so that we can say we have now got our program up to 1 per cent of gross national product, I would not want to be associated with that type of program. I think—and I have learned this from discussions with finance ministers—that they would far prefer to have a million dollars in grant funds without any repayable obligations than ten million dollars which impose future debt-servicing obligations requiring repayment of both principal and interest.

How do you statistically adjust this quality factor? How do you prorate the millions of dollars of grant funds that Canada, from 1951 and throughout our record in the aid field, has concentrated on, in order to relieve the repayment burden? Where would India be today if the \$300 million of grant funds which Canada has given to that country were part of its debt-servicing burden which has all of the countries of the western world worried today? India is now in a critical financial position, and I have explained that it is in large measure because of the debt repayments.

Having said all this, the last impression I would want to leave is that I consider the Canadian aid effort to be adequate in terms of volume. I think the needs are so great that no country in the western world, including Canada, can take satisfaction from what we are doing today in the matter of volume. But I do deplore these people who go around proclaiming this magic formula of 1 per cent of gross national product. I am pleased to see that, in large measure, the press of our country has abandoned this, because it is not realistic.

It is my personal hope—and I tried to indicate as much in my opening statement—that the Canadian aid program will continue to increase in volume. I do not think we can take satisfaction from the size of our program today, but I do take satisfaction from the fact that it is growing, that it is moving in the right direction, and that it is on the most highly concessional terms offered by



any aid-giving nation today. That is why it is popular in the overseas countries—its terms.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Moran, I am glad to have provoked this statement from you because I think it is helpful; but, after all, I think you acknowledge yourself that the one per cent, however inadequate, has been set as the international standard. It was not just that some people thought it up. It was reviewed by representatives of world bodies, was it not?

Mr. MORAN: I had not intended to leave that impression. This was put forward in the United Nations in a resolution which was accepted. It was adopted by the countries as a reasonable resolution. But I have already explained the position DAC has taken. I have already explained the resolution of UNCTAD, which is the one that is internationally accepted today. This conference was attended by representatives of 119 countries, from both the developed and developing areas, and they passed a resolution recommending one per cent as a reasonable target for the advanced countries, based on factor cost and making due allowance for countries that are net importers of capital.

If you read that resolution you will see it does not say that Canada ought to be giving one percent of the gross national product. I am not saying Canada should not be, but I think you have placed an interpretation, Mr. Brewin, on the UNCTAD resolution that is not strictly in accordance with what the delegates had in mind when they voted for it.

Mr. BREWIN: I think you have given us proper qualifications for it but still you can see that it remains an objective—a reasonable objective—set by some international standards, do you not?

Mr. MORAN: Not the phrase you used, "one per cent of gross national product". I do not know where that is a target, except among some Canadians who keep raising it.

Mr. BREWIN: What is the one per cent then?

Mr. MORAN: One per cent of gross national product at factor cost with due allowance being made for countries that are net importers of capital. That is quite different from the little chopped off phrase "one per cent of gross national product". For example, the two figures are quite different. The gross national product of Canada I am not sure—I think it is 52 billion now—but it is not 52 billion when at factor cost.

Mr. BREWIN: What is the factor cost?

Mr. MORAN: I do not know as I am not an expert on this; it may be 48 billion, or 47 billion, I do not know. It is something different than \$52 billion.

I do not want to quibble on small matters, Mr. Brewin, but for four or five years I have read, and heard people talking, about "one per cent of gross national product", and, while this quite clearly does not apply to you, nobody has been able to indicate why they believe in "one per cent of gross national product".

First of all, why are we putting a ceiling on our appropriations? I would hope that one day Canada and the other western nations would be far beyond one per cent of gross national product.



I am sorry to have got off on this line. You quite rightly used the words "provoked this explanation", because it has been a provoking experience to be continuously confronted with a hypothetical sort of target.

Should I continue?

The CHAIRMAN: Please do.

Mr. MORAN: In the case of the United States, .2 per cent of the gross national product represents private flows, that is private investment, contributors of voluntary agencies and things of that kind; and in the United Kingdom these constitute .3 per cent.

Is it suggested that in Canada, where there is no private flow, one per cent should still remain the target for official funds? This would hardly put us in a comparable position with countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I did not want to suggest to Mr. Moran that we were not comparably doing what we ought to do. I just wanted to find out from him, with his experience, whether he thought we were making over-all an adequate contribution. I am not talking about quality; I am now talking about quantity. Would he like to express an opinion whether we should be expanding our over-all contribution.

Mr. MORAN: I thought, Mr. Chairman, I had already answered that question. I said two things: That I thought the needs of these developing countries were so great that no country in the western world, including Canada, could take satisfaction from the present level of its aid; and the second comment I made was that I took satisfaction from the progressive increases in the Canadian aid program over the years. I think the phrase I used was "moving in the right direction".

If you go back, Mr. Brewin, to 1958: In 1958 Canada's only aid program was the Colombo Plan; we had nothing else. In that year the government introduced a program of \$10 million over a five-year period for the Caribbean area and, at that same time, increased the Colombo Plan appropriations from \$35 million to \$50 million per year. Therefore, if you take your starting point just prior to 1958, you have a Canadian aid program of \$35 million plus a very inconsequential contribution to multilateral organizations. Today we have just dealt with figures in excess of \$200 million. Surely this is progress; surely this is moving in the direction that you want to go and that I want to go.

Mr. BREWIN: I had a number of other questions but I do not want to take up the time of the Committee. I just want to ask Mr. Moran about one thing, perhaps now, if I may.

I do not know how much of this article I have in front of me is you, Mr. Moran, and how much is the editorial writer of the *Globe and Mail*, but there was an editorial on the 28th of April in the *Globe and Mail* entitled "Crucial Gaps in Our Foreign Aid" which drew very heavily on a speech which I think you had made a very short while before, in which you emphasized, apparently—and you mentioned it again here today—the stifling effect of the staggering growth in population. You spoke particularly of the situation in Pakistan and in India, and you went on to say: "India and Pakistan have received little external



help with this urgent problem, although the desire for family planning is stronger in these two countries today than at any other time in their history." Now, I think that part of that was a quotation of your own point of view.

Mr. MORAN: All of it was.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to ask you: Do you see any possibility of the acceptance of greater Canadian responsibility in this field which, I must say, seems to me to be one that is absolutely crucial, because if we spend a lot of money increasing productivity and at the same time your population increases almost proportionately you are no further forward at the end?

Is there a Canadian program, or a contribution by Canadians of programs, in this field which we have not had in the past and which we hope to develop in the future?

Mr. MORAN: Mr. Chairman, I think, if you would agree, it would be safer, for the record, if I quoted the words of that statement which I have before me rather than relying on editorial interpretation. I said on that occasion:

Through the World Health Organization, UNICEF, various national aid programs, and through voluntary organizations like the Canadian Save the Children Fund, the developing areas have received the advantages of the latest medical research, modern medicines, support for national health programs and more effective techniques to lower the death rate, but paradoxically they have not been given any similar help in family planning. We all recognize that this is a delicate area for many governments and therefore any assistance in the formulation and execution of a population control program through the provision of literature, advisory services and needed materials, will probably have to come mainly through international and private agencies, at least in the foreseeable future.

Mr. BREWIN: What international agencies, or is there just that one—

Mr. MORAN: The World Health Organization, UNICEF, and the Canadian Save the Children Fund, are the three that I mentioned here.

I might say, incidentally, that the World Health Organization is doing something on this problem at the present time, and quite extensively in India.

Mr. HARKNESS: Mr. Moran, I am very glad that you have done something to dispel some of the fallacies with regard to this one per cent figure which I think has caused trouble to all of us, and which is quoted so frequently in letters which I and, I think, most other members receive in regard to the amount of external aid which we provide.

Now, reverting to some extent to what Mr. Brewin was just talking about, the thing that struck me most was the statement you made that it is estimated there will be a billion people in India by the end of the century at the present rate of increase. Is there any possibility in the world of a billion people being fed in India by the end of the century, by the development of their own agricultural resources and by what aid might be given to them?

Mr. MORAN: I am a long way from being an expert in that field, but I gather from people who are knowledgeable in this area there will be little



possibility, on present production trends, short of the development of the synthetic foods which everyone is suggesting will one day be our normal diet.

I think the disturbing thing in places like India and Pakistan, where the population is moving ahead so rapidly, is the deterioration in their own agricultural production. We can all remember when the Punjab was the granary of southeast Asia, and what are regarded as the developing countries today were, in 1930, exporters of food to the extent of something like 20 or 30 million tons a year. The position has now deteriorated to the point where they are importers of millions of tons. The paradox is that in these countries two-thirds of the people work on the land and yet most of the population is hungry.

In the Indian situation they have two problems in 1966 in respect of their critical food position: One is to obtain the amounts required abroad because of the short fall in their own crop and the additional people who must be fed; and the other is the port handling facilities and the distribution system within the country for the amounts required. India has, with help from the United States and some from Canada, improved their port handling facilities to the point where they can accept about a million tons of wheat a month on the average, or 12 million tons a year. This is an average because it drops in the monsoon period to something like maybe 900,000 tons per month. This means there is a serious distribution problem even if countries were in a position to make available—

Mr. HARKNESS: The basic point I am getting at is this, that in some of the countries which need aid the most—and India and Pakistan are two outstanding examples—the rate of increase in population is such that there seems to be no reasonable prospect whatever of preventing starvation in those countries unless this rate of increase is stopped. Therefore, my question would be this: Would it not be in the interests of the people of these countries, and in the interest of the world as a whole, to be concentrating more of our aid along the lines which Mr. Brewin has suggested, of the curtailment of family size by, say, both information and the physical means of doing that?

Mr. MORAN: This would be a useful form of help from some source.

Mr. HARKNESS: As we have been giving a very considerable amount of aid to India, would it not be a desirable thing to channel more of our aid into those lines rather than the straight matter of giving them so much wheat which never keeps up with—and I see no possibility of it ever keeping up with—the increase in the rate of population?

Mr. MORAN: As you will appreciate, Mr. Harkness, this gets into the area of policy on which I cannot speak. My job is to interpret the problems and needs in the developing countries, and the form and nature of our assistance is for decision by others.

Mr. HARKNESS: However, you would agree that that type of aid is perhaps the most essential type that could be given, would you?

Mr. MORAN: I think that the most serious problem confronting the developing countries today is the population growth, and there may be a variety of ways in which this can be overcome.



In the case of India they have embarked on a very extensive family planning program. When I was there a year ago, Mr. Mehta, their minister of planning, said he had just returned from a trip through the country, and one of the things that had struck him was the change in the psychology of the people; he had found them readier for some of the family planning techniques than ever before. He told of going into a village and talking to one of the elderly bearded villagers and asking "What changes have you noticed here since you were young?" and his answer was "The tremendous number of children around." Mr. Mehta said it is coming home to the people that the population press is a problem in the villages as well as in the cities, and as a result of the improved health services in the country, whereby people are living longer, the necessity for parents to have nine or ten children in the hope that two or three might survive to support them in their old age is now less necessary. There is now a trend in that direction—a trend towards smaller families.

● (12.15 p.m.)

I suppose to some extent what we are discussing today is in the short term pretty academic, because even if some program was introduced immediately it will be almost another generation before it has any real effect on the kind of problems that we are discussing.

Mr. HARKNESS: Another of your statements I would like to ask a question or two about is that you said our aid, in your view, should be concentrated in certain countries rather than spread too widely. With that I would generally agree.

What countries in particular did you have in mind in which our aid should be concentrated?

Mr. MORAN: My definition was: Countries in which Canada has important interests and which have demonstrated both a willingness and an ability to make effective use of the external resources that are made available to them. Those countries may vary from year to year, but if you look at the present Canadian program there is a fair measure of concentration in it now.

In southeast Asia our aid goes preponderantly to India and Pakistan, with smaller amounts to Ceylon and Malaysia; we have about three million dollars, I think it is, for all of the non-Commonwealth countries of southeast Asia.

In Commonwealth Africa our program is mainly in Nigeria and Ghana, with Tanzania gradually receiving larger allocations from Canada, mainly because it has made progress in its project preparation and now has projects which can be effectively financed by Canada.

In the Caribbean, most of Canadian aid goes to Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. This is, in part, because these two islands are independent; it is, in part, because their economic planning has advanced to a point that they have need for external assistance on major capital projects.

In French Africa a pattern has not emerged to the same extent, but at the moment the three principal recipients of Canadian aid are the Camerouns, Tunisia and Morocco. But in all of these countries—in all of these areas—there are a number of smaller countries which are receiving modest amounts of Canadian assistance, mainly in the form of technical assistance.



Mr. HARKNESS: And educational aid.

Mr. MORAN: Yes, educational aid, such as the supply of teachers; and, of course, from an administrative point of view there are great advantages in concentration, as you can imagine. I have never felt that a country with Canada's resources should try to undertake a global program. This is how you lose your impact, and of course the administrative expenses are out of all proportion to the value of the aid you are giving.

Mr. HARKNESS: This is one of the things I was wondering, whether it would not, perhaps, be advisable for us to concentrate more of our aid in the Caribbean countries rather than spreading it over a very large number of the new countries in Africa. For one reason, the area is closer to us, we have less expense in providing the same amount of aid and perhaps a greater possibility of accomplishing results than in many of these other areas.

Mr. MORAN: I think that over the years in determining the direction of Canadian aid we thought in terms of countries with which Canada has had historical links. For that reason all of the countries of the Commonwealth are eligible for Canadian assistance.

Then, because of the bilingual and bicultural composition of our country we are in a special position to help French language countries, as we are doing in francophone Africa and in the countries of southeast Asia—Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

Within these broad categories I think we should look at the countries that can make the most effective use of our assistance.

Mr. HARKNESS: I have just one other question: In regard to the interest-free loans, is the cost of those loans included in any of these statements you have given?

Mr. MORAN: The cost to the government?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, the cost to the Canadian people.

Mr. MORAN: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Because at the present time, of course, the government has to pay  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, or something like this, in order to secure funds, and the cost of refunding this amount seems to go up; therefore, the cost of these interest-free loans must be quite considerable. It has struck me that this is one of the elements in our foreign aid, so far as the general public is concerned, for which we have not been getting credit.

Mr. MORAN: Yes, I think this is right. This is a matter that has been discussed, whether this should be included as a budgetary item within the aid estimates. As you quite properly say, this is a cost to the government. This is an expenditure Canada makes on behalf of these countries.

Mr. HARKNESS: And this is a constantly increasing cost.

Mr. MORAN: It is as much a contribution to the developing country as is the extension of the capital itself, the principal of the loan. On the other hand—



Mr. HARKNESS: Have any compilations of the cost of that been made, to your knowledge?

Mr. MORAN: No, sir, not yet. These are quite new. I think the first loan was signed some time in 1965—only last year—and these moneys are advanced as the project progresses and as the funds are needed to buy Canadian equipment or pay the Canadian engineers.

Mr. HARKNESS: What countries have had these interest-free loans, and what are the amounts of them?

Mr. MORAN: India, \$48.15 million; Pakistan, \$33.36 million; Ceylon, \$2.5 million; Thailand, \$1 million; Trinidad and Tobago, \$4.9 million; Jamaica, \$5.25 million; Nigeria, \$3.5 million; El Salvador, \$3.24 million; Ecuador, \$1.26 million; and a loan has just been signed with Tanzania for \$2.45 million.

Mr. HARKNESS: That would aggregate over \$100 million, would it?

Mr. MORAN: It is \$105.6 million; and we have \$100 million—

Mr. HARKNESS: If you include the interest rate it would be a contribution of over \$6 million a year.

Mr. MORAN: Our soft loans have been further softened this year by the removal of the three-quarters of one per cent service charge and commitment charge that formerly applied.

Mr. GROOS: I think Mr. Thompson has another appointment so I would like to defer to him; I can ask a question afterwards.

Mr. THOMPSON: Time is too short to go into any lengthy detail, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to personally express my appreciation for the helpful attitude that has always been displayed by the External Aid Office under Mr. Moran's direction. His information and willingness to co-operate on some of the problems that we may have personal experience or interest it has always been gratifying, and I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation and to wish you well as you go on to your new assignment, Mr. Moran.

I am only going to ask one or two very brief questions. The first is related to this one million tons of gift wheat to India. I hear repercussions of the inability of India's foreign exchange situation to pay for the freight that is involved in shipping this amount of food to India. This may seem strange to us but in their crisis on foreign exchange I think it is something very real to them.

Has consideration been given to perhaps increasing the aid allotment for them to be able to pay for this freight, or to decreasing the amount whereby the saving would permit the payment of the freight on this wheat shipment?

Mr. MORAN: This problem, Mr. Thompson, was very much in the minds of everyone at the time the government decided to forgive the remaining payments of some \$10 million on a loan owing to Canada by India, as direct relief to their foreign exchange position. This would go a long way to helping them with their transportation problem.

The second consideration is that countries which wanted to help in the food crisis, but did not themselves have foodstuffs available, made their contribution



in the form of either shipping services, if the country concerned had vessels available or a contribution of cash to enable India to pay for other shipping services. Britain did this, for example. They made a contribution—I believe it was in the form of a soft loan to India—of several millions of dollars with which to pay shipping charges on foodstuffs supplied by other Commonwealth countries.

India, in the matter of shipping, is not in as difficult a position as some developing countries, because it has a number of ships of its own. Much of our grain has in the past been carried, and will be carried this year, in Indian bottoms. The delivery schedule is worked out with the Indians and they tell us when their ships will call at the port. It is then our responsibility to have the grain available in Vancouver, Saint John, or Halifax, wherever it is being shipped from, on the specified date.

Mr. THOMPSON: Does this mean, then, that this amount of wheat is going to be taken advantage of by India? Have they given that assurance?

Mr. MORAN: Oh, yes. This figure of 1 million tons is related to the amount India indicated it could use.

Mr. THOMPSON: One million tons—

Mr. MORAN: Up to one million tons.

Mr. THOMPSON: One other question in regard to food in India. It is reported that if India were able to conserve their food properly they would not have a real basic food problem today; that 20 per cent of their food is lost through rodents, through feeding of sacred animals, through their inability to preserve and to package food.

Is the external aid program considering anything beyond their freedom from hunger campaign in the Mysore project, towards helping improve the situation in India?

It seems to me that here is one area where something much more beneficial in long term assistance could be provided, rather than just food gifts directly.

Mr. MORAN: Yes, I think this is quite right. I do not know what the wastage percentage is, but clearly one only needs to travel in the country and to see the conditions under which food must be stored to realize that there is wastage.

I have indicated a number of the ways in which we have given assistance in the agricultural field. We have had advisors out there on this particular problem, although the direct help in food storage has not been extensive; but it is a matter of where to direct your assistance in the agricultural sector, because India is getting help from other sources in this respect.

The Canadian project under the freedom from hunger committee at Mysore is concerned with this whole problem of food technology—packaging, storing, preserving, and so on; and under the aid program we have given help to that particular project. Although the project is being carried out by a private organization it has been assisted with official funds, and recently through counterpart funds Canada built a hostel for the students who will be attending this school at Mysore.



The problem, as you rightly point out, exists, and we have given some help, although our major assistance in the agricultural sector has been in other fields, in other ways.

Mr. THOMPSON: I have two very short questions. Is Canada's contribution, the government's contribution to the CUSO program of transportation and of administrative assistance included in external aid, or is that met through some other department?

Mr. MORAN: No, the transportation figure is not included in these estimates; this is done by the Department of National Defence and I am unaware of how they account for that amount, which I think is estimated at—I do not have their estimate but it is a National Defence figure.

The amount of direct support we are giving to CUSO this year is \$750,000 and that comes out of the bilateral grant aid appropriation. It is part of the 48.5 million dollar item.

Mr. THOMPSON: One last question: Is external aid participating in the coming conference which is to be held in Canada with the heads of governments of the various Caribbean countries? Is there a program of consultation and negotiation regarding aid in the Caribbean area included in that.

Mr. MORAN: Yes; there is a meeting of officials going on at this moment which I would normally have attended but another member of the office is there to discuss the forthcoming conference.

Mr. THOMPSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GROOS: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask Mr. Moran about a geographic area which does not seem to be covered in our external aid program, and I am thinking of Cyprus.

I am a member of the NATO Parliamentarians Association and I recall, about a year and a half ago, Senator Javits, who is a member of the economic committee of this association, with a group of others, took the initiative to try to work out some long term solution to the problems in Cyprus between our two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, by basing a solution on perhaps an identity of economic and industrial interests with the assistance of the Ford Foundation they have been studying this proposition.

It seems to me that this is a particularly fruitful area for Canadian aid, because it might be helped by the presence of specialist Canadian servicemen on the site, and I say particularly fruitful because it certainly gives one ray of hope for a solution to this very unfortunate position.

I am wondering if this has come to your attention and whether we have investigated the possibility of lending some aid in this area.

This brings me to yet another question, and I do not know whether you will have time to answer this, but I just wondered if, for my own enlightenment, you could give me some idea how programs of external aid are initiated.

Before I ask you to answer this first question of mine, I hope, Mr. Chairman, you will let me join with our colleagues also in thanking Mr. Moran for his many years of service to Canada's external aid program.



Mr. MORAN: Cyprus is eligible, Mr. Groos, for Canadian aid and, as in the case of so many of the smaller countries, our help has taken the form mainly of technical assistance.

We have had six students from Cyprus come to Canada for training under our program. Last year we brought two students who created a problem that we are experiencing with greater frequency—it is in fact becoming a very troublesome problem—namely, the reluctance of some students to return home. This, of course, is contrary to the real objective of any country's aid program and most countries enforce the return home rule quite rigidly. It is a common policy and one which is supported internationally as well as receiving very strong support within Canada.

The Association of Canadian Universities and Colleges, then the Canadian University Foundation, established a committee to look into some aspects of higher education in Canada and they, within their terms of reference, included the question of foreign students, not only under the aid program but all foreign students attending Canadian institutions of higher learning.

In their report one of the recommendations was that in no circumstances should any student from a developing country, who has been sponsored under an official government aid program and whose training has been financed by public funds, be allowed to remain in Canada.

The principle is well established, is supported and has been accepted by the public, but we do encounter individual cases where special circumstances seem to justify an investigation and where, on occasion, it is felt that an exception should be made. Yet we all know what happens with exceptions, and as a result this has become a very severe problem for us, because the numbers of applicants are increasing.

We had this problem, as I say, with the two whom we brought from Cyprus last year. When they had completed their course of training they made representations to be allowed to remain in Canada. As a rule, these students can find a sponsor or a supporter somewhere—their professor or the dean of their faculty—who have had association with them and who have come to find them likeable people. This has been our most recent experience with the two we accepted from Cyprus last year.

On your broader question of how the programs are initiated—while the funds have now all been lumped in one general vote, you will remember that they used to be voted by individual area programs. One was the Colombo Plan for south east Asia. To be eligible for Canadian assistance you must be a member of the Colombo Plan. Another is the special Commonwealth African aid program, and there you must be a Commonwealth country in Africa. There is also a program for the French states of Africa. Therefore, in the African area you will find a country like Sudan excluded because it is neither a francophone country nor a Commonwealth country. This is one of the disappointments of Mr. Thompson, for example, in respect of Ethiopia. Unfortunately that country does not qualify under either of those two bilateral programs. The one in the Caribbean is pretty straightforward as it includes all of the West Indies islands.

That is the basis of eligibility. Then, the government each year makes allocations to individual countries or areas based on a number of factors, and we then work out with the recipient countries suitable programs related to the amount of funds available.



There are two or three places where allocations are not made to individual countries each year. The country allocations are restricted to the larger recipients. There is an allocation of funds, in the case of the Colombo Plan for a group of countries. It reads: "Non-Commonwealth countries in the Colombo Plan; Thailand, Burma, Viet Nam etc.—" Similarly in Africa there will be allocations to the major recipients of Nigeria, Ghana, East Africa; and then there will be an amount which provides for countries like Malawi, Zambia and so on. In the case of the Caribbean there are specific allocations to Trinidad and Tobago, and to Jamaica, but the little eight are lumped as a unit in an allocation of something in the order of \$2½ million.

Mr. GROOS: Getting back to Cyprus, Mr. Moran, our effort has been limited so far to education of students?

Mr. MORAN: Yes; that is all we have done.

Under the allocation method I have just described we would have very limited funds for Cyprus because it is not a Commonwealth African country, it is not a member of the Colombo Plan and consequently it qualifies only under an old heading that used to read "for Commonwealth countries not included in other programs". This picked up places like Hong Kong, Cyprus and, before they were included in the Caribbean program, British Honduras and British Guiana. The amount of money for that block is quite limited, so that under present allocations we would not be able to do anything very extensive in Cyprus.

● (12.45 p.m.)

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, I just want to add my congratulations to Mr. Moran. Perhaps if the Chairman is amiable enough we might meet you out in the Far East again if the external committee decides to investigate conditions out there.

I have just a few questions on the scope of our aid. Are we running ahead of public inclination with the scope of our aid, or behind it? I see letters to the editor saying "If you can't pay our old age pensioners more than \$75 a month maybe we shouldn't be helping other nations". In the scope of our external aid program do you feel that we are ahead of public inclination, just about even, or running a little behind? This all has to do with public relations, of course.

Mr. MORAN: I am not sure what the basis of judgment on a matter like this should be; I suppose we all have our own views on people who write letters.

As a result of talking to Canadians across the country and visiting organizations and church groups I would be inclined to say that we were running behind.

On the other hand, in this last month or two an increasing number of letters critical of the growing aid expenditures have been received in our office. These started at the time the increased food assistance for India was announced. They are not a concerted effort; they come from different parts of the country, are phrased in the different language, and do not use common arguments. We find ourselves at ten o'clock in the morning answering a letter from a person who is advocating one per cent of gross national product, and at half past ten we are engaged in an answer to a person in another part of Canada, who has



said that we cannot afford aid at this level; I hope we are ingenious enough to assemble arguments that will satisfy both points of view. But in the last two months the letters critical of the growing program have increased in number.

Mr. WALKER: Do you feel that Canadians generally are sufficiently informed about the aims and objects of our external aid program?

Mr. MORAN: No; and I think this is one of the deficiencies of my office. I do not say this in the sense that we have not been aware of the deficiency. It is a problem we have tried to cope with and we have attempted to inform the public in various ways. I assume members are receiving the monthly newsletters that go out from our office in French and English.

Incidentally, I forgot to mention that the French edition of this green backed report will follow, but it is the usual problem of the translation service being overburdened. A brochure has been prepared which, I think, will be of some assistance.

In the time that one can find to be away from the office, I have tried to accept speaking engagements, as have other members of the office, but, to be perfectly frank, development assistance has been described by some of my newspaper friends as a rather sexless subject. The result is that a successful project apparently is not regarded as being particularly newsworthy. This attitude is not peculiar to Canada. I think it is true of all the countries. I know that my colleagues in the United States and Britain and elsewhere are complaining of the same thing.

Paul Hoffman, Director of the United Nations Special Fund, when he was here about a year ago, initiated the subject in our discussion. He said he had gone to a newspaper friend in New York—a newspaper editor—and explained that the Fund had just extended to Chile some of the most useful help that that country had received in the way of a pre-investment survey from which quite substantial private investments had flowed. It was a real news story but he could not get any paper to carry it. Mr. Hoffman said, "My newspaper friend looked at me and said, 'Mr. Hoffman, if you put up a skyscraper we will give you a paragraph on the business and financial page, but if you blow up a two-storey building you will have a headline on the front page' ". This, I suppose reflects one point of view about aid projects.

There is an interesting tendency that I have noticed among the press in Canada to give preferred treatment to despatches from abroad. We put out a press release from our office announcing Canadian participation in an airport project in Ceylon, and it was not used by any newspaper in the country; but ten days later it appeared under a dateline "Colombo". This also happened on our road survey in Thailand. The most recent example was just last week when a press release of ours was not used by any newspaper, but a few days later it was on the front page of several including one of the local Ottawa papers, with an overseas dateline. I do not know what it proves.

Mr. WALKER: Is this an area of activity which your department is seriously looking into?

Mr. MORAN: Yes; very much so. As you know, over a year ago, Mr. Westall, who was formerly the *Globe and Mail* correspondent in the parliamentary press gallery, joined us, and he has been doing a most effective and industrious job



and I am sure that the goodwill he enjoys among his former colleagues is an asset, but it still does not overcome the problem of adequate coverage.

Mr. Sharp gave a very sophisticated speech on the subject of aid in Toronto last week, but I have not seen a paragraph on it in any newspaper. It was a speech dealing with the principles of aid, which was thoughtful and informative and might well have been of interest to the general public.

Mr. WALKER: I wanted to ask questions about the qualifications for countries who are receiving aid, but that has been fairly well covered, except for one point: What are the criteria? You see the words "developing nations". This must be very hard to decide if the only eligibility for a certain nation is that it is considered a developing nation. Is there a cut-off point anywhere?

Mr. MORAN: I do not think, Mr. Walker, it is too difficult to make this judgment, except perhaps in Latin America. You do encounter marginal cases there, but I do not think you have this same difficulty in Asia or Africa.

The world bank categorizes countries on the basis of annual per capita income and they relate this in turn to the terms on which assistance will be extended. Islands like Trinidad and Jamaica are not eligible for loans from the International Development Association, which is the soft lending agency of the world bank, because they have an annual per capita income of \$250 or \$260. This is regarded as too high for an IDA type loan, which is a loan equivalent to our soft loans—the same terms, with no interest rate.

Countries like India and Pakistan, where the annual per capita income is in the neighbourhood of \$70, are clearly eligible for IDA type financing.

Mr. WALKER: There is an accepted measurement for the definition of a developing nation, then?

Mr. MORAN: I do not think there is a specific definition. It has just been accepted that you can readily identify a country that should be included in the category of a developing nation.

Mr. WALKER: I have one other question about qualifications, but this has to do with staff and personnel. Is age one of the qualifications? Has age anything to do with the personnel—doctors, nurses, and other people—who may be part of our external aid personnel assistance in other countries? Is age a factor?

Mr. MORAN: No, sir. We have, at the present time, a number of people in their twenties, who are serving abroad; we have one adviser who is 64 years of age; we have one over 70; we have two retired company executives—I am not sure of their age now, but they retired at 65; there is a company vice president who retired a month or two ago at the age of 65, who we are hoping to be able to recruit for an overseas assignment.

Age does become an important consideration for the individual volunteer because of the climatic and other conditions in which he will have to live, and this is a factor that he has to weight before offering his services. However, from our standpoint, if he passes his medical examination and the doctors declare him physically fit to undertake life in a developing country, we are quite satisfied.



Mr. WALKER: At the moment could you use more retired doctors, nurses and people, everything else being equal—their qualifications, their experiences? Are there holes—?

Mr. MORAN: There are; it would depend on the profession or skill. There are areas in which we are never requested to provide an adviser, although this does not mean that these particular skills are not needed. We are almost never asked for a general administrator or a man who has had simply executive experience, because the countries are inclined to use their available external aid funds for the services of professional and technical personnel.

I could give you a list of the categories that we are most frequently asked to provide. I suppose our greatest demand at the moment is for academic people—university professors and teachers. Again in the teaching profession there are certain types for whom we are never asked. The principal demands are for teachers of mathematics, teachers of science and teachers of French or English as a second language. They are among the most frequent requests.

Mr. WALKER: Do you have an increasing number of applications from Canadians? Do they know that there might be a chance their services could be used in external aid? Do you have an increasing number of applications coming into your office?

Mr. MORAN: Yes, we have quite a large number of applications but the difficulty is that many are what you might call general duty personnel rather than specialists. Therefore, frequently when we receive a request for a specialist we have to find the person somewhere other than from our roster of applicants.

One of the problems we are encountering—and this is particularly true of the medical field—is the cost to the program—the financial terms on which we are able to get a qualified individual.

Our program is different in a number of respects from CUSO. The requests which come to us are for people who have had several years of practical experience in their trade or profession, because they will be employed as advisers, or in the case of our teachers, they probably will be asked to serve as principal of a school or the head of a department, or to develop the school curricula, or help in the drafting of an examination system.

It is a similar situation with doctors. In the villages of Africa and Asia practising medical personnel are greatly needed but this is not the type of person we are asked to provide because the countries have found that they can usually get general practitioners in other ways. They can get them through voluntary organizations or through private medical groups especially in the United States. Therefore, again they use their available aid funds for the specialists that they need. Many of our medical personnel have gone out as members of a medical team, such as we sent to Malaysia and the two or three that we have at the present time in Viet Nam.

Mr. WALKER: I have just two more short questions. Do you advise on the export-import insurance applications at all?

Mr. MORAN: Our principal association with the Export Credit Insurance Corporation is in connection with their long term loans, where we are consulted if it is a loan to a country in which our aid program operates, because it is felt



that we may have some background knowledge of the country concerned or sometimes of the particular project.

Mr. WALKER: But those in which you have a program are referred to you?

Mr. MORAN: Yes, there is an ECIC committee and when one of these projects is on the agenda we are asked to send a representative to the meeting.

Mr. WALKER: I have just one last question: As your department is set up, if, by a miracle, overnight you had twice as much money to spend could you spend it in a year.

Mr. MORAN: Oh, no, not immediately. I will not get started on this topic because it is another quite technical problem in development aid, and an experience that all of the donors have had.

Perhaps it is not correct to say that we could not spend it because, of course, you can spend any amount of money. But can you spend it effectively and in a way that, five years from now, somebody will say "That was a good Canadian project" as against asking "Who in the world ever thought such a project would make a contribution to the economic development of this country?"

Programs have to be developed slowly, and the World Bank on its experience urges careful investigation of projects. One of the severe problems in development assistance is what the technicians call the long pipeline—the money that is available for capital projects, but has not yet been committed. That is why we think we have moved quickly on the development loan program to have been able in the two year period to commit 98 of the 100 million dollars.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Now that Mr. Moran is leaving the country I think we can safely congratulate him on his excellent piece of work over the years on External Aid. I do it anyway, whether he is leaving or not.

May I say this, on the matter we were discussing, with regard to those people in the country who favour external aid and the critics who think we are attempting to do too much, that I recall that when I had responsibility for the Colombo Plan operation, when it was in Trade and Commerce, time and again I drew attention to the fact that a greater part of the money allotted to External Aid was spent right here in Canada. You touched on this in the course of your remarks, to a certain extent.

I recall that at that time I was able to report that 80 per cent of the total money available was spent here in Canada, either in the employment of Canadian people in factories or on Canadian manufactured products or on Canadian wheat. I do not know what the percentage is now but it may be about the same. I think that that has to be repeated and repeated and repeated in order that people will realize that it is not just a gift of money handed out to some countries far away that we perhaps have never heard of before.

Would the percentage be about the same now, Mr. Moran?

Mr. MORAN: It certainly would not be less; and what you have said is so true. We keep repeating that cash transfers are not made.



Mr. CHURCHILL: This is not understood and I think it deserves constant repetition.

Mr. MORAN: Yes; even someone as eminent and well-informed as Mr. Randall laboured under this misunderstanding—which was the basis, and also the error of his speech. He started from a false premise and inevitably arrived at a false conclusion, because his theory was based on the assumption that aid money was handed over to the authorities in the overseas countries.

Mr. CHURCHILL: One of the not publicized but effective reorganizations within government departments when we were in office was the shifting of the Colombo Plan from Trade and Commerce to External Affairs and the setting up of the External Aid Branch of External Affairs.

I will not bother the Committee with taking any official credit for that at the moment!

The other point I wanted to raise on this, is that I quite agree with what was said, and with what Mr. Harkness and others emphasized, that there is a danger of proliferation of our External Aid. We are spreading ourselves too thinly over too many countries.

I am not going to single out any of these, but you just wonder, looking at the record, how we got mixed up with Afghanistan, for example, and Algeria and the Philippines. It is not that they do not require assistance, but there must be two dozen other countries that require assistance.

I favour what you suggested, that we should concentrate on certain selected countries. Then, following up that line, I wonder would it not be possible to effect a much greater concentration on the Caribbean area, the West Indies, with the hope that over a period of, say, 20 years some of those islands that we would be assisting would become self-sufficient and would no longer require aid?

Some long range program like that, on a much larger scale than we now have adopted, might in the long run be much more effective. What would you think of that?

Mr. MORAN: I think the Caribbean is certainly an area of very major and direct interest to Canada, and it is also an area in which there is an increasing public interest because of the growing number of Canadians who go down there for winter vacations and then come back as emissaries of the particular island they have visited.

Our program has been growing at a fairly respectable pace in the Caribbean, and each year the allocation is slightly higher. It is only two years ago that the little eight islands got a million and a half dollars, last year it was two million and this year it will be two and a half million. Trinidad and Jamaica between them get more than seven million, which was around the level of our program over a five-year period for the entire area when Canada started to aid the Caribbean; so it is growing.

I think one evidence of the interest of Canada and, I am pleased to say, to some extent, also of the United States, is the tripartite mission which, over the last three months, has been visiting the little islands to prepare a report for the three sponsoring countries on the potential of these islands in foreign exchange earnings, export trade and where priorities should lie in their development



plans. This report was made available to a meeting yesterday in Washington, attended by representatives of Britain, the United States and my deputy Director General who represented Canada. I would hope that, based on this report, there will emerge larger assistance program and perhaps a more orderly one; more orderly in the sense that I think a large element of cooperation is needed between these small islands themselves. I think some type of regional planning agency is desirable so that each individual island will not seek its own harbour, or its own separate air strip. I think common services can be established in these little islands, but this will require a large measure of cooperation on their part.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is now past 1 o'clock. We have been sitting for more than two hours.

There are still three gentlemen who have expressed the wish to ask questions, Mr. Allmand, Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Régimbal. If these three gentlemen agree to forego their right to ask questions we may dispose of External Aid today. If not, we shall have to meet again.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Are we going to have the opportunity of speaking with Mr. Moran again, apart from this?

The CHAIRMAN: Well, no; as I say, if we complete External Aid today Mr. Moran will not be required to appear again before the Committee.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Would you be willing to give me about three minutes for one particular question which I would like to have answered?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Allmand, Mr. Macdonald?

Mr. ALLMAND: I was going to ask if there is anybody else available from the department? I have a short question, too.

Mr. WALKER: If it is just a question of 10 or 12 minutes I am certainly willing to continue, but I do not know if Mr. Moran is available.

The CHAIRMAN: If we want to dispose of External Aid today we can do it. It would mean the end of the committee.

Mr. WALKER: What have we got left—about 10 or 12 minutes?

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: I will be five minutes at the very most.

Mr. WALKER: Well let us try it.

Mr. MACDONALD: I forego the rest of my questions.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Mr. Moran, I would like to come back to this question of population growth for a moment.

Could you tell us how the present situation compares with the situation, say, 10 or 12 years ago, as far as the actual birth rate is concerned—the number of people being born? Let us forget the ones who are staying alive for a minute, and see if any improvement has been recorded in the natural control of the actual birth rate.

Mr. MORAN: I think that in many of the countries the actual percentage increase has been quite gradual but, as I mentioned in my statement, it becomes



significant in terms of the population base to which that percentage is being applied.

A few years ago India, I think, had about a two per cent annual increase while today it is around 2.8 per cent but the net result is that India now reproduces every year half the population of Canada.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: But this has been so for several years?

Mr. MORAN: No; because a few years ago, the population base was very much less while the percentage has grown gradually. As you apply that each year to a larger existing population it results in that many more people.

I have some figures here which show the position in the less developed areas, such as South East Asia. This is the average for South East Asia.

● (1.15 p.m.)

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: That is, our first contributions usually are to feed them, then to help them to get the means to produce themselves so that they can feed themselves and eventually, in principle anyway, solve their problems. Therefore, all these improvements are perfectly justified.

I cannot help but question the advisability of, and the justification that we could have for, taking one more step, which has been suggested through health organizations, in preventing them from being born. I wonder if this is not an area where there is legitimate concern about the extent to which this could be our business?

Mr. MORAN: Here is a figure which perhaps is interesting. It was produced by the senior research demographer in the office of Population Research at Princeton University, who has said that a continuation of present trends in India will mean a population by the year 2,000 of 1 billion, two hundred and thirty-three point five million. If India's birth rate could be cut in half her population by that year would be only 908 million.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: I am still concerned with the advisability and the justification of our participating in anything which would prevent them from being born.

Mr. MORAN: I am not advocating that.

Mr. RÉGIMBAL: Any help in family planning could be interpreted by them as a form thereof.

Mr. MORAN: I tried to make this clear by reading from my statement in which I indicated that this is a delicate area for many governments.

All I was saying is that in the years ahead any assistance will probably have to come from private organizations and international agencies.

I consider it my responsibility to this committee, and to others, to point out the fundamental problems in the developing countries—the factors which are stultifying economic advances. You ask me: What has been accomplished under aid programs? Why is more progress not being made? There are a whole series of problems to overcome of which I regard population growth as one of the most serious. I feel that I have a responsibility when reporting to the Committee to



say I regard it as a problem. The solution is in somebody else's hands, including the Indians'.

Mr. ALLMAND: Mr. Moran, you said that the greatest percentage of our aid was allocated to bilateral projects rather than multilateral projects. Is this a policy of the government to favour bilateral aid rather than multilateral aid, and, if so, why?

Mr. MORAN: No; I think it would not be right to say that it favors multilateral as against bilateral—

Mr. ALLMAND: It would be the other way around, would it not?

Mr. MORAN: Yes; that it favours bilateral as against multilateral. I was looking for a statement I recently made on this subject, but it was to the effect that both forms of assistance have their merits, and in some countries bilateral assistance is much more appropriate than multilateral; and in other countries it would be the other way around. But the larger appropriations for bilateral aid as opposed to multilateral aid is common to every aid-giving country.

I think one thing we must keep in mind is that it is under the bilateral programs that the citizens of your own country can experience direct benefits, and automatically become more enthusiastic supporters of aid. Under a multilateral program you have no control over the direction of your funds, where they are spent, or how they are spent. Such contributions do represent cash transfers to international organizations.

Mr. ALLMAND: Here is the problem that I am concerned about: It would seem to me that, in the long run, it would be better to favour multilateral aid because multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, would be in a better position to assess the real need and would be less apt to give aid on political considerations.

This morning you have spoken about the need to concentrate aid, and it has been said "Why give a little bit here and a little bit there?" Would it not be better for these countries with only a little bit to give if they gave it to the United Nations where it could be used in large amount to best help the people of the world?

Mr. MORAN: This is a complex problem which certainly cannot be decided in three minutes. I have given half-hour speeches on the relative merits of both methods. I am not prepared in this limited time to go beyond the summary, that there is an appropriate place for both types of assistance.

There are many answers to your proposition. One is the cost of multilateral aid. At an international conference where the French delegate spoke in some detail on this point, he submitted a calculation that, for the same amount of money, the French program could offer 10 scholarships as against 6 from the UNESCO. I do not think that this is a fact that you can dispute, nor is it any reflection on the United Nations, because they have an unique situation when forming a Secretariat, or appointing people to their organization, where national representation must be considered, and this, of course, makes for higher administrative and operating costs.

In the case of the recipient countries, many of them prefer bilateral aid, for a series of reasons. As recently as the current food crisis in India, there was, as

you probably know, a suggestion that the food be funnelled through a selected international organization. This was unacceptable to the Indians for reasons of their own.

The composition of UN teams that go into the field has experienced great difficulties because so frequently they are made up of say an Englishman and an American and a Belgian who share no common language; there is no common background or system against which they are framing their proposals and their advice.

These are just a few of the considerations. As I say, you are into a field that could well be debated interminably.

Mr. BREWIN: Is not the World Bank developing a system to overcome some of these problems in UN aid?

Mr. MORAN: Oh, yes. Through the consultative groups and consortia that I referred to in my opening statement, the Bank plays a very key role. I mentioned regional banks but I mentioned also the World Bank; I mentioned the Development Assistance Committee and others; but I understood Mr. Allmand's question to be something different—that instead of spending your money bilaterally, you hand it over to an international organization and say "take it and do with it as you see fit".

Mr. ALLMAND: As you say it is a long question, I will not go any further with it.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, is item 30 carried?

Carried.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Item 35 carry? Item 35 is economic, technical, educational and other assistance, in the amount of \$84,100,000.

Some hon. MEMBERS: Carried.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall item L 25 carry?

Carried.

Gentlemen the next meeting will be held next Thursday.

We will have as witnesses Mr. B. M. Williams and Mr. R. E. Collins, both assistant under-secretaries. Mr. Williams will deal with the administrative aspects and Mr. Collins will deal with political aspects in Africa, Asia and Europe except NATO.

On behalf of the committee I wish again to express our appreciation to Mr. Moran for his co-operation, and to wish him well on his next assignment.

Mr. MORAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 7

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THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1966

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Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

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WITNESS:

Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Chairman, Canadian Section, International  
Joint Commission.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                                    |                      |                  |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                       | Mr. Klein,           | Mr. Pelletier,   |
| Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ), | Mr. Laprise,         | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Churchill,                     | Mr. Lind,            | Mr. Régimbal,    |
| Mr. Faulkner,                      | Mr. Macdonald        | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Forest,                        | ( <i>Rosedale</i> ), | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Foy,                           | Mrs. MacInnis,       | Mrs. Wadds,      |
| Mr. Groos,                         | Mr. Macquarrie,      | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Harkness,                      | Mr. McIntosh,        |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1966

WITNESS:

Mr. A. P. Heeney, Chairman, Canadian Section, International  
Joint Commission.

ROGER DONAHUE, P.R.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966



MINUTE BOOK PROCEEDINGS  
ORDER OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, June 1, 1966.

Ordered.—That the names of Mr. Pelletier and Mrs. MacInnis be substituted for those Messrs. Basford and Brewin on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

Also present: Mr. Cowan, M.P.

In attendance: From the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission: Messrs. A. D. P. Healey, Q.C., Chairman, Canadian Section; J. L. MacCallum, Assistant to Chairman and Legal Advisor; D. G. Chance, Secretary, Canadian Section.

The committee resumed consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-67.

The Chairman called Item 40:

International Joint Commission, Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission—\$792,000.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Healey, who made a statement and was questioned.

Item 40 was carried.

At 1:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 2, 1966.

Dorothy F. Bannister,  
*Clerk of the Proceedings.*

ORDER OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, June 1, 1922.

Ordered—That the names of Mr. Felleiter and Mrs. MacInnis be substituted for those Messrs. Hasford and Kewin on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Attest:

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nathan

LEON J. RAYMOND,

The Clerk of the House.

- |                        |                 |                 |
|------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Mr. Allmand,           | Mr. Klein,      | Mr. Felleiter,  |
| Mr. Asselin (Charles), | Mr. Laprise,    | Mr. Pilon,      |
| Mr. Churchill,         | Mr. Lind,       | Mr. Robitaille, |
| Mr. Faulkner,          | Mr. Macdonald,  | Mr. Stelbrink,  |
| Mr. Forest,            | (Joseph),       | Mr. Thompson,   |
| Mr. Foy,               | Mrs. MacInnis,  | Mrs. Wadd,      |
| Mr. Groes,             | Mr. Macquarrie, | Mr. Walker—(24) |
| Mr. Harkness,          | Mr. McInnis,    |                 |

Dorothy E. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 2, 1966.

(8)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Mrs. MacInnis, Mrs. Wadds and Messrs. Allmand, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Klein, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (Rosedale), McIntosh, Nesbitt, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (19).

*Also present:* Mr. Cowan, M.P.

*In attendance:* From the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission: Messrs. A. D. P. Heeney, Q.C., Chairman, Canadian Section; J. L. MacCallum, Assistant to Chairman and Legal Adviser; D. G. Chance, Secretary, Canadian Section.

The committee resumed consideration of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs, 1966-67.

The Chairman called Item 40:

International Joint Commission, Salaries and Expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission—\$392,000.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Heeney, who made a statement and was questioned.

Item 40 was carried.

At 1.00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until Thursday, June 9, 1966.

Dorothy F. Ballantine.

*Clerk of the Committee.*





## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, June 2, 1966

● (11.00 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, we have a quorum.

First of all, I have a memorandum which I will convey to the Committee. Mr. Speaker, Lucien Lamoureux, advises that a ceremony and a reception will take place in the Railway Committee Room at 12.30 p.m. today to honour the former Speaker, Mr. Alan Macnaughton, on the occasion of the hanging of the traditional Speaker's portrait. Mr. Speaker Lamoureux would be grateful if chairmen of committees would conclude their meetings by 12.30 today in order to permit members to attend the ceremony.

Gentlemen, we are resuming consideration of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs for 1966 and 1967. At the end of the meeting last week I expected the two witnesses today to be Mr. B. M. Williams and Mr. R. E. Collins, both assistant Under Secretaries of State, but there has been a change and we have with us today Mr. Heeney, whom you all know very well. Mr. Heeney is now the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Commission. If it is agreeable to the meeting we shall start today with Item No. 40, which reads as follows:

B—International Joint Commission

40. Salaries and expenses of the Commission and Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the Commission, \$392,000.

Under that item I would ask Mr. Heeney to make a statement and I am sure he will be ready to answer your questions.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Heeney starts—I do not know what methods you use in cutting down the list of those who are asking questions but at the last meeting I knew I had to leave before the meeting was over and I put my name down early but you let others, who had had to leave also, ask the questions. Now, is there going to be an opportunity or not for us to question the last witness again? Is he finished?

The CHAIRMAN: We are finished with that item.

Mr. MACINTOSH: All right.

The CHAIRMAN: The way I, as Chairman, propose to act is to recognize members as they raise their hands and if you wish to be recognized first today it would be my pleasure to recognize you now, as soon as—

Mr. MACINTOSH: I just noticed that it was not done that way last time; that is all.

The CHAIRMAN: There were quite a few who raised their hands last time and I made note of them in the order in which their hands were raised.

Mr. A. D. P. HEENEY (*Chairman, Canadian Section, International Joint Commission*): Mr. Chairman, this is, as you say Item No. 40, regarding the salaries and expenses of the Commission, and I thought, perhaps, it would be most useful to members of the Committee if I were to say something in general and to some extent, in particular, about cases covered before the Commission, at this stage, and then subject myself to questions. You were kind enough to say that I would answer questions. I will try to answer questions, if they are posed after my somewhat informal statement is made. I regret having notes here but I have no formal submission to make to you, Mr. Chairman, partly because of the relatively short notice of my invitation to appear before you and, partly, because I think it might be more useful if what I have to say is less formal or formidable than has been the normal practice in the past.

You will, I hope, Mr. Chairman, permit me to say it is always a pleasure to come before this Committee. It is a Committee before which I have appeared over a period of many years, in various different capacities, but I can remember many happy discussions at the time that I was an official of the Department of External Affairs.

Members of the Committee will, of course, be aware that the International Joint Commission is an international body which was established by treaty with the United States. The treaty is called the Boundary Waters Treaty, which was signed in 1909. Perhaps it is as well to recall what the purpose of the treaty is and I will therefore quote very briefly from its preamble:

—to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions which are now pending, between the United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise—

That is the end of the quotation from the preamble, the general statement of the purpose of the treaty.

● (11.15 a.m.)

The Commission has three American members, appointed by the President of the United States, and three Canadian members, appointed by the Governor in Council in Canada. The Commission maintains offices in Ottawa and in Washington.

It is, I think, important to recall that the Commission acts not as a continuing conference of two national delegations—delegations under instruction from their respective governments—but they act as a single body, seeking solutions in the joint interests and in accordance with the principles set out in the treaty.

I emphasize this, Mr. Chairman, because this is not always understood. We are a unitary body, although composed of two sections, and decisions taken and recommendations arrived at are not arrived at on the basis of a negotiation between a Canadian and American team; but in the way a court would arrive at a decision in a case placed before it, according to the individual opinions of the



commissioners after hearing the evidence and seeing the results of the studies that are made by their technical boards.

The Commission itself does not maintain a large staff either in Canada or in the United States. It pursues its investigations and obtains its advice by means of specially constituted boards, and this is of some importance.

The members of these boards are selected by the Commission from the departments and agencies of the two governments where the best technical knowledge and competence are to be found. This is an authority and privilege that we are given by the executive authority of the two governments, that is, to select from the government services in Washington and in Ottawa those who are best suited to investigate the problems which are before us, and we bring these people together in boards, again, jointly formed, but a common unitary body, to proceed with these investigations which the governments, ask us to undertake.

Over the years, this has proved to be an effective and efficient means of mobilizing the authority and the variety of talent that is required for the Commission's purposes. It has also avoided the necessity of building up a large and expensive establishment of our own, and this is the reason why the estimates asked by the government for the support of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission are so modest. Frequently people are surprised that the amount of cost directly involved, for the Commission, in its Canadian Section and its American section, is so small. But, the explanation is that we use the officials from the various departments of government where the technical knowledge and competence is to be found.

Since its first meeting in 1912 over 80 questions have come before the Commission, either for final approval under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction which we have under Article 8 of the treaty, to approve applications, or references—that is, the so-called references under Article 9—for examination and report to Ottawa and to Washington.

In all but a very few of these investigatory cases, which constitute the bulk of our business, governments have accepted and acted upon the Commission's recommendations.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable to you, I thought I might select, from the cases that are before us, a number of current ones which seem to be of the most importance and likely to be of the most interest to members of the Committee. If there are questions concerning other ones that I do not mention, I would, of course, be glad to attempt to deal with them.

Selecting then, some examples, and moving from the east to the west, beginning with the Atlantic provinces, we have had an investigation in operation for some time on the St. Croix river, both in regard to regulation and to pollution. Pollution, as they say nowadays is, of course, very big, and, under the treaty, which is our charter, pollution is prohibited. The two governments agree that pollution shall be prohibited on the one side of the boundaries if it affects property or health on the other. That is to say, each government is under an obligation to prevent, on its side, the pollution of boundary waters or waters going across the boundary, if the result of that pollution is injurious to health of property on the other side.



The St. Croix river reference was given to us in 1955, and four years later, the Commission, after making its technical investigations, made its report. It recommended, as is common in pollution cases, specific water quality objectives for the St. Croix river and their adoption by the government in both countries, on the basis of the criteria which were set out in our report. The objectives we recommended in this case—and I cite this as a typical pollution case—were approved by the governments and then the problem arises of how these are enforced.

The Commission, of course has no penal authority, no executive function to carry out the recommendations which it makes, and which are approved by governments; but here reliance must primarily be placed on local authority, where the jurisdiction rests. In the case of the St. Croix, the primary jurisdiction rested, of course, in the state of Maine, and the province of New Brunswick. The progress made in this case, has, I think, been disappointing, although the governments of Canada and the United States have communicated with the province of New Brunswick and the state of Maine respectively, seeking and urging them to move forward along the lines of the International Joint Commission's recommendations.

Within recent months we have had more encouraging response from those local authorities, and it is to be hoped that the municipalities on the two sides, whose sewage is partly responsible for the pollution, and the industrial plant on the United States side, which is very largely responsible for the pollution, will take necessary measures to bring about a gradual clarification of this very important international stream.

Mr. HARKNESS: On a point of order, if I might just interject, has either of the federal governments any real power to force either the provincial or municipal governments to take action?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, Mr. Chairman, I suppose the answer to that question is a legal opinion, which possibly I should not give. But let me suggest a possible line of response.

This is an obligation—a treaty obligation of the governments of Canada and of the United States—to prevent pollution occurring on their respective sides, to the injury of health or property on the other side. Therefore, I take it that it is within federal competence on each side to do what is necessary to discharge these obligations. Now, the method by which it must do this, I suppose, is through local authority; the province on the one side and the state on the other. How this can be accomplished in a compulsive manner, I do not think that I am really competent to say, or possibly I should not even venture an opinion. What has happened, over the years, is that persuasion and pressure have been brought to bear and, on the whole, pretty successfully, in a number of cases.

The speed of improvement has, perhaps, not always been what might be desired from the point of view of cleaning up water situations. As I am sure Mr. Harkness knows, Mr. Chairman, these are complicated problems, not only politically and jurisdictionally, but also economically because the industry which, in the case of St. Croix, is a principal polluter, is of the greatest possible importance to the economy of the whole district, which is not a very high level economic area. Companies normally take the position that if they are to move in



capital equipment necessary to bring about this improvement, this will make their business unprofitable, et cetera—you know, the usual argument.

In my judgment, and experience, this is a slow process. One cannot expect to bring about a satisfactory situation overnight. All one can hope for is a constant pressure and a willingness to co-operate, on the part of private industry, with the encouragement, financial and otherwise, from governmental authorities.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, it has always seemed to me that this is the crux of the situation, that the constitutional power of the federal government, in each case, was really not sufficient to ensure that the measures which were recommended were carried out.

Mr. HEENEY: Well, it is part of the treaty power. I suppose a court would hold that the government—well, I should not express a legal opinion, Mr. Chairman, in the presence of so many legal authorities. But it is a treaty obligation of the government of Canada and a treaty obligation of the government of the United States.

Mr. HARKNESS: We had a great example of a treaty which could not be carried out in regard to the Columbia because of the refusal of the province to meet some of the conditions. So, therefore, the treaty had to be changed.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Heeney, you do not have to give a legal opinion. You are very free to answer or not to answer, but perhaps the Committee would permit the witness to finish his statement first; then we will proceed with questions.

Mr. HEENEY: The next example I would like to give of a case before the Commission, which would be of interest, is the Champlain reference. This is the reference made by the two governments to the Commission to examine the economic feasibility of developing and improving the waterway between New York and the St. Lawrence through Lake Champlain, the Hudson and the Richelieu rivers.

This investigation is now complete. Only a fortnight ago we had our final hearings on the Canadian and United States sides of the boundary at St. Jean, Quebec, and at Burlington, Vermont. This is the customary procedure we follow in such investigations.

Normally, after the references have been made by the government setting out the questions which they wish to have answered, we have preliminary hearings in the areas likely to be principally affected to give opportunity to public bodies, private individuals and others, to express their opinion, and to bring evidence before the Commission. We then set to work the combined board of experts, drawn from the two governments, to make a technical investigation of the economic and engineering features of a possible undertaking like the Champlain waterway. Then, after the board's report is before us, we make this report public and we deposit it in various points where it can be accessible to those who would be affected by the project. We then have a final series of hearings and we have now arrived at that stage with the Champlain waterway.

The board's report, which, as I say, is now being made public, and the supplementary report which we asked for on this problem, concluded, in



essence, that there were no insurmountable engineering problems involved in the construction of an improved waterway through this area, but that the value of the transportation savings that would be realized, is far below the level required to justify its construction. Now, at the moment we have all this evidence, both technical, and the evidence of witnesses, and we are now struggling with the problem of preparing our recommendations for government.

● (11.30 a.m.)

I will only touch upon the St. Lawrence river power application which is a case that continues to concern us. It is, of course, a very important one and I would be glad to go into it further if members of the Committee wish, Mr. Chairman. This, of course, concerns our part of the Seaway development where we continue to have an important responsibility in the controlling of the levels and flows of waters at Barnhart and down into the lower river. We do this, also, through a board, which, in this case, is not an advisory board, but a board of control. They maintain a constant watch on the levels and flows in order to do the best that can be done for the various interests concerned; not only power being developed on the two sides of the river at the Barnhart Works, but also, of course, in regard to navigation, not excluding the very important, tricky, business of the levels of Montreal Harbour.

Mr. COWAN: What about the level of Lake Ontario?

Mr. HEENEY: The level of Lake Ontario is also, of course, a very important feature of this. Oh, no, we do not neglect that, indeed. We have very important criteria for the maintenance of this level as far as human beings can maintain that within a range of stage which is settled in our order of approval.

Mr. COWAN: I notice you said power first although the table—

Mr. HEENEY: This has no significance whatever. It just came into my mind first, because power does not come first, as you, I am sure, very well know.

Mr. COWAN: Third position.

Mr. HEENEY: Exactly, third position. No; please do not read any significance, Mr. Chairman, into my having said that first. There is no priority for power of course.

Let me say something about the Great Lakes reference that was given to us in 1964. I am referring, now, not to the pollution reference but to the reference on regulation and the range of stage. This is certainly the largest, most expensive, hydrological study that has ever been undertaken by the Commission. I was just informed this morning that there are about 100 Canadian technical people engaged on this examination now.

The question put to us by governments here, arising, of course, out of this very severe and difficult low water situation which existed a year or more ago, was to determine,—and I am quoting now—

Whether measures within the Great Lakes basin can be taken in the public interest to regulate further the levels of the Great Lakes, or any of them, and their connecting waters, so as to reduce the extremes of stage which have been experienced, and for other beneficial effects in these waters.



Here, when the reference had been settled and given to us, we established what we call the International Great Lakes Levels Board, drawing upon the best people we could find in the departments in both Washington and Ottawa. We directed this board to undertake the required technical investigations, which are of a great complexity and extent, and after their preparation of what they regarded as the best way to go about this, we approved the program and they are now engaged very intensively in this.

The Committee might be interested, Mr. Chairman, to know that the board's studies have been broken down here into four main areas.

First, the effect of various levels on shore property—and there is some 10,000 miles, I think, of shoreline involved here. Second, the effect of regulation on navigation, which is, of course, important to both countries. Third, the effect on power production, and fourth, the regulation studies in anticipation of the possibility of bringing some or all of these lakes under a stricter regimen of regulation.

The Canadian costs of these studies for the period 1965-66 right through to 1971—and not until then do we expect to have the study completed—are tentatively estimated to be about \$1,500,000. The cost of studies of the regulatory works required to effect regulation have not as yet been estimated but these might run to another \$500,000. The United States costs—new costs are estimated to be about \$800,000 since a great deal of the preliminary work on that side of the line had already been done before the International Joint Commission obtained its reference.

The board tell us that they expect to have their report in our hands by October 1970. This seems a long time but I can assure members of the Committee, Mr. Chairman, that this is a really vast undertaking. Some engineers have told me that this is the largest hydrological undertaking of which they are aware. Fortunately, of course, the situation is not as critical as it was when the reference was originally given to us.

May I pass on now to perhaps the most urgent and important investigation that is currently underway, under the auspices of the International Joint Commission, and that is the investigation into the pollution of Lake Erie, the international section of the St. Lawrence river and Lake Ontario.

Perhaps I might read here the questions that were put to us in this connection by the two governments. The questions were three: First, are the waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the international section of the St. Lawrence river being polluted on either side of the boundary to an extent which is causing, or likely to cause, injury to health or property on the other side of the boundary? This is what, of course, brings it into the international context.

Second, if the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, to what extent, by what causes and in what localities, is such pollution taking place?

Third, if the Commission should find that pollution of the character just referred to is taking place, what remedial measures would, in its judgment, be most practical from the economic, sanitary, and other points of view, and what would be the probable cost thereof?

Again, when this problem was put to us, we assembled the best technical advice we could in advisory boards for the purpose, and the program of investigation is, of course, well under way now.



In Canada, the members selected for the Canadian section of the advisory boards were drawn from the Departments of National Health and Welfare, Fisheries, Mines and Technical Surveys and, for the province of Ontario, from the Ontario Water Resources Commission. Here, the Canadian section of our international board is a federal-provincial mechanism. The United States similarly drew their experts from the corps of engineers, and from the Department of Health Education and Welfare, and now from the Department of the Interior, which, in the United States, has primary responsibility with regard to anti-pollution measures.

Not long after the studies got under way, the Commission, on advice, came to the conclusion that this was an exceedingly urgent matter and we adopted the course of preparing, with the advice of these technical boards, an interim report to governments. This was put before the two governments in December of last year.

In a moment I am going to remind members of the Committee, if I may, Mr. Chairman, of the recommendations that we made at that time. But perhaps I should say something about the scope of this study because I think it is not generally appreciated what an extensive and complicated problem this is.

Financial facts are not necessarily a reflection of magnitude and urgency but they do give some measure of the order of magnitude, and by looking at the estimates of the International Joint Commission, you would get no real notion of the size of this undertaking, for the reasons that I explained in my introductory remarks. That is to say, by reason of most of the expenses coming through other departments of government rather than by direct vote attributable to the Commission itself.

The preliminary estimates related to the investigation for the period 1966-67, that is, this current year, up to 1970-71, are as follows: The Fisheries Research Board—and they are playing an important part here—\$5,200,000; Mines and Technical Surveys, \$8,131,000; National Health and Welfare, \$1,491,000; a total of nearly \$15 million, excluding, of course, capital expenditures for the building of ships and the construction of laboratories, and so forth.

The Commission is not, of course, in a position to require—and this is an important item which I want to draw to the attention of the Committee—the assistance and co-operation of provincial authorities. The province of Ontario is very conscious of its own responsibilities in regard to pollution in these boundary waters, comprising these two lakes and the international section of the river, and there is only one provincial authority, of course, involved here. On the other side of the line there are, I think, four states involved which somewhat complicates our position.

The province of Ontario being directly concerned, and conscious of the urgency of this problem, is co-operating directly with the Commission through membership in our board—the one board on the Canadian side. The Ontario Water Resources Commission, which has been designated by the government of Ontario to play the co-ordinating part at Queen's Park, is directly involved in the program of investigation and study.

That agency, the O.W.R.C. as it is called, has agreed to schedule its operations so as to assist and complement the investigations which are being carried out by the rest of the Canadian section of this board drawn from the



federal departments. The Ontario Water Resources Commission estimates that the cost of the work which has been allocated to it will be approximately \$1½ million by the time they are through.

The government of Canada have agreed with the province of Ontario to pay half the costs of that portion of the work that is done by the province of Ontario through the Ontario Water Resources Commission under a typical cost sharing arrangement. You will see when you come to look at the details of the vote before you that we are inviting you to recommend that there be provision made for that portion of the work done by the Ontario Water Resources Commission which is to be paid by the federal government. This is a new procedure and this is why there is an item of, I think, \$240,000 in the vote as it stands now.

In December, 1965, as I said a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, the International Joint Commission made an interim report to governments on this situation. It seems to me to be important enough to repeat for the record of this Committee—although, I have no doubt that this is known to many members, if not all—the recommendations which we made at that time in this report. They appear on page 15 of a report which is entitled: "Interim Report of the International Joint Commission of the United States and Canada on the Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the international section of the St. Lawrence River—December 1965."

Mr. LIND: Mr. Chairman, May I ask Mr. Heeney a few questions? A couple of weeks ago there was a report from the Ontario government that they expected to have the pollution problem in Lake Erie completely eliminated by 1970. It came out in the *Globe and Mail* to that effect. Are the O.W.R.C. actually doing anything about it or just studying it at the present time?

Mr. HEENEY: I could comment on that right now, if you like. Do you want me to answer that now, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: No.

Mr. HEENEY: Well, I will do whatever the Committee wishes, Mr. Chairman, I will attempt to answer now or I will leave it to after I have finished my statement.

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps you had better finish the statement first. Mr. Heeney will then answer all questions because there are quite a few who have given their names for asking questions.

Mr. HEENEY: Very good, then. I will go on with the quotation, Mr. Chairman, of our recommendations made in December of last year.

"The Commission recommends that the governments of the United States and Canada, as soon as possible, and in association with state and provincial governments, take appropriate action to ensure

(a) sufficient purification of all municipal and industrial wastes before discharge into these waters and their tributaries, to achieve the maximum possible removal of phosphates; (b) prohibition of the construction of combined sanitary and storm sewers and the initiation of a program of separating existing combined sewers in communities dis-



charging wastes into these waters and their tributaries; and (c) an effective system of regular sampling of effluents discharged into these waters and their tributaries in accordance with programs approved by the Commission.

Paragraph 2 of the recommendations—

Mr. WALKER: Do you use the word "sanitary"?

Mr. HEENEY: I spoke about both sanitary and storm sewers, the proposition here being that the separation is an important step in the direction of cleaning up the situation.

I continue with the second paragraph of the quotation.

The Commission recommends that the two governments support fully the Commission's program of investigation and research as outlined in this interim report and as subsequently developed by the provision of the personnel and facilities required from time to time for its effective implementation."

Now, both governments, in Washington and in Ottawa, have taken this interim report seriously. They have expressed themselves as being aware of the importance and urgency of this problem, and, indeed, at a meeting of the joint ministerial committee on trade and economic affairs held in Washington, reference was made to this in the communiqué after a discussion of this problem.

As yet, there has been no formal acceptance of these recommendations by either government. I presume that the problem, if it be a problem, to which reference was made a few moments ago in another content, Mr. Chairman, namely, the relationship between federal and local authority on both sides of the line, may have been responsible for any delay or deferring of formal approval. I do not know whether or not the fact that formal approval has not been given has slowed up the remedial action. I am not in a position to say. But that is the fact, that formal approval has not yet been given to those recommendations.

Meanwhile, the Commission, in accordance with its mandate and within its jurisdiction and powers, is pressing forward with the investigation as a matter of fullest urgency. The Canadian side alone—and this, again, is some measure of the importance that we attach to it—has some 200 officials involved in this investigation at present.

There are a number of other cases that I might just touch on more briefly. Again, exemplary, rather than for their intrinsic importance. The pollution of the Rainy River and the Lake of the Woods for instance, in which some members will be particularly interested. Here we had an investigation which was made under a reference from the two governments in 1959. After some years of investigation, the Commission reported to the two governments that the Rainy River was being polluted on each side of the boundary to the disadvantage and injury of property and health on the other side, and recommended that water quality objectives, as set forth in the report, be adopted by the governments and that the appropriate enforcement agencies require the industries and municipalities concerned to initiate construction of



appropriate pollution treatment facilities necessary to achieve these standards or objectives which we set forth.

We also recommended that the Commission be authorized to establish and maintain supervision over these waters to see how these objectives were being met. Here, I can report, with some satisfaction, that the federal governments have accepted these recommendations and are in active contact with the state of Minnesota and the province of Ontario. I think there is good reason to believe that the situation is going to be improved considerably within a relatively short time.

Moving west again, Mr. Chairman, we have the first reference we ever had on pollution in a water crossing the boundary, namely, the Red River. In 1964 we were asked to investigate pollution of the Red River at the international boundary. Hitherto, all our studies in this field have been concerned with waters that formed the boundary.

The main problem here seems to be the result of industrial activities south of the line, such as potato factories and sugar beet factories, which have an effluent which is causing difficulty. Conditions are aggravated in the winter because of the ice cover then. We have had our initial investigation by our board and the Commissioners are going out to have a look at it in the autumn. We are advised that that is the best time to go. Here, we received excellent co-operation from the state and provincial authorities of Manitoba, North Dakota and Minnesota in the establishment of our board and I am hopeful that we will be able to arrive at agreed recommendations to the two governments and that we will be able to improve that situation there.

Another case in Manitoba of some interest, because of the principles involved, has to do with the Pembina River. Here a reference was made to us in 1962 when we were asked to examine the Pembina River. For those members who are not familiar with that stream, Mr. Chairman, it arises in Manitoba, loops into North Dakota and then comes back into the Red River, just below the boundary in Manitoba. We were asked by the two governments to look into the possibility of a co-operative development there, on the two sides of the boundary, to see whether such a co-operative development between the two nations had something to offer which could not be found in separate national developments.

The problem on the United States side was primarily flood control; the problem or the possible benefit on the Canadian side was not so much flood control as the possibility of improved irrigation. Here, our boards have made a careful investigation; we have had preliminary hearings and final hearings. The board has put up three plans of possible co-operative development and, at the moment, with the assistance of our technical adviser, we are endeavouring to achieve an agreed report which we can recommend to the two governments. If one can jump ahead a little bit, it does look as if there are possibilities of achieving modest, beneficial cost ratios for a joint development here.

To my mind, the importance of this is not so much that the benefits will be dramatic in this particular scheme, but here we are dealing with a kind of laboratory example of the possibility of regional development across the line. We shall see how this works out. I suspect that the conclusions we come to may have some important value from the point of view of precedents in future and perhaps larger cases.



Now, those are the cases that I have selected, not at random, but because I think they are the most interesting, or the most important that are before us. We have a great many other cases. We have a number of cases which are before us in a continuing surveillance role. These include, for example, the levels of Lake Superior, the flow of the Souris River, the levels of Rainy Lake, which are causing some anxiety now, from the point of view of their height, the levels of Kootenay Lake, the backwater effects of the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, the control of levels and flows in the St. Croix River, which I mentioned in connection with pollution, and the operation of the Niagara control structure and the Lake Erie ice boom.

This completes what I have to say, in chief, as it were, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I could now make a few references to the actual estimates, if the Committee would find that useful and then try to deal with such questions as members may wish to put.

Mr. HARKNESS: May I just ask if there is no longer any reference as far as the Milk River and the St. Mary River are concerned.

Mr. HEENEY: This is a matter which is being dealt with by the governments in a separate section of the treaty, as you know. There is no reference before us on this. The division of waters provided for under the treaty is made as between the Canadian and the United States authorities. Am I not right there? Under a general supervisory authority which the International Joint Commission have under the terms of the treaty.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Heeney's general statements are not dealing specifically with budget items, I think there are a number of general questions rather than specific items and we might proceed just as fast if we were now allowed to ask these general questions, which may well do away with the necessity for details, when we might get down to it.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed that we proceed with the general questions now?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Heeney, I would like to go back to the subject of the Great Lakes. In what manner is the co-ordination maintained between the studies done on the United States side and studies done on the Canadian side?

Mr. HEENEY: Are you speaking of levels or of pollution?

Mr. FAULKNER: I am speaking of pollution.

Mr. HEENEY: The method of co-ordination is typical throughout the whole I.J.C. structure. The pattern which obtains at the top as it were, that is to say, a joint commission, composed equally of United States and Canadian members, is maintained throughout our advisory boards and committees, which do the actual investigation and study, for report to us.

Let us take the regulation study of the levels on the Great Lakes. Here we have an international board composed on the same pattern as the international Joint Commission itself, of an equal number of Canadian and United States representatives. They act as one ultimately. That is not to say that, during the course of the investigation, they do not separate for the purpose of pursuing their studies. But, they come together in order that their reports to us may be joint in nature. Do you see what I mean?



Mr. FAULKNER: Yes. So that the pattern of research is really on a lake-wide basis. What is going on on the United States side is fully understood and probably, in large measure, duplicates what is going on on the Canadian side.

Mr. HEENEY: Complements is a better word than duplicates because I am quite sure that not only do they try to avoid duplication, that is to say, the Canadians and the Americans studying the same phenomena at the same location, but they do achieve this complementary operation to an extraordinary measure.

If there is a unique thing about the International Joint Commission, Mr. Chairman, it is this co-operative, integrated, complementary method of proceedings between two nations.

Mr. FAULKNER: You mentioned that the International Joint Commission submission to the two federal governments had not been formally endorsed yet it appears that there are appropriations in other estimates of the Canadian federal government involved in carrying out some of the recommendations or at least the studies the report recommends.

Mr. HEENEY: That is quite right. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I did not intend to give too much significance to the lack of formal acceptance or approval of these recommendations because, here, actions speak louder than words or formal endorsements and the federal authorities—as members will see when the estimates of the various departments come forward—are providing the funds which are necessary to carry on the program of investigation and study which we have recommended.

Mr. FAULKNER: What are the appropriation levels on the American side?

● (11.59 a.m.)

Mr. HEENEY: Well, for historical reasons, the situation there is different. When we started our joint program of investigation, and this is true of levels as well as of pollution, they were, generally speaking, more advanced in their knowledge. There had, for example, been very substantial studies done by the corps of engineers on the United States side in both areas, so that they had assembled a good deal more data than we had in the Canadian departments at the time of the initiation of the study.

I do not think I could indicate now the extent of the moneys that will be spent between 1966 and 1970 from United States funds. It may be somewhat less than that to be spent on the Canadian side under the program simply because, in a sense, they started ahead of us.

Mr. FAULKNER: But it could not be possibly argued that there is a greater effort of research being done on the one side of the great Lakes than on the other.

Mr. HEENEY: No; I certainly would think not. In fact, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that the program launched by the Canadian section of the international board, as approved by us, is a very impressive program and I think it is quite the largest of its kind that has ever been undertaken in Canada.

Mr. FAULKNER: There is just one other question I would like to ask, not exactly along the lines of Mr. Lind, but it relates to the question he put. Maybe he will have an opportunity to ask that question directly, because I think it is



very interesting that while we are in a process of spending \$16 million or more federal dollars, it seems to me that the Ontario government is the one which is going to clear up the pollution on Lake Ontario. Possibly that could be answered.

I was wondering what is the Ontario Water Resources Commission doing in the Great Lakes—Erie and Ontario—other than by contributing, in part, to this particular study? Their role here is fairly minor, in view of their appropriations, assuming that there is some relationship between what they are going to achieve and what they are going to spend.

Mr. HEENEY: Well, Mr. Chairman, they have a very substantial program and, I think it is fair to say, in comparison with other local jurisdictions in North America, an advanced program, for the improvement of situations of this kind which, of course, apply to the whole of Ontario.

I am sure members of the Committee will, from time to time, have seen announcements of the provisions of their role and the regulations of the Ontario Water Resources Commission calling for programs—from the pulp and paper industry, for example—setting out means by which these industries propose to improve their effluents between the time the regulation was made and a given date in the future. This is subject to penalties, which of course, the Ontario government are in a position to impose under the constitution and under their law. So that industries located on international waters would, of course, be subject to the same program and the same sanctions, and the same incentives—because there are incentives involved here as well—to clean up the situation. So I would say that, from the point of view of Ontario, Mr. Chairman, that industrial and municipal polluters are in the same situation as other industries and municipalities within the jurisdiction of the province of Ontario.

Mr. FAULKNER: So, in fact, what is happening is that steps are being taken by the Ontario Water Resources Commission to control obvious sources of pollution at the same time as studies are being undertaken in the Great Lakes to locate sources of pollution other than the obvious ones.

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, I am, of course, not a competent witness on this. It is my understanding that this program of the O.W.R.C. is being moved forward. I am not really in possession of much more information in this matter than has become public although I could, of course, obtain it. But I understand that this is being done and that attention, in this connection, is being given to the recommendations which we included in our report of December.

Mr. FAULKNER: Would it be fair to say that the \$16 million appropriation from Fisheries, Mines and Technical Surveys, Health and Welfare, are exclusively devoted to study?

Mr. HEENEY: Oh, yes, exclusively devoted to study—investigation or study. It is not academic study in the sense that it is not removed, it is not pure research; this is very much applied research. This is research, not only to find out what the situation is, but it is also research to find out what are the methods which can best be employed to improve the situation. That, I think, is an important detail.

Mr. FAULKNER: Yes. Thank you.



Mr. HEENEY: My attention has just been drawn to one paragraph in our interim report, at the top of page 9, which reads as follows:

On the Canadian side of Lake Ontario the municipal wastes from a population of 2.5 millions are discharged into the lake; 82 per cent of the wastes receive secondary treatment, seven per cent primary treatment and one per cent no treatment.

In terms of municipal wastes, this is not a bad record.

The CHAIRMAN: The names of the members on my list now: Mr. Foy, Mr. Walker, Mr. MacIntosh, Mr. Lind and Mrs. Wadds. Perhaps you will permit the Chairman to strike a happy medium between the people physically to my right and the people physically to my left and to recognize Mr. MacIntosh first, then Mr. Foy.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Well, I would prefer that you go ahead and ask those who had their hands up first, as we decided. Agreed?

Mr. FOY: Mr. Heeneey, I would like to direct my questions to the St. Clair River, specifically around the area of Sarnia which, as everyone knows, is the great chemical valley of Canada. In the last couple of years or more there has been a great deal of discussion in the area, and in the adjoining area across the river in the state of Michigan, specifically the town of Port Huron, regarding air and water pollution.

I am wondering what study the federal government is entertaining at the moment in this regard. Before you answer, I wonder if I could just verify what I believe to be the federal activity.

It is my understanding that, in the beginning this is really a state and a provincial affair. In this particular case, I understand that the city of Port Huron complained to Washington, and, in turn, Washington complained to Ottawa, and that it has become a matter for the International Joint Commission. Is this true?

Mr. HEENEY: Not quite, Mr. Chairman. Some years ago these narrow waters were under reference to the Commission and have been the subject of a report. I am informed that we reported in 1950.

Mr. FOY: I think that was specifically in the Windsor-Detroit area, was it not?

Mr. HEENEY: I am talking about water pollution now. I will say a word about air pollution there too, if you wish.

This report was accepted by the two governments, certain standards were adopted and I think very considerable improvement was made. That is not to say that the situation is by any means wholly satisfactory now. It happens that the International Joint Commission are making a visit to Sarnia and that whole area next week.

Mr. FOY: Is that as a result of what I just mentioned?

Mr. HEENEY: No; I do not happen to be aware of that particular complaint. That has not as yet been communicated to us by the government. We are going to take the opportunity there, on both sides of the river to see how things have come along since the commencement of the regime which was established under our recommendations.



On the Canadian side, apart from Sarnia, there has been a good deal of co-operative work—perhaps of a semi-voluntary kind—done by industry and there has been a great awareness of the difficulty. I think there is good reason for hope that that situation will continue to improve. It has a long way to go. As you know, the west end of Lake Erie is another cause of anxiety. The pollution can be seen from the air, I understand.

The only reference we have had on air pollution in the Windsor-Detroit area has been that resulting from smoke from vessels plying the Detroit river. And this, as a direct result, I think, of our investigations and report, has been vastly improved within the past five years, in particular.

Mr. FOY: With regard to air pollution around the Sarnia area, the industrial complex has increased a great deal in the last seven years.

Mr. HEENEY: There has been no reference on air pollution deriving from industry, only on air pollution deriving from passing vessels. I suppose I can say, although, Mr. Chairman, it is not my business, that I do know the two governments are now considering the desirability of a reference to us with regard to industrial air pollution throughout the whole St. Clair-Detroit rivers area.

Mr. FOY: And this will be done in conjunction with the province of Ontario?

Mr. HEENEY: Oh, yes, it would have to be done in co-operation with the state of Michigan and the province of Ontario.

Mr. FOY: Have you any knowledge, sir, of continuous tests for air pollution being made in the area? I refer to the devices or equipment used by the Ontario government for this purpose. Do you know if this is a continuous feature?

Mr. HEENEY: Should this investigation be given to us to make, I would expect there will be a good deal of data available to us at once, as a result of testing on both sides. But whether this is adequate or sufficient for the purpose of formulating conclusions, I do not know.

Mr. FOY: You might call it a complaint, but one observation from people, other than management of plants in the area, say that when officials from the provincial authority come to Sarnia to test water and air pollution, the industries are aware of this in advance and take advantage of this. Is there any remedy for this?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, I suppose we could be suddenly parachuted in, Mr. Chairman. But, I have no knowledge of the ducks being put in order for us to count. No, I am afraid I have heard no complaints of this. I have heard no substance to such complaints.

Mr. FOY: This has been brought to my attention by a number of organizations in the area, including members of the medical profession, who seem to know.

Mr. HEENEY: Are you speaking of water or air, in particular?

Mr. FOY: Both water and air.

Mr. HEENEY: Both water and air.

Mr. FOY: They say that the day the people come in to make the tests, then



the industries are pretty careful and that the people who are making the tests are not getting the true picture.

Mr. HEENEY: I would be surprised, Mr. Chairman, if it were feasible, at relatively short notice, to suddenly make the effluent pure in the water; certainly in an industrial process. I would have thought the same difficulty in producing pure air might be encountered. But I am not an expert in these things. I must rely upon my experts. I would be very glad to have this considered; the possibility of the evidence being, shall we say, arranged?

Mr. FOY: You say your representatives are going to Sarnia in the next week or so.

Mr. HEENEY: I am going myself.

Mr. FOY: Will you meet, then, with the American principals of the American federal organization?

Mr. HEENEY: We will go as a Commission, that is to say, both the United States and the Canadian commissioners will go together. We will have with us our board, which is United States and Canadian, and which consists of federal and state officials. So we will be in the official "net" as it were.

Mr. FOY: Well, then, could you tell me what your activities will be when you are there? Will you be having a meeting with the industrialists?

Mr. HEENEY: We will be meeting with them and visiting actual plants and municipal sewage disposal plants as well.

Mr. FOY: Will you also be available for the people I mentioned who have been complaining to me about these things?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, I would welcome the opportunity of speaking to anybody with whom you would like to put me in touch.

We are not holding any hearings; this is an inspection visit, not a hearing. But I would welcome either personal conversation or correspondence from anybody who has any anxiety about the matter Mr. Foy has mentioned, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOY: One more question. When you have completed your activity in Sarnia within the week, could you give me a follow-up? Supposing you discover that air pollution is prevalent in the area, what would your next step be?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, the air pollution is not a matter which is before us now, although it is likely to come before us.

Mr. FOY: Your visit concerns water pollution?

Mr. HEENEY: Yes, water pollution is the cause of our visit now. We have the water pollution problem before us. I am simply informed that the two governments are considering a reference to us on air pollution. I would be very glad to have a chat with you when I come back in ten days or so.

Mr. FOY: That would be fine.

Mr. WALKER: You just mentioned boundary waters for the I.J.C. what about offshore waters? Are you involved at all on either side of the coast?

Mr. HEENEY: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WALKER: This is not considered a boundary water?



Mr. HEENEY: No, it is not.

Mr. WALKER: Besides the boundary waters, are you ever involved with underwater products such as fish, minerals and this sort of thing?

Mr. HEENEY: No, not directly, although in the investigation we are making in pollution of the Great Lakes, for example, we are, of course, very much concerned with effect of pollution on biological phenomena. The Fisheries Research Board are undertaking an important part of the investigation because for instance, of the effect of pollution on fish life.

Mr. WALKER: Actually, what I am really thinking about is ownership. If, for instance, a huge oil deposit were discovered under Lake Erie, would this be subject matter for international discussion?

Mr. HEENEY: It would only be a matter for consideration by us if the governments asked us to take it into account.

Mr. WALKER: All right. Let me start on another one then.

Mr. HEENEY: Perhaps, I should add, Mr. Chairman, that the treaty makes it possible for governments to report to the International Joint Commission any matter of any kind along the frontier, or indeed, elsewhere. But we require a reference before we can take notice, sir.

Mr. WALKER: You do not have initiative powers right now. You are like one of our standing committees.

Mr. HEENEY: Well, we have initiative powers in relation to—

Mr. WALKER: Subjects which have been referred.

Mr. HEENEY: No, we have another jurisdiction, which is a quasi-judicial jurisdiction, which requires the approval of the International Joint Commission before any new use, or obstruction, or construction which affects the levels or the flows in boundary waters can be undertaken. That is an original jurisdiction.

Mr. WALKER: Which affects the levels or flows.

Mr. HEENEY: Right, the levels or flows.

Mr. WALKER: If somebody wanted to put an oil well up in the middle of Lake Erie it would not affect you.

Mr. HEENEY: It would not be our affair unless the governments asked us to look into it.

Mr. WALKER: All right. You mentioned the decisions you make having to be ratified or referred back to government. Do you use the word "government" in place of the words "parliament" or "Congress"?

Mr. HEENEY: Government; yes.

Mr. WALKER: Government.

Mr. HEENEY: The executive branches.

Mr. WALKER: The executive branches?

Mr. HEENEY: What the Americans call the executive branches.

Mr. WALKER: There are a lot of discussions and studies now in progress regarding the northern waters. If some of these northern waters crossed the boundary would you be a party to the discussions that would take place on this?



Mr. HEENEY: This, Mr. Chairman, would depend upon what the governments decided. The International Joint Commission is there and could be employed in such a context if it were the decision taken by the two governments.

Mr. WALKER: I think Mr. Harkness brought up the matter of the jurisdiction the I.J.C. have or might not have over municipalities and such. You have been using persuasion and reason, but has any test ever come to course on the actual powers that you have?

Mr. HEENEY: No; I do not think there is any real difficult legal question involved, so far as that is concerned, Mr. Chairman. We do communicate directly with offending municipalities and seek to persuade them of the wisdom of the course we propose. Beyond that we have no sanction.

Mr. WALKER: In other words, if they told you to go and jump in the polluted lake, you would never consider pressing further with a matter?

Mr. HEENEY: There are two things that we do. We direct our attention to the municipalities and seek to have them abide by the accepted standards that we have laid down. If they fail to do so, our recourse is to the two federal governments. We draw it to their attention the fact that such and such a municipality has failed to comply. It is up to the federal government to take the ball from there.

Mr. WALKER: In the case of Canadian municipalities do you deal directly with the municipality or through the provincial authority?

Mr. HEENEY: We do, indeed. And, I should say, Mr. Chairman, that, on the whole, the results have been very gratifying. The International Joint Commission in previous years and under previous dispensations have drawn matters seriously to the attention of municipalities. The record is that municipalities have paid attention.

Mr. WALKER: This may be a little difficult because it gets into a personal area but I am interested because the Canadian people are working very closely with the Americans on this. Do you find yourselves almost taking opposite roles? For instance, do you find yourselves pressing Canadian offending parties involved, to do certain things on behalf of American interests, and do you find in the American members pressing their offenders to take certain measures in order to clean up things for Canadians? Does your personnel become "denationalized"?

Mr. HEENEY: I think the answer to your last question is that we become almost completely denationalized, as I think we should. Although, if you take the St. Croix as an example, I would perhaps have a greater sensitivity about a municipality on the Canadian side, say, St. Stephen, than would the Chairman of the United States section, simply because I am a Canadian and would like to have the Canadian side of the record clean. He might have more sensitivity about Calais, which is the municipality on the other side. And, although, also, it is our practice to follow-up immediately on our own side of the river, as it were, and I take the initiative with the Canadian offenders while he takes the initiative with the United States offenders, yet we maintain our unity of actions and responsibilities. Does that answer your question?



Mr. WALKER: Yes, it does. I have just one last question. In that context, if the I.J.C. had unquestioned authority to put into effect their programs and measures, and you had the necessary budget to do this, if it involved capital expenditure, could you clean up the pollution problem much faster than the way you are doing it now?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, Mr. Chairman this would be quite contrary to the concept of the International Joint Commission which is embodied in the treaty. We have no administrative function. It would mean the establishment of the International Joint Commission—at least in some measure—as a supra-national body with authority to execute on both sides of the boundary. This, of course, would be a very radical departure from the present philosophy of the treaty.

Mr. WALKER: That is quite right, sir. You may not want to answer this; but, if that were so, in your judgment, could the pollution problem and other boundary water problems be cleaned up much faster?

Mr. HEENEY: I do not want to take refuge, Mr. Chairman, in suggesting that this is wholly a hypothetical question but I am not sure that this solution, which has been suggested in various quarters, would be as effective if it were feasible, as it would appear to be on the surface.

A number of people have made suggestions at various times that what we need, for example, is a supra-national regime for the Great Lakes basin; that some international authority, perhaps the International Joint Commission or some new authority, should be clothed with all authority with regard to all matters in the Great Lakes basin. This would be such a radical departure from our historic and traditional national position, that I find it very difficult to visualize in the present state of the world, the strength which each country continues to feel should obtain for the national authority—the national authority is involved here—and this would involve the giving up of sovereignty, on both the Canadian and American sides, to an international body. In the present state of humanity, I cannot see this on the cards, although I would like to think we were moving closer to that kind of thing.

Mr. WALKER: You do not think we can get a United Nations concept with boundary waters?

Mr. HEENEY: I do not see this in the immediate future.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is 12.30; does the Committee wish to continue, or to attend the reception?

An hon. MEMBER: Is Mr. Heeneey going to be back next week?

Mr. HEENEY: No; I am going to Sarnia next week.

The CHAIRMAN: When can you come back, Mr. Heeneey?

Mr. HEENEY: I will come back next week if the Committee insists. We have this arrangement for this visit to the Sarnia area. I can absent myself, Mr. Chairman, if that is the wish of the Committee.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): On a point of order, I wonder if we might just continue with Mr. MacIntosh and the rest can ask their questions while we have it fresh in our minds.



Mr. MACINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Heeney, I am concerned with the problem of pollution, generally, and I would ask whether, in the terms of reference to the International Joint Commission, you deal only with international waters. Is that correct?

Mr. HEENEY: Boundary waters and waters which cross the boundary.

Mr. MACINTOSH: My second assumption, I think, is wrong from a statement you made a few moments ago about the Red River, and so on. I took it for granted that the flow of water would naturally be from north to south, and that is not so, because I see you are shaking your head.

Mr. HEENEY: South to north in Manitoba.

● (12.28 p.m.)

Mr. MACINTOSH: No; but generally speaking across Canada.

Mr. HEENEY: Most rivers which cross the boundary are flowing from Canada into the United States.

Mr. MACINTOSH: From Canada to the United States.

Mr. HEENEY: I am told that this is a dubious generalization and that it might be closer to 50-50, but I am not able to answer this question. Anyway, I do know that the Red River runs north and a great many run south.

Mr. MACINTOSH: That is what made me say that my second assumption is wrong then. But you did mention government financial assistance to pollution problems. Now, you have not too many powers in order to put into effect what you believe. I wonder have you made any recommendations to the government on an extensive program to speed up these remedial recommendations that you have put forth? Pollution is a problem that has to be stopped in our fresh waters and, apparently, those on the Commission have realized this, you know the sources of it. I am thinking of industries that could be helped for relocating or changing their system of disposal.

Would it not be a good thing for your Commission to recommend to the government that, because of the pollution created by these industries, they now be given financial assistance to correct that measure?

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, we have not hitherto adopted such a course. Our practice has been to draw to the attention of the governments the situation as we find it to be and to recommend that measures, which we identify, be taken to eliminate or improve the situation. We have not, however, gone into the specifics of financial aid or subsidy or accelerated depreciation, or any of these things which have been adopted or discussed on the two sides of the line.

Perhaps we should get into this area, it is a matter that we might well consider. I would be very glad to talk this over with my colleagues. Hitherto, we have not done this. We have relied upon the state and federal governments adopting the laws and policies which they consider to be most appropriate for the achievement of the objectives we have recommended which they have accepted.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Well, can I ask you this question: In your opinion, do you think the steps now being taken by the various levels of government are holding the pollution in check or is it a very serious problem; more serious than we, as citizens of the country, believe it to be?



Mr. HEENEY: It certainly is more serious, Mr. Chairman, than most Canadians—and I think most Americans—realize. I think it would be fair to say the situation is continuing to deteriorate and that, before it can even be stopped from further deterioration, very serious and urgent measures are required. It is difficult to give a general judgment on whether the measures adopted on either side are all that they might be. Myself, I do not think they are all that they might be. This is my own opinion, and, here, I am not speaking for the International Joint Commission.

Of course, a great deal more might be done. There is a great deal of money involved in this. You referred to the relocation of industry for example, Mr. Chairman. This is a costly business and may have an important economic impact upon the employment in an area, for example, in the Rainy River area, on which I touched this morning.

The pulp and paper business in International Falls and Fort Frances is the virtual sole employer in that whole area and, therefore, the costs involved are a fact of great importance. The financial measures to be taken by governments—state, provincial and federal—are costly, if this situation is to be improved or checked in a short period of years.

Mr. MACINTOSH: I did not actually mean the relocation of industry from one area to another, but the relocation of the type of disposal they are using, which would not have any effect on the unemployment situation in one particular area.

Mr. HEENEY: No; except that it involves large capital costs which, of course, affects the profitability of the enterprise. This is the kind of difficulty industries encounter. If I am required to install new capital facilities, in order to improve the quality of the effluent from my mill, this will make my costs so great that I will not be able to continue in business. This is the kind of argument we are encountering.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Well, then, I take it that you have, as a Commission, made recommendations to your different governments with regard to this serious problem.

Mr. HEENEY: We have not recommended legislation or legislative or financial measures, but we have recommended standards to which both private and public polluters should be required to adhere. But, so far, we have not felt it our function to suggest particular legislative measures. The governments themselves on both sides of the line, are, of course, very actively considering both from the financial and legal points of view, what is the best way to deal with these situations.

Mr. MACINTOSH: In your opinion, then, it is just at a consideration stage. You have seen no active participation to eliminate the problems.

Mr. HEENEY: Yes, there have been a number of measures taken, let us say, by the province of Ontario and the federal government in relation to Ontario pollution. Certainly Ontario has made considerable progress. If I am correct, in the federal sphere there have been some tax incentives provided by way of accelerated depreciation for the installation of pollution improvement equipment, which should be of substantial importance in accelerating the improvement of industrial effluents. Then, of course, there are several sources to which



municipalities may apply for favourable loans and grants to improve their sewage treatment.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Is action taken, then, keeping abreast with the increase of the pollution of the waterways?

Mr. HEENEY: I am not, of course, an expert, but so far as I am able to answer, I would say no, the situation is continuing to deteriorate.

Mr. MACINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LIND: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Mr. Heeney a question regarding the O.W.R.C. You made a statement that they contribute \$1,500,000 to research on pollution problems. I am speaking mainly of Ontario, and, in particular, the Lake Erie Region. The federal government contributes 50 per cent of that. Is that correct?

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, the position is this: the various responsibilities in the agreed program of investigation are allotted to, first of all the appropriate federal authorities and, secondly, to the provincial authority; the attempt being to give to each entity that function which he is most competent to discharge. And I think the experts managed to do this pretty well. Ontario has undertaken a certain part of this program and that total program undertaken by Ontario, if I remember the figures I quoted, is to cost something like a million and a half dollars. The government of Canada have agreed to pay one half of that cost.

Mr. LIND: Does this include any of the costs of the sewage disposal plants constructed under the O.W.R.C.?

Mr. HEENEY: No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LIND: Now, getting back to one other point regarding the O.W.R.C., is that the only research being done in that area by the O.W.R.C. or does the government of Canada, under the auspices of fisheries, or mines or health and welfare departments do nay research in that area.

Mr. HEENEY: The answer, Mr. Chairman, is yes.

Mr. LIND: Now, as you stated earlier this present project consists of Ontario plus 5 states. What are the 5 states doing regarding the controlling of rural, urban and industrial pollution of their area of Lake Erie?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, Mr. Chairman, I would not be able to give any detailed reply, but I can say one or two things. The states vary in the intensity with which they have attacked this problem of pollution. There has been a very considerable acceleration of activity in all the states even within the past year, largely, in my opinion, as a result taken by the government of the United States under their Clean Water Act. This is an act which was passed by the Congress within the last year under which the federal authority may move in if the local authority—that is to say the state—fails, by a certain date, to fix acceptable standards for the water within their local jurisdiction. I think this has had a very beneficial effect upon the activities of the states, which have tended to vary as between the eight that are involved as riparian to the Great Lakes.

Some states have been more effective and more up to date than others, in the measures they have adopted and have been more pressing in their administration of the measures that they have on their statute books. I think Michigan has been particularly advanced in this field; they have done a lot of work here.



But I would not want to attempt to give you any detailed description of the programs that exist in the states. They vary and, I think, generally speaking, it would be true to say that those who are anxious and worried about this problem and particularly Lake Erie, which is the outstanding example of a polluted lake, are not satisfied that all that can be done is being done or at a rate which is acceptable.

Mr. LIND: Is the International Joint Commission, satisfied with the progress of the Ontario Water Resources Commission? An article appeared in the *Globe and Mail*, in which the statement that there is nothing to worry about; that the pollution of Lake Erie will be cleaned up by 1970, is attributed to the International Joint Commission.

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you could identify that statement? Did it come from the chairman of the O.W.R.C.? I saw the headline, myself and, in fact, I read the account.

Well, it is difficult for me, Mr. Chairman, to comment on a press account and, if you will forgive me, I will not do so. But I will say that I would be foolish to be satisfied with the rate of improvement in any jurisdiction with which I have come into contact, because this is a very anxious, urgent problem.

Mr. LIND: Population-wise, around Lake Erie the problem would be divided into nine parts; one part for Ontario and eight parts for the bordering states. That would be about the ratio, would it not?

Mr. HEENEY: No; I do not think that would be right. Have we got the figures on population?

Mr. LIND: Well, the population on the Canadian side is about 1,200,000 and on the American side it is about 9,000,000.

Mr. HEENEY: This is on Lake Erie?

Mr. LIND: Yes.

Mr. HEENEY: Yes; this is where the disparity is the greatest; the Lake Ontario portion is another thing again. The United States are the principal offenders on Lake Erie, of course.

Mr. LIND: What mainly concerns me, regarding the pollution of Lake Erie is, of course, that we are expected to use these lakes as sources of water supply, both for urban use and for industrial development in southern Ontario. If it is true that the phosphates going into the lake are deteriorating the oxygen content to the extent that the fish life has been changed, then this problem must be much more serious than we really think it is.

Mr. HEENEY: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the position of Lake Erie. Our scientific advisers, both Canadian and American, tell us that this situation is continuing to deteriorate; and to devise means of even stopping it where it is, is an exceedingly complicated and difficult problem. So far as I know, no wholly satisfactory method has yet been devised.

When we made our report in December recommending, as you, sir, have reminded us, that the phosphates are one of the principal offenders, we were satisfied, on the advice that we had, that phosphates were a principal, if not the principal offender, causing the growth of algae and the destruction of the oxygen in the water, with which we are familiar. But, there are probably other



elements involved in this which are also causing great difficulty and, as our studies proceed, no doubt we will get further advice on this.

But we thought the introduction of the phosphates was sufficiently identified and sufficiently serious for us to draw this, at once, to the attention of the governments.

Mr. LIND: Is this of sufficient importance that we should be urging the federal government to take a more active hand in this and bring pressure to bear on the American states to speed up this process of pollution control so that we can, in the near future, arrest it and break even?

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, it certainly is my belief and conviction that anything that can be done to accelerate the process of improvement, should be done.

One of the greatest difficulties is to determine, not only what the facts precisely are, but what should be the means of improving the situation. The scientists are not wholly decided on this, but there are some things we can do. That is why, in December, we recommended the two things about which we felt certain, namely the elimination reduction of phosphates and the cessation of the practice of having combined sewers.

Mrs. WADDS: Mr. Chairman, I am going to brief. I would like to congratulate Mr. Heeney on his exact answers.

Along the St. Lawrence, where I live, some time before this became a popular problem, we had the problem of international shipping. Has there been an increase in fines or attention paid to this area of the pollution problem since the pressures have been put on generally?

Mr. HEENEY: Yes; I think I can say that the answer to that is yes, on both sides of the line. As the traffic, of course, has increased in the St. Lawrence Seaway, too, more attention has been given to this. You are talking about refuse and pollution from ships?

Mrs. WADDS: Yes.

Mr. HEENEY: This is exceedingly difficult to police as you, I am sure, are aware. But more attention has been given to this over the past two years, during the time I have been concerned with these matters.

Mrs. WADDS: This is under the Department of Transport?

Mr. HEENEY: That is right, the Department of Transport in Canada.

Mrs. WADDS: Do the complaints just come in, willy nilly and are then dealt with or is there a definite policing being done, and, if so, has this increased?

Mr. HEENEY: I could not state on the extent and nature of policing, but there certainly is a policing. However, how extensive, or effective it is, I am afraid I am not in a position to say.

Mrs. WADDS: Therefore, you are not in a position to say whether or not this might be increased to the advantage of the overall pollution problem?

Mr. HEENEY: I am sure it would be an advantage to increase it.

Mrs. WADDS: One other question; in our area we are particularly interested in tourism. You mentioned the Champlain development. When, and by whom, was that instigated, and do tourism and pleasure traffic come into the considerations of this development?



Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, to answer Mrs. Wadds' second question first; certainly, recreation—that is our general heading for tourism and so forth—certainly was a consideration in the examination by the board of the possibilities of the Champlain waterway. Nowadays, this is becoming rather “big”, as they say, and the benefits to be derived from recreational development, such as boating, swimming, all that kind of thing, is becoming something of great importance—a direct financial advantage. This was weighed and considered.

On the former question; which had to do with where the activity in favour of the Champlain waterway developed, this is quite an old story. This is the second report the Commission have made on the Champlain waterway possibilities, both on the United States and the Canadian side. The principal interest on the Canadian side derives from the valley of the Richelieu, Sorel, St. Jean and the right of way leading to the mouth of Lake Champlain; those areas which looked forward to the possibility of ocean-going vessels travelling within their areas and improving industrial possibilities, and so forth.

On the American side, not so much in the area of Lake Champlain, although there was some support there, but on the upper Hudson river, by those who are interested in the port of New York and the short way from New York to Montreal.

Mrs. WADDS: When was the first report made?

Mr. HEENEY: Nineteen thirty-eight.

Mrs. WADDS: Nineteen thirty-eight; and is it up to the municipalities in the areas along this route, to continue to put on pressure from the recreation and tourist angle?

Mr. HEENEY: Well, the interest really goes beyond municipalities. As we can see the recreational possibilities now, certainly provincial and state government are becoming very active with regard to recreation because they see the possibilities of improvement, not only for the local area, but for the larger jurisdiction.

Mr. FOREST: I will be very brief. Mr. Heeneey, in the province of Quebec besides Lake Champlain and Lake Memphremagog, would there be any other rivers or lakes that would fall under the jurisdiction of the International Joint Commission?

Mr. HEENEY: The upper waters of the Saint John?

Mr. FOREST: The St. Jean River.

Mr. HEENEY: Yes; which crosses the boundary below Rivière du Loup—around there somewhere?

Mr. FOREST: There were no special studies made or contemplated for, say, Lake Memphremagog?

Mr. HEENEY: No. Lake Memphremagog straddles the boundary at the south end as you know.

Mr. FOREST: It is in my riding, I know.

Mr. HEENEY: It is a very nice place to have in your riding.

An hon. MEMBER: Roughly how many waterways across Canada come under your jurisdiction, Mr. Heeneey—100?



Mr. HEENEY: Well, we have 80 dockets, I can remember that. But this does not mean that, in the event of a dispute, there are not others which could be put under our jurisdiction, should the governments decide to do so. There has to be a dispute or a difference of opinion before an investigation is made.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Item 40 carry?

Mr. COWAN: Mr. Chairman, I came to the first meeting of this Committee and told you I wanted to be present when the I.J.C. were here. I was out at the last meeting but you said I would be advised of when the I.J.C. were to be present. I found out today that the hearing was on. I have a few questions I would like to ask.

Could the witness supply us with a table showing the high and low figures that have been set by this international joint St. Lawrence board of control for the level of Lake Ontario? I know that it has only been in effect for about six or seven years so it should not be too hard to supply the table and the dates on which these figures are varied. I do not know the exact figures but sometimes it is running at something like 241 feet low and 246 feet high, then eight months later, it has changed to 240 feet low and 245 feet high.

Mr. HEENEY: The range of stage—I am speaking from memory and I hope my memory will be corrected—is from 242 feet to 246 feet approximately during the navigation season, Mr. Chairman, and that we attempt to maintain. I could certainly get that table for you and would be glad to.

Mr. COWAN: I want it from the time it was started and then each time it was altered.

Mr. HEENEY: It has never been altered. The range of stage has never been changed, but it has not always been possible to maintain it. But, what I think the questioner would actually like, Mr. Chairman, is the actual figure.

Mr. COWAN: Well, I am putting a question. I happen to know that there have been three different changes on it. For instance, one thing has been called—going from memory—1958 (c), and another one has been called 1958-2 (D) or something like that. There have been changes.

Mr. HEENEY: I misunderstood. The plans of regulation, to which reference has been made, had to do primarily with the flows. My recollection is that the range of stage provided for in the order of approval is a fixed range which, as a criterion, has not varied since the order of approval was made. Am I not correct?

Mr. COWAN: Then put in the accepted figures of the rate of flows as well, in answer to my question.

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, could I inquire how long back—

Mr. COWAN: It only goes back to 1958 when—

Mr. HEENEY: You would like the figures for the flows per month, let us say?

Mr. COWAN: What ever time you set.

Mr. HEENEY: I just want to be perfectly clear on what I may have to produce. I take it you would like the monthly figures on flows, from the time regulation commenced under the order of approval, of course; a monthly average, or something like that over the period of the years. And also the levels of Lake Ontario during that same period?



Mr. COWAN: That is right.

Mr. HEENEY: If I understand you correctly, this, I think, would give you the information you wanted.

Mr. COWAN: Another question I wanted to ask is this; does your authority or jurisdiction extend over the St. Lawrence river, where it has Quebec on both sides, or does it end at the international border?

Mr. HEENEY: It ends at the international boundary, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COWAN: I raise that question simply because you make mention of the Red River, and I think, in answer to Mr. MacIntosh, you said you were interested in the water which came across the border into the Red River.

Mr. HEENEY: Mr. Chairman, we have jurisdiction over two types of rivers. One, the boundary waters, that is to say, those that constitute the boundary or through which the boundary runs, and also the waters which cross the boundary. The Red River comes under the latter category, running from the United States into Canada. It is that, which gives us jurisdiction there.

Mr. COWAN: Do you have jurisdiction over the Red River in Manitoba?

Mr. HEENEY: No; sir.

Mr. COWAN: Well, where is your jurisdiction—on the invisible line?

Mr. HEENEY: It is the invisible line, if you like, yes. It is in relation to the crossing of the boundary that we have jurisdiction. The particular reference given to us on the Red River has to do with pollution moving from upper waters into the lower waters.

Mr. COWAN: The point on which I am endeavouring to get some facts is this, and I am talking about moving east. You are quite interested in the pollution of that water as it moves into the St. Lawrence River at Cornwall, between the two Quebec sides.

Mr. HEENEY: Well, we are interested, if that is the word, Mr. Chairman, in pollution in the international section, which, of course, affects the national section.

Mr. COWAN: Up to Cornwall.

Mr. HEENEY: Yes.

Mr. COWAN: The International Joint Commission is interested in the question of pollution in the water of the St. Lawrence up to Cornwall.

Mr. HEENEY: Yes.

Mr. COWAN: But after it gets into the two Quebec borders, you do not care whether or not Montreal dumps all its sewage in there. Yet you want the water to be clean when it goes into Quebec.

Mr. HEENEY: I have no right to be concerned, but, as a Canadian, I am very much concerned.

Mr. COWAN: That is a very fine answer; I appreciate that answer very, very much. These were all the questions I wanted to ask.

Mr. HEENEY: There is one other question if I might volunteer an observation, Mr. Chairman, which is perhaps relevant to what has been asked.



At an earlier stage, I mentioned the Montreal harbour as being an interest of the International Joint Commission. It is not a direct responsibility of the International Commission, but the International Joint Commission, in its examination of this levels and flows problem on the St. Lawrence, have agreed—need less to say at the urging of the Canadian members of the Commission—that the level of the harbour of Montreal, as a great international port, is an interest of ours, if not, strictly within our legal jurisdiction. And that, in our regulation of the international river, we should do everything possible to maintain the level of the Montreal harbour at an acceptable level, from the point of view of navigation, provided this can be done without harm to those interests for whom, of course, we have a legal responsibility. That is of some relevance to what you were saying.

Mr. COWAN: What about maintaining the level of Lake Ontario, which is a direct responsibility.

● (1.00 p.m.)

Mr. HEENEY: This is something to which the International Joint Commission gives very first attention.

Mr. COWAN: It gives very first attention?

Mr. HEENEY: First attention.

Mr. COWAN: Myself, I thought it was Montreal harbour.

Mr. HEENEY: No; I would not accept that for one second.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Item No. 40 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Carried.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Committee, I wish to thank Mr. Heeneey for his kind co-operation and I wish him bon voyage to Sarnia.

Mr. HEENEY: Thank you, as usual, it was a pleasure and a privilege.

The CHAIRMAN: Meeting adjourned.

Respectfully

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary; J. A. Hays, Administrative Services Division; B. A. Kalla, Administrative Department Unit, Department of External Affairs.

HOWE DEPARTMENTAL PRESS

QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF PRINTING

OTTAWA, 1966

At an earlier stage I mentioned the Montreal International Joint Commission. It is not a direct responsibility of the International Joint Commission, but the International Joint Commission in its examination of this problem on the St. Lawrence have agreed—need—need—need—their role is to assist the members of the Commission. The level of the harbor of Montreal as a great international port is an interest of ours if not strictly within our legal jurisdiction. And that is our obligation of the International Joint Commission. We should be everything possible to maintain the level of the Montreal harbor at an acceptable level from the point of view of navigation. This can be done without harm to those interests for whom, of course, we have a legal responsibility. That is of some relevance to what you were saying.

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF MINUTES  
OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE**

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**LÉON-J. RAYMOND,**  
*The Clerk of the House.*



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 8

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THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1966

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Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

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WITNESSES:

B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary; J. A. Irwin, Administrative Services Division; B. A. Keith, Administrative Improvement Unit, Department of External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                                    |                      |                  |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                       | Mr. Harkness,        | Mr. Pelletier,   |
| Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ), | Mr. Klein,           | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Brewin,                        | Mr. Laprise,         | Mr. Régimbal,    |
| Mr. Churchill,                     | Mr. Lind,            | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Faulkner,                      | Mr. Macdonald        | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Forest,                        | ( <i>Rosedale</i> ), | Mrs. Wadds,      |
| Mr. Foy,                           | Mr. Macquarrie,      | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Groos,                         | Mr. McIntosh,        |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESSES:

B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary; J. A. Irwin, Administrative Services Division; R. A. Keith, Administrative Improvement Unit, Department of External Affairs.



ORDER OF REFERENCE

MONDAY, June 6, 1966.

*Ordered.*—That the name of Mr. Brewin be substituted for that of Mrs. MacInnis on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

*Attest.*

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,

*The Clerk of the House.*

ORDER OF REFERENCE

MONDAY, June 6, 1966

Ordered.—That the name of Mr. Brewin be substituted for that of Mr. MacInnis on the Standing Committee of Finance and Administration.

Chairman: Mr. Jean-François Dubé

Mr. W. B. Nathan, Chairman  
The Clerk of the House

- |                        |                            |                 |
|------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Mr. Allard             | Mr. Barkness               | Mr. Pelletier   |
| Mr. Asselin (Chairman) | Mr. Klein                  | Mr. Pilon       |
| Mr. Brien              | Mr. Laprade                | Mr. Régimbal    |
| Mr. Churchill          | Mr. Liot                   | Mr. Stanbury    |
| Mr. Faulkner           | Mr. Macdonald<br>(Reserve) | Mr. Thompson    |
| Mr. Forest             | Mr. Macquarrie             | Mrs. Wadda      |
| Mr. Foy                | Mr. McInnis                | Mr. Walker—(24) |
| Mr. Groves             |                            |                 |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 9, 1966.

(9)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11:10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Mrs. Wadds and Messrs. Allmand, Asselin (Charlevoix), Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Foy, Groos, Harkness, Klein, Laprise, Lind, Macdonald (Rosedale), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Pilon, Regimbal, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (22).

*In attendance:* From the Department of External Affairs: Messrs. B. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary; A. J. Matheson, Finance Division; F. M. Tovell, Personnel Services Division; J. A. Irwin, Administrative Services Division; B. A. Keith, Administrative Improvement Unit.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs for the fiscal year 1966-67.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Williams, who then made a statement on the administration of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Williams, Mr. Irwin and Mr. Keith were questioned.

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

Items 5, 10 and 15 were severally carried.

At 1:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Thursday, June 9, 1966

(2)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11:10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Duce, presiding.

Members present: Mr. Wadda and Messrs. Allmand, Asselin (Charlevoix), Brawin, Churchill, Duce, Faulkner, Forst, Gross, Hartness, Klein, Lapsley, Lind, MacDonald (Rosdale), Macdonnell, McIntosh, Pilon, Resimbal, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker (22).

In attendance: From the Department of External Affairs: Messrs. R. M. Williams, Assistant Under-Secretary; A. J. Matheson, Finance Division; F. M. Tovell, Personnel Services Division; I. A. Irwin, Administrative Services Division; B. A. Keith, Administrative Improvement Unit.

The Committee resumed consideration of item 1 of the Minutes of the Department of External Affairs for the fiscal year 1966-67.

The Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Williams, who then made a statement on the administration of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. Williams, Mr. Irwin and Mr. Keith were questioned.

Item 1 was allowed to stand.

Items 2, 10 and 12 were severally carried.

At 1:05 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, 9 June 1966.

● (11.00 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. We have a quorum. Mrs. Wadds, gentlemen, we are resuming this morning with consideration of item 1 of the estimates, and we have with us Mr. B. M. Williams, who is Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs for Administration. Mr. Williams will have a statement and he will answer questions based on his statement. Afterwards we shall deal with the items as they appear on the estimates except for item 1. You may ask questions on item 1, but this item will not be disposed of this morning because we still have to hear from the Secretary of State.

Mr. B. M. WILLIAMS (*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*): Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I think I should first express the regret of the Under-Secretary, Mr. Cadieux, in not being able to be here this morning. Mr. Cadieux is in Brussels with the Minister, and he will be returning either later today or tomorrow. I would, however, like to make the comments which the Under-Secretary had hoped to make and if you will bear with me I will try to be as brief as possible.

We welcome the opportunity of joining with you in an examination of the work of the Department of External Affairs. I am at the disposal of the Committee in providing information as required but I thought it might be of interest if I were to start with a brief statement on the administrative organization of the Foreign Service. While international developments and events often attract public attention, as does the nature of Canadian involvement in the world scene, there is less awareness of the extent to which a sound administrative organization must exist if the Foreign Service is to operate effectively in implementing the foreign policies of the Canadian Government. The costs of good administration run high but they must be met if the Department is to carry out the responsibilities assigned to it by Parliament.

Let us consider how the Department of External Affairs is organized for its work, particularly in terms of administration. We have endeavoured to bring about a number of improvements in administration within the past two years and I shall give them special attention.

At headquarters we are divided into 29 divisions and service units. These include 8 political divisions and 11 functional divisions. There are 7 administrative divisions: Administrative Services, Communications, Finance, Personnel Operations, Personnel Services, Registry and Supplies and Properties. In addition, we have 3 special units — the Administrative Improvement Unit, the Organization and Methods Unit and the Inspection Service.

### *Policy Direction*

Policy direction for all of the divisions and units is provided at the senior management level by a policy group chaired by the Under-Secretary and consisting of the Deputy

Under-Secretary and four Assistant Under-Secretaries. The various divisions report to them and to the Under-Secretary in accordance with a logical grouping of responsibilities and also taking into account the special experience and qualifications of the Assistant Under-Secretaries concerned. The administrative divisions and special units I mentioned earlier are co-ordinated by an Assistant Under-Secretary and at the present time this is my principal responsibility.

The administrative workload is influenced not just by the total strength of the Department at home and abroad but by the size and the dispersal of our overseas posts where our officers and staff members are serving. To provide all the necessary housekeeping and support services along with the required links and liaison with our network of posts is a major undertaking. An up-to-date listing of the diplomatic missions is to be found at page 103 of the Blue Book of Estimates, and the consulates are at page 108. Included in these lists are 63 diplomatic missions and 18 consulates. In addition, we have 3 international supervisory commissions in the Indo-China countries, bringing the total to 84 posts.

Included in this list is the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa which was opened very recently. It is one of the new African posts authorized by the government. The second will be in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, where an advance party has been active since January. The third will be in Tunis, where an advance group is expected to arrive late this summer. It has also been announced that a resident Canadian High Commissioner will be appointed to Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, which is important as a newly independent commonwealth country in Africa. If we add these three proposed posts to the printed list in the estimates book, the total becomes 87. I mention this figure to give some impression of the magnitude of our administrative requirements.

In addition to the resident missions there are also 31 countries with which Canada has exchanged diplomatic representatives to the extent of accrediting to the government concerned a Canadian representative who is resident elsewhere. These non-resident posts involve us in a good deal of administrative requirements although, of course, not as much as do the resident missions.

As I mentioned, within the past two years we have made a consistent effort to improve the administration. It has been an endeavour in which all of the administrative divisions and special units have been involved and one in which we have also been assisted by the staff of the Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission and in certain respects by outside agencies. I might explain at this point why we undertook a determined drive for administrative improvement. A primary reason was the increased involvement of Canada in world affairs and the resulting need of a stronger and more extensive foreign service. Over the years overseas missions had been added and the Foreign Service Officer strength had been increased but there had not been a parallel strengthening of the administrative structure. We had found it necessary to give priority to operational requirements.

In early 1964, there were several indications of the need for change. First, there was recognition within the Department that improvements and modernization were needed if we were to handle our increased workload. Second, the Glassco Commission had issued a report on the Department of External Affairs which had been helpful in pointing out some of the broad measures that could be taken. Third, major developments were taking place within the government service which had implications for us. These included conversion of staff classifications in preparation for collective bargaining, delegation to



departments of increased financial authority, and management improvement generally in a number of fields.

We launched an administrative improvement programme in March, 1964. For this purpose we formed an administrative improvement unit under the direction of a senior officer, to co-ordinate the programme and develop co-operation with other departments and with outside organizations. For the first seven months of this period we benefited from the assistance of a firm of management consultants — Urwick, Currie of Toronto. The consultants were asked to identify weaknesses of administration in the Department and to propose means of correcting them; to recommend an appropriate organizational structure; to assist in the development of a personnel programme; to make proposals on the personnel resources required for good administration and to provide a detailed programme for an organization and methods unit. It was agreed that the consultants would confine themselves to headquarters administration matters and specifically to the responsibilities related to Personnel, Administrative Services, Supplies and Properties, and Registry Divisions.

Subsequent to the completion by the consultants of a number of reports in these fields, the Department, with the co-operation of the central agencies, has carried on a programme of implementation. The results have been gratifying. The process of administrative improvement, both on the basis of the studies by the consultants and on the strength of the Department's own analysis of problems, is continuing. Three officers and other staff members were hired to constitute an Organization and Methods Unit which devotes itself to the improvement of the Department's management techniques and operating procedures. Cooperation of the Civil Service Commission has been obtained in making a study of departmental organization, which is still going on, and the Treasury Board staff are giving assistance in determining the implications for External Affairs of the financial management concepts advocated by the Glassco Commission.

I think we must, for a long time, continue to strive for increased effectiveness and efficiency, together with economy. We are endeavouring to maintain a management review system on a continuing basis so that our administrative capabilities will be kept equal to the task at all times, whatever the future growth rate or special requirements might be. Our operational needs had been so pressing that for a period we could not spare any officers to staff the Inspection Service. However, we have got it started again by the recent appointment of an Inspector General in the person of a senior officer who has had extensive experience in management positions at home and as an ambassador abroad. While the main job of the Inspection Unit will be overseas inspection work, we will ask it to assume certain headquarters' responsibilities to help us ensure that the Department is adequately staffed and organized.

I pause here to examine with you some of the reasons why administration is onerous and complex in a foreign service. We cannot operate in quite the same way as does a department whose concerns are largely confined to Ottawa. We have all the normal problems of an Ottawa department, that is recruitment of staff, maintenance of proper working conditions and equipment, and all the problems of internal communication, of preparation of documents, of co-ordination of policy and procedures. Our main business however is conducted in all parts of the world and we must have an administrative system that will look after this widely dispersed organization. To fulfil obligations and responsibilities of Canada's foreign policy we must have missions in a great many countries and special agencies at the headquarters of international organizations.



What is required to set up and maintain these overseas posts? Well, when you start listing administrative problems that arise when a decision is made to open a new post, you can go on for some time. The first need is for people to staff the mission and this means we must have a recruiting and training system that will enable us to have available people of the right levels of experience and capability to represent Canada abroad and to carry out policies of the Canadian Government in foreign countries and in international organizations. These field officers perform a wide variety of duties and we must have people to handle a variety of responsibilities. There are the senior people with diplomatic rank ranging from an ambassador with a lifetime of career experience behind him down to the third secretary who is likely to be a university graduate with one or two years service at headquarters. There are also External Affairs officers who do information work, consular and administrative work. There are communicators and security guards, clerks and stenographers. There are also sometimes members of other government departments for whom External Affairs must provide office accommodation and general administrative support at an overseas mission.

Next, we must have buildings and in this respect we usually start by renting business offices, an official residence for the Head of Mission and a variety of housing for staff members. We have a property acquisition programme under which we buy and sometimes construct buildings for these purposes. The problems of accommodation are often urgent and usually difficult.

Related to these requirements is the question of the conditions of service under which our staff members operate; we must make sure that they can live in health, comfort and decency and that their families can lead a life that is satisfactory. Inevitably it is going to be a quite different life and sometimes a much more difficult one than they enjoy here in Ottawa. We must, through special allowances and other arrangements, make sure that there is an opportunity for the children of our employees abroad to obtain adequate education—a matter that is more pressing as the average age of the children increases and educational standards go up. Our diplomatic personnel are required, if they are to do their job well, to receive in their homes officials and important citizens of the host country. We must ensure through the foreign service regulations that it is financially possible for them to do so. At a great many posts in the world, medical problems are severe and we must give attention to health matters to the extent that a department whose employees were in Ottawa would never dream of doing. We must also concern ourselves with those who have suffered disabilities through adverse health risks, particularly relating to tropical diseases. In some areas, we must make special arrangements to ensure that people can get out of the post for a vacation period each year to break the monotony of restrictive conditions or to alleviate the oppressiveness of climatic conditions.

We are aware that in making special provisions to support the people in our overseas missions, we are fulfilling certain broad objectives of the Canadian Government. In regard to housing, for instance, it is in the government's interest to get its employees housed without delay, so that they can devote themselves to their official duties; to place them in accommodation that is secure and satisfactory so that working efficiency will not be impaired and to ensure that officer accommodation is suitable for receiving guests so that proper contacts and relationships can be established.

We must attend to all of these things in a way that will strengthen morale. In other words, we must meet the need and also reassure our employees that the Canadian Govern-



ment is fully behind them in the important work they are doing. The regulations must be so administered that the employees concerned will be well disposed towards their employer and will be buoyed up by the knowledge that their endeavours are given tangible support and are appreciated. We need to look beyond the financial implications in examining the allowance arrangements and to focus attention on the personnel policy considerations. This requirement is not more valid today than in the past, but it is certainly more pressing in these days when the Department of External Affairs is in competition with other agencies, both public and private, for the kind of employee that is best qualified to serve his country in foreign posts. Without good policies in this field, we will not be able to attract and keep the high calibre of people whom we want to have at our posts abroad. We must be sure that all their normal needs are met and that the total situation in which they find themselves is sufficiently attractive to encourage them to take a succession of postings and to stay in the foreign service as a lifetime career. It is an interesting life for them and their families, but often a most difficult one. It is one that is hard on family relationships, on emotional stability and on the ability of the employee and his family to find their true identity and build a satisfactory existence. We feel that those in charge should be constantly aware of the direct relationship between the conditions of service abroad and the readiness of an employee to accept foreign assignment. The Department must try to implement arrangements that will induce employees to undertake tours of duty at difficult and unhealthy posts and to devote their lives to a series of overseas engagements.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my general remarks on the organization of the Department with particular reference to administration.

● (11.30 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Williams. Now Mr. Williams will answer all questions relating to his statement; that is, questions dealing with administration, of course, not questions on policy. Once we have finished with these broad questions we can tackle the items one by one. I recognize Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, if I may. You mention a consultant's report, Mr. Williams. Have all the major recommendations been acceptable? Are there others still to be put into effect?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I think the short answer is yes, all the recommendations were acceptable and have been implemented. The Urwick, Currie firm reviewed our personnel and our supplies and properties work. With respect to supplies and property, I am oversimplifying it, Mr. Walker, but they said, "You need more technical staff." "The day of the enthusiastic amateur is over; you need some engineers, people with broad experience in property management, you need some more interior decorators, you need people who know purchasing methods and so on."

They recommended an increase in staff for our supplies and properties of 13. We have recruited in the last year all of the people recommended for supplies and properties. You know, one keeps talking about a take-off point. I think we are at the point of being able to take off now and do a lot of the things in the supplies and properties field which everyone has wanted us to do in the past.

On the personnel side, they recommended a split of the personnel function. We have tended in the past to lump together, if I may put it this way, bodies and positions. What we have done now is split our personnel division. Personnel operations division is concerned with bodies, the recruitment, the promotion, the transfer, and eventually the



retirement of employees of the Department. Our personnel services division is much as the name implies, a service division for personnel. It looks after our locally engaged staff; it prepares the recommendations each year for the establishment of new positions; in sum anything that has to do with a service for personnel is done in that division.

Mr. WALKER: In connection with personnel, do you ever employ local people at an embassy, or is this outside policy?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No. We have, I believe, 667 locally engaged personnel at the present time.

Mr. WALKER: Do they come to Ottawa for training?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Not at all. They are drivers, junior clerical personnel etc. and some people working as household staff for a head of mission.

Mr. WALKER: And this is pleasing to the country you are operating in?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I think it is satisfactory; we have had no difficulties. It would be much more expensive if we had to send all our personnel from Ottawa. There are a whole series of tasks at a mission abroad which can quite nicely be handled by what we call locally engaged personnel.

Mr. WALKER: Balanced against that, of course, is the purely Canadian look of a Canadian installation in one of these other countries. You do not get overloaded, or do you get overloaded in numbers?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I do not think so, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER: I am not talking in terms of policy now; I am talking of appearance.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I think it would be very difficult for anyone to mistake a Canadian office other than being a Canadian office, but this does not mean you can go into any Canadian mission abroad and not find a few nationals of the country employed there. I think on average they represent probably 10 per cent of the staff of any mission.

Mr. WALKER: I do not want to take too much time on this, but what is the purpose of employing even 10 per cent of local people?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would say essentially it is economy.

Mr. WALKER: It is economy?

Mr. WILLIAMS: If we had to provide another 700 or 800 people from Ottawa we would have to pay them at prevailing rates of pay in Canada for that type of work. We would have to move them; we would have to bring them back; we would have to pay them allowances, and all in all it would be much more expensive.

I think there is another factor, Mr. Walker, and that is language. If I may speak personally for a minute, my last post was Turkey. Now I spent some time trying to learn Turkish, but in the short time I was there I did not become fluent in any fashion with Turkish. However, we could not have operated that mission without interpreters and translators, for instance. We could not operate without a Turkish driver, not that he drove any better or any worse than the rest of us, but it was very useful to have him.



Mr. WALKER: He knew his way around.

Mr. WILLIAMS: But there are jobs at a certain level in our posts abroad which could be filled by young Canadians without giving them extensive two year training programs, except for the costs involved. For instance, Canada House in London each year, during the summer, employs a few students principally in the public reception rooms where they can handle inquiries.

Mr. WALKER: I would like to ask another question, if I may. Did you get the air mail problem settled about getting information over to the various embassies? I have not been around to too many, but the ones I have visited the immediate question was, "What is going on in Canada; what is going on in the House?" I told them to read *Hansard*, and I was told, "By the time we get *Hansard* it is like a slow boat to China". This seemed to me like pretty poor economy. Is this type of thing now going by surface mail?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Walker, I would like to say that I believe we are improving in this area. *Hansard*, for instance, is sent daily by air mail.

Mr. WALKER: It is sent daily by air mail?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes, to a number of posts. We have the C.B.C. ten o'clock news which is sent from Toronto shortly after ten o'clock by air to our communication centre. We then send the news out to five of the posts which are on what we call a direct line, and those posts in turn air mail the C.B.C. news summary to a series of different posts.

Mr. HARKNESS: I wonder if I may ask a supplementary. Where are those five places to which you have telecommunications?

Mr. WILLIAMS: The five are New York, Washington, London, Paris and Geneva. I think too that Rome has now been added. If I might say so, Mr. Harkness, we got the C.B.C. news summary in Turkey by air mail from Rome. It would cost a great deal of money to provide every Canadian post with these news summaries daily by wire. What we are doing now is not 100 per cent satisfactory, but I think any other system would cost us just too much. I believe one estimate was that it would cost on average \$22,000 a year per post.

Mr. HARKNESS: Per post?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Per post, yes.

Mr. WALKER: For air mail.

Mr. WILLIAMS: For communications.

Mr. WALKER: All right. I just want to get this clear. I know that *Hansard* is not the finest reading in the world, but it is better than some of the newspapers I have read lately. All our posts get *Hansard* by air mail?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Twenty-two of the larger ones.

Mr. WALKER: How many does that leave that do not get it.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Let us say 62 approximately.

Mr. WALKER: It is a smaller number then. And yet oddly enough I think it is the



smaller ones which feel more left out. I do not know what the cost would be, but it is nothing like \$22,000. For these people in the far-flung outposts who feel cut off, even that would touch home.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I agree with you, Mr. Walker.

Mr. GROOS: I would like to make a supplementary comment here with regard to just straight Canadian news apart from press news. This has been brought up in the House; it has been mentioned in the Defence Committee, that when you go abroad it is very difficult to find out what is going on at home. When you go into a Canadian embassy waiting room it is like going into a dentist's office, the material is all out of date. I know that when Canadians are abroad they naturally want to find out what is going on in Canada; they go to the Canadian embassy, and they are upset when they cannot find anything that is less than three weeks old. I think there is a great necessity to see that air mail editions of some of the newspapers from this country are sent to all of our embassies every day.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I think, Mr. Groos, you will find that almost everyone in the foreign service will agree with what you have said. This has been my own experience. We provide all missions with the first six pages of *Le Devoir* and pages 1, 2, 5 and 8 of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*. These are sent daily by air mail. This is a minimum service.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): To all of them?

Mr. WILLIAMS: To all 84 posts.

Mr. GROOS: Would it be a great expense to—

The CHAIRMAN: I do not like to cut you off, but I allowed one supplementary and after that it reverts to Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER: After those supplementaries I will not have to ask any more. Concerning voting rights and franchise for our foreign service, do you, as a department, make representations on behalf of those employees.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes, we have. I believe the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections had an amendment under consideration in 1963 which I think would have met the particular problem. For a variety of reasons the amendment was not considered, and I think that again, we all hope an arrangement will be made which will permit us, in due course, to vote.

I regret that I am not an expert on this, but I believe one of the problems is whether to try to provide for all Canadians or just those employed by the Government of Canada. I think the other problem is whether to move toward some form of a permanent voters' list on which employees of the Canadian Government abroad can be included. We have been concerned about this matter. I think the Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections is anxious to do something. The former chief electoral officer was interested in drafting such an amendment. This is not a matter that we of the Department have anything to do with, other than to express our hope that we will have the vote.

Mr. WALKER: You have some definite recommendations, though have you not?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Walker, I would not like to answer that because I do not know.

Mr. WALKER: I see. All right. There are two other things. With respect to staff short-



ages in some of the major posts, certainly above the clerk's level, how long does it take to get suitable people to fill these posts? Are there empty posts at the present time which should be filled?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would say we have no posts which are not filled at the present time. We have a number of posts that are understaffed, if I may put it that way. I am talking about our short fall of personnel within the Department which is very close to 400; that is 400 on 2900 positions, we are roughly 400 short. You may ask where are we 400 short? We are 400 short in two, three or four large sectors. For example in the foreign service officer group at the present time I believe we have a shortage of approximately 67. However, between now and the end of September we hope, as a result of the competitions last year, to bring in 52 to 55 new foreign service officers, and I believe this represents the largest number of foreign service officers we have ever brought into the Department in one year.

We will always have vacancies in the foreign service officer group because basically we tie our recruiting to the university year. Assuming we bring all our young officers in during the summer, as we hope to do, and we fill all our positions, we are bound to have a short fall because of retirements, deaths or separations of one kind or another, and we really would not be able to fill those until we run the current competition this fall to attract the young university students who will be graduating next year. We always have some foreign service officer vacancies.

We have a large number of vacancies for stenographers. I am not competent to speak about the shortages in other Government departments, because I just do not know. My guess is though that there is a general shortage of stenographers in the Government service.

Mr. WALKER: Would you not tie these stenographic jobs into university training?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Not particularly, no. We are on the open market for our stenographers. We have recently reduced the age limit. At one time, some years ago, we insisted on stenographers being of 23 years of age before we would recruit them. We then dropped it down to 21 and we have now dropped it below 21.

Mr. WALKER: What is the age now?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I believe it is nineteen. For instance, there are a lot of girls who, for a variety of reasons, do not want to leave Canada. All our stenographers, by and large, are rotational. We bring them to Ottawa; they serve in Ottawa for a short period and then they go abroad.

Mr. REGIMBAL: How long is their assignment when they do go abroad?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Regimbal, it depends on the post. Our posts are classified into either three and a half year, two and a half year, or two year posts. I am speaking very generally here. We have many girls who come into the Department as stenographers and after one posting they decide they have had enough and they leave us. We have other girls who go to a three and a half year post and, for a variety of reasons, they find three and a half years is just too long.

I think it is quite true that everyone does not adjust well to conditions abroad. I think a lot of girls find this unsettling. Then I think there are a large number of people who



prefer to remain here and work in Ottawa. I am not at all optimistic that we will ever be able to keep our stenographic strength up to the maximum.

Another large group of shortages we have is to be found in our communications division. These are both communicators and technicians, and this is a specialized field. By and large we have relied on the armed services to fill our vacancies through the retirement of their personnel. We have been able to recruit them and bring them into the Department into communications work. Sometimes we are able to get people who have had experience with the Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Telegraphs. I am assured by our Director of Communications that communicators are in short supply in Canada, and that it will take some time before we are able to meet our continuing need for communicators and technicians.

We also are short of security guards. This is not necessarily a specialized field by any means, but we are looking for a certain type of person and it takes a little time in terms of selection. Then, we are always short a few locally engaged people. This is inevitable.

I think our short fall on personnel is unfortunate. However, we recently recruited a very able personnel recruiting officer through the Civil Service Commission and he has taken on this job of trying to fill the vacancies in co-operation with the Civil Service Commission. We are optimistic we will be able to do much better than we have done in the past.

Mr. WALKER: Does the Civil Service Commission fill these positions for you?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes.

Mr. WALKER: You do not feel there is any relationship between the short fall of 400 and maybe unnecessarily high academic standards? I use the phrase "unnecessarily high academic standards" in relation to the job.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would not say the standards are too high for our stenographic and clerical grades, Mr. Walker. With respect to foreign service officers, we had over 500 candidates last year entering the foreign service officer competition. We are taking, as an estimate, about 55 of them. I think a figure of 500 is a good record of young Canadians who are interested in coming into the foreign service.

Mr. WALKER: I just have one more question here with regard to furnishings. Is there standard equipment in all these offices, or is there any room for initiative on the part of the local representative? Do we have distinctive Canadian furnishings, or does the man just go out and buy on the local market? I am trying to determine whether there is any attempt to create the impression that when you walk in the door of a post you feel that it is definitely a Canadian installation, wherever it is. I have been in some and I really did not think ours looked any different than any other office.

Mr. WILLIAMS: We are in the hands of the Chairman. This would be under vote 10, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER: Well, I thought we were just talking generally, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: That question comes specifically under vote 10, and in that case we had better wait.

Mr. WALKER: All right. One other thing if I may.



The CHAIRMAN: You have had 25 minutes, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER: All right, I will be through in a minute. I am probably eliminating a lot of other questions.

Do you consider that our posts abroad are listening posts, or is there scope for our local representative to be a promoter? In other words, is it his job to represent Canada in that country, or represent that country to Canada? Are we weighted on one side in this matter, or is there a balance. I am thinking now about policy.

Mr. WILLIAMS: If you are going to talk about policy, Mr. Walker, I think I will have to withdraw from this subject. A good representative, I believe, is one who projects his country in every possible fashion. I think he will also try to do his best for the country in which he is resident, to develop that country's relations with Canada. It is a two-way street.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Committee very much, and I will not say another word.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Oh, oh.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Walker. Mr. McIntosh, you are next.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I have only two major questions and Mr. Walker has covered one of them quite well. The question I have in mind is improvement for the foreign service. Do you have any difficulties, other than what you have related, in recruiting university graduates and, if so, what direction do you give to collegiate students to go into the foreign service? Do you lay down requirements for the different classifications that you have difficulty in filling. Is there any liaison between the Department of External Affairs and perhaps a guidance counsellor at the university? I am thinking of young people, the adventurous type, who have had ideas they would like to go into the foreign service. What encouragement do you give that type of person?

Mr. WILLIAMS: We visit most of the Canadian campuses; I would not say all because there may be the occasional university or college that we miss. However, generally each year we have officers of the Department visiting the various universities, talking with the guidance counsellors, talking with individual members of the faculty, trying to persuade them to encourage young Canadians to join the foreign service. I do not think we have ever done very much with high schools, or secondary schools as such.

Mr. MCINTOSH: The reason I asked that question is that they have to determine when they go to university which classes they will take. Now, have you any special requirements other than the ordinary degrees which they do get at university; for instance languages?

Mr. WILLIAMS: We say we prefer people who are graduates in political science, economics, history or law. We also prefer to get candidates who have done some graduate work. Ideally, we would like the most highly qualified people, in academic terms, that we could find. However, the competition is very keen today and while I think we have our fair share, certainly the universities are cutting in very considerably into the reservoir of available people.

There is also the question of finding people with specialized language skills. This is not always possible, but from time to time we are able to get candidates with the desired

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qualifications. On the other hand, I would say we have been very catholic in the people we have taken in. We have officers in the Department who are graduates of agricultural colleges, officers who are scientists, and others who are graduates in maths and physics. We had a young officer come in two years ago who is an electrical engineer by profession, and has done graduate work in economics. He wrote our examination and passed. Our examination for the foreign service, Mr. McIntosh, is open to any qualified person.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What does that cover? Does that just cover one classification?

Mr. WILLIAMS: It covers our broad officer classification.

Mr. MCINTOSH: What would be the age limit?

Mr. WILLIAMS: The age limit is 31 maximum; but we normally recruit between the ages of 23 and 31. We insist on the candidates being Canadian citizens and having ten years' residence in Canada. We have two groups in our Department, namely the foreign service officers and the external affairs officers. In the past our external affairs officers have, by and large, been drawn from departmental sources. That is, we have screened through into the external affairs officers classification those senior clerical personnel, both male and female, whom we think have some real administrative talent. Now, however, we think we have skimmed off the best. The door is always open for some of our senior clerical people to be promoted into the external affairs officer group, but we are increasingly having to turn to the Civil Service Commission for some of what they call the J.E.O.s, the junior executive officers. At the present time, we have a public service competition for candidates from other government departments for appointment as external affairs officer 1 and 2. So we have foreign service officers who are recruited almost exclusively through annual competition. We have our external affairs officers, whom we have recruited from own ranks and through the Civil Service J.E.O. competition, and now more recently by, in a sense, going on the open market to see what we can attract.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Do you usually not fulfil your establishment each year? Are you usually about 400 behind the 2900 requirement? Is that normal or is it low, or is it good?

Mr. WILLIAMS: We would like to think it is abnormal, Mr. McIntosh.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In other words, if you could get more qualified personnel you would take them?

Mr. WILLIAMS: We would take them, yes.

Mr. MCINTOSH: That leads to my next question in the lower group where you talked about security personnel. I thought it unusual that you would find difficulty in recruiting this type of person. The thought went through my mind that this was because you do not let the people know that this type of position is open.

Mr. WALKER: What about the age limit?

Mr. MCINTOSH: Well, is there an age limit on all your classifications?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No. The age limit is only for the foreign service officers. One of the difficulties in recruiting security guards is the shift work. By and large, for a security guard to accept employment with us, he has to be on duty from, let us say, five o'clock in the afternoon until eight o'clock in the morning. We do not generally try to provide 24



hours security guard service, but we do during the quiet hours. This is not attractive to a lot of people. I believe there is a continuing competition on at the present time for security guards.

Mr. McINTOSH: My next question, perhaps, has nothing to do with the Department of External Affairs, but through experience I have found that when certain citizenship problems come up from people coming from behind the Iron Curtain in particular, there seems to be difficulty in getting information. Now, if you have representatives in most of those countries, do they work in liaison with the Department of Citizenship on applications to enter Canada, or to get relatives out of that particular Iron Curtain country?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would have thought so, yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Is that a major part of the duties of your officers behind the Iron Curtain, or is it negligible as far as their duties are concerned? I am referring to the matter of looking after the applications from the Department of Citizenship?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman, I have with me Mr. Irwin who was our ambassador in Poland and perhaps Mr. McIntosh would like to hear from him.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, I would like to hear him tell us about his difficulties in this regard.

Mr. J. A. IRWIN (*Head, Administrative Services Division*): I think I understand the question. I would not say we had difficulties. I would say that the particular kind of work you mentioned was one of our major operations in Warsaw, and has been for a number of years now. We have not had a mission from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Warsaw. All of the work having to do with immigration and visas has been done by external affairs personnel. I had one Canadian officer with a Canadian clerk in Warsaw and four local staff who issued, on the average, 4,000 visas a year. Of those 4,000, somewhere between 1,600 and 2,000 were immigrant visas. The rest were transit or non-immigrant visas. It was a major operation for us. It is not the easiest kind of work to do, and in particular it is not easy in that part of the world. But it was an operation which was established and going, and it maintains itself at the level I mentioned.

Mr. McINTOSH: There was another point. As I understand it, a great deal of investigation has to precede the granting of a visa, and this certainly must require a number of staff. Did you find you had adequate staff, or could these applications have been processed at a much greater rate if you had had additional staff? Were you hampered by lack of staff?

Mr. IRWIN: No, we were not hampered by lack of staff, and we were able to handle the approved applications. I should explain that our operation in Warsaw, in so far as the immigrants are concerned, consisted in processing applications which had already been approved by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Canada. It was a matter of making contact with the person, of putting them through their medical examination and issuing the visa; satisfying what amounted to the routine requirements. We did not and could not do the kind of personal investigation which might be carried on by an immigration mission in another kind of situation.

Mr. McINTOSH: Where it was necessary, who carried it on in Warsaw?

Mr. IRWIN: This was done, so far as it could be done, in Canada.



Mr. McINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FOY: I wonder if we could ask Mr. Irwin what sort of co-operation he got from the Polish people?

The CHAIRMAN: Is this only one question, Mr. Foy?

Mr. FOY: It is a supplementary.

Mr. IRWIN: To the extent that we had to ask for co-operation, I think we did receive it to a reasonable degree. This is not a question which arose very often for us because, as I say, our work followed a certain routine. The applications which we dealt with were applications which were approved subject to medical and similar requirements. There were occasions when the Polish authorities were able to help us in getting in touch with particular people. I can say that they put no difficulty in the way of the program that was carried on.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, I might say of the witness it is not hard to see why he is a diplomat.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Oh.

Mr. STANBURY: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a brief supplementary following the answer Mr. Williams gave about security guards? Has it been considered that members of forces might be assigned to our diplomatic posts as I think is done by the United States? Would this be a practical alternative to the present system?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I thought it was for years. However, whenever we proposed it to our own people they indicated that it was not a proposal which would be attractive or was attractive to National Defence, and I can see why. The Americans provide marine guards at all their missions and I believe they have a small administrative unit to look after them. We have looked into this, yes, in the past and it has not been a satisfactory solution to our problems.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Chairman, I have a few brief questions, but before I get into them I would just like to express my personal satisfaction with the statement Mr. Williams made. I think it was an impressive statement in so far as the priority on personnel vis a vis economy is concerned. Consideration given for such things as the convenience of our foreign service officers is a priority which, it has been my impression up to now, had not always enjoyed the degree of priority in administration within the External Affairs Department that it should have. The concept that our foreign service is doing an invaluable job abroad and it is imperative that we give them all the administrative support and conveniences possible seems to me to be a most sensible and intelligent approach to the whole thing.

But I do have one or two small questions. With respect to this organization and methods division which you have within your administrative branch, is it made up now of organization and methods experts, or are they your officers recruited from university and put into organization and methods for a short term?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Faulkner, they are specialists whom we have recruited for the job.

Mr. FAULKNER: So it is more or less a permanent posting?



Mr. WILLIAMS: A permanent posting, yes. We are hopeful that we will be able to keep our senior man for some years. This is a man by the name of Mr. L. A. Parent who has had wide government experience.

Mr. FAULKNER: Good. Is it fair to say, in deducing from your statement, that the administrative branch of the foreign service has now developed to the point where it is a division unto itself staffed by more or less permanent administrative personnel, and that your political officers are not placed for a two year stint in the administrative division and then political reporting on some post abroad? But in fact what you are developing is a permanent corps of administrators within the foreign service?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Faulkner, I think I will say yes and no, if I may, to your question. I think there has been a recognition for some time that we have needed more stability and more people on the administrative side who have more expertise. On the other hand — and now I speak as a foreign service officer, if I may, for a minute — I think I personally would regret the day that the administration did not have some foreign service officers in it. I think there are aspects of the application of the regulations, the improvements which are required in the development of any foreign service, that will come about only if you have people in the system who themselves have served abroad and have been subject to the application of the regulations. So that while yes, I think we are moving very rapidly toward more stability and more expertise on the administrative side, I personally would hope that we will always have some foreign service officers working in administration.

Mr. FAULKNER: The movement toward stability and expertise would probably, more legitimately, apply to the operations in Ottawa. It would probably be awkward, if not impossible, to apply it to your posts abroad unless it were a larger post like Paris or London?

I have two other points I would like to make. In this business of projecting the country, which we all agree is an important responsibility of our posts abroad, what sort of facilities do they have which would be comparable to the United States information service? Are they well staffed with National Film Board productions, literature and things of this type? Do they do the sort of proselytizing that the Americans do abroad, that is send their men out to speak to meetings? Is this a function which is carried on extensively abroad in those posts which are large enough to do it?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes. At every post we have a large selection of films from the National Film Board. Each year we have provided a large number of pamphlets and books of various kinds. We have a monthly bulletin which is distributed extensively. I would like to make one observation. So often in countries that are neither English, French, nor Spanish speaking, we have limited material, and I have to admit this at once. There are a number of things one could circulate in Turkey, for example—if they were printed in the Turkish language — but otherwise you are limited. However, I am talking now in general terms of those countries where you can use English, French or Spanish. We have succeeded in providing quite a bit of material in the Spanish language.

There is the monthly bulletin; there is the annual report of the Department which is circulated. There is our Canada and the United Nations report. We have a film catalogue of all our films which are circulated. There are Fact sheets on Canada. There is a publication called "Canada From Sea to Sea" which I believe has been renamed or is about



to be renamed. There is a small pamphlet entitled the "Canadian Neighbour." We have school kits which can be sent to school children. Officers and the heads of mission are encouraged to accept speaking engagements. They are encouraged to attend functions where it would be useful to project Canada. I think there are many ways in which this can be done.

I might also say that I think information work is a bottomless pit. You can spend thousands of dollars on information. You can then still have some people say, "You really have not done enough." At the present time we have a study under way on the information work of the Department. I hope, as a result of this study, that we will break new ground, and be able to come forward to the Government with some recommendations for their consideration.

Mr. FOY: In this regard do you get any co-operation from Canadian industries?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would say yes.

Mr. FOY: That is in providing material?

Mr. WILLIAMS: It seems to me that we received a lot of material and cooperation from Canadian industry at every post. Again, I am afraid one tends to be personal in these matters. For example I think one of the most successful visits we had in Turkey, was a goodwill delegation from Vancouver, comprising a group of Vancouver businessmen who travel each year at their own expense. Normally they concentrate on Southeast Asia, but two and a half years ago they decided to study the southern Mediterranean area and they visited Turkey. Yes, I think we get maximum co-operation from Canadian industry. I think certainly the officers of this Department and I am sure those of the Department of Trade and Commerce, particularly the trade commissioner service, would say, very assuredly, yes.

Mr. FOY: As a Department do you continually solicit this —

The CHAIRMAN: Perhaps you can pursue this line of questioning later on. Mr. Faulkner still has the floor.

Mr. FAULKNER: I just have one or two quick ones. First of all, do you receive complaints from Canadians abroad about the facilities and service that the embassies offer? Do you receive complaints that possibly the staff at some embassies, when faced with a particular problem which a Canadian may have, are rather rigid and formal and do not show the creativeness which a tourist might expect?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would like to tell you no.

Mr. FAULKNER: I am sure it is not true.

Mr. WILLIAMS: From time to time we do, yes. On the other hand though, I think we get a larger number of letters coming in congratulating us on services we have performed. It is a terribly difficult situation. Every person is different in what he expects. Some people are happy just to come into the embassy, sign the book and say hello. Some come in who want to catch up on the latest news. We like to think that we can always provide this, but as I was telling Mr. Walker that this is not always so. On the other hand, there are some Canadians who really expect the embassy to be a tourist bureau for them.



Mr. FAULKNER: I am not thinking, Mr. Williams, so much of those particular tourists. I am thinking of the tourist who may be in some sort of difficulty over there, or who may want some real advice in terms of what to do. I know, in my own case for instance, when I arrived in Paris I wanted to find out what sort of work I could secure, and the answer I was given was that I could not work because I did not have a "permis de travail". The advice amounted to this, that I should go back to England where I came from, make my application for a permis de travail and when that was forthcoming, come on over. I made the point that I was there and I was going to stay there. I encountered what appeared to me to be rather an inflexible attitude. I was wondering whether you get many of these sort of complaints, but apparently not.

Mr. ALLMAND: I was wondering, along these lines, whether instructions are issued by the Department on the importance of courtesy by all employees in these embassies. I have run into very recently what I would consider to be discourteous treatment, not by those higher up, but by those who meet the public, such as receptionists, librarians and so forth. I have seen them treat other people as if they were imposing upon them to go and ask questions, and also a bit condescending. A person may be just over from Canada who does not know much about the country, and yet these people who are working there are treating them as if they should know better, and why ask stupid questions about any particular thing.

Mr. WILLIAMS: I deplore it, and I think every member of the Department would like to know of instances of this kind.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, may I just interrupt. I think these things should be particularized and there should not be generalizations with regard to the service. There may be particular instances, but what has been put on the record now would seem to be rather a generalization by the questioner.

The CHAIRMAN: Your point is well taken, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. ALLMAND: Well, I have run into two instances in London and in Paris, and I have had complaints about it from friends of mine from the South American country of Peru.

Mr. FAULKNER: The position of the Department is that there are not any sizeable number of complaints along these lines. That was the original question.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Very few.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, my questions are all somewhat supplemental in view of the questions which have preceded. But one of the observations I have made down through the years is that there seems to be a very definite time lag in so far as the expressed need of accommodation and facilities — I am limiting it to that — and the meeting of those requests and those needs. I am interested in the improvements which have been made in the Department in this regard. I notice in the estimates that there is a budget of \$285,000 for Senegal and you have not yet a mission there.

Would you explain to us briefly, Mr. Williams, how your accommodation department works in obtaining new accommodation for new missions, shall we say, or expanded accommodation, including housing, for established missions that are meeting pressure as far as work and expansion are concerned.



Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Thompson, for the new mission may I take Dakar as an example. We sent a two-man team out to Dakar at the end of last year consisting of a senior administrative officer and an experienced senior representative of our supplies and properties division who I might term an expert on housing and furnishing. These officers spent considerable time in Dakar. They investigated what accommodation was available, both in terms of renting and for sale. They made recommendations to the Department. In due course we made recommendations to the treasury board which were accepted and we have, I think, suitable office accommodation. At the moment the housing situation seems to be under control.

In Addis we have succeeded in getting what I think is a satisfactory residence for Mr. Gauvin who has gone there, and we have what appears to be satisfactory office accommodation.

The problem of accommodation generally, I think, is a difficult one for the staff and I am excluding, really, the head of mission as such. I have had personal experience with both types. When I went to India some years ago I was put into a staff house which had been taken under lease, and if it had been left to myself I would have found quite a different type of house. When I was in Turkey we had a large number of flats under lease and people wanted to go and find their own apartments.

I think this whole area of staff accommodation is a terribly difficult one. I think we have to move to purchasing much more staff accommodation than we have at the present time. I am not sufficiently expert in financial matters, but I cannot believe that in the long run we are not better served both financially and morale-wise in owning much more of our staff accommodation. I am afraid I may not have fully answered your question, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON: That covers one certain aspect of it. But there are specific instances which I will cite. The first one relates to Dar es Salaam, and I mention it only because I think it is solved now. The accommodation both as far as administration is concerned — I am not speaking about staff housing now — and some of the needs related to it; I suppose it was accentuated because of the military mission moving in and this type of thing, seemed to be about one year behind in meeting those needs. At the time when those needs were first expressed it also seemed to be working a tremendous hardship on personnel including the head of mission. Has your supplies and properties division improved? Are you developing that to a point where you can be more effective in your administration? I realize that many of these problems which arise are abnormal and acute beyond reason.

● (12.29 p.m.)

Mr. WILLIAMS: I think the answer is yes, we are improving. I would like to think that with our increased staff and with the move toward what I hope will be the purchase of more staff accommodation and other types of accommodation, that the situation which you have referred to in terms of Dar es Salaam will be considered abnormal in the future.

Mr. THOMPSON: There is a second reference to the cost of property. I notice in Paris, France, we are paying as high as \$9 a square foot per year for accommodation. That is more than 50 per cent of construction costs of a similar type of accommodation here at home for complete ownership.



Mr. WILLIAMS: Presumably, Mr. Thompson, this is due to the fact that there has been very little construction in Paris. I think this is the answer. For instance, I cannot give you a specific figure with respect to rentals on apartments, although I could get it for you, but in Canadian terms it is astronomical what we have to pay to house some of our people there. I suppose in retrospect one could say yes, we could have done much more in terms of purchase or construction in Paris. In collaboration with treasury board and the Department of Trade and Commerce, we just recently sent a three-man team to look at rentals and accommodation in New York. It is extremely difficult to find accommodation in New York and it is very expensive. This is so also in Geneva and Paris, and I am told the same situation prevails in Tokyo and New Delhi. I happened to be in New Delhi last fall and the prices there for rentals compared to what I paid when I was in New Delhi from 1953 to 1956 had gone up very considerably. I think this is probably true of almost every country in the world. I think the other thing, Mr. Thompson, although this is not really answering your question, is that people coming into a capital city are not always in a position to take advantage of the cheapest accommodation. I think this is a problem which all countries have in the operation of their foreign service.

Mr. THOMPSON: I want to move on to another area entirely, Mr. Williams. How is the external aid personnel — and I am thinking of administration now, but perhaps we should also include foreign staff short term assignment — correlated or integrated with external affairs? Is it completely one operation, or does external aid come under a different classification as far as aspects of administration are concerned?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I believe the brief answer is that the staff of the external aid office is quite separate from the staff of the Department of External Affairs.

Mr. THOMPSON: Does this include administrative staff here at headquarters as well?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes. If I may speak on behalf of the Department of External Affairs, we have no responsibility for the personnel of the external aid office. We have, however, on loan to the external aid office three officers at the present time, and I would think that we will continue to have officers on loan to the aid office. I hope we will have more officers on loan to the aid office because so many of our officers in the developing countries spend a lot of their time doing aid work, and I think it is in their interest, in the interest of the aid office and in the interest of the Department to have more officers working in the external aid office.

Mr. THOMPSON: You came right to the point I wanted to get at. Is consideration being given at the present time to bringing the administration of external aid closer to that of external affairs in view of the fact that many of your external affairs officers have experience and are also probably able to give judgment and better advice in operations than anyone else?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I do not think there is any thought of bringing the administrations together at all.

Mr. THOMPSON: Or any closer?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No. I know of no proposals at the present time that would change the situation from what it has been in the last two or three years.



Mr. THOMPSON: Would you think it would be good if there were a greater number of external affairs personnel assigned to external aid?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes, I do.

Mr. THOMPSON: A third question and this is my last question, Mr. Chairman. It has been pretty well covered by the questions relating to recruitment, but I wonder if Mr. Williams could give us a little better background of how they proceed with recruitment. You mentioned that you are not too concerned with high school career days or this type of thing, but obviously external affairs recruitment is a very specialized thing and I would appreciate knowing just how you approach the problem which is constantly with you.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Thompson, we have — and I am speaking about the recruitment of foreign service officers; not speaking of stenographers —

Mr. THOMPSON: Yes.

Mr. WILLIAMS: — we have an annual competition which is organized on our behalf by the Civil Service Commission.

Mr. THOMPSON: If I might just interject here. Do you get out and actually visit universities such as companies are doing in looking for engineers?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes, we are.

Mr. THOMPSON: It is not just through competitions?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No. Mr. Thompson, for our foreign service officers we do 98 per cent of our recruiting through the competition, but prior to the competition we have officers of the Department visiting the universities and making contacts. We have over the years maintained links with universities through individual professors who at one time or another were either with the Department or had an interest in the work of the Department.

This may not be particularly germane, but we have encouraged our senior officers, on returning from abroad, to undertake speaking engagements for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs because we feel this gives them not only an opportunity to see something of Canada, but it also gives them an opportunity to meet people in centres across Canada who might be instrumental in directing people to our competition.

Basically, each year we recruit our foreign service officers through the foreign service officer competition which is organized by the Civil Service Commission on our behalf. It really consists of three parts. There is an objective test which is common to all recruits to the public service; it is a multiple choice examination and it is machine marked. As a result of this examination, candidates who have not qualified or met a certain standard are screened out. Those candidates who are interested in the foreign service, and that is either the Department of External Affairs or the Trade Commissioner Service of the Department of Trade and Commerce, take two further tests. They write an essay. They are given a choice, I believe, to draw one subject from ten and the mix of the ten subjects is generally in the broad disciplines of economics, history, law, and political science. They are also asked to do a very brief language test. Those whose first language is French take a brief English test and those whose first language is English take a French test.



Now, as a result of the essay and the objective test, candidates are called for interview. I would argue that probably the most difficult part of the competition, and in many ways the most decisive part of the competition is the oral interview. The purpose of the interview is not to catch out candidates, not to ask them trick questions, not try to prove their lack of knowledge in particular areas. It is basically to try to make a judgment of the candidate on his ability to handle himself with a small group, his powers of reasoning. It is also designed to test judgment, determine how much commonsense he has, and assess his ability to make decisions. It is a matter of all these intangibles.

It is on the basis of the oral interview that a final ranking is made of candidates and, in order of precedence or priority, an eligible list is drawn up by the Civil Service Commission. We then start from the top of the list drawing off candidates. Now we would prefer, naturally, if we are looking for 35 officers, to get the first 35 officers on the list, but often a candidate will have been offered a scholarship and he feels that he would prefer to go off and do further studies elsewhere. So we say, "Well, this is unfortunate, but we hope you will continue to be interested and compete later on." Candidates may conclude that they do not really want to be in the foreign service and they accept alternative employment.

I think, by and large, we have found that our eligible list has stood up fairly well. We have been able to get what we think are high quality candidates. The day before yesterday, I happened to meet our most recent recruits and, like all these things, it is very difficult to make a judgment as to what they are, but collectively, as a group of young Canadians, they impressed me greatly. As long as we can continue to attract young people of the quality that we are, I think we will be fine.

There is bound to be attrition at the middle and senior ranks. We tend to lose some of our senior officers to other government departments through senior appointments. Many families conclude, when children are getting to high school age, that it would be desirable to be at home, or to have a stable life for a period in order to get the children through high school. This is a loss to us, and this is why we have been so concerned over the years to provide good educational provisions so that our officers abroad, with their children, will be assured of receiving that type of education, that is as close as possible to what would be provided if they were living in Toronto, Regina or Edmonton.

Mr. THOMPSON: Are you providing language training facilities for officers who are serving in certain areas? I might just say that one of the things which has always impressed me about the United Kingdom foreign service and also about the U.S.S.R. is that many of their administrative personnel, particularly those in contact with people, are able to speak the language of the country. On the other hand, the Americans very often are way down the line. Are we providing special language training facilities, for instance, for people serving in the Far East?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes. I do not think we are doing enough, but we are providing facilities. For the last six years we have kept a succession of officers at the university in Hong Kong learning Chinese. Over the years we have tried to have a Japanese language student. We have made use of the language facilities of the Department of National Defence in some of the more difficult languages, particularly Russian.

We have had officers at the school of Arabic languages at Shemlan outside Beirut. I hope I will not be considered immodest but I think it was our second last officer who



attended this language instruction that attained the highest qualification the school has ever had.

I do not think, Mr. Thompson, that we would ever be able to produce the number of foreign language students that we might consider ideal in an ideal world. I think that we have a small service and we have to concentrate on some of the principal difficult languages, if I can put it that way.

I would like to revert very quickly to English-French. In connection with the French language schools which have been established in Ottawa, we do not see the newly recruited officers, who are English speaking, for three months; we send them immediately to the Civil Service language school for French instruction if required. Similarly, those whose first language is French, go to the school to learn English if further instruction is necessary. When I came home two years ago we had a young officer from western Canada who had done almost no French whatsoever in his life, and he was very apprehensive about how his language instruction was going to proceed. It was either a very great deal of determination on his part or very good instruction, but I must say at the end of three months this young officer came out of the language school with a reasonably competent knowledge of French.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is a typical western Canadian.

Mr. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I have one major question and one minor question. On the matter of recruitment arbitrarily you have an age grouping there from 22 to 31. You have some shortages for foreign service officers. I suggest there is a field where you might find very useful persons if you would raise the age limit for that special group. I am speaking now about officers in the armed services. In the last ten years hundreds of them have been stationed abroad, and many of them are as competent abroad as some of your foreign service officers. It is a group comprised of trained people, many of whom see no adequate future in the armed services, and they are either being thrown out or are looking ahead and trying to get out to engage in other occupations. I think in this group you might find a certain number of very able men who would be useful in external affairs. However, you would have to change your arbitrary age figure up to say 40 in order to attract people of that character.

As I say, the situation has so changed in ten years that that type of person is now available. He was not available ten or twenty years ago. Many of our armed service people have been in, I suppose, most of the countries of the world. Some of them have served on missions separate and apart from their armed services requirement, and they are already in the field of external affairs. The only adjustment that an armed service officer would have to make would be to alter his method of direct, clear and frank speaking to the use of oratorian phraseology, lengthy sentences and concealed thought that is the language of diplomacy.

Mr. WALKER: Perhaps he could strike an average of six letter words, instead of the twelve —

Mr. CHURCHILL: I suggest that you might take this up with the Minister and see if he would not consider drawing upon this pool of experienced personnel by the simple process of a special category in the age bracket that I mentioned.



Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Churchill, we will pursue that. I would just like to make two comments. We have recently been in correspondence with a particular officer and he has turned us down because of his pension provisions. I am not conversant with the application of the Civil Service regulations in terms of how it affects one's pension and what one is entitled to earn. However, this is one case.

The other aspect of it, and I hope you do not think that I am being unnecessarily rigid is that we try to operate a career service. Therefore, this means if we are going to retain our officers we have to assure them that we can promote them from foreign service officer 1 to as far as their capabilities will take them. So we tend to be concerned about bringing in too many people at the intermediate or higher level. This is a matter, however, which can be kept under review. Certainly, we have thought from time to time that we should be picking up more of these people from the services who have had a type of experience which would be useful to us, and we will pursue this.

Mr. CHURCHILL: My minor question is this, where is the cost shown of the firm of consultants who have been helping you out on this major re-organization that you mentioned?

Mr. WILLIAMS: It is included under professional and special services. It was an expenditure of \$30,000, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is it still going on?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No. It is completed.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Do you have the heading under which it is included?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Under professional and special services. It is included in vote 1.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I just have one comment here. In the light of the Royal Commission which investigated the entire organization of government and the Civil Service, and the experience which resides in all the departments, it strikes me as rather odd that we then have to spend another \$30,000 for outside consultants to come in and tell people what to do.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Churchill does not object, I would like to ask Mr. Bruce Keith to comment on that because he was the officer who was appointed the head of our Administrative Improvement Unit and he worked with the consultants.

Mr. BRUCE A. KEITH (*Head, Administrative Improvement Unit, Department of External Affairs*): Thank you. With regard to the relationship between the Glassco Commission and this study, I might say that the consultant who did the main work had himself worked on the Glassco Commission studies, and so he brought a great deal of direct experience from the Glassco Commission study and carried it over into our department.

We did examine the requirements with members of the treasury board staff and the Civil Service Commission and explored this question quite fully before launching the study. It was decided that for the specialized purposes we had in mind it was truly worthwhile to bring in people who were outstanding specialists on, for example, the problem of registry and records, paperwork and so on. The Department, and I think the treasury board staff and the Civil Service Commission who helped us, feel we received very good



value for this investment. This is not to say we have not received a great deal of help from within the government as well. Our broad administrative improvement program has gone considerably beyond the consulting engagement which was, in fact, completed in 1964. Since then we have benefited considerably from the help of the Civil Service Commission in studying organization. We have benefited also from the help of senior officers of the treasury board in devising new ways of improving our financial management.

So the short answer is that we are in fact making considerable use of the assistance of central agencies and the help of other government departments. For this particular purpose we did consider it appropriate to have what was really a fairly small study done in terms of the kind of management consultant engagements that industry takes on.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There is quite a field opening up for lifetime service staff in Royal Commissions in terms of consultants. Have you been subjected to the B and B Commission yet? Have they investigated external affairs and asked you what class you really think you belong to? I notice they are doing this with the services.

Mr. WILLIAMS: Not to my knowledge, Mr. Churchill.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that all, Mr. Churchill? We have Mr. Allmand, Mr. Foy and Mr. Brewin. Mr. Allmand?

Mr. ALLMAND: I just wanted to know if there was any liaison between Canadian embassies and provincial offices in those countries where there are provincial offices. Is there any co-ordination in what they do, the sharing of responsibilities, or does the Canadian embassy know what these provincial offices are doing?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I am told yes, there is a fair amount of personal contact and co-ordination or consultation. I believe it is true to say, with the exception of London and Paris, that most of the provincial offices are not in capital cities. I think British Columbia, for instance, has an office in San Francisco or Los Angeles. Ontario has an office in Milan and Chicago. But I would assume, Mr. Allmand, that in those capital cities, which have an embassy and provincial offices close consultation does exist.

Mr. ALLMAND: Has it ever been found that a provincial office will pursue some sort of policy in a country which would be embarrassing to the Canadian government or the Canadian embassy?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I do not think I am in any position to answer that question, I would have thought no.

Mr. ALLMAND: All right. That is all.

● (12.59 p.m.)

Mr. FOY: I just have one question which has not been brought up. We seem to have covered the waterfront pretty well. It is about medical facilities for our posts. You could, for instance, give us an idea of the set up in a place like Laos; what medical facilities are there for the foreign service staff there?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would think very little. In my day in Indo-China, and I do not know whether the services still do this or not, we did have an armed forces medical doctor who was responsible for all Canadian personnel whether in Laos, Cambodia or Viet Nam. I would assume that the same situation prevails.



With regard to Laos the situation can be difficult. It is some years since I have been in Laos, but I do not think that the situation has changed a great deal. On those occasions when we have had personnel seriously ill there they have had to go to either Saigon, Hong Kong or Bangkok. The problem of medical facilities for personnel in developing countries is a difficult one. In Ghana we were able to use the services of the military hospital.

Mr. FOY: Are there no medical people in external affairs on the site say, where there is a family with children?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No.

Mr. FOY: As you know, they can become ill suddenly. What happens to them in an emergency?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Well, we rely on the local resources. You rather hope that you have found a good doctor.

Mr. FOY: Are they adequate in most of these small places?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Oh, I think they are adequate unless you are seriously ill. If you are seriously ill you get on a plane as fast as you can and go some place where you can have a proper diagnosis.

Mr. FOY: Even if it means coming back to Canada?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes. I do not think we can undertake to provide medical services for all of our posts. By and large we have small units everywhere. In Ghana, for instance, when our military training team went there in 1960, it included two medical officers. From our point of view this was very satisfactory and it also permitted our people from Lagos to come to Accra for medical consultation. We normally have to rely on the available medical resources of the country.

Mr. FOY: I was wondering if there are very many fatalities because of this lack?

Mr. WILLIAMS: I would have thought not. I think it is probably true to say that service in the tropical countries has had a debilitating effect on a few of us, but I do not think I could go any further than that. I just do not know.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I noticed in regard to diplomatic missions that we have them in various countries and not in others. Taking Africa, for example, I cannot see any diplomatic missions in north Africa, in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya or Algeria. I understand that we have a diplomatic mission in Switzerland which may be assigned some responsibilities in these countries. On the other hand, I notice we have one in Cameroun and Senegal. This raises the question in my mind of how on earth do we select where we send diplomatic missions. I would have thought that North Africa, formerly French dependencies, countries which have quite an interesting future and who speak French, would have a great deal in common and would be natural places for us to establish diplomatic missions. Can you enlighten me on this subject?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Mr. Brewin, we will be opening, as I mentioned earlier —

Mr. BREWIN: I am sorry, I was not here at the beginning.

Mr. WILLIAMS: We will be opening in Tunis in the fall. In terms of Dakar, we have

had an aid program in operation in that area, and I think this was a consideration in the determination because it is relatively easy to handle aid programs in Mali, Guinea and Mauritania from Dakar. I think the approach has been regional in terms of North Africa. I have mentioned the opening in Tunis. At the present time we have dual accreditation in Morocco from Madrid and our ambassador, or one of the officers from the mission, visits Morocco, we hope, at least as frequently as three times a year.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Would you add Southern Rhodesia to your list? It is just as important as Senegal.

Mr. MACDONALD: When it becomes a legal sovereign state, perhaps we might consider that.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that all, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I think so. I am sorry that I could not be here at the opening and I did not know you had referred to Tunis. I am glad to hear about it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I have another supplementary question. Mr. Williams, with regard to the method of application for any position within your service, does it have to go through the Civil Service Commission, or does the applicant write direct to the Civil Service Commission and ask for —

Mr. WILLIAMS: We are quite happy if people will write to our Personnel Operations Division, if anybody is interested.

Mr. MCINTOSH: In view of a request which I received yesterday, do you recruit any nurses or medical technicians?

Mr. WILLIAMS: No, we do not, but on the other hand, the external aid office, Mr. McIntosh, may be interested.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Would you mind telling me whom I should contact?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Yes, I would suggest she direct her correspondence to Mr. P. N. Towe of the External Aid Office.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, we are prepared to pass all the items here except 1 if you are prepared to do it. May I ask just one other question. On which item do we ask questions concerning passports?

Mr. WILLIAMS: Under vote 1.

The CHAIRMAN: Item 1 shall stand. But if you do have questions to ask Mr. Williams on item 1, now is the time to ask them. Shall item 1 stand?

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Items 5, 10 and 15 carried.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, all the items under administration, except item 1, have been adopted. The meeting is adjourned to the call of the Chair.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 9

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THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1966

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Respecting

Main Estimates 1966-67 of the Department of External Affairs

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INCLUDING SECOND REPORT TO THE HOUSE

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WITNESS:

The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1966

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                                    |                      |                  |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                       | Mr. Hymmen,          | Mr. McIntosh,    |
| Mr. Andras,                        | Mr. Johnston,        | Mr. Pelletier,   |
| Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ), | Mr. Klein,           | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Brewin,                        | Mr. Laprise,         | Mr. Régimbal,    |
| Mr. Churchill,                     | Mr. Lind,            | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Faulkner,                      | Mr. Macdonald        | Mrs. Wadds,      |
| Mr. Forest,                        | ( <i>Rosedale</i> ), | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Harkness,                      | Mr. Macquarrie,      |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



MINUTES  
ORDERS OF REFERENCE

TUESDAY, June 14, 1966.

*Ordered*,—That the names of Messrs. Hymmen and Andras be substituted for those of Messrs. Foy and Groos on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, June 15, 1966.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Johnston be substituted for that of Mr. Thompson on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*

Additional advance to the Working Capital Fund of the World Health Organization, \$29,400.

Item L26 was carried.

The Chairman thanked the Minister for the help and cooperation he had extended to the Committee, and the Minister withdrew.

The Committee then set its agenda to consider its report to the House.

The Chairman stated that the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure had met June 15, 1966 and agreed as follows:

- (a) To recommend that the Estimates be reported back to the House without delay.
- (b) That a draft Report to the House be submitted to the Committee for consideration.
- (c) To recommend to the Committee the desirability of visiting New York in October 1966 so that the Committee may observe the activities and study the organization of the United Nations.

Copies of the draft report were distributed to the members and when certain amendments were made, the report as amended was unanimously approved. (See Second Report to the House page 274).

*Ordered*,—That the Chairman report the Report to the House.

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

JUNE 17, 1966.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs has the honour to present its

SECOND REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference of March 22, 1966, your Committee has considered and approved the items listed in the Main Estimates for 1966-67 relating to the Department of External Affairs.

Your Committee wishes to give further study to Rhodesia, Viet Nam, NATO, Canada-West Indies relationships, and other subjects coming under Item 1 of the Estimates, and requests that the Committee be given authority herewith to meet to discuss these from time to time and report thereon.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues No. 1 to No. 7*) is appended.

Respectfully submitted,

JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ,  
*Chairman.*



June 16, 1966  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
The Committee referred to the Sub-Committee for further consideration  
the proposed visit to the United Nations  
At 1.00 p.m.  
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, June 16, 1966.

(10)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 11.00 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Mrs. Wadds and Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Harkness, Hymmen, Klein, Johnston, Laprise, Lind, Macquarrie, Nesbitt, Pilon, Regimbal, Stanbury, Walker (21).

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; *From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Committee resumed consideration of Item 1 of the Estimates of the Department of External Affairs for the fiscal year 1966-67.

The Minister was questioned and Item 1 was carried.

The Chairman called Item L20:

Additional advance to the Working Capital Fund of the World Health Organization, \$29,400

Item L20 was carried.

The Chairman thanked the Minister for the help and cooperation he had extended to the Committee, and the Minister withdrew.

The Committee then sat *in camera* to consider its report to the House.

The Chairman stated that the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure had met June 15, 1966 and agreed as follows:

- (a) To recommend that the Estimates be reported back to the House without delay;
- (b) That a draft Report to the House be submitted to the Committee for consideration;
- (c) To recommend to the Committee the desirability of visiting New York in October 1966 so that the Committee may observe the activities and study the organization of the United Nations.

Copies of the draft report were distributed to the members and after certain amendments were made, the report as amended was unanimously approved. (See Second Report to the House page 274).

*Ordered,*—That the Chairman report the Estimates to the House.





## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, June 16, 1966.

● (11.03 a.m.)

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Gentlemen, I see a quorum. We are this morning resuming consideration of the estimates of the Department of External Affairs. As you will recall we have passed all items except Item No. 1 and a minor item, Item L20.

The Committee had agreed to hear the Minister before carrying Item No. 1. The Minister is here with us this morning. I do not know if the Minister will want to proceed with a statement, but in any event, he is ready and available to answer your questions.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Chairman, there are several questions I would like to put to the Minister. I think I might save the time of the Committee, as I know other members will have no doubt for matters that have arisen in the last few weeks. I think it might be a good idea if I placed the questions to the Minister and then he could answer them if he cares to either now or later on in the meeting.

The first question I would like to know, and it seems to be a matter of considerable interest this morning, is it a fact that the government is arranging—or attempting to arrange—a Commonwealth conference concerning the Rhodesian problem, here in Ottawa. There have been press and radio reports during the last few hours to this effect and it is our understanding that the Canadian High Commissioner to Great Britain is also in town. I was wondering if the Minister either could confirm these stories or perhaps elaborate to some degree.

The second thing I would like to put to the Minister is this: From time to time—and it is a different subject altogether, but it has not been discussed in this Committee—the Prime Minister and the Minister, and other members of the government, have been tossing out suggestions that Canada is intending to join the Organization of American States. This has been of rather considerable interest to Canada for many years and of varying viewpoints. I was wondering if the Minister could enlighten us on this subject; could he give us some idea of what the government's intention is, if any. That is the second question I would like to put to the Minister.

The third thing I would like to make some inquiries about is: Is the Minister—I realize, of course, that it is not always possible to disclose at this point plans that are being made, perhaps, for the next general assembly of the United Nations—in a position to indicate what projects Canada might be preparing for the next meeting of the General Assembly and, within these projects, what is included and whether Canada would make a determined effort to try and get a committee formed to try to reform or review the constitution of the United Nations itself. I have no illusions as to how difficult a problem this



would be but it would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that this has to be started some time because of the great increase in membership in the United Nations of countries that are not viable and where no effort is being made to have representation by population. The newest member of the United Nations—the Maldiv Islands—is a fine little country and has a population of about 60,000 and it is my understanding that even a smaller nation is attempting to obtain entry into the United Nations.

In view of the fact that it is one country, one vote, it would seem to me that the United Nations in the public's mind is at times made to appear ridiculous in instances such as this. The Soviet Union and the United States have one vote despite their position on the Security Council and countries such as the Maldiv Islands also have one vote. There is no possible comparison in population, resources, or anything else. I think sooner or later that some kind of committee must be set up to decide what kind of a United Nations we want in the future, whether we want a supranational body—an organization heading in that direction—or the type of body that was originally envisaged and has been very well defined by the present Prime Minister as a negotiating forum. We have to decide what kind of a United Nations we want. It would seem to me that in view of Canada's very active role in United Nations affairs with various governments over the years that Canada would be the country to promote the setting up of a committee for the purpose of attempting to review the constitution. It will not be done in a minute, everybody knows that; but it is something that has to be started sooner or later.

Now, there are two other items that I would like to raise with the Minister. One is the question of famine conditions in India. I know very well that Canada is making a healthy contribution to relieve the famine conditions in India. There have been stories recently in the press and elsewhere that famine conditions in that country have become somewhat less. I hope that is the truth, but I would be very obliged if the Minister could inform the Committee of the present forecast of famine conditions in India.

If conditions have not materially improved I would very much hope that the government would give consideration to additional aid to the people of India. India is a very important country in Asia and in the world. It is a good friend of Canada, and there seems to be little doubt that economic and other conditions in India are not too promising at the moment, and anything that Canada can do to help India at this time, I think, should be done. It has been suggested by some members that perhaps our external aid programs are perhaps a little too diluted and it might be better at this time to concentrate our aid—in fact, additional aid—to help India out of her present difficulties.

There is great public interest in this matter as I am sure the Minister knows. As a matter of fact, I would like to mention at this time a group of high school students—I know the Minister is familiar with this—in the town of Oakville, Ontario, that have promoted a campaign all over Canada for additional food and support for India at this time. The Minister might be interested to know that I have received thousands of names on a petition requesting the government to grant further additional aid to India. I understand this is the case all over Canada. There is great public interest and great public sympathy in this project. I do not want to burden the Minister, but perhaps he could see



from what I have in my hand, if he would take a look, there are many thousands of names signed. They are not students at all—only a small number of them are students—most of them are adults who have taken a very active interest. We have a considerable surplus of wheat I understand and if this could be useful to India I think, that now that the dock strike has cleared up that perhaps we should make some efforts to see that it gets there.

The last thing I would like to mention to the Minister at this time is this pamphlet. I did not bring this up the other day when the assistant undersecretaries were here because this would seem to be more of a policy matter than an administrative one. I refer to the pamphlet—a very good pamphlet—called “External Affairs” which is sent out by the department on a monthly basis—I believe seven months a year or whatever it is—it is very well made up, a very good pamphlet. But, more and more it is becoming to have the appearance of a political propaganda pamphlet. You see nothing in this pamphlet but statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs on what Canadian foreign policy is. In many cases the various political parties in Parliament do agree with the government, but in some cases they do not. It would seem to me if this is supposed to be an informative pamphlet, as I presume it is, that the people of Canada should be informed of what the views on various matters of other groups than the government group are. For instance, it is my understanding that the position of the New Democratic Party is somewhat different from that of the government on the question of Viet Nam, and the view of the Conservative Party is perhaps a little different from that of the government on the matter of Rhodesia.

I would suggest to the Minister that statements by the leaders of other political parties, when viewpoints differ on foreign policies, might be given some prominence in this pamphlet so that the Canadian people themselves can find out what the policy of the various political parties is on various matters. For a long time it has had nothing but the policy of the government, and while this is, of course, most important, and should be given first place, nevertheless the views of other political parties should likewise be put out in this pamphlet. Those are the matters that I have to raise immediately with the Minister and I would hope that perhaps he might be able to give us some enlightenment on some of these matters.

The CHAIRMAN: Would you like to answer now, Mr. Martin?

Hon. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all call to your attention the fact that there are a number of Carnegie scholars here who are visiting Canada at this time. I had the pleasure of being with them last night. They have been here since Saturday. They have been studying together in the United States under the auspices of the Carnegie Foundation for a number of months and they will soon be going to Europe. They are all foreign service officers in a number of countries. I would mention the countries here, but for fear I might leave out one or two and I would not want to make that mistake. But, I am sure that I can say on behalf of all of us that we are very happy and honoured to have these foreign service officers here from so many countries, Commonwealth countries, countries in the Middle East, countries in Asia, countries in the Caribbean.



With regard to Mr. Nesbitt's last question, I will certainly take note of what he said. I have endeavoured, so far as it is possible to do so, to be as non-partisan as possible in the discharge of my responsibilities in this post, and if there is anything that could be done through the bulletin to that effect I would certainly want to do so.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Martin, I was not sure that you were going to deal with that point, but the same thing applies to the annual report.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I will be very glad to look at that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have been very co-operative with the Minister, as he realizes, but I notice that in the last two annual reports there has been a sharp divergence from the annual reports of years past. Where the Minister's name used to be mentioned once, now it is mentioned not fewer than 30 times in the 1964 report and 26 times in 1965.

● (11.16 a.m.)

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, as my friend says, he always wants to be co-operative. I would be very glad to see whether there has been any change in the format.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I have examined 16 annual reports and there has been a distinct change. I would just draw it to his attention.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, if there has it could certainly be corrected, bearing in mind my hon. friend's objective interest in these matters.

Now, with regard to famine condition in India, I share Mr. Nesbitt's concern. We are providing \$71 million this year in food and aid to India. This represents, I think, proportionate to the G.N.P. as large a contribution as has been made by any country toward the very serious situation that exists in India. I can assure Mr. Nesbitt that the matter is being reviewed in the light of the continuing need.

During the calendar year 1965, Canada shipped 235,113 tons of wheat to India. During this calendar year we plan to ship, one million tons.

Mr. NESBITT: Could the Minister tell us whether there has been any change in the forecast of the conditions here?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No; there has been no change since I made this announcement in the House. We have joined with other donor countries and, particularly, the United States, in seeking to impress on donor countries that have not yet increased their volume of assistance to do so. It may be that the most effective way of doing this would be through a consortium. We would be very anxious to do all that we can to encourage other countries.

With regard to the Commonwealth Conference, the Prime Ministers' Conference, it now would appear that there is a consensus that this might take place in September, and while there has been no decision, I would presume that more likely than not, the conference would be in London. As the conference may have to do mainly with Rhodesian matters there was a suggestion that it might take place in New Delhi this summer, but there does not seem to be commanding support for this idea, and the best information that I have now would be that it would be some time in September, and likely in London.



Mr. Nesbitt asked questions about Canada and the O.A.S. I have nothing further to add to this matter other than what I said when the Committee met last year. What I said last year I would repeat and stand by. There is no doubt that Latin America continues to be a region of great importance to Canada. We are on the same hemisphere. This is the most rapidly growing area in terms of population in the world. Latin America will have an estimated 600 million people at the end of the century. This has political and economic implications that we should consider. In 1965 we exported some \$315 million worth of products to Latin America. This is slightly down from the 1964 total of \$328 million, but it is in line with the general pattern of increasing these exports.

To illustrate the growth, I would point out that the value of our exports to Latin America in 1955 was \$172 million; in 1958, \$194 million; in 1962, \$237 million, and as I indicated a few moments ago, last year, \$316 million. But our interests are not only commercial. One of the greatest evidences of Canadian interest and concern is the number of Canadian missionaries serving in Latin America. There are close to 2,000 missionaries; including 1,750 Roman Catholic missionaries working in Latin America. These latter include parish priests, men and women in the teaching orders, nursing sisters and social workers. I do not have the statistics of the Canadian Protestant churches, but they are growing. For instance, the Baptist church has many representatives in Latin America, particularly in Bolivia. They have many hospitals and schools. This interest on the part of the churches in Canada—particularly the Christian denominations—reflects an increasing interest on the part of Canada in Latin America.

We belong to five of the subsidiary bodies of the Organization of American States. My own personal view on this subject is well known, and it continues to be my view. The general Canadian opinion, however, does not seem to support the view that we should immediately join the Organization of American States, and I gather that this seems to be the opinion of the main political parties. What is important is not so much the institutionalization of Canadian interest as much as an awareness of what the Organization of American States and what Latin America means to this country. There was some objection registered years ago on the part of countries like the United States and Great Britain with regard to Canadian participation. It is a matter of historical interest that in 1941, or thereabouts, the Canadian government of that day was prepared to join the Organization of American States. This was the government of Mackenzie King, but Mr. Hull, the United States Secretary of State, and Mr. Roosevelt, were as I recall it, opposed to Canadian membership at that time. While it would have been open to Canada to act on its own, undoubtedly the fact that the likelihood of an American veto was indicated influenced the decision not to join. It was also the view of Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom of the day that that would not have been a propitious moment for Canada to join the Organization of American States.

However, the situation as far as the present Canadian government is concerned continues to be as it has been.

We are having a conference with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries in early July. Two of these countries, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, have been giving consideration to this matter. We have had some discussions with them; these discussions are continuing, and they will be the subject matter of some discussion when we meet with them in the month of July at this



conference. We are not the only country, of course, that has been following closely developments in the O.A.S. We have noted the actions taken at the recent Rio conference. We had an observer there. There was a slight modification made in the qualifications for membership.

We, ourselves, are going to provide the site for the 8th American regional conference of the International Labour Organization when it meets in September this year. Next year there will be a meeting in Canada of the governors of the central banks of the American continent. This continues to be the pattern, a growing interest and participation by Canada in Latin American institutions. Last year we embarked for the first time on the field of external aid for Latin America when we made available soft loans. Thus far we have, out of the available amount, provided soft loans in the amount of \$20 million. Projects are coming forward; these are processed through the Inter-American Development Bank, which connection, of course, is in itself an indication of growing Canadian interest in the problems of Latin America.

Mr. NESBITT: In Latin America, Mr. Martin, are we not able to find any other projects except the ones we have in Chile, and so on?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We are examining them. The projects have to be examined. They must come to us first from the Inter-American Bank.

With regard to the General Assembly—

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Mr. Chairman, before the Minister leaves the Latin America area I wonder if I could ask a question or two.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Perhaps it would be easier to let Mr. Nesbitt finish his questioning. Mr. Brewin has also expressed the intention to ask questions. You would be next, Mr. Macquarrie. I believe it would be easier if we permit one member to finish his questioning first before we proceed to somebody else.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order; there will have to be some allocation of time with regard to questions, and also with regard to answers. There are quite a number of things we might discuss this morning and I think we should not; within the discretion of the Chairman, I think there should be some limitation on some of these things. I think we have gone almost long enough on this one topic.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have not finished yet. I am governed, of course by the questions Mr. Nesbitt asked. Mr. Nesbitt asked me eight questions; I can refuse or not deal with them just as you wish.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Short answers!

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Mr. Chairman, I do not care how long the answers are. I am inured to answers of various lengths, but I would reserve the right to inquire from the Minister on the area of Latin America before he departs from this either today or the next day.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I have no objection if you want to do it right now, Mr. Macquarrie.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: No, I do not want to interfere with the routine.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, on the prospects for the next General Assembly; we have recently had meetings in Ottawa with members of the United States delegation under the leadership of Mr. Goldberg, and with the British delegation under the leadership of Mrs. White, one of the Ministers of State for Foreign Affairs, and Lord Caradon, the British Ambassador to the United Nations. We have discussed with them some plans that they have, and we have been discussing with them some plans that we have. Ours centre essentially in the area of peacekeeping, on the matter of the peaceful settlement of disputes, on the China problem; on some of the economic and social programs in the United Nations and on the problem of Southwest Africa, in connection with which there will be a judgment of the International Court of Justice we anticipate at the end of July, together with some other problems in the African region, particularly Rhodesia. I think I have covered most of them now.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like, as Mr. Nesbitt did preface my question which is rather a general one by a brief statement. I want to direct my question to the situation in Europe. I know the Minister has just returned from the NATO council meetings in Brussels, and made a statement to us. Might I also preface my remarks by saying that I would like to congratulate the Minister on the part he apparently played in Brussels, and also take note of the Statement made by the Prime Minister at Springfield, I think it was, the other day, in which it seemed to me that our spokesmen were taking a refreshing independent line which I had not noticed before particularly. After having prefaced the remarks that way I have a couple of articles here that I want to call the Minister's attention to and ask for his comment on them because they both deal with the subject of future developments in NATO and in Europe. First there is an article by Walter Lippmann which was published in the *Ottawa Journal*, I think, on May 31. I just want to read a brief excerpt from it, and then from another article. Mr. Lippmann's article reads as follows:

The central purpose with the Gaullist enterprise is to make an opening to the east and to bring about a relief of tension, and increase the economic and cultural intercourse and an end to the cold war between the Soviet and western Europe—

—But General de Gaulle is going in the direction in which the Europeans want to go, and which they believe is the way to peace in Europe, to expanding trade and prosperity, and to the elimination of the most dangerous situation in Europe—the partition of Germany.

And then he goes on to make a comment about U.S. officials; although agreeing with this in theory, not identifying themselves with this European feeling that the time has come to bring the postwar era to an end.

Now, that is one quotation that I wanted to call to the Minister's attention, and another one is from an article by Professor McWhinney in the *Globe and Mail*, page 7, on June 6, under the heading of "NATO And the Warsaw Pact," with a subheading, "Has the time arrived for a new security system?" Professor McWhinney, after reviewing these chains of circumstances, what he calls the crisis within NATO, says this:

The wise approach seems to be to re-examine the original basis of NATO and the extent to which, if at all, it corresponds to present day European political realities.



My feeling is that the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should be accepted. The west should, however, make clear to the Soviet Union that any such NATO-Warsaw Pact accord should not be designed to hold the political status quo as it exists in Europe, but it should be accompanied by the formation of a joint European regional security council composed of representatives of both organizations, and charged with the responsibility of exploring methods for securing the ultimate liquidation or dissolution of both organizations.

Now, I brought these two quotations to the attention of the Minister because there was one feature of his report to the House that he made the other day that I found, as I think I said at the time, less than satisfactory. That was the statement at the NATO council meeting. There was general agreement, I think he said, in respect of the easing of east-west tensions and an agreement that this might be dealt with on a bilateral basis. I want to put this question to the Minister: If forgetting for a moment the position of the American government, although it is naturally all important, what is the Canadian government's attitude towards the necessity of dealing with the problems mentioned in the articles, the possibility of a non-aggression pact, the recognition of the need to deal with the whole problem of the security of Europe in a different manner from the past. There seems a great opportunity now, as suggested by these articles, and I wonder whether Canada is taking initiative in these respects and identifying itself with what appears to be the strong European tendency to try to liquidate the cold war and base the security of Europe and hence of the world on a different approach to a straight NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am familiar with Professor McWhinney's article. I cannot recall that I have read Mr. Lippmann's, but I likely have because I follow what he writes with interest. I think we are entering a new chapter in the international community in so far as east-west relations are concerned. Since Cuba there has been noticeable improvement in the relations between east and west, notwithstanding the fact that none of the major political problems, notably that of divided Germany have been resolved. There is a new revival of interest, and this is mutual, between east and west countries. Canada, of course, strongly shares the view that we must extend the détente, not only with the Soviet Union, but with the eastern European countries. The latter as well as the Soviet Union, give increasing evidence that they share this disposition.

I did not say in the House that the Canadian interest in this question would be pursued only bilaterally. What I did say was that we believed that the most effective way of pursuing an improvement in east-west relations was bilaterally, but that did not mean that our bilateral conduct as a member of NATO should not in turn be influenced by a disposition on the part of the NATO countries among themselves to take measures and agree on postures that would lead to an improvement in east-west relations. It is significant that in the communique of the last ministerial meeting we observed together, that is the 15 countries agreed and I quote: "the international situation the ministers discussed the relations of their countries with the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries." We also directed the permanent representatives to continue to examine closely the prospects for healthy development of east-west



relations and to prepare a full report on these questions for meetings to be attended as far as practicable by the foreign ministers of the various countries. This report, which would deal with all possible initiatives in this field, would cover *inter alia* problems connected with European security and German reunification.

● (11.31 a.m.)

The President of France will shortly be going to Moscow. We did receive in the NATO council a general indication of the nature of that important visit. We were also reminded that this visit was similar to those which have been undertaken at one time or another by other heads of government and foreign ministers, such as the present British Prime Minister, Mr. Spaak, and the British Foreign Secretary. In line with this trend I hope to go to the Soviet Union this year and take advantage of an invitation that has been extended by Mr. Gromyko—possibly in November.

On the question of a non-aggression pact, we do not really need one. We have a non-aggression pact now in the Charter of the United Nations. We do not need more covenants but a strong disposition to live up to commitments already made. However, if the problem posed by East Germany can be overcome, and subject to the agreement of our NATO partners, we would have no objection, in principle, to such an arrangement. I think all members in the NATO alliance, including France, subscribe to the view that everything must be done to promote an improvement of east-west relations.

Finally, I would simply say we are having visits ourselves to Canada this year by important personalities from the eastern European countries. We had a delegation from Czechoslovakia here yesterday and the day before. Members from our Parliament, as you know, Mr. Brewin, have gone to the Soviet Union and to Czechoslovakia. These contacts are all part of the process of getting to know one another better; and this is the direction towards which we are certainly directing our efforts.

Mr. BREWIN: Just one further question, Mr. Chairman; Someone called to my attention—I do not know whether this is accurate or not—that Mr. Averill Harriman was in Ottawa. Is this an official visit? Does he represent the President and will the opportunity be taken to discuss with him the possibility of moves towards negotiations in Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Harriman was here for a few hours yesterday afternoon. He saw the Prime Minister and me, and later some of my officials. We naturally discussed the question of Viet Nam, but that was not the primary purpose of the visit. We discussed primarily some matters that have to do with our NATO problem in the context of East-West relations.

Mr. BREWIN: Was any comment made—perhaps it is not suitable to tell us about them—about the Prime Minister's speech at Springfield.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Not to me. I would assume that if there were any comments they would be comments that would recognize the mature approach the Prime Minister takes on these matters.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I would like, Mr. Chairman, to revert to the subject of Latin America. I was impressed with the opening and informative aspect of the



Minister's remarks on the importance of this area. I may say that personally I was disheartened when he came to the conclusion—I hope I am wrong in believing—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You are never wrong, Mr. Macquarrie.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Thank you, Mr. Martin. I hope I am wrong in believing that he has given up his struggle to convince his cabinet colleagues that the course which he recommended, namely, membership in the O.A.S. was a good and proper course for our country to pursue. This is an old question, membership in the O.A.S. I did an M.A. thesis on this nearly 20 years ago, and I see that so far as I can tell the arguments are the same today as they were then. There has not been substantial movement on the governmental level.

Now, I have two or three questions that concern me. The Minister referred to 1941 and the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom. Surely, there is no question today that the government of all members in the O.A.S. would, far from opposing our membership, in fact, welcome it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would think that was the case as far as Canada is concerned.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: So the deterrent is from within.

I wonder where the Minister is able to read public opinion so strongly against our membership. I have been watching this for a long time and it strikes me there is certainly no ground swell of opinion for membership. There are small groups in our country opposed, small groups rather strongly in favour, and in between, a fairly large area of not very strong interest. Now, I have been watching the political platforms of various national parties and I think I am right in saying that up to the present time the only ones which have mentioned the subject at all have come out in favour of membership. And from such odd resolutions which one sees from gatherings of people interested in foreign affairs one would get a slight balance in favour of membership. I wonder if the Minister could tell us if he has some pipe line to a clearer expression of public opinion that indicates that this would be the kind of move which the Canadian people could not swallow, to use the vernacular. I would predict that—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This, of course, in itself should not be a reason one way or another for government policy.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I would not have mentioned it if you had not.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I know. I do not think I can add any more. My own views are similar to yours, they are well known. There is no sense hiding these, but I do not believe, however, that membership in the O.A.S. is the essential fact, in our attitude towards Latin America. I think it is a relevant fact, but I do not think the vital fact. The vital fact is that we are showing a very great interest now in Latin America. I must say, that my predecessor, Mr. Green, took some initiatives in this field in the expansion of the Canadian diplomatic service in Latin America. I think that was very heartening. I have already publicly in the House expressed my appreciation of what he did in this regard, and, we, ourselves, have extended our representation to cover all countries. We continue to participate increasingly in the subsidiary bodies of the organization. I think we have to bring home to ourselves and to our people how



important Latin America really is to the one country in the hemisphere that does not share fully in its institutional arrangements.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Is the Minister of the impression that this continuing flow of progress, membership in subsidiary bodies—and I do not know that we have taken a role in many more than, for instance, we were involved in three or four years ago.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In three more, including the Inter-American Development Bank.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: But has this moved us appreciably closer to the vital question of whether or not we accept our real responsibility as some of us see it as a member of this very important hemisphere body.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think it moves us necessarily closer to membership in the O.A.S. as such, but it certainly does extend our relations with Latin America.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Do you believe now that we can reveal and indicate our interest in Latin America in a meaningful way, as you have suggested, without membership?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes; I think so. I do not think that membership in the O.A.S. is so all-embracing that if we do not join it becomes a calamity.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Do you think it is less important than you used to think it was?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, no, I think it is very important, personally. But I do not think it is conclusive in itself. It would be a further demonstration of our interest in their affairs, but it is not a necessary decision for us to take immediately. It is necessary for us to take an interest in the hemisphere. We are dealing with subsidiary bodies because it is necessary for us to take advantage of trade possibilities and to afford Latin American countries likewise the opportunity of enjoying trade advantages with Canada. It is important politically in our effort to establish peace through collective action that we should show continuing interest in Latin America as we do in other regions of the world.

Now, this question that interests you particularly, Mr. Macquarrie, is very closely tied in with the position of the Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean, particularly Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: If they join, as is likely?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot say that I would use the word "likely" myself, but undoubtedly their participation in the O.A.S. would cause us to give accelerated interest to the matter.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: In that question of joining? There is still a ray of hope, I so believe.

The CHAIRMAN: Any more questions?

Mrs. WADDS: A supplementary to Mr. Macquarrie's interests. Does the Minister know if there is increasing general travel between Canada and Latin America, I mean the more southerly parts of Latin America, as indicative of the general interest?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes; there is. I do not have the statistics here but I was just looking at them the other day. You would be interested in knowing by the way, that yesterday the new ambassador for Brazil presented her credentials. The new ambassador will be the first woman ambassador to be a member of the Canadian diplomatic corps in Ottawa. I believe that I should say this in answer to a question put by you.

Mr. NESBITT: Are there any plans for any particular arrangements or special arrangements that the Minister might care to comment on concerning our relations with Mexico?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, as you know, our relations with Mexico are very close. We share many common views. I would hope that it would be possible for visits to take place shortly between the head of the Canadian government and the President of Mexico. There have been invitations for visits given by both countries and I hope that these will take place. I, myself, met and conferred with the foreign minister of Mexico at the United Nations last fall and we took advantage recently of a request made by the Mexican government for information about our International Joint Commission. In that connection I asked Mr. Arnold Heeney last winter to go to Mexico where he met with the foreign minister who was a former colleague of his when the foreign minister was ambassador for Mexico in Washington.

Mr. NESBITT: Mr. Martin, while this comes more particularly under the Speaker of the House perhaps than it comes under your department, there has been talk from time to time about building a parliamentary exchange with Mexico and I was wondering if you are in a position to make any observations in this regard.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think that anything that will encourage the continuous growing friendship between Mexico and Canada is desirable.

Mr. NESBITT: Including that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I would not want to comment. That is not my particular sphere of responsibility.

Mr. JOHNSTON: Mr. Martin, I would like to raise a question that I have raised before and it has been given fresh impetus by the report in the last two days of the shift in personnel as far as our ambassadors to various countries are concerned. This is the question of the divided responsibility of the ambassador to Japan who also functions as the new ambassador to Korea as well. This concerns me because on checking the list of embassy officials I find it seems that there is no other country—not a major country—that is as important to us as Japan is that is placed in the position of sharing an ambassador with another country. Also, as I understand it, development in South Korea is increasingly rapid, and thanks to various aid programs, industrialization is going ahead apace and I should think that country too would be growing increasingly important to Canada.

Now, when I raised the question before I have always been assured that the agreement was entirely acceptable to both of those nations, and this may well be so on the surface. Also that our interests were being extremely well handled with the present arrangement, but this I doubt. Within the last year, or a year



and a half, both the premiers of the two most westerly provinces have made—not state visits—visits to Japan, and I do know that there has been a feeling in western Canada that our interests, particularly, in trade with that country, had been neglected; that there has been something of a vacuum, and that the provinces have in effect moved into a vacuum and felt it necessary to carry on a greater relationship with Japan than one would ordinarily expect a provincial government to do.

● (11.50 a.m.)

The government, I know, on many occasions has referred to interest in the Pacific rim. The Minister of Finance speaking in my own constituency a month or so ago took great pains to stress the importance of our trade with that country. But, it seems to me that the present relationship that we have, and the divided responsibilities of the ambassador there, leave some doubt in the minds of people in the western provinces of the actual concern of this government for our Pacific rim relations.

Will there be a change there in the near future?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think there has been a continuing development on the part of successive Canadian governments in their relations with nations in Asia.

On the particular question of representation in Korea, it is true that our ambassador resident in Tokyo is accredited to Korea, just as Korea was up until a few months ago represented in an accredited way in Canada by their ambassador in Washington. Now, there is, of course, a resident ambassador here now.

In due course, I cannot say when, we will undoubtedly have a resident ambassador in Korea but there are a number of priorities that we have to consider. We have to expand our service in Africa, and this we are doing, but I want to take advantage of your question to strongly support what you have said about the importance of Canada as a country on the Pacific. We have through our Commonwealth interest, of course, had a long connection with the Commonwealth countries in Asia, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, and the countries in Australasia, Australia and New Zealand, and our long participation in the International Control Commission in the three Indo China countries, has given us an association with Viet Nam—north and south—Cambodia and Laos.

With Japan we, of course, have very close economic relations as well as a close political interest. Japan is our third trading customer. We have over \$500 million worth of trade with Japan. We have a favourable balance in our trade relations with that country. The former government established a Canada-Japan ministerial technique, with the result that one year Canadian ministers meet with their opposite numbers in Tokyo and the next year there is a meeting in Canada. This year we will be welcoming in the month of September the foreign minister of Japan together with the minister of finance, the minister of industry, the minister of fisheries and one other department yet to be indicated. We welcome these visits.

The fact that Japan is the only other country, other than the United States, with whom we have these annual ministerial confrontations is an indication of the importance that we attach to that important Asian power.



Our interest in the affairs of the Far East will obviously grow. We have, of course, an office in Hong Kong. Our commercial interests in the adjacent countries, of course, are well known. We have missions, as well—apart from the Commonwealth countries—in Indonesia, and of course in Malaysia—a Commonwealth country. As I said a moment ago we have a post in Hong Kong and one in the Philippines and in Singapore.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, if any other member of the Committee wants to ask a question I will be glad to postpone mine because I already had one.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe you are the only one.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would just like to note that you wrote me on this subject quite recently. I think we have exchanged correspondence.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I want to direct a question or two to the Minister on the subject of economic aid. I know we had Mr. Moran before the Committee and he gave a detailed account but there are some matters of policy on which I would like to direct some questions to the Minister. I would preface it by a quotation, which I am sure the Minister will be impressed with. It reads as follows:

International development is the greatest imperative of our time. There is no doubt in my mind that our generation will be judged in history on the success or failure of our efforts in this greatest human adventure of all time.

This is a quotation attributed to the Minister himself, so I preface my question with this in mind.

There are two or three matters about economic aid that I am not happy with. One is the scope, the extent of our contribution. I know that monetary terms are not the only way to measure the value of aid, and I recall Mr. Moran pouring some criticism on the suggested one per cent gross national product as a target. But, nevertheless, I would like to hear from the Minister why it is apparent that our aid, including every form of soft loan, is not expanding at the same rate as our gross national product. It remains at about half of the standards that have been set by international bodies of various sorts, and in that connection I want to call his attention to the statement by Mr. Escott Reid—he is, I think a principal now—Principal Escott Reid—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Made in Toronto?

Mr. BREWIN: No; this is a statement made in a United Nations Association publication and it says this:

If the bank is to continue to help its poor member countries most of its help must in future come in the form of interest free loans in the International Development Association, not interest bearing loans from the bank proper. The bank group can only do this if its wealthier member governments greatly increase their contribution to I.D.A. Governments are now giving I.D.A. \$250 million a year. I believe that I.D.A. could wisely use something like three times this amount. For Canada this would mean increasing its annual contribution to I.D.A. from \$15 million to \$45 million a year.



I would like to ask the Minister if consideration has been given to this suggestion from Mr. Escott Reid, who, as you all know, is a great expert in this field, and I would like to ask one further question with regard to economic aid.

In Britain it was found advisable to set up a separate department. I refer to a speech from the first minister of that department, Barbara Castle, and she in a statement said that the department of technical co-operation was relatively subordinate and economic aid from Britain was diffused among half a dozen government departments. Then she goes on to explain why it was found advisable to set up a separate department for overseas development and responsibility for all the different activities in this field.

I am wondering if the time has not come for Canada to consider whether, in view of the great importance that the Minister attributes to economic aid, rather than be a subordinate agent it should not be a separate department of government to emphasize the importance that should be attached to this field of international relations.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, on this last question, my own view would be the same as that of the Glassco Commission. I think that because of the foreign policy implications, and also because of the need of servicing foreign aid, which is done through our diplomatic missions, our judgment is, as was the judgment of the previous administration who did give consideration to this, that at the present time this should be a responsibility exercised under the secretary of State for External Affairs.

I strongly support your statement, of course, as is borne out in the quotation attributed to me that external aid represents a very important and necessary development in our time. Our foreign aid appropriations have increased two years ago they were almost doubled, and they will grow. Barbara Ward is the author of the suggestion that foreign aid should be in the amount of one per cent of gross national product. You are right in saying that among the countries in OECD we are certainly not among those that have approximated this figure. I think it is now being recognized that the UNCTAD standard is the one to which countries now should address themselves. This takes into account the position of net importers of capital such as Canada, and I think you will see that between now and 1970 there will be an annual increase in the amount of foreign aid given by Canada to the point that by 1970-71 we will approximate the standard of measurement which has been established by the United Nations Trade and Development Conference.

We have not only extended the amounts available which now this year roughly are in the neighbourhood of \$300 million, but these will be increased, I think, next year by another \$50 million. We have extended as well the areas of benefit. Our assistance is in the form of capital aid, in the form of commodity aid, and food aid, and in the form of technical and educational assistance to which we are paying increasing attention. We have extended our aid, bearing in mind the question of geographic distribution, to include countries in Africa—English-speaking countries as well as the Francophone countries. I am happy to note that there has been progress made in the agreement Canada made with France last December for a close liaison between Canada and that country in the assistance that is being given to the African Francophone countries.



There is no doubt that one of the challenging problems of our time is the obligation of countries like Canada to recognize that we cannot promote conditions of peace in the world unless we contribute to those measures that will increase the standard of living in most of the countries of the world whose standards of living are a way below those of the nations in the west.

We find that the instrument of the O.E.C.D. is becoming a very useful way of making sure that there is a greater rationalization and efficiency on aid matters among the donor countries in the world. There is developing more and more the idea of using the technique of the consortium where countries in the donor group get together, discuss their programs in anticipation of what they might do in the coming year so that there will not be duplication and so that gaps will be filled more efficiently. We ourselves, as I have said, will be gradually increasing the amount of assistance that we will be providing until we reach close to the level envisaged by UNCTAD.

With regard to the International Development Association, about which you asked a question, we have increased our annual contribution from \$7.9 million to \$15 million, in 1965, and we have pledged ourselves to maintain this level over the next two years. We are one of the major contributors to the International Development Association now. In addition, last year you will recall, through the soft loan program, we began to extend assistance on IDA terms to the hitherto neglected area of Latin America.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, I am a bit embarrassed, having been called out on a matter of urgency just at a very critical point in our discussion this morning, and the Minister knows how I dislike missing anything that he says.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am well aware of that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I missed his comment with regard to a question asked by Mr. Brewin about a speech recently made in Springfield, Massachusetts, by the Prime Minister, and I would not press for a repetition of the Minister's answer unless the Committee would permit.

I was wondering about the development in our relations with the United States; it seems to be a bit of change of attitude. Is it now permissible for all of us in Canada to take a very strong stand against American policy wherever it is in force throughout the world. In this particular instance, although I agree with the idea of an Atlantic alliance and I have been a member of the organization which has been sponsoring that for years, are we now in a position where we may safely take an anti-American attitude with regard to the situation as respects France and NATO?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I would say very strongly that it would be wrong for you to conclude that Canada had an anti-American attitude on any question. It would be obvious that two countries who are so closely connected geographically and otherwise, as we are with the United States, would have problems. We have between us more trade flowing over our borders than have any two countries in the world, some \$12 billion worth, with a favourable balance of \$1,300,000,000 roughly being on the side of the United States. This undoubtedly creates problems. You, as a former minister of the crown, would know that this is so, but it would be wrong to create the impression that there are not the closest bonds between Canada and the United States. I am sure that Mr. Rusk would agree that while the United States relations with other



countries in NATO are very close, they are not any closer than are the relations between Canada and the United States. This does not mean to say that we agree on all questions, we do not. We are an independent nation; we make our own policies. Our policies inevitably are influenced by our geographic propinquity to the United States, just as the United States in turn is influenced in her policies by her relations with other countries in NATO, and in other groupings to which the United States belongs.

We recognize the overwhelming responsibilities of the United States as the most powerful nation certainly in the western world, if not in the world. We seek to support the United States to the fullest extent possible, and we do, and this is recognized. When Mr. Harriman was here yesterday, and no one could speak of our relations with greater knowledge because of his long and distinguished association in the field of foreign affairs, he mentioned how friendly our relations were. He came to Ottawa on his way to another meeting yesterday, on short notice. We were happy to receive him along with some of his colleagues for general discussions. There was no formality in making the arrangements for our meeting, it was done on short notice, which, in itself, is a mark of the friendship that exists between our two countries.

We are closely associated with the United States in our affirmation of the need for NATO. We have supported the United States and the other 13 countries in NATO in our view of the need for an integrated force structure and integrated command. We have, at the same time, emphasized, as has France, the importance of the alliance, altogether apart from the integrated force structure. There would be no basis whatsoever for the implication in your question that there had been any change whatsoever in the basic attitude that Canada takes in her relations with the United States.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask a question at this time—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I may say that yesterday I found in the talks I had at noon with Mr. Harriman that we share basically the same ideas on the steps that should be taken to improve east-west relations.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Is there any instance in Canadian history of a Canadian Prime Minister entering a foreign country and criticizing the foreign policy of that country? I do not recall any particular instance.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not aware—if you are referring to the present Prime Minister—that he has at any time indulged in the kind of criticism which you say. If you are referring to his speech in Springfield on Saturday it would be well to note what that occasion was. This was the meeting of the Atlantic Union.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, I am aware of that.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, you will not mind, Mr. Churchill, if I impress on you the significance of that particular meeting. He was given an award for his long interest in the concept of the Atlantic Union. He took occasion in that speech to talk about long-term objectives maintaining an interest which he has displayed for many years. His views on this subject are of world wide interest. There was nothing that he said then on that occasion that he has not said before. His speech, of course, was not related specifically to the recent NATO meetings. It had to do with long-term objectives which are



embedded in the Canadian concept of the use that should be made of the alliance as a forerunner, we hope, to the expansion of the Atlantic community.

Mr. BREWIN: May I ask the Minister a supplementary—

Mr. CHURCHILL: "I come to bury Caesar" is the substance of your remarks.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What you have done is to try to bury Caesar, but unsuccessfully.

Mr. BREWIN: I may have misunderstood what the Prime Minister said or what he is reported to have said. Is the Prime Minister not identifying himself more or less with the point of view that has been expressed several times by the French government and by General de Gaulle, that there is some reason to doubt, under present conditions, the complete reliability of the nuclear protection of Europe. This surely is contrary to what our American friends have said, that there is no reason whatever to doubt the continuing validity of complete reliance upon the nuclear protection of Europe.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That would not be my precise interpretation of that speech.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, one other question: You will recall, Mr. Martin, a few weeks ago I asked you very innocently—I am surprised at the laughter from the Committee.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I wonder if you really think you could be innocent.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I asked you about the possibility of a more rapid rotation of our forces in Europe and you made a nice reply to that, and yet it aroused quite a bit of disturbance among our allies. Now, how much disturbance has been aroused by this much more important statement of the Prime Minister in the area in which you have been playing a dominant role for so long. Are you embarrassed by this?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have never been embarrassed by anything that the Prime Minister of Canada says. The disturbance to which you directed my attention was not over what I said but over your question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I did not realize that internationally I was of such importance.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You are much more important than you think. I found that out at The Hague when I told you in a complimentary way what the chauffeur to our ambassador had to say.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In fairness to Mr. Churchill I would not want this remark to be misconstrued.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It does not mean an inquiry?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What the chauffeur told me was a compliment.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh, I see, Well, encouraged by what you have said I would ask one final question.

In the course of your report to the House last week you mentioned the question of Germany and in the communique there are three references to the



reunification of Germany as one of the objectives of NATO. This appears now to be coming more to the fore than in the past. What progress is being made by NATO along this line.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think there is any perceptible progress.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But it remains as one of the main objectives of NATO?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It certainly does.

● (12.30 p.m.)

Mr. WALKER: The Minister was good enough to refer to the work of the parliamentary group—Commonwealth Parliamentary and the Interparliamentary Union—and this sort of thing. There is a great interest, I think, on the part of ordinary members of Parliament in this whole area of external relations and that is why they are joining associations. Unless it was just a compliment about the work that they are doing, is there any role at all—and certainly it would not be at the highly technical level—for members of these associations, some of whom, have become knowledgeable about external affairs? Is there any role at all for them—almost at the official level—in the work of your department or is there some feelings that amateurs would just gum up the works if they became involved in a highly technical area. I see a breach here, and I see a real desire on the part of members of Parliament to do something. I suppose everybody here thinks they would make a wonderful external affairs minister. Well there is only room for one. But, I am wondering if there is not a greater part that members of these parliamentary groups might play, at international conferences, maybe just as observers, but part of our delegation in this whole area of relationships.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think, Mr. Walker, there is a big role for members of Parliament in the field of international relations. After all, I suppose if we are looking for priorities in the kind of world in which we live there is no more important area where members should be given the opportunity of participation. We cannot resolve our domestic problems unless we have peace in the world; unless we have satisfactory international relations. The Canadian-American Parliamentary committee is a good example. I think we are all convinced of the value of the contacts we have with Senators and members of the House of Representatives in the United States. We are going to welcome the members of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association here in September. That will be an important meeting where foreign policy questions will be discussed and problems that affect The Commonwealth primarily but also that affect the Commonwealth indirectly. All Commonwealth countries are members of the international community. The subsidiary meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association serves a very useful forum.

I note the part that you yourself played in the meeting that was held in Jamaica about a year ago, together with the visits which you made to other Caribbean countries. The fact that we continue to send observers to the United Nations I think is a very important way of giving members an opportunity of learning about the problems that face the United Nations. There certainly is a role for the individual member of Parliament through these bodies and through other methods that will be devised.



We had some discussion at the recent NATO meeting of foreign ministers about the desirability of making the parliamentary body of NATO even more effective than it has been. This is something we might note tonight when the NATO parliamentarians meet. They are meeting, I think, under Canadian auspices at six o'clock.

I think that we might give some thought to the idea that the Prime Minister had in mind when he spoke in Springfield on Saturday. The Strasbourg arrangement is a great factor in the promotion of European unity, and it might be that we can envisage a similar institution with respect to the Atlantic concept that the Prime Minister has been talking about.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Item No 1 carry?

Mr. NESBITT: A brief question, Mr. Chairman: In the first meeting I believe we had after the Minister completed his remarks I asked the Minister a question at that time regarding at what stage the arrangements were with Poland concerning the settlement of property belonging to former Polish citizens who are now Canadian citizens. I was wondering if he had that information available.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Our discussions with Poland on the question of claims are continuing.

Mr. NESBITT: Yes; but how close is it getting to fruition?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I wish that we were closer to agreement. You will remember that you asked me a question on February 16, and I directed your attention at that time to an answer that I made in the House about that time when I said that repeated efforts had been made in the past by the Canadian government through diplomatic channels to achieve some progress towards a just settlement of these claims. We had discussions in Warsaw in 1965 between Canadian officials and Polish authorities with a view to reaching a preliminary agreement on a satisfactory basis for claims negotiations. As a result an understanding was reached whereby the Polish government agreed to enter into negotiations toward a lump sum settlement of Canadian claims on the basis of the same principles that applied in settlements which Poland has concluded with other countries.

I announced on September 1, 1965, that Canadians should submit details of their claims against Poland to the Department of External Affairs preparatory to the negotiations. The original deadline of January 1, 1966, which was set for the submission of claims to the Department was extended to May 1 of this year in response to numerous requests from interested persons. I take advantage of this to say that we are now cataloguing these further claims.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, before we go on with Item No. 1, am I right in thinking that this will conclude our review of the estimates.

The CHAIRMAN: That is correct. We will meet in camera to prepare our report to the House and we will discuss at that time the points that were raised yesterday at our subcommittee meeting.

Mr. BREWIN: I just wanted it to be understood, in passing Item No 1, it does not in any way preclude us from making a report which will provide us with further meetings to examine some of the matters the Minister has discussed with us from time to time.



The CHAIRMAN: That is my understanding, Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Mr. Chairman, just before you pass Item 1, I want to revert to a matter which admittedly minor but of some importance, that is, the annual report.

I know that the Minister is not responsible for this but would he restrain some member of his staff—some official—from having reprinted in the annual report every reference to speeches made by the Minister whether they are at Windsor or Winnipeg or Ogdensburg. We have endeavoured throughout the years to maintain a bit of unity with regard to external affairs. All parties have co-operated in that way and we have slight differences of opinion here and now. I know that under the heading of publications it is important for students of external affairs to know where to get material. But, under the circumstances, if you are going to list all the important statements made by the Minister—and all of his statements are important—you would almost have to list statements made by other members of this Committee, other members of the House of Commons, because there are different points of view. If the Minister will give me an assurance that he will revert in the annual report to the habit of other years when the Minister was “seen but not heard” with the frequency that now applies, I would not press the matter any further. I do not object to a picture or two of the Minister appearing in the annual report. It liven's it up, particularly if he is accompanied by some distinguished foreign minister.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Churchill, I will see whether or not there has been a change in the pattern.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh, I assure you there has. I have looked at 16 annual reports.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, if you give me the assurance I would accept it, subject of course to my examination. I would not want to mislead you in this reply. I would think that you would agree that statements made by whoever happens to be the Secretary of State for External Affairs represent government policy and it is only right that they should find their place in government publications. I cannot offer you any hope in that regard, but I will see whether or not it is as balanced as you think it ought to be.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well under the listing of speeches by the Minister perhaps if his name appears once and then they place the date underneath but—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I will try to get your name in more often.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh, I do not want my name in—

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Item No. 1 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Carried.

Item agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Shall Item L20 carry?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Carried.

Item agreed to.







The CHAIRMAN: Before we meet in camera I know the Committee would want me to thank our distinguished witness for his kind, enlightening and cheerful co-operation.

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OF  
PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

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LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House.*



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 10

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TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 1967

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Respecting

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs

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WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                              |                              |                  |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                 | Mr. Forrestall,              | Mr. Macquarrie,  |
| Mr. Andras,                  | Mr. Harkness,                | Mr. McIntosh,    |
| Mr. Asselin<br>(Charlevoix), | Mr. Hymmen,                  | Mr. Pelletier,   |
| Mr. Brewin,                  | Mr. Klein,                   | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Churchill,               | Mr. Lambert,                 | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Faulkner,                | Mr. Laprise,                 | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Forest,                  | Mr. Lind,                    | Mr. Walker—(24). |
|                              | Mr. Macdonald<br>(Rosedale), |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

Respecting

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs

WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.



MINUTE BOOKS  
ORDERS OF REFERENCE

THURSDAY, October 20, 1966.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Thompson be substituted for that of Mr. Johnston on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

TUESDAY, February 21, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the Report of the Department of External Affairs tabled on January 28, 1966, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

FRIDAY, March 17, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Lambert be substituted for that of Mrs. Wadds on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

FRIDAY, April 7, 1967.

*Ordered*,—That the name of Mr. Forrestall be substituted for that of Mr. Régimbal on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

ORDERS OF REFERENCE

THURSDAY, October 23, 1886

Ordered, That the name of Mr. Thompson be substituted for that of Mr. Johnston on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

And so forth.

Tuesday, February 21, 1887

Ordered, That the Report of the Department of External Affairs tabled on January 23, 1886, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Mr. ...  
Mr. ...  
Mr. ...  
FRIDAY, March 12, 1887

Ordered, That the name of Mr. Lambert be substituted for that of Mr. Wadda on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Mr. ...  
FRIDAY, April 7, 1887

Ordered, That the name of Mr. Fortesall be substituted for that of Mr. Réginald on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,

The Clerk of the House of Commons.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, April 11, 1967.

(11)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9.10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Allmand, Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Faulkner, Forest, Harkness, Klein, Lambert, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Stanbury, Thompson, Walker—(20).

*Also present:* Mr. Stafford.

*In attendance:* The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; *From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Chairman presented the fifth report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, which is as follows:

The Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met on Tuesday, March 14, 1967 at 1:40 p.m. with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dubé (Chairman), Brewin, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), and Nesbitt.

*Also present:* Mr. Patterson, M. P.

Mr. Dubé mentioned that the Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1965 had been referred to the Committee and read a letter from Mr. Allmand, M. P. respecting an on-the-spot investigation in Vietnam.

Following discussion, the Subcommittee agreed to recommend that:

- (a) The Committee meet as soon as possible after the Easter recess.
- (b) The Secretary of State for External Affairs be invited as the first witness.
- (c) After the Secretary of State for External Affairs gives his evidence, the Committee may decide what particular topics to discuss and call witnesses on that basis.

On motion of Mr. Forest, seconded by Mr. Pilon, the report was approved.

In accordance with its Order of Reference of February 21, 1967, the Committee then proceeded to consideration of the Annual Report (1965) of the Department of External Affairs. The Chairman invited the Minister to make an introductory statement.

The Minister made a statement on Vietnam, and was questioned.

The questioning continuing, at 11:40 a.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

# MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Tuesday, April 11, 1967  
(11)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 8:10 a.m. this day, the  
Chairman, Mr. Dube, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Alimand, Andrews, Brewin, Churchill, Dube,  
Faulkner, Forest, Harkness, Klein, Lambert, Lind, Macdonald (Rosedale),  
Macquarie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Standbury, Thompson, Wal-  
ker—(20).

Also present: Mr. Stafford.

In attendance: The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External  
Affairs; From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-  
Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Chairman presented the fifth report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda  
and Procedure, which is as follows:

The Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met on Tuesday, March  
14, 1967 at 1:40 p.m. with the following members in attendance: Messrs.  
Dube (Chairman), Brewin, Macdonald (Rosedale), and Nesbitt.

Also present: Mr. Patterson, M. P.

Mr. Dube mentioned that the Report of the Department of External  
Affairs, 1966 had been referred to the Committee and read a letter from  
Mr. Alimand, M. P. respecting an on-the-spot investigation in Vietnam.

Following discussion, the Sub-Committee agreed to recommend that:  
(a) The Committee meet as soon as possible after the Easter recess.

(b) The Secretary of State for External Affairs be invited as the first  
witness.

(c) After the Secretary of State for External Affairs gives his evidence,  
the Committee may decide what particular topics to discuss and call  
witnesses on that basis.

On motion of Mr. Forest, seconded by Mr. Pilon, the report was approved.

In accordance with its Order of Reference of February 21, 1967, the Com-  
mittee then proceeded to consideration of the Annual Report (1966) of the  
Department of External Affairs. The Chairman invited the Minister to make an  
introductory statement.

The Minister made a statement on Vietnam, and was questioned.

The questioning continuing at 11:40 a.m. the Committee adjourned to the  
call of the Chair.

Dorothy E. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

TUESDAY, April 11, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. We have a quorum which, as you know, is ten. We have more than ten members now. If it is agreeable to the Committee I will proceed with the Minutes of the Meeting of the Steering Committee.

Mr. CHURCHILL: May I ask how many are required for a quorum?

The CHAIRMAN: Ten; it has been reduced to ten and we have ten members here now.

*For report of subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of Tuesday, March 14, 1967 see Minutes of Proceedings.*

You have heard the Fifth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure. What is your pleasure? Will someone move that the report be adopted?

Mr. FOREST: I so move.

Mr. PILON: I second the motion.

The CHAIRMAN: It is moved by Mr. Forest and seconded by Mr. Pilon that the subcommittee report be adopted.

Mr. ALLMAND: In the Minutes you mention that you read my letter but you did not say if any decision was taken on it. Did you make any decision?

The CHAIRMAN: No, there was no decision made on it, Mr. Allmand. If it is the pleasure of the Committee we may decide that and discuss it at a future meeting.

Mr. ALLMAND: Very good.

The CHAIRMAN: All those in favour of the adoption of this report?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Motion agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN: Our order of reference was given to us in the House on February 21, and it reads:

*Ordered.*—That the Report of the Department of External Affairs tabled on January 28, 1966, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

The subcommittee suggested that the Honourable Mr. Paul Martin, the Minister of External Affairs, be the first witness and Mr. Martin is here this morning at your disposal. I believe he wishes to begin with a statement on Viet Nam. You may ask any and all questions on Viet Nam and then Mr. Martin will proceed to other topics.

Mr. LAMBERT: Do I take it that what you are referring to as the report is that of 1965?

The CHAIRMAN: That is correct.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I have before me the 1966 report under date of January 3, 1967, from the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Hon. Paul MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): At the time the resolution was passed in the House the last report was not available, so in order to get the Committee set up we used the report of 1965.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, I was just wondering, because I noticed in the section entitled "Defence Affairs", paragraphs 1, 2 and the last paragraph, and the first sentence of the third paragraph are identical in both reports.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. LAMBERT: Outside of just updating, is there a great difference?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I wonder if you should not announce publicly that you are a year behind in everything?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I leave that for your perspicacious observations.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think it is a bit ridiculous having to study the report of 1965 when we have in our possession the report of 1966 which is dated January 3, 1967. I like to be up to date.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Everyone recognizes that you are, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): The fact is that it was Mr. Churchill's colleagues who wanted the matter brought on and insisted on having it done before the 1966 report was available. I am glad Mr. Churchill has decided to come up to date finally, but the fact is that at the time the motion was passed it was not available. Perhaps if his colleagues would agree to co-operate we could, at some stage, arrange to have the 1966 report also referred by the House.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the purpose of having January 3, 1967, in this report and then telling us that it is not available?

The CHAIRMAN: On the date the report was referred to us in the House, the 1966 report was not available, so the motion was based on the 1965 report.

Mr. McINTOSH: What was the date?

The CHAIRMAN: It was February 21. If the Committee wishes we might request another motion but at the present time our Order of Reference concerns the 1965 report.

Mr. LAMBERT: I would move that we take the report as read as an interesting document and move to 1966. We will only be one year behind then.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Of course, we are confined to the reference of the House, Mr. Chairman, and I think we should abide by the rules with regard to reference by the House.

Mr. NESBITT: With regard to the reference by the House, did the resolution concerning the report of the Department of External Affairs actually specify the year?



The CHAIRMAN: Yes, 1965.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Is that not the date of tabling?

The CHAIRMAN: No. It reads as follows:

Ordered,—That the Report of the Department of External Affairs tabled on January 28, 1966...

The report tabled on that date was the 1965 report. Really, I do not see that it makes much difference; it is just a vehicle to enable the Committee to meet. Mr. Martin is here at your disposal and he will begin with a statement on Viet Nam and you may ask him any question you wish pertaining to his statement and then we can go on to other topics. Agreed?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

Mr. McINTOSH: As long as his statement covers the 1966 report also.

The CHAIRMAN: I presume that Mr. Martin will be up to date as usual.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the Steering Committee I understood had indicated that in asking me to come before you this morning, they wanted some statement on Viet Nam and NATO, among others, and I have prepared myself accordingly.

I would like to be able to tell the Committee that the prospects in Viet Nam are encouraging. In some respects I might be justified in saying that they are. I think there is reason to feel encouraged by the progress that is being made in South Viet Nam towards the facts of responsible government. In the wider perspective of the conflict, however, I must frankly confess that neither an end to the fighting nor the outlines of a political solution are as yet within sight.

This morning I would like to do three things. First, I would like to set out what we know of the positions of the parties as they have emerged over the past year or so. I would then like to explore whether there is any basis on which it might be possible to break out of the present impasse. Then I would like to set out some of the elements which we see as forming part of an eventual accommodation in Viet Nam.

I believe it would be useful to restate briefly some of the salient points of the Canadian position in relation to the Viet Nam conflict because I think there has been a good deal of misunderstanding about the Canadian position of the war in Viet Nam.

The first point which I think needs to be made in that regard is that Canada has no direct national interest to assert or maintain in Southeast Asia. Nor do we have any formal military or other commitments there. If we have been drawn into that part of the world, it has been solely as citizens of the wider international community. What we are doing in Southeast Asia is twofold: we are there on a peacekeeping mission on behalf of countries which do have a direct national interest there; and we are also there as a contributor to the collective effort to meet the rising expectations of the people in that region for a better life.

Second, there are responsibilities which we have in Viet Nam as a member of the International Supervisory and Control Commission. We have endeavoured to carry out these responsibilities with fairness and impartiality and we propose to continue to do so. I would be the last to deny that the course of events in Viet Nam has in some important respects overtaken the mandate of the Commission. But there is agreement among all the parties that, as the representative of the



Geneva powers, the Commission cannot simply wash its hands of the situation. There is also agreement that the Commission will have a role to play in the context of any final settlement and, possibly, in helping to pave the way for such a settlement.

Third, apart from whatever role Canada may be able to play as a member of the Commission, we have tried to use our national influence in promoting the cause of peace in Viet Nam. We have done this on the basis of our close relations with the United States and the access we have to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in Hanoi as well, of course, as the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam in the south. There is one thing of which I am sure and it is this: if our efforts are to be of any avail, they must be used within the limits of what the situation suggests to be realistic. They are best directed towards arriving at some common denominator which the parties themselves are prepared to accept as reasonable. We will neither bludgeon nor shame the parties into accepting a course of policy which they regard as being contrary to their national interest. And this is something which, with respect, I would comment to those in Canada who would have us follow a course different from the one we have been following.

Fourth, the Canadian Government has made it clear that it is prepared to make its own contribution to an eventual settlement in Viet Nam. Such a settlement is almost bound to involve some form of international presence which will afford the parties involved the necessary guarantees that the terms of the settlement are being fairly and effectively carried out. If, in the light of our first-hand experience of the Viet Nam problem over 13 years, Canada were to be asked to participate in an international peacekeeping effort in Viet Nam, under the auspices of the Geneva powers or under those of the United Nations, if that were possible, would be prepared to recommend to my colleagues in the government that we accept such a responsibility within the limits of our capacity. We have also recognized for some time that, in the aftermath of any settlement, it is likely to be necessary for interested countries to mount a collective effort for the economic recovery and rehabilitation of all parts of Viet Nam and the other portions of the Indo-China region. I want to remind the Committee that our commitment to contribute to such an effort is a matter of record and that we will meet that commitment when the time comes. Our commitment was made at about the time when President Johnson made his Johns Hopkins speech about a year ago.

So much for the Canadian position in relation to the conflict.

It is now almost exactly two years since the major parties to the Viet Nam conflict began publicly to define their positions in regard to a settlement of the conflict. In the case of the United States I would date that process as having been initiated by the President in his address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965 when he first announced the willingness of the United States to enter into unconditional discussions with the other side. Almost by coincidence, the first public definition of the Government of North Viet Nam was given by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on the following day, April 8, 1965, in a report to the North Vietnamese National Assembly. The position then set forth took the form of the now familiar four points to which, to my knowledge, the Government of North Viet Nam remains committed.



In a sense, therefore, it may be said that a process of public negotiation has been in progress between these two governments over the past twenty-four months. I think this process has been useful and encouraging. At the same time we have always recognized that there were limits to this process and that, sooner or later, efforts would have to be made by third parties to bring the two sides into some form of direct contact.

As the Committee is aware, that was the essential purpose of the two missions which Mr. Chester Ronning undertook on behalf of the Canadian Government in March and June of 1966. Put in its simplest terms, what we asked Mr. Ronning to explore in the course of those two visits was whether there was any minimal basis on which it might be possible to arrange for bilateral contact between representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam without commitments of any kind on either side. This seemed to us at the time and still seems to me to be a valid approach. The issues at stake in Viet Nam are such that no third party could probably presume to negotiate them on behalf of one side or the other. Nor, I think, would such a course be acceptable to the parties to the present conflict. And if that is so, the conclusion which necessarily follows is that the efforts of third parties are best directed towards enabling the parties themselves to enter into such a negotiation at the earliest possible moment and before the mounting lack of confidence on both sides makes the possibilities of peaceful accommodation in Viet Nam recede beyond reach.

In the discussions which Mr. Ronning had with the Prime Minister and other senior personalities of North Viet Nam, it became apparent that as far as the North Vietnamese were concerned the bombing of North Viet Nam represented the key to any efforts which might be made to bring the two sides into direct informal contact. The conclusion I reached in the light of Mr. Ronning's first visit to North Viet Nam in March of last year, has since been borne out in the official public statements of the Government of North Viet Nam. I think therefore, it would be useful if I were to try to say something more about the North Vietnamese position on this subject as I understand it, in the light of the Ronning visits, in the light of the several visits made by two of our Commissioners and of other visits by personnel of the Canadian delegation on the Viet Nam Commission.

As the Committee is aware, the Foreign Minister of North Viet Nam, in an interview with the Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett in January of this year, explained the position of the North in these terms. He said:

"If (the United States) really wants talks, it must first halt unconditionally the bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. It is only after the unconditional cessation of United States bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam that there could be talks between the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the United States".

I do not want to suggest to the Committee that this is the whole position of the Government of North Viet Nam as regards a solution of the Viet Nam conflict. As far as that is concerned, the Government of North Viet Nam I freely acknowledge continues to stand by its four-point program which it regards as reflecting the fundamental principles and provisions of the Geneva settlement of 1954 and as representing the most correct political solution of the Viet Nam problem. It is only in respect of finding a basis for bilateral contact between the United States



and North Viet Nam that the matter of the cessation of bombing has been put forward as a prior and unilateral condition. I do not think this was made public until some time after it was disclosed to the government of Canada by Mr. Ronning.

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether, if there was a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam, this would have to be permanent as well as unconditional. The Committee will note that in the passage I quoted from the interview given by the Foreign Minister of North Viet Nam only the word "Unconditional" appears. The same is true of a similar passage which occurs in President Ho Chi Minh's reply of February 15 of this year to the President of the United States. I am bound to say, however, that in other passages both in the Foreign Minister's interview and in President Ho Chi Minh's message to President Johnson the word "definitive" is used along with the word "unconditional"—"definitive and unconditional", in setting out the requirements of the Government of North Viet Nam on this subject. Furthermore, if there was any lingering doubt on this score, it was removed by the North Vietnamese representative in Paris in a conversation with reporters from the *New York Times* on February 22 of this year. In that conversation the North Vietnamese representative is quoted as saying that any cessation of the bombing which was not clearly labelled as permanent and unconditional would leave the threat of bombing intact and would thus constitute an unacceptable interference with whatever talks might then be in progress between the two sides. When he was asked how a distinction could be made in practice between a temporary and a permanent halt to the bombing, the North Vietnamese representative answered that the United States would have to declare at the outset that the halt was both permanent and unconditional.

There has also been some question as to whether Hanoi would require the United States to accept its four-point program before being willing to enter into any direct talks with them. On the basis of what Prime Minister Pham Van Dong told Mr. Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times* at the beginning of January this year, I would judge that acceptance of the four points would not be regarded by North Viet Nam as a precondition to such talks, and indeed, without revealing the nature of Mr. Ronning's conversations, it was my impression from the date of his first visit, that this was the case. I have no doubt, however, that the four points must, in the eyes of the north, form the basis of any negotiation as far as they are concerned.

To summarize, therefore, the North Vietnamese position is as follows, and I think it is important that we clearly understand this if we are going to see what the problem is and how it is to be faced: If the United States ceases the bombing and all other military action against North Viet Nam permanently and without condition, the Government of North Viet Nam would be prepared to enter into direct talks with representatives of the United States. The further information we have suggests that such talks could be initiated within a reasonable interval after the cessation of the bombing, such an interval being presumably required by the North Vietnamese to give effect to their argument that the holding of talks would not, in fact, be regarded as a "condition" of the cessation of the bombing.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lambert, on a point of order.



Mr. LAMBERT: I do not want to appear difficult, Mr. Chairman, but I find, in the complexity of this statement on which we are to question the Minister, that copies of the statement are available in this room which have been distributed to other than the members of the Committee and I think this is quite wrong. If we are to make our notes to question the Minister intelligently, why should we not have the statement? Why should it be handed out to other people in the room before it is handed to the members of the Committee? The answer we get is that it will be distributed after the Minister has finished his statement. I think this is an insulting position to take. Everyone should have this statement. In other committees when ministers are making statements, the courtesy is extended to the members of the committee to have the statement as the minister reads it. This is not an undisguised press conference.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We do not have any objection. I do not think there is any issue here at all.

Mr. LAMBERT: Why should we have to raise it?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let me speak to this point of order. The Minister says there is no issue here. There certainly is an issue. If this is an undisguised press conference we might just as well adjourn and let the Minister carry on with the press. Surely to goodness we are entitled to the full information instead of this roundabout way of doing it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Churchill, we are dealing with a very important matter—

Mr. CHURCHILL: Exactly; that is why I am speaking to the point of order.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): —to which we have given a great deal of attention. It is a matter that affects all of us and all of the people in our country and in the world at this time. I assure you that there is no desire to prevent your fully appreciating the significance of what we are saying here this morning.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This is the whole point, here.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am very glad to accede to your request.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would think the Minister would be more than glad to accede to our request. I think he might very well apologize to the Committee for this type of treatment.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe the statement is being distributed now.

Mr. McINTOSH: May we ask what page the Minister has reached?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am at page 8. I must say that I have made some changes in the earlier pages as we were going along and there will be some further changes.

Mr. McINTOSH: Fine.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am reading from page 8, the first paragraph.

I think it is only fair that I should set out the United States reaction to this proposition which I understand is as follows. As regards the matter of talks, the United States Government would be prepared to enter into such talks with representatives of the Government of North Viet Nam at any time and without any prior condition whatsoever. This was the statement made by the President



two years ago when an appeal was made to him by the non-aligned countries. As regards the matter of a reduction in the scale of hostilities, the United States would be prepared to discuss such a reduction on a basis of some kind of reciprocity. What the United States is not prepared to do, so far as I understand it, and know it, is to discontinue for good what they regard as a significant aspect of their military activity in Viet Nam in return for a mere undertaking on the North Vietnamese side to enter into bilateral talks.

I would like to say something at this point about the recent series of proposals put forward by the Secretary-General for a halt to the conflict in Viet Nam. Some thirteen months ago U Thant first developed a proposition which envisaged the following three steps: a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam by the United States; a mutual de-escalation on the ground in South Viet Nam by both sides; a negotiation involving all the parties which are actually fighting in Viet Nam, that is to say, including the Viet Cong.

The Government of North Viet Nam, to the best of my knowledge, has not objected to the first and third points of the proposal of the Secretary-General. On the other hand, it is now clear that they do not accept the second point, which envisages a mutual de-escalation in the South.

The reply of the United States to these proposals was made by Mr. Goldberg in the General Assembly on September 22 last. As I interpret that reply, it expressed the willingness of the United States to stop the bombing of the North as a prior and unilateral act on the understanding, which could be conveyed in public or in private, that there would be a measure of reciprocity on the other side within a given interval of time. The United States also reiterated at that time that they did not regard the problem of affording the Viet Cong an opportunity to make their views heard at any future conference as insurmountable, and indeed, before September 22 the President himself, in Washington, in the month of July, said that this was not an insurmountable problem.

In the light of these reactions, the Secretary-General apparently decided that an adaptation of his proposals might be able to overcome the difficulties which the parties evidently had in accepting them in their original form. Accordingly, he discussed with representatives of North Viet Nam in Rangoon and subsequently formulated in writing, on March 14, an adaptation of his original proposals on the following lines: (1) there would be a general stand-still truce by all parties to the conflict; (2) the parties directly involved in the conflict would then enter into preliminary talks, with or without the assistance of the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1954 and/or the members of the International Commission, the purpose of such talks being to reach agreement on the terms and conditions for reconvening the Geneva Conference; (3) these preliminary talks would be followed by the holding of the actual conference with the participation of all those who are actually fighting and with the object of returning to the essentials of the Geneva settlement.

These revised proposals were accepted in their essentials by the United States. In accepting these proposals in an aide-mémoire on March 18, the United States pointed out, that they would expect the Government of South Viet Nam to be appropriately involved throughout the entire process envisaged by the Secretary-General. They also implied that a stand-still cease-fire could not be automatically brought about without prior discussion either directly by the



two sides or through some other channel. The note indicated that the United States, for its part, was prepared to enter into such discussions without delay.

I have not seen the reply made to the Secretary-General's proposal by the Government of North Viet Nam. The Secretary-General is now in Asia. I hope to be seeing him within the next week or so when I may have an opportunity to discuss the varied replies with him. But subject to that, I would give it as my understanding that the Secretary General's proposals did not commend themselves to North Vietnamese Government to the extent that they appeared to place the United States and North Viet Nam on the same basis whereas it is the contention of the Government of the North that a distinction must be drawn between the United States as the "aggressor" and North Viet Nam as the "victim of the aggression".

It is my understanding that the Secretary-General still stands by the proposals he put forward on March 14, notwithstanding his recent exhortation. I am told on the best of authority that he would not want his more recent public comment on a speech by Senator Joseph Clark to the National Convention of Americans for Democratic Action to be regarded as representing a new proposal or appeal. In view of the great dangers inherent in the continuation of the present conflict, the Secretary General appears to have come to the conclusion that it might be necessary for his own proposals to be given at least initial effect by a unilateral initiative on one side or the other. And it was presumably with these considerations in mind that he gave his personal endorsement to Senator Clark's suggestion that the United States give a unilateral undertaking to put a standstill cease-fire into effect and thereafter to fire only if fired upon.

The Canadian position has already been stated in the House of Commons. I would like to reiterate that we have maintained all along that the settlement of this conflict will require concessions on both sides. I believe that this is a view which is widely shared regardless of how the rights and wrongs of the Vietnam are interpreted. In response to those who have asked the Government to dissociate itself from the bombing of North Viet Nam by the United States, we have made it clear that we would indeed, like to see the bombing stopped, but that we would also like to see the infiltration stopped, and that we would like to see negotiations looking towards the peaceful solution of this conflict begun. As I indicated to the House of Commons on April 4, it is from this general perspective that we endorsed the Secretary-General's proposal of March 14 and that we shall continue to judge all proposals which are aimed at putting a halt to the fighting in Viet Nam.

As far as the Canadian Government is concerned, Mr. Chairman, we will continue our diplomatic efforts to try to establish a basis on which the two sides might be brought together. There is, of course, no dearth of formulas for trying to do that. But the fact remains that the test of any such formula is its acceptability to both sides. This has been the experience of the Secretary-General; it has been our own experience; and it has been the experience of other countries which have tried to play a helpful part in this matter.

This does not mean that any of those who have tried to lend their good offices to the parties intend to abandon this effort. Certainly, as far as Canada is concerned, I can assure the Committee that we have no intention of doing that. The question that arises is whether there is any new direction which it might be worth exploring now in the hope that it might avoid the impasse which has



apparently now been reached and which has brought us to the point where, for the first time in some sixteen months, no new initiatives, either public or private, appear to be within sight. I would just make the observation that the proposal of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, which it is reported was discussed with the Secretary General within the last few hours, is a proposal that became known some days ago.

It seems to me that, in trying to bring this conflict to a halt, the same principle may be applicable which we have found, in practice, to be applicable to the process of general and complete disarmament. In essence, that principle is that there must be a condition of parity between the two sides at all stages of the process. That is to say, care would have to be taken to avoid a situation where either side is placed or considers itself to be placed in a position of relative disadvantage at any given stage.

With this in mind, I wonder whether it might not be worthwhile to take another look at some of the terms of the 1954 Agreement. The core of that Agreement lies in the concept of a cease-fire and a disengagement of forces. That is what we are seeking today as a first priority.

That is what I said in the first statement I made on Vietnam; the objective of the Canadian government was to see a cease-fire. Would it be going too far to suggest that some thought might now be given to the possibility of discussing a stage by stage return to the Geneva cease-fire arrangements as a first step towards a more permanent settlement which would necessarily have to encompass many other factors.

This could be done by drawing on Chapter 1 of the Geneva Agreement as regards the demilitarized zone provisions (Articles 1 to 9) and on Articles 16, 17 and 19 among others. Now, of course, the cease-fire arrangements are only one aspect of the Geneva settlement and I recognize the difficulty of trying to persuade the parties to return to one aspect of the settlement in the absence of some preliminary understandings at least as regards the basis on which the other, and more intractable aspects of the settlement might be tackled in a subsequent negotiation. Accordingly, it may well be necessary to envisage a progressive re-application of the 1954 cease-fire terms as an agreed preliminary to direct discussions between the two sides and as something which would of itself help to create a favourable climate for such discussions.

If there were any merit in this approach, I could envisage it being carried out in four stages.

The first step should involve some degree of physical disengagement of the parties. This might be accomplished by restoring the demilitarized character of the zone on either side of the seventeenth parallel by the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies and equipment from that zone, by enforcing a prohibition against any artillery action across the zone, and by barring any overflights of the zone except for purpose of impartial supervision. At the same time, it would be necessary to reactivate those provisions of the cease-fire agreements which will be found in Article 19 of the Geneva Agreements which prohibit either North or South Vietnam to be used for the carrying out of hostile acts against the other. In my view this would in equity have to include the bombing and any other military action against North Vietnam, whether actually undertaken from South Vietnam or from some other point of origin.



Second, I think it would be necessary to freeze the course of military events in Vietnam at its present level. This might involve undertakings on both sides not to engage in any military activities which differed in either scale or pattern from the activities which are currently being engaged in.

It might also entail the practical reapplication, as from an agreed point in time, of those articles of the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement Articles 16 and 17 which prohibit reinforcement of troops or arms, munitions and other war material into North or South Viet Nam from any source or quarter.

The third stage of such an approach would logically involve the cessation of all hostilities between the parties, whether on the ground, at sea or in the air.

The fourth and final stage would complete the process of return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva settlement. At that stage, provision would have to be made for the liberation and repatriation of prisoners, for the withdrawal of all outside forces whose presence in the area of conflict was not provided for at Geneva, and for the dismantling of military bases or their conversion to peaceful uses.

Now, I would like to make it clear at this stage that I have not put forward, and am not putting forward now, these suggestions in the form of a set of proposals. I have been concerned to sketch out one line of approach to ending the present conflict which seems practicable to me and which, in addition, has behind it the sanction of the Geneva arrangements to which both sides say that they continue to subscribe.

Any such approach, however, would clearly have to be acceptable to the parties concerned. I want to be perfectly frank with the Committee and say that, on present evidence, I am not optimistic on that score. For while it is true that both sides are prepared to subscribe to the objective of a return to the Geneva arrangements, I am not so sure that they are at one in their interpretation of what that objective implies or as to the means by which it can be achieved. In particular, of course, we cannot be unmindful of the position of the Government of North Viet Nam which is that they cannot, they say, accept any proposal which treats both sides on a basis of strict equity because this would ignore the factor of responsibility for the conflict as they see it.

If this approach or any variant were to commend itself to the parties, the International Control Commission might have a special role to play in translating these general ideas into concrete proposals and, in due course, providing the required guarantees that they were being properly implemented on both sides. I would also want to point out that this particular approach is one which the Commission might be fully justified in putting to the parties and to the other members of the Geneva Conference who have an obvious interest in any proposal designed to ensure that the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam is respected.

There is one other point which I should like to make to the Committee. We have said consistently that we regard a purely military solution of the conflict in Viet Nam as neither practicable nor desirable. I would like to take that proposition a step further and say that on the basis of all the knowledge I have of the proposals that have been made and the initiatives that have been taken over the past sixteen months, I am doubtful if it will be possible to solve the purely military aspects of this conflict without at the same time tackling the political questions which lie at the root of it. As I have already suggested, this applies to



the approach I have outlined to the Committee as it would to any other approach to this issue.

The simple fact is that these aspects are inter-related and that progress on one front may well depend on progress being made on the other. I think that the experience of the Secretary-General bears this out. On the face of it a stand-still cease-fire as he proposes does not look as if it should involve any inordinate problems for either side if there was a willingness in principle to stop the fighting. On second thought, however, it will appear that such a ceasefire does pose problems for both sides to the point where one side cannot envisage such a move being made without prior discussion, if not negotiation, while the other cannot apparently see it being made at all in present circumstances. What happens to the Vietcong, for instance? This would be very much in the minds of both sides. It is my considered view that, apart from any possible military problems, there are political problems posed by this proposal which are such as to have a bearing on the terms on which this conflict may eventually be solved.

The underlying political issue as I see it are the ultimate political arrangements in South Viet Nam and the willingness of others to allow these to be worked out by the South Vietnamese people without—interference from any quarter. One aspect of this issue, is of course, the status of the Viet Cong. What is at stake here is not really their representation at any eventual conference table but the terms of their participation within the ultimate political structure of the country. These are the really crucial points which will have to be resolved and of which, I am afraid, the positions of the parties are as far apart as ever.

It is not for Canada, or for any other country, I believe, to prescribe to the South Vietnamese people how to order their affairs. I have made it clear that we regard a continuance of the present division of Viet Nam into two communities as probably unavoidable for the time being if only to allow the scars which have been opened by the conflicts of the past quarter century to heal and for new dispositions to be agreed for the eventual reunification of Viet Nam. It will be for the people in the two parts of Viet Nam to decide how soon and under what conditions the first steps towards reunification can reasonably be taken. I am convinced that there is a basic desire for reunification in Viet Nam as there is in other divided countries. At the same time, it seems to me on the basis of recent statements that there is also a realistic appreciation by both sides that reunification is not something which is likely to be accomplished overnight.

Whatever the prospects of early progress toward actual reunification, I would hope that, once the hostilities have ceased, a basis can be laid for a genuine reconciliation between the two communities. This will not come about quickly or easily. But I am sure there is much to be said for the early opening of channels which respond to the interests of the people of Viet Nam on both sides of the temporary dividing line. I have in mind, in particular, such matters as the reunification of families, the establishment of at least minimum facilities of communication, and the institution of commercial exchanges on a basis of mutual advantage. It is around such a nucleus of common interest that I believe the foundations for the eventual reunification can most securely be laid. And if any international presence in Viet Nam could lend its good offices in that direction, whether it be under the auspices of the Asian powers themselves, the United Nations or the Geneva framework, I would hope that this is something which could be explored.



I have already had occasion to comment on recent constitutional developments in South Viet Nam. We welcome these developments which are likely to culminate in the election of a genuinely representative government before the end of the current year. We would like to think that, once hostilities have ceased and a settlement of the present conflict has been reached, the constitutional structure that is currently being evolved will be strong enough and flexible enough to accommodate all segments of the South Vietnamese people who are prepared to play their peaceful part in the political life of South Viet Nam.

When I spoke in the House on this subject, a few weeks ago, I said that I could see merit in proposals which are being made for the neutralization, in due course, not only of Viet Nam but possibly of a wider area in Southeast Asia. I continue to think that such proposals may well offer a promising basis for political arrangements in that area. I think it important, however, that whatever arrangements are ultimately arrived at, they cannot be imposed on the countries of the area against their will. They must be such as to reflect the genuinely held preferences of these countries based on an assessment, which each country can only make for itself, as to the course which is most likely to serve its own best interests and those of the area where it is situated.

I cannot say that I assess the prospects in the short term any too hopefully. I say this because so far the simple formula which will bring the two sides together without raising other intractable issues has eluded all who have tried. I can assure the Committee, however, that the government remains committed to the search for a solution of this conflict and is engaged in doing so. I am in close touch with the representatives of all countries which may be in a position to help, in particular, of course, our two Commission partners whose ambassadors are in this Committee room this morning and with whom we hope it will be possible to concert our efforts in the right circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Mr. Stanbury will be first. Do you have a question, Mr. Stanbury?

Mr. STANBURY: Mr. Martin, the line of approach which you have outlined this morning, I gather, has already been discussed with our fellow members of the Commission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. STANBURY: Are there plans to put before the Commission this line of approach?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I thought it would be useful to make this statement available at this time. Those concerned will now have public knowledge of it. In a matter like this, the Commission of course, cannot act except by unanimity. There may even be some question as to the juridical authority for the Commission, as such, to act at all, although there can be no doubt about the capacity of the three countries constituting themselves into an informal grouping to make proposals of this kind.

Mr. STANBURY: In fact, I suppose there is a question about juridical authority of any group so to act?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What I meant Mr. Stanbury, was that under the Geneva agreement there is no legal basis for the International Commission to undertake the kind of role that Canada suggested some 13 months ago. We never



argued that there was. Our proposition was simply that the three countries with their pattern of experience in Indo-China presented a normal and potentially useful vehicle for the kind of process that we envisaged; there was nothing to prevent them, as three sovereign powers, from agreeing to undertake to act together in the pursuit of the kind of role envisaged. I think the situation is exactly that today, but the acceptance of our proposition is one that depends upon full concurrence by all three members.

Mr. STANBURY: You do see the Commission as a logical starting point from which this line of approach might be developed?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, I do.

Mr. STANBURY: Will the Canadian Mission to the UN find any means of promoting this line of approach through its new position on the Security Council? Do you see any opportunity to initiate, through the Security Council, a line of approach of this kind?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not see much opportunity on the Security Council. The Security Council is not seized with the approach I have envisaged. It has no authority on these particular problems because of the fact that a number of the countries involved are not members of the United Nations. There would, of course, be nothing to prevent our ambassador from discussing this matter with the ambassadors of countries represented in the United Nations who are on the Commission. However, I would envisage that the examination of the problem which I made this morning will now be available for consideration, not only by members of the Commission but by others, and I will have an opportunity in the course of the next few days to discuss this with representatives of the countries on the Commission.

Mr. STANBURY: Have you had an opportunity to discuss it yet with the Secretary-General of the UN?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I have not had an opportunity of discussing this in precise terms with the Secretary-General. I have discussed, from time to time, various aspects of this problem with him including a solution based on the Geneva agreement.

Mr. STANBURY: I presume that discussions with the Secretary-General would be one means of attempting to promote this line of approach, but, as I understand it, your present intention is that the Commission itself might be the base from which this line of approach would be promoted.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It would be one of the bases. As I said earlier, I do not believe, at the present time, this suggested procedure will be entirely acceptable to both sides. I cannot say that I am aware that it will be acceptable at this stage to any side, but I do envisage it as an approach to a solution. It is because for certain reasons we were anxious to have an examination made of it that we felt it desirable to spell out in this way provisions that are well known, that are in the Agreement and that provide a suggested course that might lead us to the solution. At some later time, it might become acceptable.

Mr. STANBURY: Mr. Martin, you said right at the beginning of your statement that one of our prime concerns was the making of a contribution to a better life for the people in Viet Nam. I think we would all concur with that. I wonder



if you could tell the Committee very briefly exactly what Canada has done thus far in this vein.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the first place, when President Johnson made his Johns Hopkins' speech, he said that at the end of hostilities the United States would embark on a billion dollar program of reconstruction and rehabilitation. We indicated that we ourselves would agree to take part in such a program. I think we are the only country that, thus far, has committed itself to this post-war reconstruction. In addition to that, of course, we have already made expenditure on Mekong development of some \$2.5 million beginning to the outbreak of the present phase of hostilities.

With regard to what we have done in terms of external aid to Viet Nam—do I take it that that is your question?

Mr. STANBURY: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have provided, since 1953 when Canadian aid to Viet Nam began, some \$5.8 million in development assistance. Our aid allocation for South Viet Nam at the present time is \$2 million as compared to \$1.2 million last year.

At the present time we are providing the Quang Ngai TB clinic, which involves the construction and furnishing of a TB outpatient clinic at the provincial hospital at Quang Ngai as well as the supply of medical personnel to staff it and to train the Vietnamese in TB treatment. The construction of the clinic was completed in January of this year and the equipment, which is also being supplied by Canada, is being purchased now.

We have a second project involving the provision of ten packaged emergency hospital units for which \$790,000 has been allocated. These units are being used by civilian medical personnel for the treatment of civilians. Each of these units contains sufficient equipment including beds to equip a 200-bed functioning hospital consisting of operating rooms, recovery rooms, general wards, laboratory and X-ray services.

In addition to that, we have an immunization program which involves the provision of various vaccines for immunization programs among child population groups in Viet Nam which we have undertaken in a two-stage program. One involved the shipment of 500,000 doses of trivalent oral poliovaccine in August 1966 to be used in a pilot project among children in Saigon. A further 150,000 doses were shipped in November. Stage two, which is an allocation of \$200,000, involves an expanded program to provide polio, smallpox and various other vaccines to treat children on a nation-wide basis.

Another capital project was considered last year which involved the establishment of a children's rehabilitation centre. We had asked Dr. Gingras of Montreal, a well known rehabilitation expert, to go to Saigon. He was sent by the government to make an examination. We have not been able to conclude the necessary arrangements with the government of South Viet Nam, but one of our officials who will be in Saigon this week or early next week, I think, will be talking to the government about this.



I would like to point out simply as an indication of the value of some of these things, that I have a letter before me from the Foreign Minister of Viet Nam, Tran Van Do, dated 31st January and which says, if I may read it:

(Translation)

I have the honor to inform you that the government of the Republic of Viet Nam has received in August and December 1966, a total of 560,000 doses of vaccine, which the government of Canada was so kind to offer to Viet Nam within the framework of free world assistance.

We are deeply touched by this evidence of sympathy, an assistance which constitutes moral and material support of inestimable value, and in the name of the people of Viet Nam and of the government I wish you to transmit to the government of Canada our warmest thanks.

(English)

In addition to all this we have recently joined the Asian Development Bank in which we have put up some \$25 million as part of the capital fund. This will be of great potential benefit to all of Southeast Asia.

Then, there is the project in Nam Ngum in Laos of \$2 million as part of the Mekong development scheme. We have also committed ourselves to contribution to a new project in Cambodia known as the Prek Thnot.

All of this does not include the assistance we give to Viet Nam, to Cambodia and to Laos under the Colombo Plan. It does not include, for instance, the trainees—the Vietnamese trainees in Canada now—who are here under Colombo Plan arrangements. That is the situation in a general way.

Mr. STANBURY: You have indicated there will be a Canadian representative in Saigon shortly.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This week or next week; I forget which.

Mr. STANBURY: I presume, for the purpose of attempting to press the completion of the Gingras project?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes; the trouble there, Mr. Stanbury, if I may comment on this matter is that when Dr. Gingras was there he thought he had a property where our rehabilitation program could be developed and which would be put at our disposal. However, when he got back the government of Viet Nam, for reasons of its own, decided it could not let us have this land. We had in mind some other properties, but because of the ownership of these properties by particular religious bodies, it just was not practicable for us to go ahead with the clinic. No one regrets more than I do the delay, but it is a delay over which we have had no control.

Mr. STANBURY: Do I understand, then, that the Canadian government is firmly committed to providing these facilities just as quickly as the necessary arrangements can be made with the government of South Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right. We feel that if we can get the government of Viet Nam to agree to an exclusive civilian control not attached to any other country and clearly not to be used for purposes of one side or the other in the war, this is something we should do and something that we are especially well equipped to do. We are prepared to send ten rehabilitation experts out for that purpose.

Mr. STANBURY: Has the Canadian government indicated that these facilities must be used for civilian patients only?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. STANBURY: Has this been the problem of the South Viet Nam government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, that has not been the problem. The problem has been the facilities.

Mr. STANBURY: You have had no difficulty, apparently, in arranging the other aid programs with the South Viet Nam government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No; no trouble because the facilities were not the problem.

Mr. STANBURY: Now that you have a representative going there shortly, are you optimistic that this project, too, will mature quickly?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I hope so, but we thought so earlier. There is a big rehabilitation centre there now. It caters to the civilian as well as to some of the military needs and there seems to be a strong disposition that the kind of thing that Dr. Gingras was talking about should be associated with this in some way. We feel that that cannot be.

Mr. STANBURY: Is there any consideration being given to bringing Vietnamese children to Canada for rehabilitation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Examination of it has taken place, but we have not decided to do that.

Mr. STANBURY: Is it still under consideration?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Not at the moment.

Mr. STANBURY: Can you tell us why?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We did look into it and it is not as practical as it seems *a priori* to be.

Mr. STANBURY: Has it not been done by some other country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think one country tried it and dropped it.

Mr. STANBURY: Is there any aid now being given by Canada to civilians in North Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, but the government's position has been, first of all, that all external aid is on a government to government basis and the government has declared its policy to be that if the government of the North asked for assistance, consideration would be given.

Mr. STANBURY: Is it true then, sir, that there has, in no case, been any request for any kind of aid to the civilian population of North or South Viet Nam which has not been promptly responded to by the Canadian government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There has been no request from the government of the North for assistance for the civilian population of either medical or other supplies.

Mr. STANBURY: Did the program in the South come at the request of the South Vietnamese government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes. This began, too, before the extension of the conflict. It began a good many years ago.



Mr. STANBURY: Yes, and you are quite prepared to consider any further requests from either government for aid to civilians?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The government would give consideration to a request for more assistance from the South or for new assistance from the North. We would give consideration to any request.

Mr. STANBURY: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Brewin is next and then Mr. Nesbitt.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Martin, I would like to explore whether there is any difference between the view expressed by you in this statement and that expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In a report in this morning's *Globe and Mail* of a speech made by the Secretary-General, U Thant, at a dinner in his honour given by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the following is reported as the Secretary-General's view:

Without cessation of U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam, I do not believe there will be any move toward peace.

Later he is quoted as saying:

My personal feeling is it is a very unequal combat. It has potentialities of growing into a wider war and spilling over its frontiers.

This is why I have advocated an end to the American bombing first. I am very glad to be able to find myself in complete agreement with your government that cessation of bombing is a first prerequisite, he told Mrs. Gandhi.

In this statement and, I think, in other statements of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, this first unilateral action—a priority—of the American cessation of bombing is clearly stated, as I see it, to be a necessary preliminary to any discussions of a truce or any initiation of the whole process of negotiation. As I read your statement, there is a difference of view—I may be wrong and that is what I want to find out from you—in which you envisage some simultaneous action on the part of both sides rather than that the greater nation, the more powerful nation, involved in this—the United States of America—should take the initial initiative, or am I right in detecting a difference of view between yourself and the Secretary-General of the United Nations? When I say “yourself” I mean government, of course.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This cannot be put in those simple terms. You have taken an isolated statement by the Secretary-General as reported in some paper. I do not doubt that there was a correct quotation. I have said that the Canadian position is, and that we have always been of the view that the bombing should stop. We also are of the view that the infiltration should stop. I have no doubt that if the bombing stopped, this might provide a test as to whether or not there would be the reaction that Mr. Goldberg spoke of on the 22nd of September. I do not believe there is, basically, any difference in the position that we take and that of the Secretary-General, and certainly our acceptance of the second group of three proposals indicates that this is the case.

I did point out this morning that the Secretary-General has informed me—not directly, but when I sought some clarification the other day just when he was leaving for Asia—that he does not regard his last appeal as part of a proposal. It is simply a resumption of an appeal which he made a year and a



quarter ago and he does stand by the three proposals that he has made. Now, obviously, if the United States were to make the first move this would give us an opportunity to see whether or not this would be followed, by an offer, on the part of the North, to talk but that decision is not one that is being made by the Canadian government. The Canadian government is not at war. The decision is one that rests with the United States and to anticipate your next question, it seems to me—

Mr. BREWIN: I can put my own next question.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): —it is imaginative to suggest that the United States will act simply because one country no matter how friendly that country may be, makes a suggestion that it should.

Mr. BREWIN: Of course it is doubtful what the United States will do. I am quite aware of that, but I wonder—again, I am not quite sure whether you answered the question because you referred to this as being a newspaper report, so I will put the question to you in a different way by referring to your own statement. At the foot of page 10 you said:

In view of the great dangers inherent in the continuation of the present conflict, however, the Secretary-General appears to have concluded that it might be necessary for his own proposals to be given at least initial effect by a unilateral initiative on one side or the other.

And it was presumably with these considerations in mind that he gave his personal endorsement to Senator Clark's suggestion that the United States give a unilateral undertaking to put a standstill cease-fire into effect and thereafter to fire only if fired upon.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: Is this not very clear that Senator Clark, U Thant and, according to this press despatch, the government of India and probably, I imagine, a great many other people throughout the world are asserting—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): When did the government of India—

Mr. BREWIN: I am only quoting, again, from U Thant. Perhaps he was misinformed, but I am sure Mrs. Gandhi could have corrected him if he was. He said:

I am very glad to be able to find myself in complete agreement with your government that cessation of bombing is a first prerequisite.

I am putting it to you that do you not think if the Canadian government expressed the view that it was in complete agreement with this, that this would assist elements in the United States who are of the same view in, perhaps, putting this forcibly to their own government?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is no equivocation here. We have always felt that the bombing was a key factor in the situation, but we believe that it is not responsible to say that it is the only factor, simply because it is not the only factor.

Mr. BREWIN: I do not think anybody is trying to say that it is the only factor.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think, with great respect, that it is implicit in your line of questioning now. It ignores other factors and we are saying that we think the bombing is a key factor, but it is not the only factor.

Mr. BREWIN: It will try to put this briefly and perhaps you could answer me as briefly. Do you endorse statements attributed to Mr. U Thant that this cessation of bombing is a first prerequisite? That does not say that it is the only thing that matters. Do you endorse that statement that it is a first prerequisite?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot answer your question in any other way, Mr. Brewin. I have said that the stopping of the bombing is a very vital factor in this situation. I have said that it is not the only factor. I can say to you that if the United States stopped the bombing on its own, as I have already indicated, this would be a testing opportunity for reaction. It has done this on one or two occasions, but that does not help to solve this issue. Believe me, it does not help in any way to persuade the United States, and this is one of the factors that must be borne in mind, that this is the way to make progress. I am sure of this.

Mr. BREWIN: I will end this phase of the questioning by saying to you that I, for one, would like to see our government say that it is in complete agreement with the statement made by Mr. U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but apparently you are not willing to do that.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think our statement is in disagreement with the Secretary-General, at all.

Mr. BREWIN: Are you ready to state that you are in complete agreement with the statement or not?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have given you my answer. The Secretary-General is not a member of the Commission; our responsibilities are different, but I do not believe that there is any difference between our positions. I would just like to point out to you one more thing. The Secretary-General's endorsement calling for a unilateral cease-fire applies not only to bombing, you know. That would only be a starting point for his proposal of March 14th, which would involve cessation of hostilities everywhere and any scheme must be accepted. You and I can indulge in expressing personal opinions, but what is important is getting acceptance by both sides and that is what we have to keep in mind. What is the most likely way to get both sides to agree? No matter what I think and no matter what I have said to the United States in the consultations that we have continually, I can tell you that my judgment is that the United States will not stop the bombing in the absence of some reciprocal military action. I am not saying what I believe the situation should be. The United States knows what we think it should be.

Mr. BREWIN: I would like to switch to another subject because I do not think I will get much further on that one. Referring again to the Secretary-General, you said:

In view of the great dangers inherent in the continuation of the present conflict...

I would like to ask you whether, either through Mr. Ronning or any other source, people in treacherous situations, you can tell us what are the great dangers. Is there still a danger of the involvement of the People's Republic of China if there



is any escalation of the war? What do you see as the present great dangers in this conflict?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The first great danger is the danger of escalation on the part of the present parties directly involved. That in itself is serious and such escalation, no matter where it began, would be followed undoubtedly by an increase in the assistance given by various sources outside the group of combatants. Whether it would involve China, I cannot say, but I think we have to bear in mind the possibility of this kind of expansion. This is the reason we all feel, I think, that the war ought to be brought to an end as quickly as possible to avoid that kind of expansion. I do not believe that at the present time there is any likelihood of a participation by China beyond the kind of assistance it now gives, but that is only a conjecture.

Mr. BREWIN: I have just one further question.

Mr. HARKNESS: May I ask a supplementary question? You have talked about the dangers of escalation. Do you think there is any capability on the part of North Viet Nam of considerably escalating the war, as far as they are concerned?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think there is some additional strength they could give to their effort, but they can always, of course, get more outside help, and they are getting outside help now.

Mr. HARKNESS: It really comes down to the amount of outside help they can get from Russia and China, if there is going to be any escalation on the part of North Viet Nam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Possibly China.

Mr. BREWIN: Are you through, Mr. Harkness?

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I have just one more question. On page 16 of your statement, Mr. Martin, you referred to one aspect of the issue of ultimate political arrangements which I think you said has present importance and that is the status of the Viet Cong. You said:

What is at stake here is not really their representation at any eventual conference table but the terms of their participation within the ultimate political structure of the country. These are the really crucial points which will have to be resolved and on which, I am afraid, the position of the parties are as far apart as ever.

I wonder whether you could expand on that and clarify it. I understand that at one time Senator Robert Kennedy suggested that it was necessary for the Americans to indicate, if they hoped to have fruitful negotiations, that there would be some place for representatives of the Viet Cong, not only at the bargaining table but in some eventual solution and that this indication must be given in advance. At the same time I understand the American administration made clear that at no stage could it envisage any participation by the Viet Cong—or the National Liberation Front which is, perhaps, the more correct title—in any eventual administration.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am sure that at some point the Viet Cong have to be a party to discussions. The United States government has said—both the



President and Mr. Goldberg—that the presentation of Viet Cong views would not present an insurmountable problem for them. I take it that, at some point, they would agree to the participation of the Viet Cong in the discussions that would follow a cease-fire or that would follow or take place during preliminary talks. What I was talking about was something much more fundamental. In the third part of the four proposals of the DRVN announced by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on April 8, 1965, the following is given:

The internal affairs of South Viet Nam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation.

I was suggesting that this is one of the root problems that has to be faced. It is a different problem that the mere question of allowing the Viet Cong to take part in peace talks. It is conceivable that in the democratization process that seemingly is now underway in the South there might be a place for this group—the Viet Cong—but this will be a matter that will have to be determined by the people of the South themselves. I do agree and we have already stated that we do believe that at some point all parties who have been involved in the conflict ought to be given an opportunity of expressing their views in reaching a final settlement.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Martin, you do not wish, though, to comment on Senator Kennedy's suggestion that from the American side, as it were, there might come an indication that they envisaged some measure of participation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I read what Senator Bobby Kennedy said and I do not think he said it in that way because the American government has already indicated that they would be prepared to make this possible. They have not defined the circumstances, but from discussions that I have had I know that that is their intention.

Mr. CHURCHILL: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, would you set a time limit on people who are putting forward questions as there are quite a number of us here? The Minister will be disappointed if I do not get a chance to ask him any questions because I want to support his view on this.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Maybe I would be worried if I got that kind of support.

Mr. BREWIN: As far as I am concerned, if I might just finish my last question—

The CHAIRMAN: Before you pose your last question, there are eight members who have indicated they want to ask questions, plus Mr. Churchill. I am in the hands of the Committee. If you wish to move faster you will have to limit yourselves or contain yourselves. It is up to the Committee. Of course, all the members who have questions to ask will be heard, but they cannot all be heard at the same time and we will have to meet again if we do not finish today. If the Committee wishes to move faster, it is up to the members to go quicker.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I will discontinue. I would have been finished by now if Mr. Churchill had not interrupted. I will come back again.

The CHAIRMAN: If you just have one more question—

Mr. BREWIN: No, it is all right.



Mr. NESBITT: The first question I would like to ask the Minister is this: On page 3 of the Minister's statement, the Minister, I take it, has made a commitment or an offer that Canada would be prepared to supply peace-keeping forces, should these be required.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I did not do that. What I said was that I would be prepared to recommend to my colleagues Canadian participation.

Mr. NESBITT: Well, I think in all fairness that other countries—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot believe that the present government of Canada, if invited to participate, would not.

Mr. NESBITT: Naturally, I agree that has to be done, but I would think that any other country reading the Minister's statement would naturally assume that Canada would be prepared to make an offer of some variety of peacekeeping force.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What I think any other country would do is that they would carefully look at what I said and what I said was:

If, in the light of our first hand experience of the Viet Nam Problem over the past thirteen years, Canada were to be asked to participate in an international peacekeeping effort in Viet Nam, whether under the auspices of the Geneva powers or under those of the United Nations, I would be prepared to recommend that we accept such a responsibility within the limits of our capacity.

Mr. NESBITT: I do not think there is any argument about it. The Minister has certainly suggested that Canada would be prepared to do this. Now, what type of forces? The Minister, I presume, has discussed this, perhaps, with the Minister of National Defence or the Chief of Staff. What type of force would the Minister have in mind? Would they be communications or supply forces; would they be fighting men and in what numbers, would he think?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would want to warn you at the outset, Mr. Nesbitt, that I do not propose to discuss in this Committee now, matters that are now before the House of Commons.

Mr. NESBITT: This is not before the House of Commons.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It might throw some light on the subject, then.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That would be contrary to the rules. I just thought I would make that introductory note in case you attempted to establish two forums for this very interesting subject.

Mr. NESBITT: No, but the Minister suggested that he is prepared to recommend to his colleagues the use of our forces, but what kind of forces?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have been discussing, interdepartmentally and with at least one other governmental authority, two facets of this problem: first what expansion would have to be made in the International Control Commission itself, if any, and I would envisage that this would have to be done; and second the nature of the kind of peacekeeping project; the likely total numbers and the composition of all participating countries; the probable contribution that might be asked of a country like Canada and likewise whether or not it would be a United Nations operation, whether it would be an Asian operation



or an Asian-African operation, or an operation within the framework of the Geneva powers. We are advancing plans that are in advanced state for this purpose.

Mr. NESBITT: Could the Minister give some indication of the kind of assistance we might be able to give? I refer, again, to the possibility of communications personnel, transport personnel, actual fighting personnel or ships or something of that nature.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the first place, I should have prefaced what I said by saying that this would all be conditional on the invitation of the host country or the host countries. No country can impose itself.

Mr. NESBITT: No.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that this would have to be as large if not a larger peacekeeping project than has heretofore been envisaged. I am not speaking only of the Canadian effort but in the light of the overall nature of the operation. All one has to do to see the problem that is involved is to consider the length of the boundary of South Viet Nam; between North and South Viet Nam it runs east and west and then in a southerly direction along the Laotian border. There would have to be consideration, of course, as to what countries would participate in this decision and whether or not a decision could be made at all in the absence of non-participation by mainland China. All of these matters are very much in our minds and are being carefully considered.

Mr. NESBITT: You would not care to suggest, let us say, the maximum size of force that Canada might be prepared to make available?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I am not in a position to do that. I could not discuss these details because they are not finalized; they are being discussed with others and I would not want to anticipate something that is not in a concrete form.

Mr. NESBITT: The next question I would like to ask the Minister—we may come back to this later at another time—is about his proposals on page 13 of his remarks:

Second, I think it would be necessary to freeze the course of military events in Viet Nam at its present level. This might entail undertakings on both sides not to engage in any military activities. . .

Does the Minister, in this suggestion, envisage any kind of inspection or control procedures to make sure the undertakings would be carried out?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is envisaged in the Agreement itself. This is one of the purposes of the I.C.C. in its present limited form. It is there to report on the extent to which the Agreement has been carried out. I am sure that both sides would insist on this.

Mr. NESBITT: I brought up that point for clarification because it is implied in the Minister's statement that, perhaps, there would just be a verbal undertaking, but I think if there were to be some control—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): For instance, in the case of the first proposal of U Thant where he calls for a general truce at the beginning, it was pointed out by the United States that this would necessarily involve some form of supervision. In respect of the ideas that I advanced this morning—a progressive reapplication



of some of the terms of the Geneva Agreement—while I believe that there would be a role for the Commission or some comparable body, it must be appreciated that the nature of the problem would involve a good bit of self-control on the part of the parties because of the nature of the terrain. The nature of the scheme is one that would have to depend, to a very considerable extent, on good faith.

Mr. NESBITT: The Minister has, I think, in his observations pointed out that the plan he has outlined here would have to have some similarities to disarmament and that as steps were taken neither side must gain any advantage. Has the Minister given any consideration to sending General Burns, for example, to Viet Nam to visit both sides and to look for the type of operation that would be required? In view of General Burns' great experience in the Near East, with the UN peacekeeping operations and his experience on the Disarmament Committee do you think that might be helpful?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I agree with the high estimate you have of General Burns. We have not given consideration to that at this stage. I have talked to General Burns about some aspects of the kind of preparations I spoke about a few moments ago. In any event, at the moment, General Burns is deeply engaged in the important discussions on the non-proliferation agreement, but if an opportunity develops, and I would like to hope that it would, we certainly will give consideration to the utilization of the services of all those who could help in any way.

Mr. NESBITT: I have two other brief questions. It has been suggested in various quarters that, perhaps, one of the reasons why North Viet Nam has been rather adamant in its position of late is that China—Peking China—is not at all anxious to see a solution of this problem at the present time in view of the fact that such a solution might bring the Soviet Union and the United States, perhaps, a little closer together than would be of interest to China. Would the Minister care to make any comments on that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I really cannot offer anything very helpful on the last point. I do not know what the views of the government of mainland China are on this point. I do know that an effort was made by the British Prime Minister and by Mr. Kosygin prior to the end of the *Tet* truce. It is my judgment that the Soviet Union would like to see the hostilities come to an end. When, I, myself, saw Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Kosygin last November I felt then that this was the case; just as I assured the parties with whom I was conferring that we were doing what we could, and in answer to their suggestions that we might continue this role, we pointed out that they, too, had an opportunity to exercise an influence based on their great power and their particular situation. But it must be clear that this is a very complicated picture in which, while Hanoi, while it is an independent sovereign government, obviously takes into account the considerations and viewpoints of those who are ideologically more closely associated with it.

Mr. NESBITT: I have one last question. Has the Minister any indication with respect to the type of infiltration from North Viet Nam or, perhaps, elsewhere that is allegedly taking place at the present time in Thailand in the border area? Does this resemble the kind of infiltration that started in South Viet Nam a few years ago?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not in a position to give in a public session my appreciation on this point.

Mr. LIND: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Minister, we seem to be receiving a lot of literature and pictures of the atrocities that are inflicted on the civilian population in North Viet Nam. Is the bombing of North Viet Nam directed only at military targets, as a general rule?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Those who are engaged in the bombing confirm that to be the case.

Mr. LIND: As this conflict has escalated, has it become more of a guerilla type of warfare or is it becoming more of an open conflict?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, it changes, it has a strong guerilla-like basis, of course, but the war has gone through various transformations.

Mr. LIND: Our part in Canada in support of the peace mission, I think, has been fairly thoroughly discussed, but is it the intention of the government to increase our efforts on a peacekeeping mission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In answer to Mr. Nesbitt I indicated that we were anticipating the kind of situation that might eventuate after the cessation of hostilities and the kind of role that would be presented to countries in or outside the United Nations. When you say "peacekeeping" I do not know whether you are talking of what eventuates after the cessation of hostilities or our efforts to try to bring about peace talks.

Mr. LIND: I was mainly concerned with our efforts to try to bring about peace talks.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The situation, Mr. Lind, is this: In January of 1966 there was an item before the Security Council proposed by the government of the United States. It was my view that as the war could best be settled within the Geneva framework, the quicker the Geneva framework was resorted to the better. And indeed this was the outcome of the discussion proposed by the United States in the Security Council. No final decision was taken and it was at that time that we proposed to our two colleague states, India and Poland, members of the Commission, that we might undertake a special role to try to bring the parties together. It was with that end in view that I had discussions in Warsaw last November with Mr. Rapacki. It was with that end in view that I had discussions here in Ottawa with the Ambassador of Poland and that I continue to have discussions with Poland, as well as discussions from time to time with spokesmen of India, both here in Ottawa and in Delhi, and indeed, in Saigon.

I think I can say that all of us are agreed that there may be, in given circumstances, a role for the Commission. Up to this point we are not all agreed as to the time when that role might be exercised and as the three countries must act unanimously in order to be effective, there has to be agreement on this point.

It was because I felt in February of last year that we might not reach full agreement on the modalities, that the government decided to ask Mr. Ronning to undertake a mission to Hanoi on behalf of the government of Canada. As you know he made two visits, one in March and one in June. He went to Hanoi on the Commission plane but not as a representative of the Commission. He went as a special emissary of the government of Canada. These talks were useful. I believe the first talk was very useful.



However, there was no outcome from those talks that did not lead to any direct contacts between the disputing parties. I reviewed this matter some three weeks ago with Mr. Ronning here in Ottawa. After that series of talks with him—and I think we see eye to eye—I indicated publicly that we were prepared to use his good offices at any time when we saw the slightest justification for their possible use, and that remains our position.

This does not mean that these are the only efforts that have been undertaken. Some of our colleagues on the Commission, acting not as members of the Commission but in their sovereign capacity, have made proposals which we have accepted. I am not at liberty to discuss those proposals, but proposals were made for use of the three members in ways that commended themselves to us.

In addition to that we have carried on talks with other governments all designed to meet the same objective, and these are continuing. It is not a matter for which there could be any criticism if we had not succeeded. Criticism might well be levelled if we had not tried, but I assure you that the record will show that Canada has tried unceasingly and continues its efforts to try to bring about an end to this war.

Mr. LIND: Thank you, Mr. Minister and Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on Mr. Macquarrie to ask the next question I would like to find out from the members of the Committee and from the witness how long we are prepared to meet this morning.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am in the hands of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: What is the wish of the Committee?

Mr. WALKER: Let us see how we feel at 12 o'clock.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Let us sit until 11.30. That is two and a half hours. That is long enough. We do not want to wear out the witness.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I assure you, Mr. Churchill, that you cannot wear me out but I would be concerned if I were to tire you.

Mr. LAMBERT: A supplementary at this point.

The CHAIRMAN: One moment, please. Is 11.30 satisfactory to the Committee or would you rather go on until 12 o'clock? We will try 11.30. Mr. Lambert has a supplementary question before Mr. Macquarrie.

Mr. LAMBERT: My question concerns Mr. Ronning and his availability and his capacity to act as an emissary for the Canadian government. I have been a little concerned that perhaps some of his public statements during his participation in certain activities in this country have tended to put him in a fixed position, and if a man is to be an emissary he must be acceptable to both sides. Just how does this affect his future usefulness? It is not only with the North Vietnamese people with whom he is concerned, but also he is concerned with the government of South Viet Nam and with the government of the United States.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the first place, Mr. Lambert, Mr. Ronning did not go to Hanoi on those two occasions in any capacity other than as a representative of the government of Canada. He did not go there as a spokesman for the United States. He went as a spokesman for Canada and it is the Canadian government that decides whether or not these services are to be used. It was the Canadian government that decided in the first instance that they were to be



used. Mr. Ronning was a member of the Department of External Affairs. He ceased being a member of the Department when his term as High Commissioner in India came to an end. When he was asked to undertake this role for the Canadian government he was not a member of the public service; he was a private citizen.

It is true that since his visit in June he has engaged in public discussion and that is his right as a citizen. I am not aware that he has expressed any views that were not his views before. I am sure that when he undertook to accept the role assigned him by the Canadian government in March that it was well known in several quarters what his views were—his views about Chinese participation in the United Nations, his views about the recognition of the regime in mainland China, his views about the war in Viet Nam. I do not think there was anything secret about any of these positions. I cannot say that I have any information whatsoever from any quarter that anything he has said since June has in any way prejudiced his position. If that is the case, it has not been made known to me by any source in any country.

Mr. LAMBERT: My concern, frankly, is that as an emissary of the government of Canada, the government ipso facto, shall we say, tends to assume those views.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is a conclusion that I would not agree with.

Mr. LAMBERT: No, but this is something in the public mind.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not say that there would not be a great community of interest in those views or an identity of interests. I am not commenting on that, but I do not think the government of Canada is in any way incorporating into its beliefs or policies views that are privately entertained by a citizen who was given a specific job to do any more than Senator Fulbright would.

Mr. LAMBERT: But there would be a difficulty in sending Senator Fulbright.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not so sure about that.

Mr. McINTOSH: A further supplementary, Mr. Chairman, if I may. When Mr. Ronning went over there as a representative of the Canadian government did he state personal views or government policy?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): He went as a spokesman for the Canadian government and what he discussed was pursuant to instructions given to him by the Canadian government and by no other government. This does not mean to say that in the government presentation, estimates were not made of what we understood to be the positions of particular governments, but he went as a spokesman unreservedly of the Canadian government.

Mr. McINTOSH: Can we state, then, that Mr. Ronning's statement with regard to cessation of bombing is Canadian policy?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have said that that is one of the key factors in this. We have urged that there be a stopping of the bombing. We have urged that there be a stopping of the infiltration. We have urged that the parties get to the peace table.

Mr. McINTOSH: It is a unilateral statement that has nothing to do with the unconditional conditions stated by the North Vietnamese?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think there is any connection between that question and your preceding question and my response to it.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I will come to that when I ask you further questions, Mr. Minister.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Mr. Chairman, since the Committee has taken its decision I feel under a moral closure as I apply myself to this sorrowfully realistic document which is before us. It would strike me that there are not any great grounds to believe that there is likely to be a role for Canada in the solution of this terrible crisis. I think, however,—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That was not my conclusion. My view is that there may well be. No one can say. No one is wedded to any particular instrument. If the war does not come to an end, as it did in Korea, without intervention by a third party, it is possible, as I implied in the statement, that one side may well wish to communicate to the other side a particular point of view.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Oh, of course, it is possible.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It seems to me quite logical to assume that the Commission members, collectively or individually, might well be used for that purpose because of the fact that they are the only instrument that has direct access to both sides.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I was merely indicating that I found nothing in the document which would sustain or indicate the efficacy of Canadian ethics up to the present in the solution of this crisis.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right. That is why I said to Mr. Lind we could be open to criticism if we had not seriously tried or if we did not undertake seriously to continue to try.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: No; no one would suggest that we should not continue to try.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I take from your answer to Mr. Lind that on no occasion has the I.C.C. as a group been able to make a suggestion with respect to this conflict.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. That would be a wrong conclusion. For instance, at one time the demilitarized zone which is six miles in width—three miles on each side was free from any kind of engagement. Last September when significant military clashes began to break out in the zone two members of the Commission did try to arrange for a disengagement in the demilitarized zone.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: But considering the unanimity rule, what role has the Commission so far played in the matter of providing a vehicle for solution?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The Commission is not juridically set up to provide a solution. The proposal made by Canada was outside of the Geneva Agreement framework. The three countries themselves agreed, as sovereign countries with their traditional experience and access, to be used for the purpose that we envisaged. The rule of unanimity is not an absolute rule in every situation. There are some situations where unanimity apparently is required. The report of



1962 was not a unanimous report. It was a report supported by India and Canada. The report that came out in February, 1965 on Laos was a report to which was attached a dissenting opinion by the Canadian government. So, there are occasions when the rule of unanimity does not necessarily govern.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I am interested in this matter because frequently we have heard the suggestion that Canada's role as a member of the I.C.C. gives it a special responsibility and presumably special opportunities. I am seeking from you any indications of how, through our membership in this organization, we have been able to make a contribution.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The special opportunity arises out of the fact that the Commission collectively and individually is in contact both with Hanoi and with Saigon. Mr. Orme Dier, who is now our Commission member, will be going to Hanoi next week. Mr. Victor Moore, who was our Commissioner until the end of February, was in Hanoi about the middle of January. On these visits, the Canadian delegate, in this instance, sees the highest members of the government of the North. There is a continuous opportunity for consultation and that in itself is a very valuable vehicle as you can well see. On all occasions, discussion of a *modus vivendi* for bringing the war to an end is not necessarily the order of business but very frequently it is.

I would say that as a result of the last visit of Mr. Moore there was confirmed the continued existence, from the point of view of all sides, of the channel which Mr. Ronning set up—that is, a channel in addition to the Commission. That channel continues to be open and, as I told Mr. Lind, it will be used if there is the slightest indication given of possible usefulness. I would not be surprised if at some time the exercise that we have spelled out this morning would be the subject of discussion. I do not say that it will be immediately. I think the positions are so hard at the moment that the opportunities are not bright, but these situations change. You ask for usefulness. I am sure that the first visit of Mr. Ronning gave information heretofore not given.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I hope that is the case.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I made mention of the statement by Nguyen Duy Trinh, the Foreign Minister of the North, to Mr. Burchett in January. We were aware of that information long before. It had never been made public.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I would not want to be so practical as to ask what in the long run was the effectiveness of this.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not want to identify this with any person or with Mr. Ronning or the Commission, but after the North had laid down its four points, one of which I read out an hour or so ago, the general view was that there could be no preliminary talks except on the basis of those four conditions. Nguyen Duy Trinh publicly declared that there could be talks and that they would not be on the basis of the four points but that, of course, negotiations after the first contacts could only be on the basis of the four points. That was a very significant declaration made publicly in January.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Has there been any softening of the situation since then?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.



Mr. MACQUARRIE: No; this is the point. I would be very fearful lest the Canadian public might be inclined to overestimate the contribution which we are able to make to this very dreadful situation.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am sure that is the case, and I am sure that it is equally the case that it would be regrettable if the Canadian public were not convinced that the Canadian government, through these various intermediaries, had not done everything it could, as other countries have done, to try to bring about peace in Viet Nam.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Granted. I have a couple of questions of a somewhat specific nature and they will be very brief. Has the Canadian government suggested to the United States that it might be a useful contribution to the solution of the problem if they adopt what is now called the Senator Clark formula?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: I am glad to hear that.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I will be having an opportunity very shortly of discussing that and other phases of this problem.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: On the final page of the statement:

I am in close touch with the representatives of all countries...

This, I presume, does not include the People's Republic of China.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. It does not, regrettably, include anyone representing mainland China. I would like to say that it is not because we have not tried.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: When did Mr. Ronning last serve in China?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Ronning served in China in 1949 or 1950, or thereabouts. He was born in China, of course. His mother is buried in China. He knows many of the personalities in China as he does personalities in North and South Viet Nam and he speaks Mandarin.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: Good. Has the Canadian government any information on the extent of military aid being rendered to the North Vietnamese?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot say that we know the full extent but we do have an appreciation of this.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: In your reply to Colonel Harkness you said, "possibly China". Should I take that to indicate that only China is assisting?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, there are other countries, but possibly only China would escalate. I would not want to make a comment on that.

Mr. MACQUARRIE: May I pass for the time being, Mr. Chairman? Thank you.

Mr. ALLMAND: Mr. Martin, on page 12 of your statement you say that because of the impasse that has been reached it might be worth while looking at new directions and then you go on to propose a possible new approach and you set out four points on how it might be brought about. However, after you finish doing that, on page 14 you go on to say in the last paragraph that you are not very optimistic on this score, in other words, that these proposals will have any acceptance by either side.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): At the moment that is the situation.

Mr. ALLMAND: My question is: What, then, is the value of putting forward these proposals?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The value consists essentially in that both sides have said they abide by the Geneva Agreement; that both sides would respect the propositions of the Geneva Agreement. That being the case, if that is an acceptable position, it may be, as I said earlier, that at some point in the process which is continuing this kind of arrangement might appear attractive. At any rate it is one worth examining if it is a fact that both sides regard the Geneva Agreement as still warranting their support.

Mr. ALLMAND: But the war seems to be escalating.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In December and January there was a flurry of excitement. There were some contacts made. I cannot tell what they were—I cannot say here what they were; I know what they were. These held out some promise, one of them in particular. Then in the month of February again the Kosygin-Wilson discussions took a promising turn. The situation since then has hardened again but I envisage that we will again see a period when there will be an active exchange and indications given that if this is done that it might be followed by some corresponding helpful action. If we are not to continue to try then we are forced to say that we are not going to carry on any further efforts and that is not our position.

Mr. ALLMAND: Yes, but the war is escalating.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can only say that the conclusion I reach at the present time is that the steps I have described this morning in present circumstances, I believe, would not gather the support that would be necessary but I will not say that this does not suggest that at some future opportunity, there may not be occasion for positive action.

Mr. ALLMAND: I was not suggesting that we take no initiative, Mr. Martin, but as Mr. Lind pointed out, we are receiving a lot of evidence that many people are dying, both on the American side and on the Vietnamese side. There are a lot of atrocities among the civilian population. You see pictures of children with their arms off, and so forth, and mothers who are crippled. It would seem to me that we should try to put forward proposals that might have some greater chance of acceptance. Are there any possible alternatives?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have. As I said, they have not, so far, succeeded. This is another one. I would be very grateful for any suggestion which you or any member of the Committee could make.

Mr. ALLMAND: I might do that. Does the Canadian government have any objection to any of the weapons that are being used by the United States at present in Viet Nam? I am thinking of the recent pellet bombs, the napalm and the gas. Have we taken any position on a line that should be drawn and what weapons would not be acceptable in this war?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, we have. With regard to the last matter and the matter raised yesterday by Mrs. MacInnis, we are now examining just exactly what weapons have been used. In any event they would all be covered,



of course, by our view that stopping of the bombing is desirable as is the stopping of infiltration from the North.

Mr. ALLMAND: Yes, but what about other weapons? I can see where certain weapons can be directed more accurately to military targets, but these other weapons seem to spread beyond the military targets and affect civilians.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Allmand, I share fully your concern for the loss of human life in Viet Nam through any form and it is for this reason that we, along with others, are engaged in this effort to try to bring the war to an end. No one can sit by complacently at this time in human development while this kind of thing takes place, but it must be pointed out that the atrocities have not been one-sided, by any means.

An hon. MEMBER: Bombs in restaurants.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is 11:30.

Mr. ALLMAND: I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, it is now 11:30. What is the wish of the Committee? There are five more members who have expressed their intention to ask questions.

Mr. ANDRAS: Would it not be possible to continue for another half hour or so, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN: Even if we did continue for half an hour I doubt very much that we could complete all the questioning today.

Mr. WALKER: Not only that, Mr. Chairman; Viet Nam is not the only subject that we may want to discuss.

The CHAIRMAN: It is only one topic and there are many more topics. We are dealing with the whole report.

Mr. BREWIN: As a matter of fact, too, at some stage or another, while we very much appreciate the statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, we would like to hear some outside authorities on this subject, as well.

The CHAIRMAN: It was the decision of the Steering Committee that we should hear the Minister, first on all these topics and then we can decide on what topic we shall specialize and call witnesses.

(*Translation*)

Mr. PELLETIER: It is understood that the Minister will come back to the Committee?

The CHAIRMAN: Certainly. Mr. Minister, when will you be able to come back?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I could be here tomorrow, Thursday, Friday, and next Monday morning. I am leaving for London on Monday afternoon and shall be away for the entire week.

The CHAIRMAN: It is very hard to meet on Wednesday because of the caucus meetings; however, on Thursday—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The week after, I shall be away for three days. I am going to the United Nations.

(English)

Mr. MACDONALD (Rosedale): Mr. Chairman, perhaps the Steering Committee could meet again and reschedule a further meeting at which the Minister could be present and at that time also decide on the order of witnesses to be heard with regard to other matters.

Mr. McINTOSH: When will the next meeting be held?

Mr. MACDONALD (Rosedale): It will be the first question for the Steering Committee in view of the rather difficult timetable.

The CHAIRMAN: In that case the Steering Committee should meet very shortly.

Mr. WALKER: Between 11.35 o'clock and 12 noon.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is adjourned.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-67

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 11

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THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

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Respecting

ANNUAL REPORT, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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Mr. Hymmen,  
Mr. Klein,  
Mr. Lambert,  
Mr. Laprise,  
Mr. Lind,  
Mr. Macdonald  
(Rosedale),

Mr. Macquarrie,  
Mr. McIntosh,  
Mr. Pelletier,  
Mr. Pilon,  
Mr. Stanbury,  
Mr. Thompson,  
Mr. Walker—(24).

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

Respecting

ANNUAL REPORT, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

WITNESS:

The Honourable Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, April 13, 1967.  
(12)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9:05 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Mr. Dubé, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Andras, Asselin (*Charlevoix*), Brewin, Churchill, Dubé, Forest, Forrestall, Harkness, Klein, Lambert, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Thompson, Walker (17).

*In attendance:* The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs. *From the Department of External Affairs:* Mr. M. Cadieux, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Chairman presented the sixth report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met at 3:30 p.m., Wednesday, April 12, 1967, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dubé (*Chairman*), Brewin, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Nesbitt and Thompson.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend as follows:

1. That the Committee meet at 9:00 a.m., Thursday, April 13, to complete questioning of the Minister on the subject of Vietnam;
2. That, rather than carrying on wide-ranging discussions on general subjects, the Committee specialize in studies of certain areas, commencing with Vietnam and South-East Asia;
3. That, in its study of South-East Asia, the Committee invite the following witnesses to appear:

Charles Taylor—member of editorial staff *Toronto Globe and Mail*. Formerly correspondent in Peking.

James Barrington—University of Alberta. Former Burmese ambassador in Ottawa, Washington and the UN.

Robert Thompson, M.P.—to report on his recent visit to South-East Asia;

4. That the Committee invite Mr. Charles Taylor to appear on Thursday, April 20, 1967;
5. That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to the witnesses invited to appear.

Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) moved concurrence in the report, seconded by Mr. Brewin. After discussion, the report was approved.

Questioning of the Minister on the subject of Vietnam was resumed.

The questioning having been concluded, the Chairman thanked the Minister for the information he had given to the Committee.

At 11:30 a.m. the Committee adjourned until 10:00 a.m., Thursday, April 20, 1967.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

Chairman, Mr. Dohé, presiding.

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 9:05 a.m. this day, the

Members present: Messrs. Andrew Axelsen (Charlevoix), Brewin, Churchill, Cude, Forest, Fortin, Harkness, Klein, Lambert, Macdonald (Rosebush), McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pelletier, Pilon, Thompson, Walker (11).

In attendance: The Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs; From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Gauthier, Under-Secretary; Mr. R. E. Collins, Assistant Under-Secretary.

The Chairman presented the sixth report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, which is as follows:

Your Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure met at 3:30 p.m. Wednesday, April 12, 1967, with the following members in attendance: Messrs. Dohé (Chairman), Brewin, Macdonald (Rosebush), Nesbitt, and Thompson.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend as follows:

1. That the Committee meet at 9:00 a.m. Thursday, April 13, to continue questioning of the Minister on the subject of Vietnam;
2. That further time be set aside for carrying on wide-ranging discussions on general subjects the Committee specializes in studies of certain areas, commencing with Vietnam and South-East Asia;
3. That a study of South-East Asia, the Committee invite the following witnesses to appear: Charles Taylor—member of editorial staff Toronto Globe and Mail; Formerly correspondent in Peking; James Harrington—University of Alberta; Former Business Ambassador in Ottawa, Washington and the UN;
4. That the Committee invite Mr. Charles Taylor to appear on Thursday, April 20, 1967;
5. That reasonable living and travelling expenses be paid to the witnesses invited to appear.

Mr. Macdonald (Rosebush) moved concurrence in the report, seconded by Mr. Brewin. After discussion, the report was approved.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY, April 13, 1967.

The CHAIRMAN: Order, please. Gentlemen, we have a quorum. Yesterday your Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure met and I have our Sixth Report here for your approval. (See Minutes of Proceedings.)

May I have your comments or a motion?

Mr. McINTOSH: One of my questions to the Minister today was going to be with regard to some of the personnel from his staff that apparently were over there. I understand that there are some very well informed members—Mr. Bauer is one example—who may have very definite views on what is happening, and I was wondering if he had someone else on his staff who may have had opposing views that we might like to hear.

Hon. PAUL MARTIN (*Secretary of State for External Affairs*): Is this a question to me?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes. That was one of the questions I was going to ask you.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I do not believe that it would be desirable or, under our parliamentary system, permissible for any official serving in the government service to give evidence on policy. This would be the same as the question of privilege that is involved in the request for the tabling of documents. It would be completely unconstitutional under our parliamentary system if the situation were otherwise. For instance, there can be no objection to asking the Under-Secretary to come and give evidence before this committee on administration and statistical information, but it would be improper to pursue a line of interrogation of the Under-Secretary on policy which would put him in a position where he could possibly take a personal position which, in theory, might be at odds with that of the government. This is a well established principle. You will remember it was asked in the house one time by Mr. David MacDonald whether the government would agree to Mr. Victor Moore, then the Canadian representative on the Commission, being called and I took the same position then that I am taking now. Under our parliamentary system I do not believe any other view can be taken.

Mr. McINTOSH: I can understand, Mr. Minister, a member of the Commission not coming here and giving evidence, but how about Mr. Ronning, for example; would he also be in the same category?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think there would be any difficulty in Mr. Ronning coming as an individual in respect of matters not connected with his assignments in Vietnam. I do not think he could be questioned on—

Mr. McINTOSH: He makes speeches everywhere else on it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Perhaps you have not clearly understood what I said. I do not think there could be any objection to Mr. Ronning coming, except in respect of his special assignments. I do not think he could be questioned about his talks in Hanoi. I do not think he could discuss anything that was related to the government assignment given him as an emissary. I do not think there could be questions on that. However, with regard to his views on matters that have nothing to do with that, he is a free citizen. If the Committee wishes to call him, that is within the discretion of the Committee, but with that reservation.

Mr. McINTOSH: Was it considered, Mr. Chairman, in the—

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh, I understand we are discussing the report. In that case I think it should be moved and seconded before we discuss it. I thought you were raising a point of order. Will someone move?

Mr. McINTOSH: I thought you asked for comments?

The CHAIRMAN: Yes, but I should have asked for a mover and a seconder. Moved by Mr. Macdonald (*Rosedale*) and seconded by Mr. Brewin.

Mr. McINTOSH: I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, if any other names were suggested, or was the decision not to call any more than the one?

The CHAIRMAN: No, there was a list of names provided by Mr. John Holmes, I believe. We had agreed in principle to start with two or three witnesses. If that is sufficient, then we could move to a different area of the world, but if it is the feeling of the Committee that it is open for more, this is not final. We do not yet know whether or not these three gentlemen will be available or will accept.

Mr. McINTOSH: We can wait until we hear their evidence.

The CHAIRMAN: Is it agreed?

Some hon. MEMBERS: Agreed.

The CHAIRMAN: On Tuesday questions were being asked of the Minister on Vietnam, and there were four members who wanted to ask questions but did not have time to do so.

(*Translation*)

Here is last Tuesday's list of members who wish to ask questions: Mr. Pelletier, Mr. Andras, Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Faulkner, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Harkness. The first name on the list is that of Mr. Pelletier.

Mr. PELLETIER: I would like to ask a few questions, Mr. Chairman, the first of which concerns the special position which Canada holds through her membership on the International Control Commission.

How would you describe this special position? We have heard a great many interpretations. We are told, for instance, that Canada is in a position of neutrality; others say that we should be totally impartial. What are the implications of Canada's participation in the Commission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex-East*): I believe that if our role within the Commission is to be effective, we have to be as objective and impartial as possible. There is no obligation under the agreements, in this respect, but, I believe that because of the actual nature of the role that Canada, Poland and India are called upon to play, these three countries have to be as objective as possible. That is what we have attempted to do. That is why we criticized not only the actions of the



North, but also those of the South acting in cooperation with the U.S.A. in the special report which we tabled in 1962, and again in February of 1965.

Mr. PELLETIER: For example, is the fact that Canada provides military equipment to one of the belligerent parties under agreements which have, of course, nothing to do with the Vietnam war, consonant with the actual nature of Canada's participation in the activities of the Control Commission?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): First, Mr. Pelletier, I should state that there are a great many nations that provide arms. Canada does not provide arms directly. We had, as you know, an arrangement with the United States, which dates back, I believe, to the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941, when Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. King met, and entered into an informal arrangement. This arrangement was subsequently formalized and the present form of these arrangements dates from 1959 and 1963.

However, we do not sell arms directly. For the most part, with the exception of the Caribou aircraft, the material we sell to the United States is made up largely of electronic equipment. However, this arrangement antedates the Vietnam war considerably.

Mr. PELLETIER: With regard to the needs as concerns aid to Vietnam, according to the information that we get from the press it would appear that these needs are greater in North Vietnam, or in the Viet Cong-controlled areas, than in South Vietnam. Does this accurately describe the situation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Frankly, I would not know. However, I would not be surprised if that were the case. I could not answer that.

Certainly there is a great deal of assistance given to both sides, but it is impossible for me to give you any more definite answer. I would not be surprised, however, if that, in fact, was the case.

Mr. PELLETIER: With regard to certain steps taken in the field of aid, there are in this country a number of bodies which have proposed that Canada use a hospital ship to provide aid. What is the Minister's view on that proposal? Is it really a useful solution? A number of groups feel that this is a step which Canada should take.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): A hospital ship such as—

Mr. PELLETIER: Such as the German one.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The matter has been examined; in fact, discussions were held with the Germans in this connection. I believe that the decision made was that, despite the fact that this might appear to be a good idea in principle, from a practical point of view it was not something on which we should embark; therefore, we have decided against it.

When the Director of the External Aid office appears before this Committee to give evidence he may be able to give you the actual reasons; I cannot really remember all of them. I personally have discussed this matter with the Germans, and this was the decision that we came to.

Mr. PELLETIER: Now, there is the transportation of victims—the sick and wounded—from Vietnam to Canada. Is it for practical reasons that the Department has not embarked on such a policy?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, but since the question was asked yesterday. I have asked our officials to re-examine the matter. This will be done and in a few days I may be in a position to give you additional information on that point.

Mr. PELLETIER: This is a question of interpretation, I suppose. The other day, when you were questioned on aid to North Vietnam, you answered that "the Government is prepared to consider" requests. Do you mean to say that the Government is not opposed in principle to giving aid to the North, and that it will depend on the nature of the requests made?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I believe that the answer would be yes; but we should receive a request from the Northern Government. Under those circumstances, we will be prepared to examine the matter. I doubt very much that we will receive any such requests from the Government of North Vietnam. We indicated our willingness to examine such requests a year ago.

Mr. PELLETIER: There has not been no subsequent request?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. PELLETIER: This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the Minister whether he feels that it would be a good idea for Committee to send a delegation to Vietnam to study, *in situ*, the way in which Canada's assistance programme is being handled there? Might this be useful in terms of its effect on public opinion in this country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is rather difficult to answer this question. If I were to answer No, it would certainly be misunderstood. Will you allow me to take the matter under advisement and answer later?

Mr. PELLETIER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Mr. Lambert is watching me. That is one of the reasons why I think that I should not try to answer at this time.

Mr. LAMBERT: It is like asking whether you have stopped beating your wife.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I never beat her.

(*English*)

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. McIntosh?

Mr. McINTOSH: Did he answer yes or no?

Mr. LAMBERT: He refused to admit he was even there.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not want to overlook the fact that there is one member of our committee, Mr. Thompson, who has been there. He has already honoured me with a review of his experiences there and I suppose at some time these might be transmitted to the Committee.

Mr. WALKER: I cannot help thinking, Mr. Chairman, what happened when Mr. Thompson was out of the country. I would not want to wish it on any volunteers of the Committee that might go to Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCHILL: We could suggest your name, Mr. Walker.

Mr. NESBITT: The Minister is going away for two weeks, is he not?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I can imagine there might be some circumstances when Mr. Churchill and I would both agree, but it would be helpful if perhaps he were away.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That would be very unusual.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, you do not travel very much. I do not know anyone who deserves a trip more than you do.

Mr. MCINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, my first question stems from a statement on page 15, and I am asking this question just as a matter of clarification. You start out with this sentence in the second paragraph:

There is one further point which I should like to leave with the Committee. We have said consistently that we regard a purely military solution of the conflict in Vietnam as neither practical nor desirable.

What do you mean by desirable in view of the statement you make further down in the last paragraph, where you state:

On the face of it a stand-still cease-fire does not look as if it should involve any inordinate problems for either side if there was a willingness in principle to stop the fighting.

Do you feel there is not a willingness on both sides to stop this fighting?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think there is. I suspect that there is a desire on both sides to have a cease-fire but, as I said earlier in my statement, the position taken by the government of the north is that, in the light of their view as to who is the aggressor, before they can be called upon to make any reciprocal act there must be an initial act taken by the government of the United States, and they envisage that act as consisting of an unconditional stopping of the bombing. But their present position, on the basis of clear interpretation of the respective positions of both sides, is that if the bombing were stopped within the context they lay down, then they would be prepared to give consideration to the next step, which would be in fulfilment of the American position.

Mr. MCINTOSH: I had a question to ask on this unconditional demand of one side that stems from something you said on page 6:

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether, if there was a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, this would have to be permanent as well as unconditional.

Do I take it that this is one of the demands of the North Vietnamese and that no guarantee is given by them that there will be no infraction on their part as to infiltration, and so on, that the Americans or the South Vietnamese feel here should be?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): May I again quote that statement:

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether, if there was a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, this would have to be permanent as well as unconditional.

The reason I said the question has been raised is because in various statements, including that of the Foreign Minister to Mr. Burchett in January, the word "permanent" is not included, and it suggested that because it was not included in that particular exchange that the north had changed its position. However, if you will look at page 7 of my statement you will see where I go on to point out that while that is true, the North Vietnamese representative in

France on February 22 made it clear that when "permanent" was used in any of the exchanges it must be concluded that "permanent" was intended, because I go on to say in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 7:

When he was asked how a distinction could in practice be drawn between a temporary and a permanent halt to the bombing, the North Vietnamese representative answered that the United States would have to declare at the outset that the halt was both permanent and unconditional.

So, I think we can assume that it is the view of the north that the halting of the bombing must be permanent and unconditional. I think in any event, whether one agrees with this position or not, that North Vietnam could logically say no less because anything less would amount to saying that the United States could resume the bombing if Hanoi did not meet Washington's conditions. I am not saying I agree with that, but I think that would be a logical conclusion to draw.

Mr. McINTOSH: You said they could say no less, and to me this is a—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I mean to say that I cannot imagine we would expect the north to say anything less to the United States. Obviously, if they say, "You stop the bombing", one would not expect the north to say "At some point later you might resume it".

Mr. McINTOSH: These words "permanent" and "unconditional" mean forever and ever.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, I think so.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, they are asking and I would ask you if you agree with me, something that is impossible for the United States or South Vietnam to answer. They are asking an impossible question to answer.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot believe that the United States could agree to that.

Mr. McINTOSH: On page 14, in the fourth and final stage—I will not read it all—you mention "all outside forces". Could you tell us what you mean by this?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Where is this?

Mr. McINTOSH: It is about one-third of the way down on page 14. It reads:

The *Fourth* and final stage would complete the process of return—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Just a minute, now. Are we on page 14?

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, the fourth and final stage.

Mr. McINTOSH: I will read on to the second last line in that paragraph. You say:

—the withdrawal of all outside forces whose presence in the area of conflict was not provided for at Geneva, and for the dismantling of military bases or their conversion to peaceful purposes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not have what you are referring to.

Mr. McINTOSH: Do you have the same copy we have?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not think we have. "The *Fourth* and final stage would complete the process", is that the one.



Mr. McINTOSH: That is it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): All right.

Mr. McINTOSH: You mention outside forces there?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Would you mind reading the text to which you are referring?

Mr. McINTOSH: It reads:

The *Fourth* and final stage would complete the process of return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva settlement. At the stage, provision would have to be made for the liberation and repatriation of prisoners—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH:

—for the withdrawal of all outside forces.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: I want to know who these outside forces are?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, that would be the outside forces of the north.

Mr. McINTOSH: Who are they?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, of the north.

Mr. McINTOSH: Yes, but who are the outside forces?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They are the citizens of the government in North Vietnam. I do not know whether they are composed of any other group. There may be technicians from China. I know there are technicians from China in the north.

Mr. McINTOSH: Russia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know of any technicians from Russia that would be serving the north in the south. I do not know of any outsiders serving the north in the south. I would distinguish that question from the contributions made by outsiders to the north in the north.

Mr. McINTOSH: And there would also be outsiders in the south?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh yes, there are the Australians, the Americans the Koreans and the New Zealanders, and some others.

Mr. McINTOSH: So you know how many different countries are represented in the south?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, there is first of all the South Vietnam forces.

Mr. McINTOSH: Outside forces?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The forces of the United States, the forces of Australia, the forces of New Zealand, the forces of Korea and the Philippines.

Mr. McINTOSH: On page 12, Mr. Minister, in the second paragraph about half way down—it is not necessary for me to read the whole paragraph—you say:

In essence, that principle is that there must be a condition of parity between the two sides at all stages of the process.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. McINTOSH: By "parity" do you mean, with regard to "permanent" and "unconditional", that is a unilateral demand rather than a bilateral one, and that there should be give on both sides?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, but there should be, in so far as it is possible, a result that would conform to the concept of being balanced, not that this would necessarily meet the conditions of justice or merit, but as a practical means of bringing a dispute to an end in negotiation it is usual to try and put both sides on as great a basis of parity as possible. That is what we mean. This is something that the north does not accept. They say that before they are prepared to act, in the light of their view as to who is the aggressor, there must be some prior action taken by the United States. I am not saying I agree with that, I am just making no comment on it.

Mr. McINTOSH: Has Canada made any suggestion to the north that there should be parity on both sides?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have had full discussion through the various intermediaries that I have mentioned. I am not at liberty to say what we told the north.

Mr. McINTOSH: In the first part of your brief, Mr. Minister, you mentioned a peace-keeping role, and I do not know whether you mentioned a peace-restoring role.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I have never used the expression "peace-restoring". I had never heard of it until my friend Mr. Churchill mentioned it the other day in the house, and in view of the strictures which he made on the concept I decided not to adopt the nomenclature at any time.

Mr. NESBITT: He does not listen to his colleague very well, then.

Mr. McINTOSH: At the top of page 2 you state, "we are there on a peace-keeping mission". Now is a peace-keeping mission or role similar to the Commission that we have there at the present time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The word "peace-keeping" in this context, of course, has reference to the commission. In 1954 the commission was given the responsibility of doing one thing primarily, and that was reporting to the two co-chairmen, Britain and the Soviet Union, on the extent of any violations committed by either party to the Geneva Agreement, and I have used the word "peace-keeping" in that context. Obviously if there is a violation, that is contrary to the intention to try and preserve peace. But it is not peace-keeping in the sense that one has in mind, for instance, when one refers to the peace-keeping operation in Cyprus or, let us say, in the Gaza Strip.

Mr. McINTOSH: On page 1 you state, "Nor do we have any formal military or other commitments there." We are there on a peace-keeping mission. In the second paragraph you say, "there are responsibilities which we have in Vietnam as members of the International Commission". Therefore you mean this peace-keeping mission and the International Commission are not formal military commitments?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): They are a formal obligation which we have accepted. We did not have to accept the request of the Geneva powers in 1954 to undertake this responsibility. We carefully considered it before Canada accepted it at that time. But we did accept it, along with India and Poland, and it is the only obligation that we have accepted in the Indo-China region. As I have indicated in the house on several occasions we would not favor the assumption of any other responsibility as combatants unless it were pursuant to an obligation under the charter of the United Nations.

Mr. McINTOSH: You mention on page 3, "If...Canada were to be asked to participate in an international peace-keeping efforts in Vietnam"—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Pardon?

Mr. McINTOSH: On page 3 you mention "If...Canada were to be asked to participate in an international peace-keeping effort in Vietnam." Would that be a unilateral effort or must that be a combined effort?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, first of all, we would not be asked to do this alone. If that situation arises—and I hope it does soon—presumably a request would be made by the Geneva powers and the countries directly involved. If we were asked we would certainly give it the consideration as a government that I mentioned yesterday, and within the conditions that I laid down I would certainly recommend our participation.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Who would pay for it?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well I suppose the arrangement would depend on whether it was a Geneva framework arrangement, a United Nations arrangement or some other arrangement. If it were the Geneva framework arrangement, then it would have to be paid—as it is now paid—by the contributory Geneva powers. The costs of the commission are now paid by the contributory Geneva powers, who have accepted that collective responsibility.

Mr. NESBITT: Supplementary to that, do you feel that if it were to be called at the invitation of the Geneva powers, if it should by any chance be a UN operation, do you still feel we should receive some reimbursement?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I certainly do, but we would have to examine this situation when it arises. If it were a United Nations operation—and I am not saying it will be since there are practical difficulties there because all members involved in the struggle are not members of the United Nations—then we would be into the problem that is facing the UN at the present time of the collective financial responsibility for peace-keeping operations. I have no hesitation in saying that notwithstanding that, my own personal view is that there is an obligation on the part of countries who feel strongly about these situations not to let the impasse in the United Nations stand in the way of a development of the concept of peace-keeping. This is the situation that is presently facing us in Cyprus.

Mr. McINTOSH: I have a supplementary arising out of the Minister's answer to Mr. Nesbitt. The Minister said there were certain countries involved that were not members of the United Nations. Does this not also apply in the case of Rhodesia, where the United Nations took action?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think we are talking about related matters. What I had in mind, Mr. McIntosh, with regard to the situation in Vietnam was that if the peace-keeping operation were under the auspices of the United Nations this would mean that the United Nations had come into the picture, although certain countries involved were not members of either the Security Council or the General Assembly. It might be that the only way the United Nations could come in would be pursuant to an agreement or an acceptance by the north and by the south, non-members of the United Nations, and by some kind of arrangement to which conceivably the Soviet Union and the United States might agree in order to avoid what probably would be the situation, namely, the reluctance of Mainland China to permit that kind of an operation to come into being because it is a United Nations operation.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you say one condition would be the acceptance by both the North and the South to the United Nations taking some action in there?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Absolutely.

Mr. McINTOSH: Would you apply that same reasoning to Rhodesia and the action that Great Britain took in that case?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. The situation in Rhodesia is quite a different matter, it is an unrelated question. In the case of Rhodesia the government of Rhodesia was not an independent government, it was not a sovereign power. In the case of Rhodesia the sovereign power resided with the colonial power, and the colonial power which Britain had was the ultimate element in the link of sovereignty.

Mr. McINTOSH: Where is the sovereign power in South Vietnam and North Vietnam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, they are two separate, independent, juridical units recognized by the Geneva Accords of 1954.

Mr. BREWIN: Only temporarily.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, it may be only temporarily but they are two separate, independent bodies and conceivably, they may be so for a long time. But in the case of Rhodesia the government of Mr. Smith is not a sovereign entity.

Mr. NESBITT: It is a *de facto* one.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, it is not a *de facto* one. The ultimate authority in Rhodesia rests with Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom.

Mr. NESBITT: That is *de jure* but not *de facto*.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): *De facto and de jure*.

Mr. NESBITT: Oh, go on.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I bow to your greater constitutional appreciation of these things.

Mr. NESBITT: It is not my view, Mr. Minister, it is a question of facts, whether one likes them or not.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): When you use these words "*de jure*" they are way above me, I do not understand them.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras, you indicated at the last meeting that you wished to ask questions.



Mr. ANDRAS: Yes, I just have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Martin, while I appreciate the most important thing now is to deal with the situation as it exists today and for everybody to try and seek some solution, I would be interested in and would appreciate your summary of the events leading up to the grounds for justification or otherwise of the United States intervention and participation in Vietnam in the first place.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I have no hesitation in answering the question. I have felt that it was desirable to emphasize events that were before us in such a way as to encourage some understanding on the part of the North in the hope that we might bring about peace and stability in this area, but you have asked me the question and, pursuant to that, I have no option but to reply.

The United States was not a signatory to the Geneva Agreement, neither was the government of South Vietnam. Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations provides that a country may invite the military assistance of another to assist it in the defence of its territory. So, the decision of President Kennedy of the United States to send in the first batch of military personnel in an advisory capacity was clearly in accord with the charter.

The next important fact is that in 1962 the International Control and Supervisory Commission did make a finding of fact on where aggression had begun. This is already in testimony which I gave before this Committee more than a year and a half ago. The judgment of the majority of the Commission was that the aggression on the part of the North Vietnam began shortly after the Geneva Agreement. Now, this finding of fact has been disputed. In fact, it was disputed in this Committee. Mr. Douglas on one occasion interrogated me at some length on this. I simply point out that this was a finding of fact.

Mr. ANDRAS: I understand that Mr. Pelletier brought up the question of supplying Canadian material to the United States, and I am sorry I was not here for the answer. There is one adjunct to that question that I wanted to ask you. With regard to the Soviet Union, for instance, which I understand was co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, has it been possible to identify that it is supplying any war materials to North Vietnam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): What is the question again?

Mr. ANDRAS: The Soviet Union—

Mr. BREWIN: Before you go on to that, may I ask a supplementary on a point that the Minister has just dealt with, Mr. Chairman? Is there any finding whatever by any body of the United Nations that suggests that there was any breach of the charter in relation to the outbreak of what I would have thought might be described as civil war in South Vietnam? Is there any decision whatever that you are quoting from that supports that interpretation of events?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There are no decisions of the United Nations but it is clear what Article 51 under the charter provides.

Mr. BREWIN: Does it deal with wars within a particular country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): All that governments can do is deal with governments. In the South a request was made by the constituted government of the day, and it was that government that made the request. Of course, I should point out that the right to invoke Article 51 does not require any decision on the

part of the United Nations. This is an act that is permissible and exercisable by a country on its own, without reference to the UN.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Martin, I do not want to get into a lengthy—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would like to emphasize just one point. I do not want to interfere with the questioning. I made it clear to Mr. Andras that while I am in the hands of the Committee, I am not anxious, for obvious purposes that I have explained, to deal with this aspect of the situation, but if I am asked questions I have no option but to reply to them. I do not want the government of North Vietnam to think that I raised this question.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one further question. I do not want to go into this because it is a highly controversial matter. I just wanted to check whether Mr. Martin would agree that the applicability of the United Nations charter is a highly controversial matter and that it simply is not a clear case of the charter being applicable. Would you agree with that?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am very sorry, but I—

Mr. BREWIN: I am just saying that you mentioned the United Nations charter yourself.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. BREWIN: As justification for the American troops originally being there in an advisory capacity.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I did not say in "justification".

Mr. BREWIN: All I am saying to you—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I did not say in "justification". I said as an explanation of a right that existed under the circumstances that confronted President Kennedy in 1961.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, without going into a lengthy discussion or controversy about it all, I am asking you if that is a controversial interpretation?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not believe it is, no.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Andras.

Mr. ANDRAS: In connection with the supply of materiel, war materiel particularly, to North Vietnam, is there any evidence, for instance, that the Soviet Union is supplying such materiel to the North Vietnamese?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. ANDRAS: That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have a few questions which are non-controversial, of course.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): All your questions are agreeably non-controversial.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I notice the Minister produced a four point program the other day which made a good headline. As a non-interventionist and with a knowledge of the past, which I share with him, did the Minister consider extending that to a 14 point program, like President Wilson did many years ago?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the original American proposals there were 14 points, but they have been reduced since that time. The North has a four point program and the Viet Cong has a five point program. The steps that I outlined



yesterday, which I know you would regard and take as a serious submission, are provisions that are taken from Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Actually, you have—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It seemed to us that in view of the hardened position and on the basis of some discussions we have had, it would be useful at this time to emphasize the provisions that were made available in the agreement itself.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I notice that U Thant has a three point program and you have added to it by clearing out the demilitarized zone. The significance of that escapes me at the moment, but you added a very significant factor in your second one when you were talking about no escalation and no reinforcement during the period when the two parties—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think, Mr. Churchill, you are confusing one of the points in the submission made by U Thant and the provisions specified in the Geneva Agreement, are you not?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Oh no, no.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think you are. Perhaps you would like to start again.

Mr. CHURCHILL: No, I am never confused. U Thant was suggesting a standstill truce, then preliminary talks and then the all-out conference.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. CHURCHILL: But his standstill truce did not include what you have very wisely put in—acting on the advice, I suppose, of your officials—that there should be no reinforcement by either side during the period of that standstill truce. I compliment you on that addition.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I think I must correct you again because I think you are understandably confused in the matter. What U Thant did was to suggest a three-pronged proposal, which was designed to try and bring about peace. These three proposals were simply this; a general standstill truce, then an agreement to talk and then a Geneva conference.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is what I said.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The United States accepted this proposal. The Canadian government agreed with this proposal. But the Government of the North has now made it clear that it does not accept these proposals because it believes that the United States was the aggressor, and on that account it must take some prior act. Because of the non-acceptance of U Thant's proposals, anxious as we are to try to get some acceptance that will lead to preliminary talks, we have outlined the four steps envisaged in the Geneva Agreement which, on a basis of progressive development, would offer another way out. We hope that this will be considered.

These four steps, so that you will be clear about them, are, first, that there should be some degree of physical disengagement of all the parties. When you referred to this first step you were referring to the demilitarized zone and it is because you had done so that I thought it was important that the matter should be explained to you again.

The second point was that it would be necessary to freeze the course of military events in Vietnam at its present level.

Third, that it would be logical that there would be a cessation of all activities between the parties; whether on the ground, air, or on the sea.

The final stage would be to complete the process of return to the cease-fire provisions of the Geneva Agreement, which includes the withdrawal of all outside forces.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I selected U Thant's proposals from your document on page 9, and then your own proposals on page 13, and I am glad that you have refreshed your memory with regard to them.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): But only because you were kind enough to cause me to reflect on them.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Your first step, and these are your own words:

...should involve some degree of physical disengagement of the parties. This might be accomplished by restoring the demilitarized character of the zone on either side of the seventeenth parallel by the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies and equipment from that zone...

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, by barring overflights, and so on.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is the size of that demilitarized zone?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is six miles wide; a three mile strip on each side. Its course runs east-west from the sea to the Laotian border.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is a rather insignificant area in relation to the war that is going on in that country.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know what you mean by "insignificant".

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, in size.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, in size, but that does not mean that it is an insignificant proposition. You see, before last September there was, practically at all times, an absence of significant clashes in the demilitarized zone. The nature of the escalation was reflected in the fact that last September the forces of the USA and South Vietnam and the forces of the north, entered into a process of engagement in the demilitarized zone, so it became a rather significant bit of territory. The thought here is that if there were this disengagement this would be a very significant gesture that might have a cumulative exemplary effect. You, as a very well known military strategist, I am sure would agree with that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I thought it was rather an insignificant factor to be listed prominently as a first step. It would just give your International Commission a chance to move about a little bit more than they have been doing in the last few weeks.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You say it would be insignificant, that is your judgment, but I would point out to you that this is a provision in the Geneva Agreement that was considered carefully by 9 powers at the time in 1954, and re-considered by a government of which you were so distinguished a member.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Thank you, very much. I was attempting to compliment you on adding to your four points something that had been omitted by U Thant.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I never overlook the fact that that is all you have in mind.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I asked a question in the House some time ago of the Minister of National Defence who said that the question involved matters of some secrecy.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Do not get me in the position where I would be contradicting my colleague now, Mr. Churchill.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I will point out in a minute where you failed with regard to your colleague. But should we not have a military appreciation of the situation in Vietnam in order to understand it very thoroughly? What are the sizes of the forces engaged? If you are looking forward to a peace settlement, as we all are, is it reasonable to assume that it is within sight? How intensive is the war at the present time; what degree of success is attendant upon the US and their allies' activity; are they failing in their mission, or have we reached the stage where there is a possibility of the war coming to a successful end from the point of view of the United States? You must have had some of these things in mind when you were making suggestions and looking ahead to a peacekeeping operation.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not think that that follows at all. I do not think, in the first place, that it is my role to give a report on the success of the battle one way or another. Canada is not a belligerent in this war. As a member of the Commission our role, in most difficult circumstances, is to try to comply with the obligation imposed on us 13 years ago, and that we are seeking to do through the Commission.

As to whether or not the chances for peace are good or bad, all I can say at the moment is that the positions have hardened and I do not see any immediate prospect, but that does not mean that one could not suddenly arise.

I said to Mr. Allmand yesterday that no one likes to see people killed on either side in any war, and that we are doing all that we can, as are other countries, to see that it comes to an end, but coming to an end is not a matter that is within our exclusive power in any way.

Now, you asked about the number of troops. I can give you the statistical information. I can tell you it is estimated that there are approximately 435,000 US troops, 600,000 South Vietnamese, 45,000 Koreans, 5,000 Australians, some New Zealanders, some Thais, and some Philippine personnel as well.

On the other side in the South, there are about 280,000 combined Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That will lead me to the next question. In the course of your endeavours in your visits to Russia and Poland—and we have not seen the film of that yet, I suppose that will be on display—did you consider, also, going to Australia and New Zealand to talk directly with the people there who are engaged in this war? They seem to be left out of the picture; it is just North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States that we hear about. Yet, here are two countries of the Commonwealth involved for some time now in this war. What contact have you with those people?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It would be wrong, of course, to conclude that we do not have, and have not had, continuous contacts and discussions with Commonwealth and other countries. I have met with Mr. Paul Hasluck, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Australia, on two occasions with regard to this and other matters. We have also had contacts, of course, with New Zealand. We have had discussions with the Thais, and with other countries including Korea as well, of course, as with the United States.

In the past few months we have had two independent discussions here in Ottawa with representatives of the government of South Vietnam who have come especially for that purpose.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I listened with the greatest of care to the Minister; his answers range much more widely than my questions.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is what you would expect because of the inordinate strictures of the questions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: It is not what I expect; it is what I get, but it is not what I expect.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think, you and I, as lawyers, have been taught that we should always bear in mind the purpose of a question when we make a particular reply.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I try, frequently, to know the answer too before I ask the question.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is why I sometimes wonder why you put the question.

Mr. CHURCHILL: The answer is that you have made no direct contact with Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have just said the opposite.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think this is essential because these people are involved in the war.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I beg to differ, and I hope you will not persist in saying that because I have just said the opposite. We have had the greatest consultations on this point with the governments of Australia and New Zealand, and the other governments that I have mentioned; we understand their position.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is their position, then?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have had many discussions with Sir Kenneth Bailey, the Australian High Commissioner. He was here yesterday and followed this event with great interest, and only for the fact that he had another engagement he would have been here this morning, because he knew you were going to ask some questions, and that would draw anyone.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Could we get him to the Committee as a witness?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not a member of the Committee.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, there are some good points about the Committee. I would like to ask a final question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): You are going to disappoint me if you only ask one more.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, my time is consumed by the Minister's lengthy answers.



The Minister said that he has not heard about the expression "peace restoring", but the Minister then, alone in all Canada, has not read the speech of the Minister of National Defence of December 7, published in the red cover, and at an enormous cost to the Canadian people. In that speech he uses the words "peace restoring" and "peacekeeping". Now, when the Minister is looking forward to some activity in Vietnam after the war is over he, of course, is thinking strictly of peacekeeping, which is a police exercise.

I would like to ask the Minister what size of force does he envisage under the circumstances if peace is declared?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I could not say now, as I indicated yesterday. No one could say that; we have to know the nature of the assignment, the number of participants, and there would be a whole series of questions. That is a matter that we, of course, are now considering and studying with other governments, but I could not go beyond that.

Mr. CHURCHILL: There has been speculation in the press that—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think you should rely, overly, on speculations in the press.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, I read Charles Lynch always, with regard to the Minister of National Defence.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, he is a very good journalist. I notice that he has some very critical things to say of you sometimes, but I do not agree with all his criticism.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You have thrown out the idea that Canada is prepared, on the request of the United Nations or the Geneva powers—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I did not say that. What I said was that I was prepared to recommend to a government of which I was a member, given the right conditions, that Canada assist in this kind of a project.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Yes, but your position in the government would lead anyone to assume that on your recommendation the government would take action.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is an assumption which I am grateful to you for making.

Mr. CHURCHILL: So, you just threw this out, then, as another one of these ideas about Canada's role for the future as strictly—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think in a matter of this importance that even your well-known levity should be allowed to cloud a very serious matter. The Canadian people and most members in this Committee, and most members in the House, take the matter of peacekeeping very seriously. They look upon peacekeeping and Canada's record in that area as one of our great national achievements.

What I would suggest you look at is what I actually said yesterday.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Well, you might look at the speech that I made in the House last night.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I read it, and I did not find that reading it was as useful an occupation as I had anticipated it might be.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Unless you can give us a clear indication of the foreign policy of this country, we cannot settle the other problem of national defence. That is what I was interested in.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am satisfied, with the mood that you are in these days, that no amount of serious discussion would be allowed to penetrate.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have a supplementary question for the Minister. In answering Mr. Pelletier earlier, the Minister threw out the idea that if an invitation were received by the Canadian government from the government of North Vietnam for non-military aid, it would receive consideration.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. CHURCHILL: This, in effect, is an invitation to North Vietnam to make representations to this government. Now, what position are we going to be put in?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That may be your view. I would ask you to look at the full context of the situation.

We are on the International Commission. As a result we have had 13 years of experience in continuous contact with the government of the North and the South. We are engaged in an assignment that should be as impartial and as objective as we can make it. We are also engaged, as a result, in trying to bring about some settlement of the war. It seems to me that it is only logical in response to questions such as that put by Mr. Pelletier that I would say that we would give consideration to a request for medical assistance to the civilian population of that area.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have finished my questions; I will let somebody else attempt to nail jelly to the wall, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Does that mean that you have not succeeded?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Harkness.

Mr. HARKNESS: This four point program which you have put before the Committee as your suggestion for settling the difficulties in Vietnam, I take it to be an indirect means of bringing this to the attention of the people involved, the members of the United Nations, and so on. I wondered why you did it in this indirect way rather than putting this proposition directly to the people involved.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): From time to time, Mr. Harkness, and over a considerable period now, the provisions of the Geneva Agreement have been discussed by members of the Commission, and they have been discussed with other governments. We had a special reason for doing it in this way at this time.

Mr. HARKNESS: What was this reason?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would be glad to discuss this, but I cannot in an open session.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would have thought that it was actually likely to be more effective if it were put forward directly to the people involved, and put forward directly in the United Nations, rather than by this indirect method.



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not think, in the circumstances we have in mind, that would have been helpful. I am certain that it would not have been useful to put it in the United Nations. You remember yesterday I said that when the United States put forward a particular proposal for a discussion of the Vietnam war in the Security Council, they did not proceed to a final conclusion because in the view of the Secretary-General the solution to this problem rests within the Geneva framework and not within the United Nations because all the parties involved in the conflict are not members of the organization.

Mr. HARKNESS: Nevertheless, the question has been up there time after time.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Not in the form of any particular resolution, other than the initiative taken by Mr. Goldberg in January of last year, but in the General Assembly there have been general debates. We ourselves have taken part in them.

Mr. HARKNESS: And U Thant has taken a very active part in them.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, a very active part; U Thant has made at least three different, distinct, proposals, beginning first in September, 1964.

Mr. HARKNESS: Could we take it that this is what is frequently called "flying a kite"?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That would not be the complete, but it would be a fairly good, description.

Mr. HARKNESS: There was some discussion with Mr. Churchill with regard to the first part of your initial point, but I look upon the important part of it as the latter part. Does not all of your first point essentially come down to this—that is, the important part of it—that it is a proposition that the US bombing be stopped?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, that would be included, certainly.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is really what it boils down to.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is one of the key positions in the whole proposition.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, this is a rather circuitous way of saying that the Americans should stop the bombing.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The United States government itself has made it very clear that they would stop the bombing if there were some military reciprocal undertaking given clandestinely or publicly.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): So, the position that is implicit in the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, and employed here, are consistent with the American position to that extent.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, we are all aware of that, but the basic difficulty is that the Americans are not prepared to stop the bombing—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. HARKNESS:—unconditionally. Your proposition, essentially, is that they should stop it unconditionally.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No.

Mr. HARKNESS: In other words, it is the same proposition which has been put up by various other people time after time, in essence, as I said.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not think so, Mr. Harkness. The first step is that there would be a disengagement, first of all, of both parties. That would mean stopping the bombing and stopping the infiltration. It would also mean, in the second instance, a freezing of all military events in Vietnam at the present level. In other words, it would be that the principal of parity is recognized in these provisions which are, as I say, taken from the Geneva Agreement itself.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think perhaps there is a difference of opinion on this matter; I will leave it for the moment.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I could say, if I may, that I know these propositions would not be contrary to the position that the United States government have taken through Mr. Goldberg on September 22, 1966, mainly that the bombing would be stopped if there were some reciprocal military action taken on the other side.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would like to ask a question now with regard to the statement on page 15 which was referred to by Mr. McIntosh and which, I note, is the same statement which appears in your preface to the report for 1965; that is:

We have said consistently that we regard a purely military solution of the conflict in Vietnam is neither practicable nor desirable.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. HARKNESS: We will leave out the "desirable" at the moment, but as far as the practicability of this is concerned, what do you mean?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the first place, this is not inconsistent with the public positions taken by the government of the United States. The President, in April of 1965, said that the effort of the United States was a limited one. Although there have been escalations, he has said that this continues to be a limited effort; it is not an all-out effort on the part of the United States. The President reiterated that only about a month ago. It is further supported by the statements made repeatedly by the President and by Mr. Rusk that the government of the United States is prepared to enter into peace talks whether or not there is a cessation of hostilities.

A purely military solution, involving an over-all victory, an over-running of this situation, could have exacerbating consequences of the most serious kind.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now you are getting on to the desirability.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Anything that would involve going beyond the 17th parallel could have the most serious consequences, and this has been stated and recognized by the United States.

Mr. HARKNESS: As I say, you are getting into the desirability of it; perhaps you will remember that I was limiting my question to the practicability. I think there is no question that what are generally referred to as the hawks in the United States at least, think it is a very practicable solution—

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I see what you mean.

Mr. HARKNESS: —and, as a matter of fact, the statement recently made by General Taylor, and various other statements made by Ambassador Lodge, by Mr. McNamara, and by Mr. Rusk, at one time or another, and by various other



prominent members of the American government, have reiterated the fact that it is quite possible—in other words quite practicable—to impose a military solution. This is why I wondered why you said it was not practicable.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I will tell you what I mean by practicable. If you ask: "Do you say that is not possible?" No; of course I think it would be possible. But, I use the word "practicability" with this in mind: If there is to be a settlement which will hold out a reasonable prospect of long term stability it will have to be based, I think, on a degree of accommodation of the interests of all concerned. This is unlikely to be the result of an exclusively military solution of the present conflict.

Mr. HARKNESS: You get down to the desirability, which is a different matter altogether. I was, as I say, limiting this to the practicability, and I doubt whether this is accurate in view of what I have just said.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, you are questioning my semantics. I am not denying there is a point to what you say. I am just explaining my use of the word "practicable".

Mr. HARKNESS: This, for you, is a very definite statement.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think it is a correct adjective in the context which I have explained, namely, that we are thinking of a long-term arrangement which will provide and encourage stability in the area.

Mr. HARKNESS: You dealt at some length on Tuesday with the possibility of sending a peacekeeping force in, and said that discussions had been taking place with regard to that matter as well as assessments of the number of people that might be required. In fact, you said that not only for the boundary between North and South Vietnam but because of the long boundary between South Vietnam and Laos the numbers required would be very considerable. Have any assessments been made at all of the numbers of people that would be required?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I indicated yesterday that naturally we had been giving consideration to this problem, as have others. We have not finished our examination, nor have conclusions been reached by others with whom we have exchanged views. I cannot add to that, except to repeat what I said yesterday.

Mr. HARKNESS: In effect, no appreciation has been made of the size of force that would be required for this purpose?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, consideration is being given to this, and there are tentative positions taken in respect of interested parties.

Mr. HARKNESS: I am not asking the number of people that Canada might be asked to send, or be prepared to send, or anything else; I am asking what the over-all appreciation is of the numbers of people that might be required for an operation of this kind. Can you give us any indication of what it might be?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I could not, at this time, disclose in public even the tentative figures.

Mr. HARKNESS: As far as you can go, then, is what you have already said—that they would be very considerable?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes; I would remind you that in the UNEF we had originally, I think, 6,500. It is now down to around 3,400. In the Cyprus



force, I think originally it was a little over 6,200; it is down now to something like 4,600. In the Congo—I think that was the biggest operation—they were very considerable.

Mr. HARKNESS: About 20,000.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, there were around 20,000. The Canadian contingent at that time was limited, you remember, mostly to signallers.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think you would know more about that than I would. It was not that we did not want to give more but I think we were confined to signallers or technicians, and not to paramilitary forces, and that could very well be the situation again.

Mr. HARKNESS: I think the situation there, and the situation in some of the other African and Asian areas, is that there is some prejudice against white faces in these intervention forces, and therefore there is demand for, or at least a greater inclination to have, people that do not have white faces take part in these operations.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think we have to take into consideration the interests of the countries involved. That could be a factor; I do not say it will be a factor, but it could be a factor. In fact, when the Prime Minister outlined the possible obligation of the international community in New York two years ago, he himself envisaged the very possibility which you have postulated.

Mr. HARKNESS: In view of the situation which has now come up and has just been mentioned, is any consideration being given, in order to obviate that as far as Canada is concerned, to a recruitment of 2,000 or 3,000 of our Indians, who are under-employed in any event, and who, I think, would make very excellent people for a mission of this sort? This prejudice which exists would be circumvented in that way.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am not going to deny that is a consideration that is worth making careful note of.

Mr. HARKNESS: Has any consideration been given to that? I have never heard about any, and I have wondered on several occasions whether this might not be a way in which Canada could make use of its numerous manpower resources which are not being utilized.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There would have to be consideration given to certain military aspects of that, but I can say that has not been overlooked.

I would not want to leave my response limited to what I have said. First of all, our participation in the ICC was as a result of a decision that was unanimously made, including a decision by China. There were other Asian member states at the conference in Geneva in 1954. I have no reasons for saying now that prejudice exists, or will exist but it is only right that it should be taken into account.

Our contact, through the Commission with the North has not revealed anything but an acceptance by the North of the presence of Canadian personnel, so much so that the use of the Commission continues to be recognized by all parties.

Mr. HARKNESS: That leads me to another question. How many Canadian military and civilian personnel have we in Vietnam at the present time?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I gave these figures last year—

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but they have changed since then.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): There is a total of 95 persons; 66 Canadian military personnel and 29 Canadian civilians, directly employed in the work of the Canadian delegations to the three Commissions in Indo-China. No Canadian personnel are directly employed by Canada in Indo-China.

In so far as national defence is concerned—

Mr. HARKNESS: What do you mean “no Canadian personnel are directly employed”?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No personnel are indirectly—that is, locally—employed by Canada in Indo-China. So far as national defence is concerned, the number of directly or indirectly employed personnel in Canada or in other parts of the world is nil. In the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, two foreign service officers are engaged full time in dealing with matters flowing from Canada's participation in the three Commissions. In addition, both in Ottawa and at Canadian diplomatic posts in countries which have a particular interest in the problems in Indo-China, other officers are devoting varying proportions of their time, depending on circumstances, to dealing with questions relating to or flowing from our membership on the Commission.

Mr. HARKNESS: I was concerned with the number actually in Vietnam.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In Vietnam there is a total of something like 57, or maybe more.

Mr. HARKNESS: That is 57 military?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No; the number of integrated service personnel in Vietnam is 45. Do you want the figures for Laos?

Mr. HARKNESS: No, I just want the figures for Vietnam.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): And the civilian personnel is 19.

Mr. HARKNESS: The civilian is 12?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, making a total of 64.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, what are these 45 military personnel doing in Vietnam at the present time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The level of the military personnel is comparable to that of the two other participating countries, India and Poland.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, but what are they doing?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In Vietnam the Canadian Delegation, as I say, comprises both civilian and military personnel. The military members are responsible for carrying out investigations of reported breaches of the Agreement which the Commission is supervising; for some administrative functions on behalf of the delegations; and for advising the Commissioners in respect of military problems which may be under consideration.

The civilians are responsible, of course, for the political aspects of the delegation's work, and also for some phases of administration at delegation headquarters.

Mr. HARKNESS: You say the military personnel are responsible for investigating reported breaches. Now, in actual fact, they have done none of that in the last year, have they?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, they have done some, but they are not able, by any means, to do all that they would like to do because of the nature of the conflict. In the case of the North, you will remember, there were five team sites. Prior to the heavy bombing about a year and a half ago, the North said "in the interests of security"—that is the way they put it—they wished these team sites to be withdrawn. They were withdrawn. This did not mean to say that we closed the office in the North—in Hanoi—because we did not; it continues to be open; it continues to be manned.

Mr. HARKNESS: But, in effect, these military personnel really are doing nothing useful in Vietnam at the present time because of the circumstances which prevail.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Oh, I would not say that they continue to be doing nothing.

Mr. HARKNESS: They are not able to do the job that they are sent out there to do because of the circumstances that prevail.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Because of the nature of the conflict, they are not able to do the full job for which they had been assigned under our acceptance of the obligation which we were asked to assume in 1954.

Mr. HARKNESS: Then, in effect, they are wasted manpower.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I would not say that they are wasted manpower. It would be wrong for Canada, it seems to the Government, to withdraw its personnel beyond the level which continues to be provided for by India and by Poland.

Last year—quite rightly, I think—you put some questions to me along this line and I carefully examined the matter at that time, and we came to the conclusion that misunderstanding would arise if, in view of the frustrations or the difficulties, we were to withdraw our personnel beyond those proportions maintained by Poland and India.

Mr. HARKNESS: With my Scottish background, I have an inherent dislike of waste, and this seems to me to be a serious waste of manpower and thus of funds.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is why I thought, sometimes, that your views as Minister of National Defence were not as appreciated as they should have been.

Mr. HARKNESS: Thank you.

Mr. CHURCHILL: What is he doing, complimenting him?

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Thompson?

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, my first question is somewhat supplementary to some of those asked by Mr. Harkness. Having in mind that the first sentence of your four point program, Mr. Martin, states that:

The first step should involve some degree of physical disengagement of the parties.

and also having in mind that during the New Year's truce approximately a full division of North Vietnamese regular forces moved across the demilitarized zone with sufficient supplies and equipment to keep them operating for one year, it is



obvious that any physical disengagement is going to have to come under direct control or supervision of the International Control Commission.

You also said that you see no immediate prospect of any agreements that would bring them to the conference table. Should there be, in the near future, the prospect of a conference table which, in my opinion and that of many, is closer than we probably think at this time, is the International Control Commission in any position at all, in view of the personnel that are there, to move in and take over this responsibility?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): So far as the demilitarized zone is concerned, I think a respectable operation could be undertaken. In respect of the other phases of the proposals that are embedded in the Geneva Agreement, I think there would have to be an expanded Commission.

In respect of the proposal made by U Thant on March 14—this is a point that has engaged the government of the United States—I think too that the same consideration might apply.

Mr. THOMPSON: Are we prepared to move in even the initial number of troops necessary even to control the demilitarized zones, not having in mind the coastal waters of South Vietnam, which obviously would have to be put under some kind of control as well?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): If a request were made by the parties concerned to Canada as a member of the Commission, I would certainly be prepared to recommend Canadian assistance in that regard. I should say that the framework for this kind of operation is present. This is one reason for keeping the Commission operative on a standing basis.

Mr. THOMPSON: Is any consideration being given or has any been given, to the construction of an actual physical barrier? I am speaking of something like that which exists in Korea, so far as a demilitarized zone is concerned.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In the case of Korea, there is a considerable United States operation there.

Mr. THOMPSON: I am not speaking of forces; I am speaking of a physical control area through which neither side can pass.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, that is the principle involved in the demilitarized zone itself.

Mr. THOMPSON: But is consideration being given to such a prospect if this first step could be agreed on?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, because if you notice, in my statement yesterday, I said that this could be accomplished by restoring the character of the demilitarized zone itself; namely, the withdrawal of troops by both sides.

Mr. THOMPSON: In view of the importance of Thailand's position, how soon do you expect to establish a direct diplomatic mission in Thailand?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): We have decided, as of yesterday, to do that. We will be establishing a diplomatic mission in Thailand.

Mr. THOMPSON: In the immediate future?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes.

Mr. THOMPSON: Do you regard such a mission as important in the over-all picture of Vietnam and the whole Southeast Asia area?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Undoubtedly in establishing a mission, this was one of the factors; it was not the only factor. It is important that we should have a mission there now for a number of reasons, and the exigencies of our external aid program is one of the reasons. We have a considerable external aid program there, and it is important that we should have in our mission someone who deals with the growing problems arising out of our external aid assistance to Thailand.

Mr. THOMPSON: Is any discussion going on at the present time with the two co-chairmen of the Geneva powers with regard to steps that would have to be taken should your first point become de facto?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot say that there are, with the two co-chairmen, as yet, but I have no doubt that both countries represented by the principle of co-chairmanship will be aware of our analysis of the possible situation.

Mr. Brown, the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, will be going to Moscow very shortly.

Mr. THOMPSON: Having regard for the fact that our time is limited and the Minister's time is limited, I have just one more question this morning, Mr. Chairman.

With the prospect of national elections in South Vietnam this year, with municipal elections already in process and the approval of the new constitution drawn up by the provisional constituent assembly, how much importance are you attaching to this development so far as the stabilization of the political picture is concerned and the effect that it will have on the over-all situation in South Vietnam with regard to a cessation of hostilities as they are at the present time?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): In my opening statement yesterday I said that there is reason to feel encouraged by the progress that is being made in South Vietnam towards the facts and forms of responsible government.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I will not take more time this morning.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you; Mr. Lambert?

Mr. LAMBERT: With reference to page 13 and the four point disengagement proposal that the Minister has put forward, putting aside for the moment the question of under whose aegis this might take place, I am wondering how far through this has been thought, in so far as a theoretical program is put forward. There would be obligations and undertakings by the parties to this disengagement but, as we know, undertakings and engagements are broken. How do we restore the breaches? How do we take care of the breaches of this? This is in part with a force, and my questions are much related to those of Mr. Harkness, dealing with the practical aspects of the proposal the Minister has put forward. How do you think you could enforce this type of agreement?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): As I said, I thought it would be necessary, if the four point program envisaged in terms of the Agreement were to be implemented, that to meet all of the four points would undoubtedly require an expansion of the Commission but to what extent I cannot say. I did say, however, in



answer to a question of Mr. Thompson, that for the disengagement envisaged in the demilitarized zone I thought we might begin with the Commission itself.

Mr. LAMBERT: Merely the truce teams?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, because for a long time we had a respect by both sides for the nature of the demilitarized zone which was under the supervision of the Commission. If both parties were to withdraw from the three miles on each side this would be undertaken.

Mr. LAMBERT: I put it to you, Mr. Minister, that in view of the size and complexity of the operations that are going there, it is a mere futility to suggest that truce teams might be effective.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Truce teams, in any event, only can be effective provided there is good will and good faith on both sides.

Mr. LAMBERT: If there is no good will or good faith, then there is a breach.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, obviously.

Mr. LAMBERT: And how do we restore the condition?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): All the Commission could do would be to report the breach as it is intended to do under the Geneva Agreement, and as it has been doing to the extent physically possible since 1954.

Mr. LAMBERT: I have some reservations concerning the practicality of this. I feel that what is really serious with regard to the eventual success of such a plan is that you have got to be able to carry it through.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Obviously, you cannot carry it through unless there is good will and respect on both sides.

Mr. LAMBERT: I feel that implicitly you have moved over from just mere supervisory truce teams to a concept, frankly—to use a phrase that has been recently coined and I do not want to engage in the semantics of it—of restoring the peace once there has been a breach.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I am sure, to illustrate the point that you properly make, if there were not a disposition on the part of Israel and the U.A.R. to respect the objective of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip and El-Arish, that it could not be done with the number of forces that are there. It is not inconceivable, given the preponderance of military strength on the island of Cyprus, that if there were not a disposition on the part of the government of Cyprus, the native Cypriots and the native Turks to respect the role of the United Nations force, there would be trouble. As we know, there was trouble.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, I know, but behind all this, of course, there is the weight of the sanction of public opinion and, ultimately, of force.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right. One might carry the analogy a little further and say that if the Canadian public did not have respect for the police officers of the community, there would not be enough police strength to maintain civil order. Civil order is possible because of the police, and also because of recognition on the part of most citizens that it is in their common interest to maintain the peace to the extent that it is maintained, voluntarily, by the good citizen.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, but the sanction of this public opinion and of, shall we say, a potential force, is not applicable in Vietnam; they could not care a fig.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Not if there were a disposition to disengage; not at all.

Mr. LAMBERT: Well, we would have to require a complete change of mind. This is the point that I am concerned with. This looks very nice on paper, and as an ideal but, frankly, in this business how do you assure the success of it?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, I think we have given you the postulates.

Mr. LAMBERT: I reserve my views on that; I do not think so.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I recognize that this is a fair argument to make, but all you are doing is properly labouring the nature of the task that is confronting all of us; and it is a task, but to point to the difficulty is not to destroy the objective.

Mr. LAMBERT: Some plans sound very nice until you start to put together the nuts and bolts.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I venture to suggest, Mr. Lambert, if we do reach the stage that Mr. Thompson envisaged a moment ago, that these provisions in the Geneva Agreement are not unlikely to be the basis of the kind of action that will be taken by both sides.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will move to another point. On page 17, the opening sentence of the third paragraph reads;

When I last spoke to the House, I said that we could see merit in proposals which are being made for the neutralization, in due course, not only of Vietnam but possibly of a wider area in Southeast Asia.

I would like to have you elaborate on that, first of all on the reasons you find merit in these proposals for neutralization, and also to what extent you feel this neutral zone might go.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): One of the concerns in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Indo-China area of Vietnam both North and South, Laos and Cambodia, is that there is a danger of action by the populous state of Mainland China with its some 700 million or more people. If peace comes to Vietnam as a result of negotiations, our view is that what was done in Laos ought to be done in Vietnam. In Laos in 1962 there was a guarantee of neutrality of the area; that neutrality has not been fully preserved. I do not think it is possible to envisage a neutralization in the absence, first of all, of an international presence. I think Lord Avon is on the right track when he suggests that in addition to an international presence there would have to be a great power guarantee of that neutrality. Could such a guarantee be given in view of the inward attitude taken by Mainland China? A very difficult question is whether or not that would be forthcoming, certainly in the present circumstances in China. It might be, as I suggested yesterday, that in the interests of neutralization and stability in the area, some kind of guarantee would have to be undertaken, possibly by countries like France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. I cannot say what the attitude of the Soviet Union would be in that situation. I believe that the Soviet Union is interested in seeing a neutralization of the area.

Mr. LAMBERT: What about the people of the area; have they any desire to be neutralized?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think the people of both North and South Vietnam are anxious to resolve this problem themselves; and certainly Canada, with its belief in the principle of self-determination, would recognize the right of the people themselves to decide this. It is for that reason that I suggested yesterday there may be a division of the territory in Vietnam for a period longer than might ideally be desirable. In any event, if the objective is re-unification, as I think it is, this will be something that can be determined only by the people of the South and the people of the North.

Mr. LAMBERT: How about the people in countries adjoining, in that wider area in Southeast Asia?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): These are independent countries, Laos and Cambodia. In the case of the 1962 settlement the people of Laos, through their government, opted for neutralization—neutralization that was recognized and accepted by the United States. We had urged neutralization in Laos as early, I think, as 1958 or the latter part of 1957. This was finally embodied in the agreements of 1962.

In the case of Cambodia, the same is true. As a matter of fact Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia has urged the Commission to investigate border disputes, border incursions of his country to maintain the neutrality which he has asked for and to which I think most countries subscribe. Canada, as one member of the Commission, was prepared to give assistance in that regard.

Mr. LAMBERT: The wider area to which you refer is really the area we knew as Indo-China?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is right.

Mr. LAMBERT: It does not go to Thailand and it does not go to other neighbouring countries?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. Indo-China, of course, includes only the two sections of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. But, when we talk about Southeast Asia, we do think of countries like Thailand. We do include them.

Mr. LAMBERT: Have they shown any disposition toward this?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Of course, when I talk of neutralization of Indo-China, I am not talking about the neutralization of Thailand. That is a matter for the Government of Thailand to affirm. At the present time the Government of Thailand supports another grouping of nations, another position. But this is a decision for them to make.

Mr. LAMBERT: In the interests of someone else, I will pass.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): My attention has been called to what I said at the top of page 18. It is a reiteration of what I said already. It reads:

I think it important—whatever arrangements are ultimately arrived at, they cannot be imposed on the countries—against their will. They must be such as to reflect the genuinely held preferences of these countries based on an assessment, which each country can only make for itself, as to the course which is most likely to serve in its own best interests and those of the area in which it is situated.

The CHAIRMAN: Two members have indicated they still have questions. Perhaps we can complete the evidence this morning. The first one is Mr. Asselin and then Mr. Klein.

(Translation)

Mr. MARTIAL ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Mr. Minister, to return to Mr. Pelletier's question if North Vietnam were to ask for non-military assistance, before granting this assistance would you have to consult the United States?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. I believe this is a decision for the Canadian Government. This is not a question of military assistance, but of medical supplies for the civilian population. The decision to grant or not to grant such assistance is a matter exclusively under Canadian jurisdiction.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): In this case, since the United States is involved in the Vietnam conflict, would you not like to consult the United States before providing such assistance to North Vietnam, since it is, in fact, the enemy of the United States?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): When we decide to provide assistance to a country, the decision is made by the Canadian Government without consulting any other country. This does not mean that we do not attempt to explain the assistance we give to various countries for peaceful purposes. Last Tuesday in Paris, for instance, we consulted the representatives of a number of countries with a view to helping them find a solution to the problem of famine in India. But this is not the same type of consultation which you mean.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Mr. Minister, you said a moment ago that the government of North Vietnam had refused U Thant's plan, maintaining that the aggressors in this instance were the United States.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Yes, Mr. Asselin.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): What I would like to know is: by what right, under what principle of international law can the United States justify their presence in Vietnam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I have already answered that question, but I am quite willing to repeat it. This question was asked by Mr. Pelletier, I believe, and by Mr. Andras.

Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, any country has the right to ask another country to come to its assistance for its defence. It is under the provisions of that Article that the United States, agreed in 1961, through the late President Kennedy, to establish a military force acting in an advisory capacity to the Vietnamese government. The United States and the Government of South Vietnam did not sign the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

Thirdly, according to the Commission's 1962 majority report, signed by India and Canada, the aggression had originally been committed by North Vietnam.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): There is also another...

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This was shortly after the 1954 agreements.



Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): But there is also another principle enunciated by the United Nations that every country has the right to self-determination. The principle, to which you refer would have precedence over that which the United Nations has always accepted: that each country has the right to elect its own government. Does the United Nations' principle of national self-determination override the one which you have just quoted?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, I do not believe so. Article 51 provides for the right of any country to ask another country to come to its assistance, to provide military assistance for its defence.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): During your travels in Russia, you took part in talks and discussions with Soviet government officials. In those discussions, did you detect, on the part of these officials, any marked willingness to work towards peace in Vietnam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Certainly. Indeed. That was the purpose of our discussion. Russia asked us to use our influence with our American neighbours to put an end to the bombing. We, for our part, asked Russia to exert its own influence on the Hanoi government to accept the conditions necessary for a beginning of negotiations.

I must say that when Mr. Kosygin met Mr. Wilson in London a few weeks ago, the two co-chairmen of the Conference had that objective in mind.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Did the Soviet authorities foresee the restoration of peace in Vietnam through the Geneva Agreements, or otherwise?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The North Vietnamese Government states that it respects the provisions of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and that it is prepared to negotiate a settlement in accordance with this agreement. That is why we have put forward these four points which are based on the provisions of the agreement.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Mr. Ronning our roving ambassador, who has been to North Vietnam several times. . .

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Twice.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Yes, twice. While in North Vietnam, did he have occasion to confer with Vietcong authorities?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No, he did not meet any Vietcong representatives. He met only the representatives of the North Vietnamese government—the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Do you believe that peace can be restored in Vietnam, without the participation of Vietcong representatives at the negotiation table?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think it will be necessary to bring all belligerents to the conference table. Mr. Goldberg himself, at the United Nations, last September 22, stated that this solution might not be impossible.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): One last question, Mr. Minister. U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had already stated that if it were not possible to establish peace in Vietnam through the United Nations, he would



resign his post. Now, we know that he agreed to remain in his position after the member states of the United Nations offered their co-operation in establishing a peace plan for Vietnam. Do you not think that U Thant is now in a difficult position, since his plan has not been accepted?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is quite obvious that this is a very difficult question. He has left no stone unturned to encourage negotiations. He has made three separate proposals over the last two years, in his attempts to resolve the problem but it should be recognized that the Secretary-General has extremely heavy responsibilities. His responsibility is to try to restore peace. Canada, because of its membership in the Commission, has responsibilities too, as do other countries. We are trying to carry out our responsibilities, and this is why yesterday I made so bold as to suggest the progressive reapplication of the principles found in the Geneva Agreement.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Had the suggestions which you made yesterday been submitted unofficially to the Secretary-General of the United Nations?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): No. At the present time the Secretary-General is in Asia. However, I can assure you, on the basis of discussions I have had with him on several occasions lately, that he is well aware of the provisions of the Agreement.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): May I return to a matter which is of deep concern to the public in general and which was raised here by members of the Committee. The public is questioning the good faith of the Canadian Government when it states that it hopes for peace in Vietnam, a cease-fire, and yet, at the same time, sells arms to the United States, arms which are apparently being used in the Vietnam war. Of course, it may be that the Canadian Government has entered into agreements of this kind with the United States and must live up to these agreements, but could the Canadian government not ask the United States to refrain from using arms supplied by Canada in the Vietnam war?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is what would happen. This means that if we were to ask this of the United States Government officially, there would be no agreement between the two countries. This agreement was made long before the Vietnam conflict. It began with the negotiations between Mr. King, then Prime Minister of Canada, and President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, before the end of the Second World War. But one thing which is of great concern to us is the economy and our obligations as a member of NATO. We should not forget that we buy arms from the United States in order to fulfill our NATO obligations, and that we get them at a very good price. But we do not licence the export of arms directly to any conflict area.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Since Vietnam is a very special case, as far as we are concerned, and because, according to your own statements, you are attempting to bring about a cease-fire and the restoration of peace there, would this not constitute a special case which might justify your requesting the United States not to use weapons we are selling to them in the Vietnam war?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I cannot add anything to what I have said.



(English)

Mr. KLEIN: Mr. Minister, in the sphere of negotiations for possible peace talks, is Ho Chi Minh the captain of Red China? If so, to what extent?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Ho Chi Minh is the titular head of state of a government that, juridically, is an independent sovereign power. It would be unrealistic to assume that the government of North Vietnam does not have to take into consideration in its policies the position of neighbouring and other countries—other countries with whom it shares an ideological interest. I have no doubt that the Government of Mainland China does assert its views as to what should be the course to be followed by the Government of the North.

Mr. KLEIN: But when you have a nation of some 800 million people on your border it is not merely a consultative neighbour, it is a very dominant neighbour, is it not?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): It is a fact that would obviously warrant that view. The extent of that influence is something that I could not precisely define. I would simply add that I am sure the influence of the Soviet Union is not negligible.

Mr. KLEIN: Not the Soviet Union; I am speaking of Red China.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I know. I say that I am sure the influence of the Soviet Union is not negligible, that the influence of Poland is not negligible and that the influence of other countries is not negligible.

Mr. KLEIN: Do you see any relationship between the internal problems of Red China at the moment and its desire for the war in Vietnam to continue?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know precisely what the policy of China in this regard is. I do know from information supplied to me that there is a state of disorder in Mainland China. It is difficult to assess the full character of that situation. I had thought at one time that it was of a character that might possibly have reduced Mainland China's interest in the situation in Vietnam but I would not be prepared at this time to say that that is my view.

Mr. KLEIN: Would you say that there is a relationship between the intransigence of North Vietnam to at least talk and the fact that there are problems in Red China?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would like to answer your question in this way, that my judgment is that the Government of North Vietnam is an independent government. The degree of its independence, perhaps, may have varied during the last period, but I would think that while it reaches its own decisions it reaches those decisions bearing in mind its relationships to a number of countries, including China.

Mr. KLEIN: But is it not really a fact that there cannot be peace in Vietnam unless Red China decides that there should be peace?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know that that is a fact. You ask me if it is a fact. I could not responsibly say yes or no to that.

Mr. KLEIN: Would the admission of Red China to the United Nations perhaps ease that situation?



Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): The view of the Canadian Government, of course, as stated last November, was that if Mainland China was in the United Nations this would give us a more direct opportunity of discussing all sorts of problems directly, face to face, with the so-called Chinese People's Republic. Among those questions would be Vietnam.

Mr. KLEIN: Do you think that the presence of American troops in quite large numbers in South Vietnam is having a stabilizing effect on the internal conditions in Red China?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I would doubt that it had that relationship.

Mr. KLEIN: May I ask you about the question brought up about giving aid to the civilians in North Vietnam? I presume that Canada would consider that in the context of Canada's relationship in the sphere of neutrality so as to serve as a mediator in the possibility of any negotiations rather than in taking sides with one or the other.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Certainly that would be a consideration.

Mr. KLEIN: May I ask you whether you consider, in view of the attitude seemingly taken by the western nations now, particularly with Vice President Humphrey's visit and the reporting in the press of the bad reception he received, that this is contributing to the intransigence of North Vietnam to sit down and talk in the hope that this kind of thing would build up to the point where the United States, because of public opinion, would have to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): First of all, I would like to say that the reports I have of the visit of Vice President Humphrey is that it was a very successful visit.

Mr. KLEIN: Not according to the press.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): Well, it was a very successful visit, from reports that I have had. That there have been dissident elements who have strongly expressed their views about American policy on the occasion of this visit is an obvious fact. But this does not in any way alter the fact that the talks he had with the governments concerned were, I think, useful. Undoubtedly, the demonstrations of disagreement are effective and would be taken into account by the other side.

Mr. KLEIN: May I ask you whether you would think it would be useful, as a suggestion, that both sides in Vietnam be ready to accept unconditionally standby UN peace troops which may or may never be used, as a first step in the good faith on both sides wanting to reach an agreement.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I want to get what your question is. Are you asking me that as a condition to peace there should be an agreement by both sides?

Mr. KLEIN: No, not as a condition of peace but as an unconditional arrangement, without any pre-conditions set forth, both sides accept UN peace troops as a standby peace corps in the event that negotiations can be entered into.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I want to be sure. I do not quite understand the question.



Mr. KLEIN: As I understand it, one of the prerequisites would be to establish immediately a neutralized zone. Instead of imposing that condition as a first or one of the primary conditions, which seems to be impossible at the moment, do you think it would be useful to get both sides to agree to allow the entry of equal numbers of UN peace troops which would be used as standby peace corps in the event that negotiations could begin and ultimately reach a point where the troops could be used for peacekeeping operations or peace restoring, whatever you want to call it.

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I still do not fully understand the question. What I have said is that I am sure if peace is restored there will have to be an assumption of responsibility by the international community for a presence, I think a paramilitary presence, in the nature of the traditional kind of organization which we have in mind when we talk about a peacekeeping operation. Now, whether that is the United Nations or a body made up of Asian powers or Asian and African powers or a body made up of the Geneva powers, I cannot say. It is well known that North Vietnam has said that the Vietnam problem is no business of the United Nations. One might conclude from that that it would not agree to a peacekeeping operation provided for by the United Nations—I do not know, but it is clear in my mind that if in this complicated situation we are to have any stability following the cessation of hostilities there would have to be an international presence of some kind.

Mr. KLEIN: May I just ask you one last question? Do you consider that if the United States had unconditionally withdrawn from South Vietnam that Sukarno might have been able to stay in power in his own country?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I do not know that I can give you a satisfactory answer to that. The United States has said, as a result of the conference at Manila some months ago, that after certain conditions had been established it would remove its troops within six months from Vietnam. I am not suggesting that the United States should withdraw its troops now. I do not think anyone is seriously proposing that at the present time.

Mr. KLEIN: No, but do you feel the fact that the United States has taken a stand in South Vietnam has contributed to the downfall of Sukarno?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I think that there were many things that contributed to the downfall of Sukarno; the boldness, the determination of those who were prepared to avoid certain kinds of incursions may have contributed to this. I am not really able to fully assess that.

Mr. KLEIN: Thank you.

(Translation)

The CHAIRMAN: I think Mr. Forest has a few questions to ask.

Mr. FOREST: I have only a few questions because the matter has been discussed at length in the past few days. In the world, today, the tendency is to allow countries to determine their own political affiliation. In paragraph 17, you say that you feel that the constitutional reforms in South Vietnam would seem to indicate the possibility of an election, between now and the end of the year, which might bring about a fully representative government in that country. You also state, in paragraph 16, that the crucial problem is the possible representa-

tion of the Vietcong in the next South Vietnamese government. Is it possible, given the present state of the South Vietnamese government, to hold free elections to determine whether the majority supports the National Liberation Front or whether it is in favour of intervention against the South?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): I believe that there are going to be free elections. You know that the elections held for an assembly to draft a new Constitution were a great success and I do not think there are any insuperable obstacles to holding free elections in September.

Mr. FOREST: Will representatives of the National Liberation Front be allowed to run for office?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): That is up to the people of the South. It will be up to them to decide whether there will be a coalition or not. It is a matter entirely for the decision of the people of South Vietnam. This is their decision. It is not up to us to decide for them.

Mr. ASSELIN (*Charlevoix*): Would you like to see the United Nations supervise such an election in September?

Mr. MARTIN (*Essex East*): This is not the intention. I believe that it would be an impossible task for the United Nations. It would require unlimited forces and I think that is out of the question.

(*English*)

The CHAIRMAN: I believe this completes the evidence and the questioning of the Minister on Vietnam. On behalf of the Committee I wish to thank him for his kind co-operation. The Committee may wish to call the Minister back in respect of Southeast Asia after we have completed our examination of other witnesses.

Next week, if Mr. Charles Taylor is available, we will meet again on Thursday. We will adjourn.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

First Session—Twenty-seventh Parliament

1966-1967

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STANDING COMMITTEE

ON

**EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

*Chairman:* Mr. JEAN-EUDES DUBÉ

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

No. 12

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THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1967

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Respecting

Annual Report, Department of External Affairs

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Including Index of Witnesses and Subject Index

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WITNESS:

Mr. Charles Taylor.

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Chairman: Mr. Jean-Eudes Dubé

Vice-Chairman: Mr. W. B. Nesbitt

and

- |                                    |                      |                  |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Mr. Allmand,                       | Mr. Harkness,        | Mr. McIntosh,    |
| Mr. Andras,                        | Mr. Klein,           | Mr. Pelletier,   |
| Mr. Asselin ( <i>Charlevoix</i> ), | Mr. Lambert,         | Mr. Pilon,       |
| Mr. Brewin,                        | Mr. Laprise,         | Mr. Stanbury,    |
| Mr. Churchill,                     | Mr. Lind,            | Mr. Thompson,    |
| Mr. Faulkner,                      | Mr. Macdonald        | Mr. Tolmie,      |
| Mr. Forest,                        | ( <i>Rosedale</i> ), | Mr. Walker—(24). |
| Mr. Forrestall,                    | Mr. Macquarrie,      |                  |

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.

Respecting

Annual Report, Department of External Affairs

Including Index of Witnesses and Subject Index

WITNESS:

Mr. Charles Taylor.

ROGER DUBAMEL, P.R.C.  
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY  
OTTAWA, 1967



ORDER OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, April 19, 1967.

*Ordered*—That the name of Mr. Tolmie be substituted for that of Mr. Hymmen on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest.

LÉON-J. RAYMOND,  
*The Clerk of the House of Commons.*

*Also present: Mr. Hymmen.*

*In attendance: Mr. Charles Taylor, Trade Goods and Mail.*

*The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Taylor, who made a statement on his impressions and opinions of Red China gained during his service as a correspondent in Peking.*

*On behalf of the Committee, the Vice-Chairman thanked Mr. Taylor for appearing.*

*At 12:10 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.*

*Therese F. Bellarmin,  
Clerk of the Committee.*

ORDER OF REFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, April 19, 1887.

Ordered—That the name of Mr. Toimie be substituted for that of Mr. Hymmen on the Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Attest: *John A. RAYMOND*

Witness: H. W. the name of *JOHN A. RAYMOND*

The Clerk of the House of Commons

- |                       |         |         |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|
| Mr. Allard            | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Andrews           | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Asselin (Charles) | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Brien             | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Churchill         | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Faulkner          | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Forest            | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |
| Mr. Forrestall        | Mr. ... | Mr. ... |

*Joseph F. Ballantine*  
Clerk of the Committee.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, April 20, 1967.  
(13)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 10.05 a.m. this day, the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt, presiding.

*Members present:* Messrs. Andras, Brewin, Churchill, Faulkner, Forrestall, Lind, Macdonald (*Rosedale*), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Thompson, Tolmie, Walker—(14).

*Also present:* Mr. Hymmen.

*In attendance:* Mr. Charles Taylor, *Toronto Globe and Mail*.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Taylor, who made a statement on his impressions and opinions of Red China gained during his service as a correspondent in Peking.

On behalf of the Committee, the Vice-Chairman thanked Mr. Taylor for appearing.

At 12.10 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
*Clerk of the Committee.*

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1937

(13)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs met at 10.00 a.m. this day, the Vice-Chairman, Mr. Nesbitt, presiding.

Members present: Messrs. Angus, Brewin, Churchill, Faulkner, Forrester, Lind, MacDonald (Rosedale), Macquarrie, McIntosh, Nesbitt, Pilon, Thompson, Tolmie, Walker—(14).

Also present: Mr. Hyman.

In attendance: Mr. Charles Taylor, Toronto Globe and Mail.

The Vice-Chairman introduced the witness, Mr. Taylor, who made a statement on his impressions and opinions of Red China gained during his service as a correspondent in Peking.

On behalf of the Committee, the Vice-Chairman thanked Mr. Taylor for appearing.

At 12.10 p.m. the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Dorothy F. Ballantine,  
Clerk of the Committee.



## EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

THURSDAY April 20, 1967.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: We have more than a quorum. Will the meeting please come to order.

This morning we have with us Mr. Charles Taylor, of the *Toronto Globe and Mail*. Mr. Taylor has spent about one and one half years in China and another year or so in the general area of the Far East, southeast Asia particularly. He has also been in South Viet Nam. Apparently he had some problem trying to get into North Viet Nam, but he can tell you more about that than I.

I understand that Mr. Taylor has a half hour presentation to make, and after that you may ask questions. I will turn the meeting over to Mr. Taylor.

MR. CHARLES TAYLOR (*Toronto Globe and Mail*): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. McINTOSH: Mr. Chairman, are there copies of the brief for the Committee members?

MR. TAYLOR: I prefer to speak from notes, sir, because I find this is more effective. I am sorry, I do not have a written brief.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: I quite agree with you, Mr. Taylor.

MR. TAYLOR: Thank you. It was suggested, gentlemen, that I might talk for about half an hour and that I should, first, give you, my ideas and other people's ideas about what is happening inside China today; then, try to relate this to Chinese foreign policy, with special reference to the situation in Viet Nam. That is what I propose to do. These are both tremendously big and complicated subjects, so I will undoubtedly over-simplify. I will try not to get bogged down in detail, but I am quite prepared to be tackled on some of my over-simplifications when I am through.

It is one year, almost exactly, since the so-called great cultural revolution in China became apparent to the outside world. There is still, as there has always been, a considerable amount of confusion over what exactly is involved. There is inevitably, I think, a considerable amount of distortion and a certain amount of exaggeration in the outside world, but I have no hesitation in describing what is happening inside China today as the most profound social and political upheaval since the communist victory of 1949. It will certainly have very major repercussions for the Chinese inside China and I am sure it will also have significant repercussions, at least in the long run, for Chinese foreign policy and for nations who attempt to deal in various ways with the Chinese.

It is partly a struggle for power, partly a struggle for the mantle of Mao Tse-tung, who is aging and certainly ailing. This aspect of it has been emphasized in the outside world and in the Western press. I think, to some extent, it has



been over-emphasized because I think what is happening inside China today is, even more, a very real debate over policies among different groups of dedicated communists. At stake is nothing less than the future course of the Chinese revolution, in other words the future policies, both domestic and foreign—especially domestic, that the Chinese governments will follow in the years and decades ahead.

Part of the confusion that we all labour under these days relates to the fact that the sources of information are not always the best and that there have been a lot of changes and shifts in the personnel on different sides of the so-called great cultural revolution. I think the issues, which I would like to concentrate on rather than the personalities, have been fairly constant and are now fairly easily identifiable. It is my belief that the great cultural revolution was inspired by Mao Tse-tung and that he has been throughout, and probably still is, the directing force. At any rate even if, to some extent, he is being used by people around him, the aims of the great cultural revolution are easily identifiable with everything for which Mao Tse-tung has stood for at least 40 years, and the tactics that have been used very much bear the imprint of what he has been doing in China for more than 40 years.

I think Mao's basic fear and the basic motivation for launching what is really a revolution inside his own revolution relates to his fear that his original communist revolution will be betrayed and that communism will, in the long run, be undermined in China. Specifically, he fears several groups of people. He fears, as he has always done, the bureaucrats—party and government officials mainly. He feels that they are becoming, and will become more so unless checked, self-seeking, complaisant and even corrupt and that they will emulate, in other words, the scholar-class of old under previous Chinese dynasties which have developed, inevitably, those tendencies. He fears a related class of people, the intellectuals and the technocrats. By "technocrats" I mean a class that is just starting to appear in China—young scientists and engineers and administrative people within the government apparatus. He fears that they are already starting to demand and, in future, unless checked, will demand more vociferously special privileges and prerogatives; that they will, unless checked, become a privileged élite that goes against the communist ideology of Mao Tse-tung and also to Mao, the student of Chinese history, which again recalls the scholar class of old which was a privileged élite and which lost touch with the people. He fears, as he has always done, the peasants of China—at least 550 million of them. Although he based his revolution on the peasantry, he never has had any illusions about the nature of the Chinese peasant. From early on he was talking about what he called the tendencies to capitalism on the part of the peasant. As you may know, private plots were returned to the peasants in the 1959-60 period as a partial concession, a partial withdrawal from the extreme communism of the great-leap-forward period. Mao has obviously never been happy with this sort of concession. Anybody who has been to China today, anybody who has been to any commune, even the communes they show you as the favourite ones, can tell you that the private plots are tended with a tremendous amount of dedication by the peasants. This is obvious to any foreign visitor. To Mao these are the seeds of corruption. This is a return to the anti-communist, capitalistic tendencies that he fears and, unless checked and disciplined, he fears the peasant will go on in this vein.



He also fears young people, which perhaps is his greatest fear. He is worried by the young people. Long before he launched his great cultural revolution, he was talking to foreign visitors, expressing himself very graphically, and saying that the young have never been blooded in battle; they have never fought a war, they have never fought a revolution; they have never seen foreign troops on their soil who had to be expelled; they do not realize how bad the Kuo Min Tang, the Chinese nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek, were. This is Mao talking and I am paraphrasing him. Therefore, said Mao, because they are ignorant of the past, they do not realize the need for continued self-sacrifice, hard work and so on. They lack revolutionary fervour and they, when they rise to power as they must inevitably do, will also, and primarily, betray the revolution unless great steps are taken to temper them, to discipline them, to get them thinking right.

To the foreign visitor to China, Mao's fears at first seem wildly misplaced and exaggerated, certainly up until the launching of the great cultural revolution. I think any foreign visitor to China, regardless of his political tendencies, has been impressed by the way China appeared to be united, dedicated, disciplined and egalitarian, with a spartan and puritanical ethic that many foreign visitors—myself in some ways at times—found sometimes offensive, sometimes rather humorous, but certainly unmistakable and inescapable. There seemed to be no basis for the sort of fears that Mao has been expressing, both privately and publicly, in recent months.

But if you stay there for a while, as I was privileged to do, become a resident and see a bit beneath the surface—and I stress it is only a bit—you do realize eventually that there are things at work in Chinese society: things like privilege, and even to some extent corruption. There is, what the British would call, an old boy net very much in operation in China—the old guard of party veterans, the men who were on the long march, the men who fought both the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists. This aging elite has clung very tenaciously to their positions, and they do receive certain privileges which, in our western society, would seem very innocuous. They have better salaries; they have better homes, although nothing wildly extravagant; their children are sometimes favoured when it comes to getting places in schools regardless of their scholastic ability; they can have cars, which are a rarity in China to travel around; they can take holidays—there are places for senior officials to have holidays. These things are, to us, very trivial, but to Mao this is the rot setting in. And I think to many of the young people in China too—teenagers who have formed the Red Guards, and also junior party and government officials in their twenties, thirties and forties, are to some extent frustrated. They see what to them is an injustice; they see these anomalies, these discrepancies between their own aspirations and what the elite is offered. This has been, I think, a source of genuine fervor on the part of many Red Guards; and to Mao it is the rot setting in. I think he sees it in two terms. He sees it first in terms of Chinese history, where every previous dynasty, many of which were established through peasant revolutions somewhat like Mao's, has eventually been betrayed and has fallen because of the internal corruption, both financial and psychological, of its ruling elite. Mao also sees it—I know, because this part of it is public—in terms of what has befallen communism in the Soviet Union, which we in the west regard as a very hopeful development, and I think rightly so; we see the modification of communism, the moderation of Soviet policies, both domestic and foreign. Mao sees this as a gross



betrayal of the communist cause; he calls it revisionism, and to him it is a profound shock that this should happen in the land of Lenin, and a profound warning that this could happen inside China for his own revolution.

Mao, at different times since 1949, has been more or less in the ascendancy in China. We do not know the full details; we may never know. At times he seems to have been rather elevated to a position where he was not taking very much of a direct interest in internal developments, but from 1963 to the present time there were a series of political campaigns—I watched them building up in 1964 and 1965 when I was in Peking—under the omnibus title of the Socialist Education Movement, which were the direct forerunners of what is now called the Great Cultural Revolution. These campaigns bear the imprint of Mao; they bear his ideas; they follow the tactics he has always followed. I think he was very much the driving force behind them. With these campaigns, and now with the Great Cultural Revolution, Mao aims at a thorough purge, as we would call it, or rectification, as he would call it, of the communist party, of the government bureaucracy, and of the People's Liberation Army. At the same time, and co-related to this, it aims at a disciplining of all intellectuals, bureaucrats, young people especially, a tempering of them through physical labour and a disciplining of them ideologically. A tremendous effort is being made to ensure that they have only the correct and most pure ideas.

Behind all this, the ultimate aim—and this is publicly acknowledged in the Maoist press—is to recreate Chinese society; and not only that, but to change the very nature of Chinese Man, specifically to abolish the distinctions between town and country, and between mental and manual labour, to evolve a truly classless society; and specifically too, to make every Chinese at the same time a worker, a peasant, a soldier, and an intellectual, capable of handling all the duties involved in those four designations. This strikes most of us, I think, as wildly impractical and visionary, and some people would say, and have said, quite mad. I regard it personally as impractical and visionary, but not mad. I do not think this is the mad futuristic dream of a senile dictator, for two reasons. First, it is typical of Mao's romantic approach to revolution, the approach he has always consistently followed; what he is doing today is thoroughly consistent with what he has been doing ever since he had his first revolutionary base in the late 1920s. Rather than thinking of it as some wild dream put into the future, I think it is more useful to realize that Mao is trying to recreate something he originally had; he is trying to recreate what he had in the revolutionary base areas in the 1930s and 1940s, especially the base of Yanan in the north west of China, from which, with a handful of dedicated supporters, Mao launched and continued the final campaigns of the revolution which defeated first, both the Japanese in his area, and finally defeated the vastly superior armies of Chiang Kai-Shek. Mao is trying deliberately to go back in time to **these most glorious days of his revolution** and to recreate the sort of situation he had then, when, in fact, literally everybody of his most dedicated supporters was a worker, a peasant, a soldier and an intellectual. You had to be all these things because otherwise you would not survive.

In the month of September 1965, Mao lost the majority support in the party for this program. There are fascinating speculations, but we do not know the details. We do know now that his opposition includes such extremely senior people as the Chinese head of state, Liu Shao-chi, who, until last autumn, was Mao's chosen successor, and just as significant, the very powerful secretary



general of the Chinese communist party, Teng Hsiao-ping; and the opposition also probably includes a majority of senior officials in communist party ranks throughout the country.

Some have clearly been fighting back in order to save their jobs—not their skins, because purges in China are rarely bloody—and to protect their friends. But I think there is a real difference between Mao and the opposition over specific matters of policy. We should not have any illusions that the opponents of Mao are, in our terms, necessarily liberals. They certainly are not; they are very dedicated veteran revolutionaries and communists. But they seem to have very different ideas from Mao as to how the nation should be run. These men, more than Mao, are the men who have been running the nation to a large extent for the last 18 years. As a background of their concern there is a realization that China faces very real problems: the problem of how to regain the economic and the political momentum of the years immediately following the victory in 1949; the problem of how to extend the considerable social and economic achievements of those early years. The momentum has been lost; they are trying to regain it. Involved in all this is the tremendous problem of how to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains, with a population that is rising by at least 2 per cent a year and, at the same time, break through to become a modern industrial power. These are tremendous problems that any Chinese government would face today, and there is a real and significant difference of opinion. The opponents of Mao reject his romantic, visionary, and rather simplistic, communism; they reject a return to the policies that Mao followed in the revolutionary bases in the 1930s and 1940s. They say in effect, although they would express themselves in much different language. "This is 1967; China is a nuclear power; China has steel mills; China is united; China is now on the world stage; we cannot follow these unsophisticated policies that you, Mao Tse-tung, have been advocating". Naturally their language would not be anything like that, but I am trying to translate how we might consider their arguments. They are very much aware of the dangers of abandoning the relatively pragmatic economic and social policies that the Chinese government and party have been following since about 1960 in order to recover from the very bad economic crisis they had in 1959 and 1960.

Mao, as I said, seems to have been in a minority amongst the senior leaders of his own party. His tactics have been not mad at all, but extremely shrewd and brilliant. Although in a minority, he has cleared a certain amount of success. He has done this several ways. He has relied on Lin Piao, the defence minister, who is now his heir apparent, and on whatever segments of the army that Lin Piao can speak for, and he has clearly picked Lin Piao—it is not so clear these days, but it seemed clear a few months ago—as his successor, as the most dedicated man and the man most guaranteed to carry on Mao's ideas after Mao's death. Mao is 73; Lin Piao, although we know he is a sick man, is only about 60.

At some point a deal was made between Mao and the prime minister, Chou En-lai. We do not know the details but we assume some sort of deal was made whereby Chou En-lai, who is a very important man in the hierarchy, said, "All right, go ahead and purge the party, but leave my government apparatus alone". This deal has not been an easy one; it has shown signs of breaking down at times, but so far Chou En-lai has gone along with Mao Tse-tung. It is a sign of Mao's isolation within the ranks of his senior party members that he has had to rely increasingly on personal confidants, such as his old political secretary, a man



called Chan Po-ta, who is now very senior in the leadership, and such as his fourth wife, Chiang Ching. Another Mao tactic that is very typical of the man is that he closed the high schools and turned loose the Red Guards, about which we have all read so much. He also moved very cleverly in the early days to win control of the national newspapers and the national radio network, denying his opponents a forum from which to launch any national counter attack. He has sought very cleverly to isolate his opponents, one by one geographically, and pick them off; and above all, in some ways he has used very cleverly the alleged threat of the Soviet Union of border troubles, and his own tremendous prestige—which really is tremendous—to undermine his opponents and to make any criticism of him an act of disloyalty. So the opponents of Mao Tse-tung, who are very clever men in their own right and know Mao's tactics very well, have been combatting Mao often by claiming that they were the real Maoists, that they knew what Mao was saying, and that they were really interpreting Mao's wishes.

Mao has had considerable initial success, partly because he is a master tactician and partly because of his tremendous charisma, his tremendous popular appeal, but the opposition has been strong from the entrenched bureaucracy and, in some areas of the country, from the army, because the party bureaucracy and the army leadership overlap in many key areas. As a result, today Mao and his supporters claim only to have won relatively few cities and provinces. In February and March there were definite signs of a compromise, undoubtedly partly related to the need to get the spring crops planted. This month we have seen signs of new activity. The Red Guards have been again released on the streets of Peking; there have been new attacks on the chief opponents of Mao, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Nobody really knows how to interpret this, and it would be silly to pretend that any of us really know what is going to happen now. These new attacks could be a sign of weakness and desperation on the part of Mao or they could be the signal of a new move, once the crops are planted and gathered in, against his opponents in the provinces. In the short run the future is very much in doubt. In the long run, it is my feeling that there must be a return to more normal political and economic conditions if only to avoid total administrative and economic disruption. I would say further, if China is to make significant economic progress in the years ahead it seems inevitable to me, and this is a western view, that there will have to be further development of the more pragmatic economic and political policies of recent years; in other words, the Revisionism as Mao Tse-tung calls it, which he so very much abhors, and which he is trying to eradicate. Having said that, I immediately qualify it, in a sense by saying that so long as Mao lives he can never be defeated, such is his prestige. The outcome, therefore, in the short run may never appear to us to be clear-cut and decisive. In the end, I am fairly confident—I do not say this gloatingly because I have a great deal of sympathy for Mao and his aims—that Maoism—that is, not Mao the man but the thought of Mao Tse-tung—will be discredited by his successors in deed, if not in word. They may, and I think almost certainly will, still pay lip service to the man. I doubt there will be an immediate parallel to the de-Stalinification in the Soviet Union, but I think in deeds they will betray Mao as Mao fears they will.

Now, turning briefly, and again at the risk of over-simplification, to the implications for Chinese foreign policy, and specifically the war in Viet Nam, there has been, as far as we can see, little striking change in Chinese foreign



policy during the great cultural revolution, except for an obvious lessening of tension. This is largely because they are so occupied with their turmoil at home and, in fact, a lot of their diplomats have been called back for extended—well, it would probably be an euphemism to call it, leave. To me this is not surprising because since 1949 there have been many shifts and fluctuations in Chinese foreign policy, but my feeling is that the basic goals have been constant.

Again, with the certainty of over simplifying, I will list those goals as briefly as I can. First and foremost, possibly, the most immediate goal is that of removing the United States military bases and military, political and economic influences from around their borders. This, to me, is highly understandable. I am not taking sides nor am I saying that the bases should not be there, but it is highly understandable for the Chinese government to feel that there is a very direct and immediate threat to them from the American bases that extend from south Korea and Okinawa all round to Thailand, or wherever bigger bases are being dug. The Chinese are not convinced that the new air strips in Thailand, which can and are taking B-52's, are intended primarily for the war in Viet Nam. They say that these air strips are being dug so that the B-52's can bomb them, and it is impossible to convince them otherwise. I know this because I have tried.

It is as unacceptable to the Chinese to have these bases and this military presence around their borders as it was unacceptable to the United States to have Soviet missiles in Cuba with one obvious difference, and that is that the Chinese at present do not have the might to force the removal of this military presence directly.

I think another goal, and one about which the Chinese are quite clear and open, is to recover in time—I want to stress this because they stress it—the island of Taiwan, or Formosa as we tend to call it in the west, and what they call their lost territories. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the Formosan or Taiwanese question—and I would add in brackets that my sympathies are with neither the Chinese communists nor the Chinese nationalists but with the native Taiwanese—the Chinese feel very deeply about this. They feel more deeply and much more passionately about Taiwan than they do about the situation in Viet Nam because they regard it, rightly or wrongly, as Chinese territory, and they are determined that it shall be returned. By their lost territories they mean mainly large areas of Soviet Asia and also Hong Kong and Macao, which they say were wrested from a weak and backward China in the last half of the last century by foreign powers whom they call imperialist powers, including Tsarist Russia.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Would that include any of the territory formerly called French Indo-China?

Mr. TAYLOR: They have never made any specific reference, to my knowledge, in recent years to such contentious areas as former Indo-China. They have, at the same time, settled their border disputes with areas such as Burma which were at different times, under previous dynasties, under Chinese control of one sort or another. That is all I can say about that.

Another goal which they would never admit to openly, but which I feel sure is a goal of theirs, is to reassert their traditional sway over the countries around



their borders, especially in southeast Asia. I use that word "sway", and I would also use a word like "hegemony". I think it is impossible to define exactly the sort of influence they feel they rightly should have over their neighbours, especially their smaller neighbours to the south. I will only say I am as sure as I can be that it falls far short of outright expansion and occupation by Chinese communist troops. On the other hand, I think the sort of influence they want probably is somewhat stronger than the influence the United States has over us: it is somewhere between, although probably the American-Canadian parallel is much closer in my view than the alleged Chinese aggressive intention viewpoint.

In all these ways, the Chinese are clearly determined to reassert themselves as a great world power whose voice will be heard and heeded on all matters of world importance to an extent that is commensurate with what they regard as their due in terms of their population, their potential might and their resources and, above all, in terms of the continuity and excellence of their civilization. I am not going to delve into history, but I would like to stress briefly but very strongly that in order to understand Chinese foreign policy you have to understand what happened to them during the period from about 1840 to 1949. That century to them is one of profound humiliation. The western record in China is not good. Canada fortunately was not an imperialist power, but our allies were imperialist powers, and there is no other word to describe them. The record was bad, although not as bad as the Chinese propagandists paint it, but it was nothing to be proud of. The point I am trying to make is that regardless of the rights or wrongs of it, the Chinese feel very deeply that they were humiliated by the white man, including the white Russian man. Because of their tremendous chauvinism which borders on xenophobia very often and very easily, they feel very deeply that they have to reassert themselves. The encirclement of China today by the United States seems to them to be a direct parallel to the encroachments inside China by the foreign powers in the last century.

Now, this is a nationalistic viewpoint and the goals that I have described to you which I think are the important ones are nationalistic goals. There are specifically communist goals in Chinese foreign policy, most notably the rivalry with the Soviet Union for the leadership of the communist world and the support by China for what they call wars of national liberation throughout the developing world. These are goals that are couched in terms of communist ideology. They are sincerely held by men who are dedicated communists, but I would suggest to you that these goals are pursued mainly for nationalistic reasons. This is a way of reasserting Chinese prestige and power and about the only way the Chinese have, because they cannot match the Soviet Union or the United States in economic or military terms. They cannot even match either of them as a giver of aid to the developing world. These policies, I feel, are pursued mainly to embarrass the United States and the Soviet Union, and to undermine the American and the Soviet positions, especially in the Afro-Asian world.

I would add two qualifications immediately to my description of Chinese foreign policy goals. In pursuit of these goals, the Chinese have not been notably aggressive nor expansionist since the communist victory of 1949. When they have used force they have used it sparingly, within limits and only when they felt there was a clear threat to their national security or their territorial integrity. I will not do so now, but I am prepared to defend this thesis in terms of



the Korean war, in terms of Tibet, in terms of the border war with India and in terms of the various crises in the Taiwan Straits.

My second qualification is that the Chinese will sacrifice the logic of their revolutionary communism to the logic of their national self-interest, especially around their borders. In other words, again I am saying that nationalism is more important than communism in their foreign policy as it is practised rather than as it is proclaimed. Examples of this are their friendly relations with the non-communist states around their borders such as Cambodia, Burma and Pakistan, all of which in different ways persecute their own native communist movement and their tolerance of the capitalist and colonial enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao about which Nikita Khrushchev used to taunt them. They would have every reason for regaining these lost territories which were part of China or for making life difficult for the British and Portuguese colonial administrations, and they do make life difficult for the Portuguese. But above all especially, they permit Hong Kong to exist for a very practical reason, and that is that they earn at least 500 million U.S. dollars a year in and through Hong Kong. They earn enough there to pay for all the foreign grain they buy. Hong Kong is of great practical importance to the Chinese.

I think another example of my thesis that they are both restrained and realistic around their borders is their notable restraint over Viet Nam. I feel that the Chinese have been cautious all along over Viet Nam. They have, as they state publicly, no illusions about the cost to them if they were to get involved in the war in Viet Nam. The Americans have said publicly that this is not a Korean situation and that there will be no sanctuary this time. In other words, China would be bombed. The Chinese have acknowledged publicly that they have got the message. I think they genuinely feel that they will not become involved if the Vietnamese will only follow Chinese advice. There are some strong indications that the Vietnamese have not always followed Chinese advice. I think the Chinese genuinely feel the United States will be forced to withdraw from Viet Nam if the communists in that country fight a Maoist type of protracted war, and that China will not necessarily have to become involved.

I think they also genuinely feel that if they do become involved and are bombed, they will still triumph in the end because they feel, rightly or wrongly, that China can never be defeated, because defeat to them involves occupation. This is not necessarily the doctrine the Pentagon would follow in the case of a war with China, but this is the way the Chinese have interpreted it, at least publicly. They say that China can never be conquered. Old Chen Yi, the foreign minister, the tough old marshal, growls in his Szechwanese accent and says he will go back to the mountains of Szechwan and lead the guerillas from there—and he would—and China could not be conquered or occupied.

I think the Chinese will come into the war if they are pushed into a corner, a parallel again with Korea, and if they feel their national self-interest demands it. There is no easy line; nobody knows and everybody has been looking for it. Certainly an American invasion of North Viet Nam would, in my view, more likely than not bring in the Chinese. If the escalation increases short of outright physical invasion on the ground of North Viet Nam—in other words, if there are many more extensive bombing attacks—I just do not know whether the point will be reached where the Chinese will come in. I do say that they have done



their best to stay out and I think they will continue to do so, but I have no illusions that they would not come in at some point.

I might add very briefly, and almost in parentheses in connection with Viet Nam and Chinese foreign policy in general, there is a tendency in the west I think to believe we have to pick sides in the Chinese power struggle which is rather foolish, but if we have to pick sides the opponents of Mao Tse-tung should be supported because they seem to be more reasonable men, and to some extent in our terms they are more reasonable men. However, there is some evidence, although not definite, that the opponents of Mao Tse-tung are in trouble partly because they sought to heal the breach with the Soviet Union in order for China to be tougher on the subject of Viet Nam and more adventuresome over the Taiwan-Formosa issue. There is certainly no guarantee that Mao's opponents, if they were in power today or if they eventually achieve power, would be, in our terms, more reasonable over Viet Nam or any issue of Chinese foreign policy. I do not think any Chinese government in the foreseeable future is likely to be easy to live with from the point of view of the west, so long as it is frustrated in the basic foreign policy goals which I have described to you. I would like to leave you with a few questions. First, the obvious one is whether my description of Chinese foreign goals is a correct one which is a matter of some controversy, I would admit. Second, are these Chinese foreign policy goals really inconsistent with our own basic Western interests and do the various Western policies—primarily the American one, of course, but in a different way our own—of containment and/or isolation or partial isolation, and so forth, really serve our own Western interests, or do they simply intensify and exacerbate China's legitimate grievances against the West and make impossible any settlement of basic Asian problems?

I think finally—and this is final—it is important to ask these questions now when China is swept up in a real struggle and debate over its future course. I have said, and I repeat, I do not expect any drastic foreign policy changes in the foreseeable future since I think Chinese foreign policy goals are so fundamental and basic to national Chinese interests. On the other hand, there will certainly be in the months ahead, and there probably is today, a much greater debate over tactics, if not strategy, and this debate will intensify once Mao Tse-tung is gone. No single successor to Mao will have his tremendous power and prestige and it will now be possible, much more than it ever has been before, to call into question at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership, Mao's policies of strident opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union especially since these policies have had such obviously little success and have resulted in some very real setbacks in the last two or three years.

I think at this time of transition in China it is very important for all the Western countries to show the Chinese that there are alternatives to their present policies—basically of hostility to us—and that an accommodation with the West can be worked out on terms that both the Chinese and the West might regard as reasonable. It will be a long-range problem, I realize. No immediate success is to be expected. I think it is obviously the United States that has to move the most but I think, without over-emphasizing our position in the world or in Asia, that Canada could play a more useful and important role than it plays at present.



This is the only bit of personal pitch I am putting in and it is only a couple of sentences, so I hope you will allow me.

I do not accept the argument that the present turmoil inside China justifies a stand-pat policy by Canada and, specifically, a further delay in moving towards diplomatic recognition of Peking. I feel just the opposite. I feel that the turmoil and the uncertainty, and above all the possibility of change inside China today make it all the more imperative that we do all we can to break out of what I regard as a very sterile and dangerous impasse.

Thank you.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: First of all I would like to find out roughly how long the Committee is prepared to sit. Mr. Taylor, is there any limitation on your time this morning?

Mr. TAYLOR: No, sir.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Could I get an expression of opinion of how long this Committee would like to sit this morning? A number of people have indicated they would like to speak and I want to give everybody the same opportunity to ask Mr. Taylor questions. That is why I would like to get an idea now of how long you are prepared to sit.

An hon. MEMBER: Could we say tentatively twelve o'clock?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: All right, we will say twelve o'clock. I will call Mr. Brewin.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I wrote down a number of questions but almost all of them were answered by Mr. Taylor as he went along.

An hon. MEMBER: You had better pass then.

Mr. BREWIN: No, I will not pass. I have thought of some new ones.

I wonder whether I might comment that it seems to me the very fact that Mr. Taylor is here after an experience in China and is able to give us the insight that he has indicates that one of the great values of diplomatic recognition might be that we build up a corps of people in Canada who are thoroughly knowledgeable about the situation in that country. Do you agree with that, Mr. Taylor? Do you think it is possible for us, through recognition, to advance the knowledge that the Canadian government would have of development in China and get a greater insight into what is going on, and so forth?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, I do. I would only add the qualification that foreigners in China, be they diplomats or journalists, are severely restricted in their movements and their conversations with Chinese, and no Embassy, not even, say the French, has real diplomatic exchanges and influence with the Chinese. But the mere presence of some of our younger diplomats, especially language students, and so on, in Peking, would I think, inevitably broaden and deepen their understanding of what is going on as well as keeping their mandarin in trim, which is a very important aspect.

Mr. BREWIN: This is a very general question. You clearly indicated that while we might expect the continuation for a number of years of a militant, suspicious and dogmatic approach by the rulers of China—I think you used the



word "xenophobia" as indicating hostility to outsiders—you implied diplomatic recognition might be one method of accelerating the day when this mood will change. Have you any other suggestions of steps that you think Canada and the Western world should undertake now to change this situation?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think so long as the United States and China have such different views of possible Asian solutions there is very little that the lesser powers can do; the real debate is, of course, between Peking and Washington. But I think all we can do is to try, on the one hand, to influence the Americans to adopt what I would regard as a more reasonable outlook on the situation in Asia and, on the other, hold out to the Chinese more concrete and practical indications of alternatives to present general Western policies, specifically by recognizing them diplomatically, by taking an even more realistic position in the United Nations than we took at the last session where we did move slightly.

I think things are changing in China, if they see options. I have no illusions that suddenly all is going to become sweetness and light between China and the West. It is going to be a long, hard haul but I think the Chinese are practical men and if they see options, they can go for these options. But right now they look out and all they can really see is tremendous American military might and tremendous hostility, with the partial exception that there have been a few signs of change on the part of the United States administration last spring, but these were not really significant changes. This is where I tend to preach a bit, and I am not here to preach, but I do think we should do all we can, and more than we are doing at present, to hold out options, especially the one of diplomatic recognition, which might not be accepted right away by the Chinese.

Mr. FAULKNER: What options specifically would recognition provide that are not available now?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think it would be more of a psychological one. I think if the Chinese saw a nation like Canada, a close ally of the United States—they have in fact, at times condemned us as an American puppet—extending diplomatic recognition to them, this might help to convince some of them in the process of the internal debate that may have started or is bound to be starting soon on their foreign policy to say: well, there are some signs of change in the Western position; if the Canadians are moving perhaps the Americans are going to move one of these days. Perhaps a direct clash between us is not inevitable.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Taylor, we had a suggestion, and I think you really dealt with it, but I would like to get your direct view on it. We had the suggestion that the disturbances and trouble in China at the present time make it unwise to extend diplomatic recognition when internal struggle is in process.

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not accept that argument because I do not feel there has been such a breakdown in authority that there is no legally constituted Chinese government. China is in turmoil but it is not in a state of civil war. There is a Chinese government apparatus which has remained basically unchanged throughout this whole turmoil. The Prime Minister is still Chou En-lai, and most of the vice premiers are still in positions that they have always held. The government is functioning. There is a government to recognize. I think, for the reasons I stated, because of the turmoil, there is all the more reason to state simply that we recognize the Peoples Republic of China. I wish we had been able



to do this, I think the ideal situation would have been to vote positively on the Albanian resolution at the United Nations last November and say, at the same time, this constitutes an act of diplomatic recognition, but I think it can be announced. The Chinese may not accept it; they may ignore it. I do not think it involves any discussion with the Chinese over Taiwan. That is another red herring.

Mr. BREWIN: If they do ignore it we should continue to leave the proposal open so far as we are concerned.

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, I think we should recognize; I may be knocked down by some of the people who are more familiar with diplomatic subtleties but I can see no obvious reason why we cannot simply unilaterally recognize, and then if the Chinese want to discuss the exchange of diplomatic missions, fine, but make no commitment about the status of Taiwan at the same time. Say nothing about Taiwan.

Mr. BREWIN: I have one more question and I do not know whether you have looked into this particularly. I think some people are of the view that the concentration of Chinese industrial effort on the development of a thermonuclear capacity indicates an aggressive rather than a defensive outlook and constitutes a threat to the Western world which we should be prepared to meet. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, sir, I do. I do not like the thought of anybody entering the nuclear arms race, whatever side they are on or whatever their policies are, but I think the Chinese bomb is defensive. I think, from a Chinese point of view, it was a responsible act on the part of the Chinese government. The best defence I have ever heard of the Chinese bomb came from a French diplomat. I think there are very direct and interesting parallels between DeGaulle's attitude on the bomb and national sovereignty and Chinese attitudes, I think the Chinese, felt, rightly or wrongly that they were in a situation where the two super powers of the world were, in effect, their enemies. You can say they need not have placed themselves in this situation and that is an argument I would accept, but the fact is they are in this situation and I think in this situation they felt they were menaced and that the bomb provides a deterrent, not an effective nuclear striking force. It is not for some time going to represent an effective nuclear striking force, and I doubt very much that they would ever launch a first strike.

Mr. WALKER: A status symbol?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue indefinitely but I will give way to someone else.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Brewin. I have to sandwich a brief question in occasionally between others. You mentioned that Mao feared the youth of the country. Why, then, did he turn loose the Red Guards?

Mr. TAYLOR: The Red Guards, as far as we know, represent about 20 million young Chinese which is not the total youthful population of that age by any means. These are the most highly politically articulate; the most highly indoctrinated; the liveliest of the young Chinese, and in our society they would be the people who would be marching outside the American Consulate and/or the



people who moved to Yorkville. That is not a very sensible comparison, but they are the people who are most concerned; there are a vast number and they are people in the cities more than in the countryside.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. FAULKNER: Mr. Taylor, I would just like to clarify your position on the question of recognition. You have described our present position as one of a sterile impasse. Recognition, in your view would, I think, have two advantages. One would hold out a certain option and it would contribute to the ending of the "xenophobia", or the hostility. Are those the specific reasons why you feel we should start a process of recognition which might become more widespread?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, I think that is a fair description of the two major results, but I would, again, heavily qualify them. I do not think we count for that much in the world or in China's eyes and it would not suddenly lead to a tremendous change in the Asian tensions, but I think it would be a correct, realistic and sensible move in the right direction of the general Western rapprochement with the Chinese.

Mr. FAULKNER: It would be a sensible move, but in terms of its importance or its impact, it is probably not a terribly important one?

Mr. TAYLOR: In terms of its immediate impact, it is probably not an important move, but in terms of its long-range impact, in terms of the results it might have amongst other Western countries, some of which are in the same situation as we are, in terms of results it might eventually have in the United States where every indication is that public feeling is much more advanced than the feeling in Congress or in the White House on the question of China in all these terms it might be the start of something. It might accelerate the process.

Mr. FAULKNER: The other thing that impresses me—again, if I understood you correctly—in your analysis of Chinese foreign policy is that its basis is far more pragmatic and governed by questions of national interest than it is by ideological factors.

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, that is very much my viewpoint. I think we tend to over-react to Chinese statements and tend to under-react or under-consider what the Chinese actually do. Their statements are pretty frightening.

Mr. FAULKNER: Then, in your view, statements about items of policy or objectives of policy, such as national liberation wars, are not to be taken at their face value?

Mr. TAYLOR: They are to be studied very carefully to see what the words really mean. If I might just develop this as I think this it is important, the famous document which is so often quoted, especially in Washington, on the *People's War* released in the summer of 1965 by the Chinese Defence Minister, Lin Piao, who is now, of course, heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung, has been called at different times by responsible leaders, "a blueprint for Chinese aggression", "a proof that the Chinese are bent on world domination" and specifically compared of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. This could be said only by people who either have not read it or are guilty of intellectual dishonesty, to put it mildly. If you read that document which has lots of flowery, exciting and frightening phrases about the



countryside of the world, the developing world—surrounding the cities of the world and overwhelming them, the cities being North America and Western Europe—this is pretty disturbing, but if you read it in context it makes quite clear, and this is very consistent with Mao's thinking, that wars of national liberation or revolutions succeed primarily and fundamentally through the efforts of the people in their own country and the friendly countries, like China, can supply only peripheral assistance, and this assistance is never decisive. In fact, some very reputable American Sinologists, specifically the Rand Corporation, have interpreted this whole document, which was called by their own American leaders, "the blueprint for Chinese aggression", as a specific warning to the Viet Cong to downgrade their activities because they were upgrading them too fast and getting into trouble. That is an extreme viewpoint the other way, though, that I do not accept, but that is closer to the truth, I think, than the hysterical reaction the document aroused in Washington.

Mr. WALKER: There was a phrase you used in reply to the question that I did not quite get. You said that this outside peripheral assistance is never decisive?

Mr. TAYLOR: It is never decisive; I cannot quote exactly, but the document is available to anybody who wants to read it in English, but the burden of what they said is that the wars of national liberation can only succeed primarily through the efforts of the people of that country.

Mr. FAULKNER: In that sense, then, would it be fair to say or to speculate that possibly the Chinese objectives or interests in terms of the war in Viet Nam would be an American withdrawal rather than, necessarily, an American military defeat in Viet Nam?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not know. They have many things involved for them in Viet Nam. I think they want to see the Americans defeated and humiliated. They would settle for less, but I think that is what, ideally, they would like to see. They would like to see an American withdrawal under the most humiliating conditions, but they are practical men. I think they see several ways of the situation developing in a way that, to them, would be favourable; in other words, stronger military action by the Viet Cong eventually and/or rising public opinion in the United States about which they have some very misguided notions, I think. I think they see it possibly happening as a combination of all these factors.

Mr. FAULKNER: In other words, the inability, for instance, of mediators such as Canada, U Thant and others from Great Britain to bring the two sides to a negotiating position may, in some measure, be due to the fact that possibly both the North Vietnamese, for ideological reasons and, in turn, through them the Viet Cong—assuming there is some connection—and particularly the Chinese, are interested in a military defeat of the United States rather than just ending the war and having them withdraw gracefully and with some semblance of dignity?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think there is, at least, the possibility of a significant difference in how Hanoi sees the war and how Peking sees it. I also think there is a significant difference between the National Liberation Front of the Viet Cong and Hanoi but that is a much more controversial and contentious matter, but I think there is, obviously, a difference between Peking and Hanoi. They have different motives in the war. Some of their motives coincide but others do not.



Hanoi is not entirely a free agent any more than we are entirely a free agent when it comes to doing things the Americans do not like, but there are significant areas of independence on the part of Hanoi. They are very chauvinistic, too. A situation could arise where Hanoi would follow one course despite the advice of Peking. Hanoi's interests primarily are confined to Viet Nam. This is their war that they have been fighting in different ways for 20 years. Peking sees it in a much broader concept and a much broader framework in terms of the dispute with the United States, the dispute within the communist world and the whole Afro-Asian situation. Viet Nam's interests are much more intense and local.

Mr. FAULKNER: Do I have any more time or is my time exhausted?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: You have half a minute left, Mr. Faulkner.

Mr. FAULKNER: Just let me ask you this question. I have a number of others, but I will just ask you this quick question. Harrison Salisbury made the observation that one of the major problems in finding a solution to the war in Viet Nam lies in the fact that it is not really a question of bringing the parties together, it is the realization by the North that there are no reasonable grounds for settlement once negotiations start. In other words, the bases of settlement among the North and the South and the Americans are so far apart that peace discussions, at this stage, would lead to a cease fire and a protracted series of meetings, possibly, at the end of which there would be no concrete results, leaving the North Vietnamese in the very difficult position of trying to revitalize and reactivate its guerilla activities, a task which they probably do not feel they could do.

Mr. CHURCHILL: That is the shortest question I have ever heard. I thought we were talking about China and not Viet Nam?

Mr. FAULKNER: They are related, Mr. Churchill, if you recall. I am just wondering whether you think there is any truth or substance in this?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, I think there probably is in the sense that I do not think—trying to see it from Hanoi's viewpoint, which is very difficult because we do not know what their viewpoint really is—they have been offered anything, so far, by the United States that they could accept and use to achieve their basic objectives.

The other factor, briefly, I think is an important psychological one. Every time Ho Chi Minh has negotiated at an international conference, he has been betrayed in one way or another. The French betrayed him, or at least so he feels, with some justification, I believe. But certainly he feels he was betrayed after the 1954 Geneva Conference, not only by the West, but also, to some extent, by the Russians and the Chinese.

Mr. THOMPSON: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Taylor, I am seeking information in most of my questions because I realize Mr. Taylor is one of our most authoritative Canadians on what is actually happening in China, so I am going to try to ask a series of questions that will fill in what I feel are some gaps in my own thinking, at least. How strong, in your opinion, is the physical and political strength of Lin Piao? Physically, is he worth ten years?



Mr. TAYLOR: Nobody knows, sir. He is known to have disappeared from public sight for long periods on end, specifically—my dates are not exact—somewhere in the late thirties or early forties when it is believed he was treated in Moscow for serious war wounds and then more recently in the late fifties and early sixties. He was never evident when I was in China; he was the mystery man. The two ailments he is mentioned to suffer from are some complications arising from war wounds and it is also suspected that he has tuberculosis. When he has made speeches, as he did last autumn at Red Guard rallies, people who listened to tapes of those speeches and who are expert in the Chinese language, purported to feel that he was expressing himself with great slowness and great difficulty. He slurred over and made errors with simple words which would indicate some degree of physical disability. He does not look like a healthy man.

Mr. THOMPSON: Does he carry prestige to any depth at all should Chou En-lai slip from the scene?

Mr. TAYLOR: Mao carries so much prestige that it is very hard to put anybody else in that category. He does carry a considerable amount of prestige mainly because he was one of the great generals of the revolution and in the war against the Japanese. He won all his major battles.

Mr. THOMPSON: You did not mention Chou En-lai. Where does Chou En-lai fit into this hierarchy right at the present time and projected into the future?

Mr. TAYLOR: Some sort of deal must have been made because Chou En-lai, as Prime Minister, threw in his lot with Mao and Lin Piao early on in the great cultural revolution last summer. He has always been sort of two steps behind them, going along the same path. His speeches make fascinating reading if you compare them to Lin Piao's speeches at identical rallies at which one followed the other. Chou En-lai has always been slightly more moderate. In recent months, according to Red Guard wall posters which may or may not be reliable, Chou En-lai has frequently addressed Red Guards in Peking and said, "Leave my Government apparatus alone; stop heckling people like Chen Yi, my Foreign Minister; stop criticizing my other Vice-Premiers who are heads of Government departments"—the equivalent of Cabinet Ministers—"leave them alone." He seems to have gone along in order to preserve the smooth functioning of the Government bureaucracy and the economy of the country which, as far as we can tell, has been surprisingly little disturbed, so far. He still seems to be with Mao; traditionally, he has always been a compromiser, a mediator and a survivor.

Mr. THOMPSON: Is he a continuing factor, then, in the chain of leadership, as you see it?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think he is. Nobody who was in China when I was, or to whom I have talked since, has ever seen Chou En-lai as really having top leadership stature. He is a sort of Mikoyan. He has survived partly because of this. His background is a bit more suspect than most of the others. It is a rather upper class background. He has never been a senior in the party as apparently he has been in the Government.

Mr. THOMPSON: Now, just with regard to the physical situation in China at this moment, do you agree with the reports that widespread famine is inevitable



within the next year because of lack of seed and lack of agricultural activity at this key time?

Mr. TAYLOR: I certainly would not say that widespread famine is inevitable or even likely. I think there is a serious possibility that their food grain production this year will drop below what it was last year when it was not sufficient.

Mr. THOMPSON: In other words, do you see the course of revolution getting out of hand?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not know. I am not in touch as much as I should be. This is almost a week by week thing, because it depends on the rain and it depends on the planting. I think they got enough order in the key months of March and into this month to get the spring crops planted. Whether they will be able to harvest them all right or not, depends again on the way things are stirred up. I would rather suspect that they will get a crop that is not a disastrous failure, but again it depends on the weather. The weather has not been good.

Mr. THOMPSON: I have just a couple of questions with regard to the control of the outer provinces and the activity in relationship with Russia, Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. Do you regard that as a serious threat to law and order in the country?

Mr. TAYLOR: I could see a situation arising where it might become a serious threat. I do not think it has yet but we know so very little about what is happening, especially in Sinkiang and in Tibet, that whole northern and western region of the country. Apparently the political and military men who were in control still are in control, even though they have been criticized at times and they are being very quiet so far as we know. We do not know where their allegiances or their loyalties lie or which way they are likely to go if the struggle intensifies again.

Mr. THOMPSON: I have just one or two questions with regard to foreign policy. Do you think the Chinese would accept diplomatic recognition and eventual exchange of missions without using the Republic of China or Taiwan as an issue?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think there is a very good chance because they accepted this from the French. There is the precedent and the Chinese are as keen on precedent as anybody else.

General de Gaulle, in the spring of 1964, recognized Peking. You will remember there was a flap about what would happen because he did have a mission in Taipei and we do not. Eventually, the Chinese Nationalist Government broke with de Gaulle but at no time, to the best of my knowledge, did the French government ever make a formal declaration saying that Formosa or Taiwan was part of China or that in recognizing the government in Peking it was recognizing Peking's claim to control Taiwan. I remember writing this at the time so it can be documented, I believe that a French leader—I think it was Mr. Pompidou—some months after French recognition made a speech in which he said the status of Taiwan was undecided and the Chinese said nothing.

Mr. THOMPSON: In this area of foreign policy there are approximately 350 million people in the neighbouring countries of the China rim from Japan to



Australia to Malaysia shall we say. You stated your own opinion of what Canada's policy should be in relation to this. How much regard would you have for the opinion of these countries—say the ten countries, approximately, that are involved—concerning their policy towards China, none of them now recognizing China and one of them actually advocating the recognition of China, as such, even though they are trading with China?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think it is difficult to lump all these countries together and describe in a way that sort of—

Mr. THOMPSON: No, our time does not permit it. You do not need to.

Mr. TAYLOR: In all honesty, I do not think I can answer that question simply because the attitudes of countries like Japan are vastly different from the attitudes of countries like South Viet Nam or Thailand and Indonesia.

Mr. THOMPSON: I was thinking of Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and Malaysia.

Mr. TAYLOR: I believe Indonesia still has diplomatic relations but I am not sure. I do not think we can ignore the wishes, opinions, and the policies of these governments, some of which are Commonwealth—at least one is Commonwealth—with some of which we have good relations, too. We cannot ignore them. We have to look at their reasons for following these policies. We also have to look, I think, at the nature of these governments. They are not all as representative of their own people as we might like them to be. They may not be representative of what a majority of people in that country might think of their own self-interest. We have to understand the particular problems of a country like Japan which is moving towards China in certain areas, and then we have to decide what our own national self-interest is.

Mr. THOMPSON: Yes. My time is up. I am sorry.

Mr. TAYLOR: That is a big subject.

Mr. THOMPSON: I was just concerned about our seeking prior consultation and taking into consideration the policies of these different countries and not assuming that they are all the same. I think it is a very important area.

Mr. TAYLOR: I do too.

Mr. THOMPSON: We do not have time to explore it.

Mr. WALKER: Mr. Chairman and Mr. Taylor, it is very good of you to come. This is helpful and useful. I am sure the Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, will thank you for being here.

It seems to me that there is quite some feeling, certainly in the West, that the fight, the battle, the struggle that is going on in China really is as the result of two views and this I take to be a western viewpoint. There seems to be the battle over the two views with regard to the external relations of China with the rest of the world; that is how shall we conquer the world, moderately or by a military effort, and we are getting the bomb to do it, and this sort of thing? But from what you say, the struggle is much more concerned with inside China rather than any dispute about their revolution to conquer the world. Is this so?



Mr. TAYLOR: I am quite convinced that the prime issues involved, the prime motives and the debate is over domestic considerations. I think there is some evidence that foreign policy has played a part and still is playing a part, but there is no evidence to suggest that foreign policy has been predominant at any point.

Mr. WALKER: I am sure you have had discussions with Western diplomats. I do not know whether you have had any with the U.S. State Department or our own external affairs people. But in your discussions do they accept your judgment on the posture or do you feel that the West, in fact, is uninformed about this particular subject?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not think the West is uninformed either in terms of our foreign service or in terms of our academic communities or parliaments as they choose to make themselves informed. I think there is still a great deal of confusion, and I cannot just speak for the predominant view in either the External Affairs or the State departments, but certainly the predominant view of everything I have read by the leading American Sinologists is on the domestic issues involved.

Mr. WALKER: Would you say that for us, the West,—I will put quotations around these words—"in our own selfish interest" Mao's presence at the moment serves us very well rather than having more modern, more progressive elements, if you will, in control of China who are forging a great industrial nation? I take it that Mao, in fact, rather than being a revolutionary is a reactionary who is attempting to revive something that is dead and gone. The progressive elements are being held under. Is it in our interest that Mao gives us more breathing space by his presence there?

Mr. TAYLOR: That could be argued in the short run. I do not think so. I would not really support that I think because in the long run, or even in the middling run of a decade or of 15 or 20 years, inevitably it will be in our interests and it will happen that a more sophisticated political and governmental structure will evolve in China. It still will be a Communist one but we will see something parallel to what has happened in the Soviet Union although not a direct parallel. Certainly, Chinese foreign policy may not be affected immediately by what happens inside China but there will be the growth of Revisionism, I feel. This is a western viewpoint, and I may be blinkered, but I feel it is virtually inevitable in order for China to evolve the sort of sophisticated technological society that it must have to be a great power. I think that is in our interest because I think this will eventually, not directly but eventually, lead to a different assessment of their foreign relations.

Mr. WALKER: Do the Chinese see the U.S. as an ideological or military threat? What is their fear? Is it the exposing of their people to the West? Do they fear the way Russia has, modernized, if you will, their ideology because of exposure to the West? Is this what Mao is afraid of for the Chinese people? Is it the ideological presence of the United States and the ideas of the modern world that may seep in, or is it a real fear of military might?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think it is both and I would hesitate to say which is the more predominant in Mao's mind. They would stress the ideological element in what



they say publicly, the contamination of Western ideas. They are particularly quick to jump upon the Russians any time there is a Russian novel or Russian play that they can interpret as Revisionist or even bourgeois. They will write long articles about this. They do not speak so openly about the military threat but it must be a matter of specific concern to them. There is a considerable amount of published evidence to indicate that there has been a very real debate within the army, and to some extent within the Party, in recent years, aroused by people who said it is foolish and possibly self-destructive to quarrel with the Soviet Union and the United States at the same time and be confronted by two vast military powers.

Mr. WALKER: Do you think China will ever accept the invitation to join the United Nations on the basis of Canada's two-China policy?

Mr. TAYLOR: No, not on the basis of a two-China policy.

Mr. WALKER: They will never do so?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not feel that they will necessarily always go down the line insisting on the other conditions they have put on in recent years, but I cannot see any prospect, under existing circumstances, of their adopting a two-China policy.

Mr. WALKER: I have just one thing more. How is the trade that Canada has with China—which I think is a pseudo-recognition, almost, of China—looked upon? I am thinking particularly in terms of wheat, but other trade is, I believe, developing. Do they look on it simply as a necessity, or is there a tinge of softening of attitude towards Canada because we are doing some trade with them?

Mr. TAYLOR: They say, as a matter of faith, that politics and economics cannot be separated. In effect, they do separate them all the time whenever it suits them. In our case, they do. In recent months they have severely criticized our government because of various proposals concerning Viet Nam, and because of the activities of the International Control Commission, as you know. At the same time they do see, I think, some political relevance in the trade. The trade in grain is a particularly important, but isolated, are of their trading picture. In general, since they broke with the Soviet Union they have, as a matter of political as well as economic policy, developed their trade with Japan and virtually every western country except the United States and, I believe, Spain and Portugal. This has its political meaning too. It enables them to say, as they do, "we have friends everywhere. We carry on relations of one sort or another with",—I have forgotten how many they say; it used to be something like 125 nations and territories—things like this. It appeals to them politically but in trade basically they are hard-headed and practical.

Mr. WALKER: But this trade is of necessity at the moment. Do they see trade as part of the opening of diplomatic relations, even the smallest beginning of diplomatic overtures?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think they judge each country separately.

Mr. WALKER: I see.

Mr. TAYLOR: With a country like Japan they have linked trade and politics more overtly at different times. With us, to the best of my knowledge, they never have, even privately.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Mr. Walker—

Mr. WALKER: I have one minute.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: No, as a matter of fact we agreed to 12 o'clock and Mr. McIntosh, Mr. Lind, Mr. Andras, Mr. Forrestall, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Macdonald wish to ask questions. Mr. McIntosh, please.

Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Taylor, my first question is a hypothetical one. Would you care to express an opinion about which group ultimately will be victorious, the Mao or the other group?

Mr. TAYLOR: No, sir, except to say that I do not think it will be clear-cut. In other words, Mao may be forced to make compromises. I do not think Mao himself, while he lives, can be defeated. I do not think it will be a clear-cut decision. I think it may be interpreted as a victory for one side or the other by outside commentators, but I do not think the evidence will ever be immediately clear.

Mr. McINTOSH: Well, after he dies, then?

Mr. TAYLOR: After he dies, I think he will be honoured in name, and possibly the policies followed by his successors may go against what he would really have wanted them to do.

Mr. McINTOSH: I took from what you said that his ultimate goal, as far as the Chinese people are concerned, is to change the nature of man. Do you believe that can be done in China?

Mr. TAYLOR: No, sir, I do not.

Mr. McINTOSH: With regard to Viet Nam and Korea—particularly Korea's past but for the same reason they took action in Korea—you say that they will take action in Viet Nam because of the danger to their borders?

Mr. TAYLOR: I say the possibility is there, sir. They might take action and the parallel should always be considered, because the only previous occasion on which they did massively confront the United States in a military sense was in Korea. This parallel, I think, is still a relevant one. There may be other differences but it is still politically relevant.

Mr. McINTOSH: Could you give us any reason now why they do not confront United States over the issue of Formosa? Why do they not take Formosa?

Mr. TAYLOR: Because the Seventh Fleet is in the Formosa Strait. It went in there at the beginning of the Korean war when they were all prepared to take Formosa, and they could have followed up Chiang-Kai-shek there but the Seventh Fleet came in. It is there. For them to take Formosa would be a military impossibility.

Mr. McINTOSH: Their thinking is not the same with regard to any entry into the Viet Nam war?

Mr. TAYLOR: They would enter the Viet Nam war, I feel, if they felt that the war was getting too close to their borders for them to live with, as it did in Korea. If they felt it was inevitable that the United States, as they would put it, was carrying the war into China, then they would come in, I think. There can be no certainty of this.



Mr. McINTOSH: What in your opinion, was the reason behind the conflict on the Indian border?

Mr. TAYLOR: I will give an opinion but I will first say that it is highly complex. I think there are probably very few people today who have studied all the relevant documents and looked at all the relevant maps and read all the relevant historical records and so on. I certainly have not, so I do not pretend to be an expert. My understanding is that if we have to assign guilt or blame, it is about equal. I think the Indians bear at least half the responsibility of the matter getting to the state where there were military hostilities. China's interests, as I see them, were primarily in the western area, in the Ladakh area, in that disputed section where they had built a road called the Aksai-Chin Road, which was of vast strategic importance to them since it links Sinkiang and Tibet, areas of political, military and racial sensitivity. The road was built in disputed territory not controlled by India. Indian patrols started pushing up towards it through disputed territory; the Chinese felt the road was menaced and they pushed the Indians back, at the same time launching a diversionary attack on Assam on the east, perhaps to get something to bargain with.

Mr. McINTOSH: I would like to go back for a moment to the two groups in China at the present time, because I forgot to ask you a question. It seemed to me, when you were describing the fears of Mao, that you listed practically every person in China. You said the peasants, the young people, the middle class and so on. Is there any group in China that he does not fear?

Mr. TAYLOR: I will try and say what he thinks. Mao, I think, would feel, in respect of these tendencies that I have described, that these fears of his exist in all these groups, but in all these groups there are people who can be relied upon, the hard core Maoists. Also, there are vast numbers who can also be converted, indoctrinated, persuaded, trained and disciplined into seeing the right line. He is a great believer in mass persuasion of one sort or another, intensive indoctrination. He also believes in people working together and moving together en masse, being swept up en masse and even being converted en masse. Therefore, these campaigns, which are run by the people whom he regards as dedicated hard core loyalists to himself, are used to generate an atmosphere in which other people will be converted. It is conversion that he seeks. He does not want lip service; he wants genuine conversion.

Mr. McINTOSH: In regard to the Canadian position, do the Chinese feel that we are a satellite of the United States?

Mr. TAYLOR: What they have said publicly tends to suggest that they have said it quite openly. What Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin said last November and December about the United Nations position was interpreted by them officially as supporting the nefarious American-to-China scheme or words to this effect. In private conversation, I have sometimes found them following the same line but in a more polite, almost embarrassingly sympathetic way. It has been sort of conveyed that, "Well, it is too bad you cannot adopt a more independent foreign policy but, of course, we understand the reason." I have argued back, of course, but it is a very embarrassing thing.

Mr. FAULKNER: How did you do it?

Mr. TAYLOR: I listed our trade with them and our policy over Cuba.



Mr. McINTOSH: Mr. Walker touched on the grain trade with China, using for his argument the statements of Mr. Martin and Mr. Pearson. How do they reconcile then that we will trade with mainland China even against the wishes, possibly, of the United States? Do they take that into consideration?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think they do. They do not take it into consideration officially when they condemn us as a United States puppet. They only condemn us on specific actions we take. They do not launch general press campaigns or propaganda campaigns against us. It is only when we go into a specific area that involves their interests such as the question of the United Nations representation or the matter of Viet Nam. Then they feel compelled to attack us and to relate our proposals to Washington's and to say we are acting for Washington, but there is no general tendency in the Chinese press, which rather tends to ignore us, to portray us as a faithful ally and puppet of the United States.

Mr. McINTOSH: Did you ever have any conversation with officials in relation to China's entry into the United Nations on their terms?

Mr. TAYLOR: I never had any conversation in which a Chinese official deviated one syllable from the public position of the Chinese Government.

Mr. ANDRAS: Sir, you do not advocate any delay in recognition of Red China because of the internal situation in China. Is there any possibility of some danger of doing it at this time by, for example, either one faction or the other taking it as an encouragement to the turmoil that is going on and, therefore, getting ourselves into a bit of a box vis-a-vis whatever comes out of it. I mean, is the timing right in that sense? I know, in the long term, it probably makes a great deal of sense, but is the timing just a little delicate now?

Mr. TAYLOR: That could be argued and, in fact, of course it is argued. I do not see any difficulty that way simply because the Chinese Government does exist in the form it has existed since 1949, with virtually the same personnel. There has been no meaningful disruption in Chinese diplomatic procedure except for the physical calling back of many of their diplomats abroad, but it is not a civil war situation and the existence of the government is still intact. This is a struggle basically within the Party. I do not think it is going to reach civil war proportions by any means. I think the government will remain intact and that there is a physical unchanged Chinese Government to recognize. The Chinese make these distinctions and they are valid ones. This is separate from what is going on within the terms of the Chinese Communist Party, within terms of internal politics.

Mr. ANDRAS: You do not think that either one faction or the other—and in spite of what you say there are these factions—would interpret this as, "Oh good, you are having a bit of an internal struggle here; we are recognizing you now", and implicit in that is a hope that there is going to be a change?

Mr. TAYLOR: It is a good point. The way this is presented, the form of language to be used, is something that would have to be very carefully considered if we decided to go ahead—as long as we make it clear that we are recognizing the Government of China which, as I stress, is a physical entity. We know who they are. I think this is the point. As far as we can tell, it is not going to break now into a civil war type of situation in which there is some other group of people with large areas of territory under their control who are putting



forward claims to represent China. The struggles that is going on is within the Party. I am fairly sure the leaders who will emerge, be they Maoists or opponents of Mao, will emerge within the existing Party and government structure.

Mr. ANDRAS: From the way you have described the situation and Mao's objectives which are to purge what he calls corruption, of becoming a "have" nation and the softness that would go with it, would it not be your opinion that this struggle is going to go on or repeat itself as long as Mao is alive? In other words, he is tackling an almost impossible situation which you, yourself, have said is impossible, changing the nature of man in China, and yet he is going to continue to try that as long as he is alive. So is this turmoil not going to continue as long as he is alive?

Mr. TAYLOR: It may or may not and we do not know the levels on which it will continue, if it does continue. If we go on past precedent, Mao has cut off campaigns after a certain amount of time. He is not one for unleashing endless political campaigns. On the other hand, this is a new level of intensity in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, so precedents are not entirely to be relied upon. There were signs, as I said, earlier this spring of a compromise situation evolving. I think this sort of thing will continue to happen. I do not think there will be a clear-cut end to the campaign. I do not think it will always go on on a steady level of rising intensification or the opposite. I think there will be periods of uncertainty where it will seem to get intense in some areas and relax in others.

Mr. ANDRAS: Then it will be very hard to generalize, in that sense, if we accept the argument that this is a delicate time to recognize Red China. This might go on for years and years and years, using the same argument against recognition, because there will not necessarily be a clear-cut end to the issue there?

Mr. TAYLOR: No, but I would look at that the other way and say that while this struggle or debate, if you like, is going on, although it is primarily concerned with domestic issues, in my belief, it does have some foreign policy ramifications. What is being decided is the future course that China will take, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. Options are starting to open for the first time and they will become more open, in one way or another, after Mao passes from the scene, and I think, therefore, it is all the more important to show the Chinese that these options would get some response from the West.

Mr. ANDRAS: In view of Mao's concern about the danger of contamination or corruption by western ideas, is there any real desire on the part of the Chinese leaders to have diplomatic recognition, which would mean at least the introduction of missions and a slight to large overflow of western ideas simply by their presence in China? Would they prefer, from that viewpoint, not to open the exchange of communications?

Mr. TAYLOR: A distinction has to be drawn here. They would very much welcome diplomatic recognition on terms that they can accept, such as the arrangement they made with France. They see this in terms of demolishing the American claim that China is isolated. The Chinese say that they are not isolated and that they have more than 40 countries with missions of one sort or another in Peking, and so on. They say they have friends everywhere. They use this sort



of language. This is a political game for them. It does not imply their opening of the country because, like previous dynasties, especially the last dynasty which was the Ching dynasty, they are very skillful in isolating the foreigner. I can speak with some experience on this. The diplomats in Peking missions of friendly countries with which China has intimate relations—as intimate as their relations are with anybody—are excluded, restricted and confined. This is the traditional Chinese way of dealing with foreigners. It conforms to their basic psychological reaction to the foreigner. This would happen to a Canadian mission. We would be restricted and isolated in the same way. It does not imply opening their doors to western influence.

Mr. McINTOSH: May I ask a supplementary question of Mr. Andras? What was the humiliation by the Western powers you referred to which took place during the 100 years before 1949.

Mr. TAYLOR: Roughly from 1840, the period of the so-called Opium Wars, the Western powers, with Britain in the lead, the United States rather in the rear and countries like France, Germany and Czarist Russia very much involved, forced themselves militarily and politically on China, first in the south and the coastal port areas, in Canton especially, and then moved in with military expeditions right into Peking, which included the sacking of the summer palace. These were primarily commercially inspired incursions. We introduced opium to the Chinese—that is one of the benefits of Western civilization we brought to them. We, Westerners in general, forced them to accept what they quite accurately called unequal treaties, whereby vast areas of their coastal ports, such as Shanghai, Amoy and Canton, were restricted to the foreigner, where foreign law ran, and when a foreigner killed a Chinese, he was tried by a foreign court. The record is not good. At the same time the Chinese were very provocative; there is no doubt about this. They had different ideas about how to deal with the foreigner from our ideas about how we should be dealt with, but it was their country we went into.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, I am afraid, I am going to have to be more restrictive. Mr. Forrestall.

Mr. ANDRAS: Am I now cut off, Mr. Chairman?

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. FORRESTALL: I join Mr. Walker and others in expressing appreciation for the time you have given us this morning.

In the context of your understanding and the experience you have had in China, would you care to let your mind wander for just a moment and express an opinion as to what the likely reaction of China might be to our present transformation, for want of another word, within our defence structure—the role that we might appear to be pursuing, that of an instrument of peacekeeping, peace restoration, a tool of those powers in the world that might see fit to use us if that is required.

Mr. TAYLOR: I had not thought of that but, speaking off the top of my head. I would say that if the Chinese were moved to comment on our, as you say, emergence as a peacekeeping power and our increasing emphasis on peacekeeping, they would say that this is done in the service of the United Nations, which it is primarily, and they would interpret this in the light of their description of



the United Nations as a tool for United States—Soviet Union domination of the world, and therefore they would say that we are acting in concert with the United States especially, but also with the Soviet Union, to frustrate revolutionary wars and the just aspirations of the struggling peoples of the developing world, and so on. That is, if they were moved to comment. I do not know whether they necessarily will be; they do not comment on this very often, and only when we really get involved in their part of the world.

Mr. LIND: Mr. Taylor, I am concerned with the development of self-sufficiency by Mao. Has he taken any definite steps to develop his country that he will be able to provide enough food to alleviate the poverty and famine within his own country.

Mr. TAYLOR: Sir, first of all, there is definitely poverty in China. There is not, to the best of my knowledge, famine in China. I do not believe there has been famine in China since 1949. I believe there was serious malnutrition in the bad years in 1959 and 1961. I would not even say there was starvation, except possibly in very isolated areas. But certainly poverty, yes; certainly they have this vast problem of becoming self-sufficient in food; they are not self-sufficient in food; they import now about six million tons of food grains a year. This is a bit of a more sophisticated subject; they have ways of arguing to indicate that they do not really need to import this grain, but basically I feel they need to import a great deal of it.

In recent years, as opposed to the time of the establishment of the communes, their agricultural policies have been pretty sound, as far as I can judge and as far as experts I have talked to can tell me, in that they have downgraded the original commune structure to get back to what is basically the village level, what they call the production team. There has been much greater emphasis on local decision-making at the level of practical people who know what they are doing. They did, as I mentioned earlier, return the private plot which peasants tend with great diligence and which, as far as we can ever tell, is a source of the improved food supplies in recent years. They have gone in especially for chemical fertilizer. Every expert on Chinese agriculture I have talked to outside China maintains, as do other countries in the world such as India, that this is the most hopeful single way of raising the yield on existing farmland. They are pushing to divert a great deal of their foreign exchange to the purchase of plants and goods that are of direct service to agriculture, especially chemical fertilizer and chemical fertilizer plants. They have in these last few years de-emphasized heavy industry in order to build up agriculture. At the same time the other very important aspect of this is that they are fairly vigorously, as far as we can tell, following and pushing the birth-control program. We do not know with what success, but it is advocated in many ways.

I would think, if both the agricultural policies of recent years and birth control policies, are continued, that there is a reasonable hope that they would become self-sufficient in food within a reasonable period of time, and that there would eventually be a significant surplus from the land for investment in industry.

Mr. LIND: Because I do not have much time, Mr. Taylor, I want to put a question on another subject. Are Mao's forces made mostly of Cantonese and do



these Cantonese keep static states such as Tibet and Manchuria under their control by military force?

Mr. TAYLOR: They are not primarily Cantonese. The Cantonese have given every Chinese dynasty a great deal of trouble; they are notorious rebels. Mao's closest colleagues have generally come from central China. He, himself, is from Hunan. A lot of the others, including Liu-Shao-chi and other senior leaders are from Hunan. A great number are from Szechewan and then to some extent from the north west, which did become in the late 1930s the centre of Chinese communist activities. There are very few Cantonese that I know of in the senior leadership. They have, I think, since 1949 very conscientiously followed a policy of appointing people from different provinces as provincial administrators, both in the government, in the party and in the army, obviously in order to rule out the tendencies towards warlordism which existed under earlier dynasties. There is some evidence also that this has not been entirely successful; that a man sent in from another province over a period of time tends to adopt some of the outlooks of his adopted province and starts arguing for his own local interests.

Mr. LIND: Is it true that he is holding Tibet by military force?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not know what is really happening in Tibet. I do not think anybody has a very clear idea. I was not allowed to go there obviously, although I applied. I think that both versions we hear are certainly distorted. The Chinese version of a happy contented people who were liberated from their feudal oppressors is certainly a gross oversimplification. The view that is expressed in India, not always by the Indians but by the Dalai-lama and some of his spokesmen, of a Tibet rising in a great popular revulsion against the Chinese invader, anxiously awaiting the return of the Lama system, I think, is equally distorted. I think somewhere in between is the truth.

Mr. LIND: Changing to another area, if you were looking at this from the point of view of an Australian, would you support their stand in sending troops into South Vietnam to contain this communist threat or the threat of China to 350 million people bordering on China.

Mr. TAYLOR: Sir, I do not know how I would feel as an Australian; certain things would be bred in my bones which would be responsible for my acting in certain ways. I can only answer as a Canadian, trying to suggest what might be in Australia's long range interest and what the real threat is in Asia. The real threat in Asia, to me, is not Chinese physical aggression or expansion, which is what seems to be the Asian fear; it is an unstable situation in which revolutionary movements, are inevitably springing up and will continue to spring up in these countries, and the danger is that they will be captured by communists, basically through the failure of the Western countries to recognize that revolution in this part of the world is inevitable, and that either we stay out, or we get on the right side, for once.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, about the relationship between China and Russia. I presume, at the time that you were in China, that the relationship was not as difficult as it has become now. What is the situation at the present moment? Is China's antagonism toward Russia approaching the intensity of China's reaction toward the United States.



Mr. TAYLOR: In some ways the Chinese react even more angrily to the Russians. I think, on this psychological principle, that they regard the Americans as enemies, but they regard the Russians as heretics; and you always hate somebody whom you feel has betrayed your own cause more than you hate an outright enemy. Certainly the dispute was evident during my time and it is intensely deep. It will be difficult to heal because it is not only an ideological dispute but a matter of issue between two great bordering neighbouring states which have areas of that border in dispute. I can see a rapprochement but not a fundamental healing.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Have you any knowledge of any build-up of military forces on either side of that border between China and Russia.

Mr. TAYLOR: I would have no special knowledge that had not been made available in the press, but there have been accounts of the Russians transferring troops from eastern Europe to the border; there have been accounts of the Chinese sending up extra troops. It is a heavily fortified border; it is also a very long one, and there has been trouble along parts of that border, especially in Sinkiang to the far north west of China, going back to about 1961 and 1962.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Part of it is disputed territory.

Mr. TAYLOR: Part of the border is disputed. Another problem is that the people on both sides of the border are neither ethnic Chinese nor ethnic Russian and great numbers of them are various minority tribesmen.

Mr. CHURCHILL: I have one final question. You mention that there are representatives of forty foreign countries in China. Are the views that you expressed this morning generally held by foreign diplomats you met in China.

Mr. TAYLOR: That would be hard to say because they range, of course, from Russians to British ideologically, with many Asians and Africans in between and I do not think there would be any single consensus among the foreign community.

Mr. CHURCHILL: Take the Western powers that are represented there—Britain and France. Is West Germany represented?

Mr. TAYLOR: No. West Germany is doing a lot of trade with China, more than Britain and France. Again, I think it would be very difficult to sum up because Britain and France would look at it differently, because they look at the whole Asian situation differently. I would not pretend that every diplomat in Peking would share my assumptions and my conclusions.

Mr. CHURCHILL: You mentioned in your talk something about Canadians and the language. Are there any Canadians now specifically studying the Chinese language for our diplomatic service.

Mr. TAYLOR: External affairs would know more on this of course, but to the best of my knowledge there has always been a language student studying mandarin at any one time.

Mr. THOMPSON: May I ask a supplementary, Mr. Chairman. Is mandarin, or has it become, the universal language of China?

Mr. TAYLOR: It is becoming the universal language; it will take, I would think, at least one more generation to make it effectively so.



Mr. THOMPSON: But is this the official policy that has been accepted?

Mr. TAYLOR: I could not say. That is the sort of thing a foreigner would have very little way of knowing. I would think it is a generational thing, that the young, being taught it in school, will accept it automatically.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: The Committee will sit for a few more minutes so that Mr. Macdonald can get his questions in.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Mr. Taylor, would it be fair to say that China's relations with France at the moment are warmer than her relations with other Western European countries?

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes. There is only one cloud on that picture that I am aware of, and that is the French government was severely criticized by the Chinese for the way in which the French police clashed with Chinese students who were being recalled a few months ago during the great cultural revolution. Knowing the Chinese students and knowing the French police I would hesitate to say what really happened or where the blame would lie, but there was a certain furor over that and the French Commercial Counsellor with his wife, were forced to stand in the snow on a Peking street for, I think, seven hours by Red Guards who surrounded his car in the course of an incident. That has undoubtedly clouded relations. I would not say that relations with France or any Western country have ever been warm. They have been correct and formal on the best of occasions.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Assuming that an incident involving the Commercial Counsellor was a conscious act of decision on the part of the Chinese authority—

Mr. TAYLOR: I would not necessarily assume that.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Well, are they in authority there or not? Surely over a period of seven hours they could do something.

Mr. TAYLOR: I am going to state this and I believe it to be true. I know it sounds naive but to those of us who look upon the Chinese government and party structure as monolithic, all powerful and totalitarian, it would be very hard, once Red Guards had fabricated an incident, for anybody short of the very most senior government level in Peking to call them off. No cop could do it; no director of a police station could do it; no junior official in the foreign ministry could do it. This is a time when anybody who sticks out his neck too far is really in trouble, if he can be condemned for attacking the revolutionary fervour of the young people who are trying to suppress it and so on. I do not know what caused that incident. It could have been fabricated, of course. I think much more likely it got out of hand. I know from my own experience during much more tranquil times in China that incidents and difficulties can occur by chance, and they tend to blow up, accelerate and escalate, and it is sometimes very difficult for a Chinese official to step in and say, stop.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): To use your own terms, if we stuck our neck into China because of diplomatic recognition and introduced a mission there, Canadians too could be submitted to seven hours in the snow.

Mr. TAYLOR: I sort of set myself up for that one. Yes. But fair enough. It happened; it cannot be ignored. It is a rarity. I think it would be irresponsible



for me to suggest, and I hope I have not, that this is the standard way foreigners are treated in China, even during the great cultural revolution. I will give you the example of my successor in Peking, David Oancia, who has assured us—and it has been printed in our newspaper—that during the height of the demonstrations outside the Soviet Embassy, he moved through the crowd and told anybody who questioned him that he was a Canadian, and there were smiles and the path was cleared and so forth. The incident with the French Counsellor, which I admit I brought up, I think is an isolated one. Certainly it is not typical of the way they handle foreigners. The treatment is always very correct and it is only at times of great stress, such as happened in Peking during that period, where it can break down, and that is why I feel it was a spontaneous incident. It was not decreed from above. I do not think there is a real danger that we would be subjecting Canadian nationals to humiliation or to physical danger. I certainly do not think that is the case.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): At a time when there is an obvious struggle for power at the top, can we assume that they would be agreeable, in essence, while an internal struggle is going on, to taking, to use their own phrase, a great leap forward in foreign relations.

Mr. TAYLOR: No. In the first place they would not regard establishment of diplomatic relations with Canada as a great leap forward because they do not regard us, as is rightly so, as being that important. As I said before, I think it is quite possible that if we did say we recognize China they would say nothing, which is all right.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): They might not recognize Canada.

Mr. TAYLOR: Yes, right, and I do not think they should be pressed. I think there are ways, as you know, of doing these things. We could recognize publicly and then privately inform them, through the various ways that are open to us, that if they wanted to discuss the exchange of diplomatic missions we would be delighted to do so, and leave it at that. Even if they ignored us we would have accomplished what I suggest should be our main purpose, which is taking this step that I regard as a realistic one and demonstrating to them that there is the possibility of some options to them in the foreign policy field.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): Thank you very much.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: Mr. Taylor, on behalf of the Committee I would like to thank you very, very much for coming here this morning and giving us the very extensive benefits of your information and experience in China. This is an experiment for this Committee. You are the first witness that we have called from outside and I think, as a result of your appearance here, we will be calling a number more. Again, I thank you very much.

There will be a meeting of the Steering Committee in the very near future, when the chairman comes back, to discuss who the next witness will be. The Committee will be informed as to the date of the next meeting.

Mr. MACDONALD (*Rosedale*): I presume we can assume that because of the opening of Expo we will not meet, at least, next Thursday.

The VICE-CHAIRMAN: We will discuss that later, Mr. Macdonald, but I would presume not.

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