



STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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Statement by Mr. L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on matters relating to the situation in Korea, made in the Special Session of the House of Commons on August 31, 1950.

...This afternoon I imagine the House will expect me to deal with the international position generally, and in some detail with events in Korea; to review what has been happening there since parliament prorogued and the action which has been taken by the government to meet that crisis. Korea must be the centre of our attention these days. It is there that the struggle with Soviet Communism has come completely into the open and its nature been most clearly shown. The aggression against the Republic of Korea has rung an alarm which has echoed through all the countries of the world. It has sounded imperatively here in Canada, causing us to accelerate our own military preparations and our military co-operation with our allies. It has also been one of the main reasons for the calling of this special session of parliament.

Before turning to Korea, however, I should like to consider as briefly as possible the world situation of which it is only a part. In particular, I should like to remind the House of some of the outlines of the menace by which we are now confronted, outlines etched by recent developments in Korea. There is much in the Soviet system, a system spawned by Marxist materialism out of Russian mysticism, and in the designs of those who manipulate it, which is hard for anyone bred in western traditions and accustomed to western modes of thought to understand. Nevertheless we know, or certainly should know by now, a great deal about it. It is important that we should keep its main features firmly in mind. Only by constantly remembering the nature of the forces that we are up against can we put ourselves in a position to decide on wise policies to deal with them. "Know your enemy" is a principle which is taught to every soldier. It is a principle as valuable in this half-light between war and peace as it is in war itself.

The first characteristic of Soviet communist imperialism which I should like to stress today is that its operations--we know now as we never knew before--are on a world-wide scale. Believing as they do that their slave system is an inevitable opposition to the free systems of government of other peoples, the masters of the Kremlin survey every part of the world in their calculations. Today there is fighting in Korea. Yesterday there was pressure on Persia, Greece and Yugoslavia, and a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. Tomorrow there may be aggression against Indo-China or a civil war fomented in Germany. Soviet attacks will be made wherever

and whenever the members of the Politburo think the circumstances are favourable for the achievement of their violent purposes. Therefore we must keep our eyes peeled for dangers which may arise in any quarter of the globe. The focus of conflict is now in Korea, and it is right that Korea should also be the focus of attention. Yet in concentrating on the problem which has been raised by communist aggression there, we must not forget that there are other critical points where the flames may break out.

The second aspect of Soviet power to be remembered is that while Korea shows that Soviet communism is prepared to impose its will on other peoples by military aggression, it can also act, and it does act, in other ways and through other agencies. It has at its command weapons of conspiracy, subversion and mass agitation. These are, as it were, the weapons which it takes in its left hand while brandishing the sword in its right. These other weapons, or many of them, are insidious and hard to counter. Often they work underground and in the dark; indeed sometimes they work best when they are driven underground. They can be met and overcome, as indeed they are being overcome, by the initiative of the free world in many places, notably in Western Europe; but they cannot be defeated by military action alone. Military strength is absolutely necessary, of course, but it must be supplemented by imaginative economic and social programmes if the march of communism as a social and economic doctrine is to be halted before it reaches a point at which a military attack will commend itself to the members of the Politburo as likely to succeed.

Third, I suggest that we must be clear about the elements in free society which Soviet communism uses and perverts for its own programme of oppression, degradation and expansion. One of our chief difficulties these days arises from the fact that communism has been able to assimilate for its ends good motives as well as bad. Some communists have been brought into the fold, of course, by the promises it offers them of an unlimited exercise of power without responsibility or mercy. Some persons have been attracted because of the morbid fascination of secret intrigue. But these are not the only cravings communism appeals to. It also claims to provide satisfaction for those living in distress and privation, offering them the hope of a better life, and it is perhaps not surprising that many of those living in misery, especially in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, should be taken in by these promises, and should fail to notice that whenever and wherever the Russian communist system is established, political and moral slavery rapidly follow.

Furthermore, communism has the ability to appeal occasionally to misguided idealism. That is part of the food on which it feeds, even in our own country. Nothing could be more diabolic than its capacity gradually to undermine all generous aspirations and utterly pervert them, and then make them accomplices in its own totalitarian programme. When resisting the machinations of Soviet imperialism, using communism as its spearhead, we will do well to take into account these promises it holds out to the oppressed and the down-trodden throughout the world, to whom it offers--even though it is a phony offer--the hope of a better life. To idealists whose judgment is weaker than their zeal, it sells its degrading and debasing design behind the facade of an ordered and just society. We in the West, while laying bare the trickery and malice of Soviet protestations, must at the same time provide

some real satisfaction for those everlasting hungers for bread, security and freedom to which the communists pretend to cater. Otherwise we shall not secure the support of those in many parts of the world, and particularly in Asia, on whose co-operation we must rely in the days ahead.

Those are the main features, I think, of the adversary with whom we must struggle. Even so short a summary as I have attempted to give of the Soviet system and of the operations of Soviet power, will indicate, I think, the scale and complexity of the challenge. To get the better of such an enemy, active in all parts of the world with propaganda and espionage, relying ultimately upon the brute weight of 170 powerful divisions but making also its crocodile appeal to real needs and honest longings, we will have to show ourselves resourceful and imaginative as well as strong.

This is the perspective in which we must view the war in Korea today, though I do not for a moment suggest that these considerations should lessen our anxiety over those events or block our response to them. In Korea, together with the other countries of the free world, we are now faced with a plain and unmistakable military challenge; and we, in common with all the free world, must answer that challenge. I think it is of some significance that an Asian country was chosen by international communism as the scene of the present attack. There the communists may have thought they would have the best chance to achieve their aggressive purposes with the minimum of interference. Korea is a remote spot on the map, strategically not very important, and furthermore a country which was itself divided. It was possible in Korea, as it has been possible elsewhere, for the war to be fought by satellites, by Asian troops alone. Therefore, when the United Nations intervened, the war could be misrepresented, as it has been misrepresented, as one of Asian popular forces against those of Western imperialist capitalism.

I do not claim, and of course no one claims, that affairs in Korea even since 1945 have been without light and shade. Like all human affairs they have been equivocal; but gradually in the course of these equivocal events a clear issue has emerged, and perhaps as briefly as possible I should go over the record to show how it has emerged.

During the second World War the United States, the United Kingdom and China publicly agreed--at Cairo--that Korea, which had been annexed by Japan in 1910, should be restored at the end of the war as a free and independent state. Later the Soviet union adhered to this declaration, which was reaffirmed several times subsequently. When the war ended it was decided as a matter of military convenience, however--an unfortunate military convenience, as it has turned out--that the United States forces should occupy the southern part of Korea to the 38th parallel, and the Soviet troops should occupy Korea to the north of that parallel. In the early stages of this joint occupation attempts were made by the United States to agree with the Soviet union on a plan for the establishment of a single provisional government for all Korea. However, all those attempts broke down, almost entirely because of the intransigence of the Soviet authorities. Faced with the failure of co-operation, the United States decided to refer the whole question to the United Nations. This was done in September, 1947. In an attempt to create conditions in which an election could be held and a government established, the General Assembly established a United Nations Temporary Commission for Korea in that year,

and Canada became a member of it. When, however, that Commission sought to enter into relationship with the Soviet authorities in North Korea, they found the way barred. They were never allowed to visit officially that part of Korea. Under those circumstances it became doubtful whether a Commission of that kind could continue its work with any chance of real success in the southern half of the country alone. I recall that the Canadian Government expressed its doubts on this point at Lake Success. Nevertheless it was decided by a large majority in the United Nations Assembly that the Commission should continue its work in the area in which it was allowed to exercise its functions, and in particular that it should proceed to hold free elections. That was done in the spring of 1948. The government which was elected in Korea as a result of those elections was certainly not a perfect government--no government is, perhaps not even the present government in this house. Nevertheless, the Government of Korea was formed after that election. It was returned as a result of an expression of the will of the vast majority of the Korean people. As such it was entitled to recognition, and that recognition was granted in full measure in the United Nations Assembly on December 12, 1948. It was declared, and we are bound by that declaration, that this government was the lawfully constituted government of the Republic of Korea, and that no other such government was in existence. At the same time the Temporary Commission was transformed into a continuing Commission on Korea. Canada did not stand for reappointment to that Commission when it was reconstituted.

Meanwhile events in the Soviet zone in the north followed the usual pattern with which we have become so familiar. The occupation authorities had been busy setting up a puppet administration, indoctrinating the people with communist propoganda, and training a formidable army. Just how formidable that army was we have only learned in the last few months. We knew about it, of the formation of that army, but we did not know when it was going to strike.

By the end of 1948 Soviet plans in North Korea had been sufficiently advanced for the Soviet forces to be withdrawn and the government handed over to the North Korean administration. The North Korean army contained within its ranks veterans of the war in China. The United States occupation forces withdrew from Korea a few months later, but that was a genuine, not a spurious withdrawal.

It was this regime in South Korea, established under the auspices of the United Nations and recognized by us, which was attacked by North Korean forces on June 25. This attack caught us all by surprise. Mr. Malik, the Soviet representative on the Security Council, assures us that it was North Korea which was attacked. Fortunately it is easy to clear the air of his lies and misrepresentations, since at the time the attack occurred there was sitting in the capital of South Korea, in Seoul, the independent and impartial United Nations Commission to which I have referred. It was composed of representatives from Australia, China, France, India, the Philippines, Turkey, and El Salvador.

After flashing the news of the aggression to the United Nations a few hours after it occurred, the Commission submitted the following day a much longer and more authoritative report which concluded with these categorical sentences:

authority from the United Nations. We considered this to be no academic matter, but to be a very important principle and one which should be established in a way which would be not only satisfactory for the present but a valuable precedent for the future. This was done when the Security Council passed an additional resolution on July 7 establishing a unified command and requesting the United States to designate a commander of such United Nations forces as might be made available. We welcomed this resolution because it established the United Nations character of the operations in Korea without limiting unduly the military authority which any commander must have if he is to be successful.

After that resolution was passed, the three Canadian destroyers, which by that time had reached Pearl Harbor, were made available on July 12 to the United Nations Unified Command for the restoration of peace in Korea. Then on July 14 came a request, not from the Security Council this time but from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for further assistance; and on July 19, a few days afterwards, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) announced that a long-range R.C.A.F. squadron would be provided at once for service in the Pacific air-lift. This kind of air assistance, and not the provision of fighter aircraft, was, we were told then by those concerned with operations, what was required at that time.

Then on August 7, after further discussions not only in Ottawa but also in Washington and Lake Success, and after I had made visits to both those places and talked with both the United States Secretary of State and the United Nations Secretary-General, it was announced that a decision had been taken by the government to raise an additional brigade, to be known as the Canadian special force which would be available--subject, of course, to parliamentary approval--for service in Korea as part of the United Nations forces there if it could be most effectively used in that way when it was ready for service; and I can assure the House--and my colleague, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) can do so with more authority than can I--that this brigade is being made ready with the greatest possible speed.

It is the proposed use of this force in the way I have suggested which is one of the reasons why we are meeting here today, to carry out, by parliamentary action, the pledge which the Prime Minister gave this house on June 30 last.

Under the authority of the United Nations the chief responsibility, outside that of South Korea itself, for repelling the North Korean forces has been shouldered by the United States. It is, of course, natural that this should be so. Alone among the anti-communist countries the United States had stationed in the Far East substantial forces which were available for use in Korea when the trouble began. In addition they had, of course, special obligations for peace and security in that area arising from their position as the power responsible for the occupation of Japan.

I think it should also be remembered that ordinarily it is only great powers such as the United States or the United Kingdom which possess ground forces in being which can be moved rapidly to distant theatres without imperilling the security of their homelands or of other areas in which they may have urgent commitments, such as the commitments of the French in Indo-China and of the British in Malaya and Hong Kong.

Smaller countries and middle countries like Canada, in any normal circumstances, would not have the effective ground forces for use in collective security situations such as that which has developed in Korea.

Furthermore, before June of this year, it was reasonable, I suggest, for all members of the United Nations, and for the smaller countries in particular, to assume that the chances were fairly small that they would be called upon by the United Nations to contribute to collective military action against aggression occurring many thousands of miles away. The articles of the Charter which had been specifically designed to provide for military sanctions had remained inoperative, and even now have not been invoked. The Russian use of the veto also seemed to make it impossible for the Security Council to invoke military sanctions against any communist aggression. What happened in June in the Security Council because of the rather fortuitous absence of the U.S.S.R., and because of the initiative and leadership of the United States of America, changed the whole character of the United Nations, at least for the time being, and changed it for the better.

It would not, however, have been realistic, I think, nor would it have been wise, for any government to have based its military planning on the assumption that such a change would take place or that the United Nations would be able to act as it did.

The North Atlantic Treaty, in fact, had been concluded in 1949 in order to fill, at least in the North Atlantic area, that particular gap in the Charter created by the impotence up to that time of the Security Council to enforce collective security. So our obligations for collective defence in that North Atlantic area became specific, and there was no Soviet Russia to obstruct and frustrate action under them. We knew what was involved in that obligation, but we did not, nor indeed did any country, know what was involved in our United Nations obligations.

Canadian defence policy, therefore, until June of this year, had been based on the concept of providing a small, highly-skilled regular army, charged with responsibility of doing its immediate share of North American defence, especially in the Arctic, and designed to be capable of rapid expansion in the event of a general war which might require Canada to be defended outside of Canada. The furnishing to the United Nations on short notice of expeditionary forces capable of quick deployment in distant areas wherever acts of aggression might take place had not, I admit, entered into our planning as it had not entered into the planning of any other country.

The United States has therefore, up to the present, had to bear almost alone the brunt of assisting the South Koreans on land. They have done so with speed, with great courage and with growing effectiveness. In spite of terrific handicaps, United States troops have, of course, fought magnificently, not only for their own country but for the free world as a whole. Now, however, they are beginning to receive reinforcements of ground troops from other countries with forces in the Far East; and to these will be added, if parliament approves, the Canadian Special Force which has been raised to carry out our United Nations obligation for collective defence;--Korea being the place where at the

moment that obligation faces us, although we do not know where that obligation will face us in the weeks ahead. Almost from the beginning, of course, the United States forces have been supported by naval and air force detachments contributed by other members of the United Nations, including Canada.

This special force is unique in one way among the offers of military forces which have been made to the United Nations as the result of the war in Korea; and provides, I think, a valuable example and precedent. If other countries were, in the same way, to earmark a portion of their forces which might be made available to the United Nations for collective defence, there would be ready throughout the free world national contingents for a United Nations force which could be quickly brought together in the face of a future emergency. In this way the United Nations would be equipped with that military strength which it was intended in the Charter that it should have at its disposal but which, in fact, it never has had, largely because of the attitude of the U.S.S.R.

The government's decision to ask that this special brigade should be made available, not only for service in Korea but more generally to discharge our responsibility for collective defence under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty, was dictated, I think, by an appreciation of the fact that the attack on Korea may be followed by communist-inspired attacks elsewhere. Already apprehension is felt in Iran, in Greece, in Austria and in Indo-China--places where, in the view of the Politburo, the circumstances might seem to be propitious for another armed attack.

Above all I suggest that we should not overlook the possibility that what has occurred in Korea might be repeated on a larger scale in Germany. The conditions of those two countries, superficially contrasting, offer some striking parallels at the present time. Both are cut in two by an artificial line of division; in both countries the Soviet-dominated section has powerfully equipped armed forces; while the other section is comparatively unarmed and open to attack. It is, I think, becoming increasingly obvious that the disparity between the military forces of Eastern and Western Germany must be redressed. It is no longer a question of whether or not Germany is to be rearmed, because the communist part of Germany has already been rearmed, and by Soviet Russia which controls it. If Western Germany therefore is to be defended--and certainly that defence is important to the defence of Western Europe--it must be given arms with which to assist in its own defence, or alternatively, other western countries must assume even heavier responsibilities than they have hitherto contemplated. There are of course risks entailed in rearming Western Germany. By grim experience we know that Germans with arms in their hands can be dangerous; but that risk already exists in Eastern Germany, and I think it will be minimized in Western Germany if that part of Germany, and eventually all of free democratic Germany, could be increasingly and effectively integrated economically, militarily and ultimately politically with the other countries of Western Europe. That way, I think, lies the road to safety. But that process of course will raise problems in its turn. And yet I cannot help but feel that that policy alone provides safeguards against the dangers involved in allowing Western Germany to rearm, apart from Western Europe, or even the more dangerous position of allowing her to remain defenceless against a Russian armed and controlled Eastern Germany.

The alarm rung in Korea has increased the urgency of this German problem. It has also led to an intensification of efforts among the countries associated under the North Atlantic Treaty to strengthen their collective defences. The deputies of the Foreign Ministers, members of the North Atlantic Council, have been meeting with a sense of great urgency the last six weeks, and the North Atlantic Council itself will be meeting in New York in about two weeks' time, when they will have some very important decisions to make. My colleague, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton), will be explaining to the House in greater detail what is proposed by the government in the discharge of our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. I will say no more about it at this time except to state that we will bear our proper share of the burden of collective defence.

The conclusion is forced on us, inevitably, by the situation throughout the world and by the crisis in Korea, that we must increase our own military preparations and help our allies increase theirs. The government accepts that conclusion as the measures to be introduced in this special session will show; measures which are dictated by considerations of national security and, indeed, of national existence.

In all these measures there is no trace of any aggressive purpose. We do not, in this House, I am sure, and in this country, believe in a preventive war; in aggression for peace, or for anything else. Nor do we propose to acquiesce silently when others suggest this course of action. Our job is to play our part, a part determined by ourselves, but worked out in consultation with our friends, in the collective effort of the free countries to prevent aggression if possible, by showing that it cannot succeed; or to defeat it if it occurs.

I would like to emphasize also that it is not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which will extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea; a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; and if not, a policy which should avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending it.

This attitude, we believe, and I feel sure the House will believe, is the only sensible one; first, because we should do everything we can to minimize the risk of a world-wide war; secondly, because we think that it is vitally important that the high degree of unanimity which has been obtained in the United Nations in condemning the aggression against Korea should be preserved, and third, because we should maintain close co-operation between the free countries of Asia and the western world. We understood the reasons for the action of the President of the United States--who has acted so boldly and wisely, if I may say so, throughout this Korean crisis--in ordering the United States fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and in calling upon the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. This action seemed to us designed simply to prevent the extension of the conflict in Korea. It was a strategic defensive decision and had, as we understood it, no political implications. We have, however, been disturbed, as I have no doubt others have been disturbed, by reports of preventive military measures taken by the Nationalist government of China against communist concentrations along the mainland coast, as well as by statements reported to have been made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek concerning United States-

Chinese "military co-operation". We have also been disturbed by statements that seem in our minds to confuse the defence of Korea, which has been assumed by the United Nations, with the defence of Formosa, which has not; statements that have even implied--somewhat mistakenly I think--that those who wish to draw at this time a distinction between the two operations are defeatists and appeasers. So far as this government is concerned, we are concerned solely with carrying out our United Nations obligations in Korea or elsewhere. These obligations do not, as I understand them at the present time, include anything that can be interpreted as the restoration of the Nationalist Chinese government to the mainland of China; or an intervention in Formosa.

We should do our part, then, to defeat aggression in Korea, so that the lesson of the failure of aggression there can be learned elsewhere where it needs to be learned. We should also speed our military preparations so that we may hope to be able to defeat any similar acts of aggression which, if the above lesson is not learned, may break out elsewhere, and we can never hope to do that alone. The programme of defence expansion on which we are embarked will inevitably involve an increased effort here in Canada which we must be prepared to make. I suppose it may also involve some postponement in achieving some of the peaceful goals towards which we have been working. But we must not lose sight of those goals or abandon our efforts to reach them. Nothing would suit the communist book better than for the western democracies to become slow and sluggish under the weight of armaments, to grow a thicker and thicker skin, to atrophy by degrees, and at length to become extinct like the dinosaurs.

To succeed in the struggle in which we are engaged, we of the western democracies must be true to the principle of growth and progress which is part of our nature and of our strength. For one thing, it is always harder to hit a moving target. We have in the past prospered and grown because we have been open to change and have been willing to adapt ourselves to new ideas and altered circumstances. Only by continuing as we have begun can we and our friends save ourselves from servitude and destruction. We will do well, therefore, I suggest, to see that our genuine preoccupation with the present military dangers does not bring our social progress to a standstill. Military defence must come first, of course; but social and economic progress is also a part of defence. To relate the two here and to relate the two in other free countries will mean one of the greatest balancing acts in history, and will certainly require steady nerves, a high degree of concentration, and much hard work.

Furthermore, just as we have learned slowly and painfully the dangers of great economic gulfs between various sections of our own country, now we must begin to learn the parallel lesson that it is dangerous to let such gulfs exist between various countries without doing anything to try to narrow them. That effort must be spread over many generations; but a start should be made, and now a start is being made. For just as it is impossible to have a healthy society in any one country if some individuals are living below the level of subsistence, so it is impossible to have a healthy world society when whole nations are subject to starvation and disease. Throughout large areas of Asia, such conditions now exist. Where they exist, they are natural breeding grounds for communism. These malarial swamps of poverty must somehow be drained off if we are ever to see stability and freedom in the

new Asian countries. And if we do not see stability and freedom there, we may find difficulty in maintaining them in other parts of the world.

It will also be necessary for us to try to understand sympathetically, even if we cannot always entirely agree with, the outlook of Asian leaders on present-day international problems. These leaders very properly naturally feel that they are in a better position to analyse Asian problems, and suggest solutions for them, than any western individual can be.

I am therefore hoping that when the time comes to work out a settlement in Korea we can draw heavily upon the wisdom of Asian leaders. The United Nations, both through the Assembly and through its Commission on Korea, have already given much time and earnest consideration to the problems of Korea. Nevertheless, in the light of events since June 25, it is too early to see clearly what might be the shape of a just and lasting settlement in Korea. It is not too early, however, to consider the principles on which such a settlement should be based. There are four principles, as I see it, which will have to be taken into account. The settlement must be such as to remove the possibility of a repetition of the recent attack; it must commend itself to the inhabitants of Korea; it must command support from Asian opinion, and it must recognize the progress which has already been made under the auspices of the United Nations in establishing an independent government in Korea.

It is also time for consideration to be given to the procedures through which a settlement in Korea may be found. At the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which will be attended by representatives from all parties in this House, I think a small body should be appointed with the responsibility of proposing a settlement in Korea, which settlement would come into effect once the Korean forces have been defeated. On such a body it might be well to have Asian representatives in a majority, although none of the countries which have become involved in the fighting in Korea can, of course, divest themselves of the responsibility of participation at some proper stage in the settlement.

As you know, it is very frequently my duty to represent Canada at conferences and meetings abroad. When I return I often have the feeling that our problems as a nation arise chiefly because we are a happy country in an unhappy world. That is an oversimplification, of course, as the events even of the last few weeks have shown. But there is some truth in it. In such circumstances there is bound to be a temptation to settle back into complacency and unconcern when events beyond our borders seem so complex and so intractable; to hope that we can enjoy immunity from both obligations and misfortunes. Such a course would be fatal in the face of the present menace to our security and to our very existence; when meeting that menace we must make a defence effort far greater than we have ever attempted before in peacetime. This effort will interfere with our comfortable peacetime existence. It is not going to be something that will break the camel's back, because the Canadian camel's back is pretty wide; but it will be something that may require a readjustment of the load already on that back, and will also add to that load. That is inevitable in the tragic circumstances of today.

Technically we may be at peace, but actually we are in a twilight zone between peace and war. It certainly is not peace if a country such as ours, with so much to do, with such great vistas opening up for constructive progress, with malice or aggressive intentions toward no other people--if a country such as ours is forced to spend one-quarter of its budget on defence in peacetime. That does not mean peace.

We are approaching the most difficult test, in some ways, that a democracy can face; willingness to make the effort that safety and self-preservation demands, without any of the excitement and drama and, yes, even the uplift that a fighting war provides. This will demand leadership, but it will also demand patience, discipline and resolve--not the patience of hopelessness, the discipline of slavery or the resolve of desperation, but those qualities which come from a free people who have decided to pay the price of freedom and who are united, as we are, in that decision. The price in treasure which we, and others, may have to pay, may seem high, but it will be small indeed if it will prevent the payment later in war of the infinitely higher price of tears and blood and destruction--to pay, in short, the price which gives us the best chance for peace.

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