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1950

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA, CANADA

CONFERENCE SERIES 1950, No. 1



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EDMOND CLOUTIER, C.M.G., B.A., L.Ph.,  
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OTTAWA, CANADA

CONFERENCE SERIES 1950, No. 1



OTTAWA  
EDMOND CLONDER, CARL H. L. LEE  
PRINTERS AND CONTROLLERS OF PATENT

## PREFACE



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## PREFACE

"Canada and the United Nations" is a survey of the activities and accomplishments during 1950 of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, and of the participation of Canada in these bodies. It attempts to put in perspective not only the political and military activities of the United Nations which are constantly brought to our attention, but also the economic and social activities of the whole United Nations system. This system consists not merely of the Security Council and the Assembly but of all the conferences, councils and commissions working under the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in New York, Geneva, and throughout the world.

The diverse achievements of the United Nations in economic, social and humanitarian fields, though less spectacular and easier of accomplishment than in political fields, touch upon almost every aspect of human endeavour. The initiation in 1950, for instance, of the programme of technical assistance to under-developed countries has far-reaching implications. This programme, and related projects outside the United Nations, represent the beginning of a vast and constructive effort designed to assist countries which are retarded in material development to make better use of their own resources for the improvement of their own living standards. Such programmes are not designed as acts of charity; they are investments in prosperity in which all will share. As a complement to these programmes, new industries will be set up, agricultural techniques improved, and international trade stimulated so that the general standard of living may be raised. Methods by which the long-term economic development of the less-developed countries can best be financed are now being discussed in the United Nations.

But technical assistance and long-term development projects are not merely economic in nature. They are designed to improve health standards and living conditions, and in this way they are closely associated with other projects in the social field which are being pursued in the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The programme of advisory social welfare services, for instance, is proving an excellent channel through which the experience of the more highly-developed countries may be made available to the responsible authorities in less-developed areas. Outstanding work is also being done on behalf of refugees by the International Refugee Organization, which will terminate its activities in September 1951, but which by that time will have resettled over one million refugees. Under special United Nations programmes, refugees in the Middle East have been assisted and plans are being made for aid to be extended to victims of the war in Korea. These are but a few of the large number of economic and social activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies which are described in this report. The extent of these activities represents no mean achievement for an international system whose total annual budget is about \$80,000,000.

In the long run, the maintenance of peace is closely related to this great work of social and economic development. Peace un-

accompanied by a steady improvement in the lot of all peoples would be an unstable achievement of the United Nations. At the moment, however, the unhappy position in which the Free World finds itself is that its long-term objective of social and economic progress must inevitably be subordinated to a considerable extent to the short-term objective of defending itself against the threat to the conditions of peace and security without which social progress is impossible.

Although the importance of economic and social development must not be under-estimated, the major issue during 1950 for the United Nations was the North Korean aggression and the consequences of that aggression, particularly as they affected the principle of collective security.

During the period since the United Nations was founded, the Security Council had had more success than is generally recognized in dealing with outbreaks of hostilities. In Palestine, Indonesia, and Kashmir, by persuasion, conciliation, and mediation the opposing forces had been persuaded to stop fighting and had been assisted in the tedious process of peaceful settlement. While rejoicing in these accomplishments of the United Nations we recognized that the parties concerned basically preferred a peaceful settlement rather than a continuation of war and were prepared for negotiation and adjustment. We knew, furthermore, that these were peripheral struggles in the sense that they did not directly involve the great powers and that they were not a direct manifestation of the cleavage between the Soviet world and the Free World. During these years the Assembly also had been used as an instrument to maintain peace by supporting, through the Greek and Korean Commissions of the Assembly, the efforts to strengthen the democratic governments in those countries. In neither case, however, before 1950, had the responsibilities assumed by the Assembly involved the organization as a whole in a direct military challenge from communist forces.

In June of 1950 the United Nations was faced with a direct military challenge in Korea, which was not only made in great force but had, moreover, the obvious support of the two great communist powers of Russia and China. This challenge, in spite of its gravity, was met promptly and with the approval of the very great majority of the member states of the United Nations.

The action of the United Nations in June of 1950 broke new and significant ground. The United Nations did not hesitate to take a stand even though it realized that the aggressors had the military support of two of the great powers. For the first time, the United Nations now set out to organize and use collective military action against armed aggression. We had assumed that the failure of the United Nations, because of Soviet intransigence, to fulfil the provisions of the Charter concerning collective measures would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the United Nations to organize anything in the nature of a military operation. In a situation of grave necessity, however, member states found means for conducting such an operation under United Nations auspices. In the absence of anything like a United Nations High Command, the practical alternative was to nominate the United States Government as the Unified Command, a policy which has proved efficient in spite of some inevitable

difficulties over the direction of policy. This collective action, although in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter, represented an expansion of the role that circumstances had led us to expect the United Nations to play. Precedents were set of enormous importance.

The issue was then complicated and made much more difficult by the Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Korean aggressors. This raised the whole question of the way in which the United Nations fulfilled its role as a collective security organization in the event of aggression in which a great power participated.

In these circumstances, the responsibilities of members of the United Nations were ill-defined. On the one hand the pledges set forth in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter applied to great and small powers alike. All solemnly pledged themselves not to use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; all pledged themselves to settle their disputes by peaceful means; all agreed that the first purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace".

On the other hand, however, the effect of the rule of unanimity amongst the Great Powers, as embodied in the veto, had led to the realization that the United Nations would not be used as an instrument of collective security in circumstances which involved a Great Power. This assumption seemed to be confirmed by the fact that the Great Powers themselves have failed to agree to measures under Article 43 of the Charter by which the United Nations was to be provided with the means of taking enforcement action. There had, therefore, been no preparation for the collective action which was undertaken to repel the aggression in Korea, nor was there even a clear understanding of the obligations which rested on member states in these circumstances.

The general question of the role the United Nations could play as a security organization in a divided world was thus difficult to answer. The specific question posed in the autumn of 1950 of what action it should take when confronted with the fact of Chinese participation in North Korean aggression was even more difficult.

The aggression in Korea had to be resisted; on this there could be no doubt. But should the resistance in Korea take a form which might lead to limited or unlimited war against China? On this there could be and were grave reasons for doubt and hesitation.

In the first place, the whole philosophy on which the United Nations is founded is that force should be used only as a last resort when all possibilities of settlement by persuasion, conciliation and mediation have been exhausted. Secondly, when the United Nations is compelled in the last resort to use force, it uses only as much force and no more than is necessary to attain its object, suppressing acts of aggression and restoring peace. It was, moreover, clear that the only people who would be likely to profit from a war between the United Nations and China would be the ruling circles in the Soviet Union, and it was these ruling circles which constituted the greatest

danger to the peace and freedom of the world. Finally, the motives of the Peking Government in assisting in the original aggression in Korea were obscure. Before taking any action which might lead to an extension of the hostilities outside Korea, it was therefore the duty of the United Nations to endeavour through all means at its disposal to assure the Peking Government that the legitimate interests of the Chinese Communist Government and people in Korea would not be adversely affected by a defeat of the North Korean aggressors.


A comprehension of these factors which entered into the consideration by the United Nations of the question of Chinese intervention in Korea is essential to an understanding of what the United Nations may do in the future. The United Nations should not be judged as if it were a court to try offenders, with a police force always ready and able to punish those found guilty. The United Nations is not an entity in itself. It is the sum total of the wills of its members and of the combined contributions which they are willing to make. It is not now able to apply overwhelming pressure at all times on all offenders, major or minor. Its members therefore must conserve their limited resources in order to be able to apply them collectively where they are most needed. It is for this reason that those free countries with particular responsibilities for the maintenance of peace have been obliged to supplement the United Nations with special agreements like the North Atlantic Treaty. The United Nations is of enormous importance in the preservation of peace and the maintenance of collective security. But so long as the armed forces which must be used to maintain the security of the Free World are possessed by a relatively few states, the methods by which these forces are used to fulfil the collective security obligations of the United Nations must necessarily be a matter of concern, particularly to those countries on which the burden of defending the Free World rests.

It is important, however, not to underestimate the role played by the United Nations as a whole, as distinct from that of the United States and a few of its allies, in resisting North Korean aggression. However clear the issue in Korea has been to Canadians, we should not forget that it is less clear to the peoples of Asia and other parts of the world. The United Nations has played an important role in clarifying and organizing the defence of collective security. Although the United States would certainly have been justified in intervening on its own to prevent aggression in Korea, without the United Nations it would have been still more difficult than it has been to make clear that the United States was not acting for national or imperialistic purposes. And what is more important than mere appearances is the fact that this has been an international effort in which, through the United Nations, the influence of Asian, European and other countries has been brought to bear on policy.

The United Nations brings together in closer association than would otherwise be possible countries taking active steps to resist aggression and countries prepared to give moral and in some cases diplomatic support. It provides an important forum, and it provides a meeting place where the representatives of almost all states not only can meet but cannot avoid meeting. Most important of all, it provides

machinery for peaceful settlement. Even though we have unfortunately found it necessary to increase enormously our defences, we are doing so not because we are resigned to the arbitrament of war. We are doing so to deter aggression, to persuade aggressors to negotiate fairly and honourably. The United Nations exists amongst other things to remind the Free World continuously of the ultimate purpose of its policy and to assist it to seize every possible opportunity for negotiation and settlement.

In this time of crisis in the United Nations, it is essential that the Free World maintain its principles, while at the same time recognizing and making allowance for the limitations upon its power and resources. We must make clear that we are firmly opposed to aggression of all kinds and that if at times we are unable to meet aggression with the firmness we would wish, it is because we do not yet possess the arms to do so. We should not be ashamed to profess at the same time that the principal purpose of the United Nations is to make peace rather than wage war, and that we must therefore, no matter how strong we may become, be prepared with patience and imagination to prolong our efforts to reach a settlement.



*Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

Ottawa,

February 1951.



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## NOTE

Except where specifically stated otherwise, *Canada and the United Nations, 1950* deals with the activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies from January 1 to December 31, 1950. Readers desiring a more detailed account of the earlier history of the various items discussed are requested to refer to the four previous volumes in this series: *The United Nations, 1946, Canada, at the United Nations, 1947, Canada and the United Nations, 1948* and *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, which are obtainable from the King's Printer, Ottawa, for the sum of fifty cents per copy.

# I

## POLITICAL AND SECURITY

### Korea

From the moment when the armed forces in North Korea launched their attack across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, the Korean problem overshadowed all other questions before the United Nations. After five years spent in employing processes of negotiation and conciliation as a means of settling disputes such as those in Palestine, Kashmir and Indonesia, and of attempting to solve the multiple issues of the "cold war", the U.N. had now been confronted with a case of outright and unprovoked aggression against a sovereign state. The ability of the world organization to take collective action in the face of aggression had thus been directly challenged, and the challenge was the clearer by reason of the fact that the Republic of Korea had been brought into being as an independent nation under the auspices of the United Nations.

The prompt action of the Security Council to meet this crisis was generally accepted as the only response possible in the face of such a crucial test; and fifty-three of fifty-nine members supported the Council's stand against the aggression. It was soon clear, however, that the campaign to repel the invaders would be arduous and costly and that a very substantial build-up would be required before United Nations forces could mount an effective counter-offensive. Moreover, while the war was confined to Korea, it had repercussions which demonstrated that much more was involved than the fate of that country alone. Although the U.S.S.R. had been careful to avoid an open entry into the fighting, the direction of Soviet sympathies was manifest and there was much speculation as to the degree to which the Soviet Union was prepared to support the North Korean Communists. Later, with the intervention of Chinese Communist forces, there was no doubt that the United States and other Western nations were engaged in a serious diversionary war in the Far East and that their contributions to the defence of Western Europe were in danger of being gravely affected.

The implications of the war, therefore, extended into the heart of the relations among the great powers. Moreover, as the war had progressed, fundamental questions had been raised with regard to the capacity of the United Nations to act as an agent of universal collective security.

The previous record of the United Nations in Korea had been one of limited success. The organization had endeavoured, over a period of years, to assist the Koreans to achieve independence and unity under a freely elected government. These efforts, however,

had been frustrated by the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept the procedures laid down by the General Assembly at its Third, Fourth and Fifth Sessions.<sup>1</sup> The Temporary Commission established by the Assembly in 1947 was re-established in 1948 as the United Nations Commission on Korea, with instructions to continue its efforts to achieve the unification of South and North Korea. In October 1949, the Assembly decided that the Commission should be given additional authority to appoint observers to assist it in reporting on "developments which might lead to, or otherwise involve, military conflict in Korea". Further efforts to engage in negotiations with the North Koreans failed to elicit any response, however, and the Commission was able to do no more than concentrate on carrying out the Assembly's instructions so far as they concerned South Korea, and on observing developments along the southern fringe of the 38th parallel.

Because of the unstable situation in the artificially divided peninsula, it had been realized that Korea constituted a potential threat to peace in the area. Nevertheless, the news of the North Korean attack on June 25 came as a profound shock. On the initiative of the United States Government, however, the Security Council was called into session on the same day. The United Nations Commission on Korea having provided authoritative confirmation that aggression had occurred, the Council adopted a resolution calling for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. The Soviet Delegation, which had been boycotting the Council over the problem of Chinese representation, was not able to veto this resolution. The resolution also urged members to render every assistance to the United Nations, and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. Two days later, as the North Koreans still advanced, President Truman again took the lead and announced that he was ordering United States air and sea forces to give cover and support to the troops of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Later on the same day, June 27, the Security Council, noting that the North Koreans had ignored its previous resolution, approved a second resolution recommending that "members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security within the area". Naval and air support were promptly offered by member governments with units available in the vicinity, and by June 30 authorization had been given General MacArthur to employ ground forces under his command if the situation required. The fifty-three members of the United Nations which approved the Security Council's stand declared their willingness to comply, in accordance with their individual capacities, with the Council's recommendations. On July 7, the Security Council passed a third resolution recommending that all members providing military forces and other assistance should make them available to "a Unified Command under the United States", and authorizing the use of the United Nations flag in operations against the North Korean forces.

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1948*, pp. 67-72 and *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, pp. 73-75.

In Canada official and public opinion strongly supported the measures taken by the United Nations to meet the crisis.<sup>1</sup> Government approval was recorded in the House of Commons on June 28 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs who stated that the decisions taken by the Security Council represented "collective action through the United Nations for peace". On June 30, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, told the House that "if a Canadian contribution... under a United Nations Commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace... then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution". This support soon assumed concrete form.<sup>2</sup> On July 12, Canada made available three destroyers; on July 21 an air transport squadron; and on August 11, in co-operation with the Canadian Pacific Airlines, passenger transport facilities between Vancouver and Tokyo. On August 7, the Government authorized recruitment of a Canadian Army Special Force, which, subject to Parliamentary approval, would be available for service in Korea. To this end the Canadian Forces Act was passed by Parliament and became law on September 9. An advance unit was despatched in October, and by December 19 a battalion had arrived in Korea to complete its advance training.

Despite the ready response of member nations, and particularly of the United States, to the North Korean aggression, and while the Unified Command was building up its strength for the counter-attack, the superior forces of the North Koreans compelled a steady retreat throughout July and August to a beach-head around Pusan. Meanwhile, on August 1, the Soviet Representative returned to the Security Council to take his turn as President and, as expected, to block any further constructive action on Korea. In anticipation of the revival of the veto, the Council passed a last resolution on this question on July 31, dealing with the problem of civilian relief.<sup>3</sup>

By mid-September the first phase of the Korean crisis had ended. The Security Council was inhibited from further action by the return of the U.S.S.R., which purported to view recent events in the inverted perspective of an unsuccessful attack by the Republic of Korea, backed by the United States and condoned by the illegal actions of an improperly constituted organ of the United Nations. Moreover, United Nations forces had gone over to the offensive and after the Inchon landing on September 15, were approaching the 38th parallel. Additional and urgent United Nations decisions, involving the unification and rehabilitation of Korea and, more immediately, the scope of further military operation were clearly required. Discussion of the Korean question was, therefore, transferred to the General Assembly which had, in any case, an item on its agenda entitled "Report of the United Nations Commission on Korea" dealing with the problem of the independence and unification of that country.

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the Korean Crisis*, September 1, 1950, and *Documents on the Korean Crisis*, January 24, 1951.

<sup>2</sup>While the bulk of military forces in the Korean operation were supplied by the United States, contributions in the form of naval, ground or air forces, or hospital units, were offered by the following countries and had been accepted by the Unified Command as of December 31, 1950: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom.

<sup>3</sup>See "Aid for Korea", pp. 56-58.

When the Fifth Session of the Assembly opened on September 19, the Korean question was given priority on the agenda. The Canadian attitude was outlined in a statement by Mr. Pearson on September 27, during the opening debate. This statement set forth five main principles which might govern the Assembly's decision on Korea:

- (1) "The general objective of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies — a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people itself governs without interference from outside."
- (2) "The United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout its territory as a firm foundation for democratic institutions and of free self government."
- (3) "The Korean people, once peace has been restored, must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage."
- (4) "Nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united free Korea which carries any menace to Korea's neighbours."
- (5) "The free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing those methods of government."


The main debate centred on two draft resolutions: an eight-power resolution sponsored by Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines and the United Kingdom, and the second, a five-power resolution, sponsored by Byelo-Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R.

The eight-power resolution, presented by the United Kingdom, made the following recommendations:

- (1) that "all appropriate steps should be taken to ensure conditions of stability" throughout Korea;
- (2) that "all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the United Nations for the establishment of a unified and democratic government";
- (3) that United Nations forces should only remain in any part of Korea so long as necessary for achieving these objectives;
- (4) that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish economic rehabilitation.

The resolution went on, in its operative part, to call for the establishment of a Commission to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).

The Cominform bloc opposed the eight-power resolution on the grounds that it sanctioned United States "intervention" in the internal affairs of the Korean people, and tacitly permitted the military occupation of Korea "by imperialist powers". Their counter-resolution consequently recommended that the "belligerents"



immediately cease hostilities and that the United States and other foreign troops in Korea be immediately withdrawn, and that a "parity" commission, elected at a joint meeting of the Assemblies of North and South Korea, organize and conduct elections for a national assembly of all Korea.

These resolutions reflected two irreconcilable approaches to the Korean issue. A somewhat different position was taken by the Indian Representative. While agreeing fundamentally with the objectives and assumption of the eight-power resolution, he nevertheless questioned the wisdom of adopting, at that stage, those provisions which gave a tacit authority for the continuation of United Nations military operations north of the 38th parallel, and pointed out that these paragraphs of the resolution might serve merely to increase the tension already existing in that part of the world. However, he did not submit any specific resolution embodying his views. Instead, with the strong support of Israel and Yugoslavia, he proposed the appointment of a sub-committee to formulate a compromise resolution which might command the largest measure of agreement. Many delegations, while sympathetic to the intention behind the Indian proposal, nevertheless came reluctantly to the conclusion that it was unlikely to produce concrete results. As Mr. Pearson pointed out, the Soviet Delegate had already stated that he saw no possible compromise. Moreover, the need for further United Nations guidance was a matter of urgency and a sub-committee might well result in prolonged delay. When brought to a vote the Indian proposal was defeated by 32 to 24, with 3 abstentions. The Assembly was thus faced with a choice between the only substantive resolutions which had been proposed, and there was no doubt where the will of the majority lay. In the final vote on October 7 the General Assembly adopted the eight-power resolution by 47 to 5, with 7 abstentions, including India.

In implementation of this resolution, the new United Nations Commission was immediately appointed, the members being Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. Pending its arrival in Korea an Interim Committee composed of representatives of the same nations was established at Lake Success to consult and advise the Unified Command. In view of the difficulties which were anticipated in connection with the re-establishment of civil administration in North Korea before the holding of elections, the first act of the Interim Committee was to approve a resolution advising the Unified Command to assume provisional responsibility for the government and administration of areas north of the 38th parallel which might come under occupation by the United Nations forces, pending further consideration of the problem by UNCURK. The Economic and Social Council was also preparing the way for a comprehensive programme of economic rehabilitation.

Unfortunately, just as the United Nations was beginning to formulate plans for a unified and democratic Korea in accordance with the new resolution, the situation in Korea itself underwent a drastic change and the Korean crisis entered its third phase, that of Chinese Communist intervention.

Early in October, while the debate at Lake Success was still proceeding, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, had publicly warned that his country would not "stand aside" if United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel. This warning had contributed to the apprehension of a number of delegations lest the continuation of United Nations military operations into North Korean territory might result in an extension of the conflict. On the other hand, while a halt short of the 38th parallel might have been held to be consonant with the immediate objective of stopping the aggression, it would have left unsolved the long-range problem of unification, unless the North Koreans themselves agreed to accept a United Nations settlement for the entire country; and it would have permitted the North Korean forces to regroup once more behind their previous border, remaining as a constant threat to the stability of the area. Within a month after the difficult decision was made, however, it became apparent that the warning from Peking had not been an empty threat. Substantial numbers of Chinese Communist "volunteers" appeared on the Korean side of the Yalu River, throwing back advance units of the United Nations forces. On November 6, the United Nations received official notice of Chinese Communist intervention in a special report from General MacArthur.

The gravity of this new development was recognized by all. It was, however, by no means clear what motives had inspired this intervention, which not only endangered the possibility of any peaceful settlement for Korea, but was also starting a chain of events which might lead to a third world war. If it were motivated by fear of alien forces along the Manchurian border, or by a desire to protect specific Chinese interests in the frontier area, some solution might be found. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Communist action were part of a broader plan, or were designed to throw United Nations forces entirely out of Korea, the United Nations would be faced with a new crisis incomparably more serious than that created by the initial attack on June 25.

Since the question of Chinese Communist motivation was obviously of primary importance, the first action taken by the Security Council on November 8, immediately following receipt of General MacArthur's special report, was to adopt a resolution inviting a representative of the Chinese Communist Government to be present during the discussion of this question in the Council. It was also hoped that assurances regarding legitimate Chinese interests might ease the tension, and on November 10, a six-power resolution was presented to the Security Council calling on the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea, affirming at the same time that legitimate Chinese interests would be protected, and requesting UNCURK to assist in the settlement of any problems arising along the Chinese-Korean frontier. The Interim Committee on Korea had three days before unanimously resolved to give what assistance it could in this regard, and by the beginning of December the United Nations Commission had begun to consider the problems which it had been assigned.

On November 11, the Chinese Communist Government declined the Security Council's invitation to send representatives to discuss

their intervention in Korea, and proposed instead a combined debate on Formosa and Korea. It had, however, announced that it would accept the Security Council's previous invitation of September 29 to the Chinese Communists to be represented during discussion of their own earlier complaint against United States "aggression" in Formosa. The delegation was to be headed by Mr. Wu Hsiu-chuan. It was hoped that the presence of representatives from Peking might at least open the way to private discussions of Korean issues and assist in clarifying the motives behind the Chinese intervention. The delegation arrived in New York on November 24, the day General MacArthur launched the offensive which he hoped would "end the war" and "restore peace and unity in Korea".

By the time Mr. Wu appeared at the Security Council on November 28, Chinese Communist and North Korean forces had already broken through the United Nations front, which had been pushed close to the Korean-Manchurian border. The United Nations had received General MacArthur's communique "that an entirely new war faced United Nations forces". It was therefore in serious terms that the United States Delegate, Mr. Austin, addressed the Security Council. "It now appears doubtful", Mr. Austin said, "that war in Korea can be quickly concluded. It also appears clear beyond any doubt that what all the free world hoped was an intervention for limited purpose is, in fact, aggression — open and notorious. I use the word 'aggression' here in this Council and before the world by direction of my government. The consequences of these facts must be faced squarely by the people of the world, and more particularly by this Council". Mr. Austin then asked the Chinese Communist delegate a score of questions concerning Peking's intervention in Korea.

In reply Mr. Wu pointed out that he had come to discuss the question of United States aggression against Formosa and not the special report of the Unified Command. After presenting the Chinese Communist case in uncompromising fashion and accusing the United States of aggression in Korea, he concluded with the proposal that the Security Council adopt measures calling for the withdrawal of United States forces from both Formosa and Korea.

On November 30, the six-power resolution calling on the Chinese Communists to withdraw their troops from Korea was voted on in the Security Council, and, as expected, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Nine votes were cast in favour, but India did not participate in the vote. The sponsors of the six-power resolution then submitted the question of Communist Chinese intervention to the General Assembly, which assigned it to its Political Committee. Another six-power resolution, almost identical with that vetoed in the Security Council, was at the same time placed on the agenda.

While these preparations were going forward to have the question of Chinese Communist intervention debated in the Political Committee, Mr. Pearson made the following statement from Lake Success on December 5. "In this dangerous situation it remains our view that, if and when the military position is stabilized, we should try to begin negotiations with the Chinese Communists by every means possible. I am aware of the difficulties, I assure you, but I believe that nothing should be left undone which might con-

ceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. If, for example, providing the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations—possibly covering more subjects than Korea—in which the Chinese Communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement”.

One week later, a group of Asian and Middle Eastern countries submitted two resolutions to the Political Committee proposing a course of action along the lines suggested by Mr. Pearson. The first, known as the thirteen-power resolution, recommended that a special group of three, including the President of the Assembly, Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, be established to “determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire could be arranged”. The second, sponsored by twelve powers (the Philippines did not join in sponsorship), recommended the appointment of a committee to draft plans for a “peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. The Political Committee agreed to give priority to the cease-fire resolution, which was approved on December 14, by a vote of 52 to 5 (Cominform bloc) with one abstention (China). Mr. Pearson and Sir Benegal Rau of India were named as the two other members of the Cease-Fire Group.

The initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reaction to the cease-fire proposal offered little hope for its success. Both Mr. Malik and Mr. Wu made it clear that the proposal was not acceptable, demanding instead the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea in accordance with a Soviet draft resolution of December 9. This resolution had not specified whether “foreign troops” included the Chinese Communists. The impression left by Mr. Malik’s remarks was that they did not, although he implied that the removal of United Nations forces would make it easier to arrange for the departure of Chinese “volunteers”. At his press conference on December 16, Mr. Wu flatly rejected the cease-fire proposal as a trap to permit the building up of United States strength in Korea. He also stipulated the withdrawal of United States protection from Formosa and the seating of Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations as conditions precedent to any negotiated settlement in Korea.

Despite these discouragements, the Cease-Fire Group proceeded with its task. As a first step, it consulted representatives of the Unified Command regarding a reasonable basis for future discussion. From this there emerged, among other proposals, suggestions for the establishment of a demilitarized area approximately twenty miles deep above the 38th parallel and for the supervision of the cease-fire by a United Nations Commission. On December 16, the Group sent Mr. Wu a message, repeated by cable to Peking, offering to discuss cease-fire arrangements with the Chinese Communist Government or its representatives in New York or any other “mutually convenient” place. On the same day, Mr. Entezam transmitted to Peking through the Swedish Government a request that the Chinese Communist delegation be instructed to remain in New York for discussions with the Cease-Fire Group. Finally on December 19, the Group assured the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister that it was the clear understanding of the Group and of

the sponsors of the twelve-power resolution still before the Political Committee, that "once a cease-fire arrangement had been achieved, the negotiations visualized in the second resolution" for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in the Far East "should be proceeded with at once", and that the Chinese Communist Government "should be included in the Negotiating Committee referred to in that resolution".

The Chinese Communist response was, however, negative. Mr. Wu was instructed to leave New York, and the Chinese Communist Government notified Mr. Entezam that it regarded "as illegal, and null and void" all major resolutions, especially those on Asia, which had been adopted in the United Nations without the participation of the Chinese Communist Delegation. Finally, Mr. Chou En-lai, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Government, refusing to recognize the Group, sent Mr. Entezam as President of the Assembly the text of a public statement he had made on December 22, attacking the "so-called proposal for a cease-fire first and negotiations afterwards", and reiterating the conditions for negotiating a possible settlement which had previously been laid down by Mr. Wu.

As the year ended, the Cease-Fire Group was preparing to submit to the Political Committee of the General Assembly a report on its efforts to bring the fighting in Korea to an end. At the same time, the Communist forces resumed in strength their offensive south of the 38th parallel.

### Formosa (Taiwan)

Formosa had been occupied by Japan for forty-six years before the outbreak of war in 1941. It had been ceded to Japan by China in 1895 under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as a result of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. At the Cairo Conference in 1943 it was agreed by Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that Formosa should be returned to China. This was confirmed at Potsdam in 1945 and subsequently adhered to by the U.S.S.R. Although from a legal point of view the island should probably be regarded as technically Japanese territory until some formal action is taken through a peace treaty with Japan, it has for all practical purposes been treated, since 1945, as under Chinese administrative control. Since the Chinese Communists completed their hold on the mainland in 1949, Formosa has been the seat of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Both the Nationalist and Communist governments are in agreement, however, in regarding Formosa as an integral part of China.

Following the aggression of North Korea on June 25, 1950, the question of Formosa acquired new significance, and on June 27 President Truman announced that "... In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack

on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government in Formosa to cease all sea and air operations. . . . The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations”.

The Chinese Communist Government reacted immediately. In a statement on June 28 the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, charged the United States with “armed aggression against the territory of China and a complete violation of the United Nations Charter”. In a subsequent cable to the Secretary-General he called on the Security Council “to condemn the United States Government for its criminal act in the armed intervention of the territory of China and to take immediate measures to bring about the complete withdrawal of all the United States armed invading forces from Taiwan and from other territories belonging to China”. This complaint was put on the agenda of the Security Council on August 29 and was embodied in a formal resolution, sponsored by the U.S.S.R., on September 2. The Security Council decided on September 29 to extend an invitation to the Chinese Communist Government to be represented during the discussion of these charges, and further consideration of the subject was deferred until after November 15.

Meanwhile, additional Chinese Communist charges of the United States bombing of Manchurian territory in the course of the Korean operation had resulted in the introduction of resolutions in the Security Council by both the United States and the Soviet Union. None of these was adopted, however, and the Soviet Delegation decided to bring the Chinese Communist accusations, including those relating to Formosa, before the General Assembly under an item entitled “Complaint . . . regarding aggression against China by the United States of America”.

All these charges and complaints regarding Formosa were based on the Chinese Communist interpretation of the status of the island, a question which had now been complicated by the competing claims of the two Chinese governments. While consistently refusing to recognize any validity in the Chinese Communist accusations, the United States Representative had noted in a letter to the Secretary-General as early as August 25 that “the United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. . . . We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful rather than forcible solution of that problem”. In an effort to resolve the larger issue of the long-term status of the island and, if possible, to find a peaceful solution under United Nations auspices, the United States proposed on September 20 that the General Assembly include on its agenda the “question of Formosa”. In submitting this item, which was accepted and referred to the Political Committee on October 7, the United States emphasized once more that the measures it had taken were “without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa”. Discussion in the Political Committee was scheduled to begin about the middle of November. However, in view of developments in Korea and of the increasing tension in the Far East, the United States Representative suggested on November 15 that consideration be deferred and that

the item be placed at the end of the agenda. This was agreed to and further discussion was consequently postponed.

There still remained the problem of dealing with the Chinese Communist charges. The delegation from Peking arrived toward the end of November, and attended the Security Council on November 28. After hearing a lengthy and bitter attack on the United States by the Chinese Communist Representative, the Security Council on November 30 rejected both the Soviet resolution of September 2 and a later Soviet-sponsored proposal, submitted by the Chinese Communist Delegation, calling for the withdrawal of United States forces from Formosa and Korea. The vote in both cases was 1 in favour (U.S.S.R.) to 9 against, with India not participating.

In the Assembly, the Political Committee had also agreed to invite the Chinese Communist Representative to participate in the discussion of the general Soviet complaint regarding United States aggression against China, which began on November 27. This discussion was interrupted by the more pressing problem of Korea, and on December 19 the Chinese Communist Delegation left New York. The year ended, therefore, with no action in the General Assembly on either of the items on its agenda dealing with Formosa.

In the circumstances, there was no opportunity for any expression in the United Nations of Canadian views on the Formosa problem. It was referred to, however, by Mr. Pearson, in his address to the Windsor Chamber of Commerce on November 15. Stating that the desire to localize the conflict in Korea had dictated the policy of the Canadian Government over Formosa, he continued: "We appreciated the necessity for the action which President Truman took on June 27 in ordering the United States Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa, because it seemed to provide a way of neutralizing that island during the course of the fighting in Korea. We also understood the explanatory comment which President Truman gave in his press conference on August 31 when he declared: 'of course, it will not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Formosan Straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United Nations forces'. The question of Formosa has now been placed by the United States on the agenda of the General Assembly. We will be prepared to support in the United Nations any appropriate resolution which would authorize the continuance of this neutralization of Formosa so long as the war in Korea makes that necessary".

### **Chinese Nationalist Charges Against the U.S.S.R.**

Chinese charges against the Soviet Union of treaty breaking and violations of the United Nations Charter were originally introduced at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. After a full debate the question was referred, on December 8, 1949, to the Interim Committee.<sup>1</sup> On February 7, 1950, the Chinese Delegation submitted a draft resolution to the Interim Committee reiterating China's case against the Soviet Union and calling on all member states to withhold recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, pp. 70-73.

Since many members were reluctant to take action on this resolution because they found it difficult to determine what might usefully be done, the Interim Committee did not discuss the substance of the question. Apart from the distribution of a letter from the Chinese Delegation containing additional charges of Soviet aggression, no further action was taken until September 15, when the Interim Committee referred the question back to the General Assembly where it was placed on the agenda of the Political Committee.

On November 17, the Chinese Delegation introduced a draft resolution calling for the appointment of a United Nations commission of enquiry. Support for this resolution was not forthcoming, however, and it was withdrawn on November 23. The final outcome of the debate was that the General Assembly, on December 1, referred the question once more to the Interim Committee.

The Canadian position was re-stated in the Political Committee of the Assembly on November 22. While the Canadian Representative agreed that Chinese charges made in 1949 and 1950 were "indeed an eloquent accusation of bad faith in the conduct of the Soviet Government towards a state to which it was bound by an agreement of friendship and alliance", he opposed the new Chinese proposal for the establishment of a special commission at this stage, explaining the Canadian attitude in the following terms: "We are not proposing that all accusations and evidence be buried. We are merely saying that little practical result can come from surveying them once again before a commission formally established by the United Nations". The Canadian Delegation also opposed the suggestion that the Interim Committee should again be asked to consider this question. The Canadian attitude on this aspect of the problem was that the Interim Committee "should not be expected to resolve problems which the First Committee itself cannot resolve, or to act when the First Committee is unwilling to act".

The Assembly also adopted during its consideration of this item, a resolution on the promotion of stability in international relations with the Far East, including a reference to the independence and territorial integrity of China. This resolution was supported by the Canadian Delegation.

## Peace and Security Proposals

The President of the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, Brigadier-General Carlos Romulo, expressed the hope in September 1949 that the session over which he was about to preside would become known as the "Peace Assembly". One year later Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, the new President, stated his hope that the Fifth Session would come to be described as the "Assembly of Collective Security". The difference in emphasis between these descriptive titles illustrated the increasing concern felt in the United Nations as the organization approached and passed its fifth anniversary in the atmosphere of a grave international crisis. The year which had intervened had marked an abrupt transition from the cold war to a new and more menacing phase in world affairs.

An outbreak of armed aggression had not only brought United Nations forces into action against a declared aggressor, but was threatening to bring about a general world catastrophe.

Under these circumstances it had become, in the judgement of many member states, including Canada, a matter of prime urgency to review the collective security machinery which was available to the United Nations. It was true that the Security Council's action on Korea had been forthright and effective; but there was good reason to believe that in another such crisis the United Nations might not be so well served by the Security Council. For one thing, the U.S.S.R. had resumed its place at the Council and thus could not be counted on to continue to forego its right of veto. For another, there were many possible danger areas where the United Nations maintained no observation agency such as the Commission on Korea, which had provided reliable evidence on the North Korean attack. It was realized that the prompt implementation of the Council's decisions on Korea would not have been possible had United States troops not been available in close proximity to the area of hostilities. The fact that such assistance might not be readily forthcoming in other possible danger areas had brought to a head the concern of many member states over the failure of the permanent members to agree on the formation of the United Nations military forces envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. While the Security Council's recommendations of June and July 1950 had, in the event, met with spontaneous acceptance by fifty-three member states, there seemed to be a need for new means of organizing collective defence against aggression. In spite of its record of achievement on Korea, the Security Council did not retain the confidence of the non-Cominform world as a capable guarantor of international peace. A second line of defence was sought in the General Assembly, where votes were not rendered ineffectual by the veto of one of the permanent members. The debates which followed in October and part of November 1950 were staged against this background, and they resulted in the adoption of constitutional decisions of potentially great importance.

These decisions were embodied in a set of three resolutions. By far the most significant provisions were contained in the first of these, entitled "Uniting for Peace", which was guided through committee and plenary debate under the joint sponsorship of Canada, France, the Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. In its final form this resolution contained a lengthy preamble, and five parts (A to E), four of which had been included in the original text. The fifth incorporated references to economic and social objectives based on a proposal, similar in character to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, submitted by the Chilean Delegation. The final version of the resolution, as adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 53 to 5 (the Soviet bloc) with 2 abstentions (Argentina and India) on November 3, 1950, provided for the following:<sup>1</sup>

- (a) the calling of emergency sessions of the Assembly on twenty-four hours notice for the purpose of making recommendations if the Security Council had failed to agree

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix 8, p. 167, for excerpts from the text of the resolution.

- on a means of resisting a breach of the peace or an act of aggression;
- (b) establishment of a Peace Observation Commission of fourteen states, including the five permanent members of the Security Council, to observe and report on the situation in areas of international tension;
  - (c) a recommendation that each member state maintain elements within its armed forces for prompt use as United Nations units;
  - (d) the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee of fourteen members to study methods which might be used to strengthen the collective security machinery of the United Nations;
  - (e) a call for intensified respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for increased efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress.

Each one of the five elements of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution was subjected to detailed scrutiny and each in its final form incorporated certain amendments which had been put forward in the debate and to which the sponsoring states agreed. A brief record follows of the most important features of the discussion of each of the main provisions.

The proposal that the Assembly should be empowered to meet in emergency special session on twenty-four hours notice met with general acceptance. It was challenged by the Soviet Representative, who took the view that a period of two weeks (he later amended this to ten days) would be more reasonable. But the majority agreed with Mr. Pearson,<sup>1</sup> the Canadian Representative, when he said that Korea had "shown us what an aggressor can do in two weeks by exploiting the initial momentum that an aggressor always has over his victim" and when he added that "in any event a special emergency session . . . would not be summoned until the Security Council had itself attempted and failed to deal with the aggression". Two points in this section of the resolution deserve particular attention. First, it is provided that a vote of any seven members in the Security Council or of a majority of the members of the United Nations would be required for the summoning of an emergency session. Secondly, with regard to the powers of the Assembly under the resolution, it is stipulated that the actual use of United Nations armed force may not be the subject of a recommendation unless there exists either a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. (A threat to the peace may be *discussed* but may not be the subject of a recommendation involving military measures.)

On Part B of the resolution establishing the Peace Observation Commission, the Assembly came closest to unanimous agreement.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, so general was support for the Commission ("the eyes and ears of the United Nations", as the United States Representative called it) that even the Soviet bloc voted for its establishment, and the U.S.S.R. indicated its desire to be included with the other four

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix 9, p. 169, for further excerpts from the Canadian statement.

<sup>2</sup>The following fourteen member states were appointed to membership in the Peace Observation Commission: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.

permanent members of the Security Council in the membership of the Commission. On the questions of Chinese representation on the Commission, and of the use of the United Nations Panel of Field Observers by the Commission, the U.S.S.R. did, however, withhold its approval. With the adoption of this provision, machinery exists whereby either the Security Council or the Assembly (or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session) can, with the consent of the states directly concerned, call upon its own observation agency to proceed to a danger region and to report on the facts as it finds them.

Part C of the resolution was not unnaturally the most controversial of the five main provisions. It asked member states to maintain within their own national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as United Nations units upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly. As expected, this proposal was singled out for concentrated attack by the Soviet bloc, which professed to see in it a violation of the enforcement provisions of the Charter, and in particular an attempt to transfer the functions of the Security Council to the General Assembly. In accordance with these objections the U.S.S.R. put forward a series of amendments and counter-proposals. Among these was a proposal, later adopted as an independent resolution in slightly revised form, that renewed efforts be made to apply those articles of the Charter designed to provide for the establishment of United Nations military forces available to the Security Council.

In reply to the Soviet objections and counter-proposals, the sponsoring delegations made it clear that it was not the purpose of the resolution to relieve the Security Council of its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace. In Mr. Pearson's words: "(The resolution) does not sabotage the Security Council. It merely establishes peace machinery under the Assembly to supplement the Security Council when the latter body sabotages itself. If the Security Council can work effectively to defend the peace and defeat the aggression, this resolution will never have to be invoked." The majority of delegations regarded Part C as a practical and legally justifiable means of ensuring that if the Security Council was prevented from acting against an aggressor, the Assembly would be enabled to do so through the moral force of a recommendation to member states. Moreover, it was essential, in Mr. Pearson's words, to put "police power behind the United Nations will for peace" without delay. Mr. Pearson reminded the Committee that Canada had pioneered in this field, and that the Canadian Government had already recruited a special force which was being trained and equipped for service under the United Nations. He drew attention to the need for general observance of the provision recommending the organization of such units by member states, adding that "if sufficient forces of this kind could be held in readiness, it would be a powerful deterrent to anyone who would disturb the peace".

Although there was general support for the underlying purpose of Part C of the resolution, a number of its provisions were subjected to lengthy debate, leading in some cases to textual amendments.

Thus, in response to suggestions from certain states whose constitutions imposed limitations on the employment of their armed forces, a condition was included that the units maintained by each member should be made available "in accordance with its constitutional processes". Other delegations doubted the need for a panel of military experts, provided for in the resolution, to assist member states in organizing and training their United Nations units, but on this point the sponsors would not yield, and the provision was retained.

The fourth section of the resolution (Part D) established ad hoc machinery in the form of a Collective Measures Committee<sup>1</sup> of fourteen members to study and report to the Security Council and the General Assembly before September 1, 1951, on methods by which collective measures against aggression might be organized. Early in the debate certain delegations, notably the Australian, expressed misgivings as to the scope of the investigatory powers of the proposed Committee, and it was in response to this that the sponsors made it clear that they were principally concerned with means which might be employed to implement the principles set forth in Part C of the resolution. In the course of his statement on this point, Mr. Pearson suggested that the Collective Measures Committee might "examine the pros and cons of a small, specially recruited international force". Canada was appointed to membership on the Committee.

The final section of the resolution, Part E, embodies the essence of a Chilean draft resolution urging intensified and universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and calling for new efforts to achieve economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of under-developed areas.

It is too early to predict to what extent the new provisions adopted by the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution will add to the peace-preserving resources of the United Nations. Whether or not the Assembly will make use of the authority with which it has been endowed will, of course, depend on the willingness of member states to act in accordance with the moral force of the Assembly's recommendations. The Charter contains no clause which could be interpreted as making recommendations of the General Assembly legally binding on member states. However, in the words of the Canadian statement on this point "recommendations, as we now know from the events of June, can have a force as strong and compelling as any mandate, when right and justice are behind them". In strict law, therefore, member states remain free, under the "Uniting for Peace" provisions, to act according to their own desire in response to requests for action by the Assembly, so long as their actions are in conformity with their general obligations under the Charter. At least, however, the new procedure should ensure that the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace will not be abdicated because of the failure of the Security Council to agree on collective measures to resist aggression.

<sup>1</sup>The following fourteen member states were appointed to membership in the Collective Measures Committee: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

Although the sponsors of "Uniting for Peace" were able to incorporate at least the sense of a large number of amendments suggested during the debate, there were certain proposals which were considered to be more suitable for adoption in the form of separate resolutions. Consequently, in addition to an annex containing revisions in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure in accordance with the various provisions of the resolution, two further resolutions were adopted. The first of these, concerning the application of Articles 43 and 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter, has already been mentioned. It was passed by a large majority after an amendment had been added to the effect that its acceptance would not in any way prejudice the Assembly's action under the "Uniting for Peace" provisions. The second independent resolution, which was unanimously adopted, recommended that the five permanent members of the Security Council should meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, all problems relevant to the maintenance of peace; and that they should advise the other member states on the result of their consultations.

Following the Assembly's adoption of the resolution discussed above, the Political Committee debated two proposals submitted by the Yugoslav Delegation. The first, entitled "duties of states in the event of the outbreak of hostilities", was introduced by Mr. Kardelj, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, who pointed out that there was a need to perfect, enlarge and broaden existing legal machinery on which the United Nations could base its efforts to prevent acts of aggression. The essential provisions of the resolution were, in brief, that within twenty-four hours after an outbreak of aggression each party should announce its willingness to cease fire and to withdraw its armed forces; that each party should, at midnight on the day of such an announcement, put the cease-fire order into effect and begin the withdrawal of its forces; and that any state which failed to abide by these provisions should be considered the aggressor, and would assume responsibility for prolonging the war.

The majority of delegations spoke in favour of the purposes of this proposal, but serious misgivings were expressed with regard to its various provisions. In the view of many delegations an aggressor was unlikely to be deterred by the resolution since an excuse for disregarding it could always be discovered. For this reason the proposal might work to the disadvantage of a victim of aggression which complied with it in good faith. Moreover, it was the consensus of the majority that to set up automatic criteria for determining an aggressor would be dangerous, and that no definition of aggression should be attempted without a full examination of all its implications. Accordingly, the agreement of the Yugoslav Delegation was obtained to a modified version of its own resolution. The final text is so phrased as to protect the interests of a state which complies with the recommendations, and to assure it of reasonable freedom of action. A clear reference is made to the rights of self-defence recognized by the Charter; those engaged in hostilities are to announce, within twenty-four hours after the outbreak of armed conflict, their readiness for a simultaneous cease-fire on terms agreed by the parties or under conditions laid down by the United Nations.

Finally, a procedure is established to enable the Peace Observation Commission to make an immediate investigation. The issue of a definition of aggression is avoided, but a Soviet proposal, laying down criteria by which aggression might be so labelled, was referred to the International Law Commission for consideration. This proposal which, as Mr. Pearson pointed out, contained no reference to "indirect aggression", was based on a somewhat similar set of criteria which had been advanced at the second session of the Disarmament Conference in 1933 by Mr. Litvinov.

In its second resolution the Yugoslav Delegation proposed that the General Assembly should set up a permanent commission of good offices as a means of mediating in international disputes. Following a brief general discussion this proposal was referred to the Interim Committee as part of that body's study of United Nations conciliation machinery.

The item entitled "declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations" was discussed on the initiative of the Soviet Delegation, which had chosen this means of injecting the "Stockholm" peace appeal into the Assembly's deliberations. Apart from this new theme, the body of the Soviet case differed very little from the propaganda proposals which the U.S.S.R. had sponsored in 1948 and 1949. Reduced to its essentials, the resolution tabled by the Soviet Delegation called for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and for a system of international control; declared that the first government to use the atomic weapon, or any other means of mass destruction, would be committing a crime against humanity and would be regarded as a war criminal; and urged the Great Powers to reduce their armed forces of all kinds by one-third during 1950-51. The only new element among these recommendations was the proposed declaration that the first government to use the atomic bomb should be branded as a war criminal, a theme which had found frequent expression in the publicity which had accompanied the "Stockholm" peace appeal.

In spite of the familiar propaganda tone of this resolution, determined efforts were made by many delegations in the Political Committee to ascertain whether or not the 1950 version of the Soviet protestations represented a genuine desire to resume negotiations with the non-Cominform powers. Hope that these efforts might be fruitful was increased by a statement which Mr. Vishinsky made in the Committee on November 23 when he introduced the Soviet resolution. Mr. Vishinsky's statement was notable for its unusually heavy emphasis on the theme of the U.S.S.R.'s peaceful intentions towards the rest of the world. At one stage in his statement he asserted that Soviet policy was based on the idea that "peaceful co-existence between the Soviet system and capitalist states for a very long period was not only possible but unavoidable". Moreover, it appeared from what Mr. Vishinsky said regarding atomic weapons that the U.S.S.R. might be genuinely willing to enter into negotiations on the question of the inspection and control of atomic energy.<sup>1</sup> There was a rapid reaction to this section of Mr. Vishinsky's state-

<sup>1</sup>See "Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments", pp. 48-50.

ment. Referring specifically to it, Mr. Pearson<sup>1</sup> asked the Soviet Representative to clarify the type of international control which he had in mind, but no direct answer to this challenge was forthcoming from the Soviet Delegation, and it became increasingly clear during the remainder of the debate that the Soviet Union was not prepared to engage in fruitful discussion of the atomic energy impasse.

When their hopes of serious negotiations had proved unavailing, the non-Cominform delegations turned their attention to the formulation of counter resolutions in which they reiterated their conception of the principles on which the pursuit of international peace should be founded. These principles were outlined in a resolution entitled "peace through deeds" which, in its final form, was sponsored by eight member states: Bolivia, France, India, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. In many of its clauses this resolution resembled the declaration on the "essentials of peace"<sup>2</sup> which had been adopted at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. Its most important elements were: a condemnation of the practice of intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another for the purpose of changing a legally established government by the threat or the use of force; and a declaration that aggression in any form, whether committed openly or by the fomenting of civil strife in the interest of a foreign power, is "the gravest of all crimes against peace and security". The resolution also declared that the achievement of lasting peace was dependent on the establishment of certain indispensable conditions: the acceptance of effective international control of atomic energy on the basis of the majority plan already approved by the General Assembly; the control and elimination of all other mass-destruction weapons; and the regulation of all armaments and armed forces under a United Nations system of control and inspection, with a view to their gradual reduction.

When this declaration was voted upon it received 47 votes (including that of Canada), was opposed by 5 member states (the Soviet bloc), with one nation, Yugoslavia, abstaining. A Chilean resolution, the essence of which was a statement condemning war propaganda, was adopted by 43 votes to none, with 8 abstentions.

A further noteworthy feature of the debate on this item was a proposal submitted by India recommending the creation of a United Nations Peace Fund for the development of under-developed areas, and further recommending that each member of the United Nations, before March 1951, send to the Secretary-General a submission setting forth the principles and the scale on which it would be prepared progressively to reduce its armaments, and to contribute to the Peace Fund. This proposal stimulated considerable interest in the Committee and led to questions as to the relationship between the suggested Peace Fund and the Technical Assistance Programmes already functioning under the auspices of the United Nations. The Indian Delegation, however, did not press this proposal to a vote and agreed to withdraw it and to become co-sponsor of the "peace through deeds" resolution in view of the willingness of the re-

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix 11, p. 173, for excerpts from Canadian statement.

<sup>2</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, pp. 33-37.

maining sponsors to insert a reference in their resolution to the objectives of the Indian proposal. This reference took the form of a declaration that one of the essential prerequisites of lasting peace and security was a reduction of armaments and a corresponding development of the human and economic resources of nations for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of under-developed areas of the world.

The record of the discussions on this item illustrates the increasing tendency for the Assembly to become involved each year in a hostile and fruitless propaganda debate on "peace". There can be no doubt that the U.S.S.R. welcomes this perennial opportunity to air before a world audience its plausible but empty protestations, and it is regrettable that the delegations of those member states whose policies are vilified by Soviet spokesmen should be obliged to devote so much time and effort to exposing the baselessness of Soviet arguments. It may be assumed that Mr. Pearson reflected the views of many delegations when he suggested in his statement on the Soviet resolution "a two-year moratorium on bellicose and violent speeches about peace at the United Nations and a two-year attempt to do something about peace". It is, however, too much to hope that the U.S.S.R. will surrender the full use of this forum for its propaganda. It is also certain that the non-Cominform delegations will continue to dissect and examine Soviet statements in case they should bring to light a genuine readiness to do something more than talk about peace.

### Former Italian Colonies

During its Fifth Session the General Assembly had to deal with a number of issues arising out of its comprehensive resolution of November 21, 1949, on the disposal of the former Italian colonies. These affected all three of the territories: Italian Somaliland, for which the Assembly had recommended a ten-year period of trusteeship; Libya, with its three component parts of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, which was to become a sovereign state by January 1, 1952; and Eritrea, concerning which the Assembly had asked for more information before it attempted to make a definite recommendation. Canada took an active part in the Assembly's work during the Fifth Session in regard to both Libya and Eritrea but made only one brief intervention in the debate on Italian Somaliland.


On January 27, 1950, the Trusteeship Council completed its draft of a trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland, worked out at Geneva in consultation with representatives of Italy, which accepted the draft, and Ethiopia, which did not. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, the formal enactment of which was subject to the approval of the General Assembly, Italy took over the administration of Italian Somaliland on a provisional basis from the United Kingdom on April 1, 1950, having bound itself to observe the terms of the draft agreement. This was similar in many respects to the trusteeship agreements adopted in 1946 for trust territories

in other parts of Africa. It had, however, several unique features. It was the only agreement which made provision for its own termination, the territory being promised independence after ten years. It was also the only one to which a declaration of constitutional principles was attached, vesting sovereignty in the people and providing for the creation of a territorial council to be consulted by the administering authority in all matters other than defence and foreign affairs. Since in this single instance the administering authority was not a member of the United Nations, there was set up, with headquarters in Mogdishu, an Advisory Council consisting of representatives of Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines, whose members were authorized to participate without vote in debates in the Trusteeship Council on the administration of Italian Somaliland.

Ethiopia, which opposed the return of Italians to East Africa in an administrative capacity, reserved its position fully in relation to this trusteeship agreement. When the issue came up for consideration in the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the Assembly in November 1950, Ethiopia argued that the United Nations did not possess the authority to proceed further with the matter. It maintained that no true "agreement" had been submitted, inasmuch as Article 79 of the Charter made it clear that trusteeship "agreements" implied prior acceptance by the states directly concerned, and in this case Ethiopia, as a state directly concerned, had not agreed. Ethiopia's argument was rejected. Canada, like the majority of committee members, held that since the Trusteeship Council had been asked by the Assembly in November 1949 to negotiate a trusteeship agreement with Italy the Assembly was bound to consider the instrument so prepared. Ethiopia was subsequently dissuaded from pressing to the vote an alternative proposal under which the International Court of Justice would be asked to give a series of advisory opinions on the interpretation of Article 79 of the Charter. On December 2 the Assembly formally approved the trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland by a majority of 44 (including Canada) to 6 (Ethiopia and the Soviet bloc). There were no abstentions. A budgetary appropriation of \$175,000 was required to cover the expenses of the Advisory Council for Italian Somaliland in 1951.

At its Fifth Session the General Assembly also had before it the report of the United Nations commission which had gone to Eritrea in February 1950 to examine local conditions and to offer recommendations on the best means of promoting the welfare of the inhabitants. Members of the commission disagreed on the disposition which should be made of the territory. The Guatemalan and Pakistani members recommended that Eritrea should be established as a separate, independent state, after a maximum period of ten years under direct United Nations trusteeship. The Norwegian member suggested union of all or part of the territory with Ethiopia, the Western Province being permitted, however, to join the Sudan if it preferred. The Burmese and South African members recommended the federation of the whole of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

Italy was known to prefer the creation of a separate, independent Eritrean state, while Ethiopia advocated the full incorporation of Eritrea in its own empire. In the Interim Committee of the General



Assembly, where the report of the Commission for Eritrea was first discussed between July and September 1950, Canada gave its support to the principle of federation, believing that the Eritreans would encounter insuperable difficulties if they tried to create a separate state, although some concession should be made to the convictions of those who opposed incorporation of Eritrea in Ethiopia. Canada had considerable sympathy with the Norwegian proposal, but believed the evidence showed that federation was the solution likely to be acceptable to the largest number of Eritreans. A tentative draft resolution based on the federal principle was worked out by the Chairman of the Interim Committee during the summer in private consultations with the Italian and Ethiopian Representatives and a number of interested delegations, but final agreement could not be reached before the General Assembly convened.

The following suggestions offered at various stages of the debate during the Fifth Session were defeated: a U.S.S.R. proposal for the immediate establishment of Eritrea as a separate, independent state and the withdrawal of British forces within three months; a Polish version of the Soviet proposal, providing that Eritrea should become an independent state after three years of administration by a council of six members, which would report annually to the General Assembly; a suggestion of Pakistan that Eritrea should be prepared for independence with the aid of a United Nations Commissioner,

through a process similar to that which is being followed in Libya; and an Iraqi proposal, which had considerable support, that the choice between federation with Ethiopia or independence as a separate state should be made by a national assembly duly representative of the people of Eritrea by July 1, 1951, at the latest.

When it became apparent that the intervention of a number of disinterested states was needed to encourage agreement between Italy and Ethiopia, Canada consented to act as one of fourteen joint sponsors of a draft resolution, based on the federal principle, which was similar to the arrangement worked out by members of the Interim Committee earlier in the year. This draft resolution was finally adopted in the Assembly on December 2 by a vote of 46 to 10 with 4 abstentions. Those opposed to the resolution were the Soviet bloc, four Latin American states and Pakistan. In its final form the resolution outlined the terms of a federal act in accordance with which Eritrea would be an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. Exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers in the field of domestic affairs, it would have equal representation with Ethiopia in an Imperial federal council. A United Nations Commissioner would help to draft the Eritrean constitution, which would have to be considered, however, by an Eritrean Assembly and ratified by Ethiopia. The transfer of powers from the United Kingdom administration would take place as soon as the constitution and federal act entered into effect, the process being completed by September 15, 1952. On December 14 the Assembly elected Mr. Eduardo Anze Matienzo of Bolivia as United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea. The amount required to support the Commissioner's work for 1951 was \$266,200.

In Libya, as a first step in preparation for the coming of independence by January 1, 1952, the administering powers had been establishing self-governing institutions on a regional basis. Cyrenaica had enjoyed autonomy since September 1949, the Fezzan since February 1950. In Tripolitania an administrative council had been set up in May 1950, pending elections for a regional representative legislature. Mr. Adrian Pelt, the United Nations Commissioner, reported moreover that a preparatory committee of twenty-one Libyans, created in July, was arranging for the summoning of a national assembly of sixty members, of whom twenty would be named from each of the three component regions of Libya. The Commissioner was confident that, despite all obstacles, Libyan independence could be achieved by the date which the Assembly had previously stipulated. Canada, Chile, Ecuador and Greece accordingly submitted a joint draft resolution expressing confidence in the effectiveness of the work of the Commissioner, aided by his advisory council, and recommending that the administering powers press on with the creation of the desired governmental institutions, co-ordinating their work to this end. The need for continuing technical assistance to enable Libya to develop a sound administrative system and viable economy was also recognized.

Indonesia, Pakistan and five Arab states led a joint attack on the administering powers, alleging that they were purposely delaying the transfer of power to national authorities and that they intended to perpetuate their hold on the separate parts of Libya by ensuring a

federal rather than a unitary form of government for the new state. The principle of equal representation of the three parts of Libya in the national assembly was particularly criticized, since it meant that Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, possessing between them only a quarter to a third of the nation's population, could outvote the representatives of the more populous and advanced region of Tripolitania, whose people incline toward a unitary form of government. In a joint draft resolution the seven states proposed that a Libyan national assembly "duly representative of the inhabitants" should be convened by January 1, 1951, and that a provisional government, responsible to this assembly, should be set up by March 1 to take over all the powers now exercised by the British and French authorities.

Canada participated in the informal deliberations of a drafting committee which eventually produced a compromise text. The new draft, avoiding any criticism of the work accomplished in Libya, allowed an extra month of preparation before the creation of the provisional government, which would not be responsible to the constituent assembly but would take over progressively from the administering powers in accordance with an arrangement to be worked out by the Commissioner. Although insisting that Libya should be a united state, the compromise draft resolution left it to the inhabitants to decide whether the new state should be constituted along unitary or federal lines, in accordance with the principle of self-determination previously adopted by the General Assembly. The need for technical assistance continued to be recognized, though it was made clear that aid should be extended to Libya only at its express request. After some debate this draft resolution, jointly sponsored by Canada and twelve other members, was adopted in the Assembly, with an amendment affecting the section on technical assistance. During the debate on the resolution the Commissioner promised that he would recommend that the Libyan national assembly should enact a constitution only in provisional form, leaving to a duly elected parliament the function of giving the instrument final approval. He looked for the establishment of a bi-cameral legislature, the first chamber to be popularly elected and the second to be composed of an equal number of representatives from the three regions of Libya. An Egyptian amendment calling for the creation of an elected rather than an appointed national assembly, which would have entailed a considerable postponement of the date on which independence could be achieved, failed to receive two-thirds majority support. Instead the thirteen-power resolution was adopted on November 17 by 50 votes in favour and none against, the cost to the United Nations of implementing it in 1951 being estimated at \$582,200. The Soviet bloc and France abstained from voting, the latter on the ground that the dates set to mark the various phases of Libya's development would be difficult to meet, although France pledged its full co-operation. On the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council the Assembly provided in a separate resolution that Libya should not be deprived of technical assistance during the interval which might elapse between the achievement of independence and the admission of the new state to membership in the United Nations. Soviet efforts to prescribe a unitary form of government for Libya, and to secure the withdrawal of foreign troops

within three months and the dismantling of military bases, were defeated.

On December 15 the Assembly adopted by large majorities, with only the Soviet bloc opposed and two members abstaining, the separate sections of a draft resolution carefully worked out in sub-committee with the aid of Italian and Egyptian representatives, providing for the orderly transfer to Libya, with the aid of a United Nations tribunal, of various categories of Italian state property and other economic and financial interests. With regard to claims for war damages in Libya the Secretary-General was asked in a separate resolution, unanimously adopted, to study the problem within the context of the technical assistance which Libya is to receive. Mr. Lie will submit his findings to the Sixth Session of the Assembly.

Undelimited portions of the boundaries of two of the former Italian colonies are to be fixed according to procedures approved by the Assembly in a further resolution adopted on December 15. After Libya has achieved independence it is to negotiate a boundary settlement with France directly, although the aid of a "third person" may be provided, either by decision of the parties themselves or through an appointment to be made by the Secretary-General. The boundaries of Italian Somaliland with British Somaliland and with Ethiopia are to be fixed through negotiations conducted by Italy with the United Kingdom and Ethiopia respectively. In case of difficulty recourse may be had to a United Nations mediator. Should his recommendations not be accepted by either party a procedure of arbitration will be adopted.

Canada voted in favour of all the resolutions adopted at the Fifth Session of the Assembly in relation to the former Italian colonies. It also agreed with a decision that the proposed adjustment of the boundary between Egypt and Libya should be held over for consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly.

## Palestine

The United Nations had five matters to consider during 1950 in its efforts to help bring about stable conditions in Palestine on the basis of the partition of the country between Jews and Arabs. These five questions were studied against the background of the formal incorporation of the central portion of eastern Palestine into the Kingdom of Jordan in April 1950, which permitted its inhabitants for the first time since 1920 to regard themselves as citizens of an independent state. The particular issues considered by the United Nations were: certain violations of the armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours, a question referred to the Security Council; the negotiation of a general peace settlement, a task devolving upon the Palestine Conciliation Commission; the repatriation, resettlement and compensation of Palestine refugees, also a responsibility of the Conciliation Commission; the temporary maintenance of the refugees through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; and the

establishment of direct international control over the Jerusalem area, responsibility for which the General Assembly transferred from the Conciliation Commission to the Trusteeship Council after the Conciliation Commission had expressed its own preference for a different administrative arrangement.

Ordinarily complaints of violations of armistice agreements are taken up by the Mixed Armistice Commissions, on each of which a member of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serves as chairman. In September 1950, however, Egypt asked the Security Council to consider the recent expulsion by Israel of over 6,000 Arabs into Egyptian territory. Jordan subsequently referred to the Security Council the question of the occupation by Israel of an area east of the former Palestine boundary. Israel maintained that these complaints should have been addressed to the Mixed Armistice Commissions and itself protested Egyptian and Jordanian threats of aggressive action, Egypt's interference with shipping in the Suez Canal and Jordan's failure to work out certain detailed arrangements as agreed on April 3, 1949.

On November 17 the Security Council decided by 9 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions, to ask the parties to deal with their difficulties according to procedures established in the armistice agreements. It also urged them to get on with the settlement of issues still outstanding between them. It asked, however, for urgent consideration of the expulsions of Arabs from Israel, made certain other requests concerning future movements across boundaries or armistice demarcation lines and instructed the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to keep the Security Council informed of developments.

The Security Council's discussions and continuing incidents on Israel's borders lent force to the opinion expressed by the Conciliation Commission in its report of October 23, 1950, that conditions of security based on a protracted armistice were deteriorating. The Commission maintained that to achieve a positive peace Israel should do its best to counteract the dislocations caused by its own establishment and the Arabs should try to adapt their policy to the changed conditions. Since neither party had yet shown a sincere spirit of conciliation, however, United Nations bodies should be kept in the area as the best guarantee of the restoration of stability. The parties should be urged to engage in direct discussions, with United Nations assistance, to arrive at a peaceful settlement, the refugee question being given priority. Hitherto the Arabs had consented to serve with representatives of Israel on joint committees under the Conciliation Commission's chairmanship only if the principles which the joint committees were to apply in working out the details of a settlement had first been agreed through processes of conciliation or mediation. Israel, on the contrary, had opposed mediation by the Conciliation Commission. It wished to negotiate directly with representatives of separate Arab states, with or without the aid of the Conciliation Commission, whose role would be merely to extend its good offices with the parties' consent. Moreover, while the Arabs demanded that the refugee question should be settled first, Israel maintained that it could not be discussed apart from a general peace settlement.

At the Fifth Session of the General Assembly these two questions, a general agreement and settlement of the refugee problem, were linked in the resolution finally adopted. A Soviet proposal to dissolve the Conciliation Commission was defeated. Canada supported at the outset the suggestion of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Turkey that the parties should be urged to engage without delay in "direct discussions" of a general settlement, either under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission or independently. A Chinese amendment was ultimately accepted, however, by virtue of which those concerned would be given a choice between direct negotiations, as Israel wished, and negotiations conducted "with the Conciliation Commission", which would enable the Arabs to work with the Commission, as they preferred, until the principles of a settlement had been agreed, after which they would be ready for discussions with representatives of Israel.

The remainder of the resolution was devoted to the refugee question. The Conciliation Commission had recommended that the Arab refugees should be made to realize that conditions in Israel had changed and that they should be assured that non-returning refugees would receive "just compensation" for the loss of their property. A solution of the problem, it thought, should be based partly on repatriation and partly on resettlement of refugees in Arab lands, the governments concerned providing the necessary facilities and the United Nations the technical and financial assistance required. The Assembly resolution adopted on December 14 by 48 votes (including that of Canada) to 5 (the Soviet bloc), with Israel, Iraq and two other states abstaining, provided that the Commission should set up an office to make arrangements for the assessment and payment of compensation to refugees for their property and to work out such arrangements as might be practicable to implement other objectives of the Assembly's 1948 resolution on repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees. The office is to continue conversations already begun regarding such matters as the release of blocked funds of Arab refugees in Israeli banks and measures to halt the deterioration of Arab property in Israel. Whether repatriated or resettled, refugees are not to be subjected to discrimination of any sort. This resolution was approved only after the consideration in committee of five separate proposals representing the views of Arabs and Israelis and of various delegations which tried to bridge the gulf between the two. A net budgetary appropriation of approximately \$700,000 was approved to cover the expenses of the Conciliation Commission and the special office in 1951.

The question of temporary assistance to refugees was considered separately on the basis of a report from General Howard Kennedy, a Canadian who was appointed Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. On December 2, the Assembly adopted a draft resolution initiated by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States setting up two funds for the year 1951-52, both to be based on voluntary contributions. The first was a fund of \$20 million for direct relief, the second a "reintegration fund" of at least \$30 million to be used only for projects proposed by Near Eastern governments and

approved by the Agency for the permanent re-establishment of refugees. A negotiating committee of seven was appointed, on which Canada has been serving, to ascertain in advance what contributions will be made available by member states and others to finance the Agency's work for the period July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952. Inasmuch as the fund of \$54,900,000 established by vote of the Assembly on December 8, 1949, for the combined relief and works programme had not yet been fully subscribed, the negotiating committee was also instructed to ask for contributions for the period January 1 to June 30, 1951, from member states which had not already contributed. Canada itself contributed \$750,000 in funds and supplies between May 1 and December 31, 1950, for the current relief and works programme.

The Trusteeship Council, in conformity with the wishes of the General Assembly, completed on April 4, 1950, its statute providing for the administration of the Jerusalem area as a separate political entity under United Nations control. According to this statute the United Nations Governor would have possessed wide powers, including authority to recommend to the Trusteeship Council the dissolution of a proposed legislative council for the area should he consider it advisable. On June 14, having learned that neither Jordan nor Israel would agree to these arrangements, the Trusteeship Council decided to report the resulting situation to the General Assembly.

During the second week of December three possible ways of dealing with the issue were discussed at Lake Success. Sweden suggested a modified form of international control, through the appointment of a United Nations Commissioner whose functions would relate only to the Holy Places and the established rights of religious communities while Israel and Jordan would divide between them the administration of the Jerusalem area itself. The Commissioner might ask either government to introduce or to suspend particular measures if he considered this necessary to safeguard the interests he was appointed to protect. When Jordan failed to accept the Swedish plan the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay offered an amendment, to which both Israel and Jordan agreed, the effect of which would be that pending further decisions the United Nations should send to Jerusalem merely a "representative", who would report to the General Assembly on the observance by Israel and Jordan of pledges which both would be asked to make in relation to the Holy Places and religious interests, the guaranteeing of human rights and the reduction of armed forces. More support was gained, however, by a Belgian draft resolution, which provided that the Trusteeship Council should appoint four persons to consult with the states, authorities and religious bodies concerned and report to the General Assembly at its Sixth Session on the conditions of a Jerusalem settlement which, based on the principle of direct international control previously adopted by the Assembly, would ensure effective protection of the Holy Places and of spiritual and religious interests in the Holy Land under United Nations supervision. A Lebanese amendment led to the inclusion in this proposal of a reference to the three resolutions already adopted by the Assembly in favour of direct international administration of the Jerusalem area.

When the amended Belgian draft resolution was voted on in the Assembly on December 15, 30 favoured it, 18 voted against and 9 abstained. The Canadian Delegation abstained because it doubted the usefulness of conducting further enquiries when Israel and Jordan had already made their stand crystal clear. Having failed to obtain a two-thirds majority the resolution was defeated. No other resolution was brought forward, since none would have obtained the necessary support. Jordan and Israel both made voluntary commitments that they would protect the Holy Places under their control, guarantee freedom of access to them and maintain existing rights of religious denominations.

Thus, for the time being at least, United Nations representatives regularly assigned to tasks in the Middle East growing out of the partition of Palestine will be the members of the Truce Supervision Organization, the Conciliation Commission and its special office, and the Relief and Works Agency and its Advisory Commission. They will not include United Nations representatives specifically responsible for dealing with questions relating to the administration of Jerusalem, the protection of the Holy Places or the maintenance of the rights of religious communities.

## Greece

Between the Fourth and Fifth Sessions of the General Assembly there were no further attempts by communists and Macedonian separatists to overthrow the Greek Government by force of arms. Relations between Greece and Yugoslavia showed signs of improvement, but the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) reported that there still remained a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. It recommended to the General Assembly among other things that Bulgaria and Albania should be named once more as having given aid to the Greek guerrillas, that Albania, Bulgaria and Greece should be called on to establish diplomatic relations and provide effective machinery to control their common frontiers, and that the United Nations should continue to maintain representatives in the Balkans. There had as yet been no international verification of the internment and disarming of the thousands of Greek guerrillas who had escaped across the northern boundaries of Greece. The Assembly should ask once more that this should be done. Military and civilian personnel carried across the boundary by the Greek guerrillas and still detained in other countries should be allowed to return, and every possible effort should be made to find some means of restoring to their homes the Greek children carried off by guerrillas.

The Soviet Representative argued that the real threat to Greek independence was Anglo-American intervention in Greece. This should be terminated, UNSCOB should be dissolved, a general amnesty should be declared, executions should be prohibited and communists should be allowed to vote. The Soviet draft resolutions

growing out of these demands were decisively rejected by the Assembly, after its Political Committee had refused to be drawn into a debate on the domestic affairs of Greece.

On December 1, Canada and all other members present at a plenary session of the Assembly, except representatives of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia, voted in favour of a Greek draft resolution recommending the repatriation of those members of the Greek armed forces still detained abroad. They also voted in favour of a draft resolution jointly sponsored by Australia, France, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and United States, approving the report of UNSCOB and continuing that body in being until the Sixth Session of the Assembly. If in the meantime, however, the Special Committee should recommend its own dissolution, the Interim Committee of the General Assembly is authorized to take appropriate action.

It was reported to the General Assembly that, except for Yugoslavia, no country harbouring Greek children carried away by the guerrillas had yet taken definite action to comply with Assembly resolutions of 1948 and 1949 calling for the return of the children. Moreover, the number Yugoslavia had offered to repatriate up to the time the Assembly convened had been negligible in relation to the total detained, even after due allowance had been made for some thousands whose parents are living in Soviet-dominated territory, who do not wish their own children to be repatriated. On December 1, the Assembly adopted by 50 votes to 0 a joint resolution of Australia, Denmark, France and the Netherlands repeating in effect the recommendations adopted in 1948 and 1949 regarding repatriation of Greek children and establishing for the first time a standing committee, composed of representatives of Peru, the Philippines and Sweden, to consult with the Secretary-General and the states concerned so as to facilitate the early return of the children. Partly because they objected to the appointment of this committee, the five Cominform members abstained instead of voting for repatriation of the children as they did during the Fourth Session.

### **Human Rights in Eastern Europe**

In 1950, for the second year in succession, the General Assembly was called upon to consider charges of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms levelled against the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania. The policy of religious persecution and political oppression deliberately followed by these governments, apart from the concern which, of necessity, it must cause to the international community, is in flagrant contravention of specific articles in the Peace Treaties of which the three Balkan states are signatories. Although a number of the Allied and Associated powers repeatedly protested through diplomatic channels against these violations of human rights, and invoked the disputes machinery laid down in the Peace Treaties, the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania not only refused to acknowledge the existence of a dispute, but made no attempt to refute the charges which continued to be directed against them.

In its resolution of October 22, 1949, the General Assembly had decided to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the following juridical questions. Do the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania, on the one hand, and certain of the Allied and Associated powers, on the other, disclose a dispute subject to the provisions for the settlement of disputes contained in the Peace Treaties? If such a dispute existed, were the three Balkan Governments obligated to appoint their representatives to the competent Treaty Commissions? In the case of failure on their part to appoint representatives, could the Secretary-General nominate the third member of the Commission upon the request of the other party to the dispute, and would such a Commission be properly constituted within the meaning of the relevant treaty articles?

Following the reference to the International Court of these questions, Canada presented notes to Hungary and Roumania on January 5, 1950, informing them of the appointment of the Right Honourable J. L. Ilsley as the Canadian member of the Treaty Commissions. On January 16, a reply was received from the Hungarian Government contending that no dispute existed; the Roumanian Government did not reply.

On March 30, a majority of the judges of the International Court of Justice delivered the opinion that a dispute could properly be said to exist and that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania were consequently obligated to appoint their representatives to the Treaty Commission. On April 27, Canada presented further notes to Hungary and Roumania drawing their attention to the advisory opinion of the International Court on the first two questions submitted to it and assuming, in the light of the Court's decision, that the Governments of Hungary and Roumania would nominate their representatives to the Treaty Commissions. On May 26, the Hungarian Government replied that in its view no dispute existed and that neither the United Nations nor the International Court of Justice was competent to consider the issue. As in the case of the previous Canadian note, no reply was received from the Roumanian Government.

On July 18, the International Court gave its opinion on the remaining questions referred to it. The Court concluded that the Secretary-General was not authorized to appoint the third member of a Treaty Commission before the appointment of the other two members. In recording his dissenting opinion, however, Judge John E. Read of Canada warned that, to admit the contention that a party to a dispute may prevent its arbitration by the expedient of refusing to appoint a representative on a Commission specifically provided for the purpose, would be tantamount to an admission that any international engagement can be nullified by the deliberate failure of one of the signatory parties to abide by its procedural provisions for the settlement of disputes.

On the basis of the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice, the General Assembly, on November 3, adopted, by a vote of 40 in favour (including Canada), 5 against, with 12 abstentions, a resolution put forward by the Delegation of Australia and subsequently revised during the debate. The reso-

lution, taking note of the two opinions of the International Court of Justice, condemned the wilful refusal of the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania to fulfil their obligations under the Peace Treaties to appoint a representative to the Treaty Commissions. It expressed the opinion that the conduct of these governments was such as to indicate that they were aware of having violated the human rights clauses of the Treaties of Peace, and noted that the three governments had made no satisfactory refutation of continuing accusations against them. Finally the resolution invited members of the United Nations to submit to the Secretary-General for circulation to the other member states all evidence which they now hold or which may become available in future in relation to this question.

In a statement on October 5, the Canadian Representative expressed the view that, while his government accepted the pronouncement of the Court without reservation, the opinion registered by the dissenting judges should not be lightly dismissed. Concerning the merits of the case against the three Balkan Governments, on which the Court had not presumed to deliver an opinion, he stated that available evidence seemed to make it quite clear that these governments had launched upon a systematic campaign against the basic freedom which society conferred upon the individual, in particular the freedom of conscience. While the General Assembly could do little to assist the victims of this oppression, the compilation of available evidence, as envisaged in the resolution, would at least serve to bring the true facts before world opinion.

With the adoption of the resolution, there appears to be little more that the United Nations can do. The majority of the members of the United Nations have once more demonstrated their strong disapproval of the violations of human rights committed by Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania. Moreover, it is possible that, as a result of the Assembly's most recent resolution concerning the submission of evidence, further information may become available which will assist public opinion in the democratic countries to understand the true nature of the circumstances underlying the disputes, as well as the methods of persecution employed by the three Balkan Governments.

## Spain

On December 12, 1946, the General Assembly, responding to a widespread popular demand for the ostracism of governments established under the auspices of Fascism, had adopted a resolution which, in its preamble, condemned the Franco regime as hostile and undemocratic and made three recommendations which were to govern the relations of United Nations member states with Spain: that Spain under the Franco regime be debarred from membership in the Specialized Agencies; that the Security Council consider measures which might be required if, within a reasonable time, a democratic government deriving its authority from the consent of the governed were not established in Spain; and that members of the United Nations recall from Madrid their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary.

Although adopted by a substantial majority, the December 1946 resolution has not, throughout its subsequent reviews by the General Assembly, had the continuing support of all those states which originally voted in its favour.<sup>1</sup> By 1950 it was evident that a sufficient number of member states had begun to entertain serious misgivings as to the wisdom and legality of the United Nations boycott of Spain to warrant reconsideration of the December 1946 resolution by the General Assembly at its Fifth Session.

The item entitled "relations of states members and Specialized Agencies with Spain" was placed on the agenda of the Fifth Session on the initiative of the Dominican Republic and Peru. A number of draft resolutions proposing revision of the December 1946 resolution were then submitted by other Latin-American states, and these were subsequently revised and consolidated into a single draft resolution, jointly sponsored by Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and the Philippines,

In its preamble, the eight-power draft resolution emphasized that the accreditation of heads of diplomatic missions did not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of the receiving government. It further expressed the view that inasmuch as the Specialized Agencies were technical, largely non-political in character and designed to benefit the peoples of all nations, they should be free to decide for themselves whether the participation of Spain would broaden the scope and increase the efficiency of their activities. The joint resolution thereupon recommended the revocation of the two operative provisions of the resolution of December 12, 1946, which called for the withdrawal of heads of missions from Madrid and the exclusion of Spain from membership in the Specialized Agencies.

The fundamental point of controversy which crystallized in the course of the debate related to the validity of the premises upon which the 1946 resolution was based. Certain delegations, in particular the Soviet bloc, which opposed the rescission of the two operative parts of the resolution, argued that if these premises were valid in 1946, they must still be valid in 1950 since the situation in Spain, if it had changed at all, had changed for the worse and that if the United Nations did not now uphold the provisions of the original resolution, the first step towards a complete surrender to Franco would have been taken. On the other hand, delegates supporting rescission contended that the December 1946 resolution not only represented an unjustifiable attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state but also had the effect of limiting the freedom of action of states members of the United Nations in the conduct of their diplomatic relations. They held that adoption of the joint draft resolution would in no way involve an expression of approval of the policy followed by Franco but would merely rescind certain measures which, in the light of Spain's peaceful conduct in the post-war years, were discriminatory, unjustifiable and in contravention of the Charter.

In his statement on October 28, in support of the eight-power draft resolution, the Canadian Representative reaffirmed Canada's disapproval of the totalitarian form of government but emphasized

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949* pp. 54-55.

that the General Assembly was not being asked to reach a political verdict. The basic objective of the December 1946 resolution had been to achieve the supersession of the present Spanish Government by a genuinely democratic regime. Since it had failed to attain this aim and had served only to isolate the peoples of Spain from all democratic contacts, it was logical for the General Assembly to review both its efficacy and its wisdom. As regards the provision dealing with the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, the Canadian Representative pointed out that the act of accreditation of a head of mission was one taken solely in the interests of the accrediting nation, and was a sovereign prerogative which it was beyond the competence of the United Nations to suspend. With respect to the recommendation debarring Spain from the Specialized Agencies, the Canadian Delegation had opposed it in 1946 and still held to the view that it would be to the advantage of all member states that Spain should be enabled to accept the obligations and restraints imposed by membership as well as the benefits which such membership would confer upon the Spanish people. By rescinding this provision the General Assembly would, moreover, be endorsing the principle of universal membership, the avowed goal of the Specialized Agencies.

The joint draft resolution, including a minor amendment submitted by the Netherlands Delegation, was adopted by the General Assembly on November 4, 1950,<sup>1</sup> by a vote of 38 in favour (including Canada), 10 against, with 12 abstentions.


### Kashmir

The United Nations, throughout 1950, continued its efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In December 1949, Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, in his capacity as President of the Security Council for that month, had been appointed by that body to assist the representatives of India and Pakistan in finding a mutually satisfactory basis for a solution of the problem.<sup>2</sup> When Canada's term of membership on the Security Council expired at the end of 1949, Gen. McNaughton's functions as mediator ceased. It was not until early February, however, that he was able to report to the Council on his failure to secure agreement between the disputants on demilitarization. On March 14, the Security Council adopted a resolution, embodying, in the main, Gen. McNaughton's proposals for demilitarization and providing for the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). In the place of UNCIP, the resolution called for the appointment of a United Nations representative, acceptable to both India and Pakistan, to arrange for, and act as mediator in, a demilitarization programme, prerequisite to a free and overall plebiscite in Kashmir.

Prior to the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council, both India and Pakistan announced their acceptance. In doing so, the Indian Representative stressed that there had been no modification of his Government's position regarding the proposals for

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix 10, page 172.

<sup>2</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, pp. 70-71.



demilitarization, but that, subject to this qualification, it would extend to the United Nations representative such co-operation in the discharge of his duties as lay in its power. The Representative of Pakistan asserted that, as the draft resolution had been based on the McNaughton proposals, which Pakistan had accepted, his Government, consequently, also accepted the new resolution and promised full co-operation with the United Nations representative.

In accordance with the resolution of March 14, 1950, Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent Australian jurist, was appointed United Nations representative on April 12, and proceeded on his important mission to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent early in May. After almost four months of investigation on the sub-continent and negotiation with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Sir Owen Dixon returned to Lake Success in August. Under cover of a letter dated September 15, 1950, addressed to the President of the Security Council for that month, he reported on the results of his mission.

Sir Owen stated in his report that he had initially attempted to secure the agreement of India and Pakistan on a programme of demilitarization which would permit a free and impartial plebiscite by which the people of Kashmir could determine their future. After listening separately to the cases presented by representatives of both nations, he had arranged for the Prime Ministers to meet with him and had found that neither had any affirmative plans or proposals to offer for the settlement of the dispute. Sir Owen had

then submitted his own proposal providing for a set date on which Pakistan troops would be withdrawn, a subsequent withdrawal of Indian forces and finally the disbanding of pro-Indian and pro-Pakistan native units. The Prime Minister of India had, however, rejected this proposal on several counts. After further efforts at demilitarization had proved unavailing, the United Nations representative explored the possibility of partition—first, of the whole area excepting the Vale of Kashmir (within which a plebiscite would be held) and later, of the state as a whole. The lengthy and intricate negotiations on the question of partition had also been unproductive, as neither side had been willing either to accept his suggestions or to offer any alternative solution.

In summary, Sir Owen, in describing his own inability to bring the disputants into agreement, declared that throughout the history of the dispute both India and Pakistan had consistently failed to agree and had thrown the entire responsibility for settling the controversy upon the Security Council and its representatives. As a consequence, he had come to the conclusion that the initiative should now pass back to the parties and that the best hope of agreement lay in partition and in some means of allocating the Vale of Kashmir, rather than in an overall plebiscite. He advocated that at the same time the Security Council retain the United Nations military observers in Kashmir and that it urge the two parties to reduce their forces on their respective sides of the cease-fire line to numbers which would suffice for normal protection of a peace-time frontier. In this report, Sir Owen Dixon also requested the formal termination of his position as United Nations representative for India and Pakistan.

The Kashmir issue had not subsequently been discussed by the Security Council by the end of 1950.

### Indians in the Union of South Africa

On May 14, 1949, during the second part of its Third Session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon South Africa, India and Pakistan to hold a round-table conference for the purpose of settling their dispute over the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa.<sup>1</sup> This avenue towards an amicable solution, however, was closed in June 1950 when the Government of India stated that it was no longer prepared to participate in direct discussions in view of the enactment by the South African Government of the "Group Areas Bill" under which the various racial groups in the Union would be restricted to specific areas of residence and economic activity. The Indian Delegation, in the course of the debate on this item during the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, contended that the policy upon which this Bill was based represented a flagrant contravention of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Accordingly the Delegation of India, in conjunction with Burma, Indonesia, and Iraq, introduced a draft resolution recommending that South Africa

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, p. 75.

initiate the necessary steps to bring its treatment of people of Indian origin into conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

South Africa, as in previous debates on this issue, rested its case substantially on the provisions of Article 2(7) of the Charter which precludes the United Nations from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. The South African attempt to prevent the discussion of this matter as being incompatible with the terms of the Charter failed, however, when the Ad Hoc Political Committee, by a vote of 35 in favour, 3 against with 17 abstentions (including Canada), upheld the competence of the United Nations to consider and vote upon any proposals relating to the issue under consideration.

In view of the fact that many delegations were convinced that a mere condemnation of the policy of racial segregation ostensibly followed by the South African Government would do little to alleviate the condition of Indians living in the Union, the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 33 in favour, 6 against, with 21 abstentions (including Canada), a more constructive resolution originally put forward by Bolivia, Brazil, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and substantially amended in the course of the subsequent debate on this item. This resolution recommended that the governments concerned resume their direct negotiations on the basis of an agenda previously agreed upon and, in the event of failure to arrive at an agreement within a reasonable time, avail themselves of the services of a mediation commission. The resolution further called upon the parties to the dispute to refrain from taking any steps likely to prejudice the success of their discussions, in particular the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the "Group Areas Act", pending the conclusion of such discussions. The General Assembly decided, finally, to place the subject of the treatment of people of Indian origin on the agenda of its Sixth Session.

Canada's abstention from voting on the main resolution as well as on the question of competence was based on the recognition that, in the absence of an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, the South African thesis that this was a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union Government could not be lightly dismissed. At the same time Canada has consistently held that a round-table conference of the parties concerned offered the best hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement of their dispute. Accordingly the Canadian Delegation supported those provisions of the substantive resolution which urged the three governments to make a further attempt at composing their differences by direct negotiation.

## Indonesia

In preceding years, by virtue of its membership on the Security Council, Canada had a direct responsibility for the settlement of the Indonesian dispute. Canada's membership on the Council expired at the end of 1949. During 1950, Indonesian affairs occupied a much less important position in the work of the United Nations than they had in the preceding year. However, as a result of a

Canadian proposal of December 1949, the United Nations Commission in Indonesia was under instructions to continue its work in accordance with the resolution of January 28, 1949, an omnibus resolution regarding the Indonesian problem which included provisions setting up the Commission and determining the scope of its activities.

Relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands within the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union continued to improve during the year, despite the difficulties involved in the attempt to find a solution to the problem of Indonesian claims to Dutch New Guinea (Irian). Additional problems were raised by the decision of the Indonesian Cabinet to adopt a unitary form of government in place of the federal system provided for by the Round Table Agreements. The Republic of Indonesia, which replaced the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, was proclaimed on August 16, 1950. This constitutional change was not accomplished without an intensification of internal disorder, culminating in an attempt by the inhabitants of the island of Amboina to set up an independent Republic of the South Moluccas.

Offers by the United Nations Commission to endeavour to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to mediate in the conflict were refused by the Indonesian Government on the ground that the Amboinese revolt was a matter of purely domestic concern. During the military operations against the South Moluccan dissentient forces, however, the Commission has been able to assist in localizing the fighting, preventing its spread to other parts of the islands where former Netherlands East Indian troops of Amboinese origin were awaiting dispersal. This contribution was recognized in November, when both Indonesian and Netherlands authorities expressed the desire to achieve, with the assistance of the Commission, the settlement of continuing problems relating to the demobilization and repatriation of the troops of the disbanded Royal Netherlands East Indies Army.

Indonesia's unanimous election to the United Nations on September 28, warmly supported by Canada, was quickly followed by increased interest in international affairs on her part. Indonesia was one of the Asian co-sponsors of the thirteen-power resolution of December 14 which set up a three-man committee to determine the basis on which a cease-fire in Korea might be arranged.

### **Repatriation of Prisoners of War Detained in Soviet Territory**

When the Second World War ended, large numbers of German and Japanese prisoners of war were in the hands of the Allied Powers both in Europe and the Far East. Subject to certain arrangements agreed upon at Potsdam whereby, as a part of German reparations, a labour force of German prisoners of war was to be employed in countries devastated by the German Army, it was agreed that the repatriation of the bulk of the prisoners, both German and Japanese, should be completed as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, an agreement dated December 19, 1946, between the U.S.S.R. and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP), set

the rate for the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war at 50,000 per month, while the Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Moscow in the spring of 1947, decided that all German prisoners of war held by the Allied Powers should be repatriated by December 31, 1948.

It soon became apparent that the repatriation of both German and Japanese prisoners of war from the Soviet Union was not proceeding according to schedule. In Germany the quadripartite machinery, which was to have produced a detailed plan of repatriation, collapsed in March 1948. In January 1949 the Western Powers announced that all prisoners of war in their custody had been returned to Germany by December 31, 1948, and drew attention to the parallel obligation of the U.S.S.R. under the Moscow agreement of 1947. They enquired for what purposes these prisoners were being retained in the Soviet Union and observed that the Soviet Government had taken no action regarding notification of the deaths of prisoners of war as laid down by international agreement. They further proposed that the Soviet Government suggest an international body to inspect the working conditions of German volunteer workers in the United Kingdom and the Near East, on the understanding that the same body should be permitted to carry out similar investigations in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government replied that the Allied Control Council, which had been instructed by the Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare a detailed plan of repatriation, had failed to produce such a plan and that the U.S.S.R. was thus under no obligation in this regard. Having given its refusal in these terms, the Soviet Government added, without supplying statistical evidence, that the overwhelming majority of the prisoners of war which had been held in the Soviet Union had already been repatriated and that the Soviet repatriation plan would be completed in the course of 1949.

The U.S.S.R. proved to be equally unco-operative with regard to the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war. Repeated offers were made to the Soviet authorities with a view to providing them with transportation facilities which would enable the monthly repatriation figures to be increased. These offers were ignored. Instead, on May 20, 1949, Tass News Agency reported that only 95,000 Japanese ex-servicemen remained to be repatriated, although the total number listed at that time by normally reliable Japanese Government sources and by the occupation authorities was about 469,000. The Soviet Government has made no effort to account for this discrepancy of approximately 374,000 prisoners. In the words of a United States note dated December 30, 1949, the discrepancy can "only be explained by the continued detention of large numbers of Japanese in Soviet-controlled areas and/or by an abnormally high death factor among those who were to be repatriated".

In April and May 1950 Tass News Agency was again the channel for a pronouncement of Soviet policy. Statements that the U.S.S.R. had completed repatriation of all German and Japanese prisoners of war from its territory, with the exception of those detained in connection with war crimes or on account of illness, created consternation in Germany and Japan. On May 2 the Japanese Diet, and on

May 5 the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic, adopted resolutions of protest, appealed to the U.S.S.R. for an explanation and to the Western Powers for an approach to the Soviet Union. The Japanese Diet went further: it requested the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan to appeal to "the justice and public opinion of the world through the United Nations". When further representations by the Allied Powers had failed to elicit a reply from the U.S.S.R., Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States placed the matter before the Fifth Session of the General Assembly.

The Assembly's debate centred on a proposal jointly sponsored by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which would have provided for the creation of a United Nations Commission of Prisoners of War. In spite of the moderate tone adopted by the co-sponsors, it soon became clear that the Soviet Delegation was not approaching the problem in a spirit of compromise. The Soviet Representative categorically denied that German or Japanese prisoners of war were still detained in the U.S.S.R. and denounced the three sponsors for their alleged detention of thousands of prisoners for purposes of slave labour. At the same time a number of delegations feared that the wording of the joint resolution, which referred specifically to the prisoners of war still held in the U.S.S.R., might provoke the Soviet Government into an even more intransigent attitude. To allay these fears, the sponsors produced a watered-down version of their proposal which incorporated a number of modifying amendments, and amounted to little more than an innocuous expression of concern that certain countries had not repatriated the prisoners of war which had been held by them. The resultant resolution was adopted by 43 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

Under this resolution the Assembly called upon the governments concerned to submit certain information on prisoners of war by April 30, 1951. In a further provision, the Secretary-General was requested to appoint a commission of three qualified and impartial persons chosen by the International Red Cross. This commission, which is to be convened after April 30, 1951, is to examine the information made available by member governments, and report the results of its work to the Secretary-General for transmission to member states. The governments concerned are urged to co-operate fully with the commission and to grant right of access to their respective countries and to areas in which prisoners are detained.

Since Canada had not been involved in past negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on this subject, and was not included among the occupying powers either in Germany or Japan, the Canadian Delegation did not take a leading part in the debate. It was, however, in full agreement with the original draft resolution, and voted in favour of the modified version which was finally adopted, even though there seems little prospect of its leading to a constructive solution of this problem.

## Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State

During 1950 a controversy arose in the United Nations as to which of the two rival Chinese Governments should be entitled to accredit delegates to represent China in the United Nations. From January until August, when the Soviet Representative returned to the Security Council, the Soviet Union refused to participate in the various organs of the United Nations while the representatives of the Chinese Nationalist Government continued to be accepted as representatives of China. Recognition being, as it is, a question which each individual state decides for itself, it was not unnatural that as long as the majority of states continued to recognize the Nationalist Government, those states would continue to support the representation of China in the United Nations by the Nationalist Government.

There was a further difficulty. Because the principal organs of the United Nations and the various Specialized Agencies have authority to pass upon the credentials of representatives at their own meetings, it would be possible for some of these to accept representatives of one government and for others to accept representatives of the other government.

Early in 1950 the Indian Representative on the Security Council proposed that, if the right of a government to represent a member state in the Security Council were challenged, the President should, before the question is decided by the Council, ascertain the views of all member states of the United Nations. Constitutionally an affirmative vote by seven of the eleven members of the Security Council is all that would be necessary to seat a representative of a new government. The majority of the members of the Security Council considered, however, that, while the Council was the competent body to deal with any issue relating to the representation or credentials of its own members, the General Assembly was the more appropriate organ to initiate the study of the broader question of representation of a member state in the United Nations. As a result of this decision Cuba, a member of the Security Council, proposed the inclusion of the item, "recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a member state", on the agenda for the Fifth Session of the General Assembly.

Immediately upon the opening of the Fifth Session, the question of Chinese representation was broached directly by both the Indian and Soviet Representatives on September 19, 1950. Resolutions were introduced seeking support for the immediate seating of the representatives of the Chinese Communist Government. Neither of these resolutions was adopted.

Meanwhile, to provide an opportunity of examining the issues involved, the Canadian Delegation had submitted an alternative resolution proposing the establishment of a special committee of seven to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back, with recommendations, to the same session of the General Assembly taking into account the views of the Assembly

on the broader issues raised by the Cuban item. The resolution also proposed that, pending a decision by the General Assembly on the special committee's report, the Nationalist Government Delegates should continue to sit in the Assembly with the same rights as other representatives. This resolution proved acceptable to a large majority and was adopted by a vote of 42 in favour and 9 against, with 6 abstentions.

Since this resolution provided that the special committee should not report back until after the General Assembly had discussed the question of recognition of the representation of a member state, it amounted in effect to the postponement of a decision on Chinese representation until consideration could be given to the item proposed by Cuba. Later the Korean crisis was to overshadow other questions with the result that although the special committee consisting of representatives of Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, the Philippines and Poland held its first meeting on December 16, it decided to leave to the chairman the calling of further meetings "in the light of discussions relating to the cease-fire in Korea".

The debate on the question of the recognition of the representation of a member state centred mainly on two draft resolutions, one submitted by Cuba, the other by the United Kingdom. Both proposals recommended that when the question of the right of a government to represent a member state arises, the matter should be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for decision and the other organs of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies should, in the interest of uniformity, be requested to take appropriate action on the General Assembly's decision. Both draft resolutions also stipulated that a decision of the General Assembly on such a question should not affect the direct relations of member states with the state, the representation of which has been challenged.

The two proposals also recommended that certain criteria be adopted as the basis upon which the General Assembly might arrive at its decision. The United Kingdom proposal recommended that, in arriving at a decision, the General Assembly should consider which government has "effective control and authority over all or nearly all the national territory, and has the obedience of the bulk of the population of this territory, in such a way that this control, authority and obedience appear to be of a permanent character". This is the test generally applied in the recognition of one government by another. The Cuban proposal on the other hand emphasized subjective tests. It stressed "consent" of the population as opposed to "obedience" and insisted also on the ability and willingness of a government to fulfil the obligations of the Charter and its international obligations generally, and on the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

While the question of China was undoubtedly in the minds of all delegates throughout the debate, there was a marked disposition to approach the problem on the basis of more general considerations. The Soviet bloc, however, insisted that a purely political decision on the specific case of China was required and that the attempt to establish criteria of general application was intended to deny China her rights as a member state. A large number of delegations doubted

whether any generally valid criteria could be adopted. On the other hand, there were many delegations which considered that every advantage should be taken of the opportunity to promote the smooth functioning of the United Nations by clearly defining the principles which ought to be followed in arriving at a decision on the question of recognition of the representation of a member state.

The debate resolved itself into a discussion on how far the so-called "subjective tests" of the Cuban proposal could be modified or abandoned in favour of the so-called "objective tests" proposed by the United Kingdom. The Canadian Delegation considered that a decision of the General Assembly on the question of representation should be on the basis of certain agreed principles rather than on the basis of expediency. The Canadian Delegation was therefore of the opinion that the United Kingdom proposal afforded the best basis for a satisfactory solution.

A compromise draft resolution was evolved. It recommended that decisions with regard to representation be taken in the light of "the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case" and went on to list three factors which "should be among" those taken into consideration:

- (1) The extent to which the new authority exercises effective control over the territory of the member state concerned and is generally accepted by the population;
- (2) The willingness of that authority to accept responsibility for the carrying out by the member state of its obligations under the Charter;
- (3) The extent to which that authority has been established through internal processes in the member state.

The Canadian Delegation considered the second principle to be superfluous in view of the fact that the draft resolution already recommended that decisions with regard to representation should be made in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter. The third principle, it was suggested, would undoubtedly give rise to difficulties of interpretation. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of these principles the Canadian Delegation indicated its reluctance to have included in the draft resolution a reference to specific principles. In view of the fact, however, that the resolution would have the useful effect of unifying the procedure to be applied in different organs of the United Nations when the representation of a member state became the subject of controversy, the Canadian Delegation indicated its willingness to support the resolution as a whole, though it would abstain in the vote on the two principles to the inclusion of which it had raised certain objections. When it appeared that only the deletion of the reference to the specific criteria could secure for the resolution the requisite majority, the Egyptian Delegation introduced an amendment to this effect which was carried by a vote of 27 in favour, 13 against, with 14 abstentions (including Canada).

The resolution, as finally approved by the Assembly on December 14 by a vote of 36 in favour (including Canada), 6 against, with 9 abstentions, recommends that whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a member state

in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the General Assembly or the Interim Committee should consider the question in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case and that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or the Interim Committee should be taken into account in the other organs of the United Nations and in the Specialized Agencies. The resolution concludes that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such questions shall not in itself affect the direct relations of individual member states with the state concerned.

This resolution is a step forward in that it contemplates that the other organs of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies will, in the interest of uniformity, follow a decision of the General Assembly in regard to the question of the representation of a member state. At the same time, however, the failure to provide specific and objective criteria on which such a decision might be based, is unlikely to facilitate the solution of the controversy over Chinese representation, which prompted the Cuban Delegation to submit the broader question of representation for the consideration of the General Assembly.

### **Secretary-General's Peace Programme**

By the early months of 1950 the international crisis had assumed such menacing proportions that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie, embarked on a series of speeches and consultations designed, in his own words, "to end the so-called cold war, and to set the world once more on a road that will offer greater hope of lasting peace". The Secretary-General's peace efforts, which were to take him on a tour of important world capitals including Moscow, were first foreshadowed on March 21 in Washington, when he reviewed the peace-preserving resources of the United Nations and spoke of a "twenty-year programme to win peace" through the organization. Although Mr. Lie did not disclose full details of his programme at that time, he threw out the hint that, as a means of achieving the resumption of genuine negotiation among the Great Powers, the provisions in the Charter permitting special "periodic meetings" of the Security Council might be invoked as a first step. He reminded his audience that such meetings, which had been envisaged in Article 28 of the Charter, could be attended by heads of governments or by foreign ministers and that they might be devoted to periodic reviews of outstanding issues before the United Nations.

In the two succeeding months, the Secretary-General developed his peace programme and discussed it personally with the heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. Although he was careful throughout to emphasize that he was seeking to bring about "negotiation" among the Great Powers, his efforts nevertheless met with considerable criticism and misunderstanding. Even before he reached Moscow, the Soviet press maligned his motives in proposing a peace plan, while in certain unofficial United States quarters he was branded as an appeaser of the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding these conflicting

criticisms the Secretary-General, encouraged by a heavy volume of public correspondence in support of his peace mission, persevered with his consultations. After visiting President Truman on April 20, he went to London and Paris for consultations with Prime Minister Attlee and Premier Bidault, respectively, and on May 11, still without having made public the details of his programme, he arrived in Moscow. During his stay in the Soviet capital, Mr. Lie had a number of conversations with Soviet leaders, including Premier Stalin. The details of these talks were not made public, but on Mr. Lie's return to New York he expressed himself as "not dissatisfied" with his conversations with the various heads of government whom he had visited.

Soon after his return to United Nations headquarters, the Secretary-General published the ten-point memorandum which had served as the basis of the discussions. In doing so he admitted that while certain of his proposals called for urgent action, others would require patient effort over a long period.

The principal points of the programme may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The inauguration of periodic meetings of the Security Council, attended by foreign ministers or heads or other members of governments as provided by the Charter, and the further use of other United Nations machinery for the solution of international disputes, including a renewed effort to secure agreement on limitation of the veto power.
- (2) A new attempt to make progress towards the establishment of an international system of control and inspection of atomic energy which would be effective in preventing its use for war and permitting its use for peaceful purposes.
- (3) A new approach to the problem of bringing the armaments race under control. Armaments to be considered would include not only atomic weapons, but also other weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional armaments.
- (4) A renewal of efforts to reach agreement on armed forces to be made available to the Security Council for the enforcement of its decisions.
- (5) Acceptance and application of the principle of universality of membership in the United Nations.
- (6) An active programme of technical assistance and encouragement of broad scale capital investment with the use of all appropriate private, governmental and inter-governmental resources.
- (7) A more vigorous interest by all member governments in the work of the Specialized Agencies.
- (8) Continued efforts to promote wider observance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- (9) The use of the United Nations to promote, by peaceful means, the advancement of dependent, colonial, or semi-colonial peoples towards self-government.
- (10) The development of international law towards an eventual enforceable law for a universal world society.

The attitude of the Canadian Government towards Mr. Lie's initiative was favourable, although not sanguine. Mr. Pearson remarked to a Parliamentary committee on June 13 that the Secretary-General of the United Nations was justified in taking this action to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument for achieving world peace.<sup>1</sup> In common with other governments, the Canadian Government gave careful and detailed study to the ten-point programme, which it regarded as a useful basis for discussion of outstanding world issues. Within a month of its publication, however, the war in Korea forced the Secretary-General's peace efforts into abeyance until they were discussed, at Mr. Lie's request, during the Fifth Session.

The Assembly's debate on the peace programme, which was held in plenary session, had, not unnaturally, a somewhat academic air, since it took place simultaneously with the renewed crisis brought on in Korea by the Chinese Communist intervention. The Secretary-General, in opening the debate, explained that in the early spring of 1950 it had seemed to him that the United Nations was in grave danger. The deadlock over the representation of China had come at the end of a chain of events which had progressively weakened faith in the U.N. approach to the problems of peace and war. Referring to the United Nations action in Korea and to the further steps taken towards the creation of collective security machinery,<sup>2</sup> he said that these did not diminish the importance of other approaches to peace prescribed by the Charter, to which he had drawn attention in his memorandum. Significantly, he said that his memorandum was intended as a "working paper", and that detailed consideration of the ten points could "most fruitfully be undertaken by those organs of the United Nations particularly concerned."

In the view of the majority of delegations, detailed debate on the proposals would have been unprofitable since a number of them were already under study in various forms in other United Nations organs. Accordingly, a resolution sponsored by nine members, including Canada, was introduced, commending the Secretary-General for his initiative and requesting the appropriate United Nations organs to consider those portions of the memorandum with which they were especially concerned. The results of such studies were to be reported to the next session of the Assembly.

The Soviet bloc statements on this item dispelled any doubts there might have been as to the U.S.S.R.'s attitude towards the Secretary-General's proposals. The familiar propaganda line on such themes as "war mongering" and atomic energy were recapitulated, and a vicious personal attack was made on Mr. Lie, who was accused of having obtained advance approval for his memorandum from the State Department in Washington. Mr. Lie promptly refuted this and similar accusations. The Soviet statement, he said, "is not true and will not be made true by repetition". He had consulted only his eight assistant secretaries-general in drafting the programme. (The significance of this reference to all

<sup>1</sup>See Mr. Pearson's evidence before the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons, June 13, 1950.

<sup>2</sup>See "Peace and Security Proposals", pp. 13-21.

his assistant secretaries-general was that one of them is a Soviet citizen.)

Representatives of the Asian and Western countries spoke in generally favourable terms of Mr. Lie's memorandum, although some pointed out that their governments could not accept it in its entirety. The Canadian Representative called the memorandum "a valuable effort to suggest methods and principles through which agreement can be reached" and "a chart for further progress". He spoke against a Soviet resolution which endeavoured to wrap up in an ill-assorted package some of the favourite Soviet propaganda proposals, e.g.: the seating of Communist China in the Security Council, unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, and "unswerving compliance" with the veto principle in the Security Council. Two proposals in the Soviet resolution — those favouring technical assistance and the expansion of international trade — might have been acceptable had they not been drafted in "improper and objectionable" terms designed to make "unjustifiable insinuations" about those countries which were in fact taking steps to achieve the desired ends.

The nine-power resolution won an overwhelming majority when the vote was taken; the Soviet proposal was voted down, paragraph by paragraph, by a wide margin.

## **Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments**

In spite of the anticipated development of a "hydrogen bomb" utilizing the process of solar energy release, and the mounting international tension which flared into open conflict in the Far East, the interval between the Fourth and Fifth Sessions of the General Assembly saw no progress towards reaching agreement on either the international control of atomic weapons or the limitation of conventional armaments. The primary obstacle to agreement was the continued refusal of the Soviet Government to modify in any significant way its previous proposals which had been considered by the majority of members of the United Nations to be so inadequate as to provide no more than a mockery of the security the nations sought. Soviet intransigence was augmented by their insistence that disarmament and all other issues be subordinated to the question of Chinese representation.

Talks on atomic energy control among the six sponsoring Powers, including Canada, were resumed in December 1949 at the request of the General Assembly. These talks, however, were interrupted abruptly by the walk-out of the Soviet Representative in January 1950, as a result of the group's refusal to unseat the Representative of Nationalist China. Shortly after, the other five permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission concluded that it would be useless to continue without the Representative of the U.S.S.R., and no further progress among the Six, or in the Atomic Energy Commission as a whole was possible during 1950.

A twenty-year peace plan, submitted by Mr. Trygve Lie in the spring of 1950, was debated at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. It included a proposal that the problem of atomic energy

control be considered by an international panel of scientists, but as the obstacles to agreement appeared to be fundamentally political rather than technical, support for this proposal was not forthcoming.

The General Assembly at its Fourth Session (1949) had asked the Commission for Conventional Armaments to continue its studies in the field of inspection, verification and reduction of conventional armaments, and as 1950 opened, talks were in progress in the Working Committee of the Commission. Like the negotiations concerning atomic energy, however, these talks were broken off by a Soviet walk-out in January over the question of Chinese representation.

In an address to the General Assembly on October 24, President Truman indicated his willingness to meet the repeated demand of the U.S.S.R. that the subjects of atomic control and general disarmament should be given joint consideration. Late in the Fifth Session of the Assembly this suggestion was taken up in an eight-power resolution establishing a committee of twelve members, to examine the possible merging of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments and to report to the next regular session. Canada, one of the co-sponsors, is represented on the committee, which was established on the adoption of the resolution by 47 votes to 5 with 3 abstentions. This resolution was opposed by the representatives of the Soviet bloc whose speeches monotonously reproduced their previous views on the subject. Their counter-proposal, calling for simultaneous conventions prohibiting atomic weapons and establishing control of atomic energy, was defeated by 32 votes to 5 with 16 abstentions.

The perennial Soviet proposals in this field call for an immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and a one-third reduction of conventional armaments. Western governments mistrust these suggestions, at least in the form in which they have been put forward by the Soviet Union, for two basic reasons. In the first place, the measures of inspection and control which the U.S.S.R. has so far advanced to ensure that disarmament would actually be carried out, are totally inadequate.<sup>1</sup> The West is not prepared to accept Soviet good faith alone as their guarantee that both sides would in fact disarm. In the second place, the governments of the free world are conscious of present conditions of military preparedness. The Soviet Union carried out no comparable general demobilization on the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, as the West did in 1945 and 1946. Moreover, since that date the Soviet military forces have been extensively re-equipped with weapons of the most modern type. Under such conditions any proportional disarmament, even if honestly implemented by the Soviet Union, could only enhance the present military unbalance. In view of the aggressive policy followed by the Soviet bloc in the last five years, the free world cannot seriously entertain the Soviet terms for disarmament until it has brought itself to some measure of military parity with the U.S.S.R., and until an adequate system of safeguards has been established.

<sup>1</sup>See excerpts from Canadian statement, Political Committee, October 30, 1950, Appendix 11, p. 173.

Although the Western countries in the United Nations are still keeping the door open, the Soviet bloc continues to refuse to consider any disarmament proposals which would not leave the Soviet Union in its present position of military preponderance. In other words, it has been unwilling to discuss any plan for genuine disarmament. Until there is a readiness on the part of the U.S.S.R. to seek a real settlement of the fundamental issues separating the Powers, it would be unduly optimistic to expect agreement on atomic energy and disarmament. Nevertheless, the Western nations stand prepared to resume serious negotiations should the U.S.S.R. be disposed to participate.

### Admission of New Members

Since 1945 twenty-three countries have applied for membership in the United Nations. Nine have been admitted.<sup>1</sup> The only state to be admitted during 1950 was the Republic of Indonesia whose application was unanimously approved by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The other fourteen applications have either failed to get the required support of seven members of the Security Council, or have been vetoed by the Soviet Representative in the Council.<sup>2</sup>

At the present time chances appear remote for getting agreement in the Security Council to admit any of these outstanding applications. The objection to the admission of Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumania has been that their governments have shown themselves to be unwilling to comply with the requirements of the Charter with regard to human rights; Albania's support for the rebels in Greece has indicated that it is not a "peace loving" state, within the meaning of the Charter; and the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Mongolia is doubtful. The Soviet Union has indicated that it will refrain from using the veto in the Security Council to obstruct the admission of the other applicants if its satellites are admitted. This type of bargain has not, however, as yet found favour with the other countries concerned, particularly the United States. It was suggested last year by Argentina that the Assembly should vote on admissions whenever the use of the veto or failure to get a majority in the Security Council prevented that body from making a recommendation. Any such vote by the Assembly, however, was held to be contrary to the Charter by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in February 1950.

Despite the deadlock on the question of new admissions, there appears to be a growing body of opinion in many countries in favour of the principle of universality of membership. As Mr. Pearson said before a Parliamentary committee in May:<sup>3</sup> "I think there are a lot of countries now which would feel that any sovereign unit recognized as such should, *ipso facto*, be a member of the world organization irrespective of its form of government". This principle

<sup>1</sup>Afghanistan, Burma, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand and Yemen.

<sup>2</sup>Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Mongolian People's Republic, Nepal, Portugal and Roumania. For an account of the treatment of these applications, see *Canada and the United Nations* for previous years.

<sup>3</sup>See Mr. Pearson's evidence before the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on External Affairs, May 1, 1950.

of universality of membership was one of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, Mr. Lie, in his ten-point memorandum on a twenty-year peace programme for the United Nations.

When the question of the admission of new members was put before the General Assembly in December 1950, it was the view of the Canadian Government that the time was not propitious to review the outstanding applications. The Canadian Representative, accordingly, joined with the Representatives of Brazil, the Philippines, Sweden and Syria in co-sponsoring a resolution which disposed of the question for the time being by recalling previous Assembly recommendations on the admission of new states and asking the Security Council to "keep the applications under consideration". This resolution, as was hoped, gained a large majority without much debate (46 in favour, 5 against, and 2 abstentions). The Canadian Representative, speaking in the debate, stated that as soon as circumstances permitted the question of membership should be examined with particular reference to the relationship between Article 4 of the Charter<sup>1</sup> and the general desire for universality of membership.

A Soviet resolution recommending the Security Council "to review" the applications of thirteen candidates (not including the Republic of Korea) was rejected by a vote of 22 against, 18 in favour, and 13 abstentions. A resolution submitted by El Salvador, the terms of which included a proposal for observer status in the United Nations for all outstanding applicants except the Soviet-sponsored states, was defeated by a vote of 19 against, 13 in favour and 19 abstentions. The Canadian Representative spoke and voted against this proposal on the ground that it appeared to be contrary to the Charter.

### Appointment of the Secretary-General

During its Fifth Session the General Assembly extended for three years Mr. Lie's term of office as Secretary-General. Mr. Lie was appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations on February 1, 1946, for a five-year term. It was therefore necessary for the Security Council, in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter, to attempt to reach agreement on a candidate to recommend to the Fifth Session of the Assembly. Following the aggression on the Republic of Korea, however, it became evident that the permanent members of the Security Council would have great difficulty in reaching agreement on a suitable recommendation, the difficulty being Soviet resentment of the role played by Mr. Lie in carrying out the decisions of the Security Council to restrain this aggression.

Nevertheless, negotiations to reach agreement on an appointment began in the Security Council early in October 1950. In the course of several closed meetings of the Council, nine members voted to recommend Mr. Lie for another five-year term, only to have this recommendation blocked by a Soviet veto. The Soviet Represent-

<sup>1</sup>Article 4 reads: "1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

ative stated that either Sir Benegal Rau (India), Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico) or General Romulo (the Philippines) would be acceptable to his Government. However, the behaviour of the U.S.S.R. during these debates raised an important question of principle. In the eyes of most delegations it appeared that the U.S.S.R., which, up to June 1950, had not publicly criticized Mr. Lie, had decided to "punish" the Secretary-General for his stand against the North Korean aggression. Because of this attitude of the Soviet Union, which in effect denied the right of the Secretary-General to carry out the duties and responsibilities of his office which flowed from a binding decision legally adopted by one of the principal organs of the United Nations, the re-appointment of Mr. Lie or the extension of his term of office became, in the view of many delegations, a matter of principle. The Representative of the United States even threatened to veto any other candidature.

In view of the resultant deadlock in the Security Council, the question was referred to the General Assembly on the ground that, while the Council had the power of recommendation, the Assembly had the power of appointment, and consequently the power to set and alter the term of office of its appointee. It could therefore without any further recommendation from the Security Council decide to extend Mr. Lie's term of office. In opposing this theory, the Soviet Representative asserted that, as no recommendation had come from the Security Council, the General Assembly could not legally deal with the question. Consequently he proposed that the Security Council be instructed to re-examine it. In an attempt to intimidate the Assembly he reiterated his previous threat that if Mr. Lie was appointed as Secretary-General of the United Nations for any new term of office "the Soviet Government will not deal with him and will not regard him as Secretary-General."

Three draft resolutions reflecting the different viewpoints of member states were then submitted to the General Assembly. The first resolution, submitted by the U.S.S.R., called for the deferment of the issue. The second resolution, sponsored by Iraq, called for the appointment of a committee of seven members to meet and discuss the whole question and to report to the Assembly within two weeks. The third resolution, which was sponsored by fifteen countries including Canada, recommended that the General Assembly extend Mr. Lie's term of office for a further period of three years from February 1, 1951. Speaking on behalf of the joint resolution, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Pearson, said that the arrangements proposed by the draft resolution were "admittedly an expedient to meet the situation created by the deadlock in the Security Council". However, the procedure laid down in 1946 when Mr. Lie was first nominated indicated that the arrangements now proposed to the Assembly were legal and would not constitute a strained interpretation of Article 97 of the Charter. "No Article of the Charter and far less any General Assembly resolution", Mr. Pearson went on to say, "can possibly be interpreted in such a way as to render inoperative the whole structure of the United Nations as established by the Charter". Accordingly, failure of the Great Powers to agree on a successor to Mr. Lie could not mean that the Secretariat should be left without a Secretary-General.

Finally, after having decisively defeated the Soviet and Iraqi resolutions, the General Assembly adopted the fifteen-power resolution which, by extending Mr. Lie's term of office as Secretary-General, ensured the uninterrupted exercise of this important function.

## II

### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

#### Survey of the Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council is one of the major organs of the United Nations. Under the United Nations Charter it is responsible for promoting international economic and social cooperation, and has as its specific aims the achievement of higher standards of living, conditions of economic and social progress, and universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

In the early years of its existence, the Council was necessarily preoccupied with post-war emergency programmes and with the establishment of its organizational and co-ordinating machinery. Recently, however, it has been able to concentrate an increasing proportion of its time and efforts on facilitating the solution of important economic and social problems, which constitutes its real purpose. During the past year particularly there has been a marked shift of emphasis to the longer term and continuing aspects of the Council's responsibilities.

Canada, which was one of the original members of the Economic and Social Council, served until the end of 1948, and after one year's absence was again elected to membership for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1950. During the past year, therefore, Canadian Delegations attended the two sessions of the Council and took an active part in its work. In the Canadian view, the Economic and Social Council provides a valuable means of international co-operation for the initiation and development of constructive programmes in the economic, social and humanitarian fields, which can do much in the long run to remove the basic causes of war. At the inception of the Council in January 1946, the Canadian Representative, Mr. Paul Martin, said of it "... We represent, one might say, the positive side of the work of the Organization. Our task is not so much to prevent as to do, not so much to avoid the undesirable as to accomplish the good...". The Canadian concept of the role of the Council in the framework of the United Nations, as thus interpreted by the first Canadian Representative, remains unchanged, and Canada re-assumed the responsibilities of membership in the belief that every effort should be made by the members of the Council to carry out the tasks assigned to it under the United Nations Charter along sound, practical and realistic lines.

At the opening meeting of the Tenth Session of the Council in February 1950, the Soviet Delegation supported by the two other Cominform members, Poland and Czechoslovakia, attempted to have the Representative of Nationalist China expelled. When their proposal was rejected, all three delegations withdrew from the Session. These Governments continued their boycott of the Council during the first part of the Eleventh Session which was held in Geneva in July and August. The absence of the Cominform members had a marked effect upon the work of the Council and the atmosphere in which the debates were conducted. In the first place, there was a happy relief from cold war propaganda, and no time was wasted on irrelevant and unfounded charges with the inevitable corollary of refutations and counter-charges. Secondly, fundamental differences of opinions and interests among democratic countries could be considered on their merits, uninhibited by the efforts of the Soviet group to exploit these differences for their own purposes. While divergent views were frankly expressed, and acceptable conclusions were often arrived at only with considerable difficulty, the genuine goodwill, the high degree of responsibility, and the moderation and mutual accommodation shown on all sides, were an encouraging feature of the Council's sessions. Thus, while it is regrettable that a large part of the world remained unrepresented in this major organ of the United Nations during 1950, there is no doubt that the Council was able to perform its functions in a much more workmanlike manner than in previous years.

On the economic side, the Council conducted the usual annual review of the world economic situation, based on a comprehensive survey prepared by the Secretariat. This item of the agenda has now been accepted as providing an opportunity for a general exchange of views on world economic conditions, on important trends in international economy and on measures of a remedial or stimulating nature which might be taken on the national or international level. The economic debate which obtained most attention during 1950 was that on full employment. This item resulted from a study prepared by a group of experts appointed as a result of a decision taken by the Council in the summer of 1949 at the suggestion of the United Kingdom. The problem of economic development of underdeveloped countries maintained its place of importance on the Council's agenda. The Sub-Commission on Economic Development devoted an entire session to the study of this question and several sensible and useful resolutions drafted by this body were subsequently adopted by the Council. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, established as a result of the initiative taken by the Economic and Social Council in 1949, following the lead given by President Truman in point four of his inaugural address in 1949, began operation in 1950.

During 1950, the Council gave serious attention to several important social and humanitarian problems. The General Assembly at its Fourth Session decided to place the United Nations Programme of Advisory Social Welfare Services on a continuing basis and the Economic and Social Council drafted a revised resolution to govern this programme. The Council played an important part in shaping the organization and functions of the new Office of the

High Commissioner for Refugees, which will be its continuing responsibility. It drafted the Statute which will serve to govern the activities of the Office. Closely related to this work was the preparation of an international convention on refugees, which was transmitted to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. The problem of future activities of the United Nations on behalf of needy children was also dealt with by the Council during 1950, and proved to be one of the most difficult issues on which to secure general agreement, because of the wide divergence of views on what kind of assistance should and could be given by the United Nations in this field. The draft International Covenant on Human Rights, transmitted to the Council by its Commission on Human Rights, gave rise to a lengthy and lively debate which resulted in a request to the General Assembly to give policy directives to the Human Rights Commission on certain broad aspects of the Covenant on which general agreement had been impossible to achieve.

The Eleventh Session of the Council opened a few days after the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea. This raised for the first time the question of the desirability of implementing in some form Article 65 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for assistance to be given by the Economic and Social Council to the Security Council upon the latter's request. The Security Council did in fact make such a request, and the Economic and Social Council unanimously adopted a resolution pledging its co-operation. By the same resolution the Council decided not to close its session when the agenda had been disposed of, but to adjourn temporarily so that it could meet again at United Nations Headquarters at the call of the President, when matters under this resolution required further action. In fact, the Council met again at Lake Success in October and November to prepare, at the request of the General Assembly, detailed plans for a United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea. Before this meeting the Cominform governments had resumed attendance at United Nations meetings and the Representatives of the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Poland, therefore, attended the Council while these plans were being drafted. They took an active part in the discussions, submitted many amendments, and in the end abstained on the final resolution on the grounds that political considerations had been introduced by the inclusion in the preamble of a reference to North Korean aggression.

During 1951 important developments may take place in connection with the organization of the Economic and Social Council. There is criticism in some quarters that the present structure with its functional commissions, sub-commissions, and regional economic commissions, is unnecessarily cumbersome, and that it could be simplified to advantage. There is a certain amount of support for having the Economic and Social Council, like the Security Council, meet in continuous session, and for abolishing some of its functional commissions. The Council was, in any event, under obligation to make a special review of the work of the regional economic commissions not later than 1951, with a view to determining whether they should be terminated, modified, or continued. In considering, at the Eleventh Session, what action should be taken preparatory

to deciding on the future of the regional commissions, it became clear that the Council at large generally recognized that the question of the entire organization of the Council should be thoroughly reviewed. A resolution was, therefore, adopted asking the President to appoint an ad hoc committee to study this matter, and to report to the Thirteenth Session of the Council in July 1951, with recommendations.

The responsibilities of the Council lie in fields which are not spectacular, and its achievements tend for that reason to pass almost unnoticed. Nevertheless, it can play a major role in implementing the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and it is important that it pursue its objectives with vigour. During 1950 the Council has dealt with more important issues, and has accomplished more in the way of positive results than in any year of its existence. In part, its more businesslike working methods and, therefore, better results, can be traced to the absence of the Cominform representatives, but in particular, it results from a growing recognition and appreciation of the magnitude of the problems to be tackled, and the necessity for concentrating limited resources on projects of maximum value. It is to be hoped that this encouraging trend will continue so that sound progress and gradual expansion in the field of economic and social co-operation may be achieved over the next few years.

### **Aid for Korea**

From the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the United Nations concerned itself not only with its obligation to repel armed aggression, but also with the necessity by co-operative action to help the Korean people repair the ravages of war in their country.

The first step in this direction was taken by the Security Council when, on the last day of July 1950, it adopted a resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council and other appropriate United Nations organs to provide such assistance as the Unified Command might request for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea. The Economic and Social Council was in session when the Security Council resolution was passed. On August 14, the President of the Council introduced a resolution in plenary session and spoke to this item on behalf of the Council. The resolution declared the readiness of the Economic and Social Council to co-operate with the Unified Command in support of the civilian population of Korea and invited the co-operation of Specialized Agencies and appropriate non-governmental organizations in this effort. By the same resolution the Council decided not to close its Eleventh Session when it had disposed of its ordinary business, but to adjourn temporarily so that it could meet again at United Nations headquarters to consider what action might be required under this resolution. The Council recorded a unanimous vote on the resolution concerning Korea (the three Soviet bloc delegations were, of course, absent).

When the General Assembly opened its Fifth Session in September, wide support was quickly obtained for an eight-power resolution setting forth the general objectives of a post-hostilities settlement in Korea. In addition to military and political action,

the resolution provided for a large-scale United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation of the civilian population of Korea, and requested the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the Specialized Agencies, to prepare plans for the programme and to report back urgently to the General Assembly.

In compliance with the request of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council met again at Lake Success on October 14, and by early November had completed its task. Its recommendations were contained in a draft resolution which was adopted without change by the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> The resolution included both organizational plans and a statement of policy to govern the execution of the programme. A United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency was to be established under the direction of a United Nations Agent-General, responsible to the General Assembly. Careful provision was made for co-ordination with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, with the designated Korean authorities, appropriate Specialized Agencies, and inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. An advisory committee consisting of representatives of five member governments was to advise the Agent-General on major financial, procurement, distribution, and other economic problems relating to his planning and operations. Members of this Advisory Committee were Canada, India, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. The resolution envisaged the commencement of the rehabilitation programme about January 1, 1951, and the estimates of requirements were based on an initial period from that date until early 1952. Certain categories of priorities of supplies and services were drawn up to cover this period. First priority was to be given to the provision of the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter for the population of Korea, and measures to prevent epidemics. Second highest priority was to be given to projects such as the reconstruction of transport and power facilities which would yield early results in the indigenous production of basic necessities. As the programme develops, emphasis would be shifted to the provision of other materials, supplies and equipment for the reconstruction or replacement of war-damaged facilities, necessary to the economic life of the country.

The statement of policy approved by the General Assembly provided, *inter alia*, that it was the objective of the United Nations to furnish relief and rehabilitation supplies, transport and services, to supplement the general recovery effort to be undertaken by the Korean people; that the assistance to be given by the United Nations must not be accompanied by any conditions of a political nature; and while the programme should be consistent with the pattern of long-term economic development in Korea, it was itself necessarily limited to relief and rehabilitation; and that the supplies to be provided under the programme should be equitably distributed to all classes of the population without discrimination as to race, creed or political belief.

In a separate resolution on the same subject, the General Assembly requested the President to appoint a negotiating committee for the purpose of consulting, during the Fifth Session of the

<sup>1</sup>For text of this resolution, see Appendix 12, pp. 173-177.

General Assembly, with member and non-member states on the amount which governments might be willing to contribute toward the financing of the programme for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. This resolution provided that after the Negotiating Committee has completed its work, a meeting of member and non-member states would be called at which members might commit themselves to their national contributions, and the contributions of non-members might be made known. The member states appointed by the President to the Negotiating Committee were Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay.

The total budget for the operation of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency was not finally determined, but from information made available by the Unified Command, and by the Representative in Korea of the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council estimated that the costs of the programme for the initial period, from January 1, 1951, until early 1952, would be in the neighbourhood of \$250 million. At the end of the year, the Canadian Government was giving consideration to the contribution which Canada might make to this programme.

After the plans for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea were laid, military reverses suffered by United Nations forces necessitated a change in the time-table for the commencement of the programme. Therefore, while arrangements for the organization were completed and the funds pledged, no action would be taken until the political and military situation in Korea was clarified.

Meanwhile there have, of course, been pressing emergency needs resulting from the destruction of property and the creation of a grave refugee problem. Immediate aid was, in fact, provided from the beginning through the Unified Command, under whose authority emergency relief activities in Korea were carried out. Most of the relief supplies so far distributed were furnished by the United States Army, but several other countries contributed urgently needed commodities and medical supplies; and certain Specialized Agencies, as well as the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, provided technical personnel and co-operated in other ways in this humanitarian effort to lessen the misery of the Korean people.

## **Aid for Under-Developed Areas**

### **Technical Assistance**

Though the activities of the United Nations in providing technical assistance to economically backward countries have been overshadowed in 1950 by urgent international political problems, both the immediate necessity and the long-range importance of extending to under-developed countries of the world assistance in their economic development have been underlined by the very nature of these political developments.

The guiding principles of the expanded technical assistance programme were approved by the Fourth Session of the General Assembly in November 1949, and it was originally intended that the programme should start at the beginning of 1950. The actual

operation of the programme was, however, delayed until the middle of the year because of the postponement of the Technical Assistance Conference at which governments were to make known their financial contributions. Although hampered by the reluctance of many under-developed countries to put forward specific requests for assistance until it was known what funds would be available for the programme, the organizations taking part used the interval to make their own administrative preparations.

The Technical Assistance Conference, attended by forty-six United Nations member countries and eight other countries which are members of participating Specialized Agencies, met at Lake Success on June 12, 1950. None of the countries of Eastern Europe with the exception of Yugoslavia participated in the Conference. A total of over \$20 million, of which the United States contributed \$12.5 million, was pledged for the first eighteen months of the operation of the programme. The keynote for the under-developed countries was sounded by the Indian Representative who appealed for 'dynamic action' to assist them in meeting their problems of economic development. Although disappointment was expressed by some of the under-developed countries that the wealthier members of the international community had not contributed more, many of those who had been most closely involved in plans for the programme had grave doubts whether in the first stage of the programme the United Nations would be able to find the experts and facilities on which to spend wisely more than \$20 million.

In announcing the Canadian contribution of \$850,000 the Canadian Representative stressed that the programme was capable of development provided it had a solid foundation and that, although the contributions which were announced were somewhat more modest than at one time might have been expected, they were based on a realistic calculation of the amount which could effectively be spent in the first stage of the programme. He stated that the Canadian Government intended to do everything possible to see that as many Canadian experts as possible were made available to other countries, and that it was his government's intention to make facilities available so that students and apprentices from other countries might come to Canada to share Canadian skills and experience. He said that in estimating the contribution which it would be able to make to the programme, the Canadian Government had found it necessary to take into consideration its other extensive obligations, particularly its obligations to other United Nations activities to which Canada had always been a substantial contributor. He also mentioned that, like other Commonwealth governments, the Canadian Government was making a contribution to the Colombo programme for technical assistance to the countries of South and South-East Asia.

The Canadian view, expressed both at the Technical Assistance Conference and later at ECOSOC, was that the programme should be devoted primarily to technical assistance which would contribute to increasing food supplies, improving health and social standards, making administrative services more efficient, and developing essential natural resources. This view was in line with the action taken by the Conference when it approved the percentage allocations to be made to the participating agencies and organizations. The

largest share of the special account, twenty-nine per cent, was allocated to FAO and twenty-two per cent to WHO. Of the remainder, eleven per cent was allocated to ILO, fourteen per cent to UNESCO, and one per cent to ICAO. Twenty-three per cent of the fund was allocated to the United Nations itself which is responsible for the more general aspects of the programme such as providing assistance through comprehensive exploratory surveys, technical advisory services, scientific and industrial research projects, pilot and administrative projects, and the dissemination of technical information and training under fellowships in public administration, economic and social affairs. In order to carry out these United Nations responsibilities in the field of technical assistance, the Secretary-General established the Technical Assistance Administration as an integral part of his Secretariat and in September 1950 he announced the appointment of Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, formerly Canadian Deputy Minister of Resources and Development, as Director-General of the Administration. Dr. Keenleyside earlier in the year headed a United Nations technical assistance mission to Bolivia.

Co-ordination between the various agencies extending technical assistance is achieved through the Technical Assistance Board, presided over by the Secretary-General or his representative, and attended by the executive heads of the United Nations and the directors-general of the participating agencies. The Board is itself responsible to the Technical Assistance Committee, consisting of representatives of member governments of the Economic and Social Council, which is charged with supervising the technical assistance activities under the expanded programme. Canada, as a member of the Economic and Social Council until the end of 1952, is a member of this body and is thus able to assist in exercising supervision over the programme to ensure that the fund is expended with the maximum effectiveness.

In giving its support to the principles guiding the United Nations technical assistance programme and in making a financial contribution to the special account, the Canadian Government accepted a continuing responsibility for the success of the programme. When the Canadian Government announced its contribution, it instructed the Department of External Affairs in co-operation with other interested departments to develop a programme to plan and co-ordinate Canadian participation in the expanded programme. Because of the continuing responsibilities which Canada has accepted not only under the United Nations technical assistance programme but also under the co-operative plan for technical assistance to South and South-East Asia, as well as additional responsibilities resulting from a number of direct requests for technical assistance from foreign governments, it was decided that any machinery set up within the Government should co-ordinate all Canadian activities with regard to technical assistance. A technical assistance service has therefore been established in the Department of Trade and Commerce. The Director of this unit reports regularly on its operations to an interdepartmental group drawn from interested government departments, the chairman of which is an officer of the Department of External Affairs. In setting up the Technical

Assistance Unit, the Government agreed to make special arrangements to enable federal civil servants to accept temporary appointments under the technical assistance programmes and drew to the attention of all federal government departments and agencies that their co-operation both in respect of encouraging employees to accept temporary positions abroad under these programmes and in making available to trainees facilities in their fields of activity, is essential for effective Canadian participation in the technical assistance programmes.

From the time that the United Nations expanded programme came into operation until the end of 1950, the Canadian Government had received twenty-five requests from the United Nations for the placement of United Nations fellowship holders in government departments, industry and universities. In only two cases was it found impossible to make suitable facilities available. Civil servants came to Canada from such widely scattered countries as Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Haiti, India, Iraq, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan and Thailand. Their interests were in such divergent fields as veterinary services, taxation assessment, industrial development, forestry, hydro-electric power development, public administration, geological surveys, census-taking and civil service personnel administration. In addition, a group of civil servants from representative under-developed countries attending the United Nations seminar in public administration spent several days in Ottawa participating in a programme arranged by the Civil Service Commission.

It has been found somewhat more difficult to recruit Canadian experts and technicians to serve abroad. Nevertheless, in addition to lending the services of Canadian Government officials and civil servants to FAO, WHO and ILO for special technical assistance projects, assistance has been given to the Technical Assistance Administration in recruiting experts for a technical assistance mission for Colombia as well as a survey mission to make recommendations with regard to administrative, economic and social problems which will face the new Libyan Government.

### **Economic Development**

Under-developed countries have been seeking, through the United Nations, funds for their capital development as a complement to the technical assistance which they are now receiving through it. They are asking for this financial assistance to make possible the numerous projects which they hope to undertake within the next few years. Thus, at its Fourth Session in 1949, the General Assembly requested ECOSOC to prepare "studies and recommendations for international action concerning the urgent problems of the financing, in all its aspects, of economic development in under-developed countries".

The report of the sub-commission of ECOSOC which studied this question emphasized the need for the under-developed countries to take some initiative. It is noteworthy that the majority of the members of this sub-commission came from under-developed countries. Their recommendations for the most advantageous mobilization of their own domestic capital included the development

of land banks, farmers' credit unions, central financial institutions, and sound fiscal policy. The report showed clearly that there was a great deal which the under-developed countries could do for themselves in order to raise the necessary capital and that the primary responsibility was theirs.

Nevertheless, the sub-commission also recognized that the continuing need for capital from abroad would make development dependent on the availability of foreign exchange. This problem could not be solved by the under-developed countries alone. They would require direct financial assistance from the more advanced countries. Investment in under-developed countries, however, has been discouraged by their own discriminatory regulations which often favour local industries and penalize foreign capitalists. ECOSOC, acting in part on the recommendations of the sub-commission, recommended that governments adopt legislation to prevent unfair discrimination against foreign investment capital, and that they draw up bilateral treaties to this effect, if necessary. The Council rejected a proposal for the drawing up of an international code for the fair treatment of international investment capital. It was decided that it was first necessary to establish the basic economic conditions to provide a favourable "climate" for foreign investment. The Council also agreed that governments of the more highly developed countries should seek to encourage the investment of private capital in under-developed countries.

The Soviet and other Eastern European Delegations criticized these recommendations during the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. They maintained that, to prevent foreign domination of the economies of the under-developed countries, domestic financing alone should be used. The under-developed countries themselves, having played such an important part in preparing these recommendations, did not join in this criticism. On the contrary, they again emphasized the need for foreign investment capital to defray the costs involved in importing the capital goods necessary for their economic development. The resolution prepared by ECOSOC on the financing of economic development was unanimously approved by the General Assembly.

Some criticism was directed against the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development during the meeting of ECOSOC and at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. This criticism was based on the feeling that the Bank had, in the past, followed a too restrictive policy in advancing financial assistance. However, a number of delegations pointed out that the Bank had shown signs of liberalizing its lending policy; money could be advanced with respect to non-self-liquidating projects and loans could be made if the economic and financial condition of the borrowing country were satisfactory.

The General Assembly also directed its attention to the outdated systems of land tenure which hamper the economic progress of many under-developed countries. ECOSOC has been asked to prepare a report recommending the best methods for instituting land reform and encouraging viable small holdings. These recommendations will be offered to the under-developed countries as a

basis for reforming their land tenure systems and thus improving the condition of their agricultural classes.

The Canadian Delegation to ECOSOC played an active part in preparing the resolution on the financing of economic development which was approved at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. Canada was represented on a special working group which drafted this resolution.

## Full Employment

The Fifth Session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution implementing Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations under which member states are pledged to promote "full employment" within their own national boundaries and to cooperate for the attainment of this objective throughout the world. This resolution was prepared, in the main, by the Economic and Social Council at its Eleventh Session. The preamble of the resolution affirms confidence that full and productive employment can be maintained without having oppressive systems of government exercising full economic and political control over their peoples. The resolution states that national economies operating under conditions of full employment can exist in an expanding world economy without abridging the fundamental social and economic freedoms of the individual.

The operative section of the resolution lists a number of national and international measures for the maintenance of full employment to be carried out by national governments acting together with other members of the United Nations. Thus, each government is requested to publish an annual statement outlining its economic objectives or forecasts for the coming year with special reference, wherever practicable, to its goals in employment, production, consumption, investment and other such measurable economic factors. In addition, national governments are asked to indicate measures to promote a steadily expanding economy, to combat recessionary tendencies, to meet unemployment emergencies and to avoid inflation. The resolution offers several suggestions for the implementation of these measures, such as adaptable public investment policies and budgetary controls.

These annual statements which governments are requested to make public are to be used as the basis for discussion in the Economic and Social Council which will review annually the employment situation throughout the world.

Recognizing that the restrictive policies adopted by many countries during the thirties spread unemployment and depression from country to country, the General Assembly in its resolution on full employment recommends to all governments that such policies be avoided in order to prevent a recurrence of world-wide depression. The resolution, therefore, urges that governments strive to keep restrictions on trade and international investment to the minimum. The Assembly also recognizes the over-riding importance of maintaining a workable equilibrium in the international balance of payments. It maintains that, in the post-war years, the chief danger

to maintaining a world-wide high level of employment lies in the possibility that disequilibrium in the international balance of payments, resulting in a decline in the volume of international trade, would have a serious effect on the employment situation in most countries. The Assembly therefore calls for the maintenance of a "high level and regular rate of flow of international investment capital for development purposes," points to the importance of each country's maintaining an adequate level of reserves in convertible currencies and gold, and urges the reduction of quantitative restrictions on international trade imposed in the interest of maintaining a balance of payments.

The General Assembly also directed its attention to the employment problems of the under-developed countries where there is under-employment. The level of economic activity in these countries is not sufficiently high to provide adequate employment opportunities to the population. The United Nations is acting to overcome this situation through its expanded programme for technical assistance and action to raise the level of economic development.<sup>1</sup> The Assembly has provided for the establishment of a committee of experts to prepare a report on this problem for further consideration by the Economic and Social Council.

The discussion in the Economic and Social Council, where the resolution was prepared for consideration by the General Assembly, was based on a study prepared by a group of experts. This report is entitled "National and International Measures for Full Employment".<sup>2</sup>

In the discussion the Canadian Delegation pointed out that Canada could not accept recommendations for automatically bringing into play arbitrarily prescribed administrative measures whenever unemployment rose to a fixed maximum percentage. This was particularly so in a country dependent on external trade and containing wide regional differences. The Canadian Delegation thought that the time and place for compensatory action had to be left to the discretion of national governments acting in the light of circumstances in their particular economies.

The resolution prepared by the Economic and Social Council is a compromise among various viewpoints. The United Kingdom Delegation had originally proposed a resolution which favoured the adoption of automatic measures to combat unemployment. These, and certain proposals put forward by other countries, were not acceptable to the majority of delegations. Nevertheless, the final resolution, drawn up by a working group of which Canada was a member, was acceptable to all delegations and was approved unanimously. The Canadian Delegation voted in support of it both in ECOSOC and in the General Assembly.

## Refugees and Stateless Persons

Looking ahead to the time when the International Refugee Organization will have gone out of existence and with a view to making some permanent provisions for alleviating the plight of

<sup>1</sup>See article on aid for under-developed areas, pp. 58-63.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations publication. Sales No. 1949.11. A. 3 obtainable from the Ryerson Press, Toronto.

refugees caused either by their lack of nationality or the absence of a government or authority to whom they could appeal, the United Nations in 1949, and again in 1950, acted to provide for the situation. In 1949, the decision was taken to establish an office of High Commissioner for Refugees; the details attendant upon the setting up of this new United Nations body were left to the Secretary-General and the Economic and Social Council to draft in the form of a statute. This statute was subsequently amended and approved by the Fifth Session of the Assembly in 1950.

The concept of a High Commissioner for Refugees is not an entirely new one, but the functions which the new High Commissioner will be called upon to perform are not the same as those that IRO has been fulfilling during the past forty months; nor are they the same as those of the pre-war League of Nations' High Commissioners. The Assembly decided that some means must be established of providing international protection for refugees who have no authority to whom they can appeal when they are being discriminated against or otherwise subjected to unfair treatment. It is true that IRO performed this function among others, but IRO was established for a temporary purpose and for a limited period of time. The United Nations, it was thought, should make some permanent provision for carrying on this necessary activity. An additional important duty which the High Commissioner will perform will be to assist governments and private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees or their assimilation within new national communities. His work will, of course, be entirely non-political and will be concerned as a rule with groups and categories of refugees instead of with individuals who may appeal to him for assistance. This restriction on his duties was thought to be necessary because of the limited size of his office and his staff, and because of the large numbers of refugees who might wish to make use of his services.

In 1950, both the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly debated at length the question of what classes of refugees should be able to avail themselves of the facilities offered by the new High Commissioner. Obviously, some definition of "refugee" for this purpose had to be formulated. Two schools of thought quickly developed in the United Nations debates. On the one hand, many delegations, notably that of the United States, were in favour of spelling out the various categories of persons who could appeal to the High Commissioner. The advocates of this view prevailed at the Geneva session of the Council. On the other hand, several delegations, including the United Kingdom and Canadian, thought that it would be better if the definition adopted were more flexible and broader, leaving in some respects to the discretion of the High Commissioner the decision whether or not his office could extend its facilities to particular groups of refugees. It seemed to these delegations, furthermore, that it was more in keeping with a United Nations office to have its responsibilities defined in as broad terms as possible. The Fifth Session of the Assembly approved a compromise definition which was the result of a great deal of behind-the-scenes work, particularly by a small working group which included representatives from several countries including Canada.

The Assembly, in addition to approving the detailed statute for the Office of High Commissioner, elected a well known and distinguished Netherlands subject, Dr. G. J. Van Heuven Goedhart, as its first High Commissioner for Refugees. He has been called upon to report to the next session of the General Assembly on the results of his first year's work. Among other things, Dr. Goedhart will endeavour to promote the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervise their application and, if necessary, propose amendments to them. One of the first conventions of this nature which will receive his attention will be the United Nations convention on refugees and the protocol on stateless persons which is discussed later in this article. In addition, the High Commissioner will try to improve the situation of refugees: by promoting special agreements with governments to improve the conditions and to reduce the number of these unfortunate people who require protection; by assisting governments and private organizations in their promotion of voluntary repatriation or assimilation; by prevailing upon governments to admit refugees; and by co-ordinating the efforts of all private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees.

The General Assembly was careful to stipulate that the High Commissioner should not appeal to governments for funds or make a general appeal of this nature. The administrative expenses of his office will be carried on the regular United Nations budget. No special financial provision has been made for the High Commissioner to administer relief or provide for the care and maintenance or transportation of refugees. These will be the responsibility of the interested governments. On the other hand, he is empowered to administer any funds, public or private, which he may receive for assistance to refugees by distributing them to those private and public agencies which are best qualified to administer such assistance.

The task of the new High Commissioner will not be an easy one. He will probably be besieged with all kinds of requests for assistance which he will have to turn down. His will not be a job of caring for the physical wants of refugees, great as these may be. He will, instead, be a kind of diplomatic guardian angel. The results of his labours will depend, to a very large extent, on the co-operation which he receives from governments.

### **Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees**

During 1950 the United Nations drafted a convention designed to guarantee to refugees the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination. The belief behind this convention was that a consolidated convention on the international status of refugees and a protocol on stateless persons, once drafted and acceded to by a number of countries, would constitute an important step forward in placing refugees on an equal footing with other classes of people.

Consequently the Economic and Social Council established an ad hoc committee to prepare a comprehensive convention on refugees. This committee, in the course of two sessions during 1950, produced

a very useful international instrument. This instrument covers a considerable number of rights which will be extended to refugees by those countries which adhere to it. It includes general articles such as one on non-discrimination which stipulates that no contracting state shall discriminate against a refugee within its territory on account of his race, religion, or country of origin, or because he is a refugee. There are other more specific clauses which in some cases call upon contracting states to grant refugees similar rights to those given to their own nationals, and in other cases rights similar to those given to other aliens. Examples of these rights are those concerning the acquisition of property and leases and other contracts relating to property; rights concerning the protection of industrial property such as inventions, industrial designs, trademarks and trade names; rights of association; the right of free access to the courts of law; and the right to engage in wage-earning employment and self-employment. Similarly, contracting states are asked to grant refugees the same rationing privileges as nationals and to treat them not less favourably than aliens in matters pertaining to housing. There are other clauses dealing with such matters as public education, public relief, labour legislation and social security, freedom of movement, identity papers and travel documents.

There were, of course, differences of opinion at the two sessions of the special committee and at the sessions of ECOSOC and of the General Assembly which considered various aspects of this convention and of its attached protocol on stateless persons. The draft, as a result, contains many compromises. Nevertheless, many delegations have expressed reservations on certain points, and the convention will contain a reservation clause making it possible for formal reservations to be made at the time each country accedes to the convention. Certain basic parts of the convention, of course, are excluded from this right of reservation.

The Fifth Session of the General Assembly decided to ask the Secretary-General to convene a diplomatic conference in 1951 in Geneva, for the purpose of finalizing the text of the convention and the protocol, and of opening it for signature. Both members and non-members of the United Nations will be invited to participate in this conference. In addition, the Assembly formulated a compromise definition of the term "refugee", which representatives attending the conference are asked to take into account. The conference, of course, is free to accept, modify, or reject this recommended definition which represented a compromise reached by those countries which preferred a narrow category-type definition and those which preferred a broad definition.

The Canadian Delegation has already given its general approval to this convention, and has been active in its preparation. The Canadian Representative was the chairman of the ad hoc committee which prepared the first draft in January and February 1950. It will, of course, be necessary for a federal-state clause to be included before Canada can become a party to it because some of the rights included in the agreement concern matters which come within the provincial field of legislation.

## Long-range Activities for Children

For the past year, various bodies of the United Nations have been giving thought to the needs of children throughout the world and the sort of activity which the United Nations can best undertake. A survey of the continuing needs of children revealed that some 400 million children are under-privileged and in need of some form of assistance which their own national governments are, at the present time, unable to provide. The Specialized Agencies concerned, particularly WHO and FAO, UNICEF itself and the Social Commission, all gave attention to this problem during the early part of 1950, and the Economic and Social Council, after prolonged discussions inside and outside the Council chambers, decided upon a draft resolution for the consideration of the General Assembly.

At all these stages it was apparent that while there was unanimity of purpose in supporting co-operative action through the United Nations to benefit the world's under-privileged children, there was, unfortunately, a wide divergence of views on the nature of the programme which would best serve this purpose. Three main lines of approach emerged during the various debates on this subject. The governments of under-developed countries have been solidly behind the extension of the activities of UNICEF to their countries, and the continuation and expansion of those activities on a permanent basis. In this view, they have been strongly supported by France. The Australian Government has pressed for a temporary continuation of UNICEF for a further two-year period, and has been opposed to any decision on long-range activities at least for the present. Its approach won support, in varying degrees, from the United Kingdom, New Zealand and a few other countries. The Canadian and United States Governments, on the other hand, took the attitude that now that the post-war emergency conditions in Europe, which led to the creation of UNICEF, have greatly improved, the Fund's mandate should come to an end and a new programme based on the continuing needs of children throughout the world should be established. This new programme should concentrate on assistance to governments, through technical and advisory services and demonstration projects, in initiating and developing their own programmes of child welfare, though provision should be retained for relief supplies in cases of sudden and serious emergency. Canadian Representatives at all the United Nations organs considering this question during 1950 have stressed that, in the view of the Canadian Government, this is the only type of programme which will do more than scratch the surface of the problem posed by the needs of more than 400 million under-privileged children.

The Social Commission's recommendations, which called for the uninterrupted continuation and development of the activities of UNICEF, were opposed by the Canadian, United Kingdom and United States Representatives mainly on the grounds of being too ambitious in scope. At the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council, the terms of the Social Commission's recommendations were slightly modified and the United States Delegation found itself able, with certain reservations concerning the methods of financing the programme, to join with other delegations in spon-

soring a resolution which won majority support. The Canadian Delegation abstained on this resolution because it considered that, with the limited funds likely to be available, the programme envisaged would lead to such a diffusion of resources as to minimize its effectiveness on all fronts. For that reason, and because the provisions for co-ordination with Specialized Agencies and other bodies also operating in the field of child welfare were considered unsatisfactory, the Canadian Delegation hoped that major revisions would be made in the resolution by the General Assembly.

In the event, the General Assembly dealt with the item on long-range activities for children from quite a different angle and took as a basis for discussion not the Council resolution but a resolution submitted by Australia which called for the continuation of UNICEF for two years and a further review at the end of that period. The representatives of the under-developed countries were happy to use this resolution as a starting point since it provided for a shift of emphasis to non-European countries. They succeeded in securing the adoption of an important amendment which provides for the continuation of UNICEF for a three-year period and a review by the General Assembly at that time *with the object of continuing the Fund on a permanent basis*. The Canadian and United States Delegations, supported by a few others, attempted in vain to secure agreement on a new long-term programme concentrating, except in emergency conditions, upon technical and advisory services to national governments. When it became clear that the Australian resolution, as amended, would gain overwhelming support, and no alternative scheme would be acceptable, the Canadian Delegation voted in favour of it after a Canadian amendment was adopted emphasizing the desirability of strengthening permanent child health and welfare programmes of the countries receiving assistance. Although the final result is not, in the Canadian view, the best solution of the problem, it represents the main United Nations effort in the field of assistance to children and Canada would certainly not wish to oppose it. The Fund will, of course, continue to be financed on a voluntary contribution basis.

The United States Government has been strongly opposed to the continuation of UNICEF beyond 1950 although it has, of course, been far the largest contributor to the Fund up to date. On the final resolution which was otherwise adopted unanimously, the United States Delegation abstained. If the United States Government maintains its position and declines to contribute further to UNICEF, its effectiveness will be greatly reduced, and indeed will be negligible, unless other countries give financial support on a much larger scale than in former years.

## International Children's Emergency Fund

In the four years since the International Children's Emergency Fund<sup>1</sup> was established by the General Assembly, it has received contributions amounting to \$152,847,000 (U.S. equivalent) from

<sup>1</sup>For the membership of the reconstituted Executive Board, see Appendix 20, p. 189.

forty-seven countries and two territories, and has allocated \$151,917,500 to forty-six countries, twelve territories and for the relief of Palestine refugees. The contributions include \$106,636,000 from governments, \$12,454,000 from voluntary sources, \$32,332,000 from UNRRA assets, and \$1,425,000 from miscellaneous sources. Canada has contributed a total of \$8,194,090 — \$6,722,727 from the Government and \$1,471,363 from voluntary contributors.

The main emphasis in the first two years was on supplying food to the children of war-devastated countries in Europe and in assisting certain broad medical programmes there. European programmes are being gradually completed, and after the exhaustion of existing supplies, the Fund will continue these programmes only in Yugoslavia, Italy and Greece, where there are special needs to be met. As conditions in Europe improved and the work of the Fund became more widely known, there was increasing pressure to extend its services to other areas. While emergency needs, such as those of refugees from Palestine and Korea, continue to be met from the Fund, the majority of requests from governments in Asia and Latin America are for assistance in developing their permanent health and welfare programmes for children. This assistance usually takes the form of providing supplies, technical advice and the training of experts and practitioners either at home or abroad.

The Fund has adhered to its policy that, except for special emergencies, the receiving government must contribute to the development of its programme an amount equal to the UNICEF allocation. In many instances, government expenditures far exceed those of UNICEF. This increasing emphasis on long-range programmes has produced certain changes in the work of the Fund. As the necessary planning and securing of persons and special equipment often take a great deal of time, the development of programmes and the rate of expenditure are slower than when the main concern was with shipments of food or raw materials.

The long-term programmes require close co-operation with the Division of Social Activities in the United Nations Secretariat and with the Specialized Agencies, particularly the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Most programmes are concerned with health. They may be for the eradication of certain specific diseases or for the building up of child and maternal health services. WHO provides the necessary technicians for these programmes, but in most cases the costs have been borne by UNICEF and have accounted for a substantial part of each allocation. WHO has recently informed the UNICEF Board that in future it is prepared to recommend the payment of technicians from the technical assistance funds at its disposal, provided the projects qualify for such financing. If the UNICEF budget is relieved of these costs, it will be able to devote larger amounts for the purchase of supplies. This is an important consideration because in many of the under-developed countries certain programmes can be undertaken only if supplies, which must be purchased abroad, can be made available. Once a programme has been established by this method and its value recognized, experience shows that the government is usually able to continue it without outside assistance.

## International Covenant on Human Rights

The United Nations Charter includes among its principles and purposes the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. As a means of furthering international recognition of these obligations, the General Assembly decided in 1947 that an International Bill of Human Rights should be drawn up, and the task of preparing this instrument was assigned to the Commission on Human Rights. The Bill is to consist of a declaration and a covenant, with measures for implementation. The Declaration of Human Rights was completed in 1948 and approved by the General Assembly on December 10 of that year. It is a statement of general principles and, as a solemn declaration of the General Assembly, carries considerable moral force, but it is not legally binding upon member states.

For the past two years the Commission on Human Rights has devoted most of its time to drafting a covenant and measures for its implementation. The Covenant, unlike the Declaration, will take the form of a multilateral treaty and its provisions will, therefore, be binding in international law on governments acceding to it. It was to be expected that there would be divergent views on the proper scope of the Covenant, the terminology to be used, and the degree of precision with which the basic rights and limitations on these rights should be defined. There have also been serious differences of opinion on the measures which should be taken to implement the Covenant when it comes into effect.

The Human Rights Commission, at the conclusion of its sixth session in May 1950, transmitted a draft Covenant including measures for implementation to the Economic and Social Council for consideration at its Eleventh Session. The Council studied the broad aspects of the draft Covenant and the adequacy of the proposed implementation machinery and, after consideration of the important areas of disagreement, concluded that these parts of the International Bill on Human Rights were not yet ready for final adoption by the General Assembly. It was clear, on the other hand, that the Commission on Human Rights could not improve the drafts without further guidance, and the Council, therefore, requested the General Assembly to give to the Commission policy directives on the following broad aspects of the problem: the general adequacy of the first eighteen articles defining certain human rights and fundamental freedoms included in the present draft Covenant; the question of the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the basic civil rights now included; the question of the inclusion of federal and colonial clauses; and the general adequacy of the articles relating to implementation machinery.

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly, after a lengthy debate in its Social Committee, concludes that the Covenant should be broadened in scope to include economic, social and cultural rights, as well as certain political rights; that the terminology should be as precise as possible; that recommendations should be drafted concerning the application of the Covenant in federal states; and that consideration should be given to provisions in the proposed

implementation machinery relating to petitions from individuals and organizations about alleged violations of the Covenant. The General Assembly also adopted a resolution which directs the Commission to include in the Covenant a clause explicitly providing that the Covenant must be applied to all the dependent territories of metropolitan states that adhere to it.

The position of the Canadian Delegation on these fundamental questions may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The present draft is adequate in scope, but unsatisfactory in form inasmuch as certain articles are drafted in minute detail while others contain general principles. In order to allow for greater certainty of interpretation, considerable revision is necessary.
- (2) The problem of international agreement on economic, social and cultural rights is fraught with great difficulties and requires much fuller examination. Some of the proposals for economic and social clauses are not so much definitions of individual rights as statements of governmental responsibilities in the field of social welfare. It would be extremely difficult to combine basic human rights in all these fields in a single instrument. The first Covenant should, therefore, be restricted to the traditional civil liberties.
- (3) The inclusion of a federal clause, under which the legal obligations assumed by a federal state would be limited to those matters coming under federal jurisdiction, is essential to Canada since many of the provisions of the Covenant lie within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures. A territorial clause should be included, as otherwise the colonial powers would find it difficult, if not impossible, to adhere to the Covenant because of their desire to respect the autonomy of colonial governments and legislatures.
- (4) The articles relating to implementation represent the minimum which a Covenant of this nature could include and are generally adequate.

The Canadian Delegation could not support the final General Assembly resolution partly because it provided for the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the first Covenant, and partly because it was repetitious, imprecise, and might lead to confusion. Although the Delegation did not consider that the resolution constituted satisfactory guidance to the Commission, it was not prepared to oppose any resolution which might assist in furthering the promotion of human rights and it, therefore, abstained on the vote.

The Commission on Human Rights, at its seventh session in the spring of 1951, will again take up this problem, and in accordance with the directives received from the General Assembly and in the light of further comments from governments will revise the Covenant for submission to the General Assembly in 1951.

## Advisory Social Welfare Services

The Advisory Social Welfare Services instituted by UNRRA and continued under the authorization of the General Assembly in 1946 have developed into one of the important services of the United Nations. The original resolution authorized the Secretary-General to provide experts to advise governments on the development of welfare services, to award fellowships to permit qualified officials to observe the experience of other countries, to hold seminars for regional consultation, and to provide technical publications.

Canada has received fellows for observation of Canadian practices during each year of the programme and has, on occasion, provided experts to advise other governments. One Canadian has been awarded a fellowship. Canada has supported continuation of this work and approved the proposal made by the General Assembly in 1949 to put these services on a continuing basis for which provision would be made annually in the United Nations budget. This has made possible planning over a longer period, which has undoubtedly made the programme more effective and more efficient.

As immediate post-war needs have been met, the general trend has been to increase the services to under-developed countries. Experience has shown that in many under-developed countries the number of senior officials to whom fellowships might be awarded is limited and it is often difficult for them to be away from their posts. A number of requests were received for scholarships for junior persons who need professional training which is not available in their own countries. In addition, the need was recognized for demonstration projects within a country to illustrate the value of certain types of work. The Economic and Social Council, in reviewing the programme at its Eleventh Session, recommended that these two services should be added to those originally included in 1946. The General Assembly approved this recommendation.

With the development of technical assistance, it became apparent, as was pointed out by the Canadian Delegation in 1949, that much of the work of the Advisory Social Welfare Services might appropriately be incorporated into this programme. The Secretary-General reported to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly that this part of the Secretariat had now been transferred to the Technical Assistance Administration. This transfer should prevent duplication and make for greater efficiency; it should also serve to keep the social aspects of technical assistance to the fore. The importance of these social aspects has been stressed by Canadian delegations to the Social Commission and the Economic and Social Council.

In general, the Canadian Delegation at the United Nations Assembly in 1950 expressed its satisfaction at the work which had been done under the Advisory Social Welfare Services, and stressed its value both to the countries giving and to those receiving assistance.

The General Assembly approved an increase in the annual budget from \$610,500 in 1950 to \$768,500 in 1951. Canada did not support this increase, since it believed that it should be possible to provide

the additional services included in the new terms of reference by making adjustments in the total programme. Governments receiving assistance will continue to bear responsibility, as far as possible, for all or part of the local expenses connected with these services.

### Forced Labour

This subject, originally put on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council in 1948, has been debated inconclusively at a number of recent Council sessions. Attempts by the Council to obtain agreement on an impartial inquiry into forced labour conditions have failed because of the refusal of the Soviet Union and other Cominform countries to co-operate in it. In answer to an inquiry from the Secretary-General addressed to all governments, the Canadian Government replied in October 1949, stating that Canada agreed in principle to an impartial inquiry and was prepared to co-operate fully in this United Nations endeavour. Many other countries signified their willingness to co-operate in the inquiry, but in the face of the Soviet refusal to co-operate, the Council at its Tenth Session decided that no useful purpose could be served by carrying it out in restricted areas of the world and that effective action was, for the time being, impossible.

Toward the end of the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council, the United States and United Kingdom Delegations submitted a joint resolution proposing the establishment, in co-operation with ILO, of an Ad Hoc Committee to survey the field of forced labour, to assess the nature and extent of the problem, and to report the results of its studies to the Council and to ILO. The representatives of the two sponsoring governments made long and forceful statements on the Soviet forced labour system, and the United Kingdom Delegation also circulated a collection of documentary evidence in support of its charges.

Following these two statements, the Canadian Representative intervened to say that while the Canadian Delegation abhorred the barbarous practice of forced labour and would heartily endorse any action which might bring nearer the elimination of such practices, it must be recognized that the problem was an extremely difficult one with which the Council had tried repeatedly to come to grips. The joint resolution was being submitted almost at the close of the Council Session and the very important proposals it contained could not be given adequate consideration by governments in the remaining time at the Council's disposal. The United Nations could not afford to set up a body to study forced labour which might fail in its task; the Council should not establish machinery for dealing with forced labour unless it was convinced that such machinery would be effective. The Canadian Representative therefore proposed that the resolution be tabled and the debate adjourned until the next session of the Council, by which time governments would have had an opportunity to give serious thought to the suitability of the proposed machinery. This motion for adjournment was accepted by the Council and no further discussion of the substance of the resolution took place.

The Governing Body of ILO, at its meeting in November, considered the draft resolution on forced labour tabled in ECOSOC and decided to record the intention of ILO to co-operate with the Council in the proposed commission of inquiry. The Canadian Representative, supported by the Australian Representative, objected to this procedure on the ground that it was premature for ILO to take any action on an ECOSOC resolution which had not yet been approved by that body.

The draft joint resolution will come before the Economic and Social Council at its Twelfth Session in February 1951 for detailed study and final action.

### **United Nations Research Laboratories**

The Economic and Social Council in September, 1946, adopted a resolution instructing the Secretary-General to investigate the desirability of establishing international United Nations research laboratories for the study of scientific problems of recognized international importance. The Secretary-General's report on this matter was considered by the Council in August 1948, and it was decided that all governments should be informed of the Council's desire to have the proposals discussed by the governing bodies of all higher educational and research institutions.

Acting on the Council's resolution, the Canadian Government consulted some thirty Canadian institutions, six government departments, and the National Conference of Canadian Universities. A consolidated statement of the Canadian point of view was presented to the Secretary-General in November 1949. The general consensus of the Canadian institutions consulted was that the proposal to establish international research laboratories should be studied very carefully before any steps were taken which might prejudice the research in existing laboratories. The Canadian view was that the proposed international laboratories would not necessarily be the most effective method of forwarding research and better results might be obtained by the expansion of existing laboratories to the point where they would be operated at maximum efficiency. The extension of the policy of co-operative research and the fullest communication of scientific information would give more immediate and satisfactory results. Although a great deal of interest was indicated in the proposal to establish United Nations research laboratories, the general feeling was that such a project should not be undertaken at this time.

At the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council in July 1950, a discussion on this subject was held on the basis of a report from the Secretary-General containing the comments of governments and a report by the Committee of Scientific Experts which the Secretary-General had been invited to set up in co-operation with UNESCO.

The recommendations of the scientific experts envisaged several elaborate projects, including preparations for the establishment of a United Nations international computation centre, a United Nations international institute of research on the brain, a United Nations institute of social sciences, and the convening in 1951 of an inter-

national conference of scientists to formulate suggestions and give advice on the development of these three projects. On the basis of a proposal submitted by the United States, the Council adopted a resolution inviting UNESCO to prepare a detailed plan for the setting up of an international computation centre, and requesting UNESCO to submit a report to the Council evaluating the adequacy of the existing research centres and analyzing the need for and possible functions of specific regional or United Nations laboratories. The resolution also contained a provision postponing a decision on the convening of an international conference, pending the receipt of the report requested from UNESCO.

The Canadian Delegation supported the latter part of the resolution in preference to an alternative proposal to approve the calling of an international conference, but opposed those sections of the resolution which implied approval of the eventual establishment of United Nations research laboratories. Because of the inclusion of these provisions the Canadian Delegation voted against the resolution as a whole.

## **Freedom of Information**

### **Draft Convention.**

At the International Conference on Freedom of Information held in Geneva in 1948, a draft convention containing general principles relating to freedom of information was formulated for consideration by the General Assembly. Discussion of this draft convention in the General Assembly in the spring of 1949 brought out clearly the serious differences of opinion that existed on the principles of freedom of information which should be included. At the Fourth Session of the General Assembly in 1949, it was decided that discussion of the substance of the draft convention should be deferred, and that meanwhile the Commission on Human Rights should be requested to include adequate provisions on freedom of information in the draft international covenant on human rights. When the subject was again debated at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, several delegations, led by France, urged that some definite action be taken on the draft convention. Other delegations, including Canada, considered that, since the draft international covenant on human rights was to be revised for submission to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the matter of a separate convention on freedom of information should be deferred for another year, and a final decision on the necessity for such a convention should be taken only after there had been sufficient opportunity to study the provisions on this aspect of human rights to be included in the covenant. After considerable discussion, the General Assembly nevertheless decided to appoint an ad hoc committee of representatives of fifteen countries to prepare a draft convention on freedom of information, taking into account the work already done on this subject. This committee is to report to the Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council in the summer of 1951 on the results of its work and submit recommendations, particularly with

regard to the advisability of convening a plenipotentiary conference for the establishment and signature of a convention on freedom of information.

### **Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information.**

This body, which is a sub-commission of the Commission on Human Rights consisting of journalists and other experts, met at Montevideo in May 1950, and submitted its report to the Economic and Social Council at its Eleventh Session. There is, at present, no Canadian on the Sub-Commission.

Much of the time of the Sub-Commission was devoted to the preparation of a draft international code of ethics for "everyone engaged in the collection, transmission and dissemination of news". The Sub-Commission requested the Economic and Social Council to authorize the Secretary-General to circulate this draft code to all member governments for distribution to information enterprises and national professional associations in their countries, which, in turn, would be asked to transmit their comments and suggestions to the Secretary-General through governments. The Sub-Commission's recommendations included a provision for the convening of an international professional conference to deal with the draft code. The Council limited its action on this draft resolution to authorizing the Secretary-General to transmit the draft code direct to information enterprises and national and international professional associations, and to agreeing that the Sub-Commission should re-examine the draft in the light of comments received and recommend any further action which it might consider desirable, including the possibility of convening an international professional conference.

There were other proposals recommended by the Sub-Commission and later approved by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. These included a condemnation of the practice of jamming radio programmes, an appeal to governments to put an end to confiscatory measures and discriminatory action in regard to the sale and purchase of newsprint, and a recommendation that all member states, when compelled to declare an emergency, adopt measures to limit freedom of information and of the press only in the most essential circumstances and to the extent strictly required by the situation.

## **Non-Governmental Organizations**

For some time now, the Economic and Social Council has maintained a system of consultation with a large number of specified non-governmental organizations that have been given some degree of recognition by the Council. This, in a sense, has been a novel experience in that these organizations, which are not representative of governments but very often have a large international membership, are given a chance to let their views be known before one of the main organs of the United Nations. In the past this consultation, which is prescribed by a statute drawn up and approved by the Council, has manifested itself in a variety of ways: the non-governmental organizations which have been recognized by the

Council have received documentation for the sessions of the Council and its commissions; they have been invited to comment on various programmes and projects; they have, in many cases, submitted written statements on many of the outstanding subjects. Similarly they have requested the right to be heard at sessions of the Council and its N.G.O. Committee, and this right has very often been granted to them. Finally, in the past they were given the right to submit items for the agenda of the Council's sessions and, if approved, to document these items both in writing and orally.

Some of these organizations have used their privileges well, others have abused them. In particular, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) has abused all of its privileges, including that of proposing agenda items, by using the Council platform as a sounding board for the echoing and re-echoing of Soviet propaganda. Other organizations have in the past submitted items for the Council's consideration which were either ill-conceived or not properly thought out and certainly not properly documented. Still others have directed items to the Council which should have been directed in the first instance to the Specialized Agencies.

In 1950 the Council had before it a report which it had previously asked its N.G.O. Committee to prepare proposing a new statute to govern the consultative arrangements for N.G.O.'s. This new statute would have withdrawn from these organizations the right to propose items for inclusion in the agenda of the Council's sessions. It was undoubtedly the abuse of this privilege by WFTU which had led the Committee to propose this drastic action. Many delegations thought that it was a bit too severe to punish all the organizations because of the sins of a very few. Nevertheless, there was general agreement at the Council session that the arrangements needed some revision. Most delegations emphasized that the N.G.O.'s should concentrate their efforts on seeking a closer day-to-day working relationship with the Secretariat of the Council and with the Council's less spectacular, but nonetheless important functional commissions.

After a thorough discussion in the Council, a satisfactory compromise solution was reached. The agenda privilege, which, in the opinion of most delegations, was over-estimated by the non-governmental organizations but which had come to have an extremely important symbolic value to them, was not taken away entirely. Instead, the N.G.O. Committee has been given the power to decide whether an item proposed by an N.G.O. should be dropped, or whether it should be referred to the Agenda Committee for its consideration. The old arrangement was that neither the N.G.O. Committee nor the Agenda Committee had the right to keep an N.G.O. item off the Council's provisional agenda. The N.G.O. Committee will now examine all of these requests from the point of view of proper documentation, preparation and probable results which might take place if the Council agrees to discuss a particular item. The effect of this change should be to make these organizations more responsible in proposing agenda items. The Council also approved a plan whereby N.G.O.'s can propose items for inclusion in the agenda of functional commissions. Other less important decisions were taken

to improve the working relationships of the organizations with the Council and its commissions.

The Canadian Delegation made known its view that the agenda privilege had undoubtedly been abused in the past and some N.G.O.'s had been irresponsible in proposing and preparing items for the Council's agenda. Furthermore, the Canadian Representative expressed the view that these organizations were placing too much importance on the agenda privilege and not paying enough attention to other means of consultation. The Canadian Delegation would have preferred that the Council's Agenda Committee instead of the N.G.O. Committee screen these proposed items but did not press its view.

Under the new arrangements, organizations granted consultative status by the Council will consist of the following three categories: Category A Organizations which have a basic interest in most of the activities of the Council; Category B Organizations which have a special competence in only a few specialized fields; and organizations listed on a special register because they have a significant contribution to make to the work of the Council but are not, in the opinion of the Council, qualified for listing in either of the other two categories. In addition, the register will include those organizations in consultative status with a Specialized Agency.

During 1950, as in previous years, the Council made a number of up-gradings and down-gradings in its review of organizations now in consultative status and the new organizations which had recently applied or re-applied for this status. The most important addition, which was immediately classified as a Category A organization, was the new International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. This application was approved unanimously by the Council in the absence of the Soviet delegations.

It is the Canadian view that non-governmental organizations have an important part to play in helping the Economic and Social Council achieve its purposes. Indeed, the Department of External Affairs often consults Canadian affiliates of non-governmental organizations when certain matters of concern to them are coming before the United Nations and Canadian policy is being evolved. Without exception the Canadian affiliates have been most co-operative and have welcomed this chance to make known their views.

## **Commissions of the Economic and Social Council**

### **Commission on Human Rights**

The Commission on Human Rights held its sixth session in March-May 1950, and in addition to its work on the draft International Covenant on Human Rights<sup>1</sup>, considered a number of problems of human rights and recommended several resolutions for the approval of the Economic and Social Council at its Eleventh Session.

The draft resolutions prepared by the Commission included a decision to give high priority in its 1951 programme of work to the consideration of additional covenants and measures dealing with

<sup>1</sup>See pp. 71-72.

economic, social, cultural, political and other categories of human rights. Another draft resolution requested the Secretary-General to invite governments to furnish him with information concerning legislative or judicial action taken in connection with the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities. The Commission also drafted a resolution on the prevention of discrimination through education, calling for the co-operation of member governments to adopt measures in their educational institutions designed to eliminate discrimination, and requesting the co-operation of UNESCO in preparing and distributing information which would help expose fallacies of race theories and combat prejudices which give rise to discrimination.

The Commission also recommended new arrangements for the compilation and publication of the United Nations Yearbook on Human Rights. Each volume of the Yearbook will contain one section concerning the application and evolution of one of the rights or of a group of closely related rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Yearbook will continue to record international and national developments concerning human rights which have taken place during the year, and will also include texts or summaries of, or sufficient references to basic laws on human rights in respect of non-self-governing and trust territories.

### **Commission on Narcotic Drugs**

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs held its fifth session during the first two weeks of December 1950, in New York. This body is composed of representatives of fifteen countries and, under the Economic and Social Council, is primarily concerned with the making of policy in the field of international narcotic control. The Canadian Representative on the Commission is Colonel C. H. L. Sharman. In addition to routine business items, such as the national reports of addiction and illicit traffic, there were three items of unusual importance on the agenda: a draft agreement for limiting opium production and establishing an international opium monopoly; a draft agreement to replace the numerous existing international narcotic drug agreements; and a report of a commission of inquiry on the effects of coca leaf chewing in Bolivia and Peru.

The draft agreement, drawn up in 1950 by representatives of leading opium-producing countries and of the main drug-manufacturing countries, is aimed at limiting world opium production to the amount needed for medical and scientific requirements. India, Iran, Turkey and Yugoslavia, the main exporters of raw opium, have agreed to reduce and control their opium production. Agreement has not yet been reached, however, on the proposal to set up an international opium monopoly to buy and sell raw opium at agreed prices; nor has the question of the price of opium to be traded under the agreement been resolved.

At the Commission meeting, the Canadian member expressed his concern about the safeguarding of the interests of the drug-consuming countries, of which Canada was one, in any agreement arrived at by the producing and manufacturing countries. He was apprehensive of the possible effects of the proposed agreement on

the source and price of Canadian drug imports. He thought that the proposed ten per cent tax on all opium transactions to cover the administrative costs of the monopoly might raise the price unduly. He also referred to the dangerous position in which countries like Canada might find themselves if they were entirely dependent on one source of supply. In this connection, he referred to Canada's plight in 1938 and 1939 when codeine was not even available for use in hospitals.

In view of the divergence of views on some of the basic questions involved in the proposed agreement, the Commission decided to have a revised draft of the agreement prepared for study at its next session in April 1951.

The draft of a proposed new agreement, drawn up by the Secretariat to replace the numerous existing international agreements and protocols concerning international narcotic control, also provoked objections from several of the members of the Commission, and it was decided to request the views of the governments represented on the Commission before proceeding. As the next session of the Commission is to be devoted mainly to work on the proposed agreement on opium, a detailed discussion of the new single convention will be reserved for the 1952 session.

In the autumn of 1949 a field survey was made of the effects of coca leaf chewing in the mountains of Bolivia and Peru. The conclusion of the commission of inquiry was that coca leaf chewing was not an addiction, but a harmful habit the effects of which are malnutrition, moral and intellectual degradation and poverty. It recommended the adoption of educational and welfare measures, together with a gradual reduction of coca leaf production in the countries concerned. The Peruvian and Bolivian Representatives, however, objected to the report of the commission of inquiry on the grounds that it did not take into consideration the relationship between high altitude and the coca leaf problem. The report will be referred to the Economic and Social Council, and studied again by the Commission at its seventh session.

If the Economic and Social Council approves, the sixth session of the Commission will open in Geneva on April 3, 1951, and will last for two months to permit a full discussion of the proposed agreement on opium limitation and control.

### **Commission on the Status of Women**

The Commission on the Status of Women held its fourth session at Lake Success in May 1950. Canada is not a member of this Commission.

The most important decisions taken by the Commission in 1950 were embodied in draft resolutions and submitted to the Economic and Social Council at its Eleventh Session. One of these resolutions, which resulted in considerable controversy in the Council, was concerned with the nationality of married women. The Commission's recommendation was that the Council should take appropriate measures at an early date to ensure the drafting of a convention to include the two principles that there should be no distinction based on sex as regards nationality and that neither mar-

riage nor its dissolution should affect the nationality of either spouse. The disagreement in the Council centred not on the two proposed principles but on the best procedure to ensure the application of these principles. The Canadian view was that governments had already been asked for their views on the desirability of a convention on this subject; very few governments had expressed any interest in it; most of those which had replied already had legislation protecting the nationality of married women; and the task of drafting this convention should not be undertaken until there was evidence that a substantial number of governments would be prepared to accept it. Canada itself would have no objection to such a convention since the two principles proposed by the Commission on the Status of Women were already recognized in Canada and applied under Canadian legislation. The Economic and Social Council finally decided to deal with the Commission's recommendation by asking the International Law Commission to determine whether "it deems it appropriate" to proceed with the drafting of a convention. The Canadian Delegation voted in favour of this resolution, since it left to the International Law Commission the discretion to take whatever action it saw fit.

Another resolution proposed by the Commission requested the Economic and Social Council to call to the attention of certain appropriate United Nations bodies the plight of women survivors of German concentration camps who had been subjected to so-called "medical experiments". It was pointed out in the Council that negotiations on this problem were then in progress in Germany between the Allied High Commissioners and the German Federal Government, and many members of the Council, although entirely sympathetic with the objective of the draft resolution, were reluctant to have the United Nations take any steps which might prejudice the negotiations being carried on. A satisfactory formula was finally found, however, which extended the scope of the resolution to include both male and female survivors of concentration camps and which simply requested the Secretary-General to consider, with the competent authorities and institutions, means for alleviating the plight of such victims. The resolution was then unanimously adopted by the Council.

Resolutions drafted by the Commission and adopted by the Council without controversy concerned provision for co-operation with the Social Commission on the application of penal law to women; recommendations relating to the participation of women in the Technical Assistance Programme; recommendations concerning educational opportunities for women; and support for all efforts to effect the repatriation of Greek children.

The Commission also proposed a resolution which would have drawn the attention of member states to the desirability of greater participation of women in their delegations to United Nations meetings and would have asked the Secretary-General to examine and report upon the reasons why women had not yet been able to take up more of the important posts in the Secretariat. The Council considered that it would be inappropriate to take either of the actions recommended by the Commission since one of the questions fell within the discretion of member states, while the other, under the

terms of the Charter, lay within the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General.

One of the problems which has been considered for some years by the Commission on the Status of Women is that relating to political rights of women. The Commission considered that after four years' study, which clearly revealed discrimination against women in the political field, the Secretary-General should be asked to prepare a draft convention on this subject. While the Commission's resolution to this effect was not submitted to the Economic and Social Council for its specific approval, the question, nonetheless, was discussed in the Council during consideration of the Commission's report. Representatives expressed their support for the principle of equal political rights for men and women, but many of them doubted whether a convention was the appropriate method of dealing with the problem. Those governments which granted equal rights to women would probably sign the convention, but those countries which still denied women equal political rights would not adhere to it. In these circumstances the political rights of women would not be furthered by the adoption of a convention. The majority view was that, in the immediate future, propaganda and education were likely to prove more effective than a legal convention.

### Social Commission

The Social Commission held its sixth session from April 3 to May 5, 1950. Mr. R. B. Curry of the Department of National Health and Welfare was the Canadian member. There has been a Canadian member of the Social Commission since its inception and Canada was re-elected by the Economic and Social Council for a further three-year term beginning January 1, 1951. The most important items on the extensive agenda of the sixth session were consideration of a long-range programme, review of the advisory social welfare services and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. The latter two subjects are reviewed in separate articles elsewhere in this report.

The long-range programme was debated at considerable length, and recommendations were drafted for submission to the Economic and Social Council. The long-range programme furnishes an outline of work for some years ahead both for the Social Commission and for the particular divisions of the United Nations Secretariat charged with duties in this field. Priorities, both in subject matter and in time, are indicated. The principal social activities of the United Nations are set forth. They include provision for: direct assistance to requesting governments; facilities for giving service through technical information, consultation and co-operation; and the completion of a number of studies on social problems together with recommendations arising out of these studies. The fields to be covered include planning, organization and administration for social welfare; work with respect to community, family and child welfare; projects for work in social defence; rehabilitation of the handicapped; and housing, town and country planning.

The Canadian member of the Social Commission expressed the view that the Commission's work in laying down fairly precisely its programme for the next few years, indicating its concept of its functions, the subject matter with which it should deal, and the priorities it should give these subjects, was a valuable accomplishment. The Canadian position was one of some caution on the financial implications of some items of the programme, and it stressed the importance of providing the best obtainable people to carry on the projects. The Canadian member further emphasized that the Commission should periodically review its programme and re-assess the importance and the priority to be given each one of the items at present included; careful thought should be given to the inclusion of new items and the elimination of some present items, the whole to be dependent upon the relative importance of the projects and the availability of money and people to carry them through successfully.

When the item concerning the welfare of the aged was considered, the Commission decided to postpone formulation of a declaration on this subject. The Canadian member took the position that too great stress was given to economic considerations by the sponsors of a resolution on the subject, and that too little attention was given to the social and psychological problems of the aged. The Commission decided to ask the Secretary-General to initiate a programme of research in this field with consideration being given to any views that the Commission on Human Rights might express, as well as to the relevant discussions of the Social Commission.

Canada joined with a number of other countries in the preparation of a joint resolution on the rehabilitation of the physically handicapped. This resolution requested the Secretary-General to develop with the Specialized Agencies and other appropriate bodies an international programme to assist the rehabilitation of handicapped persons. The Canadian member placed special emphasis on the matter of the rehabilitation of the blind. He considered that in this field types of assistance available under the programme of Advisory Social Welfare Services and other sources such as the U.N. programme of Technical Assistance, should be employed as far as possible.

The Commission decided that governments in the Far East should be consulted about calling a conference to consider the establishment of a Far Eastern bureau to combat the traffic in persons. The Canadian member thought that, having in mind the unsettled conditions in the Far East, it might be wise to approach the question cautiously and he agreed, therefore, that consultation with the governments directly concerned was the best first step.

The Commission considered the social aspects of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and concluded that while this programme was essentially economic in character, the social implications of any projects likely to affect the economy of the countries concerned were important. Some representatives said that the Technical Assistance Board should have on it a representative of the Social Activities Department of the Secretariat. The Canadian member's view, which was accepted, was that the Secretary-General should take appropriate steps to see that the social aspects of these

problems were kept before the Technical Assistance Board. The Commission considered also that economic projects sponsored by the United Nations should provide, if possible, for the advice of social welfare experts.

Items on the agenda of the Social Commission which were deferred until later sessions include the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders and the study of the question of enforcing minimum housing standards.

## Economic, Employment and Development Commission

The Economic and Employment Commission (now known as the Economic, Employment and Development Commission), on which Canada is represented by Mr. J. J. Deutsch of the Department of Finance, held its fifth session in January 1950. The main item on its agenda was the examination of the experts' report on "national and international measures for full employment", which had been released only a few weeks earlier.<sup>1</sup> Because governments had not yet had sufficient time to study the report, the Commission limited itself to the formulation of preliminary views intended to facilitate study of the experts' proposals by member governments and other interested parties in anticipation of the formal examination of the report by the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council.

During the year, the Commission was entrusted with specific new tasks as the result of the action taken by the Economic and Social Council at its Eleventh Session when it examined the full employment report and the question of the financing of economic development.<sup>2</sup> In its resolution on "full employment" the Council requested:

- (1) that the Commission examine Secretariat analyses of the replies of governments to the Secretary-General's periodic questionnaires on full employment goals, policies and programmes, with a view to "formulating significant problems of international concern" which might be brought to the Council's attention;
- (2) that the following reports to be prepared by experts during 1951 should first be submitted to the Commission for its comments and recommendations:
  - (a) "national and international measures required to reduce unemployment and under-employment in under-developed countries",
  - (b) "alternative practical ways of dealing with the international impact of economic recessions", and
  - (c) "balance of payments forecasts".

In view of these additional tasks, the Council has authorized the Commission to meet twice a year, instead of once as before, and to hold an extraordinary session if exceptional circumstances require. The problem of the financing of economic development is to be placed on the agenda of at least one session each year.

In order to reflect more adequately the scope of the Commission's functions, the Council changed its name from the Economic and

<sup>1</sup>See "Full Employment", pp. 63-64.

<sup>2</sup>See "Economic Development", pp. 61-63.

Employment Commission to the Economic, Employment and Development Commission and increased its membership in favour of the under-developed countries from fifteen to eighteen members. Chile, the Philippines and Turkey were elected as the three new members. Finally, the Council accepted the recommendation put forward by the Commission at its fourth session in 1949 that the two Sub-Commissions on Economic Development and on Employment and Economic Stability, whose work in the past had been relatively ineffective, be abolished. This recommendation had been largely based on a paper submitted at that time by the Canadian Representative.

These modifications in structure and responsibility are, however, provisional. The future of the Commission will be re-examined by the Council in 1951 in the light of the conclusions of the ad hoc committee which will undertake a comprehensive review of the organization and operation of the Council and its commissions.

### Population Commission

The Population Commission, which was established by the Economic and Social Council in October 1946, is required by its terms of reference to study and advise the Council on all population problems. It consists of representatives nominated by each of twelve member states and it maintains liaison with other United Nations organs and agencies concerned with population matters by including a representative from each as a non-voting participant in its discussions. For the first time in 1950, there was no Canadian member on the Commission, Canada's three-year term having come to an end on December 31, 1949.

At its fifth session, May 28-June 2, 1950, the Commission continued work which it had already begun on the broad problem of migration. It considered the report prepared by the Secretariat on the observations which the Statistical Commission had made at its fourth session. Special emphasis was placed on the possibility of improving migration statistics without complicating further the formalities of border crossing, possibly by the use of the sampling method.

A notable achievement during the year was the publication of the first issue of the Demographic Year Book by the Secretary-General. The Population Commission had fostered this project, which provides member states with a considerable amount of demographic data. The Commission recommended that the Secretariat proceed further with this work by using and developing objective methods for appraising the quality of demographic data, by making available plans to improve demographic data, setting minimum standards for the inclusion of data and by filling gaps in the compilation.

The Commission also concerned itself with the 1950 censuses of population. Particular attention was paid to occupational classification; the importance of achieving international comparability in this field was stressed and attention was drawn to the nine major occupation groups, which had been approved by the Seventh International

Conference of Labour Statisticians in September 1949, and the thirty-four sub-groups of occupations developed by the Committee on the 1950 Census of the Americas.

The first analytical section of the Commission's report consisted of views and recommendations on the problem of extending technical assistance in demographic matters to further the economic development of certain backward areas and called attention to the importance of demographic factors in connection with the Economic and Social Council's programme for promoting development within these areas. Assistance may take the form of disseminating existing knowledge through the United Nations, providing experts for joint economic and social surveys, and training local experts.

The Commission pointed out that many under-developed countries had a very high mortality rate (and, especially, high infant mortality), whereas some of the countries concerned were experiencing serious agrarian over-population. Although the Commission believed that the mortality rate could be reduced, the consequence of such a reduction was a more rapid population increase than at present, because the rate of reproduction was likely to remain at a high level. While the Commission's report concluded that the problem was to make sure that economic development proceeds at a greater rate than population growth, it suggested that fertility was an important area of investigation for those planning the social and economic improvement of under-developed areas.

The Commission discussed the findings of studies on the relationships between population trends and economic and social factors, which had been prepared by the Secretariat, and recommended some important additions. The Secretary-General was requested to incorporate into the report a clear statement of gaps in existing knowledge, along with a tentative indication of useful directions of research to fill these gaps, to give guidance to governments and private groups.

A Secretariat report dealing with different systems of registration of vital statistics was reviewed; the purpose of the report is to improve the comparability of definition, classification and tabulation. Basic studies now under way will be supplemented by the preparation of a handbook on vital statistics methods. In this kind of work the World Health Organization is also playing a part by establishing health demonstration areas, in which the collection of vital statistics will be an important part.

Other items on the Commission's agenda were research on demographic aspects of employment and unemployment, recent trends in the birth rate, a specific plan for the preparation of a demographic dictionary and the priorities for future work.

### **Statistical Commission**

The Statistical Commission has held five sessions since its establishment by the Economic and Social Council in June 1946. During 1950 it made further progress in fulfilling each of its three essential functions: recommending means for the improvement of statistical standards and the achievement of international comparability in statistical series; advising on the co-ordination of the

statistical work of the Specialized Agencies; and advising the Statistical Office of the United Nations on policy aspects of its programme. Before 1950 the Commission consisted of representatives from twelve member countries and Canada was represented by Mr. Herbert Marshall, the Dominion Statistician, who was chairman of three of the four sessions he attended. Canada was not a member during 1950 but has been elected for a further three-year term commencing January 1, 1951, at which time the membership of the Commission will be increased to fifteen.

During 1950, the Committee on Statistical Classification of the Commission revised the League of Nations "minimum list of commodities for international trade statistics" and the resulting "United Nations standard international trade classification" was given the stamp of approval by the Economic and Social Council. While trade statistics have been kept for many years by almost all countries, the task of making comparisons between these has been formidable because of differences in classification; it is expected that the work of the Statistical Commission will result in more useful data. The Commission has included in its future programme the preparation of a manual for use in preparing commodity statistics based on the new standard.

Improvement of classification of trade statistics is not the only way in which their usefulness may be increased. The valuations of commodities, the definitions of countries of origin and destination, and the determination of what constitutes merchandise trade, were all considered and assigned to the Secretariat for further study and for consultation with governments. At its next session the Commission will use the information collected to determine the desirability of modifying and expanding the existing international convention in this field.

The measurement of changes in the volume of production has been one of the Commission's concerns since its second session. In 1950 a number of recommendations were made designed to secure indexes which could be used more readily for comparative purposes. With the same object the Commission sponsored a carefully worked out manual on theory and method. This was prepared by an expert consultant working with the Secretariat and meets a widely felt need.

During and since the Second World War the compilation of statistics on national income and related subjects has become of major importance in many national statistical systems. The Statistical Commission recognized this activity at an early session and recommended publication of the report of the Sub-Committee on National Income Statistics of the League of Nations Committee of Statistical Experts. It has followed this up by having the Statistical Office prepare a book summarizing existing data in this field. A manual for compiling and reporting national income statistics is now being prepared and will shortly be circulated among governments and interested experts.

Other important accomplishments of the Commission in improving the quality of national data and making easier international comparisons were concerned with price indexes, censuses of distribution and transport statistics.

The interest of the Statistical Commission in the development of international standards has been demonstrated in the work of the Sub-Commission on Statistical Sampling, which held its fourth session in the autumn of 1950. The Sub-Commission has studied the use of sampling methods in various countries and has indicated their place in censuses of population, in crop forecasting, in collecting manpower statistics, and in preparing estimates of national income and expenditure. Its detailed examination of specific sampling projects, with the assistance of the statisticians responsible for them, has helped to improve the standard of work in a field of increasing importance.

### Transport and Communications Commission

The Transport and Communications Commission was established by the Economic and Social Council in June 1946 to assist the Council in its work relating to transport and communications problems. In particular, it advises the Council on the co-ordination of certain aspects of the work of the Specialized Agencies in this particular sphere. In addition, it gives advice on problems which concern more than one aspect of transport or communications. The Commission may suggest to the Council the creation of new agencies, the conclusion of new conventions or the revision of existing conventions. At the same time, it may act as a conciliator, when so authorized, in cases of dispute between states or Specialized Agencies on international transport and communications problems. There is not a Canadian member on this Commission at the present time.

The Commission held its fourth session in March-April 1950 and prepared a number of resolutions which were subsequently approved by the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council. These resolutions covered a wide variety of subjects, the more important of which were as follows:

- (1) Member governments have been asked to accede to the convention establishing the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, since IMCO should greatly facilitate the solution of a number of urgent and important problems affecting international transport.<sup>1</sup>
- (2) Members have been urged to attend the Extraordinary Radio Conference which was to have taken place at The Hague in September 1950, but which has been postponed until the summer of 1951. The purpose of this conference is to reach agreement on the allocation of radio frequencies. The urgency of reaching such an agreement has been stressed.<sup>2</sup>
- (3) Regional economic commissions of ECOSOC have been asked to pay particular attention to ways and means of co-ordinating inland transport in their regions. At the present time international co-operation in the field of land transport continues to be carried out mainly within the framework of the regional economic commissions, most of the problems being of a predominately regional character.

<sup>1</sup>See article on IMCO, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup>See article on ITU, pp. 115-116.

- (4) All governments have been asked to take, as soon as possible, whatever further action is necessary to apply the standards and recommended practices on the facilitation of international air transport which were drafted by ICAO and have since entered into force.
- (5) Members of the United Nations have been urged to pay special attention to national measures for the simplification of customs and related formalities constituting barriers to the international transport of goods, bearing in mind that these measures must be consistent with the Charter of the International Trade Organization.

The Commission itself has continued to study the problem of the barriers to the international transport of goods on the basis of replies which it has received from governments conveying their views on recommendations put forward by the International Chamber of Commerce. It has been decided for the time being that direct international action such as the convening of a conference cannot be undertaken immediately because the International Trade Organization, within the competence of which this problem would primarily fall, has not yet come into being.

### **Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East**

The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was established as a regional commission under the United Nations in March 1947. Its function, as defined in its terms of reference, is to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction of Asia and the Far East; for raising the level of economic activity in those regions; and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of these areas both among themselves and with the other countries.

Although not a member of ECAFE, Canada has important interests in the Far East, not only because it borders the Pacific, but also because it is a major trading nation whose prosperity depends substantially on a healthy and stable world economy. In addition to this general interest in the stability and economic recovery of the Pacific area, Canada has a more particular interest as a participant in the Colombo Plan for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia and the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, both of which have close working relationships with ECAFE, and as a member of the Economic and Social Council under whose supervision ECAFE functions.

The sixth session of ECAFE was held from May 16-20, 1950, in Bangkok. Unfortunately, as in previous sessions, a considerable amount of time was devoted to political discussions. When the conference approved a proposal of Thailand that the question of Chinese representation be decided by a higher United Nations authority, the Soviet Representative withdraw from the meeting, stating that his Delegation would not participate in the work of the Commission as long as the Representative of Nationalist China was present, nor would the U.S.S.R. be bound by any decisions of the Commission taken in the absence of the Soviet Delegation.

Despite political difficulties the Commission's reports and recommendations indicate that ECAFE is making progress in preparing economic studies, in formulating plans for industrial development and trade promotion, and in collecting, evaluating and disseminating technical and statistical information. Reports and technical publications have been prepared on flood control (advisory services on flood control have already been extended to several governments), industrial development and planning programmes, trade and exchange controls, trade and financial agreements, the dollar shortage, foreign investment, and national trade and travel promotion. A partial report has been prepared on trade with Japan. In addition, the Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East has again been published for 1949 and is more comprehensive than its two predecessors. This experience in economic and technical research should prove of great value in the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme and the Colombo Plan for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia. The ECAFE Secretariat has in fact been instructed to advise governments in Asia and the Far East on the preparation of their technical assistance projects, and also to advise the United Nations Headquarters on applications under the United Nations Fellowship Programme.

The Canadian Government has generally approved the work of ECAFE, while stressing the need to consider ECAFE's activities in relation to the whole United Nations economic programme, and to pay particular attention to the adequacy, practicability and priority of the projects undertaken.

### **Economic Commission for Europe**

The Economic Commission for Europe was established by the Economic and Social Council in 1947 to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action in European economic activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the European countries both among themselves and with other countries of the world.

Canada is not a member of this Commission, but as the development of satisfactory economic conditions in Europe is of great importance to it, Canada maintains contact with the Commission through the Canadian Delegation to the European Office of the United Nations, which, like the headquarters of ECE, is situated in Geneva. Canada also supplies data, on request, to the Commission concerning the production of certain materials, such as timber and steel; and the Commission, in turn, has been able to use this information for the purpose of making recommendations on the allocation of scarce materials among the European countries.

One of the important activities of the Commission during 1950 was the initiation and arranging of an ad hoc meeting in Geneva, in November, of European countries interested in increasing their trade in certain grains. Countries of both Eastern and Western Europe attended. The primary objective of the meeting was to ascertain the import requirements of Western European countries and the available exports of the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries, and to study the possibility of promoting trade in the grain in question.

Import requirements turned out to be very much greater than products available for export. No commitments were made at the meeting, but bilateral negotiations were begun between the Soviet Union and some of the importing countries immediately after it ended. However, the amounts of grain likely to be involved in the near future will be relatively small.

The most important report of ECE, the annual "economic survey of Europe" is published in Geneva in May of each year. It is a very competent and authoritative work on European economic affairs. This and other ECE studies, prepared under the direction of the eminent Swedish economist, Mr. Gunnar Myrdal, have established a reputation for high quality, reliability and usefulness.

### **Economic Commission for Latin America**

The Economic Commission for Latin America, on which Canada is not represented, continued its unspectacular but useful work during 1950. At the present stage of its development, this regional body of ECOSOC is concentrating its resources on the preparation of studies, many of which are original and thus of considerable value to the countries of that particular region. In these studies, the Commission has co-operated with both the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

In December, 1949, a joint Co-operative Unit of ECLA and FAO was established at the Commission's headquarters in Santiago, to work particularly on problems of technical assistance relating to agriculture. The Unit has made a number of studies of agricultural credit in Central America, in collaboration with the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. During the past year the secretariat has prepared further reports on technical assistance, immigration, and legal and economic status of foreign investments and the trade trends and policies of Latin American countries.

The third session of the Commission was held in Montevideo, Uruguay, from June 6 to June 20, 1950. Discussion was centred on technical assistance, immigration and the re-establishment of normal trade relations with Europe. The secretariat was requested to prepare further studies on a number of topics, including the maritime shipping problems of Latin America and the scope and nature of investment in the region. Individual studies are to be made of products likely to achieve a large volume of trade in Latin America. These are to be examined at the fourth session of the Commission, scheduled to meet in Mexico City in May 1951. It was also recommended that the secretariat, in co-operation with FAO, prepare a joint study of agricultural credit for presentation to the regional FAO conference in Montevideo in December 1950. For this purpose the two organizations were requested to arrange as soon as possible a conference of agricultural credit experts to meet in Central America.

Although its field is limited to a single geographic area, the Economic Commission for Latin America has performed valuable services during the past year. Fundamental research undertaken by the secretariat has contributed toward an understanding of the region and its problems, and will undoubtedly be useful in furthering

plans for economic development. The recent report on the legal and economic status of foreign investments in certain countries has already proved a valuable source of information for Canadian missions in Latin America.

### III

## SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

### Co-ordination

During 1950 stress has again been laid on proper co-ordination of the activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, and some encouraging steps in the right direction have been taken. It is too early to assess the results of the agreements in principle which have been reached but it is to be hoped that overlapping of programmes will be kept to a minimum and that efforts will be concentrated on realistic projects which are capable of producing effective results in the foreseeable future. It must be realized, of course, that the action which the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council can take in the direction of making the Specialized Agencies adhere to certain strict standards of priorities is severely limited because of the nature of their relationship. The Specialized Agencies are, in fact, autonomous bodies. On the whole, however, they have been co-operative, and in particular the joint efforts of the Secretary-General and the Directors-General in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination have met with a good deal of success. Much more, of course, remains to be done. In the last year or two the General Assembly and the Council have rightly placed the greatest emphasis on the need for national delegations to co-ordinate the policies which their representatives to the international conferences of the Agencies are instructed to carry out. It is encouraging to note that these international bodies are thinking in terms of the elimination of overlapping, the concentration of their combined resources and making the best use of the funds at their disposal.

During 1950 the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination recommended measures which the various bodies could take in their day-to-day work to achieve maximum co-ordination. Further, the Secretary-General, as a result of the resolution approved by the Fourth Session of the General Assembly, prepared a comprehensive report with recommendations on how the efforts and resources of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies could best be concentrated in order to achieve the most effective results. Then again the Economic and Social Council, and in particular its Co-ordination Committee, devoted a number of meetings during its Geneva Session in 1950 to this important subject and as a result put forward a number

of useful proposals which were endorsed by the Council. Finally, the General Assembly, in considering the Council's report during a short but effective series of meetings, put the stamp of approval of the parent body on the recommendations made by ECOSOC.

Largely on account of Canadian initiative the Council approved a set of criteria which were designed to enable the respective Agencies to give proper priority to the programmes and projects which they were undertaking in the future. These criteria for priorities are, of course, only a first step, but they indicate that emphasis is switching from attempts to eliminate overlapping and to co-ordinate programmes already launched to the co-ordination of initiatives. In other words, the Council was trying to direct the thinking of each Agency to the point where it would first make a thorough survey of its proposed projects and of similar projects being undertaken by other Agencies and bodies of the United Nations. On the basis of this survey, and by using such criteria as those suggested by ECOSOC, each Agency would then decide which of its proposed programmes could be dropped because they would duplicate work already undertaken elsewhere, which should be deferred, and which should be undertaken immediately. The criteria suggested were urgency, feasibility, scope, degree of preparation and co-ordination, and the possibility of results. Each was elaborated upon, and the Council stressed that this list was not meant to be an all-inclusive one. The Council considered that the criteria for priorities were subject to two overriding principles: international action on any matter would be justified only where the desired results could not be achieved with any degree of certainty and within a reasonable period of time by individual governments without outside assistance; it must first be determined that any proposed international action is technically sound and capable of producing practical results. Provision was made for the further elaboration and development of these criteria in the near future in the light of experience.

Several other important recommendations were made to achieve greater co-ordination: the more frequent use of joint inter-agency committees; the possibility of further reducing and synchronizing international meetings; the cutting down of requests for lengthy reports from the various secretariats, except when these were essential, so as to enable the secretariats to carry out more substantive tasks; and further consideration of the possibility of the use of common staffs and the pooling of administrative services in regional centres where several agencies have offices.

After considering the very useful work of the Economic and Social Council in the field of co-ordination, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which, *inter alia*, requests each Specialized Agency to review during 1951 its 1952 programme in the light of the criteria mentioned above. The Council is also asked to make a similar survey with respect to the 1952 programmes of the United Nations and the agencies and to seek the assistance of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the administrative and financial aspects of the matter. Furthermore, ECOSOC and the agencies are to indicate in the future, when new projects are adopted, which current projects may be "deferred, modified, or eliminated". The final clause of the Assembly resolu-

tion urges that efforts towards the fullest co-ordination of programmes and activities be vigorously pursued.

## Food and Agriculture Organization

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), conceived at a special conference at Hot Springs, Virginia, in May 1943, was established over five years ago on October 16, 1945. Its purpose is to promote the common welfare by furthering separate and collective action for: raising levels of nutrition and standards of living; improving the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products; and bettering the conditions of rural populations.

In 1950 five states have been admitted to FAO: Cambodia, the German Federal Republic, Jordan, Spain and Viet Nam. These additions increased the membership to sixty-eight states. This number will be reduced by the withdrawals of Poland and Czechoslovakia which are to take effect in 1951.

Each member has one vote in the Conference or governing body of the organization. A Council acts for the Conference between the latter's sessions which up to now have taken place annually. After the 1951 session it is expected that sessions of the Conference will be reduced to one every second year. The work of the organization is supervised by the Director-General, who is appointed by the Conference. The present Director-General is Mr. Norris E. Dodd.

Under a reorganization of the Secretariat approved at the special session in 1950, the technical work of FAO is to be redistributed under the following divisions: agriculture (including rural welfare), economics (including statistics and distribution), fisheries, forestry and forest products and nutrition. These divisions provide a wide range of fact-finding and advisory services designed to furnish statistics and information on which sound national and international solutions to the problems of food and agriculture, forestry and fisheries may be based.

Among the projects aimed at crop improvement which have been undertaken by FAO during 1950 are a rice breeding project in the Far East, maize breeding research in Europe and the Near East, and widespread distribution of seed for experimental testing. In the field of animal husbandry emphasis was given to the breeding and adaptation of cattle to tropical and sub-tropical environments. A livestock breeding conference at Lucknow was the first of a series designed to start active co-operation and exchange of information between areas. In addition, work was begun in Guatemala to improve feed supplies by better pasture and range management. In soil and water conservation examples of FAO's work in 1950 include engineering assistance to Ecuador in restoring irrigation facilities destroyed by earthquake, and surveys and advisory aid on soil and water problems in Haiti, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia and Thailand. In the fisheries division, attention was given to the advancement of pond fish culture as a cheap and efficient method of increasing the protein content of the diet of backward areas.

In 1951 the work of FAO will be interrupted and curtailed by the move of its headquarters from Washington to Rome. This will be financed in part out of current income, thus reducing FAO's working budget from \$5 million to \$4.5 million. Nevertheless, plans were made for expanding the activities of the organization in two directions: participation in the expanded technical assistance programme of the United Nations; and assistance in the programme for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea. The main programme is essentially a continuation of work done in 1950 and the beginning of work projects that will continue into 1952.

The Conference of FAO did not meet in regular session in 1950. However, a "Special Session" dealing with administrative questions was convened in Washington in November. Among the items on the agenda was a proposal to make permanent the committee on commodity problems. The Conference passed a resolution to this effect and Canada has been invited to continue its membership in the committee.

As the organization had just completed five years of operations, the Conference at its special session recommended that the Council appoint a small working party to review the fundamental policies and trends of FAO with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the organization. This working party has been instructed to study the following problems:

- (1) The degree to which effective decentralization of the work of the organization can be carried out without reducing its efficiency and involving duplication.
- (2) The extent to which increased use can be made of universities, research institutions, and other organizations, in implementing the organization's programme, and the possibility of utilizing temporary consultants on a larger scale while maintaining fewer permanent technical officers on the staff.
- (3) The planning of FAO's activities in such a way as to achieve maximum co-ordination with the United Nations, its regional commissions (ECE, ECAFE, ECLA), and the Specialized Agencies in fields in which FAO is specially interested.
- (4) The collection of information from member countries, particularly in the form of the annual reports requested by Article XI of the Constitution and the use of this material in framing the programme of work, in implementing FAO's work projects, and in advising member governments.
- (5) The relative importance to be given to activities of the organization in the several fields of its competence, the long-term policies to be adopted within these different fields of activity, and the priorities to be followed in deciding upon different projects in these fields, with special reference to the considerations set out in the introduction to the programme of work.

Canada supports the fundamental ideals and objectives of FAO and in general agrees with the type of technical work that has been carried on during its first five years. On the other hand, the variety

and complexity of the activities which are undertaken by FAO present difficult problems of choice, organization, and administration. Canada welcomes the appointment of the working party to study these problems and to suggest ways of improving the efficiency of the organization. While Canada is not a member of the working party, the Canadian representative on the Council will ensure that Canada's views are aired on the issues before it which are basic to the future of FAO.

### **Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**

The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization was negotiated and signed by fifty-four governments in March 1948. Up to the present time it has not been ratified by twenty countries, the number required to permit the establishment of ITO. Many countries have been waiting to see whether the United States Government will ratify the Charter. To date Congress has not yet fully considered the matter and it is not expected to do so for some time to come.

In view of the increasing possibility that ITO will not be established, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade assumes a new importance. The General Agreement does not cover as wide a field as the Havana Charter, but it implements, in a practical way, many of its basic objectives. It was negotiated while the Charter was under discussion in order to provide the necessary framework for multilateral tariff reductions which were undertaken by the Contracting Parties without waiting for ITO to come into existence. The main purposes of this framework were to establish the "most favoured nation" principle between Contracting Parties and to protect any tariff concessions which might be granted from the counteracting effects of quantitative and other restrictions.

The General Agreement, which came into provisional operation in January 1948, is thus the embodiment of an attempt, by international co-operation, to restore a non-discriminatory single market economy to the world. The Agreement could not be expected to accomplish this objective in a single stage, but it has advanced toward it along three paths: by the institution of multilateral tariff negotiations with the object of removing or reducing tariff barriers to trade; by controlling any further increase in quantitative restrictions and planning the gradual reduction of all such barriers when international payments return to a reasonable balance; and by holding sessions of the Contracting Parties and so providing an international forum in which restrictive or otherwise undesirable trade practices may be discussed.

In 1950 there have been two sessions of the Contracting Parties: the fourth which was held in Geneva in May and the fifth which took place in Torquay in November and December. In addition the third round of tariff negotiations began in September and, at the time of writing, is still in session. The tariff negotiations were undertaken in an effort to reduce tariffs between the twenty-six Contracting Parties beyond the reductions accomplished at Geneva and

Annecy in 1948 and 1949 and in order to allow these present Contracting Parties to negotiate with a number of new countries wishing to accede to the General Agreement.

The fourth and fifth sessions of the Contracting Parties have dealt with a large number of administrative matters and a variety of minor disputes over trade practices which have arisen between individual contracting parties. In addition to these routine matters the most important work of the fourth session centred on a detailed examination of the current operation of quantitative restrictions on imports and exports imposed by member countries. At the session a report on these restrictions was prepared to assess the degree to which they contravened the provisions of the General Agreement and to determine the extent to which they encourage the development of uneconomic industries.

At the fifth session, which ended on December 16, the Contracting Parties carried out consultations with a number of countries in the sterling area on import restrictions maintained against dollar goods and the possibility of relaxing those restrictions under present conditions. Another important accomplishment was the completion of preparatory work looking toward the establishment of more effective machinery to administer the Agreement between sessions of the Contracting Parties. Their decisions included the adoption of: a procedure for obtaining information needed in the detailed examination of current import and export restrictions; a recommended code of standard practices for the administration of the necessary trade restrictions; and procedures to enable contracting parties which are not members of the International Monetary Fund to carry out their Agreement obligations affecting the control of foreign exchange. They rejected a proposal for the amendment of the Agreement to include certain articles of the Havana Charter dealing with employment and economic activity.

Canada has supported the General Agreement to the fullest extent. Although it is still only provisionally applied, all Canadian legislation is now compatible with the General Agreement. The Canadian Government has developed its commercial policy in the spirit of multilateralism which the General Agreement envisages and in strict accordance with its terms. At the sessions of the Contracting Parties in 1950 Canada continued to play its full share. Mr. L. D. Wilgress, Canadian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, was again elected chairman of both the fourth and fifth sessions. Mr. Wilgress has been chairman of all meetings of countries which are parties to the General Agreement since its inception.

## **The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund**

The functions of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are to assist in the reconstruction and development of the economies of member countries by the granting of loans for productive purposes and by promoting wherever possible the inter-

national movement of private capital. The functions of the International Monetary Fund are to exercise international supervision of exchange rates and exchange restrictions with the purpose of encouraging a balanced growth of international trade on a multi-lateral and non-discriminatory basis, to promote exchange stability and to lend its resources to member countries when necessary, and on a temporary basis, to enable them to achieve these objectives.

The International Bank had an active year during 1950 and expanded its relations with borrowers and potential borrowers to a considerable degree. The Bank also conducted a successful refunding operation in the United States, and at the end of 1950 was reaching the point where it will be necessary to float an additional bond issue and to obtain permission to use additional amounts of the capital subscriptions of its members in order to finance its operations in 1951.

The activity of the International Monetary Fund during the year was necessarily less noteworthy. In view of the improvement in the international payments position of the world generally, and the spectacular devaluation of many currencies against the dollar which occurred in the previous year, there were few significant changes in exchange rates in 1950. Indeed the abandonment of the effective par value of the Canadian dollar in favour of a fluctuating rate was the only major change in exchange systems among member countries during the year. Partly for the same reason there were no drawings by members upon the resources of the Fund. In terms of concrete activity, therefore, the Fund was concerned in 1950 mainly with the payments problems of a number of its smaller members many of which were operating multiple exchange systems, and with efforts to promote a relaxation of discriminatory exchange practices. Generally speaking the Canadian Representatives on the Board of Directors and Board of Governors of the Bank and Fund have been in agreement with the decisions and policies adopted by these institutions.

By the end of 1950, forty-nine countries were members of both Bank and Fund. During the year Pakistan and Ceylon were admitted to membership while Poland resigned its membership. The Pakistan quota in the Fund and subscription to the capital stock of the Bank were both put at \$100 million. Ceylon's quota and subscription were fixed at \$15 million. Applications for membership were received from Burma, Indonesia, Jordan and Sweden and the terms of membership are being discussed with these countries.

### **Operations of the International Bank in 1950**

During 1950 the International Bank concentrated its lending and advisory activities on the development of under-developed countries. The sixteen loans made to such countries during the year amounted in total to \$280 million, a peak year for development loans. This brought the total of loans outstanding to a figure of \$1024 million.

The Bank also made substantial progress in 1950 in promoting the international financing of private undertakings. Up to the

present the majority of Bank loans have been made to governments or governmental agencies, with only few loans being made to private enterprises. The reason for this is that the Articles of the Bank require that loans to private borrowers must be guaranteed by the government of the country concerned. Because governments are often unwilling to guarantee loans to private enterprises, or because private concerns are reluctant to accept their government's guarantee of loan commitments, with the possible loss of control that this may involve, little use has been made of the Bank's ability to lend to private enterprises, except in the case of public utilities. Moreover, the small scale and considerable variety of the projects that private borrowers tend to present to the Bank is a factor operating to retard an expansion of this kind of lending activity. The Bank has tried various techniques to overcome these difficulties. One type of solution was found in the Bank's loan to the *Herstelbank* (Reconstruction Bank) of the Netherlands in 1949, which enabled the latter to extend credits to some twenty private enterprises to be used for the import of equipment from hard currency areas. In this particular case the Government of the Netherlands guaranteed the loan made to the *Herstelbank* and was not involved in the loans made by the latter to the various private concerns. From the Bank's side this kind of loan had the advantage that the principal responsibility for choosing the enterprises needing foreign capital, as well as for the supervision of the loans, rested with the *Herstelbank*, in whom the Bank had full confidence and to whom the loan was made.

This technique has since been promoted by the Bank in the less well developed countries, where new development banks have been set up under Bank encouragement. These activities have been associated with the desire of the International Bank to encourage a wider degree of private initiative in countries whose development has been retarded by the lack of private enterprise. This explains the assistance given by the Bank in 1950 in the establishment of the new Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, which was accompanied by a loan of \$9 million. It is expected that this loan will enable the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey to help establish new private enterprises, which require foreign capital to pay for imported equipment, and to expand and modernize various existing private undertakings. It might ultimately encourage a further investment of purely private capital, both domestic and foreign, in Turkish industry.

Also worthy of note in this connection is the line of credit extended by the International Bank during the year to a consortium of eight of the principal Mexican commercial banks to assist in financing small enterprises in Mexico, and the technical assistance and financing made available to the newly established Ethiopian Development Bank.

The lending policies and techniques of the Bank have necessarily been kept flexible to meet the needs of the times, despite the fact that world economic conditions have been quite different from those expected by the founders of the Bank at Bretton Woods in 1944. A full account of the present policies of the Bank with respect to the choice of projects to be financed, the character of bank investigations, loan charges, loans to private enterprises, lending standards

etc., is given in the Fifth Annual Report of the Bank released on September 6, 1950.

During 1950 the Bank made loans for a great variety of purposes to governments or firms in the following countries:

	Millions of U.S. dollars
Australia .....	\$100
Brazil .....	15
Colombia .....	6.1
Ethiopia .....	7
India .....	18.5
Iraq .....	12.8
Mexico .....	36
Thailand .....	25.4
Turkey .....	25.4
Uruguay .....	33
	<hr/>
	\$279.2

The geographical distribution of the purchases made by borrowers out of funds provided by the International Bank is shown in the following table, which includes all disbursements made by the Bank since its inception up to November 30, 1950:

Area of Expenditure	Amount in millions of U.S. dollars
United States .....	\$467.3
Canada .....	37.7
Europe .....	70.4
Latin America .....	56.2
Africa .....	2.2
Near East .....	2.5
Far East .....	.1
	<hr/>
Total .....	\$636.4

### Technical Assistance to Under-Developed Countries

The Bank's contribution to the economic advancement of its under-developed members is not confined to the loans which it has thus far granted. Upon request of its members, the Bank has sent increasing numbers of technical experts, from its own staff or recruited elsewhere, to study the economies of various of the under-developed countries, to assist in the formulation of practical development programmes adapted to their needs, and to suggest measures for improving their financial stability and credit standing. These studies, and the measures which result from them, help to reinforce the Bank's loans and increase the contribution made by these loans to rapid, balanced development in the countries involved. In addition, they may serve to render the Bank's under-developed member countries more attractive to private investors and thus encourage an increased flow of investment from that source.

Such missions have sometimes engaged in a substantial economic analysis of the country concerned, enabling the member and the Bank to determine the best directions along which development

should proceed. Others have been concerned with a study of particular projects likely to be suitable for Bank financing, or have involved technical advice and assistance of one kind or another.

### **Borrowing and Marketing Operations**

Up to the present time the funds available to the Bank for lending have come very largely from United States sources, either from the 18 per cent paid-in portion of the subscription of the United States Government to the Bank's capital or from the proceeds of the sale of \$250 million of the Bank's bonds sold in the United States investment market in July 1947.

At the end of November 1950 the International Bank still had at its disposal \$72 million of uncommitted funds available for lending purposes. For this reason it was not necessary for the Bank during the year under review to resort to any further large-scale borrowing in the United States for the purpose of raising "new money". However, a refunding operation was undertaken. In January 1950 the Bank called for redemption its outstanding issue of \$100 million ten-year  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent bonds, due in 1957, and replaced this with a new issue of serial bonds, for a like principal amount, due in 1953-1962. By this arrangement the Bank was able to synchronize the maturities on its own bonds more closely with the repayments of principal on its outstanding loans.

In order to create a wider international market for its bonds, and to acquire Swiss francs currently needed for its lending operations, the Bank also sold a bond issue of 28.5 million Swiss francs (\$6.6 million) to a group of leading commercial banks in Switzerland in March 1950. The serial bonds carried a rate of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent and were sold at par. This was the second issue to be sold in Switzerland in the last two years.

Funds for lending were also derived from the use of the 18 per cent capital subscription of several member countries during the year. Thus, early in 1950, Canada consented to the use of an additional \$2 million in Canadian funds from the Canadian subscription to the Bank, bringing to \$10 million the total amount made available in this way. The United Kingdom also released \$2.8 million of its capital subscription to the Bank for lending purposes. Other countries which have already made available a partial use of their 18 per cent capital subscription are Belgium and Denmark. In France, Italy, the Netherlands and several other countries, the principle has been accepted that their 18 per cent subscriptions are to be placed at the disposal of the Bank subject to the approval of the governments concerned in specific cases as and when the need arises.

The Bank's bonds have also been listed on the Mexico City Stock Exchange and ruled as eligible as investments for banks, insurance companies and other credit institutions. They have also become eligible for investment by banks in Chile and Cuba.

The need for acquiring non-dollar capital for use in the Bank's lending operations, particularly in Europe, became more important in 1950. In view of the increasing availability of goods in Western Europe at prices comparable with United States products, the Bank's borrowers have been shifting their requirements to some extent

away from United States sources. That being so, the extent to which the Bank is able to use its non-dollar capital or the proceeds of non-dollar bond issues for lending purposes will necessarily influence the volume of Bank lending to the under-developed countries.

## Operations and Activities of the International Monetary Fund

### The Payments Position of Member Countries in 1950

The work of the Fund in 1950 both in terms of its financial operations and of its consultative and advisory functions must be viewed against the background of the changing situation of its members with respect to their international payments and receipts. It is therefore important to record the fact that the year 1950 revealed a substantial improvement in the post-war position of many countries with respect to the dollar shortage. This improvement did not bring about any great relaxation in the various types of trade and exchange restriction and discrimination which were practiced in 1950 to conserve dollars (both United States and Canadian). Nevertheless, the partial closing of the dollar gap was noteworthy and would appear to be favourable to the relaxation of restrictions.

The improvement in the payments situation can be demonstrated by the fact that for the first time since the end of the war the total international receipts of the rest of the world from the United States from the sale of goods and services, from capital transactions, and from a diminished level of Marshall Plan aid and the like exceeded the total payments to the United States. For example, the United States surplus with the rest of the world arising from trade in goods and services, which was nearly \$7 billion in 1949 was little more than \$2 billion in 1950. The outflow of funds on private capital accounts, together with special military assistance and Marshall Plan aid, more than offset this surplus. As a result of this situation gold and dollar reserves accrued to the rest of the world during 1950. In the same way the deficit position of the non-dollar world *vis-a-vis* Canada was reduced. While the improvement in the payments position for different countries was uneven, and in some cases resulted from a restriction of imports which was harmful and incapable of being maintained indefinitely, substantial progress was undoubtedly made in restoring a stronger and better-balanced pattern of international payments. The factors that brought about these changes include the effects of the devaluation of currencies in Europe and elsewhere, the high level of business activity in the United States and the boom in United States imports and import prices beginning with the Korean fighting.

The improvement in the payments position of the world generally explains, in part, the absence of any drawings by members on the resources of the Fund, and the comparative stability in exchange rates and exchange rate systems in 1950. It also has a bearing on the continued efforts of the Fund to press for a relaxation of exchange restriction and discrimination among its member countries outside the North American continent.

## Exchange Rate Adjustments

The activity of the International Monetary Fund in the field of exchange rate adjustments must necessarily be unobtrusive and unspectacular since its principal function consists in the resolution of any differences which may arise between members over exchange questions (including the practice of trade discrimination through multiple exchange rates) and in seeking to bring about the establishment of more liberal international payment regimes. Such consultations are conducted privately in the Executive Board of the Fund or between the Fund and its members, and the results of such consultations are only occasionally revealed in public decisions and announcements. To some degree the results of consultations are revealed in changes in rates of exchange or adjustments in exchange systems. Since practically all adjustments contemplated by governments need the approval of the Fund the continued emphasis of the Fund on certain principles of international economic behaviour may have an influence which is strong, though incapable of measurement.

As mentioned above the world-wide devaluation of currencies against the United States dollar which took place in September 1949 began to display its expected consequences in 1950 aided, of course, by the high level of production and demand in the hard-currency areas. Consequently, no additional exchange adjustments on the part of the larger trading countries were appropriate or necessary in 1950, except for the special case of the abandonment of a fixed rate for the Canadian dollar. There were some modifications in the system of multiple rates operated by certain countries, particularly in Latin America, where this form of control over trade and payments is common. In these cases modifications of the exchange system usually resulted from efforts to offset the consequences of further inflation, or to simplify a system of rates as a step towards the adoption of a unitary rate of exchange. Some of the changes were for the purpose of devaluing the rate or rates of exchange applicable to certain exports, in order to encourage particular exports without penalizing imports, or were made to restrict particular imports. By and large the exchange adjustments in 1950 resulted from special situations peculiar to particular countries, and were not the result of a worsening of the general payments position of the under-developed countries. On the contrary, the improved balance of payments pattern was shared by most areas of the world, perhaps especially in Latin America.

During 1950 the Fund either noted or approved significant changes in the exchange rate systems of the following countries: Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Ecuador, Iceland and Nicaragua. In addition small changes were approved in the cases of Iran, Paraguay, Thailand and Uruguay.

## Exchange Restrictions

In subscribing to the purposes of the Fund, all member countries have agreed that restrictions on current foreign exchange transactions, even though they may be necessary under certain conditions, are undesirable in principle. The Articles of the Fund

nevertheless recognize that, because of the disturbances of international financial conditions resulting from the war, a transitional period is needed during which members of the Fund may retain exchange restrictions on their current international payments and adapt them to changing circumstances and, in the case of enemy-occupied territories, may even introduce new restrictions.

However, to ensure that countries would not lose sight of the ultimate purposes of the Fund during this transitional period, Article XIV requires that as soon as conditions permit, members shall take all possible steps to withdraw restrictions. In March 1950 the Fund released its first report on exchange restrictions. This report, supplemented by the Fifth Annual Report made to the Board of Governors (April 30, 1950), surveyed current trends in the field of exchange restrictions and described the obstacles which stand in the way of a general return to the convertibility of currencies. It pointed out that the conditions under which full convertibility could be established include: the restoration of productive capacity in the deficit countries, a well balanced flow of international trade, appropriate relations between the price-cost structures of the main trading countries, freedom from undue inflationary or deflationary pressures, an active international capital market and adequate monetary reserves. The report pointed out that although substantial progress had been made during the preceding twelve months towards meeting these conditions, many difficulties still remain to be overcome before countries could remove restrictions and assume the obligations of convertibility. The devaluations of September 1949 had provided a basis for further progress toward that goal since they had corrected many of the distortions in international price relations that were the result of varying degrees of inflation in different countries. However, the improvements brought about since the devaluations had not been followed by measures that would produce a decisive and general freeing of the movement of international trade and payments.

While some countries have reduced certain restrictions and simplified their exchange practices, new restrictions have also been imposed and new bilateral agreements have been undertaken.

On the favourable side the OEEC countries relaxed their quantitative import restrictions on considerable sections of their imports from other OEEC countries in 1949, and a further relaxation took place after the establishment of the European Payments Union in the summer of 1950. Belgium achieved a considerable degree of convertibility in 1949-50 and a large proportion of inter-Benelux trade was freed from restrictions. Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom took steps to facilitate payments among themselves in respect to "invisibles" and capital items in 1950 and the Canadian emergency import restrictions of 1947 were considerably reduced in 1949 and 1950. On the other hand, additional dollar-saving restrictions were introduced by the sterling area countries in accordance with decisions made in the summer of 1949, and the exchange restrictions imposed by the Philippine Republic at the end of 1949 and by South Africa became effective in 1950.

In the summer of 1950 a European Payments Union was established by the members of the OEEC group of countries. Its objective

is stated to be to encourage intra-European trade on a competitive basis and to encourage progress toward a general convertibility of currencies. It is designed to avoid the rigidities in intra-European trade caused by bilateral payments agreements. The member countries of the EPU also committed themselves to a further reduction of quantitative restrictions between themselves and agreed to remove all discrimination applicable to the trade of member countries by January 1, 1951.

The International Monetary Fund participated in some of the discussions leading to the establishment of the EPU and continues to maintain a liaison with the Union, although it is not a participant and has no organic relationship with it.

Other efforts of the Fund toward a relaxation of restrictions on international trade were pressed forward in its various formal consultations with the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During the year the Fund was consulted by GATT with respect to the intensification of import restrictions by a number of countries. The Fund produced information showing the improvement in the balance of payments and monetary reserves situation of some of these countries and put forward for consideration the suggestion that the time had come for a partial relaxation of import restrictions and trade discrimination in respect to Australia, Ceylon, New Zealand, Southern Rhodesia and the United Kingdom. It recognized, however, that the rearmament needs of these countries and other factors would require such relaxation to be undertaken with due caution. The Fund was of the opinion that it would not be appropriate for Chile, India or Pakistan to engage in any general relaxation of their restrictions against imports from the dollar area.

### Gold Policy

During the year the Fund reviewed, and in April 1950 decided to maintain, the policy concerning external transactions in gold at premium prices as originally communicated to its members in June 1947. The occasion for a review of the policy arose out of a proposal put forward at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Fund in September 1949 by South Africa to modify the policy of the Fund so as to allow half of the newly-mined gold to be sold freely in premium markets.

This proposal was studied by the staff and Executive Board of the Fund, and the Fund decided not to change its policy. The Canadian Representative on the Executive Board supported the conclusion.

Certain gold-producing countries that, after consultation with the Fund, had resorted to the use of gold-mining subsidies have, since the devaluation of September 1949, either cancelled their subsidy payments or decided to reduce the scale of such assistance. During 1949-50 Australia and Southern Rhodesia cancelled their gold-mining subsidies, and Canada notified the Fund that its gold subsidy programme had been curtailed. In October 1950 Canada informed the Fund of its intention to extend its gold-mining subsidy at a reduced rate for a further year (i.e. 1951) beyond the former

expiry date. The Fund decided that this extension was not inconsistent with the Fund's policy with respect to gold subsidies.

### **Technical Assistance by the Fund**

In 1950 the Fund gave increased emphasis to its activities in the field of technical assistance. The Fund gives expert technical help concerning both the international payments problems which countries face and the related internal financial factors. On the external side it assists countries on programmes for the balancing of international payments. It may give its opinion on specific actions such as changes in exchange rates, modifications in multiple currency practices, and alterations in the scope and type of exchange controls. On the internal side it provides advice with respect to domestic monetary, credit and fiscal policies which have an important bearing on balance of payments developments. It can assist countries in setting up and improving the institutional machinery necessary to carry out the policies undertaken. The Fund has conferred with a number of countries on techniques for improving the collection and reporting of financial statistics, on such problems as the monetary impact of development programmes, on repurchase obligations, gold transactions and gold subsidies. The Fund has also made individual staff members available on loan to governments for extended periods to work on specific problems, drawing also on the services of qualified experts from the outside.

In 1950 technical assistance missions and visits were made to twenty-one countries, including one non-member. Of the countries visited, nine were in Latin America, eight in Europe, three in the Middle East and Africa, and one in the Far East.

In addition the Fund in 1950 began a training programme in Washington for technicians from member countries. During the year, representatives from six countries participated in an intensive course of instruction on balance of payments techniques. In 1951 a general programme of training in monetary and economic matters will be begun for a different group of technicians. The trainees will be expected to return to the service of their countries after completion of their studies.

### **Use of the Fund's Resources**

In addition to its consultative functions the Fund exists to make its exchange holdings available to countries facing a temporary situation of unbalance in their international accounts. In 1949 the total of such drawings amounted to approximately \$101 million making a total of drawings since the inception of the Fund of \$777 million. In 1950 there were no drawings by any member. In fact, this year saw a small number of "repurchases" or repayments of Fund drawings amounting to roughly \$30 million.

The absence of drawings may be explained in part by the improvement in the payments situation of many members and by the fact that the OEEC countries who are members of the Fund were in most cases drawing Marshall Plan aid, or were able to draw on the credits made available under the European Payments Union.

It is possible that in the case of some countries the known doubts of the Fund as to its ability in the present state of the world to determine whether or not a proposed drawing could be regarded as for a "temporary purpose", and hence an eligible one, may have precluded them from making application. The Canadian representatives on the Fund Board and at the September 1950 meeting of the Board of Governors have joined with several other members in expressing the belief that there was need for a further examination of the whole question of the use of the Fund's resources to see what can be done to remove these uncertainties.

### **Canadian Representation on Fund and Bank**

Canada continued to be represented on the Board of Governors of both the Fund and the Bank by Mr. D. C. Abbott, Minister of Finance, as Governor, and by Mr. G. F. Towers, as Alternate Governor of the Fund and by Mr. R. B. Bryce, as Alternate Governor of the Bank. Mr. Louis Rasminsky continued to be the Canadian Executive Director of the Fund and in February 1950 he also replaced Mr. Donald Gordon as Executive Director of the Bank. Mr. J. F. Parkinson continued as the Alternate Canadian Director of the Bank and Fund devoting his full time to the duties of representation on these two institutions in Washington. Canadian representatives were present at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank and Fund held in Paris in September 1950, and the Canadian Director was re-elected for a further two-year term to the Board of Directors of each institution.

### **International Civil Aviation Organization**

During 1950 the Council of ICAO and its subsidiary bodies met frequently to consider a variety of questions related to the advancement of civil aviation and the efficient performance by the Organization of its functions.

Of special interest to Canada was a session of the Legal Committee in January at Taormina, Italy, to consider revision of the Rome Convention of 1933 concerning damage by aircraft to persons and property on the ground. Canada has never been able to accede to this convention because certain of its terms have been considered unacceptable. Much progress in revising the convention was made at Taormina, but a generally acceptable draft was not arrived at. Further work was done on this problem at a meeting of a sub-committee of the Legal Committee in Paris during December 1950 and discussions will be continued in the Legal Committee in Mexico City in January 1951.

Also of special interest was the initiation of a joint study by ICAO, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and Canadian civil aviation officials of the contribution made indirectly by Canada to international civil aviation through facilities maintained in the North Atlantic area. This study is continuing. It is intended that it will establish a pattern for further studies of the kind on the basis of which a change may eventually be made in the method of determining the individual contributions of member states to ICAO under joint assistance programmes.

During the year Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation came into effect. This annex provides for standardization of customs, immigration and related procedures which will speed the international movement of passengers and cargo by air. Two further annexes were produced and approved for adoption by member states. Annex No. 11 on air traffic services contains standards and recommended practices concerning the establishment and operation of air traffic services, viz., air traffic control, flight information, and alerting services. No. 12 on search and rescue lays down plans for a search and rescue organization which will be practical, efficient, and economical in establishments and operations. It makes provision for the fullest possible use of facilities now maintained by member states and for the pooling of resources and the formulation of joint plans by member states.

Iran and the Republic of Indonesia became members of ICAO in 1950. Switzerland stated its willingness to contribute to the Joint Support Programme which was initiated in 1946 to provide financial support for the maintenance and operation of certain aids to civil aviation in the North Atlantic region.

The Fourth Session of the Assembly met in Montreal on May 30, 1950, to review the whole field of activities over which ICAO has jurisdiction. One of the more important of its decisions was that ICAO should participate in the programme formulated by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for the provision of technical assistance to under-developed countries. For its part ICAO will make available competent experts, training facilities and, in cases of special need, financial support for the development of civil aviation in certain under-developed countries. It will receive for this purpose one per cent of the United Nations' fund for technical assistance. The Assembly heard a report from the Secretariat on the progress made to date in this field in both ICAO and the United Nations, approved the steps already taken, and adopted a resolution directing the Council's further approach to the programme. This resolution also requested the assistance of member states, in particular in supplying competent technicians and training facilities.

Elections to the Council brought to that body five new members—Denmark, Italy, the Philippine Republic, the Union of South Africa and Venezuela. Canada was re-elected to a seat. The Assembly approved a budget of \$3 million for 1951 which will permit a level of activity about the same as that for 1950. It decided that major sessions of the Assembly should henceforth take place every three years to coincide with the time at which elections to the Council take place. Minor sessions are to be held in intervening years to handle budgetary and administrative matters. During the Assembly a matter which attracted considerable attention was the attempt made by a number of delegations, notably Latin American, to make it legally possible without an amendment of the constitution for the headquarters of ICAO to be transferred from Montreal should it be decided at a later date to do so. Although this proposal was adopted at the committee stage, it did not receive the approval of the Assembly.

During 1950 Dr. Edward Warner was elected for a further three-year term as President of the Council, and the retirement of Dr. Albert Roper as Secretary-General of ICAO was announced. Brigadier C. S. Booth, Canada's Representative to ICAO, was elected Chairman of the Council's Finance Committee.

## **International Labour Organization**

The International Labour Organization declares in its Constitution that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere," and that "lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice." The mission of ILO, therefore, is to improve the standards of working men and women in all countries of the world. Considerable significance attaches to the method by which such an objective is to be attained. The ILO Constitution asserts the necessity of free discussion and democratic decision as a means of promoting the common welfare.

The Organization is thus pledged to a programme of labour reform, to be achieved by democratic and constitutional methods. It does not pit class against class. On the contrary it seeks to harmonize the interests of labour and management by bringing together representatives of workers' and employers' organizations to participate in its discussions. Such representatives, in fact, are given an equal status with government delegates in the forming of decisions. This participation of non-governmental delegates in an official capacity gives a unique quality to meetings of ILO, and is generally cited as one of the Organization's sources of strength. It is of particular importance, in view of the growing stature of labour bodies, political as well as economic, that an official international organization exists through which their views can be expressed and their influence wielded in constructive fashion, in consultation with management and government.

Through its annual conferences, ILO has obtained agreement on a series of international labour standards embodied in the form of conventions. Less important decisions of the Conference take the form of recommendations or resolutions. In the thirty-three conferences that have been held since the formation of ILO in 1919, ninety-eight conventions have been adopted and, by the end of 1950, a total of 1,184 ratifications of conventions had been registered by member governments. The act of ratification signified the acceptance by the government concerned of the labour standards laid down in the convention, and its undertaking to maintain those standards in effect, generally by means of legislation.

The ninety-eight conventions that have been adopted constitute an international labour code, which has a moral as well as practical value. This code is a target, indicating social objectives which have gained international acceptance, and towards which different countries proceed at their own best speed. Its existence is a stimulus to social progress. It also serves as a compendium of useful technical information.

In 1950, the annual conference dealt with such subjects as equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value,

conciliation procedures in labour-management disputes, collective agreements, rehabilitation of disabled workers, and minimum wage machinery for farm workers. It also carried on its annual task of reviewing the way which member countries were applying the conventions adopted in previous years.

But apart from this work, ILO during 1950 was making a more direct approach to the problems that fall within its scope. Two years ago ILO embarked on what it termed an "operational" programme, designed to give administrative assistance to countries wishing to develop training programmes and employment services, and otherwise to make more productive use of their manpower. With the development of the technical assistance programme,<sup>1</sup> which was officially set in motion during the course of 1950, ILO made plans to intensify its "operational" activities. The Organization has been allotted eleven per cent (roughly \$2 million) of the budget devoted by the United Nations for purposes of technical aid to under-developed countries. Though its most important work is likely to be in the training and organization of manpower, ILO will also help in the setting up of labour administration and inspection activities, and will give advice and assistance to countries wishing to make advances in such fields as accident prevention, social security, co-operatives and handicrafts, and the protection of women and juvenile workers.

At the end of 1950 ILO listed twenty-one countries for which technical assistance has been either initiated or planned. This gave hope for the development of a more skilled labour force, higher industrial productivity, and better labour standards in many countries in Asia, South America and other quarters of the world where the need for help was combined with the desire to co-operate in this new and unique international adventure in the cause of peace.

Canada, with one of the world's highest standards of living, was making a substantial financial contribution to this programme in the expectation of sharing in the long-term benefits of international goodwill, better trade opportunities, and increased general prosperity. In the closing months of 1950 two senior officials of the Canadian Department of Labour were lent to ILO to co-operate in the administration of the technical aid programme.

In accordance with its long-established policy of support of the aims and objectives of the International Labour Organization, Canada sent representatives to several ILO meetings<sup>2</sup> during 1950. The most important of these was the annual conference, held in June in Geneva, to which Canada sent a tripartite delegation representing workers, employers, and the Government. The Governing Body, which functions as the executive organ of ILO, held three sessions in 1950. Canada holds one of the eight seats on the Governing Body reserved for the nations of chief industrial importance. Of the eight ILO industrial committees, three held meetings in 1950, namely the chemicals, petroleum and textiles committees. Canada was represented at these meetings, which studied such matters

<sup>1</sup>See article, "Aid for Under-developed Areas", pp. 58-63.

<sup>2</sup>The proceedings of these meetings have been reviewed in the monthly publication of the Department of Labour, the *Labour Gazette*.

as safety, wage levels, working hours, training, and other special problems of the industries concerned. Canada also participated in a committee meeting of social security experts, a meeting of experts on pneumoconiosis, and a migration conference.

During 1950 Canada registered its ratification of the International Labour convention dealing with employment service organization. Although the subject matter of the majority of ILO conventions fall within the jurisdiction of Canada's provinces rather than the federal Government, Canada has now been able to ratify thirteen conventions.

An interesting episode in Canada's relationship with ILO was marked by a ceremony held at McGill University in September. Having decided to leave its headquarters in Switzerland at the time of the Nazi invasion of the Lowlands and France in 1940, ILO was invited at that time to establish a temporary office on the McGill campus. Here ILO remained through the war years and returned to Geneva only in 1948. In gratitude to McGill for its wartime hospitality, ILO presented to the University a bronze tablet, commemorating its stay in Canada. At the unveiling ceremony the Minister of Labour expressed the Government's satisfaction that Canada had been instrumental in helping ILO carry on its wartime work. The Principal of McGill, Dr. F. Cyril James, recalled warmly the many individuals who, in spontaneous awareness of their responsibilities to an ideal, had helped make possible the transfer of ILO to Canada. "The quality of our civilization," he said, "is measured in terms of its efforts to enhance the welfare of ordinary men and women throughout the world. The lamps will indeed have gone out if international organizations like the ILO should cease to function because they have no friends."

### **Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization**

The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization will come into existence when the convention which set it up has been ratified by at least twenty-one states of which seven must have a total tonnage of not less than one million gross tons. The Organization, designed to promote co-operation among governments in international shipping problems, did not come into being during 1950 because the required number of ratifications had not been received. Canada ratified the Convention on October 30, 1948; it was the first country to do so. Since then, Greece, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have deposited instruments of ratification. The last country, to date, that has acceded to the Convention is the United States, on August 17, 1950. It is expected that a number of other countries will notify their accession in the near future. There were no meetings during 1950 of the Preparatory Committee which was set up as an interim body pending the establishment of IMCO. The Convention provides for an Assembly which is to be convened within three months of the date the Convention comes into force.

## International Refugee Organization

The primary functions of the International Refugee Organization are the repatriation; the identification, registration and classification; the care and assistance; the legal and political protection; the transport; and the resettlement and re-establishment in countries able and willing to receive them, of persons who are the concern of the Organization. These responsibilities have been progressively reduced in anticipation of the conclusion of all operations in 1951. On June 30, 1950, IRO discontinued all care and maintenance for refugees with the exception of those who were in the process of being repatriated or resettled and the institutional cases requiring permanent assistance.

IRO has operated within restricted terms of reference, and only the following classes of refugees could appeal to it for help: persons who were outside of their countries of nationality or of former habitual residence and who were victims of the Nazi, Fascist or Falangist regimes, or who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the Second World War for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. The IRO Constitution specifically excluded certain groups of refugees, notably persons of German ethnic origin.

During 1950 IRO experienced, through no fault of its own, a decline in the rate of its resettlement operations and, as a result, the Director-General asked the General Council at its sixth session, which was held in October 1950, to allow the Organization to continue its operations for another six months beyond the original closing date of March 31, 1951. The General Council endorsed this suggestion, and IRO will now wind up its operations at the end of September 1951.

The decline in movements began in the first half of 1950, and is generally attributable to an unexpectedly long delay in the adoption of the revised United States Displaced Persons Act. Movements, therefore, to the United States, which has now become the main receiving country, did not live up to expectations. At the same time, reception difficulties in Australia resulted in a decrease in the rate of flow of refugees to that country. Furthermore, some shipping was diverted because of the Korean war, and it became increasingly difficult to resettle certain "hard core" and other cases for which IRO is responsible.

Nevertheless, hopes are high that before it winds up its operations IRO will have resettled over one million refugees. This is a remarkable record, particularly as the main burden fell on a comparatively few members of an organization which has itself a membership of only eighteen contributing countries.

During 1950, at the suggestion of the Director-General, the member governments agreed to extend the mandate of the Organization to include those refugees from Iron Curtain countries who would normally have been entitled to IRO assistance if they had been in a position to register before October 1949, the cut-off date which had been previously established. As a result of this decision some 50,000 additional refugees, who had escaped from Eastern Europe during the previous year, became eligible for resettlement assistance. This was agreed to by the General Council after it was

made clear that the chances of resettlement of the refugees who had already registered would not be prejudiced, nor would any further contributions be required from member governments.

The "institutional hard core" problem is one of the most difficult which the Organization has to face during its closing period. These refugees, although small in number, have proved to be the most difficult to resettle. Most of them cannot immediately take up gainful employment because they are confined to institutions; they are very old, crippled, mentally deranged, or they suffer from chronic tuberculosis. The last category is by far the most difficult of all to resettle. Sweden has been a pioneer in accepting some of these tuberculosis cases. Other countries have been asked to do their share. The difficulty is that in most cases persons suffering from tuberculosis are prohibited by statute from entry to countries such as the United States and Canada. Further, because of their chronic condition, they automatically become a burden on the community or state in which they reside, a fact which is only partially offset by any financial contribution which IRO is in a position to make. At the end of 1950 approximately ten thousand institutional "hard core" cases remained for whom no resettlement opportunities had yet been found.

The Director-General, in response to the resolution of the Security Council which called on all Specialized Agencies to assist the Unified Command in Korea in every way possible, offered medical supplies, welfare personnel and a sterling loan. The loan was not taken up, but the medical supplies and the welfare personnel were found to be most welcome by the authorities in Korea, and accordingly the Organization made these available expeditiously. The General Council approved the action of the Director-General and gave him authority to assist further in any way possible, within the limits of the Organization's present resources. Thus IRO has made a worthwhile contribution in 1950 to the relief and rehabilitation of the Korean people.

Canada's financial contribution to IRO for what has now become a fifteen-month period (July 1, 1950 to September 30, 1951) was \$2,107,915.70. The budget for this supplementary period was on a reduced scale. Canada's average annual contribution to IRO in past years has been well over five million dollars. The Canadian Government agreed during 1950 to a request of the Director-General that part of its Canadian dollar contribution be converted into Italian lira.

As it enters the final year of its existence, IRO is cautiously optimistic that it will be able, with the support of member governments, to achieve successfully the resettlement programme which it ambitiously undertook over three years ago. On the other hand, the number of refugees who will have been repatriated to their countries of origin by September 1951 will be comparatively small. The rate of repatriation during 1950 has been insignificant. Since 1947 only 70,000 persons have chosen to return to their former homes. In contrast to this, over 850,000 refugees had been resettled by IRO by the end of October 1950. In all, over 1,510,000 people have registered with the Organization for assistance since its inception.

In its memorandum to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly on the state of the refugee problem, the Organization frankly warned

that it could not yet be said with any degree of certainty that the "hard core" problem would have been met by the end of September 1951, although every effort would be made to find a satisfactory solution to it. Most of these unfortunate persons in the "hard core" category are at present in Germany.

The General Assembly has again appealed urgently to all states to assist IRO in its efforts to resettle refugees remaining under the Organization's care before it ceases operations. The alternative to resettlement or repatriation is, of course, local settlement. Arrangements are being made with German, Austrian and Italian authorities to retain on a permanent basis a number of refugees who at present reside in those countries. This is not as satisfactory a solution as resettlement, but in many cases there is no alternative.

Canada has done its fair share to help solve the refugee problem, having admitted over 90,000 IRO refugees by the end of September 1950. The three leading reception countries are the United States, Australia and Israel, in that order. The picture, then, of what this temporary Specialized Agency has been able to do to help solve the refugee problem resulting largely from the Second World War, is an encouraging one. The fact that nearly eighty per cent of "the great human salvage task" entrusted to IRO in 1947 has been accomplished is remarkable evidence of the energy and devotion which international officials and member governments have brought to bear on this great co-operative effort. It would, of course, be false to suggest that nothing more will remain to be done after the end of September 1951. However, it appears likely that the emphasis will have shifted, because of the nature of the remaining problem, from multilateral arrangements concluded under the aegis of an international organization to a series of bilateral agreements entered into by particular supplying and receiving countries. To this end, the International Labour Organization has already embarked on a worthwhile programme in the field of migration, and the fruits of its labour will be available to those countries which wish to make use of them.

## **International Telecommunications Union**

ITU is a Specialized Agency of the United Nations established for the purpose of maintaining and extending international co-operation in the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds, and promoting the development and use of technical facilities with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunications services.

During recent years the main problem faced by ITU has been the allocation to member states of frequencies in all bands of the radio spectrum. In most bands there are too few frequencies available to satisfy the needs of all prospective users. Added difficulties have been created by the strains and rivalries associated with the waging of the propaganda aspect of the cold war. Most of the work connected with allocation has been done by the Provisional Frequency Board set up by the International Telecommunications Conference at Atlantic City in 1947, which also outlined a frequency table and

established a set of general principles within which the Provisional Frequency Board was to work.

Canada has a very considerable interest in the allocation of frequencies in all bands. The international service of the CBC now broadcasts to most parts of the world, and to maintain its services the CBC requires the unrestricted use of a number of frequencies. Internally, the size of the country and its rapid rate of development, particularly in the northern areas, create special requirements for the use of radio as a medium of communication.

In March 1950 the Provisional Frequency Board, on which Canada had been continuously represented since January 1948, completed a frequency allocation list and reported to the Administrative Council of ITU. Although it had made considerable progress in several directions, the Board had not found it possible to obtain general agreement on the allocation of frequencies over the whole field covered by the table set up by the Atlantic City Conference in 1947. A conference of all member states was called to meet at The Hague in September 1950 to complete the work of the Provisional Frequency Board and to achieve final general agreement. This conference was cancelled when it became clear that prospects for its success were remote.

In recent years it has been in the high frequency band of the radio spectrum that the greatest difficulties have arisen in achieving agreement on allocations between states. High frequency channels have taken on increased importance because they are the channels used in long range directional and communications services. A conference on this subject sat at Rapallo in Italy from April 1 to August 19, 1950. The Soviet Union and its satellites withdrew at an early stage on the political grounds of participation by Nationalist China, and the conference finally adjourned without reaching agreement.

In contrast, some success was achieved in allocation of frequencies in the standard broadcast band at a North American Regional Broadcasting Conference which began meeting in Washington on September 6, 1950. This conference produced an agreement which was signed on November 15 by all interested countries in the North American region except Mexico and Haiti.

Canada is one of the eighteen members of the Administrative Council, which is the executive and co-ordinating body of ITU. During its 1950 session in Geneva the Council made plans for an extraordinary conference at Geneva in August 1951, when a further effort will be made to complete the work of the Provisional Frequency Board and to obtain general agreement on implementation of the Atlantic City Frequency Allocation Table.

### **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization**

UNESCO, which passed its fifth anniversary in 1950, also reached a stage where it was forced by the logic of events to re-examine its fundamental purposes. The results of this re-examination were not wholly definitive, but at least they brought

into the open two conflicting concepts of the proper functions of the organization. Should UNESCO's programme be judged, in the words of its former Director-General, Dr. Julian Huxley, "by its direct and immediate contribution to peace in the present", or should stress be laid on "the indirect but indispensable contribution of education, science and culture to the peaceful one world of the future"? Was UNESCO, in other words, to devise some form of direct action for peace, or was it to concentrate its efforts on a long-range programme based on intellectual co-operation among the peoples of all nations in the hope that gradually such co-operation would lead to the uprooting of the causes of war? The fact that this dilemma became a live issue in 1950 was in large measure attributable to the increasing gravity of the world situation, which seemed to some to call for drastic and immediate action on the part of all organizations dedicated to the ideal of peace. In this context there were some who questioned the efficacy of the long-range programme and who sought to come to grips with short-term problems. Among those who felt the need for decisive action was UNESCO's Director-General, Dr. Torres Bodet.

Dr. Bodet had been in office for one and a half years out of a six-year term when the General Conference opened at Florence in May 1950. Two months before, in the belief that the basis had been laid for an expansion of UNESCO's activities, he had asked the Executive Board to approve a budget for 1951 in excess of \$9 million, as compared with \$8 million for 1950. When the Board, more sensitive to the attitudes of contributing governments, declined to recommend the increase to the General Conference, Dr. Bodet announced that he would carry his appeal to the Conference as final arbiter. The Conference, however, supported the ceiling favoured by the Board and with the aid of certain adjustments the 1951 budget was finally set at \$8.2 million.

Although this decision came as a great disappointment to Dr. Bodet, it was a more fundamental issue which led to his unexpected announcement towards the end of the General Conference that he could no longer continue to serve as Director-General. Closely linked with his vision of an expanded UNESCO was his conviction that the organization should, in addition to its long-range programme, embark on projects designed to achieve something concrete towards modifying the tensions of the cold war and contributing actively to the maintenance of world peace. UNESCO, he considered, should not abandon its proper mission of spanning the gap between East and West, and should strive to maintain its character as a universal instrument of peace. And if these objectives were to be pursued, UNESCO's budget would clearly have to be increased.

The Conference was not persuaded of the advisability of the Director-General's proposals, either in their policy or their budgetary aspects. Indeed, it veered in the opposite direction. It not only resisted Dr. Bodet's attempts to enlarge the budget; it began to modify the neutrality which it had previously professed in the ideological conflict between the Cominform states and the rest of the world. In this it was no doubt influenced by a significant address delivered to the Conference by Senator Benton of the United States, an early supporter and counsellor of UNESCO who, on this occasion,

attended as a Congressional adviser to the United States Delegation. Senator Benton said, in effect, that UNESCO must cease its vain efforts to preserve a neutral position in the cold war, and that it should enter with determination on that side in which its ideals were acknowledged.

The ideas propounded by Senator Benton received expression in three proposals tabled by the United States Delegation. These proposals were based on principles which ran directly counter to Dr. Bodet's view that UNESCO should remain neutral in the cold war. According to the United States proposal, UNESCO would draw up plans for specific projects, for which part of the funds would be canvassed outside UNESCO's budget, not merely from private but also from governmental sources. Moreover, the projects recommended were designed to facilitate the democratic re-education of Germany and Japan. By its intention to embark on these projects, which would, of course, only be made possible by the contributions of individuals or governments sympathetic to the objectives contemplated, UNESCO showed a significant tendency to align itself with the democratic nations and began to assume the character of an interpreter of democracy.

In the final week of the Conference a debate took place on what direct contribution UNESCO could make to the peace of the present-day world. Three resolutions were before the meeting — one proposing that atomic bombs should be outlawed; another that UNESCO should draw up scientific reports on the effects of modern warfare; and third, that a conference of intellectuals should be called to devise means of mitigating "war psychosis". The weight of the debate was obviously swinging against the idea of steering UNESCO's programme in this direction and in favour of maintaining the existing long-range character of the programme. When he realized the extent of the opposition to these projects, which were along the lines which he favoured, the Director-General tendered his resignation.

The insistence of member states upon compression of the budget, and their reluctance to accept for UNESCO responsibility for reconciliation of the political and ideological differences between the U.S.S.R. and the democratic world, clearly underlay Dr. Bodet's decision to resign. Two days later, following requests by representatives of forty-four member states, he agreed to withdraw his resignation. Since, however, he had not, in the view of many delegations, provided the General Conference with sufficiently detailed information on what he meant by "a more active policy for peace", the Conference could do little else than request him to present to the Sixth General Conference suggestions according to which UNESCO's activities might be directed more effectively towards the consolidation of international peace.

The Director-General's resignation, and the emphasis it placed upon the dilemma with which UNESCO is confronted, will undoubtedly provoke a stock-taking of the organization's position, actual and potential, in world affairs. Should UNESCO become an instrument of the majority in the United Nations? Or should it retain, at all costs, its universal character? Should it concentrate on

long-term objectives? Or should it devote some of its energies to immediate problems? Should the budget be enlarged? To what extent should the participation of its members be intensified? These basic questions have not yet been answered, although on the basis of the Fifth General Conference it must be admitted that the preference of the majority of members appears to be for a long-range approach towards UNESCO's goal of developing international understanding by means of education, science and culture.

UNESCO has, in the past, been criticized in Canada and elsewhere on the ground that it was wasting its energies and dispersing its resources on activities the scope and utility of which could not readily be assessed. In spite of the differences uncovered in connection with the Director-General's resignation, however, the organization is beginning to develop a sound and well-balanced long-term programme. Progress is being made in setting priorities in such a way that attention is focussed on essential projects and emphasis may be shifted from year to year according to the urgency of particular items. In this regard the Canadian Delegation to the Fifth General Conference introduced a proposal<sup>1</sup> on "the selection of central UNESCO themes", which was designed to invest the Director-General with authority to determine an order of priorities among the various projects.<sup>2</sup> Since, however, this raised a major issue at a time when the resignation of the Director-General was under consideration, the Delegation did not press for a full debate.

Other illustrations of the emphasis which delegations to the Fifth Conference placed on economy and sound planning may be found without difficulty. The United States Delegation, for instance, proposed that sessions of the General Conference should be held every two years instead of annually. Biennial conferences, in their view, would relieve the Secretariat of the responsibility for preparing annual reviews of their activities, would reduce the burden on participating states, and would be more conducive to sound periodical planning of UNESCO programmes. The Director-General has been asked to study the effects which the proposed change would have on the structure and operation of the organization and it is expected that a decision on this proposal will be taken at the Sixth Session of the General Conference.

Although the effects of the General Conference over-shadowed the continuing activities of UNESCO during 1950, a number of notable achievements for this period lie to the credit of the organization, in most of which Canada took an active part. In the field of education, seminars were held on the following subjects during 1950: methods and techniques of adult education, at Salzburg, Austria; the role of libraries in adult education, at Malmö, Sweden; and the improvement of textbooks, at Brussels. All of these were attended by Canadian delegations. In addition, a seminar on the teaching of geography, the first to be held in Canada, met at Macdonald College, Ste. Anne de Bellevue, P.Q., from July 12 to August 23. The Department of Mines and Technical Surveys and Canadian

<sup>1</sup>For text of the draft resolution, see Appendix 14, pp. 179-180.

<sup>2</sup>For text of Canadian statement, see Appendix 13, pp. 178-179.

educational bodies co-operated with UNESCO and contributed to the success of this seminar.

Another important activity has been UNESCO's part in technical assistance programmes. The UNESCO's technical assistance project was inaugurated on October 1, 1950, when aid amounting to \$850,000 (U.S.) was extended to twelve countries in Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere. Each recipient country will contribute at least an equal amount of its own currency to help maintain and finance special UNESCO missions engaged in such activities as technical and industrial training, the elimination of illiteracy, and the establishment of social research centres. Seven other countries (Burma, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Israel and the Philippines), as well as United Kingdom and French non-self-governing territories, have also applied to UNESCO for technical assistance.

As mentioned previously, UNESCO is also planning to be active in Germany and Japan. In an attempt to solve the serious problem of unemployed youth in Germany, to develop higher learning in the social sciences, and to provide for teachers to assist in the re-education of the population disrupted by years of false political indoctrination, the Committee of Experts on German Questions set up by the General Conference has recommended the establishment of a centre for international youth activities, an institute for social sciences and a pedagogical research centre. Assistance to the Japanese people in their educational, scientific and cultural development, as well as in their relationships with workers in other countries, was also contemplated.

In the field of reconstruction, UNESCO made appeals during 1950 on behalf of distressed Arab, Ecuadorean, Greek and Indian children and on behalf of scientific institutions, museums and libraries devastated by war. Moreover, following the outbreak of war in Korea, the Executive Board of UNESCO unanimously responded on August 28 to the United Nations appeal for support by providing credits totalling \$125,000 for relief assistance to the civilian population in Korea and related projects. In Canada the main effort in reconstruction has been channeled through the Canadian Council for Reconstruction through UNESCO, a non-governmental body set up to assist in the rehabilitation of war-devastated countries by means of collecting and distributing cash contributions, services and gifts in kind. The CCRU has, through its fellowships project, brought more than sixty persons from war-devastated countries to work or study in Canada; has allocated funds, under the university reconstruction scheme, to twenty-four universities abroad for the purchase of scientific equipment; and through its creative arts project has made provision for relief and grants-in-aid to selected artists. The activities of the CCRU were concluded at the end of 1950.

The total budget of UNESCO for 1950 was \$7,906,279, the Canadian contribution amounting to \$279,677.

## Universal Postal Union

During 1950 the Universal Postal Union continued its unspectacular but important work in pursuance of its objective of organizing and perfecting postal services throughout the world. The Universal Postal Congress did not meet during 1950, but the important Executive and Liaison Committee and the Technical Committee on Transit both held meetings in Switzerland. At the same time the International Bureau, or permanent Secretariat of the Union, continued its assigned work.

Under article V of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Universal Postal Union, the latter is requested to present an annual report on its work. The annual report of UPU for 1949 was communicated to the United Nations by the Executive and Liaison Committee and submitted by the Secretary-General to the first part of the Eleventh Session of the Economic and Social Council which was held in Geneva in the summer of 1950. In presenting the report the representative of the Universal Postal Union emphasized the help rendered by his organization to under-developed countries in the form of pamphlets on certain aspects of post office work. Four of these pamphlets, he said, had been printed and issued, others were in print and yet others were in preparation. Further, he pointed out that the allotment for this work would be increased in 1951. The report itself, besides reviewing the work of the organization and giving an account of the conferences held during 1949 by the various bodies of the Union, outlined the work of the International Bureau. Special mention was made of the four new members of the Union: Japan, Ceylon, Burma and Israel.

The discussion which took place in ECOSOC was entirely uncontentious. The Union was particularly commended for its publicity campaign through the general sale of directories of post offices and its periodical "L'Union Postale", which is now published in six languages. The Union, ECOSOC further noted, was collaborating closely with ICAO on the question of air mail statistics. Finally, the Council adopted unanimously a resolution expressing its appreciation of the report and transmitting to the Union the record of its discussions.

The Universal Postal Union has always endeavoured to encourage the use of postal communications for information purposes. There is, for instance, under the scope of the Universal Postal Union, an arrangement whereby subscriptions for newspapers and periodicals of other countries may be placed with any national post office. Article 36 of the Universal Postal Convention also recognizes the right of each administration to allow a reduction of fifty per cent on postal rates for printed papers. However, these arrangements, aimed at facilitating the free flow of information through wider use of postal communications, have been ratified by only a small number of countries.

This question was raised at the Fifth Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, held in Florence in May 1950. Referring to the reduction of obstacles to the free flow of information, the Conference adopted a resolution authorizing the Director-General of UNESCO to seek to secure wider application of the schemes initiated by the Universal Postal Union to permit payment in national cur-

rency for subscriptions to foreign newspapers and periodicals and for a reduction of fifty per cent on postal charges for printed material. It remains to be seen in what measure these arrangements, which have not seemed very practical to many countries, can be implemented.

During 1950 the International Bureau has continued its usual work which is to collect, publish and circulate postal information to members of the Union, and to give opinions on request on questions in dispute. At the same time the Executive and Liaison Committee and the Technical Transit Committee, in which Canada is directly concerned, held meetings in Switzerland. While the Executive and Liaison Committee has been principally engaged in long-term research work, the Technical Transit Committee, as reconstituted at the Universal Postal Union Congress held in Paris in 1947, has been charged with the study and review of transit rates — payments which are made to the countries concerned for the onward transmission of closed mails. Its task is to formulate the most equitable basis on which transit rates could be computed and to suggest the most rational methods for calculating the amounts due from the countries concerned. The first meeting of the seventeen members of this Committee took place in Interlaken, Switzerland, in 1949 where a full review and discussions took place following the study of completed questionnaires which had been circulated to members of the Universal Postal Union. In view of the implications, the decision was reached to set up a small study group, with Canada as a member, which met in Axenstein in September 1950 to study further the additional data which had been collected. Their findings are to be circulated to all members of the Universal Postal Union, and the full group is to meet again in 1951 for the purpose of arriving at a final decision on the basis of the latest information available.

### **World Health Organization**

The World Health Organization (WHO) proceeded during 1950 in a steady though unspectacular way towards its goal of raising the level of health of the peoples of the world. The Organization contributed considerably towards the eradication of such ancient scourges as cholera and malaria, and continued successfully the work commenced in 1949 such as "health demonstration centres" and joint action with other Specialized Agencies, particularly the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.

WHO, which became one of the Specialized Agencies in 1948, with Dr. Brock Chisholm of Canada as Director-General, is carrying on the pre-war work of the League of Nations Health Organization and the Office International d'Hygiene Publique, and has the aim not only of preventing disease but of creating conditions throughout the world which will make improved standards of health possible. Its headquarters are in the Palais des Nations, Geneva. A building fund of \$233,645 (one million Swiss francs) was established in 1950 to expand the present facilities; to it the Swiss Government has generously donated three million Swiss francs.

The trend of WHO in past years towards perhaps too rapid

decentralization of its activities continued in 1950. Six regional offices are provided for, of which those for the Americas, South-East Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean are already in operation, with headquarters in Washington, New Delhi and Alexandria, respectively. Canada has taken the attitude that the extra expense involved in decentralization cannot be adequately financed from the limited budget of the Organization and therefore the added costs must perforce be drawn from other more urgent services that the Organization could perform.

The Constitution of WHO provided that the Pan American Sanitary Organization (PASO), along with other existing inter-governmental regional health organizations, should eventually become integrated with WHO. In 1949, an initial agreement was concluded between these two organizations whereby PASO was assigned the regional functions of WHO for the Americas. Canada has been urged to join this regional organization and was represented by an observer at the Pan American Sanitary Conference held in Ciudad Trujillo in the Autumn of 1950. However, as is natural, PASO has focussed its attention on the principal health problems of the area which are largely those of a tropical or sub-tropical nature, whereas Canada's contacts in health matters have been traditionally with those countries having similar problems, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the countries of Western Europe. For this reason, Canada has been reluctant to become associated more closely with the activities of this regional organization.

The Third World Health Assembly, attended by delegates and observers from sixty-three countries and territories, and observers from a number of other Specialized Agencies and non-governmental organizations, was held in Geneva from May 8 to May 27. The Honourable Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Minister of Health of India, was elected president, the first woman to hold this office. The Assembly examined the work of WHO during the previous year and approved a budget and programme for 1951. In spite of the fact that nine members had withdrawn from the Organization and a number of countries were in arrears with their 1948 and 1949 contributions, the Assembly decided on a budget of \$7,300,000 which included the assessments on Albania, Bulgaria, Byelo-russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R. which had announced their withdrawal from the Organization. Canada opposed this manner of budgeting as unrealistic. In effect, however, it was decided to request the Executive Board to keep expenditures to \$6,300,000 in its plans for 1951. Canada's contribution to the 1951 budget amounts to \$218,084 (U.S.).

It became apparent at the Third World Health Assembly that its programme was too ambitious for its limited budget, and the Canadian Delegation, while recognizing the importance of many of the proposed schemes, tried to secure a clear scale of priorities in the elaboration of programmes. It was not entirely successful in this. Nevertheless the Assembly decided to continue the traditional international services such as health statistics, health regulations, population studies, epidermiological intelligence, and to try within its resources to expand its co-operative services such as joint work with FAO, UNICEF, ECOSOC, and national governments; advisory

and demonstration services to governments; assistance to governments in the control of communicable diseases, such as malaria, venereal diseases, cholera, tuberculosis; and the provision of fellowships and training facilities. In connection with the three latter items, the Assembly examined its role in the expanded technical assistance programme, of which some \$4 million is to be the share of WHO.

The Organization, which has one of the largest membership of any of the Specialized Agencies, admitted four new members in 1950: Indonesia, Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos. Southern Rhodesia was admitted as the first associate member of WHO.

At the same time the withdrawal of states in the Soviet orbit continued, in spite of efforts to persuade them to remain in the Organization. It was the hope of most members that the U.S.S.R. and the other Cominform countries would be willing to co-operate in a field where politics should play only a minor role and where the interests of the peoples of the world might be advanced by the joint efforts of impartial health experts. Nevertheless, by May 1950, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelo-russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, the Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. had all indicated their intention to withdraw from the Organization. In August, Poland as well notified its intention of withdrawing.

The Assembly also considered the question of Chinese representation, in the light of a communication from the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taipeh stating that while it supported the aims of WHO, it withdrew temporarily from the Organization, and a telegram from Peking demanding the expulsion of "the Kuomintang Representatives". A resolution was eventually passed inviting China to resume participation in the Organization.

The Executive Board of WHO consists of eighteen persons designated by as many member states, one third retiring every year. Since Byelo-russia had failed to send a person to attend four consecutive sessions of the Executive Board, the Assembly elected Brazil to complete the remainder of Byelo-russia's term of office. It also elected Chile, France, Italy, El Salvador, Pakistan and Thailand to serve on the Board for the next three years.

As a result of a decision taken by the International Revision Conference in Paris, 1948, a number of national committees on vital and health statistics were established. A Canadian committee, known as the Medical Advisory Committee to the Dominion Statistician, was formed with the responsibility of giving technical advice on matters affecting the operations of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in the field of health statistics, and to provide international liaison between WHO and Canadian health organizations and agencies. The Committee has done some useful work during 1950 in research into health statistics, and, in accordance, with a recommendation of WHO, held a joint meeting with the United States National Committee on October 16 in Ottawa.

In spite of some imperfections and the enormous difficulties confronting it, WHO nevertheless did a commendable job during 1950, and Canada is convinced that its important work must be continued and gradually expanded.

## World Meteorological Organization

The Convention of the World Meteorological Organization which was signed by thirty-one governments in Washington on October 11, 1947, proposed that WMO should be established as a Specialized Agency of the United Nations with the functions of promoting standardization and improvements in world meteorological activities, and of encouraging an efficient exchange of weather and other meteorological information between countries. By its terms, the Convention was to come into effect on the thirtieth day after deposit of the thirtieth Instrument of Ratification. That condition was satisfied on March 23, 1950, and WMO came into existence on that date. Canada ratified the Convention on July 12, 1950. Thirty-seven states have now ratified or acceded to the Convention. During the year steps were taken to establish a Secretariat for the Organization and to transfer to it the responsibilities of the International Meteorological Organization which is to be liquidated. The first conference of WMO will be held in Paris in March 1951.

### IV

## DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

### The Trusteeship Council

The trusteeship system was established by the United Nations "for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements," in order "to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants and their progressive development towards self-government or independence". The Trusteeship Council, created to implement this system, was empowered to obtain information regarding each trust territory, to examine reports of the administering authorities, to accept petitions from indigenous inhabitants, to send visiting missions to trust territories, and to take these and other actions "in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements."

The Trusteeship Council held two regular sessions during 1950, in neither of which the U.S.S.R. participated. The Soviet Representative did attend the opening of the sixth session and proposed that the Chinese Nationalist Delegation should be excluded from the Council discussions. This attempt having failed, he warned that his government would not recognize as legal any decisions or recommendations which the Council made during the absence of his delegation.

As in the past a major part of the Council's work during its sixth and seventh sessions was to examine the annual reports submitted by administering authorities. The Council also examined the reports of its two visiting missions to West African and Pacific trust territories, as well as petitions made either to the visiting missions or directly to the Council. It decided that a visiting mission should be sent in 1951 to the East African trust territories, including Somaliland; it examined the special report of the visiting mission to West Africa on the problems arising from the insistent demands of the Ewe people for unification under a single administration. (At the present time the Ewes are divided between the Gold Coast Colony and French and British Togoland.) Finally, it praised the work of the Anglo-French Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland and recommended that it be further developed and that customs barriers be further reduced.

After re-electing the Dominion Republic and electing Thailand to replace the Philippines on the Trusteeship Council, the General Assembly began its debate on the report of the Trusteeship Council. In view of the relatively harmonious atmosphere which had prevailed during the two sessions of the Trusteeship Council, it had been hoped that debate in the Trusteeship Committee on the report of the Council, would be less heated and more objective than in previous years. These optimistic expectations were not realized. During a lengthy and often acrimonious debate, which found the administering powers constantly on the defensive, strong criticism of these powers as well as of the Trusteeship Council itself was made. The Soviet bloc repeated its perennial accusation that the administering powers were trying to annex the trust territories as colonies in violation of their Charter obligations, and that they were mercilessly exploiting the native peoples in their charge. Spokesmen for certain Latin American, Middle Eastern and South-East Asian countries strongly criticized the administering powers for alleged failure to pursue the objectives laid down in the Charter. These criticisms frequently showed a lack of understanding of the practical problems and difficulties facing the administrators of trust territories. Many of the representatives of non-administering powers, furthermore, attempted to assert the authority of the General Assembly, in which they are in the majority, over the Trusteeship Council, where the administering and non-administering powers have equal representation.

This debate on the relationship between the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council developed into a protracted, and at times heated, discussion between several non-administering powers and a nucleus of administering powers and their supporters. The Council, it was said by the critics of the administering authorities, was "no more than an organ" of the General Assembly, and the Assembly's duty was to give direction to the Council in the form of recommendations which were "legally binding". Accordingly the Trusteeship Council should not take a vote on these recommendations of the General Assembly but should execute them to the best of its technical knowledge. In rebuttal, the administering powers, although not denying the general authority of the Assembly, expressed the opinion that it would be unrealistic to expect dele-

gations which had opposed a resolution adopted by the Assembly to support such a measure when it came before the Trusteeship Council. The Council, they argued, had been carefully constructed so as to preserve a balance between the administering and non-administering powers. The Council was furthermore a principal organ of the United Nations, under Article 7 of the Charter, and it would be against the intentions of the Charter to reduce the Council to the status of a technical agency of the Assembly. However, there needed be no conflict between the two organs: while the Assembly decided the general policies to be followed, the Trusteeship Council decided on the best means to carry them out.

Concurrently with the debate on this aspect of the question there was a determined effort on the part of non-administering countries to assert the supervisory authority of the General Assembly over the administering powers themselves on trusteeship questions. This effort came to a head as a result of a statement by the United Kingdom Representative, to the effect that the administering powers must be "the sole judge" of whether an Assembly recommendation could be implemented in a particular trust territory. The Representative of the Philippines, after a fiery attack on the United Kingdom statement, moved an amendment to the resolution under discussion which would have placed the General Assembly on record as declaring that the administering authorities "have a clear obligation to implement the recommendations of the General Assembly and of the Trusteeship Council". In view of the mood of the Committee, it appeared at the time that the Philippine amendment would be approved. It was, however, withdrawn, and an acrimonious debate was avoided.

In a series of resolutions, the General Assembly asked the Trusteeship Council to: improve its procedure for examining petitions; amend the structure of its report so that it might be more easily examined by the General Assembly; send visiting missions to trust territories more frequently and for longer periods; and study the prevailing practices and laws relating to land tenure in trust territories. The administering powers were asked to make greater use of the technical assistance available for trust territories, to give more emphasis to long-term plans to promote the educational advancement of indigenous peoples, and to eliminate corporal punishment from the territories under their control. At the same time the Secretary-General was asked to report on the measures taken by administering authorities to implement Assembly and Trusteeship Council resolutions, or to set forth the reasons given by the administering authorities for not implementing these measures. Finally, the French authorities were asked to investigate complaints about election methods in Togoland and to report their findings to the Trusteeship Council and to the General Assembly.

The policy of the Canadian Delegation throughout the debate was to resist all attempts to have the Assembly prescribe in detail the manner in which the Trusteeship Council should carry out the functions assigned to it by the Charter. Moreover, the Canadian Representative spoke against an amendment which would have placed the Assembly on record as declaring that the administering authorities had "a clear obligation to implement the recommendations

of the Assembly and of the Trusteeship Council". If this principle were adopted, the desirable element of flexibility which exists in the United Nations trusteeship system at the present time would be eliminated. It is doubtful whether the results achieved in advancing the peoples of trusteeship territories towards self-government would have been any better. Indeed, by alienating the goodwill and co-operation of the administering powers, the results might well have been far less satisfactory than at present. An additional danger is that some Assembly resolutions might not always be in conformity with the terms of individual trusteeship agreements and they might call for expenditures which the administering powers are not in a position to bear.

### South-West Africa

At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, South Africa indicated that it did not intend to place the mandated territory of South-West Africa under United Nations trusteeship, and hoped instead to incorporate this territory within the Union. Nevertheless, in 1946, the General Assembly invited the South African Government to bring South-West Africa within the United Nations trusteeship system. At succeeding sessions, the General Assembly had reiterated this request. However, until the International Court of Justice, at the request of the Assembly,<sup>1</sup> handed down an advisory opinion on certain aspects of the international status of South-West Africa on July 11, 1950, discussions of this question had been seriously hampered for lack of an authoritative juridical statement regarding the international position of the mandated area. South-West Africa, a "Class C" mandate under the League of Nations, has been administered, in accordance with this mandate, as an integral part of the Union of South Africa.

The International Court was unanimous in the opinion that the status of South-West Africa remained that of a territory under international mandate. It also agreed unanimously that South Africa, acting alone, lacked the competence to modify the international status of South-West Africa, but that such competence rested with the Union acting with the consent of the United Nations. By a majority of twelve to two, the Court concluded that South Africa continued to have international obligations for South-West Africa under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the mandate itself, and that supervisory functions in regard to annual reports on the administration of the territory and the transmission of petitions of the inhabitants should now be exercised by the United Nations. *Mutatis mutandis*, the International Court of Justice ought to replace the Permanent Court of International Justice with respect to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the mandate.

While the Court was unanimous in finding that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter provided a means by which South-West Africa might be brought under the Trusteeship System, it held, by eight votes to six, that the provisions of this Chapter did not impose upon the South African Government a legal obligation to do so.

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, p. 171.

The Fifth Session of the Assembly considered two aspects of the South-West African problem. The more important part of its debate was concerned with the implementation of the advisory opinion of the International Court. Three main proposals were advanced during the committee stage: two of these, put forward by groups of Latin American and Asian powers respectively, clearly reflected the highly critical attitude of their sponsors towards the South African Government on this question. After some discussion and private negotiation, these were merged into a single proposal the effect of which was to recommend the establishment of a supervisory body to enforce the opinion of the Court as regards the examination of petitions and reports dealing with South-West Africa and any other matters relating to that territory. This resolution also called upon the South African Government to submit reports on its administration of South-West Africa for the years 1947-50, and, in due course, for subsequent years.

The third proposal was put forward by the United States in conjunction with seven other member states representative of different geographical areas. This eight-power proposal was based on its sponsors' desire, on the one hand, to have the advisory opinion of the Court endorsed and, on the other, to call on the South African Government, in the most moderate language possible, to comply with its terms. Accordingly, under this proposal, South Africa would have been urged to take the necessary steps to give effect to these terms and a committee would have been established to confer with the Union Government on measures to implement the information and to report its findings to the next session of the Assembly.

The attitude of the sponsors of the moderate eight-power proposal obviously differed widely from that of the Latin American-Asian group; and this difference is most clearly illustrated by the fact that whereas the function of the committee which the Latin American-Asian plan envisaged would be supervisory, the committee recommended by the eight-power group would be established to confer with the Union Government.

When the vote was taken in Committee, the Latin American-Asian proposal won a narrow majority (26 to 21 with 4 abstentions) and a vote was therefore unnecessary on the eight-power resolution which Canada had been supporting. The majority in favour of the former had, however, been so small that in order to prevent a voting stalemate in the full Assembly (where a two-thirds majority would be required), the Latin American-Asian group joined with the eight powers which had advanced the more moderate proposal, and worked out a compromise formula designed to attract general support. In this compromise proposal, the sponsors accepted the basic provision of the eight-power proposal that the committee to be established should be "negotiating" rather than "supervisory" in nature. At the same time, the new resolution contained provisions authorizing the committee to examine reports and petitions, and "any other matters" concerning South-West Africa, with respect to all of which the original eight-power draft had been silent. When this compromise was put to the vote in the full Assembly, it received 45 votes, and only South Africa and the Soviet bloc voted against it, with 6 countries abstaining.

Canadian efforts in the consideration of this item were directed towards the adoption of a proposal which would be based on the acceptance of the Court's opinion as a whole, and which would, at the same time, enlist the fullest possible measure of co-operation from the South African Government. In the Canadian view it was desirable to avoid proposals which appeared unnecessarily provocative to the South African Government and which might have the effect of closing the door on continued negotiation through the United Nations. Accordingly, the Canadian Delegation considered the original Latin American-Asian resolution as unsatisfactory because it sought to set up machinery to exercise supervisory functions over South-West Africa without reference to the Union Government, a recommendation which South Africa was certain to refuse to accept. The proposal that the supervisory body should be empowered to deal not only with petitions and annual reports but with "any other matters" relating to South-West Africa also appeared unwise to the Canadian Delegation. Nor did Canada concur in the wisdom of requesting the South African Government to submit reports on the administration of South-West Africa for the years 1947, 1948 and 1949. In the Canadian view, the primary responsibility of the Assembly at this stage lay in discovering means of implementing the Court's opinion, and not in reviving past issues.

It was for these reasons that the Canadian Delegation voted against the Latin American-Asian resolution and preferred the original eight-power draft. When the two resolutions had been merged, the resultant compromise appeared to the Canadian Delegation to contain unsatisfactory elements. In particular, the provisions relating to the examination of petitions and reports were, in the Canadian view, couched in ambiguous language which might be construed as going beyond the Court's opinion in certain respects. The fact that a "negotiating" rather than a "supervisory" committee was to be established by the compromise resolution was, however, welcomed by the Canadian Delegation. The Canadian Delegation therefore voted for the resolution as a whole after abstaining on the clause relating to petitions and reports.

In addition to the attention devoted to the implementation of the International Court's advisory opinion, a number of delegations tabled resolutions urging South Africa to submit a trusteeship agreement for South-West Africa, despite the Union's repeated refusal to do so in the past. Once again, Latin American and Asian proposals were merged; the amalgamated draft reiterated earlier recommendations of the Assembly with respect to the submission of a trusteeship agreement, and endorsed the International Court's opinion concerning the "normal way" of modifying the international status of South-West Africa, i.e. that it should be placed under the trusteeship system. The vote on this resolution was 30 in favour, 10 against (including Canada), with 6 abstentions. Although Canada had supported a 1946 recommendation of the Assembly inviting the South African Government to submit a trusteeship agreement, the Canadian Delegation voted against a renewal of this invitation in 1950. The Canadian position was that since the International Court, in its recent advisory opinion, had taken the view that the Union Government was not legally obliged to submit such

an agreement, the question should either be allowed to lapse, or at least be deferred pending the completion of arrangements for the implementation of the other aspects of the Court's opinion on which the Assembly has now asked the South African Government to take action.

### Non-Self-Governing Territories

Under Article 73 of the Charter the members of the United Nations which administer territories "whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government", and which do not come under the trusteeship system, have accepted "as a sacred trust" responsibility for the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories and for their progressive development towards self-government. The general obligations assumed by the administering authorities under Article 73, in respect of non-self-governing territories, are essentially the same as those they have assumed in respect of trust territories, with, however, the important difference that their formal obligation to the United Nations is limited to the regular transmission of statistical information relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories. The transmission of information in these three categories is, under Article 73 (e), obligatory on the administering authorities, whereas the transmission of political information regarding the territories is not obligatory. In practice, however, several of the administering states have agreed to submit information in this "optional" category. Those administering states which have not agreed to submit such information—in particular, the United Kingdom—have been the target of much criticism from the "anti-colonial" delegations in the United Nations, which take the position that the difference between the "optional" and "obligatory" categories is an artificial distinction which should not be continued. In reply to this the representatives of the administering powers have invoked the language of Article 73 (e), which does not refer to the submission of political information.

In recent years the General Assembly has developed a procedure for considering the information transmitted under Article 73 (e) by the administering powers. A special committee has been set up by the Assembly to examine this information, as summarized and analyzed by the Secretariat, and to submit a report to the General Assembly with whatever recommendations the committee may deem desirable. At its 1949 Session the General Assembly decided, after discussion, to continue the life of the special committee for a period of three years. The committee is composed of Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, which are permanent members because they are administering states. In addition to these eight administering powers the Assembly elected in 1949 eight non-administering powers in order to give the special committee an equal balance. These eight states were Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, Sweden and Venezuela. At the 1950 session of the Assembly, Sweden and Venezuela, which had been elected in 1949 for only a one-year period, were replaced by Cuba and Pakistan.

The 1949 session of the General Assembly also asked the special committee to concentrate its attention during 1950 on educational problems relating to the non-self-governing territories, without prejudice to its work in the other two fields: economic and social. The special committee did this and submitted a special report to the 1950 session of the General Assembly concerning education. It also submitted an additional report on the other work it had undertaken. These two reports provided the basis for the Assembly's discussions of this question.

The discussion of the special committee's recommendations in the field of education did not prove to be highly controversial and it was soon evident that the conclusions of the special committee were supported by the great majority of delegations. This report covered the following aspects of the question: eradication of illiteracy in these territories, the language of instruction, equal treatment in matters relating to education, participation of the inhabitants in the formulation of educational policy and in the administration of education, higher education and teacher training. The committee urged that facilities for primary education should be developed as rapidly as possible, and that special schemes should be inaugurated for the teaching of adults. It recommended that "the first approach to the inculcation of literacy should, wherever possible, be through the mother tongue", but also observed that "where an indigenous language has local currency only, a language of wider currency should be introduced in instruction". The report stressed that there should be no discrimination on a racial or religious basis in educational opportunities, and that school facilities should be made equal for all groups. The report strongly emphasized the pressing need for the training of teachers in these territories. After a short discussion, the Assembly approved this report "as a brief but considered indication of the importance of educational advancement" in non-self-governing territories. The Assembly resolution also noted that UNESCO was carrying on special studies regarding the training of teachers and the greater use of indigenous languages for teaching purposes, and asked that the results of UNESCO's studies should be made available to the special committee. Finally, the Assembly approved the special committee's recommendation that the committee concentrate in 1951 on "economic problems in the non-self-governing territories", and asked the Specialized Agencies concerned to co-operate with the special committee in its studies in this broad field.

Another resolution recommended by the special committee concerned the use of technical assistance in the non-self-governing territories. This resolution invited the administering powers to make applications for such assistance through the United Nations expanded programme of technical assistance. In the Trusteeship Committee a Philippine re-draft of this resolution was adopted which also asked the administering powers to include yearly in the statistical information transmitted by them under Article 73 (e) as full a report as possible of all such applications made for technical assistance. The Canadian Representative abstained on this question, not because of any opposition to its substance, but because he preferred the original resolution of the special committee.

A much more contentious resolution was a proposal by a group of Middle Eastern and Latin American delegations regarding information on human rights in the non-self-governing territories. This proposal asked the administering powers to submit information on the degree to which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been "implemented" in the non-self-governing territories under their administration. In opposing this resolution, the Canadian Representative pointed out that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an expression of aspirations not a legal covenant, and that no other member state was required to submit a report on the degree to which it implemented the provisions of the Declaration. It thus seemed unfair to single out for special treatment the non-self-governing territories and the states which were charged with their administration. He also pointed out that the draft covenant on human rights was still being discussed in various organs of the United Nations and that, in Canada's view, it was premature to adopt a resolution of this nature until work on the covenant had been completed. He therefore proposed that discussion and voting on this resolution should be adjourned until the 1951 session of the General Assembly. A number of other representatives spoke in a similar sense, but the Canadian proposal for adjournment was defeated by a vote of 14 in favour, 24 against, with 4 abstentions. The resolution regarding information on human rights was then adopted by a vote of 26 in favour, 10 against (including Canada) and 7 abstentions.

The Canadian Representative also opposed a resolution adopted by the Assembly concerning the use of comparable statistical information. This resolution referred to the question of using statistical information submitted by member states for the purpose of comparing it with similar information submitted for non-self-governing territories. The Canadian Delegation had supported resolutions previously adopted by the Assembly relating to the use of such comparable statistical information, but opposed the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its Fifth Session which contained a new and very restrictive element. This was a clause to the effect that when the Secretariat used such information for comparable purposes, it should first obtain the consent of the member state which had submitted the information. The Canadian Delegation considered this a retrograde step which would prevent the Secretariat from developing really comparable statistics, as those member states whose statistics compared unfavourably with the non-self-governing territories would be in a position to withhold their consent. This resolution led to a good deal of debate but was, however, adopted in the Trusteeship Committee by a vote of 25 in favour, 18 against (including Canada) and 6 abstentions, and was later approved by the Assembly.

The Fifth Session of the Assembly recommended that the United Nations should be informed of any case where a non-self-governing territory had reached self-government, and where, consequently, the administering authority had discontinued submitting information under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. This question arose when the Netherlands Government had informed the Assembly that the Republic of Indonesia had now reached full independence and

that, for this reason, the Netherlands Government would not submit any further information on Indonesia.

A significant discussion arose over a draft resolution submitted by Cuba which concerned a visit which had been made to Greenland by two senior officials of the Secretariat, at the request of the Government of Denmark which is responsible for the administration of Greenland. The Cuban draft resolution asked that the General Assembly encourage such visits to non-self-governing territories and also asked that the report prepared by these Secretariat officials should be distributed to the members of the United Nations. The Danish Representative intervened emphatically to state that, when his Government invited these two Secretariat officials to Greenland, it had not considered that there would be any question of a report on their visit being submitted to the Assembly. He said that "such a report should not be regarded as the concern of any committee or of the General Assembly" and emphasized strongly the difference between the Assembly's sending visiting missions to trust territories and its sending such visiting missions to non-self-governing territories. The latter practice would, he claimed, remove the purely voluntary principle on which the Danish Government had invited the two officials to visit Greenland. After this statement the Cuban Representative withdrew his proposal. The incident reveals, however, the growing tendency on the part of the majority of members of the United Nations to invoke the principle of "international accountability" insofar as non-self-governing territories are concerned. It also shows the consistent effort being made by some delegations to narrow down as much as possible the differences between Chapter XI of the Charter (dealing with non-self-governing territories) and Chapters XII and XIII (which deal with trust territories). This tendency has been strongly resisted by the administering states and has also been opposed by Canada.

### Administrative Unions

Some of the United Nations trust territories are linked for administrative purposes with adjacent colonies of the administering powers concerned. The degree of unification varies greatly but may involve customs, fiscal, or administrative unions so long as these conform with the provisions of the respective trusteeship agreements.<sup>1</sup> In November 1949 the Assembly asked the Trusteeship Council to complete the investigation which it had already begun on the operation of the administrative unions. The Council referred this request to its committee on administrative unions which, in a series of fifteen meetings held between June 5 and July 11, 1950, examined the matter with the assistance of the administering authorities concerned and of the Secretariat.<sup>2</sup> The committee's deliberations reflected the underlying divergence of view which frequently characterizes discussions between the administering and non-administering powers on questions relating to dependent territories.

<sup>1</sup>For details of these unions, see *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, pp. 166-167.

<sup>2</sup>The following countries were represented on the committee: Argentina, China, France, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States. The Committee's final report, dated July 11, 1950, will be found in United Nations document T/L. 96.

Nevertheless, the results which the committee submitted to the Trusteeship Council demonstrated that for the most part the policies of the administering powers were not such as to invite serious criticism.

The committee summarized its conclusions in a resolution which was phrased as a point-by-point response to the request made by the Fourth Session of the Assembly. The committee's most important recommendation was that since the problem of administrative unions appeared likely to pose questions of a long-term nature, the Trusteeship Council should establish a standing committee on administrative unions. To this recommendation the Council unanimously agreed.

In its examination of the various administrative unions, the committee concentrated on five main points. It found that no new administrative unions were at present contemplated by the administering powers. It expressed itself as generally satisfied with the statistical data supplied by the administering powers. It noted that separate judicial organizations had been established in Ruandi-Urundi and in Tanganyika, and considered that although no such bodies existed in the British Cameroons and in New Guinea the interests of the inhabitants of these territories were sufficiently protected. With regard to the establishment of a separate legislative body within each trust territory, the committee concluded that such an arrangement was inapplicable in the British Cameroons; noted that a legislative council was contemplated for New Guinea and Papua, and urged that its establishment on a democratic basis be accelerated; noted that a legislative council already existed in Ruandi-Urundi; and, while acknowledging the existence of a separate legislative body in Tanganyika, expressed misgivings as to the allocation of powers between this body and the East Africa Legislative Assembly. In the view of some members there was a danger that Tanganyika might become increasingly dependent in an economic and political sense on Kenya and Uganda. Finally, the committee took note of an assurance by the administering authorities that the fullest possible consideration would continue to be given to the wishes of the inhabitants of the trust territories.

The committee had also been asked to determine safeguards which might be needed to preserve the distinct political status of the trust territories, and with this in mind it emphasized that the administering authorities should: furnish adequate statistical data on the trust territories; facilitate the operations of visiting missions; maintain the separate status and boundaries of trust territories participating in administrative unions; and ensure that annual expenditures on administration and welfare in the trust territories should not be less than the annual revenues derived from these territories.

The Trusteeship Council unanimously approved these recommendations, which were then forwarded to the General Assembly. The Assembly, however, postponed consideration of the item until its Sixth Session, partly for lack of time, and partly on the ground that the newly established standing committee on administrative unions would, in any case, carry on its studies in this field after the Assembly had adjourned.

## V

### LEGAL

The question of the recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a member state, including the specific issue of the rival authorities claiming to represent China in the United Nations, has been dealt with in a previous section of this report.<sup>1</sup> The rules and principles of international law on the recognition of governments were discussed when the General Assembly was considering which of two competing regimes should represent a state in organs of the United Nations.

The Fifth Session of the General Assembly also considered certain reports of the Secretary-General on the registration and publication of treaties, and on reparations for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations. A revision was made in the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly to clarify and settle the question of the voting majority required for the adoption of amendments to proposals relating to important questions and parts of these proposals when they are voted on separately. A set of rules was adopted to govern the procedure for the calling of non-governmental conferences by the Economic and Social Council. Further, a resolution was passed empowering the Secretary-General under certain circumstances to make regulations to be applied within the Headquarters District of the United Nations.

During the year the International Court of Justice handed down three advisory opinions on questions submitted to it by the General Assembly in 1949. These related to the interpretation of the clauses in the Balkan Peace Treaties on the machinery for the settlement of disputes,<sup>2</sup> the international status of South-West Africa,<sup>3</sup> and the requirements under the Charter for the admission of new members.<sup>4</sup> The opinions rendered by the Court and the subsequent action taken on them by the General Assembly are treated in other sections of this report. In addition, the Court gave a judgment on November 20 in the contentious case between Colombia and Peru on the right of asylum in diplomatic premises.

#### Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons

In a resolution adopted on December 3, 1949, the General Assembly decided to convene a United Nations conference with a view to concluding a convention on the declaration of death of missing persons.<sup>5</sup> This conference met at Lake Success, from March 15 to

<sup>1</sup>See pp. 42-45.

<sup>2</sup>See pp. 31-33.

<sup>3</sup>See pp. 128-131.

<sup>4</sup>See pp. 50-51.

<sup>5</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, p. 205.

April 6, 1950. Twenty-one nations sent delegations and six sent observers most of whom signed the Final Act of the Conference establishing the text of the convention, with the proviso, however, that "the respective representatives and observers have signed this Final Act, fully reserving the decisions of their Governments with respect to accession to the Convention."

As far as Canada is concerned, the matters dealt with by this conference fall essentially within the realm of civil procedure, and thus are within provincial jurisdiction. It does not seem probable, therefore, that Canada will accede to the convention because of the constitutional difficulties involved and also because of Canada's limited direct interest in the problem the convention is designed to solve. However, it was thought that this country should do everything in its power to fulfil its obligations to fellow members of the United Nations by supporting, wherever possible, these humanitarian activities of the United Nations. A member of the Canadian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations attended the conference as an observer and, although he was not in a position to vote, he was able to take full part in the discussions.

The conference had for consideration a draft convention originally submitted by an ad hoc committee in 1949 to the Economic and Social Council which had, in turn, referred it to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly. According to the terms of Article 13, the convention is "open to accession on behalf of Members of the United Nations, non-member States which are Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and also any other non-member State to which an invitation has been addressed by the Economic and Social Council". Article 14 states that it is to enter into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the second instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The convention provides that states acceding to it shall:

- (1) designate competent tribunals to receive applications for declarations of death of persons coming within the scope of Article 1, which extends to "persons whose last residence was in Europe, Asia or Africa, who have disappeared in the years 1939-1945, under circumstances affording reasonable ground to infer that they have died in consequence of events of war or of racial, religious, political or national persecution";
- (2) recognize certificates of declaration of death of other nations party to the Convention;
- (3) forward notices of application and the results of applications thereof to the proposed International Bureau for Declarations of Death.

It is further provided by Article 8 that:

- (1) There shall be established within the framework of the United Nations an International Bureau for Declarations of Death. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall determine its seat, position, organization, and method of operation.
- (2) A central registry shall be established in the Bureau.

On November 16, 1950, at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, the necessary approval was granted for the establishment of the International Bureau.

Although no states have as yet acceded to the convention, it is reasonable to expect that there are countries, principally in Europe and Asia, that would benefit by its terms and will therefore shortly become parties to it.

### Reservations to Multilateral Conventions

One of the major difficulties in the formulation of international agreements is to make the provisions acceptable to all parties. It has consequently become a practice for states which object to certain articles of an agreement to qualify their acceptance by the inclusion of reservations. In the usage of international law, a reservation may be defined as:

a formal declaration by which a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to a treaty, specifies as a condition of its willingness to become a party to the treaty certain terms which will limit the effect of the treaty insofar as it may apply in the relation of that State with the other State or States which may be parties to the treaty.<sup>1</sup>

The Brussels General Act of 1890 was one of the earlier multilateral international agreements to which a reservation was made. In this case France agreed to ratify the Act if she were allowed to exclude certain articles. In 1899, the principle of submitting reservations to multilateral agreements was given tacit approval when four states affixed reservations to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Conflicts, and in 1907 further sanction was given to the practice when sixty-one reservations were made at the time of signature by various states to eleven of the conventions adopted at The Hague Conference.

Under the League of Nations reservations to international agreements were permitted, although there were indications of the growth of a practice either to define in a treaty the precise reservations the drafting parties were disposed to admit, or to exclude expressly the right of making any reservations whatsoever to the agreed text. The general policy adopted by the League, therefore, was that, with the exception of International Labour Conventions to which no reservations could be made, reservations made to international agreements must be referred to all parties for implied or express consent. It was considered, however, that whenever possible, some measure of control should be exercised in order that a minimum of damage would be done to any international agreement by the application of reservations.

The practice followed by the United Nations Secretariat on this matter has been that, in the absence of stipulations in a particular convention regarding the procedure to be followed in the making and accepting of reservations, the Secretary-General in his capacity as depositary may accept reservations only after it has been ascertained that there is no objection on the part of any of the other states directly concerned. If the convention is already in force, the consent, express or implied, is thus required of all

<sup>1</sup>Harvard Research in International Law; *Law of Treaties*.

states which had become parties up to the date the reservation is offered. Should the convention not be in force, an instrument of ratification or accession offered with the reservation may be accepted in definitive deposit only with the consent of all states which have ratified or acceded by the date of entry into force.

There has not been universal agreement among the members of the United Nations on the policy adopted by the Secretariat, and for this reason the matter of reservations was placed on the agenda of the Fifth Session of the General Assembly by the Secretary-General. After the preparatory work was completed following lengthy discussion by the Legal Committee, a joint resolution sponsored by thirteen countries was adopted by the General Assembly on November 16 by a vote of 47 in favour (including Canada) and 5 against, with 5 abstentions. This resolution makes specific reference to the Genocide Convention to which important reservations had been made by the Soviet bloc. It requests the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following questions:

Insofar as concerns the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the Convention subject to a reservation made either on ratification or on accession, or on signature followed by ratification:

- I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the Convention while still maintaining its reservation if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others?
- II. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, what is the effect of the reservation as between the reserving State and:
  - (a) The parties which object to the reservation;
  - (b) Those which accept it?
- III. What would be the legal effect as regards the answer to question I if an objection to a reservation is made
  - (a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified;
  - (b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet done so?

The resolution also more generally invites the International Law Commission to study, in the course of its work on the codification of the law of treaties, the question of reservations to multilateral conventions, both from the point of view of codification and from that of the progressive development of international law. The Law Commission is asked to give this study priority in order that its report may be considered at the next session of the General Assembly. In a final paragraph the resolution gives an interim mandate to the Secretary-General to follow the practice he has previously adopted concerning reservations pending the rendering of an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice and the receipt of a report from the International Law Commission.

### International Crimes and Criminal Jurisdiction

Two important legal problems considered by the General Assembly were the definition of international crimes and the proposal to establish an international criminal court. Both questions came before it as parts of the second annual report of the International Law Commission,<sup>1</sup> which had been requested "to formulate the prin-

<sup>1</sup>See *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, p. 136.

ciples of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal" and also "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes". The Commission had also been requested to prepare "a draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded to the principles" mentioned above, which are usually referred to as the "Nuremberg principles". It is expected that the Commission will complete this task at its next session in 1951.

In order to appreciate fully the nature of the problems before the Assembly, it is necessary to recall briefly the background in which they arose. At the conclusion of the Second World War, it was clear to the major victorious powers that the traditional notions of the trial and punishment of offenders against the laws and customs of war were not broad enough to permit the just punishment of the major Nazi war criminals. Minor war criminals could be tried by the military commissions, familiar in international law as the legitimate instrument of an occupying conqueror, or by the national courts of the countries where the crimes were committed if the law of those countries prohibited the criminal acts. But the acts of the major war criminals knew no territorial limitations such as would render the criminals amenable to national courts, while many of their acts were not positively characterized as criminal by the applicable national law. Furthermore, the major victorious powers were moved to apply an international judicial sanction to those who initiated a war of aggression. Accordingly, when the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the U.S.S.R. signed the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, establishing the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, they annexed to it a Charter which prescribed the law and procedure to be applied in the trial of the major Nazi war criminals and in it defined, in particular, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Many civilized states adhered to the agreement, but it was plain that the so-called "Nuremberg Charter" and the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal were of a special nature directed towards a particular set of circumstances. It was with a view to preserving the principles inherent in the Charter and judgment that the General Assembly in 1946 "affirmed" those principles and later requested the International Law Commission to formulate them and to pass upon the desirability and possibility of establishing an international criminal jurisdiction which would have some degree of permanence.

### **The Nuremberg Principles**

The International Law Commission in its formulation of the Nuremberg principles set forth seven basic propositions describing the personal responsibility of individuals who commit international crimes: there is no necessity that that responsibility correspond to a responsibility under the national laws; official position or the orders of a superior does not absolve the individual from responsibility; the accused has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law; the crimes which are punishable under international law are in three categories — crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Commission did not, however, express any

appreciation of the seven principles as "principles of international law". The General Assembly had indeed "affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal", but neither this affirmation nor the formulation of the Commission conclusively determined whether the principles as formulated by the Commission formed a part of international law at the time the Nuremberg Tribunal was established, or indeed whether they now form a part of international law. As a result of this uncertainty, and the impossibility of resolving it, much of the debate during the Fifth Session of the Assembly was aimed at securing support for various interpretations of the outcome of the Nuremberg trials.

Thus, the first two principles as formulated by the Commission, relating to the personal responsibility of the individual for international crimes, gave rise to debate on whether international law now imposed obligations on individuals as well as on states, even when the law of the individual state did not coincide with international law. The same conflict of opinion was apparent in the discussion on the inclusion in the formulation of "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression" as an international crime.

The definition of crimes against humanity was criticized on the ground that it was too restrictive. In confining the definition to acts (such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation of any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds) done "in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime", the International Law Commission followed a restrictive interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter, which the Tribunal itself had adopted. Again it was clear that some delegations held the view that the Commission's formulation was not definitive.

Because of the divergent views expressed, the inherent complexity of the subject, and its great importance, as well as the fortunate circumstance that the International Law Commission had yet to complete its draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind into which the Nuremberg principles are to be incorporated, the General Assembly adopted by a large majority, including Canada, a resolution which invited the governments of member states to furnish their observations on the Commission's formulation, and requested the Commission, in preparing its draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind, to take account of the observations made on this formulation by delegations during the present session and of any observations which might be made by governments.

### **International Criminal Jurisdiction**

In its report on the desirability and possibility of establishing an international criminal jurisdiction for the trial of persons charged with genocide and other crimes, the International Law Commission stated that it had decided by a vote of 8 to 1 with 2 abstentions that the establishment of such a jurisdiction was desirable, and by a vote of 7 to 3 with 1 abstention that it was possible. The Commission's report recorded the views of the non-concurring members that

nations would refuse to give up their territorial jurisdiction or to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of an international organ; that a tribunal would be unable to bring the accused before it and to enforce its judgment; that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals could function effectively only because the states which established them were occupying the territories in which the trials took place and had the accused in their power; that punishment of aggressors would depend on their being on the losing side; and that no illusory ideas should be encouraged as to the possibility of setting up the tribunal. A further difficulty confronted the Commission because of a fundamental divergence of views on the question of desirability. It was stoutly maintained by one of the members of the Commission that an international criminal jurisdiction would be desirable only if effective, that it would in fact be ineffective especially in respect of grave international crimes, and therefore its establishment could not be deemed desirable.

When this report came before the Fifth Session of the General Assembly it was apparent that many delegations thought that the conflicting views had not been adequately reconciled by the Commission. On the other hand, the essential task was to appraise the probable co-operation of governments in apprehending their own nationals and surrendering them for trial by an international court. A resolution was accordingly introduced by Cuba, France and Iran that a committee of representatives of states meet at Geneva in 1951 "for the purpose of preparing one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals relating to the establishment and the statute of an International Criminal Court". This resolution secured majority support from those delegations which shared the view of the majority of the Commission that the establishment of such a court was both desirable and possible and from those delegations which, regardless of their attitude to the Commission's report, believed the proposed committee would present to the Assembly a draft convention and statute, providing for the arrest and surrender of individuals for trial by an international court, in a form most likely to secure general support.

The Canadian Delegation, while sharing this latter view, nevertheless considered that the convening of such a committee was premature in that states were not yet in a position to determine what modifications of natural laws and surrender of normal territorial jurisdiction would be required. The new international criminal law had not yet been fully defined even in draft form, as the International Law Commission had not completed its draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind. The Canadian Representative accordingly introduced a resolution which called for the postponement of further consideration of the report of the Commission until it had completed its draft code. South Africa joined Canada in sponsoring this proposal.

It became apparent that the only chance of carrying the Canadian-South African draft resolution was to have it put to a vote before the joint resolution proposed by Cuba, France and Iran. However, a procedural motion to this effect was defeated on a tie vote, 18 in favour and 18 against, with 11 abstentions. Nevertheless, the Canadian Representative was successful in moving an

amendment to the three-power resolution which had the effect of preventing that resolution from being interpreted as an outright acceptance of the report of the International Law Commission. This amendment and an amendment submitted by the United Kingdom, which pointed out that a final decision regarding the setting up of an international criminal court could not be taken except on the basis of concrete proposals, preserved the freedom of governments to reassess their positions after the code of offences against the peace and security of mankind has been completed.

Following the adoption of the resolution sponsored by Cuba, France and Iran, as amended, the Assembly designated seventeen countries, including France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, India and Pakistan, which would appoint representatives to attend the meetings of the committee in August 1951, in Geneva.

## VI

### ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL

The cost of participation in the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies has been rising at a time when member states are bearing an increasingly heavy burden of expenditures for their other foreign programmes and for defence. As a result there has been a growing recognition that international organizations must discharge their responsibilities with the maximum of efficiency and economy in order to ensure the best possible use of available resources. Canadian delegations have constantly stressed that public confidence in the United Nations and its Agencies, and support for their basic objectives, might be adversely affected or even endangered unless clear evidence is forthcoming that the organizations are concentrating their resources on projects of the highest priority and that they are successfully resisting the temptation to disperse their efforts over too many fields of endeavour.

#### Cost of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies

##### Administrative Budgets

The total cost of administering the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies for 1951 will be about \$81 million.<sup>1</sup> This amount represents a substantial increase over 1950, especially if the significant reduction in the administrative expenses of the International Refugee

<sup>1</sup>The actual expenditures for 1948 and 1949 and the appropriations voted for 1950 and 1951 for the United Nations and eight of the Specialized Agencies are shown in Appendix B, p. 181. Canadian assessments for these years are also shown.

Organization (which will end its activities on September 30, 1951) is taken into account. Canada's contribution will amount to \$2.6 million.<sup>1</sup>

### Operational Programmes

To these administrative expenditures which are provided for in the regular budgets (voted annually by the general conference of each organization) must be added the cost of a number of special programmes which are usually financed either by "operational" assessments or on a purely voluntary basis.

Of these, one of the most important has been the operational programme of the International Refugee Organization. During the first three years of IRO's operations (1947-1950), Canada contributed approximately \$16 million out of a total assessment of \$352 million. The final phase of IRO's activities for the period July 1, 1950, to September 30, 1951, will require a further \$42 million, of which Canada's share is \$1.8 million.

In addition to these funds, which are raised by assessment, Canada has also contributed on a purely voluntary basis to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Up to April 1950, Canada's contributions to the Children's Fund amounted to more than \$6 million out of public funds and \$1.2 million from private donations. Total contributions and pledges by all member states were \$148 million (inclusive of \$31 million transferred from UNRRA surpluses).

Canada has also provided: supplies worth more than \$1 million for the \$36 million United Nations Programme for Relief of Palestine Refugees for the period December 1, 1948, to April 30, 1950; almost \$700,000 toward a \$54.9 million programme undertaken by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, which is carrying on the responsibilities of UNRPR during 1950-51; and a little more than \$800,000 to the \$20 million United Nations Technical Assistance Programme.

In all these voluntary activities sponsored by the United Nations, Canada has assumed its full share of responsibility; its participation in financial terms compares favourably with that of any other country.

### Other Prospective Programmes

Canada has also been requested to play a part in a \$50 million programme (for 1951-52) intended to provide a long-term solution to the Palestine refugee problem, as well as in a \$250 million programme approved by the Fifth Session of the General Assembly for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea.

### Financial Discussions During 1950

The concern expressed by many states over the increased costs of international activity has led to strong and sustained efforts in the United Nations and all the Agencies to stabilize their regular

<sup>1</sup>Since the United States dollar is the basic unit of account for the United Nations and most of the Agencies, all figures in this article (and supporting tables) have been expressed in U.S. dollars. Where payments have been made in Canadian dollars or in other currencies, appropriate conversions have been made.

budgets and to limit extraordinary or emergency expenditures to essential activities of the highest priority. Although the nature, scope and direction of these efforts have varied from organization to organization, they have usually taken one or more of the following forms: closer scrutiny of the programmes of each organization to ensure that projected activities are sufficiently important to warrant their being carried out at this time; detailed examination of the budget estimates of each organization to eliminate waste and extravagance; attempts to improve internal efficiency by organizational and administrative improvements, by simplified procedures and by the recruitment of staff of higher calibre; greater emphasis on the necessity for an equitable sharing of costs among all member states; stronger efforts to induce member states to pay their contributions promptly; the development and application of procedures or sanctions to be applied in the event of continued arrears; increased efforts to "co-ordinate"<sup>1</sup> the programmes of all organizations in order to ensure that they are acting in harmony and avoiding costly overlaps and duplications; and the development of common services which can be carried out more economically than separate services for individual organizations.

Running counter to the acknowledged desire for lower expenditures was the ever expanding range of international interests and responsibilities. Aggression in Korea, continued friction in the Middle East, and intensified efforts to improve standards of living and to speed up the pace of economic development in the backward areas of the world, were among the activities which contributed to increased demands on the United Nations and the Agencies.

At a time when costs generally were rising, it was evident that despite efforts towards rationalization and general financial retrenchment, the desire for stabilized budgets could not be fully realized.

## **Examination of 1951 Budgets**

### **United Nations**

The original estimates for 1951 issued by the Secretary-General on August 18, 1950, called for expenditures of \$45,450,800, an increase of \$3,809,027 over the 1950 budget. The increase was largely due to items to which the General Assembly had already committed itself, including the first instalment of \$1 million on the loan from the United States for the United Nations permanent headquarters, the cost of remodelling the library (\$500,000), moving expenditures of \$537,000, increased maintenance costs (\$800,000) and the approved refugee programme for 1951 (\$300,000). In presenting the estimates, the Secretary-General stated that the budget had been prepared with "a full realization that United Nations expenses are only a small proportion of the total international financial commitments of the member states". He also stated that "he would continue to search for ways to alleviate the problems that some countries would experience in meeting their international obligations in hard currencies".

<sup>1</sup>See "Co-ordination", p. 93.

One of the most important changes in the estimates arose out of the establishment of the Technical Assistance Administration, a step taken in anticipation of an extension of United Nations activities to assist the people of under-developed countries to raise their productive capacities and living standards.

Another new feature of the 1951 budget was the presentation of the personnel estimates on the basis of the new salary and allowance system recommended by the committee of experts appointed by the Secretary-General in 1948. In 1951, the Secretariat was expected to have a total of 3,700 employees, or approximately 100 fewer than in 1950.

During the Assembly, a number of new proposals were submitted by member states involving further increases in the amounts requested by the Secretary-General. After the budget and these new proposals had been examined, first by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,<sup>1</sup> and later by the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the Assembly, a number of economies were effected. On balance, the added cost of the new activities approved by the Assembly exceeded the reductions in the estimates, so that the appropriations finally approved for 1951 rose to \$47,798,600.<sup>2</sup> From this amount estimated miscellaneous income of \$6,521,000 is deducted, leaving an estimated net expenditure for 1951 of \$41,277,600, or \$4,756,117 more than the corresponding figure for 1950.

In order to determine the full amount to be contributed by member states during 1951, a further \$1,551,735 must be added to the 1951 appropriations. This additional amount represents the difference between supplementary appropriations (of \$2,879,000) for the financial year 1950 and savings and adjustments out of the previous year's appropriations and income.

Of these supplementary appropriations, \$1,117,000 was required for reimbursement of national income taxes paid by members of the staff during 1950. The remainder was due to various inescapable items of expenditure for which provision had not been made in the 1950 budget, such as the additional outlay for Korea and Libya (\$770,000) and expenses incurred during 1950 in commencing the move to the new permanent headquarters in New York City (\$484,700). These expenditures had been financed out of the Working Capital Fund under special authority vested in the Secretary-General to make "unforeseen or extraordinary expenditures" while the Assembly is not in session.

Member states will therefore be requested to contribute a total sum of \$42,829,335 during 1951, of which Canada's share will be \$1,413,368 (3.3 per cent).

A number of important decisions taken by the Assembly were reflected in the final budget estimates. The Assembly adopted a new system of salary, allowance and leave provisions for members of the Secretariat.<sup>3</sup> It increased subsistence allowances from \$20 to \$25 per diem for members of commissions, committees and all

<sup>1</sup>For a description of the financial machinery of the United Nations, see p. 174, *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*.

<sup>2</sup>For details of the budget finally approved by the General Assembly, see Appendix 16, pp. 182-184.

<sup>3</sup>For details of the new system of salary, allowance and leaves, see p. 154.

similar bodies except the International Law Commission, whose members will receive \$35. These increases are required to cover the increased daily expenses of members of these commissions while attending meetings.

The Assembly also decided to hold the twelfth session of the Economic and Social Council in Santiago and to hold the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in Europe, at an added cost (as compared with Lake Success) of approximately \$300,000 (for the Council) and \$1,750,000 (for the Assembly). Canada opposed both these decisions on the grounds that the additional expenditure entailed in holding these meetings abroad was not warranted, and that the work of the Secretariat would be seriously disrupted by the moves.

The Assembly approved the following expenditures, totalling \$3,946,800, for the following political commissions of enquiry:

UN Special Committee on the Balkans.....	\$ 520,000
UN Commission for India and Pakistan.....	600,000
UN Commission for Indonesia .....	147,500
UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine.....	693,000
Repatriation of Greek Children .....	50,000
UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea .....	790,700
UN Commissioner and Council for Libya .....	695,000
(and Arbitral Tribunal)	
Advisory Council for Somaliland .....	175,000
UN Commissioner for Eritrea .....	250,000
International Regime for Jerusalem .....	25,600
	<hr/>
	\$3,946,800
	<hr/>

The expenditures of the political commissions are somewhat higher than last year due, in the main, to the accelerated activity of the United Nations Commissioner for Libya and to the creation of the new Korean Commission. Countries of the Soviet bloc opposed the appropriations for the Korean commission as well as those for the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans on the grounds that their establishment was contrary to the United Nations Charter.

The Assembly also approved appropriations amounting to \$2,285,000 and \$1,608,550 for the departments of economic and social affairs after a number of delegations had indicated their belief that "too much was being attempted too quickly" in these fields and that important economies could be achieved by more efficient administration and by slowing down the pace for initiation of new projects.

It also approved appropriations of \$2,687,000 for the Department of Public Information and \$934,500 for information centres at various international capitals, after a number of delegations, including the Canadian, had indicated their belief that too large a proportion of the organization's available resources were being devoted to public information. Those opposing the full appropriation

based their case on the observation of the Advisory Committee that "information services must be held subordinate to the organization's primary responsibilities in the political, economic and social fields". Support for the full appropriations came mainly from smaller countries which stressed their reliance on the United Nations information programme and commended it as a means for furthering international understanding and co-operation. The estimate was finally approved after adoption of a resolution, submitted by Australia, requesting the Advisory Committee and the Secretary-General to review the public information activities of the United Nations and to recommend to the Sixth Session of the General Assembly ways for obtaining substantial economies. While no specific amount was referred to in the resolution, the Australian Representative suggested that it should be possible to reduce expenditures in this field by \$250,000 during 1952 without any serious impairment of fundamental activities.

### **The Specialized Agencies**

In a similar manner, the budgets of the various Specialized Agencies were scrutinized carefully by their respective conferences. In general, the discussion followed patterns very similar to those in the United Nations, with the emphasis on concentration of resources and the achievement of economies through more efficient planning and implementation of the various projects. Canadian delegations to UNESCO and WHO particularly stressed their belief that these organizations were dispersing their efforts over too many fields and were not accomplishing as much as they should with the funds expended.

In their further quest for economies, many of the Agencies considered the desirability of reducing the frequency and duration of their annual conferences. In the past, all the conferences have been held annually (excepting the congresses of the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union, which meet every five years). However, during 1950, the Food and Agriculture Organization, with many of its early organizational problems resolved and anxious to reduce its demands on member governments, decided to meet (in regular session) only once every two years. For similar reasons, WHO and UNESCO are also considering biennial instead of annual conferences.

The general conferences of some of the Agencies (in particular UNESCO, WHO and FAO) were faced with peculiar problems because of the failure of some governments to pay their contributions. As a result of these arrears, the funds available for carrying out the programmes have not been adequate. To meet this situation, the conferences, while approving their respective programmes, stipulated that their Directors-General should limit expenditures to "foreseeable income" during the ensuing financial year. Thus, although full programmes have been drawn up and approved, they will not be proceeded with if they require expenditures beyond the anticipated financial resources of the organization.

In accordance with the requirements of Article 17 (3) of the United Nations Charter, the budgets of the Agencies were examined

by the General Assembly. Basing itself on the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Assembly adopted a resolution which urged the Agencies to intensify their efforts to stabilize their regular budgets by elimination or deferment of less urgent projects; and to take a number of other steps aimed at achieving more satisfactory arrangements for the provision of common services and the development of common standards of personnel and financial administration. The Assembly also recommended that the United Nations and the Agencies should make every effort during 1951 to meet demands for expert assistance in Korea, and for other vital emergency programmes, by deferring less essential projects.

These recommendations are a positive expression of the general desire for co-ordination, economy and efficiency and received the full support of the Canadian Delegation.

### Apportionment of Expenses

Member states are deeply interested in what they will be required to contribute to the cost of administering the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. In all the organizations which require annual financial contributions from their members (except UPU and ITU) it has been agreed that contributions should be determined "broadly according to capacity to pay".<sup>1</sup> However, the translation of this principle into a precise mathematical formula has always given rise to technical and political difficulties. The establishment of just and equitable scales<sup>2</sup> of assessment has, therefore, been difficult.

#### United Nations

When the United Nations was first established, it was decided that comparative estimates of national income should be considered, *prima facie*, the fairest guide for the measurement of "capacity to pay". Other factors to be taken into account included comparative income per head of the population, temporary dislocation of national economies arising out of the Second World War, and the ability of members to secure foreign currencies.

Despite agreement on these general principles, the General Assembly experienced difficulty in arriving at an acceptable scale. In the absence of reliable current statistics, the Assembly used the best available pre-war data adjusted to take into consideration war damage and other relevant factors. The first scale submitted to the Assembly called for a United States contribution of almost half the budget. This was not acceptable to the United States Delegation, which contended that "in an organization of sovereign equals no nation should pay too high a share of the budget". The United States assessment was finally set at 39.89 per cent (for 1946 and 1947) on the understanding that the matter would be reviewed

<sup>1</sup>No contribution is made to the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, whose operations are financially self-sustaining.

<sup>2</sup>A table showing the percentage scales of contributions to the United Nations and six of the main Specialized Agencies for the fourteen main contributors, appears at Appendix 17, p. 185.

again the following year. The Canadian contribution was set at 3.35 per cent.

In 1948 the General Assembly acceded to United States demands for a ceiling on its contribution and adopted a resolution stipulating that "in normal times" no one government should pay more than one-third of the ordinary budget of the United Nations. It was agreed that this ceiling would be approached gradually as "world economic conditions improve". The Assembly also decided, on Canadian insistence, that "in normal times" the per capita contribution of any member should not exceed the per capita contribution of the member bearing the highest assessment. In proposing this principle, the Canadian Representative stressed that member states would find it exceedingly difficult to justify a higher per capita payment than the United States, the country with the highest per capita income in the world.

The scale first adopted by the Assembly remained in force without significant modification until 1950. This was due mainly to the lack of reliable statistical data, but also to the fact that many member states pleaded an inability to pay larger shares of the budget. The only change in the Canadian contribution during this period was a reduction to 3.2 per cent in 1948, as a result of the addition of new members to the organization. Similarly, the United States received a token reduction (in 1949) of 0.10 per cent in its assessment as a first move toward the new ceiling.

As in previous years, the United Nations Committee on Contributions' recommendations for a 1951 scale were adopted by the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. In its report to the Assembly, the Contributions Committee stated that although national income statistics were still inadequate for some countries, they were generally more up-to-date than in previous years. These statistics, in conjunction with official statements and other available information, gave a clear indication of the extent of economic recovery in many countries. As a result, the committee felt that progress should now be made toward the removal of maladjustments in the scale. It therefore recommended that the 1951 contributions of fourteen countries be increased and of nine decreased. In particular, it recommended that the assessment of the U.S.S.R. (which had not been changed since the beginning) should be raised by 10 per cent from 6.34 per cent to 6.98 per cent. The contributions of the other countries in the Soviet bloc were to be raised by the same proportion. At the same time, the committee felt that the growth of the Canadian national income justified an increase from 3.2 per cent to 3.3 per cent in the Canadian assessment.

These increases mainly benefited Sweden and the United States, whose contributions were reduced by 0.13 per cent and 0.87 per cent respectively. The reduction in the Swedish share was intended to compensate for an earlier over-assessment. The United States reduction represented a further move toward the implementation of the ceiling principle.

As the seventh largest contributor to the United Nations, Canada has repeatedly stressed the importance of an equitable apportionment of expenses. At the Fifth Session of the Assembly, the

Canadian Representative expressed<sup>1</sup> the belief that while the recommendations advanced by the Committee on Contributions represented a step in the right direction, the proposed scale for 1951 did not fully reflect the rapid and far-reaching economic expansion which had taken place in certain countries. In particular, the U.S.S.R. and other Soviet countries had claimed impressive post-war recovery. The proposed increases in their assessments, though significant, should have been greater to conform with the avowed improvements in their economies.

For technical and other reasons, the Canadian Delegation reluctantly agreed to accept the 1951 scale (recommended by the Contributions Committee) as an improvement on the past, but on the distinct understanding that a more equitable scale would be submitted for 1952.

### The Specialized Agencies

Although the scales of contributions of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies are based on similar general principles, they differ considerably from one another. The differences have arisen mainly out of historical circumstances and the varying character and membership of each organization. For instance ILO and FAO, which came into being before the United Nations, have based their contributions on the scale used by the League of Nations, adjusted to reflect post-war conditions and a widened participation. In these two organizations, as well as in ICAO, which regards interest and importance in civil aviation as an additional consideration in the calculation of assessments, the United States, as the largest contributor, pays an appreciably lower percentage than in the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the UNESCO and WHO scales are based on that of the United Nations, modified to take into account differences in membership. Like the United Nations, they have approved the principle of a ceiling to be applied "in normal times", but WHO has so far been the only Specialized Agency to recognize the related principle of per capita adjustments.

Canada has consistently maintained that since the United Nations scale had been derived from the most reliable and up-to-date information regarding capacity to pay, it should be used to the greatest possible extent by the Agencies, with only such adjustments as are necessary to reflect differences in membership and other special factors. In conformity with these views, which are shared by many other governments, the General Assembly in 1949 adopted a resolution authorizing the United Nations Committee on Contributions to recommend or advise on the scale of contributions for a Specialized Agency if requested to do so by the Agency. By the end of 1950, FAO, ILO and UNESCO had requested assistance in the preparation of their scales.

Although there has been some progress toward a closer relationship between assessments in the several organizations, there has been a natural resistance by most members to any upward adjustments in their contributions. The United States Government,

<sup>1</sup>For the text of the Canadian statement on the "Scale of Assessments", see Appendix 18, pp. 186-188.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix 17, p. 185.

for instance, has taken the position that any upward movement in its contributions to ICAO, FAO and ILO should be gradual and directly related to a downward revision in its contributions to the United Nations, WHO and UNESCO. As a result, the United States shares in 1951 were increased over 1950 in ICAO and ILO but reduced in the United Nations, UNESCO and WHO. In FAO, the United States percentage remained unchanged. At the same time, the Canadian contribution has been lowered in ICAO from 4.80 per cent to 4.40 per cent and in FAO from 4.50 per cent to 4.11 per cent, while remaining at 3.17 per cent in WHO. It has been raised slightly in the other organizations, mainly as a result of the growth of the Canadian national income.

For purposes of assessment, members of UPU and ITU are divided into broad groups, each representing a fixed number of units. Upon joining the organization, members decide the contributor group to which they wish to belong. Under this system, Canada will pay in 1951 twenty-five units each to the UPU and the ITU out of totals of 921 and 762 units respectively.

### Collection of Contributions

For the most part, member governments have discharged their financial obligations to the United Nations promptly. By October 1950 they had paid 100 per cent of their assessment for the period to 1949, 96.41 per cent of their 1949 assessment, and almost 78 per cent of their 1950 assessment. Their record in the Specialized Agencies has not always been as satisfactory. In FAO, WHO, UNESCO and ICAO, arrears in contributions have grown rapidly, with some member states in default two or more years and by amounts which represent a substantial proportion of the total anticipated revenues of these organizations.

This situation can be attributed to a variety of circumstances. A major factor for all the Agencies (and latterly also for the United Nations) has been the inability of the Government of Nationalist China to meet its financial commitments. Certain other member states have simply been lax in remitting their contributions. In the case of WHO, a special contributing factor has been the refusal of this organization, for constitutional and other reasons, to accept the withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. and five other Cominform states. Although these countries formally withdrew from WHO in 1949 and have paid no contributions since that time, they are still included in the scale of assessments. As a result the organization faces a permanent deficit in its income.

To prevent arrears from reaching dangerous proportions, the constitutions of the United Nations and the Agencies provide that, under certain conditions, voting rights and certain other privileges may be suspended where members have not fulfilled their financial obligations to the organization. In application of this provision, ICAO in 1950 suspended the voting rights of six of its members pending settlement of their arrears. During the year, UNESCO and ICAO also took steps to strengthen the constitutional provision for the "suspension of vote".

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly stressed the necessity for prompt payment of contributions. In 1949, in the face of the unsatisfactory record of payment, the Assembly recommended that the Agencies should keep their annual expenditures within the limits of prospective receipts, and that they should review their programmes of expenditure periodically and make adjustments necessary to achieve this objective.

FAO, WHO and UNESCO have already taken steps to implement this recommendation. Their general conferences have instructed their directors-general to ensure that the cost of the projects undertaken in 1951 will not exceed the amounts these organizations can reasonably expect to receive from their members or from other sources of revenue.

### **Personnel Administration**

In 1951, the secretariats of the United Nations and of the ten fully-established Specialized Agencies will be manned by 8,800 staff members, 3,700 of them serving with the United Nations. In accepting appointment, these international civil servants pledge themselves to work solely in the interests of their organization and neither to seek nor receive instructions from any government or other external authority.

#### **Selection of Staff**

Without variation, the constitutional provisions of each international organization prescribe two criteria in the selection of staff. The paramount consideration is the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity; it is also provided that due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

However, the number of qualified persons available for international recruitment is limited and there is strong and sustained competition between national and international agencies for their services. As a result, the proper balance between competence and geography has been exceedingly difficult to attain, especially in the small and more technical secretariats. Despite the acknowledged difficulties in finding trained staff, many delegations, particularly those of the smaller, economically under-developed countries, have often complained about the low representation of their nationals.

To fulfil their constitutional responsibilities and to meet these objections, the organizations have made sustained efforts to attain broader geographic representation. Through improved recruitment and promotion policies, and by the conduct of training programmes for new appointees, the situation is gradually being improved. Canadian delegations have agreed with the wisdom of this approach and have, therefore, consistently opposed attempts at fixing quotas for national representation which, if rigidly applied, might seriously impair the efficient working of the organizations.

#### **International Civil Service Advisory Board**

The General Assembly has from time to time made recommendations designed to promote the development of a more uniform

international career service which would attract outstanding candidates from all parts of the world. With this objective in mind, it authorized, at its First Session in 1946, the establishment of the International Civil Service Advisory Board to counsel and assist the United Nations and Specialized Agencies on recruitment methods and standards, and related phases of personnel administration.

### **Joint Staff Pension Fund**

In 1948, the Assembly instituted the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Scheme designed, among other purposes, to facilitate interchangeability of personnel, and urged the Agencies to participate in it. Agreements for participation in the Fund have already been concluded with WHO and FAO and negotiations with ICAO, ILO and UNESCO are well advanced. With these five Agencies participating, the number of beneficiaries will exceed 6,000. Separate pension systems are still maintained by the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Universal Postal Union and the International Telecommunications Union.

### **New Salary, Allowance and Leave System**

The most important single step towards the development of an international career service of high quality was the adoption by the Fifth Session of the General Assembly of a new salary, allowance and leave system for the United Nations Secretariat. The new system, which comes into effect on January 1, 1951, (subject to transitional provisions designed to safeguard the rights of present staff members) was based on the recommendations of a group of three independent experts. Its adoption will permit of greater flexibility in the use and assignment of staff members by reducing the number of categories of posts from more than forty under the previous system to three broad categories (exclusive of assistant secretaries-general). It will simplify staff administration and, in the long run, it should produce substantial financial economies.

Under the new plan, the assistant secretaries-general, who head the main departments of the Secretariat, will receive a salary of \$23,000, subject to deductions under a staff assessment plan. Below the assistant secretaries-general there will be a directorial category comprising senior policy-making and administrative posts. Officers doing professional work or entrusted with general administrative responsibilities will belong to a professional category. Staff in these two categories will be recruited on an international basis.<sup>1</sup>

The third or general service category will comprise posts of a clerical or similar nature normally recruited locally. The salaries for these posts will be fixed by the Secretary-General on the basis of the best prevailing conditions of employment in the locality of the United Nations office concerned.

The new system also contains satisfactory arrangements for such diverse matters as representation allowances, leave provisions,

<sup>1</sup>The detailed classification system and salary scales for these categories are shown in Appendix 19, p. 188.

children's allowances, education grants, and all the other complex elements that enter into the salary system of an international secretariat. Under the new plan, a scheme for the payment of repatriation grants has been substituted for the previous system of expatriation allowances. Hitherto, members of the Secretariat recruited from abroad had received a special annual (expatriation) allowance intended to compensate them for loss of professional contacts and other disabilities faced in living away from their home countries. The Canadian and other delegations had protested against a perpetual allowance of this kind on the grounds that the real need was for a grant which would assist Secretariat members in re-establishing themselves in their own countries upon repatriation. The new system of repatriation grants will meet this requirement at considerably lower cost to the organization over the years.

The experts had also recommended a reduction from two to three years in the frequency of home leave for staff recruited from countries other than that of their duty station. This recommendation had received the support of the Advisory Committee and of a number of delegations. However, it was opposed strongly by other delegations and by the Secretary-General on the ground that leaves every two years were required to maintain the international character of the staff. In the debate on this question, the Canadian Representative contended that home leave at two-year intervals was unduly costly and had disruptive effects on the work of the Secretariat. The Canadian practice was to grant foreign service officers home leave every three years. After a spirited debate, the experts' recommendations were adopted in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee by 28 votes to 13, with 5 abstentions. However, this decision was reversed a few days later by an overwhelming vote in the General Assembly. As a result, the members of the Secretariat continue to receive home leave every two years.

The administrative heads of the Specialized Agencies have indicated their agreement with the fundamental principles expressed in the salary report, on the understanding that they may be applied flexibly to meet the particular needs of their Agencies. The executive bodies of certain Agencies have already begun a thorough study of the plan, and it is expected that most Agencies will take action during 1951 to implement its main provisions.

### **Permanent Staff Regulations**

As a further move toward the adoption of uniform personnel standards and equivalent conditions of employment, a set of "permanent staff regulations" embodying the fundamental conditions of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of staff members was considered in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination. Each member of this committee has agreed to bring the basic principles in these proposed regulations to the attention of his organization. It was the intention of the General Assembly to consider these regulations at its Fifth Session. However, pressure of urgent business made it necessary to defer their consideration until the Sixth Session.

## Tax Equalization — Staff Assessment Plan

The taxation of internationally recruited staff has been a continuing source of difficulty for the United Nations. When the United Nations was first established, it was decided to exempt all officials from the obligation of paying taxes. This was considered necessary to ensure that the "take-home pay" of members of the Secretariat performing similar duties would not differ because of the diverse tax laws or rates applicable in the many countries from which staff are recruited or in which United Nations offices are located. The principle of tax exemption was included in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and all members were requested to accede.

By September 1950, only thirty-eight of the sixty members of the United Nations had acceded to the Convention. Of those acceding, three (including Canada) did so with the reservation that exemption from taxation imposed by their laws would not extend to their own nationals employed by the United Nations in their own country. The Canadian position was based on the objection to the creation of a "tax-free" class in Canada. The United States Government, which has not yet ratified the Convention, took a similar stand.

To meet these objections, the United Nations General Assembly instituted in 1948 a "staff assessment plan" under which all United Nations employees pay the organization an annual amount roughly equivalent to the taxes they would pay as citizens of the United States. The funds derived from these assessments are treated as miscellaneous income in aid of the budget.

For similar reasons, a "staff contributions plan", modelled on that of the United Nations, became effective on July 1, 1950, for the Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organization at Montreal. The rates of contribution under the plan are slightly higher than comparable Canadian income tax rates.

Since these assessments, in effect, constitute a "tax" on the employees of these organizations, the Canadian Government, in December 1949, amended the Canadian Income Tax Act. The amendment provides that Canadian nationals on the staff of an "international organization" will be given a credit on their Canadian income tax for the deductions made from their salaries under the staff contribution plan. In this way, the objection to a tax-free class has been met, while at the same time the inequities of double taxation have been avoided.

However, despite repeated assurances by United States delegations in the General Assembly, Congress has not yet passed legislation to deal with this matter. As a result, United States nationals on the Secretariat of the United Nations are now assessed by the organization and are also paying taxes to the United States Government without benefit either of full or partial relief from double taxation.

In order to maintain the salaries of these United States nationals at the intended level, the General Assembly from year to year, but with considerable reluctance, has authorized the Secretary-General

to reimburse its staff members (the majority of whom are United States citizens) for taxes paid to their national governments.<sup>1</sup>

## **Other Administrative and Financial Questions**

### **United Nations Headquarters**

The General Assembly considered a report submitted by the Secretary-General showing progress in the construction of the new permanent headquarters in New York City. During the discussion of this report it became clear that owing to rising costs it would not be possible to complete the headquarters with the loan of \$65 million originally provided for this purpose.

However, it was anticipated that the additional funds required should not be large. Since almost \$25 million of the \$65 million loan is still available to meet current demands, it will not be necessary to make provision for additional funds before the next session of the Assembly. The Secretary-General will present his annual progress report at that time, which will indicate the additional appropriations, if any, which will be required to complete the project.

The Secretary-General will also submit, for the consideration of the Assembly, tentative plans and proposals for financing the construction of a building at the northern end of the headquarters site in which permanent national delegations to the United Nations can rent space.

### **United Nations Postal Administration**

A United Nations postal administration, to begin operations on January 1, 1951, was authorized by unanimous vote of the Assembly. The resolution authorizes the Secretary-General to sign an agreement, already drafted, between the United Nations and the United States.

According to this plan, which probably will be working fully late in 1951, the United States Post Office Department will operate a United Nations post office at the permanent headquarters. The United Nations postal administration will supply to the United States Post Office Department, free of charge, stamps valid for postage only on mail posted at headquarters.

The United Nations will operate a separate agency for sale, by mail only, of stamps to philatelists. All revenue from these sales, estimated at \$300,000 for the first year of operation, will be retained by the United Nations. Designs for United Nations postage stamps will be determined by international competition.

The plan was approved on the understanding that there was no intention, at this stage, of extending the services of the U.N. postal administration to outlying offices or the Specialized Agencies.

<sup>1</sup>These amounted to \$1,117,000 during 1950, see p. 146.

## United Nations Telecommunications System

The Secretary-General's plan for a United Nations telecommunications system was approved unanimously by the Assembly. The principle of the plan had been approved by the Assembly in 1948, and its details worked out later by a committee of experts. At that time a complete, world-wide system was envisaged.

The present plan, however, is a modification of the original proposals since the Secretary-General considered that existing commercial arrangements are adequate and that the present volume of traffic would not warrant the expenditure involved. Only minimal broadcasting facilities are, therefore, authorized. These are to be used for special priority services and services to areas which cannot be served by available national facilities. To minimize costs, they will be operated by an outside contractor.

The Secretary-General did not anticipate an addition to the budget for operating costs, since current rental charges for transmitting facilities would be eliminated. He proposed, however, that the capital cost of the new installation, estimated at \$1,983,000, should be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. He was authorized to accept funds provided in this way on the clear understanding that the facilities would become the exclusive property of and be controlled entirely by the United Nations.

## Permanent Financial Regulations

The General Assembly adopted a set of permanent financial regulations to replace the provisional regulations in force since 1947. The regulations cover such diverse matters as preparation of the budget estimates, voting and use of appropriations, provision of funds, and control of expenditures.

The regulations have been drafted with a view to achieving uniformity in financial practices between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. After extensive inter-Agency discussions, the Secretary-General and the heads of the Agencies finally agreed on a draft set of regulations which they were prepared to recommend to their organizations.

The regulations were presented to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General and were adopted after acceptance of amendments recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. They will now be submitted to the 1951 conferences of the Agencies.

## Services of Investments Committee

The General Assembly passed a resolution, jointly sponsored by Australia and Canada, making the services of the United Nations Investments Committee available upon request to the Specialized Agencies. The Investments Committee, which is comprised of three financial experts of international prominence, advises the Secretary-General on the investment of certain reserve and special funds, such as the Joint Staff Pension Fund. Its extensive technical knowledge and financial experience will now be available to the Agencies.

## Annual Audit of Accounts

The General Assembly adopted the financial accounts and reports of the auditors on the United Nations for the financial year ended December 31, 1949, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the financial year ended December 31, 1949, and the United Nations Agency for Relief of Palestine Refugees for the period December 1, 1948 to April 30, 1950. In similar manner, the 1950 conferences of the Agencies accepted the financial reports and accounts of their respective organizations for the financial year ended December 31, 1949.

## Appendix 1

### Statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation in the Opening Debate of the General Assembly, September 27, 1950.

During its brief history, the United Nations has existed under a shadow of fear, the fear that the problems arising out of one great war would resolve themselves, not in a peace, but in a new war. As the Fifth Session of the Assembly opens, this danger has been brought nearer to us by the reality of warfare in Korea. Indeed, as we debate the issues of peace and war in this Assembly, men are fighting and dying in Korea for the cause of the United Nations. We pay tribute to their gallantry and to their devotion.

This war in Korea is but the continuation by armed and open aggression of the policies which communist imperialism has been pursuing by other means in other states. It is part of the theory of communism that the disruptions and dislocations of a post-war period give to a communist minority its best chance to seize power by force and maintain it by the terror and repression of the police state. Systematically the forces of communist imperialism, in these last years, have been trying out these theories in the four corners of the world. In countries where they have been able to depend upon the direct support of the Soviet army, they have been successful. Only one country in which Soviet forces were actually present in the post-war period has been able to throw off the control of the Kremlin, and even that country now feels itself to be gravely menaced. Whether or not continental China will be brought into the orbit of this international conspiracy remains to be seen. We may hope, however, that the Chinese people, with their own age-old civilization, with their traditional wisdom and patience, will not walk into the trap. The consciousness of their own great undeveloped resources and the strength of their national feeling will we hope make them justly apprehensive of being exploited by Soviet imperialism.

In Korea, where the Soviet army had been present in force and where a communist minority was established in power in part of the country, conditions seemed admirably suited for communist seizure of the whole country. This time, however, the attempt was more open and violent than usual, and this time it met with collective United Nations

resistance. This is what makes the aggression in Korea stand out. Despite all propaganda camouflage, the fact that North Koreans invaded the Republic of Korea was clear. This was not a *coup d'état* engineered by a minority as in Czechoslovakia, nor a regime imposed by an occupying force as in Roumania. This was armed invasion. As such, it came as a shock to peace-loving nations. But it also acted as a stimulus to them. A swift and sudden assault on a peaceful nation had an obvious meaning for us all. Hence the speed and determination with which many of the free democracies, my own country included, have applied themselves to the task of jointly building up our defences against aggression. The countries which have felt obliged to take these steps in self defence and to preserve the peace will not be deflected from their purpose by any specious manoeuvres designed to weaken and divide them, or to put them once again off guard.

The effect of the North Korean aggression within the United Nations itself has been to give overwhelming support to the organization in this crisis of its existence. It has, however, demonstrated that, with very few exceptions, the members were not in a position to make that support immediately effective. They were caught by surprise and unprepared to meet at once the demands of the situation. We have, I hope, learned the lesson of this experience. We have also learned, however, that the United Nations can act in response to a challenge; that it is no longer remote from reality, a mere international talking-shop. A new impetus has been given to our world organization and a new atmosphere is generated in this Assembly of which we are all, I think, conscious.

Events—and United States and British soldiers—are rapidly demonstrating in Korea that aggression does not pay. It will soon be necessary for the United Nations to show with equal vigour and resourcefulness that it can deal with the problems of the post-aggression period in Korea. The political and economic life of that country must be established on a basis which will enable the Korean people to fulfil the destiny that has been promised them. As hostilities draw to a close in Korea, and the Assembly takes up its new responsibilities there, it seems to our delegation that certain specific principles should govern its decisions and that we should embody these principles at once in an Assembly resolution.

In the first place, the general objective as we see it of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies—a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people themselves govern without interference from outside. This should be achieved by United Nations action and not through decisions reached by certain of its members.

Secondly, the United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout their territory as the firm foundation for democratic institutions and free self-government. It is our hope that the people of Northern Korea, having been forced into a perilous and disastrous venture by their communist rulers, will now themselves repudiate these rulers and co-operate with the United Nations in bringing to Korea the peace and unity which its people desire. This is the time for the aggressors to cease fire, to admit defeat. If they do, it may not be necessary for United Nations forces in Korean territory to advance far beyond their present positions. The United Nations must, however, leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist aggressors of North Korea are not permitted to re-establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people.

Third, the Korean people—once peace has been restored—must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage. This of course means a Korea without foreign bases and free of foreign military domination; it means a Korea which will be responsible for its own defence within the framework of our collective security system. Above all, it means a Korea which will not be divided and disturbed by subversive communist elements directed from outside Korea.

The fourth principle should be that nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united, free Korea which carries any menace to Korea's neighbours. There have been comments in the press and elsewhere about the role which the Korean peninsula has played in invasions of the Asiatic mainland. Nothing must be done in Korea, as indeed nothing will be done, which holds the least suggestion that any member of the United Nations has any purpose whatever in Korea, other than to establish that country under the full sovereignty of its own people. Korea does not me-

nace any of its neighbours, though in recent years it has had reason to fear the menace of at least one of those neighbours.

My fifth principle is that the free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing these methods of government. The countries of Asia and of the Western Pacific have made an outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations. I think we should now make sure that we gain full advantage of the judgment of these states in charting a course for the future in Korea in the difficult days ahead.

Meanwhile, the destruction of the homes of the Korean people and the inevitable casualties to the civilian population which occur when hand to hand fighting is going on in a city, as it is in Seoul, are bringing terrible hardships upon that unhappy country. At this very time, the Soviet Delegation has the effrontery to produce in the Security Council resolutions condemning the United States Government for destruction and loss of life in Korea, when the Soviet Delegation must be well aware that, at a nod from the Kremlin, the North Korean aggressors would cease fighting and that the bloodshed and suffering would be brought to an end. If the Soviet Government were really concerned about the sufferings of the Korean people, they have all along had it in their power, as they have at this moment, to bring these sufferings to an end, which were caused in the first place by this communist adventure in aggression.

Those who fomented the Korean aggression must know now—if they did not know before—that their actions are running counter to the deepest and strongest trends of the age in which we are living. Today the peoples of the world, above all things, long for peace and security. I know that this is true of the populations of our free democracies and I have little doubt that it is true also of the peoples of the Soviet Union and its associated states. The Soviet rulers are well aware of this sentiment. It is one of the ironic tragedies of the present world situation that the Soviet Government, while pursuing policies of aggression, should be advertising itself as the champion of peace. It has been said that hypocrisy is the tribute of vice to virtue. The present Soviet-sponsored peace propa-

ganda is a tribute to the universal desire for peace which they would exploit for their own purposes. This is a dangerous course, dangerous even to those who hope to profit by it. For people, even the Russian people deprived as they are of access to the truth about political events, cannot be deceived forever. The game of pinning the name of aggressor on the victims of aggression cannot continue indefinitely and the disillusionment of people who, in their political simplicity, are signing the so-called Stockholm Peace Appeal, will, in the end, act as a boomerang against communist imperialism itself. For sooner or later it will become clear to all, as it is clear to most of us now, what kind of peace the Cominform has in mind. It is the peace that prevails in a state dominated by one party, one political faith, one group of self-perpetuating rulers, one political prophet; the peace of the policeman and the gaol.

We want peace but not that kind of peace. Nor will we be led by any number of plausible answers to manufactured questions, or by superficially impressive resolutions about the prevention of war, reduction of armaments, the banning of weapons, to put ourselves in a position again where this kind of dead peace can be imposed on us by dictators. It is for genuine peace, based on the absence of fear and the presence of friendship and co-operation that we long. Furthermore, we are anxious not only to talk about peace and to pass resolutions about it but to do something about it. It seems to us that the first practical step which we can take for peace is to put the security factor into the disarmament equation. We can disarm if—and only if—we are sure that in doing so we are not exposing our people to dangers from others who *say* they are disarming but are not doing so. If we are going to disarm ourselves, we must know—by seeing for ourselves and not merely by being told—that other people are disarming as well. We have in fact, the right of continuous reassurance that the olive branch does not conceal 175 divisions. It is with these considerations in mind that we are bound to examine the resolution which the Soviet Government has introduced into this Assembly on the subject of peace and disarmament. We should approach it with an open mind and a constructive spirit. This, I confess, would be easier if we had not had a painfully disillusioning experience with a whole series of Soviet resolutions in the past, couched in the most pacific

terms, purporting to be contributions to the cause of peace which, on closer examination, have proven to be something else indeed. Nevertheless, the issues of the present time are too grave and the dangers are too acute for us to brush aside any proposal put forward in the name of peace. So we must apply to the Soviet proposal some touchstone which will enable us to see whether this is merely an echo of past performances or whether, within it, is to be found some firm ground for a step forward. For if we see the promise of even a short step in the direction of peace, we must not fail to take it.

The Soviet resolution covers a lot of ground, a good deal of which we have been over before in previous Assemblies. It speaks of the desirability of concluding a five-power peace pact, of reducing the present armed forces of these five great powers by one-third during 1950, that is during the next three months—a transparently insincere and meaningless proposal. The resolution also urges the Assembly to declare itself “in favour of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control for the unconditional implementation of this prohibition”.

My delegation is first of all interested in establishing what precisely is meant by these far-flung proposals, and we think that there is one very simple and direct test of the sincerity of those who have made them. There is one clear question which, if it could be answered by the Soviet Delegate, would go far to resolve our doubts. What does he mean when he says he is in favour of strict international control of atomic energy, or, indeed, of armaments generally? He used that phrase—strict international control—several times in the course of his very interesting statement to the General Assembly in introducing the resolution. He spoke at some length to the last session of the Assembly on the same subject. The Canadian delegation have studied his remarks with the care which they deserve, no doubt other delegations also, but we are quite unable to determine whether the Soviet view of international control differs in the slightest degree from what has been previously put forward by the Soviet representative, and which have been shown to be quite inadequate and unsatisfactory. Therefore, before the Soviet resolution on disarmament comes to a vote at this Assembly, we have the right to ask for a clarification of the Soviet concept of international inspection and control as applied to the

problem of atomic energy — and indeed to disarmament measures generally.

One method of securing such clarification, a very simple method would be to introduce an amendment to the Soviet resolution by including the following words at the appropriate place:

“By ‘strict international control’ is understood a system in which the inspection rights of the international control authority would include:

- (a) the right of free access at all times to every atomic energy installation or plant of any kind whatever; and
- (b) the right to search for undeclared atomic energy facilities wherever there can be reasonable grounds for believing, in the opinion of the international control authority, that they may exist.”

Now an amendment to the Soviet resolution, I suggest would act as the touchstone of its sincerity. If the Soviet delegation indicate by the readiness to accept it, that atomic energy and disarmament negotiations might profitably be resumed then I think that we should try once again to negotiate an agreement in this field that would be effective and would give us something more on which to base our common security than empty phrases or hypocritical gestures.

If, however, the Soviet delegation refuses to accept some such definition of international control, then their resolution on peace and disarmament will be exposed for what it would be — a propaganda manoeuvre designed for purposes far removed from ensuring peace and security.

Another important step which we can take at this Assembly has already been suggested by the United States Delegation in their valuable proposal for the strengthening of the Assembly. It has always been the view of our delegation that the Assembly should be a second line of defence for the security of members of the United Nations when the Security Council is able to act. Fortunately, when the crisis came in Korea, the Security Council was able to act — with speed and force. This decisiveness, made possible because of the fortuitous and temporary absence of the Soviet member, forced the Soviet Government into a hasty reconsideration of its determination never to sit in on the Security Council with any Chinese representative except the one which it had chosen. On the first of August, there was an end to dramatic walk-outs, and in their place

we had a walk-back which was equally dramatic because it showed how the United Nations had come to be regarded as a powerful instrument for peace, even by those who disliked the peace that it was enforcing. But now the spectre of the irresponsible and unprincipled use of the veto hangs over us once more — together with all the other devices for delay and frustration which have been used by communists all over the world to disrupt the activities of democratic bodies. In these circumstances the Canadian delegation welcomes the United States proposals which will make it possible, in appropriate circumstances, to fall back upon the General Assembly as an instrument to express the determination of free people to resist aggression.

We are particularly interested in that part of the United States proposal which would call upon member states to hold forces in readiness for the use of the United Nations. Certainly the need for such measures was demonstrated by the emergency in Korea. Our own experience is a case in point. As early as 1946, the Canadian Delegate at the United Nations said that we were prepared to establish our Article 43 forces immediately, and that we would like the United Nations to tell us what military preparations we should make to fulfil our obligations under the Charter. The Military Staff Committee, however, was never permitted to function because of the obstructive tactics of the Soviet representative, and as a result there was never any plan into which we could fit our collective security plans. Consequently, when the call came for help in Korea, my country — and other countries — did not have at hand land forces, earmarked and trained for United Nations use, which could be quickly thrown into that area. Canada was able, however, to send without delay naval and air help and we then set about determining how best we could contribute to United Nations forces on the ground. We felt that this was exactly the kind of situation which members of the United Nations were supposed to prepare for under Article 43. So we decided, therefore, that we would take this occasion to put ourselves in readiness not only to meet the appeal in Korea but to fulfil similar commitments under the Charter in the future. For that purpose we have recruited in Canada a special force: a brigade group, trained and equipped by the Canadian Government for use on occasions when a United Nations appeal

has been made to which Canada must respond.

Our interests, clearly, in the United States proposal for establishing a United Nations force of national components is an obvious and immediate one. We accept that idea and hope that it can be worked out in practice. But if this is to be done effectively, then every loyal member of the United Nations must make its appropriate contribution to this new and great effort to put force behind peace and security.

The communist aggression in Korea was a blow struck at the very heart of the United Nations. That blow has been warded off by the heroic actions of the South Koreans, U.S. and British forces and the aggressor has been met on his own ground and on his own terms. Even from evil there may sometimes come good, and the good that has come out of this aggression is the new vitality which has been given to the United Nations. Because of the way in which the challenge has been met, we may now begin to walk the road toward collective security, a road upon which we first set out foot in 1945, a road upon which we may now for the first time advance with vigour and with confidence; the only road which can lead to peace.

### Appendix 2

Security Council resolution, June 25, 1950: Korea

(Vote: 9 in favour, none against, 1 abstention, U.S.S.R. absent)

*The Security Council,*

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea";

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results

sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

- i. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and  
Calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;
- ii. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea
  - (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
  - (b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
  - (c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;
- iii. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

### Appendix 3

Security Council resolution, June 27, 1950: Korea

(Vote: 7 in favour, 1 against, U.S.S.R. absent)<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and

Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and

<sup>1</sup>As they had not received instructions from their governments, the Representatives of Egypt and India did not participate in the vote. On June 30, India announced its support for the resolution, and the Egyptian Representative stated that he had been instructed to announce that Egypt would have abstained.

*Having noted* from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

*Having noted* the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

*Recommends* that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

#### Appendix 4

Security Council resolution, July 7, 1950: Korea

(Vote: 7 in favour, none against, 3 abstentions, U.S.S.R. absent)

*The Security Council,*

*Having determined* that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

*Having recommended* that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. *Welcomes* the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. *Notes* that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. *Recommends* that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a Unified Command under the United States;

4. *Requests* the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. *Authorizes* the Unified Command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. *Requests* the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the Unified Command.

#### Appendix 5

General Assembly Resolution, October 7, 1950: Korea  
(Vote: 47 in favour (including Canada), 5 against, 7 abstentions)

*The General Assembly,*

*Having Regard* to its resolutions of 14 November 1947 (112(II)), of 12 December 1948 (195(III)) and of 21 October 1949 (293(IV)),

*Having received* and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

*Mindful* of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been made by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,

*Recalling* the General Assembly declaration of 12 December 1948 that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

*Having in mind* that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of 27 June 1950, subsequent to its resolution of 25 June 1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

*Recalling* that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea,

1. *Recommends* that

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

- (b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government in the sovereign State of Korea;
- (c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified Government;
- (d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above;
- (e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. *Resolves that*

- (a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be established to
  - (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea;
  - (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;
  - (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;
- (b) Pending the arrival in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the Governments of the States represented on the Commission should form an interim committee composed of representatives meeting at the seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise the United Nations Unified Command in the light of the above recommendations; the interim

committee should begin to function immediately upon the approval of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

- (c) The Commission shall render a report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to any prior special session which might be called to consider the subject matter of the present resolution, and shall render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to Members;

*The General Assembly* furthermore,

*Mindful* of the fact that at the end of the present hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean economy will be of great magnitude,

3. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop plans for relief and rehabilitation on the termination of hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within three weeks of the adoption of the present resolution by the General Assembly;

4. *Also Recommends* the Economic and Social Council to expedite the study of long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the authorities which decide requests for technical assistance to the urgent and special necessity of affording such assistance to Korea;

5. *Expresses* its appreciation of the services rendered by the members of the United Nations Commission on Korea in the performance of their important and difficult task;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with adequate staff and facilities, including technical advisers as required; and authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses and *per diem* of a representative and alternate from each of the States members of the Commission.

## Appendix 6

General Assembly Resolution, December 12, 1950: Korea  
(Vote: 52 in favour (including Canada), 5 against, 1 abstention)

*The General Assembly,*

*Viewing* with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

*Anxious* that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an

end to the fighting in Korea itself and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Requests* the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons including himself to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible.

### Appendix 7

**Draft Resolution introduced by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, Political Committee, December 12, 1950: Korea**

*The General Assembly,*

*Viewing* with grave concern the situation in the Far East,

*Considering* that the continuance of this situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of world peace and security,

*Recommends* that the representatives of the following Governments, namely, ..... shall as soon as possible meet and make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

### Appendix 8

**General Assembly Resolution, November 3, 1950: Uniting for Peace (Vote: 53 in favour (including Canada), 5 against, 2 abstentions)**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing* that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”, and

“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”,

*Reaffirming* that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

*Finding* that international tension exists on a dangerous scale,

*Recalling* its resolution 290 (IV) entitled “Essentials of peace”, which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution,

*Reaffirming* the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

*Reaffirming* that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security,

*Conscious* that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.

*Recognizing* in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

## A.

1. *Resolves* that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Adopts* for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

## B.

3. *Establishes* a Peace Observation Commission which for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter;

4. *The Commission shall have authority* in its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions;

5. *Recommends* to all governments and authorities that they co-operate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV);

## C.

7. *Invites* each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security;

8. *Recommends* to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. *Invites* the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8;

## D.

11. *Establishes* a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General

Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in Section C of the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter);

12. *Recommends* to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and assist it in the performance of its functions;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution;

14. *The General Assembly*, in adopting the proposals set forth above, is fully conscious that enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries; and accordingly

15. *Urges* Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of underdeveloped countries and areas.

### Appendix 9

Excerpt from Canadian Statement,  
Political Committee, October 11, 1950:  
Uniting for Peace

...I should like to say a few words about the draft resolution sponsored by the seven delegations, of which my delegation has the honour to be one. This joint draft resolution, as we see it, embodies a plan to strengthen and

organize the Assembly for peace. As such, it threatens no one, except he who would commit an aggression or break the peace. Its purpose is solely to help defeat aggression and it has nothing to do with war mongering or incitement to war.

In one sense, this draft resolution is the product of the aggression committed by North Korean forces last June. That aggression shocked us all not only into a realization of our danger, but also of the inadequacy of our collective security arrangements to meet this danger quickly and effectively. True, the Security Council did act in June, speedily and effectively, but such action—as has been pointed out by one speaker—was made possible only by the accident of Soviet absence from the Security Council. The reasons given for this absence had, of course, nothing to do with the aggression in Korea, and the validity and sincerity can be judged by the fact that they still existed a month later when the Soviet Union Delegation returned to the Security Council to frustrate its operations during August. The walkout, and the walk back, were both examples of arrogance on the part of a minority which could not have its own way immediately in respect of a matter which it considered to be very important and, indeed, is very important. The action of the Security Council in June also showed how unprepared most members of this Organization were to implement quickly the recommendations which they accepted. We were frankly not organized for this purpose. We had to improvise. Well, we hope that next time we may not have to improvise.

I think that we have learned the lesson of the events of June, and this draft resolution is a demonstration of that fact. We have learned, I hope, that in the face of a dangerous international situation, and because the Security Council can apparently act in certain types of aggression only in the absence of one of its members, we must strengthen other agencies of the United Nations to preserve the peace. We must especially strengthen the Assembly. This does not mean that we wish to short-circuit the Security Council or destroy the role that it was meant to play under the Charter, as the agency of the United Nations primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security. Not at all.

The General Assembly, in this draft resolution, is only to be used when the Security Council fails to perform, or is prevented from performing, its peace-preserving functions. If the Security

Council acts, that will satisfy us, and there is nothing in this draft resolution which interferes in any way with such action.

But if it does not act, or if it is unable to act, what then? Are we to sit back and admit the final and complete failure of our peace machinery? That would be an admission of defeat and despair, and we are not willing to make such an admission. One way out of this dilemma, of course, is the building up of regional and limited collective security systems, such as that under the North Atlantic Treaty. These do help to close the gaps in our security system, but they are only partial and limited devices. It is the United Nations itself, our universal organization—we must try to keep it that—which must be strengthened; among other ways, by strengthening the Assembly along the lines of the draft resolution. We must organize—through the General Assembly, and in the event of the Security Council failing in its duty—force behind the law; force to stop aggression; force to carry out Assembly recommendations which are accepted by its Members. It is, of course, only by recommendation that the General Assembly can act—and nothing in this draft resolution changes that—but recommendations, as we know now from the events of June, can have a force as strong and compelling as any mandate, when right and justice are behind them.

Mr. Vishinsky made a great effort yesterday to prove that this draft resolution is illegal and contrary to the Charter in many of its terms, but I do not think he will have convinced those of us who are not already satisfied that anything he says is convincing. He has overlooked, of course, one essential point which I have already mentioned, namely, that the Assembly is being given powers which are not only within the Charter, but are to be used only after the Security Council itself has failed to take or been unable to take action. The acceptance of Mr. Vishinsky's legal argument merely means that the United Nations cannot take any action at all to safeguard peace and security, if the Security Council is made powerless by any one of its members. We do not and cannot believe that the United Nations Charter sanctions any such futility.

The Canadian Delegation, in sponsoring this draft resolution, considers that the General Assembly, by voting these proposals, would be simply making provision to utilize certain powers which it already possesses. And that is the

basis of our position. We do not think of these proposals as constituting any radical or revolutionary departure in interpretation of the Charter, but rather as practical measures to meet situations in which the purposes of the United Nations might be frustrated. We consider that the time has now come to spell out certain measures which, within the terms of the Charter, the General Assembly and its members can take to be more fully prepared for such emergencies in the future.

In his statement yesterday, Mr. Vishinsky spent a good deal of time in an endeavour to prove that our proposal to make the General Assembly better able to deal with matters which the Security Council had failed to resolve, was contrary to Article 11 of the Charter. The Representative of the Soviet Union argued that because of Article 11—and regardless of any action that could be taken under Article 10—the Assembly must refer to the Security Council—without taking any other action whatever, any question on which action is necessary. That seems to us to be a strange doctrine to hear from the lips of Mr. Vishinsky, because, on repeated occasions, he has brought into this Assembly resolutions which contained recommendations in the strongest and most precise language on subjects which either were or could be on the agenda of the Security Council. Within the last week, for example, in this very room, he has urged us to adopt a resolution recommending that all sorts of things should happen in Korea, including the withdrawal of United Nations troops. He is now trying to tell us that it is illegal under the Charter for the Assembly to recommend that United Nations troops should be sent into Korea to prevent invasion, but that it is not in the least illegal for the Assembly to recommend that United Nations troops should be withdrawn from Korea in order that the country may be at the mercy of the invader.

Mr. Vishinsky of course likes to have it both ways, and, in the many debates in which he has participated during the course of the last two decades, he has never been worried too much by the concept of consistency. But he cannot really expect to carry conviction by this kind of argument. He cannot invoke the first part of Article 11, paragraph 2, in the first week of October to advocate the kind of solution he wants in Korea, and then invoke the second part of the same paragraph in the second week of October for exactly the opposite purpose.

In any case, as I see it, there is no real substance to this legal argument. Leaving aside again Article 10, which itself seems to give the Assembly adequate powers, the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2, reads:

"Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion". By the word "action" is clearly meant the kind of mandatory action which the Security Council is empowered to take under the Chapters of the Charter which define its function. This surely does not include the "recommendations . . . to the state or states concerned" which the Assembly is empowered to make. Nor will these recommendations be made, in any case, until the Security Council has had the opportunity to take the action which it is empowered to take and has failed so to do. There is therefore no suggestion in this draft resolution that the Assembly will be assuming the power to act in the manner prescribed for the Security Council.

So far as the draft resolution itself is concerned, the other sponsoring delegations have reviewed its purposes and its principles, and I do not think it is necessary for me at this stage to go over the same ground again. There will be time for discussion of details later. I should like, however, to say one or two things about it now.

Section A of the draft resolution seems to command almost unanimous approval. Mr. Vishinsky said that his delegation could accept it, but he wished to propose some amendments which we shall no doubt soon have an opportunity to examine. He was, of course, satirical about the 24-hour rule for summoning the Assembly and thought that two weeks would be more reasonable. How could the Soviet Union Foreign Minister, he wondered, get from Azerbaijan to Lake Success in 24 hours. Well, Korea has shown us what an aggressor can do in two weeks by exploiting the initial momentum that an aggressor always has over his victim. Twenty-four hours is therefore not, I think, too short a time. But in any event, a special emergency session of the kind visualized in this draft resolution would not be summoned until the Security Council had itself attempted and failed to deal with the aggression. I have no doubt that the Soviet Union Government, for instance, would be very adequately represented indeed at any such meeting of the Security Council and that its representative would be able to move across the hall from the

Security Council to the Assembly within 24 hours. Probably he would not have to come from Azerbaijan. In any case, what would a Soviet Union Foreign Minister be doing in Azerbaijan at a time of international stress and tension at Lake Success, with a breach of the peace threatening?

The next section of the draft resolution — point B — provides for a peace observation commission. The importance of this has, I think, been demonstrated by events in Korea and in Greece and other places. The U.S.S.R. Delegation apparently approves of this provision — and we certainly welcome that approval — but it warns us that the members of such commission must not be the tools of any one group of states. It is a point well taken, and I hope that all delegations, including the U.S.S.R. will remember it. Members of this commission — and indeed of any United Nations commission — must be men of independent judgment who will not be subjected to inappropriate pressure or, indeed, pressure of any kind, from any other government.

Point C of the draft resolution is one to which my Government attaches very particular importance, especially paragraph 8 . . .

We think that this section, and especially this paragraph, marks an important step forward in putting police power behind the United Nations will for peace; in organizing and making effective steady and collective resistance to aggression. Paragraph 8 is of particular importance for smaller countries which, as the Korean incident has shown, do not normally have land forces available for quick and effective United Nations action in any part of the world. This paragraph, of course, does not establish an international force as such, but it does provide the germ of such a force by making it possible to earmark national contingents for United Nations purposes; national contingents which will be organized and trained to implement United Nations recommendations which they have approved, and which will, of course, be available for other purposes of national defence as well.

Mr. Vishinsky has complained that this recommendation goes too far and is a violation of the Charter. It seems to me a more legitimate criticism might be that it does not go far enough in strengthening the machinery provided for by the Charter; but it is at least a beginning, and a beginning which, we hope, may lead to important and far reaching developments. It is true, of

course, that the General Assembly can only recommend action under this section, and it remains for the individual members to decide whether they will adopt or reject the recommendation. As I have said before, a recommendation based on justice and a true knowledge of the facts as ascertained by a United Nations commission itself must have very great authority and force and no loyal member of the United Nations will find it easy to refuse to act under it.

The crisis in Korea was one to which my country was able to respond quickly by sea and in the air. But we did not have land forces which we could make immediately available. We have, however, seized this opportunity to begin to carry out the purposes of paragraph 8 of this draft resolution at once and, authorized by the Parliament of Canada, we have recruited a special force which is being specially trained and equipped for carrying out our undertakings under the United Nations Charter in the future. I venture to express the hope that the great majority of the members of the United Nations will take similar action under this section if and when it receives the approval of the General Assembly. If so, and if we are again confronted with an emergency such as that which faced us last June, we who accept our obligations under the Charter and desire to do what we can to carry them out will be in a better position to make a speedy and effective contribution to the defeat of aggression. Indeed, if sufficient forces of this kind could be held in readiness it would be a powerful deterrent to anyone who would disturb the peace. On the other hand, it would be most unsatisfactory, I think, if only a few members of the United Nations were willing to take appropriate action under this section. For this reason we believe that all states members should give early and serious consideration to this recommendation that they should maintain, within their national armed forces, elements for the implementation of United Nations resolutions.

Then we come to the last section, section D. Some doubts have been raised as to the advisability of the inclusion of this section in the draft resolution. The Representative of Australia in his statement yesterday expressed his doubts, and in so doing I think he read far more extensive power and responsibilities into this section than certainly was intended by the authors of the draft resolution. The intention in section D is straightforward and seems to us to be a very wise one.

Under section C we are putting, we hope, certain forces and resources at the disposal of the United Nations. Surely it is not unreasonable to suggest that an ad hoc committee.. a temporary committee.. should be set up under section D to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly before next September on methods by which the principles which we set forth in section C can be worked out in the light of the response which has been made to this draft resolution. For instance, among other matters this committee might examine and state the arguments for and against a small, specially recruited international force along the lines which have been recommended, among others, by the Secretary-General. As I understand it, no question arises in this section — or indeed in paragraph 9 of section 1 — of United Nations military planning or of Mr. Trygve Lie on his white horse leading his forces down Grand Central Parkway. Nor is there any question of an inquisitorial investigation of the natural resources of member states. This is to be merely a committee to study and report in the same way that other United Nations committees have studied and reported.

But if the wording of this section gives rise to misunderstanding and difficulty, possibly amendments could be introduced to remove some of these doubts...

## Appendix 10

**General Assembly Resolution, November 4, 1950: Spain**  
**(Vote: 38 in favour (including Canada), 10 against, 12 abstentions)**

*The General Assembly,*  
*Considering that:*

The General Assembly, during the second part of its first session in 1946, adopted several recommendations concerning Spain, one of which provided that Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, and another that Member States withdraw their Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid,

The establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of Ambassadors and Ministers with a Government does not imply any judgment upon the domestic policy of that Government,

The Specialized Agencies of the United Nations are technical and largely non-

political in character and have been established in order to benefit the peoples of all nations, and that, therefore, they should be free to decide for themselves whether the participation of Spain in their activities is desirable in the interest of their work,

*Resolves:*

1. To revoke the recommendation for the withdrawal of Ambassadors and Ministers from Madrid, contained in General Assembly resolution 39 (I) of 12 December 1946;

2. To revoke the recommendation intended to debar Spain from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations, which recommendation is a part of the same resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 concerning relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain.

### Appendix 11

Excerpt from Canadian Statement,  
Political Committee, October 30, 1950:  
Atomic Energy

"...Mr. Vishinsky has recently tried to remove our doubts on one aspect, but only one aspect of this control, namely inspection. I would like to ask him this simple question. Does the U.S.S.R. admit that any international agreement should include—again let me emphasize the word 'include' (for inspection itself is not enough)—should include provisions for a strict system of international inspection by which the officials of the international authority would have the right, at any time and with or without the consent of the state concerned (a) of continuous inspection of any atomic energy installation or atomic plants of any kind whatever, and (b) to search, by any means, including observation by air, for undeclared atomic energy facilities wherever the international control authority has any reason to believe they exist? This atomic energy question of such critical importance to the fate of the whole world should be given further and urgent examination by the Atomic Energy Commission, to see if the gap between the two positions can be narrowed or even closed. The possibility of such examination was removed, however, when the Soviet Representative walked out of that Commission on a totally irrelevant issue. One test of Soviet good faith in the matter would be its willingness to walk back again."

### Appendix 12

General Assembly Resolutions, December 1, 1950: Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea

(Vote: Resolution A—51 in favour (including Canada), none against, 5 abstentions)

Resolution B—same

A.

*The General Assembly,*  
*Having Regard* to its resolution of 7 October 1950 on the problem of the independence of Korea,

*Having* received and considered a report of the Economic and Social Council submitted in accordance with that resolution,

*Mindful* that the aggression by North Korean forces and their warfare against the United Nations seeking to restore peace in the area has resulted in great devastation and destruction which the Korean people cannot themselves repair,

*Recognizing* that as a result of such aggression the people of Korea are desperately in need of relief supplies and materials and help in reconstructing their economy,

*Deeply Moved* by the sufferings of the Korean people and determined to assist in their alleviation,

*Convinced* that the creation of a United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea is necessary both to the maintenance of lasting peace in the area and to the establishment of the economic foundations for the building of a unified and independent nation,

*Considering* that, under the said resolution of 7 October 1950, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is the principal representative of the United Nations in Korea and hence must share in the responsibility for the work undertaken by the United Nations in furtherance of the objects and purposes mentioned in the said resolution,

*Considering* that it is nevertheless desirable to set up a special authority with broad powers to plan and supervise rehabilitation and relief and to assume such functions and responsibilities related to planning and supervision, to technical and administrative matters, and to questions affecting organization and implementation as are to be exercised under the plans for relief and rehabilitation approved by the General Assembly, such authority to carry out its responsibilities in close cooperation with the Commission,

**A. Establishment of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea**

1. *Establishes* the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) under the direction of a United Nations Agent General, who shall be assisted by one or more deputies. The Agent General shall be responsible to the General Assembly for the conduct (in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly, and having regard to such general policy recommendations as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may make) of the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea, as that programme may be determined from time to time by the General Assembly.

2. *Authorizes* the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea:

(a) To recommend to the Agent General such policies concerning the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's programme and activities as the Commission may consider necessary for the effective discharge of the Commission's responsibilities in relation to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea;

(b) To determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographical areas within which the Agency shall operate at any time,

(c) To designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General may establish relationships; and to advise the Agent General on the nature of such relationships;

(d) To take such steps as may be needed to support the Agent General in fulfilling his task in accordance with the policies established by the General Assembly for relief and rehabilitation;

(e) To consider the reports of the Agent General to the General Assembly and to transmit any comments thereon to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly;

(f) To call for information on those aspects of the work of the Agent General which the Commission may consider necessary for the proper performance of its work;

3. *Authorizes* the Commission to consult from time to time with the Agent General in regard to the provisional programme adopted by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council and especially with regard to the adequacy

of that programme to meet the needs of Korea as defined in the statement of general policy, and to make recommendations thereon to the Economic and Social Council;

4. *Directs* the Agent General:

(a) To co-ordinate his programme with measures taken by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly relating to the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea, and to support the Commission in fulfilling this task;

(b) To commence the operation of the programme in Korea at such time as may be agreed upon by the United Nations Unified Command, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the Agent General;

(c) To consult with and generally be guided by the advice of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea on the matters set forth under paragraph 2 (a) and be governed by its advice on the matters covered in paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c);

5. *Further Directs* the Agent General, in the carrying out of his functions:

(a) To ascertain, after consultation with the designated authorities in Korea, the requirements for supplies and services for relief and rehabilitation made necessary by the consequences of armed conflict in Korea;

(b) To provide for the procurement and shipment of supplies and services and for their effective distribution and utilization within Korea;

(c) To consult with and assist the appropriate authorities in Korea with respect to measures necessary for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy and the effective distribution and utilization within Korea of supplies and services furnished;

(d) To submit reports to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General, transmitting copies simultaneously to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and to the Economic and Social Council;

(e) To be guided in matters of administration, to the extent consistent with the special requirements of the programme, by the rules and regulations established for the operation of the Secretariat of the United Nations; Specifically he shall:

- (1) Select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Agent General and the Secretary-General shall agree are applicable;
- (2) Utilize, wherever appropriate, and within budgetary limitations, the existing facilities of the United Nations;
- (3) Establish, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and in agreement with the Advisory Committee established under paragraph 6 below, financial regulations for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency;
- (4) Arrange, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, for the rendering and audit of the accounts of the Agency under procedures similar to those applicable to the rendering and audit of the accounts of the United Nations;

6. *Establishes* an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of..... (five Member States) to advise the Agent General with regard to major financial, procurement, distribution and other economic problems pertaining to his planning and operations. The Committee shall meet on the call of the Agent General but not less than four times a year. The meetings of the Committee shall be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations except in special circumstances, when the Committee, after consultation with the Agent General, may meet elsewhere if it deems that this would be essential to the proper performance of its work. The Committee shall determine its own methods of work and rules of procedure;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consulting the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the Advisory Committee to appoint the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction, and authorizes the Agent General to appoint one or more Deputy Agents General in consultation with the Secretary-General;

8. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to establish a special account to which should be credited all contributions in cash, kind or services, the resources

credited to the account to be used exclusively for the programme of relief and rehabilitation and administrative expenses connected therewith; and directs the Secretary-General to make cash withdrawals from the account upon request of the Agent General. The Agent General is authorized to use contributions in kind or services at his discretion;

9. *Recommends* that the Agent General in carrying out his functions:

(a) Make use at his discretion of facilities, services and personnel that may be available to him through existing national and international agencies and organizations both governmental and non-governmental;

(b) Consult with the Secretary-General and the heads of the specialized agencies before appointing his principal subordinate personnel in their respective fields of competence;

(c) Make use of the advice and technical assistance of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and, where appropriate, request them to undertake specific projects and special tasks either at their own expense or with funds made available by the Agent General;

(d) Maintain close contact with the Secretary-General for the purpose of ensuring fullest co-ordination of efforts of the organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in support of the programme;

10. *Authorizes* the Agent General to enter into agreements with such authorities in Korea as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may designate, containing terms and conditions governing measures affecting the distribution and utilization in Korea of the supplies and services furnished, in accordance with the statement of general policy on Korean relief and rehabilitation contained in section B of the present resolution;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make available to the maximum extent possible and subject to appropriate financial arrangements, such facilities, advice and services as the Agent General may request;

12. *Requests* the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to make available to the maximum extent possible, and subject to appropriate financial arrangements, such facilities advice and services as the Agent General may request;

13. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to review the reports of the

Agent General and any comments which the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea may submit thereon, and such other data as may be available on the progress of relief and rehabilitation in Korea and to make appropriate reports and recommendations thereon to the General Assembly;

14. *Calls upon* all Governments, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, pending the beginning of operations by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, to continue to furnish through the Secretary-General such assistance for the Korean people as may be requested by the Unified Command;

15. *Invites* countries not Members of the United Nations to participate in financing the programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea;

#### **B. Statement of General Policy on Relief and Rehabilitation in Korea**

16. *Approves* the following statement of general policy:

1. The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation in Korea is necessary to the restoration of peace and the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea.

2. To this end, it is the objective of the United Nations to provide, subject to the limit of the resources placed at its disposal for this purpose, relief and rehabilitation supplies, transport and services, to assist the Korean people to relieve the sufferings and to repair the devastation caused by aggression, and to lay the necessary economic foundations for the political unification and independence of the country.

3. The United Nations programme of relief and rehabilitation for Korea shall be carried out in practice in such a way as to contribute to the rapid restoration of the country's economy in conformity with the national interests of the Korean people, having in view the strengthening of the economic and political independence of Korea and having in view that, in accordance with the general principles of the United Nations, such assistance must not serve as a means for foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs of Korea and must not be accompanied by any conditions of a political nature.

4. The United Nations programme is to be a supplement to the general recovery effort that will be undertaken by the Korean people on their own initiative and responsibility, through the

most effective utilization of their own resources as well as of the aid which is rendered under the programme.

5. Whilst the programme should be consistent with the pattern of long-term economic development in Korea, it is itself necessarily limited to relief and rehabilitation, and contributions and supplies furnished under this programme shall be used exclusively for that purpose.

6. First priority shall be given to the provision of the basic necessities of food, clothing and shelter for the population of Korea and measures to prevent epidemics. Second highest priority shall be given to projects which will yield early results in the indigenous production of basic necessities; this will include the reconstruction of transport and power facilities. As the programme develops, emphasis should be shifted to the provision of other materials, supplies and equipment for the reconstruction or replacement of war-damaged facilities necessary to the economic life of the country.

7. The necessary measures shall be taken to ensure that distribution shall be so conducted that all classes of the population shall receive their equitable shares of essential commodities without discrimination as to race, creed or political belief.

8. Subject to adequate control, the distribution of supplies shall be carried out, as appropriate, through public and co-operative organizations, through non-profit-making voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross, and through normal channels of private trade. At the same time, measures shall be taken to ensure that the cost of distribution and the profit from the sale of supplies are kept to the minimum. Measures shall be taken to ensure that the special needs of refugees and other distressed groups of the population are met through appropriate public welfare programmes, and accordingly the sale of relief supplies will take place only in justifiable cases and under conditions agreed upon with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

9. The local currency proceeds derived from the sale of relief and rehabilitation supplies or, at the discretion of the Agent General, an amount commensurate with the value of goods and services supplied, shall be paid into an account under the control of the Agent General. The Agent General, after consultation with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation

of Korea, and in agreement with the Advisory Committee referred to in paragraph 6 of Section A of the present resolution, shall use these funds for appropriate additional relief and rehabilitation activities within Korea, for the local currency expenses of the relief and rehabilitation operations of the United Nations, or for measures to combat inflation. The proceeds shall not be used for any other purpose.

10. The necessary economic and financial measures shall be taken by the authorities in Korea to ensure that the resources provided under the United Nations programme, as well as Korean resources, are effectively employed to aid in laying the economic foundations of the country. Among these, special attention should be given to measures to combat inflation, to sound fiscal and monetary policies, to the requisite pricing, rationing and allocation controls (including the pricing of goods imported under the programme), to the prudent use of Korean foreign exchange resources together with promotion of exports, and to the efficient management of government enterprise.

11. Import taxes shall not be imposed on relief and rehabilitation supplies received under the United Nations programme.

12. The authorities in Korea should maintain such records and make such reports on the receipt, distribution and use of relief and rehabilitation supplies as may be determined by the Agent General after consultation with them.

13. All authorities in Korea shall freely permit the personnel of the United Nations to supervise the distribution of relief and rehabilitation supplies, including the examination of all storage and distribution facilities as well as records.

14. The personnel of the United Nations shall be accorded within Korea the privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the fulfilment of their function.

15. All authorities in Korea and the Secretary-General shall use their best efforts to inform the people of Korea of the sources and purposes of the contributions of funds, supplies and services.

16. In determining Korean's needs for relief and rehabilitation, in drawing up programmes and plans, and in implementing such programmes and plans, the Agency created to administer the relief and rehabilitation programme should consult with and utilize, to the

greatest extent feasible, the services of Korean authorities.

## B.

### *The General Assembly,*

1. *Requests* the President to appoint a Negotiating Committee composed of seven or more members for the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-member States as to the amounts which Governments may be willing to contribute towards the financing of the programme for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea:

2. *Authorizes* the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures best suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind;

(a) The need for securing the maximum contribution in cash;

(b) The desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of a nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated programmes; and

(c) The degree of assistance which can be rendered by specialized agencies, non-members States and other contributors;

3. *Requests* that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascertained the extent to which Member States are willing to make contributions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-General in order that they may consult with their Governments;

4. *Decides* that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has completed its work, the Secretary-General shall, at the Committee's request, arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly, an appropriate meeting of Member and non-member States at which Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and the contributions of non-members may be made known.

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In accordance with the terms of the above resolution, the President of the General Assembly, at the 318th plenary meeting on 4 December 1950, announced that he had appointed a Negotiating Committee. The following States Members were appointed: Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay.

### Appendix 13

#### Canadian Statement, Fifth Session of General Conference of UNESCO, June 14, 1950: The Selection of Central UNESCO Themes

... The basic programme as it is presents a reasonably cogent and logical whole. The fact remains, however, that many delegations in the plenary session have expressed the view that the UNESCO tree needs further pruning. The purpose of the Canadian draft resolution is to indicate a method by which this pruning may be accomplished.

The preamble of our resolution hardly requires any explanation as it is a recital of well-known facts. The last paragraph of the preamble, to the effect that a maximum concentration of resources is now indispensable, meets, I think, with general approval. In Canada, as I imagine in many other countries, there exists a feeling that UNESCO is grappling with too many problems to be really able to tackle one successfully. Let us beware of diffuseness for fear of compromising UNESCO's future.

The first article of our resolution asks the General Conference to defer until a more propitious time all low priority projects in the UNESCO programme, and to carry on those of secondary importance on a reduced scale. This is not a new proposal. The Director-General himself, in his speech of May 26 in plenary session, said "I had already (before the Fourth Conference) attempted, with the wise guidance of the Executive Board to correct the impossible situation created by the superabundance of projects, by laying down an order of priority".

Our clause would simply confirm and extend the practice followed by the Director-General and the Executive Board by providing them with the moral authority of a formal directive from the General Conference.

The Canadian resolution states further that the General Conference should decide to select a theme or themes. Theoretically, an appropriate central theme for UNESCO could consist of the following:

- (a) a broad objective;
- (b) one of the services of UNESCO;
- (c) a particular programme activity or project;
- (d) the grouping of programme items under a title which could be used effectively for publicity purposes.

In practice, however, only two kinds of activities could, in our opinion, appro-

priately be used as central themes: certain programme activities or UNESCO services.

The United States Delegation has suggested in plenary meeting that the activities of UNESCO be organized around a limited number of major objectives. The integration of the Organization's programme around a few major objectives may entail considerable adjustment in budgetary appropriations and in the administrative structure of the various departments of UNESCO. Moreover, the selection of a few major objectives for UNESCO raises very difficult problems.

These basic objectives would necessarily be couched in broad terms which would lack the concreteness and the urgency necessary to catch the imagination of the masses and obtain the public support that we seek. The public, as you know, does not indulge readily in esoteric exercises. It needs slogans which are both concrete and imaginative.

The proposal made by the United Kingdom Delegation that the various items of UNESCO's programme be grouped under one title, in order that the Information and Publication Service of UNESCO may be provided with a central publicity theme, has considerable merit and we heartily agree with it. As a matter of fact, our proposal provides for just that type of co-ordinated publicity, but as a corollary of the concentration of purpose in the programme activities. It seems to us that we should go beyond concentration of publicity efforts if we wish UNESCO's action to be really effective.

We should, therefore, use as central themes certain programme activities or UNESCO services. It would appear to be far easier to agree on a specific service of UNESCO or a certain programme activity, the furtherance of which would be the main concern of the Organization during a given period, than it would be to reach agreement on the major objectives of UNESCO for all time. In fact, it is conceivable that secondary themes may be combined with the central themes if this is considered useful. This essentially pragmatic approach would enable us to retain the flexibility of purpose which is so necessary in an organization such as UNESCO. If we wish to select a service of UNESCO for 1951, I suggest the Exchange of Persons Service which has elicited strong support from member states. If on the other hand we wish to select a programme activity as a central theme, I suggest a worldwide campaign against illiteracy in view of the favour with

which the fundamental education programme of UNESCO has been received.

These themes are given as examples. We realize, of course, the difficulty of selecting UNESCO themes but this should not necessarily be a stumbling block if it is realized that selection does not imply that it is the most important activity of the Organization. It should only be important enough to deserve special emphasis. Each year, the lime-light could be turned on a different activity of the Organization and in this manner world public opinion would, in the course of a few years, become aware of the aims and purposes of the Organization. The concept of UNESCO and what it is trying to do should in this way become clear even to the non-initiated.

The last operative paragraph of our resolution requests that the Director-General be instructed to concentrate the efforts of the Organization on carrying out the central theme. This means that the various departments of UNESCO would be called upon to co-operate to the fullest extent compatible with administrative efficiency in their own field. We do not envisage that a certain proportion of the special budgets of the various departments of the Organization would be assigned to the furtherance of the activities selected as a central theme. It should be possible, however, to transfer non-specialized personnel from one department of UNESCO to another on a temporary basis in order to achieve a greater degree of concentration.

Sub-paragraph B of the last operating paragraph of our resolution calls for an all out effort to publicize the central theme chosen for UNESCO. We attach, of course, considerable importance to this point. The Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation has stressed the importance for UNESCO to streamline its publicity activities. I will not come back to this matter because it is obvious that publicity efforts are much more effective if they are not dispersed over a variety of subjects.

Sub-paragraph C of the last operating paragraph of our resolution merely states that a report be made to the Sixth General Conference on the success achieved by the selection and execution of the central theme, in order to help the next General Conference decide whether the same theme should be retained, or some other selected.

Briefly, our resolution seeks to achieve three things:

- (1) confirm and extend the practice followed by the Director-General and Executive Board in establishing an order of priority amongst the various UNESCO projects, by asking the General Conference to formulate a directive on this subject;
- (2) authorize the Director-General to effect necessary transfer of personnel to the extent he deems practical, in order to encourage certain programme activities or service activities indicated to him by the General Conference;
- (3) help, through the selection of a temporary central theme, the UNESCO Information Service to concentrate its publicity efforts.

I hope I have made clear the purpose of the resolution which I am sponsoring on behalf of Canada. If it is adopted it will contribute, I hope, to the efficiency of the Organization and enhance its credit amongst those who are questioning its usefulness. The non-initiated, who, after all, constitute the majority of the taxpayers, need to be better informed and made fully aware of UNESCO's purposes so that they may be willing to support its endeavours. Our duty is to dissipate the impression of diffuseness and dispersion that has gained ground, by putting the emphasis on some important activities of the Organization. At this price only will UNESCO obtain the sympathy and support that it deserves.

## Appendix 14

Draft Resolution<sup>1</sup> Submitted by the Canadian Delegation to the Fifth Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, May 24, 1950: The Selection of Central UNESCO Themes

### *The General Conference*

*Noting* with satisfaction the statement of fundamental objectives and fields of work of UNESCO set forth in the "Programme proposed by the Executive Board — Paris 1950." (5C/5(1) Rev.).

*Noting further* that the Executive Board has indicated that "these fields of work are very extensive and for practical reasons a selection has to be made of those activities that are to be undertaken at any particular time".

*Considering* that the scale of activities for 1951 must be strictly limited to that which can be effectively undertaken with

<sup>1</sup>This resolution was not put to a vote.

the available resources of personnel and funds.

*Considering* further that a maximum concentration of resources is now indispensable to avoid further diffusion of efforts and to enlist wide public support through a better understanding of UNESCO's aims and purposes.

*Decides:*

- (a) to defer until a more propitious time all low priority projects in the basic UNESCO programme and to carry on those of secondary importance on a reduced scale;
- (b) to select from the higher priority phases of the programme one or more major themes or services to be designated the "central UNESCO theme(s)" for 1951.

*Instructs* the Director-General, in consultation with the Executive Board, and

in the light of specific recommendations made by national delegations during the Fifth Conference,

- (a) to concentrate the major efforts of the organization to carrying out this central theme during 1951 as far as practicable, and without prejudice to the continuation at reasonable levels of other phases of the programme;
- (b) to devote a substantial proportion of the funds available within the 1951 budget for public information activities to publicizing this central theme;
- (c) to report to the Sixth General Conference the extent to which these efforts to concentrate on and publicize the "central theme" have been successful in order to guide later sessions of the General Conference in the selection of other themes for the future.

## Appendix 15

### Regular Administrative Budgets of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies<sup>1</sup> and Annual Canadian Assessments

Organizations	Administrative Budgets				Canadian Assessments			
	1948 (Actual Expenditures)	1949	1950 (Appropriations)	1951 (Appropriations)	1948	1949	1950	1951
	(In Thousands of Dollars U.S.) <sup>2</sup>							
United Nations . . . . .	37,623	42,575	44,520 <sup>3</sup>	47,799	1,090	1,297	1,059	1,413
Food and Agriculture Organization . . . . .	4,182	4,654	5,000	5,000	190	190	225	205
International Civil Aviation Organization . . . . .	2,285	2,555	2,938	2,857	133	117	113	109
International Labour Organization . . . . .	4,148	5,034	6,023	6,219	176	188	233	241
International Refugee Organization . . . . .	3,457	4,798	4,500	2,507	153	153	144	80
International Telecommunications Union . . . . .	897	2,994	1,749	1,380	4	58	34	49
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization . . . . .	7,136	7,757	8,000	8,180	321	298	279	309
Universal Postal Union . . . . .	209	297	333	291	6	8	9	8
World Health Organization . . . . .	4,443	4,397	7,501	7,300	149	154	221	218
	64,380	75,061	80,564	81,533	2,222	2,463	2,317	2,632

<sup>1</sup> Exclusive of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, whose operations are financially self-sustaining; the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization and the International Trade Organization which have not yet come into existence; and the World Meteorological Organization which has just come into existence and has not yet held its first conference.

<sup>2</sup> Since the budgets of most organizations are expressed in U.S. dollars, all amounts in the above table are shown in that currency for purposes of comparison.

<sup>3</sup> This figure excludes the \$8 million appropriation voted by the Fourth Session of the General Assembly for the establishment of an international regime for Jerusalem, but includes 1950 supplementary appropriations to an amount of \$2,879,000 voted by the Fifth Session and to which members will contribute in 1951.

## Appendix 16

## General Assembly Resolution, December 15, 1950: Budget Appropriations for the Financial Year 1951

(Vote: 50 in favour (including Canada), none against, 5 abstentions)

*The General Assembly,**Resolves that for the financial year 1951:*

1. Appropriations totalling US\$47,798,600 are hereby voted for the following purposes:

## A. UNITED NATIONS

		<i>Amount in Dollars US</i>
<i>PART I. Sessions of the General Assembly, the Councils, Commissions and Com- mittees</i>		
<i>Section</i>		
1.	The General Assembly, commissions and committees.....	2,568,750
2.	The Security Council, commissions and committees.....	
3.	The Economic and Social Council, commissions and committees.....	502,000
	(a) Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body.....	22,900
	(b) Regional economic commissions..	64,000
4.	The Trusteeship Council, commissions and committees.....	53,600
TOTAL, PART I.....		3,211,250
<i>PART II. Investigations and Inquiries</i>		
<i>Section</i>		
5.	Investigations and inquiries.....	3,946,800
	(a) United Nations Field Service....	450,000
TOTAL, PART II.....		4,396,800
<i>PART III. Headquarters, New York</i>		
<i>Section</i>		
6.	Executive Office of the Secretary-General.....	484,200
	(a) Library.....	450,000
7.	Department of Security Council Affairs.....	758,700
8.	Military Staff Committee secretariat..	129,600
9.	Technical Assistance Administration..	300,000
10.	Department of Economic Affairs.....	2,285,000
11.	Department of Social Affairs.....	1,608,550
12.	Department for Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.....	865,000
13.	Department of Public Information...	2,687,000
14.	Department of Legal Affairs.....	430,000
15.	Conference and General Services.....	7,179,000
16.	Administrative and Financial Services	2,920,000
17.	Common staff costs.....	4,366,700
18.	Common services.....	2,810,000
	(a) Transfer to the permanent Headquarters.....	400,000
19.	Permanent equipment.....	302,200
TOTAL PART III.....		27,975,950

	<i>Amount in Dollars US</i>	
<i>PART IV. United Nations Office at Geneva</i>		
Section		
20. United Nations Office at Geneva (excluding direct costs, chapter III, secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body).....	4,383,600	
Chapter III, joint secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body.....	55,200	
(a) Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.....	254,000	4,637,600
TOTAL, PART IV.....		4,637,600
<i>PART V. Information centres</i>		
Section		
21. Information centres (other than in- formation services in Geneva).....		840,000
TOTAL, PART V.....		840,000
<i>PART VI. Regional economic commissions (Other than the Economic Commission for Europe)</i>		
Section		
22. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.....	825,000	
23. Economic Commission for Latin America.....	503,800	
TOTAL, PART VI.....		1,328,800
<i>PART VII. Hospitality</i>		
Section		
24. Hospitality.....	20,000	
TOTAL, PART VII.....		20,000
<i>PART VIII. Contractual Printing</i>		
Section		
25. Official Records (excluding chapter VI, Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body).....	875,560	
Chapter VI, Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body...	12,440	888,000
26. Publications.....		962,000
TOTAL, PART VIII.....		1,850,000
<i>PART IX. Technical programmes</i>		
Section		
27. Advisory social welfare functions....	768,500	
28. Technical assistance for economic development.....	479,400	
29. International centre for training in public administration.....	145,000	
TOTAL, PART IX.....		1,392,900
<i>PART X. Special expenses</i>		
Section		
30. Transfer of the assets of the League of Nations to the United Nations....	649,500	
31. Amortization of the Headquarters construction loan.....	1,000,000	
TOTAL, PART X.....		1,649,500

## B. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

	<i>Amount in Dollars US</i>
PART XI. <i>The International Court of Justice</i>	
Section	
32. The International Court of Justice....	595,800
TOTAL, PART XI.....	595,800
	47,898,600

## C. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

Section	
33. Global reduction on the provision for established posts.....	-100,000
Grand Total.....	\$47,798,600


2. The appropriations voted by paragraph 1 above shall be financed by contributions from Members after adjustment as provided by the Financial Regulations. For this purpose, miscellaneous income for the financial year 1951 is estimated at US \$6,521,000;

3. The Secretary-General is authorized:

- (i) To administer as a unit the appropriations provided under section 3 (a), section 20, chapter III, and section 25, chapter VI;
- (ii) With the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to transfer credits between sections of the budget;

4. In addition to the appropriations voted by paragraph 1 above, an amount of US \$14,000 is hereby appropriated for the purchase of books, periodicals, maps and library equipment, from the income of the Library Endowment Fund, in accordance with the objects and provisions of the endowment.

# The Structure of the United Nations






# ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

## PRINCIPAL ORGANS

## SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

### COMMISSIONS



Simplified reproduction of Chart taken from *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48*, (published September, 1949, by Department of Public Information of the United Nations, Lake Success, N.Y.)

**Appendix 17**  
**Percentage Scales of Contributions to the United Nations and Certain Specialized Agencies**  
**for the Fourteen Main Contributing Countries**

	United Nations		ILO		ICAO		WHO		FAO		UNESCO		IRO	
	1951	%	1951	%	1951	%	1951	%	1951	%	1951	%	1950-51	Operational Budget %
United States of America . . . . .	38.92		25.00		24.98		35.00		27.10		35.00		39.89	45.75
United Kingdom . . . . .	11.37		13.60		8.01		11.38		14.52		13.27		11.48	14.75
U.S.S.R. . . . .	6.98						6.28 <sup>1</sup>							
France . . . . .	6.00		8.88		5.07		5.94		7.68		7.00		6.00	4.10
China . . . . .	6.00		3.04		0.66 <sup>2</sup>		5.94		3.99		7.00		6.00	2.50
India . . . . .	3.41		4.43		3.14		3.22		4.16		3.80			
Canada . . . . .	3.30		4.28		4.40		3.17		4.11		3.78		3.20	3.50
Australia . . . . .	1.92		2.69		3.27		1.95		2.52		2.30		1.97	1.76
Sweden . . . . .	1.85		2.33		2.47		2.02		2.54		2.12			
Argentina . . . . .	1.85		2.51		3.00		1.83				2.16			
Brazil . . . . .	1.85		2.61		2.60		1.83		2.36		2.16			
Netherlands . . . . .	1.35		1.45		3.00		1.39		1.81		1.54		1.40	0.90
Belgium . . . . .	1.35		2.08		2.13		1.34		1.72		1.54		1.35	1.00
Union of South Africa . . . . .	1.04		1.69		2.00		1.10		1.44		1.19			

The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are excluded from the above table, since they are not financed by contributions. Also excluded are the Universal Postal Union (the members of which, for purposes of determining contribution, belong to one of six classes ranging from one unit to twenty-five units), and the International Telecommunications Union (whose members are divided into eight groups ranging from one unit to thirty units), as the method of assessment used by these organizations does not offer a basis of comparison with the scales of contributions of the other agencies.

<sup>1</sup>The U.S.S.R. gave notice of withdrawal from WHO early in 1949.

<sup>2</sup>China gave notice of withdrawal from ICAO, effective May 1951, and has in consequence only been assessed for the period from January to May, 1951.

### Appendix 18

#### Excerpts from Canadian Statement, Administrative and Budgetary Committee, November 29, 1950: Scale of Assessments

... Last year the Canadian Delegation expressed its belief that the scale of contributions then recommended to the General Assembly did not adequately reflect the rapid and substantial improvement in their basic economic situation that certain member states claimed to have achieved. As a result, we felt that our own contribution was relatively higher than it should be on a purely objective basis. We did accept the scale for one more year, but only on the understanding that the Committee on Contributions, with the full co-operation of all member states, would be in a position to make definitive recommendations and to propose a scale for 1951 which would be more in keeping with the factual situation which the countries to which I refer are attempting to establish. We regret that this has not been possible...

You will recall the circumstances under which the first United Nations scale was established. The nations of a shattered world, just emerging from the most devastating war in history, had sent their representatives to San Francisco to establish the basis for a new world organization which would help avoid any recurrence of the catastrophes through which we had so recently passed. Recognizing the great differences in size and wealth of the various member states, it was agreed, quite logically, that the financial support for the organization should be based on "relative capacity to pay". Each member state would pay its fair share of the costs, to be determined from objective statistical and other data examined annually by a body of experts to be designated as the "Committee on Contributions". That was an acceptable principle from a long-term point of view. However, at that time a temporary situation of a special nature had to be faced. To compensate for the serious devastation and dislocations of war, special exemptions were granted to a number of member states on the understanding that these exemptions would be gradually eliminated as the effects of war receded into the background. The scale finally approved by the First Session of the Assembly had, as a result, serious limitations, but it was the best that could be devised with the information available at that time and in view of all the circumstances.

Now, however, the war is some years behind us. Great progress has been

made in many member states, both in their economic situation and in the quality and quantity of the statistical material available to measure that improvement. Many countries have achieved substantial recovery from the ravages of war and have, to a large extent, re-established more normal conditions.

We regret that there has been no comparable improvement in the scale of contributions for the United Nations.

In case my observations may be construed in any way as a direct criticism of the Committee on Contributions, I must firmly correct any such interpretation. In the first instance, it has not been our Committee on Contributions which failed the General Assembly. It has been rather that some member states, by their inability or unwillingness to provide adequate statistical data, have made the development of a new scale an exceedingly difficult, if not an impossible, task. Because of these difficulties, the committee found itself in a position where it had to proceed very cautiously. With inadequate and inaccurate data on which to base its calculations, the committee decided, some years ago, that, in the circumstances then existing, it had to avoid precipitate actions which might, in the long run, prove to be unwarranted. In practice, it accomplished this end by applying an arbitrary limitation on the extent to which the contribution of any member state should be changed in any one year. In effect, the Contributions Committee said that, in order to avoid unwarranted adjustment, "no change upwards or downwards of more than ten per cent in any one year shall be proposed in the percentage contribution of any one country".

In the early days, the application of this rule may have been justified. It was only proper that the committee should act cautiously and avoid the necessity for rapid and unwarranted fluctuations in the final scale. But the situation today is vastly different and we are extremely doubtful that any justification remains for the application of this rule, either now or in the future....

We must strongly protest against the continuation of any such arbitrary limitation. If we are to accept the application of this working rule indefinitely, we must resign ourselves to a situation in which certain member states will continue for many years to pay much less than their fair share of the costs of the United Nations. So long as this rule remains in effect, it will be impossible for the Contributions Committee to adequately reflect two factors. First,

the accelerating recovery of many countries from war damage and devastation. In other words, the rule ties the scale of contributions much too permanently to compensatory arrangements designed to meet a situation which was recognized to be a special and temporary one.

Secondly, it will not be possible for the Contributions Committee to give adequate effect to some truly amazing improvement in productivity and national income which have been claimed by certain member states.

Any permanent situation of this kind would, of course, be entirely inconsistent with the best interests of the organization. The Canadian Delegation has always insisted that, unless the burdens of the United Nations are equitably and justly shared by all its members the effect on the public at large and upon national legislatures in particular can only be unfavourable and detrimental to the long-range interest of this organization. We cannot permit the Committee on Contributions to continue to be guided by a rule which perpetuates the present inequities in the scale.

The Canadian Government has always been most sympathetic to the problems of those countries which have been faced with the problem of repairing war damage. We have to the greatest possible extent given assistance wherever this was required. But we cannot accept a situation in which the difficulties of the past are accepted as justification for the unlimited avoidance of current and future responsibilities.

The Representative of Poland, in a statement in the Second Committee, informed us that "despite the fact that, as a result of the ravages of war, my country lost over one-third of its national wealth, already in 1949, after the three-year plan was completed, industrial production reached a level of 177 per cent of the pre-war output". In the same speech, this representative referred to a 180 per cent improvement in the production of electric power and equally impressive figures for industrial growth, agricultural growth and capital investment.

Later, the Representative of the U.S.S.R. made equally imposing claims regarding the level of the post-war improvement in the economy of his country. It may be naive for us to assume, in the face of such obvious and impressive testimony, that these member states, which exert such an important influence on the activities and deliberations of the United Nations, should be carrying a considerably higher proportion of the cost of the United Nations.

However naive or not that may be, we, in Canada, feel most strongly that it is only reasonable to expect that the contributions of these states should reflect in full measure this increase in their basic capacity to pay. In this connection, I do not think it is up to us to make any judgment on the reliability of claims of the nature to which I have referred. It is sufficient to say that they have been seriously advanced before committees of this Assembly in support of positions assumed by these countries themselves.

We have selected these examples because in these cases the conclusions seem to us unavoidable. These are countries whose contributions were set at an arbitrarily low figure in order to give them an opportunity to limit their financial burdens during the difficult period of post-war reconstruction. Now that their reconstruction is well advanced, we must insist that they begin to pay their fair share of the load. We cannot accept the continuation of any working rule which will prevent this from being achieved. However, once an adequate permanent scale has been achieved through the rapid application of the necessary re-adjustments to bring the contribution of all member states to a satisfactory level, then the application of the rule might be reconsidered to prevent unduly erratic fluctuations of national contributions which might arise from the necessity of following too closely temporary variations in national economies.

It must be evident from what I have said that my delegation is not satisfied with the present situation. However, we are not unmindful of the difficulty, if not the absolute impossibility, of attempting in this committee to formulate a new scale in which the ten per cent working rule would be abandoned. Therefore, in a spirit of co-operation and accommodation and in order to expedite the work of this committee, the Canadian Delegation will reluctantly accept the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions for 1951.

We do so, however, on the clear understanding that this situation will not be repeated again next year. We would, however, request the rapporteur to carry a clear indication of the will of this committee that during 1951 the ten per cent rule is no longer to be applied and that all member states will be required to carry their full and equitable share of the burdens of the United Nations. Alternatively if you would prefer a more formal expression of this thought, my delegation would be pre-

pared to submit a resolution to this effect.

The Canadian Delegation would also like to stress again the importance of ensuring that the per capita contribution of any one member state should not exceed the per capita contribution of the member state bearing the highest assessment. This is a most important principle. I am sure that all members here are in full agreement that they would not wish to place any national delegation in a position where it would have to justify to its legislature and public opinion the payment of a per capita contribution which exceeds that of the United States. My delegation appreciates that this particular principle is already embodied in an Assembly resolution and that the Committee on Contributions has always taken it fully into account. However, we restate it now because of its fundamental importance.

It goes without saying that in order to accomplish these important objectives, the Committee on Contributions must have all the necessary data for its work. There will, of course, be a few countries whose statistical services have not yet

reached a state which would permit them to meet these requirements fully. However, these are exceptional cases and it is the belief of my delegation that in its next annual report, the Committee on Contributions should be instructed to indicate those states which have not furnished the United Nations with adequate statistical data.

I have said that the Canadian Delegation will accept the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions for 1951 as the best that can now be provided.

We have been pleased to carry our fair share in the past, and we will continue to do so. However, I wish to state forcibly that unless the scale recommended next year is a more just and equitable one, we shall insist on reconsidering our entire position as to contributions. In the meantime, if the scale is reopened this session, we will, of course, find it necessary to take whatever action we consider necessary and desirable to safeguard our own position. Under no circumstances could we consider a contribution which would further increase the inequities in the present scale.

## Appendix 19

### United Nations Salary Scales<sup>1</sup> for Internationally Recruited Staff

Under the new salary system adopted by the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, assistant secretaries-general will receive a salary of \$23,000. The classification and salary levels of other internationally recruited staff are as follows:

Levels	Directors and Principal Officers \$	Professional Service \$
Principal Director	17,000-18,000 (2) <sup>2</sup>	
Director	15,000-17,400 (4)	
Principal Officer	13,300-17,000 (6)	
Senior Officer		11,310-15,000 (9)
First Officer		9,140-12,500 (10)
Second Officer		7,330-10,150 (10)
Associate Officer		5,750- 7,870 (9)
Assistant Officer		4,250- 6,000 (8)

The above figures represent gross salaries and are subject to deductions under the United Nations Staff Assessment Plan.

Salary differentials will be applied for duty stations away from headquarters to take into account relative costs and standards of living.

The following representation allowances will also be paid, at the discretion of the Secretary-General, to:

- (i) Assistant Secretaries-General: from \$7,000 to \$10,000.
- (ii) Principal Directors: from \$1,000 to \$ 3,500.
- (iii) Directors: from \$0 to \$1,500.

The Principal Directors and the Directors are further entitled to all allowances, such as education and children's allowances, available to eligible staff members generally.

<sup>1</sup>All figures quoted in this Appendix are in United States dollars.

<sup>2</sup>The figures in brackets indicate the number of salary increments within each level. These increments will normally be granted annually in the professional category and every two years in the director category.

## Appendix 20 Membership<sup>1</sup>

### UNITED NATIONS

Afghanistan	Iraq
Argentina	Israel
Australia	Lebanon
Belgium	Liberia
Bolivia	Luxembourg
Brazil	Mexico
Burma	Netherlands
Byelo-russian S.S.R.	New Zealand
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Norway
China	Pakistan
Colombia	Panama
Costa Rica	Paraguay
Cuba	Peru
Czechoslovakia	Philippines
Denmark	Poland
Dominican Republic	Saudi Arabia
Ecuador	Sweden
Egypt	Syria
El Salvador	Thailand
Ethiopia	Turkey
France	Ukrainian S.S.R.
Greece	Union of South Africa
Guatemala	U.S.S.R.
Haiti	United Kingdom
Honduras	United States
Iceland	Uruguay
India	Venezuela
Indonesia	Yemen
Iran	Yugoslavia

### ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Permanent Members	Non-Permanent Members
Canada	To serve until December 31, 1951:
China	Ecuador
France	India
United Kingdom	Yugoslavia
United States	To serve until December 31, 1952:
U.S.S.R.	Brazil
	Netherlands
	Turkey

### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

To Serve Until December 31, 1951	
Belgium	France
Chile	India
China	Peru

To Serve Until December 31, 1952	
Canada	Mexico
Czechoslovakia	Pakistan
Iran	United States

To Serve Until December 31, 1953	
Philippines	United Kingdom
Poland	Uruguay
Sweden	U.S.S.R.

### INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND

Australia	Iraq
Belgium	Israel
Bolivia	Italy
Brazil	New Zealand
Byelo-russian S.S.R.	Switzerland
Canada	Thailand
Ceylon	Turkey
China	Union of South Africa
Dominican Republic	United Kingdom
Ecuador	United States
France	Uruguay
India	U.S.S.R.
Indonesia	Yugoslavia

### SECURITY COUNCIL

Permanent Members	Non-Permanent Members
China	To serve until December 31, 1951:
France	Ecuador
United Kingdom	India
United States	Yugoslavia
U.S.S.R.	To serve until December 31, 1952:
	Brazil
	Netherlands
	Turkey

### TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Administering Trust Territories	New Zealand
Australia	United Kingdom
Belgium	United States
France	
Permanent Members of the Security Council Not Administering Trust Territories	China
	U.S.S.R.
Elective Members	
To serve until December 31, 1952:	Iraq
	Argentina
To serve until December 31, 1953:	Dominican Republic
	Thailand

<sup>1</sup>Membership as of January 1, 1951, is given unless otherwise stated. For membership of these organs during 1950 see *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, page 307 et seq.

## Appendix 21

### United Nations Documents

Printed publications of the United Nations may be procured in Canada through the Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, Ontario. Mimeographed United Nations documents are available to the general public by annual subscription from the United Nations Secretariat, Lake Success, New York; and to university staffs and students, teachers, libraries and non-governmental organizations from the United Nations Department of Public Information, Lake Success, New York.

Complete sets of United Nations documents may also be consulted at the following centres in Canada:

University of British Columbia  
(English printed and mimeographed documents)

Provincial Library of Manitoba  
(English printed and mimeographed documents)

University of Toronto (English printed and mimeographed documents)

Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto (English printed and mimeographed documents)

Library of Parliament, Ottawa  
(English and French printed documents and English mimeographed documents)

McGill University (English printed and mimeographed documents)

University of Montreal (French printed documents)

Laval University (French printed documents)

Dalhousie University (English printed and mimeographed documents)

## Appendix 22

### Publications of the Department of External Affairs

The following is a list of publications relating to the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, issued by the Department of External Affairs during 1950.

1. *Canada and the United Nations, 1949*, 319 pp.; printed; King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada: 50 cents. (Reports for the years 1947 and 1948 are still available from the King's Printer at 50 cents each.)
2. *White Papers*  
*Canada and the Korean Crisis*, September 1950; 36 pp; printed; King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada; 15 cents.  
*Documents on the Korean Crisis*, January 1951; 38 pp; printed; King's Printer, Ottawa, Canada; 15 cents.
3. *Statements and Speeches*  
Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, free on request.
  - No. 50/5 — Four Years of the United Nations
  - No. 50/7 — Statement on External Relations
  - No. 50/26 — Canada and the Korean Situation
  - No. 50/28 — Statement on Further Canadian Assistance to United Nations forces in Korea.
  - No. 50/29 — Methods of Financing the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries.
  - No. 50/30 — Le plein emploi
  - No. 50/31 — Canada and the Far East
  - No. 50/32 — Statement on Matters Relating to Korea
  - No. 50/34 — Statement in Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly
  - No. 50/38 — Statement on Korea
  - No. 50/41 — Statement to the New York Herald Tribune Forum
  - No. 50/42 — The United Nations: A Practical View
  - No. 50/44 — Statement on the Soviet Peace Resolution
  - No. 50/45 — United Action for Peace
  - No. 50/46 — Statement on the Question of the Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities
  - No. 50/48 — Report from Lake Success
  - No. 50/50 — Review of the Current International Situation
  - No. 50/51 — Canadian Policy in the Present International Crisis
4. *External Affairs*  
Monthly bulletin of the Department of External Affairs. Obtainable from the King's Printer, Ottawa, annual subscription \$1.00 per year, students 50 cents. Each issue contains a section on current developments in the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. In addition, special articles on subjects relating to the United Nations and Specialized Agencies appear from time to time.



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