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January/February 1979

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

READERSHIP
SURVEY

Peacekeeping in Lebanon


Economic growth in advanced societies

Future of Canada-France relations

Yugoslav ambivalence towards détente

Comprehensive test ban negotiations

International Perspectives



READERSHIP SURVEY

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Lebanon: the latest example of UN peacekeeping action

By Henry Wiseman

The swift establishment of the United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, on March 19, 1978, in response to Lebanon's charge of "naked aggression" by Israel, marks a further extension in the complexity and the mandated responsibilities of United Nations peacekeeping. An instrument that had been overtaxed in the Congo, abused in Cyprus and actually expelled from the Sinai, peacekeeping was nonetheless reintroduced in the Sinai and the Golan Heights in 1973, and has now been thrust into the Lebanese crisis. Though subject to its special failings and seldom free of criticism, peacekeeping has been effective as a component of the broader United Nations commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since UNIFIL has only recently completed its first authorized life-span of six months and since the general situation in Lebanon remains so volatile, no current treatment can do it adequate justice. Nevertheless, its unique mandate, its activities and, as we shall argue, its considerable success to date provide some basis for comparison with other operations and, in general, sufficient evidence of the growing effectiveness and legitimacy of United Nations peacekeeping.

In May 1958, widespread revolt broke out in Lebanon. In June, responding to the claim by President Camille Chamoun of massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria), the Security Council established the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, UNOGIL, by a vote of ten to none, with the U.S.S.R. abstaining. Its function was to ensure that there would be no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanese borders and, to this end, the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, defined its role as limited strictly to observation. Its size was estab-

lished at 550, contributed by 20 nations, and its total cost was approximately \$5 million, apportioned as part of the regular budget. It had a life-span of only six months, during which time it was able to provide little evidence of the suspected infiltration. Nonetheless, its presence did help to shore up the pro-Western government of President Chamoun. However, when that government was further threatened by a pro-Nasser *coup* in Iraq, Chamoun requested military aid from the United States. In July 1958, 14,000 Marines were landed in Lebanon to stabilize the situation. Simultaneously, British forces entered Jordan. UNOGIL, though outwardly compromised by this action, was held to its original mandate. Directed by a General Assembly resolution to make "such practical arrangements" as would facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan, the Secretary-General did increase the strength of UNOGIL. For this and other reasons, stability was quickly restored, foreign troops were withdrawn by early November and one month later UNOGIL was disbanded.

However, since UNOGIL had failed to confirm the immediate cause of its own creation and had been subjected to controversy on account of the U.S. military presence, which deadlocked the Security Council and moved the issue to the General Assembly, its political justification was clouded. Coming so soon after the Suez crisis of 1956, it bore the stigma of Western intervention.

Broader scope

Though there are striking parallels between the events of 1958 and 1978, UNIFIL is much broader in scope and significance. In escalated reprisal for a Palestinian commando raid on Tel Aviv that killed 35 persons and wounded 70, Israel launched a determined invasion of southern Lebanon designed to root out Palestinian liberation forces from the area between its border with Lebanon and the Litani River. The action resulted in casualties on all sides and caused a stream of 250,000 hapless refugees to flee northward towards Beirut, beyond the immediate

Stability quickly restored

Dr Wiseman teaches political science at the University of Guelph. He was made peacekeeping his principal field of research. The views expressed here are those of Dr Wiseman.

*Emergency
meeting
of Security
Council*

battle area. The Israeli purpose was largely accomplished. However, the already chaotic and inflammable situation in Lebanon, involving an ineffectual central government, civil war between Christian, Moslem and Palestinian forces in and around Beirut and a forcibly interventionist Syrian army of 30,000 men acting as a Pan-Arab peacekeeping force, was made even more explosive by Israel's action. It also threatened direct confrontation between Syrian and Israeli forces.

Denying any responsibility for the Palestinian commando operation, Lebanon brought the issue to the attention of the Secretary-General on March 15 and on March 17 called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Israel, charging "continuous acts of terror and violence", did the same. A meeting of the Security Council in which Lebanon, several other Arab states, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel were invited to participate, was called immediately into session.

UNIFIL mandate

In the highly-charged atmosphere, the debate was characterized by rhetoric, propaganda, charge and counter-charge. Even so, the draft resolution submitted by the United States was adopted by a vote of 12 in favour, with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union abstaining and China, which was opposed to the idea of peacekeeping, not participating in the vote. Resolution 425 called on Israel "immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith . . . [and decided] to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in this area". Though it charged Israel with aggression and was unwilling to agree that UN troops be given functions "not proper to them in regard to the transfer of effective authority in that region to the Government of Lebanon", the Soviet Union did not veto the resolution, on the grounds of the support it had received from Lebanon and other Arab states.

The mandate was further defined and elaborated by the Secretary-General's report, which was adopted as Resolution 426. The size of the force was set at 4,000. The operational guidelines adopted were those for the two peacekeeping forces in the Middle East — the United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai (UNEF)

and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF) —, with the renunciation of force except in self-defence, which included "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate". The expenses of the force were established as expenses of the organization under Article 17, Paragraph 2, in the amount of \$54 million. Following the pattern of UNEF and UNDOF, the General Assembly assessed the membership states, from the most-developed to the least-developed, in amounts of descending order.

Effectively, UNIFIL was charged with the formidable task of intervening in a critical situation, both domestic and international. It was introduced into the area before the establishment of a ceasefire, which it had to ensure and confirm. It was to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli forces and ensure the absence of hostilities over a densely-populated area of 450 square miles. UNIFIL is far more than a force interposed between warring parties that have agreed in advance the general objectives of a peacekeeping mandate. Domestic Lebanese politics, and instability of the Government, the activity of the PLO and the support it receives from friendly states, the strength of Christian forces and the support they receive from Israel, the purposes and activities of the powerful Syrian military presence in Lebanon and the persistent civil war that involves all parties on the battleground — all these are factors affecting the outcome of UNIFIL's mandate in southern Lebanon. It must, therefore, engage in sensitive political negotiations with both state and non-state actors are subject to erratic and volatile political and military behaviour. The scene is reminiscent of the Congo in 1960-1961. Since the successful operation of UNIFIL cannot but contribute to the Israeli objective of ridding southern Lebanon of forces hostile to Israel, the difficulty of UN in steering a neutral course is patent.

All this UNIFIL was called upon to accomplish under circumstances in which the U.S.S.R. disagreed with the transfer of effective authority to the Government of Lebanon, which, if carried out, would have eliminated the PLO from the area it had used as a staging-ground for raids in Israel. The Soviet Union also expressed grave reservations about paying its assessment for the force, and closely monitored the activities of the Secretary-General to ensure that all would be done with the approval of the Security Council. The Secretary-General was forced to act with

great care and with sensitivity to every political nuance. For example, because of Arab objections and undoubted Soviet concurrence, his observation of March 19 to the Security Council that UNIFIL should prevent "unauthorized armed persons" from entering the zone of UNIFIL competence was altered to read "to ensure peaceful character of the area of operations, and to that end control movement into and out of the zone". The issue of what forces should be allowed or denied to enter proved a continuing source of difficulty for UNIFIL.

Deployment

The interests of speed and efficiency, the Secretary-General drew, as in previous cases, on the resources of existing peacekeeping operations. Advance organizational and logistic personnel (Canadian, Swedish and Iranian) drawn from UNTSO (the UN Truce Supervisory Organization), UNEF and UNDOF, arrived within days under the interim command of Major-General E. A. Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. In addition, offers of troops were accepted from France, Nepal, and Norway; these advance units arrived March 23. The unsolicited French offer particularly significant. The five permanent members had been specifically excluded from UNEF and UNDOF, although the Soviet Union had, at that time, proposed such participation. This time France, which helped to found the state of Lebanon, reported that it considered it a "moral duty" to contribute "in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Lebanon". As in all cases of composition, approval by the members of the Security Council was requested and granted. The U.S.S.R. may have opposed French participation, but there is no evidence that it raised any objection. In any event, this arrangement added considerable weight and purpose to the UN presence in the area. France, and later Norway, agreed to supply the crucial element of any UN peacekeeping force - that is, logistics. Canada also agreed, after initial reluctance, to supply a communications unit of about 117 men for a period not exceeding six months. Its logistic capabilities were already stretched to the limit because of continuing participation in UNFICYP (the UN Force in Cyprus), UNEF and UNDOF. The Canadian contingent was, in fact, withdrawn after six months, the first time Canada had adhered to a declared intention of putting a time-limit on its participation in a UN peacekeeping venture.

From the very first days of the oper-

ation, the complexity, sensitivity and danger of the situation became apparent. Israel issued a cease-fire order on March 19, two days after Resolution 425, but received an uncertain reply from the PLO. (As reported in the *New York Times* of March 22, "if they stop bombarding us, we will not respond by shelling them, but behind their lines everything is fair game".) But the PLO was not the only source of trouble. The first units to arrive from Canada, France, Iran and Sweden were sent immediately to the Tyre area, along the Litani River, and also to the temporary UN headquarters at Nagoura, close to the Israeli border. Those that were dispatched from UNDOF, and had to cross the border from Israel, were met with threats from right-wing Christian militia under the command of Major Saad Haddad. However, they were later allowed to pass.

Then, on March 24, the French contingent ran into trouble as it entered Tyre. The PLO, which occupied the base, did not prevent the entry, but they refused to leave themselves. There were numerous skirmishes and, on March 29, UNIFIL suffered its first casualty when a Swedish vehicle hit a land-mine. Nevertheless, as the strength of UNIFIL approached 3,000 by mid-April with the arrival of units from Nepal and Norway, and reached its projected complement of 4,000 with the arrival of Senegalese and Nigerian troops at the end of April, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Co-ordinator of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Middle East, began to implement his plan to push the deployment of UN troops south of the Litani River with each successive withdrawal of Israeli forces.

But the troubles continued. In the first days of May, French and Senegalese units came under fire at the western end of the line near Tyre, suffering several dead and wounded, as they tried to prevent infiltration of armed Palestinians and left-wing Moslems. At the eastern end of the line round Marjayoun, the Norwegian unit took the view that it had no right to stop the movement in and out of its area of local armed Christian militia on the grounds that they were Lebanese. At the centre of the line, Iranian and Nepalese units tried to avoid taking a stand one way or another. It was reported that officers of various contingents complained that orders coming from the UN Secretariat were "contradictory, unclear and unrealistic". Such problems of general interpretation of the mandate and specific implementation are common to most peacekeeping operations, especially those

*Infiltration
of armed
Palestinians
and Moslems*

as heavily laden with political considerations as the operations in Cyprus and the Congo. There is also the problem of the meaning of "the use of force in self-defence", when a strict implementation of the mandate by the officer in the field may elicit armed action by the party concerned.

It was the frequency of such incidents involving the use of force, the extensive and rugged terrain that had to be patrolled and the delicate and sometimes dangerous tasks to be performed that persuaded the Secretary-General, after his personal tour of the area, to ask the Security Council to increase the total strength of the force from 4,000 to 6,000, a request that was granted on May 3. Fiji, Iran and Ireland agreed to provide the additional forces. The Secretary-General also requested troops from Romania and several other East European states. Refused in each case, he was at least able to report to the Security Council that he had made every effort to achieve "balanced composition" for UNIFIL.

Political considerations

As UNIFIL met with resistance in the field in its effort to deploy its forces throughout the area from the Litani River to the Israeli border, and with continuing difficulty in the fulfilment of the other aspects of its mandate, much of the UN activity was concentrated at the political level. General Siilasvuo, General Erskine, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and his Under-Secretary, Roberto E. Guyer, in various visits to Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem, used their considerable skills in prevailing on Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the PLO to co-operate in enabling UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate. Pressure was put on Yasir Arafat to withhold hostile action in the southern sector. The French Ambassador in Beirut also held discussions with Arafat to the same purpose. But perhaps the most convincing pressure came from Syria, which, though it was party, with the PLO, to a mutual defence pact and was opposed to Israel in every way, placed a ban on movement of troops and material assistance to the PLO in the southern sector. Arafat agreed to comply, and arrangements were worked out to avoid incidents.

Heavy pressure by the United States and the United Nations was also brought to bear on Israel for rapid and complete withdrawal. On April 6, Israel finally agreed to a staged withdrawal. The first stage was completed by April 14 in the eastern sector, south of the Litani River and adjacent to the Golan Heights. But the pace was slow. In consequence,

Kuwait, acting in the name of the Arab countries, insisted that the Security Council meet and take a tough position on the slowness of the Israeli withdrawal; at the same time, the United States raised the question of Israeli contravention of agreements by using American arms in the invasion of Lebanon; and the Secretary-General issued his third appeal for a rapid and complete withdrawal. Israel responded with a further withdrawal by April 17 from positions comprising 65 per cent of the area of original occupation. Elements of the Senegalese, French, Iranian and Swedish units took over this area. On June 13 the Secretary-General was able to report that all Israeli forces were out of Lebanon and the first phase of the mandate had been completed. But the return of the territory to effective Lebanese authority was still a matter to be resolved.

In its withdrawal, Israel did not hand over to UNIFIL its positions along the 60-mile Israel-Lebanon border, but instead handed them over to Major Sa'ad Haddad's Christian Maronite force, with which Israel maintained friendly and operative relations. It appeared, for a time, that Haddad would act on behalf of the Government of Lebanon when he followed its orders and confined his men to barracks and attempted to hand over positions to UNIFIL. But other Christian elements of the Falangist Party and of the National Liberal Party refused to accept these orders and denied UN entry. They feared that UNIFIL would permit the return of Palestinian elements and, in fact, Israel charged that hundreds of armed PLO terrorists had clandestinely returned to the south and that UNIFIL had permitted the transfer to them of food and other supplies.

Though its forces were strategically stationed throughout the area, UNIFIL proved unable to assert full control and rival Christian forces clashed around the area and the Government of Lebanon looked for a way to establish its own authority in the area. To that end the Lebanese Government declared its intention of sending in its own force by June 20. In the meantime, bloody fighting broke out in Beirut between the Christians and the Syrian troops — fighting that alternated with uneasy cease-fires during the ensuing months. Disagreement among the Christians, especially between the Falangis and the Chamounists (who support the Maronites in the south), also erupted into open hostilities. Finally, on July 31, the Lebanese Government did send elements of its reconstituted military forces into the south to replace the Maronite militia.

Syrian ban on movement of assistance to southern sector

Lebanese forces to enter southern Lebanon have been forcibly repulsed, UNIFIL has yet to fulfil the second half of its mandate, the establishment of its full control over the area of operations and the return of Lebanese forces. But, with the political turmoil and frequent hostilities raging in the north and with powerful Syrian forces entrenched on Lebanese soil, UNIFIL also serves as a buffer and as a deterrent to any attempt by the PLO or Syria to disrupt progress of the Camp David framework for peace by moving hostile forces close to the Israeli border. This is a silent aspect of the mandate, not to be found in Security Council resolutions.

There can also be no doubt that UNIFIL, in the implementation of Resolution 425, functions at a high level of continuous and critical political involvement. Its role is broader than the forms of interposition of UNEF and UNDOF, and well beyond the limited observation of UNOGIL. It can be likened to the complexity of ONUC, but without the attendant political confusion and financial burden that threatened to wreck the UN. On the contrary, UNIFIL adds to the competence and prestige of the organization.

It may be argued that, in the present era of search for *détente*, UN peacekeeping is less subject to the hostile criticism and partisanship that characterized the period of the Cold War. Soviet restraint and French participation are testimony to this view. The successes of UNEF, UNDOF and UNOGIL also provide the legitimacy to the conception of UN peacekeeping that may carry it to the next stage of agreement in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the standards, planning, control and infrastructure of peacekeeping for future operations.

As for UNIFIL, it will be some time before its full effects can be assessed. It will certainly face serious tests in the foreseeable future. And, unless the Camp David framework for peace is expanded to include all Israel's neighbours, the need for its existence will continue. But peacekeeping is a vital part of the long and precarious path to peace. There should be no doubt that, in this case, peacekeeping and peacemaking are inextricably combined. Any echoes of past voices that criticize peacekeeping for failures in the process of peacemaking have no relevance to the contemporary situation.

*High level
of political
involvement
for UNIFIL*

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rity Comrive Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice
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ns in r contact between Israel and the Mar-
Secretarite-controlled areas and that Maronite
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responciance of the Lebanese Government and
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Elemen escort, moved towards a Maronite
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he retue UN acted as intermediary between
Lebanee Lebanese and the Maronites. How-
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not tuy mid-August the Lebanese battalion
long abandoned its efforts to enter the area.
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nd the regulate the flow, filter out dissident ele-
look ments, curtail internecine struggles and,
athoriwith the help of a special humanitarian
ebane fund established earlier by the Secretary-
cion General, do all it could to help provide
20. the basic human needs for a population
raged by war.

Renewal

At the time of writing, the original man-
date has been renewed for a further four
months. However, determined efforts by

The future of growth in advanced societies

By David S. Wright

International anxiety regarding the recent economic performance of leading industrialized countries tempts one to ask whether something new and very fundamental has happened that limits the capacity of men and governments to manage economic affairs. Traditional Keynesian tools seem inadequate to cope with the present combination of unemployment, inflation and monetary instability. Of course, current economic problems do not approach those of the 1930s, and perhaps the anxiety is in part the result of a much more sophisticated public awareness of economic matters. However, expectations have been heightened by a generation of prosperity and steady increases in living standards, and there is some doubt as to whether these expectations can continue to be met to the same degree as in past years.

Two broad arguments may be put forward. The first is that the economic problems of the 1970s are the product of an unfortunate coincidence of events and that underlying elements of strength will reassert themselves once these shocks have been absorbed and overcome. The second is that, for a number of fundamental reasons, industrialized countries have reached a plateau, and will not, for the foreseeable future, experience the kind of economic growth they enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s.

The first argument is an optimistic one. It acknowledges that developments in the past five years have had an ex-

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tremely unsettling effect on the element of confidence and certainty on which strong economic performance depends. The legacy of several years of high inflation and the fear that it will accelerate again, slow growth, the rapid rise in prices, and increased competition from the Third World have been major shocks for industrialized economies. The argument continues that, with sound economic and monetary management, economic performance will turn round and confidence will be restored.

More pessimistic

The second argument is more pessimistic. It suggests that certain basic maladjustments — notably excess capacity that emerged in key industries such as shipbuilding, textiles, artificial fibres, some petrochemicals — will result in a general slowdown in industrialized countries after several decades of fairly rapid growth. Export-led growth, which brought a steady and rapid increase in living standards in many countries, can no longer be maintained in the face of such overcapacity. Fundamental adjustments in industrial structures, it is argued, will be necessary to cope with new realities, including shifting comparative-advantage relations with Third World countries. Such adjustments are always politically painful because they inevitably involve high social costs such as unemployment and displacement of population. Yet, if the adjustments take place, it is argued, a return to economic stability and steady increases in real living standards will be possible.

The present worldwide slack in economic activity and the accompanying inflation make it difficult to assess whether this more pessimistic argument is correct. Whether certain more fundamental adjustments in economies may have a long-term depressive effect on economic performance. Shorter-term cyclical problems can easily be misinterpreted as being longer-term at times of economic slack.

*Expectations
heightened
by generation
of prosperity*

Very long-term predictions of economic performance are usually of limited use. The Russian economist Kondratieff studied long-term economic trends and concluded that there were 50-year cycles or long waves in the performances of Western economies. (He was imprisoned during the Stalinist period for ideas inconsistent with those prevailing in his government at the time.) The cycles he identified were roughly the following:

1790 - 1815	upward
1815 - 1845	downward
1845 - 1870	upward
1870 - 1895	downward
1895 - 1920	upward

Kondratieff attempted little in the way of explanation of these long waves or the cataclysmic effects of major wars and discoveries of large deposits of gold. Nonetheless interest in his work and in long cycles was heightened in June 1978 when, in its annual report, the Bank for International Settlements in Basle referred to a possible slowdown "of the Kondratieff type". The possibility of industrialized countries having entered the downward side of a 50-year cycle was widely reported in the press, particularly in the lead-up to the Bonn "summit".

One way of tackling the question of whether or not the leading industrialized countries have reached an economic plateau, and of judging the validity of the optimistic and pessimistic arguments presented above, is to look at some of the basic qualitative factors that affect the numbers by which economies are measured. Such factors include:

- population growth
- availability of natural resources
- technological innovation
- government participation in economies
- situations in developing countries
- social factors.

Population growth

In industrialized countries, population growth has ceased to be a dynamic factor in economies. Populations are stabilizing. Social and economic development usually result in more careful planning of family size. The postwar "baby boom", which contributed to much investment-led growth after the Second World War (e.g., housing, schools), has now resulted in high unemployment rates among young people because slow-moving economies cannot absorb new workers quickly enough.

While in industrialized societies the child is now viewed as an economic liability,

in many developing countries the child is still seen as an economic asset. Developing-country populations continue to grow rapidly in most regions, and they may not stabilize before about the year 2050. Such growth is likely to have a dynamic effect on overall economic output in developing countries, although its effect on *per capita* income is clearly quite different.

Natural resources

Concern over the rapid exploitation of non-renewable resources is at the centre of some of the arguments that anticipate physical limits to growth in the future. There is a clear need to recognize that some fundamental changes will have to take place to respond to resource depletion, e.g. adaptation on a massive scale to new sources of energy for the post-petroleum era.

In general, the raw materials necessary to fuel economic growth are harder to obtain and more costly than they once were. Exploitation of cheap resources in colonies and the Third World led to easy and rapid growth. The colonies no longer exist and the Third World wants a legitimate return for its resources. The Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a good example of this. The cheapest and most accessible natural resources in the industrialized countries themselves have been exploited. What remains will be more difficult to obtain in terms of the input of energy, technology and transport. This may act as a brake on economies, although the need to adjust to changing resource-supplies can in itself be an incentive for various kinds of economic activity.

Efforts to economize on resources, to find substitutes and to develop new techniques for resource exploitation may provide an important stimulus in the future to further technological innovation and investment, and may be a major force in generating new economic activity.

Technological innovation

Growth in industrialized countries has been stimulated by quantum leaps in technology - e.g., the internal-combustion engine, electricity. Technological advance in recent years has tended to result in more efficient processes rather than new products. Often the advances are "labour-saving", and thus job-destroying rather than job-creating. There is a view that the technological revolution may have reached a stage of maturity in industrialized countries, and that there are not many major innovations on the horizon that would create dynamic growth. Such

*Raw materials
harder to obtain
and more costly
than ever before*

a view is almost purely speculative. There is at least an equal probability that major innovations will occur in a number of areas — solar and other forms of energy, the seabed, space, agriculture — that will have an important impact on economic activity.

Government participation in economies

In many countries, the economic prosperity of the last 20 years allowed expansion of the public sector to a considerable degree, notably in important social areas. This expansion was broadly supported and, it is argued, contributed to economic growth. Even very conservative elements of society were willing to see some spending of the benefits of growth for the common good.

An economic downturn, however, has led to a surprisingly large consensus that governments have gone too far and that government spending needs to be cut back. Governments are under widespread pressure to reduce their role in society. California's Proposition 13 is a dramatic example. Although this might remove an element that has contributed to growth, governments are perceived by some as getting in the way of progress through the very size of the public sector, and through over-regulation. It is argued that less government would free the private sector for stronger expansion of economic activity.

Situations in developing countries

Whatever one's view as to whether certain resource, population, consumer, technological and public-sector plateaus may have been reached in the industrialized countries, these clearly have not been reached in the Third World. There is an enormous amount of dormant consumer demand throughout the Third World. The need for improved infrastructure is obvious. The scope for applying present technology is considerable. The problem is a shortage of investment and expertise. The savings and capital, along with the technology, remain in the industrialized countries, while there is ample need for its application in the Third World. Middle-income developing countries are at present growing more quickly than any other countries.

Meanwhile, in areas in which the Third World has become industrialized, its exports are having very disruptive effects in less efficient sectors in the industrialized world. The Third World clearly has a comparative advantage in these areas (footwear, textiles). This has led to excess capacity and the need for structural change in industrialized countries.

Social factors

At least for more affluent societies, additional economic indicators are an adequate measure of human satisfaction. The quality of life becomes more important once basic economic needs are met or exceeded. Concern for the environment grows as societies grow richer. The government has acted to check some forms of industrial activity that have led to traditional economic growth.

There is another related social phenomenon that sets limits on the desire of societies for quantitative growth. As individuals grow richer, the satisfaction they derive from goods and services depends not only on their own consumption of them but on consumption by others. The satisfaction derived from a country house depends in part on how many other people have access to the surrounding area. Economic growth can lead to congestion, while the affluent may seek some exclusiveness in his life. The use of a private automobile is a good illustration of a phenomenon to which certain social limits will inevitably have to apply.

At a certain stage of individual wealth, a consumer's behaviour begins to shift in a way that may lead to his making a lesser contribution to the gross national product in favour of a better quality of life. After the Second World War, consumer behaviour provided a positive stimulus to growth in industrialized societies. Enormous demand for material goods was released. A stage has been reached in some wealthier countries in which a growing percentage of the population is turning its attention away from material goods (another car or television set) to better services and more leisure. It is argued, however, that further steps in income distribution within industrialized countries (and between developed and developing countries) would have a stabilizing effect on consumer spending.

Conclusion

No definitive conclusion of a trend towards greater or less dynamism over the long term can be drawn from the evidence. Neither the optimistic nor the pessimistic argument is overwhelming. It is certainly conceivable that industrialized countries are in the early stages of a longer-term downward swing in economic performance. Because of the clear need for difficult structural adjustments in industrialized countries over the next generation, the possibility should be borne in mind that economic growth will not be adequate to meet the expectations of wide sectors

Consensus that governments are costing too much

he population, exaggerated by the inflationary experience of the past decade. *Economic relations among industrialized countries, in the past involving a division of the fruits of growth, may in the future be characterized by an apportionment of the burdens of adjustment.*

The necessary structural adjustments to cope with the circumstances faced in industrialized countries cannot be dealt with as effectively in a period of low growth. Accordingly, it would be wrong to accept with resignation the prospect of mediocre growth for a prolonged period.

Renewed efforts aimed at innovation in the energy and resource fields may act against some of the more depressive longer-term factors identified here. It also appears that the "engine of growth" that might turn the process round in the next decade lies in the Third World. While industrialized countries are over-saving and under-investing, there are enormous opportunities in the Third World. Investors are understandably cautious, wary of political risk as well as normal business risk. Even OPEC surplus countries, which

are part of the Third World in terms of political solidarity, tend to invest their surplus money in Switzerland or the U.S.A.

The worst way to cope with this situation would be to allow industrialized countries and developing countries to slide into confrontation. Unfortunately, the causes of potential confrontation are at the heart of the need for structural adjustments in the future. Low-cost textiles, footwear, electronics goods and other products from Third World countries trying to industrialize are displacing the products of less-competitive manufacturers in developed countries.

While the Third World needs the investment and technology of the industrialized world to achieve more acceptable living standards, industrialized countries need the dynamic effect on their own economies of all the unfulfilled demand, untapped skills and unexploited resources of the Third World. Interdependence has never had more real meaning, or constituted a more important challenge.

How "official" Ottawa views the Third World

By P. V. Lyon, R. B. Byers and D. Leyton-Brown

According to a recent survey of elite opinion, four-fifths of the makers of Canadian foreign policy agree that world peace depends upon narrowing the gap between the rich and poor countries. A third perceive that the likeliest source of global instability in the coming decade will be the North-South tensions, while less than a twentieth now perceive that the primary threat is the continuing East-West rivalry. Over half believe that Canada's development assistance should be doubled. Responses such as these to the survey questions might well convince you that official Ottawa is seriously concerned about the Third World. You would be wrong.

A similarly erroneous conclusion might be drawn from the speeches of our leaders, most notably those of Pierre Trudeau. For example, in a moving but little noted speech to the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1974, Trudeau said that if "Canada's presence in the world" was to

be judged by a "single criterion," he hoped that it would be its "humanism, its pursuit of social justice . . . Canadian foreign policy would be meaningless if it were not caring" and "our compassion must have no geographic focus". In his celebrated Mansion House speech a year later, he went even further in demanding "an acceptable distribution of the world's wealth". Such statements have been noted in Third World capitals, where no Western leader enjoys a better reputation than

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*Embarrassing
shortcomings
in Canada's
response to
Third World*

Trudeau for personal commitment to the cause of global equity.

Some of the Government's actions have been consistent with the Trudeau rhetoric. Until 1976, the proportion of Canada's gross national product committed to official development assistance had climbed steadily to .56 per cent, within hailing distance of the United Nations approved target of .7 per cent. Canada in 1977 took a useful initiative in cancelling debts owed by the poorest of the aid-recipients. It has recently been active in the UN, and quietly effective, in seeking to accelerate decolonization in southern Africa. In 1972, Ottawa acted quickly in receiving many of the victims of Idi Amin's racism. Despite considerable weariness, we continue to assist Third World countries by being the UN's most reliable supplier of efficient peace-keepers.

The shortcomings in Canada's response to legitimate Third World demands, however, are increasingly obvious and embarrassing. The proportion of GNP spent on development assistance dropped in 1976 to less than .5 per cent, and in 1978, as part of an economy drive, the Government cancelled the increase planned for the following year. Canada long dragged its feet in introducing the generalized system of tariff preferences to benefit the exports of less-developed countries. The imposition in 1976 of quotas on textile and clothing imports was directly contrary to Canada's commitment to the New International Economic Order. Despite belated support for a buffer fund to cushion swings in commodity prices, Canada retains a well-earned reputation for niggardliness in the UN Conference on Trade and Development and for opposition to reforms of the international monetary system that would benefit the LDCs. Canada's exceptional influence in the Law of the Sea Conference has contributed to the sabotage of the "Common Heritage" proposals that could have effected a really significant transfer of resources to the very needy.

Discrepancy

How is one to explain this discrepancy between promise and performance in Canada's response to the rising demand for global equity? Assuming, as is likely, that Trudeau's personal concern is genuine, it is unfortunate that he is not the autocrat so often portrayed in Parliament and the media. Indeed, in terms of Cabinet management, he is arguably the most consensual Prime Minister Canada has ever had. Ottawa officials and ministers certainly

act as a rule in Third World matters and they need pay little heed to his announcements. Since they perceive Canadian participation in international development to be essentially a matter of altruism, conscience, and nothing in which Canada has a vital stake, they attach low priority to meeting the challenges posed by the Third World. Their diagnosis of the problem seems radical, but their prescriptions are conservative.

This is the depressing conclusion to be drawn from the response to 35 Third World questions put to nearly 300 Members of Parliament and officials in interviews conducted by authors as part of the Canadian International Image Study (CIIS), which is described in the Summer 1977 issue of *International Journal*.

Ottawa's foreign-policy elite readily agrees that the rich-poor dichotomy is the most serious threat to stability, peace, and is willing to increase Canadian aid budget. Aid, however, is what Lester Pearson and others have described as a "soft option". Though still relevant, Canada can scarcely begin to implement the structural changes required if Third World poverty and dependence are to be alleviated. When it comes to more significant reforms, especially those that are politically difficult, our foreign-policy makers sing a different tune. By a two-to-one margin, for example, those we interviewed rejected the proposal that Canada should speedily remove tariffs on imports from developing countries. Asked to name the most important problem confronting Canadian foreign policy, less than a tenth mentioned one related to the Third World. Similarly, when invited to rank the themes from *Foreign Policy for Canada* (the Trudeau Government's definitive statement of 1970), "Social Justice", a theme embracing economic redistribution and race equality, came a poor fifth, below "Peace and Security", "Sovereignty and Independence", "Economic Growth" and "Quality of Life".

A separate study of foreign-policy priorities in the Department of External Affairs was even more revealing, and disturbing. This was conducted by Professors Brian Tomlin, Harald von Riekl and John Sigler. Fourteen carefully selected senior officials were invited to weigh 77 specific foreign-policy objectives derived from a study of internal public statements. Only one primary concern with the Third World — peace in the Middle East — was placed in the top 25. Dominating the top-ranked objectives were those having to do with

the rich-poor gap (11 per cent), "humanitarian" or "moral" (11 per cent) — or as a means to promote Canada's interest indirectly, and in the long run, by contributing to a peaceful international order (8 per cent). Asked to name the country that behaved most like Canada in international affairs, over half named one of the Scandinavians (45 per cent) or the Netherlands (9 per cent), while 29 per cent cited a member of the white Commonwealth. A reason frequently offered for the selection was that the other country shared with Canada a genuine concern for the well-being of the weak and the poor.

(Independently of the CIIS project, one of the authors interviewed 71 foreign elite members in 25 Asian and European capitals; although by a smaller margin (60 per cent compared to 77 per cent), they also perceived Canada's aid as primarily altruistic, and the largest portion (49 per cent) concurred that, in its general behaviour, Canada most closely resembled those nice Scandinavians (39 per cent) especially Sweden, or the Netherlands (10 per cent). Whatever the factual basis, one must accept that Canada's international image, both at home and abroad, remains remarkably benign.)

Image remains remarkably benign

Objectives

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the values of the Ottawa decision-makers, the CIIS interviewers asked them to indicate the weight that should be assigned 11 objectives in determining Canada's aid policy. Four-fifths agreed with the proposition that an important objective should be "to assist those recipient countries whose need is greatest". Far less support was accorded such objectives as promoting Canadian exports (52 per cent) or fighting Communism (22 per cent). It is difficult to be certain whether the elite attached less value to these objectives, or simply considered economic aid to be an inefficient means to attain them. Other CIIS questions revealed that Canadian decision-makers are no longer militantly anti-Communist, but more of them might favour using aid to wage the Cold War if only they thought it might work.

The objective given the strongest endorsement was the promotion of stability in the recipient countries. This is not necessarily in conflict with the desire to assist the most needy, which received almost the same support. The respondents may well have reasoned that economic well-being is improbable without stability. Not everyone recognizes, as has Mitchell

atters Canada's material well-being, especially to his nose related to the law of the sea. Ob- e Cana tives involving global economic redis- evelopm tribution, or human rights, emerged right altruism the bottom.

ch Can Although four-fifths of the Canadian ow prio eign-policy elite concurred that non- ed by igned countries are significant in world is of fairs, they appeared to attach relatively heir pote importance to the organizations in hich these nations are predominant. onclusion y 13 per cent perceived the United o 35 T tations, increasingly a Third World club, o 300 mis gaining in influence; 60 per cent perceived decline. The reduction in influence ed by as frequently attributed to the disparity n Inter etween UN voting and "real" power, and hich ne consequent disregard of many As- 7 issue mbly resolutions. The few who perceived n increase in the UN's stature often te rea eferred to the shift in its agenda to omy po sses, such as poverty and race dis- ability rmination, that matter more to more e Cana eople than do the traditional Cold War hat Le nd security issues. For most of the bed as anadian decision-makers, however, this elevant, hift seems more to be deplored than the str oughed.

Commonwealth

The Commonwealth is the organization in which Canada interacts most intimately are po with Third World countries. Unlike the y mak with UN, it has engaged the wholehearted wo-to- nthusiasm of the Prime Minister. Only interview ntwo-fifths of the foreign-policy elite, how- da sho ever, share his conviction that "the orts fve Commonwealth is a significant factor in nterview nternational relations". At least in prin- name iple, the elite endorsed the Third Option, n a te the Government's strategy to diminish rd Wo Canada's dependence upon the United k the States, but only 3 per cent mentioned Canadi Third World countries as the likeliest definit with which to generate countervailing istance", tions. By a wide margin, the elite per- distrib ceived the European Community as a fifth, more influential actor in international af- overeig fairs than the Organization of Petroleum- Grow Exporting Countries. In terms of Cana- dian priorities, the makers of our foreign ign-po policy clearly regard Third World coun- Exter tries as the ones that could most easily , and be ignored.

Twelve of the CIIS propositions dealt with the motivation of Canada's develop- careful ment assistance. Less than a fifth of the nited elite perceived it to be primarily self- objectiv interested in any direct way, such as to urnal promote Canadian exports (6 per cent), prima or a means to augment Canadian in- d - pe fluence (9 per cent). Over three-quarters ed in saw it as essentially altruistic — to help nked the most needy (48 per cent), to close do w

Sharp, that economic development is likely to be disruptive. A clearer indication of the élite addiction to the status quo may be seen in its emphatic rejection of national liberation as an objective of aid policy, and in the fact that only a narrow majority concurred that "Canada should restrict its relations with countries that make racial discrimination an official government policy". On the other hand, four-fifths rejected the proposition that "Canada should take no responsibility for helping to solve racial problems in Africa" and, asked to rank 20 international actors in terms of their impact upon the global system, the élite considered only the Palestine Liberation Organization to be more negative than South Africa.

Canada's most active Third World role has been that of peacekeeper. An overwhelming majority of the élite (94 per cent) agreed that this role should continue. Only 14 per cent concurred that "Canada should automatically volunteer troops whenever the United Nations establishes a peacekeeping operation", and many respondents volunteered that we should be more discriminating than in the past. Nevertheless, asked to evaluate the importance of ten reasons for Canada to maintain armed forces, the élite ranked peacekeeping second only to the defence of sovereignty, and well ahead of such objectives as "to help counter the Soviet military threat," or "to maintain internal security". Although the Third World has been the locale for most of the post-1945 violence, and the area where all the UN's peacekeeping has occurred, or seems likely to occur, the élite's commitment to the peacekeeping vocation seems unlikely to be mainly attributable to concern for the well-being of the developing nations. It results also from pride in a role that has brought Canada considerable distinction, and concern for global stability. The super-powers have avoided direct confrontation in the many Third World conflicts, but the possibility remains that one of these disturbances might trigger a major war that Canada could not escape, or economic dislocation that would probably injure Canada through the impact upon its major trading partners.

The élite no longer appears to believe that Canada's contribution to peacekeeping is essential, or even that UN peacekeeping in itself constitutes a major contribution to global stability. Still less does it appear to believe that Canada's response to the demands for a New International Economic Order are likely to matter very much. Hence, even when the desirability of global harmony is recog-

nized, the conviction often remains that Canada could afford to take a cheap ride in international development. That Canada fails to exercise this option, the élite appears to believe, is primarily because its foreign policy is substantially influenced by the morality and altruism of the Canadian people. These qualities, however, are perceived to be limited. Unless the élite is persuaded that Canada must respond more adequately to the demands of the Third World to escape serious material damage, it seems unlikely to alter the current policy priorities. Alternatively, it would need to be convinced that the Canadian electorate is more moral, and more determined to shunt the wretched of the world, than has been assumed. There is little evidence of strong popular resistance to Canada's modest role in the Third World. There is even less, alas, of a mounting demand that Canada should do a great deal more.

The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion reported in 1975 that 72 per cent of Canadians believed that the developing countries should share in the responsibility for Third World development, and over half (53 per cent) favoured an increase in economic assistance. On the other hand, other polls have found an unwarranted degree of public satisfaction with Canada's contribution to international development, and a reluctance to make sacrifices in order to improve performance; CIPO, for example, reported in 1968 that two-thirds of the Canadian public rejected the proposal that taxes be increased as a means to assist poorer nations.

Variations

Striking variations exist within the foreign policy élite. Not surprisingly, the strongest support for doubling Canadian aid came from the senior officials of the Canadian International Development Agency whom I interviewed. This might be discounted on the ground that CIDA has a vested interest in a large development budget; but a cynic could also cite the self-serving instinct that prompted a large majority of CIDA to reject the proposition that more Canadian aid should be channelled through effective multilateral agencies. CIDA sympathy for Third World aspirations, however, is well demonstrated by its relatively strong support for racial equality and national liberation, and the fact that it was the only sub-élite to favour the speedy removal of tariffs on imports from less-developed countries. The CIDA officials were also the most likely to insist that the need of the recipients should

*Peacekeeping
second only
to the defence
of sovereignty*

...the basic criterion, and to reject the pro-
...a chea... of Canadian exports as an impor-
...ent. That objective of aid policy. They were
... unanimous in opposing the use of aid as
... primarily a means to wage the Cold War.

The military establishment provided
... the sharpest contrast. It was the least
... likely to perceive altruism in Canada's aid
... policy, or to believe that it should be an
... important element. The military were the
... least likely to locate the source of global
... stability in the Third World, or to agree
... that peace depends upon closing the rich-
... poor gap. They were the only sub-élite in
... which a plurality agreed that an impor-
... tant aid objective should be the contain-
... ment of Communism, and were the most
... unanimous in support of stability in the
... recipient countries. They offered no sup-
... port for national liberation as a purpose
... of Canadian assistance, and were the least
... likely to favour restrictions on Canada's
... relations with countries that make race
... discrimination official policy. In view of
... these responses, it would be difficult to
... read much altruism in the military's en-
... thusiasm for Canada's role as a peace-
... keeper. Indeed, it seems possible that
... their coolness towards the aspirations of
... the Third World stems from a fear that
... generosity would be at the expense of the
... defence budget.

The senior officials in the Depart-
... ment of External Affairs emerge as the
... bureaucrats most concerned about inter-
... national Canadian politics. They were three
... times as likely as Industry, Trade and
... Commerce officials to agree that an im-
... portant objective of Canadian aid should
... be the promotion of cohesion *within* Can-
... ada, and twice as likely to support using it
... to strengthen ties with La Francophonie;
... presumably External Affairs officials were
... more likely to be knowledgeable about the
... skillful way Canadian economic assistance
... had been employed to undercut the cam-
... paign to upgrade the position of Quebec
... in *francophone* West Africa, and to ap-
... pease the critics who used to argue that
... Canadian foreign policy ignored the
... "French fact". This concern with cohesion
... within Canada should not surprise those
... who recall that several Prime Ministers
... have contended that the first aim of Cana-
... dian foreign policy must be the preserva-
... tion of Canadian unity. It is less easy to
... explain why External Affairs should give
... least support to proposals to eliminate tar-
...iffs on Third World exports, and be second
... only to IT&C in its willingness to exploit
... the aid program to promote Canadian
... exports. In conversation, External Affairs
... officials are generally sceptical about the
... leverage to be gained over the policies of

aid-recipients, but as a group they are the
... most likely to endorse the use of aid to
... augment Canada's influence. They show
... considerable sensitivity to Third World
... feelings about maintaining relations with
... countries that make race discrimination
... official government policy. In general,
... however, External Affairs officials are con-
... tent to leave to CIDA the advocacy of
... Third World interests in the Canadian
... policy-making process. Their complacency
... is also reflected in the fact that they were
... much the most likely to agree with the
... optimistic prediction that by the year
... 2000 the distribution of the world's wealth
... would be more equitable.

This facile optimism was rejected
... most emphatically by the 19 young Exter-
... nal recruits we interviewed; only 24 per
... cent agreed with the majority of their
... seniors, while 38 per cent withheld any
... opinion. They were also decidedly more
... willing to meet Third World demands.
... Ninety per cent agreed that Canadian aid
... should be doubled, compared to 53 per
... cent of the External élite, and a third
... favoured the speedy removal of tariffs on
... LDC exports, compared to 18 per cent of
... their seniors. Dare one hope that the re-
... cruits will soon be influencing policy? Or
... is it more likely that they will be condi-
... tioned to adopt the complacency now
... characteristic of the department?

Industry, Trade and Commerce offi-
... cials were the most prone to perceive
... Canadian aid as being essentially altruistic
... in purpose. To judge by their responses,
... however, this altruism is a fault to be
... remedied. Three-quarters agreed that an
... important aid objective should be the pro-
... motion of Canadian exports, and less than
... one-fifth favoured the speedy removal of
... tariffs on Third World imports. Though
... generally less insensitive to the LDCs
... than the military, IT&C officials appeared
... to be the least warm towards the Com-
... monwealth and the United Nations, and
... exceptionally unlikely to welcome the in-
... trusion of moral considerations, such as
... human rights, in the conduct of Canada's
... foreign relations.

Ministers

We interviewed 11 serving ministers, and
... ten who had been in earlier Trudeau
... Cabinets. Their perceptions of the Third
... World were generally similar to the bu-
... reaucrats', but they were considerably
... more willing to accommodate Third World
... aspirations. The Cabinet-level respon-
... dents, for example, were likelier to sup-
... port an increase in aid and the speedy
... removal of tariffs. They were also more
... disposed to limit relations with states

*Facile optimism
emphatically
rejected
by recruits*

practising race discrimination, and to make the need of the recipients the primary criterion for economic assistance. The ministers gave less support to the use of aid to promote exports, but more to the combating of Communism. Their political sensitivity was displayed in their relatively high support for domestic cohesion as an objective of aid policy, and the related strengthening of ties with La Francophonie and the Commonwealth. Politicians may be more inclined than bureaucrats to shade their responses to cater to the presumed views of the interviewer, and several volunteered that they would go further to meet Third World demands if they thought public opinion would tolerate it. Nevertheless, especially in view of the strong statements by the Prime Minister, it seems regrettable that Canada's Third World policies are closer to those advocated by the bureaucracy than by our Cabinet respondents.

The only non-governmental élite interviewed was a group of 36 academic specialists in international relations. They proved less likely than the Ottawa élite to concur that peace depends upon closing the rich-poor gap, and, perhaps in consequence, fewer of them attached importance to using aid to promote stability. They were the least likely of our sub-élites to agree that Canada's aid has been essentially altruistic, but approached CIDA in their support for a doubling of the program, and were relatively strong in support of cutting tariffs on Third World exports. On most points, academic views did not differ greatly from those of the politicians and officials.

The interviews were conducted late

in 1975 and early in 1976 — before the shock of November 15, 1976. It would be comforting to believe that Ottawa perceptions have evolved in the interim, and now more sympathetic to the needs of LDCs. With the persistence of Canadian economic tribulations, however, and renewed threat of domestic disintegration this hardly seems likely. Canadian standards remain very high by global standards, and we consume more than good for our health, to say nothing of souls. Worry about the threat to national unity is understandable, but obsession with the problem can be counterproductive. One way to counteract the centrifugal forces is to shift attention from domestic issues, which frequently divide, and to concentrate on the global concerns that can only be tackled effectively if all Canadians pull together. In the postwar years, the so-called "golden decade" of Canadian diplomacy, Canadian contribution to international causes was second to none. A revival of its internationalist vocation could strengthen institutions in Canada and support for its centripetal impact upon world problems.

To be internationalist in the Seventies, however, means to contribute seriously to the establishment of equitable economic conditions for all peoples — help bridge the North-South gap that is the greatest scandal of our time. This will not happen without cost. Since the Ottawa policy-making élite does not perceive a vital Canadian stake in this cause, it will have to be persuaded to act by a manifestation of popular demand far exceeding anything we have yet seen.

What does the future hold for Canada-France relations?

By Neil B. Bishop

What does the future hold for relations between Canada and France? In order to answer this question, it would be helpful to know the present state of these relations. Canada is one of the many countries

Dr Bishop did his graduate work in French-Canadian literature. He is at present doing postgraduate research in Marseilles. The views expressed here are those of Dr Bishop.

with which France has fairly close contacts, but its relations with France are among the most difficult to analyse and the most seriously threatened by later instability. Indeed, any discussion of them may be likened to a stroll across a stretch of quicksand.

This instability understandably surprises the average Canadian and the average Frenchman. It is, of course, the task of Quebecers and Frenchmen to describe the relations between their two groups

before of an English-speaking Canadian from would be West such as myself. The English-speaking Canadian, for his part, cannot help but be impressed by the generally excellent quality of relations between English-speaking Canadians and the French. He knows that as a traveller, student or employed person in France the very fact he is Canadian tends to guarantee, on the part of French people who are aware of his nationality, a degree of friendliness, co-operation and even enthusiasm that is often denied the citizens of other countries. It has long been common knowledge that it is in the interest of Canadians visiting Europe to make their nationality known, and there are few European countries in which Canadians are as well treated as they are in France. These excellent relations find expression in Canada too. Many Frenchmen have had occasion to appreciate, in various parts of Canada, a real enthusiasm for almost everything French — an enthusiasm, it must be admitted, that is sometimes observed in the same people who exhibit a disappointing lack of enthusiasm for or even understanding of their French-speaking compatriots. The very understandable anti-French sentiments provoked in many English-speaking Canadians by General de Gaulle's "Vive le Québec libre" in 1967 seem for the most part to have been short-lived. The remarkably successful 1977-1978 activities of the Alliance Française in Toronto bear witness to the pro-French attitudes of a considerable number of English-speaking Canadians, who represent almost three-quarters of the population.

The atmosphere of uncertainty or latent instability is characteristic not of the relations between the two peoples but of the relations between the two governments. This being so, such uncertainties are even more surprising, objectionable and unnecessary. France is evidently uncertain what kind of relations it wishes to have with Canada, especially since Quebec, quite naturally, is trying to develop closer relations with Paris than is Ottawa.

Ambiguities

The attitude towards Canada adopted by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the French governments formed since the 1974 Presidential elections has been more moderate in tone, and politer, than that of governments under General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. It is clear that the equivocal nature of present relations between Canada and France derives primarily from the fact that these apparently normal, or almost normal, relations were

established after a period of open hostility — so some progress has been made. Current ambiguities may escape the notice of the general public but will be of concern to close observers of Franco-Canadian relations. Memories of visits to France by members of the present Quebec government, formed by the Parti Québécois, are still fresh. The reader will recall the problem of René Lévesque, the present Premier of Quebec, and his Legion of Honour decoration; from Ottawa's point of view, it was an insult to Canadian sovereignty.

However, a far more striking example of the ambiguities that still hang over Franco-Canadian relations was provided by the spectacle of the successive trips to Paris, in the months following the 1974 French Presidential elections, of Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada and the Quebec Premier of the day, Henri Bourassa. Of course, Mr Trudeau received an official welcome worthy of a friendly country's head of government, and according to French television he was to be seen walking "arm in arm" with Gaullist Jacques Chirac, his French counterpart at the time. Mr Bourassa, however, received an even warmer welcome, highlighted by his attendance at a meeting of the French Council of Ministers, a rare honour intended to evoke what was tantamount to a family relationship between France and Quebec. And why not? Provided that the special relations between France and Quebec do not hinder the development of special relations between France and Canada.

Nevertheless, the example of Mr Trudeau's and Mr Bourassa's visits to France shows that the lack of clarity that is spoiling official Franco-Canadian relations is largely the result of France's ambiguous attitude towards the "two Canadas". This lack of clarity, of course, is partly due to the ambiguous nature of Canada itself and to the uncertainties that, at least since 1867 — and especially since November 1976, when the Parti Québécois came to power —, have affected Canadian political, social and economic life. The dual nature of Canada, and the potential instability inherent in this duality, combined with the manner in which France chooses to react to it, explain the uncertain, even uneasy, state of Canada's relations with France today.

Auriol and de Gaulle

Yet such ambiguities have not always typified France-Canada relations, and this implies, of course, that they are not inevitable. Ample proof is given in a particularly interesting article appearing in

Official visits emphasized ambiguities in relations

the current issue of an interdisciplinary scholarly journal the very existence of which indicates how good relations between the two countries could be. *Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies* has been published annually in Bordeaux since 1975 by the Association française des études canadiennes. Pierre Guillaume's article, "Montaigne et Shakespeare: Réflexions sur le voyage du Président Vincent Auriol au Canada en avril 1951", describes Mr Auriol's official visit and compares it with de Gaulle's visit in 1967. The author also very effectively explains how General de Gaulle's view of Canada evolved from 1940 on.

Guillaume argues convincingly that in 1951 Mr Auriol, President of a France weakened by war and in quest of support from a rich and united Canada for French positions within the Atlantic Alliance, made a point of acting in the same way towards English- and French-speaking Canada and of publicly honouring such myths as Canadian unity and the equality of the two languages and two linguistic groups within Canadian society. Guillaume links Auriol's attitude and behaviour not to personal factors but rather to his conception, as President, of his country's national interest. The author shows, however, that, even if the national interest of France in 1951 had not required a united Canada under a strong Federal Government, the ideological and personal preferences of this socialist with little interest in Catholicism would in all probability have precluded the development of closer relations with a Quebec whose political and religious élites did not hide their disapproval of the kind of France he represented or their fond memories of Pétain, the Vichy regime — and even the Ancien Régime.

According to Guillaume, from 1940 onward General de Gaulle displayed an entirely different attitude. This difference can doubtless be attributed in part to his ideological and personal predispositions: de Gaulle, in 1940, presented himself to French Canadians as a Frenchman and a Catholic. It must primarily be linked, however, to the fact that in 1958 he became President of a France that was stronger than the France of Auriol, a France whose national interest, in de Gaulle's view, no longer required a united Canada and whose mission was to aid and unite French-speaking peoples all over the world. It should be pointed out here that the Gaullist position on Canada is quite logical and should give Canadians cause for reflection on some points, as Guillaume's article shows. It is time to change the

popular Canadian image of de Gaulle as a lunatic or monster. Guillaume also serves a paradoxical liking for Canada de Gaulle's part. It is not a question of "forgiving all" but rather of developing a clearer perception of history in order to understand it better.

New policy

Although Guillaume refrains from discussing the present state of relations between Canada and France, he has very effectively described the historical context so essential to our understanding of the. In spite of the fact that Giscard d'Estaing may now appear to be merely vacillating passively between the opposing types of Canadian policy that have successively been adopted by France — Auriol's pro-federalist position and de Gaulle's pro-separatist stand —, to believe that this is really the case would probably be to underestimate the President of the Republic. He seems, in fact, to be one of the most active promoters of the West's evolution towards what he explicitly envisages as a "new world order". That, precisely, what one would wish for: not a return either to Auriol's policy or de Gaulle's but rather the elaboration of a new, clear position that would take present realities into account.

Future development of French policy towards Canada and of relations between France and Canada will depend on what the two countries feel their national interest lies. Mr Trudeau's desire to establish closer links with the European Economic Community while increasing Canada's dependence from the United States is important in this regard. This two-fold development will probably also depend on the changing Canadian constitutional and political situation. However natural, and even highly desirable, close economic and cultural ties between France and Quebec may be, it is much to be hoped that France will not overlook this exceptional opportunity to establish, in every field of endeavour, very cordial, and even special relations with English-speaking Canada as well. The national interest of both countries is at stake.

Improved official and economic relations could easily be built on the excellent relations that already exist between the two peoples. The governments of France and Canada bear a great responsibility in this respect; it is not normal for relations between two countries so closely linked by history, culture and the sufferings of two world wars, as well as present and future mutual interest, to be fraught with uncertainty and even suspicion. However

Gaull... responsibility for changing this state of... also rests with the general public... Canada... and the media, which can and must... influence their governments' policies in... order to make the relations between the... order

two countries as cordial as those that already exist between the two peoples.

How long will it be until the President of the French Republic makes an official visit to Canada?

Eastern Europe

Yugoslav foreign policy's ambivalence towards *détente*

By Francine Friedman

from... ations... has v... al cont... g of the... d'Esta... vacillat... types... ccessiv... riol's p... lle's p... at this... be to... Republic... the m... evol... ages as... cisely... a ret... Gaull... ew, cl... level of development) in the light of a... realistic... possible superpower condominium. The... departure from government of President... Josip Broz Tito, who is a major unifying... factor in multinational Yugoslavia and... the principal architect of its nonalignment... policy, is imminent. The question of the... extent of Yugoslavia's unity and strength... of purpose in his absence has increased... Yugoslavia's ambivalence towards Soviet... American *détente*. The process itself is... currently fraught with inconsistencies and... deadlocks so that even the promise of a... decline in world conflict is endangered. In this situation, Yugoslav ambivalence... towards the Soviet-American *détente* in... the decade of the 1970s and the effect of... the vagaries of the *détente* process on... Yugoslav relations with the major actors... in both the East and the West warrant... examination.

Yugoslavia has achieved outstanding... social, economic and cultural progress... since the end of the Second World War. The formerly backward agrarian country... has become a moderately-developed industrial nation with a comparatively modern working class.

Yugoslavia's present-day international status was achieved through the... determination to maintain the independence for which the partisans fought... during the Second World War. It has tried... to follow an independent foreign policy... despite its strategic location in the his-

torically-unstable Balkan area, between the two military-political blocs, and in proximity to the volatile Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean areas. Furthermore, Yugoslavia is situated between two different socio-political systems but belongs to neither; it is a European country outside the European bloc system, a Communist regime outside the organized socialist community. As a result, Yugoslavia's concern has been to protect not only its territorial integrity and political independence but also its unique socio-economic system of "socialist self-management".

The country's situation is reflected in its unique foreign policy. Having established contact with newly-independent countries of Asia and Africa in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia became a leader of the nonaligned movement. The nonaligned countries rejected great-power hegemony, power politics and colonial relations as well as the special role of the great powers as political leaders and sole decision-makers in international relations.

Yugoslav leaders publicly and consistently emphasized that Yugoslavia's national interest would be served best if it followed its own ideological principles without interference from either the Soviet Union or the United States. In the eyes of many non-Yugoslav observers, however, the country's chosen policy of nonalignment contradicts its desire for "socialist

Between two systems and belonging to neither

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solidarity". The Yugoslavs are Communists and, therefore, do agree with many positions taken by the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, they fear that the Soviet Union might use this feeling as an entry point in order to infringe ultimately upon Yugoslav independence and exert influence over its decision-making as the price for the Yugoslav desire for "socialist solidarity".

Basic tension

Thus there exists a basic tension in Yugoslavia's foreign policy. On the one hand, the Yugoslavs desire to a certain extent to placate the Soviet Union, which poses a potentially dangerous and imperialist threat to Yugoslavia (but also shares with Yugoslavia certain common principles and visions of a socialist world). This is coupled with Yugoslavia's particular influence, by the example of its success as a Communist country outside the Soviet bloc, on other Communist parties and states. The Yugoslav example could be viewed by some impressionable Communist parties as an encouragement to defy certain Soviet strictures on foreign and/or domestic policy.

On the other hand, the successful use of the nonalignment policy to manipulate both super-powers has increased Yugoslavia's power and influence in world affairs far beyond what its size, location and level of development would ordinarily have indicated. The Yugoslavs have not forgotten that they survived the 1948 clash with the Kremlin mainly through massive co-ordinated trade and economic, and even military, aid from the West. No demands that would have compromised Yugoslav independence accompanied Western assistance. As a result, the Yugoslavs have maintained their ties to the West more or less closely depending on the intimacy of their relations with the Soviet Union at any given time. Memories of 1948 have insured that Yugoslavia has regarded the U.S.S.R. with at least a touch of caution no matter how friendly relations between the two countries have become.

Yugoslavia tends to react more harshly to potential Soviet threats than to possible Western threats. For example, the Yugoslavs roundly condemned the December 1975 statement of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor of the U.S. State Department. Sonnenfeldt had suggested that Yugoslavia should become less dependent upon the United States and should rely more on its own strength in its relations with the Soviet Union. He commented further that world tension

might decline if there were a "organic" relation between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Such remarks implied that the Yugoslavs might always be able to count entirely on an American counterbalance to possible Soviet imperialism as they had since 1945. Until Sonnenfeldt's statement, American foreign policy had seemed to assume the need to forestall Soviet attempts to extend hegemony over Yugoslavia. Such an American stand had allowed Yugoslavia to follow a foreign policy based on extracting concessions from both super-powers by balancing the interests of one against those of the other. The Sonnenfeldt statement implied, however, that this freedom of manoeuvre might not in the future be in the American national interest. The Yugoslavs responded to the Sonnenfeldt remarks with loud and widespread criticism.

On the other hand, the remarks of Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 generated more than verbal condemnations. Brezhnev justified this intervention in Czechoslovakia in a statement, known in the West as the "Brezhnev Doctrine", of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries. The "Doctrine" cited the defence of the socialist achievements that were being threatened by imminent counterrevolution of the Czechoslovak "reformers" as the reason for the invasion. The implication of this rationale was that the Soviet Union alone decided when the interests of the "socialist commonwealth" took precedence over international law. The Yugoslavs responded by developing a new defence system to guard against the prospect of a Czechoslovak-type intervention in Yugoslavia. It is clear, furthermore, that Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the League of Communists' Central Committee, was looking eastward when he warned in 1976:

... this country wishes to make it quite clear that it will not tolerate threats to its independent, sovereign and non-aligned position from anyone or from any quarter. To be sure, there are no overt threats of this kind being made today; nevertheless, there have been instances of mischief-making from time to time and various malicious conjectures are often heard about what will become of Yugoslavia tomorrow. Let it be well understood that the future of Yugoslavia lies in the further development of the socialist system of self-management and the policy of nonalignment, and let there be no illusions that it might be elsewhere.

Successful use of non-alignment to manipulate superpowers has increased influence

ideas into the East. This influence was due mainly to its leadership position in the nonalignment movement.

The beginning of *détente*, however, heralded the end of the influence and efficacy of nonalignment, which was mainly a movement in opposition to the Cold War. As the *détente* process grew, the nonaligned countries found that their notion of themselves as intermediaries in the Cold War struggle — a role that had enhanced the prestige of the nonalignment movement — had been negated by the super-powers. The nonaligned countries were still insisting on the need to abolish blocs even at the time when the two blocs were negotiating over their differences rather than threatening the independence of the nonaligned countries.

The *détente* era signaled the possible end of bloc conflicts over various non-committed areas or countries. Confrontation politics were to be replaced by the politics of negotiation as the super-powers instituted diplomacy by conference. But since the *détente* process was monopolized from the beginning by the super-powers, there was a tendency for them to try to solve all international problems without necessarily communicating with other involved countries. Yugoslavia discovered that the status of smaller countries like itself could be used as part of an agreement rather than as an object of conflict as it had been during the Cold War. The outcome for a small country in such a case, however, could conceivably be the same — domination by a super-power — though by a different method. Furthermore, there were none of the perquisites for the small country that wooing during the Cold War period had provided. Nor was there the influence the country in question might have garnered by keeping both super-powers at arm's length.

The *détente* process thus raised in nonaligned Yugoslavia fears of its position under *détente* conditions. Its leaders became more wary in their pronouncements about *détente*. The Yugoslavs also had very real misgivings about their future if the United States and the Soviet Union should agree on Yugoslavia's position and then consider it a closed subject. On the other hand, Yugoslavia, as a leader of the nonalignment movement and one of the major agitators for Soviet-American negotiations to reduce conflict, could not oppose *détente* as such. Its name was very closely linked to efforts by the nonaligned countries to promote *détente*. Like other small countries, therefore, Yugoslavia began to oppose *détente* as a manifestation of "great-power domination".

*Détente process
monopolized
by superpowers*

*Yugoslavia's
future in world
closely tied
to post-Tito
stability*

Post-Tito era

It would appear that Tito was finally acknowledging his mortality as he began a round of visits in 1977-78 to major countries to try to insure Yugoslavia's continued viability after he left the political scene. The question remains, will Yugoslavia be able to cope successfully with the changing world situation when Tito departs, or will the world situation, and Yugoslavia's own internal problems, prove overwhelming? More precisely, is Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc, in an ideological — or any other — sense, imminent, despite its own predilection for nonalignment? The answers to these questions depend, of course, on what Soviet intentions are towards Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.

The question of Yugoslavia's future in world affairs is closely tied to the degree of internal stability Yugoslavia can maintain after Tito — the major unifying force in the country — departs. The Soviet Union, which most Yugoslavs consider to be the real threat to an independent Yugoslavia, might welcome a reawakening of nationality problems in the post-Tito era. Such a situation could allow it influence over Yugoslavia's development. Conservative forces in Yugoslavia itself might welcome this if they believed that the U.S.S.R. was the only country that could protect Yugoslavia's Communist regime against a liberalizing trend and its federal system against too rapid a movement towards confederation (trends of the 1960s that could again rise should over-enthusiastic reformers and nationalists gain sufficient power).

It seems more likely, however, that the long-term Soviet interest would not be in a break-up of Yugoslavia (though the Soviet Union has been accused of intriguing with Croatian nationalists, Bulgarians over Macedonia, and pro-Soviet groups within Yugoslavia itself). The Soviet Union would probably prefer a weak but unified Yugoslavia. Such a potentially-pliable Yugoslavia would allow the Soviet Union to manoeuvre for a larger influence in Yugoslav policy planning as well as for naval and air facilities on the Adriatic with access to the Mediterranean. If, however, nationality problems arose within Yugoslavia, the Kremlin could justifiably worry about the stability of the historically conflict-ridden Balkans and the effect on Eastern-bloc countries. Furthermore, a civil war in Yugoslavia might invite super-power intervention, which would endanger peace in the rest of Europe.

If these nationality problems in-

creased in Yugoslavia to the point where there was a succession struggle, peace in the Balkans and prospective *détente* in Europe could be threatened. For instance, if a Croat opposition to Yugoslav leadership asked for United Nations protection for an independent existence (a proposal made by some Croats in 1971), the Soviet Union would probably see this as a danger to its vital interests and become involved. The United States, too, would almost certainly be interested in the consequences of such a development. Another possibility that could call forth Soviet assistance would be nationality problems that had become so severe as to portend an anti-socialist revolt in Yugoslavia.

In a *détente* situation, the situation could read a little differently. *Détente* and a resulting lessening of tensions could also make the achievement of security more difficult for Yugoslavia. As a country becoming increasingly important in the eyes of the super-powers because of its geo-strategic location, especially in regard to the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean areas, Yugoslavia promises to be a subject of much superpower discussion.

Non-intervention

Early indications of the *détente* process suggested that the super-powers were quite capable of negotiating with each other to insure their own interests and return for non-intervention in the interests of the other. If Yugoslavia were claimed by the Soviet Union as a vital interest, the United States might be tempted to ask for concessions in another area important to it in return for "hands-off" or "look the other way" policy in regard to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's future might thus be taken out of its own hands, as its importance as a great-power pawn increased. Or a *détente* agreement between the super-powers could conceivably — though not very probably — result in an eventual military withdrawal of the American presence from Europe. Yugoslavia, as part of its nonalignment posture, is anti-bloc and should therefore be unrestrictedly pleased at the possibility of disengagement in Europe; nevertheless such a move by the United States would leave the Soviet Union in a better position to re-absorb Yugoslavia into the socialist bloc, if it so desired, should the countervailing force of American troops be absent.

A possible alternative scenario would be little more pleasing to Yugoslavia: Soviet disengagement from Europe through a devolution of power from the Kremlin to the East European regimes could cause

it a natural leader of a newly-nonaligned Europe. The influence Yugoslavia could exert within such a powerful grouping of countries could insure its continued viability as an independent country and replace the conception of "socialist solidarity" with that of a "nonaligned Europe" or at least a "European consensus".

Mixed blessing

On the whole, it appears that the Soviet-American *détente* process beginning in the early 1970s has been considered a mixed blessing by the Yugoslavs. In his speech at the Eleventh Congress of the League of Communists in June 1978, Tito reiterated that "*détente* between the superpowers is an essential prerequisite for the whole process of the easing of international tensions, preservation of world peace and fostering of international relations on the principles of active peaceful coexistence". He called on the United States and the Soviet Union "to make serious efforts to transcend the present unsatisfactory situation" arising from "signs of a deterioration and increased distrust". Tito thus appeared as a leading advocate of Soviet-American *détente*. The winding-down of superpower hostility would be beneficial for all the world, helping to ensure the continued existence of the planet and opening up new avenues for co-operation. Tito may have decided that Yugoslavia would be under less pressure from the Soviet Union in the possibly-chaotic post-Tito period if there were to be the stability that the Soviet-American *détente* could provide.

At the same time, however, the Yugoslavs still entertain some qualms as to their situation under *détente*. Like many others, they fear that the promise of ever-increasing Soviet-American consultation and co-operation might see settlement of international problems without consultation of less influential, but nonetheless involved, countries. Yugoslavia, whose influence has rested primarily on its ability to mobilize public opinion in favour of nonalignment, is thereby faced with the prospects of declining prestige and power, which, in turn, could spell an increasing vulnerability to Soviet desires for hegemony.

The current stalemate in *détente* has provided an excellent opportunity to use the nonalignment platform to push for renewed movement towards *détente*. Tito seized this opportunity during his travels in early 1978 and stressed the need for worldwide, and not just superpower, involvement. This was an attempt to revitalize the nonalignment platform from

*Importance
of ability
to mobilize
public opinion*

which to urge further progress towards peaceful coexistence and to bolster Yugoslavia's prestige as a leader of the movement for *détente*. The rewards, however, could be shortlived if the United States and the Soviet Union should again emphasize bilateral, rather than multilateral, negotiations, with Yugoslavia's future as a subject of those talks. Yugoslav leaders might then be forced to end their heretofore profitable balancing act and decide between two courses (alignment with the capitalist West being considered tanta-

mount to desertion of socialism). Would Yugoslavia have to agree to participate in Soviet-influenced "socialist solidarity" in order to maintain its viability? Should it try to lead the way towards European nonalignment in an attempt to salvage its declining influence, especially in the post-Tito era? It is no wonder Yugoslav leaders, faced with such a potentially difficult and dangerous situation, look upon the Soviet-American *détente* with ambivalence.

Eastern Europe

Hungarian minority in Romania

By Paul Pilisi

In September 1977, a Communist leader and member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party wrote an open letter denouncing the violation of the individual and collective rights of his people. With a courage not often seen in these times, this Marxist of Hungarian origin criticized the deplorable way the Romanian Party and Government had dealt with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. On January 23, 1978, Reuters confirmed from Belgrade that the Romanian police had placed Karoly Kiraly under house arrest because of his letter. The matter at issue here is not just the violation of the rights of an individual but the violation of the collective rights of a people forced to live outside the national borders it has known for a millennium. What reasons and motives exist for this denunciation in a socialist country? In answering this question, it is important and helpful to examine various major aspects of the current quarrel between Hungary and Romania, two socialist countries, over the "nationalities" problem. Sixty years ago, in October 1918, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary presented the Act of Surrender to the President of the United States,

Woodrow Wilson. After the First World War, the Versailles system sanctioned balkanization of Central and Eastern Europe. This policy, based on the democratic principle of self-determination of nations, in practice gave rise to the oppression of minorities. The political and economic atomization of Central and Eastern Europe, intensified between the First and Second World Wars by rivalry among the new "national" states (each with several nationalities sharing territory), favoured the growth of the influence of the powers directly interested: Germany and the Soviet Union. Torn apart by conflicts and disunited in their efforts, the new national states became one by one victims or satellites of the two powers.

The lessons of their shared or similar past experience have not led these countries towards a democratic, voluntary and sensible reunion, but rather towards a reversal of the earlier situation. The formerly dominant peoples have become, most of the new states, dominated minority groups.

Socialists and nationalists

After the Second World War (the cause of which are fundamentally linked to the situation arising from the First World War), the Eastern European countries which had adopted the Soviet model of socialism, were not capable of resolving the nationalities problem. In Marx-

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theory, this problem is considered to be restricted to capitalist society. The national bourgeoisie maintains and nourishes it in order to strengthen further the unity of the oppressing mechanism, the state. In a socialist society, characterized above all by collective expropriation (nationalization) of the means of production, the nationalities issue disappears, for it is a problem that is specifically bourgeois.

In fact, however, the socialist countries, in spite of clear doctrinal guidelines, are incapable of settling conflicts between nationalities. One has only to consider the quarrel between the Serbs and Croats, the differences between Czechs and Slovaks, the Macedonian problem involving Bulgaria and Yugoslavia or the fate of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Moreover, under the pretext of socialism, some countries, such as Romania, have gone beyond the discriminatory methods and policies practised in the inter-war years by "bourgeois" governments towards the minority nationalities.

Since the Belgrade Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in the summer of 1978, the observance of human rights in the Eastern countries — and in the U.S.S.R. in particular — has aroused sustained public interest in the Western hemisphere.

In recent months, Western public opinion has discovered that entire peoples are condemned to the fate that was believed to be restricted to certain individuals. The public is learning that avowed socialist political systems are using Marxist doctrine and the omnipresence of the state, which is in the hands of a single party, to violate the right of national groups to lead a collective life, at least so far as culture and national language are concerned. It goes without saying, using the most elementary logic, that if individual rights and freedoms are violated, then similar rights of minorities and communities will certainly not be respected either.

This sudden new concern was sparked by the dissident Romanian writer Paul Goma at a press conference held in December 1977 in Frankfurt, West Germany. The young author, who had spent part of his life in concentration camps, gave a stirring account of the violation of minority rights in present-day socialist Romania. Mr Goma, who was present on the invitation of the Komite für Menschenrechte in Rumänien (Committee for Human Rights in Romania) and the Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte (Human Rights Association), painted a dark picture of the fate of the minorities in Romania, and of the Hungarian minority

in particular. It should be noted that there are some 300,000 Germans in Romania today, besides Ukrainian and Serbian ethnic groups.

After this interview, the most influential and respected newspapers and magazines of Western Europe (the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Der Spiegel*, *L'Express* and *Die Welt*, among others) began to cover the problems of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

One French journalist did not hesitate to describe the policy of the Romanian Government as actual "cultural genocide". In the October 28, 1978, international issue of *L'Express*, the term "ethnocide" was used by E. Bailby, who had studied the question at first hand. According to statements by the Hungarian socialist poet Guyla Illyés, winner of the European prize for literature in 1967, the term is very accurate. The poet accuses the Government, the Romanian Communist Party, and in particular its Secretary-General, Nicholae Ceausescu, of "proceeding in the name of socialism to liquidate the Hungarian culture in Transylvania".

With the publication in 1976 of a book documenting the changes in Transylvania by this Transylvanian author, the problem of the Hungarian minority had become a subject for thought in Western Europe. The question acquired considerable dimensions in September 1977, when Kiraly published his open letter denouncing the "tragic" situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania.

What are the roots and implications of the problem? Transylvania, an integral part of Hungary and the home of the national Magyar (Hungarian) culture, was allotted to Romania after the First World War. The homeland of three nationalities (Hungarian, Romanian and German), Transylvania became part of Romania on June 4, 1920, under the Treaty of Trianon, which reduced Hungary's territory by two-thirds. Romanian sovereignty was therefore established without prior concern for the wishes of non-Romanians, who nevertheless represented over 50 per cent of the population. This, then, is when the whole Transylvanian problem began, in that the Romanian Government was to disregard the guarantees it had signed as a safeguard for minority rights. Between the First and Second World Wars, the chief monuments to Hungarian history and culture were systematically destroyed. The policy of assimilation to which minority nationalities are usually subject was applied.

The Treaty of Paris, signed on Feb-

ruary 10, 1947, confirmed Romanian sovereignty over Transylvania. The 1952 Romanian constitution granted the status of Magyar Autonomous Region to the land of the Szeklers. For self-protection, the Hungarian people joined the Communist Party. The end result of the administrative reforms of 1956 and 1968, aimed at dispersing and then assimilating the Hungarian minority, was the abolition of the Magyar Autonomous Region.

According to the 1966 census figures, the Hungarian population numbers about 1,800,000, or 9.2 per cent of the population of Romania. One-third of this number lives in the large cities along the border between Hungary and Romania, and constitutes the majority group in the following cities: Nagyvárad (Oradea), Szatmar (Satu-Mare), Arad and Temesvár (Timișoara). Another third of this minority is concentrated in the Szekler region, making up over 80 per cent of the population of the former districts of Csik (Ciuc), Háromszék (Trei-Scaune) and Udvarhely (Cluj). The remaining third is spread among the towns and villages of Transylvania. Some 200,000 Hungarians live beyond the Carpathians, cut off from the rest of the Magyar population in Transylvania.

Since the administrative reform of 1968, a whole series of steps has been taken by Romanian authorities in order to restrict the individual and collective rights of the Hungarian minority. These measures generally focus on the areas of culture, education and national development. Recent decrees place very severe restrictions on contacts among Hungarians themselves.

Culture and education

The educational and cultural policies of the Romanian Government continue, and go beyond, postwar principles. As early as 1949, the Hungarian writers' union of Romania was forced to join the Romanian writers' union. Dissidents have been relegated to the condition of labourers and eliminated forever from the writing profession. Censorship of minority-group publications is stricter than censorship of the ideological content of approved texts. The decreasing output of the minority press is blamed on a shortage of newsprint and economic conditions in general. Censorship guidelines set out limits, subjects and proscribed words. However, since the beginning of the 1970s, the Romanian Party and Government have put the nationalist policy in high gear and have been paying special attention to the issue of minorities. At the Eleventh Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1974, Mr Ceausescu,

representing the Central Committee, stated the Party's guidelines on this matter. Law 63, concerning the protection of Romanian cultural heritage, which dates from November 1, 1974, gives Romanian authorities the power to expropriate works of art, documents, church architecture and so on. Particularly valuable architecture belonging to two Hungarian secondary schools were quickly seized. This law effect hands over property that is part of the Hungarian cultural heritage — many respects richer than that of Romania — to the Romanian Government.

In 1960, the Romanian Government began forcing the Hungarian-language universities in Transylvania to integrate with their Romanian counterparts. Despite the suicide of one vice-chancellor, court proceedings, harassment and "voluntary" resignations followed. Schools and institutes of higher learning are now almost all Romanian. For the few hundred Hungarian students still following courses in their mother tongue in departments of the former Hungarian university in Kolozsvár, which has become Romanian, there are almost no opportunities. The number of Hungarian secondary schools has been gradually reduced to the point where a special correspondent for *L'Express* in Transylvania affirmed in the October 1978, issue that the secondary schools were disappearing.

Hungarian primary schools are also being transformed into Romanian schools in accordance with Party guidelines, the excuse given being the "insufficient number of Hungarian students". The primary education problem is much more serious in regions where the Hungarian minority is surrounded by a Romanian majority. In Moldavia, Hungarian schools have been suppressed since 1960 and the use of the Hungarian language banned in Catholic religious ceremonies. Since the Romanian population in this region is Greek Orthodox or Greek Catholic, this ban has the pure and simple effect of eliminating freedom of religion — a right that is, moreover, guaranteed by the constitution.

In addition, the textbooks distributed to Hungarian schoolchildren are simple translations of Romanian books. It is forbidden to use any other type of material. Thus students have no source of knowledge of their national culture and history except for information acquired at home. These facts were noted in the open letter already mentioned from Karoly Kiraly:

We were promised secondary and technical schools in which the language of instruction would be that of the nationalities, and we are seeing these schools

*Restriction
of individual
and collective
minority rights*

decrease in number before our eyes from year to year. Children are not able to study in their mother tongue; compulsory teaching of the Romanian language is introduced in kindergarten. The 1976 decree suppresses the right of Hungarian-language institutions of higher learning to exist. The fate of Bolyai University in Kolozsvár (now Babes University) was shared by the Medical and Pharmacological Institute in Marosvásárhely and, following a high-level decision, the Istvan Szentgyorgyi art school was changed into a Romanian faculty. Such steps have eliminated the last pockets of Hungarian post-secondary education. It is no secret that the director of the Hungarian National Theatre in Marosvásárhely is a Romanian who does not speak Hungarian. Nor is it a new phenomenon to see Romanian mayors who do not speak a word of Hungarian appointed in such cities as Nagyvárad, Marosvásárhely and Szovata, which still have a Hungarian majority.

Mobility and development

Social mobility, usually compulsory, and national development are classical methods used to weaken the influence and solidarity of a minority group. Compulsory social mobility separates Hungarian workers from their ethnic and cultural group. Under the labour code, they must accept a job offered in another area and consequently move. In order to obtain a better job, through opportunism or for personal or professional reasons, Hungarian workers will even change their names. For example, many people are unaware that the parents of the gymnast Nadia Comaneci, the champion at the Olympic games in Montreal, changed their name from the Hungarian form Kemenes. The trainer of the Romanian team, Béla Kiraly, has the same last name as that of the author of the open letter. The Hungarian trainer and gymnast were obliged to speak Romanian in public, in accordance with directives issued by Ceausescu on April 4 and 5, 1974.

The dispersal of the Hungarian population of Transylvania weakens the influence of the minority and at the same time changes the ethnic make-up of the cities. In general, a Hungarian is almost always refused permission to move to a large city with a significant Hungarian population, such as Kolozsvár. On the other hand, Romanian municipal authorities encourage the exodus of Romanians to large cities having Hungarian populations. For example, the population of

Kolozsvár increased from 167,000 in 1965 to 220,000 in 1976, but the Hungarian population, which totalled 75,000 in 1965, had hardly increased in number by 1978. For reasons of professional mobility, the Hungarian rural population must leave Transylvania and look for employment in remote regions. This enforced mobility, which particularly affects young people fleeing the rural areas, explains in large part the considerable number of Hungarian workers in outlying industrial centres.

Ethnologists and sociographers, who are concerned about preserving folk culture in villages and isolated regions, are routinely harassed by the police. Their instruments are often damaged while at work, in "inspection" accidents. In most cases they can find no employment and the Hungarian Academy of Science appoints them as academic "corresponding members", so that they can receive a minimum salary in the form of an honorarium.

Mail between Hungary and Transylvania, as well as conversations on the telephone and in restaurants, is monitored. Regulations concerning visits between Hungarians on either side of the border prohibit a Hungarian from Hungary from staying with relatives in Romania; the only exception is made for visits with immediate family members, which may not last longer than three days. Violation of the rules means an automatic fine of \$500 and the possibility that the next visiting request will be refused. Despite these restrictions, the Hungarians of Hungary are going in greater and greater numbers to Transylvania to show their national solidarity. These tourists from a "sister" country are not well received by the exclusively Romanian staff of the tourist industry. The tombs and monuments of scientists or artists who have contributed to world culture — for example, the house in which Béla Bartok was born — cannot be seen or are in poor condition. This is the case with the tomb of the Hungarian national poet Sandor Petöfi, who was killed during the revolution and war of independence of 1848-49 by Russian troops.

Kiraly's open letter clearly recognizes a gulf between socialist practice and Marxist theory:

It is clear from these few facts that the situation openly contradicts the constitution, the Party's fundamental rules and the principles stated in its official documents. Not only does this conduct go against these principles but it contravenes Marxist-Leninist beliefs and totally ignores the most basic human rights, ethical values and human dig-

nity; in sum, it goes against all the things promoted by propaganda in its most varied forms.

Moderating influence

The Kiraly letter sounded a new note in the controversy involving the two parties and governments. If this controversy has not yet taken on an aggressive and tragic nature, it is due to the moderating influence of Janos Kadar, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Hungary.

The meeting between Kadar and Ceausescu in the summer of 1977 took place in an atmosphere of discontent on the part of the Hungarians of Hungary. It produced uncertain results. The only positive result of the meeting was the relaxing of restrictions on the contacts between the people of Romania and Hungary. The border zone in which people can circulate freely was extended by only five kilometres (from 15 to 20). The three main cities of the border region on the Romanian side with a significant Hungarian population were not included in the zone. At the present time, the Hungarians of Transylvania are not allowed to visit their families in Hungary more than once every two years.

Public opinion in Hungary appears to be increasingly hostile to Bucharest's policies towards the sister minority. The performance of plays by Transylvanian authors in Budapest has been accompanied by repeated demonstrations by young people. On December 31, 1977, and January 1, 1978, the Budapest daily newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* (*The Hungarian Nation*) published two articles by Gyula Illyés. The title, "Reply to Herder", is symbolic, referring to the German philosopher and writer J. G. Herder, who in the eighteenth century predicted the assimilation and disappearance of the Magyars since they had no ethnic or linguistic relatives on the European continent. Illyés wrote that a large Hungarian minority was without a university and soon its own language would no longer be taught.

The Romanian Government, for its part, continues to ignore the nationalities issue and intervenes only indirectly in the debate. After the distribution of these two issues of the Budapest daily was banned in Romania, a reaction appeared in the weekly publication *Contemporanul* on February 10, 1978, in Bucharest. The Romanian magazine did not discuss the complaints expressed either by Kiraly or by Illyés. The two historians working for the publication, D. Berciu and C. Preda, limited themselves to examining a study that appeared on December 25, 1977, in

the Budapest newspaper *Magyar Hírlap* (*The Hungarian Gazette*), in which official theses on the historic rights of the Romanian people in Transylvania were again called into question. "What worries me is the obstinacy shown by Party officials, from the lowest to the highest level in refusing to discuss these problems," wrote Kiraly in his open letter, in which he still affirmed his Marxist beliefs.

At the very moment when public opinion, the Party and the Government in Hungary expect some explanations from Romania, the Romanian Party maintains its silence and builds a personality cult around the figure of Nicolas Ceausescu, President of the Republic and Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party. In January 1978, on the leader's sixtieth birthday, this cult assumed unprecedented proportions. On January 1, four pages out of six in the journal *Scinteia* were devoted to him; they contained personal statements concerning "the most beloved son of the people". A Government official expressed his joy "being a contemporary" of the man praised by an obscure poet of the Stalin era as "the passion and the shield of our land". With last summer's strike of miners, a large number of whom belong to the Hungarian minority, he became the nation's "honorary miner".

When will Comrade Ceausescu take up the honourable cause of the Hungarian minority in the name of socialist internationalism?

In the next issue . . .

William Epstein reported on the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in our September/October issue. In the March/April issue he returns to our pages with an analysis of subsequent Canadian disarmament initiatives. "The year 1978," he declares "marked a turning point in Canadian disarmament policy." In that context he examined the handling of disarmament questions at the UN's thirty-third General Assembly last fall.

Evaluating the progress of test ban negotiations

By Ashok Kapur

A study of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) negotiations since 1977 shows how shaky international disarmament diplomacy is and how disarmament diplomacy is primarily about national policy rather than about global disarmament. Since the acceptance of the Partial Test Ban (1963), the CTB has remained on the agenda. To date, China and France have not joined the test-ban but France entered the anti-proliferation debate through its participation in the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975 onward) and in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (1978). At this session, China opposed superpower policies verbally but played a constructive role by not challenging the consensus in the final document of the session. In signing this document, China, with other nuclear-weapon states, is now on record in favour of nuclear disarmament as the final goal. Still, the CTB is being negotiated at a time that the superpower *détente* is in trouble and there is no consensus in the American foreign-policy establishment about the future of U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations.

In historical terms, a dual thrust has moved the CTB negotiations to their present status. The Third World pressure against the superpower arms race is growing. Even though UN statements are ritualistic and verbal, the pressure from Brazil, Argentina and India is gaining momentum. At the 1978 special session on disarmament Brazil fought unsuccessfully to eliminate a reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and it is arguable that today it would be difficult to get the Third World to accept the ban. The real source of pressure lies in the emergence of Third World nuclear options. The Third World plea to the nuclear-weapon states to move towards disarmament is a threat to the existing hierarchy because any disarmament can unfreeze the structure of global power and produce an upward mobility of select regional military powers.

The plea that the superpowers ought to freeze the arms race and prepare for disarmament is politically significant because it is accompanied by an implicit threat that the failure to disarm is likely

to increase incentives towards horizontal proliferation. It implies a promise to slow the acquisition of nuclear options if the super-powers tone down their arms race. So today the linkage between disarmament diplomacy and nuclear-option diplomacy of the Third World nations creates a new element in the context for superpower negotiations. It is still a marginal element but has potentialities nevertheless.

The second overt pressure towards a CTB is related to the first one. Until India exploded its nuclear device in 1974, there was no question of linking the control of peaceful nuclear explosions to a CTB. The PNE element was added after the Indian test. The reason for the addition is that, even though PNEs are mostly dead as engineering resources, they are alive as diplomatic and political ones. So the PNE argument is still alive theoretically — in the Soviet Union, India, Brazil and Argentina, in the language of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), and in the absence of a technical consensus against PNEs in the debates of the International Atomic Energy Agency and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. At the international level, the issue becomes urgent because the Soviet Union has an important PNE bureaucracy. Secondly, because of its irritation with China, Moscow would like to have the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions as its escape clause to a CTB agreement. So, unless the complete defection of the Soviet Union from the PNE case can be arranged, the issue cannot be killed. This is the background against which the CTB negotiations can be studied.

The status of the current negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban is

Dr Kapur teaches political science at the University of Waterloo. This article is based on research he did while on sabbatical leave during the 1977-78 academic year. He is the author of International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and Regional Aspects, which is to be published shortly. The views expressed in this article are those of Dr Kapur.

*New element
for superpower
negotiations*

somewhat as follows.

Initially, the Soviet Union wanted to exclude the PNE issue from the CTB negotiations. On November 2, 1977, Leonid Brezhnev offered to place a moratorium on Soviet PNE testing for a limited time, as well as to ban military testing; the duration of these bans remains unspecified. In diplomatic circles this is taken to mean three years (the Soviet preference) and five years (the Western preference). A possible U.S.-Soviet bargain on this point is that the United States would admit that PNEs are allowed in principle and the Soviet Union would admit that extremely strict international control is needed to conduct them. In this case, any state (including the Soviet Union) would have to justify its PNE requirement before an international authority on a case-by-case basis. The chances are that perhaps one out of ten projects might be approved after prolonged debate. The key element is that the Soviet Union itself would insist on strict international controls and would accept self-restraint in its PNE program as the price for its commitment to non-proliferation.

The other problem in negotiating a CTB concerns the issue of verification. A combination of seismic monitoring, on-site inspection by challenge, and national intelligence methods seems technically workable and politically acceptable to CTB negotiators. It is, therefore, possible that this issue can be settled at the tripartite level.

There is a problem, however, in the linkage between the questions of duration and of entry into force of the CTB and the PNE moratorium. The Soviet position offers two choices. The debate preceding November 2, 1977, between the Soviet and Western powers was to get Moscow to discuss the PNE issue seriously. Mr. Brezhnev offered to do so in November 1977. The Soviet idea subsequent to November 2 was to offer a choice: (a) limited duration for the treaty (three years) and immediate entry into force subject to review by the parties. This approach was based on the premise that China and France would not join the treaty and that it would be a non-universal document. Alternatively, Moscow offers an unlimited duration period, but with no immediate entry into force until China and France join.

Welcome discussions

For those who argue that the NPT provisions must be implemented conscientiously and that there should be a movement towards disarmament, the tripartite CTB

discussions between the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. are welcome. The conditional defection of Moscow from its wholehearted commitment to PNEs is a major achievement of the CTB debate so far. Moreover, the PNE issue a theoretical one can be viewed as a non-proliferation measure that can be expected to influence the foreign policy debates in select Third World nations. Therefore, even though the issue is currently meant to be a finite agreement, it has some infinite implications with respect to the PNE issue and strengthening the arms-control cooperation of superpower decision-making diplomacy. A CTB would freeze military testing and strengthen the superpower strategic dialogue. Britain's role is to assist the two principals as a "honest broker" rather than to function as a principal itself. So even a time-bound moratorium buys time for the tripartite negotiations and the superpower dialogue. The underlying premise is that the role of UN members and of China are presently marginal to the reaching of an agreement on the test ban but that China is a major factor in Soviet thinking (in the "run") and yet the dialogue is basically "bilateralized" and likely to remain the view of the superpowers.

At present a superpower dialogue in which the CTB serves a number of purposes. Because of the difficulties of fostering a spirit of *détente* these days, the debate creates an atmosphere for bilateral negotiations in a number of areas. For instance, in SALT II. Negotiations towards a moratorium can be a preparation for a permanent ban on all testing in the perspective of military or peaceful developments. A moratorium now would also help to stabilize the military-technology situation and at the same time leave the political positions of the principals intact because the superpower could at present renounce its current positions and close all loopholes.

Soviet and American perceptions of each other are different and there is no consensus in the foreign-policy and security communities about the central premises. The perception of issues with respect to technical detail and concerning political and psychological issues, the differences affect the narrow issues of the CTB negotiations as well as the broader political context in which the negotiations occur. For Moscow, the issue does not exist not as bargaining chips. Geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations make it important not to renounce all options without examining all implications. India (a marginal actor in the CTB debate), the PNE option is important in

Verification
poses problem
to negotiations

S., Britain, and the context of its evolving relations with China. On the one hand, it necessitates moves to normalize relations with China; on the other hand, the Desai Government, like the Indira Gandhi Government, has given the border issue more visibility.

In Europe there is no meaningful activity relating to PNEs but the deliberations of the International Atomic Energy Agency demonstrate the practical possibilities of PNE experiments. Internationally, therefore, the issue is not quite resolved and may be assumed that, once China has a strong nuclear status (say, five to ten years hence), it may be able to play a role in the disarmament debate. Even if this happens, China may itself want a PNE option as an escape clause. The superpowers have to keep such possibilities in mind.

A moratorium also has its uses in the context of the play of bureaucratic politics in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. It is far from clear that military bureaucracies in these countries are willing to accept a permanent freeze on military testing and retesting of existing equipment and technology. For it is certain that organizational interests and rivalries can be curbed by political leaders and that intergovernmental negotiations can escape the role of laythings for officials and bureaucratic interests in order that the two governments may make reciprocal sacrifices. Politically, therefore, as a temporary agreement, the moratorium buys time for the principals to work on their problems at home. Internationally, in the context of post-NPT diplomacy, a CTB/PNE debate neutralizes the national PNE debates and yet keeps the PNE issue theoretically alive by shifting the discussion to the realm of Article V of the NPT. This aspect is important, because it practically nullifies the PNEs and yet theoretically implements Article V of the NPT and thus one of the NPT bargains.

Real issues

CTB/PNE negotiations to date disclose an area of negotiability for a tripartite agreement if the issues are seen as: PNE control; accepting a finite CTB agreement; implementing Articles V and VI of the NPT; gradually drawing China and France into the disarmament dialogue; and responding to Third World pressure in the UN to move towards nuclear disarmament.

If these were the principal issues, a CTB/PNE agreement would be relatively easy to negotiate. But it is a mistake to view these negotiations primarily as an exercise in intergovernmental negotiation. Rather, the intergovernmental arena is

meant to work out intragovernmental debates in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The American debate seems more important than the Soviet one because Americans seem to have a capacity to influence the Soviet debate greater than the Soviet capacity to influence the American debate. A number of considerations are involved about the context of CTB/PNE debate, and we now turn to an assessment of these.

In de Gaulle's time, France was formally the third nuclear-weapon state in the world because of its maverick behaviour, because Britain was largely predictable and controllable in the nuclear field by the American partnership, and because China did not count much in military terms. France, however, was ignored by the two principals because it chose to be ignored. Under President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, it has developed a new posture. It joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and entered the UN Special Session on Disarmament in a big way as a nuclear-weapon state. However, it will still be ignored because the strategic dialogue is basically bilateral. France is at present militarily stronger than China. For example, the Chinese armed forces still use anti-tank equipment of the kind used by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second World War. It is possible that China will make a quantum leap in the modern era, and, taking such considerations into account, China is the potential third voice in international-security policy-making. (Even the Federal Republic of Germany has a greater impact than France on alliance policy and disarmament diplomacy, and its involvement in the international nuclear trade and its space-research activities based in Zaire merit attention.) The rest of the world does not count at present in nuclear and military strategy, but it does count in UN diplomacy — and this is a marginal factor the superpowers consider.

Some movement

To date there has been some movement in the CTB debate, but the superpowers have not conceded anything of substance, except that the Soviet Union is now willing to accept a non-universal treaty and thereby give China a chance to continue its military testing while Soviet testing is suspended for three to five years. The Soviet-Chinese military gap is immense, and on a military basis cannot be bridged. So banning all tests is really a political decision, and the underlying Soviet motives could include the following.

First, a moratorium can help develop intelligence about Chinese intentions by

*New posture
for France
developed
under Giscard*

Moratorium helps leaders to negotiate with military bureaucracies

giving China an opportunity to increase, decrease or suspend its nuclear-testing program during the life of the superpower agreement. Secondly, the moratorium period can be an offer of time to China to develop its disarmament policy; the underlying expectation is that China will do something with this time rather than merely keep criticizing the superpowers. Thirdly, as noted earlier, the moratorium period helps the political leaders to negotiate with their military bureaucracies and other sectors in the domestic debates. Fourthly, at the intergovernmental level of perception, it can be argued that a number of factors work against an American decision to move quickly towards a CTB: (1) The United States has more "pull" than the Soviet Union to set the pace of negotiations in the latter and to accelerate the conversion of China to the disarmament persuasion; conversely, the Soviet leaders have less chance of converting the Americans and the Chinese permanently to a test-ban position. (2) Because of the absence of consensus in the American foreign-policy and security communities, the Soviet Union (the Soviet experts say) has to live with the prospect of prolonged negotiation until the U.S. can make up its mind about a permanent ban. These factors thus recommend the utility of moratorium as a time-buying activity in superpower relations.

There is an additional explanation. To avoid accepting the blame for failure in the eyes of the Third World and of American audiences, the Soviet Union made its November 1977 concession on PNEs with a view to putting the ball in the American court. The premise is that the American debate about a CTB has yet to emerge publicly and the high visibility given to SALT II in American politics does not denote the absence of a CTB debate. Even the verification issue is unsettled in American politics, though it appears to be a marginal issue in tripartite debate. Furthermore, there is a larger question among Washington insiders whether the U.S. ought even to negotiate with (as distinct from talk to) Moscow. The argument is that American military technology is superior to Soviet technology, the Soviet economy faces insurmountable difficulties in the foreseeable future, and the Soviet Union is an expansionist regime with the outlook of the principality of Muscovy in the fifteenth century. Hence no real settlement with Moscow is possible and arms-control agreements create a false sense of security and a false expectation that nuclear disarmament is possible.

A formidable task

In this perspective, the task before Soviet strategists is a formidable one — viz., to convert the Americans to recognize the use of a permanent ban on testing then to have them induce a change in Chinese thinking to facilitate its entry into the disarmament debate. Brezhnev's November 1977 announcement had, therefore, little to do with PNEs but a great deal to do with Soviet relations with the U.S. and China. Underlying the linkage of the United States and China in Soviet disarmament diplomacy is the opinion that the key to change in Peking's foreign policy orientation lies in committing the U.S. to the idea of a comprehensive test ban and then moving to involve China in that agreement.

Underlying this approach is the perception in Moscow that the main problem of China is internal. Until China's political struggle is settled, it needs an external threat to justify its current military foreign-policy orientation. For Soviet strategists it is not a question of who the U.S. is, as long as he is powerful and is willing to commit China to involvement in a policy debate on international security. So, when the power structure in China is firmly established, the Chinese will be able to think of their national interests, which perspective Sino-Soviet relations are not permanently hostile. The prospect of reaching this conclusion is likely to be slow. Militarily, China can be disregarded by the Soviet Union but, since it has the capacity to do political harm, Sino-Soviet adjustment is needed. One approach is to encourage the Chinese leaders to indicate their willingness to join the CTB when they have reached a certain level of development in their military technology and their force structure.

Soviet disarmament diplomacy does not rely only on American assistance, and Soviet/Third World connections are helpful. Encouraging China to come out of self-imposed isolation in international security policy by participating in international-disarmament diplomacy is an opportunity and a danger for China. Soviet support for disarmament would win plause in the Third World, but there is also danger: China could lose the opportunity to quickly militarize itself and win a seat at the superpower table and thereby realize its potential as the major voice in international-security policy-making. To some extent, the game is "zero-sum" because a China moving towards superpower status is likely to lose its credentials in the Third World. Today China can blur the choices because it

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ina's po and another such session is likely in 1981-
an exte 82, at which time the nuclear-weapon
ilitary states will again have to explain their dis-
Soviet armament record. Since China has also
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interests shift on PNEs in November 1977 will
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The pro mental in the American security and
likely to foreign-policy debate are unsettled in the
disregar Carter Administration. One voice in the
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The opposing voice says that disharmony between the superpowers is the natural and permanent condition in their relations, and *détente* is a waste of time, since it creates a false sense of security and it is much neater to fight a Cold War or to prepare for one than to prepare or practise peace. At present there is no one in the United States, including President Carter and his adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who can synthesize ideas and policies and settle the debate. The negotiating context for the CTB will, therefore, probably remain mixed and inconclusive with regard to the settlement of the premises.

In conclusion, a finite CTB agreement is unlikely to settle the central issues but it will create the "cosmetic" effect of movement, if not achievement. China is unlikely to join the CTB, and there is sympathy for its position because of its problem with Soviet Union and because of its inexperience with international-conference diplomacy. India is important for "cosmetic" reasons, but it is suspicious of the CTB. The temptation to take a seat at the table by signing a moratorium, and thereby to acquire the right to consider the future of the moratorium a few years hence (in return for Indian acceptance of full-scope safeguards), is a weak bargain that does not appeal to a self-contained India today. The real debate is still bilateralized, and this requires clarification about the effects of the American debate on the Soviet debate and *vice-versa*. The CTB could symbolize the taking of a step towards disarmament, but it is likely that the principals are not yet ready to abandon all their options. The CTB debate has consequently little to do with PNEs and with the goal of nuclear disarmament and a lot to do with intra-élite debates in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

Agreement unlikely to settle central issues

Book review

Goldmann's Jewish paradox

By Sidney Freifeld

At the age of 84, Nahum Goldmann can look back on a crowded career as a Jewish leader extraordinary; at one period in the Sixties, he held simultaneously the presidencies of the World Jewish Congress, which he helped to found, the World Zionist Organization, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany - for which he was the

prime and successful negotiator - and the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, as well as several lesser offices. This may explain why, when Pope John wanted to

Mr Freifeld, an officer of the Department of External Affairs since 1947, retired in 1975. His last post was Ambassador to Colombia and Ecuador. The views expressed here are those of the author.

Goldmann
a provocative
dissenter

talk with a Jewish leader, he sent his confessor, Cardinal Bea, to Goldmann and the Cardinal said: "It's hard to negotiate with the Jews, because one does not know who best represents them. For us, there is the Vatican; for the Protestants, there is the World Council of Churches; but when I investigated the present-day structures of Jewry . . . it was so complicated that I asked other Jesuits for advice. They told me that you were the ideal man to see, particularly the Pope of the Jews!"

If his awesome list of positions should convey the impression that Dr Goldmann has been a stodgy figurehead of the Jewish establishment, this book quickly reveals him as a provocative dissenter from a number of Israeli policies and as a gadfly who seemed to derive satisfaction from raising hackles and playing the maverick. During his lifetime he achieved the not inconsiderable feat of being attacked at the same time by Zionists and anti-Zionists, and by Israeli officialdom as well as the Diaspora establishment. In more recent years, during which he appears to have mellowed not at all, he has not hesitated to criticize domestic tendencies within Israel and, more conspicuously, important aspects of Israel's foreign policy — in particular, its posture towards the Arab world. He was critical of Henry Kissinger's step-by-step negotiations following Egypt's 1973 attack on Israel, and he expressed preference — this was before Camp David — for seeking a general settlement through the Geneva conference that was then being considered. He wanted the Israelis to commit themselves to evacuating the occupied territories, while "the Arabs must formally recognize the Jewish state". He feels, however that division of Jerusalem would be "intolerable" and that "a solution acceptable to all the different peoples and religions would have to be found".

Dr Goldmann has frequently drawn the ire of Israeli leaders for his forays into sensitive fields. At one time after 1967, he was reported as about to meet with Nasser and later with President Sadat; more recently, he has been reported as willing to meet with Yasser Arafat. He comes down especially hard on his old friend David Ben Gurion, a "clever, brilliant man, who had a statesman's perspective and the admiration of a man like de Gaulle," but who "never forgives a defeat, never forgets a humiliation, and always wants to exact revenge". Goldmann was often critical of Ben Gurion's policies towards the Arab world.

This volume is replete with Dr Goldmann's *obiter dicta*: on the the deficien-

cies of a world organized on the basis of nation states, the sins of the super-powers and the virtues of neutralism for Israel, and of a confederation of states of the Middle East. He defines a politician as one who takes account only of what his supporters want, and a statesman as one who is concerned also with the needs of his adversaries because they are the people he must settle with. In his view Israeli negotiators have to learn that one is ever altogether right; absolute situations do not exist because the absolute is impossible to reach. He is unhappy that, because of the wars imposed upon Israel had to start its existence as a state by concentrating on physical power and also because, convinced of its own right, it often overlooks those of its adversaries and weakens its position in the eyes of the world.

What Dr Goldmann fears for the Jews is not another holocaust but the loss of their heritage, "not murder but suicide". Jewish youth, he believes, need a challenge: "To build an Israel which is not content with having the best army in the Near East . . . which concentrates instead on religious, cultural and social creativity". He would like to see world Jewry, inspired by an Israel of peace and justice, become a champion of the world against poverty, illiteracy and inequality, demanding the abolition of the sovereign state and the establishment of peace.

When he founded the World Jewish Congress 40 years ago, Dr Goldmann came a *bête noire* to some Jews in the West, who feared the Congress might prejudice their struggle for equality in their own countries and wanted to forestall any resurgence of age-old charges of conspiracy. Today the WJC stands for a wider acceptance of the view that Jews in many countries may have common interests and concerns, and that it is natural that they should organize to advance their common interests.

During a hectic life of considerable attainment, Dr Goldmann has dealt with many of the world's leaders, from Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Acheson to Pope Paul VI, Adenauer, Brandt, Tito and Ceausescu — and also, during the Thirties, an emissary from the Hapsburg family, who came to him with a scheme to enlist Jewish support for the restoration of the monarchy, in return for which the monarch would grant haven for Germany's 700,000 Nazi-endangered Jews in Austria, which the Hapsburgs believed, would thereby gain economic prosperity and cultural pre-eminence. Dr Goldmann expresses a decided preference for dealing with "exceptional persons", who, by his own

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...count, reciprocated. Chancellor Raab of
...Austria tells him that he's "too clever a
...man". Mussolini is annoyed with Gold-
...mann for not having accepted a proposal
...but later admits: "You were right. You
...are a statesman". After a meeting with
...President Ceausescu, a Romanian partic-
...ipant tells him that he "has just learnt
...a valuable lesson in diplomacy". Another
...European leader says that he "always
...foresees what is going to happen". Dr
...Goldmann seems to have spent undue
...time nodding in approval before his own
...mirror; whether or not this constant praise

of self through the utterances of con-
temporaries is narcissistic or reveals some
deep-seated insecurity, it needlessly tar-
nishes his image if not the record of his
accomplishment.

This lively volume is a good transla-
tion from the French original, but is
marred by a number of typographical er-
rors and editorial blemishes, e.g.: "I knew
Gromyko well when he was in office."

Goldman, Nahum. *The Jewish paradox*.
Translated by Steve Cox. New York: 1978.
Fred Gordon Books/Grosset & Dunlap.

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Reference Section

Canadian Foreign Relations

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No. 106 (December 1, 1978) Canadian participation in United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

No. 107 (December 8, 1978) Statement by Deputy Prime Minister MacEachen in House of Commons December 8, 1978, regarding thirtieth anniversary of Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

No. 108 (December 12, 1978) Statement on behalf of Canada by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Gignac during consultations on Indochina refugee problems held in Geneva under sponsorship of UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

No. 109 (December 13, 1978) Establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Democratic Republic of Sao Tomé and Príncipe.

No. 110 (December 18, 1978) Air-quality talks between Canada and United States.

No. 1 (January 4, 1979) Coming into force of convention on multilateral co-operation in Northwest Atlantic fisheries.

No. 2 (January 5, 1979) Canada-U.S. negotiations on maritime boundaries and fisheries problems.

No. 3 (January 5, 1979) Evacuation of Canadians from Iran.

No. 4 (January 10, 1979) Visit to Commonwealth Caribbean by Secretary of State for External Affairs, January 16-21, 1979.

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No. 78/12 Growing Economic Interdependence, with Special Reference to Developing Countries. A statement at the OECD ministerial meeting, Paris, June 15, 1978, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.

No. 78/13 Conference on International Human Rights. An address at a lunch co-sponsored by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian Council on International Law, and the Canadian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, in Ottawa on October 26, 1978.

No. 78/14 Thirtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. A statement by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, in the House of Commons, December 18, 1978.

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No. 78/16 Canadian Position on Disarmament Restated. A statement by the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control, Mr G.A.H. Pearson, to the First Committee of the thirty-third regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 21, 1978.

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No. 78/18 An International Problem of Greatest Urgency — Resettlement of Refugees from Indochina. A Canadian statement by Mr Jacques Gignac, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, during consultations held in Geneva on December 11 and 12, 1978, concerning the Indochina refugee problem, under the sponsorship of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Egypt, Arab Republic of

Development Loan Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Cairo, December 21, 1978
In force December 21, 1978

European Space Agency

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Montreal, December 9, 1978
In force December 9, 1978
With effect from January 1, 1979

France

Agreement on Mutual Assistance between Canada and France for the Prevention, Investigation and Suppression by the Customs Administration of Both Countries of Customs Offences

Paris, January 9, 1979

Iran

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Iran concerning Visa Requirements for Non-immigrants

Tehran, November 2, 1978
In force December 1, 1978

Italy

Agreement on Social Security between Canada and Italy

Toronto, November 17, 1977
Instruments of Ratification exchanged
December 28, 1978
In force January 1, 1979

Korea, Republic of

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning Textile Restraints

Ottawa, December 13, 1978
In force January 1, 1979

United States of America

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of four OMEGA Navigation Monitoring Stations in Canada

Ottawa, July 26 and December 20, 1978
In force December 20, 1978

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America constituting an Agreement amending the Technical Regulations annexed to the Agreement between Canada and the United States of America for Promotion of Safety on the Great Lakes by Means of Radio, 1973

Ottawa, December 29, 1978
In force December 29, 1978
With effect from February 1, 1979

Exchanges of Notes (June 30, 1953) between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning Installation of an Oil Pipeline from Fairbanks, Alaska

Ottawa, June 30, 1953
In force June 30, 1953
Amended by Exchange of Notes May 1960
Amended by Exchange of Notes April 1962
Canadian Notice of Termination of Agreement dated January 12, 1979, effective January 12, 1980

Multilateral

Protocol Extending the Arrangements regarding International Trade in Textiles (Subject to the following declaration)

"In depositing this Instrument of Acceptance, the Government of Canada declares as follows:

This acceptance is made taking into account the confirmation, by all Parties to the Protocol extending the Arrangements regarding International Trade in Textiles of the understandings set forth in the conclusions adopted by the Textiles Committee on December 14, 1977, a copy of which is attached to the Protocol."

Done at Geneva December 14, 1977
Entered into force January 1, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited October 24, 1978
Entered into force for Canada October 1978

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 4) and 11.7-12.5 GHz in (Region 1), Geneva, 1977

Done at Geneva, February 13, 1977
Canada's Instrument of Approval deposited at Geneva, December 13, 1978
Entered into force January 1, 1979

Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Signed at Ottawa, October 24, 1978
Canada's Instrument of Ratification deposited November 30, 1978
Entered into force January 1, 1979

CORRIGENDUM: The first treaty listed under "Multilateral" in the November/December 1978 issue of *International Perspectives* should read as follows (corrections shown in italics):

Adopted at New Delhi, November 1956; revised April 24, 1963
April 14-17, 1969
Entered into force May 10, 1958
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited October 24, 1978
Entered into force for Canada October 1978

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International Perspectives

Journal of opinion on world affairs

Canada's disarmament initiatives

Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb


Implications of the Afghan *coup*

Three aspects of Asia

Canada at the Tokyo Round

Energy: an international problem

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Canada's disarmament initiatives mark return to active role

by William Epstein

The year 1978 marked a turning-point in Canadian disarmament policy. Canada had long been a supporter of disarmament and, because of its wartime role in helping to produce the first American atomic bomb, had been an active participant in all the UN bodies concerned with negotiating disarmament. But in recent years Canada has played a much less active role. For more than a decade Canada had presented no new major concrete proposals, being content to leave the initiatives to the two superpowers, which were mainly interested in collateral measures of arms control rather than in disarmament measures that would really reverse the arms race. The activist non-aligned and Third World countries such as Mexico, Sweden, Yugoslavia, and, to a lesser extent, India and a few others made valiant and determined efforts to ensure that the disarmament negotiations were concerned with substantial measures of real disarmament, but with little success.

During the same period, despite the achievement of eight multilateral treaties and a dozen bilateral American-Soviet treaties and agreements mainly having to do with SALT, the arms race was neither halted nor even slowed. Indeed, it has accelerated in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

For example, in the last 17 years world military expenditures have increased from about \$100 billion a year to more than \$400 billion. Even allowing for inflation and the lessened value of the dollar, this represents a startling increase in terms of constant dollars. When the SALT talks began in 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed, in all, fewer than 3,000 strategic nuclear-missile warheads. Today they have a total of some 15,000 deliverable strategic-missile warheads.

The most important and dangerous side of the arms race is the technological or qualitative aspect, particularly in offensive weapons. According to various official government estimates, from 25 per cent to 50 per cent of the scientific, engineering and technological manpower of the industrialized states, and 40 per cent of all research and development spending, are devoted to military purposes. So rapid is the pace of the technological arms race that some scholars believe that, if the number of weapons were reduced by 20 per cent a year (i.e. not in absolute terms but by 20 per cent of

the declining balance) for the next five years, that would not by itself serve to halt the arms race or really reduce the killing power of the military arsenals of the two superpowers.

It is a disturbing fact that, if all the arms-control negotiations now proceeding at SALT, the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the mutual force reduction talks in Vienna, and the several other negotiations now under way, were to succeed in their immediate objectives, that would not result in significantly slowing down the arms race. The slow pace of disarmament negotiations lags far behind the speed of advancing military technology. The world is on the verge of a new technological explosion in both nuclear and conventional weaponry, and nuclear proliferation and possible nuclear terrorism loom as increasing threats.

Strategy of suffocation

It was, no doubt, growing concern about the continuing nuclear-arms race and the threat that it posed for both human survival and human welfare that led to a reawakening of Canadian interest and efforts to halt what has been aptly described as this "mad race to oblivion".

A group of consultant experts was established by the Department of External Affairs at the end of 1977 to help prepare the Canadian position for the UN Special Session on Disarmament in the spring of 1978. Mr Trudeau chose the special session as the first occasion in his ten years as Prime Minister to appear before the United Nations. In his address to the General Assembly on May 26, 1978, he outlined a new "strategy of suffocation . . . to halt the arms race in the laboratory". The importance of this major initiative merits its reproduction at some length. The Prime

Mr Epstein is a Special Fellow of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and a Killam Visiting Fellow at the University of Calgary. He was formerly Director of Disarmament Affairs in the UN Secretariat and was a special adviser to the Canadian delegation to the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. He is the author of The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (1976). The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Epstein.

*Bilateral***Minister said:**

The conclusion I have reached is that the best way of arresting the dynamic of the nuclear-arms race may be by a strategy of suffocation, by depriving the arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds. This could be done by a combination of four measures. Individually, each of these measures has been part of the arms-control dialogue for many years. It is in their combination that I see them as representing a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising approach to curbing the nuclear-arms race. The measures I have in mind are:

First, a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear-explosive devices. Such a ban is currently under negotiation. It has long been Canada's highest priority. I am pleased that the efforts of Canada's representatives and those of other countries stand a good chance of success during 1978. The computer can simulate testing conditions up to a point. But there is no doubt in my mind that a total test ban will represent a real qualitative constraint on weapons development.

Secondly, an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic-delivery vehicles. This would complement the ban on the testing of warheads. I am satisfied that, in the present state of the art, such an agreement can be monitored — as it must be — by national technical means.

Thirdly, an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The effect of this would be to set a finite limit on the availability of nuclear-weapons material. Such an agreement would have to be backed up by an effective system of full-scope safeguards. It would have the great advantage of placing nuclear-weapon states on a much more comparable basis with non-nuclear-weapon states than they have been thus far under the dispensations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Fourthly, an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. This will require the development of the necessary openness in reporting, comparing and verifying such expenditures.

A strategy of suffocation... will have a real and progressive impact on the development of new strategic-weapons systems. It will have that impact in three ways: by freezing the available amount of fissionable material; by preventing any technology that may be developed in the laboratory from being tested; and by reducing the funds devoted to military expenditure.

The second of the four points calling for a ban on flight-testing of all new strategic-delivery vehicles was completely new. Although various proposals had been proposed from time to time to halt the production of new strategic nuclear weapons, this was the first time that any official proposal had been made in

the United Nations for a ban on flight-testing. Such a ban is essential as a practical way of stopping development and production of new nuclear-weapon systems.

It was not, of course, possible for the special session to give full consideration to this new Canadian initiative, but it did decide that the various proposals presented to the session should be transmitted to appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with disarmament for further and more thorough study. Among the list of these, specific reference was made to the "Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear-arms race".

In addition to this reference, the Final Document of the special session contained language that was similar in its intent to the strategy of suffocation. Paragraph 50 called for the "cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems" and the "cessation of the production of types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes". Paragraph 51 called for "the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all states within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process". Paragraph 89 called for "gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis".

On June 30, 1978, at the conclusion of the special session, the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated in Parliament that he had "started a new mechanism in Canada and the department to deal with disarmament questions". On July 13 he announced the creation of a new Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs in the department, with Mr Geoffrey Pearson appointed as Deputy Disarmament Adviser. In addition to acting as principal adviser on disarmament policy and being responsible for following up the decisions of the special session, he was charged with strengthening Canada's role in the negotiations and with encouraging research and stimulating public information activities in relation to disarmament.

At the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1978, Mr Pearson took personal charge of the disarmament work of the Canadian delegation and two of the members of the original consultative group of disarmament experts were appointed to the delegation as special advisers.

General Assembly

Since this session followed so soon after UNSSOD, its work and tone were largely determined by the special session. As had been decided by the special session, the First Committee devoted its full time solely to disarmament and related international security questions and 45 resolutions were adopted, about double the number in recent years. The debates, although dealing with a number of highly controversial subjects

were somewhat lower-keyed than in the past because of the absence of any competitive proposals by the two superpowers and also because the issues had been so fully thrashed out during the special session.

The session engaged in a thorough and generally constructive discussion of substantive issues but it did little to advance the results of the special session. The United States and Soviet Union provided no real leadership. The United States did not undertake a single positive initiative and frequently adopted a negative attitude to many of the initiatives of others. The Soviet Union took two initiatives (on security guarantees and on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons) that were mainly propaganda efforts, and it too maintained a largely negative stance on the proposals put forward by other states.

France continued the role it began at UNSSOD by taking an active part in the session, but China continued its previous role of minimal participation, and both France and China maintained their longstanding positions that gave them a free hand to continue to build up their nuclear arsenals.

The non-aligned and Third World countries continued the active role they had played at UNSSOD. Argentina, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia, in particular, took a number of initiatives and sponsored or co-sponsored many resolutions.

Follow-up

Canada played a more active role than for many years and co-sponsored nine resolutions. For the first time in more than a decade, it launched a major initiative in presenting the resolution on the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. This was a follow-up of the third point of Prime Minister Trudeau's "strategy of suffocation". The Canadian proposal, as was indicated by the Prime Minister, was important both as a measure for limiting the nuclear-arms race and for preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. however, opposed it as not going far enough since it did not also call for a cut-off of production of nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. had proposed such a cut-off more than 20 years earlier, and had vigorously supported it for several years, the issue had lain dormant for ten years. The U.S. was no longer a strong advocate of the idea, but it did vote for the Canadian proposal, which was co-sponsored by Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania and Sweden.

The resolution as adopted reads:

The General Assembly,

Conscious that effective measures on a universal basis are necessary in order to facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament and the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that efforts to halt and reverse the

nuclear arms race will facilitate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Considering that the acceptance by all States of binding and verifiable controls in the form of full scope safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, on all production of fissionable material, so as to ensure that it is not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, would contribute towards the efforts to promote non-proliferation, limit further production of nuclear weapons and facilitate nuclear disarmament,

Noting with satisfaction that the General Assembly at its tenth special session recognized, in paragraph 50 of its Final Document, that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require, *inter alia*, the urgent negotiation of an agreement, at an appropriate stage and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned, on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes,



Prime Minister Trudeau addressed the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament on May 26, 1978. In his speech, he advocated a "strategy of suffocation" as a means of achieving progress in disarmament. He is seen here at the podium of the Assembly.

Bilateral

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its pursuit of proposals contained in the Programme of Action adopted by the tenth special session, to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

The resolution was adopted by 108 votes in favour, ten against (the Soviet bloc, except for Romania) and 16 abstentions (including France, India and Argentina). China did not participate. This large affirmative vote should encourage the Canadian delegation to pursue the matter actively when the new Committee on Disarmament begins its work in Geneva in 1979.

A comprehensive test ban to prevent the development of nuclear-explosive devices was the first of Trudeau's four points and a long-standing Canadian policy. Canada, therefore, also supported the Indian proposal calling for a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and explosive devices, and co-sponsored the New Zealand resolution calling for a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority, which could be considered at a resumed session of the present General Assembly in 1979. The Indian resolution was adopted by a vote of 130 (including the U.S.S.R.) to two (China and France), with eight abstentions (including the U.S.A. and Britain). The New Zealand resolution was adopted by a vote of 134 to one (China), with five abstentions (including France). Since the U.S.A., Britain and the U.S.S.R. are making progress in their tripartite negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, there is hope that agreement on this measure of disarmament may be achieved during 1979.

Although no specific or formal proposals were made concerning a flight-test ban, Mr Pearson referred to it in his statement in the First Committee on November 21, 1978, as a "useful and feasible way to seek to curtail the qualitative aspects of the arms race". Mexico once again submitted its usual resolution on SALT which, *inter alia*, stressed the need for qualitative limitations on strategic arms and regretted the delay in achieving a SALT agreement. Canada supported the Mexican resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 127 to one, with ten abstentions (including the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., Britain and France). China did not participate.

In addition, Sweden initiated a proposal for the preparation of a new comprehensive report on nuclear weapons, whereby experts would, *inter alia*, study trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems and the implications for international security as well as for negotiations on disarmament of the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon sys-

tems. Canada supported the Swedish study, which was approved by an overwhelming vote of 117 to 21 with 21 abstentions, although all the nuclear powers abstained. The new study is closely related to the concept of the ban on flight-testing and, if properly undertaken, it is bound to come to grips with the question. It is hoped that Canada will name an expert to participate in the study who will ensure that the flight-test ban is given the most careful and thorough consideration.

Canada also supported another Swedish resolution which is intended to facilitate the reduction of military budgets by having a panel of experts carry out a practical test of a proposed instrument of standardized reporting on the military expenditures of states. This pilot test study is related to the efforts to help to promote the fourth point in the strategy of suffocation.

Thus, in addition to the main Canadian effort in support of the cut-off, the other three points in the strategy were all covered in greater or less degree. The groundwork was laid for further steps towards their future implementation.

Other measures

A total of 16 resolutions, the largest number on substantive matter, dealt with nuclear disarmament which confirmed the decision of the special session that nuclear disarmament must be given the highest priority.

The question of the use or non-use of nuclear weapons was a prominent item at this session of the General Assembly. One resolution, initiated by India, declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that the use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament. The resolution also requested all states, in particular the nuclear-weapon states, to submit to the Secretary-General, before the third or fourth session of the General Assembly, proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of nuclear war, in order that the question of an international convention, or some other agreement on the subject might be discussed at that session. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 103 to 17 (all the NATO powers including Canada) with 10 abstentions (the Soviet bloc and a few others). China did not participate in the vote.

Another item dealing with the non-use of nuclear weapons was put forward by the U.S.S.R. as a way of promoting the idea of non-proliferation among non-nuclear states and also as a means of embarrassing the U.S.A. and its NATO allies. It proposed the elaboration of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear states, whereby the nuclear-weapon states would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear

which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control. Pakistan proposed a counter-proposal convention whereby the nuclear-weapon states would pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states not parties to the nuclear-security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon states, and whereby the nuclear-weapon states would undertake to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time.

The U.S. and its NATO allies were opposed to both proposals. The U.S. contented itself with endorsing that the Security Council merely endorse the limited pledges made by the three nuclear powers at the special session in the spring, which were regarded as less than satisfactory by the non-nuclear states. It did not, however, press this suggestion to a vote; had it done so, its proposal would probably have been rejected.

In order to avoid a bruising showdown, the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan agreed to a compromise. Both revised their draft resolutions to request that the Committee on Disarmament consider all the proposals made, without assigning priority to any. Both resolutions were adopted by overwhelming majorities, with Canada voting in favour of both. The U.S. voted in favour of the Soviet draft. China voted against the Soviet resolution and France abstained. Both China and France voted for the Pakistani resolution, but the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. abstained. These votes well illustrate the degree to which expediency, or their individual perceptions of their interests, override positions of principle, particularly, but not solely, among the nuclear powers.

Another Soviet initiative in the nuclear field dealt with the stationing of nuclear weapons abroad. It proposed a resolution which, *inter alia*, called upon all nuclear-weapon states to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of states where there are no such weapons at present. The resolution was adopted by 105 votes to 18 (all the NATO powers including Canada), with 12 abstentions. China did not participate in the vote.

Since Canada had decided not only to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons for itself but, in fact, also to withdraw from any nuclear role either for its forces in Europe or in Canada, it is not easy to understand why it did not abstain on this resolution rather than vote against it. While it is not impossible to do so, it is difficult to envisage other new countries where the U.S.A. might need or want to station nuclear weapons in peacetime, and one can only conclude that Canada voted as it did on grounds of basic NATO strategy and alliance solidarity.

The Assembly also adopted the usual resolutions in support of nuclear-weapon-free zones, namely

Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as in the Indian Ocean (as a zone of peace). These resolutions did not introduce important new elements compared with the corresponding resolutions of 1977. Canada voted for all of them except the one on the Indian Ocean, where it abstained together with most of the Western powers, because of law-of-the-sea considerations.

Canada co-sponsored a resolution on the preparation of a second review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980. The resolution was adopted by 122 votes to one with 16 abstentions (including Argentina, Brazil, France, India, Israel, Pakistan and Spain, none of which are parties to the NPT). China did not participate.

Finally, a resolution was adopted on the initiative of Iraq, co-sponsored by 38 Arab and some non-aligned countries, which requested the Security Council to call on all states under Chapter VII of the Charter to halt the supply of all arms and military equipment, and all transfer of nuclear equipment, material or technology to Israel. The vote was 72 to 30, with 37 abstentions, which was the smallest vote received for an anti-Israel resolution in a number of years. Canada, like the U.S.A., Britain, France and most of the NATO countries voted against the resolution.

Non-nuclear measures

Somewhat surprisingly in view of the decisions of the special session in this field, there was very little discussion of conventional disarmament. One resolution was adopted by consensus as a follow-up to previous ones on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

The Federal Republic of Germany initiated a proposal, which Canada also co-sponsored, on confidence-building measures. States were asked to consider on a regional basis specific confidence-building measures, and all states were invited to inform the Secretary-General of their views on measures they considered appropriate and feasible. The resolution was adopted by 132 votes to none, with two abstentions. All nuclear powers voted in favour.

Belgium proposed a comprehensive study by the Secretary-General with the assistance of governmental experts on all aspects of regional disarmament. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 93 to none, with 40 abstentions. Canada joined all the NATO powers in the affirmative vote. The Soviet bloc and a number of non-aligned states abstained.

As in previous years, the Assembly also adopted by overwhelming majorities, including Canada, Western- and Eastern-sponsored resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction. Two resolutions on

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chemical and biological weapons were adopted by consensus, one calling for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of conventional weapons and the other on the holding in 1980 of a review conference on the Convention on Biological Weapons. Canada co-sponsored both resolutions.

This session of the General Assembly was also highlighted by the approval of nine studies to be undertaken by governmental and non-governmental experts, by far the largest number ever approved, and sorely needed in order to provide greater understanding and wider knowledge of the subjects. Canada co-sponsored two French resolutions for studies on an international disarmament fund for development and an international institute for disarmament research, and voted in favour of the other seven dealing with disarmament and development, disarmament and international security, nuclear weapons, military budgets, regional disarmament, an international satellite-monitoring agency (also sponsored by France), and the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

In a vote that is somewhat strange to the author, however, Canada joined the four nuclear powers and some other Western states in abstaining on the decision (taken by a vote of 100 to none, with 23 abstentions) that the UN Secretariat produce an anti-war film at a cost of less than \$200,000 for dissemination in schools and to the public.

Finally, in the field of information and publicity, the Assembly: approved the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General for the establishment of a program of 20 fellowships on disarmament, to be started during the first half of 1979; set out some guidelines on the dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament; and adopted a resolution on the implementation of a measure taken at the tenth special session—namely, the proclamation of the week starting on 24 October of each year as a week devoted to fostering the objective of disarmament. All these resolutions were adopted by consensus.

Considerable attention was devoted by the Assembly to the machinery for disarmament deliberations and negotiations. Seven resolutions were adopted, including a decision to hold a second special session on disarmament in 1982. These resolutions dealt with: the agendas and work of the Disarmament Commission and of the Committee on Disarmament; the implementation of the Program of Action adopted by the special session and the elaboration of a comprehensive program of disarmament; the transmission to the deliberative, negotiating and studying organs of the 33 proposals (including the Canadian one) submitted to the special session that were not fully considered by it; the review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament; and the continuation of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

Another agenda item that led to considerable discussion was that dealing with the strengthening of international security. Four proposals were submitted which were only tangentially related to disarmament rather than being directly concerned with the subject. They were: a Polish declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace, which was a rather lengthy propaganda document; a Guyanese resolution on non-interference in the internal affairs of states calling for the elaboration of a declaration on the subject; a Yugoslav omnibus resolution reaffirming the position of the non-aligned countries on a number of previous UN resolutions on various problems such as colonialism, disarmament, the new international economic order, the Helsinki Final Act, the dismantling of foreign bases, etc.; and a Venezuelan resolution on the situation in Nicaragua, expressing concern over the domestic situation there and the threat it posed to the security of the region.

The Polish resolution was adopted by an almost unanimous vote, with only the U.S. abstaining. Canada reluctantly voted for the Polish resolution, explaining its reservations about the insufficient emphasis on human rights in the resolution and constitutional problems involved for Canada. The Guyanese resolution was also adopted by a large affirmative vote, but Canada abstained along with other NATO members. On the Yugoslav resolution, U.S. and Israel voted "no" and Canada joined other NATO powers in abstaining. The Venezuelan resolution was adopted by a somewhat smaller majority, with Canada voting in the affirmative although the U.S., Britain and France abstained along with a number of African and other countries.

In general, the session may be regarded as a constructive but not particularly productive follow-up to UNSSOD (except, perhaps, in terms of the number of resolutions adopted!). More countries than ever before, and in particular the smaller ones, became actively involved in the disarmament work both regards the debates and the sponsorship of resolutions, which may indicate an increased interest in disarmament in general and perhaps also their growing feeling of competence in the subject. While it is not possible to say that any specific or concrete measure of disarmament was brought nearer to achievement as a direct result of the session, the program of work and studies outlined for the Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the Secretary-General and the member states will certainly keep them fully occupied during the forthcoming year, and will provide new opportunities for real progress.

From the Canadian point of view the session was especially noteworthy in that it marked the resumption by Canada of an active role in the disarmament field and the taking of the first steps along the road of implementation of the new Canadian disarmament policy set forth in the strategy of suffocation.

Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb

By Hugh Macdonald

From mid-1977 to early 1978, the "neutron bomb" was a subject of widespread debate in Canada and other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The issue of deploying in Central Europe American enhanced-radiation warheads (ERW) for the Lance battlefield missile and for the eight-inch self-propelled cannon was presented by NATO authorities in Brussels as one of military necessity, arising from the superior offensive capacity of Warsaw Pact armoured ground forces.

The weight of public opinion in this country and elsewhere, however, turned decisively against deployment. ERW were viewed as dangerously provocative in crisis situations, likely to cause escalation in the event of war, and in any case of dubious moral character.

This difference between what was said to be the case by NATO authorities and what was judged to be the case by the general public was highlighted in April 1978 when President Carter postponed the production and deployment of ERW. Did his change of heart affect NATO one way or another? And how did the Government of Canada react?

Seven or eight defence ministers attend the meetings of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which are chaired by the Secretary-General of NATO. In 1977, the NPG appeared to be in favour of deploying ERW, but the United States wanted explicit governmental confirmation, from its main allies at least. There were several important and instructive reasons for this caution.

In accepting ERW, America's allies would be accepting for the first time nuclear weapons designed primarily for close-range defensive nuclear war, as opposed to crisis-deterrence, or wartime escalation to the use of strategic forces.

Secondly, the military utility of ERW lay in their early use against concentrations of tanks and military personnel. Efficient deployment and use would require initiatives by battlefield commanders, prompt authorization from political authorities, and probably heavy early use along the forward edge of the battlefield.

Thirdly, these military dispositions, though not more than changes of degree in themselves, would commence a shift in NATO strategy away from "flexible response" covered by American strategic nuclear forces towards a form of forward defence dependent

on nuclear firepower deployed within the theatre. The United States would thereby gradually lessen its strategic liability to spread a war in Europe beyond the region itself. ERW would facilitate this in a double sense. The low blast effects of ERW would (supposedly) "make it possible to save West Germany without destroying it"; but at the same time it would become possible to fight a "limited" nuclear war in Europe while lessening the risk of escalation to inter-continental nuclear systems.

Fourthly, the United States had begun to seek allied understanding of the dynamics of theatre nuclear forces on both sides of the military balance in Europe. American force-improvements in operation since the early 1970s have been directed towards a smaller arsenal of lower-yield (more "useable") weapons. Soviet force-improvements have been towards an increasingly large arsenal of not-so-low-yield weapons. The interaction of these deployments was revealed in the mid-Seventies, when a number of analyses of force postures, weapons effects, budgetary trends, and Soviet and NATO options, suggested that a hitherto presumed NATO advantage in theatre nuclear systems probably had — or soon would — become a crucial, perhaps decisive, initial *disadvantage*. The most probable form of Soviet offensive would become an armoured ground attack from "ready-to-go" positions, initiated by selective nuclear pre-emption.

Finally, there was concern about the impact of ERW on arms-control negotiations in Vienna, because within NATO these involved a delicate balancing of the interests of several major allies. Rapid moves to deploy ERW would risk a collapse of consultation within the alliance and set back arms control in Europe; but too much time spent considering the arms-control implications of ERW would crucially delay short-run defensive improvements in NATO's force posture.

Had these considerations been clearly presented publicly, the neutron-bomb debate would have been very different. The public would have become aware for the first time that fundamental changes in Soviet-American strategic deterrence had unfavourably

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altered the strategic situation of Western Europe, and that the stability of the military balance in that region was now jeopardized more by regional nuclear options — on both sides — than by Soviet tank numbers. Consequently, ERW deployment would have appeared in its proper context — as a palliative of NATO's conventional weaknesses in the front line but, by the same token, as a marginal addition to the nuclear firepower already available in the region as a whole.

Sacrosanct doctrine

However, NATO's ten-year-old doctrine of "flexible response", with its "built-in" assumption of escalation dominance, remains sacrosanct. Thus, officially-inspired press comment favouring ERW could not emphasize their political-strategic context. Instead their battlefield "virtues" were stressed. ERW were presented as "clean" because of low yields, low collateral damage, relative absence of fissile by-products, accuracy and lethality against tank crews, and as "just another weapon" with the unexceptionable quality of killing by massive doses of fast neutron radiation. Moreover, NATO claimed that deploying ERW would increase deterrence and would not lower the "nuclear threshold".

ERW do have low yields, owing to miniaturization and efficient engineering of the warhead. They are less immediately destructive than equivalent-yield *fission* (atomic) weapons, being based upon a predominant *fusion* (thermonuclear) reaction, which is optimized to yield radiation over blast and heat. Because their radius of effect is greater for prompt radiation than other effects, ERW detonated at specific burst-heights against given point targets can kill military personnel without extensively damaging surrounding structures — which low-yield fission weapons cannot.

Other things being equal, there is no reason to think that planning to destroy a tank offensive with ERW rather than by other means would undermine deterrence, which is a structural relation between material capability and political credibility on both sides of the East-West balance. To deploy ERW alongside other capabilities and assert that their use would be defence against armoured assault is perfectly believable. But ERW probably would lower the "nuclear threshold", which is fundamentally determined by a political calculus of means and ends for each side separately. If NATO deployed ERW, their use in the event would be certain; but deploying ERW for this obvious purpose would equally certainly reinforce the present Soviet emphasis upon nuclear pre-emption. Thus ERW possess a limited but significant military potential against concentrations of manned vehicles and large-scale offensives; their deployment, however, would exacerbate the dynamics of theatre and regional nuclear systems, which are, in general, significantly unfavourable to NATO.

Moreover, ERW require a small fission-tri that in practice limits the proportion of prompt radiation to other effects to about 50:50, which means that collateral damage cannot be eliminated. Against fast-moving and widely-dispersed targets, ERW yield and low-blast combination would be inefficient which might lead to heavier collateral damage through use of fewer low-yield fission weapons. The particular systems chosen for ERW are open to criticism; *Leopard* allegedly has poor survival and command-and-control qualities, and is too expensive, while the artillery cannon lacks range compared with Soviet artillery. The Pugwash Council has contradicted the claim that ERW are "clean", stating that "the neutron bombardment would generate strong induced radioactivity by neutron capture in the soil . . . and . . . long-lasting somatic and genetic effects . . . cast grave doubts on the assertions . . . that its use would minimize harm to non-combatants". Finally, developments in conventional-weapons technology, such as precision-guided anti-tank weapons, offer an alternative — far more flexible — strategy of defence, which NATO is anxious to exploit.

"Foxy" look

It is scarcely surprising that NATO's position looks "foxy" to the man in the street, to parliamentary positions, to the press, to many academics and, of course, to the dewy-eyed idealists of the peace group. A formidable barrage of counter-fact and option soon set up against ERW.

Of all the claims made in public comment about ERW, it was the quasi-moral usage "clean" that provoked the greatest uproar. This epithet provided a handle for a "moral" campaign against ERW. Specialist opinion in Europe, prompted by a Soviet campaign of feigned distaste and heavy political innuendo, denounced ERW as instruments of capitalist class interests for exterminating the masses while preserving private property. Precisely why the masses in question should be driving across West Germany in Soviet tanks, and why capitalist interests should choose their country to fight an aggressive war in defence of private property, were riddles that remained largely unnoticed.

But, in any case, NATO's cumbersome machinery for political consultation was thrown well and truly out of gear. From a mid-1977 position wherein deployment of ERW seemed agreed on by the main alliance with others such as the Dutch more or less opposed and yet others such as the Canadians more or less undecided, public controversy delayed any final decision at year-end NATO meetings. Then the American position began to change. President Carter embarked upon a complete, personal reconsideration — strongly supported by "liberal" arms-control advisers — and as the American position shifted, irritation rose in Europe, becoming quite pointedly public in Bonn.

Chancellor Schmidt, though, did have special reason to worry. He feared that ERW would become yet another technical "bargaining chip" in the strategic arms-limitation talks (SALT) without being deployed, rather than, as he himself had strongly suggested the previous autumn, a strong political card to play in European arms-control negotiations after (but only after) a NATO decision to deploy ERW had been taken. In the end, President Carter decided to postpone production pending further NATO consultation. But his clear aim in asking for comparable Soviet restraint in deploying further SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles was to unload the ERW from NATO military policies and place it firmly in the context of nuclear-arms control, whether "strategic" or "regional".

In all of this there was an undue amount of vacillation and outright contradiction in statements of

Ottawa's position.

Initially, the Minister of National Defence, Barney Danson, said Canada's position was undecided but stressed the "reduced-blast" character of the weapon and the need for rational appraisal of its broader implications, which went "quite beyond" the narrow question of military utility. Several months later, when speculation arose in Washington about the use of ERW as an arms-control "bargaining chip", or as an example of unilateral "restraint" demanding some Soviet *quid pro quo*, the Minister suggested that "... perhaps we should take this and give it to the Russians". But, early in April 1978, a new set of emphases appeared; the Government's policy was "still evolving", it was not going to be rushed on such an important matter, and anyway this was an American problem, which did not bear directly upon non-nuclear Canada.

You were saying...

At press time we had received 339 responses to the questionnaire enclosed in the January/February 1979 issue. Of these, 237 (70 per cent) were from individual readers and 102 (30 per cent) were on behalf of institutional recipients. Here is what we have learnt so far:

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|---|--|
| <p>1. How long have you been receiving <i>International Perspectives</i>?</p> <p>Five years or more 40%</p> <p>Two to five years 41%</p> <p>Less than two years 19%</p> | <p>2. Why do you read it?</p> <p>For professional reasons 76%</p> <p>For personal reasons 21%</p> |
| <p>3. How would you rate the magazine in terms of your reading?</p> <p>Essential 13%</p> <p>Very useful 43%</p> <p>Desirable 25%</p> <p>Marginally useful 15%</p> <p>Not useful 2%</p> | <p>4. Should an alternative publishing arrangement be concluded, would you be prepared to subscribe to <i>International Perspectives</i> at a commercially-competitive subscription rate?</p> <p>Yes 45%</p> <p>No 42%</p> |

In calculating the replies to Question 4, we had to create a new category to accommodate those who made a conditional response. These accounted for 12 per cent of the respondents.

Where percentages do not total 100, it is because a few respondents did not answer all questions and the figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

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The Greater Game: implications of the Afghan *coup*

By David Van Praagh

"I am only a beginner at the Game, that is sure." —
Kim, from the novel of the same name by Rudyard
Kipling.

For the best part of a century, the British *raj* in India played what was called the "Great Game" against Czarist Russia for paramount influence over Afghanistan. At stake in endless international intrigues, military operations and economic pressures was control of the historic gateway to the subcontinent. It was the stuff from which Kipling could weave a tale like *Kim*.

Despite severe losses at the hands of the untamed Afghans, the British imperialists succeeded in securing the traditional invasion route to India. This was partly due to establishing an intelligence network dependent on not-so-innocent operatives like the young Kim, partly due to setting up an emir in Kabul in 1881 from whom the Afghan royal family descended.

After independence and parti-

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tion of India in 1947, the "game" continued. Rulers of the Soviet Union exerted persistent pressure towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, while the United States, later joined by Iran in aid programs, blocked Soviet domination of Afghanistan, which shares a 1,500-mile border with the Soviet Union.

The bloody overthrow on April 27, 1978, of the ruling members of the Mohammadzai clan, Afghanistan's educated *élite*, appears to have ushered in — or helped to set in motion — a Greater Game.

The Russians not only overcame the last barrier to control of Afghanistan through previously outlawed local Communists. The *coup* also put them in a position to influence decisively events in both India and the oil-rich countries of the Middle East — above all troubled Iran.

The turning of Afghanistan into a "democratic republic" sponsored by the Soviet Union has Asia-wide implications. It may be part of a pattern extending from the Horn of Africa to Indochina. Certainly it is no coincidence that the Soviet Government has recently concluded treaties of peace and friendship with the Communist governments of Ethiopia, whose forces have reached the Red Sea opposite Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, whose forces have conquered Cambodia; and Afghanistan.

A future chronicler of the Greater Game may note that it showed even less Soviet respect for the spirit of *détente* and non-inter-

ference in other nations' affairs than the game played with Cuban troops in a number of African countries. But we in the West, to paraphrase Kipling, are only beginners at the Game, that is sure. Perhaps the United States in particular, under the Carter Administration, will lose its innocence and, like Kim, will turn quickly to Asian reality through tutoring by more experienced international serving players. The new "regular association" of China, Japan and the United States is confronted by serious challenges and a need to respond strongly, possibly through other partners.

Unlikely locale

The harsh Central Asian landscape of Afghanistan seems an unlikely place for events to shake the continent of the world. A landlocked, backward, rigidly Moslem country without even a railway, Afghanistan is characterized by rugged mountains — the Hindu Kush, or "Killers of Hindus" — and equally fearsome deserts. Its often handsome tribesmen and nomads could come straight out of the Old Testament except that many carry homemade guns. It is uncertain how many Afghans there are, but the population of 15 million or more is among the poorest in the world.


Following a brief visit by President Eisenhower to Kabul in 1959, the United States put roughly \$1 billion into aid to Afghanistan every two dollars of Soviet assistance, though Moscow also equipped and trained Afghanis-

med forces. The two superpowers financed power and irrigation projects. Soviet and U.S. road-builders in Afghanistan found themselves operating in creating a transportation network where none had existed before the mid-Sixties, the Soviets building roads south from the Oxus River and their Central Asian republics, the Americans pushing them east and west between Iran and the storied Khyber Pass into Pakistan and the subcontinent. Wheat from the United States was baked into bread in a Soviet-built bakery in Kabul. Some aid projects such as showpiece airports — were extravagant perhaps unnecessary, but Afghanistan began slowly to emerge from its backwardness, with some amenities that were more advanced than rebuilt or expanded structures left behind by the *raj*, such as the narrow, dusty highways of India and Pakistan.

This modernization was encouraged by King Mohammad Zahir Shah, a benevolent, popular monarch who was descended from the emir established by the British in 1881. The women in the royal family set an example for removal of *purdah*, and the King nurtured a cautious democratic experiment. A constitution was adopted in 1964 — the Afghans refused to follow any foreign models — a parliament was brought into being and two popular elections were held, but without officially-recognized political parties. However, as early as 1968, a group known as *Khalk* was identified as being Communist and having close ties to the Soviet Union. Its student supporters held flash demonstrations at Kabul University and in the streets of the capital for "homes, clothes and food for all".

Liberalization of the political process came to an abrupt end in

July 1973 with the overthrow of the King, who was visiting Italy, by Mohammad Daud. Daud and his brother, Mohammad Naim, were first cousins of the King, and Daud was his brother-in-law; the two brothers had effectively ruled Afghanistan before King Zahir took matters into his own hands to bring about a democratic set-up.



It was widely believed at the time of the 1973 *coup* that the Soviet Union would control the new government. Moscow may have been behind the abolition of the monarchy with its opening of Afghanistan to a number of foreign influences. But Daud continued to take U.S. and Iranian economic aid for his new republic. In 1977 he allowed a new constitution to be adopted. And he not only came close to agreement with Pakistan on the disputed border between the two countries, but quickly made friends with the Janata Party Government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai after the people of India voted Indira Gandhi's Congress Party, which was closely linked to Moscow, out of power in March 1977.

Afghanistan's improving relations with Pakistan under President

Daud appear to have been a key factor in what happened next. Perhaps even more important was the astonishing turnabout in India from an authoritarian government in economic step with Soviet five-year plans to a democratic government committed to rural development on the village level. Turmoil in neighbouring Iran, undermining the power and position of the pro-Western Shah, while fed from Afghanistan as from other outside sources, is not likely to have been an immediate objective of the Communist *coup* in Kabul. But the turmoil following on the *coup* vastly strengthened the Soviet hand in the region.

Hardy Pushtu tribesmen — or Pathans, as they are called in Pakistan — live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. The Afghans never accepted the British imposed Durand Line separating their country from undivided India's — later Pakistan's — Northwest Frontier. Starting in the Fifties, they called for a tribal homeland, to be

called Pushtunistan. They have never made clear how much this notion encompasses. But if Pushtunistan ever came into being, it would tear away much of present-day Pakistan, which since 1971 has been without its old east wing, now Bangladesh. Even as a propaganda ploy, the demand for Pushtunistan has led to suspension of diplomatic and trade relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has supported this Afghan claim against Pakistan, a U.S. ally in the Central Treaty Organization. Moreover, India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and later under his daughter Indira Gandhi, from time to time joined Afghanistan to squeeze Pakistan on the Pushtunistan question, partly to counter Pakistani demands for a plebiscite among Kashmiris.

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However, Daud, a Pathan whose family came from Peshawar on the Pakistani side of the Khyber Pass, and who had been a loud advocate of a tribal homeland, signalled Pakistan in the last months of his rule that he was ready to accept the Durand Line. This was a relief to the Pakistani generals, many of them Pathans, who had reimposed martial law on the country as a response to violent protests over Prime Minister Ali Bhutto's claimed victory in elections shortly before the Indian popular vote ousted Mrs Gandhi. Anything that would help hold Pakistan together was welcome. Tribal unrest in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan to the south had not disappeared with the deposition and imprisonment of Bhutto. Tense rivalry between Punjabis and Sindhis in Pakistan's other two provinces increased with the sentencing of the former Prime Minister to death upon his conviction for alleged participation in a political murder.

Meanwhile, in India the unexpected defeat of Mrs Gandhi represented a setback to the Soviet Union whose severity was not fully appreciated in the West. The Soviets had spent years and billions of rubles and much industrial and military hardware on tying New Delhi to Moscow politically, economically and militarily. While Mrs Gandhi's Congress Party did not quite embrace the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India on the federal level (it did so on the state level), Indian armed forces were dependent on Soviet weapons systems, Indian heavy industry was dependent on Soviet technology, and Indian non-alignment had been compromised in most eyes by the treaty of peace and friendship concluded with the U.S.S.R. prior to India's forcible conversion of East Pakistan into Bangladesh.

Suddenly, with the defeat of Mrs Gandhi, this whole edifice was in danger of falling, not all at once but gradually. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and ranking Soviet military officers rushed to

New Delhi to shore it up, Prime Minister Desai even went to Moscow and East European trade delegations continued to troop to India. But the nature of the Janata Party's new development strategy spelt diminishing Indian reliance on Soviet economic and possibly military assistance. It called for emphasis on agriculture, the village and cottage industry, as prescribed by Mohandas Gandhi, instead of state-owned heavy industry on the Soviet model. And, while India could hardly be expected to align itself under Desai with the United States and the West to the same extent it had aligned itself with the Soviet Union under Mrs Gandhi, President Carter told a responsive Indian Parliament at the beginning of 1978 that "for the remainder of this century and into the next", the world's democratic nations would increasingly consult on how to adjust common values to meet social and economic challenges.

There is no way to prove that the Soviet leadership saw its great investment in India placed in such jeopardy by Mrs Gandhi's ouster that it instigated the Afghan *coup* as a way of dramatizing Moscow's regional presence. But, even if the Russians only seized on the *coup* as an unexpected windfall, there is no doubt that its implications spread immediately beyond Afghanistan. It represented a Soviet victory after a bad year for Moscow round the world in 1977: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel; the Indian elections; perhaps above all the growing strength of the post-Mao, pragmatic, anti-Soviet leadership in China; and, even in Europe, mounting discontent in the Soviet bloc while Spain, Portugal and Greece groped their way from right-wing dictatorships to viable democracies, and the Communist Parties of France and Italy were unable to share national power even after breaking with the Soviet Union.

The circumstances of the *coup* itself remain unclear, and there are several versions of events. But there is no dispute on some points. Soviet

military advisers were attached to all major units of the Afghan armed forces. The Communists who took power as a result of action by these units were few in number and could not have succeeded on their own. As soon as they did succeed, Daud, his immediate family and his brother Naim were executed on the spot. And a "revolutionary" cabinet headed by Premier Mohammed Taraki, a former Embassy translator, was immediately formed.

It is uncertain that a move by Daud to arrest Communist plots against him was the immediate cause of the *coup*. It is puzzling why, according to reliable sources, following a lull in the fighting, the defenders of the palace had apparently beaten off attackers, only to see loyalist troops suddenly capitulate. It is not clear what happened to members of the Mohammadzai clan beyond Daud's immediate entourage, who held most of the government, business and educational positions in the capital.

Within a month or two of the *coup*, however, a completely new pattern in Afghanistan began to emerge. With the Communist rulers apparently unable to run the country on their own, and fearful that they could suffer the same fate as the Daud Government, the number of Soviet civilian and military advisers in Kabul increased from 200 or 300 to more than 1,000 and approximately 100 new Soviet tanks joined the Afghan armed forces, one of the Soviet-built roads south from the Soviet border. The International Hotel outside Kabul held a weekly "Russian Night". According to reliable reports, more than 1,000 former officials, military officers and teachers were being held in Afghan jails, and thousands more had been transferred to minor posts in remote areas. Afghan ministers were manned by formerly low-grade functionaries and by young Afghan loyal to Khalk, or the People's Party, the pro-Soviet Communist faction that had banished a group of ideological purists.

In an ironic way probably unappreciated and certainly unintended in Washington, the aid efforts of the superpowers in Afghanistan had been renewed again. The Soviet-equipped armed forces carried out the coup, and students and former students brought about social injustice by American teachers in U.S.-built schools provided much of Khalk's support.

It was India's Prime Minister Desai who quietly brought home to the Carter White House the immediate danger outside Afghanistan of the Communist takeover. "The last thing India wants," Desai told Carter in Washington in June, 1978, "is a Pakistan in four pieces."

The remark reflected Indian understanding of Afghanistan as a historic pressure point on the subcontinent and Indian awareness of Pakistan's vulnerability. It is not known what Carter's response was, or what he replied when General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan's Chief Martial Law Administrator, wrote to him shortly after the Afghan coup to express Pakistani fears that, as he put it in an interview in July, a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan "is likely to change the total geopolitical situation in this region".

Although he was soon preoccupied with upheaval at home, the Shah of Iran also was reported profoundly disturbed by the coup in Kabul; he had failed in his pledge to help maintain a non-Communist Afghan Government on his eastern flank, and his commitments to help keep Pakistan together, and to keep open the oil lifelines to the West and Japan through the Persian Gulf, were increasingly called in question. At a greater distance, though Sinkiang touches the Pamirs of Afghanistan, China's leaders, in their paranoia about Soviet encirclement and "hegemony", took a dim view of Afghan events; like India's leaders, they desperately seek years of peace in Asia to permit internal economic development.

It did not take long for the new Afghan Government, with its Soviet advisers, to revive the idea

of a tribal homeland for Pushtus living in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province as well on both sides of the Kabul Gorge. Fresh Afghan enticements to Baluchis living in both Pakistan and Iran may have even more far-reaching potential for instability. Pakistan's bleak, uncertain political picture did not show signs of the cohesion of its "four pieces" at the beginning of 1979. If Mrs Gandhi had still been in power, India might well have seized the opportunity presented by the Afghan coup to try to break up Pakistan altogether. Desai's Government followed the Soviet lead in immediately recognizing the new Afghan regime, stimulating old Pakistani fears. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union, through Afghanistan, is tempting its old friend India to do just that. If India took the bait; its revived dedication to democratic development would be sidetracked and perhaps crippled. But the Janata Government is actively exploring instead the chances of close regional co-operation with Pakistan, Turkey, Iran (when and if Iran gets on a new track) and even Afghanistan. This is part of what can be called a new Indian good-neighbour policy, and is rooted partly in deep, if not openly, expressed, concern over Soviet ambitions.

Characteristically, General Zia and Pakistan are more direct in warning of the implications of the Soviet border's finally extending, in effect, to Peshawar. To keep it from reaching Amritsar, India's north-western city on the line with Pakistan, and to help protect Iran, Zia has proposed acceptance of his country as a buffer against further Soviet advances. Pakistan would replace Afghanistan, the traditional buffer state in the region, now that the Russians have won the Great Game. International measures are necessary, in Zia's blunt view, to prevent the Russians from now attaining "their dream of reaching warm water," possibly at Karachi. For Pakistan, in its weakened state to play any role in such arrangements, un-

derstandings would be needed with India, with China and with the United States, which under the Carter Administration has blocked sale of 100 A-7 aircraft to the Pakistanis.

U.S. Strategy

If U.S. strategic considerations have always put the Indian subcontinent to one side, this is not true of Iran and the oil lifelines. If the importance of a warm-water port seems archaic in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a Soviet naval base athwart the tanker routes through the Strait of Hormuz to Western Europe and Japan would have major modern impact.

Moreover, while China's leadership is painfully aware of its distance from the region — though a Chinese road has been built through Pakistan's northern mountain reaches —, its view of Soviet policies in Asia helps to put the seemingly remote Afghanistan coup into a possible pattern.

In this view, the Soviet leadership is using client Communist powers to advance Moscow's aim of "hegemony" in Asia. The most dramatic example of this is Vietnam's swift military takeover of Cambodia — Hanoi had extended its control over most of Laos earlier — through what the Chinese call "regional hegemony". This was a major setback to China itself. It brought the Vietnamese military machine, supplied and fuelled by the Soviets, to the borders of Thailand, the front-line non-Communist Southeast Asian nation. But there is an even more encompassing danger, and the possibility of its coming to pass penetrates to the core of the Greater Game.

Having helped Vietnam extend its sway in Indochina, the Soviets may be closer to the prize of the U.S.-built, deep-water base at Cam Ranh Bay on the South China Sea for their powerful Pacific fleet, which has been largely bottled up in the Sea of Japan because of dependence on its home base of Vladivostok. With such a base in southern Viet-

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nam, the Soviet fleet could range at will through the Western Pacific Ocean into the Indian Ocean. And with a similar Indian Ocean base west of India, reached through Pakistan, Iran and/or Ethiopia, a huge Soviet naval arc would be complete, bringing constant pressure on Ja-

pan, China, non-Communist Southeast Asia, India and the oil lifelines.

The Afghan salient, especially with the internal disruptions in Pakistan and Iran, is a two-edged sword. To turn it aside, and to foil the entire scheme of which it may be a part, old enmities will have to

be forgotten and new friendships forged, not only among the United States, China and Japan — an association already developing rapidly — but also India and Pakistan. Then, and only then, will it be possible to exclaim with Kim: "is the Game called great!"

Editor's note: The following three articles on Asia were written before the outbreak of war between China and Vietnam.

Aspects of Asia

China: an ancient land catching up with the world

By Robert and Stephanie Reford

Not so over in National Defence headquarters. The American decision not, for the time being, to deploy ERW provoked a determined defence of their military and political merits in the face of public and Parliamentary criticism. Civilian experts in the Department of National Defence concluded that, "given reductions in indiscriminate effects and the potential for a more resilient deterrent posture, it is likely that the enhanced-radiation warheads would be a positive addition to NATO's nuclear inventory". Then the Chief of Defence Staff bluntly supported ERW, timing his pronouncement perfectly to contradict the thrust of a major speech the Prime Minister gave before the UN special session on disarmament.

The Prime Minister was predictably statesman-like and developed his long-standing dislike of things military in an eloquent plea for disarmament by a "strategy of suffocation" of new-weapons development, praising President Carter's "farsighted postponement" of a decision to produce ERW. Exactly how far President Carter had seen became less certain when, after six months, he decided to authorize production (but not deployment) of ERW components.

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But this apparent retreat met with official silence in Ottawa.

What lessons are suggested by the neutron-bomb debate? For NATO, it again demonstrates that mis-state or under-state the meaning of policy is to pave the way for bad policy, or even none at all. For too long, NATO has been attempting to sustain public support for modernization programs — good as well as bad — based on a faulty and obsolescent dogma about "flexible response". So far as Canada is concerned, the issue shows that this country pursues each line of development separately in an *ad hoc* fashion, reacting to the initiatives of others without clear aim or understanding. It suggests also that, if members of the public are not offered a clear and consistent official policy, they will be influenced by other sources of fact and opinion.

The neutron-bomb issue has been treated too politically by NATO, too emotionally by the general public, and too inconsistently by governments; neither the case for, nor that against, ERW has been demonstrated.

Although NATO is a creature of its 15 members, its institutionalized world view sometimes seems to take on an independent existence; usually, however, this is because member countries, which should decide on their own policies, have not done so. A better thought-out set of defence policies in Canada would go some way to ensuring a more coherent and less paranoid self-image for the NATO alliance as a whole. The People's Republic of China celebrates its thirtieth

friend's birthday in 1979, and this year is likely to prove among the momentous of its history. On a recent visit, we were left with the impression of an ancient land hurrying to catch up with the rest of the world. Already, it is beginning to emerge from its self-imposed isolation, a process highlighted by the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. Its leaders, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Vice-Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, have already started paying state visits to other countries and the roster of very important people travelling to Peking will grow larger and more illustrious. China seems to have accepted the fact that one cannot be in the world without being part of it. Its emergence into the international arena may not make the task of achieving peace and development easier, but it was an illusion to believe that, in the long run, this could be accomplished without China.

The time of inward-looking may have been necessary if the Government was to achieve the extraordinary feat of feeding, housing and clothing a population currently estimated to be some 900 million. This appears to have been done. In addition, China has survived the passing of its two principal architects, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. There have been times when it seemed about to lapse into chaos — as in the heyday of the cultural revolution — and times when there have been setbacks rather than great leaps forward. There have been occasions when democracy might appear to threaten the centralized control of the country, such as the recent parade of wall-posters. But the Government in Peking still appears to have things well in hand and is determined to bring China into the twentieth century. Looking at what has been accomplished in the first 29 years, one cannot shrug off the prospect of success. Yet one must ask what the price may be.

Chinese society is tightly organized; people are apparently sent wherever their services are required. One of our interpreters was working in a different city from her husband, and another had only recently been reunited with his wife after several years apart. When young men and women have finished training, their job assignments are not usually a matter of preference. A Canadian would find this lack of choice an intolerable infringement of his freedom, but it is designed to make an efficient allocation of human resources, as well as being one method of preventing unemployment.

Chairman Hua Kuo-feng told the Fifth National People's Congress in Peking, on February 26, 1978: In order to make China a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the century, we must work and fight hard in the political, economic, cultural, military and diplomatic spheres, but in the final analysis what is of decisive importance is the rapid development of our socialist economy. At the third National People's Congress and again at the fourth, Premier Chou, acting on Chairman

Mao's instructions, put forward a grand conception for the development of our national economy, which calls for the all-round modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology by the end of the century so that our economy can take its place in the front ranks of the world

The socialist modernization of our agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology is a great and unprecedented undertaking and a profound revolution, too.

Ambitious program

This is an ambitious program, and the first reaction of a Western observer is to wonder whether it can possibly be carried out. In 1958, Mao introduced what became known as the "Great Leap Forward". It has not succeeded in making China the equal of the West, and some observers have described it as a disastrous failure. One can also recall Nikita Khrushchov's claim that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States by the end of the century, which seems as much an impossible dream today as it did at the time.

Perhaps the Government in Peking has learnt from the mistakes of the past and the failures of the Soviet Union. If it is to succeed, however, there are likely to be side effects that will transform China.

In the field of agriculture, Chairman Hua called specifically for "the highest possible degree of mechanization, electrification and irrigation".

China is still an agricultural country. Wherever one travels, the amount of land under cultivation is impressive. Equally impressive is the fact that, at least in the parts we have visited, farming is still done by hand. Rice seedlings, for example, were being transplanted from the seed-beds to the paddies where they grow to maturity. In an industrial exhibit in Shanghai, we saw tractors designed to plant, transplant and harvest rice, but we did not see them being used in the fields. We cannot be sure, therefore, whether they are as efficient as they look or how many are being produced and used. If mechanization is carried out on the scale apparently envisaged, many country people are likely to find themselves out of work, and no alternative employment program has yet been outlined.

Industry

For industry, Hua said "there will be automation in the main industrial processes, a major increase in rapid transport and communications services and a considerable rise in labour productivity". Industry was not included in our program on any substantial scale. What we saw indicated that China was capable of manufacturing high-quality goods, though we did not learn whether they were produced in quantity. Nor were we able to judge the efficiency of servicing and maintenance. We have been told by people better qualified than ourselves that this has been a problem.

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At the factories we did visit — making machine-tools, textiles and carpets —, we were told that whatever troubles there have been in recent years were the fault of the “Gang of Four”. This is the name given to Chiang Ching, Mao’s widow, and the three “Politburo” members from Shanghai who were dismissed and disgraced in October 1976. Indeed, everything that has gone wrong in China is blamed on the Gang, whether it be the failure to reach a production target, the banning of traditional Chinese art forms, or even the firing of the chef at a leading hotel in Shanghai because he cooked “Peking duck”. One could not get through a briefing or a conversation without hearing the Gang of Four taken to task for something.

To the Chinese, the modernization of defence is essential because, as they see it, war with the Soviet Union is inevitable. The Russians, we were told over and over again, are aggressors and it is impossible to change the nature of an aggressor. Sooner or later, he will become blinded by self-confidence and will launch an attack. This can be postponed but not prevented. “We shall not attack unless we are attacked,” said Chairman Hua to the eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. “If we are attacked, we shall certainly counterattack.” On another occasion, he expressed the attitude towards a world war as: “First, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it”. A visitor is told that, if the Russians enter China, they will never be allowed to leave. It is apparent that defence strategy is based on a relentless guerrilla war in which large parts of China’s territory and millions of lives might be sacrificed. But, in the long run, China is confident of victory.

To a Canadian, the chances of a Soviet invasion seem unlikely. The U.S.S.R. has shown itself to be more concerned with holding what it has than gaining additional territory, and ruling an occupied China would appear a virtually impossible task. However, we do not have an army of a million men stationed on our border.

Canada is accustomed to *détente* and the search for peace through agreements acceptable to both parties. To the Chinese, this smacks of appeasement. They maintained that President Carter’s decision to scrap the B-1 bomber and postpone production of the neutron bomb were acts of appeasement that would only tempt the Kremlin. We were told that the Soviet Union was trying to gain a foothold in the Middle East and along the coast of North Africa so that it could encircle Western Europe. This strategic deployment must be “smashed”. Did this imply the use of force? The answer we were given was that Soviet influence in Egypt and Somalia had been smashed (we might say “exposed”) and the same must happen to their designs against Europe. Thus, one finds China supporting a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Our visit did not take us to military establish-

ments, though some of the airfields on which we landed were used by both civil and military aircraft. Members of the People’s Liberation Army could be seen on the streets of every place we visited, though they did not carry arms.

In the light of their belief about the inevitability of war, it was hardly surprising to find active preparations for survival. At a middle school in Shanghai, we were shown with pride the tunnel, or air-raid shelter, as we might call it. We were told it was dug by the students and finished by the workers. Walking down some 30 steps, we passed through double concrete doors each one foot thick into a central chamber surrounded by corridors and a number of smaller rooms. It is used today as a recreation centre for students. As justification for this construction, a rather curious dictum of Mao Tse-tung was cited: “Dig tunnels to store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony.” This was quoted by Hua Kuo-feng in his address to the eleventh Party Congress. He continued by saying, “We shall never seek hegemony or strive to be a superpower. In our international relations we should get rid of great-nation chauvinism resolutely, thoroughly and completely.”

The key

Science and technology is, perhaps, the key modernization among the four listed by Hua Kuo-feng. Without it, the other three may prove impossible to achieve; at the same time, it is here that China may have fallen farthest behind. During the decade between the start of the cultural revolution and the downfall of the Gang of Four, the educational system was virtually at a standstill. Many schools were closed and only recently have they returned to what we should call normal operation. The universities are still recovering and enrolment is, by our standards, very small. However, the emphasis in admission today is on ability rather than party qualifications or an equitable geographical and professional distribution. The Government has apparently recognized the shortcomings of the universities in the aftermath of the Gang of Four era by deciding that it must send thousands of young men and women to universities in the West for their education.

The emphasis on excellence and on learning from others is likely to have repercussions that will affect the structure of society, the system of government, and perhaps even the purity of Mao Tse-tung’s revolution, which has been so jealously guarded. Already the conception of material compensation for better work has been supported by the *People’s Daily*. “The difference in skill and work should be reflected in the pay of the workers, with those making outstanding achievements given extra material rewards,” said an editorial that appeared while we were in China. New prerequisites can also be introduced, as they have been in other Communist societies. The encouragement of

we language and technology involves the encouragement
 of creative thought and invention. Will it, in turn, lead
 to independence of thought, which is virtually impos-
 sible to control? Freedom of this kind carries with it
 the seeds of danger and dissent for a highly-organized
 society such as China's. This is a chance the Govern-
 ment is apparently willing to take.

Until recently, self-reliance was the watchword
 of the People's Republic. After the Soviet Union
 abruptly withdrew all aid in 1960, Peking was deter-
 mined that such an experience should never be
 repeated. China could not find itself relying on others.

This stand has now been modified. "China should
 learn everything that is advanced from other coun-
 tries," Chairman Hua told a conference on finance and

trade in Peking in July. "Theory, politics, economics,
 management, science and technology — all need to be
 studied and the general education level raised."

China, then, is launched in new directions that
 may radically change its society as well as its economy.
 The task it has set itself is formidable, and it remains
 to be seen whether this new Great Leap Forward
 can be accomplished. When one looks back on what
 has been achieved during the past 29 years, the record
 indicates that one should never underestimate the
 capacity of the Chinese people. By the end of this
 century, China may have become what it claims it
 doesn't want to be — a global super-power in the true
 sense of that phrase.

Aspects of Asia

One man's "China card" is another's "America card"

Sino-American normalization

By Georges Vigny

Reality is a duality all of whose aspects are inter-
 changeable. This interchangeability applies both to
 the motives underlying the reality and to the objective
 reality itself.

The normalization of relations between Washing-
 ton and Peking is a two-sided reality. The so-called
 "China card" is much like a magician's trick card with
 a different face on either side; depending on whether
 the person presenting it is American or Chinese, the
 same card will be spoken of as the "China card" or
 the "America card".

In other words, the "China card" is politically,
 spatially, chronologically and strategically the same
 as the "America card" played by Peking; the cards
 are much like two sides of the same coin.

If we take the comparison with the magician one
 step further, a determined effort has been made, since
 the famous evening of December 15, 1978, when
 President Carter made his dramatic announcement to
 the American nation, never to show more than one
 face of this master card at a time. Witness the fact
 that, in the official announcement itself, most Amer-
 ican commentators omitted or ignored the striking

element of the joint statement, and it was left to
 Moscow to mention it before it was finally discussed
 "on the rebound", as it were.

Thus, in the communiqué read by President
 Carter, there were five clearly-defined principles, the
 second of which was the most important in this con-
 text, since it went far beyond bilateralism, giving this
 normalization its specific flavour. The principle was
 that neither party "should seek *hegemony* in the Asia-
 Pacific region or any other region of the world" and
 that both were "opposed to efforts by any other coun-
 try or group of countries to establish such *hegemony*".
 Neither hegemony nor "hegemonism"! If the com-
 munique had contained no more than these passages,
 it would still have constituted an affront to Moscow,

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 in this article are those of Mr Vigny.*

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since, in official Chinese jargon, "hegemonism" stands for Soviet "social imperialism".

The few times this principle — reduced to a single word — was quoted, it was out of context, or it was mentioned briefly to illustrate another point placed in a "linkage" situation. Such discretion on the part of the Americans was suspicious; it was almost as if they were seeking to deny the obvious fact that this normalization was a move against the Soviet Union and its attitudes towards China and the rest of the world. Either discretion or simple clumsiness was behind the subsequent incident involving the American President, who misinterpreted — or slanted — the message of his Soviet colleague and prompted a clarification from the Tass news agency.

Are we to believe that the White House does not know the political meaning of the word "hegemony" as the Chinese use it, and sees in the word only a refined expression for the desire to dominate? Such a reading would make the paragraph in the joint communiqué a pious generality, like the claim to be in favour of virtue and opposed to vice.

This would certainly be surprising — and neither Peking nor Moscow (especially not Moscow!) — understands it in such a sense.

The counterweight

The thaw in relations caught the Americans unawares, while Cyrus Vance was in the Near East and, curiously enough, during the assessment of the chances for a Carter-Brezhnev summit meeting. However, the matter had been a long time germinating, and the surprise consists only in the final state of the Sino-American negotiations, which cannot, in any case, be understood without the Chinese internal context.

This crucial phase can readily be dated from June 25, 1978, not because it began on that precise day but rather because on that day the Soviet Union issued a public warning against the temptation to play Peking off against Moscow. The expression "China card" originated with Leonid Brezhnev himself. Speaking on June 25 in Minsk during an official tour, the Soviet President, without naming names, attacked those American politicians who sought to play the China card against the Soviet Union. Condemning this policy as shortsighted, the Soviet leader expressed the hope that those taking such a step would not have to repent bitterly of their error.

Whom was he talking about? Clearly, it was President Carter's appointed adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had said, on his return from a trip to China in May, that a strong and secure China was in the interests of the United States.

This public warning to the United States has turned out to be an error in judgment on the part of the Soviets; it was just what was needed to encourage the Americans, and even more the Chinese, to complete the normalization process.

The next day, June 26, in a press conference, President Carter denied the Soviet accusation, saying that the Americans were not trying, and never would try, to play the Soviets off against the Republic of China, or *vice versa*. The denial is clear, but the choice of words and the allusion to a possible and implied "Soviet card" ("play the Soviets against the Republic of China") constituted a shift of language and conception; the denial does not cover the same ground as the accusation. To begin with, President Carter did not merely refute the accusation but, adding insult to injury, he made it clear that China and the United States shared common hopes throughout the world and that Sino-American relations, by reason of their very extent, needed to be developed. The object, continued Jimmy Carter, was to live in peace with the people nearly one-billion strong. Is it necessary to point out that at that time China was providing unequivocal support to the anti-Soviet camp both in Zaire and in the Horn of Africa?

In undeniable continuity of purpose, the White House announced next day, June 27, a visit to Peking on July 6 by American scientists, at the very time when China was voicing more and more plainly its great desire for Western technology. Colloquially speaking, the warning was answered by "one-upmanship".

We need not go over the history of the diplomatic exchanges between Washington and Peking or between Moscow and Washington, but need only locate the key stage in order to comprehend it.

The context of the summer of '78 was that of the stalling of SALT, of an outbreak of espionage, of increased Soviet repression against "dissidents"; and of the "destabilization" of Africa already referred to. It was a context aggravated by the impossible "linkage" and the selectivity of *détente*.

Washington's overtures to China, at a time when Leonid Brezhnev in person was visiting the Soviet Chinese border to reassure his own people and presumably to disturb the Chinese, were already a sort of counterweight. The theory that, in order to conduct successful negotiations with the Soviets (that is, to force them to a compromise), the U.S. must improve its relations with China has always had its advocates in Washington.

All this did not take into account — at least not sufficiently — the Chinese domestic crisis, in which the indefatigable Teng Hsiao-ping was daily erasing from Chinese life all traces of the Gang of Four — which in the end became the "Gang of Five", once it was realized that the first member was not Mao's widow but Mao himself.

In the meantime, Peking was launching an all-out offensive (offering a little comfort to Don Jamieson, who was swiftly overtaken by the Europeans in the race for the Chinese market), negotiating the agreement of the century with Japan and even sending President Hua to the Balkans to defy the Soviets in

their own backyard. On the way, Enver Hodja was cast off like an old shoe and Tito came back into favour.

The illusion

All the preceding goes to show where Brezhnev's error lay. It was as if he were solemnly admitting on the public square that Sino-American normalization would hurt Moscow, or that the Soviet Union was taken aback by such a thaw in relations.

It is easy to see that the heads of the American and Chinese offices, Messrs Woodcock and Chai Tse-min, had an eventful fall season, and clear indication of China's impatience can be detected in the warm welcome given in October to James Schlesinger, U.S. Energy Secretary and champion of the hard line against Moscow. But, as always, these efforts came up against the obstacle of Taiwan. On this point, however, an essential clarification must be made, which the Americans, caught up in their own set of problems, were unable to understand — the obstacle of Taiwan, with which Washington is slowly and painfully learning to live, is an *illusion!*

At various times, and in particular after the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese leaders, caught in the infernal spiral of the battle for succession, clearly announced that the "liberation" or reintegration of Formosa with the mother country was the responsibility of Peking alone, which was reserving its decision for the proper place and time. It is certainly difficult, in translation from one language to another, to render all its subtleties, but the Chinese internal situation was such that this language, which appeared hard, meant the opposite of what the West generally thought it meant. Although, in the literal sense, Peking's statement meant that it was not giving up Taiwan and was threatening reconquest, reading between the lines showed that Peking was not in a hurry to recover the island, which reduced the urgency of the problem.

Yet this was not the sense in which the Chinese statement was read in Washington. Nor was Peking in a hurry to provide the key to the code. Relying on American myopia, which was cunningly sustained by Chinese ambiguity, the leaders in Peking took full advantage of the Taiwan problem for the purpose of imposing their own perspective on the negotiations and, even more obviously, their own rhythm, dictated by internal developments.

To reveal the Taiwan problem in its true light would have been not only a strategic and ideological mistake but also, concretely, a surrender of Chinese control over the negotiations and, even more obvious, of the rhythm already referred to.

The Chinese have often been praised for their pragmatism, and justly. But another gift that has always been ignored is their refined use of illusion, their sure control of ambiguity and false appearances.

Never look at the empty hand held out by the magician; the action is taking place in the other hand, between the bent fingers, shielded from everyone's attention. We know who Rameses II was, but what about President Hua — do we know his real name? Do we even know whether or not Hua and Teng, rather than being opponents, support each other in a constant battle against extreme elements pressuring them from both right and left? How many people understood, when Teng met his political downfall for the second time after the death of Chou En-lai, that his ouster was not the end of a process but rather the beginning of an upheaval that is now in the "boomerang" stage?

All this is to say that the Taiwan illusion worked marvellously, attracting great attention to a stake that, in the final analysis, concerned only the Americans. It is the United States that is linked to Taipei by a defence treaty, and Washington has incurred all the odium of the rejection of this document now that the American leaders have become convinced of the inevitability of the change in direction that must be made. The masses of angry Taiwanese reviled the American representatives and insulted Carter, not Hua or Mao.

And this despite the fact that Peking has never had, and still does not have, the means to capture the island of Formosa by storm, or the intention of doing so. It can even be said, in the celebrated Chinese spirit of pragmatism, that it is in Peking's interests to leave Taiwan as it is indefinitely, since the island is a bigger, richer version of Hong Kong. It can more profitably be left as an autonomous entity than swallowed up in China's insufficiencies.

The "America card"

In an interview with Walter Cronkite of the Columbia Broadcasting System on December 31, 1978, Jimmy Carter said that Leonid Brezhnev's message concerning the Sino-American normalization was "very positive" in its general tone. He even commented on the "understanding" of the Soviet leader, according to whom the new Sino-American relations would contribute to world peace.

And Carter added, when Teng's trip had already been announced for January 29, 1979, that he hoped Brezhnev would go to Washington before the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister. This was shown to be a false hope when the subsequent meeting between Vance and Gromyko on SALT did not produce the desired breakthrough. All the same, Tass took the initiative of offering a clarification that, though moderate in tone, was still a denial of Carter's claim. According to the Soviet agency, Brezhnev's message noted the development and, while admitting that it was quite legitimate for sovereign states to establish normal relations, inquired about the object being sought in this particular case. Did Jimmy Carter

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misinterpret Brezhnev's message? Or did he deliberately read it selectively in order to force the Soviets to express themselves openly for or against? Normalization is one question, but "on what basis the normalization takes place, and what aims are pursued by the parties" is quite another.

The Soviets did not miss the references to hegemony and hegemonism. According to Tass, the joint communiqué contained "expressions whose direction is beyond doubt, if one bears in mind the usual vocabulary of the Chinese leaders". Moscow would, therefore, follow closely the development of the new relations between Washington and Peking to see what they would be like in practice, and would "draw appropriate conclusions for Soviet policy".

It can be inferred that, even before the economic impact of normalization with Washington can be evaluated, Peking is reaping political and strategic dividends from its "America card". Washington gratified Peking more by including in the communiqué the very word that calls up for Moscow the disconcerting spectre of "encirclement" than it did by renouncing the "two-Chinas" position.

The question now is not how many bottles of Coca-Cola will sell in China, how many tourists and businessmen will visit Peking, how many American tractors will be sold or how many hotels will be built. All of this constitutes the corollary of the fundamental question, which can be expressed as follows: is the Sino-American *rapprochement* irreversible, as is the countervailing Sino-Soviet divorce?

Until now, it has been the fashion to speak of "objective alliances" between China and the United States and between China and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly in a "containment" approach to what has been called "Soviet expansionism". Peking has been a thoroughgoing debunker of the idea of *détente*, and has never hesitated to take the side of the West against the Warsaw Pact countries, in either the European or the African theatres. As for the entry of Vietnam into Comecon, it can even be maintained that this creates more problems for Moscow than it solves, since Peking considers the development a direct threat to its borders.

In other words, Sino-American normalization had been in the realm of possibility for a long time. The current *rapprochement* is much more significant in view of its timing; at the height of Teng's power and of his specific line, this normalization means that China has overcome its instability and found a form of internal stability that makes it possible for the masses to accept this major event. Preceded by a vast campaign of conditioning through the *dazibaos*, normalization has coincided with a challenge to the legacy of Mao himself.

The "Great Helmsman" is quoted as saying that while all men are no doubt mortal, some of the dead weigh more than Mount Taishan and others are lighter than a feather. Could he have imagined that this would be applied to himself, and in both senses — first as Mount Taishan and then as a feather?

Dissuasion and influence

Peking knows very well that it cannot dissuade Moscow by itself, and so it is trying to succeed in this effort by turning to the colossal American potential. The question is not so much whether the United States alone is able to provide the quantity and quality of technology Peking needs as whether any other power except the U.S. is capable of lending China its credibility.

With the obstacle of Taiwan behind them and with full normalization established, it can be claimed that, in all probability, the Sino-American *rapprochement* is irreversible and that Moscow must give up its dream of an Asian security treaty.

Even if it is granted that the Americans will one day recover from the Indochinese trauma, Peking knows full well that friendship with the United States and the objective *rapprochement* under way cannot seriously threaten its own priorities.

Through Western glasses (particularly American dark ones), the interchangeable duality disappears. The fact is that repudiation of the man Mao and his thought has never meant, nor will it ever mean, repudiation of China's past, its tradition or its heritage. The truth is that China aspires to achieve world power; if it succeeded, with American, European and Japanese help, in getting its industrialization off the ground (which, needless to say, is its chief priority), the country would become the spiritual beacon it has been aspiring to become once again after centuries. Its prosperity would attract the covetous, while the influence of its thought and the image of its power would rebuff them.

This is not a poet's dream; it is a pallid reflection of the Chinese spirit, an image maintained by millennia of tradition to which Mao only added a new page. It is no coincidence that the Great Helmsman, the equivalent of a Celestial Emperor of China, was simultaneously the greatest revolutionary in Chinese history and a poet. It is the intersecting of these two dimensions that makes it possible to attain, with or without Mao, government by thinking men with a social conscience.

Contrary to what is believed in the West, this attitude does not produce a nation of dreamers; it induces in the Chinese a sharp perception of reality that its Western partners confuse with pragmatism.

Japan, China and the U.S.— the new trilateralism of Asia

By F. Quei Quo

In 1978, while the attention of the world was focused on the situation in the Middle East, a new international power configuration was quietly in the making in the Far East. The ratification of a peace and friendship treaty between China and Japan on October 23, the announcement of official normalization of relations between China and the United States, to take place at the very outset of 1979, the signing of a friendship treaty between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. on November 3, the increased hostilities between Vietnam and Cambodia, and the successive visits by high-ranking officials and politicians of China, Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. to the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries were not an accidental accumulation of isolated events. Viewed together, these events signify the coming of a new era in the international politics of Asia.

The "new trilateralism" consists of the United States as the prime mover, China as the balancer and Japan as the follower. The coalition among these three nations now creates a supreme force — in military strength, human resources and technological and economic powers. The "new trilateralism" now effectively controls Soviet ambitions in the Far East and compels the U.S.S.R. to search elsewhere for a breakthrough against containment; hence the moves in Southeast Asia.

Nearly half a decade has elapsed since Prime Minister Tanaka shook hands with the late Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai, indicating to the Chinese that Japan would not fall behind the United States (though his visit was a few months after the "Nixon shock") in the degree of its interest in developing friendship with China. The negotiation of a peace and friendship treaty, however, had been prolonged because of interrupting events and some basic differences in principles insisted upon by the parties involved. The turn of events late in 1978 was, therefore, hardly predictable, and the Russians were the most surprised of all. There were, however, a number of reasons for the rapid emergence of the new scheme of things in the Far East. These included the failure of *détente*, the internal conflicts within the two major ideological camps and, in particular, the changes in

political leadership of the nations involved.

To begin with, the *détente* of the Sixties and Seventies had very little impact on the Asian front, where the problem was more among allies than between enemies. To the Russians, the Chinese appeared to have become more Communistic and revolutionary than themselves. To the Americans, the Japanese seemed to have become more capitalistic and peace-loving than Americans had ever wanted them to be. Moscow found itself branded as the capital of the "revisionists" and the New York money market became the trade centre for Japanese *yen*.

The conflict in the socialist camp was both intensive and extensive. It involved ideological disagreement, border skirmishes, struggle for leadership within the camp and competition to win allies among the new nations.

The economic warfare between Japan and the United States was more real than it appeared to be. It became such a highly-politicized issue that a special Cabinet post was created and a former diplomat was appointed for the purpose of smoothing Japan's trade relations with the United States and the countries of the European Economic Community. The economic competition launched by "Japan Inc." was, to many Americans, as unfair as the attack on Pearl Harbor by Imperial Japan in 1941. Criticism of Japan's getting a "free ride" in its journey towards "peace and prosperity" placed Japanese leaders in an untenable position, for the nation's political climate was not yet ready for a "right turn". At an international meeting, Prime Minister Fukuda lamented that the situation reminded him of the Thirties, leaving his Western colleagues to speculate on the implications of his remarks. Somehow a new international order had to be created so that each of these Asian powers — the

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U.S., the U.S.S.R., China and Japan — could find its proper place.

The diplomatic offensive was initiated by the United States as soon as its internal political instability was settled by the election of Mr Carter as the thirty-ninth President. In Far Eastern policy, two general principles were to be applied — first, to make the Asians responsible for their own security and prosperity and secondly to neutralize the Russian ambition for Asian power. The timing was perfect. The new Chinese regime had just rid itself of the fanatical "Gang of Four", under whose leadership any rational policy had been impossible. The 1978 Constitution inspired by Chairman Hua now proclaims China's desire to become "modern" in its military and socio-economic development. Zbigniew Brzezinski flew to Peking to pave the way for eventual normalization of relations between the two nations, but also stopped in Japan before he returned to the United States. The scheme was to cultivate China and Japan as an effective check against the Russian threat.

To accomplish this purpose, both an American understanding with China and the exertion of pressure on Japan were required. The proposed withdrawal of troops from South Korea also called for co-operation with both China and Japan, since the former exercised a persuasive influence over the North Korean Government and the latter over the Government of South Korea. The tie between Kim's North Korean Government and Peking is a close one. North Korea owes a great debt to China, without whose military intervention the Government could have been chased out of Korea in 1951. In the south, Park's regime is indebted to the Japanese for its industrialization and its economic prosperity. The conservative Liberal-Democratic Government of Japan even helped Park by voicing a minor plea against the withdrawal of U.S. troops. It was not difficult for both China and Japan to convince their Korean friends that the status quo in the Korean peninsula had to be preserved, at least for the time being. The difficulty lay, however, in Japan's own decision to take part in the new scheme, which would have such serious political implications. The instinct of the political animal was to shy away, if possible, from any serious political involvement.

Partnership with China, though economically desirable, is politically unwise in the eyes of some Japanese politicians, including former Premier Fukuda. It offends the U.S.S.R., with which a peace treaty has not yet been signed. The Soviet Union remains in occupation of the islands north of Hokkaido, which it took over in 1945 and which are still claimed by Tokyo as Japanese territory. In spite of repeated efforts on the part of Japan, the Soviet Union is not prepared to talk peace while U.S. bases continue to exist in Japan. The Japanese were warned

officially that the "anti-hegemony" clause in proposed Sino-Japanese Treaty implied hostility towards the U.S.S.R. However, the issue became non-partisan day by day. All the opposition parties joined the majority of the ruling Liberal Democrats in urging normalization of relations with China. The only objection came from the pro-Taiwan faction of the Liberal Democratic Party itself. Especially important was the upcoming presidential election in LDP, in which the main opponent to Premier Fukuda would be Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Tanaka Cabinet, who championed the cause of normalizing Sino-Japanese relations. To deplore Ohira of an issue favourable to his candidacy, Fukuda finally approved the signing of the treaty.

There was, of course, the prospect of the Chinese market as a solution to the problem of current stagnation in Japan's heavy industries. Japan's technology, skill and plants could be exchanged for Chinese resources. Facing mounting problems in the American and European markets, Japan might find China the most suitable partner in economic affairs. Thus, as economic pressure from the West increased, the industrial leaders of Japan exerted political pressure on the Government for an early normalization of relations with China. Without an alternative market, it was argued, Japan's heavy industries would be forced to move towards military production.

For the first time since 1945, voices urging the Government to relax the limitation on the export of military products were heard among industrial leaders. The shipbuilding industry said that it could have produced battleships and submarines for Israel which had recently placed a \$500-million order with West Germany. This was also the case with the automobile industry, which could convert its truck-production line to the production of armoured vehicles for Middle East nations. Indeed, Japan could also increase its own defence expenditure by enlarging its armament, which would be more in line with what the United States and the right-wing political forces of Japan wanted. With the memory of the Second World War fading and the pressure of economic expediency rising, it looked as if the revival of "Imperial Japan" was imminent.

For the majority of the Japanese population, however, the treaty with China has more sentimental than military or economic value. Historically, none of the other three nations had been "friends" of Japan. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the Second World War of 1941-5 indicate the inevitability of conflict with others whenever Japan contemplates its own expansion. However, China stands alone as a nation that suffered from Japanese imperialism without indemnity. If there are any guilt feelings about the war remaining in the Japanese mind, they must be towards China first. For the United States, appreciation of its gentle

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treatment of the defeated nation cannot outweigh the resentment against its use of atomic bombs. There are ample reasons for the Japanese to hate and distrust the Russians. The Soviet declaration of war against Japan on the eve of Japan's surrender, the mistreatment of Japanese prisoners of war, the continuous occupation of the northern islands and the recent military manoeuvre exemplify its attitude towards Japan. Japan's defence efforts are today directed north - against the U.S.S.R., the only possible enemy. The new trilateral arrangement, therefore, is an exploitation of the historical and economic circumstances of Japan by the United States.

The scheme conceived by Brzezinski, however, also implies the declining political role of the United States in the Far East. Under the new arrangement, the Americans think it possible for them to manipulate from the vertex of the triangle. The price to be paid is, in Brzezinski's own words, "to nurture Japan", even if it includes the remilitarization of a "fragile" democratic Japan. The fight by proxy is the new rule of the game. As the Cubans fight in Africa under the aegis of the Russians, so the Chinese are advising the Africans with American blessing. At the global level, the entrance of China into international politics with its anti-U.S.S.R. policy relieves the United States from being the "lone ranger" policing international security. At the regional level, the participation of Japan in Far Eastern affairs means the creation of a new sphere of influence. Both Japan and the United States have received notice that China claims Taiwan as an integral part of its territory; in fact, the Chinese have recently made this legal through their new Constitution. Privately, however, the Chinese agree that "timing and international circumstances" are important factors in the assumption of sovereignty over the island. Japan's special concern for South Korea was recognized in exchange for acceptance of China's dominance over North Korea.

The agreement can be extended to Southeast Asia only if Japan is willing. Already there is heavy economic involvement. But Japan still prefers to keep economics and politics separate. The separation is artificial and can serve only as a temporary measure pending definite political policies. Conflict between Japan's economic expansionism and Southeast Asian nationalism has already been witnessed from time to time. The gospel of the "Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" advocated by Japan before and during the last war may be resurrected as a new policy without objection from the United States or China. Fortunately, Japan's entry into the new alliance had little political reason or global strategic significance. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's blessing on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Act and Japan's Self-Defence Force, conferred in his interviews while he was in Tokyo to exchange letters of ratification, actually embarrassed many enthusiastic supporters of the

treaty, especially the Japanese Socialists and the Communists.

Needless to say, for the United States the "new trilateralism" in Asia is a link in its global strategy of containing the Russians as well as of stabilizing potentially-troublesome areas so that it can avoid being drawn into unnecessary direct confrontation with others, as in the case of Vietnam. The difficulties with the SALT II talks, the increased Russian influence in Africa and the aging of Brezhnev have Washington worried. The "new trilateralism" will, the United States seems to expect, force the Russians to become closer and friendlier in their dealings with Washington.

But the Russian leaders have more to be uneasy about than their counterparts in Washington. Their influence in Europe has diminished and now they are denied any role in Asia. Their repeated gestures towards mending the fence with China have met only with discourteous rebuffs. Furthermore, the Carter Administration's position on human rights interferes with the domestic affairs of the U.S.S.R. The feeling of being encircled is running high again in Moscow for the first time since the days of Stalin.

Examined from the viewpoint of the politics of the balance of power, the Russian strategy has been wrong. In the first place, the Russians should realize that reconciliation with China is most unlikely in the foreseeable future. The "liberalization" of China will bring it closer to the capitalist U.S. than to its fellow "revisionist" the U.S.S.R. The weakest link in the "new trilateralism" of Asia is Japan. One should not minimize the possibility of neutralizing Japan. Were the Soviet Union to return the northern islands to Japan, extend generous fishing rights to the Japanese and make possible joint ventures in natural-resource development, Japan might be prompted to clean up the anti-U.S.S.R. atmosphere surrounding the new trilateral agreement. In fact, it is the U.S.S.R. itself that has deprived the Japanese left wing politicians and intellectuals of evidence of a friendly relation with the Russians. There is no effective link for the Russians in Japan. Neither the Japanese Communist Party nor the Japanese Socialist Party identifies itself with the U.S.S.R., though both are critical of Japan's becoming a surrogate for the United States.

Outlook and problems

In the immediate future, the "new trilateralism" will create peace and stability in the Far East. The tension over divided Korea has already been relaxed considerably, through the recognition of Kim's regime in the North by Japan and the United States in return for recognition of Park's Government in the South by China is still on the short-term agenda. At least, establishment of some cultural and economic relations between Japan and North Korea is conceivable. Across the Strait of Formosa, Teng Hsiao-

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ping is making all kinds of gestures in his wooing of the regime and people on the island. With the assurance of preserving the capitalistic socio-economic structure of Taiwan, Peking hopes for a peaceful settlement with the island through talks with the Kuomintang officials. What remains to be seen is the determination of the 16 million people of the island, who may not accept the transition easily. However, China's insistence on its sovereignty over Taiwan and simultaneous acceptance of the real state of affairs suggests the possibility of some sort of association between the two — a sovereign state and an associate state or an autonomous region with a considerable degree of independence.

In spite of the long historical association between Japan and Taiwan, the former considers the issue a political taboo in its relations with China. For Japan, the hottest local issue in the Far East is the return of its northern islands by the U.S.S.R. A recent suggestion is that Japan should ask for the return of the two nearby islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu only and settle for the non-fortification of the others. The compromise may have some appeal to the Soviet Union should the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Act be abandoned. The new Government under Prime Minister Ohira is not, however, prepared for an expansion of its own military capabilities. The course of "Nippon Maru" requires economic prosperity first. More attention will be paid to improvement of domestic living conditions such as housing, health and welfare.

Nevertheless, the pressure for a more independent and positive role by Japan in international affairs is there. The "hawk" candidate, Nakosone, polled a surprising 15 per cent among the LDP supporters at the party's recent presidential election. Nakasone campaigned with slogans such as "Amend the Constitution; legitimate the Self-Defence Force" and also argued for the need of "legislation for emergency", meaning delegation of powers to the military in order to meet any unexpected attack or crisis. Next to the urge for establishment of effective anti-submarine forces, the Japanese Government will also face pressure to develop a security system for its "supply-line" to Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia thus becomes the theatre of struggle for domination among the superpowers. Whatever the Russians have lost in the Far East, they intend to regain, at least partially, in Southeast Asia. The accelerated aid to Vietnam and the latest fall of Phnom Penh seem to have turned the tide against China. In addition to worry about border conflict with the "Northern Bear", China will probably face problems at its south gate. The Russian version of a collective-security system for Southeast Asia now finds a partner in Vietnam, which subscribes to the idea of a "Great Indochina" under its own hegemony.

Any tension at the border will disrupt the internal

progress to which China is now fully committed. China, however, the "four modernizations" — defence, industry, agriculture, science and technology — must go ahead at full speed. In the long run, the United States may be most instrumental in the modernization of Chinese defence capabilities, while Japan comes the major helper in China's industrialization. Should Canada be interested in becoming a participant in this "Western consortium" of China help, it would have to be in the field of agriculture, and perhaps jointly with others too in the areas of science and technology — especially the often-talked-of Canadian supremacy in oil-exploration. Competition among the Western industrialized nations, as well as Japan in the China market is inevitable. Already there have been warnings by specialists against the optimistic use of China as a solution to the problems of industrial nations. After all, Japan probably will be the winner in most of these competitions for historical, geographical and economic reasons.



At the end of January, Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping made his historic visit to Washington. Following his third meeting with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Teng and the President stepped out of the Oval Office for a public appearance on the lawns of the White House.

Canada at Tokyo Round of trade negotiations

By Gilbert R. Winham

Five years of effort are now on the line in the trade negotiations in Geneva. Launched in Tokyo in 1973, the current negotiations are joined by approximately 97 nations participating under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Canada, an original signatory of the agreement, is participating fully in the current "Tokyo Round", and senior Canadian officials claim a successful conclusion will produce substantial benefits for Canada's ailing economy. But success is far from certain.

The timetable for the Tokyo Round is rapidly running up against very real deadlines. As in past trade negotiations, an export-oriented United States has taken a leading role in this round, offering an attractive package of concessions to its trading partners, and demanding much in return. But U.S. authority to negotiate is limited by Congressional legislation. The present legislation expires on January 4, 1980, thus fixing the early spring of 1979 as a practical working deadline. The current economic downturn, and protectionist sentiment in Congress, both ensure that no extension of authority would be forthcoming for U.S. negotiators. Without the United States, there would be little practical reason or political impetus to continue.

The Tokyo Round comes in a historical context. There have been six rounds of previous negotiations (the first was in 1947, and the sixth, the "Kennedy Round", concluded in 1967), and they were mostly concerned with reducing tariffs on

industrial products. The current Tokyo Round is tariff negotiation, but it also includes discussions on non-tariff trade barriers and on improvements in the structure of the international trading system. Most nations, with the possible exception of Canada, view these latter issues as relatively more important than tariffs in current trading practices. Ironically, these issues may be more important in an absolute sense as well, for, as tariffs are lowered, protectionist forces tend to be manifested in trade restrictions other than tariffs.

Canada's traditional concern in international trade has been twofold. As a producer of primary products and semi-processed goods, Canada has pursued internationalist policies (and supported institutions) designed to encourage a healthy export trade. On the other hand, Canada has been a relatively protectionist nation so far as imports were concerned (particularly imports of industrial and finished products) in an effort to develop the manufacturing sector of the Canadian economy. The latter policy has long-standing political roots, dating back to the National Policy of 1879, when the tariff was used to help foster economic and political integration in Canada. Today the imperatives appear to be more export-oriented. It is necessary for Canada to maintain its exports of semi-processed goods, while at the same time boosting employment-producing exports of manufactured goods, an area where the Canadian economy does not perform well. To

manage this requires reducing the restrictions of other nations on Canada's products, which in turn means that the Canadian Government's offer on its own restrictions must be attractive. So far, in these negotiations, Canadian policy has worked from the premise that a big deal, meaning greater reciprocal liberalization for more products, is better for Canada than a little deal. One gives more but gets more in return.

Tariffs

The tariff negotiations at the Tokyo Round have been especially important for Canada, since it is generally recognized that Canada relies more on tariffs than non-tariff measures to protect domestic industry. In the Kennedy Round, which consisted principally of industrial-tariff negotiations, nations evolved an across-the-board (or formula) approach to tariff-cutting. The formula cut agreed on at the Kennedy Round —

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namely 50 percent fewer exceptions — was not subscribed to by Canada, on the ground that its exports were largely primary products, on which foreign tariffs were low, while its "inputs" were industrial products on which tariffs were much higher in all countries. Hence 50 percent cuts across the board could have produced inequities for Canada. This negotiating position was severely criticized abroad, and served to increase pressure for Canada to accept a formula approach in the Tokyo Round.

Nations devised a formula approach in the current negotiations, based on a "Swiss formula" that called for across-the-board cuts of about 40 per cent, with a harmonizing principle that provided for deeper cuts in high tariffs than in low ones. After substantial deliberation over the winter of 1977-78, the Federal Government accepted the formula, recognizing that Canada's goals in the negotiations could not be met without accepting the implications of what had become a general negotiating practice among industrialized countries. The Government did attach certain conditions to its acceptance, however, in order to ensure that Canada's goals in certain sectors of resource-based goods would be reached.

Canada's concern in resource-based sectors springs from a policy of seeking to increase the amount of "value-added" processing in the production of raw materials. The connection with tariffs comes from the fact that most nations maintain an ascending level of tariff protection related to the amount of processing in the product, with the result that small tariffs, and small tariff differentials, can have a large impact on a nation seeking to diversify its exports. Consider one hypothetical comparison: metal exported in ingots at \$1.00/lb. over a tariff of 2 per cent *versus* metal exported in rolled bars at \$1.10/lb. over a tariff of 4 per cent. In either case, the tariff on the product itself is probably insignificant but the tariff on the value-added portion is a sub-

stantial 20 per cent, thus inhibiting industrial development in the exporting country. These concerns led Canada initially to propose a "sector approach" to negotiation, which would have dealt with certain resource-based sectors in integrated packages, ranging from raw materials to finished products, and would have keyed on eliminating small foreign tariffs on semi-processed goods. This approach was not acceptable to Canada's trading partners, leaving the Government the task of realizing its sector concerns, especially in forest products and non-ferrous metals, through the mechanism of formula cuts.

Most important element

Canada's position in the tariff negotiation with the United States, its largest trading partner, is the most important element in the negotiations as a whole. There are now prospects of substantial agreement in this area that will accommodate most of the Federal Government's objectives. The main task as the negotiations wind up will be to keep an attractive U.S. offer "on the table". Canada has made exceptions to the formula tariff cut that will have to be reassessed as the negotiations conclude, and the decisions remaining will be as difficult as the decision to accept formula cuts in the first place. At stake is the possible loss of jobs in import-competing industries such as textiles, as opposed to access in foreign markets for export-oriented industries such as petrochemicals. Since provincial interests differ sharply on these issues, the negotiations will present problems of balancing regional economic interests that go to the core of the Canadian national existence.

Regardless of the outcome of the Tokyo Round as multilateral negotiations, a large Canadian-American package is likely, since there is between these nations a large bilateral trade in many products that does not involve third countries. It is estimated that Canada and the United States are approaching a free-trade position now, 70-75 per

cent of the products now being non-dutiable. Assuming a successful bilateral package at Tokyo Round, the number of dutiable items would rise to 80 per cent, with corresponding reductions in the tariffs of those remaining dutiable.

Non-tariff measures

The negotiations over non-tariff measures are also of importance to Canada. Such barriers are extremely varied, ranging from simple quantitative restrictions like quotas to complex customs-valuation procedures or government-procurement policies that restrict access to foreign markets. The main objective of the Tokyo Round in the non-tariff area is to remove the trade-distorting effects of such barriers, and bring them under more effective international scrutiny and control. The emphasis in the negotiations has been on reducing the uncertainty exporters face in selling their products abroad and stabilizing international trading patterns by removing the unilateral right of nations to restrict movement of goods.

The non-tariff negotiations constitute one of the most interesting examples of multilateral negotiations occurring today. Faced with a staggering variety of trade restrictions, GATT members began the process of compiling data on the non-tariff measures taken by various trading nations. With the help of the GATT Secretariat, nations pinpointed those practices that adversely affected the access of their exporters to foreign markets, and further indicated what action the government in the importing country should take. This information was brought together in a non-tariff measure inventory that identified the nation making the complaint, the practice in question, and the nations against which the complaint was made. Further work reduced the inventory to categories, and then draft codes of conduct were drawn up in each category, which served as a basis for further negotiation. The entire operation is a

object lesson in the process of achieving regulation in a vast and complex area of international relations. Even if the "code" negotiations fail, it is likely that the structural effects of the work already completed will help regulate the international trading system of the future.

The process of negotiating the non-tariff codes has been more difficult than negotiating tariffs. Unlike tariffs, non-tariff barriers are not necessarily intended to restrict or distort international trade, even though they may have that effect in practice. They often represent practices or institutions that are deeply entrenched, such as provincial liquor-control boards, and they are difficult to alter even though they make trade more difficult. In Canada, many identified non-tariff measures are provincial in origin. This has obliged the Federal Government to maintain close liaison with the provinces throughout the Tokyo Round, and it will necessitate in some cases agreement by provincial governments on any final international settlement, a fact that increases uncertainty over the outcome of the negotiations. The problem is even more severe in the United States. Whereas in the negotiation of tariffs the Administration acts with full authorization from Congress, its authority to negotiate non-tariff issues is only partial, and any agreements of this sort must be ratified by Congress. By law, this ratification must be all or nothing, yet Congress does not have the opportunity to propose amendments that will undoubtedly make it easier to secure approval. And approval is far from certain in view of the current protectionist mood prevailing in Congress.

Codes of conduct

Four codes of conduct regulating non-tariff measures have evolved in the Tokyo Round. One is the "Technical Barriers to Trade", which aims to reduce trade obstacles caused by technical requirements, standards, test methods or certification sys-

tems. This draft code is nearly in final form, and attention is turning, at least in Canada, to the question of what legislation or mechanisms will be necessary to implement the code. A second code attempts to establish an international procedure for customs valuation. Canadian valuation procedures are significantly different from those of other countries, and Canada has not to date been substantially involved in these negotiations. Whether this position will change depends on consultations taking place with provincial governments and private-sector interests.

The third code deals with government procurement. The object here is to regulate the purchasing policies of governments, which are increasingly large consumers of goods and services, and in particular to prevent governments from legislating against the purchase of competitive goods coming from foreign countries. Legislation such as the Buy America Act, and certain protectionistic practices in Canada concerning bidding and tendering, would be regulated under this code as it has been framed thus far during negotiation. The code is, however, far from complete, and its precise scope and coverage will have to be spelt out in greater detail if it is to be effective. For example, there is no agreement on what specific purchasing entities will be affected by the agreement (Air Canada, the provincial governments?) and there is no commonly-understood threshold value below which preferential government purchasing would be tolerated. This code is important, and the trade values in the area are significant. As one example, the U.S. Government recently passed an Urban Mass Transit Act containing a "Buy American" component that has a heavy impact on Canadian exports of transportation equipment. If the government procurement code were fully realized, enabling legislation or amendments to laws such as the Mass Transit Act would be necessary, which indicates the amount of work remaining to be

done in the Tokyo Round.

The fourth code, concerning subsidies and countervail duties, has been one of the most hotly-contested subjects of the Tokyo Round, and is shaping up as a major obstacle to any general agreement. On one side are nations, principally those of the European Economic Community, that use government subsidies in part as a means of encouraging exports; the code would seek to provide redress for other nations affected by these subsidies. On the other side is the use of countervail duties (principally by the United States) to offset any advantages that might be gained through export subsidies; the code would provide an injury test to demonstrate that economic disruption had actually resulted from subsidized exports. Were the matter limited to export subsidies, it would be more easily solved, but the issue cuts deeper than that. Export subsidies cannot be distinguished in practice from regional-development policies practised by many countries, such as the operation of Canada's Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). Hence, countervail duties, which can appear in some cases as a justifiable means of offsetting a government-induced advantage in the exporting country, can appear in other cases as an unjustifiable tampering with regional-development policies in the exporting country. Canada finds itself in the middle on this issue, between the EEC and the United States. It supports international guidelines that would restrict EEC domestic-subsidy programs, particularly those related to agricultural products, where Canadian interests are at stake. Canada is however, opposed to current U.S. countervail procedures, and has strongly pressed the United States to adopt an injury test that would more fairly determine the need for countervail actions. This issue has exacerbated bilateral trade relations with the United States in the past, notably over the export of tires from the DREE-supported Michelin plant in

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Nova Scotia, and more recently over the export of fish products. It would be helpful if the problem could be resolved in the context of a multi-lateral settlement.

The prospects are not promising for the subsidies/countervail code, however. The issue has become symbolic, with the Europeans on one side refusing to admit that the EEC's agricultural-export restitution system constitutes export subsidy, while, on the other side, the Americans are maintaining the right to countervail with no evidence of injury to U.S. industry. Much remains to be negotiated in the code, and the question is complicated by the fact that U.S. legislation requiring countervail duties on a number of EEC products is being waived until January 2, 1979, after which the duties automatically become obligatory. The Administration is unlikely actually to collect these duties, but the problem of who goes first nevertheless remains an awkward one. Congress has insisted it will not change U.S. countervail law without a completed package on subsidy/countervail as a *quid pro quo*, while the EEC has declared that it will not negotiate a subsidy/countervail package under the threat of a U.S. law it feels contravenes GATT obligations. It is entirely possible that this dispute will run out the clock on the negotiations over subsidy/countervail.

Agriculture and safeguards

Remaining areas of importance in the Tokyo Round include agriculture and safeguards. As to the first, the United States, Canada and

other exporting countries have pressed for a substantial agreement on agricultural products, involving in particular improved access to the EEC and Japan. As with the Kennedy Round, however, it is not expected much will materialize in this area. The Japanese have been unforthcoming in agriculture, and the EEC is much too absorbed internally in working out its Common Agricultural Policy to contemplate serious change in international trading patterns. What may evolve from the negotiations on agriculture is a new forum within GATT where the relations between internal agricultural programs and external agricultural trade might be examined in a comprehensive way. This may be an improvement over present procedures, since the trade-negotiating format has not generally been an effective mechanism for liberalizing agricultural trade.

The safeguard issue arises over attempts to clarify the provisions of Article XIX of GATT, under which imports that cause serious injury to domestic producers can be temporarily restricted. A major problem here has been the "selectivity" idea introduced by the EEC. This would allow a country to take action only against those countries whose exports were actually causing injury, rather than against all suppliers of the product in question. Selectivity represents an exception to the general GATT rule of non-discrimination, and is defended by the EEC on the ground that, in today's market, disruption is most usually caused by identifiable large shipments from single countries and it

is against such countries that action should be taken. The EEC position is unacceptable to most other countries, and it can be expected that there will be strong pressure to incorporate non-discrimination, or at least notification and consultation procedures in the draft text safeguards.

Prospects

At the Bonn "summit" last summer an agreement was reached among major participants in the Tokyo Round to conclude negotiations by December 1978. This target is particularly important to U.S. negotiators, who must give 90 days notice of impending trade legislation to Congress in addition to the 60 working days required by law for Congress to take action. As with past deadlines, the December target is important but probably not definitive, and its main implication will be that work not completed by the end of 1979 will probably not be advanced much in 1980. However, the early months of 1980 will present more serious deadlines. Multi-lateral negotiations inevitably involve trade-offs and interlocking issues, and there comes a point where failure to resolve a few sticky issues could cause the entire agreement to unravel. Negotiators will try to avoid this by maintaining the momentum for an agreement in the coming months. The best guess now is that a significant agreement will be reached, but with extreme difficulty. It is hard to imagine a worse economic climate in which to conclude a major initiative in trade liberalization.

Sorry we're late! A combination of having to wait for the award of a new printing contract followed by delays in the delivery of paper for the presses, has made the appearance of this issue later than usual. *We apologize for any inconvenience.*

Energy: an international problem

by Ulf Lantzke

Seldom during the postwar period have world economic prospects been so uncertain. Though industrial countries have managed to weather the recent recession, difficult economic problems persist, whose scale goes beyond the normal cyclical pattern of the postwar years.

While there is a complex set of causes that has given rise to these problems, it is important to recognize that energy is both an objective and a psychological factor underlying the present uncertain economic climate. It is an objective factor because the energy situation contributes directly to some of these problems — for example, inflation due to higher energy prices or the large energy component in trade deficits. It is a psychological factor because insecurity about energy undermines confidence in plans for economic expansion and reduces expectations among both investors and consumers about general economic prospects.

I do not want to overemphasize the role of energy in this process. Nevertheless, one cannot treat energy as an isolated issue. The energy problem has triggered far wider economic, and even political, problems, and one cannot afford to ignore the general context.

Future crisis

A number of commentators have recently made rather optimistic statements on the near-term energy situation, largely because of the current surplus in the world oil-market.

I cannot, however, share the view that the present oil-market surplus solves the energy problem. First, we must remember that we have paid a heavy price in reduced economic growth for the reduction that has taken place in oil demand. Secondly, we must recognize that prospective new supplies are relatively insignificant compared to incremental oil demand each year, though we have, at the same time, been fortunate that earlier investments in new supplies from the North Sea and Alaska have given us additional breathing space on the supply side.

Thirdly, the industrial nations continue to be extremely vulnerable to decisions by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries on supply and prices. Fourthly, there is the danger that the current

temporary oil-market surplus could mislead public opinion into believing that the energy problem does not exist, and thus undermine political support for the strong energy-policy measures that are necessary.

For the reality, underlined by a wide range of expert analysis, is that, if the industrial democracies do not strengthen their energy policies, then mounting oil demand will reach the limit of available supplies perhaps as soon as the mid-1980s, creating crisis conditions in world energy-markets, with severe economic and political consequences for all nations. It must be emphasized that, though such a crisis is very possible, it is not inevitable. It can be avoided if we act now, while we have a relatively calm energy environment, to initiate the necessary energy-policy measures that have long "lead times".

Consequences of doing nothing

If we do not strengthen our energy policies sufficiently, the gap between potential demand and available supply will be closed forcibly for us. In the short term, energy uncertainty would only continue to frustrate efforts to achieve non-inflationary economic recovery. Indeed, at the present time, one is constantly struck by the number of business people who point to energy uncertainty as a major element in their lack of confidence in the general economy. In the medium-to-long term, by not doing enough about energy we should be inviting steep and sudden price increases and chronic supply shortages.

In all the industrial democracies, energy problems would spill over into general economic difficulties by adding to inflationary pressures, larger balance-of-payments deficits, increasing trade restrictions, and monetary instability. As a result of these pressures, erosion of business and the confidence of investors

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could still further reduce economic activity and increase unemployment. Our economies would be faced with the task of trying to accomplish within a very short time major energy-induced structural changes under conditions of intolerably low economic growth.

It is hard to see how our societies could avoid the serious social and political unrest that might result from such general economic deterioration. The internal political stability of many countries could be gravely weakened.

Competition among nations for access to scarce oil-supplies could be particularly divisive. In such a situation of chronic shortage, the stronger economies may come off best in the short term, but this will mean that other nations may not have enough energy to meet their essential economic needs. The weaker economies might feel obliged to take severe deflationary and protectionist measures, which would, though a "feed-back" process, result in lower world economic growth and reduced trade and would, in the long run, adversely affect all countries.

Nor could it be ruled out that nations, either individually or collectively, would seek, through measures going beyond the usual forms of commercial competition, to develop preferential supply relations with oil-producing states. To the extent that these succeeded, they would threaten the flexibility of the world oil-trading system. Moreover, such arrangements could extend into politically sensitive areas such as arms sales, the supplying of sensitive nuclear technology without adequate safeguards, or fresh political complications in the settlement of the Middle East dispute. All these developments would have a negative effect on the interests of the Western industrial nations. And, indeed, they could create an atmosphere of confrontation that would be harmful to global relations. No one wants this situation to arise. Everyone realizes how inadequate such short-term responses would be. But we must ensure through action and co-operation on energy that conditions will not develop in the future that could give rise to such tendencies.

I believe, therefore, that, if we allow present energy trends to continue, if we do nothing about the energy situation, we can expect growing energy insecurity to have an increasingly negative effect on relations among the industrial nations — which would be disastrous for everyone.

Lengthy transition

We must recognize that the world faces a lengthy transition from primary reliance on relatively low-cost oil to greater reliance on other, more plentiful, energy resources and, later, to reliance on renewable energy systems. Although it will be a long process, if it is begun now it can be managed smoothly. If, on the other hand, the necessary changes have to be made suddenly the result will be costly disruption.

Market forces alone will not bring about such a transition. The investments required are of such magnitude and the strategic importance of energy is so great that the political responsibility of governments must be brought into play.

I do not underestimate the difficulties posed for many people by stronger energy programs. Measures required involve significant changes in the mode of living we have grown used to, and they also affect traditional interests. For example, penalties aimed at encouraging the production of more efficient cars or at improving energy efficiency in buildings may be quite painful. But the inconvenience of adapting to these changes is far less than the consequences of allowing the energy situation to worsen. Similarly, some energy-development projects may affect certain visual amenities — or even interfere with the mating habits of the caribou! Even though the environmental aspects are not important, they should be kept in the proper perspective — and the proper perspective as I have already described it is one that does not do serious damage to vital economic and political interests unless we act rapidly to improve the energy situation.

In view of the global nature of the energy problem, what sort of action is required and who should take it? On the demand side, we shall have to increase the efficiency of energy use and change the structure of energy consumption to match the new "mix" of energy supplies that will be available in the future. On the supply side, we need to maintain oil and gas production, greatly expand the role of coal and nuclear power and support vigorous programs to develop new energy technology.

International co-operation

In principle, it is individual governments that will have to decide on energy policies and implement them. The energy circumstances of the industrialized countries vary widely, and in countries such as Canada there are important regional differences that have to be reconciled. But, though policy must be implemented on a national scale, international co-ordination is vital, too. Energy interdependence is a reality, and the energy problem is an international one that can only be solved on an internationally co-ordinated basis. No nation can solve the problem on its own. If any major industrial nation attempts to "go it alone" irrespective of the plans or policies of other nations, it risks making the wrong decisions, making inefficient investments and jeopardizing not only its own economic prosperity but also that of its economic partners and political allies. Only through the co-ordinated efforts of all nations can we hope to guarantee sufficient energy supplies to meet future needs.

Each nation must make a contribution according to its ability. Among the industrial countries, the United States stands out as the country with the

greatest capability of reducing its oil imports, improving energy efficiency and expanding supplies. Perhaps the most urgent task of U.S. energy policy is to raise its energy prices closer to world levels, since action on pricing would have a major positive impact on the domestic and international aspects of energy policy. The potential of the other medium-sized economies, such as Japan, Germany, Britain and Canada, is also significant, for, in the aggregate, they could make a contribution as important as that of the United States. Because of the relatively poorer energy-resource base of the European nations and Japan, their contribution will differ from that of North America. Nevertheless, they too must make a determined effort to adapt their energy-consuming industries to a new energy structure.

Canada's role

Canada's role is an important one, not least because Canadian leadership in energy matters will have an important effect on the opportunities available to other countries. Considerable attention has been paid in Canada to energy policy since the 1973-74 energy crisis. Many improvements have been made that will ultimately have a beneficial impact on the domestic energy situation. Specific energy goals have been established. A pricing schedule for oil and gas has been adopted that should in time allow energy to be priced at more realistic levels. Energy conservation is taken seriously. But what about the international implications of Canadian energy policy? Canada is fortunate to be well endowed with energy sources — with deposits of conventional and non-conventional hydrocarbons, with large coal and uranium reserves, and with proved nuclear technology. Canadian energy-supply policies could make a significant contribution to an improved worldwide energy situation. What exactly should Canada do, and why?

Canadian coal policy, along with that of the United States and Australia, could greatly affect the energy alternatives open to Europe and Japan. If the Europeans and Japanese are to succeed in displacing oil in electricity-generation and in industry, they will require large quantities of imported coal. For Canada and other coal-producers, an enormous export potential exists in the long term. Co-operative international efforts to tap this potential could be aimed at large-scale expansion of a world coal-trading network, which would need stable trading conditions. Major infrastructure investments would be required in mining, inland and marine transportation and port facilities and would bring substantial economic benefits to all concerned.

On a similar basis, international co-operation could provide the right conditions for expanded exports of Canadian uranium and nuclear know-how to countries whose energy requirements over the remaining decades of this century cannot be met with-

out nuclear power. Again, assured supplies would be necessary to encourage Europe and Japan to develop adequate nuclear-generating capacity.

Canadian efforts to develop oil and gas in frontier areas could also make a significant contribution to the energy situation as a whole. First, expanded domestic oil-production would reduce the Canadian need to increase oil imports and would ease conditions in the world oil-market for countries poor in resources. Secondly, expanded gas exports to the United States could similarly help to reduce the U.S. need for increasing supplies of imported oil.

The point about all of these efforts is that, though they must be implemented on a national level (or, in Canada, often at the provincial level), they are part of a broader international effort. They require other countries to undertake complementary efforts; thus the European countries and Japan should be prepared to substitute imported coal for imported oil and to embark on the necessary structural changes in their energy economies. Canada would be required to adopt a more open attitude towards international investment and trade in energy.

World energy body

The International Energy Agency has been established as a framework within which such efforts can be organized internationally on a co-ordinated basis.

Canada's experience to date in the IEA is that closer consultation among member countries reduces their uncertainty concerning one another's plans and policies. International agreement on a broad policy approach on areas such as coal and nuclear policy can help to crystallize the decisions and directions each country must take in the light of its individual energy circumstances. Energy co-operation does not limit but rather enlarges the range of energy-policy options open to each country. Moreover, co-operation among industrial nations sets the stage for coherent forms of broader co-operation on a global scale with the oil-producing and other developing nations.

How can we ensure that this co-operation will be effective enough to match the nature and scale of the energy problem? How can we ensure that stronger policies are being implemented and that they are mutually consistent, so that they reinforce each other? Again, our experience within the IEA points to its usefulness as an instrument by means of which such co-operation can be assessed and intensified as necessary. Most important, it has established a policy framework in which long-term energy aims have been clearly defined and means are available to assess, on a continuing basis, the progress made in achieving those aims.

At a meeting in Paris last October, chaired by Alastair Gillespie, Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, ministers from IEA countries

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agreed on the basic elements that should be contained in each country's energy policy. Recognizing that only limited quantities of oil would be available from the world oil-market in the mid-to-late 1980s, they decided to establish a group objective of holding their oil imports in 1985 to no more than 26 mb/d. They also agreed upon 12 principles of energy policy that would serve as guidelines for the implementation of national policy efforts. These principles include the basic policy issues for North America, Europe and Japan I have already described.

Finally, they agreed that the International Energy Agency should conduct regular systematic reviews of each country's energy policy. These reviews are for the purpose of ensuring that the contribution of each country will be sufficient to achieve the group objective, as well as to indicate scope for improvements and the strengthening of energy policies.

Our country reviews have drawn attention to the fact that each country faces difficult issues in implementing stronger energy policies. Canada is no exception. For example, the decision on the Trans-Canadian gas pipeline did raise difficult issues for Canada — issues concerned with environmental impact and the rights of the Eskimo people. But one must remember too that this decision not only affected Canadian and U.S. energy prospects but was followed closely by other countries throughout the world. Similarly, the question of sovereignty over natural resources, whether federal or provincial, has been raised in the context of foreign investment and access to energy resources. But, again, these concerns must be set against the global energy problem and, indeed, its ultimate impact on the Canadian and Western economies.

With regard to nuclear policy, too, it is right that Canadians should be concerned about the spread of nuclear technology.

But this must be balanced against the fact that nuclear power is the only hope for some countries of meeting their energy requirements. Canada must accept the fact that other countries have real need of nuclear supplies and must ensure that they have access to such supplies so that nuclear power can be developed in a controlled way. Otherwise, countries will seek to satisfy their nuclear needs in whatever way they can, which may ultimately mean fewer controls over nuclear development.

Our most recent review of energy programs concluded that existing efforts in all IEA countries were insufficient to achieve the Agency's aims. In consequence, each country will have to implement stronger energy policies and take into account IEA recommendations such as those I have already discussed.

Benefits

Thus the IEA provides a forum in which the industrial democracies can work together to shape energy poli-

cies that respond to the needs of all groups of countries. The benefits of undertaking such co-operation and implementing stronger policies are considerable.

A leading benefit would be that all nations could look forward to an energy future of great security. Oil would be available in adequate quantities throughout the transition to alternative energy sources. Gas could make an increasingly important contribution and natural-gas infrastructures could be developed in such a way that they could also be used at a later stage for manufactured gas. Coal and nuclear power would increase their share of total energy supply and there would be enough time to develop the new energy technology that will be needed in the next century.

For a country like Canada, there would be significant benefits in the form of increased investments in energy production and enlarged secure export markets. There would be benefits too for the general economy. First, all nations would escape the severe economic consequences that would otherwise result from future imbalances between potential energy demand and available supply. Secondly, greater certainty on energy prospects would help to restore confidence. Moreover, the investment required to increase energy efficiency and to expand new supplies would give an important stimulus to economies. Many of the energy policy actions that are necessary, such as insulation in buildings, manufacturing an entire new generation of fuel-efficient cars, and construction of port facilities or railroads for coal transport, could increase the demand for goods and services in other key parts of the economy. Many are also labour-intensive and could help relieve persistent unemployment. Instead of being a constraint on growth in general economic activity, energy could serve as a means of giving renewed dynamism to the economies of IEA countries.

Finally, in political terms, the industrial nations could look forward to revitalized relations. Strengthened energy co-operation would remove a source of political weakness and instability. Success with energy would act as a powerful example of what could be done in other areas. The industrial nations would be in a stronger position to tackle difficult problems in various parts of the world — areas such as East-West relations, the Middle East, African problems and co-operation with the developing countries on economic and political issues.

Energy is a major challenge for all of the industrial nations, though it is a difficult one because it requires a continuing political commitment and strong and sustained action to meet it. The consequences of doing nothing threaten the vital interests of all regions. This means that we cannot afford to fail. On the other hand, the benefits of strong political leadership and action on energy would greatly enrich the relations among the industrial democracies. This opportunity should not be lost.

Lament for Third Option . . .

Only two years ago I was still taking comfort from the knowledge that Canadians are fair-weather nationalists; we would cease to be so stupidly obsessed by the threat of United States domination, I told myself, as soon as we were again confronted with problems of real substance. Now my worry is that the Government, apparently with broad popular support, has swung much too far towards the other extreme. Concern about independence has faded into insignificance. How can we expect the world to take Canada seriously when our moods and policies are so erratic?

The Third Option, we are assured from on high, is still official doctrine, and the "special relationship" with Washington has not been formally revived. But, on reading the speeches of the Honourable Don Jamieson, and more especially excerpts from the cloying dialogue between "Don" and "Cy", one really must wonder.

Admittedly, the Third Option was never intended to be anti-American. While seeking to strengthen Canada's distinctiveness, and to diminish its vulnerability to policy changes and other developments south of the border, the Government promised to maintain the substance of existing relations with the United States, and to conduct them in a co-operative spirit. If the Third Option means anything, however, we should be striving to augment ties with other countries and shunning new measures that would lock Canada more firmly into the American embrace.

The Northern pipeline appears to make economic sense, but could well be more integrative in its consequences than any changes in the regulations governing the continental flow of goods. Our one concern, to judge by the Parliamentary and public debate, has been "jobs for the boys", a determination to see that Canadians will get their full share of the new employment opportunities.

Similarly, the Government is to be applauded for not rejecting out of hand the Senate report endorsing continental free trade. Canada would not only prosper from such a reform but could strengthen its independence as well. I am startled, however, that the Senate committee has not been widely criticized for dismissing, with almost no explanation, the possible political implications of bilateral free trade. Conceivably the committee was influenced by the study of these implications that I wrote for the Economic Council of Canada.

More plausibly, it considered that extended comment was superfluous in view of the rapid decline in public and governmental concern about national independence. It is to be regretted, moreover, that Canada, were it to accept the Senate committee's advice, would now need to negotiate free trade from a weaker position than in 1975, when the Economic Council offered similar recommendations, or in 1947, when the initiative last came from Washington.

The decision not to buy the *Tornado*, the European candidate in the competition for a new fighter-reconnaissance aircraft for the Canadian forces, is another setback for the Third Option. Its purchase would have fostered a shift in trade and corporate structures from North America to transatlantic, and impressed foreign governments with our determination to diversify. I'm told that it was more suitable for the European theatre than the Canadian Arctic, and that we could not afford two different aircraft. One would have more confidence in the Government's decision, however, had it displayed greater support for the Third Option in other contexts, and if it were not so obvious that the Canadian brass have become homogenized into the North American *élite*.

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No. 5 (January 12, 1979) Diplomatic appointments — Arcand as Ambassador to Lebanon and concurrently to Syria and Jordan; Beaulne as Ambassador to the Holy See; Middleton as Ambassador to South Africa and concurrently High Commissioner to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; Morantz as Ambassador to Ethiopia; Roger as High Commissioner in Barbados and concurrently to Grenada and Dominica, as well as Commissioner to the West Indies Associated States and Montserrat; Sheehan as High Commissioner in Jamaica and concurrently in the Bahamas, as well as Commissioner to Belize; Trottier as Ambassador and Permanent Delegate to UNESCO.

No. 6 (January 18, 1979) Visit of OECD Secretary-General to Ottawa, January 22-24, 1979.

No. 7 (January 20, 1979) Canada/CARICOM Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement signed January 20, 1979.

No. 7 (January 29, 1979) Corrections to above release.

No. 8 (January 23, 1979) Canada presents *Cosmos 954* claim to U.S.S.R.

No. 9 (January 25, 1979) New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister visits Ottawa.

No. 10 (January 31, 1979) Agreement concerning investment insurance in Rwanda signed by Canada and Republic of Rwanda.

No. 11 (February 8, 1979) Visit to Canada of Foreign Minister of Republic of Korea.

No. 12 (February 9, 1979) Canada-France extradition agreement signed.

No. 13 (February 9, 1979) Canada-France agreement signed on transfer of prison inmates.

No. 14 (February 9, 1979) Canada-France social-security agreement signed.

No. 15 (February 14, 1979) Joint Canada-U.S. statement on Atlantic Coast fisheries and boundary agreements.

No. 16 (February 16, 1979) Canada announces recognition of Iranian provisional government.

No. 17 (February 19, 1979) Special Canadian representative at St. Lucia independence celebrations named.

No. 18 (February 22, 1979) Canada-Australia Literary Prize winner announced.

No. 19 (February 23, 1979) Canada-Denmark marine-environment talks, Ottawa, February 21 and 22, 1979.

No. 20 (February 27, 1979) Canada-Mexico treaty on prisoner transfer ratified.

No. 21 (February 28, 1979) Canada agrees to protect Israeli interests in Iran.

No. 22 (March 2, 1979) UN Human Rights Commission chooses Canadian chairman.

No. 23 (March 6, 1979) Canada-EEC fisheries relations.

No. 24 (March 7, 1979) March 12 chosen as Commonwealth Day.

No. 25 (March 9, 1979) Canadian response to fifth annual report of IJC on Great Lakes water quality.

No. 26 (March 12, 1979) "Proximity" talks on Namibian settlement set for New York, March 13-20, 1979.

No. 27 (March 15, 1979) Joint press release issued at end of second meeting of Canada-Japan Joint Economic Committee, Tokyo, March 15, 1979.

No. 28 (March 16, 1979) Canadian delegation named to eighth session of Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, March 19 to April 27, 1979.

No. 29 (March 29, 1979) Canada-U.S. fisheries and boundary agreements signed in Washington, March 29, 1979.

No. 30 (March 29, 1979) Vietnamese diplomat declared *persona non grata*.

No. 31 (March 29, 1979) Diplomatic appointments — Béchard as Consul General in New Orleans; Nutt as Consul General in New York; Stone as Consul General in Chicago.

- No. 32 (March 30, 1979) Regional passport offices to be opened in Calgary, Saskatoon, Hamilton, Quebec City and St John's.

Statements and Speeches, published by the External Information Programs Division:

- No. 79/1 Canada reminds the Security Council of its South-east Asian Responsibilities. A statement by Ambassador W.H. Barton, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, in the Security Council, New York, on February 24, 1979.
- No. 79/2 Canada and the States of the Caribbean Community. A statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, on the occasion of the signing of the Canada/CARICOM Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement in Kingston, Jamaica, on January 20, 1979.
- No. 79/3 A Canadian View of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Young Presidents' Organization of Ontario, Toronto, February 5, 1979.
- No. 79/4 An Auspicious Development in Canada-U.S. Relations. Remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, in announcing the Agreement on Atlantic Coast Fisheries and Boundaries, Ottawa, February 14, 1979.

Treaty Information

*Bilateral**Algeria*

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria constituting an Agreement amending and extending the Agreement between Canada and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria concerning the Establishment of a Line of Credit for Co-operation, dated June 1, 1973

Algiers, November 6, 1978, and February 12, 1979

In force February 12, 1979

With effect June 1, 1978

France

Agreement between Canada and France concerning Extradition

Ottawa, February 9, 1979

Agreement between Canada and France on the Transfer of Inmates and the Supervision of Persons under Sentence

Ottawa, February 9, 1979

Agreement between Canada and France on Social Security

Ottawa, February 9, 1979

Denmark

Treaty between Canada and the United Kingdom of Denmark concerning Extradition

Ottawa, November 30, 1977

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

February 13, 1979

In force February 13, 1979

Indonesia

Convention between Canada and the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Tax Income and on Capital

Jakarta, January 16, 1979

Korea, Republic of

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Korea constituting an Agreement with Respect to the Protection of Industrial Property

Ottawa, February 13, 1979

In force February 13, 1979

Mexico

Treaty between Canada and Mexico on the Execution of Penal Sentences

Ottawa, November 22, 1977

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

February 27, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Philippines

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Philippines constituting an Agreement relating to Trade in certain Textile Products

Manila, February 19, 1979

In force January 1, 1979

Rwanda

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Rwanda constituting an Agreement relating to Canadian Investments in Rwanda assured by the Government of Canada through its Agency the Export Development Corporation

Kigali, January 30, 1979

United States

Protocol amending the Convention of August 16, 1916, for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States

Ottawa, January 30, 1979

Multilateral

Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Governments of the Member States of the Caribbean Common Market

Kingston, January 20, 1979

Protocol amending the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean

Done at Tokyo, April 25, 1978

Instruments of Ratification exchanged

February 15, 1979

Entered into force February 15, 1979

Amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, 1972

Adopted at London, October 12, 1978

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited

February 27, 1979

Convention on Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture

Signed at Washington, March 6, 1979

June, July/August 1979

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
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Towards a foreign policy for Canada in the 1980s

by Douglas Roche

Alexander Solzhenitsyn's indictment of the West for losing its courage provides a good introduction to an examination of Canada's role in the world community as it enters the 1980s. The Russian exile declared at Harvard that the fight for the planet, physical and spiritual, had already started, adding that we were nevertheless oblivious to new dangers, spiritually exhausted and content to see the media reflect our "prescribed smiles and raised glasses".

What kind of world is Solzhenitsyn talking about?

It is a world of multidimensional dangers: the escalation of nuclear arsenals and conventional weapons, imbalances of food and population, violations of human rights, depletion of resources, economic disorder, an upsurge in violence and terrorism. These are the critical problems of our time that demand political solutions. Long-range survivalist policies are imperative to protect the next generation, and the one after that, from even greater global disorder.

Yet there is no sense of urgency, or even priority, in Canada concerning global problems. On any list of the ten most important problems Canada faces, foreign policy is usually eleventh. The debates on international unity and the domestic economy have so mesmerized Canadians that they have forgotten that 99.7 per cent of the world's land and 99.5 per cent of its people exist outside Canada. *Saturday Night* has described the situation as the "decline and fall of Canada's foreign policy". Certainly the optimistic and generous spirit of Canada in the 1950s and 1960s has been replaced by a defensive and restrictive mood in the 1970s. A self-serving inwardness is the new characteristic of our society. Solzhenitsyn could have had Canada in mind.

It is ironic that this new insularity has occurred precisely the moment when the conjunction of two great trends ought to be awakening us to new challenges. First, the gravity of the global problems reveals an unprecedented crisis of social organization, and of civilization itself. Secondly, with the fantastic advances of science and technology that could ensure a life of human dignity for everyone, human development has reached a turning-point.

A geopolitical movement of historic proportions

is taking place in the world today. Changes and developments in the world economy, in political institutions, in the environment, and in science itself have combined to produce a world that, though composed of independent and sovereign states, is becoming more interdependent. Thus we are entering a totally new period in our planet's history. As the Club of Rome points out in *Goals for Mankind*:

Through the birth of a spirit of world solidarity . . . the world would change from an arena of marginal security and economic and political conflict to a global society of undiminished diversity but firm collective self-reliance, greater security and more equity.

Fundamental unity

For a long time, of course, we have known of the inescapable physical unity of the planet, the interdependence of winds, tides and climates. International systems of trade and commerce reflect this physical interdependence. Now I sense a new recognition of the fundamental unity of mankind.

Last summer I travelled round the world on a foreign-policy mission for the Progressive Conservative Party. One cannot make such a journey round McLuhan's "global village" without being profoundly impressed with a new sense of human creativity. As I travelled through several countries, seeing people in their own surroundings, I was aware of the deep common desires that link the human family. People everywhere want to live in an atmosphere of security, economic progress and human dignity. The wide discrepancies in the ability to attain these goals jolt the traveller, but the desire to have decent, happy, peaceful, orderly, satisfying human relations is now universal.

Mr Roche is the Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Edmonton Strathcona. A former journalist, he is the author of several books on international economic development. This article was written by Mr Roche in 1978 and has not been revised by him since then. The views expressed are those of the author.

I remember vividly: the native Anglican priest from the Solomon Islands proudly carrying his country's flag down the aisle of Westminster Abbey during a service marking the entry of the Solomons into the Commonwealth; the widow in an Indian village, grateful for a dairy co-operative that bought the milk from the buffalo tethered to her hut; the rich Japanese businessman telling what legislative improvements were needed in Canada to make our country more attractive to Japanese capital. These incidents reveal the very human qualities that make up a world of instant communication and rapid transportation.

All this is a new sign of hope that the world, amid its griefs and anxieties, can attain a more balanced and stable development. The problem is how to make sensible international arrangements that will promote the new creativity possible in the technological age.

The task, therefore, for Canadian foreign policy in the 1980s is to reconcile independence with interdependence. To do so it must be flexible enough to take an enlarged view of the opportunities that unite and the problems that divide mankind. Unfortunately, we lack the drive to act in accordance with this enlarged view.

Weak image

Time and again, in meetings held during my trip, the message was conveyed to me, sometimes indirectly, sometimes directly, that Canada was not regarded as playing its full and proper role in world affairs. Despite the presence of competent officers in its foreign service, Canada's image abroad is weak and its performance mediocre. The inadequacies of political direction in Ottawa result in confusion, poor morale in the field and a sense of diminished stature for Canada.

In the 1978 cutbacks, the Government slashed the budget of the Department of External Affairs by \$20.9 million and froze the budget of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) by withholding an anticipated \$133-million increase as part of Ottawa's desperate restraint program. Although a vigorous external policy does not depend on money alone, these cuts are not likely to improve Canada's performance abroad. How can we meet the demand for Canadian participation in the UN peacekeeping forces when \$150 million is cut from the defence budget? How can we reach the declared goal of .7 per cent of the gross national product in official development assistance when CIDA's budget is frozen? How can we improve the Canadian presence abroad when we are closing embassies?

Indeed, the inability to manage the federal budget in a systematic way has prevented Canada from fulfilling its responsibility in the international community — and this at a time when we should be more, not less, active in the world.

I am not arguing that a country of 23 million people could or should remake the world in its image. But it is in our own interests, as the second-largest country in the world, possessing enormous resources, land and technology, to play a leading role in building the planetary conditions for peace. Canadians are among the most privileged and fortunate people in the world. If we want to preserve the security, freedom and progress that we enjoy, Canadian foreign policy should be pursued with more vigour.

Some say that we cannot focus on foreign policy until we get our own house in order, until our national unity and domestic economy problems are solved — a shortsighted view. The world is changing rapidly and will not wait for Canada. Moreover, a new understanding of Canada's role in a world seeking more security, trade and development would itself be an important element in the internal struggle to preserve national unity. In short, planning and explaining to the public a constructive role for Canada in the world community during the next decade can help us renew the sense of purpose and direction in this country.

That sense of purpose is found in John Holmes' phrase "enlightened internationalism". By this I mean that we stop separating the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity and human rights. The new issues of foreign policy include the escalating arms race, nuclear proliferation, food and energy shortages, the problems of international development, and world-wide inflation and unemployment.

Our goal should be the strengthening of Canada's voice and action in the world community. Only the world community can bring about practical solutions to global human problems — to end world hunger in the next ten years, to provide every human being with clean water by 1990, to introduce a housing program that will provide a decent shelter for every family in the world.

In an interdependent world, Canada's future depends as much on the solution of problems caused by the unequal distribution of the world's resources as it does on the search for *détente*; in such a world developments in the Middle East and in southern Africa can be of no less concern to us than our own relations with the United States and Europe. In the name of our common humanity, we must seek to ensure that human rights are universally respected.

Total review

Canada cannot, of course, be a major player in every arena. Nor should we try to make policy overnight reacting to the latest headlines. The careful construction of a foreign policy for the 1980s that will be both realistic and productive demands a total review of present Canadian policy.

The last time foreign policy was reviewed was in 1970 — since when one shock-wave after another has

been felt. The price spiral started by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, Soviet military expansion, China's westward orientation, the North-South development imbalance, recession in the West spawning protectionism, and a new demand for human rights — all have had a major impact on world affairs. The magnitude of the new problems, and the new opportunities, requires a new Canadian approach.

This does not mean throwing out all the old policies. In fact, the preparation for the 1980s ought to reaffirm Canada's traditional, and necessarily strong, ties with the United States, its defence alliances and the Commonwealth. The biggest foreign-policy mistake the Government made in the Seventies was to give the impression that we were downgrading these ties. This impression had serious repercussions abroad and upset and confused the Canadian public.

It is precisely because of the dramatic changes in the world that, to be supported by the electorate, responsive foreign policy needs to be presented in terms that are reassuring as well as challenging. To knock over the sign-posts of the past is not only one further aggravation in the age of discontinuity but bad policy organization as well. A sense of our own history must inspire each new step forward.

That is why I am proposing that the formulation of a new policy to meet the demands of the Eighties be done in terms that are both important and understandable. There are three areas — security, trade and development — through which the old and the new currents flow. By approaching a reconstituted foreign policy in the light of what ought to be done by Canada on security, what ought to be done on trade, and what ought to be done on development, Canada will find it possible to develop a comprehensive policy that will enable it to relate systematically to an interdependent world. Only by recognizing the interrelations between the security, trade and development aspects of our foreign policy can we establish cohesion, clarity and conviction — and show the Canadian people why it is in our interest to become more active in foreign policy.

Security

Canadian security is of primary importance. Despite the human movement forward, the world remains an increasingly dangerous place. All the briefings I have received from security experts have convinced me that strong and expensive defence commitments must be maintained, especially while Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe and Africa is so pronounced. The first requirement for any government is to maintain strength against attack and to work for nuclear control to prevent expansionists and revolutionaries from slaughtering humanity and blowing up the planet in the process.

Far from undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (as Canada did in the early Seventies),

we should reaffirm our commitment to that organization as the key alliance maintaining stability between the superpowers. This entails broadening Canada's participation in the joint international efforts of NATO in the areas of strategic and economic study, as well as political exchange, while maintaining and improving the present level of commitment to the Alliance in Europe. NATO — and the North American Air Defence Command as well — provide the only assurance Canada has against aggression, besides making possible a certain degree of influence on the maintenance of a semblance of order and security in a crisis-ridden world.

Security, however, demands more than a military presence. One of the paradoxes of the modern world is that, though arms are necessary, the arms race itself is a threat to security. The arms race, aside from being potentially fatal to the world, siphons off untold quantities of resources and scientific expertise needed for world development.

Canada, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, should work more diligently to create the conditions for peace. A willing participation in workable UN peacekeeping arrangements is part of this task. In his latest report, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim appealed again for governments to bring their problems to the Security Council, declaring that, if the Council had the will and means to deal with them on merit, "we would have made a decisive step towards world order". Used properly, the United Nations can be the instrument for overcoming much of the mistrust and insecurity that make so many international problems insoluble.

Human rights

One of the conditions for peace is universal respect for human rights. The widespread practice of torture, degradation of the human spirit and suppression of basic political and civil rights lead to further violence.

Amnesty International, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year, emphasizes the fact that becoming aware of the need for international rules to safeguard the individual's rights is the first step towards achieving international machinery for maintaining them. Action by individual governments will never be sufficient. International responsibility in this field is increasingly recognized.

The argument that the treatment of its citizens by a state is strictly an internal matter and should not be subjected to foreign intervention is no longer valid. The shared commitment to the United Nations Charter and other human-rights documents has irrevocably placed human rights on the agenda of subjects of common international concern.

That is perhaps the chief lesson of the Belgrade Conference, where 35 nations, including Canada, reviewed all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act. Although this conference could not provide a substantive docu-

Bilateral

ment on human rights, the very fact that the whole issue is today a central factor in East-West relations is itself a sign of progress. Western pressure is bringing some slight improvement to civil rights in the Soviet Union — e.g., on reunification of families — but this amelioration has been accompanied by tougher Kremlin action against internal dissent. It is thus, as the *Christian Science Monitor* remarked, “a delicate line the West treads in pressing the Soviets to be more humane without inviting even harsher policies”.

Acknowledging the delicacy, the Canadian Government needs to take a more forthright and active role in those international bodies that are charged with the safeguarding of human rights — in particular, to press for the appointment of a UN Commissioner for Human Rights. We need to give more than lip service to the principle of human dignity. Where religious and ethnic communities are denied civil and political rights, or are refused social, economic or cultural justice, Canadians ought to declare their active support for these communities when they demand freedom for their members — notably freedom of emigration and equality of political expression. Further, the reunification of families and persecution of non-violent dissidents should be raised on all possible occasions by the Canadian Government in its relations with foreign governments.

In view of the lack of progress at Belgrade, Canada should look elsewhere for ways in which its foreign policy might more effectively work towards the end of human-rights violations. One such area is external aid. The Government of Canada should reduce to a minimum its material assistance to, and symbolic approval of, governments that commit gross violations of human rights. Necessary food aid should be exempted from such a policy.

The year 1978, the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption by the UN of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, was dedicated to the theme of education about human rights. A Canadian foreign policy vigorously directed against human-rights violations could increase the awareness by Canadians of this fundamental issue.

Trade

When we consider Canada's trade position, it is easily understood why the maintenance of a strong and productive relation with the United States is essential. The U.S. accounts for 72 per cent of Canada's exports, and the trading relation with the U.S. continues to grow despite the “Third Option” and the “contractual link” with the European Economic Community.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, which advocated in 1973 the development of closer trade links and a contractual link with Europe, presented a new report this summer advocating bilateral free trade with the United States. In short, the committee

said that the Third Option was unrealistic; bilateral free trade was essential to the stimulation of industrial development in Canada. With trade blocs growing and non-tariff barriers being raised against third countries, the committee concluded that Canada could not remain “odd man out”.

The response to this recommendation will depend in part on the outcome of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations. But already the report has served to focus on Canada-U.S. trade as a basic component of foreign policy. If the free-trade idea is advanced, dislocations in Canadian industry are inevitable. Is the price of these dislocations acceptable in the name of a stronger Canadian economy in the Eighties? And is not an economically-strong Canada a prerequisite to preserving our cultural and political identity?

This question is, of course, closely linked to the larger issue of trade-liberalization. The protection of Canadian industries from the exports of rapidly industrializing nations is becoming increasingly costly, as we see in the textile and footwear industries.

Arguments against trade-liberalization have focused on the unemployment that would result in Canada. Yet the Economic Council of Canada, as well as the World Bank, maintain that open trade fosters a more rational division of labour, provides products at lower prices, and thus reduces inflationary pressures and encourages expansion in markets for Canada's own exports. Of course, liberalization must be accompanied by a domestic program of adjustment and stimulus in industries where Canada has a comparative advantage.

In the words of the Economic Council:

The best policy for Canada will be one that enables industrial capability to arise wherever there is an actual or potential comparative advantage — including in developing countries — so that factors of production at home may be concentrated in areas where Canadian efficiency is greatest.

Some of the most rapid rates of growth are projected in manufacturing, especially wood and paper products, mixed fertilizers, non-industrial chemicals, non-metallic mineral products, aircraft and parts, and electrical industrial equipment, including communications equipment. The Canadian private sector should become involved in the implementation of foreign policy through joint ventures in these and other areas.

I have seen the vast new opportunities for economic co-operation and trade that exist in several countries in the Middle East and Asia. The development of Canadian business opportunities abroad ought to be just as much an aim of foreign policy as adequate diplomatic representation.

International economic co-operation — as much as security — is a prerequisite for peace and stability.

Once we grasp fully that low productivity, in both the developed and developing worlds, is at the heart of present economic instability, it becomes easier to take a systematic approach to Canada's role in world development.

It is in the interest of both rich and poor to boost productivity all over the world, and this can best be done by stabilizing commodity prices, lowering tariff barriers, increasing the flow of capital into the developing world, and improving the transfer of technology. All of this constitutes the North-South dialogue, which, unfortunately, has lost sight of the interdependence of global interests.

There are important gains to be made by forging a stronger North-South partnership. Most of the industrial countries are today afflicted by high unemployment, slow growth and continuing inflation. Similarly, the developing countries, particularly the poorer ones, suffer directly from the repercussions of this recession — and even those that have gained from the rise in oil prices or exports of manufactures have lost out to inflation and protectionist pressures in the industrial economies.

To move towards a more dynamic global economy could thus be in the mutual interest of both North and South. By raising the purchasing power among the greatly-expanding populations of the South, releasing new resources and developing new markets for both poor and rich, higher levels of trade can be created within and among all countries. In effect, the developing countries of the South could become one of the engines of growth of resumed progress in the industrial world.

My argument is thus that economic growth in the North demands progress in the South.

Bridge-building

This idea ought to permeate a new Canadian strategy for international development co-operation as the Third Development Decade starts in 1980. Here is where Canada can play a major bridge-building role in the international community. It is time to offer a moderate yet constructive solution to world poverty that avoids the extremes of utopian solutions and intransigence or structural change. As Maurice J. Williams, chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, notes:

Broad international support is more likely to be mobilized for evolutionary changes which remove unjust constraints in the international economic order, facilitate an on-going process of structural change, and encourage a concerted effort to help weak and vulnerable people.

Canada is better suited to lead than to be a grudging participant in the search for new order in the world.

The goal of improved economic relations should be to bring about equality of opportunity, both within and among nations, rich as well as poor, without discrimination as to race, colour, religion or sex. Consequently, it should be a matter of priority for national and international efforts to meet the basic human needs of the vast majority of mankind by the turn of this century, by enabling the poorest sections of society to increase their productivity and to participate in economic development on an equal footing and on the basis of self-reliance.

The complex North-South question can be boiled down to a two-pronged approach: the provision of basic needs and the mutuality of North-South trading interests.

Committed Canadian leadership could help significantly to develop better negotiating attitudes in international forums searching for new arrangements in the fields of trade, commodities and credit. The struggle in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development over the Common Fund for Commodities is a case in point.

It is no longer enough to think that aid (particularly when it is tied so tightly to Canadian benefit) is a sufficient response to the challenge of world development. A more realistic Canadian policy would comprise such multiple steps as: more emphasis on water-management and soil-conservation and the notion of self-reliance in our aid program; intensified and continuous technical co-operation with developing countries; and domestic industrial-adjustment strategies to enable Canada to produce more of the high-technology goods needed on world markets.

To restore the Canadian public's confidence in the \$1.2-billion CIDA operation, it will be necessary to make public an independent management study of the Agency. Only in this way can Parliament decide whether aid is as effectively administered as it might be and whether it really helps the poorest people whom Canadians wish to help. This move, coupled with the establishment of a Canadian Advisory Council on International Development to provide systematic consultation between business, labour and government, would stimulate public support for a renewed development effort in the 1980s.

Finally, we are left with Solzhenitsyn's call to rise to a new height of vision in the global community. If a nation as blessed as Canada cannot respond to such a challenge, what hope is there for humanity? We must ask ourselves if we have the courage to bring peace and hope to a world in conflict.

Is External Affairs a central agency? — a question of leadership controls

by W. M. Dobell

Deputy ministers do not deliver speeches to gain partisan political exposure. They may speak more today than a generation ago, yet as a group they still do not talk very much to public audiences. It may occasionally be necessary to represent a department at a senior level when its minister is unavailable and the parliamentary assistant too inexperienced. Nevertheless a deputy ministerial address remains a rare occurrence. It usually means not that an occasion requires a speech but that selling an idea demands an audience. A deputy minister who has been the senior civil servant in three departments over ten years may well have perspectives worthy of reflection. Thus, when the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs delivers a public lecture on the role of his department within the fabric of government, his message should be studied. Yet, as a shrewd practitioner of bureaucratic politics, he would be the last to expect his words to be taken as Holy Writ.

"The Government considers the Department of External Affairs to be a central agency," the Under-Secretary boldly declared in Toronto on February 15, reasserting a few

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minutes later that "there is no doubt that the Government regards the Department as a central agency." To understand the implications of this statement, some knowledge of what constitutes a central agency is required. What units within the Federal Government are accepted as central agencies? Which of their responsibilities make them central agencies?

The term "central agency" has gained increasing currency throughout the 1970s, but has yet to find a regular place in the table of contents or index of standard works on the Canadian Federal Government or Canadian public administration. Since some phrases that sound similar are not synonymous while others are, a necessary step is the clarification of terminology. The Post Office, which is supposed to supply a service to the Canadian public, is an example of a central-service agency. It is not a central agency, and even its performance of a service efficiently would not make it one.

Crown corporations are sometimes called Crown "agencies", and are then subdivided into three categories, one of which is the "agency corporation". Examples of the latter are Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and the National Harbours Board, which have considerable authority but within a limited jurisdiction. Neither the umbrella Crown agency nor the more specific agency corporation is analogous to a central agency. On the other hand, a central control agency, a central policy

agency, or a central policy-support organization is a central agency.

Definition

Although the term central agency has become bureaucratized, it has not progressed sufficiently from the colloquial to the institutional to have become a statutory term of some precision. An acceptable definition would involve three components: a broad spectrum of government activities; a co-ordinating role with respect to those activities; and a leadership role with respect to the co-ordination. How policy-oriented a spectrum, how extensive the co-ordination and how much authority should accompany the leadership are not as widely accepted.

No one would fail to list the Privy Council Office as a key central agency. It is responsible to its President, who has also served as Deputy Prime Minister for nearly three years, and to the Prime Minister. Some would list the Prime Minister's Office as a separate central agency, but its limited size and capacity make this questionable without the co-operation and support of the PCO, it could not adequately perform central-agency functions. The two complement each other in what has become a cliché of the Seventies — the PCO is non-partisan, operationally-oriented yet politically-sensitive, whereas the PMO is partisan, politically-oriented yet operationally-sensitive. No draft legislation on any subject can reach Cabinet without passing the scrutiny of the PCO; every proposal is

checked to ensure that the requisite co-ordination has been undertaken and the probable consequences assessed.

Since the era of the Glassco Commission on Government Organization, the Treasury Board has been the other indisputable central agency. That term was used by its Secretary ten years ago, at least in the negative sense of denying that a central agency was like Kafka's castle - amorphous, inaccessible and powerful. But it was expected to evaluate the effectiveness of programs, to ascertain the relations of competing programs to government goals, and to ensure that funding was consistent with predetermined priorities.

A much more questionable central agency is the Public Service Commission. After the Glassco reforms, some of the old Civil Service Commission's hiring functions were taken over by departments, and its pay-research functions fell to the Treasury Board. Even "pre-Glassco", the CSC's control functions were in too narrow an area to make it a convincing central agency, had the term been in vogue. The present PSC possesses broad staffing responsibilities and advisory duties in organization and management analysis, but makes almost no contribution to substantive public policy.

Finance

Enlarging the central-agency category beyond the PCO and the Treasury Board involves considering particular government departments whose responsibilities might be thought to involve the equivalent of central-agency status. Of these, the department with the largest operating budget is Finance, which is responsible for the Federal Government's fiscal and economic policy. Finance has a clear co-ordinating and leadership role in all areas of government expenditure; other departments are well aware that they cannot spend money Finance has not raised. External Affairs has not sought to compete with it for leadership in international financial and

monetary questions. In the Under-Secretary's February lecture, Finance was the only other department listed as a central agency.

The Board of Economic Development's jurisdiction might appear on paper to have the breadth, co-ordination and leadership attributes associated with a central agency. Such a generous interpretation would be contingent on a support role on the part of Finance, the Treasury Board and the Deputy Prime Minister. The full participation of all three in the new board is less than formalized, and indeed the whole board may prove to have enjoyed an ephemeral existence. Many of its responsibilities and staff have, however, moved over from Industry, Trade and Commerce, leaving the latter much weakened. Traditionally, I, T and C has been the department most resistant to any imperial pretensions on the part of External Affairs. At the moment, it is no worthy adversary, any central-agency pretensions having lain dormant throughout the winter.

A final department to be considered is Justice, which is charged with drafting bills for the entire Federal Government prior to their submission to Parliament. That is an internal Government service, not a substantive policy "input". Its liaison with the provinces on legal and constitutional matters, however, and its responsibility for the Government's legal position, give Justice a major policy role. It could readily enough manage Canada's international legal position as well, further consolidating its own case for central-agency status, should External Affairs cease to discharge that function. That option enjoys little support at External Affairs, even among diplomats indifferent to the central-agency argument. To the diplomatic central-agency enthusiasts such a transfer would be unthinkable, for the international legal mandate is an integral part of External's case.

It is now time to examine that case. Having defined such common agreement as exists on the import of

central-agency principles, and listed the candidates mentioned in the debate, what is the rationale for including External Affairs? Looking back to 1977, when he took up his post, the Under-Secretary was convinced that the Department must become "a modern central-policy agency". So apparently it was not a central agency two years ago. Yet, in February of this year, he stated that it was one, together with the PCO, the Treasury Board and Finance. How other departments or foreign-service officers had failed to adjust to the situation was not made clear, but the fact that External Affairs was a central agency was "less appreciated" than it should have been: "It is part of my purpose to ensure that this is understood and that the Department acts accordingly."

The Under-Secretary acknowledged having posed four basic questions in 1977: What did the Government expect of the Department? What authority did the Department need? What structural changes had to be made at headquarters and abroad? And what personnel policies were required? His answer to the first was a strong foreign-affairs role, more analysis of international issues, and awareness of competing policy objectives and provincial interests. This expression of generality could hardly be criticized. It was in answering the second question that the plan for central-agency status became most apparent.

"Central agencies not only co-ordinate and consult, they lead on key issues of national policy." External Affairs had "a responsibility to provide other departments with coherent policy and priority guidance"; each central agency had its task, and External's was to be the "central foreign-policy-management agency". The Under-Secretary did not precisely state what authority was needed - but leaders do expect to be followed, priorities involve an established order, and management implies control. When he had begun his career 22 years earlier, the speaker recalled, the Department

had a clear mandate to lead and to manage. A reinforced mandate was evidently being sought, albeit through depicting a central-agency role that incorporated directional powers. The difficulty here is that the speaker was suggesting something beyond an Under-Secretary's capacity to command.

Part of the Under-Secretary's third question was within the Department's control — i.e., what changes had to be made at headquarters. The changes specified — establishing a new level of Deputy Under-Secretaries capable of acting as surrogate Under-Secretaries, appointing special co-ordinators for disarmament and development policy, and establishing *ad hoc* task forces — had already occurred. Apart from demonstrating a willingness and ability to take charge, the intra-Departmental changes do not appear to do very much to establish External's interdepartmental mandate.

New procedures

The other part of that third question (i.e., what changes had to be made at posts) was back in the realm of matters beyond the Department's unilateral control. But in this instance the Under-Secretary was able to announce that new procedures had been agreed on by the Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations. In 1970 a confidential task force had recommended a single comprehensive system for an integrated foreign-operations program. Full structural integration (or unification, as it was called) would have absorbed I, T and C's Trade Commissioner Service, Manpower and Immigration's Foreign Service Branch, and the Canadian International Development Agency's development officers into a single unified foreign service in which the influence of External Affairs would have been predominant. Because of interdepartmental resistance, only the lower-level or support-staff integration was introduced in 1971. The system was a hybrid, with administrative service under External Affairs and foreign-

service officers independently controlled by their respective departments.

The new procedure agreed to in 1978 involved assigning "line authority" to the head of post over all operations within the scope of approved programs. The individual program manager was not to treat his home department as his sole controlling authority, but he was to be responsible as well to his head of post for approval of the planning and implementation of all program objectives. The practice of imperfectly informing the head of post was "no longer acceptable". The ICER departments and CIDA had established "unequivocally that the head of post is accountable both to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and to the relevant deputy ministers, for all post activities in their respective jurisdictions".

Although the obligation on the program manager was intended to clarify the role and reaffirm the authority of the head of post, the dual accountability of the head of post to Ottawa went beyond that. It was well short of unification, but it was a further step beyond the integration process of 1971. Where the head of post is a diplomat, External Affairs acquires a post-program responsibility for the programs of other departments; where the head of post is from another department, he is still accountable to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. This innovation did lend some additional support to the central-agency claim, dovetailing thereby with the Under-Secretary's second question about what authority the Department needed.

His fourth question — what personnel policies were required — was reminiscent of his approach to changes at headquarters. His emphasis was on quality, semi-specialist training, much-increased two-way secondment, some lateral entry, and a slowdown in the process of rotation. Like the headquarters changes, there was little direct relevance to External's mandate, but an undertaking of largely internal initiatives

that could affect behaviour and image. Rotational deceleration, in particular, was intended to enhance the level of effectiveness of diplomats in Ottawa by reducing the disadvantage of unfamiliarity with issues in the "interdepartmental game". When playing bureaucratic politics for central-agency status the Under-Secretary obviously saw no point in playing under a handicap.

Credentials

In addition to posing his four questions, the Under-Secretary spoke of the Department's authority to act as a central agency in matters of formal credentials, particularly those of the Minister, and of informal arrangements, including his own role. Under formal credentials, he briefly listed legislation, Orders-in-Council, Cabinet directives and custom and precedents, specifying the SSEA's authority to sign all submissions to Cabinet concerning international agreements and the size and composition of delegations to international conferences. The content of these formal credentials was evidently somewhat less than compelling. In its efforts to exercise this authority, according to the Under-Secretary, the Department ran into problems that compelled it to rely largely on informal arrangements.

It is an accepted principle that even the humblest department supports its minister to the full. Nevertheless, the Under-Secretary chose to include constant support for the Minister as an informal device to consolidate and enhance the Department's role as a central agency. His citation of the SSEA's chairmanship of the Cabinet Committee on External Affairs and National Defence ignores the fact that all the major relevant studies of the 1970s — the foreign-policy review, the development-assistance review, the long-range patrol-aircraft decision and the European-sector battle-tank purchase — bypassed this committee.

Perhaps for this reason the participation of the Minister in the key Priorities and Planning Com-

committee is also mentioned. But the SSEA only happens to be a member of the latter committee; he is not so automatically, and the next Minister may not be included. Central-agency status would seem logically to require that relevant policy decisions for Cabinet approval be handled by a committee in which the Department enjoys a *primus inter pares* advantage, the leverage of chairmanship. In Priorities and Planning, the Minister's "clout" is more political than departmental, which does little to support the central-agency claim.

Regarding his own role, the Under-Secretary believes that his most important responsibility is that of making recommendations for heads of post. Although assisted by ICER, he alone has that responsibility, he avers, and some of the posts are the equal of deputy ministers in scope. The problem about this assertion is that it focuses on recommendation, not nomination, and Prime Ministerial appointment of the occasional political colleague for an overseas post detracts from the central-agency argument.

Committees

The Under-Secretary is chairman of three interdepartmental committees. The one concerned with Third World relations, the Interdepartmental Committee on Economic Relations with Developing Countries, has existed for five years in comparative obscurity. A 1978 creation, the Committee of Deputy Ministers on Foreign Policy, is much broader in scope, and is a forum for discussing almost any policy issue with international implications. If this committee becomes a channel for resolving interdepartmental differences in a manner consistent with External's perceptions, it will certainly enhance the central-agency case. But, if, on the tough issues, the key departments continue to go their own ways, the central-agency claim will not have been forwarded. It is, however, one of the two real steps the Under-Secretary has taken towards central-agency status. The

other step was taken in the third committee he chairs, ICER — the move already described to take support-staff integration forward to include the head of post's line authority over all programs, and dual accountability to the SSEA and to the home-program department.

A possible third step towards central-agency status, one taken prior to the Under-Secretary's assumption of office, has also been mentioned. This was the allocation to the SSEA of the authority to approve and make recommendations to Cabinet on the size and composition of delegations to international conferences. The Cabinet directive did not cover technical meetings, general official travel or unofficial deliberations, otherwise known in Orwellian jargon as non-conferences. As for meetings in Canada, other departments are more likely to reveal that they are expecting overseas visitors, who may well not pass unnoticed, but the same does not apply to visiting American officials.

In 1972, External Affairs was assigned responsibility for ensuring co-ordination of the external aspects and applications of national policy. The functionally-originating department was supposed to notify External of any program with external content or aspects, but, inadvertently or otherwise, sometimes failed to do so. Since the most frequent omissions were in the area of Canadian-American relations, a further and more specific Government guideline was issued in 1974 to try to stop issues with Canadian-American implications from reaching Cabinet without prior consultation with External Affairs. Throughout much of the decade, therefore, the Department was obviously not viewed as a central agency from which other departments had to seek clearance before carrying through those functional programs that happened to have incidental external aspects.

The limitation of co-ordination as a central-agency tool is that it is dependent on co-operation and persuasion. Unless the responsible body

stipulated has the power to ensure compliance, not merely with the outward forms of co-ordination but with the policy implications of its direction and leadership, then its formal obligations and responsibility with respect to other departments may be purely nominal.

The Under-Secretary affirms that the Department's means of exercising its authority distinguishes External Affairs from other central agencies. Treasury Board controls the budget expenditures for all Government departments; it establishes the administrative policies of the Government as an employer: "Government departments and agencies do not have a choice whether to go through Treasury Board." The USSEA might have said the same of the PCO, the guardian of the gates to Cabinet. No department can circumvent the Treasury Board and the PCO, but departments can extend minimal co-operation to External Affairs without following its leadership and without suffering severe consequences as a result. The Treasury Board and the PCO have something to offer or hold back that is considered valuable to regular departments; External does not.

All three are concerned with a spectrum of policy issues broad enough to qualify them as central agencies; all three have the requisite co-ordinative responsibilities; but only two enjoy the powers of control necessary to ensure successful discharge of those responsibilities. The power to control is a crucial lever in the weaponry of a central agency. What distinguishes External Affairs is not the difference in methods of exercising central-agency authority but the absence of the authority required to ensure that it consistently acts as a central agency.

External Affairs falls comfortably into that slightly larger group of departments and agencies known as the traditional "horizontal co-ordinative portfolios". These departments have high policy influence owing to the frequency of their opportunities to intervene in policy

issues. Each deals with basic horizontal, or cross-cutting, dimensions of Government policy. If External Affairs obtains leadership control of, say, international commercial policy, and maintains its sway over

international legal policy, its authority will have been sufficiently consolidated for it to move into the central-agency category. If it does not obtain enhanced powers, use of

a looser definition of central agency will not satisfy its aspirants. The central-agency debate is not really a semantic one — it concerns leadership controls.

United Nations

Ambassador Barton recalls term on Security Council

A personal reminiscence

by W. H. Barton

Just as the League of Nations was conceived as a response to the horrors of the First World War, the founders of the United Nations were motivated primarily by the need to provide mankind with an institution to prevent the recurrence of the madness of the Second World War. It was for this reason also that the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations listed as the first of its purposes the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, the Charter conferred on the Security Council, as the organ primarily responsible for the achievement of this aim, exceptional powers to act on behalf of all members of the organization.

The record of the Security Council in fulfilling its responsibilities during the past 33 years has been a mixed one, reflecting the reality of relations between the nations, particularly the major powers. But, for better or worse, the Council has been, and remains, the focus of power and centre of attention at the United Nations, and, indeed, in the eyes of the world, on those issues of peace or war that nations are prepared to have come before the world body.

Mr Barton is Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. In that capacity, he sat on the Security Council during Canada's most recent two-year term on that body. The views expressed here are the personal views of Mr Barton.

For this reason, and because service on the Council carries with it the assumption of special responsibilities by those governments selected for the assignment, it also confers on them the opportunity to play a particularly influential role in negotiations aimed at resolving some of the most threatening issues facing the world today.

The five permanent members of the Council carry this mantle of responsibility and influence as a matter of course, but for the 146 other members of the United Nations the opportunity to serve a two-year term can at best arise only at infrequent intervals and competition for the assignment is fierce. In Canada's case, notwithstanding its active participation in the UN and its leading role in peacekeeping, it has served on the Council only four times. At that time Canada is the first member of our geographical group to have served so often.

Responsibilities

The responsibilities and the distinction of membership on the Security Council are, of course, assumed by member governments, and in particular by their foreign ministers. But it is only rarely that ministers attend meetings of the Council, so that, although the Permanent Representative in New York is guided by instructions from his home office, a considerable burden devolves on him. George Ignatieff, who was Permanent Representative during Canada's last pre-

vious term of office called it "the hot seat". I did not have his experience of being involved in a war situation (the Six-day War of 1967), but I was very conscious of being the fourth Canadian to have had the honour and privilege of serving on the Council, and of the obligation to try to live up to the standards set by General McNaughton, Charles Ritchie, and George Ignatieff before me.

To one who is used to working in the unwieldy General Assembly of today, where it is rare to find even an intersessional committee with fewer than 40 or 50 members, there is a real "culture shock" in learning to operate in the clubby atmosphere of the Council, limited as it is to 15 members and with the reality of the veto lying behind every negotiation. I have described the atmosphere as clubby with reason. During its early years, the Council was notorious for confrontations between East and West and for the succession of Soviet vetoes. As time has gone by, the Cold War has moderated, the influence of Third World nations has grown, and a new atmosphere of cooperation, within the limits imposed by basic national positions, has emerged. Nowadays most differences are argued out in closed informal consultations and formal meetings are normally held only when a course of action and a script for what is to happen have been worked out behind the scenes. Because the Council is small, the members get to know each other really well and work together with good humour in an effort to achieve the widest possible agreement.

During our tenure of office, the Council met formally 125 times, 73 in 1977 and 52 in 1978. But behind these statistics lay countless hours of informal consultation and negotiation between delegations, at all times of the day and night, and all too often on week-ends.

The Council has a long-established practice of reacting only responsively to situations that are referred to it by governments. In the last two years, the principal substantive areas of concern have been southern Africa, including Rhodesia, Namibia and the *apartheid* policies of the South African Government, the Middle East, including the problems of Lebanon, and Cyprus. The Council also gave some attention to problems in other parts of Africa, notably the mercenary raid on Benin in January 1977 and the differences between Chad and Libya over support allegedly given by the latter to Chad rebels. The Council did not take up the situation in the Horn of Africa or in the Sahara, nor did it deal in any way with issues in other parts of the world.

Although the Security Council has not evolved in the way envisaged in the Charter, as a body watching over the peace of the world, and, given the present state of relations between the great powers, is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, at the outset of our term Mr Jamieson advanced the idea that a modest beginning might be made towards trying to head off

trouble rather than wait for it to happen before doing anything. He suggested that, from time to time, when foreign ministers represented on the Security Council were in New York, they should take advantage of the opportunity to have informal consultations on the state of the world. When we attempted to follow up on this idea, we found that, while Western members of the Council and those familiar with the traditions of the Commonwealth were receptive, some of the others found it difficult to grasp the idea of a free and informal exchange of ideas without publicity or commitment, and the Eastern European and Chinese members were resolutely opposed. Even if our efforts were unsuccessful, I believe they were worth trying. But changes along the lines we were working for will not occur until the permanent members of the Council are prepared to espouse them and work actively for their adoption.

It was evident at the outset of our term of office that the Council would be actively involved in the problems of the Middle East and Cyprus and, because Canada was playing a major role in the UN peacekeeping activities in both of these areas, I arranged, together with the Mission's Military Adviser Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Gallagher, to visit the Canadian and other peacekeeping forces in the Sinai, on the Golan Heights and in Cyprus. It proved to be an invaluable experience, and added enormously to my understanding of the issues and of the problems of the peacekeepers who serve with selfless dedication in conditions that are difficult and often dangerous. With benefit of hindsight, I only wish that I had arranged a familiarization tour of southern Africa, the other principal area of UN preoccupation. My advice to my successor as Permanent Representative, even though he will not be on the Security Council, is that, at an early stage in his tour of duty, he should press to make visits to both areas unless he is already familiar with them.

Southern Africa

During 1977 and 1978, the problems of southern Africa were unquestionably the major preoccupation of the Security Council. The African members of the Council, actively backed by their regional group and with the support of the whole of the Third World, pressed vigorously for action to resolve the situation in Rhodesia and Namibia, and for punitive measures against South Africa unless it abandoned its *apartheid* policy. In African eyes, these were all aspects of the same problem, because it was South African involvement and support that made it possible for Ian Smith to cling to power and South African refusal to terminate its illegal mandate over Namibia that prevented the UN's Council for Namibia from taking over the administration of the territory and establishing a truly independent government with SWAPO at the helm.

Bilateral

In the early months of 1977, the African members of the Council launched a major initiative consisting of four draft resolutions focused on the problems of southern Africa, including Rhodesia, *apartheid* in South Africa, and Namibia. These resolutions embodied a number of provisions — particularly mandatory sanctions against South Africa — that the Western members were simply not prepared to contemplate, not least because of the extremely painful effect such measures would have on their own economies.

At that moment, the Western members of the Council (the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, France, the United States and Canada) had a private meeting at the Canadian mission to discuss what we should do. This was the first occasion on which Andrew Young, as a black, had been faced with the prospect of public confrontation on an issue of deep emotional significance to him. His response to this challenge was imaginative and courageous, and though it did not work out exactly as he had hoped, it has served as the most important single element in the Western plan of action in the Council since then.

Two-pronged approach

Ambassador Young suggested that we should follow a two-pronged approach. First, we should suggest to the Africans that, instead of following the route of confrontation in the Council, with the inevitable vetoes that would follow, we should try collectively to draft a declaration asserting affirmatively the wide areas of agreement on southern African issues. Such a declaration, as a considered expression of the convictions of the Council, would have an important impact on world opinion. Secondly, the five Western members of the Council would use their good offices, as major trading nations dealing with South Africa, to see if they could persuade South Africa to accept a plan, consistent with guidelines laid down by the Security Council, to hold free elections at an early date in Namibia, leading to its establishment as an independent state recognized as such by the UN.

It was acknowledged that this approach rested on pretty shaky foundations, but at least it meant that we should be taking the initiative rather than remaining in a negative position of inaction. The five governments were, therefore, pleased to endorse it. From the outset, the Africans were doubtful about the feasibility of our approach, but they agreed to hold off pushing their resolutions until we could test the water.

We spent a busy spring preparing what we thought was an affirmative declaration on southern Africa and then trying it on our African colleagues. We made some progress, but in the end, as I suppose was predictable, there were simply too many questions of principle where the maximum distance we could go fell short of the minimum positions that the Africans could contemplate, and by June this particular fire

had spluttered out. Things were quiet during the summer, but then the build-up of detentions and prison deaths, culminating in the death of Steve Biko, and the suppression of the anti-*apartheid* press stirred the Africans to demand that the Council deal with their proposals.

The Western members of the Council shared the general repugnance against the direction affairs were taking in South Africa, and looked hard for something to be done that would express the universal sense of indignation but, at the same time, could be tolerated economically, particularly by Britain. The most obvious target was a compulsory arms embargo, to be implemented in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It would be the first time that compulsory sanctions had been invoked against a member state, and even that limited measure produced doubts and tensions within the Western group.

There was an intense period of internal discussions, which involved extended consultations with our governments, before we finally reached a decision to go ahead. Unfortunately, the resulting delay led to a highly-charged debate in the Council, in which the Western countries were accused of negotiating in bad faith. The outcome was that the Western members went along with one of the African-sponsored resolutions but voted against the other three, which meant that they were vetoed by the negative votes of Britain, the U.S.A. and France. We then brought forward the Western proposal for a compulsory arms embargo. The angry Africans at first spurned it but, after a cooling-off period of a day or so, they accepted an Indian re-write of the text, which was essentially the same as the one we had proposed. This landmark resolution was adopted on November 4, 1977.

Namibia

While all this was going on, the Western Five had also been working on the other element of their plan of action, Namibia. As it turned out, this initiative proved to be, on all counts, their major preoccupation during 1977 and 1978. At this moment, it also looks as if it may prove to be a major accomplishment of the Security Council.

The situation at the beginning of 1977 was that the South African Government had announced a program to give Namibia its independence — South African style. Our first move was to propose to the South African Government that, if it would halt this process, the Five would use their good offices to try to obtain UN acceptance of a plan, based on free elections with universal franchise, that would result in a truly independent Namibia, rather than another unrecognized Transkei. At the same time, it was made clear that, if South Africa persisted in going ahead on its own, the Western governments could not be expected to keep on resisting retaliatory action by the Security Council.

There then began a 16-month balancing act, which was threatened with collapse on an average of once every three weeks. We had to come up with a plan that would insure: that the guerilla warfare along the frontier between Namibia and Angola and Zambia would come to a halt; that the blacks who had fled the country would feel safe to return; that the 20,000 to 30,000 South African troops would be reduced to a minimum so that there could be no possibility of intimidation during the voting process; that the possibilities of intimidation by the police and civil administration would also be neutralized; and, finally, that the electoral and constitutional measures could be carried out to the satisfaction of all that they were fair.

To carry out the negotiations we established a Contact Group consisting of the deputy representatives of the five missions. The Canadian member was Paul Lapointe, who has recently moved to Ottawa as Director-General of the UN bureau of the Department of External Affairs. The main elements of our plan were agreed on at an early stage, but it required months of fine-tuning the language, modifying details, and "hard selling" by both sides to convince the parties concerned that their vital interests were taken care of. The Western Contact Group made five trips to Africa. Sam Nujoma, the head of the South West African People's Organization - the liberation movement recognized by the UN - came to New York for consultations three times. The South African Foreign Minister came twice. The five Western foreign ministers had lengthy joint consultations with both sides, and with the Front-Line States (Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique).

Western plan

In April 1978, South Africa announced acceptance of the Western plan but, while we were concentrating on trying to get SWAPO's acceptance as well as the support of the Front-Line States, the South Africans launched a fierce raid on SWAPO headquarters in Angola. Nujoma went home at once in anger and consternation and our talks broke off. It took a month for the situation to cool off to the point where talks could be resumed. We found that the Front-Line States were anxious to get a negotiated solution and, with their strong support, SWAPO accepted the Western plan on July 12. As a result, at the end of July we were able to get a resolution through the Security Council authorizing the Secretary-General to send a special representative to Namibia to devise an operation plan to put our proposals into effect.

It was a historic Council meeting, with five foreign ministers present, and I had the honour to preside in the absence of Mr Jamieson, who had to return from New York to Newfoundland to be with the Queen, who was visiting that province at the time.

Then, just when success seemed within our grasp, new difficulties arose that necessitated the Western foreign ministers visiting South Africa, and a subsequent condemnation by the Security Council of the South African decision to go ahead with internally-conducted elections in Namibia, notwithstanding its expressed willingness to see the subsequent implementation of the UN plan. However, once again the seemingly-intractable obstacles were overcome and, at the end of 1978, when Canada left the Council, the prospects for getting a UN presence in Namibia and beginning the electoral process by February looked very encouraging.

Middle East

Contrary to our initial expectations, the Security Council was not actively concerned with Middle East matters in 1977-78, except for the situation in Lebanon, which took a critical turn in March 1978, when Israel reacted to the turmoil, and in particular the fighting between the Palestinian and Lebanese Christian elements in the southern part of the country, by occupying Lebanon south of the Litani River. The situation was highly charged and politically complex, including great-power differences over the conduct of Middle East negotiations, Arab-Israeli hostility, and strong inter-Arab differences.

What happened showed the Council at its best. There were intensive day-and-night negotiations over a period of about 72 hours, which produced a resolution calling for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces, and providing for the establishment at once of a United Nations interim force for Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, restore peace and security, and assist Lebanon in the re-establishment of its effective authority in the area.

The prompt action of the Council defused the immediate situation, but Lebanon has remained a troubled country. In October 1978, a resolution that was adopted calling for a cessation of fighting in Beirut was helpful in arranging for a cease-fire, and in December the Council met again to call on all parties not fully co-operating with UNIFIL, particularly Israel, to stop at once interfering with UNIFIL's operations.

Apart from its deliberations on Lebanon and one or two meetings of a general nature on the rights of the Palestinian people, the Council's only business with the Middle East was the renewal of the mandates, when required, for the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai and the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights. Debate on these renewals was, without exception, brief and low-keyed.

If the involvement of the Council in Middle East affairs proved less difficult than we had expected, the exact opposite can be said for the situation in Cyprus.

Bilateral

The sorry tale of events on that unhappy island is too long to be recounted here. Suffice it to say that the presence of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) plays a vital role in preventing a renewal of fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The Security Council mandate for the Force comes up for renewal every six months, on June 15 and December 15, and the debate on the enabling resolution serves as a platform on which both sides can ventilate their views on the situation and on what should be done about it. Up to now, for varying reasons, both sides have wanted UNFICYP maintained but, because in principle their consent to the renewal of the mandate is required, they have attempted to use this as a means of obtaining changes in the text of the resolutions in their favour.

It so happened that, in accordance with the Council's practice of monthly rotation of the presidency, Canada was in the chair in June 1977. In my innocence, I thought that, after one or two private consultations with the parties concerned a few days prior to the expiration of the mandate, we could obtain agreement on the text of a resolution, similar to the one that had been adopted six months earlier, and have the Council approve it in ample time. How wrong I was! Both sides advanced claims as to what should be in the resolution, and neither would budge.

As the deadline of midnight June 15 drew closer, I enlisted the aid of the Secretary-General and several members of the Council to attempt to influence the parties, but late that evening we were still locked in informal consultation in a small conference room in the basement of the UN Building. We finally got agreement on a text at 11:45 p.m., and raced upstairs to the Council Chamber to adopt the resolution formally at 10 seconds to midnight. My colleague, the Bolivian Ambassador, who presided over the Council this last June, was even less fortunate than I was. We had to "stop the clock" at midnight and it took until 5:00 a.m. before the Council was able to act.

The Council took up the subject of Cyprus again in November 1978 at the request of the Government of Cyprus, which wished to have "a political debate" without the constraints imposed by the time-limit for renewal of the mandate for UNFICYP. The goal of the Cypriots was to have the Council set a deadline for the withdrawal of the Turkish Army from Cyprus, failing which the Council would take appropriate action, presumably under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This goal was unrealistic, and the climate for the debate was made more difficult by some by-play behind the scenes over who should be allowed to participate in the debate and under what auspices. In the end, the Council adopted a simple resolution calling on all concerned to work towards a solution of the problem in accordance with principles previously laid down by the Council and asking the Secretary-General to report on progress next May.

It is easy for those of us not caught up in the Cyprus dispute to say that the two communities must learn to live with each other in peace, and to be impatient with their failure to do so. But there are very great problems for them to overcome — problems compounded by cultural, social and economic differences and, though renewed efforts are being made to get negotiations going again, there is no general air of confidence in success. Instead there is a current of opinion, particularly among the main contributors to UNFICYP, that, instead of providing an incentive to peace, the Force is serving as a shelter for the two sides to take intransigent positions. The views of UNFICYP contributors are also influenced by the failure of some countries that have an active interest in peace in Europe to share in carrying the financial burden. It will be interesting to see if this sense of concern is given tangible expression when the UNFICYP mandate comes before the Security Council again next June.

Personalities

Inevitably the personalities and capacities of the individual delegates significantly affect the way the Council works. There were a few "weak sisters", but most were fine men, who, while advocating and defending the positions of their governments with great skill and energy, at the same time were conscious of their obligation to do their best to contribute to the reputation and effectiveness of the Council.

The representatives of the five permanent members of the Council have the advantage of continuity of service, but in fact all were strong personalities and effective representatives of their governments. I shall never forget the blunt, undiplomatic candour of Andy Young, the gentle but firm interventions of Jacques Leprette, the razor-sharp wit of Ivor Richard, the cheerful friendliness of Oleg Troyanovsky, and the dialectical talents of Chen Chu when the opportunity arose to point the finger at some of his colleagues.

The non-permanent members have the disadvantage of transient status, and positions that most or all of them may favour can be blocked by a veto from one or another of the permanent members, but, by the same token, their support is essential to any agreement on a course of action. The non-aligned (that is to say, the members from Africa, Latin America and Asia, except for China) caucus on every issue, and participate actively in the drafting of texts. During our period on the Council, the contribution of Rikhi Jaipal, the Indian representative, was particularly noteworthy in this regard.

Finally, I should like to say a word about the role of the two Western non-permanent delegations, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada. We were both anxious to demonstrate that, while we could be expected to share a general identity of views with the permanent Western members, we should be acting

on our own assessment of situations and reaching our own decisions. On the whole, I think we accomplished this purpose. The Western votes were not monolithic, and there were numerous occasions when we persuaded our permanent colleagues to modify their positions in directions we thought were right. The one area where we did operate as a united group was in pursuit of our initiative on Namibia, but even in that case our public positions were preceded by intense argumentation and agreement in the Contact Group as to the best approach to pursue.

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Rudi" von Wechmar, was a cheerful and very able colleague in all these negotiations and, if he is successful in his campaign to be President of the General Assembly in 1980, I am sure he will fill that important post with great distinction.

Inevitably, the quality of the Security Council varies from year to year depending on the quality and character of its non-permanent members. Nearly every member nation wants a turn on the Council, but the fact is that some are in a much better position

to make an effective contribution than others. For this reason, I believe that the Canadian Government, as one of those that can be expected to be an effective contributor, is right in pursuing the consistent policy, over the years, of standing for election to the Council whenever the situation is propitious. Looking back on our most recent term, we have received many expressions of appreciation from friendly delegations, and some even from delegations whose views on what the Security Council should and should not do are opposed to ours. The one disappointment has been that events subsequent to our departure from the Council have seemingly brought to naught our efforts to have free elections take place in Namibia under United Nations supervision. Nevertheless, it is our conviction that the great efforts made by the Security Council — and in particular the five Western members — will, in the final analysis, prove to have made an important contribution to the resolution of the problems of southern Africa, thereby earning for the membership of the Council for 1977-78 a place in the history of the United Nations.

United Nations

Recap of Canada's activities at thirty-third General Assembly

by J. F. Tanguay

The United Nations, the most universal of international organizations, continues to grow and develop; its membership has tripled in 33 years. In 1978, the Solomon Islands and Dominica joined the UN, increasing its membership to 151 states. The UN budget has now passed the \$1 billion-mark, and totals \$2.5 billion when the UN Specialized Agencies are added. The heavy agenda of the thirty-third General Assembly contained 129 questions. To finish its work, the Assembly had to hold a resumed session after the Christmas and New Year's holidays. It adopted 205 resolutions and 70 decisions, which were published in a 512-page book.

Canadians have recently shown a renewed interest in UN activities because of Canada's two-year membership in the Security Council and its highly-visible participation in the initiative, together with the United States, Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (the "Western Five"), to bring

about an internationally-acceptable settlement in Namibia. During the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, Jamaica, Norway, Zambia, Bangladesh and Portugal were elected as non-permanent members of the Security Council to begin two-year terms in January 1979. Norway and Portugal replaced Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, whose mandates ended on December 31, 1978.

During the general debate of the session, Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson

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stressed three key international issues: the unresolved Middle East crisis, decolonization in southern Africa and human-rights violations. He deplored the lack of progress towards a durable peace in the Middle East and total decolonization in southern Africa. On human rights, Mr Jamieson noted that it was "not a matter of laying down to governments how they should fashion their political or economic systems". "It is simply," he declared, "a matter of making certain that all governments observe the fundamental decencies of civilized life to which they have all pledged allegiance." He called for a UN investigation into the human-rights situation in Democratic Kampuchea, and urged all states to take action to alleviate the plight of Indochinese refugees.

In the Third Committee of the Assembly (Social and Humanitarian Questions), the Canadian delegation drafted and co-sponsored an important resolution urging governments to investigate and account for cases of disappeared persons, and called on the Secretary-General and the Commission on Human Rights to investigate reports of involuntary disappearances. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and was referred to the Commission on Human Rights for follow-up action. Canada also co-sponsored resolutions dealing with national human-rights institutions and regional arrangements for the effective promotion and protection of human rights. Other resolutions focused on equal opportunity for women, youth matters, the elderly, trade-union detainees, and the *UN Yearbook on Human Rights*. In general, the session was notable for the enhanced dialogue that took place between the West and the Third World on human-rights and social-development issues.

On December 11, 1978, the UN General Assembly commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights and bestowed several prizes on individuals and organizations for human-rights accomplishments. Professor John P. Humphrey, Special Adviser to the Canadian delegation, addressed the General Assembly. A well-known figure in North America, the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., American civil-rights leader and 1964 Nobel Prize winner, was among those who received a posthumous human-rights award. The organizations that received the prizes included the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.

Middle East

On the political scene, despite dramatic events outside the UN, such as the Camp David agreements, Middle East resolutions at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, with one or two exceptions, closely resembled those of previous years. One of these resolutions contained a clause directed against the framework for peace negotiations agreed to at Camp David because of which Canada changed its vote on the

resolution from positive in 1977 to negative. Canada, the United States, Israel and most West European nations voted against three resolutions on the question of Palestine.

An entirely new resolution was introduced on the issue of co-operation between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Palestinian people. It called on the UNDP to establish and finance projects to improve the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian people. Canada, the U.S., Israel, Australia and Malawi voted against this resolution on the ground that the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was clearly responsible for providing assistance to the Palestinian people and a duplication of efforts could occur with UNDP involvement in such assistance.

Canada maintained its negative vote on the resolution concerning the situation in the Middle East. This year's resolution referred to a resumption of the Geneva peace talks and the participation in the peace conference of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It also called for an Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967. Canada, the United States, Israel and Guatemala voted against this resolution because it exceeded the framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and because the reconvening of the Geneva peace talks would prejudice the negotiations started by the Camp David agreements. Canada, the U.S. and the West Europeans supported, however, a resolution criticizing Israel for establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories because such settlements reduced the prospects for peace.

The thirty-third General Assembly deliberations did not, in fact, satisfy initial hopes of progress towards peace in the Middle East. Many of the debates were acrimonious and repetitious.

Southern Africa

The problems of southern Africa have increasingly affected the whole UN system. The drive of various liberation movements for international recognition has raised political and legal questions in almost all UN agencies and subsidiary bodies. The General Assembly, frustrated by many years of adopting resolutions that have failed to bring social justice and racial equality to southern Africa, now routinely endorses "armed struggle" as a legitimate method of achieving social and political change. The invidious definition in 1975 of Zionism as a form of racism has led to the linking of two intractable problem areas, the Middle East and southern Africa, and in turn has undermined the consensus that existed previously on questions of racism and racial discrimination.

The Zionism-racism issue re-surfaced at the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in Geneva last August and caused the withdrawal of Canada and 11 other Western nations

from the conference. General Assembly debate on racial discrimination and the Decade against Racism took place against the background of the results of the conference, which was the subject of two resolutions.

Ghana's strong attempt to minimize the damage to the Decade against Racism, a resolution of the conference that could have been adopted by consensus, failed to win African support. The sponsors of a competing resolution, which explicitly endorsed the world conference's results and thereby made the resolution unacceptable to most Western countries, then decided to offer contentious amendments to the Ghanaian draft. These amendments were ultimately voted on and incorporated in the text. The Canadian delegation strongly criticized such tactics as "divisive". Not only had certain delegations promoted their own resolutions, they had also prevented the adoption of a consensus resolution that could have provided the basis for continued Western support of the Decade against Racism. The Canadian delegation voted against both resolutions, and many other delegations also voted against them or abstained. Canada later abstained on a resolution on the Decade against Racism, the objective of which had been compromised by the world-conference resolutions.

The debate on Rhodesia was marked by increasing frustration over the apparent ineffectiveness of international pressure on the white minority regime, the lack of clear results from the Anglo-American initiative for majority rule, and Ian Smith's successful manoeuvring to retain effective control of the Rhodesian Government. This frustration was reflected in a further hardening of the language of the two traditional resolutions on Rhodesia.

The first resolution on the situation in Rhodesia, which had been adopted by consensus in the three previous years, drew ten abstentions, mostly by Western nations. Canada abstained because the resolution's implicit endorsement of armed struggle was not consistent with the fundamental principles of the UN and because the resolution incorporated allegations against unspecified Western states about support for the illegal Rhodesian regime. The second resolution dealt mainly with sanctions and suffered from similar defects. It also called for measures against Rhodesia that would place restrictions on the basic rights of Canadians to enjoy freedom of travel and information. Canada and 12 other countries abstained.

The final act of the regular session of the thirty-third General Assembly was to adopt three resolutions on Namibia, which studiously avoided any mention of the Western Five's initiative to bring about a negotiated settlement. This silence reflected much scepticism and impatience over the Western Five's initiative. After 20 months of negotiations, it had not yet led to a clear South African acceptance of the UN plan for Namibia's independence. However, as the Five thought their initiative could still succeed,

they chose not to complicate it at a crucial stage by taking a position on the substance of the resolution, and abstained on procedural grounds. South Africa's later acceptance of UN-supervised elections in Namibia kept alive hopes at that time that a successful conclusion to the Western initiative was still possible.

Apartheid

The debate on the agenda item "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa" resulted in 15 draft resolutions, the same number as last year. This item was not assigned to a committee for consideration, for the somewhat illusory reason that it gained in importance by having the substantive debate take place in plenary. The item came up towards the end of the session, and the long list of speakers and competing priorities meant that it could not be completed during the regular session.

In the resumed session, resolutions on the UN Trust Fund for South Africa and on political prisoners were adopted without a vote. Furthermore, a resolution on tributes to the memory of leaders and outstanding personalities who worked for oppressed peoples and a resolution on the dissemination of information on *apartheid* were adopted unanimously. Canada voted for resolutions on the international mobilization against *apartheid*, the work program of the Special Committee on Apartheid and *apartheid* in sports.

Although Canada supported the resolution on the international mobilization against *apartheid*, the Canadian delegation stressed its disagreement with the preambular paragraph, which sought to reaffirm the General Assembly's full commitment to "the elimination of the threat to international peace and security caused by the *apartheid* regime". Canada argued that such a determination could only be made by the Security Council and that the General Assembly should not prejudice such an important decision using a casual reference in a preambular paragraph.

Canada abstained on resolutions concerning an oil embargo against South Africa, nuclear co-operation and military collaboration with South Africa. The other members of the Western Five voted against these resolutions, except West Germany, which also abstained on the resolution on military collaboration. Canada and other Western countries voted against resolutions on relations between Israel and South Africa, economic collaboration with South Africa and the situation in South Africa, and abstained on resolutions concerning investments in South Africa and assistance to oppressed peoples.

Regarding Canada's abstention on the resolution calling for a total end of all nuclear co-operation with South Africa and the resolution on military collaboration with South Africa, the Canadian delegation explained that these resolutions might weaken incentives for South Africa to become a full adherent to international nuclear safeguards. Canada abstained on the

oil-embargo resolution and the new-investments question because the action called for could only be implemented effectively through mandatory decisions of the Security Council.

Canada's vote against the resolution on relations between Israel and South Africa reflected again its objection to singling-out Israel. On economic collaboration with South Africa, Canada explained that one of the implications of implementing the resolution would be severance of diplomatic relations with South Africa, a self-defeating measure. As it did last year, Canada voted against the resolution on the situation in South Africa, primarily because of a general hardening of the language, including the affirmation of the legitimacy of armed struggle.

Continuing tensions

The debate on Cyprus in plenary did little, unfortunately, to ease the continuing political tension 14 years after initial UN intervention. The Canadian delegation emphasized that "peacemaking" should accompany "peacekeeping". Canada's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Barton, said:

We think it reasonable to expect that the parties will bend their efforts to finding an accommodation that enables the UN Peacekeeping Force to leave Cyprus rather than keep the Peacekeeping Force as guardian of the status quo.

The resolution adopted at the thirty-third session called for an urgent resumption of negotiations between the Cypriot communities and asked the parties to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the UN peacekeeping force. Canada supported this resolution but abstained on a clause that recommended that the Security Council examine the implementation of its relevant resolutions and adopt, if necessary, appropriate and practical measures to ensure such implementation. In Canada's view, this clause was unnecessary; negotiations between the two communities were the most "appropriate and practical" way to resolve the question of Cyprus.

The continuing dispute in plenary unfortunately spilt over into the Third Committee's discussion of missing persons in Cyprus. The parties, unable to agree on the terms of a single text, produced a resolution whose implementation is doubtful. Canada abstained on all voting on this item on the ground that the resolution could not solve the Cyprus problem and might exacerbate an already serious situation.

The debate on peacekeeping was highlighted by a European Community initiative, a draft resolution appealing to member states to support and strengthen UN peacekeeping operations. Members were invited, for the first time, to consider the possibility of training their military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. They were asked to provide supplementary assistance to peacekeeping operations through logistic support or any other peacekeeping potential. They

were also invited to supply the Secretary-General with up-to-date information on possible standby capacities. Canada, the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, vigorously supported this resolution.

The debate did not resolve the past and present differences of view among members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, especially on guidelines to govern the establishment, financing and day-to-day control of such operations. Despite its disappointing lack of progress over the years, the committee has done some useful work by identifying important issues. The General Assembly urged it to complete its work soon on acceptable guidelines and devote attention to specific questions of the practical implementation of peacekeeping operations.

Disarmament

The disarmament debate capitalized on the spirit of compromise that evolved from the special session on disarmament held from May 23 to July 1, 1978. Of the 41 resolutions adopted, 18 passed by consensus. The various aspects of the special session's program of action dealt with included resolutions on the successful conclusion of SALT I, an agreement on a comprehensive test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Canada's representative on the First Committee, the newly-appointed External Affairs Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control, Geoffrey Pearson, urged the General Assembly to request the Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently an adequate cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. The General Assembly adopted the proposal. This Canadian initiative was one of four elements of the "strategy of suffocation" proposed by Prime Minister Trudeau during the special session to arrest the arms race. The other elements were a comprehensive test ban, an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles and an agreement to limit and progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

The General Assembly session produced a plodding debate on economic and financial matters and managed to avoid serious problems despite the frustrations of the Third World members. They were encouraged, for instance, by some progress on the Common Fund, a clarification of the mandate of the Committee of the Whole and the adoption of guidelines for an international development strategy (IDS). During January's resumed session, many important items from the Second Committee were adopted without vote. UN member states are now looking ahead to the fifth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V).

The Second Committee adopted 68 resolutions (56 by consensus). The first part of its session was spent working out the mandate of the committee of

the Whole, whose future remains in doubt. The Group of 77's review of all texts also caused a backlog of work and delayed the activities of the committee. Resolutions on an IDS and an international conference on new and renewable sources of energy were adopted by consensus. Non-controversial texts on UNCTAD IV, the resumed negotiations on the Common Fund and the UN Conference on Science and Technology for Development also appeared. The imminence of these meetings led to the "mark-time" character of the thirty-third session as far as North-South issues were concerned. A hardening of the Group of 77's position was somewhat impeded by the apparent flexibility of the United States and West Germany. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands consistently pressed for progress on North-South issues. Few political aspects were introduced into the debate.

The Canadian delegation was pleased with the Second Committee's deliberations. Canada had worked for sound decisions on human settlements, operational activities and the energy conference. The Canadian vice-chairman of the Second Committee, Jeremy Kinsman, helped promote Canadian objectives, which were shared by a large group of member states, and mediated successfully on several occasions. This latter work showed that Canada should adopt a mediating role whenever possible.

The UN, like many international organizations, faces financial difficulties. Canada's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Barton, criticized the UN supplementary estimates in a January 26 statement just before the resumed session ended. The supplementary proposals increased the UN net biennial budget after only one year by 39 per cent as compared to 1976-77. The Secretary-General had also indicated that member states could expect further financial requests by the end of 1979. Mr. Barton maintained that the approval of these expenditures was "a testament to the inability of this Assembly to control the budget and the management of the UN", particularly when many member states were struggling with serious economic difficulties and implementing domestic programs of restraint. Ambassador Barton urged the Secretary-General to include controls over budget and programs in his forthcoming report to the General Assembly on improvements in procedures and UN effectiveness. He also warned that some governments would be forced to act unilaterally if the UN members failed to demonstrate their collective ability to control the budgetary process. Canada, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal and Turkey abstained on the vote on the supplementary estimates. Even countries that voted in favour mentioned the absolute necessity for greater budgetary discipline and restraints.

The Assembly noted with satisfaction that the UN University's program was progressing in three priority areas: global hunger, human and social devel-

opment, and the utilization and management of natural resources. The Assembly also adopted without vote a resolution on the establishment of a university of peace proposed by the President of Costa Rica. The proposal was passed to UNESCO and to the UN member states for consideration. A resolution on the rights of children was presented to be studied at the thirty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly. It is hoped that it will be adopted during 1979, the International Year of the Child. The General Assembly also adopted by consensus a resolution on the draft convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Canada helped to ensure that the mandate for the Outer Space Committee provided adequately for the consideration of the question of nuclear-power sources.

The thirty-third session of the General Assembly could be described as a productive one. The Assembly has worked reasonably well, adopting a growing number of resolutions by consensus. The Canadian delegation took several constructive initiatives, such as the resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the resolution on disappeared persons and the resolution to help solve the immediate financial problems of UN peace-keeping operations. Many member states have asked the Secretary-General to develop new procedures so that the General Assembly might better cope with its growing membership and agenda. Canada remains committed to the UN system's continuing quest to respond effectively to the complex and changing global environment.

Our mistake!

In our March/April issue, the concluding paragraphs of Hugh Macdonald's article "Canada, NATO and the neutron bomb", were accidentally placed on page 16 as the opening paragraphs to Robert and Stephanie Reford's article on China. The Reford article should have begun with the last line on page 16. We apologize for any inconvenience our mistake may have caused to either readers or authors.

President Carter and human rights: the contradiction of American policy

by Louis Balthazar

It is not surprising that President Carter has had to tone down his campaign on international human rights. There are so many obstacles standing in the way of such a policy and it is so inconsistent with the exigencies of American diplomacy that it is difficult to see it as anything but a self-indulgent declaration of principle more appropriate for less crisis-filled times or for the early months of a President's administration.

However, it would not be correct to conclude that this direction in American foreign policy is merely a chance event. Neither the left, in vociferously denouncing its "hypocrisy", nor the right, in laying emphasis upon its lack of realism, really defined the true nature of America's foreign policy. Grand statements of principle on foreign policy tend to be generally somewhat hypocritical. This is true for most countries. On the other hand, the United States does not have a monopoly on unrealistic policies. But idealism in foreign policy is a characteristically American trait, a sort of given constant of the American style. Carter's policy on human rights is an expression of this national style.

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Long-standing obsession

A mood of idealism marked the founding of the American nation. The early American settlers believed that they had found the conditions for an ideal kind of life, and this conviction was a principal factor in their triumphant emancipation from British rule.

This belief was soon translated into a foreign policy characterized by stubborn isolationism. As early as 1796, Washington, in his farewell address, urged his countrymen to remain aloof from the vagaries of European diplomacy, which were considered immoral.

When Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt defended a more interventionist policy a century later, they did so in the name of a sacred mission that consisted in extending the notion of "Manifest Destiny" overseas. Their successor, Woodrow Wilson, justified American participation in the First World War on the basis that there was a moral obligation "to make the world safe for democracy". The same was true for Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the great proponent of hard-line anti-Communism in the 1950s, was still motivated by moralism when he became the self-styled promoter of a philosophy that saw the world in strict black-and-white terms and of a dream (never realized) of freeing the captives of Eastern Europe.

John F. Kennedy, in a new

style, appealed in his turn to the conscience of America in committing his country to "bear any burden, pay any price" for the defence of the "free world".

After the dreadful ordeal of a long and humiliating war in Vietnam, the stigma of the Watergate scandal and an interlude of *Realpolitik* with Kissinger, Jimmy Carter, candidate and President, was guaranteed domestic success with his promise to inject a new morality into foreign policy. The man who had not travelled in Washington's political circles, the self-made man from Georgia, was going to come to the defence of human rights throughout the world. Despite all the problems and contradictions inherent in this policy, it was welcomed almost everywhere in the United States with open arms. "It is so refreshing," people were saying in 1977. At last the nation could have a clear conscience again and its former idealism could be restored. It is as if the United States cannot survive long without a moralistic policy. Even so, the contradictions are quite obvious: this moralism does not in any way eliminate the pursuit of very real interests that are more self-centred than charitable, if not at times rather sordid.

Conditions

Is this American moral will therefore an illusion, an ideological superstructure that helps persuade the American people to accept the immoralities of a foreign policy centred on capitalist exploitation? Not

entirely.

Jimmy Carter seems to be sincere, as were those who spoke about the "New Frontier" and as were John Foster Dulles and Woodrow Wilson. When Americans talk about freedom, they believe in it; when they sing the praises of their moral character, they believe in that too, to the point where they can bring about the resignation of a President. But, at the same time, they believe in the virtues of unbridled accumulation of wealth in a world of rank inequalities.

This inveterate ambiguity permeates the entire history of the United States, for Americans have always preserved the legacies of both Hamilton and Jefferson. His respect for individuals and the will of the people made Thomas Jefferson, according to whom "every man is a potential ruler", the champion of democracy. As the author of the Declaration of Independence, he believed so strongly in this democratic virtue that, for a time, he was opposed to industrial growth. The Jeffersonian tradition is still an essential component of the American system. Both the great purge following Watergate and the generous intentions of Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young are living testimony to this fact.

On the other hand, Alexander Hamilton, architect of the federalist Constitution of 1787, was the defender of economic liberalism and law and order in the interests of capitalism. He felt that, if the economic interests of the landowners had to come into conflict with democracy, it was democracy that must be sacrificed, since America's importance and power depended, above all, on private property and the economic strength of large industry. Those who were later to maintain that "what is good for General Motors is good for America" were only restating the Hamiltonian argument.

The American miracle consists in the fact that these two traditions have been able to survive side by side without their inherent contra-

dictions resulting in total chaos. But there is some question whether this ambiguity is not basically detrimental to American foreign policy, or at least to those at whom it is directed.

The use of the term "freedom" is at the very heart of this ambiguity. Americans may call themselves defenders of freedom and at the same time support authoritarian regimes in many parts of the world. For, in American terms, freedom means essentially freedom of trade, the freedom to carry on business, as much as individual freedom. But the word is sometimes defined differently elsewhere. For many people, freedom can only be envisaged realistically and meaningfully in collective terms. From this point of view, "equality of opportunity" is much less important than equality of result. In this case, economic and social rights, rather than political and individual rights, have to be emphasized.

President Carter might well be sincere in stating, as he did in his inaugural address of January 1977: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." But his words remain hollow to those who see the approaches of Hamilton and Jefferson as basically irreconcilable. For such people freedom for some means, essentially, less freedom for others. This attitude does not make it easy to develop a true international policy on human rights.

Responsibilities

Moreover, by defining freedom over the past 30 years as the opposite of Communism, American policy has produced catastrophic results (to use the expression of an American commentator) from the point of view of human rights. On more than one occasion, it has been responsible for perpetuating what it now seeks to prevent.

In the name of anti-Communism, Americans have often set up, or at least supported, regimes that violated human rights. In Latin America (consider Chile, where the

United States preferred Pinochet to Allende, who was democratically elected, or Brazil), in Asia (South Korea and the Philippines, to mention only two examples), and even in Europe (Greece under the colonels, Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar), in the name of containment or the *Pax Americana*, Washington had no compunction about aligning itself with those who maintained themselves in power from day to day by means that clearly flouted the most basic freedoms. Indeed, it seems that the defence of American freedom has often involved indirect support for the violation of freedom elsewhere. How can the United States criticize the Soviet Union for its treatment of dissidents when it is itself responsible for so many violations in other parts of the world?

Furthermore, thanks to an annual budget of approximately \$7 billion never yet subjected to real scrutiny by Congress (which nevertheless examines in microscopic detail much smaller sums of money allocated in aid to developing countries), the intelligence-gathering agencies of the United States carry out covert operations whose purpose, it has been learnt recently, is to destabilize popular governments, and even to assassinate foreign leaders, not to mention the many illegal activities they have carried out in the United States itself. It is enough to set Jefferson's statue aquiver in his memorial, which is still the pride of the American capital!

It is, to say the least, disturbing for the victims of these operations to hear the new moral message of American foreign policy!

Constraints

As if this were not enough to make Carter's human-rights policy appear meaningless, there are a number of factors that stand in the way of such a policy, arising from the very nature of the international system.

The rules that relate to the sovereignty of states and the notion that still prevails regarding the

legitimacy of governments mean that a regime's treatment of its population cannot become a genuine object of international concern. The intervention of one state in the affairs of another and subversion (even though both practices are, in fact, widespread) are still considered reprehensible. Despite the fact that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign policy, countries continue to protect what they have defined as domestic politics from foreign diplomatic incursions.

Moreover, certain American priorities with respect to foreign policy, such as nuclear non-proliferation, the safeguarding of alliances and strategic-arms limitation, are difficult to reconcile with firm positions on human rights. Thus the withdrawal of credit from Argentina because of its poor record on human rights will not help curb the nuclear ambitions of that country. Other countries have agreed to a sort of trade-off with the United States; in exchange for American bases or for protection of strategic American interests, authoritarian regimes receive American support. And, no matter what is said, it is not easy to disassociate American positions on dissidents in the Soviet Union from negotiations over the SALT agreements.

Position still meaningful

Finally, America's desire to encourage governments to improve the lot of their populations may be totally counter-productive. A government under stress as a result of indictment as repressive withdraws into itself, protects itself and may become even more repressive. President Carter has been criticized for harming *détente* by his crusades for human rights, and thus contributing to strengthening the stranglehold of the Warsaw Pact, which will not promote the liberalization of policy in the East European countries. Some Soviet dissidents have even accused the President of harming their cause by provoking drastic reactions on the part of the Kremlin.

Should Washington, therefore, entirely abandon the idea of a human-rights policy? Despite all that has been said, the answer is still no. Given certain conditions, the first of which is more modest ambitions, an American position in favour of human rights may still be meaningful.

In order to avoid setting themselves up as the champions of human rights and inevitably appearing hypocritical, Americans might first agree to submit to the same criteria they seek to impose on others. In order to accomplish this, it would be highly preferable if they concentrated their efforts, as has already been suggested, within the framework of multilateral institutions such as the Helsinki agreements and the United Nations. At the very least, a human-rights policy would have much more chance of success if it were seen as a strategy of the Western countries in general.

Next, it follows that Washington should take immediate action with respect to regimes that are in power by virtue of American support. President Carter has already taken some hesitant steps in this direction in Latin America. But these were still very minor in comparison with everything that had been done in the past (and is probably still being done) to support authoritarian regimes. Would American policy not have more credibility if it were aimed at South Korea or the Philippines rather than at its longtime rival the Soviet Union?

A further condition is that the American Government, Congress and people would have to be courageous enough to admit that human rights can sometimes be better served by left-wing regimes than by pro-American ones. Objectively speaking, it is very difficult to believe that Batista had more respect for human rights than Castro or that Pinochet is a better protector of freedom than Allende was, regardless of the value judgments which may be made of the Cuban revolution or the Popular Unity Government of Chile.

As a result, the notion of rights must be expanded to include collective — economic and social — rights. Can we believe that Washington will ever progress to this position? Can we still believe that American officials will one day agree to open contemplation of a new world economic order? Answering these questions in the affirmative requires a great deal of optimism. Be that as it may, it does appear that this is the direction a genuine universal human-rights policy will have to take.

Meanwhile, all that can be expected is that the American Government will take action one step at a time, in a way that is not too contradictory — satisfying, one might hope, some of these conditions, achieving partial and, one might again hope, positive results. Mr Carter may look like the heir of Jefferson, but it cannot be denied that the spirit of Hamilton is alive around him and within himself. The odds are that the legacy of Hamilton will succeed in greatly reducing Carter's grand aspirations, if this has not already happened. The American contradiction is nowhere close to being resolved.

Note to subscribers:

Production delays have made it desirable to combine the May/June and July/August issues. Subscription expiry dates will be adjusted to provide subscribers with six separate issues.

Federal-provincial co-operation in development assistance

by C. V. Svoboda

Canadian provincial interest in international aid has a long history. Substantively, much of it, such as direct "people-to-people" assistance through voluntary organizations, has been in the form of matching grants from provincial authorities and in emergency-relief ventures by way of food and cash. It was not until the mid-1960s, however, that the Federal Cabinet concluded that, in the context of Canada's general external-aid effort, the provinces could make unique and necessary contributions, particularly in human resources that could be enlisted in support of the program. Thus, in 1965, the Cabinet decided, first, to take steps to facilitate co-operation between the Federal Government and the government of Quebec in implementing Canada's external-aid program and, secondly, to begin consultations with other provinces for the same purpose.

In 1967, a series of propositions and principles on the provincial aspect of foreign aid, subsequently termed the "Pearson Doctrine", were set out in communications to the provinces. The two main features of the proposals were:

- (1) Foreign aid was to remain an integral part of Canada's relations with other countries and therefore a federal responsibility.
- (2) The consequences for the provinces of using their resources in the development and execution of external-aid projects, which might have been heavy, particularly in the field of education, needed to be fully considered.

With regard to the first point, there were concomitant considerations, the most important of which were: that only the Federal Government, in this case the External Aid Office (which later became the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)) and Canadian missions abroad, would serve as intermediary with the government of a country where projects were undertaken, and also that, in the instance of an aid project or projects that a provincial government might wish to finance or otherwise support, the only line of formal communication between the recipient country's government and provincial authorities would be through federal services. Purely

administrative local communications between provincial personnel in the field and recipient-country authorities (necessary for project-execution, for example) could take place under this proposal once projects involving provinces were set in motion under the necessary covering agreements.

Largely in response to the active interest in international affairs shown by Quebec at that time, which was, by contrast with most other provinces, being pursued vigorously, the Federal Cabinet held discussions on this question and, as a result, in 1968 the Government issued *Federalism and International Relations*, a background paper that stated, *inter alia*:

"In addition to participation in federal programs, a number of provinces have indicated an interest in providing assistance directly to developing countries, particularly in the field of education and other spheres of provincial jurisdiction. . . .

"The Federal Government welcomes provincial contributions as consistent with the objectives of increasing Canada's aid effort to the greatest extent possible. The Government nevertheless considers it essential that the Canadian contribution as a whole be maintained and developed in a coherent manner. As a result, the Federal Government has put forward a number of suggestions to the provincial authorities which would permit fuller consultation and more effective arrangements with the provinces . . . it is intended that procedures should be established to provide for consultations with the Federal Government with regard to aid projects financed or supported by the provinces. . . ."

Mr Svoboda is an officer of External Affairs currently on secondment to CIDA as Co-ordinator, Federal-Provincial Relations. A graduate of the Universities of Saskatchewan, Dalhousie and Carleton, he entered the Department in 1963 and has served abroad in Cuba, New Zealand and on several Canadian delegations to United Nations General Assemblies and conferences. He also served on loan with the Federal-Provincial Relations Office during 1977-78. The views and conclusions in this article are those of Mr Svoboda.

In the decade or so since this paper was issued, certain of its recommendations regarding greater federal-provincial co-operation in overseas development have been implemented. Individual provinces have responded in varying degree to the proposals outlined in 1967 and 1968 and, though there have indeed been problems, the general attitude of both levels of government to co-operation in pursuing common goals of international assistance has been positive. Federal assistance to provincial councils concerned with international co-operation, provincial non-governmental organizations and provincial agricultural-aid ventures, through the Voluntary and Agricultural Development Aid Program (VADA), established in 1975, as well as the conclusion of individual federal-provincial agreements on projects and other co-operative-development matters, manifest themselves as milestones in this progress, encouraged by the policies outlined not only in the 1968 background paper but also in the 1970 set of pamphlets *Foreign Policy for Canadian* and the 1975-80 *Strategy for International Development Co-operation* (Point 21).

Still valid

The aims set out in these documents with regard to federal-provincial co-operation in dispensing external aid retain their validity, and recent discussions between federal and provincial officials suggest that the matter is receiving serious consideration. It has become increasingly clear that several provinces desire greater opportunity for participation in matters of international development. From the perspective of the Federal Government, external aid is seen as an integral part of foreign policy, and must therefore be retained under the authority of the Central Government. However, the effectiveness of Canada's aid policy and programs continues to depend in important respects on the co-operation of the provinces. New kinds of co-ordination and co-operation are under current consideration (for example, in VADA and with individual provinces). These changes would not only meet to some extent the growing interest of the provinces in taking part but would give CIDA an opportunity to involve them in the attempt to enlist the support of the people of Canada in responding to the rising economic expectations of the Third World. At the same time, the legitimate interests of the provinces can be encouraged in directions consistent with CIDA's priorities and co-ordinated development-planning processes.

Thus there exists considerable interest in, and scope for, continued co-operation between the Federal Government and provincial authorities in the field of international development. Although there are a number of areas in CIDA's current programs that involve federal-provincial interaction, it is fair to say that the full potential for involvement has not yet been reached. Organizationally, significant progress in

these directions appears to be developing as those CIDA activities that involve the provinces, as a consequence of a thorough review of the matter in 1977, no longer remain unco-ordinated, *ad hoc* and largely responsive in nature.

At present, federal-provincial contact-points involve a number of areas within CIDA. Primarily these are:

- the Policy Branch, which, through the Co-ordinator, Federal-Provincial Relations, has the responsibility for general co-ordination of activities involving the provinces;
- the Voluntary Agricultural Development Aid Program, under the Multilateral Branch;
- the Bilateral Programs Branch, which uses provincial government organizations as executing agencies;
- the Special Programs Branch, which works closely, through the Non-Governmental Organization Division, with certain provincial governments and provincial councils of international co-operation, in support of NGO endeavours, which it often finances. (Through the Industrial Co-operation Division, this branch also maintains contact with provincial governments in the development and management of its program of co-operation with business and industrial concerns in Canada and the Third World);
- the Resources Branch, which has entered into agreements with individual provinces in order to obtain the services of qualified individuals, consultants and experts in the context of CIDA projects abroad, and which arranges for the placing of students and trainees in support of several programs and projects;
- the Communications Branch, whose public information programs involve liaison with provincial governments, including departments of education, in order to bring the aid program closer to Canadians.

On the provincial side, the governments approach intergovernmental and international questions, including involvement in the aid program, in different ways. Alberta, Quebec and Ontario have established ministries of intergovernmental affairs and Saskatchewan will do so once current legislation is passed. Other provinces deal with these matters through secretariats or units established under the premier's authority. Because of VADA's agricultural basis, provincial departments of agriculture have long been involved and, in the case of Alberta, which makes some \$4 million a year available for non-governmental organizations engaged in development assistance, the Department of Culture bears a major responsibility in this field. Saskatchewan has this year, in its new Agricultural Development Corporation, also estab-

lished a branch to deal with international co-operation ventures.

Among the provinces, Quebec has, over the years, been involved (usually as executing agent) in by far the largest number (20-odd) of Canadian aid projects abroad, largely in *francophone* Africa and the countries of the Maghreb. That province has also provided the most significant number of technical advisers (*co-opérants*) to CIDA projects — their numbers running into the hundreds. Other provinces, however, have responded to similar requests in various ways with the active encouragement of the Federal Government.

In many cases, provincial government departments or agencies under contract with CIDA have undertaken the execution of projects and have directly staffed them. In other instances, provincial administrations have supplied consultants at the feasibility and planning stages in order to develop programs and projects already identified and agreed upon bilaterally — i.e., between Canada and the recipient country. Thus provincial administrations themselves have added significantly to Canada's human-resources base in expertise and in the capacity to develop, undertake and execute aid projects and programs in the Third World. This has been specially true in education, public health and rural development, though the focus shifted in recent years towards more technical areas, such as natural-resource exploration and development, communications, hydro-electric construction and railroad-building, as well as other infrastructure projects in line with increasingly sophisticated requirements.

Difficulties

Provincial involvement in the aid program has not been without administrative and other difficulties. But by and large, it can be argued that these have not been quantitatively or qualitatively of a different order from relations in this regard with the private sector. Special sensitivity has been required, however, to ensure that the implementation of aid projects was not affected by differing views in Canada on the role of the provinces in this field. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider this matter in any detail. (Readers who wish to pursue the question, however, might begin by looking at the article by Claude Morin, Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, dealing with the Quebec viewpoint, which appeared in the November 1977 issue of *Jeune Afrique*, and at the March-April 1977 issue of *International Perspectives* for articles on the provinces and foreign affairs.)

Without entering into the constitutional "theology" of the matter, it is nevertheless instructive to review in greater depth Quebec's sustained efforts to establish an identifiable role within the framework of Canada's external-aid efforts. Quite apart from an evident and positive interest in aiding Third

World states, Quebec has in this way strengthened its international presence and experience.

This province's interest and involvement in aid matters also lent special impetus to the Federal Government's consideration of provincial interests in this area; and the direction given to federal actions to facilitate co-operation between the Central and provincial governments thus owes much to Quebec. Perhaps as a consequence, Canada, among the world's federal states, has the singular distinction of encouraging and facilitating the interest of its constituent entities in this way. CIDA has received the benefits of active co-operation, including access to provincial departments and agencies for special expertise in areas not under federal jurisdiction, such as education, and has been able to integrate and maximize the development impact of provincial contributions.

Human resources

Provincial contributions have, in the main, been in the realm of human resources. For example, over the years hundreds of provincial public servants have been made available for special studies, consultant work and roles in project execution. Quebec has supplied several hundred teachers and technical-assistance *co-opérants* for service abroad, normally in developing *francophone* states. Provincial governments have responded positively to such requests where this has been possible, recognizing, in part, the staff-development value inherent in such functions, as distinct from the important service provided in support of Canada's external-aid efforts. These services cannot readily have a dollar value assigned to them.

Other provincial governments, notably those of the four Western provinces, have provided funds to non-governmental organizations, including church groups, charitable institutions and voluntary bodies, to an approximate total in 1978 of some \$6 million. Late in April, Quebec announced a special grant of \$100,000 to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to finance health and educational aid projects in Angola, Burundi and Zaire. The Atlantic Provinces have co-operated with CIDA in such ventures as an international small-farms conference and the training of fishermen from Belize and elsewhere. The provinces have co-operated in making universities and technical-training facilities available to Third World students and trainees. Ontario has on a number of occasions responded to requests for emergency food relief, and all provinces have participated over the past four years in the federal-provincial Voluntary Agricultural Development Aid Program. For 1979-80, VADA ventures are to receive \$1 million in federal funds, largely for the transport of goods and services donated by provincial governments. Proposals are under consideration to increase the scope and funding of this mechanism, which also provides a useful forum

for federal-provincial dialogue on aid matters, to embrace multi-year budgeting and a program committee to receive, consider and fund international aid projects identified by the provinces.

In all, therefore, the federal-provincial co-operation picture in the aid program is a bright one. The will to co-operate has been clearly in evidence on the part of both orders of government, and interest has not only been sustained but has been given practical effect in the various ways already suggested. While the

letter of the "Pearson Doctrine" has never been given formal approval by provincial governments, the spirit is very much alive. The imperatives of the "New International Economic Order" and the Third UN Development Decade will provide new challenges not only for Canadians but for their governments. The federal and provincial governments can, through co-operative leadership, make these challenges better known to Canadian citizens and more effectively met by Canada's resources.

Western Europe learns to live with its 'guest' workers

by Thomas Land

An embarrassing resolution by the United Nations Human Rights Commission seeking "to promote the normalization of the family life of migrant workers . . . by their reunion" illustrates the anxiety of Western Europe over foreign poverty in its midst. The nine governments of the European Community privately acknowledge that their "guest" workers and their families — an economically-exploited and culturally-diverse minority of about 13 million people — are here to stay permanently. But, in the present climate of insecurity caused by growing unemployment, few governments have the political courage to admit that the presence of such a large permanent community undermines

the essential premises of democracy. Apart from Britain's Commonwealth and Irish immigrants, all Western Europe's immigrants lack political power.

In West Germany, Europe's biggest employer of foreign labour, the population of "guest" workers and their dependants is a record four million — in spite of the country's four-year-old recruiting ban and its various schemes to encourage the departure of foreigners. In addition to this figure, 1.4 million close dependants of foreigners already in the country are expected from abroad.

Originally, these "guest" workers were expected to stay strictly for the duration of their employment, performing the dirtiest and least remunerative jobs, scorned by the natives. Their reluctance to leave after the oil crisis, which ended a period of unprecedented economic growth in Western Europe, has surprised the manpower planners of the European Community.

The experts had disregarded the economic conditions of the "guest" workers' native countries — in Southern Europe, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean —, to which those of Western Europe compare favourably, even during a recession.

In Canada, different circumstances led to a similar situation. The adoption of universal criteria for immigration, combined with the increase in the number of potential immigrants from the developing countries, has resulted in a significantly growing intake of Third World immigrants. A recent study on relations between Canada and the developing countries records a drastic increase in the proportion of Third World immigrants, from 8 per cent in 1961 to 52 per cent in 1975. The study, published by the Economic Council of Canada, predicts that, though the absolute level of immigration may be declining, "the proportion of immigrants originating from the developing nations is likely to remain significant".

Mr Land is London correspondent for the Financial Post of Canada. He is also associated with The Times, The Observer and The Financial Times of London. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr Land.

The big difference is that Europeans still publicly pretend that their "guest" workers are likely to stay only for a limited time. Europe's immigrants have become a large and permanent economic entity constituting a self-generating population. Their children, officially natives of the countries of their birth, are statistically likely to inherit the poverty and inferior social and employment status of their parents.

Human rights

The uncontroversial resolution by the Human Rights Commission in Geneva expressing particular concern about "the situation of the children of migrant workers and the effects upon their cultural, medical and psychosocial well-being and the difficulties of adaptation and separation to which they are exposed" has added impact when one considers that one-fifth of the school-age children of migrant workers are believed to be receiving no education.

In view of this fact, and in connection with the International Year of the Child, the Commission asked all UN organizations to give special attention to improving the lot of migrant workers and their families. It has also established a working group on the human rights of migrant workers to ensure that the topic receives recurring attention.

Out of this request have come a number of projects and directives. Education pilot projects in many European cities try to ensure that the one and a half million migrant children attending school not only learn the language of their adopted country but also retain their original language and culture. The EC's Council of Ministers has adopted a directive to ensure that school curricula meet the specific needs of migrant children. A proposal to combat illegal immigration and the employment of illegal immigrants has been prepared by the European Commission; and there has been a gradual co-ordination of the immigration policies of the member states. Various housing pilot schemes aimed

at the cultural integration of migrants have been started.

These measures, however, hardly meet the actual needs. A comprehensive report on the housing of migrant workers published by the European Commission proposes the establishment of a fund to finance urgent measures to end discrimination. The report, compiled by 30 specialists throughout the Community, including anthropologists, social geographers, economists, psychologists and sociologists — all of them independent of both the European Commission and the national administrations —, treated the issue as a long-term problem of considerable effect on the entire Community.

Canada

Despite political controversy, Canada's record on the integration of immigrants has been far more successful than the European experience. The reason is probably that in Canada both the newcomers and their hosts admit that they must learn to live with each other permanently.

Ottawa's 1978 Immigration Act gives landed immigrants the same basic rights as those enjoyed by Canadian citizens — with the notable exception of the right to vote. Significantly, an immigrant can apply to bring in his relations as soon as he reaches Canadian soil. The reunification of the family is a consistent objective of postwar Canadian immigration policy, and the present legislation recognizes three classes of immigrant: sponsored (close family members), nominated (more distant relatives) and independent (must qualify on the basis of skills and education).

The European Commission is promoting some modest proposals for a gradual sharing of political rights with the resident foreigners. The Commission also wants them to have an automatic right to bring in their families — as in Canada — and as proposed by the Human Rights Commission. But these proposals are doggedly resisted by member countries, whose governments have been

on the retreat from the vocal extreme-right political movements that thrive on economic insecurity and seek the compulsory repatriation of the foreigners.

Paradoxically, immigration restrictions imposed on foreign labour are likely, in fact, to increase, rather than decrease, unemployment among the natives, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. It explains that labour shortages confined to a few sectors of the economy cause a shortfall of output and therefore redundancies. Another study, published in Geneva by the UN's Economic Commission for Europe, argues that economic recovery in Western Europe may well depend on a fresh influx of foreign labour.

This confirms Canada's experience. While it is difficult to assess the economic advantages and costs of immigration from the Canadian perspective, the Economic Council believes the "immigrants from the developing nations . . . appear to have contributed positively to the economic well-being of Canada". The Council's own calculations, based on replacement costs, place at \$2.9 billion the sum that Canada would have to devote to training its own population from 1966 to 1974 had it not benefited from immigration from Third World countries. Its report establishes that the economic advantages may be considerable. The undiscounted net gain for the typical immigrant from the Phillipines or India is estimated at close to \$400,000 (in 1974 prices).

Even if it were possible — and, indeed, desirable — to expel the foreign workers from Western Europe, their places would soon be taken by others. Portugal, Spain and Greece are expected to join the European Community within the foreseeable future, opening the door to vast numbers of South European pre-industrial peasants. The cherished principle of free circulation of labour within the Community will thus perpetuate Western Europe's embarrassment over imported poverty.

Letter to the Editor

Sir,

In your January/February issue, you published an article ("Hungarian minority in Romania") by Paul Pilisi on which I must, as a Romanian of Transylvania, cast some light. This article is superposable on one in the *Express* of October 28, 1978, by Edouard Bailby, except for certain passages that apparently did not find favour with Mr Pilisi. The following excerpt from one such passage, notably absent from the Pilisi article, says a great deal about the "restrictions and ethno-cultural genocide" that Pilisi evokes:

For 500 km inside the Romanian border [Mr. Bailey was coming from Hungary to Romania], the traveller seems effectively still to be living in Magyar country. In the streets people speak Hungarian. In the shops, labels are written in Hungarian as well as Romanian. On news-stands, newspapers in Hungarian; in libraries, whole sections of Magyar literature. In Ghiogheni, in Mercuea Ciuc, in Sfantu Gheorge, one feels nothing that conveys a sense of discrimination or the least tension.

The Romanian names of the villages and of the Orthodox churches are the only things that seem to proclaim the influence and hold of Bucharest. On Romanian territory "these are the self-same things that are unacceptable to the national Hungarian poet, Gyula Illyes".

This picture of that part of Transylvania, with all the cities he mentions and for which he fears genocide, should normally reassure Pilisi. Instead it exasperates him, and he uses this so-called genocide as a pretext for reopening an ancient historical debate to try to convince us that Transylvania belongs to the Hungarians. I admit that generations of Hungarians were cradled there; but it was not their cradle, it was mine.

There are 1,700,000 (not 1,900,000) Hungarians in Romania, for the most part established in Transylvania and representing 7.8 per cent of the population of Romania. They account for 23 per cent of the population of Transylvania, compared to the 4,000,000 Romanians who account for some 60 per cent of the Transylvanian population. These statistics are close to those of 1910, when the area was still under Hungarian domination. At that time, the Romanians formed 50 per cent and the Hungarians 25 per cent of the population.

It was on December 1, 1918, that Transylvania, acting in accordance with the principle of auto-determination demanded by President Wilson at Versailles, linked itself to Romania of its own free will, as expressed by the quasi-totality of the Romanian majority in Transylvania. The quotation from Illyes ("The population of Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, was totally Magyar when I visited there in 1930") is doubtful to me. But, if it is true, he simply admits and confirms the policy of tolerance practised by Romania between the two World Wars.

In any case, Mr Pilisi knows very well that, under Hungarian domination, the Romanians of Transylvania did not have the right to inhabit the towns and cities; today the Hungarians account for 40 per cent of the population of Cluj. As to the other cities, already mentioned, with heavy Hungarian populations, I remember the half of Transylvania given to Hungary by the Dictate of Vienne of 1940 as repayment for joining the entourage of the Berlin-Rome axis as early as 1936. During the 1940-44 occupation, the Romanians (especially those in the towns) were once again terrorized and massacred and driven back to their mother country. Now it seems that Janos Kadar, fawning on the new Russian masters, wishes to reissue the Dictate.

This part of Transylvania was reintegrated into Romania in 1945. However, because of the complicity of numerous Hungarian Communists, the then government in Bucharest accorded them an autonomous zone, in the very heart of Transylvania, that lasted until 1967, when Mr Ceausescu put an end to it.

If today the Hungarians of Transylvania can travel to Hungary every two years, they should consider themselves lucky. For a Romanian it can take a lifetime to get an exit visa. Men and documents, collectivities or individuals, Hungarians or Romanians, all are at the mercy of the *Arbitrar*. They are victims of the restrictions that are part of the very nature of the ruling regime, and not of a policy of ethno-cultural genocide for the Hungarian minority of Romania.

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Romania has integrated over the centuries (without always assimilating, which is the equivalent of cultural genocide) all who came and remained to become sons of that land. The cultural ethnocide Mr Pilisi talks about is a false issue to bring into our Canadian lives. It pits us one against the other by means of ancient elements and conflicts that 1,000 years of history have not been able to settle. Instead, let us together condemn the absence of liberty in Romania and in all other countries under Communist rule. Let us condemn the personality cult, the regimenting of intellectuals who are given no other choice but jail or exile, the censorship, the Berlin Wall and the totalitarianism. But for pity's sake let us, Romanians and Hungarians, unite against the common aggressor, the Soviet Union of ancient and modern Tsars.

Jean Taranu, M.D.,
President,
Romanian Federation of Canada,
Montreal

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Canadian Foreign Relations

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- No. 33 (April 5, 1979) Appointments to the Board of Governors of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
- No. 34 (April 16, 1979) Canada announces recognition of new Government of Uganda.
- No. 35 (April 20, 1979) Canadian playwrights promote Canadian plays in Britain.
- No. 36 (April 20, 1979) Seventh Student Commonwealth Conference — April 24 to 27, 1979.
- No. 37 (April 23, 1979) Conference of Ministers of Education of French-speaking Countries (CONFEMEN), thirty-second session, Québec City, April 25 to 27, 1979.
- No. 38 (April 24, 1979) Honorary consuls appointed: José A. Brache to Santo Domingo; Allen M. Duffield to Nassau.

- No. 39 (April 25, 1979) Robbery at Alta Vista Post Office, Ottawa.
- No. 40 (May 8, 1979) Notes for opening statement at fifth session, on May 9, of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V), Manila, by Larry A. H. Smith, deputy head and leader of Canadian delegation.
- No. 41 (May 10, 1979) "Canada Days" to be held in Paris, May 11 to 23, 1979.
- No. 42 (May 10, 1979) Montreal National Theatre for Children (Les Pissenlits) to perform in Soviet Union and Switzerland.
- No. 43 (May 11, 1979) Expulsion of Mijat Tomic, Vice Consul, Yugoslav Consulate General, Toronto.
- No. 44 (May 11, 1979) Diplomatic appointments: T. O. Bacon as High Commissioner in Zambia; Fred Bill as Ambassador to Thailand and concurrently Ambassador to Lao People's Democratic Republic; G. H. Blouin as Ambassador to the Netherlands; E. I. Bobinski as Ambassador to the Philippines; C. J. Charland as Ambassador to Mexico and Guatemala; Marc Faguy as High Commissioner in Ghana; J. Y. Grenon as Ambassador to Peru, with concurrent accreditation to Bolivia; J. G. Hadwen as High Commissioner to India, with concurrent accreditation to Nepal; D. S. McPhail as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; W. H. Montgomery as Ambassador to Indonesia; J. S. Nutt, Consul General in New York, concurrently accredited as Commissioner in Bermuda; R. D. Sims as Ambassador to Costa Rica; J. S. Stanford as Ambassador to Israel, with concurrent accreditation to Cyprus.
- No. 45 (May 11, 1979) Canada studies new Soviet citizenship legislation.
- No. 46 (May 16, 1979) Secretary of State for External Affairs comments on new Soviet citizenship law.
- No. 47 (May 18, 1979) James R. Midwinter appointed Inspector General of Foreign Operations.
- No. 48 (May 21-22, 1979) Ministerial meeting, Paris, May 21 and 22, of International Energy Agency.

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- No. 79/5 Current Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy. A statement to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Ottawa, March 8, 1979, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson.
- No. 79/6 The Role of Government in Promoting and Protecting the Interest of the Canadian Business Community in the Changing World Economic Environment. Notes for remarks by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Don Jamieson, to the Canadian Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, Montreal, March 5, 1979.

79/7 NATO After Thirty Years. A statement issued by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, on April 4, 1979, to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

79/8 UNCTAD V: The Second Asian Meeting. The opening statement at the fifth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Manila, May 9, 1979, by the deputy head and leader of the Canadian delegation, L. A. H. Smith.

Treaty Information

Bilateral

Argentina

Commercial Air Transport Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Argentine Republic

Buenos Aires, May 8, 1979

In force provisionally May 8, 1979

France

Agreement on Mutual Assistance between Canada and France for the Prevention, Investigation and Suppression, by the Customs Administrations of both Countries, of Customs Offences

Paris, January 9, 1979

In force, May 1, 1979

Japan

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of Japan constituting an Agreement concerning Textile Restraints

Ottawa, May 15, 1979

In force May 15, 1979

Senegal

Foreign Investment Insurance Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Senegal

Dakar, January 19, 1979

In force January 19, 1979

United Nations

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the United Nations amending the Agreement concerning Third Party Claims arising out of Acts committed by Members of the Canadian Contingency with UNICYP signed March 25, 1970

New York, March 30, 1979

In force March 30, 1979

With effect from September 1976

United States

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on East Coast Fishery Resources

Washington, March 29, 1979

Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

Washington, March 29, 1979

Special Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to Submit to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

Washington, March 29, 1979

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to a Court of Arbitration the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area

Washington, March 29, 1979

Protocol amending the Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed at Ottawa, March 2, 1953

Washington, March 29, 1979

Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America concerning amendment of the Convention between Canada and the United States of America for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea signed at Ottawa, March 2, 1953

Washington, March 29, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America to supersede the Agreement of July 6, 1970, as amended by an exchange of Notes of August 11, 1970, concerning the Operation of Pilotage Services on the Great Lakes (with a Memorandum of Arrangements)

Ottawa, August 24, 1978 and March 29, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Exchange of Notes between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America providing for the Construction, Operation and Maintenance of a Loran-C Transmitting Station at Port Hardy, Vancouver Island, B.C.

Ottawa, March 19 and 29, 1979

In force March 29, 1979

Upper Volta

General Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Upper Volta concerning Development Co-operation

Ouagadougou, November 8, 1977

In force April 6, 1979

Multilateral

Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)

Done at London, September 3, 1976

Signed by Canada, May 14, 1979

Protocols for the Fifth Extension of the International Wheat Trade and Food Aid Conventions constituting the International Wheat Agreement, 1971

Done at Washington, April 25, 1979

Signed by Canada May 15, 1979

September/October, November/December 1979

International Perspectives

A journal of opinion on world affairs

Appraising Carter's foreign policy


International trade environment

Industrial policy in Canada

Islam and the crescent of crisis

The agony of Nicaragua





Epilogue

In his preface to the first issue of *International Perspectives* in 1972, my predecessor of the day, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, wrote: "The journal is an experiment . . . with risks".

International Perspectives has in fact been that and much more. It has provided a forum for the expression of a great variety of individual viewpoints. It has stimulated informed debate on Canada's foreign policy and public interest in international affairs.

Today, the Department of External Affairs says farewell to *International Perspectives*. After eight years of publication, first under Murray Goldblatt, E. R. Bellemare and Pierre Ducharme, then under Alex Inglis and Louis Balthazar, we relinquish the journal in anticipation of a private sector venture.

To the readers as well as to the editors and contributors to *International Perspectives*, thank you for your past support. We look with confidence to new ventures.

FLORA MACDONALD
Secretary of State for External Affairs



International Perspectives

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"Half-Past Carter"

The Carter Report Card

by Charles R. Foster and Anne L. Vorce

Even though the Carter Administration has passed its mid-term point, its foreign policy remains elusive to observers at home and abroad. Despite a number of major well-publicized foreign policy initiatives, the Carter stance on foreign policy is seen as fuzzy and erratic by friend and foe alike. Doubt and uncertainty about the Administration's leadership in foreign affairs are reflected domestically in its low ratings in public opinion polls. Confused by its lack of clear direction in international matters, allies question the reliability of its commitments to security, to human rights and to the management of the dollar in terms of the world economy. The Carter foreign policy is viewed as a series of disjointed improvisations in response to immediate domestic or international pressures.

The substance of the Carter foreign policy, however, is more impressive than its general image suggests. The above description of the Carter Administration is not unique. It is similar to Zbigniew Brzezinski's assessment of the Nixon foreign policy after its mid-term point. At that time Mr. Brzezinski prepared a report card to rate the Nixon performance; it seems appropriate now to use Mr. Brzezinski's method to evaluate this administration's foreign policy.

For a serious assessment of the Carter Administration's foreign policy, its substance must be separated from its style, although they are interrelated. The popular view is that the Administration has conducted its foreign policy in an amateurish and *ad hoc* manner, but actually the over-all approach has been a mixture of rather sophisticated global activism and naive messianic zeal. The theoretical underpinnings are based on earlier Brzezinski writings and speeches. Acting within Brzezinski's "architectural" structure, which is built upon the theory of bilateralism, the Carter Administration has attempted to localize conflicts through multilateral negotiations in a number of areas to prevent military conflict. The Carter Administration has attempted to regain for the U.S. its role of world leader in both a moral and a power sense.

In the early days of the Carter Administration, the rhetoric flowed freely as the Administration at-

tempted to present its overly ambitious plans for reshaping the world order. When this agenda did not correspond exactly — or even roughly — to certain developments, the Carter Administration was unable to explain the compromises it had to make in its programs as essential for the protection of U.S. vital interests. In many cases, the Administration's rhetoric was contrary to what was obviously taking place. Its media style raised false expectations. Coming to power on a platform of morality, Carter rose largely on the basis of his messianic rhetoric in the grand tradition of American liberal diplomacy. As a result, Carter's actions have generally been described in light of his moral stance. This is especially true of his position on human rights, which was based on standards, largely for domestic political reasons, that could never be realistically applied. Although his human rights stand proved effective in certain cases, it also alienated some allies. In dealing with certain countries he was forced to compromise on the issue to protect other, more vital, U.S. interests. His failure to apply such standards in Iran, Korea, Nicaragua and China — at least publicly — made his high-sounding rhetoric seem suspicious. He has never properly explained the complex nature of negotiations involving American interests. By defending authoritarian regimes, he has diminished the positive impact of his rhetoric.

Another problem of the Carter Administration is the division within the Administration itself. The most publicized differences have been those between Vance and Brzezinski, who have often given speeches expressing opposing views on the same topic on the same day. Also, debates within the NSC, particularly over linkage, have resulted in the departure of several key members, including Samuel Huntington.

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Recently, the resignation of nearly a quarter of the staff has been attributed to "mid-term blues". These internal conflicts, combined with the absence of a mediator other than the President, who seems to be more involved in the detailed technical aspects of events, have led to inconsistent policies, such as the stance concerning the Soviets. Another factor contributing to the public's confusion over U.S. foreign policy is its many spokesmen. In the initial days of the Administration, open discussion was encouraged and publicly welcomed as a needed relief from the secret diplomacy of the Kissinger years. The Vance-Brzezinski debates were encouraged and Andrew Young was given free rein. Carter has continued this approach by using troubleshooters such as George Ball and Robert Strauss. As a result, the Carter Administration has frequently lacked a unified voice on foreign policy.

In spite of its unfortunate style, the Carter Administration has had a number of notable foreign-policy achievements. Building upon the efforts of previous administrations, it has made successful policy decisions involving China, the Panama Canal and, apparently, SALT II. The Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel was a much-needed breakthrough, but it requires expansion. Carter has, in general, succeeded in re-establishing friendly relations with traditional allies and lesser developed countries that had been relatively ignored during the Nixon-Kissinger years. It is misleading to see Carter as having had an easier role to play in foreign affairs than his predecessor because the U.S. is not involved in any military conflict. The Carter emphasis has been mainly on economic and political activity, rather than on military effort. Because of the Soviet arms buildup, however, the Carter Administration appears to be modifying its policy of avoiding military responses.

Africa

The successes and most glaring failures of the Carter foreign policy can be discerned in its approach to Africa, which has assumed a surprisingly significant position in its foreign policy. In contrast to the neglect of African affairs by the preceding administration, Carter has acknowledged African affairs as a top priority. In spite of a pronounced tendency at first to analyze African problems in terms of the American

civil rights experience, the Carter Administration has approached African affairs more broadly, namely in terms of "African solutions to African problems". Within this framework, the U.S. has sought to co-sponsor negotiations with Western European countries to settle regional conflicts among African nations, such as in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Zaire.

China

Despite a slow start, partly to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has moved carefully, yet rapidly, to normalize relations with China. The timing of the announcement came as a surprise, but the Administration had carefully made behind-the-scenes preparations that were built upon the groundwork laid by preceding administrations. The Administration has limited the playing of the questionable "China Card" to the normalization announcement and a joint communique with Deng Xiaoping con-

demning Asian "hegemony".

Europe

In contrast to the Kissinger era, the Carter Administration has actively sought political and economic partnerships with various European nations for the solution of global and regional concerns. Reflecting Brzezinski's initial trilateral "architectural" approach to foreign affairs, the Administration has acknowl-

The Carter Report Card

GEOGRAPHIC	Comment	Grade
1. Africa	<i>initially appealing approach undermined by failure to resolve some intractable problems</i>	B
2. China	<i>normalization followed by appropriately cautious optimism</i>	A-
3. Europe	<i>generally healthy climate, though much tension from particular issues</i>	B+
4. Japan	<i>continuing trade problems, despite efforts</i>	B-
5. Latin America	<i>business as usual: rhetoric without substance</i>	D+
6. Middle East	<i>still fluid: success, but also failures</i>	I
7. South and East Asia	<i>neglect; mixed on human rights</i>	B-
8. Soviet Union	<i>ambiguous, until recently</i>	B-
TOPICAL		
1. Arms Control	<i>mixed record on arms sales, non-proliferation; good on SALT</i>	B
2. Defence	<i>unclear approach</i>	B-
3. Foreign Aid	<i>neglect</i>	C+
4. Human Rights	<i>mixed: positive thrust, notable failures</i>	B
5. Trade and Economic Policies	<i>good on trade, mixed on monetary policies</i>	B+
OVERALL	<i>Style and consistency poor, substance impressive</i>	B

edged Europe as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. The U.S. and Europe are joining in political discussions on a number of areas, most notably on Africa, and on global economic problems. The Carter Administration has also pursued human rights objectives in Eastern Europe, with some success. However, Carter Administration policies have irritated European friends. Until late 1978 the U.S. allowed the dollar to deteriorate to a point alarming to its allies. Carter finally undertook massive rescue efforts in November, but it seems likely that management of the dollar, as well as the management of the U.S. economy in general, will continue to be a source of tension between the U.S. and Europe. The Administration has also angered several countries, most notably France and Germany, by its approach to the energy problem. Overall, the relationship between the U.S. and Europe appears to be healthy, but there is a danger of increasing tension as the energy problems continue and the U.S. economy worsens.

Japan

Although Carter has repeatedly declared that Japan is the cornerstone of his Asian policy and has made important security concessions to the Japanese in order to demonstrate his commitment, tension exists between the two countries because of the trade issue. The Administration has thus far been successful in insulating the security arrangements from the trade conflict. Continued strained relations, however, over the increasingly important trade issues may affect other areas. The Administration is devoting a great deal of effort to solving the trade problems and has achieved several agreements recently, but they may be limited by the complexity of the situation in both countries. Domestic factors are significant in both Japan and the U.S. The Administration must inform the public that the trade negotiations can only progress slowly and, at the same time, it must demonstrate a strong interest in securing agreements.

Latin America

Latin America provides the most striking illustration of the divergence between rhetoric and substance. The Carter Administration began its Latin American policy efforts with a flurry of activity directed toward improving relations dramatically with the long-neglected Latin American countries. The high priority that was initially accorded to Latin America was indicated by the unprecedented number of Carter speeches on Latin America, the widespread travel throughout Latin America by the Carter entourage, and numerous other symbolic gestures. Yet by 1978 it was clear that Carter's Latin American policy had clear limitations. The Administration's human rights policy became eroded in light of his support of the Somoza regime. Although Carter initially felt that his

human rights philosophy could have its greatest impact on Latin America because of the widespread existence there of authoritarian regimes and the absence of vital U.S. interests, the Administration discovered that it did, indeed, have important interests there. The Administration did create a distance between itself and the repressive Pinochet regime in Chile, but has mishandled the carrot and stick approach in aid to Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador and Guatemala. As a result, these countries have become alienated without much having been accomplished in the human rights area. The Administration's early initiatives in Cuba appeared to be appropriate until it was confronted with Cuban adventurism elsewhere. Despite more laudable intentions than its predecessors, the Carter Administration has not fared well in its relationship with Mexico, which has assumed increasing importance. Apart from the legacy of bad relations that any administration would have to overcome, the Carter Administration has created its own problems. The mishandling of the oil deal, the embarrassing comments made by Carter during his recent trip to Mexico, and the failure to settle the alien problem have hurt relations. Finally, the Carter Administration must be congratulated on its Panama Canal efforts. The Panama treaty was initially defined as a priority issue, and the Administration followed through.

Middle East

Although the Carter Administration has had an ambitious, relatively sensitive and, to an extent, innovative approach to Middle Eastern affairs resulting in several important accomplishments, U.S. interests there have been seriously undermined by recent unforeseen events. However different the Carter Administration may have been from its predecessor in its more even-handed approach to Arab-Israeli issues, its strategy continued to rest ultimately on the two "pillars" of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The significance of the collapse of Iran and the cooling of the Saudi friendship as a result of the Camp David settlement cannot be underestimated. It seems that the foundations for protecting the oil supply through regional security arrangements have been weakened. The U.S. apparently intends to change its approach from a relatively passive one to a more active "Carter Doctrine for the Middle East" with the Middle Eastern visit of Defence Secretary Harold Brown last winter, the training of Saudi military by the U.S., the dispatch of an aircraft carrier to the Arabian Sea in February in response to the Yemen conflict, and the possible separation of the U.S. Middle Eastern Command from the European Command. Thus, the Administration recently has recognized that a different strategy is necessary to protect American interests in the Middle East.

South and East Asia

Highly sensitive to previous U.S. involvement in South-east Asia, the Carter Administration initially sought to de-emphasize the U.S. presence there. In fulfillment of his campaign pledge, Carter immediately began to withdraw troops from South Korea until the Japanese indicated their displeasure. Also, ASEAN indicated to the Administration that it needed the commitment of U.S. presence in Asia. As a result, the Carter Administration found itself faced with responsibilities in Asia that Carter had strongly criticized during the presidential campaign. This inconsistency, although primarily due to the realities of power, damaged the Carter image. In addition, the lack of forceful human rights criticism of the Asian countries, including allies, hurt the Administration's credibility. Apart from the military assurances, the Carter Administration had paid little attention to South and East Asia.

Soviet Union

The Carter Administration's policy towards the Soviet Union has generally been unfortunate, despite the recent SALT II agreement. The Administration started with a misperception of the Soviet world role and, as a result, misread Soviet intentions. Beginning with a false sense of strength and superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as a result of the legacy of *détente*, the Administration virtually ignored it except to make periodic human rights pronouncements and to settle the major issues through the comprehensive SALT negotiations. Yet problems in Soviet-American relations have occurred apart from the SALT negotiations, in various African, Middle Eastern and Asian areas. Because the Carter Administration's world order policy for matters other than strategic ones was based on a doctrine of trilateralism, the SALT issue was seen as a goal in itself without immediate relevance to other events. The Soviet image held by the Carter Administration and conveyed to the American public – and to the Soviet Union – indicated the confusion in attitudes towards the Soviets within the Administration. On one hand, the Soviet Union was considered the major partner in building a strategic world order through the SALT agreements. On the other hand, it was seen as a perpetrator of gross human rights violations. There is no doubt that the accusations of human rights violations have had some influence on the recent increase in numbers allowed to emigrate. However, the over-all effect of this dual policy has been to give an impression of inconsistency. The Carter Administration has recovered in part from this shaky beginning; and Carter's tough Annapolis speech in June, 1978, can be seen as a watershed.

Arms Control

The Carter Administration has a mixed record on arms control. Its greatest success is the SALT II

agreement, which offers sufficient advantage to certain American interests. The Administration jeopardized the negotiations at first by sending Vance to Moscow immediately with major new proposals, which the Russians refused. It recovered rapidly, however, from this mistake and has since proceeded more cautiously. The Administration has expressed lofty sentiments regarding non-proliferation, but the results of its initiatives in this area have been poor. The Germans and Brazilians, in particular, have been greatly alienated by the Administration's approach. The Carter Administration has also had a mixed record on arms sales. In contrast to previous administrations, they linked arms sales to the purchaser country's stand on human rights. To an extent they achieved some positive results, but their inconsistency in carrying out this policy was unfortunate.

Defence

The Carter Administration has generally sought to exercise U.S. leadership through political and economic initiatives rather than through military threats. It has maintained traditional global military commitments, but created some confusion because it lacked a clear definition of vital interests. In response to what was perceived to be the "lesson of Vietnam," the Administration drew back from global military involvement at first and then began to restructure its defence commitments in terms of more limited objectives. However, it has become clear that the continued existence of certain vital strategic interests limits any radical changes in defence policy. The failure to consider the strategic implications of a total withdrawal from Korea and the zig-zag decision on the deployment of neutron bombs in Europe have contributed to an image of confusion.

Foreign Aid

The Carter Administration has proclaimed extremely high standards for its foreign-aid program, but has not lived up to them. Despite its declared intent to establish a foreign-aid program that would further American moral interests, the Administration has yet to come up with concrete criteria and objectives for foreign aid. Continuing traditional U.S. policy, the Carter Administration has not changed the proportion of aid to the poorer nations as opposed to that given a few developed ones. It has made little effort to sell foreign-aid programs to Congress and the public.

Human Rights

President Carter must be given credit for the influence he has had on the worldwide interest in human rights, merely by publicizing the issue. It is difficult to assess the precise impact of the Carter rhetoric, but it is clear that the level of awareness of the issue of human rights has increased. The Administration has undoubtedly had a positive influence on

emigration from the Soviet Union and the release of political prisoners.

The Administration has, however, limited the impact of its efforts by its hyperbole and its failure to establish adequate criteria for implementing its own human rights policy. Its initial verbal activism without sufficient consideration of the effect on other important U.S. priorities hurt the Carter image. The Administration did not recognize that there are a number of other vital U.S. interests as well as human rights. Rather, it spoke of human rights issues as though they were the overriding interest in U.S. foreign policy.

Trade and Economic Relations

In contrast to the preceding administration, Carter has pursued a consistent and generally successful free-trade policy. The Administration has achieved favorable terms for the U.S. with the GATT agreement and has improved its global economic relations. The two major problem areas are Europe and Japan. The apparent lack of attention to the declining dollar has angered some European allies. They relate this failure to the weak domestic energy policy and the resulting increase in oil imports which wrought havoc

with U.S. balance of payments. Although the Administration is attempting to solve the Japanese trade problem, it is limited by institutional and domestic forces in both countries. Overall, the Carter Administration has made substantial progress on both these issues.

The Balance Sheet

Why is the Carter report card so uneven? Given global complexities, the Carter Administration has performed well on most issues. Its inconsistency is, in part, a result of the management of inevitable contradictions in any foreign policy. When it has faltered, however, the Carter Administration has too often been a prisoner of its own rhetoric.

Why is the Administration's foreign policy so little understood? Without a clear crisis, and without clear domestic mandates on any issues, it is difficult for any administration to define its foreign policy. But the Carter style has unnecessarily obfuscated the substance of its foreign policy. As Brzezinski cogently argued in 1971, there was no Nixon doctrine. Similarly, today, there is no Carter doctrine, and the President's chief task ought to be a lucid explanation of his goals and strategies.

International trade environment in the post-MTN period

by Robert G. Clark

The Tokyo Round may have been the last and most ambitious multilateral trade and tariff negotiations (MTN) to be conducted on a comprehensive and global basis. The initialling of the results also marks the first time that any major GATT trade negotiation has been concluded during a protracted period of slow growth in the world economy. At the four economic Summits held from 1975 through 1978, leaders sought to give impetus to an early and satisfactory conclusion of the GATT negotiations then in progress. At the Tokyo Summit leaders drew attention to the MTN achievement, and pledged commitment to the "early and faithful implementation" of the MTN agreements. Now, attention can be focused still more closely on the fundamental medium-term structural issues which will condition the international trading environment in the post-MTN period,

and on the major trade-policy issues which flow from them.

Slow growth

The advanced industrial economies are having to adjust to sharp increases in the cost of energy, persistent inflationary pressures and reduced growth rates. In

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these circumstances industrial economies are having to cope with slow productivity growth, fundamental demographic shifts, significant changes in demand and supply trends, technological changes, the effects of aging capital stock and the emergence of competition in some sectors from a number of developing countries. These structural phenomena (which have been exacerbated by cyclical overcapacity in some sectors) have been reflected in lagging domestic investment, unsatisfactory rates of unemployment and, externally, in large international-payments disequilibria and attendant periods of disorderly exchange market conditions. Domestically, these developments have led to pressures for increased government intervention, aimed particularly at stimulating investment and export earnings and protecting threatened industries from import competition.

While there has been a moderate economic recovery since the 1974-75 recession, current prospects are for little appreciable rate of increase in world trade or production for 1979 over 1978, and in particular little change is projected for real GNP growth in the industrial countries as a group (which averaged about 3.5 per cent in 1978). Looking further ahead, whether one accepts the "slow-growth" scenario or a more optimistic estimate, it seems generally agreed that the world will not soon return to the sustained growth rates characteristic of the pre-1973 quarter century. Among the many factors cited for this, is that tariffs have now been reduced in the West to the point where further reductions beyond those agreed in the MTN would be unlikely to lead to a significant expansion in international trade.

Thus, while constituting a signal success in present economic circumstances — a world-wide reduction in tariffs of about one-third, agreement on a series of significant non-tariff codes, and strengthened procedures for surveillance, consultation and dispute settlement — the MTN achievement is unfinished. It will be important to carry out the implementation of the MTN results through a) bringing domestic legislation and regulatory practices into conformity with the newly negotiated codes where necessary, and b) giving force to the codes through their effective administration in GATT. This will entail an enhanced management and administrative capacity for GATT. It will also likely require the development of a trade-policy role for the organization, possibly evolving from the existing Consultative Group of 18, which might be given a mandate to ensure that the spirit and intent of the MTN codes are fulfilled and trade-policy issues are addressed in a timely and coherent manner. Without determined follow-through, the MTN results might not be rigorously applied, increasing the risk of escalating trade-restrictive measures which the last six years of MTN negotiations have helped to avoid.

While the MTN result that has emerged is better than could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances, it can neither substitute nor lessen the need for fundamental adjustments in the world economy to the underlying structural changes which are now taking place. Moreover, given the degree of structural problems perceived and the lack of public support for freer trade, pressure to maintain protective mechanisms may rise in proportion as the pace of adjustment threatens to exceed domestic tolerance. Protectionism and adjustment thus confront trade policy makers with a basic two-edged issue which must be faced squarely if the MTN results are not to be endangered by the implementation of more sophisticated beggar-thy-neighbour policies. To reinforce their endorsement of the MTN results and any impetus given to their implementation, leaders at the Tokyo Summit made public their concern to manage the medium-term issues of adjustment and protectionism.

Protectionism

Protective measures, both ongoing and temporary, are provided for in GATT and are not regarded *per se* as necessarily unwise or undesirable. Judicious application of temporary and reasonable protective instruments can be a legitimate response to the injurious effects of imports whose disruptive impact overwhelms the absorptive capacity of the receiving economy at the time. Legitimate protective measures can be used to buy time for a domestic industry to adjust to foreign competition by becoming more competitive, or to "adjust out" of an industry in a manner which minimizes hardship on the workforce. As sanctioned by GATT, they also protect producers from unfair injurious import competition arising from such measures as dumping, government subsidization or predatory pricing practices. However, especially in periods of slow growth, the danger is that protective measures will be used only as means of deferring adjustment and safeguarding employment — as palliatives treating immediate symptoms rather than as remedial actions aimed at underlying causes.

While often politically more attractive in the short term, protective action which does little more than prop up weak industries usually creates vested interests in continued protection, often attracts new investment to the least dynamic sectors of the economy, and thus contributes to inflexibilities in the economy which lock in labour and capital to their least dynamic uses. In the long run, this will involve loss of higher-income, higher-productivity jobs in those sectors with the most growth potential. Moreover, the real danger that protectionism would spread through example and retaliation cannot be underestimated in a sustained period of slow growth.

It is against this background that the OECD Trade Pledge (to avoid trade-restrictive measures for



Within weeks of becoming prime minister of Canada, Joe Clark was off to Tokyo for the fifth in the series of economic summit meetings that began at Rambouillet, France, in 1975. He is pictured here with Margaret Thatcher, Giscard d'Estaing and Jimmy Carter.

balance of payments purposes) was renewed at the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in June. Artificially depressed demand in both the developed and developing economies through restricted market access would aggravate existing structural difficulties and result in a major impediment to any hope of a sustained world economic recovery. Equally, an undisciplined proliferation of export subsidies and investment incentives would lead to exaggerated distortions in capital and trade flows in relation to market signals.

Adjustment

The phenomenon of structural change and adjustment is not new. The post-war revival of Europe and the emergence in the 1960s of Japan and Italy were accompanied by pressures to accommodate new technologies and new patterns of consumption and trade flows. The western industrialized system has, by and large, been receptive to and has benefited from this dynamic change, acting from the premise that liberalized flows of trade and investment and the law of comparative advantage work to the benefit of the international community. What is new in current circumstances is the confluence of slow growth, serious structural problems and the rapid, export-led emer-

gence of the upper-income developing countries as highly competitive producers particularly in standard-technology, labour-intensive industries.

The trade liberalization embodied in the MTN result will, if anything, accelerate the need for adjustment to structural change. At the same time, increased competition in domestic and third markets will mean that conditions are least favourable for positive adjustment policies in domestic decision-making. The time would seem ripe, therefore, for a concerted approach to the phenomenon of structural adjustment which will lend some element of predictability and market confidence with respect to legitimate "positive" adjustment, and at the same time, minimize the possibility that the adjustment process will become transformed into a negative-sum exercise whereby all governments would manoeuvre to shift the burden of adjustment to their trading partners. It is against this background that the OECD has undertaken an intensive examination into the difficulties encountered in shifting to more positive adjustment policies, including a clarification of some of the general issues raised, to assist policy-makers in their consideration of adjustment problems.

The OECD study recognizes that adjustment policies can be directed towards economic ends

Bilateral

(encouraging the most efficient allocation of capital and labour) and non-economic ends (encouraging social goals through regional development and farm policies, income redistribution programs, etc., or mitigating the impact of severe economic dislocation). Adjustment policies are also viewed as integral to the achievement of sustained non-inflationary growth. Hence the OECD study points in the direction of choosing adjustment policies aimed at accomplishing the various socio-economic goals of governments with minimum distortion to the marketplace and by means that are compatible with economic efficiency.

It may be argued that the central challenge for policy-makers in the post-MTN environment will be to create an international climate of confidence — based on the reasonable expectation of mutual discipline — respecting structural adjustment. Otherwise, governments around the world, caught up in an escalating competition involving actions which retard adjustment, will find themselves running faster to stay in the same place relative to their trading partners, with each resistance to adjustment doing further harm to the cause of genuinely improving domestic economies. Thus, it was in this light that the Tokyo Summit leaders drew attention to the need to improve the long-term productive efficiency and flexibility of their economies.

Interdependence

A central feature of the trading environment during the 1980s will be the evolutionary integration of a growing number of developing countries into the international economic system. The extent to which Eastern European centrally-planned economies may share in this integration, and the impact they may have, is uncertain. Equally uncertain is whether the Chinese growth targets are obtainable, and if so, what will be the implications for the West of a billion people in that country becoming moderately more wealthy by the year 2000. Nevertheless, the principal issue posed by the emergence of the so-called "newly industrializing countries" is: what conditions should govern their entry as full participants into the world economic system? For it is no longer debated whether the prospects for accelerated growth in developing economies are a welcome development from the point of view of the industrialized economies. There is a clear marriage of interest in favour of a mutual expansion of trade based on comparative advantage. The middle-income developing countries provide markets for the specialized, technologically innovative products and "know-how" services of the developed economies, while providing consumer goods at lower cost. Investment capital from industrialized countries is used to finance development plans in LDC's — including the development of raw materials and energy — and in turn, frees up export earnings for the purchase of imported goods sourced from devel-

oped countries. In periods of weakened investment demand in the developed countries, the developing countries have also provided a welcome counter-cyclical outlet for investment. Growth in the developing world, for example, ameliorated the 1974-75 recession in the developed countries.

However, particularly in the wake of the 1974-75 recession, market penetration by low-cost imports in sensitive sectors of developed-country economies has brought pressures for relief for the threatened industries and a growing, sometimes exaggerated, concern generally about the implications of import competition from developing countries. Conversely, the developing countries perceive the existing international system as biased against them in terms of trade, access to private capital markets and control over resource development, and accordingly, they have called for fuller and more effective participation in all decision-making concerning the international economy. More particularly, during the Tokyo Round tariff negotiations, the developing countries pressed for special and differential treatment in the form of deeper-than-Most-Favoured-Nation formula cuts; faster or slower staging of tariff reductions, shallower MFN tariff reductions for items covered by the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to minimize the erosion of their GSP preference; binding of preferential concessions and margins, and various improvements in the GSP. In the negotiations of non-tariff codes as well, developing countries sought the incorporation into the codes of special and differential provisions. While MTN negotiations with a number of LDC's continue, they have already registered their dissatisfaction with the MTN results and the conduct of the negotiations, most recently at the UNCTAD V meeting in Manila in May.

While it is true that progress in meeting a number of the preoccupations of developing countries fell short of LDC expectations, the MTN negotiations provided developing countries with specific gains, in addition to the benefits accruing to them on an MFN basis from the concessions exchanged in the negotiations. These gains include a firmer legal basis for the GSP and for preferential trade arrangements among developing countries, the advance implementation of non-reciprocal tariff concessions on a range of tropical products, and provisions for special and differential treatment in the various non-tariff codes. The code provisions are particularly noteworthy, both in themselves and in the sense that they represent a departure from the Most-Favoured-Nation principle of GATT in order to respond to the interests of developing countries.

Whatever the perceptions of the MTN outcome, and its likely impact on trade, one issue which will be significant in influencing the evolution of trade relations between developed and developing countries in the post-MTN period is the need for the more

advanced developing countries to assume greater obligations and to take measures of liberalization commensurate with their state of economic development. At issue here are the implications for both the developed and developing countries of not reaching agreement on the difficult question of "graduation", and of prolonging a trading system wherein the benefits of special and differential treatment accrue to those developing countries which increasingly need it least.

As the most advanced of the developing countries continue to gain in economic strength, and as others join their ranks, the impact from their having derived disproportionate preferential benefits will increase for developed and developing countries alike. With respect to the latter, the advanced developing countries will likely attract investment away from lesser developed countries, will dominate intra-LDC trade, and, to the extent that developing countries maintain their solidarity in the North-South dialogue, may well have a dampening effect on the future willingness of the developed countries to accede to the demands of the LDC's as a group. As regards the developed countries, and especially their need to adjust constructively to the emergence of the newly industrializing countries, this will be more difficult politically if domestic interests perceive themselves as having to adjust not only to a change in comparative advantage, but to import competition which unfairly benefits from unwarranted preferential treatment.

As part of an attempt to encourage business confidence, and as a signal to both the lesser- and most-developed of the developing countries that "differentiation" is an issue with far-reaching implications, the international community will want to examine appropriate means of ensuring that all countries assume international trade obligations commensurate with their state of economic development.

Japan's role

During discussions on structural adjustment and the alignment of macro-economic policies at the Tokyo Summit, the role of the Japanese economy came under implicit scrutiny. Japan's global trade surplus, exceeding \$25 billion, has resulted in strong pressures from both the EC and the U.S. for an increased contribution from Japan towards the achievement of greater bilateral and international equilibrium. The emphasis has been on securing more effective Japanese stimulation of domestic demand, together with greater liberalization of the Japanese market. While the Japanese growth rate has fallen short of their undertaking at the Bonn Summit, the main concern of Japan's major trading partners, including Canada, has been market access, without which increased domestic demand in Japan loses its relevance. The Japanese in turn point to: steps they have already taken to meet others' concerns; the domestic political

constraints upon the degree of flexibility they can be expected to show; the tradition of hard work and sophisticated marketing to which they credit their success; and (implicitly) the present and future vulnerability of their resource-dependent economy to external forces beyond their control. Although Canada places a high priority on obtaining market access in Japan for a higher proportion of processed and manufactured exports, its over-all trade surplus with Japan places it in a different position from the other Summit participants.

The Tokyo Summit was neither the time nor place to single out one Summit participant for attention or to press bilateral matters. It offered an opportunity, on the other hand, to stress the need for avoiding basic structural imbalances in the economic system, to welcome any contributions Summit countries might make to that end, and to reflect concern for the international system as a whole if it must sustain for much longer the maladjustments to which it is currently subject. It was also an occasion to recall that unilateral action by a Summit participant to restrict another's imports would be unfortunate politically as well as economically for both parties, and would likely entail adverse consequences for third parties through trade diversion.

Canadian interests

Given the nature of the Canadian economy, our position relative to the "Big Three" trading entities, and the emergence of newly industrializing countries with a growing capacity to compete with us domestically as well as in third markets, Canadian interests are served by an open international trading environment characterized by effective multilateral disciplines and non-discriminatory trade rules which work. This affords the best means of advancing Canada's basic trade interests, namely: the expansion of export opportunities for Canadian high-technology goods and processed industrial materials; the promotion of long-term and stable primary export markets on an internationally competitive basis; and the development of a competitive domestic economy with scope for an appropriate mix of access to and protection from imports to reflect Canada's particular circumstances.

Consistent with the above trade interests, there would be advantage for us in a post-MTN international trade environment which included the following major elements:

- (a) implementation of the MTN results through bringing national legislation and practices where necessary into conformity with the various GATT non-tariff codes;
- (b) strengthening of the GATT institutional framework to ensure that the letter and intent of the codes are fulfilled, and that major trade-policy issues are addressed in a timely and coherent manner;

- (c) a common political conviction that with the MTN negotiations concluded, protectionism must be resisted in both developed and developing countries in the universal interest of continued economic recovery;
- (d) endorsement of a positive approach to structural adjustment, in both developed and developing countries, so that socio-economic goals of governments are achieved with minimum disruption to the efficient reallocation of resources both domestically and internationally;
- (e) the gradual assumption by the more advanced developing countries of obligations and measures of liberalization commensurate with their state of economic development; and,
- (f) more generally, engagement of the developing countries on a broad range of trade-policy issues subsequent to the MTN and UNCTAD V, involving a coherent approach to the contributions to be made in discussions in GATT, the OECD and UNCTAD.

Industrial policy in Canada

Reconciling national interests to the international system

by Roy A. Matthews

In the last few years, there has been growing insistence in Canadian political debate on the need to evolve what is referred to as an "industrial strategy". Less widely known in this country is the fact that national industrial strategies or policies are also coming to represent an important topic of discussion in world councils, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, where such arrangements are viewed with some concern.

It seems fitting that attention should be focused on the matter of governmental support to Canada's manufacturing sector during 1979, for this year marks the 100th anniversary of the introduction of the famous National Policy by Sir John A. Macdonald. Since 1979 is also the 40th anniversary of the start of the Second World War, whose origins can be traced at least in part to the failure of the international economic system in the 1930s — and most notably to the stifling of trade through excessive import protectionism — it appears a particularly appropriate year for examination of an ever-crucial question: the relationship between the search for industrial expansion

at home and the requirements of economic exchange and efficient international division of labour in the global context.

Manufacturing

Macdonald's National Policy was not, of course, by any means entirely an exercise in industrial development. Nonetheless, although that ingenious political construct involved many elements outside the realm of what we would now call industrial policy — it included measures promoting railway building, settlement of the western prairie, and large-scale immigration — probably its most important effect was the foundation it helped to lay for the establishment of a broadly-based manufacturing sector in Canada. One may usefully consider the role of the National Policy in the evolution of the Canadian economy and policy over the past hundred years, because it had an underlying purpose — or set of purposes — that can be seen as very relevant, still, to the sorts of concerns motivating our search for industrial strategies today.

The goals that were to be served by the National Policy — and in particular by the system of import tariffs that formed a part of its overall design — are the eternal objectives of any nation: wealth, strength and unity. Creating a complex of manufacturing in-

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industries would make Canadians rich by drawing workers out of traditional activities like agriculture and fishing into modern spheres of endeavour where a more dynamic and innovative atmosphere prevailed. It would make Canada strong — that is, ensure its independence as a nation — by providing the basis for employing a lot of people, both native-born and immigrant, who would be gathered in great cities where the elements of a forceful cultural identity could be forged. It would unite the country by encouraging the interregional exchange of central-Canadian finished goods for eastern and western primary produce, an integrative symbiosis from which all would benefit.

There has been no change in the goals, obviously. What is more to the point, in the present context, is whether the requirements of contemporary conditions call for a similar effort by government to guide and foster industrial development, pursued not only through conventional import protection but through additional mechanisms capable of distorting international trade, investment, and other exchanges.

Today's goals

Given that the labour force of any developed country is, by definition, almost entirely employed in the modernized sectors of the economy, there is no longer any significant scope for enhancing efficiency and thus national wealth by attracting workers into manufacturing industry. Instead, efficiency is generally held to be adversely affected by any attempt to protect or otherwise sustain secondary industrial enterprises that cannot compete in world markets on their own. The argument most often heard nowadays in favour of special policy measures favouring industrial employment as a means of maximizing wealth — or, at least, as stimulating the potential for greater wealth creation in the future — is rather different. It suggests that the rewards of economic endeavour are especially large in the case of high-technology industries, so that governments will be well advised in effect to channel resources saved by the present generation into technological development that may pay off for the next. Thus the industrial policies of this day and age stress aid for research and development, tax incentives for high-technology innovations, and comparable devices.

The importance attached to technological competence is also a prime focus of the modern-day search for national strength and independence. Whereas in earlier times it seemed necessary to increase the number of Canadians — perhaps, in the ultimate extreme, to provide sheer manpower for an army — today the essence of nationhood appears to be a capacity for noteworthy technological achievement. Ours is a civilization based on scientific and technical excellence; *ergo*, any self-respecting nation must have its own cadres of brainy people able to contribute to the wonders of nuclear physics or electronic microcircuitry.

Disentangling the mystique of such notions from the real significance of technological capability for nation states and their peoples is one of the great challenges currently facing political economy. The problem is expressed very largely in terms of the role of highly sophisticated industrial technology in the growth of so-called multinational firms, which are seen as potent instruments for the dissemination of cultural influences and the perpetuation of unsymmetrical interdependencies between “metropolitan” countries (where multinationals have their headquarters) and “peripheral” ones (where branches and subsidiaries are located). This perception of affairs causes governments in countries like Canada to introduce machinery for the screening of foreign investments and motivates many people to advocate the establishment of state corporations in key industries to keep them under domestic control.

The continuing goal of national unity, as it presents itself in contemporary Canadian affairs, still has implications strongly reminiscent of those justifying the National Policy. However, the basis of the original position — namely, that Ontario and Quebec would constitute the nation's industrial heartland and the east and west its sources of primary goods — no longer seems to be workable. On one hand, Quebec is falling behind as a manufacturing centre for all except the more labour-intensive, standard technology products; on the other, western provinces are seeking to develop their own manufacturing capacity, at least as it concerns further processing of raw materials for export and possibly with respect to other items of various kinds. These conflicting trends explain the emergence of provincially sponsored efforts at industrial policy-building, which the federal government is desperately trying to accommodate in some sort of grand strategy of its own.

International aspect

Should these national goals, and the industrial-policy devices engineered to achieve them, be accepted as legitimate by the international community? In regard to the goals themselves there can be little quarrel. Although, in an interdependent world, there may be a *prima facie* implication that human welfare at the national level is indivisible from peace, progress, and prosperity among all nations, it is obvious that individual countries do often gain or lose, relative to some international average, from the outcome of economic events as determined by market forces. Because the citizen inevitably looks to his national government — and, in federal countries, also to his regional one — for the management of so many aspects of affairs influencing the milieu in which he lives, it is clear that such governments must always attempt to further those interests perceived as benefiting the electorate as a whole. Pursuit of national goals, therefore, is an intrinsic part of the nation-state system, which for

all its faults is as yet the only effective scheme we have found for organizing society at a level of any complexity.

The question to which students of this subject have to address themselves, however, is how far the particular interests of the nation can be pushed before there is damage to the fragile but substantive international order of which all states are now integral components, with the effect that in the end the individual nation itself is likely to suffer more loss than gain. At a time of rising protectionist sentiment, uncomfortably like the "beggar-my-neighbour" attitudes that helped to precipitate the Great Depression in the 1930s, there is little need to stress this danger. At the same time, though, it is also worth asking whether too great an insistence on global laissez-faire might not, under certain circumstances, undermine a relevant national interest to the ultimate detriment of international well-being. (For example, might a refusal by the Canadian government to sustain import-vulnerable industries in Quebec contribute to a collapse of employment in that province so serious that confederation would be fatally undermined, causing upheavals in the economy of this part of the world that would be felt by all our trading partners for a considerable time to come?)

Criteria

A number of criteria suggest themselves for gauging the legitimacy and validity of the devices put in place as elements of an industrial policy. One is the importance to the nation — as judged by an impartial observer rather than a politician or any other citizen of the country concerned — of readily identifiable goals evidently fundamental to its people's long-term welfare. Another is the extent to which the effects of the policies in question involve damage to interna-

tional interests that can be seen as measurable — even in the broadest sense — and substantial, instead of merely entailing an internal transfer of benefits and costs within the national economy. A third is the length of time the policies may be expected to remain in force and their consequences to be felt, not only at home but abroad. (To these three principal criteria might be added some sort of categorization of nations, the fragility of their economies or even of their political and social structures, and so on — which is really an elaboration of the first criterion.)

The implication of such notions must be, of course, that a type of surveillance or "referee" mechanism could come to exist, situated outside national jurisdictions, to rule on the acceptability of measures introduced by nations in the name of industrial policy. That is the proposition that lies behind deliberation of the issue among delegates from member governments in the OECD. It is likewise the underlying theme of an assessment of national industrial arrangements being fostered this year by the influential Trilateral Commission, which brings together luminaries from North America, Western Europe, and Japan to consider major foreign policy questions affecting their countries and the world.

Whether, in fact, it will ever prove feasible to allow supra-national institutions to have so substantial a role in the affairs of individual nations remains to be seen. But, given Canada's large stake in the effective operation of the international politico-economic system, the matter is surely of highest importance to Canadians. One might hope that the current popular attention being devoted to the pursuit of renewed viability for Canadian industry could, therefore, take account of such larger concerns, which up to now have been subject to virtually no public discussion at all.

The transfer of technology is sometimes conceived as nothing less dramatic than the secret delivery by an inventor to his associate of a "magic black box." Those who see it this way may have in mind William Stevenson's description, in *A Man Called Intrepid*, of the delivery by the British government to the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development of the cavity magnetron which generated short-wave-length electronic beams and made possible the centimetric radar that was small enough to fit into destroyers and aircraft. In fact, the transfer of technology is far more prosaic. Simply put, it is the process of the transfer of knowledge, and of how to use it, by people to people. And the knowledge transferred is itself the product of innovative thought and effort by people.

Extract from "The Transfer of Technology: the need for pragmatism" by E. Hugh Roach, Public Affairs Adviser, Alcan Aluminum Limited, Montreal, published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs as Volume XXXVII No. 5 of its Behind the Headlines series.

Challenging the Economic Council's view of the new world order

by Jeffrey S. Steeves

If the 1960s represented a period of growing awareness within Third World nations of the complexities of development programs and directions promoted by the West, the 1970s have marked the growth of cynicism and disillusionment with those same policies. During the 1970s, Third World countries have become increasingly frustrated in their attempts to "develop" and have begun to perceive their condition of "underdevelopment" as emerging from the current structuring of the international economy. The collective efforts of OPEC countries in 1973 to determine a common price structure for oil stimulated the political leadership within the Third World to speak in unison on economic issues which clearly work to the advantage of the rich, developed North while systematically weakening the poor, underdeveloped South. Efforts by the Group of 77 to secure changes in the conditions of trade, monetary reform, agreements on commodity prices and on the transfer of technology have proved to be difficult, despite a whole array of international conferences established to work towards a more equitable international economic system. Meanwhile, the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries continues to widen. Of far greater significance, there is even less appreciation of the deteriorating condition of poor people — the near-landless, landless, under-employed and unemployed — who constitute the majority of the population in Third World countries.

Canada and the other industrialized countries of the North face a changing international environment, one in which a new policy framework must be developed to meet new international conditions. As one study has suggested, "We are entering an era in international relations during which political conflicts are widely perceived to be centred in economic relations."

Despite statements of intent and concern expressed intermittently by our political leaders, the Canadian response to North-South issues has been tempered by domestic concerns. Two major preoccupations — a persistently poor economic performance with high unemployment, inflation and a slow growth in productivity and the national unity question — have distracted concerted attention from the need for

a fundamental reorientation of assumptions and aspirations. Two important effects of our preoccupations can be perceived, both of which bear directly on the policy process at the federal level. Firstly, public awareness of and debate on the difficult choices which Canada will have to face over the next several decades have been inadequate. In part, this represents a failure of political leadership to alert Canadians to the important and continuing changes in our external environment and their potential impact on the country. Secondly, since the priorities of politicians and senior public servants lie elsewhere, little hard analysis of complex North-South issues has been undertaken or thought given to the alternative courses of action available, much less to the formulation of an appropriate policy to guide our relations with underdeveloped countries. As a result, the Canadian position is one of "suspended animation".

Last year, however, one institution at the periphery of the policy process in Ottawa, the Economic Council of Canada, released a major study entitled, *For A Common Future: A Study of Canada's Relations with Developing Countries*. The prestige of the Economic Council and its ability to draw upon both official and academic expertise raises the expectation that finally we will have a basis for informed debate and thereby an awakening of political and public concern.

A critical precondition to the development of a broad policy framework for Canada is the requirement for a sound and careful analysis of current reality and the identification of future trends which will be important to our relation with Third World countries. Unfortunately such an analysis has not been presented in *For A Common Future*. The authors of the Council's report have been captured by assumptions and attitudes which may have been relevant to an earlier period but which are clearly outdated now. In part, the explanation can be traced to the dom-

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inance of economists. The report lacks a political perspective. It seldom refers to events within underdeveloped countries and exhibits little appreciation of what is politically tenable in Canada. Of a much more critical nature is the lack of sensitivity to political realities, which is reflected in a naive and dangerous tendency to define our external environment in a way that supports the preferences of the authors of the report. Canadians are offered a portrait of the economic, social and political conditions within Third World countries that is reassuring, one that serves our interests and aspirations. If Canadian policy is premised on this analysis and the recommendations which flow from it, our actions will be misplaced.

Perspective

Not unexpectedly, a fundamental weakness underlying the arguments advanced in the report appears in the introductory remarks. The Economic Council suggests that the most appropriate theoretical perspective on development rests with the neoclassical growth approach. This approach assumes "... that accumulation of capital and increased trade provide countries with the wherewithal to develop". In other words, Third World countries can develop successfully along the path suggested in the early 1960s by Walt W. Rostow in his famous (some would suggest infamous) study, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960).

What arguments are advanced for this particular perspective? The authors suggest first that development economists cannot agree on the nature of the development process. This is hardly surprising given the differences that underlie the theoretical divisions within economics. Secondly, conditions vary between countries both in the nature of development objectives and in key economic, social and political variables that affect the process of development. To say the least, this is stating the obvious. Thirdly, generalizations are not helpful — surely the Economic Council could not be expected to devote the time and resources necessary to complete a thorough study of individual Third World countries. The Council is quite correct in claiming that individual country studies are beyond its resources. However, ignoring the findings of the research which has been undertaken cannot be accepted so easily. For these reasons, the Council has been driven to adopt a simpler approach — "we have assumed that any developing nation that looks to this country for assistance wishes to receive Canadian capital and technology and to obtain access to Canadian markets for its products" — without spelling out clearly the inadequacies of this approach or the premises upon which it is based. The simpler approach, moreover, fails to address the persistent and compelling failure of Third World countries to break out of a condition of "underdevelopment". As the Chairman of the Development As-

sistance Committee of the OECD noted in his 1977 Report:

In spite of the tremendous economic progress of the last twenty years, the promise of effective development is dimmed by the fact that very little progress has been made by the poorest peoples and nations. Also, almost everywhere impressive rates of economic growth have not been matched by growth in employment or by improvement in the relative distribution of income — as the speeches of Robert McNamara and others have pointed out. Instead, the tendency has been for increased unemployment and polarization of incomes, as development has failed to provide enough opportunities for productive employment.

Despite portraying the social divisions which have arisen as a result of attenuated growth and despite recognizing that political elites have been influenced by the premises of "dependency theory", the Economic Council is content to reaffirm the liberal economic model. It is the political dimension of "growth without development", that is, the potentially explosive results of social differentiation between rich and poor, between the modern urban and the traditional rural areas, between the landed and the landless within underdeveloped countries that has led political elites to demand major reforms in the structure of the international economy.

The Economic Council bases its optimistic assessment of the future on two major assumptions. First, the social stratification evident in underdeveloped countries is temporary. Secondly, where selected countries — namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea — which have industrialized are today, the majority of Third World countries will be in twenty or thirty years' time.

No evidence is presented for the first assumption; the second assumption is quite simply an expression of hope. Moreover, the authors are incredibly naive in assuming that political consciousness and action on the part of the underprivileged majority within underdeveloped countries can be overcome by pointing to models that portray some improvement in per capita income by the year 2000. The Council acknowledges that the concessions it is prepared to advocate will only benefit the more advanced Third World countries. Yet, even here, liberalization of trade, opening the Canadian economy to their products, "... is likely to be conditional upon a market improvement in such factors as ... (Canada's) ... overall employment level. Until that occurs, we cannot in conscience advocate anything more than a hold-the-line policy". For the Third World as a whole, the Economic Council is willing to let international market forces make the necessary adjustments:

... the best policy in the area of trade is to let the forces of competition operate freely, in accord with the international distribution of comparative ad-

vantages. Thus we believe that, as a rule, it is preferable to avoid balancing-off development concerns against the operation of market forces. In view of the great poverty of a number of Third World countries, however, we feel that a minor qualification of the rule might be warranted.

The very mechanism that is under challenge by the Group of 77 represents salvation to the Economic Council of Canada. Thus, although the report claims to deal with our relations with developing countries, rather it focuses on a narrow concern with the competitive challenge of exports from more advanced developing countries.

Aid program

From the Council's perspective, the economic fate of the remainder of the Third World must continue to rest with the aid program rather than with any fundamental change in our economic relationship. The Economic Council, not surprisingly, affirms the beneficial effects of aid, and argues in favour of the Canadian government's policy of maintaining a commitment not to let our aid volume fall below .5 per cent of GNP. In addition, it supports the general direction of bilateral aid both in relation to greater concentration on a smaller number of recipient countries and the continuation of aid-tying.

A number of basic elements that affect the Canadian aid program are either ignored or hastily reviewed. In the 1970s, aid donors, international institutions and academic researchers, concerned with the tendency for development efforts to benefit the wealthier strata within underdeveloped countries, have argued that greater attention should be given to the social impact of aid-sponsored projects. This means not simply a shift away from urban to rural development but as well a concern to see that less privileged strata within rural society gain access to participation in development.

In the past, efforts to promote cash-crop agriculture among small farmers have concentrated on the progressive farmer and left the bulk of the farming community outside the distribution of benefits. The new approach requires greater effort by aid and government officials to understand the structure of rural society and to be able to take account of the social divisions in project design and selection. Other important changes have occurred within aid circles. A "basic human needs" strategy, for example, has been advocated by the Development Assistance Committee and the World Bank. This strategy represents an attempt to provide the basics of food, shelter, health, education and other social services to the poorest 40 per cent of the population. In addition, since the Least Less Developed Countries, the poorest 25 on the basis of per capita income figures, depend heavily on aid to support government efforts, it is conceded that a greater effort must be made to increase the

aid contributions to this group of countries. Canada, in the *Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975-80*, accepted the reorientation in aid towards a concern for the distributional effects of aid efforts:

Assistance will be concentrated in those countries which are at the lower end of the development scale, as measured by a variety of economic and other social indicators, and which are most severely affected by current world economic conditions. Priority will be given to meeting the basic needs of their populations. Canada will give the highest priority to development projects and programs aimed at improving the living and working conditions of the least privileged sections of the population in recipient countries and at enabling these people to achieve a reasonable degree of self-reliance.

A recognition of the significance of the social impact of projects and the acceptance of a basic human-needs strategy requires critical reforms within the aid programs of donor countries. Bilateral aid, for example, must focus on integrated rural development projects rather than on large-scale infrastructure projects which utilize Canadian goods and services as a result of the demand for high levels of Western technology. Aid must become increasingly untied to allow local project costs to be funded through aid dollars. Projects which serve the rural poor may be dispersed over a wide number of Third World countries which will require less emphasis towards concentrating Canadian aid on a limited number of program countries. In order to facilitate the selection of projects to meet the new criteria, a stronger emphasis will have to be placed on developing a larger and better qualified CIDA field establishment.

Both the reorientation in attitudes towards aid efforts and the requisite changes which must be introduced to respond effectively have escaped the attention of the Economic Council. In the section of the report devoted to aid, the only reference to the social impact of aid and the relevance of the social structure of Third World countries to development occurs with the rather bland statement that this is a complex area about which not much is known. The Council then presents an overview of the Canadian aid program that is directly counter to the demands of the new approach.

To the authors of the report, one of the central problems that has hampered the administration of our aid program has been the inability of CIDA to spend the funds allocated by Parliament. This "disbursement problem", which affects the bilateral component most severely, can be traced to several major factors. In the Council's assessment, aid-tying contributes to disbursement difficulties because Canadian products may not be sufficiently competitive or the economy of the underdeveloped country may not be

capable of absorbing Canadian technology. Secondly, the best method of committing large sums of money may be inappropriate. Program aid, which involves general balance of payments support and funding over a wide range of government expenditures, is not as simple to apply or administer as the alternative mechanism, project aid, which involves financial support for a very specific development effort such as road construction. Since project aid becomes the dominant method of disbursement, the problems associated with recipient countries' ability to suggest good projects coupled with the inability of Canadian aid personnel to identify and evaluate projects quickly tends to slow down the selection process. As a result, the time required and the limited range of relevant projects contributes to our failure to spend the allocated funds.

Although the authors pinpoint the basic elements of the disbursement problem, they do not come to terms with two fundamental points. Firstly, since the poorest underdeveloped countries require project aid, given Canada's concern to focus on these recipients, one would expect a series of recommendations as to how our aid administrators can overcome the difficulties of project selection. Secondly, and more importantly, if the social effect of development efforts is to be taken seriously in assessing projects for Canadian assistance then the difficulties in spending will be a less significant consideration. The assumption that the volume of our aid is the relevant indicator of the quality of the Canadian aid program will have to be abandoned.

The effects of this approach can be seen in the reforms suggested by the Council. The report suggests we should work to expand the number of program countries relative to those which receive project assistance and we should concentrate our assistance on a manageable number of program countries so that our aid efforts can be administered more efficiently. This revised strategy assumes that the efficient administration of aid has become pre-eminent. The provision of useful assistance, defined in relation to narrowing the social differentiation which has appeared in underdeveloped countries and addressing the basic needs of the poor majority, is neglected. Despite a disclaimer to the contrary, the priorities of the Economic Council have displaced the priorities defined in the *Strategy for International Development Co-operation, 1975-1980*.

Having argued for a concentration of our aid on a select number of countries, the Economic Council studiously avoids defining criteria which could be used to guide Canadian policy-makers. Rather, the authors engage in an unsuccessful attempt to identify what might have been the key criteria used by policy-makers some time ago:

From the point of view of eligibility . . . (how Canadian authorities choose the recipient countries)

. . . it appears that a developing country will probably receive a favourable decision if it is either a Commonwealth member or a francophone country, if it has a large population, and if its income per capita is low. On the other hand, the value of Canadian exports to that country and the amount of aid it receives from other donors do not seem to have any influence on the eligibility decision. Note, however, that these results are for the years preceding the publication of the Canadian government's *Strategy for International Development Co-operation in 1975*. We do not know what influence these factors have had on the eligibility decision after that year.

Although the Council has recognized the adverse effects of aid-tying on our ability to spend aid allocations and the far greater need for aid finance to support local costs in development projects, the authors are very hesitant to advocate untying. This must be deferred until a time when the effects on the Canadian economy will be negligible.

With this decision, the Economic Council of Canada has come full circle. Major changes in the tariff structure, which impedes access to the Canadian market by underdeveloped countries, fundamental reforms in the Canadian aid program to meet the Canadian government's new aid priorities, untying of procurement to meet the needs of recipient countries and an increase in the volume of our aid disbursements must await a revitalization of the Canadian economy. The authors use phrases which suggest action and reform but which on inspection merely justify the continuation of policies defined in and only relevant to an earlier period. A selection from the concluding comments on Canadian aid serves to illustrate the point that the Council is not prepared to come to terms with its own recommendations:

All of our policy recommendations except the last, are in the nature of improvements in either the developmental quality of Canadian aid or the effectiveness with which it is administered. But the implementation of these measures will take time. In the interim, it would be unreasonable to plan for the immediate continuation of the same growth in aid volume that Canada has achieved in the past. This conclusion is reinforced by the current state of the Canadian economy and the future requirement to accommodate the fiscal needs of a large-scale domestic adjustment and redeployment program.

Domestic adjustment

The central thrust of the report is found in the domestic adjustment and redeployment program designed to alter Canadian employment and production in industrial sectors most seriously threatened by the competitive challenge of the advanced developing countries — Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. Six major manufacturing sectors were iden-

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tified as being under challenge: textiles, clothing, wood products, electrical apparatus, leather goods and footwear, toys and sporting goods. The Council estimates that 250,000 workers in Canada in 1971 were employed in the affected industries, which represented 15 per cent of all manufacturing jobs or 3 per cent of Canada's total employment. Most crucial in political terms, by far the largest concentration of the key affected industries is in Ontario and Quebec. Ruling out the possibility that workers in Central Canada could adopt the "Maritime" solution for seeking employment, that is, to move further west to seek new occupations in expanding industrial and resource development in Western Canada, the Economic Council suggests there are only two alternative courses of action worth consideration:

The practical question is . . . whether efforts to maintain . . . (the regional political balance) . . . should take the form of an increasingly difficult, and perhaps ultimately hopeless, attempt to save jobs by import protection or . . . that of determined strategy to revitalize the vulnerable regions — and replace the present noncompetitive activities — through programs of industrial adjustment and redeployment.

The Economic Council decided to opt for the latter response. A major concern, however, is that the industrial adjustment and redeployment plan, which requires federal planning and a national consensus to create and support a \$4 billion fund for "regional renaissance", must be tied closely to a timetable for liberalization of trade. In addition, this package approach requires an advance agreement on a date for, "... the reduction of import barriers in the vulnerable sectors . . ." The "release point" that the Council envisages would occur in approximately 15 years and it would be premised on "... a lower national rate of unemployment . . . indicative of a condition of overall economic buoyancy and employment growth". This sets out not only the time when the program of trade liberalization would begin, but also the earliest date that the Council is prepared to advocate any untying of bilateral aid. There are several general comments which should be made. Firstly, the Economic Council assumes that the political will exists in Canada, at the federal, regional and provincial levels, to support such an expensive and elaborate strategy. Let us take just one example of what is required in terms of political commitment. The Council suggests that one possible structure to implement the strategy "... might be a development corporation — at least for the Central Quebec/Eastern Ontario region — that could implement an integrated design developed through federal-provincial co-operation." Given the presence of a Parti Quebecois government in Quebec and the more general sensitivity of Quebecers to federal intrusion in Quebec's affairs, the evolution of a political will for joint action between Ottawa and Quebec is hardly

likely. Secondly, it is conceded by the authors of the Report that the advanced developing countries will be the primary beneficiaries of the strategy. In the interim and beyond, the majority of underdeveloped countries will not receive the tariff reductions so essential to their ability to overcome "underdevelopment". Thirdly, since the poorest underdeveloped countries depend so heavily on aid, the possibility of our bilateral program becoming untied, and therefore more relevant to their needs, will be delayed for a further fifteen years at least until the magical release point is achieved. Fourthly, the continuation over the short term of protectionist policies by Canada in the face of increasingly vociferous demands by Third World countries for meaningful reforms will not assist the promotion of Canadian exports beyond our traditional markets. Finally, but of no less significance, the Council assumes away the problems of "underdevelopment" which Canada itself faces. There is no consideration of the extent to which key decisions on the future of our vulnerable industries are centered in Head Offices located outside Canada.

Conclusion

For A Common Future portrays the economic position of Third World countries from a simplistic perspective. The Economic Council's analysis is based on a false belief in the relevance of the liberal economic model of development. The authors have failed to appreciate that the political demands in the movement for a new international economic order derive from the persistence of a condition of underdevelopment in the majority of Third World countries. Although the shift in emphasis in aid theory towards a concern for the social impact of development projects and the basic-needs strategy represents a more appropriate basis for assistance, fundamental reforms in trade, monetary and investment patterns and the transfer of technology are required. The Economic Council, given its initial assumptions, never reaches the stage of identifying and assessing the central issues facing Canada. How can we account for the inadequacies of *For A Common Future*?

Three factors can be isolated in attempting to explain its shortcomings. The first is the overwhelming dependence by the Economic Council on economists schooled in and committed to liberal economic theory. Policy advice, such as that advanced by the Council, must be broadened to include more wide-ranging perspectives. This requires not only a broader outlook on the part of economists, but also the involvement of other disciplines which share an interest in the study of underdevelopment. Beyond this obvious criticism is the failure of the report to seek and assimilate the criticisms and recommendations of aid recipients.

Secondly, it is apparent that the authors have concerned themselves to a large degree with antic-



ipating the preferences of government officials rather than with carefully examining recent events and offering critical analysis in an effort to come to terms with international political realities.

Following upon this point is the absence of a sense of history evident in the report. The authors seem incapable of envisioning the long-term national interest — a fundamental prerequisite to providing a solution to the problems of underdevelopment and

world stability. Although the consequences of accepting such a proposition appear enormous, a new world order may demand a reduction in our standard of living and in our economic growth. Instead of confronting this possibility, the Economic Council has ignored it entirely. In turn, the Council has sacrificed its credibility as an organization established to consider and recommend appropriate strategies for policy-makers.

Islam and the "crescent of crisis" —exploding the myth of homogeneity

by Georges Vigny

When, in connection with the Middle East, we speak of a "crescent of crisis", do we mean that these countries, whose geographical distribution suggests the shape of a crescent, are a breeding ground for crisis?

Or do we mean, on the contrary, that these countries are the victims of crisis?

Or are both of these interpretations correct?

Could it be that we are mistaking the effect for the cause? More precisely, are these "sensitive" countries merely reacting more violently to external factors, namely world events, just as the weak parts of a structure are more liable to collapse under pressure?

This expression, which American specialists — and non-specialists — employ with a certain affectedness, as their own wonderfully incisive invention, is rather inappropriate and clumsy. How many of those who use it attach to it the same meaning and apply it in the same context? The expression makes a gross generalization, leads to misunderstanding and is, besides, sterile in that having become a sort of "buzzword", it seems to cast a negative light on all the events that take place in the area in question.

Moreover, the term is, at best, a plagiarism: what in the forties, in the excitement over the burgeoning Arab identity, was called the "fertile crescent", in reference to Hashemite federal projects, seems to

have provided a semantic basis for this ill-advised expression, which owes its popularity to that of its predecessor.

The expression, representative of a certain kind of political thinking, perpetuates through its first word, "crescent", a serious error: the crescent is the symbol of Islam, and in the expression "crescent of crisis" it has the immediate effect of homogenizing the fundamental differences which exist not only between the countries that compose it, but also within the Islamic religion itself.

Dangers

Our sole purpose in attacking this popular expression is to warn against the dangers of what is termed the "buzzword pattern", which, by giving rise to the assumption that one has understood the situation, results in serious distortions of the truth, both intentionally and unintentionally. When such a process provides the framework or basis of political thinking within a government, it generally leads to political decisions which are based on an erroneous though accepted view of reality.

In the case of the "crescent of crisis" and the homogenization mentioned above, we are led to believe that the area described contains similar, if not identical, entities. A common denominator is held up in support of this claim: Islam and everything it represents as a dynamic and a static force. And to the extent that this subject has been studied within a single country, extrapolation does the rest, resulting in a dangerous and arbitrary generalization. The

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most blatant example is no doubt Iran, where the Peacock Throne occupied by the Pahlavis has been swept away by the liberating tide of Islam. More and more one is led to believe that what was true for Iran is also true for other countries, starting with Turkey. Trapped in this seemingly logical reasoning, one begins to speculate on the cloudy future of Saudi Arabia and, at the other end of the crescent, on that of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and so on, so that the effects of the "buzzword" are now combined with those of political generalization.

This is an absurd exercise which takes into account neither the true nature of Islam nor its internal differences. After minimizing this potential force for decades we are now trying to compensate by committing a second historical error. We were first guilty of default; now we are guilty of excess.

The truth is that Islam is not a monolithic religion, and that each of its sects has a cultural heritage distinctly different from the others — not to mention the fact that each ethnic and national entity endows its moral values with a specific set of aspirations and taboos.

To speak of Islam as an over-all common denominator is like speaking of Christianity as a monolithic whole. This would mean that the Huguenots and Catholics should never have been opposed for the simple reason that they belonged to the same religion.

Caught in a geopolitical situation where the search for national identity requires the rejection of Western objectives imposed by force or established through now-disgraced dictators, the masses are releasing a potential repressed for decades and, as is the case in Iran, are still in a state of general confusion. Through an understandable process of identification, they see the overthrown dictator as a Western presence, and by replacing a monarchy with a republic they believe they are rejecting Western-type government. In what way is a republic a less Western type of government, and in what way are parliamentary structures less Western than the overthrown empire and the government of one man? The opposite would no doubt be more true; otherwise history should be rewritten: the Sublime Porte and its government structure were Western inventions, the Ottoman Empire was a scheme of the Infidel, the caliphate following Mu'awiya was a heresy, and the history of Islam was a long succession of heresies until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Rouhallah Khomeini.

In other words, what we should examine in the expression "Islamic Republic" is not the concept of "republic" but that of "Islamic". Thus, when we Westerners assume that every monarchy, such as the Wahhabite in Saudi Arabia, is necessarily threatened by the religious force released in Iran, we are like wide-eyed spectators watching an illusionist.

Islam has always been governed by men who

hold in their hands both secular political power and the religious moral authority suggested by their title, "commander of believers". Thus, if developments in Iran constitute a threat to pro-Western regimes, it is not with regard to their political structure. A regime is endangered insofar as it follows the Western example and sacrifices its Islamic character to its ambitions and objectives. In this respect, a republic is threatened just as much as a monarchy, especially since nothing resembles a monarchy more than an authoritarian "republic" ruled with an iron hand and without opposition by a faction which is usually military.

Although today, by a coincidence — such as the one that provided the basis for the homogenization implied in the term "crescent of crisis" — the objectives are confused and Arab is considered the equivalent of Islam, it is important that a distinction be made not only between the categories of Islam, but also between what is Arab and what is not Arab in the context of the internal diversity of the Arab world.


Thus it would be just as reasonable to argue that Iraq and Syria have strengthened their ties in defence against a threat resulting from the traumatic experience of Iran as it would be to place this rapprochement in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. For even though Egypt, because of its pro-American policy and its decision to recognize Israel, seems to provide an ideal target, the Kurdish problem in Iraq and the resulting Sunnite-Shiite rivalry, and the minority Alid government in Syria, which is primarily Sunnite, make these two countries ideal breeding grounds for an Islamic crisis.

It should also be pointed out that the 40-odd countries that take part in Islamic assemblies are more concerned with the problem of Islamic holy places in Jerusalem than with the threat that President Sadat represents to so-called Arab "solidarity", and that Saudi Arabia owes its position as leader not so much to its wealth as to its status as guardian of the holy places at Mecca and Medina, and for this reason claims the right to defend the mosques of Al-Aqsa and Omar in Jerusalem.

Roughly speaking, the question is: which country wishes to remain faithful to Dar al-Islam and which country has given its allegiance to Dar al-Harb?

Sects and identities

Two errors mark our perception of the Islamic religion. First of all, we generally confuse Arab and Moslem, since we discovered one at the same time as we discovered the other. The confusion is all the more understandable since the Arabs themselves have propagated the belief that the only Moslems are Arabs. Secondly, our mental picture of Islam is that of a vague, indistinct whole which contains a reality. What we forget is that the reality has no internal unity.



AP Photo

The Ayatollah Khomeini is silent and alone aboard a chartered plane that flew him back to Iran from France on February 1 to end fourteen years of exile.

The first error corrects itself when we realize that Indonesia and Pakistan alone account for more Moslems than all the Arab countries combined, or that some of the most devoutly religious Islamic communities are to be found among black African countries. It is not very flattering to Western Europeans, but some of the racist terms they employ are based on this misunderstanding. To state, therefore, that Arabs are Moslems, is to state a fact that serves as a basis for Arab nationalism itself, but to say a Moslem is of necessity an Arab is absurd.

At this point we encounter the weakness of the Islamic religion, which, integrating with amazing ease different cultures, languages and traditions, often envelops them superficially, adapting itself to local rituals and celebration, of which the Iranian Nowrouz is a good example.

Since Arabic is the language of the revealed book, one can understand how the Arab speaker should be considered a Moslem. But is the language of the revelation meant to be understood, or is it merely a ritual to be memorized? In other words, is this language a means of communication between non-Arab Moslems? It is interesting to note in this regard that Mustafa Kemal, wanting to secularize Turkey, instituted a Latin alphabet.

The point we are trying to make is that by calling themselves "Islamic", Moslems no doubt reinforce the Westerner's second error regarding Islam, but

also give rise to a second question: what kind of Islam? For although religion serves as a major unifying force in relations with the outside world, the world of the Infidel, or Dar al-Harb, the differences that divide it and the irresistible currents that run through it make it, in the longer term, a divisive element which surfaces at the political level.

True, in order for someone to call himself a Moslem he need only profess that there is no God but Allah and that Mohammed is his Prophet (La Ilaha illa Allah Mouhammad Rassoul Illah); accept the Kelem Allah, or Koran, as the undisputable word of God revealed to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel; recite the five daily prayers and participate in the special congregational prayer on Friday; fast at Ramadan; perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and give alms; celebrate the feasts of Islam (the Mawled, the Id as-Saghir and the Id al-Kabir, and the Achoura); and fight, when necessary, a holy war, or "Jihad". But here the differences begin.

For example, the teachings and works of Mohammed as witnessed by his first disciples were collected as a supplement to the Koran. These "hadith", which constitute the "Sunna", were rejected by the Shiites, but accepted by the Sunnites, who acquired their name from these writings.

Since this is not a course on Islam, I will limit myself to mentioning the four major schools of thought: the Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi and Hanafi.

As for the origin of the Shiite sedition (the word "shi'a" means "sedition") let us recall that after the death of Mohammed, Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, cousin and heir, had the caliphate taken away from him by Mu'awiya, the prefect of Damascus. The partisans of Ali, a martyr, went on to form three main dissenting branches, and agreed that the first three caliphs who had succeeded Mohammed, namely Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman, were usurpers, since the quality of "imam" could only be found in the family of Ali. They moreover considered Ali equal to Mohammed in holiness. Lastly, they rejected the Sunna as a supplement to the Koran.

Although one should be wary of extreme generalizations, it should be noted that "Shiism" is a sort of poor cousin within Islam. In strictly political terms, this means that in a given Arab society, the middle class is of the Sunnite faith, while the poor masses are Shiite.

This is the case, for example, in the Moslem society of Lebanon, although in a predominantly Shiite society the situation would obviously be different. I would also point out that this insurmountable religious difference is also rooted in ethnic differences, and that in the case of Iran — which, though not an Arab society, does provide us with an example of Shiism which is typical in its Iranian form and zealous practice — it dramatizes the problem of Kurdish and Turkoman minorities.

As for the *Ismailians*, they are an esoteric sect with their own interpretation of the Koran. They believe that the principles of the soul and universal reason are accessible only to prophets and imams. This transmigration is supposed to climax with the coming of the Mahdi, or Messiah, an incarnation to be hoped for by the faithful and feared by their oppressor. The Ismailians limit to seven the number of legitimate imams, inheritors of the Prophet's authority. The seventh, Ismail, however, died at the end of the eighth century without being able to transmit his divine quality. His followers therefore refused to believe in his death and insisted that he had merely disappeared, and formed this sect (whose leader, the Aga Khan, is known to the world for an entirely different reason) which claims that Ismail will return as the Mahdi.


The *Druzes*, who are concentrated in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, form a branch of Ismailism.

Another dissident sect, smaller but with a zealous following, is that of the *Kharijites*, who are often compared to the Quakers. They are especially concentrated in Oman, Muscat, Djerba, Zanzibar and Tripolitania.

There are also other sects, such as the Najarite, the Mutazilite, the Jabrite, and so forth.

This division of Islam into sects goes hand in hand with the influence of the monastic orders, of whose structure we know little, but whose power is undeniable. Today we hear most often about the "Akhuwan al-Muslimin", or Moslem Brothers of Egypt, yet these "Khuans" (literally "brothers") are spread throughout the Islamic territory, and their order, the *Sufi*, has undertaken to call all believers to the truth.

In North Africa it is *Maraboutism* (the Marabout is a descendant of the shریف and is considered to belong to the family of the Prophet) which has pros-



AP Photo

Once back in Iran the silence is over for Khomeini. He is pictured here engulfed by supporters on arrival at Tehran's Mehrabad airport from Paris.



pered and assumed the leading role. The head of the brotherhood expects, and receives, total submission from his faithful, being considered divine.

There are, moreover, five basic religious orders: the Qadiriyyah, the Khelwatiyyah, Shadhiliyyah, Naqshbandiyyah and Suhrawardiyyah, and their branches are numerous.

Lastly, it was not surprising that the proliferation of sects and dissident groups should lead to the appearance of reform movements advocating a return to the sources of tradition and, in particular, the re-establishment of theocratic authority. At the head of these reform movements was the Wahhabi sect, to which belongs the royal family of Saudi Arabia, whose founder, Mohamed Ibn Sa'ud, embraced this doctrine. The common factor in these reform movements is perhaps the encouragement they gave to national emancipation — what we could call today national "liberation".

Driving force

The purpose of this brief glance at Islam is to establish by disproving the homogeneity of the phenomenon — namely the religion, its practice, and the values it represents — that Islam, both in the Arab and non-Arab world, serves as the seed of nationalism and, once this nationalism has been awakened, becomes its driving force.

Although the doctrinal controversies and "seditious" interpretations within Islam are insurmountable, religion is nevertheless a unifying element in the face of Western intrusion. It should also be noted that according to Islam, Marxist-Leninist ideology is also a pernicious Western invention and, more than that, the product of what today is still referred to as "international Jewry". This paradox may be found in yet another context: the designation "Zionist-imperialist" supposedly applies to Israel and the United States, yet some Islamic countries are allied to the Soviet Union, whose ideology is an "invention of the Jews" for the purpose of world domination. What is even more noteworthy is the fact that atheist Marxist-Leninist ideology is, according to Islam, a form of influence to be fought even more vigorously than the infidel and materialistic, but nevertheless monotheistic, capitalist forces. Infidel does not mean unbelieving, which explains Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's statement that the area should be rid of atheists, namely the Soviets; for Arabs, Jews and Americans — especially Jimmy Carter — have a common belief, if not a common religion.

In order to combat the intrusive and degrading influence of the West, whose exactions have been accompanied by a weakening of religious practice in Dar al-Islam, one must return to the unchanging values and principles of the Koran, which is not only a religious book, but also the inviolable sum of all social rules. It was this that led the Moslem Brothers

in Egypt to state well before the proclamation of an Islamic republic by the Ayatollah Khomeini, that "the Koran is our constitution".

In other words, and contrary to the claims of some, the anti-Western movement and the repudiation of its values is due to a return to Islamic sources, that is, an attempt to revive the dream of Arab greatness through conservative religious zeal.

In the final analysis, this means two things: that this nationalism will inevitably come into conflict with another nationalism, also inspired by Islam but grounded in a different, if not opposite, tradition; and that two anti-Western Islamic movements will not necessarily converge, but may, at a future date, find themselves radically opposed and attempting to renew ties with the West, whose influence would have been curtailed in the preceding period.

Thus one may turn to Mustafa Kemal for an example and conclude that, after 60 years, this "absurd theology", which should be eradicated, is more alive than ever, and if Sunnite Turkey is threatened by instability, it is certainly not because of a disease contracted from the virus that attacked Shiite Iran. Turkey has been carrying the painful seeds of an identity crisis for 60 years.

The bloody conflicts in Afghanistan, which is now a Marxist country, are an indication of the fact that this ideology comes into conflict with religious authorities and principles, and that, from one ethnic group to another, the rejection of this imported prototype begins with heightened religious feeling.

On the other hand, to return to our previous argument, the threat is not to a particular kind of regime, but is inversely proportional to the intensity of Islamic practice. This clearly explains — and here it is the surprise of the "observers" which is surprising — why, after Egypt and Israel had made peace, it was Saudi Arabia that took over the leadership of the states hostile to this "betrayal" of Arab Islam. The very concept of moderation when one speaks of Islamic regimes is a pitifully self-centred one, and it leads to a chain of errors. For although a given country may, in a given matter, adopt the American point of view, this so-called moderation affects only a superficial detail, and has little bearing on that regime's philosophy. Thus, the more "moderate" of two régimes is not necessarily the one that refuses to increase the price of its oil while proclaiming its religious leadership, but perhaps the one that increases the price while proclaiming its indifference to religious faith. A Wahhabite reformist is a nationalist in the full sense of the word, since his nationalism is based on Islam, whereas a supposedly extreme nationalist socialist is in a precarious position and no doubt sees socialism as a rapid means of attaining his ends.

In these circumstances, if the crescent is a symbol of anything, it is the symbol of the crescent moon of Islam.

South of the border

The agony of Nicaragua

by James Guy

Revolution is very much a catchword in Latin America, although few of the republics have actually experienced one. In an area of the world where political violence is one of the only means of accelerating progress towards modernity, frequent *golpes de estado* (coups) are often erroneously considered as revolutionary. In most cases these *golpes* and *cuartelazos* (barracks revolts) merely shift power from one elite to another without affecting the daily lives of the peasants and urban dwellers. However, Nicaragua's painful 1979 upheaval has all the indications of a real revolution: the political, social and economic fabric of Nicaraguan society appears to have been irrevocably altered. Out of this revolutionary holocaust, which rendered all "Nicas" equally superfluous, emerged a Nicaragua that will never be the same again. Indeed the violent and chaotic events that led to the exile of Anastasio ("Tachito") Somoza Debrayle and members of his family in July have traumatized this nation far beyond any other experience in its history and will continue to do so for many years to come.

The immediate human costs are enormous, with approximately 15,000 people killed, 600,000 forced to flee their homes, the destruction of villages, towns, and cities, and the termination and ruin of many businesses. In spite of the victory of the Sandinistas, political nihilism is rampant in this largest of Central American republics. People have witnessed and experienced the mass execution of infants, children, peasants and soldiers, the brutal torture of political prisoners, arbitrary murder, detentions and the denial of civil liberties. All of these atrocities have left an indelible mark on the collective psyche of a nation that has moved from a ruthless personalistic authoritarianism to an amorphous totalitarianism. It may be some time before any positive attributes of this transition can be isolated and analyzed. But what is certain is that Nicaragua has not developed the institutions and traditions of democratic rule since it achieved independence as a separate state in 1838. Until recently the only detectable characteristic of "political stability" in the Nicaraguan political system was the mere fact that one family had been able to maintain control for more than four decades. The

important question now is what institutions, if any, will emerge to fill the political vacuum left by the demise of the Somoza family.

The Dynasty

United States Marines intermittently occupied Nicaragua for about 19 years between 1912 and 1933 in order to "restore order" and "protect American lives and property". Six years before the final departure of the Marines the U.S. created the National Guard and approached a jovial pro-American Liberal, Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza Garcia to take charge. One of "Tacho's" first acts in consolidating his command of the guard would prove to sow the seeds of destruction for himself and for his son "Tachito" some 45 years later. On February 21, 1934, he ordered the execution of the charismatic Augusto Cesar Sandino who led peasant troops against the Marines during the second occupation. More than 20 years later, on September 21, 1956, a young Nicaraguan poet and follower of Sandino, Rigoberto Lopez Perez, assassinated Somoza Sr. during his fourth bid for re-election as president. After another 20-odd years the Marxist guerrilla movement which formed the major ground swell of opposition to "Tachito" Somoza also took its inspiration from Sandino and rallied around the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN) which had been formed in 1962.

The decade after the death of "Tacho" saw his two sons, Luis and Anastasio, run Nicaragua. Luis had been president of the Congress and constitutionally designated to fill the presidency at the time of his father's death. He had received his formal education at the Universities of California, Louisiana State and Maryland; his democratic reformism irritated his younger brother, Anastasio, a graduate of West Point, by nature a tough-minded authoritarian, who feared the ramifications of Luis' liberal politics. As com-

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Bilateral



AP Photo

Ousted from power in Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza holds a press conference in July at his Miami Beach residence. His son Julio Somoza (standing) listens in.

mander of the National Guard, Anastasio had the power to prevent his brother from continuing to implement his policies of democratization and modernization. Thus as a compromise between the two, from 1963 to 1967 two puppet presidents succeeded one another as "moderate liberal reformers" and administrators of the policies and programs of Luis Somoza. Dr. Rene Schick Gutierrez was elected president in 1963 and his vice-president, Lorenzo Guerrero, succeeded Schick upon his death in 1966. Luis died unexpectedly of a heart attack in 1967 and "Tachito" — after a thoroughly rigged election — ascended to the presidency. Commenting on his electoral victory, two *Los Angeles Times* columnists prophetically referred to "Tachito" Somoza as "the worst of the dynasty".

Somoza's tendency to use police brutality and military power to quell opposition to his government did not win him much popularity. This, coupled with his exploitation for personal profit of the 1972 earthquake that struck Managua by selling international relief supplies and land to the dispossessed, did little to endear him to the people.

National Guard

The five-star-general *cum* president began to encounter violent opposition to his government and his

dictatorial ways quite early in the 1970s. The powerful 12,000-man Nicaraguan National Guard (a combination army and national police force) was at the heart of the crisis. Commanded by both "Tachito" and his half-brother Colonel José Somoza, the Guardsmen were one of the most modern, best-trained military forces in all of Latin America. On a *per capita* basis, the numbers of Nicaraguan recruits the U.S. trained in the Canal Zone and at Rio Hato were greater than those of any other military or police force in the Western Hemisphere.

Reports of human rights violations by the Guardsmen emerged almost from the first day "Tachito" took office. Any declared opposition to the regime was threatened by the National Guard. The conclusions of the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights were definitive about the commission's findings on the use of torture and execution by the Guardsmen. Notwithstanding the toned-down nature of its resolution, the United Nations General Assembly condemned human rights violations in Nicaragua in December 1978, even though the U.S. abstained on the resolution. The Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights constantly reported the disappearance of people. Many of the most obvious violations of human rights were conveyed by the

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Nicaraguan Red Cross which often witnessed these atrocities. The Washington office on Latin America which had been monitoring human rights violations in its publication *Update: Latin America* wrote that "almost every single human rights violation reported from Nicaragua has been attributed to the National Guard".

Historically the Somozas had been quite successful in governing Nicaragua by operating under three facades: they claimed to be the allies of competitive organized labour; they pretended to be progressive and liberal; and they projected the image of themselves as statesmen who were devoted to the socio-economic independence of Nicaragua.

In actual fact, peasant and urban labour had progressed only marginally since the Somozas came to power in the early 1930s. Like most groups that tried to organize under the tight scrutiny of the regime, they acquired no political anchorage in the system. The ubiquitous presence of the Somozas in the businesses of Nicaragua made labour an important asset to the family. It has been estimated that over one-sixth of the Nicaraguan economy was directly controlled by family businesses; the national jet airline, shipping companies, two seaports, construction and cement companies, import franchises and important agricultural-export concerns. The awesome economic power of the Somozas went beyond the borders of Nicaragua with large holdings in the United States and Europe. But domestically, all roads led to a Somoza enterprise. It is not surprising then that the political system worked to discourage organized activities which may have threatened the regime, thus fostering ignorance and defencelessness.

When the Alliance for Progress was transferring funds to Latin American nations that took on the trappings of democracy, the Somozas paid lip service to peasant needs. However, the monies never funded peasant initiatives because the family blocked allocations and redirected them to their own interests. So in 1964 a non-governmental organization, the Institute for Human Promotion (IMPRHU) was started to raise the consciousness of the peasants by educational programs and occupational incentives. But the Somozas sabotaged its activities whenever they could and set up legal road blocks in its operations. In 1975 the Somozas, with the assistance of the United States, established the Institute of Peasant Welfare (INVIerno) to improve the lot of the rural poor. Many of the work projects undertaken by INVIerno were strategically placed in areas of major guerrilla activity and were designed to neutralize and dismantle guerrilla influence. The organization, however, proved ineffective.

Opposition

Nicaragua's urban labour force is barely distinguishable by advantage when compared with its rural

cousin. Ideologically, labour has tended to be internally fragmented by extreme right- and left-wing factionalism. The Somozas constantly monitored the 30,000-member workers' movement in order to detect any dangerous cohesions in its organization. But disunity was built into the organizations that comprised



AP Photo

Sandinista guerrillas raise their weapons in a victory salute on the Leon highway outside Managua after the fall of General Somoza.



Bilateral

the movement. For example, the Marxist Independent General Confederation of Labour (CGTI) with its 12,000 members could not come to terms with the government-patronized General Confederation of Labour (CGT) whose 10,000 members openly supported the Somozas. Thus a monolithic opposition against the Somozas from this sector of the economy was impossible.

The position of the Church was also relatively weak as an opposing force. Historically the Church tended to take a permissive stance on all governmental activities. The Church came to accept the Somozas and the Liberals as defenders of the status quo. Monsenor Alejandro Gonzalez y Robleto was not respected by Nicaraguans as a result of his open support of the Somozas. Since the early 1970s, however, the Church has manifested a reversal of its crucially conservative image. A newer and more progressive clergy challenged the government on a number of issues. It refused to endorse Somoza's "continualismo"; his determination to remain in power even though his constitutionally designated term of office had expired. The new Archbishop of Managua, Monsenor Miguel Olando Bravo, openly denounced the regime in a number of pastoral letters and by boycotting official ceremonies. By 1979 the Church was committed to the overthrow of the president.

Effective opposition to Somoza first materialized in 1974 when the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL) was formed. Initially UDEL included all opposition parties and labour unions but was gradually joined by business, the Church and many other groups which reflected an almost universal cross-section of Nicaraguan society. Somoza's grip on Nicaragua was not seriously threatened, however, until after the assassination of the outspoken publisher of *La Prensa*, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, in January 1978. Chamorro was a prominent political leader who only three months before his death had received the Columbia University Cabot Award for his journalistic contributions to the promotion of Inter-American co-operation. His assassination was the result of his declared intentions to "end the Somoza dictatorship and establish a regime in which pluralism would fit". The demise of Chamorro gave the Sandinistas the incentive they needed to speed up their militant activities and to galvanize all opposition groups against Somoza and the National Guard. They began by organizing a two-week general strike which virtually paralyzed Nicaragua and generated increasing support from the business communities. This activity gave the Sandinistas international visibility and focused world attention on the growing vulnerability of the Somoza regime.

One of the most successful "actions" undertaken by the Sandinistas resulted from President Carter's congratulation of the Somoza regime for its "improvement of local human rights." The guerrillas attacked

and occupied the National Legislative Palace in the centre of Managua, holding over a thousand bureaucrats and legislators hostage. Among the hostages were Somoza's cousin, Luis Pallais Debrayle, who was the deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, and the president's nephew, José Somoza Abrego, the son of the former acting commander of the National Guard. Somoza conceded to a list of demands which further demonstrated the eroding strength of his government. This, in turn triggered a longer general strike and uprisings in most Nicaraguan towns and cities which ultimately forced Somoza to flee for his life.

Revolution

Interesting similarities can be isolated in the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions. First, in both cases the guerrilla forces remained small in number, defeating a formidable military dictatorship protected by a large contingency of combat-ready troops well armed by the United States. Even the military strategies developed during the two revolutions reveal striking resemblances. The basic strategy of the rebels was to harass isolated army positions, withdrawing immediately and then preparing ambushes for the pursuing troops. During this period the guerrillas established friendly relations with the peasants and urban dwellers to acquire food and supplies and to make certain that the location of the guerrillas would not be divulged to the enemy troops. As with the case of Batista, the brutality of Somoza and the National Guard led to increased alienation of previously neutral citizens.

There are important differences as well. In the Nicaraguan insurrection the emphasis of the struggle was on urban terrorism, the guerrillas in the countryside playing only a secondary role. Castro, on the other hand, saw the priorities in the opposite order, with the urban resistance supporting the rural guerrillas through financing, recruitment and supply. Secondly, the Nicaraguan revolution ensued in the absence of a charismatic leader; while in the case of Cuba the personal magnetism of Fidel resulted in the people's following him.

International effects

What is significant about the Nicaraguan revolution from an international perspective is the example to other nations of yet another successful guerrilla strategy as an efficacious way to achieve political change and modernization. In Latin America this is perhaps a result of the intransigent position taken by the United States *vis à vis* reformist governments of the leftist variety. In all cases where left-wing governments have emerged in Latin America by democratic means — Guatemala, 1954, Chile 1970 — or nondemocratic means — Cuba, 1959 — the U.S. has intervened in the internal affairs of the country and attempted to overthrow the government. While President Carter

has publicly committed the United States to non-intervention in Nicaragua, his Administration has also adopted a wait-and-see position on the question of "normal relations" with the Sandinista junta. Certainly it is not in the interests of the U.S. to have another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. Thus external intervention will continue to be within the realm of possibility, as either a multilateral effort led by the U.S. in the Organization of the American States or as a simple unilateral action.

Increasingly Latin American nations are showing their support for the new Sandinista government headed by Sergio Ramirez Mercado. The five members of the Andean Pact were particularly supportive during the insurrectionary stage of the revolution. One of its members, Venezuela, openly denounced Somoza and demonstrated its determination to help bring an end to the government. Venezuela also signed a Defence Pact with Costa Rica on September 15, 1978, to defend the sovereignty of Costa Rica and actually sent an arsenal of planes that were stationed near San José for a short time in order to dissuade Somoza from taking any military action against its neighbour.

A supportive OAS will be important to the fledgling Nicaraguan government in order for it to survive. It will also have to demonstrate its credibility to the other members of the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Central American Monetary Union (CAMU) and the Organization of Central American States (ODECA).

It is also expected that the foreign policy positions of the new Nicaraguan government will call for an end to dependence on the United States. This means that Nicaragua will seek to diversify its external relations by developing ties with nations like Cuba and the Soviet Union. It may also mean that Nicara-

gua will turn to Canada should the U.S. develop trade difficulties with the new government over the question of nationalizing U.S. business interests. Canada recognized the government in July 1979 and is in a good position to help in the reconstruction of Nicaragua. Canada can provide Nicaragua with many of its present needs in the area of non-durable consumer goods, durable consumer goods, raw materials for industry and construction materials.

Development and technical assistance would immediately benefit some capital projects that were under way before the revolution, such as expansion of the water-supply system in Managua, reconstruction of Managua's Las Mercedes International Airport and the geothermal-energy development project at Momotombo.

Prior to the Revolution, between 1975 and 1977, Canada's trade with Nicaragua more than doubled. Imports grew from \$6,061 millions in 1975 to \$14,436 millions in 1977 and consisted mainly of bananas, cotton, fish and coffee. Exports increased from \$4,045 millions in 1975 to \$9,178 millions in 1977, most of which was newsprint, telecommunications equipment, cereals and motor vehicles. If a socialist Nicaragua is here to stay, Canada may discover that the trade benefits with this country are as abundant as with Cuba.

The Nicaraguan Revolution shows that a small nation can break out of its past and establish a new order. But this battered nation has many fundamental economic problems to solve; inflation now in excess of 25 per cent, food shortages, no growth expected from a Gross Domestic Product of \$2.1 billion, and dependence on a primary-product monoculture subject to the vicissitudes of the world market. No *caudillo* or *junta* — socialist or capitalist — can solve these problems in the short term; perhaps not even the long term.

Letter to the Editor

Epstein erred . . .

Dear Sir,

Mr William Epstein's interesting article in the March/April edition of *International Perspectives* about Canada's Disarmament Initiatives at the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly contains one serious error of fact. He gives the voting figures for the Mexican resolution on SALT (33/91C) and says that the 10 abstentions included the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France. This is quite untrue. The only abstainers were the East European group of countries (less Romania) and Malawi.

Terry Empson
British High Commission
Ottawa



South of the border

The Andean group at the ten year mark

by Gordon Mace

In 1966, in response to a call sent out by Presidents Eduardo Frei of Chile and Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia, the heads of state and government of the Andean countries — with the exception of Bolivia — met in Bogota to discuss problems connected with regional integration in Latin America. Three years after what came to be called the Little Summit of the Five Nations, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru signed the Cartagena Agreement, which set in motion the process of Andean sub-regional integration. Venezuela did not join the group until 1973.

On May 26, 1979, exactly ten years after the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, the heads of state of the member countries — except Chile, which withdrew from the Agreement in 1976 — met again in Cartagena to take stock and, in particular, to affirm the desire of each of the participating countries to speed up the integration process. It is, therefore, an appropriate time to look at the results of the first decade of integration in the Andean region, and at the same time to consider the future of the integration plan.

Bogota to Cartagena

The Bogota Declaration, signed on August 16, 1966, provided for the setting up of a Joint Commission whose purpose was to create a general framework for a sub-regional integration agreement in which the Andean countries were to take part. The countries concerned were not forming a clique at Bogota and withdrawing from the Latin American Free Trade Association. They were merely criticizing the LAFTA scheme of things, which they felt was geared too much to liberalization of trade and thus brought dispropor-

tionate benefits to the three largest countries of the region — Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. They proposed for themselves a separate system which would ensure them more rapid economic progress, so that they could in time participate in LAFTA on an equal footing with the three major countries.

In the Joint Commission discussions, which went on from 1967 to the signing of the Cartagena Agreement, there were two main schools of thought. The first, championed by Chile and Colombia, put priority on the use of mechanisms for liberalization of trade. This was an entirely logical position for these two countries since, being the most developed countries in the region, they would derive greatest benefit from liberalization of trade. The other countries, however, especially Peru, opposed this concept and championed an integration process geared to mechanisms designed to promote the economic development of each country so that gradually a balance could be established between the countries in the region. As often happens in such circumstances, negotiations resulted in a compromise satisfactory to all parties. The Constitutive Treaty, a faithful copy of the final compromise, was seen, however, to give a slight edge to the free trade aspect, since liberalization would be achieved automatically but member countries would have to decide on the schedule for implementation of the mechanisms relating specifically to economic development.

Institutions

The Andean Group's first four years were very fruitful from the point of view both of the setting up of central institutions and of the general development of the integration process. At the beginning, observers made very positive statements about the promising future of the Andean Group. This optimism seemed justified at the time, although it was based only on analyses of the economic aspects of the integration process. The future of the Andean Group, in fact, seemed more assured than that of any previous integration experiments attempted in the Third World. The most astute observers noted that the reality of the Andean Group went far beyond that of the Cartagena Agreement. The integration process would

Dr. Mace studied at the Institut universitaire des hautes études internationales in Geneva. The Andean Group is the subject of his thesis, to be published shortly. Dr. Mace has done research and conducted interviews in Mexico City and the Andean countries. He is, at present, professor of political science at Laval University. This article reflects the author's personal opinions.

be based in fact on four pillars which, although of unequal strength, still constituted the four foundation stones of regional integration. These four pillars are: in the economic sphere, the Cartagena Agreement; in the cultural sphere, the Andres Bello Agreement; and in the social sphere, the Hipolito Unanue and Simon Rodriguez agreements.

In the field of economics, the Cartagena Agreement provided for the setting up of a Commission which would be the key organ in the community institutional structure. Made up of one principal representative from each member country, the Commission is responsible for formulating the main economic policies, and is chiefly responsible for supervising proper implementation of the Agreement. Its decisions require a two-thirds majority or, for important questions, unanimity. It is the Commission that assigns work projects to the Junta and, in the absence of a community court of justice, it acts as the organ for monitoring the legal aspects of the Cartagena Agreement and ensures that the member countries respect the obligations they have undertaken within the framework of the Agreement. The growing difficulties experienced by the Commission in carrying out the latter function have demonstrated to the members the importance of setting up a community court of justice as soon as possible. For various reasons the Commission has so far been unable to come to a decision to do so, but a recent work program of the Junta indicates that they will decide in favour of setting up the necessary mechanism by the end of 1979.

The Cartagena Agreement provided for the founding of a technical body, the Junta, which would be composed of three members to whom the Constitutive Treaty guaranteed total independence of action. The technical body also plays an important administrative and executive role, since besides performing all the functions of a permanent secretariat, the Junta conducts studies requested by the Commission and supervises implementation of the Agreement as well as of the Commission's decisions. The Andean Development Corporation was founded by a separate treaty, and it too constitutes an important community organization in the economic sphere. Subject to international law, the ADC is the first exclusively Latin American international financial organization. It began operation in 1970 with the primary object of facilitating the economic and social development of the member countries. Its activities in this sphere are carried out through technical and financial assistance; priority is given to industrial development.

The other organs of the Cartagena Agreement — the Economic and Social Advisory Committee, the Consultative Committee and the various councils — are advisory bodies, as their names indicate. It must be said that for various reasons they have to date been unable to play the full role expected of them.

Finally, other community institutions have also

been set up for cultural and social activities. The Andres Bello Agreement, signed by the representatives of all the Andean countries at the beginning of 1970, governs community relations in the fields of education, science and culture. Article 34 of the Agreement stipulates that all regional educational, scientific and cultural activities will be co-ordinated by a number of permanent community agencies. The most important of these is the Conference of Ministers of Education, which plays a role similar to that of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement. This "Council of Ministers" is backed by a co-ordination office, a committee of national directors of planning and a number of joint commissions. In the health and labour sectors, the Hipolito Unanue and Simon Rodriguez agreements provide for community structures, similar to that of the Andres Bello Agreement, for everything relating to co-ordination of regional activities in these spheres.

Chief mechanisms

Although the priorities of the region have forced the Andean countries to devote most of their efforts to economic activities, the member countries have still considered it necessary, from the beginning of the integration process, to take an interest in educational and cultural matters. The leaders of these countries soon learned that education and culture could perform an important role in establishing regional solidarity and at the same time play a significant part in the transformation of economic structures. That is why, despite the shortage of funds available to them for this purpose, the governments of the member countries did not hesitate to carry out programs in each of these fields. An effort at harmonizing school systems has been made, which has made possible the establishment of a system of diplomas valid in all member countries, and has promoted the use of common textbooks in various subjects at the primary level. An International Integration Institute and an Andean Entrepreneurs' School have also been founded. It should be noted, further, that there is already close co-operation between the various cultural institutes and that the member countries have implemented a training and research program in social communications. Lastly, a Commission of Higher Education has been set up for the entire region and, following the signing of the University Compromise of Trujillo in 1974, an Andean Association of Universities has also been established. Naturally these steps are only a beginning, but to realize their full importance we have to remember that the Andean countries have never really been associated in the past and that animosity still persists in the region as a result of the scars of border conflicts. Much remains to be done on the cultural level, but the efforts already made deserve high praise in a venture so complex that the results



are hard to quantify, and whose impact will only be felt in the long term.

The governments of the Andean countries have also resolved to co-ordinate their efforts in the fields of labour and health. Although their activity in these sectors has been on a smaller scale, they have agreed to give special attention to problems of co-ordinating labour and social security policies, to measures designed to facilitate manpower mobility and to occupational training systems. These intentions, first set forth in the Quito Declaration, have been followed through in the Lima Program of Action adopted in 1975 by the Third Conference of Labour Ministers. In the field of community health, the Hipolito Unanue Agreement has already given rise to interesting developments such as the formulation of health legislation applicable to all of the Andean region and the adoption of a common policy on pharmaceutical products. Close co-operation has also been developed in the field of assistance to disaster areas, and the member countries have agreed to exchange information and to co-operate closely in the repression of use and, more especially, traffic of narcotics.

Although the above measures are being carried out, it is natural that the member countries have considered it necessary to devote most of their integration efforts to the economic sphere. In this area, the basic community model, as defined in 1969, reflected quite faithfully the approach of the Economic Commission for Latin America. The thinking of the ECLA, strongly influenced by economist Raul Prebisch, stressed the necessity for Latin America to concentrate its efforts on industrial development through substitution of imports and a gradual increase in exports of finished and semi-finished products. In keeping with this line of economic thought, the leaders of the Andean countries devised a community model of economic development which was termed in Lima "rationalization of capitalism", in that the play of the free market was to go hand in hand with intervention by the State as chief agent in the assignment of resources.

This model was put into action by the adoption of a number of basic mechanisms. The first of these is the regional trade liberalization program, to be applied automatically and according to schedules set by the Constitutive Treaty. It covers about 6,000 products grouped under various headings and due to be liberated according to the appropriate schedule for each of the categories. In this regard liberalization of trade is surely the most successful mechanism of the Andean Group to date. In 1976, Colombia, Chile and Peru had already achieved five annual ten-per-cent tariff reductions. This made possible an increase in regional trade from \$143 million in 1969 to \$817 million in 1974. Of course, the total of regional sales is still low, but the action is interesting and promising in that it has made possible a diversification of regional

trade. This has made more room for manufactured products and non-traditional export goods, a significant change if we look at the total trade of the Andean countries with non-member countries, 95 per cent of which is still in primary commodities and traditional exports.

A second important mechanism of the Cartagena Agreement is the adoption of a common external tariff. In the beginning, it was planned that this common tariff would not be applied before 1980, because of the enormous difficulties in harmonizing the tariff structures of the various member countries. That is why the Commission, through its Decision 30, decided on the adoption of a minimum common external tariff which was applied by Colombia, Chile and Peru in 1970. This exercise was to serve as a dry run for future application of the real common external tariff. It had limited success, however, although the measure did not impose any real constraints on the member countries. Application of the common external tariff was postponed several years by the Lima Protocol of 1976 because some participating countries objected to the proposed tariff structure and level. The Commission resumed discussion on this subject a few months ago and it is possible that it will soon make a statement on the matter.

No doubt the most important mechanism of the Cartagena Agreement, and certainly the most original is industrial programming. This is the instrument by which the Andean countries plan jointly the industrial development of the region. The seven major sectors reserved for industrial programming are primary metallurgy and non-metallic minerals, chemistry and petrochemistry, timber, pulp and paper, metal-working, the electrical and electronic industry and lastly the food industry. Two major types of programs are implemented in each of these sectors. Industrial rationalization programs are aimed, as their name suggests, at rationalizing the production of existing industries in these sectors. Somewhat neglected in the beginning, these programs have been growing in importance in the last few years, as evidenced recently by the setting up of a department of industrial rationalization in the Junta. Sectoral programming, for its part, deals with future production, and its main objective is to lay the foundations for an industrial specialization in which all the member countries will be able to participate equally.

By no means all the objectives of industrial programming have been reached. Only three sectoral programs had been approved at the time of writing, for example. This delay cannot really be blamed on the member countries themselves, but appears to be due rather to the novelty and complexity of a mechanism that has never been tried before in any other regional integration scheme. It is certainly too early to speak of failure in this area.

Another original mechanism has to do with the

preferential treatment given the relatively less-developed countries, that is, Bolivia and Ecuador. Because its scope is so extensive, this mechanism involves the Andean Group in an integration process entirely different from any before it. The preferential treatment affects most elements of the Cartagena Agreement, and to date it seems to have been implemented successfully by the member countries. The recent Decision 119, which instituted a special program of support to Bolivia, is a good example of the vitality of this measure. However, implementation of preferential treatment has not been a complete success in all fields: the Bolivian representatives on the Commission have noted negligence on the part of certain participating countries in isolated sectors such as regional trade and sectoral programming.

The last major mechanism is the harmonization of economic and social policies. Important steps have been taken in this area, in particular in the fields of industrial property and development, tariff nomenclature and export financing, agricultural product marketing, physical infrastructure and communications. The best known measure in this field of policy harmonization must be the adoption of a regional code of foreign investment and technology transfer. This decision aroused comment and criticism which has only been quieted with the gradual dilution of the principal measures of the code. It is evident, however, that the mechanism of economic and social policy harmonization has not been a priority during the first years of existence of the Andean Group. This is to be expected at first, but it is certain that if progress is to be made in this area in future, an effort will have to be made to produce greater homogeneity of social and economic structures in each of the member countries.

Difficult years

The first four years of the Andean Group's activity saw spectacular progress in the movement towards integration. It is quite usual for such a plan to move full speed ahead in the setting-up stage. The founding of community institutions and the rapid adoption of certain important measures helped to create a climate of optimism and unbounded confidence in the future of the Andean Group. This attitude also prevailed among the Andean technocrats, that is, all the regional officials and national negotiators who were involved, closely or remotely, in the integration process and who shared a common willingness to ensure the success of the venture. Lastly, the fairly strong similarity between the political intentions of the governments of Bolivia (until 1972), Chile and Peru also explains the success of this initial stage of the Andean Group.

Beginning in early 1974, however, the situation became more complicated. In fact, it can be said that the integration process came to a standstill from 1974 to 1976. The first reason for this situation was a technical one involving Venezuela's entry into the Andean

Group. This entry, which the Government of Caracas had been obliged to delay under the pressure of the powerful Fedecamaras, had forced the Junta, in 1972, to devote a significant proportion of its time to studying and adapting existing regional programs. The new membership involved the reworking of several of the Cartagena Agreement mechanisms, and this prevented the Junta from concentrating on analysis of the proposals it was expected to make before the 1975 deadlines, in particular concerning the common external tariff and industrial programming.

The second reason was the serious deterioration of the international economy, beginning in 1973. The Andean countries, particularly those who were oil importers, were hard hit by the crisis. But they were not alone; all the underdeveloped countries were suffering from the situation — petroleum derivatives represent a large proportion of these countries' imports. Most of the Andean countries became more cautious in view of the economic situation and they hesitated to continue supporting integration mechanisms that might make the region less attractive to foreign investors who had, it was said, become more selective in their investments because of the scarcity of capital. However, the most important factor in the crisis came from within the Andean region itself. The Andean Group's image had deteriorated badly since the early seventies. At that time, three countries made up what could be called the driving force behind the integration process. These three — Bolivia under the Torres government, Chile under President Allende and Velasco's Peru — had, in varying degrees, come to adopt strongly nationalistic economic policies and had thus wanted to shape the regional economic model in line with their concerns. Thus it was the delegations of these countries on the Commission, and chiefly the delegation from Peru, that insisted on and obtained a decision in favour of control of foreign investments and transfers of technology.

The situation soon changed, however, with the coming to power of General Banzer's reactionary government in Bolivia at the end of 1971. Later, in September 1973, came General Pinochet's *coup d'état* in Chile. Thus, at the beginning of 1974, there were only two nationalist governments remaining in the Andean Group, those of Venezuela and Peru, while the latter was becoming increasingly entangled in an extremely difficult economic situation.

In 1972, the new Bolivian government had begun to call for a softening of some of the provisions of the Cartagena Agreement. Bolivia said, with justification, that it had not benefited as much as its partners from the first sectoral program relating to the metal-working industry. It also demanded profound changes to the foreign investment code, which was in opposition to an economic policy the new government was then trying out and which was subsequently adopted through that government's acceptance of the Musgrave



report. The new Chilean government, for its part, had taken pains at the beginning to make known its enthusiasm for the regional integration process. However, as 1974 wore on and more especially in 1975, it became clear that Chile's new economic development model was fundamentally incompatible with the regional model as defined in 1970.

The passing of the deadline, at the end of 1975, for adoption of the common external tariff and the entire industrial program served as a pretext for Chile, supported by Colombia, to challenge the entire community economic model followed to that point. The situation, which had begun to grow worse in mid-1974, now became critical for the future of integration. Chile, inspired by the "Chicago Boys", demanded no less than the abolition of the foreign investment code, an average common tariff protection not exceeding 10 to 20 percent in general, and the elimination of the State's role as an agent of economic development.

Although some countries, in particular Bolivia and Colombia, wanted to see a softening of the Constitutive Treaty, none of the member countries could share Chile's extreme position. All were prepared to make certain concessions so that Chile could remain in the Andean Group and thus make more flexible the elements of the regional model that, from the outside, appeared too nationalistic. After several months of intensive but fruitless negotiation, the Five resolved in to put pressure on Chile by signing the Additional Protocol of Lima, which had been provided for by Commission Decision 100. The reaffirmation of the intentions of the Five in the Bocaya Declaration of August 1976 did not succeed in shaking the Chilean government's firm stand. There was no choice but to draw the appropriate inferences, and it was decided that Chile would withdraw from the Cartagena Agreement. Thus, more than technical difficulties, and more than the effects of the difficult international economic

situation, the change in the economic development models of some member countries was the real reason for the grinding to a halt of the Andean integration process and for the profound changes in the regional economic development model.

The future

The Additional Protocol of Lima, reinforced by later Commission decisions, resulted in severe dilution of the regional economic program as it had been defined and implemented at the beginning of the seventies. The Andean Group is no longer what it was. The loss of one of its member countries has damaged its prestige and the new regional economic model it has adopted no longer seems to be a fitting instrument for the pursuit of independent development.

Consequently, it is difficult to share the optimism expressed by one of the members of the Junta in an interview last fall. The truth is that the Andean Group has been unable to avoid the difficulties that have affected and sometimes destroyed integration experiments elsewhere in the Third World.

It is too early, however, to make a final assessment, for the game is far from over. An integration process is not a one-decade experience — witness the unfinished European Economic Community. If we compare the Andean experience to other integration attempts in the Third World, we find the Andean Group's results definitely superior.

Any regional integration process constitutes an open and changing system. Consequently, it is possible that, under the impetus of certain governments such as that of Venezuela and the new Ecuadorean government, the Andean Group will return to an economic development model geared much more than at present to a truly independent type of development. However, such a change in the situation is not foreseeable in the short term.

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