





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


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A

EN

Prin

A N  
A C C O U N T  
O F T H E  
F A C T S

which appeared on the late  
ENQUIRY into the Loss of MINORCA,  
From AUTHENTIC PAPERS.

By the MONITOR.



L O N D O N,  
Printed for J. SCOTT, at the *Black Swan* in *Pater-noster-row*.

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MDCCLVII.

100

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A N  
A C C O U N T  
O F  
F A C T S, &c.

**T**HE only addition to misery is the despair of redress. And there can be no greater appearance of a failure in this respect, in the body politick, than where the representatives of the people are deaf to their complaints, insensible of their griefs, and partial to the authors of their misfortunes.

THE liberality with which the nation contributed towards a war with *France*; and the tranquility on the continent of *Europe*, gave us great hopes of success; but our most sanguine and well grounded expectations soon vanished, with the loss of *Minorca*, and therewith the trade and navigation of the *Levant*.

OUR only relief was a dependance on the guardians of our liberties, to *enquire* into the cause of this misfortune, and to punish those, who  
B should

should be found the authors of our disquietude, disgrace, and loss. The whole nation laid their case in the most dutiful and affecting terms before their sovereign: his Majesty promised his afflicted people that justice should be done. They directed their representatives to make a calm, dispassionate, and impartial ENQUIRY: but, behold! they have the mortification to find that neither the royal wisdom, nor their own authority, was sufficient to convict the least of the offenders, or to bring one of the managers of our marine, or one evil counsellor to justice.

It is true *an enquiry* was, after many difficulties, begun, and the state papers relating to the equipment of the *French*, in their several ports, during the time of their preparations against the *British* dominions, were produced in the house of commons: but, by the same means, which so often have influenced the members of that august assembly to grant the people's money without measure, the managers for the late ministry have endeavoured to stifle all further examination into their conduct by the following resolutions:

“ MR. P—t—r (according to order) reported  
 “ from the committee of the whole house, to  
 “ whom it was referred to consider of the se-  
 “ veral papers and accounts, presented to the  
 “ house in this session of parliament, relating  
 “ to

“ to intelligence concerning the motions or de-  
 “ signs of the *French*; to preparations made,  
 “ and orders given, for the equipment or sailing  
 “ of any of his Majesty’s ships of war, or for  
 “ the defence of any of his Majesty’s dominions  
 “ in the *Mediterranean*, and to the state and  
 “ condition of his Majesty’s navy, and of the  
 “ island of *Minorca*, during the years 1755 and  
 “ 1756; the resolutions, which the committee  
 “ had directed him to report to the house,  
 “ which he read in his place, and afterwards  
 “ delivered in at the table, where the same were  
 “ read, and are as followeth, *viz.*

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ his Majesty from the 27th *August* 1755, to  
 “ 20th *April* 1756, received such repeated and  
 “ concurrent intelligence, as gave just reason to  
 “ believe, that the *French* King intended to  
 “ invade his Majesty’s dominions of *Great*  
 “ *Britain* or *Ireland*.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ his Majesty received repeated and concurrent  
 “ intelligence, from the month of *August* 1755,  
 “ to the month of *April* 1756, that, with in-  
 “ tent to invade his Majesty’s dominions, great  
 “ numbers of troops were marched from the  
 “ interior parts of *France*, to the coasts of *Pi-*

“ *cardy, Normandy, and Britany*, great quantities of provisions, artillery, and warlike stores, collected, and numbers of vessels for the transportation of soldiers assembled, in the ports of *France*, opposite to the coasts of this kingdom.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that in the months of *September, October, November,* and *December, 1755*, his Majesty received various repeated and concurrent advices of the actual equipping of a squadron of twelve ships of the line, besides frigates, at *Toulon*, and that the said armament would at latest be ready to sail very early in the spring, 1756.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that on the fourth of *February 1756*, in a letter from Mr. consul *Birtles*, dated *Genoa, 17 January 1756*, his Majesty received advice of an intention to surprise the island of *Minorca*, which was confirmed by many subsequent advices of the actual destination of the said armament against the said island, received in the month of *February 1756*.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that his Majesty received repeated and concurrent  
 “ intel-

“ intelligence, that the *Toulon* Squadron, which  
 “ failed to *Minorca*, consisting of twelve ships  
 “ of the line, was ill provided with men and  
 “ guns.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ his Majesty, between the 30th of *January*  
 “ 1756, and the 6th of *March* 1756, received  
 “ intelligence, that there was fitted and fitting  
 “ for the sea at *Brest* and *Rochfort*, a squadron  
 “ of seventeen ships of the line, which by intel-  
 “ ligence, received the 7th *March* 1756, was to  
 “ be augmented to twenty-two ships of the  
 “ line, some of which were to be fitted out for  
 “ transporting troops; and by further intelli-  
 “ gence received, of the 31st of *March* 1756,  
 “ was increased to twenty-three ships of the  
 “ line, exclusive of three ships of the line, said  
 “ to be destined for *America*.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that Sir  
 “ *Edward Hawke* received orders to sail on the  
 “ 27th *February* 1756, and actually sailed on  
 “ the 12th of *March* following, on a cruize to  
 “ the westward, with a squadron of fourteen  
 “ ships of the line, which squadron, under the  
 “ command of Sir *Edward Hawke*, was, on the  
 “ 1st of *April* 1756, ordered to be re-inforced  
 “ with five ships of the line, under rear admiral  
 “ *Holbourne*.



“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ on the 8th *March* 1756, orders were given  
 “ by the commissioners of the admiralty, to  
 “ get ready ten ships of the line, for the *Medi-*  
 “ *terranean*, and on the 11th of *March* 1756,  
 “ orders were given by the commissioners of  
 “ the admiralty to admiral *Byng*, to take the  
 “ said ten ships of the line under his command,  
 “ and fit them for sea, as soon as possible,  
 “ and on the 27th of *March* 1756, the com-  
 “ missioners of the admiralty were ordered to  
 “ send ten ships of the line to the island of  
 “ *Minorca*, which ships sailed on the 6th of  
 “ *April* following, which ten ships at their  
 “ sailing were fully manned, (including the royal  
 “ regiment of fuzileers, sent on board to serve  
 “ as part of their complement, and which was  
 “ ordered to be landed at *Minorca*, in case the  
 “ governor, or commander in chief of that  
 “ island, should think it necessary for its de-  
 “ fence,) and, as appears by a letter from the  
 “ said admiral to the said commissioners, were  
 “ in every respect ready for sailing.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ on the 1st of *April* 1756, there were twenty-  
 “ seven of his Majesty's ships of the line, cruiz-  
 “ ing on the following services; that is to say,  
 “ four-

" fourteen ships of the line cruizing between  
 " *Brest* and *Rockfort*, under the command of  
 " *Sir Edward Hawke*; five more of the line  
 " ordered, under the command of admiral  
 " *Holbourne*, to join *Sir Edward Hawke*; one  
 " between *Cape Clear* and *Scilly*, one between  
 " *Scilly* and *Ushant*, two off the isle of *Bass*,  
 " one off *Cape Barfleur*, two in the *Downs*,  
 " under the command of admiral *Smith*, and  
 " one at *Cork*; and twenty-eight ships of the  
 " line in commission at home, that is to say,  
 " seventeen fitted for sea, ten fitting, and one  
 " in harbour service, all which were, exclusive  
 " of the squadron under the command of ad-  
 " miral *Byng*, then under orders to sail imme-  
 " diately for the *Mediterranean*, and that the  
 " complement of the said twenty-eight ships of  
 " the line at home, amounted to 14,640 men,  
 " and that there were borne upon the said ships  
 " books, 9891 men, and 7249 mustered.

" *Resolved,*

" THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 " on the 1st *April* 1756, there were forty-five  
 " frigates, sloops, and armed ships, cruizing on  
 " the following stations; that is to say, three  
 " under *Sir Edward Hawke*, one off *Brest*, two  
 " off the isle of *Bass*, four off *Cape Barfleur*,  
 " fourteen under admiral *Smith*, two at *Dublin*,  
 " one at *Greenock*, one at *Whitehaven*, two at  
 " *Liverpool*, two in *Kingroad*, one at *Biddeford*,  
 " one at *Falmouth*, one at *Exmouth*, one at *Yar-*

“ *mouth*, one at *Lynn*, one in the *Humber*, one  
 “ at *Newcastle*, one at *Leith*, one at *Sheerness*  
 “ going to *Leith*, three convoy to *Stadbt*, one  
 “ convoy from *Ostend*, and then ordered to the  
 “ *Downs*; and there were at home seventeen  
 “ frigates, sloops, and yachts, fitted and fitting  
 “ for the sea, the complements of which seven-  
 “ teen amounted to 2405 men, of which 1508  
 “ were borne, and 1320 mustered.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears by the last returns from  
 “ *Minorca*, before the siege, bearing date the  
 “ 31st *July* 1755, that the garrison of fort  
 “ *Saint Philip* consisted of 2860 men (officers  
 “ included) and that on the 1st *February* 1756,  
 “ there were thirty-five military officers absent  
 “ from their duty, including the governor and  
 “ commander in chief of the island, the governor  
 “ of fort *Saint Philip*, and the colonels of the  
 “ four regiments in garrison there, the governor  
 “ of the island, being otherwise employed in his  
 “ Majesty's service, the governor of fort *Saint*  
 “ *Philip* disabled by age and infirmities, nine-  
 “ teen second-lieutenants and ensigns, appointed  
 “ between the 1st of *October* 1755, and the 4th  
 “ of *January* 1756, and nine officers, employed  
 “ in the recruiting service in *Great Britain*.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ major general *Stuart* did, in the month of  
 “ *Novem-*

“ *November* 1755, receive orders from his  
 “ Majesty, to repair to *Minorca*, in order to be  
 “ assistant to lieutenant general *Blakeney*, then  
 “ commanding his Majesty’s forces in that island,  
 “ and that on the 3d of *February* following  
 “ the colonels of the several regiments then in  
 “ *Minorca*, received an order from his Majesty,  
 “ to send all the absent officers of their re-  
 “ spective regiments to their duty there, except  
 “ such as it should be necessary to keep in *Great*  
 “ *Britain* on the recruiting service.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ on the 28th of *March* 1756, a detachment,  
 “ with proper officers, equal to a battalion, was  
 “ ordered to be sent from *Gibraltar*, to be landed  
 “ for the relief of *Minorca*.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ on the 30th of *March* 1756, orders were  
 “ given for raising a company of miners, con-  
 “ sisting of 200 men, and on the 7th of *May*  
 “ 1756, directions were given for sending three  
 “ more battalions for the reinforcement of the  
 “ garrison of fort *Saint Philip*.

“ *Resolved,*

“ THAT it appears to this committee, that  
 “ the squadron of his Majesty’s ships in the  
 “ *Medi-*

“ *Mediterranean*, in the month of *December*  
 “ 1755, consisted of one ship of 60 guns, two  
 “ of 50 guns, four frigates, and one sloop; and  
 “ that the garrison of fort *Saint Philip*, in the  
 “ said month of *December*, according to the last  
 “ returns, made the 31st of *July* 1755, consisted  
 “ of 2860 men (officers included) and that it  
 “ doth appear, that no greater number of ships  
 “ of war could be sent into the *Mediterranean*  
 “ than were sent on the 6th of *April* 1706, nor  
 “ any greater reinforcement than the regiment  
 “ which was sent, and the detachment equal  
 “ to a battalion, which was ordered to the relief  
 “ of fort *Saint Philip*, consistently with the  
 “ state of the navy, and the various services  
 “ essential to the safety of his Majesty’s domi-  
 “ nions, and the interest of his subjects.”

RESOLUTIONS! which I presume were not  
 taken by the whole house: and should it ap-  
 pear that the minority in the debate were  
 members of the greatest property and integrity,  
 who have something of their own to lose, and  
 are tenacious of the right and property of their  
 constituents, and were of opinion that the loss  
 of *Minorca* was principally owing to the not  
 sending an earlier and stronger naval force into  
 the *Mediterranean*, than that, which failed under  
 admiral *Byng*; to the delay of not sending any  
 reinforcements of troops to that island, till the  
 departure of the said admiral; to the suffering  
 the officers belonging to the garrison to continue  
 absent

absent from their posts; and to the not giving orders for raising miners for the defence of fort *Saint Philip*, till the 30th of *March* 1756. Won't an injured nation be apt to think, that these resolutions were taken by men, who had no will of their own, and held their seats in parliament by ministerial tenure, and not by the free choice of the people? Because it does appear from the original papers laid before them, that the ministry, in their several departments had *very early* and *clear* intelligence of the preparations and strength of the enemy in the ports of the *Mediterranean*, as well as of those armaments that were carrying on along the coast of the *British* channel: and that there was no want of ships, nor of men for sea or land service to have defended our own coast, and to have repelled all attempts the *French* were able to make against any part of the *British* dominions.

BUT this will be more conspicuous from the following minutes faithfully extracted from those very papers; on which the free and independant representatives of the people grounded their negative to the above recited resolutions; and are thus published in justification of their conduct in a case of the greatest concern to their constituents; and to enable every rational and unbiassed Elector to discern how far the wisdom and integrity of their representatives, who have skreened the objects of their country's resentment,

ment, and the authors of its disgrace and misfortunes, should recommend them to their future favours.

By a letter from the secretary of our embassy at *Paris*, dated so early as the 1st day of *January* 1755; and at a time that the Duke *de Mirepoix* was employing all his abilities to prevent the just resentment of *Great Britain* against his nation for the hostilities committed by the *French* in *America*; with the most religious assurances, that his court was sincerely desirous to adjust finally and expeditiously all disputes subsisting between the two crowns in the new world; Sir *Thomas Robinson*, one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, was informed, that seventeen men of war were ordered to be equipped at *Brest*, the admiral's ship to be of 70 guns, and that *the greatest part of this fleet was destined for AMERICA.*

THIS intelligence was repeated from *Paris*<sup>a</sup> and other places, with many additional circumstances. On the 8th<sup>b</sup>, the same gentleman advised that the armament at *Brest* consisted of

<sup>a</sup> It is said, with *good foundation*, that orders are gone to *Brest*, to fit out seventeen men of war (by some I am told) frigates included: (by others, exclusive of them) The admiral's ship is 70 guns. They are to have regular troops on board. But part of this fleet only (and that the *greatest*) is destined for *America*: but can't be ready before *April* or *May*. *De Cosne.*

<sup>b</sup> Received on the 12th.

sixteen ships of the line and five frigates to carry 3000 land forces; again, on the 15th<sup>e</sup> he reduceth the number of ships to *ten*, from 60 to 74 guns, and four frigates; and twelve ships from 12 to 24 guns, each to serve as *transports*, to sail with 5000 land forces at the end of *March*, or beginning of *April*. From the *Flague* this equipment was confirmed, but said not to be with that dispatch as first reported; that 10,000 men were ordered for *Britany*, and that the troops to be embarked would be draughted out of old corps<sup>d</sup>. On the contrary, other advices to the said office declare that the preparations at *Brest* were then as great, as if the flames of war would extend all over *Europe*: and that it was reported, though *not to be credited*, that an attempt was designed in favour of the Pretender<sup>e</sup>.

ON the 25th<sup>f</sup>, Mr. *De Cosne* further discovers that there were eight more ships fitting out at *Rochfort* and *Rochelle*, which in all would make thirty ships of war; twenty of which were of the line, that they were to take on board 6000 land forces, and that they worked night and day to get them to sea<sup>g</sup>.

<sup>e</sup> Received on the 18th.

<sup>d</sup> Advices received in Lord *Holderness's* office, *January* 17th, 1755. Letter A.

<sup>e</sup> See ditto.

<sup>f</sup> Dated *Paris*, 22d *January*, 1755.

<sup>g</sup> See letter A in Lord *Holderness's* office.



LIST of the ships at Brest then fitting out <sup>h</sup>.

	Rate.	built.	refitted.	men.	guns.	captains.
<i>Le Formidable,</i>	1	1746	1749	1100	90	<i>Macnamara.</i>
<i>Palmier,</i>	2	1752		750	74	<i>BoislaMothe</i>
<i>Heros,</i>	2	1752		750	74	<i>Monluc.</i>
<i>Bizarre,</i>	3	1750		580	64	<i>Salverte.</i>
<i>Defenseur,</i>	2	1723	1752	750	74	<i>Boisnir.</i>
<i>Entreprenant,</i>	2	1751		750	74	<i>Beaufremont.</i>
<i>L'Espérance,</i>	2	1724	1747	750	70	<i>La Vilcon.</i>
<i>Algenquir,</i>	2	1752		750	70	<i>Montalet.</i>

## At Quebec.

<i>Dauphin,</i>	2	1735	1749	750	70	<i>Hocquart.</i>
<i>Alcide,</i>	3	1740	1743	580	64	<i>M. Choiseul.</i>
<i>Illustre,</i>	3	1750		580	64	<i>St. Lazarre.</i>
<i>Leopard,</i>	3	1721	1747	580	64	<i>L'Orgerie.</i>
<i>Lis,</i>	3	1746		580	64	<i>Gouin.</i>
<i>Apollon,</i>	4	1721	1751	350	58	
<i>Actiff,</i>	3	1752		580	64	
<i>Prothee,</i>	3	1747	1749	580	64	<i>Marinieu.</i>
<i>Fleur de lis,</i>	frig.			230	30	<i>Du Boto.</i>
<i>Amethiste,</i>	do.			230	30	<i>Bori.</i>
<i>Heroine,</i>	do.	1752		220	26	<i>Tourville.</i>
<i>Sirene,</i>	do.	1745		230	30	<i>L'Arguille.</i>
<i>Aquilon,</i>	4	1730	1751	350	50	<i>Bonville.</i>
<i>Comete,</i>	frig.	1752		220	22	<i>Grang.</i>

To be commanded by Monsieur Macnamara;  
to carry six regiments of two battalions each,  
and to be victualled for four months and a half<sup>1</sup>.

SOON

<sup>h</sup> From *De Cosne*.

<sup>1</sup> Dated February 12th and 19th, received on the 16th and 23d. Mr. de *Cosne* also advises, by letter dated Feb. 5th

SOON after this he transmitted a circumstantial account of the equipment making at *Rochfort*, and the diligence used to fit those ships for service: by which it appears that the enemy had the following ships fitting out in this port in *February 1755* <sup>k</sup>.

Ships names.	rates.	built.	men.	guns.	captains.
<i>Le Veille,</i>	3	1752	580	64	<i>Fontais.</i>
<i>L'Inflexible,</i>	3	1752	580	64	<i>Guebriant.</i>
<i>L'Opiniatre,</i>	3	1752	580	64	<i>Moileire.</i>
<i>L'Aigle,</i>	4	1750	350	50	<i>Cousage.</i>
<i>La Diane,</i> frig.		1741	230	34	<i>Rigaudiere.</i>
<i>La Fidelle,</i> do.		1747	220	26	<i>Tonquiere.</i>

1755, that they were sure of their complement of men to man this fleet; and that they took choice of what they found in all their vessels. And by his dispatches of the 5th *March*, received the 11th, it appears that the quantity of provisions had been doubled. Other advices are positive that there were then twenty ships of the line fit for service at *Brest*; and add that the report of a descent on *Scotland*, in favour of the pretender, seemed to be without foundation. See letter A, dated *Feb. 24, 1755*.

<sup>k</sup> With this list it is observed, that there was not a sufficient quantity of cannon in the royal stores to arm the ships putting in commission; that they had borrowed some from the *East India* company, and sent for the rest to *Sweden*; and that only the five first ships in the *Brest* list had their lower tiers.

It was advised from *Holland*, by a letter dated 15th *Feb.* that the *French* were buying up all sorts of stores and provisions at *Amsterdam*, and sending them to *Brest* and *Rochfort*: with which two ships had already sailed, and two more were in the *Texel* waiting a wind.

HITHERTO

HITHERTO it does not appear that there was any intelligence of armaments making ready in the ports of the *Mediterranean*: on the contrary, thirty officers of that department in the *French* marine were ordered round to *Brest*, under a pretence to serve in the fleet fitting out in that port. From whence the ministry received, on the 24th *February* 755, certain advice, that they were fitting out with all expedition fifteen sail, *viz.* seven of the line, five frigates, and three from 20 to 30 guns; to be ready to sail in *March* for *America*, with a large body of regular troops: that another squadron of seven ships of the line was ordered to be equipped as soon as possible; and that *France* seemed determined to put *all its naval force* to sea, either to reinforce their *American* Squadron, or to execute more dangerous projects.

FOUR days after, the same channel informs the Earl of *Holderness*, that in all these armaments there appeared a plain design to make settlements, and to build forts: because the greatest part of the ships were equipping *en flûte*, or for the transporting of troops. He also remarked, that it was reported they were resolved to augment the fortifications at *Louisbourg*, and to build forts on the *Ohio*; that *M. Salvert* would be charged with the expedition to *Canada*: and that, after sending reinforcements to *America*, it was probable they  
would

would keep two squadrons at home, to be employed only *en la petite guerre*; as not being strong enough for the *English* at sea.

BUT consul *Birtks*, by letter from *Genoa*, dated tenth of *February* 1755, and received by the secretary of state on the 26th of the same month, writes, that there were at that time twenty-four ships of war in the harbour of *Toulon*; besides three on the stocks, and a 70 gun ship careening: that there were orders arrived from court to fit out that *whole fleet* with expedition: that *the magazines and stores were in great order, and in such readiness*, that it was possible to put all those ships to sea in a very short time.

THIS was confirmed from *Cartagena* on the 12th *March* 1755: from whence consul *Banks* informs Sir *Thomas Robinson*, that the *French* were fitting out *thirty-six* large ships of war: that they worked very hard to get them ready for sea: that the great admiral of *France* was to have the chief command: that the merchant ships were taken up to transport a great number of land forces: but that it was not known against what place they were designed.

IT might be thought that this repeated, circumstantial, and creditable intelligence of the exertion of the *whole naval power* of *France*; and the embarkation of so many land forces, &c.

for *America*; and in the *Mediterranean*, where *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*<sup>1</sup> were the most probable objects of their destination; would have roused the attention of the *British* ministry to exert their endeavours to intercept the *American* squadron, and to cover our fortresses in the *Mediterranean* and *Streights* from insult and surprize. But, though it must be granted that *Great Britain* was, by far, superior to *France* by sea, and that the loss of *Mahon* or *Gibraltar* would be a fatal stroke to the *British* commerce, no care was taken to secure the internal strength of those fortifications, nor to cover them from an attack by sea: and, as we shall see hereafter, the squadron dispatched for the *American* service, was not appointed with that *prudence*, which was necessary to defend our interest in the new world.

M. de *Cofne*, who seems to have been very diligent in procuring intelligence of the measures pursued by the *French* ministry, acquaints Sir *Thomas Robinson*, by letter dated from *Paris*, 12th *March* 1755, That, from what he had been able to learn further of their armament, he had found, that ten of their large ships were not to have their lower tiers; but to have their port holes caulked up, in order to be fitted up to transport their troops. He then adds, “ It is

<sup>1</sup> By advices in Lord *Holdernefs*’s office, dated 25th of *March*, there was a talk at *Paris* of a project to attack *Gibraltar*.

“ said,

“ said, that it will require near two months  
 “ before the equipment can be completed. I  
 “ am told there are only *six* ships already  
 “ equipped; which lie out, in the road of *Brest*  
 “ harbour, and that, *as this expedition* is supposed  
 “ to be intended for *Canada*, if all the ships  
 “ were ready, yet it would not be proper to  
 “ sail before the latter end of *April*; because  
 “ the harbour of *Louisbourg* would not be clear  
 “ of ice at their arrival: that the voyage thither  
 “ is generally about forty, and sometimes fifty  
 “ days; and the usual time of departure is never  
 “ before the beginning of *May*: therefore, if  
 “ the expedition be retarded to that time, it  
 “ may be concluded with *great appearance of*  
 “ *certainty*, that it is destined for that place;  
 “ and that, on the contrary, if any of the ships  
 “ sail sooner, their destination may be suspected  
 “ to be for some other quarter.”

LORD *Holdernefs*, about the same time<sup>m</sup>, re-  
 ceived advice, that in the port of *Brest* there  
 were great preparations for embarking officers:  
 that the ships *en flute* were to carry no more  
 than 20 or 22 guns: that there were orders  
 sent to fit out eight more ships of war: that  
 there were now at *Brest* thirty-five ships, *viz.*  
 eighteen of the line from 60 to 80 guns, the  
 others frigates and light vessels, besides *nine*  
 men of war, *viz. five* of the line, and four  
 frigates on the stocks, to be launched within

<sup>m</sup> *March* 5th, 10th, and 14th.

three months : that they had been supplied with masts and other stores, 36 pieces of cannon, and balls by *Swedish* vessels: that only *nine* ships of the line were ready with two thousand <sup>n</sup> soldiers: and that at *Brussels* it was reported ten transports were assembled at *Calais*.

ON the 17th of *March* the ships equipped at *Brest* got into the road: but the letters on the 25th said, that they could not be able to sail before the beginning of *April*; that they would endeavour to slip away, without noise, with succours to *America*, and that the Duke of *Mirepoix's* negociation was only to gain time, till the *French* should arrive at their settlements, and be provided to declare open war.

THE advices to Lord *Holderness* on the 29th of *March*, brought an account That there were seventeen ships armed and equipped at *Brest*: that the rest would not be ready till the 13th of *April*; though four ships from 60 to 64 guns, were fitted out and gone into the road: that they were victualled for six months, and destined for *America*: and that a squadron of an equal force was equipping in that port, with five or six fireships, and some bomb-ketches.

<sup>n</sup> The advices of the 21st confirm this embarkation to be for *Canada*, and augment the number of soldiers to 3000; and mention another equipment to be commanded by *Gallaiffoniere*.

*April*

*April 2d, 1755*°, THE armament at *Brest* was carried on with the same diligence; and proposed to be ready to sail by the 20th. No step towards augmenting their land forces.

5th. FOURTEEN ships were got into the road: on which were embarked implements for throwing up or removing earth, and erecting forts; also provisions for *Indians*—destined for *Gaspésie*—and to be commanded in chief by *De la Motte*; *M. Macnamara* being thought too old, though certainly the best officer they have<sup>p</sup>.

8th. IT is now discovered that *six* ships, which got into the road on the 17th of *March*, had sailed privately for *America* with troops, in the night between the 18th and 19th of the same month: that *six* others took their station in the road, and received on board a number of regular troops<sup>q</sup>, amongst whom were many *Scotch* and *Irish* officers; and that orders were issued for *five* more ships to be expedited with the utmost diligence.

° Received by the Earl of *Holderness* on the 6th.

<sup>p</sup> See advices in Lord *Holderness*'s office, *March* 21st, 1755.

<sup>q</sup> *April* 9th. Orders were sent for their embarkation at *Brest* on this and the following days to the 13th. They in all amounted to 3000 men, taken by 500 out of six regiments of two battalions each; as by advice received *April* 19th from *M. Cosne*.



11th. EVERY thing speaks war at hand. The *five* new ships of war are all ready, and will be in the road next week<sup>1</sup>, and M. *Dieschau*, who is to have the chief command by land in *America*, will embark on the 15th.

THESE letters add, that there was some talk of the *Pretenaer*, and of a *descent* to be made on one of the kingdoms of *Great Britain*: and that there were no orders as yet gone for equipping a fleet at *Toulon*: which is very inconsistent with consul *Birtle's* advice of the tenth of *February*; and, indeed, seems to have been wrote at random; for, three days after, this same correspondent delivers it for fact, that orders had been sent to *Toulon* for fitting out *ten* ships of the line; and further adds, that the *French* marine armaments were expected to be completed in a month.

16th. M. *de Cosne* writes that the frigate *La Diane* had been dispatched and sailed from *Rochfort*, on the 27th ult. to *Louisbourg* and *Quebec*, with advice of the succours destined for *America*: that *eight* ships more of the line were ordered to be victualled and fit for the sea in two months: that M. *Macnamara* had received orders to sail this day, if the wind should permit; and that the courier was ordered not

<sup>1</sup> They sailed into the road on or before the 18th day, as appears by other advices.

to return to court, till the Squadron was out at sea.

18th. ADVICES from *Flanders* related that there was at *Brest* eleven ships ready for sea; but was thought they would not sail till the whole armament was completed: that the equipment at *Rochfort* was finished, and two more sixty gun ships, and a frigate of 46 had been put into commission: that there were some armed frigates at *St. Malo's*: that each vessel was ordered to take 330 soldiers on board: that besides the fleet then ready to sail, they were fitting out at *Brest* one 70, one 56, and one 50 gun ship; and that there were twelve more ships of 64 guns in that harbour, which might very easily be made fit for sea\*.

*M. de Cofne* is more particular; who having by letters of the 15th, confirmed the intelligence of the united fleet, or squadrons from *Rochfort* and *Brest*, being ready to weigh anchor in *Brest* road; and sent a list inclosed of *land forces*, particularly the *Irish* brigade, ordered to march down to the sea coast, and to remain in garrison at *Dunkirk*, *Graveline*, and *Calais*, till further orders; he, on the 18th, sends advice that the said

\* In order to man this fleet they were obliged to strip the ships of all their sailors in the merchants service, as appears by advices received from *Holland* on the 21st, which said that vessels were detained in *Dunkirk* for want of hands; the sailors being obliged to repair to *Brest*.

fleet was then preparing to sail, and contained and was commanded, as follows:

LIST of the Brest Squadron, the officers, and guns.

Ships.	Captains.	Guns.
<i>Formidable</i> ,	<i>Macnamara</i> , general des armes navales,	90
<i>Entreprenant</i> ,	<i>Du Bois de la Mothe</i> , chef d'escadre,	74
<i>Bizarre</i> ,	<i>Perrier de Salvart</i> ,	do. 64
<i>Heros</i> ,	<i>Monluet</i> ,	do. 74
<i>Palmier</i> ,	<i>Beaufremont d'Ouvillers</i> , captains,	74
<i>Alcide</i> ,	<i>Hocquart Parcevaux</i> ,	do. 64
* <i>Desperuere</i> ,	<i>Beaufrier</i> ,	do. 70
* <i>Dauphin Royall</i> ,	<i>Montalet</i> ,	do. 70
* <i>L'Algenquir</i> ,	<i>Vilcon</i> ,	do. 70
* <i>Esperance</i> ,	<i>Bouville</i> ,	do. 70
* <i>Actif</i> ,	<i>Chev. de Cheaumont</i> ,	do. 64
* <i>Illustré</i> ,	<i>Choiseul</i> ,	do. 64
* <i>Opiniatre</i> ,	<i>Moclien</i> ,	do. 64
* <i>Le Lis</i> ,	<i>Orgerie</i> ,	do. 64
* <i>Leopard</i> ,	<i>St. Lazarre</i> ,	do. 64
<i>Améthiste</i> ,	<i>Sieur du Botte</i> , &c. lieutenants,	30
* <i>Apollon</i> ,	<i>Govier</i> , &c. do.	58
<i>Fleur de Lis</i> ,	<i>Marnuic</i> , &c. do.	30
<i>Sirene</i> ,	<i>Tourville</i> , &c. do.	30
<i>Comette</i> ,	<i>Grauy</i> , &c. do.	30
<i>Heroine</i> ,	<i>Bory</i> , lieutenant,	30
* <i>L'Aiguillon</i> ,	<i>L'Aiguillon</i> , &c. do.	† 50

15 ships from 80 to 64 guns.

7 frigates.

† Appointed for an hospital ship, and mounted only 26 guns.  
Ships

*Ships sailed from Rochfort, officers and guns:*

<i>Le Veille,</i>	<i>De Fountais, de Rochechamart,</i>	captain,	64
<i>L' Aigle,</i>	<i>Du Consaque Billy,</i>	do.	50
<i>La Diane,</i>	<i>Rigaudiere,</i>	do.	30
<i>Fidelle,</i>	<i>La Jonquiere De,</i>	lieutenant,	26
<i>Inflexible,</i>	<i>Guebriant l' Aumont l' Aine,</i>	captain,	64

---

2 ships of 64 guns.

1 of 50,

2 frigates.

---

5 Total of both ports,

18 ships of the line.

9 frigates.

---

27

*N. B.* THOSE ships marked with \* served as transports for the troops, and only carried from 18 to 22 guns, although pierced as above. The others were completely armed, and were the convoy to the ships for transporting the troops.

HOWEVER, though the orders from court were so positive, and every thing was ready, the wind would not permit this fleet to sail till the 3d of *May*<sup>t</sup>; of which our ministry received

<sup>t</sup> This delay created various conjectures; for the public began to think that some other reason, besides contrary winds, occasioned it: as appears from the advices dated *May* 2d.

this

this positive advice from *Paris*, dated *May* 6th.  
 “ The *Brest* fleet set sail very early on the 3d,  
 “ with so fair a wind, as to be out of sight in  
 “ a short time. It is generally believed, that  
 “ *Macnamara’s* orders are *only* to convoy the  
 “ ships that serve as transports, to a certain  
 “ distance, and then to let them pursue their  
 “ voyage without him ”.

By these advices it is evident, *Great Britain* had nothing to fear from an invasion into either of its kingdoms: and that, notwithstanding *France* had a few more ships in the ports of *Brest* and *Rochfort* fit for service, they had neither sailors, provisions, ordnance, nor ammunition, to fit them out for sea; nor any number of vessels, capable of transporting an army into this island; had it ever so seriously meditated a descent in favour of the Pretender \*. Why then

\* This was confirmed by the return of M. *Macnamara* on *May* 20th, with *nine* ships of the line, having convoyed the transports beyond the capes, and left them to proceed to *Canada* with a fair wind. *May* 20th captain *Innis*, *Otter sloop*, at sea, saw nine sail of *French* men of war off *Ushant* going into *Brest*. *May* 23d captain *Edwards*, *Dispatch*, off *Falmouth*, saw twenty-five sail on the 4th, *viz.* twenty line of battle, two of 50, and three frigates, which came out of *Brest* and separated. The *French* admiral with eight sail hauled their wind. See advices to *Admiralty office*.

\* The only intelligence, upon which the ministry could form any idea of an invasion at this time, being the letters of Mr. *Barnham* from *Dover* to Mr. *Amyand*, I shall add their contents.

On

then was there not a more powerful fleet ordered, in time, to block up, or to intercept *Macnamara's* convoy? Could the sovereign of the seas spare no greater force than *eleven* ships of the line, and one sloop, to defeat the embarkation for *America*? Did the ministry exert the *utmost* of their power in defence of our colonies, and to maintain the dominion of the seas, when they, apprised of the force under sailing orders at *Brest*, confined their own strength to a squadron under Mr. *Boscawen*, of little more than half the force; totally neglected a necessary supply of land men; and paid no manner of regard to the equipment of *ten ships of the line* at *Toulon*, of which they had positive advice on the 14th of *April*: nor to the intelligence from consul *Banks*, on the 12th of *March*; which he wrote under a confirmed opinion, that *there*

On *Feb.* 10th, He mentions great warlike preparations daily making; and a surprizing quantity of powder brought in a few days to *Calais*, in thirty flat bottomed vessels, by the way of their canals, and more expected.

*Feb.* 28th, He writes: The only intelligence this day learned from *Calais* is, that the troops, which were ordered from the interior parts towards the sea coast, have received counter-orders: and that every thing at that time seemed to be very quiet at *Calais*.

*March* 10th.—600 bomb-shells are brought into *Calais*, and laid on the key: but their destination is a profound secret. At the same place are also arrived 60 cannoneers; and more troops are expected. But notwithstanding this mighty warlike preparation, I cannot learn they are taking any steps to increase their shipping at that place, which at present is very inconsiderable. See *Admiralty office*.

would

would be a powerful expedition with land forces from that port?

THE only step taken to remedy these egregious omissions in the *British politicks*, was to risk six ships of the line and one frigate under admiral *Holbourn* to follow Mr. *Boscawen*; who did not sail till the 11th of *May*, when it could scarce be thought possible for him to escape *Macnamara's* fleet, which had sailed but eight days before. And yet this was the only effort made by the *British* ministry for several months, to counteract the vigorous armaments of the whole naval power of *France*.

THE account of the *Brest* fleet's being failed, was soon after seconded by advices of more equipments in that port, *Rochfort* and *Toulon*. On the 13th of *May* our intelligence from *Paris* mention more preparations of the marine at *Brest* and *Rochfort*; and also a squadron somewhere to be commanded by *Galassioniere*. The letters of the 23d are more explicit: they inform that five more ships were put in commission at *Rochfort*, and that there was a frigate fitting out at *St. Malo's* \*; that *Macnamara* was returned into the port of *Brest* on the 20th, with nine ships, viz.

\* Paper B. 1. in Lord *Holderness's* office.

The <i>Formidable</i> ,	90
<i>Heros</i> ,	74
<i>Palmier</i> ,	74
<i>Inflexible</i> ,	64
<i>Veille</i> ,	64
<i>Aigle</i> ,	50
Frigates, <i>Amethist</i> ,	30
<i>Fleur de Lis</i> ,	30
<i>Heroine</i> ,	30 <sup>x</sup>

and that there were in *Brest* harbour thirteen ships of the line, and four frigates; besides eight ships of the line, and four frigates more fitting out; and to be joined by four ships from *Rochfort*.

M. *de Cofne* on the 28th of *May* writes, that these *nine* ships were victualling for six months: and that he believed they would sail only to cruise about the *Streights* mouth off of *Gibraltar*: and that they accordingly set sail on the fourth of *June*, under the command of M. *Du*

<sup>x</sup> These were not expected to return so soon. They convoyed the divisions of M. *de la Motte*, and of M. *de Salvart*, to the first meridian. The ships armed *en flutes* were destined for *Canada*, and to land in *Gaspéy-bay*, in order to make diversion towards *Acadia*, at the same time that the troops on the *Ohio* advance on the side of *Virginia*. See B. 2. in Lord *Holdernefs's* office. M. *de Cofne* adds, These transports, after landing the troops at *Louisbourg*, will return full armed, having stowed the rest of their guns as ballast: and *Macnamara* has orders to meet them.



*Guay*, Chef d'Escadre, M. *Macnamara* being ill of the gout : their destination remaining a profound secret, they kept cruising in the *Atlantic* ocean, near the *Streights of Gibraltar*, till they entered the port of *Cadiz*ʸ.

IN the mean time, the lords commissioners of the *Admiralty* received advice from captain *Buckle* of the *Unicorn*, dated *May* 9th, in *Genoa-mole*, that eleven days before, there had been orders published by beat of drum, for sailors to repair to *Toulon* : and that orders were likewise sent to *Toulon*, to fit out all the ships in that harbour.

*May* 30. CAPTAIN *Scroope* writes from *Villafranca*, that he had seen five ships of 60 and 70 guns in *Hieres-bay*. And the advices to Lord *Holderness*, of the 5th of *June*, specify an order for equipping the following ships of the line and frigates,

<i>Le Temeraire,</i>	74
<i>Esperance,</i>	70
<i>Esprit,</i>	70
<i>Lion,</i>	64
<i>Sage,</i>	64
<i>Orphee,</i>	64
<i>Rose,</i>	36
<i>Pomone,</i>	30
<i>Atlante,</i>	30

ʸ When this fleet returned from *Cadiz* about the beginning of *August*, M. *Du Guay* left four frigates in that port. See advices to the *Admiralty* from *Gibraltar*, dated *Aug.* 26.  
inde-

independant of four frigates and *nine* gallies, which they were already at work upon, and just finished, when these orders arrived ; and not to be employed against Corsairs. Yet Mr. *Villetes* writes from *Bern*, on the 8th of *June*, that hitherto there was not a ship of war fitting out at *Toulon* ; nor the least order for the troops in *Dauphine*, *Languedoc*, nor *Provence*, to move or to keep in readines.

THE armament at *Rochfort*, by advices of the 21st of *June* to Lord *Holderness*, was continued : three ships of the line and one frigate being then equipping in that port : but they add, that nothing was doing to the eight ships ordered to be equipped at *Brest*, that shewed any design of putting either these, or those at *Rochfort* soon to sea : for, though they might be furnished with sailors out of the *Indiamen*, and other ships lately arrived, they were in want of cannon.

*July* 1st. THE advices to Lord *Holderness* brought an account of five ships at *Brest* almost fitted, with part of their crews on board ; five more in great forwardness, and five more at *Rochfort*, in all fifteen sail : that there were many regular battalions quartered about *Brest*, but no talk of an embarkation : that *du Guay's* instructions were to cruize on the coast of *Portugal* to favour the return of *la Motte* and *Salvert*, in case of bad news from *America* : that they

they had at *Toulon* twenty-eight ships, which might be easily put to sea ; and *plenty of naval stores and artillery* : and that sailors belonging to nine ships then careening and rigging had orders not to go out of the way without leave.

THE intelligence received on the 1st of *July* 1755, from Mr. *Villettes*, our resident at *Geneva*, mentioned a report, that a considerable number of pilots had been ordered to bring home *twelve* large men of war, built for the service of *France* in the ports of *Sweden* ; and that they were to bring in them a vast quantity of iron cannon ; which he presumes may not be entirely fact : however, other letters confirm this account, and specify the number of cannon to be 6000 pieces, bought in *Sweden* ; and further say, that twelve more ships were building in that kingdom for the *French* King : concluding with this observation, “ this may be exaggerated : but it seems “ at least that they intend to make attacks on “ more than one side, and that they move more “ than one spring.”

THE *French* court about this time was making detachments from the militia to be sent to the *East Indies* : and though there were ten ships at *Brest*, in a condition to be fitted out on the first notice, and five at *Rochfort*, they were not intended to sail till it was known what had passed in *America*.

THUS,

THUS, it appeared that the whole attention of the *French* councils was taken up with their *American* interest, or at least to favour the return of their ships from *Canada*; and that *Britain* had nothing to fear of an invasion, from any preparation at *Brest* or its neighbouring ports.

BUT, though it was confirmed by letters to Lord *Holderness*, dated *July* 19th, and received on the 22d, that no ships were fitting out at *Brest*; and that they were equipping with expedition *nine* ships at *Toulon*; with orders for the sailors not to depart from thence; the *British* ministry contented themselves with sending Sir *Edward Hawke*, on the 24th of *July*, to cruize till *September*, only to endeavour to intercept *Du Guay's* Squadron in its return from *Cadiz*; or any ships which might escape the vigilance of Mr. *Boscarwen*, and attempt to recover any port in *France*: his whole force being no more than twenty-one ships of the line, and five frigates: whereas, if there was any credit to be given to our intelligence, it was probable that he might have met with *Du Guay's* Squadron of ten ships, joined by five ships from *Rockfort*, ten ships from *Brest*, and the ten ships in their return from *America* <sup>2</sup>. By which it appears that this

By advices in Lord *Holderness's* office, *July* 15th and 19th, there were about 12,000 men quartered about *Dunkirk*; but it was thought by those, who gave this information, that this was done purely to give umbrage to *England*.

D

fleet

fleet was commanded upon a very hazardous service, and all the advices concerning the naval preparations in the *Mediterranean* were disregarded.

SIR *Edward* was no sooner got to sea, than our ministry were informed by good authority, that the armament at *Brest* of *eight* ships was forwarding with all expedition; that *four* more were ordered; in all twelve, *viz.* five of the line, and seven frigates from 30 to 50 guns<sup>a</sup>: and that in case their navy was found insufficient to cope with *England*, the *French* were determined to have recourse to their armies. Accordingly, on the third of *August*, advice arrived that the baggage of the *Prince de Soubise* was packing up to be transported from *Lisse* to *Dunkirk*; that *M. De Cremille*, lieutenant-general, was marched to *Dunkirk*, at the head of 20,000 men; and that they were at work night and day in that port repairing the fortifications<sup>b</sup> and opening the harbour, in order to make an embarkation, as they pretended; but rather to draw the *English* forces to that side. And letters of the 15th and 19th add, that great preparations for war were making on the *French* frontiers: that the troops were in motion in the *inner* part of the

<sup>a</sup> There were also three ships from 67 to 70 guns, and two frigates of 36 guns building at the same time in that port. See advices dated *July* 25th and 28th.

<sup>b</sup> Building new forts, and mounting cannon on the *Risbank*. See ditto, dated *August* 3d, 6th, 8th, and 11th.  
kingdom,

kingdom, and the regiments had orders to augment every battalion with four companies: That these armaments, and the enlisting even boys of fourteen or fifteen years of age, discovered a design in the *French* to begin the war *with some great stroke*: but that at *Dunkirk* there was no talk of equipments for an *invasion* <sup>c</sup>, nor even of the *Pretender* <sup>d</sup>. Yet Mr. *Barnham* writes from *Dover* on the 31st of the same month, that 5000 sailors were ordered to *Brest* against the 17th of *September*, and that all the fishing-boats at *Dieppe*, were ordered to sail to *Boulogne* and *Calais* <sup>e</sup>.

THE equipments in the port of *Toulon*, which hitherto had been carried on with more artifice, began now to appear openly, and to keep pace with the encampments facing the *British* shore, *formed merely to give umbrage to the ENGLISH*, and with the motion and augmentation of their

<sup>c</sup> Though the same advices add, that there were at that time sixty-three vessels of different sizes in the harbour: that the militia was ordered to be in readiness: and that a camp was talked of, to be formed between *St. Omer's*, *Dunkirk*, and *Calais*.

<sup>d</sup> Letters of the 27th mention, that the marines were augmented to 50 men in a company: that camps were forming at *Valence*, *Richmont*, and *Sambre*: That the *Pretender* had been in *France* ever since the 28th of *July incog*. But that there was no hurry at *Brest*, to fit out ships in a condition for service, which greatly surprized the people.

<sup>e</sup> It is somewhat remarkable that this intelligencer gained more credit than any other advices, which by their situation, &c. were more likely to come at the truth.

troops. For the letters of the 6th of *August* declare expressly, that orders had been sent to *Toulon* to equip, with *all expedition*, all the *new* ships, and to get the *old* ones also in a condition for service: that these orders were then pursued with great diligence, and that they were to take on board several companies of land forces besides marines. They further advised, that since the arrival of two expresses at *Toulon*; which had caused the holding of two extraordinary councils attended by the principal officers of the marine, the hands, which were at work in fitting out the *nine* ships there, were doubled, and *six* other ships of the line put in commission, and ordered to be equipped with the former nine, so as to be able to put all the fifteen sail to sea before the 18th or 20th of *August*, and to be victualled only for *three* months. Which letter concludes: “ Though the destination of this squadron is not known, it is generally conjectured to be intended against *Gibraltar*: but be that as it will, never was a greater hurry in that port than at present<sup>f</sup>.”

AT the same time it ought to be observed, that we had no force in those seas to prevent

<sup>f</sup> Is it not very extraordinary that capt. *Edgecombe* of the *Deptford*, should write from *Mahon*, on the 7th of *August*, that he had received advice from *Marseilles*, that there were no orders arrived at *Toulon* on the 1st, for fitting out the ships in that port; and that there was great want of naval stores, and that there was not sufficient artillery. Received by the *Admiralty*, Sept. 16.

*Du Guay's* Squadron, which did not sail from *Cadiz* till the beginning of *August*, from joining the Squadron at *Toulon*.

LORD *Bristol*, in his letters to Lord *Holderness*, dated *Turin*, *August* 16th, in part confirms the preparations at *Toulon*. His Lordship writes, that all the master-builders were commanded to repair immediately from the ports of *Provence*, &c. to *Toulon*; and that a body of 20,000 *French* troops were preparing to form a camp at *Valence* in *Dauphine*: but adds, that nothing had hitherto been done towards equipping any of their ships. However, on the 23d his Lordship advises, that there were twenty ships large and small at *Toulon*; but there was not artillery sufficient to equip them, and that no orders were as yet issued for enlisting of sailors in that port. And on the 30th of the same month, the same noble Lord writes, that an express had arrived the week before at *Toulon* from *Versailles*, with orders to equip with the utmost expedition

Is it not more surprizing that Mr. *Villettes* from *Bern*, on the 16th of *August*, should write that he was informed that no armament or warlike preparations, were as yet making in the ports of *Provence*: excepting a few *Tartans*, which were ordered to sail to caution the *French* homeward bound merchantmen to be upon their guard? Or is it possible to think, that this information should deserve, or meet with, more credit in the *British* cabinet, than the positive, circumstantial, and, if neglected, the destructive advice of the 6th of the same month to the Secretary's office?



*seventeen* ships: and that he was informed they were already at work to expedite this armament, and had taken off all hands from the merchantmen building, &c. in the neighbouring dockyards.

THESE advices were confirmed by consul *Birtles*, who by letters of the last date, writes that letters from *Nice*, of the 25th of *August*, advised, that a courier was arrived at *Toulon* for the intendant to fit out *seventeen* ships with the *utmost diligence*; and that a vessel was arrived, in four days, from *Marseilles* at *Genoa*, which confirmed that orders had been received for equipping ships at *Toulon*.

CORUL *Cabanis*, by letter to Sir *Thomas Robinson*, dated *Nice*, *August* 25, writes that the *French* were augmenting their land forces, and actually recruiting in *Languedoc* and *Provence*: that the last post brought orders to *Toulon* for equipping *seventeen* sail of men of war; that next day they did begin to inspect them: and that he was assured by very good hands, the intendant had sent immediately for all the *cornfactors* from *Marseilles* and the adjacent parts.

To this armament Mr. *Villetes*, by letters from *Bern*, dated *August* 28th, adds three new built 80 gun ships, purchased of the *Genoese*,  
and

and expected soon at *Toulon* <sup>s</sup>. He also mentions the preparations making for assembling a camp at *Valence* in *Dauphine* : and that it appeared to him, there would be nothing undertaken on the continent this year, 1755, till their trading vessels, and seamen employed in the fisheries, were returned, and that in the mean time they would make such necessary preparations, during the winter, as would enable them to pursue early in the spring those measures, which their circumstances, and the dignity of the crown of *France*, might require.

FROM *Carthagena*, consul *Banks*, in his letters of the 20th and 27th of *August*, is still more explicit : “ Masters of *French* vessels from *Toulon*, says he, report that there are in that port “ *twenty-six* men of war of the line, *viz.* eighteen “ new ships built since the peace, and eight old

<sup>s</sup> But, in order to lessen the opinion of this equipment, we find in a former letter from this gentleman dated *August* 20th, the following account of the state of the marine at *Toulon*. “ They have, says he, built at *Toulon*, since the “ peace, there are upon the stocks, in all fourteen ships “ or frigates. They may, perhaps, fit ten more old ones : “ they, who exaggerate, say eighteen. But there are only “ 3000 sailors in that department, including old men and “ children : they have neither cannon, ropes, nor materials “ to make any ; which they hoped to have gotten from “ *Sweden* and *Denmark* : but those states have not thought “ it convenient to supply them. And should it be true, “ that they have purchased three ships of the *Genoese* ; those “ ships will want both cannon and sailors.” See the advices of *July* 1st.

“ ones, which are all fitting for sea : also *twelve*  
 “ frigates, and a great many smaller vessels,  
 “ which are in like manner fitting out ; besides  
 “ six ships of the line on the stocks ; some of  
 “ which are ready for launching : That he had  
 “ received intelligence of 180 battalions of  
 “ soldiers marching into *Roussillon* with great  
 “ diligence, and that these troops were designed  
 “ against MINORCA, to be transported thither  
 “ in merchant-ships now at *Marseilles*, and to  
 “ be convoyed by all the men of war in the  
 “ port of *Toulon*.”

WHILST these preparations were going forward in the south of *France* against *Minorca*, the *French* ministry, by their emissaries in *Holland*, &c. and their movements on the coasts of the *British* channel, and even sometimes by counter orders at *Toulon*, endeavoured effectually to draw off the attention of *Britain* from the main object. For,

AT the *Hague* it was reported, *August* 29, that there would be an embarkation of troops at *Boulogne*, *Calais*, and *Dunkirk*, in order to make a descent in *Scotland*.

MR. *Barnham* from *Dover*, *August* 31st, improves the *Dutch* intelligence by informing (but God knows upon what authority !) that there was a talk in *France* that 5000 sailors were ordered to *Brest* against the 17th of the next month,

month, and that all fishing-boats at *Dieppe* were ordered to sail for *Boulogne* and *Calais*: that there were four regiments of the *Irish* brigade at *Boulogne*, and more troops expected there. Then he adds: “Yesterday there arrived at “*Calais* a dogger in her ballast, as has done “within these few days three or four small boats: “what service they intend them for, is kept a “secret: but, no doubt, they would have us “believe, that they design playing us their old “game, with which they amused us in the last “war<sup>h</sup>.”

THEY managed their proceedings at *Toulon* and in that neighbourhood, at the same time, so artfully, that Mr. *Villetttes*, and Lord *Bristol*, could scarce be induced to give any credit to the intelligences they hitherto had transmitted to *London*. And the modern panic of an invasion so effectually concurred to favour the politics of *France*, that, notwithstanding the ministry of *Great Britain* were well informed, by letters of the 29th of *August*, “that the *French* ministry were “never more perplexed: that though they were “angry, they were divided in their sentiments: “that councils upon councils were held; but “nothing had been resolved on: and that, though “an invasion of *England* had been talked of, the “present situation of *France* had, upon examination, been found very different from that in “1745;” they suffered themselves to be amused,

<sup>h</sup> See before advices of the 27th of *August*.

and, by discrediting their correspondents in *Italy*, *Spain*, and the south of *France*, neglected our trade and property in the *Mediterranean* and *America*, and every other object of our care, to watch the execution of a scheme, not so well attested, and much more hazardous for the enemy to attempt. Even so far did this negligence take place in our councils, that not an officer was ordered to his corps in garrison, nor a ship of war to intimidate the *Toulon* Squadron, or to cover our fortresses and navigation from the insults of the enemy in the *Mediterranean*.

THE month of *September* produced more positive accounts of the *Toulon* Squadron, and its destination.

SIR *Benjamin Keene* our minister plenipo' at *Madrid*, on the first of this month, transmitted to Sir *Thomas Robinson* an authentic list of the fleet at *Toulon*.

#### The L I S T.

- 2 of 84 guns.
- 5 of 74 one wants considerable refitting.
- 8 of 64 the *Valliant* will be launched the end of next month.
- 3 of 56 one refitting will be soon finished, one wants considerable refitting.
- 2 of 40 one not fit to serve any longer.
- 7 of 30 two out, one on stocks, two scarce begun.
- 2 of 24

3 bomb

3 bomb vessels.

4 xebecs at sea.

1 of 14 guns not fit to serve any more.

---

37 which only want cannon.

LETTERS of the same date, and received at the *Admiralty* from *Marseilles*, on the 19th of *September*, advised that orders had been sent on the 29th *ult.* to *Toulon*, to fit out with all expedition *twelve* men of war, *viz.* one of 80, three of 74, seven of 64, and one of 50; that they had begun to work hard, and that it was expected they would be ready to put to sea in two months; besides *seven* others, which might be equipped for service against the spring.

ON the same day the secretary of the *Admiralty* received information from captain *Harvey* of the *Phoenix*, dated *Genoa*, *Sept.* 3d, that the *French* had at *Toulon*, in all twenty-eight sail great and small, and that thirteen of the line, four frigates, and six xebecs were fitting out for sea with great expedition. Amongst the remainder, he adds, are four large new ships; which prove so leaky that they do not attempt to fit them. There is a great want of guns, 900, upon proving, being found unfit for service, or wanting: and a great scarcity of sailors: but 6000 are expected home in the *Levant* ships. The captain then confirms the intelligence of the purchase of three ships at *Genoa*: but con-

cludes with this remark, " I have been on board, " and find it easier to fit for a *Brazil* convoy, or " a *Mc-an* cargo of timber, than a line of " battle."

Six days after, the same captain writes from *Villa-franca*, that the consul at *Nice*, and the agent at *Marseilles*, had confirmed the intelligence of the 3d, and sent the following account of the armament at *Toulon*, viz.

17 of 60 to 80, of which 3 incapable of service.  
 8 frigates of 20 to 40.  
 1 frigate of 40 expected hourly from *America*.  
 6 xebecs.  
 3 before *Sallee* expected.  
 4 galleys fit, the rest incapable.  
 1 ship of 80 upon the stocks.  
 4 others little advanced.

---

44 in all, including 4 bombs and 2 fireships.

*N. B.* Twelve ships of the line, and four frigates, fitting with all expedition.

ON the 13th, Mr. *Birtles* consul at *Genoa*, confirms by letters from *Marseilles* of the 5th of *September*, as also by a vessel arrived in three days at *Genoa* from *Toulon*, that they were equipping twelve ships of the line, and four frigates, in that port; and inclosed the following list in *French*.

*Noms*

*Noms des vaisseaux de guerre qui ou armé a*  
TOULON.

<i>Le Foudroyant,</i>	80 guns.
<i>Guerrier,</i>	74
<i>Redoubtable,</i>	74
<i>Couronne,</i>	74
<i>Achille,</i>	64
<i>Triton,</i>	64
<i>Lion,</i>	64
<i>Sage,</i>	64
<i>Orphée,</i>	64
<i>Content,</i>	64
<i>Hercule,</i>	64
<i>Tier,</i>	50

800 guns in all.

With four frigates.

FROM *Turin* Lord *Bristol* informed Sir *Thomas Robinson*, by letter dated the 6th of the same month, that all the marines in *France* were recruiting, and that cannon were mounting on the batteries: and on the 20th transmitted the following account of the maritime force of *France* in the *Mediterranean*.

*State*



*State of the maritime force of France in the Mediterranean, on the 20th of Sept. 1755.*

15 ships from 66 to 80 guns, one of 80 leaky, others of bad wood, which will soon want refitting, when been at sea.

2 quite unfit for service.

1 of 80 guns upon the stocks, ordered to be launched in *October*, but cannot be got ready this year.

2 of 60 to 70 guns upon the stocks, one of which only the keel laid, the other not much forwarder.

8 frigates of 24 to 40 guns fit for service.

1 frigate of 36 guns expected from *America*,

4 xebecs on a cruize off *Sallee*,

These five expected every day at *Toulon*. }

4 bomb ketches.

2 fire-ships.

4 galleys fit for service.

2 strong large sloops, equipped with 20 men,  
— and a culverin of 36 pounds: with which

45 it is proposed to sink the enemy's ships, by running upon them and making their fire between wind and water.

*N. B.* The firing of this piece of cannon is very quick; as it is replaced immediately, by means of a spring, *as soon as fired*.

To this was added a particular list of the sea forces then getting ready at *Toulon*, *viz.*

1 The

1 The *Foudroyant* of 80 guns.  
 11 from 66 to 70 guns.

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12 ships of the line.

To complete which Squadron, says my Lord, they want 800 pieces of cannon, and 10,000 men, including sailors, troops, and officers; there being only cannon enough for lower tiers, and scarce enough for the second and third tiers: that they depended on *Genoa* for a supply of artillery, to be brought to *Toulon* in three large ships, if approved of by a captain of a man of war, the master founder, &c. gone to examine and prove the ships and cannon: that the new levies for completing the four companies, and to augment the companies of marines from fifty to an hundred men were continued: that the delays in fitting out the fleet had been occasioned by the great scarcity of money: but that twenty-four millions were now assigned to pay the expence of this armament; and that orders were arrived to pay six months wages to the workmen, &c.

His Lordship then concludes, that as there was no commanding officer as yet appointed to the eight ships in commission; it was not possible to guess at the destination of that Squadron: but that, in consequence of an order from court, dated the third of this month, they were employed diligently in getting ready  
 twenty-

twenty-five thousand quintals of biscuit for its use<sup>1</sup>.

THE same noble Lord, by dispatches of the 27th of the same month, further adds, that by orders arrived at *Marseilles* on the 13th, *four* new men of war from 60 to 70 guns, were immediately to be built under the direction of the Marquis de *Rouse*: that he was well assured, they had received eighteen millions of livres at *Toulon*, last week: that every artificer in that port, at *Marseilles*, and in that neighbourhood, were employed *continually* to get all<sup>k</sup> the ships and frigates ready for sea, by the end of *October*. That they had already got *six thousand seamen* in readiness, and that they expected a supply of *four thousand* more in a very short time. And,

<sup>1</sup> Capt. *Scroope* of the *Dolphin*, by letter of the 22d of *September*, dated at *Villa-franca*, repeats the very same intelligence.

<sup>k</sup> On *Sept.* 19th, advices from the *Hague* confirmed this equipment at *Toulon*, and inclosed the following list of ships ordered to be in readiness at that port, *viz.*

1 of 80 guns,	} and two frigates.
3 of 74	
7 of 64	
1 of 50	

---

12

It is very possible, he adds, that the intendant of the marine may have received orders from court to prepare a squadron of as many ships as are fit for service: But that none of the letters mentioned above take notice that any supply of *rigging* and *artillery*, which was also greatly wanted, has of late been imported at *Toulon* from abroad.

as captain *Scroope* had observed by letter, of *Sept.* 22d, that these ships were so bad as not be fit for long cruizes, it was most natural to conclude their destination must be for some expedition *not beyond the Streights of Gibraltar.*

My Lord *Holdernefs*, about the same time, received advice, that the Count *de Grammont* was gone on the 26th of *August* to *Genoa*, to examine *four* ships of the line; offered on sale to the court of *France*: that the *Genoese* had also offered to supply them with 5 or 600 cannon: that at *Toulon* they worked *incessantly* in building *new* ships: that they were able to fit out ten or twelve ships of the line, exclusive of frigates, *in a very short time*, whenever orders should come for that purpose; and yet this adviser pretends to say, that there were *no armaments* YET making at *Toulon*.

LETTERS of the 22d, 27th, and 30th to the same office discover, that the *Toulon* squadron was to be commanded by M. *Galassioniere*: and that the officers of the *Toulon* department, who had been exercising on board of *Du Guay's* squadron, which had returned to *Brest*, on the third instant, were ordered to repair to their proper service; and that they were accordingly returned to that department.

MR. *Villetes*, by letters of the 20th dated from *Bern*, writes that several letters assure that

E pre-

preparations were making at *Toulon* for fitting out twelve ships of the line and *six* frigates: but, according to his usual method, endeavours to destroy the force of that intelligence, by declaring, contrary to the most particular and authentic accounts from Sir *Benjamin Keene*, Lord *Bristol*, and others of great capacity, penetration, and veracity, that he *fancied* it was more than they really had in that port in a condition to put to sea.

How can the adhering to such advice be reconciled with the total neglect of the intelligence dated 22d *Sept.* and received by the *Admiralty* on the 11th of *October*, “ that eighteen millions of livres had been received at *Toulon* to fit the Squadron to sea: that they worked night and day to complete their orders by the end of next month: that the line of battle was one of 80, three of 74, eight of 64, in all carrying 814 guns, besides two frigates: that there were shipped 6000 sailors, and 4000 more were hourly expected, and that they had got 1400 brass and iron cannon.”

WHILE

They pressed all the carpenters in the country. See advices received by Lord *Holderness*, *Sept.* 27th.

<sup>m</sup> Letters of the 29th from the same quarter, confirmed the state of the maritime force of *France* in the *Mediterranean*: that they were fitting twelve ships of the line at *Toulon*, to be commanded by *Galassioniere*: that these ships would be ready in six weeks: and that they would be able to put seven or eight more to sea in the spring. *Advices to the Admiralty.* Consul

WHILE these armaments were expediting at *Toulon*, the *French*, knowing the foible of their neighbours, to be terrified with every motion they should make on the coast of the channel, played off their old political engine of an invasion so effectually, that they dampt the *British* fire, which, a few months before, had threatened destruction to the navigation of *France*, and made the ministry so cool, that they seemed unconcerned what became of the important tenures of their master's crown in the *Mediterranean*.

FOR, whether by their emissaries, or by artful devices, the nation was alarmed with frequent reports of an intended descent upon *England*, which pretence was heightened in proportion to the acceleration of the real expedition determined against *Minorca*.

ABOUT this time, *Great Britain* rang with the armaments making by the *French* on the coast of *Britany*. Advices to Lord *Holderness* brought an account of twelve millions being applied to

Consul *Cabanis* gives this armament another turn: he acknowledges that there was an order at *Toulon* to arm seventeen men of war, but adds, that order had been changed; and the arming no more than twelve ships of the line, was, *without doubt*, owing to the bad condition they found their ships in, and their want of artillery, which was not to be bought at *Genoa*. See his letter dated *Sept. 15th*, received *Oct. 4th*.

the service of the marine of the *Brest* department; of orders for putting the coast of *Britany* and *Belle-isle* in a good posture of defence; of a number of vessels of different sizes ordered to *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, and *Boulogne*; of twenty-four ships at *Bourdeaux* to be victualled for the transportation of troops, and of the arrival of *Buckley's*, *Salley's*, and *Oglevie's* regiment at or near *Boulogne*: *Keith's* regiment at *Graveline*, and the *Royal Scotch* at *St. Omer's*, under orders to be at *Calais* on the third of *October*.

LETTERS of the 13th of *September* were more particular. They pretend to give information of the ° *Pretender's* being then at *Paris*, and of an embarkation on the coast of *Britany* for *Scotland*. They mention the taking of the *Blandford* man of war: and the return of *Du Guay's* squadron from *Cadix* on the third of this month: they give a list of the eight following ships.

° See advices in Lord *Holdernes's* office, dated *Aug. 21*, received *Sept. 6th* and *10th*.

° A vessel arrived in twenty-four days from *Louisbourg* with advice, that *M. de Mothe* had taken an *English* man of war of 70 guns, and a frigate: that the *French* troops were well at *Louisbourg*; and that their squadron only waited for a strong gale to disperse the *English*, that they might return to *Europe*. Other letters of the 16th mention a report of the *Pretender's* arrival at *Paris* on the 24th of *August*: but conclude with saying, that this report wanted confirmation.

<i>Soleil Royal</i> , of	80 guns.
<i>Courageux</i> ,	70
<i>Bienfaisant</i> ,	64
<i>Protée</i> ,	64
<i>Superbe</i> ,	70
<i>Halcion</i> ,	56
<i>Amphion</i> ,	50
<i>Arc en Ciel</i> ,	50

ordered to be equipped with all expedition for sea; besides eight more of the line equipping at *Rochefort*, and the *St. Michael*, then careening; and declare that they were raising soldiers, and sailors, every where: that thirty-four vessels were stopt at *Dunkirk*, *Graveline*, and *Calais*, to serve in case of need, and that at *St. Omers* they were busy in making fascines and pickets <sup>p</sup>.

ADVICES dated *Sept. 19th*, confirmed the report of an embarkation intended for *Scotland*; and related a prohibition laid upon sailors from navigating; an order for the *Brest* squadron to continue in the road, and for laying an embargo

<sup>p</sup> *Sept. 10th*. It was given out, says my Lord *Holdernes's* correspondent, that an embarkation would be made at *Boulogne*, *Calais*, and *Dunkirk*; because it is said the ships, which were to return from the islands, could not pass, being prevented by the *English*: and they endeavour to make it believed as if they had a mind to make a descent in *Scotland*, to give a diversion to the *English*, that they may, by that means, have a way open to send succours to the (*West*) *Indies*. In the mean time, the garrison at *Boulogne* has orders to keep itself in readiness.



on all shipping; and, informed the ministry that the *French* were pressing forward the works at *Dunkirk*.

“ THE chain at *Dunkirk* was laid but once  
 “ in the evening of the 12th of *September*.  
 “ The next day an order was affixed at the port,  
 “ permitting foreign vessels to go in and out of  
 “ the harbour freely, but forbidding *French*  
 “ vessels to go out.

Garrison at <i>Dunkirk</i> ,	8 battalions.
<i>Bery St. Winnox</i> ,	2 ditto.
<i>Graveline</i> ,	2 ditto.
<i>Calais</i> ,	4 ditto.
Companies of marines,	2
<i>Boulogne</i> ,	4
<i>Montrevil</i> ,	1

“ *N. B.* THE sixteen battalions and eighteen  
 “ squadrons, which came from the camp  
 “ at *Barlemont*, are cantoned, waiting for  
 “ the assignment of their winter quarters<sup>1</sup>.”

HOWEVER, there could be nothing so terrible in all these appearances as to engage the whole attention of the *British* ministry, and our chief strength at sea to wait upon their motions: For other letters on the *thirtieth* of the same month informed, that though all the grenadiers in the *Flemish* garrisons had orders to be ready to

<sup>1</sup> See advices in Lord *Heldernefs*'s office, dated *Sept.* 27th, 1755.

march,

march, and the troops at *Dunkirk* were still encamped, the infantry had begun their march into winter quarters, and the cavalry were gone for *Britany*, *Franche-comte*, and *Burgundy*.

A NATURAL disposition for covering their own coasts against a descent from *Britain*: but very improper to be interpreted a disposition for invading an island; whose bulwarks are the ocean, and whose cities and towns are without walls and fortifications. Had the *French* ever intended to invade us, they would have kept their infantry on the coast, and not their cavalry.

I SHALL conclude the intelligence of this month with another letter in Lord *Holdernefs's* office, which relates the order from the *French* court to release the *Blandford* man of war: as also an account that the officers belonging to the *Toulon* fleet, and were serving on board *Du Guay's* were commanded to repair with all expedition to their department. "Whence, says this correspondent, "some conclude that M. "*Du Guay's* will be laid up, and that some of "those ships will be joined to the eight ordered "to be equipped at *Brest*."

THIS is a true state of the *French* armaments both by sea and land till the end of *September* 1755. By which it appears without any disguise, that a considerable squadron was fitting

out with great diligence at *Toulon*; that they had already 6000 sailors, and hourly expected 4000 more: that an army was actually ready to embark on board transports to be conveyed by this squadron, victualled *only* for *two months*: and that every rational measure was taken by the *French* court to expedite and support this equipment in the *Mediterranean*: but that the only appearance of hostilities in the northern provinces of *France* amounted to no more than the return of *Du Guay's* squadron to *Brest*; where it was laid up: a report that the Pretender was arrived at *Paris*, which was not credited even by those who thought it their duty to transmit all the intelligence they could scrape together: a talk of an invasion of *England* or *Scotland*, which was grounded upon the trifling circumstances of soldiers, &c. drawn down to cover their own shore from a surprize: of a few vessels collected at *Havre*, *Dieppe*, *Bourdeaux*, &c. without considering the situation of *France*, which now was very different from that in 1745: and a squadron of eight ships ordered to be equipped at *Brest*, and of eight more at *Rochfort*. Yet our ministry, as if they had forgot, or were resolved to sacrifice the important fortresses of *Gibraltar* or *Mahon*, and the *British* trade and navigation through the *Streights*, took not the least step towards securing them from the apparent insult and ruin, to which they were exposed from the armaments at *Toulon*. They did not so much as dispatch a soldier or

an officer to strengthen their garrisons, nor a sloop of war to protect their trade. Their whole attention being engaged to frustrate the discredited advices of a descent on this island; as will more fully appear from the following lists, which will at one view exhibit all his Majesty's ships of war, or squadrons of such ships as were equipped and made ready for the sea, from the first day of *August* 1755, to the first day of *October* 1755, and of such of the ships therein named, as were ordered to be formed into or to reinforce particular squadrons within the said term of time.

*Admiralty-Office, March 19, 1757.*

A LIST of all his Majesty's ships of war, or squadrons of such ships as were equipped and made ready for sea, from the first day of *August* 1755, to the 30th day of *April*, 1756.

PREPARED in pursuance of an address of the honourable house of commons to his Majesty, dated 8th *February*, 1757.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
2	<i>Remillies,</i>	90	750	These ships were at home on the 1st <i>Aug.</i> 1755, and in all respects fit for the sea, except the want of men; which must
3	<i>Vanguard,</i>	70	520	
3	<i>Effex,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>P. Frederick,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Bedford,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Trident,</i>	64	500	
				4 <i>Eagle,</i>

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.	
4	<i>Eagle,</i>	60	400	either proceed from neglect of those, whose business it was to ship them, or to the great hardships, to which seamen in his Majesty's service are exposed. See <i>Monitor</i> N°.xcviii.	
4	<i>Warwick,</i>	60	400		
4	<i>Windsor,</i>	60	400		
4	<i>Falmouth,</i>	50	350		
4	<i>Antelope,</i>	50	300		
4	<i>Winchester,</i>	50	300		
4	<i>Greenwich,</i>	50	300	These ships and sloops were at home the 1st of <i>Aug.</i> 1755, and in all respects fit for the sea, except want of men.	
6	<i>Gibraltar,</i>	24	160		
6	<i>Centaur,</i>	24	160		
6	<i>Rye,</i>	24	160		
6	<i>Greyhound,</i>	24	160		
6	<i>Blandford,</i>	24	160		
		car.	fw.		
fl.	<i>Raven,</i>	10	14	100	
fl.	<i>Otter,</i>	10	14	80	
fl.	<i>Wasp,</i>	8	10	70	
5	<i>Humber,</i>	44	280	5th <i>August</i> 1755.	
fl.	<i>Dispatch,</i>	10	14	100	6th.
fl.	<i>Hazard,</i>	8	10	70	6th.
5	<i>Roebuck,</i>	44	220	7th.	
6	<i>Sheerness,</i>	24	160	17th.	
3	<i>Revenge,</i>	70	480	20th.	
4	<i>Bristol,</i>	50	300	20th.	
4	<i>P. Louisa,</i>	60	400	22d.	
4	<i>Oxford,</i>	50	300	27th.	
3	<i>Hamptoncourt,</i>	70	480	28th.	
4	<i>Isis,</i>	50	350	28th.	
4	<i>P. Mary,</i>	60	400	29th.	
6	<i>Lime,</i>	24	160	30th.	
fl.	<i>Wasp,</i>	8	10	70	30th.

rate. ships names. guns. men. when made ready for sea.

5	<i>Ambuscade,</i>	44	250	3d	<i>September</i>	1755.
fl.	<i>Wolf,</i>	8	10	70	4th.	
4	<i>Portland,</i>	50	300	5th.		
6	<i>Experiment,</i>	24	140	5th.		
6	<i>Rye,</i>	24	160	6th.		
fl.	<i>Swan,</i>	10	14	100	6th.	
3	<i>Stirlingcastle,</i>	70	480	7th.		
fl.	<i>Otter,</i>	10	14	80	9th.	
fl.	<i>Fly,</i>	8	12	70	10th.	
fl.	<i>Ranger,</i>	8	10	70	12th.	
6	<i>Seaborse,</i>	24	160	14th.		
6	<i>Queenborough,</i>	24	160	23d.		
3	<i>Trident,</i>	64	500	24th.		
4	<i>Tilbury,</i>	60	400	24th.		
fl.	<i>Swift,</i>	8	10	70	24th.	
fl.	<i>Savage,</i>	8	10	76	27th.	
6	<i>Greybound,</i>	24	160	28th.		
fl.	<i>Peregrine,</i>	12	12	100	28th.	
fl.	<i>Dispatch,</i>	10	14	100	28th.	

A LIST of such of the ships named in the foregoing list as were ordered to be formed into, or to reinforce particular squadrons between the 1st of *August* 1755, and 30th of *April* 1756.

rate. ships names. guns. men. destination.

3	<i>Vanguard,</i>	70	520	} Ordered 6th <i>Aug.</i> 1755 to reinforce the western squadron, under the command of Sir <i>Edward</i> <i>Hawke.</i>
3	<i>Essex,</i>	70	480	
fl.	<i>Raven,</i>	10	14	

4 *Green-*

rate.	ships	names.	guns.	men.	destination.
					<i>Thomas Faulkland</i> , Esq;
					was ordered 6th <i>Aug.</i>
4	<i>Greenwich</i> ,	50	300	} 1755 to proceed with these ships to the Leeward islands, to relieve Capt. <i>Pye</i> in the command of his Majesty's ships in those parts.	
4	<i>Warwick</i> ,	60	400		
4	<i>Winchester</i> ,	50	300		
					{ Ordered 12 <i>Aug.</i> 1755 to be employed as the <i>Downs</i> squadron under the command of Vice Admiral <i>Smith</i> .
2	<i>Ramillies</i> ,	90	750	} <i>N. B.</i> This squadron afterwards underwent many and frequent changes and augmentations, as will appear by the copies of the sailing orders to ships equipp'd and made ready for the sea during this period of time, as also by monthly lists.	
4	<i>Falmouth</i> ,	50	350		
4	<i>Antelope</i> ,	50	300		
5	<i>Romney</i> ,	44	280		
6	<i>Gibraltar</i> ,	24	160		
6	<i>Centaur</i> ,	24	160		
6	<i>Greyhound</i> ,	24	160		
fl.	<i>Wolf</i> ,	8	10		70
fl.	<i>Granado</i> ,	10	14		100
fl.	<i>Cruiser</i> ,	8	10		70
					{ Lord <i>Anson</i> was ordered
4	<i>Windsor</i> ,	60	400	} <i>Aug.</i> 20 1755, to proceed to <i>Helvoetsluys</i> with these ships and yachts, to attend the King on his return to his <i>British</i> dominions.	
4	<i>Falmouth</i> ,	50	350		
5	<i>Romney</i> ,	44	280		
6	<i>Greyhound</i> ,	24	160		
6	<i>Centaur</i> ,	24	160		
fl.	<i>Wasp</i> ,	8	10		70
fl.	<i>Wolf</i> ,	8	10		70
					4 <i>P. Mary</i> ,

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	destination.
4	<i>P. Mary,</i>	60	400	Ordered 27 <i>Aug.</i> 1755 to reinforce the squad- ron at <i>Jamaica.</i>
3	<i>Bedford,</i>	70	480	
4	<i>P. Louisa,</i>	60	400	Ordered 27 <i>Aug.</i> 1755 to convoy the trade to the <i>Mediterranean,</i> the <i>Princess Louisa</i> and <i>Portland</i> to remain there to reinforce the squad- ron under Capt. <i>Edg-</i> <i>combe,</i> and the others to return to <i>England</i> with the homeward bound trade.
4	<i>Portland,</i>	50	300	
4	<i>Bristol,</i>	50	300	
2	<i>Ramillies,</i>	90	750	
3	<i>Orford,</i>	75	520	Ordered 26th <i>Sept.</i> 1755 to proceed to the westward under com- mand of Vice Admiral <i>Byng.</i>  <i>N. B.</i> He did not sail till Oct. 14.
3	<i>P. Frederick,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Hamptoncourt</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Monmouth,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Trident,</i>	64	500	
3	<i>York,</i>	60	420	
3	<i>Kingston,</i>	60	400	
3	<i>Windsor,</i>	60	400	
3	<i>Eagle,</i>	60	400	
4	<i>Rochester,</i>	50	350	
4	<i>Colchester,</i>	50	300	
6	<i>Gibraltar,</i>	24	160	
6	<i>Sheerness,</i>	24	160	
fl.	<i>Swan,</i>	10	14	
fl.	<i>Savage,</i>	8	10	70



THE advices in the month of *October* from the *southern* provinces daily confirmed the *Toulon* equipment, and discovered their destination.

MR. *Villetes*, by letter of the fifth of *October*<sup>1</sup>, writes, that the reports, mentioned in his last, concerning the Squadron fitting out at *Toulon*, had been, within a few days, confirmed to him by several creditable accounts; which he enclosed to the Secretary of state.

By other dispatches of the 13th, the same minister advises, that a man of war lately built had been launched the week before at *Toulon*; and that fresh orders had been issued for *increasing* the number of *carpenters, caulkers, &c.* to be employed in the building of others on the stocks, and accelerating the equipment of the *twelve*, as already ordered to form a Squadron in that port.

AGAIN, on the *seventeenth*, he writes “ that  
 “ they did now work in earnest in the docks at  
 “ *Toulon*, and that the press for sailors was so  
 “ hot, that they took them out of every mer-  
 “ chantman as soon as arrived at *Marseilles*,  
 “ and conducted them to *Toulon*: yet, he adds,  
 “ I do not hear of any positive orders from  
 “ court, for the *entire armament* or *sailing* of a  
 “ Squadron: and *perhaps* these sailors are only

<sup>1</sup> Received on the 18th.

“ sent to get rigging in readiness.” He further says, in his letters of the 27th, “ that the five frigates, which had been fitting under a pretence to sail for *Algiers*, were not ready ; that money was wanting ; the workmen withdrew for want of pay, and the work in the docks went on slowly. However, he concludes, “ they are employed in sheathing their men of war, which denotes a long voyage : which circumstance, and the reports which prevail that four *West India* merchant ships had been hired to take in provisions, give room to think they are destined for *Canada* ; especially as *England* will not suspect such an expedition from the ports of the *Mediterranean*.” And yet this same gentleman, who seems either to be easily deceived, or very uncapable of reasoning upon maritime affairs ; by letters of the twenty-ninth of this month <sup>†</sup>, which were but two days after, gives information, that the *French* were using their utmost endeavours for equipping out the squadron at *Toulon* ; under a thorough conviction that they could expect very little service by letters of marque or reprisals, till they could get a number of men of war to sea : and that the squadron in that port might be ready to sail in the beginning of the next year.

THE intelligence by this channel positively confirms the equipment of the *Toulon* Squadron

<sup>\*</sup> See his letter dated *Oct.* 27th at *Bern*.

<sup>†</sup> Received *Nov.* 10th.

of *twelve* men of war, and clearly relates the expedition with which they were augmenting their navy in that port; and the heat of the press for seamen at *Marseilles*. It is true, this correspondent has pretended to reason upon these facts; and according to his usual way of judging, would insinuate that those preparations were rather intended for *Canada* than any service nearer home. But this conjecture was very ill grounded, and ought not to have been regarded; because the number of *land forces* expected to embark under the convoy of that squadron was too great for an *American* expedition; and the victualling of the men of war ordered for *two months only*; the bad condition of the ships, which rendered them unfit for a voyage across the *Atlantic Ocean*; and the contracts discovered to be making with the cornfactors, &c. in *Provence*, for the subsistence of those to be employed in this armament, evidently shewed that it must be intended against some appendage to the *British* crown in *Europe*, and within the *Streights*. His intelligence was good: but his application weak, inconsistent and confused. Yet this is the advice on which the ministry, which drew up the instructions for Admiral *Byng's* conduct in his last unhappy voyage, seem to have placed the greatest confidence: for, they *principally* directed him to watch the sailing of the *Toulon* squadron for *America*; and in case he, on his arrival at *Gibraltar*, should hear that it had passed out of the *Mediterranean*,

to

to send a detachment, under the command of Admiral *West*, after them to *North America*."

SHOULD there not have been more credit given, and greater attention paid, to the advices, sent to Lord *Holderness's* office, within the said distance of time, and inclosing a list of the officers appointed to command the *Toulon* squadron? which is seldom done in *France*, till the ships are almost fit to go to sea: and which in particular confirmed the account of its consisting of *twelve* ships", and of the chief command being given to M. *Galassioniere*.

THESE advices\* confirmed the account of sailors pressed within this month at *Marseilles*, and fixed them at 2000 for the squadron equipping at *Toulon*.

<sup>a</sup> In these instructions it is commanded — " Upon your arrival there [at *Gibraltar*] you are to enquire whether any *French* squadron is come through the *Streights*; — and, as it is probable, they may be designed for *North America*, — you are immediately to take the soldiers out of so many ships of your squadron, as, together with the ships at and going to *Halifax*, will make a force superior to the said *French* squadron, — and then detach them under the command of Rear Admiral *West*, directing him to make the best of his way off *Louisbourg*." See Admiral *Byng's* trial and defence published by authority.

<sup>w</sup> 1 of 80 guns, }  
 3 of 74 } Oct. 8.  
 7 of 64 }  
 1 of 50 }

\* Dated Oct. 10th.

It is true other dispatches <sup>y</sup> to the said office observe, that they did not seem to be in such a great hurry at *Toulon*, as they had been for some time past : but add, that they would be able, in a very short time, to have the first order for equipping *twelve* ships completed, so as they might be in a condition to act ; besides frigates : and that there would remain *eight* large ships in that port, which, in part, could be made fit for sailing in fifteen days or three weeks.

*October* 31st. THE intelligence brought to the same office was positive that a squadron of ten ships <sup>z</sup> in great forwardness, *viz.*

1 of 74

2 of 70

4 of 64

1 of 36

2 of 30

that all the officers and seamen were actually on board or embarking, and would be ready to sail from *Toulon* in eight or ten days ; that they were victualled only for *two months* : which this correspondent wisely observed, was an indication that this armament was not designed to pass the *Streights*. He also mentions the launching of a 64 gun ship ; the setting another on the

<sup>y</sup> Dated *Oct.* 14th.

<sup>z</sup> Another correspondent, *Oct.* 31st, writes “ It is assured “ that *twelve* ships were ready to sail from *Toulon* this “ month.”

stocks, and that four more from 70 to 74 would be finished before Spring.

LORD *Bristol* writes from *Turin*, that *Monf. de Galassioniere* was appointed to command the twelve ships now fitting out at *Toulon*<sup>a</sup>. That the naval preparations<sup>b</sup> at *Toulon*, were carried on with expedition, and that there were orders arrived for equipping four more ships of the line in that port. But adds, "by the best accounts I can receive, no body can guess where the *French* will find artillery or sailors for this "armament:" and concludes with a report, that the *French* had purchased nine large ships in *Sweden*, on condition that the *Swedes* should man them.

THE advices to the *Admiralty* this month concur in the accounts of the *French* activity in the port of *Toulon*. For though, on the 15th, letters from *Marseilles*<sup>c</sup> write that they worked but slowly on the squadron at *Toulon*; that seven only had got masts up, and that there were no orders given for heaving them down; yet others of the same date from *Gibraltar*<sup>d</sup> shew, that

<sup>a</sup> Dated *Oct.* 4th, received the 18th.

<sup>b</sup> Dated *Oct.* 18th, received *Nov.* 5th.

<sup>c</sup> Received *Nov.* 6th.

<sup>d</sup> From Capt. *Edgcombe* of the *Deptford*, received *Nov.* 21st. The Captain wrote, That in consideration of the intelligence of a *French* squadron of twelve ships and four frigates ready to sail from *Toulon*, the governor had embarked two serjeants, three corporals, and forty private men to go with him to *Mahon*.

they were convinced of the reality of the *French* preparations at *Toulon*. And that they believed their intention was to attack either *Gibraltar* or *Mabon*.

CONSUL *Dicks*, by letters of the 27th<sup>c</sup>, mentions the sailing of five large ships on the 23d from *Toulon*. And,

CAPTAIN *Scroope* of the *Dolphin*, by dispatches of the same date<sup>c</sup>, from *Villa-franca*, inclosed the following piece of intelligence in *French*; “ *Ordres d’armer autre 12 vaisseaux de ligne, 5 frigates, il parolt qu’on travaille avec beaucoup de diligence, y ayant 6000 employer.*”

IT appears with great perspicuity from these advices, that the *French* observed an exact uniformity of conduct in their ports of the *Mediterranean*; sometimes in a hurry; at other times shewing, by way of feint, a slackness in their armament, or a distant intention; but never losing sight of their real object, and making as much dispatch, as the nature of their expedition and the season of the year would now permit. In which they discovered great policy and oeconomy; confounding our intelligence, and expending no more of the public money than was necessary, till the time of action would discover their real design.

<sup>c</sup> Received on the 12th of *November*.

IN the northern provinces they took care to keep up the report and appearance of an embarkation.

By the papers in Lord *Holdernefs's* office, it appears there was early intelligence <sup>f</sup> of the arrival of the *l'Entrepenant*, *Leopard*, *l'Illustre*, and *l'Opiniatre*, four ships of M. de *Bois de la Mothe's* squadron from *Louisbourg*; that M. de *Salvert* was left at *Louisbourg* purely to amuse the *English*; and that these, who were returned, had given Admiral *Boscawen* the slip, by venturing through the mountainous sea in the *Streights of Belle-isle*.

LETTERS of the same date <sup>f</sup> informed that the *l'Vielle*, *Inflexible*, and *Aigle* were returned to *Rochfort* from *Cadix*, that the

<i>Le Juste,</i>	of 70 guns
<i>Le Prudent,</i>	66
<i>Le Capricieux,</i>	64
<i>Le Hardi,</i>	64

were ordered to be equipped in the same port; and also brought a list of a new squadron equipping at *Brest*, viz.

<i>Le Soleil Royal,</i>	of 80 guns.
<i>Courageux,</i>	74
<i>Superbe,</i>	70
<i>Beaufaisant,</i>	64
<i>Prothée,</i>	64
<i>Alcion,</i>	56
<i>Arc en Ciel,</i>	50
<i>Amphion,</i>	50

<sup>f</sup> Dated Oct. 8.



with this observation, “ that, except the whole  
 “ or part of *M. du Guay's* squadron should be  
 “ laid up, this *new* squadron would want both  
 “ guns and sailors.”

Two days after it was advised that all the ships of war, which had served as transports to *Louisbourg*, and were returned to *Brest* were ordered to be laid up: that there were only five men of war in the road; and that although four were ordered immediately under the command of *M. Perrier*, and four others to be equipped for sea, *they did not make any great dispatch*, as if they were in haste.

THE same intelligence brought a list of the following ships in a condition to put to sea from *Brest*,

<i>Le Zodicque</i> , of	74 guns.
<i>Minotaure</i> ,	74
<i>Diademe</i> ,	74
<i>Celebre</i> ,	64
<i>Belliqueux</i> ,	64
<i>Robuste</i> ,	64
<i>Solitaire</i> ,	64

observed that they were building with much expedition, but that there was great want of materials from abroad to complete their orders: It was also remarked that a person had been to sound the harbour and road of *Dunkirk*, as it was supposed, with a design to send some men of war to that port.

MY Lord *Holderness* also received the following intelligence from *Paris*, on the 31st of *October*, that though several ships were hired by the government, at *Brest*, *Boulogne*, *Calais*, and *Dunkirk*, to enforce the report of an embarkation, there was yet no appearance of any such measure. And by another channel of the same date, the advices agree to discredit an embarkation at those ports. “ Armaments at *Brest* and *Rochfort*, say they, are carried on with vigour: there is money enough; a million per month being appointed for each port; but that alone is not sufficient to fit ships for service: and though there are strong reports of a design to make a *descent* in *England*, and *Embarkations* on the coast of *Normandy*, there are yet no dispositions for it.”

INDEED letters from *Dunkirk* and other places along the coast, dated *Oct.* 21, and received on the 31st, mention reports of embarkations to be made in *February*, and that these reports were industriously propagated; the *French* ministry being desirous to create a belief of their intention to make a descent in *Great Britain* or *Ireland*, by way of feint, about the time, when they really concerted the conquest of *Minorca*.

HENCE we may account for the intelligence picked up by Vice Admiral *Smith* from Captain

*Vincent* of the *Greyhound*, who informed <sup>e</sup> the *Admiralty* that there were one hundred and twenty-nine vessels at *Dunkirk*, and that fifty empty vessels had been detained by order of the government: and for other <sup>h</sup> advices to the said office, as “ that at least *one hundred thousand* “ troops were in motion, and only waited for “ transports for *them* [what, 100,000 men! “ where could they find vessels?] to embark “ for *Great Britain* or *Ireland*; and <sup>i</sup> that they “ were collecting transports at *Calais*, where “ were eleven topsail vessels, and twenty-six one “ mast vessels; and at *Boulogne* where were “ twenty-two fail of brigs, snows, and sloops <sup>k</sup>.

*MR. Barnham* <sup>l</sup> writes from *Dover* in his panic stile, “ I mentioned some time ago, that “ orders were given by the *French* to collect a “ number of vessels from *Dieppe, Havre, &c.* “ to rendezvous at *Calais* and other ports in that “ neighbourhood. What their real design for “ so doing at that time, I hinted was only to “ amuse. But I cannot help *thinking* now, from “ the number of vessels, that have been brought “ into our ports, and are daily taken, bound to

<sup>e</sup> Letter to the *Admiralty* dated *October* the 20th, received on the 21st of *October*.

<sup>h</sup> Dated *Oct.* 20th, received 31st from a *Dutch* skipper.

<sup>i</sup> Dated *Oct.* 22d, received on the 25th.

<sup>k</sup> Does this number of vessels appear any ways adequate to the transportation of 100,000 troops, as above?

<sup>l</sup> *Oct.* 7th.

“ *Calais, &c.* but that they have *some scheme*  
“ in agitation.”

“ WITHIN these few days past, I am in-  
“ formed from *Calais*, that above ten sail are  
“ arrived there in ballast from *Rowen*, which  
“ draw but little water, and some of them two  
“ hundred tons : and it is now no longer a secret  
“ that these vessels are actually in the *French*  
“ King’s pay.”

BUT the most penetrating intelligence, re-  
ceived *October* the 20th, in Lord *Holdernefs*’s  
office, ought to have rectified all these vague  
suppositions : “ No court, says that correspon-  
“ dent, was ever in a more cruel situation than  
“ that of *France*. They have been led into a  
“ war by the repeated assurances given them by  
“ the Duke of *Mirepoix*, that however angry the  
“ [*English*] nation was, the King and his ministry  
“ would not enter into a war. As this was credited  
“ by the *French* council in general, they took  
“ their measures in consequence ; and were never  
“ more surprized than when the news came of  
“ our taking the two *French* ships in *America*.”

IT is certain the *French* King and his ministry  
are greatly incensed at present. An invasion of  
*Ireland* has been proposed, and to risque sending  
troops into *Scotland* at the same time. But on  
examination, many difficulties have arisen.  
However this is not laid aside : but it is to be  
believed.

believed some attempt of that kind will be made: if *England* rejects the last terms, this crown will be obliged to make by the distress they are in, every ship in *France* will be fitted out: and the court of *England* may be assured, that if a peace be not made, *some stroke* of great consequence will be struck, to indemnify the *French* merchants for the loss of their ships.

AT this time there was a list handed about which greatly magnified the strength of the *French* navy, *viz.*

At <i>Brest</i> ships of the line	24
frigates, &c.	21
At <i>Rochfort</i> ships of the line	10
frigates, &c.	11
At <i>Toulon</i> ships of the line	18
frigates, &c.	13
Ships building at <i>Toulon</i>	5
At <i>Brest</i>	7

whence it was immediately propagated that <sup>m</sup> M. *Machault* had engaged to the *French* King, to put sixty two ships of the line to sea in the next spring, besides frigates.

WHAT politician could avoid forming a precise judgment from the premises, that some stroke of *great consequence* would be struck, on the part of *France*. That it could not be expected by a *new* embarkation for *America*, where their

<sup>m</sup> See advices in Lord *Holderness's* office, received Oct. 31st 1755.

force was already greatly superior to ours, and which could not be undertaken with bad ships, and scarcity of artillery, men, and provisions: nor by invading *Britain* or *Ireland*, for which they had neither transports for such an undertaking, nor were making other dispositions in the northern provinces, that could induce us to give credit to such reports; for the motions and disposition, as well as the extraordinary number of their troops, more naturally explained their intention to prepare against any attempt, which might be made on their own coast, and to draw off the attention of the *English* from the *Mediterranean*, than to encounter the difficulties, which, upon examination, were found to discourage an invasion of these kingdoms. But that it was to be guarded against in the *Mediterranean*. For, all our intelligence agreed in these facts, “ that a considerable squadron was *now* in great forwardness to sail with an army under its convoy, victualled only for two months: that though strong insinuations were propagated of an intention to invade *Great Britain* or *Ireland*, there were yet no dispositions for it: and that the armaments carried on at *Brest*, *Rochfort*, &c. were neither so forward, nor of that force, as to require the detention of the greatest part of the *British* fleet to watch their motions.” Yet from the following *authentic lists*” the reader

<sup>n</sup> Prepared in pursuance of an address to the H. of C. to his M——y, dated *Feb. 8th, 1757.*

will

will be enabled to judge, whether his Majesty's navy was employed, as it ought to have been, to prevent the blow, which *France* was preparing to strike in the *Mediterranean*.

A LIST of all his Majesty's *ships of war*, or *Squadrons* of such ships as were equipped and made ready for sea, within the month of *October* 1755.

rate.	ships	names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
fl.	Raven,	8	10	70	1st <i>October</i> 1755.
4	Hampshire,	50	300	4th.	
4	Rochester,	50	350	5th.	
4	Colchester,	50	300	7th.	
4	Eagle,	60	400	8th.	
4	Kingston,	60	400	8th.	
6	Sheerness,	24	160	8th.	
6	Lime,	24	160	8th.	
5	Romney,	44	280	9th.	
fl.	Hazard,	8	10	70	10th.
3	Monmouth,	70	480	11th.	
6	Centaur,	24	160	11th.	
5	Chesterfield,	44	250	15th.	
4	Dreadnought,	60	450	16th.	
4	York,	60	420	17th.	
5	P. Edward,	44	250	17th.	
3	Lancaster,	66	520	21st.	
fl.	Happy,	8	10	70	21st.
3	Swiftsure,	70	520	22d.	
3	Elizabeth,	70	480	25th.	
3	Essex,	70	480	26th.	

rate. ships names. guns. men. when made ready for sea.

3	<i>Weymouth,</i>	60	420	29th.	
4	<i>Antelope,</i>	50	300	29th.	
6	<i>Blandford,</i>	24	160	29th.	
fl.	<i>Swan,</i>	10	14	100	29th.
fl.	<i>Hound,</i>	10	14	100	29th.
3	<i>Buckingham,</i>	70	535	30th.	
3	<i>Orford,</i>	70	520	30th.	
3	<i>Ipswich,</i>	70	480	31st.	
fl.	<i>Fly,</i>	8	12	70	31st.

A LIST of such of the ships named in the foregoing list<sup>o</sup> as were ordered to be *formed* into, or to *reinforce* particular *squadrons* within the month of *October, 1755.*

rate. ships names. guns. men. destination.

3	<i>Revenge,</i>	70	480	} Ordered 15th <i>Oct.</i> 1755 to reinforce the western squadron, under the command of Vice Ad- miral <i>Byng</i> , who did not sail till the 14th of this month.
3	<i>Ipswich,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Buckingham,</i>	70	535	} Rear Admiral <i>West</i> or- dered 28 <i>Oct.</i> 1755 to proceed with these ships to reinforce the western squadron under Vice Admiral <i>Byng</i> .
3	<i>Orford,</i>	70	520	
4	<i>Weymouth,</i>	60	420	

<sup>o</sup> See the former part of this list in the month of *September*, page 58.



THE *monthly list* of the *Admiralty*, giving an abstract of the disposition of the ships, &c. in sea pay, for the month of *October* 1755.

	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>Plantations,</i>	{	4	9	3025
		5	3	780
		6	10	1380
		sloops	9	630
			<hr/>	<hr/>
		31	5815	
		<hr/>	<hr/>	
<i>Vice Admiral Boscawen,</i>	{	3	10	5615
		4	5	1940
		6	1	140
		sloop	1	80
			<hr/>	<hr/>
		17	7775	
		<hr/>	<hr/>	
<i>Mediterranean,</i>	{	4	1	280
		6	3	390
		sloop	1	80
			<hr/>	<hr/>
		5	750	
		<hr/>	<hr/>	
<i>East Indies,</i>	{	3	2	975
		4	2	660
		6	1	140
		sloop	1	90
			<hr/>	<hr/>
		6	1865	
		<hr/>	<hr/>	
			<i>Cruisers,</i>	

	rate.	ships.	men.
Cruisers,			
90 to 24 } To westward	2	1	770
16 } with Admiral	3	10	5020
2 floops, } <i>Byng.</i>	4	13	4690
50 to 24 } Under Vice	5	3	780
7 } Admiral	6	10	1540
6 floops, } <i>Smith.</i>	floops 23		1850
	arm. v. 3		240
	<u>63</u>		<u>14890</u>
Ready 17,	1	1	660
Fitting 15,	2	5	3320
	3	10	5055
	4	8	2940
At home,	5	5	1280
	6	3	480
	floops 3		300
	yatchs 6		280
	hof. sh. 3		101
	<u>44</u>		<u>14416</u>
General abstract,	1	1	660
	2	6	4090
	3	32	16665
	4	38	13535
	5	11	2840
	6	28	4070
	floops 38		3030
	arm. v. 3		240
	yatchs 6		280
	hof. sh. 3		101
	<u>166</u>		<u>45511</u>
			By

By which it will appear that our greatest force was kept *inactive*, or at most, to watch an uncertain destination of a few fishing boats, and unarmed vessels in the *French* ports on the *British* channel; and that our whole strength in the *Mediterranean* amounted to no more than one fourth rate, three sixth rates, and one sloop: which together carried 750 men. Was this doing *all* that was in the power of the ministry towards the preservation of *Minorca*!

THE advices received on the 4th of *November*, in Lord *Holderness's* office, gave an account that orders had been sent to *Toulon*, to equip *five frigates* with the utmost dispatch, besides the other <sup>p</sup> ships already fitting out; *seven* of which ships of the line and *four* frigates were completely equipped and ready for sailing <sup>q</sup> before the end of this month: and they worked so diligently on the last orders, that one of the five was put to sea before the sixteenth of the same month: "Though, says Lord *Bristol*, neither  
 " its service, nor the destination of the whole  
 " number is yet known: some imagining that  
 " they are commissioned to protect the mer-  
 " chant ships that trade to and from the *Levant*,  
 " or to defend the coasts from the insults of the  
 " *Algerines*; or to proceed to *Algiers*, to reclaim

<sup>p</sup> Twelve ships see advices to the same office, received *October 31st*.

<sup>q</sup> See advices in the said office of the 29th of *November*.

“ the *French* prisoners, and demand satisfaction  
 “ for insults ’.”

AGREEABLE to which, Consul *Dicks* writes<sup>s</sup> from *Leghorn*, he had received intelligence from *Toulon*, that five large ships of war were to sail on the 23d, as it was reported, to demand four ships detained in the port of *Algiers*.

MR. *Villettes*'s dispatches in this month diminished greatly the former apprehensions, which might have been raised by the armament at *Toulon*: he first writes<sup>t</sup>, “ that there had lately  
 “ arrived at that port two millions of livres, for  
 “ expediting the former orders to equip twelve  
 “ men of war of the line, and five frigates :”  
 and then adds, “ that there was a want of ma-  
 “ terials, and all manner of provisions : that part  
 “ of the workmen in the docks were discharged,  
 “ and more were discharging daily : that they  
 “ had been obliged to buy Callico for sails to the  
 “ amount of one hundred thousand livres : that  
 “ the fitting out of the five frigates went on  
 “ very slowly : and that they had entirely given  
 “ over, or at least deserted the armament of the  
 “ twelve ships of the line.

<sup>s</sup> See advices from Lord *Bristol* of *Nov.* 15th, received *Dec.* 4th; and *Nov.* 22d, received *Dec.* 13th.

<sup>t</sup> Without date, received by Sir *Thomas Robinson*, *Nov.* 18th.

<sup>r</sup> By letters of *Nov.* 3d.

ON the 8th<sup>u</sup>, he again insinuated his opinion of an intention to send supplies by the *Toulon* Squadron to *Canada*: “ For, says he, such a “ scheme being less liable to be suspected, and “ thereby more likely to escape the vigilance of “ our squadrons and cruising vessels in the ocean, “ seems to deserve attention.

AND though he was obliged to acknowledge on the 20th of the same month<sup>w</sup>, that there were still a great number of hands employed at *Toulon*, to complete the *twelve* ships, and that the five frigates were all ready for careening; he will not allow them to be in any hurry, but writes that they went on but very slowly in fitting them for sea.

IN which he was seconded by advices from Captain *Edgecombe* of the *Deptford*, dated *Villafranca*, Nov. 17th<sup>x</sup>, who having inclosed an account of thirteen ships of the line and eight frigates, carrying 1104 guns, then in the port of *Toulon*, writes, that the *French* had discontinued their naval armaments in that port, and that the Squadron therein mentioned could not be ready to sail before *February* or *March*.

<sup>u</sup> Received *Nov.* 28th.

<sup>w</sup> Received *Dec.* 4th.

<sup>x</sup> Received *Dec.* 6th.

YET, on the same day, by letters of the 21st of *November*, the Lords of the *Admiralty* were informed that, though the equipment of the twelve ships went on slowly, every thing was preparing to get them ready for service: and that in case of orders for sailing, they would be *soon* got to sea; though it was the general opinion, that they were not designed to sail before Spring.

THE positive facts in these advices, which required our greatest attention, were, that there was no want of money to carry into execution the orders for the *Toulon* equipment: that there was no scarcity of workmen: that five more frigates had been added to the former orders: that they worked so diligently on these ships, that *one* of the last five frigates was got to sea before the 15th of the month: that five large ships of war were ordered to sail on the 23d of the same month: that *seven* of the twelve ships of the line, and four frigates, were completely equipped, and ready for sailing before the end of the said month: and that they were all in such readiness as to be soon fitted for sailing, when commanded to sea: every other part of their intelligence being only confused conjectures, and, it may be artful reports, propagated on purpose to deceive our spies and agents abroad.

As for the intelligence concerning the equipments of the *French* nearer *Great Britain*, and their preparations for an invasion, it appears,

THAT, by advices received in Lord *Holderness's* office, on the 4th of *November*, one hundred marines were arrived at *Dunkirk*, and exercised: but that there was *not the least appearance* of an embarkation at that port.

THAT it was talked, <sup>y</sup> the Pretender had been at *Fontainbleau*, *incog.* that seven ships of war were gone into *Brest* road: that there were four battalions of the *Irish* brigade; and sixty ships belonging to different countries at *Boulogne*; that the garrisons of *Calais*, in which port were about thirty ships of the like sort, and of *Graveline*, were formed of the *Irish* brigade: but that there were *no more* troops in that neighbourhood; nor *any talk* of an embarkation, nor even of privateers; these seven men of war, if they should fail, being intended only to protect the commerce.

LETTERS of the same date relate, that all the ships at *Brest*, that had been out, were ordered to disarm and to be refitted: but that *M. de Conflans's* division, was in less forwardness than that to be commanded by *M. Perrier*. And yet other letters of the 22d of the same

<sup>y</sup> Letters received *Nov. 12th 1757.*

month,

month <sup>2</sup>, after having acknowledged the inactivity of the *French* ministry, add, that some attribute their conduct to a want of means to raise money; and that others were of opinion that the *French* made those delays in their marine equipments, only to blaze out at once with a fleet of *two hundred ships* to be collected between *Dunkirk* and *Brest*; that those transports were to be escorted by fifty sail of men of war in two squadrons in order to invade *England*, and that the invaders intended to march, as soon as disembarked, directly to the capital.

THIS intelligence was immediately followed with this further circumstance: That Marshal *Bellisle* had formed a project for invading *England* and *Hanover* at the same time: that there had been lately built two frigates at *Havre*; and that there were four frigates in *Brest* road intended only to protect the merchantmen: but that there did *not appear the least disposition* for an embarkation at *Dunkirk*, or in the *neighbouring ports*. Which was confirmed by <sup>a</sup> dispatches from Admiral *Smith*; who having given an account of *fifty ships* at *Dunkirk*, and *thirty-five* at *Calais*, assured their lordships that there

<sup>2</sup> In Lord *Holderness's* office, there was about the same time an account that the *French* had augmented their forces with 27,000 foot, 15,150 horse, 2560 dragoons, and 6000 marines.

<sup>a</sup> Of the 30th of *November*, received by the *Admiralty* on the 15th of *December*.



was *no movement* that indicated an embarkation of land forces.

THUS the terror of an invasion was founded upon no better authority than the trite accounts of the *Irish* brigade being quartered on the coast; a few merchantmen detained or laid up in *Dunkirk* and *Calais*; seven frigates lying under sailing orders in *Brest* road, for the protection of their mercantile navigation, and a gascoynade of a resolution to invade *England* with a fleet not in their power to send to sea, and at the same time to attack *Hanover*: whereas the best of our correspondents declared that there did *not appear the least disposition*, nor was there any talk of an embarkation<sup>b</sup>.

YET our ministry affected to be terrified with the certainty of an invasion; and paid no regard to the real armaments making at *Toulon*<sup>c</sup>; as will

<sup>b</sup> For, though different plans had been proposed, they had been all rejected; because, in the first place, it was impossible for them to collect a sufficient number of transports in one or two ports, as would be necessary: because the *Brest* fleet, was it in a condition to put to sea, could not pretend to convoy them; for should that fleet meet the *English*, either in going or returning, it would be risking the whole trade of *France*, and exposing both their fleet and forces to ruin. Therefore, their whole intention is to alarm and distress *England*; though, says the correspondent, I can't answer how far passion may carry them. See advices in Lord *Holderness's* office.

<sup>c</sup> Except we may account the order, in this month, for General *Stuart* to repair to his command in *Minorca*, the first appearance of an intention to put that island into a posture of defence; though he could not obtain a passage to *Mabon* till the 6th of *April* 1756, when he sailed with Admiral *Byng*.

more fully appear by the following account of the equipment made in *Great Britain*.

A LIST of all his Majesty's *ships of war*, or *Squadrons* of such ships as were equipped and made ready for sea, within the month of *November 1755*.

PREPARED in pursuance of an address of the honourable house of commons to his Majesty, dated 8th *February*, 1757.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
fl.	6 <i>Gibraltar</i> ,	24	160	2d <i>November 1755</i> .
4	<i>Medway</i> ,	60	430	3d.
2	<i>Prince</i> ,	90	750	4th.
2	<i>St. George</i> ,	90	750	5th.
fl.	<i>Peggy</i> ,	8	10	70 5th.
4	<i>Newcastle</i> ,	50	350	6th.
fl.	<i>Saltash</i> ,	10	14	100 9th.
fl	<i>Cruiser</i> ,	8	10	70 9th.
5	<i>Ambuscade</i> ,	44	250	11th.
6	<i>Experiment</i> ,	24	140	20th.
4	<i>Falmouth</i> ,	50	350	21st.
5	<i>Lynn</i> ,	44	250	21st.
fl.	<i>Swallow</i> ,	14	14	100 21st.
6	<i>Solebay</i> ,	24	160	22d.
3	<i>Nassau</i> ,	70	480	23d.
5	<i>Woolwich</i> ,	44	280	24th.
2	<i>P. George</i> ,	80	720	27th.
fl.	<i>Wolf</i> ,	8	10	70 30th.

A LIST of such of the ships named in the foregoing list as were ordered to be *formed* into, or to *reinforce* particular *squadrons* in the month of *November*, 1755.



rate.	ships	names.	guns.	men.	destination.
					{ Ordered 4th Nov. 1755
5	<i>Chesterfield</i> ,	44	250	}	to convoy trade to the <i>Mediterranean</i> , and re- inforce the squadron under Capt. <i>Edgecumbe</i> .
6	<i>Experiment</i> ,	24	140		
1.	<i>Raven</i> ,	10	14		

THE *monthly list* of the *Admiralty*, giving an abstract of the disposition of the ships, &c. in sea pay, for the month of *November* 1755.





	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>Plantations</i> ,	}	4	9	3045
		5	2	560
		6	10	1400
		sloops	8	560
		29	5565	
Vice Admiral <i>Boscarwen</i> ,	}	3	10	5015
		4	5	1940
		6	1	140
		sloop	1	80
		17	7775	
			<i>Medi-</i>	

	rate.	ships.	men.		
<i>Mediterranean,</i> <i>Deptford</i> 50 3 24	{	4	1	280	
		6	3	480	
		sloop	1	80	
		<hr/>		5	840
		<hr/>			<hr/>
<i>East Indies,</i>	{	3	2	975	
		4	2	660	
		6	1	140	
		sloop	1	90	
		<hr/>		6	1865
<hr/>			<hr/>		
8 ships } <i>Downs, Vice</i> 11 sloops } <i>Admiral Smith</i>	{	2	1	770	
		3	16	7995	
Cruisers, 22 90 to 50 } <i>under Vice</i> 3 24 } <i>Admiral</i> 1 sloop }	{	4	14	4990	
		5	3	780	
		6	11	1740	
		sloops	24	1990	
		arm. v.	3	240	
<hr/>		72	18505		
<hr/>			<hr/>		
<i>Refitting</i> 13, <i>Fitting</i> 17,	{	1	2	1510	
		2	6	4120	
		3	5	2730	
		4	9	3240	
		5	7	1750	
		6	3	480	
<i>At home,</i>	{	sloops	3	290	
		fire sh.	2	100	
		hof. sh.	3	101	
		yatches	5	210	
		<hr/>		45	14531
<hr/>			<hr/>		






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5



	rate.	ships.	men.
General abstract,	1	2	1510
	2	7	4890
	3	33	17315
	4	40	14155
	5	12	3090
	6	29	4380
	sloops	38	3090
	arm. v.	3	240
	fire sh.	2	100
	yatches	5	210
hof. sh.	3	100	
		<u>174</u>	<u>49081</u>

THE ships designed for the expedition against *Minorca*, being got as forward as needful for the season of the year, and the time appointed for carrying it into execution; you have seen in the accounts of the last month, that the *carpenters*, &c. who had been brought from all parts to work upon them, were (many of them) discharged. Why? because, as the Squadron was not to sail till *March*, it was needless to retain a number of useless hands, for three or four months to do the work, which could be finished in three or four weeks; every thing being already done, which required the assistance of such a number of hands: besides this discharge of the workmen produced another good effect: it carried the appearance of a *delay*, or an *alteration* in the measures of the court, in regard to the armament



ment at *Toulon*; and in consequence created a belief in the *British* agents and ministry, that they had nothing to fear from that quarter. For, thus ran the intelligence from several quarters in the course of the last month. Our correspondents, without considering the work that had been expedited by the diligence and numbers employed in the fitting out of the *twelve* men of war of the line, &c. very impolitically concluded that the discharge of the workmen was an indication of the equipment's being laid aside: and without attending to the season of the year, which did not require more expedition than was really necessary to get the squadron to sea within the time limited for its appointed service, they interpreted the oeconomy of the *French* ministry a *slowness* or want of resolution, men, or materials, to carry their first intention into execution.

THE same infatuation prevailed in the month of *December* in the advices from *Turin*. For Lord *Bristol* writes <sup>c</sup> that though the *five* frigates at *Toulon* were ready to put to sea; the armament of the *twelve* ships of the line in that harbour went on very *slowly*, and by all accounts must be *many months* before they could be in a condition to sail.

CONSUL *Cabanis* at *Nice* wrote <sup>d</sup> in the same strain. "The *five* frigates, *viz.* one of 50 guns,

<sup>c</sup> *December* 20th, Received *January* 21.

<sup>d</sup> *December* 22d, received *January* 21st.

“ one of 30 guns, and three of 24 guns at *Toulon*  
 “ are ready to sail : but, as to the *twelve* ships  
 “ of the line in commission, their equipment  
 “ goes on very *slowly*, and they will not be able  
 “ to get them ready *this winter*. He adds, that  
 “ they recruited their *land forces* with all ima-  
 “ ginable diligence.”

SUCH was the deception in *Italy*, in regard to the *French* armament at *Toulon*. However, Mr. *Villettes*, at *Bern*, seems to have been somewhat better advised. For, in his letter <sup>e</sup> to Mr. *Fox*, he first relates that the *five* frigates were ready to sail : that there was only one of them got into the road ; and that people could not tell what to think of the *slowness* with which they proceeded in the marine department of that port. Then he <sup>f</sup> adviseth that all the *five* frigates had <sup>g</sup> got into *Toulon* road, though it was not known when they should sail ; that the intendant of the marine at *Toulon* had taken a list of all the *West India* merchant ships in the port of *Marseilles*, specifying their burthen, strength and number of cannon ; and that he had ordered two of them to repair to *Toulon*.

LETTERS from the same correspondent of the 22d of *December* observed, that it was reported orders had arrived at *Toulon* for the frigates to sail ; but that their destination was kept a pro-

<sup>e</sup> *December* 6th, received the 20th ditto.

<sup>f</sup> *December* 13th, received on the 25th ditto.

<sup>g</sup> On or before the *first* day of *December*.

found secret: " though it is probable, continues he, " that they will go and join those near " armed at *Brest*; and, if the project for invading *England* is not laid aside, they will be " employed in favouring the passage and landing " of the land forces." Should not Mr. *Villettes* have first reasoned with himself upon the difficulty, and almost impossibility of such a weak force of *five* frigates of 50 to 24 guns, to get into *Brest*, which was, at that time, blocked up by a strong squadron of *British* men of war? he had more reason to keep to his former vague surmise of an intention to favour the *French* hostilities in *North America*. But it should seem, as if this gentleman was very happy in coinciding with the favourite schemes of those, whose endeavours were to perplex the *British* councils with the cry of an invasion.

HE afterwards informs the government, that orders had been published at *Marseilles*, by sound of trumpet, for all sailors to repair immediately to *Toulon*: that *four* of the frigates above-mentioned, were said to be ordered to convoy the *Algerine* galliot, lately taken, to *Algiers*; but that they had not received their last orders for sailing, and that it was very certain they had quite another destination<sup>h</sup>.

<sup>h</sup> By letters dated 27th *December*, received *January* 13th, inclosing advices of *December* 15th. *N. B.* He writes on the 29th of *December*, that the people were quite tired to hear the frigates were ready and did not sail: and that the *French*, by means of a *Portuguese* merchant, had bought 1200 pieces of cannon in *England*.

YET,

YET, even in the midst of this uncertainty, it plainly appears that the *Toulon* squadron of *twelve* ships of the line might be put to sea in the Spring : that, in the mean time, all diligence was used to recruit the land forces in *Provence*, and the neighbouring provinces : that measures were pursued for taking up ships for transports : and that a strict watch was kept to secure a sufficient number of sailors against the time of action.

AGREEABLE to these facts, the government received advice from Mr. *Banks*, consul at *Cartagena* in *Spain*, that by his intelligence from *Toulon*, the *French* fleet was ready, and only waited for orders to put to sea : that several battalions and squadrons were in motion toward the frontiers of *Catalonia*, and that most of the ports in *Provence* were crowded with *Polaccas*, *Settees*, *Tartans*, and other vessels, a great many of which were taken up in the government's service <sup>1</sup>.

LETTERS to the *Admiralty*, dated *Marseilles*, *December* 24th, expressly mention, that the *five* frigates were ready to put to sea ; and that the *twelve* ships of the line were under orders to be equipped with all expedition, and would be ready to sail in *three weeks*.

<sup>1</sup> See his letter of *December* 7th, received *February* 19th.

THUS

Thus every particular, but the positive destination of the *Toulon* Squadron, was known: and their intention to invade either *Gibraltar* or *Minorca*, was easily to be collected from their manner of *viſtualling*, number of troops, and variety of *ſmall veſſels* taken into pay for tranſports.

HOWEVER our miniſtry rather choſe to give credit to the advices of the tranſactions in the north of *France*. From whence Lord *Holderness* was informed<sup>k</sup> of great augmentations to the militia of *Normandy* and *Picardy*, which already conſiſted of twenty-two battalions each; and that nothing was talked of but a declaration of war, and a reſolution to fix the *Pretender* on the throne of *England* in the *March* following.

THIS intelligence was ſoon followed by an account of ſeventy or eighty thouſand land forces expected<sup>l</sup> to arrive, and to be cantoned in the towns and villages near *Dunkirk*, in order to take poſſeſſion of *Nieuport*, *Oſtend*, and other barriers, to favour a Squadron to be commanded by *M. Bart*, and appointed to ſail into thoſe ſeas<sup>m</sup>. But,

WHENCE was a Squadron to be expected ſufficient to face the *British* navy? It could not

<sup>k</sup> By letter dated *December* 9th, received the 13th ditto.

<sup>l</sup> *December* 5th.

<sup>m</sup> By letters dated *December* 12th, received the 15th ditto.

be from *Toulon* for reasons already assigned. It could not be from *Brest*, nor from *Rockfort*; because advices of the first of *December* to that same noble Lord expressly declare, that the squadron in those ports, under M. *Conflans*, went on *very slowly*: that the squadron under M. *Perrier*, consisted only of *five* ships of the line and *four* frigates, when completely equipped: that there was but *one* ship fitting at *Dunkirk*, and that there was *no other maritime* disposition in that or in its neighbouring ports.

WAS it to be collected from *Bayonne*, *Bordeaux*, *Nants*, *Rockelle*, and *Havre*, where it was reported there was a design to build frigates in private, or in the merchants docks. That was by far a too distant view: for had that scheme been adopted by the *French* ministry, it would have enabled the King's yards to build a number of capital ships, but not a sufficient number to cope with the *British* navy, or to favour the pretended invasion, within the compass of the year 1756. It is true the advices of the 9th of this month, related a design in *France* to fit out every ship that could be made capable to keep the seas; and to divide the whole into *two fleets*, one at *Toulon*, the other at *Brest*; to fall with force on the *British* squadrons, dispersed in small numbers; and, in the meantime, to make a powerful diversion by means of an invasion, for which purpose they had assembled already 50,000 troops from *Givet* to

the neighbouring port. But, the next day, this formidable gafoynade was knocked on the head by fresh assurances <sup>n</sup> that *France* had *no other views in all this than to gain time*: that there were *no dispositions* on the coast of the *British* channel for an *embarkation* <sup>o</sup>: that eight frigates had sailed from *Brest*, but were employed by way of convoy for their merchantmen: that the armament of the two squadrons went on so slowly, that *M. Perrier's* could not be got ready till *January* at soonest, and that of *M. Conflans* not till *May* <sup>p</sup>: and that there was nothing new on the 19th of *December* in the ports of *France*, except the arrival of some troops at *Dunkirk*.

OTHER intelligence in the same office, dated *December* the 4th and 13th, allow that there had been some proposals for an invasion, but they were rejected on account of the many difficulties, and the sacrificing so many troops; and conclude that all talk of that sort was only designed to *alarm* and *distress*; for, that after diligent search, no plan for invading *England* or *Ireland* could be found.

IN the whole course of this intelligence, which carries us to the conclusion of the year 1755, no one can presume to find any foundation for the *ministerial* panic, continually dreaming of,

<sup>n</sup> *December* 10th, in Lord *Holdernefs's* office.

<sup>o</sup> *December* 13th, in ditto.

<sup>p</sup> Letters of *December* 15th, in ditto.

and alarming the people with, the dread of an invasion. How then ought we to account for that passage in his Majesty's speech, where he informs his parliament, that "from various appearances and preparations there was reason to think there have been formed designs against his kingdoms and dominions;" except, as a certain noble Peer, many years at the head of the law, has taught us, we consider such speeches as the language of a ministry, rather than the sentiments of their Royal Master: and then it may create a suspicion that this invasion was a pure *ministerial bubble*, to raise a prodigious sum of money out of the fears of the people: and not to be hitherto resolved upon by the court of *France*.

Is it not also very extraordinary that there was not the least notice taken of the advices received concerning the armaments at *Toulon*, and the appearances and preparations making in that port and its neighbourhood, for invading and conquering *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*? Except we may suppose those two important places are included under the general name of *dominions*: which both houses of parliament, in their addresses, certainly understood to mean his Majesty's *Electoral and German dominions*<sup>1</sup>: besides

<sup>1</sup> HIS MAJESTY, on the 13th of *November* 1755, informs his parliament in these words: "I have confined my views and operations to hinder *France* from making new encroachments, or supporting those already made; to exert our right to a satisfaction for hostilities committed  
it



it will appear from the following, as well as foregoing lists, that his Majesty had not been advised to extend his *views and operations* to

“ in a time of profound peace, and to disappoint such designs, as, from various appearances and preparations, there is reason to think, have been formed against my kingdoms and dominions.”

*The House of Lords*, in their address on this speech, express themselves in these terms: “ We look upon ourselves as obliged by the strongest ties of duty, gratitude, and honour, to stand by and support your Majesty in all such wise and necessary measures and engagements, as your Majesty may have taken, in vindication of the rights of your crown; or to defeat any attempt, which may be made by *France*, in resentment of such measures: and to assist your Majesty in disappointing and repelling all such enterprizes as may be formed not only against your kingdoms, but also against *any other of your dominions*, although *not belonging to the crown of GREAT BRITAIN*, in case they should be attacked on account of the part which your Majesty has taken for maintaining the essential interest of your kingdoms.”

*The House of Commons*, in like manner, addressed his Majesty in these words: “ We beg leave to assure your Majesty, that your dutiful and faithful Commons will vigorously and cheerfully support your Majesty, in all such wise and necessary measures and engagements, as your Majesty may have taken, to vindicate the just rights and possessions of your crown, and to guard against any attempt which *France* may make, on account of your Majesty’s not having submitted to her unjustifiable encroachments; and that we think ourselves bound in justice and gratitude to assist your Majesty against insults and attacks, that may be made upon any of your Majesty’s dominions, though not belonging to the crown of *Great Britain*, in resentment of the part your Majesty has taken in a cause wherein the interests of this kingdom are immediately and so essentially concerned.”

disappoint the designs of *France* against the *British* dominions in the *Mediterranean*.

A LIST of all his Majesty's *ships of war*, or *Squadrons* of such ships as were equipped and made ready for sea, in the month of *December* 1755.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
fl.	<i>Speedwell</i> ,	8	10	70 1st <i>December</i> 1755.
3	<i>Newark</i> ,	80	620	4th.
6	<i>Unicorn</i> ,	24	160	5th.
fl.	<i>Peregrine</i> ,	12	12	100 6th.
5	<i>Gosport</i> ,	44	250	8th.
6	<i>Rye</i> ,	24	160	10th.
fl.	<i>Ferret</i> ,	10	14	100 12th.
fl.	<i>Savage</i> ,	8	10	70 12th.
fl.	<i>Granado</i> ,	10	14	100 13th.
fl.	<i>Wasp</i> ,	8	10	70 21st.
fl.	<i>Ranger</i> ,	8	10	70 24th.
fl.	<i>Scorpion</i> ,	10	14	80 25th.
6	<i>Squirrel</i> ,	24	160	28th.
4	<i>St. Albans</i> ,	60	420	30th.
4	<i>Dreadnought</i> ,	60	415	30th.
6	<i>Greyhound</i> ,	24	160	31st.

A LIST of such ships named in the foregoing list<sup>r</sup> as were ordered to be *formed* into, or to *reinforce* particular *squadrons* within the month of *December*, 1755.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	destination.
5	<i>Woolwich,</i>	44	280	Ordered 5th <i>Dec.</i> 1755 to reinforce the squadron at the <i>Leeward-Islands</i> <sup>o</sup> .

THE *monthly list* of the *Admiralty*, giving an abstract of the disposition of the ships, &c. in sea pay, for the month of *December* 1755.

	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>Plantations,</i>	{ 3	1	500	
	{ 4	10	3345	
	{ 5	2	560	
	{ 6	9	1260	
	{ floops 9		640	
		<hr/> 31	<hr/> 6305	
<i>Mediterranean,</i>				
<i>P. Louisa,</i> 60—2	50	{ 4	3	980
2 24		{ 6	2	320
		{ floop 1		80
			<hr/> 6	<hr/> 1380

<sup>r</sup> See the former parts of this list, p. 58 and 76,

<sup>o</sup> See page 59.

	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>East Indies,</i>	}	3	2	975
		4	2	660
		6	1	140
		sloop	1	90
			<hr/>	6
To Westward 8.				
<i>Downs, Vice } 9 ships</i> <i>Admiral Smith } 13 sloops</i>	}	3	7	3400
		4	7	2250
		5	7	1810
		6	9	1420
		sloops 23		1890
Cruisers and Convoys,		arm. v. 4	320	
		<hr/>	<hr/> 57	
			<hr/> 11090	
Ready	}	1	2	1510
		2	7	4890
		3	23	12440
		4	19	7335
		5	3	720
		6	8	1240
Refitting	4			
Fitting	41			
Harbour service	15			
	2			
At home,	}	sloops 3		300
		fire sh. 2		100
		yatches 5		210
		hof. sh. 3		101
			<hr/>	75

General

	rate.	ships.	men.
General abstract,	1	2	1510
	2	7	4890
	3	33	17315
	4	41	14570
	5	12	3090
	6	29	4380
	sloops	37	3000
	arm. v.	4	320
	fire sh.	2	100
	yatches	5	210
hof. sh.	3	101	
		<u>175</u>	<u>49486</u>

THE first advices 'in the new year (1756) relating to the armament at *Toulon*, received by Lord *Holdernefs*, relate, that they had got the *twelve* ships of the line, and *four* frigates into *Toulon* road: that they effected to make believe this squadron was intended to attempt to join that at *Brest*: but that the *small quantity of provisions* ordered for their use, made it more rational to suppose it was *not to pass through the Streights*: that they had launched a seventy gun ship lately, had one of 30 guns on the stocks, and were busy on four more large ships, which were to be finished with all expedition.

THIS intelligence was somewhat invalidated by letters of the 6th and the 12th of the same

' Of *January* 3d, 1756.

month, the former of which contradicted the sailing of the *Toulon* squadron, and in general terms declared that it could not be got ready to sail so soon as was pretended. They at last limited the time of its sailing to the month of *February*; and informed that the command of the expedition, for which it was equipping, had been given to the Duke of *Richelieu*<sup>u</sup>.

THE Earl of *Bristol* informs Mr. *Fox*<sup>v</sup>, that repeated orders had been sent to *Toulon* to *careen* and to *arm*, with the utmost expedition, five ships of the line to sail forthwith with five frigates already equipped. But that sailors were so scarce that they had pressed boys and old men, and hired not only artificers but servants to make up the complements of their crews. And on the 31st, which was received by the same packet, his Lordship further diminished the strength of the *Toulon* armaments, by observing that they went on *slowly*; and that the delay was occasioned by a want of money, artillery, and timber for building, &c. ships<sup>x</sup>.

<sup>u</sup> Who, as Lord *Bristol* wrote to Mr. *Fox* from *Turin*, was to receive forty battalions from the interior provinces of *France*. See his letter dated *January* 24th, received *February* 24th.

<sup>v</sup> From *Turin*, dated *January* 24th.

<sup>x</sup> Besides, says he, most of the manufacturers in the south provinces of *France* are at a stand, no ships venture out: trade is declining: merchants are breaking: no vent for goods which are perishing in their warchouses, &c.

BUT

BUT *twenty days* before this lame account arrived at the Secretary's office, Mr. Fox received certain informations<sup>y</sup> from Consul *Birtles*, "that after many orders and counter-orders for equipping the fleet at *Toulon*, a positive command was received by the Intendant to get *all* the ships, fit for the sea, ready as soon as possible: that *five frigates* were ready to sail: that the Dukes *Richelieu* and *Mirepoix* were nominated to command in *Provence*, and that it was whispered, they intended to make a descent from *Toulon* with a body of troops to surprize the island of *Minorca*: that no embargo had yet been laid to detain vessels for transports; but that the department of *Marseilles* had received orders to furnish 1500 seamen for the squadron, and that all other maritime places on that coast had directions to furnish a number of seamen proportionable to their trade." And then very judiciously and honestly observes, *that the orders and counter-orders which had been given from time to time about the Toulon fleet had been with a view to make the necessary preparations to carry the plan into execution with the greater secrecy.*

IN his advices of the 26th, the consul repeats his apprehensions of the *French* scheme of surprizing the island of *Minorca*; and further adds, "he had been told by some, who had *the best*

<sup>y</sup> Dated *Genoa*, *January 17th*, received *February 4th*.

"in-

“ intelligence from *France*, that, letters received  
 “ three days before, *sixty* battalions were ordered  
 “ to march into *Provence*, to be commanded by  
 “ the Duke de *Richelieu*: that between *sixty*  
 “ and seventy vessels had been embargoed for  
 “ transports: that they continued to send to  
 “ *Toulon* all sailors, as fast as they arrived in  
 “ other ports; and that the five frigates then in  
 “ the road were victualled for three months.”

EVEN Mr. *Villettes*, on *January* 19th writes,  
 “ It is *very certain* that orders have been re-  
 “ ceived at *Toulon* to fit out *twelve* ships of the  
 “ line, and to arm them; and that the two first  
 “ equipped were to join the *five* frigates, above-  
 “ mentioned.” He afterwards confesses that all  
 his intelligences confirmed the great diligence  
 used at *Marseilles*, and the other neighbouring  
 ports, for manning the *Toulon* Squadron<sup>2</sup>.

ON the 28th of *January* Mr. *Fox* received  
 from Lieutenant-General *Fowke* the following  
 list of the *French* maritime force; and his ac-  
 count of the *French* armament at *Toulon*.

<sup>2</sup> Dated *Bern*, *January* 31st, received by Mr. *Fox*,  
*February* 24th. Though, by his letters of the 8th of  
*January*, he assured Mr. *Fox* that the *same remissness and*  
*suspence*, which he had mentioned before, still subsisted with  
 regard to the *naval armaments* in the south of *France*, and  
 gave it as his opinion, that the late calamities, with which  
 the upper part of *Provence* had been afflicted lately, would  
 influence and slacken their preparations.



*Le Foudroyant*, for Admiral, 80 guns, *Guerrier*, *Redoubtable*, *Temeraire*, *Couronne*, *Lecture* of 74 guns.

*L'Achille*, *Lion*, *Valliant*, *Hercule*, *Constant*, *Triton*, of 64 guns; *Tier* of 50 guns.

*La Junon* of 50 guns; *Rose*, *Gracieux*, *Royalle*, *Minerve*, *Oiseau*, of 30 guns; *Nymphe*, of 26 guns; *Topaz*, of 24 guns.

Two fireships, four xebecs, four bombs, fourteen galleys, of which only four in condition.

One bark of 24 guns, having no masts.

*Le Ferme*, of 90 guns, fitted to serve as a fort in the middle of *Toulon* road.

*L'Ocean*, on the stocks, of 80 guns; *L'Orsee*, now launched, of 64 guns; *L'Oriflamme*, of 50 guns, at sea; *La Fumeme*, of 30 guns, on the stocks far advanced; two frigates of 30 guns, keels only, having no timber to proceed.

To sail by first orders,

12 ships of the line of <i>Toulon</i> ,	} commanded by
8 ditto, of <i>Brest</i> ,	

At *Brest* seven ships of war on stocks.

Number of guns at *Toulon* 1636 pieces  
of 18, 24, and 36 pounders.

For fortifications of town and port, 500

Remain for the marine,	1136
------------------------	------

Five frigates besides getting ready.

The

The general then continues and writes, "It appears they work with great diligence and dispatch, employing 6000 men: yet all commissions agree that they will not be able before *February* or *March*, to send out either the *twelve* men of war or *five* frigates, having no guns on board either one or the other." However he allows that the arsenal at *Toulon* was indifferently well furnished with stores, except wood; and that two Tartans had lately arrived with timber from the coasts of *Romagna* and the kingdom of *Naples*. He mentions a report of 4000 seamen to be furnished by the *Genoese*, but thinks it improbable: assures there has been a great want of money to pay the workmen; but that there had arrived at *Toulon* 500,000 *l.* and that the trading part of *Marseilles* were obliged to advance 40,000 *l.* weekly to keep them on: and concludes thus; "Sir, this is genuine, and truly the *real state* of affairs."

THE Lords of the *Admiralty* received also an account of the state of the *French* marine actually armed and arming on the 20th of *January* 1756, viz.

At <i>Brest</i> 2 of 80, 1 of 74, 2 of 70, 3 of 64,	} 24
3 of 50, 1 of 34, 8 of 30, 4 of 24, in all	
At <i>Rochfort</i> 2 of 74, 1 of 70, 3 of 64, 7 of 30,	13
At <i>Toulon</i> 1 of 80, 3 of 74, 7 of 64, 1 of 60,	} 18
4 of 30, 2 of 24, in all	
At <i>Havre</i> 2 of 32,	2
Total	<hr/> 57

Whereby it appears that the armament at *Toulon* was actually expediting to fall early in the Spring: that it was not intended to pass *the Straights*; that it was to convoy an army to make a descent, probably on *Minorca*; and that every method for manning the ships of war, and transporting the land forces, was daily put in execution, which indicated a sudden determination of the great stroke so long and so often threatened against some part of the *British* dominions.

IN the mean time, letters from the *Hague* to Lord *Holdernefs*, of the 2d of *January*<sup>a</sup>, brought fresh advices of an intended descent to be made early this year on *England*, or of an invasion of *Hanover*, by the *French*; and that, with this view, they were providing a great number of flat-bottomed boats.

THEY further said<sup>b</sup>, that the plan for invading *Great Britain* was proposed by M. *de Belleisle*, who offered to undertake the execution thereof; but that he had been violently opposed therein by M. *Seybelles*. The Marshal's plan was not to attack any of the powers on the Continent, and particularly to leave *Hanover* quiet: but at the same time to assemble *three* large armies on the frontiers of *Alsace*, *Flanders*, and *Languedoc*, in order to keep the powers in

<sup>a</sup> Received on the 6th.

<sup>b</sup> Dated *Hague*, *January* 20th received *February* 1.

*Europe* in awe and suspense. Then seriously to attempt an invasion of *Great Britain* or *Ireland*, or of both; by getting together as many vessels as possible in different ports, with every thing necessary for an embarkation. And he further advised the *French King*, not to send out any large squadrons of men of war, but only some light cruisers to cover the arrival and departure of their transports; to give notice of the motions of the *English*, and to carry supplies to their colonies; however at *Brest* he thought it necessary to have a *very large fleet* ready to give umbrage to the *English*, and to serve as occasion should require.

THIS was *Belleisle's* plan; which, our correspondent confessed was not to every body's taste: but notwithstanding, says he, it appears, as if some part of it was already adopted, by the motions of the *French* towards the frontiers on all sides, and particularly to the sea coast of the ocean, where *M. Belleisle* and the *Prince de Soubise* were beginning to make their circuit; being daily expected at *Dunkirk*, and from thence to proceed along the coast.

AT the same office there arrived advice <sup>c</sup> that 80,000 men were reported to be marching from the inland places towards the coast, and that they were to be quartered by brigades from *Dunkirk* to *Senlis*: also that *Perrier's* Squadron

<sup>c</sup> *January 3d*, at Lord *Holderness's* office.

was beginning to get into the road of *Brest*<sup>d</sup>, but that there were, *as yet, no dispositions* <sup>e</sup> made in the ports of the ocean for an embarkation.

LORD *Bristol* writes from *Turin*, that 140 battalions were assigned to march under the command of Marshal *Belleisle*. And M. *Villetes* from *Bern*<sup>f</sup>, that orders had been sent to the *French* ports on the ocean, particularly to *Brest* and *Rochfort*, for fitting out *all* their naval force, and for assembling seven or eight hundred *flat-bottomed vessels*: for, says he, the invasion of *England* will be an easy matter after the junction of the *French* squadrons [from *Toulon* at *Brest*] to cover the passage of their troops.

YET Vice Admiral *Osborne*, by letters of the 6th of this month, informs the *Admiralty*, that Mr. *Joseph Cockburn* of the *Hunter* cutter, having ventured into *Brest* water in his row-

<sup>d</sup> Letters of the same date in the said office informed that the *Courageux*, the *Amphion*, and two other ships of the line, and two frigates, were in the road waiting for the *Prudent* and three frigates from *Rochfort*, which being joined, M. *Perrier* would sail very speedily.

<sup>e</sup> Other advices of the same date, and to the same office, mention that it was confidently reported, that eighteen out of forty-one ships at *Boulogne* were fitting: which, with orders concerning *privateers*, shewed that they had *something* in view. Letters of the 12th inform that four men of war, three frigates, and three pinks were building after a new method, at port *l'Orient*, to be ready in eight months: and that six frigates were building at *Nantes*.

<sup>f</sup> See his letters dated 19th and 31st.

boat, could see only *nine* men of war, five of which were as big as the *Princessa*, two of 50 guns, and two smaller, and six sail of large merchant ships, in that harbour.

CONSEQUENTLY, though the *French* affected to talk of, and to threaten us with, an invasion, to be headed by the *Pretender*, and schemed and conducted by *Belleisle*, “ All persons of judgment (says another intelligent correspondent with Lord *Holderness’s* office, dated *January 21st*) “ agreed that it was attended with “ insuperable difficulties, and *was only intended* “ *to alarm and distress us.*” Which, in part, was confirmed by the resolution of the *French* court, at this time, to send troops to *Canada*<sup>2</sup>; which, and not a fleet of flat-bottomed vessels for transports to this island, were convoyed by the squadron equipped at *Brest*.

So that in fact, there was neither power, nor means, nor indeed the appearance of an embarkation sufficient to alarm *England* with an invasion hitherto. Yet it will be seen by the disposition of our fleets within this month, that the ministry provided against the equipments made by the *French* in the ports of the ocean, and did nothing for the security of *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*.

<sup>2</sup> See *January 31st*, in Lord *Holderness’s* office.

A LIST of all his Majesty's *ships of war*, or *Squadrons* of such ships as were equipped and made ready for sea, within the month of *January* 1756.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.	
3	<i>Captain</i> ,	70	480	<i>January</i> 1st 1756.	
6	<i>Lyme</i> ,	24	160	5th.	
3	<i>Somerset</i> ,	70	520	8th.	
5	<i>Pr. Edward</i> ,	44	250	9th.	
fl.	<i>Raven</i> ,	10	14	10th.	
3	<i>Chichester</i> ,	70	520	14th.	
3	<i>Yarmouth</i> ,	70	520	14th.	
3	<i>Northumburland</i> ,	70	120	15th.	
3	<i>Edinburgh</i> ,	70	480	15th.	
3	<i>Monmouth</i> ,	70	480	15th.	
6	<i>Arundel</i> ,	24	140	15th.	
3	<i>Vanguard</i> ,	70	520	16th.	
3	<i>Buckingham</i> ,	70	535	17th.	
4	<i>Windsor</i> ,	60	400	17th.	
6	<i>Port Mabon</i> ,	24	160	22d.	
fl.	<i>Hazard</i> ,	8	10	70	22d.
6	<i>Queenborough</i> ,	24	160	23d.	
3	<i>Monarch</i> ,	74	750	24th.	
4	<i>Medway</i> ,	60	420	24th.	
4	<i>First Firebrand</i> ,	8	8	55	24th.
4	<i>Newcastle</i> ,	50	350	26th.	
fl.	<i>Dispatch</i> ,	10	14	100	26th.
fl.	<i>Cruiser</i> ,	8	10	70	27th.
6	<i>Seaford</i> ,	24	160	29th.	
4	<i>Nottingham</i> ,	60	400	31st.	

A LIST of such of the ships named in the foregoing list<sup>a</sup> as were ordered to be *formed* into, or to *reinforce* particular *squadrons* within the month of *January* 1756.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	destination.				
				Rear Admiral <i>Townsend</i>				
				was ordered the 6th of				
4	<i>Dreadnought</i> ,	60	415	<i>Jan.</i> 1756 to proceed				
				in her to <i>Jamaica</i> , to				
				relieve Mr. <i>Cotes</i> in the				
				command of a <i>squadron</i>				
				there.				
3	<i>Somerset</i> ,	70	540	Ordered 9th <i>Jan.</i> 1756				
3	<i>Buckingham</i> ,	70	535		to proceed to the west-			
3	<i>Swiftsure</i> ,	70	520			ward under the com-		
3	<i>Yarmouth</i> ,	70	520				mand of Vice Admiral	
3	<i>Chichester</i> ,	70	520					<i>Osborne</i> .
3	<i>Lancaster</i> ,	66	520					
3	<i>Vanguard</i> ,	70	520					
3	<i>Northumberland</i> ,	70	520					
3	<i>Elizabeth</i> ,	70	480					
3	<i>Monmouth</i> ,	70	480					
4	<i>Windsor</i> ,	60	400					
4	<i>Antelope</i> ,	50	300					
5	<i>Romney</i> ,	44	280					
5	<i>Gosport</i> ,	44	250					
6	<i>Unicorn</i> ,	24	160					
fl.	<i>Ferret</i> ,	10	14	100				

<sup>a</sup> See the former parts of this list, in the several months of *September*, *October*, *November*, and *December*.

A monthly



A monthly list of the Admiralty, giving an abstract of the disposition of the ships, &c. in sea pay, for the month of *January* 1756.

	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>East Indies,</i>	{	3	2	975
		4	2	660
		6	1	140
		floop	1	90
			6	1865
<i>Plantations,</i>	{	3	1	500
		4	10	3345
		5	3	810
		6	9	1260
		floops	9	640
	32	6555		
<i>Mediterranean,</i>	{	4	3	980
		6	2	320
		floop	1	80
			6	1380
<i>Cruisers and Convoys,</i>	{	3	4	1920
		4	7	2300
		5	5	1280
		6	8	1260
		floops	25	2120
		arm. v.	4	320
<i>off Brest</i>	{			
<i>Downs</i>				
		53	9200	
	I	2	Ready	

	rate.	ships.	men.
	1	2	1510
	2	7	4890
Ready, or line 44	3	26	13920
Refitting under 50 10	4	19	7285
Fitting 11	5	4	1030
Harbour service 2	6	9	1400
	sloops	2	150
At home,	fire sh.	2	100
	yatches	5	210
	hof. sh.	3	101
		<hr/> 79	<hr/> 30596
	1	2	1510
	2	7	4890
	3	33	17315
	4	41	14570
	5	12	3120
General abstract,	6	29	4380
	sloops	38	3080
	arm. v.	4	320
	fire sh.	2	100
	yatches	5	210
	hof. sh.	3	101
		<hr/> 176	<hr/> 49596

THE month of *February* increased our light into the armament at *Toulon*. For, letters of the *sixth*, arrived <sup>1</sup> at the *Aimiralty* from *Mar-*

<sup>1</sup> On the 25th *February*.

*seilles*,

*seilles*, with advice that they were very hard at work on the *twelve* ships at *Toulon*; that eight more were ordered to be fitted for sea; that preparations were making to embark 25,000 men, with a train of artillery, and that it was, according to the general report, designed against *Minorca*.

LETTERS of the 13th, from the same port<sup>i</sup>, confirmed this report, adding, that the ships were hove down, and that they were to convoy forty battalions. Consul *Birtles* writes also from *Genoa*, that they wrought with such dispatch, that they would be ready to put to sea by the middle of *March* in two squadrons<sup>k</sup>; one for *America*; the other against *Minorca*. Capt. *Edgecombe* at *Leghorn*, assures their Lordships that the *French* fleet at *Toulon* was then fitting out in earnest, and that it was thought to be intended to surprize *Minorca*.

THE advices in Lord *Holderness's* office corroborated the premises. For, they wrote from the *Hague*<sup>l</sup>, that 30,000 men were ordered to embark on the coast of *Provence* to make an attempt upon *Minorca*: which this correspondent observed was no very difficult undertaking: and another writes that this report might be very true considering the person from whom it came.

<sup>i</sup> Received *March* 2d.

<sup>k</sup> Or a *flam* in order to divide the *English* fleets.

<sup>l</sup> *February* 10th, received on the 14th.

SIR *Benjamin Keene*, by letter to Mr. *Fox*, dated *February* 24th, hath this remarkable sentence:—"The uneasiness I feel comes from  
 " the approach of an intended attack on his  
 " Majesty's dominions in the *Mediterranean*.—  
 " I mean the island of MINORCA in particular:  
 " being forced to this idea by repeated accounts  
 " of numbers of troops assembled at *Marseilles*,  
 " and on the coasts of the *Mediterranean*, to be  
 " easily transported in small vessels under the  
 " convoy of *twelve* capital ships ready to sail  
 " from *Toulon* <sup>m</sup>."

THIS intelligence gained so much credit, that Mr. *Villettes*, on the 2d of *February*, wrote from *Bern*, that orders had been published every where by sound of trumpet for sailors to repair to *Toulon*, even upon the coasts of *Roussillon* and *Languedoc*, to man the ships ready; and that they continued to work on the *twelve* ships with the same activity; but that he believed they had neither sailors nor cannon enough to fit them

<sup>m</sup> This gentleman on the 14th of the same month wrote to General *Blakeney*, in this form: "The great number  
 " of troops assembled in and about *Marseilles*, and coasts of  
 " the *Mediterranean*, seem to me too strong indications of  
 " the place they intend to attack. The facility, collection  
 " of small vessels and transports, and the readiness, which  
 " great part of the *Toulon* squadron is in to sail, to protect  
 " and to co-operate with them, whilst his Majesty's squa-  
 " dron in that sea is so much inferior, give me the strongest  
 " apprehensions, that they intend to surprize and attack  
 " *Minorca*."

out.

out. However, by his next letters of the 4th of the same month, he allowed that they either by chance or connivance, got *a great many Genoese* failors.

HE remarks that the thirty battalions, said to be marching into *Provence* were 30,000 men, and that 18,000 loads of corn had been provided for their subsistence. He complains that the *French* court *changed their opinions* [he should have said *gave their orders under such disguise*] that it was impossible to fix on any thing: but that it then seemed to him that *five* frigates were to sail by themselves, to be followed after by *four* ships of the line, and that *eight* others would sail afterwards. On the twenty-third he confirms the march of troops for *Provence*: mentions ninety carpenters arrived at *Toulon* from *Genoa*; orders to take up fourteen *West-India* merchant ships to be sent to the said port. —Yet this gentleman was unwilling to apply these preparations as intended against *Minorca*. He rather chose to insinuate that they were made to intimidate the neighbouring powers, in order to facilitate an invasion or descent on *Great Britain* or *Ireland*.

CONSUL *Dick* at *Leghorn* on the 16th of *February* gives advice of fifty or sixty transports taken up for the troops in *Provence*; and concludes that the motions of the *French* threatened some dangerous enterprize.

LORD *Bristol* at *Turin* writes on the 21st of *February* <sup>a</sup>, that repeated orders had been sent to *Toulon* to hasten the workmen: that five frigates had been all ready some time, but were ordered not to sail till the *twelve* ships of the line should be thoroughly equipped; that then they had orders to sail together, with 35,000 men for *Minorca*: that it was the opinion of most intelligent people that they would be ready to put to sea about the beginning of *April*; but that he could not believe they would all be completely equipped by that time, because he had the fullest assurances, from those who had been on the spot, that there was not cannon sufficient to equip the twelve ships of the line in the port of *Toulon*. However he allows that there did begin to appear some preparations for fitting a great number of transports and a train of artillery; and that a great number of workmen did daily pass through *Nice* from *Genoa* to *Toulon* <sup>o</sup>.

CONSUL *Birtles* at *Genoa* mentions the hiring of *Genoese* workmen, and that upon his remonstrance against their entering into the service of *France*, care had been taken to put a stop to

<sup>a</sup> Received on the 8th of *March*.

<sup>o</sup> See his letters of the 21st of *February*, received *March* 8th, and 28th of *February*, received *March* 15th. Consul *Birtles* fixes the train at twenty four pieces of heavy cannon, 12,000 cannon balls, &c.

that scheme. He likewise writes that the armament of the fleet of five frigates and twelve ships of the line went on with great vigour, so as to be ready for sea by the middle of *March*: that an embargo was laid on all vessels to carry the projects into execution: that every thing was getting ready for the embarkation of the troops and the train; and that it was talked there would be part of the embarkation dispatched to *America*, and the other against *Minorca*: which was generally believed; though he would not pretend to affirm it positively.

BUT what this wary gentleman wanted in *positiveness*, was amply supplied by the intelligence received from Captain *Harvey* of the *Phoenix* at *Mahon*, who, in his letters <sup>p</sup> to the *Admiralty*, acquaints their Lordships that 25,000 *French* were quartered on the coast of *Provence*; that *twelve* men of war would be ready within the month to sail from *Toulon* with *five* frigates, and that it was publickly talked and believed in *France*, and other parts, that *most certainly* an embarkation was intended against *Minorca*.

<sup>p</sup> Dated *February* 7th, received *March* 6th. Next day, the same gentleman wrote to Lieutenant General *Fowke*, informing him with the same design against *Minorca*; and declaring his belief of it. He acquainted him that there had been a council of war, and resolutions taken to prepare for a defence: but adds, *we can do nothing if you do not speedily send us some beef*. And further, that *the garrison was then in great distress*.

CONSUL

CONSUL *Banks* at *Carthagena*, having first advised <sup>9</sup> that six frigates had sailed about the latter end of last month for the *Levant*; that considerable bodies of troops were in motion, merchant men taken up, and other dispositions were making, which indicated an approaching embarkation, or some other great enterprize, under convoy of all the King's ships, to the number of twenty-six, fit to go to sea; he concludes that a *French* report prevailed in *Spain* that the afore said squadron had put to sea with transports having on board 20,000 men, to be landed on *Minorca*.

GENERAL *Blakeney* himself was so convinced of the truth of these concurring advices, that on the 10th of *February*, he wrote a letter <sup>1</sup> to Mr. *Fox*, in which he expresses himself in these terms:—"I can't be too early in acquainting  
 " you, Sir, that by different informations from  
 " *France* and *Spain*, there is great reason to  
 " believe the *French* intend very shortly to make  
 " an attack upon this island. It is publickly  
 " talked of at *Marseilles* and *Barcelona*, and  
 " founded upon an order for 25,000 men to  
 " march immediately to the sea coast of *Pro-*  
 " *vence*.—Large boats built at *Toulon* to contain  
 " sixty men each, and one twenty-four pounder:  
 " twelve sail of the line *absolutely* ready to put  
 " to sea in this month; and five frigates ready

<sup>9</sup> *February* 25th, received *March* 17th. Capt. *Edgecombe* on the 27th, received *March* 15th, confirms the same.

<sup>1</sup> Dated *Minorca*, *February* 10th, received *March* 6th.



“ victualled, and said to be under sailing orders.”

“ IN consequence I’ve called a council of war; produced the informations, which were confirmed by a letter to the same purpose, directed to Captain *Harvey* of the *Phoenix*, present commission officer in this port. And we were unanimously of opinion, that considering who these informations came from, and the reports every where about, which seemed to tally with them, this island ought, with the greatest speed, to be put in the best state of defence it can;—and I am accordingly applying myself to every measure I think for the safety and defence of this place.”

“ On the 6th of *February* he wrote to Mr. *Dick*, Consul at *Leghorn*, to furnish him with 1000 barrels of beef with the greatest dispatch, not being able to gain a supply at *Gibraltar*. Lieutenant General *Fowke* excused himself in this manner: “ It is a satisfaction to hear that Capt. *Lloyd* of the *Chesterfield*, with provisions, was seen off *Mabon*. —Capt. *Beard* is taking in further supplies; and will, I hope, be shortly with you.—By two merchant ships from off the *Isle of Wight*, I hear, two squadrons of our fleet are ready, and expect to sail on the first or second of this month, having been detained by contrary winds. —And as the ministry *must be under some apprehensions for you*, I am persuaded one of those squadrons is intended for your protection and assistance, and am in daily hopes of its appearing.—We have here in the naval stores six months provisions for 4000 men, and I proposed sending about twenty tons in this vessel, but, on consulting with Capt. *Beard*, he declined giving an order for it; and as to our garrison, *provisions are unluckily too short to spare any*; unless your necessity were greater than hope it is.”

THUS

THUS you find that there was certain intelligence of the activity with which the *French* had resumed the fitting out of their *Toulon* squadron: of a powerful army, a train of artillery, and of transports for their embarkation: that they would be ready to put to sea about the beginning of *April* at farthest: that it was generally believed to be designed against *Minorca*: and that this was the opinion of all correspondents in *France* and *Spain*, and of the commanders of our ships and transports in the *Mediterranean*.

HOWEVER, the letters from the *Hague* seem to have worked more effectually on the *British* ministry, and almost to have driven the *Toulon* armament from their regard.—They were full of the excessive preparations of all kinds making on the coast of the channel for an *invasion*: as the marching of several regiments to *Normandy* and *Britany*; or order for forty battalions to quarter on the coasts, and to store all the fortified places with ammunition and provisions. They further said, that the court of *France* had in most parts approved *Belleisle's* plan, which was to assemble 100,000 men between *Cherbourg* and *Dunkirk*, in order to give equal uneasiness to the *south* and *west* parts of *England*, and oblige them to separate their forces; and to order twelve ships of the line, and twelve frigates to be equipped at *Brest*, to facilitate an embarkation

ation of 600 fail of transports, each to carry 100 men, to be piloted by smugglers of *Kent*, *Suffex*, and *Hampshire*, to three different attacks; two of which to be only feints, the real one to be in the west of *England*, and commanded by the Marshal in person. Who answered all the objections made to this plan by insisting, that it was feasible in a fresh south easterly wind, a dark night, a fog, or a stark calm: because, *in any of these cases*, the *English* fleet could not come to prevent their passage, so that the scheme was allowed to be *practicable*, notwithstanding the formidable fleet of *England*<sup>c</sup>.

IN the same office advices<sup>u</sup> were received that sixteen frigates would be ready in a month at *Brest* for service: that 100,000 men were marching down to the coasts of *France*, and there were actually at *Dunkirk* one hundred and forty vessels of different sizes, twenty belonging to the *Dutch* not rigged, and four for privateers. They also mentioned a great convoy of ammunition and provisions sent to *Calais*, and other preparations at *Douay*: that M. *Belleisle* was

<sup>c</sup> See Letters of the 6th and 10th of *February*, in Lord *Holderness*'s office from the *Hague*, one of which also related a project for transporting of as many troops as possible to *America*, and in order to facilitate the same, to fit out a great number of privateers, that by distressing the merchants, they might occasion such a dispersion of the *British* navy, as might give the *French* men of war an opportunity to proceed for *America* with greater security.

<sup>u</sup> *February* 1st and 2d.

expected at *Dunkirk* at the head of 135 battalions disposed between that and *Bayonne*, and that an embarkation was talked of in a very raging manner; as also an army to march into the *Low Countries*. And further, that orders were arrived to send all the ships to *Brest* as fitted, which was expected to be done by the *fourth* of *March*; and that twelve ships, belonging to the *East India* company, were taken up for transports.

OTHER advices \* to the said office gave an account of preparations for a vast project to appear all at once: of bilanders pressed at *Lisse*, to carry ammunition to *Dunkirk*, &c. of which three loaded with pallisadoes, were arrived at *Dunkirk*: of a number of troops assembling in *Lower Normandy*, and of a battalion of the royal artillery at *Boulogne*, and of another at *Havre*, destined for embarkation, besides a large quantity of warlike stores filing off from *Doway*, &c. and of a report that there would be collected in the ports of *Britany* and *Normandy*, about 600 flat-bottomed boats to be made use of for a descent; and that the *Pretender* kept near at hand, had been at *Versailles* some time, and

\* Of the 6th, 7th, 9th, 14th, 20th, 25th, and 27th of *February*. Mr. *Barnham* also on the 10th informs Mr. *Amyand*, that great warlike preparations were daily making, and that a surprising quantity of gunpowder had been brought to *Calais* in thirty flat-bottomed boats, and that more was coming by way of their canals.

expected to be joined by numbers at his landing.

THEY also remarked that the train of artillery was large, consisted of mortars, bombs, and all materials for forming a siege; throwing up entrenchments, and fortifying a camp: that a number of waggons had been provided: that *Havre* and *Brest* were the ports to assemble and embark; and that from some particular circumstances it might be concluded, that the *French* ministry was determined to execute *Belleisle's* plan, though they were certain to lose all the vessels sent and risque their whole kingdom: but that they hoped by their number of *boats*, and superiority of fire from the heavy cannon they were to carry, they might form a safe passage, notwithstanding they should meet with the *English* fleet \*.

*February 24th.* THE letters to the said office informed that the *French* were resolved to invade, and even to sacrifice half of their kingdom to be revenged; that the preparations of offence and defence were immense, and the train of artillery was *prodigious*: that they threatened, in case they could land their whole force, to march directly to *London*: but that some engineers were of opinion, and the battering train, and the ships ordered to assemble at *Brest* and

\* Advices in Lord *Holderness's* office, *Feb.* 7th, 1756.

*Toulon*

*Toulon*, confirmed that it was intended first to secure *Portsmouth*’.

SIR *Benjamin Keene* writes to Mr. *Fox* his sentiments on this invasion in the same letter by which he informed him of the design against *Minorca*: “ From the number of troops, says he, “ assembled on the *French* coasts, that are “ nearest to his Majesty’s dominions; the extensive command and active inveterate spirit “ of Marshal *Belleisle*: his discourses, when a “ prisoner, that with a regiment of *Gressins* he “ would undertake to march from one end of “ *England* to the other; and from the naval “ preparations at *Brest* to co-operate with the “ troops, it is evident that it is the resolution of “ the court of *Versailles* to attempt a descent on “ *Great Britain*. The expence is made. They “ have not troops to cope with us at sea: and “ the great and salutary measures taken by his “ Majesty by his preventive treaties, have left “ no door open, nor even a possibility of employing their formidable army on the Continent. This therefore is the *only* means left “ them for pouring forth their wrath against us. “ And what will they lose but men? whom

Other letters of the 25th say, no doubt the *French* King is *seriously* resolved to invade *England*. Agreeable to this advice the *Admiralty* the same day was informed, that a master of a vessel belonging to *Rotterdam*, who had left *Caen* on the 20th, reported that troops were cantoned about *Cape Barfleur*, to be in readiness to invade the *British* dominions.

“ they

“ they can well spare, in case they should be  
“ disappointed in their attempt.”

YET if we attend to the following intelligence, it will be found that all these preparations were no other than feints, on the part of *France*; and that Sir *Benjamin's* speculations and terrors, about an invasion of *Great Britain*, were sufficient to weigh with the *British* ministry, so as to confine their armaments entirely to home service. For, the least attention to the nature of all these intelligences, concerning an invasion, will find that there was not near the *same certainty* of a resolution to make a descent on *Great Britain*, as there was on *Minorca*.

THE advices of the 6th of *February*, which reported that some imagined a descent would actually take place, delivered it as the more probable opinion, that the *French* only made a shew of a descent to alarm, and to make *England* more watchful of their own coasts, while they transported troops to AMERICA.

THE bugbear of three squadrons fitting out at *Brest* was known on the first of *February*, to amount to no more than a squadron under M. *Perrier* to sail to *St. Domingo*; another under M. *Beaufremont*, to guard the coasts; and the third under M. *Conflans*, to protect their colonies. So that nothing could be feared from the naval power of *France* in the channel<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> In Lord *Holderness's* office, *February* 1st, 1756.

THE very pretence of employing 100,000 troops in an expedition of this kind, might have convinced that it was not *serious*; such a numerous army standing in need of more vessels and necessaries than the kingdom of *France* could furnish. But observe what they thought, who transmitted the intelligence of these motions:—  
 “ It is believed, says one <sup>a</sup>, that their motion to  
 “ the sea coast is nothing but an *affected parade*  
 “ of marches and counter-marches:” or, as another <sup>b</sup> of the same date, “ An army to screen  
 “ their own coasts from a descent, and to inti-  
 “ midate *England*.”

ON the 6th of *February* it was assured, that neither armament, nor embarkation was ordered. Mr. *Barnham* himself writes to Mr. *Amyand*, on the 28th, that he had learned the same day from *Calais*, that the troops ordered from the interior parts of *France* to the sea coasts had received counter-orders: and that every thing for the present, seemed very quiet at *Calais*. And the Lords of the *Admiralty* were informed by letters of the 24th, that Capt. *Whitwell* of the *Roebuck*, had looked into the port of *Havre*, and also examined the crews of two *Spanish* snows from thence; and that from what he could see and learn, there were neither troops nor vessels of any sort collecting in that port;

<sup>a</sup> *February* 1st, in Lord *Holderness's* office.

<sup>b</sup> Ditto, and letters of the 14th ditto.



that all reports of such armaments were false, and that, including two frigates on the stocks ready to be launched, and two others of 30 and 40 guns sent from *Brest* a few days before to be refitted, there were in that port no more than fourteen or sixteen sail of shipping.

Is it not, therefore, very extraordinary that his Majesty was advised to send a message to the House of Lords, on the 23d of this month, signifying, " That he had received repeated " advices from different places and persons, that " a design had been formed by the *French* court " to make an hostile invasion upon *Great Bri-* " *tain* or *Ireland*; and that the great preparations " of land forces, ships, artillery, and warlike " stores, were *then* notoriously making in the " ports of *France*; opposite to the *British* coasts, " left little room to doubt of the reality of such " a design: that he had not only augmented " his forces by sea and land, to put his kingdoms " into a posture of defence; but that he had " ordered transports to bring over hither a body " of *Hessian* troops, in order further to strengthen " himself." Without taking the least notice of the advices concerning the hostile invasion of *Minorca*; repeated with greater certainty, and from persons of greater credit than a *Dutch* skipper; or of any measures taken by his ministry for its defence.

It is true there appears an order in *the War office*, dated the 3d of *February*, for all the absent officers from *Minorca*, except General *Huske*, to repair to their posts. But there was no passage provided for them till the sixth of *April*, when they sailed with Admiral *Byng*. And not a ship sent to the *Mediterranean*, as you will see by the following lists<sup>c</sup>.

A LIST of all his Majesty's ships or squadrons of such ships as were equipped and made ready for the sea within the month of *February 1756*.

rate.	ships	names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
fl.	<i>Swift</i> ,		8	10	70 3d <i>February 1756</i> .
fl.	<i>Swan</i> ,		10	14	100 5th.
fl.	<i>Happy</i> ,		8	10	70 5th.
fl.	<i>Ranger</i> ,		8	10	70 6th.
4	<i>Hampshire</i> ,		50	300	7th.
5	<i>Roebuck</i> ,		44	220	7th.
6	<i>Squirrel</i> ,		24	160	10th.
3	<i>Intrepid</i> ,		64	480	11th.
4	<i>York</i> ,		60	420	11th.
6	<i>Winchelsea</i> ,		24	160	11th.
6	<i>Sheerness</i> ,		24	160	13th.
fl.	<i>Saltash</i> ,		10	14	100 13th.
fl.	<i>Wasp</i> ,		8	10	70 14th.
fl.	<i>Peggy</i> ,		8	10	70 15th.
2	<i>Ramillies</i> ,		90	750	16th.

<sup>c</sup> See the former parts of these lists in the months of *September*, *October*, *November*, *December*, and *January*.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
3	<i>Terrible,</i>	70	615	19th February 1756.
11.	<i>Swallow,</i>	14	100	20th.
3	<i>Cambridge,</i>	80	650	21st.
11.	<i>Hound,</i>	10	14	100 21st.
3	<i>Torbay,</i>	74	700	25th.
3	<i>Culloden,</i>	74	600	25th.
3	<i>Orford,</i>	70	520	25th.
3	<i>Revenge,</i>	70	480	25th.
4	<i>Rocheſter,</i>	50	350	25th.
3	<i>Ipswich,</i>	70	480	26th.
4	<i>Dunkirk,</i>	60	420	26th.
5	<i>Ludlow caſtle,</i>	44	250	26th.
11.	<i>Bonnetta,</i>	10	14	80 27th.
4	<i>Iſis,</i>	50	350	28th.
5	<i>Ambuſcade,</i>	44	250	28th.
6	<i>Lime,</i>	24	160	29th.

A LIST of ſuch ſhips named in the foregoing liſt as were ordered to be *formed* into, or to *reinforce* particular *ſquadrons* within the month of *February* 1756.

rate.	ſhips names.	guns.	men.	deſtination.
3	<i>Captain,</i>	70	480	Ordered 17th 1756 to accompany the <i>Hampſhire</i> and outward bound <i>East India</i> ſhips 100 leagues into the ſea, and then to return to <i>Spithead</i> .
3	<i>Edinburgh,</i>	70	480	
4	<i>Medway,</i>	60	420	
4	<i>Newcaſtle,</i>	50	350	

rate. ships names. guns. men. destination.

				The <i>Admiralty</i> informed that six sail of <i>French</i> men of war had sailed from <i>Brest</i> , ordered Sir <i>Edward Hawke</i> on the 27th of <i>February</i> to put to sea immediately with this Squadron; but he was detained till the 12th of <i>March</i> by contrary winds: on which day he sailed with the <i>East India</i> ships to convoy 150 leagues westward of <i>Ushant</i> . He was then ordered to return to <i>Cape Ortugal</i> , and cruise in the bay to prevent <i>French</i> ships putting to sea from <i>Brest</i> or <i>Rochfort</i> , or to intercept the forefaid <i>French</i> Squadron; which his instructions directed to be the <i>principal object</i> of his attention.
2	<i>St. George,</i>	90	750	
3	<i>Monarch,</i>	74	715	
3	<i>Orford,</i>	70	520	
3	<i>Culloden,</i>	74	600	
3	<i>Northumberland,</i>	70	520	
3	<i>Captain,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Edinburgh,</i>	70	420	
4	<i>York,</i>	60	420	
4	<i>Dunkirk,</i>	60	420	
4	<i>Medway,</i>	60	420	
4	<i>Newcastle,</i>	50	350	
fl.	<i>Swan,</i>	10	14	100

A monthly list of the *Admiralty*, giving an abstract of the disposition of the ships, &c. in sea pay, for the month of *February* 1756.

	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>East Indies,</i>	}	3	2	975
		4	2	660
		6	1	140
		sloop	1	90
		6	1865	

*Plan-*

	rate.	ships.	men.		
<i>Plantations,</i>	{	3	1	500	
		4	11	3760	
		5	3	810	
		6	11	1580	
		sloops	9	640	
		<u>35</u>	<u>7290</u>		
<i>Mediterranean,</i>	{	4	3	980	
		5	1	250	
		6	3	460	
		sloop	1	80	
				<u>8</u>	<u>1770</u>
<i>Convoys and Cruisers,</i>	{	3	14	7215	
	{	4	8	2700	
<i>Vice Adm. Osborne,</i>	} 17	1 sloop	5	4	1030
			6	9	1420
<i>Vice Admiral Smith, Downs</i>	} 7		sloops	23	1920
			13	arm. v.	4
			<u>62</u>	<u>14605</u>	
<i>At Home,</i>	{	1	2	1510	
		2	7	4890	
		3	17	9365	
		4	18	6770	
		5	4	1030	
		6	6	940	
		sloops	4	350	
		fire sh.	2	100	
		yachts	5	210	
hof. sh.	3	100			
		<u>68</u>	<u>25266</u>		
	K	4	General		

	rate.	ships.	men.
General abstract,	{ 1	2	1510
	{ 2	7	4890
	{ 3	34	18055
	{ 4	42	14870
	{ 5	12	3120
	{ 6	30	4540
	{ sloops	38	3080
	{ arm. v.	4	320
	{ fire sh.	2	100
	{ yatchs	5	210
	{	hof. sh. 3	101
		<u>179</u>	<u>50796</u>

THE time of action drawing nigh, and no preparations of a fleet, nor army made by the *English*, to oppose the grand enterprize undertaken at *Toulon*; the Duke of *Richelieu*, at *Lyons*, on the road to take the command of the embarkation, openly declared its destination was against *Minorca* and to besiege *Mabon*; of which *M. Villettes* did not fail to give advice<sup>d</sup>.

THIS same gentleman also, within the course of this month, transmitted such other advices, as might be sufficient to put the Marshal's declaration out of all doubt. For his letters of the first relate, that the *whole marine* at *Marseilles* was in motion: that besides the *West India* ships in last month's account, twenty others,

<sup>d</sup> Dated *Bern*, *March* 13.

burthen 2000 quintals, were taken up: that the *press* for *seamen* was very brisk: that *troops*, *artillery*, *bombs*, *powder*, &c. were continually arriving in that neighbourhood: and that, as they were carrying on an armament in the neighboring provinces of *Spain*, with greater activity, *he did not doubt* but the two courts had *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* in view<sup>o</sup>.

HE particularly observed that *Gallassioniere* was arrived to command the fleet: that *seven* ships of the line and *five* frigates were actually in the road<sup>f</sup>: that they were shipping 6000 bombs, 30,000 weight of biscuit<sup>g</sup>: that *twelve* ships of the line and *five* frigates would be ready to sail by the beginning of *April*<sup>h</sup>: that four gallies, four xebecks, and seven or eight other vessels, fit for such a service, were ordered to attend the fleet, and to carry the ammunition, amongst which he numbers for the land service 2500 oxen, 6000 rations of hay, 6000 fascines, 1000 barrels of gunpowder, 12 cannon of 36

<sup>o</sup> Concluding, "In these circumstances, it will be very difficult for the *English* to prevent their being taken; particularly *Mahon*, which is not strong on the land side, and where they cannot send an army capable of preventing an invasion."

<sup>f</sup> Before the *first* of *March*, the date of his letter.

<sup>g</sup> Letter of *March* 8th.

<sup>h</sup> Letters of *March* 8th and 13th, *viz.* the *Foudroyant*, peirced for 100, armed with 90 guns; five of 74 guns, three of 64 guns, and three of 50 guns; frigates, one of 38 guns, one of 30, two of 24, and one of 20 guns. Letter of *March* 24th.

pounders,

pounders 2 of 24 pounders, 8 of 12 pounders; 8 mortars of 12 inches; 6 of 8 inches, besides petards, mines, &c. that there had issued a proclamation for masters of merchant ships, captains, clerks, and cadets, to appear to serve on board the King's ships; that cloth had been bought at *Marseilles* for 350 tents, and orders issued for sixty transports: that on the twenty-second they had actually got *ten* ships of the line in the road, and two more would be ready in a week: that at *Toulon* a surprizing number of hands were employed, and every thing was put in practice to hasten the works, and to arm the fleet, which did not require much time: that on the 26th they had completed the loading of the transports, and had taken up more: that they stripped the sea and the land and the islands of their artillery and ammunition, to arm the fleet at *Toulon*: that all these steps left no room to doubt, but that an attack would be made on *Mahon*; and that M. *Richelieu* was to set out next morning from *Marseilles* to *Toulon*, and the whole fleet and embarkation of 23 battalions of foot, and one of artillery, would be in readiness to sail on the fifth of *April*, every thing since the Marshal's arrival, being pushed on with the greatest hurry<sup>i</sup>.

<sup>i</sup> Letters of the 8th, 13th, 22d, 24th, 26th, and 29th.

This is the true state of the intelligence received by M. *Villetes* from *Marseilles* and *Toulon*: but in most of his letters, that conveyed *these facts* to his principals in *England* he has endeavoured to put a quite different inten-

THESE



THESE facts were confirmed from every quarter, in the most essential points. Lord *Bristol* from *Turin* writes, (*March 6th*\*) to Mr.

tion to all the *French* armament than *their* appearances could warrant.

At one time (*March 1st*) he thinks it *not impossible*, that under the pretence of attacking *Mabon*, the *French* were making these great preparations to take possession of *Corfica*, in order to be nearer *Italy*. At another (*March 8th*) he adds, that notwithstanding all these orders, and the seeming preparations for transporting of troops, for their landing, and for a *fi*, they, who watch things closely *are of opinion*, that the whole is but a *feint* to oblige the *English* to send troops and a strong squadron into the *Mediterranean*, and leave their own coasts exposed: *Nay*, says he, (*March 12th*) all this noisy march of troops will end in a camp to be formed this Summer in the neighbourhood of *Marseilles*.—Then he shifts the scene of action from *Corfica* to *North America*.—"The armament at *Toulon* (he thinks " on *March 12th*) seems rather intended for an expedition " to *Canada* than *Minorca*, if they can deceive the vigilance of the *English* in the *Mediterranean*, or the ocean, " to send a convoy thither, because the twenty ships taken " into the transport service, are all *Maltese* perfectly acquainted with the seas of *North America*, and stronger " than those of *Provence*, which were rejected." And not able to invent any other destination, this gentleman returns to his former expedient of shewing the impracticability of fitting out the fleet, &c. as reported. On the 19th he writes, that they still were in great want of cannon; were forced to employ joiners, not fit for the work, instead of carpenters; and that they had not sailors to half man their fleet, except sent out of the *west*: and that, after all, it appeared to him, the preparations were carried on in a manner, one would imagine, rather to frighten than to hurt the *English*: for that " he much " doubted whether the fleet would sail out of *Toulon*, or " not." *March 19th, 24th, and 26th.*

\* Received *March 20th.*

*Fox,*

*Fox*, “ I have juſt heard there are *eleven* ſhips  
 “ on the point of ſailing out of *Toulon*, three  
 “ frigates of 24 guns, one of 30, one of 50, and  
 “ ſix ſhips of the line, carrying 70 to 76 guns;  
 “ two other large ſhips fitting out with great  
 “ expedition, but complement of ſailors on  
 “ board each very defective, notwithstanding  
 “ they have preſſed ſuperannuate men and young  
 “ uſeleſs boys. There are twenty-two battalions  
 “ of infantry, and two battalions of artillery,  
 “ quartered on the coaſt of the *Mediterranean*;  
 “ and the report of an invaſion being intended  
 “ on the iſland of *Minorca* is very ſtrong; of  
 “ which I have given notice to the commanding  
 “ officer at *Mabon*.” On the 13th<sup>1</sup> he men-  
 tions forty tranſport ſhips hired for an embark-  
 ation, and an order for more to be taken up:  
 that 1000 ſailors and upwards had been ſent  
 from *Genoa* for the fleet at *Toulon*, and that  
 Marſhal *Richelieu*, Duke *de Mirepoix*, and other  
 general officers were arrived in *Provence*. On  
 the 20th<sup>m</sup> he writes, that the *French* were fitting  
 out all the gallies and xebecks in the ports of  
*Provence*; were loading a large ſhip with faſcines,  
 and that they were preparing every thing neceſ-  
 ſary for carrying on a ſiege. And on the 27th<sup>n</sup>  
 his Lordſhip incloſed the following liſt of the  
 ſhips in *Toulon*, three of 74 guns, four of 64,  
 one frigate of 24, and of 20 in the road; three

<sup>1</sup> Received *April* 2d,

<sup>m</sup> Received *April* 7th.

<sup>n</sup> Received *April* 13th.

of 30 guns failed to convoy victuallers: in the dock one of 80 guns, lower tier brass, two of 64, and one of 50, which three waited for cannon: three of fifty guns, and one of 46, remained in port, having no cannon at all: one of 80 guns, one of 40, one of 50, and one of 36 could not be finished in a great while for want of timber and artillery.

CONSUL *Birtles* from *Genoa* advises on the 6th of *March* \*, that fourteen large ships of 300 tons, and encreas'd † a few days after to nineteen, were freighted at *Toulon* for three months on account of the government, which mounted from 20 to 24 guns each: that an embargo had been laid on 160 small tartans: that the greatest preparations were making at *Marseilles* and *Toulon*, and coast of *Provence* for an embarkation that ever was known: that at *Toulon* they worked incessantly on the large ships, being supplied with shipwrights and carpenters from *Naples*: that five frigates of 24 to 50, and eight ships from 70 to 76 guns were got into the road, and would be completely manned in a few days, sailors arriving daily from all parts: that twenty-two battalions were cantoned near *Toulon*: that 25,000 of wheat were arrived from *Languedoc*; and that they made no secret of their design, and publickly talked of making a descent on *Minorca* ‡. He by the same packet gave ad-

\* Received *March* 22d.

† Letter of the 10th.

‡ Letters of *March* 6th and 10th, received *April* 2d.

vice also of the arrival of *Gallassioniere*, and of a report that part of this embarkation was designed for *America*; and concludes † his intelligence in this month with an account, that they had taken up more ships for transports; and that at *Toulon* were three ships of 74 guns, four of 60 to 64, three frigates of 30, one of 24, and one of 20 in the road to be joined in three or four days by the *Foudroyant* of 80 (which in other lists has been erroneously called a 90 or 100) guns, two others of 64, and one of 50 getting ready with great dispatch, only waiting for half their guns: besides five others in total want of cannon, four frigates and an 80 gun ship on the stocks, which will require time for want of timber and artillery.

CONSUL *Banks*, at *Cartbagen* in *Old Spain*, after mentioning 120,000 men in the southern provinces of *France* ready to march, besides a grand train of artillery, stores, &c. preparing for the coast of the *Mediterranean*, and that they were busy in building a particular sort of flattish vessels to carry one gun of 26 pound-ball, and company of soldiers, besides seamen; adds that he expected the fleet would sail with the transports from *Toulon* about the end of next month: that it was to be augmented by six more ships of the line, and eighteen vessels to be fitted out as frigates, and that he that very day had seen a letter from an officer of distinction at *Paris*,

† Letter of *March* 27th, received *April* 13th.

who

who said that great preparations in the *southern* parts would continue with great vigour till the middle of *April*, when they would begin such operations as would greatly surprize all *Europe*.\*

CONSUL *Millar* at *Barcelona*, by letters of the same date informed, that it was looked upon in *Spain* as very certain that the design of all preparations making on the *Mediterranean* coasts were against *Minorca*: that they continued to work with vigour on their ships at *Toulon*: that twenty-two battalions were arrived in that neighbourhood, and expected to be augmented to forty battalions: that forty ships more had been ordered for transports, so that they had now taken up above 100 vessels: that they embarked fascines, gabions, and other necessaries for a siege; and that, though only *nine* capital ships were yet got ready to put to sea on account of the difficulty to get seamen, he believed the other ships would be ready by the 15th of *April*.

SIR *Benjamin Keene* on the 22d of *March*<sup>t</sup>, wrote to Mr. *Fox*, that notwithstanding the want of *French* failors, which had retarded the embarkation, it was intended to be put in execution the beginning of next month, twelve capital ships, and *six* frigates, being already in the road at *Toulon*: and that Mr. *Millar* had

\* Letters dated 24th of *March*, received *April* 29th.

<sup>t</sup> Received *April* 7th, with a letter, from the Consul at *Barcelona*, inclosed, to the same effect.

received

received a letter from General *Blakeney*, with advice dated the 5th of *March*; that they were ready to sail, and every thing prepared for an embarkation; and again on the 24th, that the *Toulon* squadron was to be joined by eighteen merchantmen capable of mounting upwards of 20 guns, and then fitting out at *Toulon*.

THE certainty of this expedition had already gained belief in *Holland*. For, though the letters of the 12th of *March*\*, gave credit to the vague report of the *French* ministry's design on *Corfica*: they mention for certain, that afterwards they would endeavour to make themselves masters of *Port Mahon*. And on the 22d and 26th<sup>u</sup> they confirm the embarkation from *Toulon* for *Minorca*, to be commanded by M. *Richelieu*.

CONSUL *Dick* at *Leghorn*, in his advices to Mr. *Fox* on the 8th of *March*<sup>x</sup>, informs that the *French* were taking up 15,000 tons of shipping at *Toulon* for transports, and 100 tartans to be ready on the 15th: that twenty-two battalions were to embark, which some people apprehended were designed against *Minorca*, but that his intelligence said for *Corfica*: that six frigates and fourteen ships of war were ready to sail; and that they expected fourteen large merchant-ships<sup>y</sup> from *Marseilles* for carriage of bombs,

<sup>u</sup> Received on the 14th of *March*.

<sup>x</sup> Received *April* 2d.

<sup>y</sup> Received 22d.

<sup>z</sup> Letter dated 15th *March*, received *April* 2d.

ammunition, &c. and 1000 oxen, &c. from *Arles*: that the army was encreased to twenty-five battalions, 800 matrosses, one company of miners, and a company of pioneers ready to embark.

I SHALL conclude these advices with the intelligence sent to the Lords of the *Admiralty*, which, in the course of this month, informed their Lordships that *most* believed the embarkation making at *Toulon* was intended against *Minorca*<sup>2</sup>: that *eight* more ships were to be added: and that the garrison of *Mabon* expected hourly to be attacked<sup>2</sup>. They also had the following list of the state of the marine on the 21st of *March* 1756 at *Toulon*.

Vaiffeaux en mer, *le Pamone* 30 can. relache en *Rochfort*. Vaiffeaux en armement, *le Foudroyant*, 80 can. *le Couronne*, *Temeraire*, *Redoubtable*, *Guerrier*, 74 can. *le Content*, *Triton*, *Sage*, *Orphée*, 64 can. *le Tier*, *Hippotomane*, 50 can. *la Junon*, 40 can. *la Rose*, 30 can. *le Gracieux*, *Nymph*, *Topaz*, 24 can. *Pleiade*, 26 can. en tout 17 vaiffeaux le escadre de M. de la *Gallassioniere*.

Vaiffeaux en etat, *le Hector*, 74 can. *Valliant*, *Achille*, *Hercule* 64 can. *Oriflamme*, 50 can. en tout 5.

<sup>1</sup> Capt. *Edgewcombe's* letter of *March* 7th, received *April* 5th.

<sup>2</sup> Capt. *Edgewcombe's* letter dated *Mabon*, *March* 24th received *April* 27, he adds, that the garrison was as much upon its guard and in as good condition for defence as possible, *considering our situation, and weakness of the garrison*.

Vaifléaux hors de état, le *Ferme*, 74 can. a *Radouer*, l'*Océan*, *Centaure*, *Souverain*, 74 can. l'*Oifeaux*, *Minerve*, 26 can. fur les chantiers : le *Protecteur*, 74 can. *Fantafque*, *Modeste*, 64 can. A mettre fur les chantiers, en tout 9.

By which accounts it appears that the *French* had a formidable fleet in the port of *Toulon*, and that every meafure was tried to put it into a condition to ftrike fome great blow in the *Mediterranean*.

THE intelligence concerning the equipments at *Breff* and *Rochfort*, and the appearances of an *invaſion*, amounts to no more than, at *Breff* fix ſhips of the line were gone into the road: that theſe were to be augmented to a fleet of twenty-two ſhips of the line and ten frigates, under the command of M. *Conflans*, ſome of which to be fitted to transport 6000 troops for *Canada*: that M. *Perrier* had failed *Feb.* 19, with four ſhips of the line and three frigates, and a convoy of ſix frigates for *St. Domingo*<sup>b</sup>: that the equipment at *Breff* went on briskly, and *nine* ſhips would be ſoon ready at *Rochfort* to join *Conflans*: that M. *d'Aubigny*, failed from *Breff* with the *Prudent* and two frigates for the *Weſt Indies*<sup>c</sup>, and that the ſtate of the *French* marine at *Breff* and *Rochfort* was exact according to the following liſts :

<sup>b</sup> Letter in Lord *Holderneſs*'s office, *March* 7th.

<sup>c</sup> Letter in Lord *Holderneſs*'s office, *March* 22d.



Vaiffeaux en mer, port de *Brest*, le *Courageux*, 74 can. *Prothée*, 64 can. *Amphion*, *Aigle*, 50 can. *Fleur de Lis*, 30 can. *Emeralde*, 28 can. commandes par M. *Perrier* Chef d'escadre, pour *St. Dominique*. La *Comete*, *Blonde*, *Brune*, *Amethyste*, 30 can. partis de *Havre* aller a *Brest*: La *Ibetis*, *Cumberland*, 24 can. a *Nantz*. L'*Anemone*, 24 can. en *Croisière*: La *Mutine*, *Galathée*, *Heroine*, 24 can. en rade, en toute 16.

Vaiffeaux en armement, Le *Soleil Royal*, le *Tonnant*, 80 can. la *Superbe*, 70 can. *Defenseur*, 74 can. *Beinfaisant*, *Sphinx*, 64 can. *Arc en Ceil*, 50 can. De l'escadre de M. le Comte DE CONFLANS. Le *Heros*, 74 can. *Illustre* 64, *Leopard* 60, *Sirene*, *Licome*, *Sauvage* 30 can. destines au transports des munition pour l'*Amerique*; la *Concorde* 30, *Amaranthe* 12 can. pour aller chautier M. le Comte DE AIGÜLLON, en tout 15.

Vaiffeaux hors de etat, l'*Intrepide*, *Conquerant*, *Sceptre*, *Magnifique*, *Algonquer*, 74 can. *Northumberland*, 68 can. a redoubler en total. La *Dragon*, 64 can. *Diademe*, *Zodiacque*, *Minotaure*, 74 can. *Belliqueux*, *Celebre*, 64 can. sur les chantiers. Le *Robuste*, *Solitaire*, 64 can. un a *Nommer*, 74 can. a mettre sur les chantiers au *Havre* pour *Brest*, en tout 17.

Vaiffeaux en mer, port de *Rochfort*, le *Prudent*, 74 can. *Atlante*, 34 can. *Zephir*, 30 can. a la *Martinique*. L'*Aiguillon*, 46 can. *Fidelle* et  
L 2 *Hermione*,

*Hermione* 26 can. *Frippone*, 24 can. *Valeur*, 26 can. a l'*Isle Royale*, en tout 8.

Vaisseaux en armement, le *Duc Bourbon*, 80 can. *Dauphin* et *Juste* 70 can. *Hardi* 66 can. *Inflexible*, *Etoile*, *Capricieux*, 64 can. *Diane*, 30 can. les 8 Vaisseaux destine a renforcer *M. Conflans*.

Vaisseaux hors d'etat, le *Florissant*, 74 can. en radant *Glorieux* 74 can. *Raisnable* 64 can. sur les chautiers: *Profiance*, et *Surprize*, 30 can. a contrain.

By which it appears, there was nothing to fear from the naval power of *France* on the part of the ocean or channel ; and that, notwithstanding the report of a powerful convoy to be fitted out at *Brest* and *Rochfort*, to favour an invasion, it could not be possible that they, who believed this state of the *French* marine to be true, could think it necessary to neglect every other service of their country to wait the motions of so despicable a gascoynade.

NEITHER can I think that the following advices relating to an invasion of *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, were deserving of greater attention. For, though the Earl of *Holderness* was informed by letters of the 2d of *March*, that it was said a camp would be formed for 40,000 men between *Dunkirk* and *Boulogne* ; and that thirty-two transport ships were taken up at *Boulogne*, and sixty more were expected in *March* to be escorted by the *Blune* and *Blonde* frigates from  
*Havre* :

*Havre*<sup>d</sup>: though it was said that 500 flat-bottomed boats were to be transported from *Havre* to *Rouen*, in twelve ships: and that a considerable train of artillery had passed *Soissons*, in the way to *Havre*, *Calais*, and *Rockfort*. Though the whole nation was put into a panic with an account<sup>e</sup> that FIVE flat-bottomed boats of forty-five feet long and ten feet wide, were *on the stocks* to conquer this island! and that all the ships in the ports of *Calais*, *Graveline*, and *Dunkirk*, had been measured to know how many people they could transport: though twelve by-landers were arrived at *Calais* with cannon, bombs, and balls, and numbers of seamen were sent daily from those ports to *Brest*<sup>f</sup>: tho' it was reported that *the embarkation* would be supported by *all* the King's ships at *Brest*, *Rockfort*, &c. and that the said embarkation would be undertaken as soon as possible, at *Brest*: though a great quantity of biscuit<sup>g</sup> was sent down to *Normandy* and *Britany* for the use of the transports after landing in *England*; and a plan had been made for forming a camp almost as strong as a fortified town: and though Mr. *Barnham* was informed on the 10th of *March*, that 600 bomb-shells were brought into *Calais*, and that

<sup>d</sup> See the list of the marine at *Brest*, and letter received 2d *March*. Also letter dated *March* 9th, Mr. *Villettes* multiplied this account to the number of 7 or 800 flat bottomed vessels. See advices *January* 31st, received *February* 24.

<sup>e</sup> Letter to ditto, *March* 7th.

<sup>f</sup> Letter to ditto, *March* 8th.

<sup>g</sup> *March* 22d.

sixty cannoneers, and more troops were expected; the ministry were *well assured*<sup>b</sup> that notwithstanding this mighty warlike preparation, he could not learn that they were taking any steps to *encrease* their *shipping* at *Calais*, which at that time was very considerable: that the *pretended* flat-bottomed boats were only *pontoons* of a new construction<sup>l</sup>, made easy for stowage in a ship: that the reports of the arrival of flat-bottomed boats at *Dunkirk* and *Calais* were *false*<sup>k</sup>, there being only forty-eight vessels of different sizes and nations in those ports: that part of the troops assembling were designed to embark for *Canada*<sup>l</sup>: that an expedition against *England* could not be near at hand, because there must be time for the arrival of artillery<sup>m</sup>: and that there could be *no trust* given to the *French* reports<sup>n</sup>: that the bombs, &c. arrived at *Calais* were laid up<sup>o</sup>; the talk of an invasion diminished and discouraged by the court; and that since the requisition of the *Hessians* and *Dutch*, and other wise measures taken by the *British* court, persons of rank, who expected to be employed in that expedition, grew every day more uneasy, and doubtful whether it would be attempted<sup>p</sup>: that there were on the 7th of *March* no more fishing boats at

<sup>b</sup> See Mr. *Barnham's* letter to Mr. *Amyand*, *March* 10th, received *March* 11th.

<sup>l</sup> Letter to Lord *Holdernefs*, *March* 7th.

<sup>k</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>l</sup> *Ibid.* *March* 9th.

<sup>m</sup> *Ibid.* *March* 14th and 15th.

<sup>n</sup> *Ibid.* *March* 18th.

<sup>o</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>p</sup> *Ibid.* *March* 1st.

*Havre* than usual, and no flat-bottomed-boats<sup>†</sup>, with which the *English* ministry affected to be so much frightened.

IN this situation what did the *British* ministry do? They had certain intelligence that there was a *real* armament at *Toulon* of twelve men of war of the line, five frigates, &c. ready to convoy a powerful army, openly acknowledged by the enemy to be designed against *Minorca*: and they could not be ignorant of the distress *Mabon* was in for want of a sufficient garrison, miners, pioneers, &c. and the danger of its falling a prey to so powerful an attack, for want of a superior fleet to cover the island from such an attempt; yet all this could only procure an order on the 8th of *March* for ten ships of the line to hold themselves in readiness for the *Mediterranean*: which squadron was, on the 11th of the same month put under the command of Admiral *Byng*, with an order for him to take on board the Earl of *Effingham*, General *Stuart*, and other officers and private men, ordered to their respective posts and corps at *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*. But the equipping of those ten ships<sup>‡</sup> was attended with

<sup>†</sup> Capt. *Saumarez*, of the *Ludlow Castle*, off *Havre*, received the 9th. He further said, that he stood in as near as possible in a cutter, and saw eight sail, four of which were large ships and ready for sea; and was informed by a fisherman he took on the coast, that they were two frigates of 26 guns ordered to convoy two others to *Brest*.

<sup>‡</sup> The *Ramillies* of 90 guns, the *Culloden* of 74, the *Buckingham*, *Captain*, and *Revenge* of 70 guns, the *Trident* and *Intrepid* of 64, the *Lancaster* of 66, the *Kingston* and *Defiance* of 60 guns.

such directions that their departure was delayed till the sixth of *April*, for want of men<sup>a</sup>; Mr. *Byng* being directed to hasten the fitting up the *Sterling Castle*, and to complete her complement of men in preference to any other ship; and not to meddle with the men on board the *Nassau*, *Torbay*, *Essex*, *Prince Frederick*, and *Greyhound*, they being wanted, says Mr. *Cleveland*, on the most pressing service<sup>a</sup>.

How they in power managed in regard to the motions of the *French* on the coast of the ocean and channel, though they were assured they had

<sup>a</sup> As will more fully appear by these extracts from Admiral *Byng*'s letters to Mr. *Cleveland*.

*April* 1st, ready for sailing in every respect except want  
 “ of men; will take 336 men, now the regiments are all  
 “ on board, to complete them. My own ship wants 222,  
 “ 183 of them being lent to the *Ludlow Castle*. The  
 “ *Trident* had 78 lent to the *Hampton Court*, and *Tilbury*,  
 “ which ships we are likely to meet with—will make a  
 “ great hole in the *Trident*'s company. Expect hourly  
 “ *Ludlow Castle* and *Intrepide*; when arrived hope we shall  
 “ find men to complete.

“ *April* 3d, *Intrepid*, *Ludlow Castle*, and *Cambridge*  
 “ came but yesterday to *Spithead*.—Ordered men imme-  
 “ diately.—Hope to settle to day to be able to set sail to  
 “ *St. Helen*'s.

“ *April* 4th. Wind W.—Disappointed to find the *In-*  
 “ *trepid* short of complement, though brought out 261  
 “ supernumeraries, she wanted 150 to complete her own  
 “ complement.”

<sup>a</sup> To cruise off *Cherburgh* to try if they could not intercept four frigates, and forty merchantmen drove in there from *Havre*; by the *Windjar*: which could not be so pressing as the relief of *Minorca*.

nothing

nothing to fear from their pretences, will be seen not only by their importation of a foreign army of *Hessians* and *Hanoverians* at a very great expence, and by a great augmentation of a standing army, encamped in different parts of the kingdom, but by the following lists; where you will find, that our greatest and almost whole strength by sea was so stationed, as to serve no other purpose than to watch the uncertain rumour of an invasion of *Britain*, with a few fishing or flat-bottomed boats, which upon a more strict enquiry were found to be pontoons.

A LIST of all his Majesty's *ships of war*, or *Squadrons* of such ships as were equipped and made ready for sea, within the month of *March* 1756.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	when made ready for sea.
fl.	<i>Swift</i> ,	8	10	70 1st <i>March</i> 1756.
3	<i>Grafton</i> ,	70	520	2d.
4	<i>Defiance</i> ,	60	400	2d.
4	<i>Kingston</i> ,	60	420	2d.
4	<i>Eagle</i> ,	60	400	3d.
6	<i>Seaford</i> ,	24	160	3d.
fl.	<i>Granada</i> ,	10	14	100 3d.
	armed vessel <i>Maryland Planter</i> ,	16	6	80 6th.
4	<i>Sutherland</i> ,	50	350	8th.
3	<i>Essex</i> ,	70	480	9th.
4	<i>Weymouth</i> ,	60	420	10th.
5	<i>Dover</i> ,	44	250	10th.
fl.	<i>Otter</i> ,	10	14	80 10th.

fl. *Ferret*,

rate. ships names. guns. men. when made ready for sea.

fl.	<i>Ferret</i> ,	10	14	100	11th.
fl.	<i>Fly</i> ,	8	12	70	11th.
fl.	<i>Savage</i> ,	8	10	70	11th.
fl.	<i>Wolf</i> ,	8	10	70	13th.
3	<i>P. Frederick</i> ,	70	480		14th.
3	<i>Sterling castle</i> ,	70	480		14th.
4	<i>Anson</i> ,	60	420		20th.
3	<i>Invincible</i> ,	74	720		20th.
4	<i>Harwich</i> ,	50	300		20th.
4	<i>Antelope</i> ,	50	300		20th.
6	<i>Deal Castle</i> ,	24	160		20th.
3	<i>Trident</i> ,	64	500		22d.
4	<i>Falmouth</i> ,	50	350		25th.
4	<i>Assistance</i> ,	50	350		25th.
fl.	<i>Spy</i> ,	10	14	80	25th.
3	<i>Lancaster</i> ,	66	520		27th.
6	<i>Greyhound</i> ,	24	160		27th.
6	<i>Gibraltar</i> ,	24	140		28th.
6	<i>Unicorn</i> ,	24	160		28th.
6	<i>Sheernefs</i> ,	24	160		29th.

A LIST of such ships named in the foregoing list as were ordered to be formed into, or to reinforce particular squadrons.

rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	destination.
3	<i>Somerfet</i> ,	70	520	Ordered 2d <i>March</i> 1756 to be added to Sir <i>Edward</i> <i>Hawke's</i> Squadron.
3	<i>Vanguard</i> ,	70	520	
3	<i>Cbichester</i> ,	70	520	Ordered <i>March</i> 8th 1756 to be under the command of Sir <i>Edward Hawke</i> , instead of the <i>Culladen</i> and <i>Captain</i> .
3	<i>Ipswich</i> ,	70	480	
				4 <i>Ante-</i>



rate.	ships names.	guns.	men.	destination.
				Capt. Gayton of the <i>Antelope</i> ordered 8th <i>March</i> 1756 to proceed off cape <i>Barfleur</i> , and cruise. On the 18th <i>Windsor</i> and <i>Eagle</i> to cruise between <i>Scilly</i> and <i>Ushant</i> , and the latter between <i>Ushant</i> and the <i>Isle of Bass</i> ; and April 1st <i>Eagle</i> to <i>Plymouth</i> for reinforcement going to <i>Sir Edward Hawke</i> .
4	<i>Antelope,</i>	50	300	
4	<i>Windsor,</i>	60	400	
4	<i>Eagle,</i>	60	400	
2	<i>Ramillies,</i>	90	750	Ordered <i>March</i> 8th 1756 to be fitted for the <i>Mediterranean</i> , and on the 11th of the same month to be under the command of Vice Admiral <i>Byng</i> .
3	<i>Buckingham,</i>	70	535	
3	<i>Culloden,</i>	74	600	
3	<i>Captain,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Revenge,</i>	70	480	
3	<i>Trident,</i>	64	500	
3	<i>Lancaster,</i>	66	520	
3	<i>Intrepid,</i>	64	480	
3	<i>Kingston,</i>	60	400	
3	<i>Defiance,</i>	60	400	
4	<i>Isis,</i>	54	350	18th <i>March</i> 1756, Capt. <i>Gayton</i> of the <i>Antelope</i> , then cruising of <i>Barfleur</i> , was directed to take these ships under his command, and cruise with them from <i>Havre</i> to <i>de la Hague</i> , and follow any orders Vice Admiral <i>Smith</i> should send him.
6	<i>Centaur,</i>	24	160	
arm. v.	<i>Mary-land planter.</i>	16	6 80	
1.	<i>Dispatch,</i>	10	14 100	
	2 <i>Cuttters</i>			
4	<i>Falmouth,</i>	50	350	Ordered 18th <i>March</i> 1756 to proceed to join the <i>Eagle</i> off the <i>Isle of Bass</i> , and cruise with her between that isle and <i>Ushant</i> .
6	<i>Greybound,</i>	24	160	
1.	<i>Ferret,</i>	10	14 100	
	2 <i>Cuttters.</i>			
				3 <i>Torbay,</i>

rate.	ships	names.	guns.	men.	destination.
3	Torbay,	70	700	Ordered 23d <i>March</i> 1756 to cruise off <i>Cherburgh</i> under Capt. <i>Keppell</i> ; and on 1st <i>April</i> two former were order- ed to proceed to <i>Plymouth</i> to join the reinforcement going to Sir <i>Edward Hawke</i> under the command of Rear Admiral <i>Holbourne</i> .	
3	Essex,	70	480		
4	Antelope,	50	300		
6	Gibraltar,	24	160		
fl.	Ferret,	10	14		100
3	Grafton,	70	520	Capt. <i>Holmes</i> ordered 29th <i>March</i> 1756 to proceed to <i>North America</i> with these ships, and take upon him the command of the ships employed there.	
4	Nottingham,	60	400		
6	Nightingale,	24	140		

THE monthly list of the *Admiralty* giving an abstract of the disposition of the ships, &c. in sea pay, for the month of *March* 1756.

	rate.	ships.	men.	
<i>East Indies,</i>	}	3	2	975
		4	2	660
		6	1	140
		sloop	1	90
			6	1865
<hr/>				
<i>Jamaica,</i>	}	3	1	500
<i>Plantations,</i>		4	12	3760
<i>Leeward Islands</i>	}	5	3	810
		6	12	1740
		sloops	9	640
<hr/>				
<i>Nova Scotia,</i>	}	5		
		1	sloop	
			36	7450
<hr/>				
				To

	rate.	ships.	men.
Convoys and Cruisers,	2	1	770
To <i>Lisbon</i> ,	1 70	3 8	4415
	2 24	4 11	3960
<i>St. Helena</i> ,	1 50	5 3	750
<i>West's Squadron</i> ,	11	6 11	1720
<i>Sir Edward Hawke</i> ,	15	sloops 22	1850
Off <i>Brest</i> ,	4	arm. v. 4	320
<i>Downs</i> , Vice Admiral } <i>Smith</i> ,	7 13	60	13785
			<hr/>
		1 3	2450
		2 6	4140
<i>Cork</i> ,	1 60	3 23	12145
At home,	46 above 50	4 15	5510
	12 under	5 4	1030
		6 8	1280
At home,		sloops 6	519
		firesh. 2	100
		yachts 5	210
		hof. sh. 3	101
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		75	27476
			<hr/>
		1 3	2450
		2 7	4910
		3 34	18035
		4 42	14870
		5 11	2840
General abstract,		6 35	5340
		sloop 39	3170
		arm. v. 4	320
		firesh. 2	100
		yachts 5	210
		hof. sh. 3	101
		<hr/>	<hr/>
		185	52346
			THE

THE intelligence from the *Hague*, in *April*, affected much to discountenance the reality of the *French* design against *Minorca*: for, tho' the writer was constrained by the general report, to acknowledge that the *French* boasted much of their resolution to attack that island, he would persuade, that this attack was not near so ready as they would have it believed; or, that those preparations at *Toulon* were calculated only to divide the forces of *England*, and to get an opportunity to send forces to *America*.\*

THE advices in lord *Holderness's* office of the 2d of this month, confirm the design against *Minorca*, adding, by way of speculation, that the *French* intended to take advantage of the siege of *Mahon*, to facilitate their invasion of *England*. Others of the 9th relate, that the duke *de Richlieu* publicly declared he was going with twenty eight battalions and fourteen ships to besiege *Port Mahon*, and those of the 28th brought an account of their descent on *Minorca*.

SIR *Benjamin Keene* on the 13th writes, that the *French* hoped to take *Minorca* by a *coup de*

\*Received *April* 2d, also 13th, received 16th. Yet letters from the same place of the 16th advise, that they expected to put to sea by the 10th: and those of the 27th, that the *Toulon* fleet had met with a storm on the 13th, and weathered it pretty well.

*main*, before the arrival of Admiral *Byng* : and  
 \* that their fleet consisting of three hundred sail  
 had put to sea on the 10th.

THIS was confirmed by lord *Bristol*, who  
 writes from *Turin* on the 24th of *April*, that  
 the *French* fleet set sail on the *tenth*, drove back  
 on the *eleventh*, out again on the *twelfth*, with  
 orders in case of separation, to lose no time in  
 making *Minorca*; and that the marshal *Richlieu*  
 expected to meet in three days with the whole  
 fleet, carrying twenty four battalions, and one  
 of artillery ; each battalion containing thirteen  
 companies of forty men each.

CONSUL *Birtles* mentions (*April* 3d and 15th)  
 that they had immense quantities of provisions  
 on board of thirty two large merchant ships,  
 besides four thousand sheep, and one thousand  
 two hundred live oxen, to be used in drawing  
 cannon, and then to be slaughtered : five thou-  
 sand new tents : furnaces for heating cannon  
 shot ; one hundred horses for officers ; all ma-  
 terials for a siege : bricks for ovens : and that a  
*Swedish* ship saw the *French* fleet of seventeen  
 ships of war, and one hundred and thirty three  
 transports, only nine leagues from *Minorca* on  
 the seventeenth. That he was on board admiral  
*Gallassioniere*, and was informed that eighty  
 five transports were then missing\*.

\* Letters from *Genoa*, *April* 28th, received *May* 17th.

\* *April* 19th.

LIEUTENANT general *Fowke*, on the twenty ninth and thirtieth, inclosed a list of the squadron, and informs, that the *French* landed at *Ciudadella*, from eleven to fifteen thousand men, from about one hundred and sixty vessels on the eighteenth, and reached *Mabon* on the 20th.

CONSUL *Miller* at *Barcelona* (*April 17th*) relates that the whole fleet consisted of three hundred sail; that it put to sea on the 10th, and that the garrison of *Mabon* had marched into *Fort St. Philip*, with a Resolution to defend it.

MR. *Villettes* begins (*April 2d*) his Advices in this Month, with an Account of the embarkation; and allows, that if one may judge by the appearances of the Expedition against *Mabon*, it will not fail meeting with success; because the garrison was *weak*, and but *few* ships on that station: and also declares (*April 7th*) that the general opinion was, that the *Toulon* equipment was designed against *Mabon*: yet he

*viz.* one of 80 guns, three of 70, five of 64, two of 50, three of 30, and two of 24. Consul *Banks* made them twelve men of war, five frigates, two xebecs, four galleys, two galliots, four bombs, 233 vessels with square sails carrying 18,000 land forces, and fifty larger vessels with stores and provisions: Consul *Banks* remarked that they shipped a great deal of battering artillery, and 4000 barrels of powder.

affects to discover some other intention: *first*, that their design was to provoke the *English* to send a strong squadron up the *Mediterranean*, in order to put it between two fires, that, at *Brest*, being upon the watch to follow it; or to improve the opportunity by invading *England*, in its absence. *Secondly*, he is very confident that this expedition was against *Italy*, either with an intention to secure *Corfica*, or to take possession of *Villa Franca*, or *Cagliari*, to prevent *England's* retiring thither, or to fall unexpectedly on *Tuscany*, to engage a war on the continent. But *Mabon* is certainly not the true object of the present expedition—probably the fleet may steer that way, and carry the appearance of an invasion, but it will only be to cover better this design, and they will not stay long. Thus, this gentleman persevered in destroying by his chimerical glosses all the plain intelligence he received from time to time concerning *Minorca*; and shewed that he was as obstinate in his unbelief of the most certain tokens and declarations against that island, as the *Antediluvians* were to the voice of *Noah*, persuading them to provide against the judgments hanging over their heads; and when there was no room left for conjecture, he winds up all with an *IF*. “ If (says he) the *English* are deceived in thinking the project against *Mabon* was but a feint; the old officers of the *French* troops did not think otherwise, and gave very good reasons for it. The event has shewn that they were

M “ equally

“equally mistaken,” A pretty excuse! acknowledges that all his conjectures were wrong: but comforts himself that he had err’d by giving credit to the deceitful comments of the enemy’s officers, in contempt of the most glaring appearances.

If we now turn our attention to the appearances of an invasion of *England*, they will vanish, as in the former intelligences. The first advices of this sort in Lord *Holderness’s* office, mention an embarkation talked of at *Dunkirk*; and that such ships of war as were not appointed to convoy the embarkation for *Canada*, would be employed to facilitate an invasion: that there were as many ships in the port of *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, and *Boulogne*, as might carry four thousand men; and ten ships in the road of the *Isle de Dieu*: that cannon, &c. were sent to *Havre*; fifteen thousand muskets to *Dunkirk*, and several camps of ten thousand men each, would encamp on the coasts of the channel in *May*, in such a manner, as to be able to join in a few days<sup>z</sup>: that it was believed there would be a *serious attempt* to land a *great number* of troops in *England* or *Ireland*. And in the advices to the admiralty, we find the collector of *Wells* transmitting the information of one *James Gardner*, master of the *Friends Adventure* from *Rotterdam*, who said, that on *Sunday, April 11th*, ten leagues from land, he fell in with the

<sup>z</sup> See letters dated 2d, 7th, 13th, 16th, and 19th of *April*.  
Glasgow,



*Glasgow*, of *Glasgow*, *Robert Story* master, who informed him that he left *Havre* on the 8th instant, and that the *French* were at that time embarking troops, some of which he actually saw going on board; but did not say what number of transports were in that harbour.

BUT certainly all this must amount to nothing, when the very same authorities assured that the ships in the ports of *Dunkirk*, &c. were, for the chief part unrigged<sup>a</sup>. That there appeared no dispositions for an invasion of *England*<sup>b</sup>: that the *French* were in a most terrible situation; their finances disordered, councils divided, &c.<sup>c</sup> and that after the resolution of transporting ten thousand *Hanoverians*, they had judged an invasion impracticable.

H O W E V E R, nothing more was done this month towards the defence of *Minorca*, only Admiral *Byng* made shift, after almost a whole month spent in equipping his squadron, to sail with ten ships of the line, having on board one regiment, 100 recruits, and forty-two officers belonging to the four regiments at *Minorca*<sup>e</sup>. A delay, which cannot be well accounted for, con-

<sup>a</sup> Letter in Lord *Holderness's* office, *April* 2d.

<sup>b</sup> *April* 9th, *ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> *April* 7th, *ibid.*

<sup>d</sup> *April* 20th, *ibid.*

<sup>e</sup> He was joined at *Gibraltar* by two ships of the line and five frigates under Mr. *Edgecombe*, and 270 soldiers from the garrison at *Gibraltar*.

sidering the state and condition of the ships in the several ports of these kingdoms at the time of Admiral *Byng's* departure from *St. Hellen's*.

	ships.	men born.	mustered.
<i>Deptford</i> , 3	1 28 fitting	} 9	420 351
2	24 1 fit. upon stocks		
6	arm. ves. floops yachts,		
<i>Woolwich</i> , 1	1 fitting	} 4	688 448
4	1 fitt		
6	1 { fitting		
fl. 1	1		
<i>Chatham</i> ,	1	1	237 139
<i>Sheerness</i> , 2	1 guardship	} 10	1515 1207
4	3 2 fit. 1 fitting		
6	3 fitting, fit.& refitting		
fl. 2	1 wants 1 fit		
	armed vessel 1 fitting		
<i>Deal</i> ,	3 1	} 4	1133 1011
	5 2		
fl. 1	1		
<i>Portsmouth</i> , 1	1 90 refitting	} 26	9050 7080
	2 2 90 fitting 1		
	2 80		
	3 1 80		
	1 74		
12—70 to 50	} mostly fit.		
5—44 to 20	} and fitted		

*Plymouth*,

[ 165 ]

	ships.		ships.	men born.	mustered.
<i>Plymouth,</i>	1 74	} fit, all but one under re- pair	}	13	3315
	1 70				
	2 60				
	2 50				
	1 44				
	2 24	} fit all but one. sloop wants cleaning	}		2766
	1 20				
	3 fl.				
Of the Line	33			<hr/>	
		Total		67	16358 13002

A DELAY and weakness to which Admiral *Byng* attributed his inability to relieve *Mabon*: and we may justly complain for giving the *French* an opportunity to land, and to strengthen themselves on the island of *Minorca*, while we had so strong a fleet in readiness to sail, and kept inactive at home; except *five* ships of the line ordered *April* 1st. under Admiral *Holbourne* to join Sir *Edward Hawke* in the Bay.

IN consequence of this measure, from this fatal hour, every packet and express brought some advantages gained by the enemy, who had no force to curb their operations. For, Commodore *Edgewcombe* was glad to retire with safety to *Gibraltar*, and the garrison of *Fort St. Philip* did not exceed 2400 effective men<sup>f</sup>, and about 100 of the train of artillery, when the siege

<sup>f</sup> The men thrown in by Mr. *Edgewcombe* made them 2600 effective men in all.

commenced. And the handle which Mr. Byng made of the *weakness* of his Squadron to excuse his not attempting to raise the siege, or to relieve *Fort St. Philip*, does not require a repetition in this place, it being so fully set forth in his *Trial and Defence*.

THE *French* having got, by this means, possession of all the open country and towns on *Minorca*, without the loss of a man, Lord *Bristol* informed that the *French* were making great preparations for another embarkation at *Toulon* of eight battalions, with a great increase of ammunition and stores, and also to augment *Galassioniere's* Squadron with five men of war and one frigate getting ready at *Toulon*, where they pressed sailors of all nations. All which was confirmed by Consul *Birtles*, Consul *Dick*, and Mr. *Villetes*, who adds that the towns (in *Provence* and *Languedoc*) had been so stripped of their cannon, &c. in order to support the expedition against *Minorca*, that 6000 men supported by a Squadron of fifteen men of war would be more than sufficient to take them all in eight days, without coming to a siege; and that this expedition would cost upwards of 120 millions.

BUT all this did not spirit up any further armament than five ships of the line with one regiment, and 100 of the train, mostly miners from *Newcastle*, raised for the purpose, sent to reinforce

reinforce Admiral *Byng*: which did not arrive at *Gibraltar*, before his return from the inglorious action of the 20th of *May*, and the surrender of *Fort St. Philip's*.

MIGHT not therefore the impartial reader of the foregoing intelligence and accounts, instead of adhering to the resolutions recited at the beginning of this pamphlet, discover, with greater certainty,

THAT so early as the 14th of *April* 1755, ten ships of the line were ordered to be equipped at *Toulon*, and that from the 25th of *August* 1755, they went on equipping a fleet without intermission, till the siege of *Minorca* was over, which fleet by undoubted advices to the admiralty in *September* 1755, would consist of twelve ships of the line ready to put to sea in two months, and seven more of the line would be ready in the spring, and none of the subsequent accounts ever made the *Toulon* fleet less than twelve ships of the line, but most of the intelligence made them more against the spring.

THAT so early as the 27th of *August* 1755, Consul *Banks* of *Cartagena*, advised Sir *Thomas Robinson* of the arrival of one hundred and eighty battalions in *Roussillon* designed against *Minorca*, which advice, added to all reports and suspicions, founded upon a variety of circum-

cumstances, was confirmed by letters from Consul *Birtles* of *Genoa*, dated the 17th and 26th of *January*, and received by Mr. *Fox* on the 4th and 11th of *February*, and by all the following advices from all parts relative to the destination of the armaments in the southern provinces of *France*.

THAT notwithstanding these advices after hostilities had commenced even in *Europe*; there being but four incomplete regiments and one company of the artillery in *Minorca*, forty two officers of which were absent; there being but two men of war of the line and five frigates, under Mr. *Edgecombe* in the *Mediterranean*, and the garrison short of provisions for a siege; neither stores, ammunition, provisions, officers belonging to the garrison, recruits, for the four regiments ready raised, or miners, or any additional troops were sent to the island, nor our squadron in the *Mediterranean* augmented, until Admiral *Byng* sailed on the 6th of *April* 1756, with no more ships of the line, than, by the most early and authentick intelligence, the government were sure would sail from *Toulon*, even if Mr. *Edgecombe's* squadron joined Mr. *Byng*; which was quite uncertain; and without any more troops than what belonged to the four regiments of the garrison, except one regiment, who were to serve as marines in the fleet, and an order for a batallion to be taken on board at *Gibraltar*, which could

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not be understood by a council of war there, and was not obeyed. See Byng's *Tryal and Defence*.

· THAT Admiral *Osborne* with thirteen ships of the line and one frigate, who failed to convoy a fleet of merchantmen the 30th of *January* and returned the 16th of *February* 1756, might and ought to have gone to *Minorca*, considering the expos'd situation it was in, and the forwardness of the enemy's preparations at *Toulon*, and that *Great Britain*, in sparing these ships, for this service, could not be insulted nor injured by the sixteen ships then fitting out at *Brest* or *Rockfort* (part of which by the intelligence the government had, could not be ready till *May*) because, exclusive of Mr. *Osborne's* fleet, there were ready to put to sea eight ships of the line, and twenty three frigates, and thirty two of the line, and five frigates fitting, and very near ready; nor should we in the least degree have provoked an invasion, by sending of this fleet to the *Mediterranean*, as the enemy had not at that time made any preparations to execute such a scheme; except marching troops to the sea-coast; and by all the intelligence, received to this time, the *French* court had rejected every plan for that purpose as impracticable, and meant only to alarm and distress *England*, by ordering troops to the sea-coasts.

THAT

THAT before Admiral *Hawke* sailed for the Bay the 27th of *February*, with fourteen ships of the line and one frigate, the government had advice that *d' Aubigny* sailed the 30th of *January* with one ship of the line and two frigates for *Martinico*, and that the six men of war, they sent *Hawke* after, sailed the 19th of *February* for *Domingo*; consequently no prospect of Mr. *Hawke's* intercepting them by cruising in the Bay so long after their departure. And by the departure of those two squadrons, there remained but eleven ships of the line at *Brest* and *Rochfort* in distress for cannon, as *Du Guay's* squadron was obliged to be laid up in order to furnish the nine ships sailed as above with part of the cannon they wanted: the attention to which eleven ships in port, by this fleet of Mr. *Hawke's*, when by the intelligence they could not be ready till *May*, and *Minorca* was in the utmost danger, is most absurd; especially as they were not designed to cover an embarkation against *Great Britain*, but by repeated accounts, received before Mr. *Hawke* sailed, were bound to *Canada* with 6000 troops: intercepting of which was by no means an object of any consequence in comparison with the preservation of *Minorca*. And if it had been, or this squadron was to have covered the landing of troops in this kingdom, we had by this time so many ships; besides Mr. *Hawke's* fleet, ready; that his whole fleet might have been spared, with safety to his country for the security of  
*Minorca,*



*Minorca*, and another sufficient sent into the *Bay* before the fleet for *Canada* would have failed. But how amazing is it, that notwithstanding this situation of affairs, instead of yet sending any succours or protection to *Minorca*, they, on the 8th of *March*, send two ships of the line and three frigates off *Cape Barstour*, to intercept a coasting convoy only; on the 11th of *March*, two of the line to the *West Indies*, and on the 19th two of the line to *North America*, where they were insufficient either to protect or acquire any material object: On the 23d of *March* two of the line and three frigates off *Cheburgh* to intercept the above coasting convoy also, and on the first of *April* five of the line (three of which returned from watching the coasting convoy) under *Holbourne* to reinforce *Hawke* in the *Bay*, when he was already much too strong for the fleet bound to *Canada*, some of them being only *armes en suite*, and not expected out till *May*. All of which ships might have been added to Mr. *Byng's* squadron without endangering *Great Britain*, according to the government's own apprehensions of an invasion at that time; for if these ships could be spared abroad for the above services, they certainly might for *Minorca*: and then Mr. *Byng's* squadron would have been 20 of the line and six frigates. But instead of adding the above ships to Mr. *Byng's* squadron they sent him with only ten of the line, and even denied him a frigate that he petitioned for to repeat his signals, (see his *Letter to the Admiralty*)

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notwithstanding there was in port then, exclusive of his fleet, seventeen of the line and thirteen frigates ready for sea, and eleven of the line and nineteen frigates fitting: great part of which might also have been sent with him: for there was no armament at that time at *Brest* or *Rockfort*, but that designed for *Canada*: nor was there any necessity to keep one fourth of them at home to oppose any armament in the *French* ports upon the *Chanuel*; for there was not one man of war in them, and by authentic accounts, no more ships or boats of all nations at *Dunkirk*, *Graveline*, *Calais*, and *Boulogne*, than could possibly transport more than 6000 men, nor at *Havre* and *Dicppe* no more than common; nor was there at any one time during the alarm of an invasion, any more shipping, or any preparations for an embarkation, except measuring the vessels to know how many men they would carry. So that the danger of an invasion cannot excuse the long neglect of *Minorca*, nor the sending of so insufficient a force at last.

THAT it appears that the squadron of his Majesty's ships in the *Mediterranean* in the beginning of *December* 1755 consisted of one ship of 60, two of 50 guns, four frigates and one sloop and no more, and that the garrison of *Fort St. Philip*, in the said month of *December* according to the last returns made on the 31st of *July* 1755 consisted of 2860 men, officers included, and no more, and that after that time no

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ship or ships of war whatever were sent to reinforce the said squadron, nor any recruits, nor reinforcements whatever to the said garrison till the sailing of the squadron under Admiral *Byng*, on the 6th of *April* 1756. That it appears that a greater number of ships of war could have been sent into the *Mediterranean*, than those sent on the 6th of *April* 1756.


THAT on the 30th of *March* 1756, and not before, orders were given for raising a company of miners, and on the 7th of *May*, in a letter from Mr. *Fox*, being after the commencement of the siege of fort *St. Philip's*, directions were given for sending three more battalions, for the reinforcement of that garrison.

THAT it appears that the repeated advices received by the government, of the beginning, progress, and destination of the fleet, equipping at *Toulon* in the years 1755 and 1756, and that the not sending an earlier and stronger naval force to the *Mediterranean* than that which sailed under Admiral *Byng* (notwithstanding as above) were some of the principal causes of the loss of *Minorca*.

THAT it appears that the delaying to send any reinforcement of troops to the island of *Minorca*, till the departure of Admiral *Byng* on the 6th of *April* 1756, the suffering the officers

cers belonging to the garrison, to continue absent from their posts, and the not giving any orders for raising miners for the defence of fort *St. Philip*, till the 30th of *March* 1756, are some of the principal causes of the loss of *Minorca*.

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