




**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

**CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.**

**CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.**



Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

© 1985

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur
- Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagée
- Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque
- Coloured maps/
Cartes géographiques en couleur
- Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- Bound with other material/
Relié avec d'autres documents
- Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/
La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge intérieure
- Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/
Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsqu'il était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- Additional comments:/
Commentaires supplémentaires:

- Coloured pages/
Pages de couleur
- Pages damaged/
Pages endommagées
- Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- Pages detached/
Pages détachées
- Showthrough/
Transparence
- Quality of print varies/
Qualité inégale de l'impression
- Includes supplementary material/
Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- Only edition available/
Seule édition disponible
- Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/
Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/
Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	12X	14X	16X	18X	20X	22X	24X	26X	28X	30X	32X
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>							

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:




Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol \rightarrow (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ∇ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:



L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Bibliothèque nationale du Québec

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole \rightarrow signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ∇ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.

é
étails
s du
modifier
r une
image


es

errata
l to

t
e pelure,
on à

32X





H I S T O R Y
OF THE
C O L O N I Z A T I O N
OF THE
FREE STATES OF ANTIQUITY.



2

THE
MUSEUM

OF
NATURAL HISTORY

OF
THE
CITY OF
NEW YORK

H I S T O R Y
OF THE
C O L O N I Z A T I O N
OF THE
F R E E S T A T E S O F A N T I Q U I T Y,

APPLIED TO THE
Present CONTEST between GREAT BRITAIN and her
AMERICAN COLONIES.

WITH
REFLECTIONS concerning the future SETTLEMENT of these
COLONIES.

BIBLIOTHÈQUE
SAINT-SULPICE

L O N D O N:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL IN THE STRAND.

M, DCC, LXXVII.

THE STATE OF

NEW YORK

IN SENATE

JANUARY

1880

REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSIONERS

OF

THE LAND OFFICE

AND

OF THE

4

C O N T E N T S.

INTRODUCTION Page 1

C H A P. I.

OF THE CARTHAGINIANS.

SECT. I.

Their Origin—Flourishing State—Settlements 5

SECT. II.

History of the Carthaginians obscure—They restricted the Trade of their Colonies—Imposed Taxes on them 10

C H A P. II.

OF THE GREEKS.

SECT. I.

General View of the Political Constitution and Resources of the Greek States 21

SECT. II.

Causes of Colonization among the Greeks—Their Settlements in Magna Graecia—Croton—Thurii—Tarantum 31

SECT. III.

Greek Colonies in Sicily—Syracusians—Their Conduct on Occasion of the Persian Invasion—and in the Peloponnesian War—Set at Liberty by Timoleon—Receive numerous Emigrations from Greece 49

b SECT.

S E C T. IV.

Asiatic Colonies—Subjected to Taxation by the Athenians.—Rebellion of the Samians—and of the Lesbians Page 48

S E C T. V.

Colony of Corcyra—Contest between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians, about the Supremacy of the Colony of Epidamnus—The Determination of the Athenians on that Subject 59

S E C T. VI.

Thracian Colonies—Amphipolis—Potidaea—Review of the Colonization of Greece 67

C H A P. III.

OF THE ROMANS.

S E C T. I.

Progress of the Roman Arms—Policy of that People relative to conquered States—Their Municipia—Socii—Praefecturae—Colonies—Reasons of Colonization 78

S E C T. II.

Colonies of two Kinds, Roman and Latin—Constitution and Privileges of a Roman Colony—of a Latin Colony—Former a Model of a British American Colony 84

S E C T. III.

Colonies planted before the Julian Law—Their Number—Allotments of Land—Subject to the Supreme Jurisdiction of the Parent State, particularly to Taxation—Case of the Colony of Velitrae—and of the refractory Colonies in the second Punic War—Exemption from Land-Service claimed by the Maritime Colonies 95

S E C T.

C O N T E N T S. vii

S E C T. IV.

*Account of the Julian Law—Consequences of it—Military Colonies
planted by Sylla—Julius Caesar—Augustus—Provincial Colonies
—Aversion of the Romans from settling distant Colonies—Review
of the Principles and Practice of the Romans respecting Coloni-
zation* Page 106

C H A P. IV.

Application of the preceding NARRATIVE to the pre-
sent CONTEST between GREAT BRITAIN and her
COLONIES in AMERICA.

S E C T. I.

*Ambitious Views of the American Colonists—Similar Views enter-
tained by the rebellious Colonists of Carthage—Athens—and Rome
—Right of Britain to tax America supported by the Practice of
the Carthaginians—Greeks—and Romans—None of the Colonists
of Antiquity admitted to a Participation of the Civil Government
of the Parent State* 124

S E C T. II.

*Independent Principles not easily to be eradicated from the Minds of
the Americans—Modes of Settlement—The supporting a Standing
Army in America—The admitting into Parliament Representatives
from the Colonists—Respective Advantages and Disadvantages
of each Scheme.* 138

A D V E R-

A D V E R T I S E M E N T .

THE following are the Editions of the antient Authors most frequently referred to in the Course of this Effay : Polybius Casauboni, Diodorus Siculus Wesselingii, Herodotus Gronovii, Thucydides Hudsoni, Appianus Tollii, Titus Livius Drakenborchii, Paterculus Burmanni. When Dionysius of Halicarnassus is quoted, the Part of his Works appealed to is the Antiquities of Rome published by Hudson.

C O L O N I Z A T I O N
O F
F R E E S T A T E S.



I N T R O D U C T I O N.

COLONIZATION is one of the methods which nations, in all ages, have employed to secure their conquests, or to extend their territories. If a tract of country had been ravaged and depopulated by war, a colony was provided to re-people, to defend, or to cultivate it. If it was possessed by inhabitants, few in number, and unwarlike, who had territory to spare, and would make little resistance to the first invaders, it was considered as a captivating prey to any state advanced in cultivation, or perhaps overloaded with people; and a colony was dispatched to seize and appropriate it. Accordingly, we find that colonization proceeds nearly in the same direction, and almost keeps pace with the progress of civilization. The history of society informs us, that civilization has held its course from east to west, from Asia, through Africa and Europe,

A

and

and from Europe to America. Colonization follows the same line. From the best accounts of transactions so remote, it appears, that the Asiatics first became conspicuous by their settlements on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean sea; that they planted colonies in the greater part of the islands, and on many of the coasts of that sea; and that they peopled, or, at least, introduced cultivation into Greece itself. From Greece we trace the direction of colonization to Italy and Sicily; and, from Italy, it extended, under the Romans, to the western boundaries of their empire. From the subversion of the Roman empire in Europe, to the discovery of America and the Indies, the practice of colonization seems to have been suspended. The barbarity and ignorance which universally prevailed during that time, and the dominion usurped by superstition and folly over the minds of men, repressed every enterprise which might contribute to polish and improve mankind.

The discovery of America and the Indies presented a great field for adventures. The greater part of the nations of Europe attempted to obtain a share of the new countries, and sent out colonies for that purpose. The maritime powers, however, possessed advantages superior to the other states. They monopolized, in a great measure, the American and Indian establishments, so that most of them have become the property of England, Holland, France, Portugal, and Spain.

A practice so general, it is natural to expect, should be the result of some common principles of human nature, or the constitution
of

of civil society. A similarity of management, for this reason, would probably be adopted by the several states who, at different times, have sent out colonies; and, if such management can be discovered, it will lead to the general principles of colonization. If, however, we shall not be so fortunate as to ascend to principles, it may still be useful to survey, with attention, the conduct of cultivated and enlightened nations, as, from their example, we shall probably derive the most important instruction.

At a season when the rebellion of the British colonies in America, one of the greatest events of modern times, engages deeply the attention of the nation, when the re-establishment of peace will probably soon become the subject of parliamentary discussion, an author, unknown to the leaders of public measures, prompted by no view of emolument, animated only with a love of truth, and with zeal for the preservation of a constitution the most perfect the world ever beheld, offers to his countrymen an history of colonization, as practised chiefly by the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans. His great object has been, to investigate the nature of the connection which subsisted between these nations and their colonies; to determine the extent of the jurisdiction the former assumed over the latter; but, particularly, to ascertain the practice of antiquity with regard to the much controverted article of taxation. Two reasons induced him to undertake this task: *First*, Because he had observed, in the course of the controversy concerning the propriety and justice of the present war, the practice of antiquity frequently appealed to, and commonly misrepresented; but, chiefly, because

cause he wished to prepare the nation for the parliamentary settlement * which may take place on the submission of the colonies, both by suggesting to the legislature itself all the information which can be derived from the purest and most satisfactory precedents of ancient history, and by attempting to reconcile the minds of the people in general to that settlement, when they shall find it, perhaps, supported by the policy of those ages which enjoyed the most perfect civil liberty.

In pursuing his inquiries, the writer has not satisfied himself with any secondary authorities. He has had recourse to the originals themselves ; and, that every reader, who chuses to take the trouble, may be satisfied of his integrity and candour, he has been always careful to refer to the sources from which he derived his information. The multiplicity of ancient authors, whose names appear on the margin, may give an air of pedantry to the performance ; but this circumstance will be of small importance, if it shall add weight and conviction.

CHAP.

* The public seems to expect such a settlement. The proclamation of the Commissioners in America offers a revival of the exceptionable acts of parliament : And the capital publications on the side of government give hints of representation.

C H A P. I.

OF THE CARTHAGINIANS.

S E C T. I.

Their Origin—Flourishing State—Settlements.

THE Phoenicians were the most early civilized people of whom we have any account in profane history. They had acquired the knowledge of letters and arts at a period when all the western part of the world was sunk in barbarity and ignorance. Their situation on the sea-coast, and the narrowness of their territory, obliged them to have recourse to commerce and navigation for subsistence; and they carried these arts to a degree of perfection unrivalled by antiquity, and hardly to be credited in modern times.

They first extended themselves along the south coast of the Mediterranean sea; and, at different times, occupied almost the whole of it, from the borders of Egypt to the Straits of Gibraltar. They planted many lesser colonies in that rich and pleasant country, among which the names of Utica *, Hipponne, Adrumetum, and

B

Leptis,

* Justin. lib. 18.

Leptis *, still exist, before they founded their great establishment at Carthage. Utica, according to Aristotle †, was settled no less than 280 years before the building of Carthage. The last, however, in time, engrossed the territories, extinguished even the names of the greater part of the rest, and, perhaps, allowed only emigrations from Tyre, without admitting any more colonists.

The Carthaginians became rapidly one of the most opulent and flourishing states in the world. Every circumstance was favourable. They brought along with them a knowledge of many of the most useful arts of life. They had no foreign enemy to check their enterprises, or to strip them of the fruits of their industry. They possessed a climate so healthy, that Sallust tells us ‡, few of the inhabitants died of any infirmity but old age. Their soil was so grateful to the labour of the husbandman, that its fertility is celebrated by many of the writers § of antiquity. They enjoyed the most extensive naval commerce known in ancient times; and they lived under a free government, resembling that of the Romans ||, composed of Sufetes or Consuls, of a senate, and of assemblies of the people. From all these causes, they had risen to such power, at the beginning of the last Punic war, that the city of Carthage

* Sallust. Jugur. † De mirabilibus. ‡ Jugur.

§ Horace, Ovid, Pliny, Polybius, and Sallust. They tell us, in the usual language of early society, applied to the produce of corn, that the lands of Africa yielded, not only a hundred fold, but frequently two hundred fold, and sometimes even three.

|| Polyb. lib. 6. cap. 49.

thage contained no fewer than 700,000 inhabitants *. In Africa, they had 300 cities under their jurisdiction; and they possessed a line of the finest coast in the world, of near 2000 miles in length, extending from the Syrtis Major to the Pillars of Hercules †. They had acquired, beside, the south-east coast of Spain, and very probably a large portion of the interior part of the country, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the east extremity of the Pyrenean mountains. To all which they had added settlements in many of the islands ‡ of the Mediterranean, but especially in Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balears §.

In the most flourishing state of their affairs, but it is uncertain precisely at what time, the Carthaginian senate || planned two great naval expeditions, which were directed to pass the Straits, and to steer their courses, one toward the south, and the other toward the north. The design of these armaments was, to make discoveries, and to settle colonies on the shores of the Atlantic. The former was commanded by Hanno, and the latter by Himilco. Hanno wrote an account of his voyage, and published it in his own language; but the original is unfortunately lost. There remains, however, a Greek translation of this work ¶; and from it we learn that Hanno embarked in a fleet of sixty ships, containing no fewer than 30,000 people, with all the implements necessary to build houses, and to settle colonies. He sailed slowly southward, measuring his course

* Strab. lib. 17.

† Polyb. lib. 3. cap. 3.

‡ Appian, lib. 1. cap. 1.

§ Majorca and Minorca.

|| Pliny, lib. 5.

¶ Called Hanno's Periplus.

The Greek translation was published at Basil, anno 1533, by Sigismundus Galenius.

course by the days it occupied ; and stopped at proper distances, to explore the country, and to plant settlements. He gave names to the places in which he left inhabitants ; but these names are either so mangled in the translation, a practice frequent with Greek writers when they use foreign words, or the settlements of Hanno were so soon demolished, that no mention is made of them in any maps, either antient or modern. Bochart *, guided by the etymology of the Carthaginian language, which he holds to have been a dialect of the Hebrew, is of opinion, that Cernè †, a place near Mount Atlas, and consequently, about the 28th degree of north latitude, was the last station in which Hanno planted a colony. He proceeded, however, farther southward, to make discoveries. He reached a great broad river, which he does not name ; but describes by indelible marks, its abounding with crocodiles, and the hippopotamus. Bochart concludes, with much probability, that this description can apply only to the river Gambia, one of the branches of the Niger, which runs into the Atlantic near the Island of Goree. He is induced to adopt this conclusion, from the consideration, that no other great river is to be found, for many degrees south and north of the Niger, and that it is the only river on the west coast of Africa, in which the crocodile and hippopotamus are discovered. If this opinion is to be adopted, Hanno penetrated beyond the tropic of Cancer, and within fourteen degrees of the line ; a navigation not a little surprising, when we reflect that it was performed by coasting, and without the knowledge of the compass.

Of

* Vol. 5. page 643.

† Cernè signifies, the last colony, or, the farthest inhabited land.

Of the voyage to the north of the Straits, there remains not on record a single transaction, except that it was conducted by Himilco, and performed in four months. No evidence could have been produced, even of its existence, had it not been occasionally mentioned by Pliny *, and by Festus Avienus, a poet of the fourth century, who writes, that he read an account of it in a Carthaginian author. Of the navigations, however, of the Phoenicians into these seas, the most incontestible proofs may be collected. Their frequent voyages to the Cassiterides †, from which they brought tin for the supply of the Mediterranean market, are noticed by many antient authors of the best credit ‡. But as, neither in these voyages, nor in those to an unknown island in the Atlantic, recorded by Diodorus Siculus ||, nor in the still more splendid navigation narrated by Herodotus §, in which the Phoenicians embarked on the Red Sea, sailed round the south coast of Africa, and returned home by the Pillars of Hercules, are any accounts to be

C

found

* Lib. 5. † Either Britain or the Scilly islands. ‡ Strab. lib. 5.
Pliny, lib. 7. Herodotus, lib. 3. cap. 115. || Lib. 5. cap. 19.

§ Melpomene. Herodotus remarks, that the accounts of this voyage were incredible; because the voyagers related, that, in sailing round the shores of Africa, they beheld the ecliptic, or the daily course of the sun, lying toward the north. The ignorance of the historian, in this case, is more reprehensible than his incredulity; and the objection is a confirmation of the truth of the narration it is brought to confute. A circumstance, so incredible at that time, could scarcely be fabricated; nor can it be easily supposed, that such an appearance could have been imagined, unless it had been seen. It is now universally known, that this appearance actually attends the voyage round the coast of Africa. Little doubt, then, seems to remain, that the Phoenicians were in possession of one of the most important and splendid discoveries of modern times, the navigation to the Indian seas by the Cape of Good Hope.

found of the establishment of colonies, or any facts which may throw light upon the management of them, it is improper here to pursue their history.

S E C T. II.

History of the Carthaginians obscure—They restricted the Trade of their Colonies—Imposed Taxes on them.

IT is much to be regretted, that no historical monuments remain of the Carthaginians composed by themselves. The accounts of them that exist are derived chiefly from the authors of Rome, whose narrations are marked with all the characteristics of partiality natural to the writers of a rival nation. Previous to the period at which they contended with that republic for the empire of the world, their history is in a great measure unknown; and, even posterior to that period, it is confined chiefly to their military and naval operations. The Roman writers thought it unnecessary to narrate more of the Carthaginian affairs than was requisite to explain their own. They give an account of their great transactions, their battles, and the number of their fleets and armies; but they leave us almost ignorant of their civil constitution, their commerce, and their laws. These circumstances render it impossible to trace, with entire satisfaction, their management of their colonies. Enough, however, remains to prove, that the jurisdiction they assumed over them was very extensive.

The

The most authentic documents on this subject are, the treaties of peace and commerce concluded between the Carthaginians and the Romans, which fortunately have been preserved by Polybius*. They are very curious remains of antiquity, as well on account of their matter as of their brevity and simplicity, and merit highly the perusal of the reader. The first was concluded the year after the expulsion of the Kings of Rome, under the Consulship of Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, 28 years before the expedition of Xerxes † into Greece, and 246 from the building of Rome. It breathes a jealous commercial spirit, eager to guard against the dangers of invasion, but forward to encourage navigation for the purposes of trade. It stipulates, that the Romans should not, with any ship of war ‡, approach nearer to the shores of Carthage than the head of the White Promontory §, unless driven to the southward of that Cape, by stress of weather,

or

* Lib. 3. cap. 22. &c.

† 75 Olympiad. The aeras most frequently mentioned in this treatise are the Olympiads, and the building of Rome. The Olympiads were terms of four years, and served to compute time among the Greeks. The building of Rome answered the same purpose among the Romans. That the reader may easily know how to reduce both to the vulgar æra, let him remember, that the beginning of the Olympiads corresponds to the year 777 before Christ; and the building of Rome to the year 753 before Christ. The Trojan war is reckoned to have happened about 400 years before the beginning of the Olympiads.

DONWELL'S TABLE.

‡ Longa navis, as explained by Polybius.

§ Antient Carthage stood at the bottom of a deep bay, 30 miles north of the city of Tunis. On the east side of this bay, a long cape run northward into the sea, and divided the bay from the Syrtis Minor. The head of this cape was called Pulchrum Promontorium.

or pursued by an enemy; in which cases, they were obliged to depart in five days. It grants, however, admission, into the Carthaginian harbours, to all trading vessels of Rome. It even exempts them from all imposts, and expence, except what might be due to the crier, or clerk of the sales. It offers the same privileges to commercial ships of Rome along all the coasts of Carthage, in the island of Sardinia, and in that part of the island of Sicily which was subject to the Carthaginians*.

From this treaty, it is evident, that the Carthaginians thought themselves at liberty to extend, or restrict, as they pleased, the commerce of their colonies in the islands of Sicily and Sardinia; and that the Romans had no right to trade with these settlements, in-
de-

* It will perhaps be acceptable to the reader to peruse this treaty as translated by Casaubon.

“ Amicitia Romanis et Romanorum sociis cum Carthaginiensibus, et Carthaginiensium sociis, his legibus et conditionibus esto. Ne navigant Romani, Romanorumve socii, ultra Pulchrum Promontorium; nisi tempestatis aut hostium vi fuerint compulsi. Si quis vi delatus fuerit, emendi aut accipiendi quicquam, præter necessaria reficiendis navibus et sacris faciendis, jus ne ei esto. Intra diem quintum qui navem applicuerint abeunto. Qui ad mercaturam venerint, ii vestigal nullum pendunto, extra quam ad praeconis aut scribae mercedem. Quicquid hisce praesentibus fuerit venditum, publica fide venditori debetur, quod quidem in Africa aut Sardinia fuerit venditum. Si quis Romanorum in eam Siciliae partem venerit, quae imperio Carthaginiensium patet, jus aequum in omnibus Romani obtinento. Carthaginienses nequid noceant Populo Ardeati, Antiati, Laurentino, Circeiensi, Tarracinenfi, neve ulli alii e Latinis qui sub ditione erunt. Etiam eorum urbibus, qui sub ditione Romanorum non erunt, abstineto. Si quam earum acceperint, Romanis sine ulla noxa tradunto. Castellum ullum in Latino agro ne aedificent; si cum armis infesti pedem in regione posuerint, in ea ne pernoscant.

dependent of stipulation, any more than they were entitled to negotiate with Carthage itself. The allowing of the colonists, on the other hand, to receive in their ports the merchandise of Rome, on the same terms it was admitted at Carthage, though a conspicuous mark of the generosity of the parent state, is a proof, at the same time, that this privilege might have been withheld. But the colonies, perhaps, were then in their infancy, and needed every encouragement to make them flourish. We shall find, from the next treaty, that the mother-country became afterwards more reserved and jealous.

The next treaty seems to have been the great navigation-act of Carthage, and to have remained in force till that republic was divested, in the Punic wars, of the settlements and territories to which it relates. We are uncertain at what time it was framed, as it bears no date; but probably it was concluded not long after the former. In both acts, the allies of Rome are mentioned and included. The same states are enumerated in the latter which had been named in the former; a proof that the Romans had acquired no new allies during the intervening space, and consequently, that it could not be very long, as the conquests of that active and enterprising people proceeded with great rapidity.

On the part of the Carthaginians, this treaty is materially different from the former. The line of limitation, to the southward of which the Roman ships of war were not to approach the shores of Carthage, is extended from the head of the White Promontory to

the cities of Mastia and Tarfeium, which were situated near the pillars of Hercules * ; so that the Roman ships of war must have been excluded from all the coasts of the dominions of Carthage in Africa. Even the trading ships of Rome are prohibited by this treaty from entering the ports of the colonies and cities of Africa Propria †, and the harbours of the island of Sardinia. They are allowed, however, access to Carthage, and to that part of the island of Sicily which was subject to the Carthaginians ‡.

By this negotiation, the commerce of the colonies of Africa and Sardinia is clearly monopolized for the benefit of the mother-country.

* Stephani Dictionarium Geographicum, &c.

† The word in the treaty is *Africa*; but it is plain, *Africa Propria* only can be meant. This country lay to the south and east of the original territories of Carthage. Polybius informs us, lib. 1. cap. 72. that the Carthaginians chiefly drew their provisions and their taxes from it, and reserved their own territories to supply their private expences. In this country, were the colonies of Leptis, Utica, and Hippo.

‡ This treaty is thus translated by Casaubon :

“ Amicitia Romanis et Romanorum focis, cum populo Carthaginiensi, Tyriis, et Uticensibus, eorumque focis, his legibus esto. Romani ultra Pulchrum Promontorium, Mastiam, et Tarfeium, praedas ne faciunt; ad mercaturam ne eunto, urbem nullam condunt. Si in Latio urbem aliquam Carthaginienses ceperint, quae sub ditione Romanorum non erit, pecuniam et captivos ipsi habent; urbem reddunt. Si qui Carthaginiensium aliquos ceperint quoscum foedere scripto juncti sint Romani; qui tamen sub Romanorum imperio non erunt; hos in populi Romani portus

try. If the Romans wanted any of the commodities of these settlements, they were not at liberty to purchase them in the first and cheapest market, but were obliged to procure them, in the best manner they could, in the port of Carthage. If the colonies needed any of the commodities of Rome, they were compelled to seek them in the same channel. To render the monopoly more beneficial for the parent state, the Roman merchants were not allured in this treaty, as in the former, by an exemption from imposts; they were subjected to the same regulations with the citizens of Carthage.

It is impossible, at this distance of time, to ascertain with precision the reason of the indulgence granted to the Carthaginian portion * of the

tus ne deducunt; si quis erit deductus, et manum Romanus injecerit, liber esto. Eodem jure et Romani tenentur. Si Romanus ex aliqua regione quae sub imperio Carthaginiensium erit aquam comaeatue sumpserit; cum his comaeatibus ne cui eorum noceto quibuscum pax et amicitia est Carthaginiensibus facito. Si qua injuria alicui facta erit, privato nomine ejus persecutio ne cuiquam esto; sed ubi tale quid admiserit aliquis, publicum id crimen esto. In Sardinia et Africa neque negotiator quisquam Romanorum, neque urbem condito; neve eo appellito, nisi comaeatus accipiendi gratia, vel naveis reficiendi. Si tempestas detulerit, intra dies quinque excedito. In Sicilia, ubi Carthaginienses imperaverint, item Carthagine omnia Romanus facito, vendito, quae civi licebit. Idem Romae Carthaginiensi jus esto."

This treaty is, in some places, imperfect. Polybius supplies, in the following tenor, what refers to the allies of Rome:

" Similiter Romani cavent ne fiat injuria Ardeatibus, Antiatibus, Circiensibus, Tarracensibus; haec autem sunt oppida Latii maritima, quae legibus hujus foederis volunt esse comprehensa . . .

* It extended along the whole of the south coast, from Lilybaeum to Pachynum. . . Strab. lib. 6. cap. 17.

the island of Sicily, by putting its commerce on the same footing with that of Carthage itself. One reason appears very plausible, that the Carthaginians intended to render popular their government of that island, to raise an emulation between their subjects and those of the Greek colonies *, in order to induce the latter to migrate into their territories ; and, by this means, perhaps, to obtain the dominion of the whole.

No observation is more common in politics than that money is the sinews of war. No observation, however, is more true, than, that, though all historians treat chiefly of war, few of them convey any information about its sinews. It is not easy to account for this defect, principally chargeable against antient history. The fact is indisputable. The author has searched all the antient writers of reputation who mention the Carthaginian affairs ; but has not found in any of them, except Polybius and Livy, the least account of their supplies. They narrate, at the same time, military and naval transactions, of such magnitude, as demonstrate, that these supplies must have been immense.

The leading object of the state of Carthage was commerce ; and that nation excelled all antiquity in the arts of navigation. They were induced to employ mercenary troops in their military operations ; because manufacturers did not make the best soldiers, and because they could hire and maintain foreign troops cheaper than their own. They had, accordingly, mercenaries from all the quarters

* The Romans did not enter Sicily till the first Punic war, many years after the framing of this treaty.

quarters of the old world, Asiatics, Greeks, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans. The first great military expedition in which they engaged, was the invasion of Sicily, when they conspired with Xerxes King of Persia to extinguish for ever the very name of Greece*. Xerxes was to attack the Grecian territories in person, while the Carthaginians invaded their principal colonies in the island of Sicily. Xerxes brought millions of men into the field, threw bridges over the sea, and cut roads through mountains. The Carthaginians approached Sicily with the following stupendous armament; 300,000 men, 2,000 ships of war, and 3,000 transports and victuallers †. No ideas were entertained but those of conquest. When they reached the land, they said, the war was finished, as the only enemy they dreaded was the sea. The Sicilians were not dismayed at the sight of this host, almost innumerable. They set fire to their fleet, and acted by land with an army of L. 50,000 men. They defeated their assailants, killed 150,000 of their troops, and took the rest prisoners. Twenty ships of war escaped the flames, and made the best of their way towards Carthage. But they were overtaken by a storm, and all the crews perished, except a very few men, who, saving themselves in a small boat, informed their countrymen of the melancholy tidings ‡.

However ill contrived, ill conducted, and unsuccessful this armament might be, it was a striking evidence of the resources of Carthage.

E

thage.

* Diodorus, lib. 11. cap. 1. &c.

† These numbers are assigned by Diodorus; and he asserts they are below the truth. Lib. 11. cap. 20.

‡ Diodorus, *ibid.*

thage. Immense must have been the riches of that nation which could make such an exertion. Heavy and extensive must have been the taxes which could furnish such riches.

The last military operations of the Carthaginians were their wars with the Romans; the most memorable transactions of antiquity, whether we consider their duration, their extent, or their consequences. They then contended for universal empire, and were superior to their rivals in every thing but experience in the military art.

The taxes were so heavy, during the first of these wars, that, at the end of it, money could not be procured to pay the arrears of the mercenaries. The troops were collected at Carthage, and the bold proposal was made to them, that, considering the present exigencies of the state, they should relinquish some part of their demands. They were fired with resentment, and rebelled. They were joined by all the discontented colonies and cities in Africa Propria *, who were provoked, no less by the quantity of the exactions during the war, than by the severity of the manner in which they were collected. A dreadful civil war ensued, which endangered the existence of the Commonwealth.

The reader will not be surprised at such convulsions, when he is informed, that the chief burden of the war was laid on these provinces.

* Polyb. lib. 1. c. 6.

vinces. The inhabitants of the towns * were obliged to advance double the sums they had formerly been accustomed to pay under the name of taxes. But, of the fruits of the field, procured by the labour of the husbandman, there was required no less than half the produce †. The amount of this impost will appear perfectly incredible, unless we recollect the amazing fertility of Africa. After paying this exorbitant demand, the peasant would retain, to reward his industry, a more plentiful increase than is to be reaped, by equal expence, in most other countries on the face of the globe.

It is extremely probable, that the Carthaginians extended taxation to their settlements in Spain, and the islands of the Mediterranean, though no evidence of it is now to be found, except as to the island of Sardinia ‡, from which they received various aids. When so severely pressed at home to raise supplies, it is not to be supposed they would spare these distant provinces. One thing is certain, that they drew from them recruits for their army; for, among their troops, frequent mention is made of Sardinians, Balearians, and Iberians.

Happy had it been for this great and industrious people, had they been contented with retaining the extensive, rich, and populous

* The city of Leptis, according to Livy, lib. 34. cap. 62. paid a talent every day to Carthage, as a tax. Reckoning, with Doctor Arbuthnot, the talent equal in value to L. 193 : 15 : 0, this city must have paid annually L. 70,719. This tax was exacted in the second Punic war, and was probably equal, at least, to what was paid in the first.

† Polyb. lib. 1. cap. 72.

‡ Ibid. lib. 1.

lous territories they possessed ; or had they, instead of pushing their conquests towards the north, been satisfied with extending their dominions towards the south, and carrying along with them, into the habitations of barbarity and idleness, all those arts which civilize and employ mankind. They might have flourished long, one of the greatest and happiest nations which ever appeared. But, intoxicated with their power, and vain of their opulence, they determined to aspire after universal empire. They encountered the Romans, who, while they were more hardy and warlike, were filled with the same views, and who extinguished for ever the ambition of Carthage.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

O F T H E G R E E K S.

S E C T. I.

General View of the Political Constitution and Resources of the Greek States.

TO understand the account of the Colonization of Greece, it will be necessary to take a previous survey of its resources and political constitution. The Greek states make such a conspicuous figure in history, that the reader will not easily believe their inhabitants were so few, or their territories so small, as certain circumstances compel us to admit. The whole extent of their country, even when they flourished most, comprehended only the peninsula of Peloponnesus, and the territories stretching northward from the isthmus of Corinth to the borders of Macedonia, bounded by the Archipelago on the east, and by Epirus and the Ionian sea on the west. The mean breadth of Peloponnesus, from north to south, can scarcely be reckoned more than 140 miles, and its mean length, from east to west, cannot be estimated

F

at

at more than 210 miles. Yet, within this narrow boundary, were contained six independent states, Achaia, Elis, Messenia, Laconia, Argolis, and Arcadia. Admitting, then, that the territories of these states were nearly of equal extent, the dominions of each particular state will appear to be no more than 23 miles in breadth, and 35 in length.

The country belonging to the Greeks on the north side of the isthmus, I have computed, from the best maps, to contain, of mean breadth, 153 miles, from north to south, and, of mean length, 258 miles, from east to west. It comprehended no fewer than the following nine independent commonwealths, Thessaly, Locris, Boeotia, Attica, Megaris, Phocis, Ætolia, Acarnania, and Doris. Supposing then, as in the former case, these commonwealths to have been nearly equal in point of territory, in order to obtain an idea of the mean magnitude of their dominions, we shall find each of them to have possessed lands to the extent only of 17 miles in breadth, and 28 in length. What is still more extraordinary, several of them consisted of cities, which were independent of one another, and were associated only for mutual defence. Both the Locrians and the Achaeans afford instances of this case. The former had not even all their territories contiguous *, nor did they act always in concert †; and the twelve cities of the latter seem to have been connected in no other manner than by alliance ‡.

The

* Strab. lib. 9.

† The Locri Opuntii only sent troops to the allied army of Greece, to oppose Xerxes. Herod. lib. 7. cap. 203.

‡ Pausanias. lib. 7.

The government of all these states was more or less republican; and the Greeks appear to have had no conception of a free constitution, in which an appeal to the people was not ultimately competent. The history of Greece affords abundant evidence of the truth of this remark. The early monarchies were of short duration and extremely limited. Kings, as well as usurpers, are constantly branded with the odious name of tyrants. Even the temporary revolutions which sometimes took place, from democracy to monarchy, occasioned by private ambition, or foreign influence, are no objections against the general observation. For the people, when left to the free operation of their natural sentiments and feelings, returned with keenness and tumult to the ancient constitution.

At Athens, the whole legislative power, and a great part of the executive, were lodged with the people. Even at Sparta, the two Kings possessed not more authority than the Consuls of Rome, or the Sufetes of Carthage*. They were presidents of the senate †, and commanded the armies of their country. But they had no influence in the appointment of the senators. These were elected by the people ‡. And the Kings retained the privilege only of proposing the business to be canvassed, and of giving the first vote in the decision. When they went to war, they were attended by a sort of field deputies, or counsellors, called Polemarchs §, without whose advice and concurrence they could undertake no enterprize of moment.

Two

* Arist. polit. lib. 3. † Xenoph. de repub. Laced. ‡ Arist. Polit. lib. 2.
§ Xenophon. de repub. Laced.

Two of the Ephori* also accompanied the camp, who inspected, not only their behaviour, but that of the whole army. These nominal Kings possessed no ensign of royalty but that of succession; while the people held the legislative power, the privilege of naming the senate and the Ephori, and the honour of electing individuals, out of their own order, into both these high stations †.

While the people enjoyed so much power under the Greek republics, the territories possessed by these could not be extensive, nor their citizens numerous. As, in every important transaction of government, appeals were made to the people, it was necessary their number should neither be so great, nor their situation so distant, as to render it impossible to convene and consult them.

The whole lands belonging to the Lacedaemonians were divided by Lycurgus into thirty-nine thousand shares ||; one of which was allotted to the family of every citizen; and, as these shares were on no account to be augmented or diminished, the number
of

* The Ephori were a sort of tribunes, who protected the privileges of the people.

† Arist. Polit. lib. 2.

|| Plutarch asserts, that these lots yielded annually, at an average, 82 medimni of barley, and a small quantity of fruits. Counting, then, with Dr Arbuthnot, the medimnus to hold to the Winchester bushel the ratio nearly of 13 to 14, it is easy to compute the produce of a crop of all the lands of Sparta. It amounted only to 430,404 quarters. This is a quantity of grain not greater than is raised in some single counties of England; and is a demonstration of the scantiness of the resources of that republic, and consequently of all the other republics of Greece, except Athens, next to which Sparta was the most opulent and powerful. *Plut. in vit. Lycurg.*

of citizens must have remained invariable. Of these, nine thousand were assigned to the citizens of Sparta*, who only were called to attend the lesser assemblies † of the people. The greater assemblies ‡ consisted of the thirty-nine thousand freemen, collected from all the territories of Sparta, who met to deliberate on the great affairs of state, to make laws, and to decide concerning peace and war.

The citizens of Athens were not so numerous as those of Sparta. They seem rarely to have amounted to more than 20,000. This is the number assigned by Demosthenes § and Plato ||. From a survey of Athens made still later under the archonship of Demetrius Phalerius, the citizens were again found to be 20,000 ¶.

It is extremely probable **, that these were the whole freemen of the Athenian territories, who attended the ordinary assemblies of the people, and in whose hands was reposed the government of the state. The Athenians lived originally, like the Lacedaemonians, dispersed in cities through the different districts of Attica. The-

G

sius

- Plutarchi Lycurg. † Xenophon. lib. 3. Hellen.
- ‡ Ibid. lib. 5. Hellen. § Orat. in Aristogitonem. || In Critia.
- ¶ Anonymus apud Meursium de fortuna Athenarum, cap. 4.

** A number, somewhat larger, is mentioned in a passage of Athenæus, lib. 6. which gives an account of a survey of Attica, made under the same Demetrius Phalerius, when the Athenians were found to be 21,000, the strangers 10,000, and the slaves no fewer than 400,000. The latter were mostly captives, and were employed at sea, in the mines, and other servile occupations. Xenophon, in his book de Vestigaliis, mentions one Nicias, who had a thousand slaves, whom he let to Socias a miner, at the rate of an obolus, i. e. $\frac{1}{4}$ penny each a-day, with an obligation on the part

sius found this distribution extremely troublesome and inconvenient. The public business could not be properly conducted, because the attendance of the people could not be easily procured. He enlarged, therefore, the city of Athens, and, by address or authority, prevailed with the citizens to abandon their habitations in the country to the care of their slaves, and to assume, for the future, their residence in the city.

Athens and Sparta were the principal and leading commonwealths of Greece. Their example was followed, their manners were imitated, and their alliance was courted, by all the other states. The former were zealous, in their turn, to extend their influence over their allies, by propagating among them their respective manners, customs, and forms of government. Of course, most of the other states adopted, either wholly, or in part, their civil institutions. A particular account of the political constitutions of these states is, for this reason, unnecessary. But it is, at the same time, impracticable. We scarcely know more of their separate politics, than that they were republican. Their influence was seldom so great as to render their constitution or their operations objects of attention to their countrymen, while the brilliancy
of:

part of the latter, to return the same number he received. He observes, that Hypponicus had 600, and Philomonides 300, let on the same terms. He recommends it warmly to the Athenian state to raise a revenue, by purchasing slaves, and letting them in the same manner. The difference in the number of the Athenians, assigned in this passage, from that quoted above, arises, probably, from an occasional fluctuation of the Census; which, unless a freeman possessed, he was excluded from the assemblies of the people.

of the transactions of Athens and Sparta has almost monopolized the pages of antiquity. We may, therefore, conclude, with confidence, that, however diminutive the affairs of these republics appear, when compared with a modern political scale, those of the other states would suffer greater diminution, when estimated according to that standard.

The Greeks, also, were destitute, in a great measure, of all the useful arts, particularly of agriculture and commerce. At Athens, indeed, the ornamental arts, oratory, poetry, statuary, and architecture, flourished in a manner unrivalled by antient or modern times. But, at Sparta, even these arts were prohibited by Lycurgus, and despised by the Lacedaemonians. Eloquence they derided, as an engine of sophistry and deceit. They contemned poetry, because it tended to debilitate the mind, by inspiring sympathy and compassion, and rendered men less fit for the achievements of war. They prohibited the building of every house where any tool should be employed beside an axe and a saw*. The mechanic arts and agriculture were deemed ignoble employments, and practised only by slaves †. The citizens of Sparta devoted their whole time to the operations of war, or to gymnastic exercises subservient to that profession ‡. They contented themselves with the bare necessities of life, both for food and clothing. They interdicted altogether the use of the precious metals. As they had no money, they could have no artists. They lived chiefly on bread, black broth, and

* Plutar. Lycurg. † Arist. Polit. lib. 7. cap. 9. ‡ Xenoph. de Repub. Laced.

and cheese * ; viands remarkable among the ancients themselves for being homely and unfavoury, and which mark very strongly the lowest state of agriculture. Among the supplies sent by the King of Egypt to Sparta, at the beginning of the Asiatic war conducted by Agesilaus, when that state was in the zenith of its power and glory, were 600,000 modii of wheat †.

Among the praises of Attica, Xenophon ‡ enumerates the temperature of its climate, the deliciousness and ripeness of its fruits, its great abundance of fine stone for building splendid temples and altars, and public edifices, the richness of its silver mines, its central situation for trade, and the convenience of its bays and harbours. He affirms, however, that the people were poor, and never could procure subsistence from their own territories. He urges his countrymen, with all that insinuating eloquence so characteristic of his writings, to apply themselves to commerce, as the most effectual means of supplying all their wants. Demosthenes §, that the Athenians imported more corn than any other state of Greece, and that they received it chiefly from Pontus and Byzantium. Towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedaemonians interrupted the importation of corn, which produced a famine at Athens, as the city depended principally on that mode of supply ||

If

* Plutar. Lycurg.

† Justin. lib. 6. cap. 2. about 18,750 quarters, counting the modius equal to a peck English.

‡ De vestigalibus. § Oratio adversus Leptinem. || Diod. lib. 13. cap. 107.

If such was the situation of the most powerful and flourishing republics of antiquity, even in the days of Xenophon and Demosthenes, what must have been their condition before the Persian invasion, when navigation and ship-building were almost unknown in Greece? Thucydides informs us *, that the Athenians had no decked vessels nor triremes, before the expedition of Xerxes; and that, previous to this period, they used only a sort of open boats, navigated by fifty oars. They learned the utility and importance of navigation when they were obliged to equip a fleet to oppose that of the Persians. He acquaints us, further, that all the Greek states anciently subsisted by plundering one another, and that their depredations and incursions were not reckoned dishonourable or unjust; that the custom among the Greeks of going constantly armed, arose from this opinion, and these robberies. The custom, he remarks, was retained, even in his time †, by no fewer than three states, the Locri, Ætoli, and Acarnanes; and the Athenians, he adds, were the first people who abolished both these barbarous practices. Pausanias ‡ affirms, that the poorer sort of people in Euboea and Phocis had no better cloathing than skins.

But the most curious monument of the poverty of the Greek republics is preserved by Polybius §. Cleomenes ||, the last King of Sparta of that name, sacked Megalopolis, a city of Arcadia, and the place of the nativity of the historian, because the inhabitants would not renounce their alliance with the Achaeans, and accept that of the Lacedaemonians.

H

daemonians.

* Lib. 1. cap. 14.

† That of the Peloponnesian war.

‡ Arcadica.

§ Lib. 2. cap. 61. et 62.

|| About the 131st Olympiad.

daemonians. Phylarchus, a most partial and ill informed author, in narrating this transaction, had asserted, among other improbabilities, that Cleomenes seized, in Megalopolis, plunder to the value of 6000 talents *. Polybius censures this account, as most exorbitant and incredible. He asserts, that the booty could not be supposed to amount to more than 300 talents †, and that the plunder of all the states of Peloponnesus, unless the inhabitants had been sold for slaves, could not, in the most flourishing period of their affairs, furnish the enormous sum of 6000 talents. He supports this opinion, by an account of a valuation of the lands, houses, and possessions, of the Athenians, made with a view of imposing a tax on their territories in Attica, in order to support the war ‡, which, in conjunction with the Thebans, they had undertaken against the Lacedaemonians. That valuation was inferior to the sum assigned, by Phylarchus, as the price of the pillage of Megalopolis. It amounted only to 5750 § talents ||.

When it is considered that this valuation was made at an advanced period of the affairs of Greece, when some degree of luxury had been introduced into that country, and the communication laid open

* L. 1,162,500.

† L. 49,125.

‡ This seems to have been the *Bellum Laconicum Boeoticum*, which happened in the 100th Olympiad.

§ L. 1,114,062.

|| It is not a little surprising, that an author of the discernment and erudition of Meursius, should so far mistake the meaning of Polybius, as to represent this valuation to have been an annual tax. The highest tax paid, both by the Athenians and their allies, never amounted, annually, to more than 1700 talents.

Meursius, de Fortuna Athen.

open between it and the east, and when, consequently, the value of money must have been considerably diminished, the picture exhibited of the scantiness of the resources of the Grecian republics cannot fail to strike with surprize.

S E C T. II.

Causes of Colonization among the Greeks—Their Settlements in Magna Graecia—Croton—Thurii—Tarentum.

THE preceding account of the constitution and finances of the Greek states will naturally suggest the motives which actuated them in planting colonies in distant regions, and the conduct they were obliged to adopt with regard to these colonies. In a narrow uncultivated country, containing a great number of independent tribes, straitened for territory and subsistence, several causes would induce the inhabitants to emigrate. As no provision was made for the natural increase of population, as the Greeks knew little of agriculture and less of manufactures, and as a great part of them were idle and warlike*, recourse was frequently had to force, and the weaker were compelled to cede their fields and habitations to the stronger †. The spirit of enterprise and conquest, also, which frequently seizes nations in their progress toward refinement, added to contempt for the characters of more unwarlike people, induced frequently the Greeks to incroach on the territories of their neighbours.

The

* Isocratis Panegyrica.

† Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 2.

The most fertile source, however, of the colonization of Greece, was that spirit of turbulence and faction which possesses all republics, but particularly infested those of that country. When a state was overloaded with people, from whose profligacy or idleness it dreaded innovation, it projected a colony to relieve itself from apprehensions. When a factious demagogue became formidable to the constitution of his country, he was dispatched, at the head of his followers, to some distant region, over which he might preside, and the government of which he might model to his mind.

As the principal object of Grecian colonization was, to discharge supernumerary members, or to preserve the constitution of the parent state, it was not to be expected, that, tho' she had been able, she would have been disposed to concern herself much in the prosperity of her offspring. The truth is, she was neither able nor willing. The colony was permitted to adopt that form of government which it chused to prefer, and to continue, or not, its connection with the mother-country, as best suited its interests. The former entertained not, for a long time, the most distant thought of taxing the latter, or of retaining over it any mark of sovereignty; because she could afford it no compensation in the article of defence. She was scarcely able to preserve the domestic territories she possessed, and could afford no protection to her colonies. The only connection known, for many ages, between the mother-country and the colony was that of affection or alliance.

In

In the course of the Grecian affairs, however, Sparta and Athens became principal states; and almost the whole of the other commonwealths and the foreign colonies attached themselves to one or other of these communities. The object of these alliances afforded a pretext for taxation both of allies and colonies, which Sparta and Athens, but particularly the latter, seized with avidity. These remarks will be supported by facts which will occur in the account of the colonization of Greece.

The foreign countries in which the Greeks planted their principal colonies were, the south-east coast of Italy, extending from Brundisium to the frith of Sicily, called by the antients Magna Graecia; the east coast of Sicily, from the frith, to the promontory of Pachynum; and a great part of the coast of the lesser Asia, lying along the eastern shore of the Archipelago, named Æolis and Ionia. They had, besides, many settlements on the shores of Thrace, from the Sinus Thermaicus * to the Propontis, and in the islands of the Archipelago and the Ionian sea. The colonies of Asia and the islands were chiefly planted by the Athenians; those of Italy and Sicily, by the republics of Peloponnesus †.

The most early settlements were those of Magna Graecia and Sicily. The chief of them in Magna Graecia were Croton, Sybaris, and Tarentum; in Sicily, Syracuse.

According to Strabo ‡, Croton was founded by the Achæans, who arrived by accident in Italy, in their voyage homeward from the

1

* Gulf of Salonichi.

† Thucyd. lib. 1. 12.

‡ Lib. 6.

the Trojan war. To secure their ships from the dangers of the sea, they drew them upon the beach, according to the manner of ancient navigators, and retired to explore the country, having left their women near their vessels till they should return. The latter, however, disgusted with the length and dangers of the voyage from Troy, resolved not to go again to sea; and, that they might compel their countrymen to settle in the territories on which they had landed, in their absence, they set fire to the ships. Croton became a famous colony. The climate was healthy, and the country fertile. It increased in cultivation, and in numbers, and finally acquired such eminence, as to rival Greece itself in philosophy and arts. Pythagoras leaving Samos, his native country, erected a school there, and established one of the most illustrious sects of antiquity, which continued long to flourish. It was no less conspicuous for athletic exercises. Its wrestlers were renowned over Greece, and several times carried away the prizes in the Olympic games. This colony sent one ship * to the combined fleet of Greece assembled at Salamis to oppose the fleet of Xerxes in the Archipelago, at the time of the Persian invasion; and it was the only settlement in Italy or Sicily which furnished any assistance.

This concurrence, in support of the liberties of Greece, was, however, no mark of political subjection. All the aids granted on this occasion were the fruits of alliance, or voluntary contribution. The Greek states suspended all private animosities, and cordially conjoined their forces to repel the invasion. They dispatched ambassadors to all their foreign settlements, to solicit assistance, though most

* Herod. lib. 8: cap. 47.

most of them were unable or unwilling to comply with their requests. The colonies, in general, of Italy and Sicily, thought themselves little interested in the quarrel, because they were remote from the scene of action.

Sybaris, called afterwards Thurii, situated between the rivers Crathis and Sybaris, which empty themselves into the bay of Tarentum, was also settled by the Achaeans ; though neither the time nor the occasion of this emigration are mentioned by the writers of antiquity. The colony was powerful and successful, had under its jurisdiction four adjacent states, possessed twenty-five cities, and could bring into the field 300,000 men *; which it did in the war with its neighbours the Crotoniatae †. The latter, however, got the victory in the field, and brought swift destruction on the people of Sybaris, by demolishing the banks of the river Crathis, and overwhelming their city with an inundation. This war happened in the time of Pythagoras, who is said to have directed the operations of the Crotoniatae ‡.

The people of Sybaris, who survived this calamity, sent deputies to Greece to implore assistance, and a recruit of inhabitants. They applied to the Spartans ; but their solicitations were refused. They had recourse next to the Athenians, who consented to send them ten ships filled with emigrants, under the direction of Lampon and Xenocrates.

* Probably the whole inhabitants who could bear arms.

† Strab. lib. 6.

‡ About 83d Olympiad. Diod. lib. 12. cap. 10.

Xenocrates *. These leaders published proclamations, in the cities of Peloponnesus, of their intended expedition, and consulted the oracle about its success. Great numbers of people joined them from all quarters, with whom they set sail for Italy. On their arrival, they resolved not to rebuild their capital in its former situation, which exposed them so severely to the vengeance of their enemies. They chose a new foundation for it near a spring called *Thurii*, from which, for the future, the colony received its name. The *Thurii* soon acquired great reputation for riches, learning, and arts. The philosophy of Pythagoras had spread over all the states of Magna Graecia, and had contributed highly to enlighten and polish the minds of men. Two illustrious legislators, rivals of Solon and Lycurgus, appeared on this occasion, Charondas, among the *Thurii*, and Seleucus among the *Locri*, both disciples of that illustrious philosopher. The constitution of *Thurii* was formed after the model of that of Athens. The people were divided into ten tribes, which received names descriptive of the cities from which the members of them were descended. From these names we discover, that three tribes had come from Peloponnesus †, three from the northern republics of Greece ‡, one from Athens §, one from Euboea ||, one from the Islands ¶, and one probably contained the old inhabitants **. The *Thurii* were members of the league †† for mutual defence, which subsisted among the states of

* Diod. *ibid.* † Arcadem, Achaldem, et Eleam. ‡ Boeoticam, Amphictionidem, et Doriensem. § Athenaidem. || Euboidem. ¶ Insulare.

** Idem, the old name of Achaia; *Diod. lib. 12. cap. 11.* †† *Diod. lib. 14. cap. 448.*

of Magna Graecia. They had wars with the Lucanians, and Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse, in which they were reduced to the greatest distress, were deprived of their liberties, and the greater part of their wealth. But no evidence remains of their receiving directly any protection from the mother-countries. Nor are any vestiges to be found of their expressing, either attachment or allegiance, by furnishing assistance to the latter, in money or in troops.

The Tarentines were a colony of Spartans, and emigrated from Laconia, according to Strabo*, on the following extraordinary occasion. Teleclus, King of Sparta, was murdered by the Messenians, when he came to offer sacrifice to the Gods, in their capital Messenè. The Spartans were, to the highest degree, enraged by this flagrant and enormous breach of hospitality, and bound themselves, by a solemn oath, to march directly against that city, and not to return home till they had laid it in ashes. The Messenians made an obstinate defence, and the war † was protracted for twenty years. The Spartan women, in the mean time, complained that Lacedaemon would be ruined, no less than Messenè; that the men fell daily by the sword, while the women were childless by the absence of their husbands, and brought no recruit to the commonwealth. The Spartans engaged in the war were satisfied of the truth of these representations, and dispatched from the army

K

those

* Lib. 6.

† First Messenian war, which happened about the first Olympiad.

those of their number who had left Lacedaemon so young; as not to have been bound by the oath. They ordered them to have promiscuous correspondence with all the unmarried women of Sparta; and from this intercourse arose a race of men, who were called *Partheniae*, because their fathers were unknown. When the war was ended, the *Partheniae* caused much combustion and embarrassment in the constitution of Lacedaemon. They could succeed to no legal inheritance as citizens, and they would not submit to be slaves. A conspiracy was formed, and a massacre was likely to ensue. It was happily detected, when on the point of execution; and the people were relieved from the fears and dangers of a revolution, by the expedient of an emigration. The *Partheniae* accordingly left Peloponnesus, under the direction of Philanthus, one of their number, and landed in the bay of Tarentum, where they built the city of that name, and acquired great power, both by sea and land. They were able to muster 30,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry; and they equipped the greatest fleet ever known in these parts. Learning and arts flourished exceedingly among them, especially under the famous Archytas, who embraced, with ardor, the philosophy of Pythagoras, and presided long over that commonwealth*.

Luxury and faction, at length, found access into the Tarentine state. Strabo observes, probably with some degree of exaggeration, that they had more public festivals than there were days in the year; and sedition seems to have prevailed among them so violently, that they

* Strab. lib. 6.

they could not agree to allow a native to command their fleets and armies. For this reason, in the war with their neighbours the Messapii and Lucani, they employed as generals, first, Alexander Molossus, from Epirus, and afterwards Archidamus and Cleonimus, from Sparta*.

When the Athenian fleet, during the Peloponnesian war, touched on the coasts of Tarentum in its voyage to Sicily, under pretence of assisting the Egestaci against the Selenuntii and Syracusians, but, in reality, with a view to conquer that island, the Tarentines would not permit the Athenians to enter their harbours, nor even to purchase provisions †. The rest of the Greek colonies in Italy behaved not with much more complaisance. They would only allow the Athenians to purchase provisions, but forbid them to enter their towns.

This behaviour arose in part from attachment to the cause of the Peloponnesians, from whom they were mostly descended, and with whom the Athenians were at war, but chiefly from jealousy of the power of Athens, and from dislike to see Sicily reduced under its dominion. In the future voyages of the Athenians, and when fortune seemed to favour their arms in Sicily, these colonies treated their fleets with every mark of respect; a demonstration, that they were influenced by interest, much more than by any other consideration.

S E C T.

* Diod. lib. 16. cap. 62.

† Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 44.

S E C T. III.

Greek Colonies in Sicily—Syracusians—Their Conduct on Occasion of the Persian Invasion—and in the Peloponnesian War—Set at Liberty by Timoleon—Receive numerous Emigrations from Greece.

ANTIENT Sicily was a scene of constant revolutions. The Greeks planted in it many colonies, Messana, Megara, Naxus, Agrigentum, and Syracuse*. All these, however, except Syracuse, were of little consequence, and of short duration. The Carthaginians very early possessed themselves of the south coast of the island, and were extremely anxious to add the whole of it to their empire. Syracuse only was able to oppose their efforts; and, in the course of this contest for sovereignty †, the lesser settlements frequently changed their masters. From a view, therefore, of the affairs of Syracuse, we may learn the nature of the political connection which Sicily had with Greece.

Syracuse was settled by a colony from Corinth, under the direction of Archias one of the Heraclidae ‡. She attained a degree of power and opulence superior to all the Greek colonies. Her resources were greater, her territories more extensive, and her transactions more memorable than those of any republic of Greece itself, if we except Athens and Sparta. The first intercourse between the Syracusians

* Strab. lib. 6. † Just. lib. 22. ‡ Strab. lib. 6. Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 3.

racusians and the Greeks happened at the time of the Persian invasion, when the latter sent ambassadors to the former, to solicit them to join the general alliance against Xerxes. The answer * of Gelon king of Syracuse, to this requisition, is conceived in the language of an independent state, against which the ambassadors offered no objection. They urged, however, their claim to precedence. The king represented, that the Greeks implored his assistance with a bad grace; that they regarded their own interest only, and were indifferent to that of Sicily; that he had formerly supplicated, at different times, their aid against his enemies, the Carthaginians and the Egestani; but that, on these occasions, he had been treated with the most mortifying neglect; that now, when war and danger threatened their own country, and when they wished his assistance, they condescended to solicit a state they had formerly despised; and that, were he to retaliate their conduct, he should certainly refuse their request. He would not, however, he subjoined, imitate their behaviour, but would assist them with 200 triremes, 20,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 4,000 slingers and light armed troops, if they would consent that he should be general of the forces of the alliance. The ambassadors of Sparta, then the principal state of Greece, answered with haughtiness, 'If he intended to join the alliance, he must obey the general of Lacedaemon; if he disdained to submit to him, he might withhold his troops.' Gelon felt the harshness of this reply, but was not provoked by it. He even condescended to abate something of his demands, and offered to furnish the supplies he mentioned, provided he were al-

L

lowed

* Herod. lib. 7. cap. 158.

lowed to command the fleet. The Athenian ambassadors now interposed, but with more complaisance than those of Sparta. They alledged, that they could grant precedency to no state but Sparta, that the antiquity of their common-wealth, and their superior knowledge of naval affairs, entitled them to command the fleet, if the Lacedaemonians should chuse to command the army, and that they could not resign this honour to Syracuse. Gelon, mortified with the refusal of both his demands, rejoined with firmness and spirit, that the Greeks seemed to be well provided in commanders, but had no army nor fleet to command; that as they would yield nothing, on their part, they could not expect his assistance; and that their obstinacy had deprived their country of the most powerful ally she had to expect.

Gelon did not over-rate his resources. We find, he actually offered more ships than the half of all the combined navy of Greece, and more than were furnished both by the Athenians and Spartans. Herodotus has supplied us with a list * of the ships contributed by the different powers of the alliance, and from it we learn, that the fleet amounted to 378 triremes, of which the Athenians equipped 180, and the Lacedaemonians only 16. The troops of Gelon, however, did not remain long inactive. Their attention was soon called to another quarter, to defend their own country against the Carthaginians †.

The Athenians acquired great influence among their neighbours, by the conspicuous part they acted in repelling the Persian invasion.

* Lib. 8. cap. 48.

† Page 17.

ffion. They began to rival Sparta, and even to attempt the sovereignty of Greece. Their ambition produced the Peloponnesian war, the object of which was, to decide whether Sparta or Athens should have the precedency. In this war, Syracuse was necessarily involved, by the invasion of the Athenians, in order to reduce Sicily under their subjection*.

The Athenians assembled their fleet † at Corcyra, consisting of 134 triremes, 100 of which belonged to Attica, and the rest to her allies; two vessels of fifty oars, and one transport which carried 30 horses. They steered their course, in the usual direction, across the Ionian or Adriatic sea, to the coast of Magna Graecia, and then along that coast to Sicily. They attacked and defeated the forces of Syracuse, laid siege to the city, and reduced the inhabitants to the utmost distress. In this situation, the Syracusians sent the most pressing solicitations for aid, first to Corinth, their parent state, and next to Sparta ‡. They urged the Corinthians, from the relation that subsisted between them, in consequence of being their descendants. But they assailed the Lacedaemonians by arguments drawn from interest, and from fear. They represented, that it was advantageous to attack the Athenians in the absence of their troops; that the Spartans should not remain inactive, till Sicily was subdued, when the Athenians would return flushed with victory, and reinforced with new allies, to conquer Peloponnesus; that now was the

* Page 37.

† Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 43.

‡ Ibid. lib. 7. cap. 88.

the time to send reinforcements into Sicily, and to make a diversion in favour of Syracuse, by invading Attica, unless they intended to permit Athens to obtain the sovereignty of Greece.

The Corinthians entered, with much zeal, into the views of the Syracusians. They determined, not only to grant them the aid they requested, but dispatched ambassadors along with theirs to Sparta to second their applications. The most valuable part of the assistance furnished by the Lacedaemonians, was a general called Gilippus, to command the forces of Syracuse. They had made little progress in maritime affairs, and sent, besides, only two ships. The supplies from the Corinthians were more liberal. They contributed twelve ships of their own, and prevailed with the Leucadians and Ambraciotae, two of their colonies, to add five more*.

These aids turned the fortune of the war in favour of Syracuse. Nicias, the Athenian general, implored his countrymen for reinforcements in the most pressing terms †. They decreed to send him immediately ten ships, and appointed a fleet of observation ‡ of 20 triremes, to cruise round the coast of Peloponnesus, to intercept the supplies that might be conveyed to Sicily. To these they added afterwards a much more powerful armament, consisting of 73 galleys, and many troops ||. The Lacedaemonians, however, finally

* Thucyd. lib. 6. cap. 104.
cap. 47.

† Ibid. lib. 7. cap. 11.

‡ Ibid. lib. 7.

|| Ib. cap. 42.

ly prevailed, and the Athenians were compelled to abandon Sicily*.

The Syracusians, about sixty years after these transactions †, oppressed by the tyranny of Dionysius the Younger, and harrassed and plundered by the Carthaginians, applied again to Corinth for aid. They received first the famous Timoleon ‡. for their general, and ten gallies loaded with supplies; to which afterwards were added

M

ten

* Dr Price misrepresents this piece of history, in order to draw from it an argument against the probability of success in reducing America. "The citizens of Syracuse," (he observes, Essay on Civil Liberty,) "thus circumstanced," that is, "as determined men, fighting on their own ground, within sight of their houses and families, and for that sacred blessing liberty, without which man is a beast, and government a curse; withstood the whole power of the Athenians, and almost ruined them." Would not the reader conclude, from these words, and the other examples quoted at the same time, of the States General and the Cantons of Switzerland, that the citizens of Syracuse had been either subjects or colonists of the Athenians, that they had been cruelly oppressed by that people, and that, from their own resources, they had successfully resisted the oppression, and had almost ruined the oppressors? Now, what are the facts? The Syracusians were an independent state, and neither subjects nor colonists of Athens. The Athenians entered Sicily to invade the allies of the Peloponnesians with whom they were at war; and among these allies were the citizens of Syracuse. The Syracusians would certainly have been forced to submit to the Athenians, if they had not been reinforced by supplies from the states of Peloponnesus, who, in a great measure, transferred the seat of the war into Sicily, by the aids they sent to Syracuse. It was, therefore, the reinforcements from Peloponnesus, not the power of Syracuse, which withstood the Athenians, and, though it by no means rained, yet it compelled them to relinquish Sicily.

† 108th Olymp.

‡ Diod. lib. 16. cap. 72. &c.

ten more, furnished in the same manner. Timoleon banished Dionysius, and expelled the Carthaginians. He made free all the Greek cities in Sicily, and established democracy in Syracuse. The constant wars, however, with which, for a long time, Sicily had been walled, had almost depopulated the country. Timoleon, therefore, supplicated Greece for a recruit of inhabitants. He caused it to be proclaimed through all the states of Peloponnesus, that the senate and people of Syracuse offered habitations and lands to all persons who should repair thither to possess them. The reputation of Sicily for opulence and fertility was so great, that no fewer than 50,000 people emigrated to take possession of the vacant territories; and, before this event, 5,000 persons had arrived from Corinth.

In the circuit we have traversed, no vestiges have appeared of any disposition, in the several parent states, to impose taxes on their colonies, or even to retain sovereignty over them. All the instances of intercourse which have been specified, arose entirely, either from attachment or policy. Indeed, none of the republics of Peloponnesus, except Sparta, had it in their power to act a contrary part; and, although the Lacedaemonians never demanded any annual tribute, they seized every occasion of levying money from their allies and colonies. Polybius remarks *, that the institutions of Lycurgus were adapted only to preserve the Lacedaemonians from invasion, and to continue them a poor and warlike people; but that they were altogether unfuitable for extending their dominions, or for rendering them

* Lib. 6. cap. 46. and 47.

them a great and powerful nation. When the Spartans, therefore, contended for the sovereignty of Greece, in the Peloponnesian war, and when they extended their conquests in Asia under Agesilaus, they found it necessary to grasp at every pretence for raising money, while they seemed to maintain the spirit of their constitution by imposing no taxes. Accordingly, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, they demanded a sum of money and 500 ships from the colonies of Sicily and Italy, and appointed them to settle among themselves the various contingents which should be furnished by the respective colonies*. They demanded money and ships from their allies in the course of that war†, and received even subsidies from Persia‡. They pillaged most unmercifully the territories of their enemies, and converted the plunder to the use of the public§. Their frequent and ruinous wars with their neighbours, the Messenians, were prompted by the money they expected to raise

* Thucyd. lib. 2. cap. 7.

† Ibid. lib. 8. cap. 3.

To equip the expedition, to be employed in defence of the Olynthians, about the end of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedaemonians, as we are informed by Xenophon, (Hist. Graec. lib. 5.) prevailed with their allies to consent, that a state of the necessary supplies should be sent to every city within their jurisdiction; that any city might convert the service of a soldier into money, after the rate of half a drachma (i. e. half of $7\frac{1}{2}$ d.) a day; of a horseman for the pay of four soldiers; and, if any city should furnish neither men nor money, that the Lacedaemonians might exact from it a stater of gold (i. e. 16 s. 4.) for every day during the continuance of the expedition. No consideration is had of the size of the city; a proof that this mode of raising money was new, and extremely unequal.

‡ Thucyd. lib. 8. cap. 5.

§ Polyb. lib. 6. cap. 47.

raise by selling the captives for slaves. They sold even the Asiatic colonies, according to Polybius *, that they might procure money from Artaxerxes to enable them to conquer Greece. In the history of the Athenian colonies, we shall see a different management adopted.

S E C T. IV.

Asiatic Colonies—Subjected to Taxation by the Athenians.—Rebellion of the Samians—and of the Lesbians.

A EOLIS and Ionia were the territories of the Grecian colonies in Asia. They occupied a considerable part of the eastern coast of the Archipelago, and extended, according to Strabo †, from the river Caicus, to the river Meander. The Hermus traced the boundary between them. Æolis began to be settled about 100 years after the Trojan war, upon the return of the Heraclidæ, who probably gave occasion to the emigration. All the Æolian colonies came originally from Peloponnesus, though they preserved little intercourse with that part of Greece, and were finally subjected to Athens. They possessed, according to Herodotus ‡, eleven cities on the continent §, and seven in the adjacent islands ||.

The

* Ibid. † Lib. 13. ‡ Lib. 1. cap. 149. § Their names were, Cyme, Larissæ, Novus Murus, Tenus, Cilla, Notium, Ægireffa, Pitana, Ægææ, Myrina, Grynia. || Five in the island of Lesbos, one in Tenedos, and one in Centum.

The colonies of Ionia were planted by Androclus *, the son of the last King of Athens, who relinquished his native country on the revolution which, at his father's death, banished him from the throne, and established democracy. He, with his followers, built twelve cities † in Ionia, and the islands adjacent.

Both the Æolians and Ionians flourished exceedingly. The former possessed a better soil, but the latter a preferable climate. Their situation led them to navigation, and they made considerable progress in that art, before it was understood in Greece. Learning, also, which always precedes refinement in arts, abounded in Ionia, and the city of Miletus produced some of the most celebrated philosophers of antiquity ‡, while Samos gave birth and education to Pythagoras. The Ionian, and probably the Æolian cities, were all independent, and had no political connection with one another, unless when they associated for mutual defence §.

After Cyrus King of Persia had conquered Lydia §, he attacked the Asiatic colonies; and on this occasion they made their first application to Greece for protection. The Æolians and Ionians, without addressing their respective parent states, joined unanimously in an earnest petition to Sparta, then the leading commonwealth of

N

Greece,

* Strab. lib. 14. † Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Lebedus, Colophon, Teos, Clafomene, Phocaea, Samos, Chius, Erythrae. Herod. lib. 1. cap. 142.

‡ Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes. § Herod. lib. 1. cap. 170.

§ 58th Olympiad, Sigonius de temporibus Athaenarum.

Greece, for aid against their enemies. The Lacedaemonians heard their solicitations, but did not grant their requests. All they did was, to send an imperious message to Cyrus, commanding him to desist from hostilities against the Greeks, which the latter, as might have been expected, treated with contempt *. The colonies were compelled to submit to Persia.

They remained under the dominion of Persia till the invasion of Xerxes †, when they were set at liberty by the decisive battles of Plataea and Micala, in which, on the same day ‡, the Persian forces in Greece and the Lesser Asia were entirely routed. The Ionians, notwithstanding these victories, despaired of being able to retain long their liberty against the power of Persia. It was therefore proposed by the Lacedaemonians, and assented to by the Peloponnesians, that they should be transported from Asia altogether; that the republics of Greece, who had joined the invasion, should be expelled from their habitations, and that the Ionians should be allowed to possess them. The Athenians discovered, on this occasion, some symptoms of that authority which afterwards they extended much farther. They rejected the proposal, as tending to deprive them of their colonies, and complained that the Peloponnesians should attempt to interfere in the affairs of Athens §. They not only persuaded the Ionians to remain in Asia, but prevailed with

* Herod. lib. 1. cap. 153.

† 75th Olympiad, Sigonius de temporibus.

‡ Herod. lib. 9. cap. 87.

§ Herod. lib. 9. cap. 105. Diod. lib. 2. c. 37.

with them, notwithstanding their fears of the power of Persia, to enter into a treaty, ratified by solemn oaths, in which a promise was given of perpetual attachment to the Athenians.

The good conduct and ability of the Athenian commanders, Themistocles and Aristides, added to the zeal the people of Athens had exhibited, in the course of the Persian war, recommended them highly to all the states of the alliance. The Athenians *, therefore, now claimed openly the precedency in the affairs of Greece, and their pretensions were received with more partiality and favour, on account of the treachery and unworthy behaviour of Pausanias †, the Spartan general, who had condescended to accept money ‡ from Artabasus the Persian commander, as a reward for betraying the interests of his country. Aristides seized this favourable opportunity, to propose a general tax, for the purposes of common defence against the future attacks of Persia; and to make the measure more acceptable, it was added, that the money should be deposited in the island of Delos, the most safe and sacred place in the dominions of Greece. The overture was universally approved, and, in compliment to the integrity and ability of Aristides, he was appointed, not only to determine the assessment, but to fix the contingents which should be paid by the several states. He named 460 talents || as the sum, and rated so discreetly the different allies, as to merit ever after the appellation of *Just* §.

This

* Nep. Arist. † Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 96. ‡ Diod. lib. 1. cap. 44. Nep. Pausanias.

|| Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 96. § Æschinis orat. de falsa legatione.

This measure laid the foundation of the grandeur of Athens ; so that, from the Persian invasion, to the Peloponnesian war, that republic shown with a lustre unrivalled in the history of Greece, and acquired such eminence in arms, arts, and learning, as has rendered her the admiration of mankind. Beside the illustrious men already mentioned, there flourished about this time Phidias the statuary *, Socrates, Plato, Herodotus, and the orators Pericles and Isocrates. The season for the appearance of her greatest orator was not yet arrived. That was reserved till a time of greater public danger, which alone could prompt the eloquence of Demosthenes.

In extending her influence among her allies, Athens proceeded with much address. She admitted them, with the most flattering condescension, to a participation of her councils. She prevailed with them to advance her countrymen to the command of the combined fleet and army. She rendered the measures of the Spartans so unpopular, that they became tired of the war, and left the army with their allies †. In the mean time, she transferred the treasury from Delos to Athens ‡, and augmented the tribute to 600 talents §. She

* Diodor. lib. 12. cap. 3.

† The Spartan allies seem not to have rejoined the army against Persia, after they left it with Leotyichides on the victory of Mycalé. Pausanias had only twenty ships in the expedition against Cyprus, so that very few of the Spartans or their allies could be present. The tax, therefore, imposed by Aristides must have affected only the allies of Athens.

‡ Diod. lib. 12. c. 54. Sigonius de rep. Ath. lib. 4. c. 3.

§ Thucyd. lib. 2. c. 13.

She gradually converted the service of the allies into money, and, on their delaying or refusing to advance the stipulated conversion, she compelled them by force, and reduced them from the condition of allies to that of subjects *. She fortified her capital, and the ports of Phalerus and Piræus, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Lacedæmonians, who dreaded the growing power of the Athenians, though they pretended to be afraid only of the bad use which, on some future occasion, the King of Persia might make of these works to enslave Greece †.

The Athenians suddenly acquired the sovereignty of almost all the islands of the Archipelago, and of the whole of the eastern coast of that sea. The Ionian colonies became their zealous friends, and the Æolians their subjects. Both followed their standard in war, and advanced contributions for the public expence ‡. The Ionians preserved their allegiance till the power of Athens was unable to protect them, if we except the rebellion § of the island of Samos, the principal colony of Ionia, which happened in the 84th Olympiad, a few years before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. A short account of this event will explain the manner in which the Greeks treated their colonies on such occasions.

Some misunderstanding took place between the Samians and their neighbours the Milesians, which finally terminated in a war. Both parties

O

* Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 99.
lib. 7. cap. 57.

† Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 90.

§ Diod. lib. 12. cap. 27.

‡ Ibid. lib. 2. cap. 9.

parties appealed to Athens ; but the former, suspecting that the Athenians leaned to the side of their enemies, rejected their arbitration, and applied to the Persians for aid. Pericles was dispatched with a fleet of forty galleys, to reduce the Samians to subjection, which he speedily effected. He changed their government from aristocracy to democracy ; he imposed on them a fine of 80 * talents, to reimburse the expences of his expedition ; he demanded fifty hostages as security for the payment of the fine, and for their good behaviour for the future ; and having entrusted these hostages to the custody of the Lemnians, he set sail for Athens.

Pericles had scarcely left Samos when this revolution caused prodigious commotions. The friends of the aristocracy would not submit to the new government, and again supplicated the Persians for protection. Pisistratus, who presided in the Lesser Asia, sent them a detachment of 700 men, expecting by it to obtain the dominion of the island. These supplies approached Samos in the night, got easy access into the city, re-established the aristocracy, and banished the friends of Athens. Pericles undertook, a second time, to quash this revolt. He was accompanied with sixty galleys, with which he attacked and defeated seventy ships of the enemy ; and being reinforced by twenty-four triremes from Chios and Mitelene, he laid siege to Samos itself. In a few days, however, he was obliged to quit the siege with a part of his forces, to oppose a fleet of Phoenicians which had been detached by the Persians to the assistance of the Samians. The latter seized this favourable opportunity of making a
fally

* L. 16,700.

fully on the Athenians, and defeated them. Pericles, however, soon returned, and brought with him such a reinforcement of ships from the adjacent colonies, as gave him a manifest superiority over the fleet of the rebels. He provided also, by means of a Spartan engineer, the famous besieging machines of antiquity, the *aries* and the *testudo*, which were, for the first time, employed on this occasion. He beat down the walls, intercepted the supplies of the city, and finally reduced it to submission. He punished, on the spot, the authors of the rebellion with death; exacted a fine of 200 talents* to replace the expence of the war, stripped the Samians of all their ships, demolished their walls, and restored the democracy.

In the course of the Peloponnesian war, the Ionians and Æolians acted as faithful friends of Athens, by contributing money, and furnishing troops. They are mentioned by Thucydides as tributaries and subjects of that state at the commencement † of the war. They are mentioned again, under the same character, in the seventeenth ‡ year of it, when the Athenians invaded Sicily.

The Lesbians, an Æolian colony, were the only exception. They revolted from the Athenians in the fifth year of the war, and joined the Lacedaemonians §. In the speech || recorded by Thucydides, as made by their ambassadors to Sparta and her allies, in order to induce

* L. 38,750. † Lib. 2. cap. 9. ‡ Lib. 7. cap. 57. § Thucyd. lib. 3. cap. 2.
|| Ibid. lib. 3. cap. 9.

induce them to aid and protect their country, they specify not any instances of cruelty and oppression practised by the Athenians, as reasons of their rebellion. All their arguments were derived from their suspicions and their fears. They maintained, that the Athenians, though once the most gallant and generous nation, the patrons of liberty, and friends of mankind, had of late degenerated greatly from principles so laudable in themselves, and on account of which they had afforded them their warmest support; that that state had adopted a tyrannical and ruinous system of administration; that they sought for pretences to enslave their allies and colonies, instead of defending the liberties of Greece against the common enemy; that they had already executed in part their plan of despotism, and waited only for a favourable opportunity to render it complete; and that it was in vain to expect reformation, or to withhold resistance till some flagrant act of injustice or tyranny should be committed against themselves; prudence demanded that they should arm and oppose, before the evil became incurable.

The most inattentive reader cannot overlook the coincidence of sentiments adopted by the Lesbians with those lately maintained by the Americans. It is the praise of modern times, it is the felicity of these colonies, that the moderation and humanity of a British parliament will not permit them to punish similar crimes in a similar manner with the republic of Athens.

The advantages of this rebellion were too momentous to the Lacedaemonians, not to be heartily and readily embraced. They promised

sed *, therefore their protection, and ordered the assistance required. The Athenians, however, anticipated them. They dispatched Clinippides with 40 galleys, and commanded him to obtain reinforcements from the Asiatic allies and colonies. This armament reached Lesbos before the Peloponnesian succours arrived. The Lesbians were defeated at sea, their capital Mitylené was besieged and taken, and the island reduced to subjection, notwithstanding the Spartans both sent a fleet to their aid, and made a diversion in their favour, by an invasion of Attica.

The Athenians were provoked beyond measure by this unnatural and ungrateful rebellion. In the first transports of their resentment, they passed the most cruel and bloody vote, that all the males of Lesbos, arrived at the age of puberty, should be put to death, and the women and children sold for slaves; and they sent the same day a ship with commissioners to see the decree put in execution.

When their passions subsided, they began to reflect on what they had done. A meeting of the citizens was therefore convened next day. The former sentence was reviewed, and, after much contention, it was carried, by a small majority, to make some mitigation †. A ship was instantly dispatched, to prevent the execution of the former order. The deputies of Lesbos, who had come to plead their cause at Athens, returned on board this last vessel. They procured changes of rowers, that one party might sleep

P

while:

* Diod. lib. 12. cap. 55.

† Thucyd. lib. 3. cap. 49.

while the other was employed. They offered them the most palatable provisions, and promised them the highest rewards, to procure their most vigorous exertions. The former ship had departed full twenty-four hours before them, and they could not overtake her in her course. They arrived, however, before the Athenian commander had finished the reading of the first order. The Lesbians were immediately assembled, and informed both of their danger and their safety. Even the last and mitigated sentence was abundantly severe, that the chief abettors of the rebellion, amounting to 1000 men, who had been formerly transmitted to Athens, should be put to death; that the lands of all the Lesbians, except the Methymnaei, who had retained their loyalty, should be divided into 3000 shares, of which one tenth should be consecrated to the Gods, and the remainder divided by lot among colonists from Athens; and that the government of the island should remain for the future in the hands of the Athenians*. The Lesbians were compelled, by necessity, to rent their own lands from the Athenians to whom they fell, at the rate of two minae†, for each share.

Towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, the Ionians and Æolians were compelled to relinquish their attachment to Athens, and to submit themselves, partly to the Persians, and partly to the Lacedaemonians, who had combined together to humble the Athenians. Sparta, afterwards, broke with Persia, on the defeat of
Cyrus,

* Thucyd. lib. 3. cap. 50.

† A mina was equal to L. 3 : 4 : 7.

Cyrus, whose pretensions the former had supported with all her influence, and sent Agefilaus into Asia, to protect the Graecian states in that country. He, however, was soon obliged to return home, to defend his country against a combination of almost all the republics of Greece, who could no longer suffer the insolence and rapacity of the Lacedaemonians. The latter, in revenge, by the ignominious peace of Antalcidas, ceded for ever the Greek colonies in Asia to Artaxerxes.

S E C T. V.

Colony of Corcyra—Contest between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians, about the supremacy of the colony of Epidamnus—The determination of the Athenians on that subject.

THE other principal colonies of Greece were settled in Corcyra, an island of the Ionian sea, at Amphipolis, on the coast of Thrace and Potidaea, on the eastern border of Macedonia.

Corcyra was inhabited by a colony of Corinthians, who seem to have been planted very early, though neither the time nor the occasion are mentioned by ancient historians. They acquired considerable riches and power, by assiduous application to trade and navigation, and preceded, in improvements of this kind, all the states of Greece, except Athens. They contemned the Corinthians, from whom

whom they descended, because the latter were not so opulent as themselves, and refused to allow them the usual marks of respect offered by colonies to the mother-country, namely, to send annually certain sacrifices of first fruits to the Gods* of the Metropolis †, to grant its inhabitants precedence at the Olympic games, and on all other public occasions ‡; to employ one of its priests to preside at sacrifices, to inspect the intrails of victims, and to interpret omens §. These animosities finally produced a war between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans; the causes and some of the transactions of which it is necessary briefly to narrate, because they explain the principles of colonization, which, hitherto ||, had generally prevailed in Greece.

The source of the rupture was a dispute concerning the supremacy of a colony settled at Epidamnus, known afterwards by the name of Dyrrachium. The colonists consisted chiefly of Corcyreans, tho' they were joined with some emigrants from Corinth, and were conducted, by one Phialus, a native of that city ¶. Some commotions arose among the Epidamnii, which they could not adjust without foreign aid. They applied first to Corcyra; but their supplications were treated with neglect. They consulted the oracle, concerning the measures they should next adopt, and were

* Polybii Excerpta, 114. Diod. lib. 12. c. 30. † The name the Greeks gave to the mother-country. ‡ Scholiast on Thucydides, lib. 1. c. 25. § Thucyd. ibid. || 85th Olympiad, some years before the Peloponnesian war. ¶ Diod. lib. 12. c. 3. Thucyd. lib. 1. c. 24.

were advised to solicit the assistance of Corinth. The Corinthians heard their requests with favour, took them into their protection, and promised the aid required. They were induced to act this part, from resentment of the ingratitude and undutiful behaviour of the Corcyraeans, and from the claim they possessed to the superiority and direction of the colony.

The troops of Corinth had scarcely reached Epidamnus before it was vigorously attacked by the Corcyraeans, who were highly incensed, both by the application to the Corinthians, and by the interference of that state. The city being closely besieged, and reduced to great distress, the Corinthians were again supplicated for aid, who projected a new colony for the relief of the place. They issued a proclamation, that all persons who would emigrate to Epidamnus should be intitled to the same rights and immunities which they enjoyed while citizens of Corinth; to which they added a remarkable alternative, that, whoever wished to share the advantages of the colonists, and choosed notwithstanding to remain at home, might obtain that privilege on payment of 50 drachmas * to the state. By rights and immunities it was meant, that the colonists were to enjoy the same laws, religion, and government, which were established at Corinth †, at least, that the Corinthians had no intention to deprive them of any of these privileges; for it does not appear they were able to secure to them the possession of what they promised. The conversion of the advantages of the colonists, for the

Q

small

* A drachma was worth $7\frac{1}{2}$ d.

† Scholiast on Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 27.

small sum of 50 drachmas, is a farther proof of the low estimation in which these were considered, both by the Corinthians and the colonists, and seems to have been an expedient calculated to raise money from the more opulent citizens, in order to defray the conveyance of the emigrants, many of whom very probably were unable to transport themselves. Many people joined the colony, and many advanced the money*.

The Corcyraeans were informed of these operations at Corinth, and immediately sent ambassadors thither to complain. They represented, that Epidamnus did not belong to the Corinthians, but to them; if any doubt remained on this head, they were willing to refer the decision to the oracle of Delphi, or to any neutral state of Peloponnesus; and, if these overtures should not satisfy, they would be obliged to solicit the protection of the Athenians, a measure which would be agreeable to neither of the parties.

The Corinthians would listen to no proposals of accommodation, unless the troops of the Corcyraeans were withdrawn from Epidamnus. After some intermediate operations, therefore, which by no means contributed to restore peace, the latter applied to Athens, and the former dispatched ambassadors to the same place, to counteract their negotiations. Every matter of state was debated before the Athenian people, and the several deputies appeared at their tribunal, to support the claims of their respective countries. Thucydides † has preserved the speeches, or at least the substance of the

* Thucyd. *ibid.*

† Lib. 1. cap. 32.

the speeches, which were delivered on this occasion, and what they contain concerning colonization merits attention.

The Corcyraeans maintained, that their being colonists of Corinth was no good reason why they should not obtain the assistance they asked; that every colony, indeed, ought to honour and respect its metropolis, as long as it was treated with kindness and respect; but that, should the latter adopt a contrary conduct, and, instead of cherishing, proceed to injure and affront the former, it might withdraw its attachment, and even revolt; that colonists were not transplanted to distant countries to be made slaves, but were entitled to retain all the privileges they possessed in their native country; and that the Corinthians had committed great injustice, because they had refused the most reasonable terms of accommodation, namely, to terminate the controversy in an amicable manner by arbitration.

The Corinthians replied, That the pretence of injustice, as a reason of revolt, was ill founded; for the Corcyraeans had renounced their allegiance long before the present dispute; that, as injury and oppression were unreasonable and cruel, on the part of the mother-country towards the colony, they were, at least, equally reprehensible on the part of the latter towards the former; that as the colony was not sent to Corcyra to be made slaves, so, neither was it planted there that it might insult and affront the metropolis; that the Corcyraeans' complaint without cause, was evident from the good correspondence which subsisted between Corinth and her

her other colonies, the Leucadians and the Ambraciotae, by whom she was treated with much respect and attachment; that all she ever asked of any of her colonies was, the common and decent marks of respect, and to join her as allies in war; that she had never demanded more from the Corcyraeans, although they had rebelled against her; that, even supposing she had treated them with some degree of asperity, it did not become them to resent that usage; that they would have acted better the part of dutiful children, had they yielded a little to the forwardness or peevishness of the parent; that such conduct, on their part, would have gained the approbation of all Greece, while the injustice and severity of the parent state would have exposed her behaviour to universal censure; that, with whatever colouring they might cover their actions, the true cause of former insolence and present hostility arose from a spirit of independence and tumult, inspired by the acquisition of wealth.

From the arguments and conclusions adopted and drawn by the parties in this dispute, it appears, that the respective rights and privileges, both of the metropolis and the colony among the Greeks, were still extremely undetermined. Nothing can be more equivocal, on the one hand, than the general principles, that colonists ought to be treated with kindness and favour by the mother-country; that the former were not conveyed to distant countries, in order to be made slaves, or to be subjected to the peevishness or oppression of the latter; and that, if they thought themselves exposed to such treatment, they might renounce their allegiance, claim independence, and apply to any foreign commonwealth for aid.

No less vague and unsatisfactory are the maxims employed on the other side; that the colony owed all marks of honour and respect to the mother-country, and ought not, instead of these, to offer her injury and insult; that the relation between the former and the latter resembled that between a parent and a child; and that all the duties of attention, honour, submission, and assistance, were included in this relation.

When such principles were appealed to in a political controversy, it was obvious, that the occasion of it had not frequently existed, and that the decision could not be momentous. Had the connection between the mother-country and the colony involved matter not of mere ceremony, but important civil rights and privileges, the discussion must have excited the attention of society, the principles of decision would have been generally known, and the arguments might have been expected to be more satisfactory and conclusive. Even the clause apparently most precise and definitive, that the colonists should, in time of war, muster themselves under the standard of the mother-country, and act as her friends, is expressed in terms so general and ambiguous, and might be so extended or restricted, according to the views and necessities of the parties, that it is difficult to decide whether it included any obligation on the part of the former to furnish assistance to the latter. Accordingly, we find that the Athenians determined this cause against the Corinthians, accepted the alliance of the Corcyraeans, and sent them protection. They judged it their interest to be connected with a people so powerful at sea, although their conduct might be dangerous

to themselves, by affording a precedent of impunity to their own colonies, in cases of rebellion. It is obvious, that the parent states urged the principles of attachment, respect, and alliance, as reasons of submission, because they possessed no resources to enforce those of allegiance. The Athenians had lately acquired these resources, had imposed taxes on their colonies, and their behaviour, on this occasion, in supporting a colony in rebellion against its metropolis, is a proof how much they undervalued the former principles. They succeeded, however, in their designs. The Corcyreans became zealous friends and allies of the Athenians, and aided them with money and ships during the course of the Peloponnesian war*. Their situation rendered them particularly serviceable in the war with Sicily. The Athenian fleets assembled at Corcyra, and having there provided naval stores, directed their course from that island by the shortest and safest passage to the shores of Italy. This was the only part of the voyage to Sicily which could not be performed by coasting, and, short as it is, it may be considered, perhaps, as one of the boldest efforts of ancient navigation.

S E C T.

* Thucyd. lib. 2. cap. 9. and lib. 7. cap. 57.

S E C T. VI.

Thracian Colonies—Amphipolis—Potidaea—Review of the Colonization of Greece.

THRACE was the region in which the Greeks planted their last settlements. They had formerly extended their emigrations on every other side; this quarter only remained to be appropriated. Its northern situation, the inhospitable nature of the climate, and the country abounding with mountains and forests and wild beasts, but particularly its warlike and savage inhabitants, long prevented the Greeks from attempting to take possession of it. The Athenians, however, after the Persian invasion, and the great increase of their naval power, found themselves in a condition to surmount every obstacle, and, partly by colonies, and partly by conquest, procured the dominion of almost the whole coast of the Archipelago, from the river Strymon to the Dardanelles.

Amphipolis was the chief of these colonies, and, by its situation, formed a barrier to all the rest. It stood between two branches of the Strymon, commanded a passage over it, and had most convenient and ready access to the sea, from which it was distant only three miles*. Aristagoras the Milesian first undertook to plant here a colony of Asiatic Greeks, whom he led from his native country,

* Thucyd. lib. 4. cap. 102.

country, to escape subjection to the Persian yoke under Darius; but these settlers were soon expelled by the Edoni, a tribe of the Thracians. The Athenians, thirty-two years * afterwards, transported to Amphipolis 10,000 colonists†, who retained possession of the place for some time; but, endeavouring to extend their territories, and to acquire more lands, they gave great offence to the Thracians, who attacked them at a place called Drabescus, and totally extirpated them. The Athenians repeated the attempt to effectuate a settlement in this important station, twenty-nine years afterwards, under Agnon the son of Nicias, and succeeded.

This colony remained under the jurisdiction of Athens till it was set at liberty in the Peloponnesian war, by Brasidas the Lacedaemonian, who had marched an army through Thessaly to attack the Athenian dominions on the coast of Thrace. Brasidas got possession of the place partly by surprise, and partly by treachery; but he had not force sufficient to retain his conquests. He made, therefore, a merit of necessity, and pretended he had undertaken this expedition to assert the liberties of the Greeks in that country against the tyranny of Athens. The people of Amphipolis, on the appearance of Brasidas, sent intelligence to Thucydides the historian, who had the command of an Athenian armament at Thasus, half a day's sail from their city. But, though Thucydides made all possible haste, he arrived not in time to save the place. He reached only the mouth of the Strymon in the evening of the day on which Amphipolis had capitulated.

The

* 79th Olympiad.

† Thucyd. lib. 4. cap. 102. Diod. lib. 11. cap. 70.

The loss * of this settlement was a severe blow to the Athenians, partly on account of the materials for ship-building with which it supplied them, and partly because it opened a communication to their other colonies in that country, but principally on account of the large *revenue* it returned, which probably was produced chiefly by the mines in its neighbourhood.

Potidaea was situated on the northern shore of the Sinus Thermaicus †, near the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallene. It was first inhabited by a colony of Corinthians ‡; but neither the aera nor the occasion of their settlement have been transmitted to modern times. We are certain, however, that this colony had been planted before the Persian invasion, because it is mentioned by Herodotus § in the history of that event. Xerxes, after passing the Hellespont, marched his army in three great divisions. One of them followed a route leading through the middle of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; the second moving along the shores of the Archipelago, kept always in view the Persian fleet, which proceeded at an equal rate by sea; the third pursued a course lying between the other two, at nearly an equal distance from both, in order to preserve an easy communication with the fleet, and the army ||. The second of these great bodies received the submissions and contributions of all the cities on the coast through which it travelled, and, among others, those of Potidaea. This colony furnished Xerxes with a recruit, both of ships and soldiers, and remained in subjection to that monarch till he reti-

S

red

* Thucyd. lib. 4. cap. 108. † Gulph of Salonichi ‡ Thucyd. lib. 1. cap. 56.

§ Lib. 8. cap. 125.

|| Herod. ibid.

red into Asia, after the battle of Marathon. Having rebelled, on that occasion, in conjunction with several others of the adjacent cities, Potidaea was besieged by Artabanus, with the view of reducing it to subjection. This General remained before it three months; but found all his efforts ineffectual. He then attempted to prevail by treachery, and, for that end, held a correspondence with one Timoxenus, a man of rank and influence in the place. He conveyed his dispatches into the city, closely wrapped about the shaft of an arrow, and received his answers in the same manner. The arrow, however unfortunately for him, was observed, and the treachery detected and defeated. Artabanus was finally compelled to raise the siege, by an extraordinary high tide which overflowing the plain where his army was encamped, destroyed a great number of his troops. He retired toward the main army of the Persians, which was cantoned in Thessaly and Macedonia, under the command of Mardonius, and which, a few months afterwards, was driven out of Greece.

After the retreat of the Persians, the colonists of Potidaea seem to have joined the alliance of the Athenians, and to have subjected themselves to the payment of a share of the annual tax demanded by that republic from all its allies. It is at least certain*, they had become tributaries of that state, before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. The conduct of the Athenians, in the affair of Epidamnus, and the assistance and protection which, on that occasion,

* Thucyd. lib. i. c. 56,

sion, they afforded to the Corcyraeans, had given much offence to the Corinthians. The former, therefore, conscious of having incurred the resentment of the latter, were anxious to guard themselves against its effects. They were particularly apprehensive, that the Corinthians might employ their natural influence with their colony of Potidaea, to make it renounce allegiance to Athens; and to prevent the consequences of a negotiation, which they doubted not would be attempted, they ordered the walls of that city to be demolished, and hostages to be given for the future fidelity of the place. Against this extraordinary and severe exertion of authority, the colonists sent ambassadors to Athens to remonstrate, and to Sparta to implore aid. The latter promised protection, if necessary; but the former would consent to no mitigation of its decree. Potidaea, therefore, immediately revolted from Athens, and threw herself into the arms of Corinth and Lacedaemon.

The Athenians were extremely eager to recover the sovereignty of this settlement, and the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, to maintain its independence. The former sent a powerful fleet and army to reduce it to obedience, and the latter furnished supplies for its defence. The true cause, however, of the conduct of Corinth and Sparta proceeded not from pure zeal to protect the liberties of the colonists. These they had patiently beheld for many years, equally infringed and invaded. It originated, chiefly, from that jealousy of the power of the Athenians, which soon produced the Peloponnesian war. An anxiety, on the other hand, to
preserve

preserve that power, which had begun to create uneasiness, generated the decree which commanded the demolition of the walls, and which was thought absolutely necessary to counteract the designs of the enemies of Athens*.

One of the most famous sieges, recorded by ancient history, is that of Potidaea. It continued for several years, and the garrison were reduced to the utmost distress, before they would surrender. They, at last, capitulated on the following honourable terms: That the inhabitants and soldiers should have permission to leave the place with their wives and children, and to retire whither they pleased; and that every man should be allowed to carry with him one suit of apparel, and every woman two. The Athenian commanders were disposed to grant these demands, because they were tired of a siege which had continued so long, which had cost their country so many men, and the enormous expence of 2,000† talents, and because the winter approached, which, in a cold climate, was of the worst consequence to their troops‡. As soon as the city was evacuated, it was replenished with a new colony from Athens.

Seven years afterwards, in the ninth § year of the Peloponnesian war, Potidaea was attempted to be taken by surprize, in the expedition conducted by Brasidas || against the Thracian settlements of Athens. That general approached the place in the night, and had reached the walls before he was discovered. He possessed not, however, force sufficient to invest the town; and,
on

* Thucyd. lib. 1. c. 66.

† L. 387, 600.

‡ Thucyd. lib. 2. c. 70.

§ Thucyd. lib. 4. c. 135.

|| Page 68.

on finding his first design had miscarried, he made no farther attempts, but retired with his troops.

The colony remained under the dominion of Athens, till the days of Philip * king of Macedon, and father of Alexander the Great. That enterprising Prince had begun to improve the discipline of the Macedonian troops, to increase greatly the finances of his kingdom by his successful attention to the mines of Thrace, and to extend gradually the limits of his territories. Among other incroachments toward the east, which gave occasion to some of the most brilliant orations of Demosthenes, he attacked and conquered the settlement of Potidaea †, many of the colonists of which he commanded to withdraw to Athens.

From the facts which have been advanced, and the principles which have been explained, it is presumed that the following system, with regard to the colonization of Greece, will be readily adopted by the reader. All the republics of that country were extremely circumscribed in point of territory, and contained but few inhabitants, partly on account of the narrowness of their dominions, but principally on account of the general ignorance of agriculture and manufactures which prevailed among them. When their wars, therefore, which they had almost continually among themselves, did not consume their supernumerary people, the only

T

method

* 105th Olympiad.

† Diod. lib. 16. cap. 8.

method by which they could discharge a burden they were unable to support, was to send them out in colonies to distant regions, where their strength might defend, and their industry support themselves. The mother-country was glad to exonerate herself, for her own peace and safety ; and she expected no benefit from her colonists, because she possessed no resources to protect them, or to secure any advantages to be derived from them. The only principle, consequently, of connection which did exist, indeed the only one which could exist, between the parent state and the colony, was that of affection. This principle prevailed in Greece till the time of the Persian invasion. About that aera, both the Athenians and Spartans began to extend their ambition beyond the narrow limits of their domestic territories, and thought of reducing, in part at least, their allies and colonies under their jurisdiction. Hence arose an important innovation in the political system of Greece. Great fleets and armies required a treasury, and that treasury could only be supplied by taxes. The Athenians seized the most favourable juncture in the history of their country for raising a revenue ; and they succeeded to their utmost wish. From the defeat of Xerxes, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, a period of fifty years, they imposed taxes on their allies, but particularly in their colonies, without opposition, and almost without complaint. In the course of that war, which lasted near thirty years, they lost many of their allies and colonies ; but they still continued to tax those that remained. They retained this practice till the end of the social war, nearly as long as they possessed a single foreign settlement. For a period,

period, therefore, of 120 years, namely, from the beginning of the 76th Olympiad, when the Persians were driven out of Greece, to the commencement of the 106th Olympiad, when the allies were declared independent at the end of the social war, Athens continued to impose taxes on her colonies.

The Spartans were the only other state whose resources enabled them to exercise taxation. All the remaining republics, except Thebes, during the short period of the life of the illustrious Epaminondas, neither sought nor expected more influence among their neighbours, than to preserve the small domestic territories they possessed, and to shelter themselves, with regard to the general system, under the alliance of Athens or Sparta*. The constitution of the latter prohibited all taxation. Even the domestic expences of her government were supplied by private contribution, and her soldiers served without pay. But, when the Lacedaemonians, in the course of the Peloponnesian war, collected great fleets and armies, and undertook expeditions into Sicily and Asia, and when afterwards, under Agesilaus, they pushed their conquests in Asia, and projected the acquisition.

* It is a wild fancy of some politicians, who conceive, that the balance of power is a secret of policy known only to the modern states of Europe. This secret was known and practised by the Greek republics, and their endeavours to support it were one great cause of the frequent wars and revolutions with which the history of that people abounds. It even influences and directs the operations of the savage tribes of America. It seems to be a dictate of nature, and is indeed so obvious, as scarcely to escape the observation of any body of men endowed with discernment sufficient to constitute a political society.

acquisition of the sovereignty of Greece, money became absolutely necessary to carry on such extensive operations. How did they raise this money? Not by regular taxes, indeed, but by means equivalent as to the effect, though much more disagreeable and destructive as to the manner; by heavy contributions demanded of their allies and colonies, by depredations, and ignominious contracts. This practice they continued above sixty years, from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, to the battle of Mantinæa, when the dominion of Sparta was almost annihilated by Epaminondas. In a word, *the history of Greece affords no instance of any state which had power to levy contributions or taxes from its colonies, and did not put that power in execution.*

Neither was the conduct of Athens and Sparta in this respect the cause of those powerful combinations against them, which finally accomplished their humiliation. Had they contented themselves with levying a reasonable tribute from their colonies, for the protection they afforded them, or had they satisfied themselves with demanding money from their allies in time of war, to extinguish the expences incurred for common defence, it is improbable they should have alarmed the jealousy of their neighbours, or that they should have been challenged in the exercise of such rights. But these republics, in extending their dominion, knew no moderation. Their elevation above the level of their sister states inspired the most unbounded ambition, and both of them, by turns, manifestly grasped at the sovereignty of Greece. The Spartans first confederated
the

the other commonwealths, and conducted their operations against the Athenians. The former pulled down the latter only to pursue the same aspiring course themselves. Epaminondas retaliated on the Lacedaemonians the game they had played against the Athenians ; and the Macedonians soon after laid for ever low the laurels of Greece.

U

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

OF THE ROMANS

S E C T. I.

Progress of the Roman Arms—Policy of that People relative to conquered States—Their Municipia—Socii—Praefecturae—Colonies—Reasons of Colonization.

WHEN Romulus laid the foundation of that immense fabric, the Roman empire, his resources were unpromising, and external circumstances unfavourable. The Romans were a small colony of adventurers, who emigrated from Alba, the capital of the Latins, to settle near the borders of their territories on the banks of the Tyber. They first attempted to build something like a city; but, as they had few inhabitants to possess it, they were obliged to open a professed assylum for all the banditti of the neighbourhood, and to procure women for them by stratagem, which they could not obtain on more honourable terms*.

Italy

* Liv. lib. 1. cap. 9.

Italy was then inhabited by a great number of small independent states, jealous of one another, and considerably advanced in the art of war, from the frequent rencounters which they had among themselves. The Romans had conquered no fewer than six of these states, before they had extended their territories twelve miles from their capital, and before the end of the first century from the building of their city*. From this period, to the expulsion of Tarquinius Superbus, and the extinction of the monarchy in the year of the city 245, they had acquired territory to the distance only of fifteen miles from Rome: though they had built Ostia, had conquered the Sabines, the Volsci, and the Gabii, had made war against the Latins and the Tuscans, had formed the great lines of their government under Servius Tullius, and had greatly enlarged and ornamented their capital †.

From the banishment of the Kings, to the entire conquest of the Latins, and the commencement of the war with the Samnites in the year 417 ‡, the Romans could not be reckoned powerful, nor their resources considerable. They had not yet extended their dominions above 130 miles from Rome. The Gauls had over-run their country, demolished their towns, seduced their allies, seized their capital, and almost extinguished their existence as a nation. Their neighbours, the Latins, had refused the supplies they owed them by treaty, had claimed independence, and renounced all connection with them, unless on the principles of an union. Their govern-

* Eutrop. lib. 7.

† Ibid. lib. 1.

‡ Liv. lib. 8. cap. 13.

government had been distracted with seditions and revolutions, which produced the institutions of Tribunes * and Dictators, and the election, by turns, of Consuls, Decemvirs, and military Tribunes.

Notwithstanding these convulsions at home, and such powerful enemies abroad, the Romans retained that magnanimity which never deserted them in the most critical circumstances. They attacked the Latins, and boldly declared war against the Samnites. They quickly reduced the former to obedience, and adopted such regulations in the settlement of the terms of peace, as effectually prevented all commotions from that quarter, for the future †. But the war with the latter proved the most formidable they ever undertook in Italy. It continued near fifty years, produced many battles, fought with various success, and was not finished till the year of the city 472 ‡. After the conquest of the Samnites, the progress of the Roman arms became exceedingly rapid. Before the year 500, they had nearly subjugated all Italy, and that ambitious people now began to extend their views to Sicily, Spain, and Africa. Before the end of the two succeeding centuries, Caesar and Pompey had displayed their conquering eagles in almost every quarter then known of the globe. Of the seven hundred years, therefore, during which the republic of Rome subsisted, near five hundred were spent in acquiring territory, extending only one hundred and thirty miles from the city. During the two remaining centuries, the

* The first Tribunes were appointed in the year of the city 259. The first Dictator was named in the year 253; Eutrop. lib. 1. Liv. lib. 2. cap. 18. † Liv. lib. 8. c. 14. ‡ Eutrop. lib. 2.

the dominions of that empire became so large as scarcely to know any bounds.

External circumstances form the characters, and prompt the exertions of nations, as well as of individuals. The difficulties and dangers, with which the Romans had to struggle for the first 500 years of their republic, taught the wisdom, and inspired the valour which triumphed over all opposition, and finally gained them the empire of the world. Constant wars, attended commonly with success, filled their soldiers with a degree of confidence and courage, rarely to be found in the history of mankind; but their political sagacity was not, perhaps, less conspicuous than the gallantry of their legions. They were the first nation of antiquity, who put in practice the noble principle of treating the conquered with humanity, instead of the barbarous and savage custom of selling them for slaves. They did not even restrict their treatment to instances of humanity; they extended it, sometimes, to a degree of privilege and favour, which improved their civil condition and rendered them more happy.

The conduct of the Romans towards the states of Italy, with whom they contended so long, and whom they finally vanquished, is abundant evidence of the truth of these remarks. When the behaviour of any people merited the best expression of their favour, either by ready submission to their arms, or by fidelity and attachment to their interest, they conferred on them the privileges of Municipia. These were

X

chiefly

chiefly of two kinds. By the first, the people were completely incorporated with the Romans; they adopted their laws, were admitted into their tribes, and had access to all their offices and honours. In compensation for these advantages, they were subjected to all the burdens and services of citizens. By the second, the privileges conferred were in a great measure honorary. The people retained their own laws, customs, and government. They were treated with respect and hospitality at Rome. But they still acted as allies, and were subject to such services and taxes as were settled by treaty, or were occasionally demanded by the Roman state*.

On people who merited an inferior degree of favour, that state conferred the privileges of *Socii*, or *civitates foederatae*. These retained their territories, laws, and government, and were subjected only to certain imposts and services, which were defined by treaty.

The *Praefecturae* were not very numerous, and were treated with the greatest severity. They consisted of people, whose conduct had been most offensive, and were, therefore, generally stripped of some part of their lands. Their civil government also was, in a great measure, abolished. They had no supreme magistrates of their own, and a praefectus or governor was annually sent from Rome to preside over them, and to execute the laws †.



On

* The first kind were called *Municipia cum latrone Suffragii*; the second, *Municipia sine suffragio*; Liv. lib. 38. c. 36. Festus, voce *Municipium*. Gellius, lib. 16. c. 13. † Festus, voce *Praefectura*.




On lands taken from the Praefecturae, or on lands forfeited by any other means to the state, were planted the colonies which the Romans thought proper occasionally to send from their city. Various and important were the reasons of this practice. Sometimes the colony was stationed on territories recently conquered, that it might defend that quarter of the empire, and secure the obedience of the new subjects*. At other times, the object of colonization was population † merely, and the increase of the numbers of the commonwealth; for, in all ages, the population of colonies has been extremely rapid. Another cause was common to the Romans with the other states of antiquity, namely, the security and peace of the government, which were effectually consulted, by sending to a distant region all the dissolute and factious citizens who had power to disturb or corrupt it ‡. In the later times of the republic, a new reason of colonization took place, to accommodate the veterans of the legions whose services had recommended them to the different leaders of the victorious factions during the civil wars. These were named *military colonies* §.

* Cicero, Agraria altera. † Liv. lib. 27. cap. 9. ‡ Cicero prima epist.
ad Atticum. § Patercul. lib. 1. cap. 14.






**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**Photographic
Sciences
Corporation**

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503



S E C T. II.

Colonies of two Kinds, Roman and Latin—Constitution and Privileges of a Roman Colony—of a Latin Colony—Former a Model of a British American Colony.

THE colonies were divided into two kinds, called *Roman* and *Latin**. Both consisted of citizens, except on some occasions, when a few Latins, or other allies, were permitted to join them, who acquired not, by that means, any civil privilege †.

A Roman colony was a body of citizens, who, with their families, emigrated from Rome to settle on some distant territories assigned them by the senate. An order was published bearing the name of the territory, the numbers of which the colony was to consist, and requesting those who choosed to become colonists to offer their names to the Triumviri appointed to conduct them. If more subscribers appeared than the number wanted, the emigrants had to decide by lot who should be preferred. If the subscription did not fill in due time, the citizens were ordered to draw lots for completing the colony, and those on whom the lot fell were com-

* Liv. lib. 39. cap. 55.

† Ibid. lib. 34. cap. 42.

compelled to emigrate*. The Triumviri conducted the colonists to the district on which they were settle, divided the lands among them, and fixed their form of government, which was always modelled after that of Rome.

The colonists enjoyed every privilege of Roman citizens which was consistent with their situation. They had the regulation of the affairs of the colony entirely in their own hands, when it did not interfere with the arrangements of the state. They had permission to make such local acts as were necessary for the administration of justice, and to inflict such punishments on crimes, as their particular circumstances might require †. They were, however, subject in all cases to the superintending jurisdiction of Rome. They retained her civil institutions, and owed obedience to all her laws ‡.

Neither did they possess any right to vote in the assemblies of the mother-country, or to be themselves elected into any of her public offices. These facts are supported by several reasons. First, the colonists were not enrolled, nor their estates valued in the census of any of the tribes of the city; without which qualifications, it is well known, they could have no claim to suffrage. They were all mustered in the census of the colony to which they belonged, and, according to that census, they were assessed for the local taxes of the

Y

colony,

* Dionys. lib. 7. cap. 13. This compulsion was a prohibition of the use of house, fire, and water; for no citizen could be compelled to resign his freedom without his consent.

† Liv. lib. 6. cap. 17.

‡ Gellius, lib. 16. cap. 13.

colony, and the public taxes of the state. The census of the colony was completed by its own Censor, was brought by him to Rome, and presented on oath to the Censor of the city, for the use of the public*.

Another reason is derived from the character of a Roman citizen, to constitute which three essential qualifications were required; namely, residence in the city, or *Ager Romanus*, enrollment in some tribe, and access to the honours and offices of the state. One or two of these might be possessed without the other. Foreigners had residence only. The *libertini* † had tribe and residence; but neither had access to office. The justice and propriety of connecting suffrage with residence is obvious from the nature of the thing. Why endue any part of the people with a privilege they could not use? Their distance prevented their attendance on the ordinary assemblies of their countrymen; and it was surely improper to invest them with a power, which might be employed, on extraordinary occasions, to promote the purposes of faction.

The colonies called *Latin* enjoyed only the civil privileges which the people of *Latium* possessed at Rome ‡. What these were, will be best illustrated by a sketch of the history of that people. The
 Latins

* Liv. lib. 29. cap. 15. † The *libertini* were manumitted slaves; and, tho' their holding public offices was prohibited by no law, yet constant usage opposed it.

‡ These colonies were not called *Latin*, because they consisted of *Latins*, or because they were planted in *Latium*, as some people have imagined. They never contained many *Latins*, and very few of them were settled in *Latium*. Livy, on several occasions, calls *Latin colonies*, colonies of Romans; lib. 27. cap. 9. and lib. 29. cap. 15.

Latins inhabited thirty cities *, and cultivated a fertile country, extending from the banks of the Tyber to the Lacus Pomptinus. These cities seem to have been, in a great measure, independent of one another, and to have associated only for mutual defence. The King of the Latins resided at Alba; and in that city, perhaps, were held antiently their assemblies, which met to consult the common interest of the confederates. After Alba was conquered by the famous rencounter between the Horatii and Curiatii †, and its inhabitants conveyed to Rome, the Romans advanced a claim to the sovereignty of the whole Latin nation, founded on the circumstance of having got possession of their capital ‡. But, as the other cities of Latium took no part in the contest between Alba and Rome, the sovereignty of the King of Alba was probably nominal, and the claim of the Romans on that account entirely frivolous. The Latins accordingly rejected it, and transferred, for the future, their assemblies to the city of Ferentina §.

The Latins considered the Romans as descended from them, were ambitious of their alliance, and fond to imitate their manners. Their soldiers were dressed, and armed, and marshalled after the same fashion with those of Rome. They equalled them in valour, and fought in their legions ||. The constant ground of controversy between these states, was the ambition of the former to be citizens of Rome ¶, while the latter inclined to treat them as subjects.

Their

* Dionys. lib. 6. cap. 63. † Liv. lib. 7. cap. 24. ‡ Dionys. lib. 3. cap. 35.

§ Dionys. lib. 3. cap. 35.

|| Liv. lib. 8. cap. 8. and lib. 1. cap. 52.

¶ Dionys. lib. 6. cap. 63.

Their alliance, therefore, was frequently interrupted by jealousies, which produced wars between them. These were sometimes terminated amicably by accommodation *, at other times by the loss of some of the Latin towns. After the defeat of the Latins at the lake Regillus, they sent ambassadors to Rome, who, in the most lowly and earnest manner, supplicated the mercy of their conquerors. They offered to resign all pretensions to union or independence, and requested only to be allowed to live as their subjects. The Romans, in consideration of the eminent services they had received from them as allies, and in commiseration of their misfortunes as friends, disdained to take advantage of their present humiliation, and generously restored them to their former condition †.

This magnanimity, however, did not altogether prevent future revolts. The Latins afterwards ‡ claimed zealously the execution of their favourite scheme, an union. They insisted, that one commonwealth should be formed of the two states, regulated entirely on the principles of equality ; that each people should possess an equal share of places and emoluments ; and, particularly, that one of the consuls, and half of the senate, should be furnished by the Latins §. The Romans rejected these exorbitant demands with indignation, and a bloody war ensued. The Latins were finally defeated, and such measures were adopted with regard to their cities, as effectually secured their future attachment and obedience.

Six

* Dionys. lib. 5. cap. 76.

† Ibid. lib. 6. cap. 21.

‡ In the year 415.

§ Liv. lib. 8. cap. 5.

Six cities were admitted to the full freedom of Rome, or were created municipia of the best form. Three had their lands taken from them, which were re-peopled by Roman colonies. The rest were prohibited from holding any intercourse with one another, whether matrimonial, commercial, or political. The ships of the Antiates were demolished, and the rostra of them conveyed to Rome, where they were displayed as a public monument of the fate of rebellion, and served to adorn the hustings in the forum, from which orations were made to the people; a circumstance which gave a new name to that theatre of eloquence, and which it ever afterwards retained*.

From this account, it is plain, that the greater part of the cities of Latium were not admitted to the freedom of the city of Rome. They were not even allowed to adopt the Roman laws †. They retained their own laws, acted as allies of Rome, and furnished to that state large supplies of troops ‡. They inherited, however, some singular privileges. They were always treated with particular respect and affection, and were allowed, on some occasions, to vote in the comitia; an honour which seems to have been conferred on no other ally. This gratification, at the same time, was so contrived; as to have little influence on the decision, for they were not permitted to give their suffrages apart; they were arranged in some particular

Z

tribe,

* Liv. lib. 8. cap. 14. † The Romans permitted not even their language to be used by their allies, without their consent. See the petition of the people of Cumae for this privilege, Liv. lib. 40, cap. 42.

‡ Liv. lib. 8. cap. 4.

tribe, which was determined by lot*. By another privilege, any man who had born an office of magistracy among the Latins for one year, acquired the freedom of Rome, and might canvass in that city as a candidate for preferment †.

The Latin colonists, then, inheriting only the privileges of Latium, possessed not advantages equal to the Roman. They forfeited ‡, it appears, the freedom of the city altogether; nor was any considerable recompense for this loss acquired by the occasional right to vote in the comitia conferred on the whole colony, or by the permanent right of citizenship bestowed on its magistrates. We need not wonder, notwithstanding, that the poorer citizens emigrated in colonies, on these disadvantageous terms. Most of the important business of the Roman state was transacted in the comitia centuriata; and, by the constitution of these comitia, the lowest class, which comprehended all the poorer citizens, was of extremely little significance. It contained only one century out of 193, the number of all the centuries of which the comitia consisted; and it was almost never brought to vote, as a majority of centuries had generally declared themselves, and consequently decided the business, before the last could be called ||. The poorer sort of citizens, therefore, would not perhaps value very highly the freedom of Rome. They might even prefer to it the freedom of a colony, where their influence would be greater, as the numbers were fewer, though the business was of less importance.

The

* Liv. lib. 25. cap. 3.

† Appian de bello civili, lib. 2. cap. 443.

‡ Cicero, oratio pro Caecina, cap. 33.

|| Dionys. lib. 8. cap. 82.

The Latin colonies, besides, might probably think themselves in a situation not much more unfavourable than the Roman. The capital privilege of which they were divested by losing their citizenship was, the right to vote in the comitia; and the Roman colonies, we have seen, did not possess this right. The bulk of mankind are little endued with the faculty of anticipation. The Latin colonists might, therefore, prize very little, what probably, they would never claim, and what the Roman colonists reserved, namely, the freedom of the city, when they should return to Rome*. Sigonius† asserts, that the Latin colonies were not permitted to retain even the Roman law, but in place of it, were obliged to adopt the law of Latium. He seems to have embraced this opinion, with a view to mark more strongly the difference between the two kinds of colonies, which he holds to have consisted in this, that the one used the laws of Latium, and the other those of Rome. But the authorities he quotes are neither unexceptionable, nor necessarily involve the interpretation he adopts; on the contrary, they are susceptible of a meaning perfectly consistent with the theory formerly explained. It is farther to be observed, that no imaginable good purpose could be gained by this arbitrary and wanton exertion of authority. The imposition of a new code of laws, more imperfect than those with which the colonists were familiar, must have been inconvenient and detrimental to them, and could promote no end, but to alienate their affections from the mother-country. If the Romans were happy with their own laws, they could not surely

* This right, the Romans called *Postliminio civitatem recuperare*. See the note of Graevius, on the word *Postliminio*, c. 12. *oratio pro Balba*. † *De jure Italiae*, lib. 2. c. 3.

ly grudge the enjoyment of the same happiness to their colonies, Would the colonists become worse subjects, by retaining laws they approved, and which connected them with the parent state, both by interest and inclination? Would not their attachment be manifestly shaken, by imposing on them the laws of a country, whose inhabitants were not only not citizens, but were sometimes enemies of Rome? We may, therefore, conclude, it would seem, that both kinds of colonies preserved the use of the Roman law, with which they were acquainted, and to which they were attached; and that the chief difference between them was, that the Latin colonists lost entirely the freedom of the city, while the Roman colonists reserved that right, and might reclaim it whenever they pleased.

A Roman colony was an exact model of an English American colony, as far as the different constitutions of Rome and Britain will admit. The former had its government so constituted, as to approach as nearly as possible to that of the mother-country; the *Duumviri* resembled the consuls; the *Decuriones* were the best picture that could be procured of the senate; and the people of both bore a sway, and acted a part exactly alike. In the British colonies, a similar analogy may be traced; the governor represents the regal power, the general council bears a similitude to the council of the King, and, as there is no order of nobility who might form a distinct branch of the legislature, the houses of representatives are the nearest image that could be obtained of the two houses of parliament. The Roman colonists had power to impose taxes, to enact and to execute laws and regulations for the government

vernment and police of the colony, and to chuse patrons or agents at Rome, who might attend to their interests. The colonists of America possess the same rights. The Roman colonists were deprived of no civil privileges they enjoyed in the parent-state, of which they were not necessarily divested by their situation, because they could not use them. The case of the British colonists is perfectly similar. The Roman colonists had no share in the government of the mother-country, no vote in her comitia, no access to her honours and offices; because they had sacrificed voluntarily these advantages to obtain others in the colony, which they valued more. They might, however, regain all these privileges when they pleased, by returning to their native country, and reassuming the qualifications to which it intitled them. Here, again, the condition of the British colonists is perfectly parallel. They have no share in the government of the parent kingdom. But who is to blame? They knew this would be the necessary consequence of their emigration. Can they possess things in their nature incompatible? If they judged the political rights of the people of this island of value superior to the fortunes they had a chance to acquire in the colonies, they might have retained these rights, by remaining at home. They still have it in their power to recover them, whenever they shall be disposed to comply with the terms on which they are attainable by the inhabitants of Britain. The Roman colonists were subject, in all cases, to the superintending jurisdiction of the people of Rome. So, contends the government of Great Britain, are the colonies of America. This the latter, however, have thought proper lately, in very strong terms, to deny.

The Roman colonists were obliged, not only to provide for the expences of their own provincial governments, but also to furnish occasionally such supplies, both of money and troops, as might be demanded by the mother-country, for the support and defence of her government. This is exactly the duty of the British colonies, maintains their parent-state. I have planted, nursed, and defended them, and am intitled, by all the laws of reason and justice, to their obedience and aid. We are intitled, by the laws of nature, to be free, reply the colonies. We make full recompense for all your trouble and expence, by the benefit of our trade, which you monopolize. We have no share in your government; and therefore will bear none of its burdens.

The reader has already seen evidence to prove the resemblance of the constitution of a Roman to a British colony. In what manner the Romans would have received and relished, in their colonists, the sentiments and principles contained in the two last articles, will be explained as we proceed.

SECT.

S E C T. III.

*Colonies planted before the Julian Law—Their Number—Allotments of Land—Subject to the supreme Jurisdiction of the Parent State, particularly to Taxation—Case of the Colony of Velitrae—
—and of the refractory Colonies in the second Punic War—
Exemption from Land-Service claimed by the Maritime Colonies.*

THE history of the Roman colonies may be divided into two periods ; the first extending from the building of the city to the passing of the Julian law in the year 603, under the consulship of Lucius Julius Caesar ; and the second, from the passing of that law to the subversion of the republic. The greater part of the colonies planted during the latter period were military, and consisted of the troops whose services had recommended them to their leaders in the civil wars. Almost the whole of the colonies settled in the former period were emigrants from Rome, and had their residence in Italy.

As the Romans were little acquainted with manufactures, which might have furnished employment for the poorer sort of their citizens, as even agriculture, the principal art they possessed, was, in the latter ages of the republic, executed chiefly by slaves, and, as the burden of military services fell mostly on the rich by the
constitution

constitution of the *comitia centuriata* *, Rome often abounded with citizens whom she could well spare for emigrations. Accordingly, Livy † informs us, that the republic possessed, in the second Punic war, no fewer than forty colonies, ten of which he calls *maritime ones*; and, in this catalogue, he comprehends not a considerable number mentioned by Dionysius and other writers. These had probably been suppressed, or their territories alienated, by the encroachments of their neighbours. From the second Punic war to the passing of the Julian law, there emigrated twenty-four colonies. So that, from the building of the city, to the year 663, fifty-four colonies, which then existed, had been planted in Italy. Of the far greater part of them no circumstances are narrated, but their names, and the year of their emigration, which renders it impracticable to exhibit a full account of them. Indeed, such an account would be unnecessary to accomplish the end at present in view. Our design is to ascertain the nature of their political connection with the parent state; and abundance of materials remain to determine that point, without descending much to particulars.

The early colonies consisted of few emigrants, and the allotments of land were extremely small. Till the year of the city 441, the numbers of no colony are mentioned, which, on their emigration, exceeded 2500; and several are found, whose numbers did not surpass 300. During the same period, the highest allowance of
land

* By these *comitia*, the rich monopolized the civil power of the state, but, in return, were loaded in proportion with taxes and services.

† Lib. 37. cap. 9, and 28. Ibid. lib. 36. cap. 3.

land assigned to any colonist amounted to no more than two Roman acres and a half*. Posterior to the year 441, the colonies were more numerous, and the allotments more considerable. The colony of Alba consisted of 6000 emigrants, and that of Sora of 4000 †. The colonies of Piacentia and Cremona, situated on the borders of Gaul, received at one time a recruit of 6000 families, which were to be divided equally between them ‡. The colony of Thurium consisted of 3000 foot, and 300 horsemen. The foot were assigned 20 jugera a man, and the horsemen 40 §. The colony of Bononia contained 3000 emigrants, and the horsemen were allowed 70 jugera a piece, and the foot 50 ||.

The first remarkable event in the political history of the Roman colonization is the case of Velitrae. This town was antiently the capital of the Volsci, and was situated about 25 miles south-east of Rome. It was taken by the Romans, during the war with that people; about the year 256. Its inhabitants were ejected from their city and its territory, and a colony was ordered from Rome to

B b

replace

* The Roman jugerum, according to Quintilian, (Institut. lib. 1. c. 9.) was 240 feet long, and 120 broad. The Roman acre, therefore, contained 28,800 square feet, supposing the Roman foot equal to the English. But it was about $\frac{7}{8}$ part shorter. The jugerum, consequently, contained 27,545 English square feet; and $2\frac{1}{2}$ of these jugera would contain 68,862 such feet. The English acre comprehends 43,560 square feet; so that these colonists possessed only 3522 square feet more than an acre and a half English. A demonstration, both of the poverty of the colonists, and of the richness of the soil of Italy.

† The year 521. Liv. lib. 37. cap. 46.

‡ Liv. lib. 35. cap. 55.

§ Liv. lib. 10. cap. 1.

|| Ibid: lib. 35. cap. 9.

replace them *. A few years afterwards, on a report of new commotions excited among the Volsci, in order to assert their liberty against the Romans, the colony was reinforced with a recruit of inhabitants, and another colony, with a view to support it, was stationed at Narba, a town in its neighbourhood. It was impossible, however, to retain Velitrae in obedience. After several slighter specimens of disaffection, it finally joined the Latins, and espoused, with great zeal, the cause of that people in their last general revolt, when they demanded, as the only admissible terms of reconciliation, an union with the republic of Rome †. Velitrae shared the fate of the cities of Latium, on that memorable occasion, and was obliged, in the most humiliating terms, to supplicate the conquerors for mercy. The Romans treated the Latins with much generosity and compassion. The articles of peace favoured nothing of cruelty or resentment. The only object of them was to ensure future obedience ‡. They viewed not the conduct of their colonists of Velitrae in the same favourable light. They considered their rebellion as highly criminal, and inflicted on them a punishment proportionably severe. They decreed that, as they were Roman citizens, and had frequently rebelled, the walls of their city should be pulled down, their government abolished, their lands taken from them, and the whole colony banished into Tuscany beyond the Tyber, among the enemies of Rome; that, if any person belonging to the colony should be found on the south side of the Tyber, he might be seized by the man who should first meet him,

a

* Liv. lib. 2. cap. 31.

† Ibid. lib. 3. cap. 3.

‡ Page 88.

a fine of 1000 asses* might be demanded for his release, and he might be imprisoned till the fine should be paid †. When the magnanimous Romans punished so severely the rebellion of a colony, they must have judged its behaviour uncommonly culpable in itself, or extremely dangerous as a precedent. Their history affords few instances of their treating, even their most inveterate enemies, with similar repentment.

In the year of the city 541, and the tenth year of the second Punic war, another remarkable incident ‡ happened in the history of the Roman colonization. As this transaction places the sentiments and conduct of that great people, with regard to their colonies, in a very clear light, it is proper to exhibit a particular account of it.

Annibal, at the head of the Carthaginian army, had now been eight years in Italy, from which all the power of Rome was insufficient to expel him. Hasdrubal was on his march from Spain with another army, to cross the Alps, and to enter Italy by the same route Annibal had formerly pursued. The allies of Rome, despairing, it would seem, of her affairs, began to complain loudly of her management of the war. They had, they said, for ten years past, been oppressed with taxes and levies, the consequence of which had been nothing but disgrace; they had sent abroad their countrymen without intermission, while none of them ever returned home, unless they were taken captives, and generously dismissed by their enemies;

* The As was equal to $\frac{1}{2}$ d. † Liv. lib. 8. cap. 14. ‡ Ibid. lib. 27. cap. 9.

enemies ; if they proceeded much longer in this train, they would soon be altogether exhausted ; it was time, therefore, to refuse supplies, before they should be totally ruined.

At this critical period, the deputies of the colonies arrived in Rome, to receive the orders of the senate. Twelve of them applied privately to the Consuls, and, in the name of their constituents *, informed these magistrates, that they could furnish no further supplies, either of men or money ; because, having been drained by former demands, they had now none to give. The Consuls received this intimation with surprise, and immediately construed it as a prelude to revolt. They rated the deputies in severe terms, who had held to the Consuls a language, which they could not surely intend that the Consuls should communicate to the senate ; their declaration amounted, not only to a refusal of supplies, but to open rebellion ; they should, therefore, return instantly to their constituents, put them in mind they were Romans, and inculcate the duty resulting from that relation ; they should urge them to adopt more commendable and salutary resolutions in future ; for the manifest tendency of their present measures, was treachery and destruction to the commonwealth of Rome.

The Consuls could make no impression on the minds of the deputies, who still persisted in expressing their inability to furnish supplies. They were compelled, therefore, to communicate the whole transaction to the senate, who received the information with astonishment.

* The colonies of Ardea, Nepete, Sutrium, Alba, Corfeoli, Cora, Sueffa, Circii, Setia, Cales, Narnca, Interamna.

nishment. The Roman fortitude seemed for a moment to fail; the senate of Rome trembled. Many of the senators remarked, that their empire was at an end; that the rest of the colonies would follow the example; and that the colonies and allies had conspired to betray the city to Annibal.

The consuls had time to recollect themselves, during their conversation with the deputies, and to fortify their minds against the shock of this intelligence. They exhorted, therefore, the senators to resume their usual steadiness and intrepidity, and assured them, that the rest of the colonies would not follow a conduct so ungrateful. They retired from the senate, and having called for the deputies of the other eighteen colonies*, they asked them, whether the supplies were ready which their constituents were obliged to provide? The deputies replied, that their supplies were all ready; that, if more were necessary, they would cheerfully furnish them; that they by no means wanted resources; and that their zeal surpassed even their resources.

The consuls introduced the deputies to the senate, who received the news with inexpressible joy. They instantly passed a decree, that the consuls should call an assembly of the people, should present to them the deputies as their benefactors, and should recite

C c

all

* These were, the Norbani, Saticulani, Brundisii, Fragellani, Lucerini, Venusini, Hadriani, Firmiani, Ariminenses, Pontiani, Paestani, Cofani, Beneventani, Aternini, Spoletini, Placentini, Cremonenses, Signini; Liv. lib. 27. cap. 10.

all their former services to the republic, but, particularly, their present most meritorious conduct. Of the other deputies they ordered, that no notice whatever should be taken; a behaviour which they judged most suitable to the dignity of the Roman people.

As the senate judged it improper to resent immediately the conduct of the refractory colonies, no supplies were demanded of them during the six succeeding years. After that period, however, the Roman affairs beginning to wear a more favourable aspect, the subject was resumed in the senate*; and it was proposed, that these colonies should not escape unpunished. The measure was adopted with zeal, and a resolution was immediately passed, that the magistrates and ten of the principal inhabitants of each colony should be brought to Rome; that double the number of soldiers, which they had in any year furnished, since the commencement of the war, should be demanded of them; and, beside, that each of them should contribute 120 horsemen; that if they could not muster so many horsemen, they might for one horseman, provide three foot soldiers, which should be held equivalent; that the most opulent inhabitants should be enrolled as recruits, and sent out of Italy wherever the public service might require; and that, if any colony should hesitate to comply with these requisitions, their deputies should be detained at Rome till the orders were obeyed. It was also decreed, that the colonists should be subjected to a census, executed with equal rigour as at Rome, and that the censors of the colonies should deposit with the censor of the city their valuations

* Liv. lib. 29. c. 15.

valuations on oath, before they should be permitted to resign their offices.

When the deputies of the colonists arrived in Rome, and were informed of these resolutions, they exclaimed with one voice against their severity. They maintained, that they could not possibly furnish the recruits demanded, because they had them not; that they were scarcely able to afford the ordinary supplies, far less to muster the double of them. They intreated admission to the senate to deprecate its resentment, and urged, that they had committed no crime which could justify their destruction.

The consuls knew well the insincerity of these allegations, and regarded them very little. They insisted, that the requisitions of the senate should be complied with, and that the hostages should remain in Rome, while the magistrates returned home to execute the levies. The colonists perceived they would be obliged to submit. They, therefore, thought it eligible to enhance the merit of their compliance, by giving the most prompt and ready obedience; and the supplies, accordingly, were collected with ease and expedition.

This portion of history proves, incontestibly, that the Romans, during the first period * of their colonization, exercised an ample sovereignty over their colonies; and that the lives and fortunes of the colonists were as much at their disposal as those of their own citizens. They had long been in use, it appears, to demand from them contributions both of money and troops, for the support and defence

* Page 95.

defence of their government ; and they levied both in the same manner as they did at Rome. They ordered a muster to be made of all the inhabitants, and a valuation to be taken of their estates. According to the former, they determined the number of soldiers, and, according to the latter, the quantity of taxes, any colony should furnish. They varied their demands as the exigencies of the commonwealth, or the circumstances of the colony, seemed to require ; and the colonists possessed no right to dispute their orders, or to challenge their authority. The twelve refractory colonies never offer any objection against the jurisdiction, or the supremacy, of the mother-country ; they never insinuate, that they had no share in her government, and, therefore, would “ *bear none of her burdens ; that they had the sole right to give and grant their own money ; that they were the proper judges, both of the sum to be given, and the manner of raising it ; and that the only security they had for the possession of their civil rights, was the privilege to grant their own money **.”

Doctrines of this kind were then unknown, and, we may venture to affirm, would have been reckoned an affront to the government, and an insult to the honour and integrity of the Romans. The colonies contend, that the demands were exorbitant, not because they were not legal, but because the colonists were unable to comply with them. This was surely the worst argument they could use, if they had been acquainted with any other more popular or solid. The inspection of the census must have at once confuted it.

It

* Minutes of the Congress, July 31. 1775.

It must, however, be observed, that the Romans, on some occasions, granted to their colonies exemptions from public services. But this indulgence seems to have been bestowed only on the maritime colonies, and to have been granted even to them much seldomer than it was claimed. It originated, probably, from the zeal of the Romans to encourage navigation; an art with which they were not much acquainted, and of which they had only learned the necessity in the first Punic war. Seven * of these colonies having demanded exemption from land-service in the second Punic war, they were ordered to produce the grounds of their claims before the senate, who rejected those of all of them, two colonies only excepted, whose requests they admitted †.

A similar indulgence, even with regard to the sea-service, was solicited by the maritime colonies, when their inhabitants were impressed on board the fleet in the war against Antiochus. Their case was again referred to the senate, and the decision which passed upon it is a proof, that exemptions respected the land-service only, and were calculated entirely for the encouragement of seamen. The senate decreed, that the maritime colonies possessed no right of exemption from the service of the fleet ‡.

Such were the principles and practice of the Romans in the management of their colonies, till the passing of the Julian law in

D d

the

* Ostiensis, Alifanensis, Antias, Anxuras, Minturnensis, Sinuessana, Senensis; Liv. lib. 27. cap. 38. † Antias et Ostiensis, ibid. ‡ Liv. lib. 36. cap. 3.

the year 663. That law, which granted the freedom of the city to all the allies and colonies in Italy, introduced a great revolution into the political system of Rome, and manifestly paved the way to the destruction of the republic.

S E C T. IV.

Account of the Julian Law—Consequences of it—Military Colonies planted by Sylla—Julius Caesar—Augustus—Provincial Colonies—Aversion of the Romans from settling distant Colonies—Review of the Principles and Practice of the Romans respecting Colonization.

WHILE the Roman territories extended not beyond the limits of Italy, few of the allies and colonies valued very highly the privileges of citizens, or made any vigorous efforts to obtain them. Many of the allies preferred even the subordinate jurisdiction they possessed in their domestic governments, to the distant, expensive, and limited influence they could gain by the freedom of Rome. They were generally contented, therefore, with the flattering distinction of an alliance with the victorious Romans, and furnished, cheerfully, the supplies demanded by treaty. The latter, at the same time, managed their affairs with so much gentleness and moderation, that the allies perceived not they were really subjects, and were led to consider their subordination as merely a complimentary grant of precedence to a state superior to all others in military and political virtue.

But,

But, when the Roman legions began to penetrate into foreign countries ; when it appeared that neither Africa nor Asia possessed force sufficient to resist them ; when many spoils were to be gained, much rich territory was to be disposed of, and many high offices of honour and emolument were to be bestowed, the citizenship of Rome, which conveyed a title to all these advantages, became a most precious and captivating object, and both allies and colonies contended most strenuously for its acquisition. The latter alleged their great share of the trouble as an indisputable claim to a part of the reward. They furnished * a large proportion of the victorious troops that fought the battles, and made the rich conquests which procured to the Romans so much power, reputation, and emolument ; it was therefore reasonable they should have some influence in the government which directed these operations, and some portion of the honours and profits it had to confer.

The anxiety of the Romans to monopolize advantages, the value of which they found every day to increase, was augmented in proportion to the eagerness of the allies to divide them. They defeated, therefore, for many years, either by artifice or violence, every attempt to extend to the latter the privileges of the city †. The allies, finally, were fired with resentment, and flew to arms, resolving to obtain by force, what they could not acquire by negotiation. The whole of Italy, from the Liris southward, in which districts were planted many colonies, joined in one general revolt, and.

* Patercul. lib. 2. cap. 15.

† Appian. de bellis civil. lib. 1. cap. 373.

and even the allies who adhered to Rome were extremely dissatisfied. These revolted states, during their alliance, had imbibed the courage, and learned the military skill of the Roman legions; and their numbers rendered their resources equal, if not superior, to those of Rome. Italy, during four years, lost, in this bloody social war, no fewer than 300,000 men, and the commonwealth approached the brink of destruction*. To save the state from ruin, and to remove the grounds of quarrel, by granting what was demanded, Lucius Julius Cæsar, then Consul, proposed the famous law, which afterwards retained his name, to extend the freedom of the city to the allies of Rome. The allies and colonies † who remained in subjection, first enjoyed the benefit of this law; and in a few years it was communicated to the whole.

The passing of the Julian law may be said to have annihilated the republic: For, during the short period it afterwards subsisted, it was a scene of constant tumult, sedition, and corruption, from which resulted nothing but convulsions, proscriptions, and civil wars. The comitia were too numerous before the Julian law; and it cannot be supposed that the greater part of the people who composed these assemblies, should either have understood the affairs which they canvassed, or that they should have been guided by any principles of patriotism or justice in their decisions. Had not the principal business of the state been transferred to the comitia centuriata,

* Pater. lib. 2. cap. 15.
by Cicero in his orations pro Domo, and pro Sylla; a proof that the colonies were comprehended in the Julian law.

† The suffrages of the colonies are mentioned

ata, which confined the management of it to the most opulent and most improved citizens, it is difficult to suppose a government so tumultuary, that its comitia might sometimes consist of more than 200,000 members, could have subsisted so long. What then must have been the condition of these comitia, when the whole freemen of all the allies and colonies of Italy might be brought to Rome, to give their suffrages? Could the most remote conception of justice, reason, or public good, ever pervade such a body? Faction, violence, and corruption, were the only engines which remained; because it was impossible to influence such an enormous mass by any other means. The prodigious sums * of money spent, during this period, in donations and shows, to gain popularity among the citizens of Rome, are generally appealed to as marks of the degeneracy of the times; but it is plain these corruptions were the consequences, not the causes, of the state of public affairs. At no æra did the Roman genius shine with such conspicuous lustre. In no equal period did Rome ever possess so many great men. Taste, eloquence, philosophy, political and military skill, secured immortal fame to that age, and render it still the admiration of mankind. It was the co-existence of so many heroes, who would not yield their pretensions to one another, that suspend-

E e cd.

* Julius Cæsar had spent all his fortune, and involved himself so deeply in debt, by the arts of corruption, that he used to say pleasantly, he needed 25,000,000 of sesterces, L. 195,312 : 10 s. to make him worth nothing; Appian. de bellis civ. lib. 2. cap. 432. The same author informs us, (ibid. cap. 438.) that a candidate, a little before the commencement of the war between Cæsar and Pompey, advanced, at one time, 800 talents, L. 155,000, to bribe the comitia.

ed a while the fate of the republic, which naturally should have terminated as soon as the Julian law was passed.

The Romans seem to have foreseen the fatal consequences of this law, and to have tried every expedient to elude its force. They admitted not the new citizens among the former tribes, where their numbers must have born down all opposition, and carried every cause against the old citizens. They classed them in eight additional new tribes *, which destroyed, in a great measure, their influence, and left the thirty-five old tribes a manifest superiority. The new citizens became presently sensible of this disadvantage, and complained loudly of their situation †. The same irresistible influence which procured the law, procured also the amendment of it, and the new citizens were, in a few years, arranged among the old tribes ‡.

The history of the military colonies affords some of the most striking proofs of the dismal consequences of the Julian law. Previous to that law, every citizen held himself obliged to appear in arms, when it should be necessary, in defence of his country, and to continue in the public service during the term limited by law. He reckoned this service part of the burden to which he was subjected, in return for the important civil privileges he enjoyed, and he bore it with willingness and resolution. He expected

* Pater. lib. 2. cap. 20.

† Appian. bell. civ. lib. 1. cap. 380.

‡ Epit. Liv. 80.

ed an honourable dismissal, and an exemption from future dangers, when his military age should be elapsed ; but he expected and demanded no reward for his labour. Posterior to the Julian law, the legions supported the cause, and avenged the quarrel, not of the commonwealth against her enemies, but of one leader of a faction against another. Large forfeitures were the necessary consequences of these wars. The legions fought in expectation of the spoils, and were always rewarded with an ample portion of them. The military colonies, then, were detachments of the legionary troops who were settled by their victorious leaders upon the lands of their fellow-citizens, which had been confiscated in the civil wars. They lived in affluence and ease on the plunder of their country, and secured the obedience of the district they occupied to their respective partizans.

Sylla introduced this practice, after the defeat of the forces of his antagonist Marius ; and, as his wars were bloody, the consequences of them were destructive. All his enemies, and all their friends, felt his resentment. Numberless proscriptions of individuals would not satisfy him. He confiscated whole cities and states at once. On lands, of which he had got possession by such base means, he established, at one time, no fewer than 23 legions*.

The civil wars of Sylla were succeeded, in a few years, by the war between Pompey and Caesar, which was followed, almost immediately,

* Appian. lib. 1. bell. civ. cap. 313. These legions can scarcely be supposed to have contained fewer than 138,000 men.

mediately, by that of the triumvirate, against the murderers of Caesar. The second of these wars, was the least destructive to the inhabitants of Italy. Caesar, after defeating his enemies in the field, seems to have apprehended no danger from private resentment. He indulged, therefore, all that humanity towards his foes, which is so ornamental in a conqueror, and which resulted so naturally from the dictates of his own heart *. He confiscated the lands of no individuals who had born arms against him. He stripped no cities nor districts of their rights and territories. He admitted many of his adversaries to his presence, and honoured them with offices of trust. He wished to recommend his administration to his countrymen, by affording them protection in their lives and property; and he rewarded his legions rather by largesses, than by lands. He planted, for this reason, very few military colonies in Italy, though several are mentioned which he settled in the provinces †. If Caesar meant, on this occasion, to act the part so successfully performed afterwards by Augustus, namely, to abolish republican government, and to establish monarchy, his treatment of his enemies was rather commendable than prudent. Open, generous, and unsuspecting himself, he judged of the motives of other mens actions from his own; and, as he could not conceive his enemies capable of entertaining thoughts of assassination, he was at no pains to guard himself against

* In the battle of Pharsalia, he called to his troops to spare the citizens of Rome. He allowed even those whom he had not pardoned to return home, and resume their offices and employments. Three persons only were put to death not in the field of battle, and even these are said to have been sacrificed without his consent.

† Eight military colonies only were taken notice of by the writers of antiquity, as planted in Italy by Julius Caesar. Dion Cassius affirms, (lib. 43. ad finem), that he placed one colony at Carthage, and another at Corinth.

against it. The interest of the state, he probably imagined, opposed such a design; and, as all parties seemed now sensible of the corruptions and imperfections of the republican government, he concluded some revolution was absolutely necessary for the peace and safety of the state*. If any single person was to be placed at the head of the Roman empire, no man had an equal title with himself. He had all the military force at his disposal; what could his enemies gain by resistance? They could scarcely indulge the idea of restoring the former government, which had been the source of all their distresses, though they had it in their power, and they could possess no power for that purpose without his concurrence. Nothing, therefore, remained, but to remove the aversion which his countrymen entertained against monarchy, and which had been heightened into horror, by the cruel and undistinguishing rage of Sylla. The proper method to accomplish this end was, to seem to forget injuries; to treat friends and foes with affability and respect, and to make the people feel the happiness of peace and security, in place of that madness and violence which had deformed the times of the republic.

What is most probable is not always true; nor is what is most reasonable always put in practice. Men act from the dictates of their passions and their habits more frequently than from the direction of their reason. Caesar, like a foldier rather than a politician, seems not to have taken the former into his account. It was cruel to kill or banish any of his countrymen; it was particularly cruel, to do

F f

either

* He used to remark, that the republic was only a shadow of government, a monster without form or beauty. Suet. Jul. Caesar. cap. 77.

either in cold blood, and when the necessity of the action might not be generally understood. But, while so many great men remained in Rome, who had seen the days of liberty, had felt their consequence under the old constitution, and had so many cities and districts of Italy attached to their interest, could it be expected they would descend peaceably, from the rank of equals of Caesar, to be his slaves? Had he, like Augustus, banished or assassinated every old Roman, who could be supposed to disturb his government; had he planted his legions in military colonies near the capital, to support his administration, and to intimidate his foes, he might, perhaps, have prolonged his life, and saved his country another civil war. But his heart revolted against such sanguinary and flagitious measures; and, though no man was more ambitious of empire, he could not stoop to purchase it by such base means.

Augustus far exceeded Julius Caesar in distributing through Italy military colonies. He even exceeded Sylla himself. That cool and political tyrant proceeded, without scruple or remorse, to remove, by the most effectual methods, whether right or wrong, every obstacle which opposed his progress to despotism. At his first appearance on the scene of action, he threw himself, with much dissimulation, into the arms of the senate, in opposition to Antony, because he concluded he could manage the former most effectually to promote his views, and he hired assassins to put the latter to death*. He soon, however, deserted the senate, formed an union with his
enemy

* Suet. Aug. cap. 10.

enemy Antony, and with him and Lepidus, constituted the famous triumvirate, who assumed the whole power of the state, and shared among themselves the government of the Roman empire. Under pretence of avenging the death of Julius Caesar, they made war against Brutus and Cassius, and the friends of the ancient constitution. Under pretence of preserving the peace of Italy, they banished or put to death every Roman citizen who was suspected to entertain sentiments unfriendly to their cause, or who enjoyed money, houses, or lands, they longed to possess. To encourage the legions to engage with zeal in the war against the republicans, besides other donations, they were promised, on their return home, to be cantoned in eighteen colonies, on the best and most pleasant lands in Italy; and the towns and territories are even specified which they might expect to obtain*.

The execution of this most ungracious task was committed to Augustus, who, with the same apathy with which he had ordered the assassination of every prisoner of eminence taken at the battle of Philippi, proceeded to dispossess the harmless inhabitants of the finest countries of Italy, to make room for the accomplishment of his promise to the legions. He disregarded the remonstrances of the former possessors, and the violation of the laws of justice and humanity. He gained not even the approbation of the troops†, whose hopes, it seems, were so high, that nothing could satisfy them.

When,

* Appian. Bell. civ. lib. 4. cap. 59c. Capua, Rhegium, Venusia, Beneventum, &c.

† Suet. Aug. cap. 13.

When, in the course of his progress to empire, Augustus discovered that he no longer depended on external resources for success, he first stripped Lepidus of his power, and afterwards prepared himself to act the same part with regard to Antony. Having defeated the forces of the latter in the battle of Actium, he repeated the same tragedy which had been performed after the battle of Philippi. He proscribed, or committed to the hands of assassins, every Roman of any consideration, who had been connected with his rival, and extirpated the inhabitants of the different districts of Italy who were attached to his interest *. On the lands of the latter he stationed the troops who had served him in that war, of which he formed no fewer than twenty-eight military colonies; and the policy of this crafty Emperor is strongly marked by the civil regulations he adopted with regard to these colonists. Though he had, by their aid, successfully violated all the principles of justice, reason, and humanity, demolished the ancient constitution, and laid the lives and fortunes of his countrymen at his feet, he thought it expedient, hypocritically to preserve, even with regard to them, the forms of the republic, and to make provision for the commodious exercise of their important privilege of giving their suffrages in the comitia of Rome. As the distance, then, of the situation of the colonists might render their attendance on these assemblies extremely inconvenient and troublesome, he ordained that the suffrages of the colonies should be taken on the spot, should be sent to Rome, properly authenticated by the senate of the colony, and should be

* Dion. Cass. lib. 51. An author extremely willing to extenuate the enormities of Augustus.

be admitted to their share of influence in calculating the votes of the citizens*.

This regulation is the only circumstance that remains on record relative to the civil jurisdiction of the military colonies, and it will be allowed to be of such a nature as to deserve very little regard as a precedent of liberty. It is of the same character with the other civil transactions of the Romans posterior to the passing of the Julian law, which concur to demonstrate this proposition, that the virtue of that people did not expire with their government, but that the spirit of their constitution subsisted after the power of it was extinct. Insuperable, almost, must that spirit have been, which could not be extinguished by so many civil wars, assassinations, and banishments. Destructive to the constitution must have been that law which was the occasion of them. For this reason, though I judged it would be acceptable to the reader to pursue the history of the colonization of the Romans to the subversion of the republic, it will appear that the authority of their practice is only valuable previous to the time of the Julian law.

It will perhaps create some surprize, that the account given of the Roman colonization appears to conclude, without taking notice of any colonies planted in the provinces. It will probably be asked, Were no colonies settled in the provinces during the long period of 150 years which elapsed between the first Punic war, when the Romans began to acquire territory beyond the limits of Italy, and

G g

the

* Suet. Aug. cap. 46.

the aera of the Julian law, when the establishment of military colonies commenced ; and, if none were settled during that period, what was the reason of a conduct apparently so unaccountable ?

In answer to the first of these questions, it is to be observed, that no colony was planted beyond the borders of Italy before the year of the city 620, forty-three years only previous to the framing of the Julian law. About that time a colony was established at Carthage by the famous Tiberius Gracchus ; and Paterculus * informs us, that it was the first which had been stationed in the provinces. It is uncertain whether any other provincial colonies emigrated during the remaining forty-three years, as no mention is made of them ; but, if any did emigrate, they were probably very few. The colony of Carthage seems not, by its prosperity, to have given encouragement to that practice. It would appear it had been unsuccessful ; for, about the year 700, we find Julius Caesar employed in establishing a new colony at the same place †.

With regard to the second question, it is to be remarked, that the Roman colonists disliked situations very remote from the capital, and that they were in use to desert their stations when they found them either inconvenient or dangerous. The colonists of Cremona and Placentia, planted on the confines of Cisalpine Gaul, relinquished their possessions for fear of the savage people in their neighbourhood, and left their territories almost uninhabited. The Romans

* Lib. 2. cap. 15.

† Dio. Cass. lib. 43.

mans found it necessary to send out a numerous emigration to replace them*.

But the chief impediment to provincial colonization, arose from the opinions of the people of Rome. The cautious old Romans were jealous, it seems, of the prosperity and power of distant colonies, and dreaded, that they might one day rival and resist the dignity and authority of the parent state. They were afraid, Rome might share the fate of Tyre, Phocoea, or Corinth, whose colonies of Carthage, Marseilles, and Syracuse, far surpassed their parent states in grandeur, opulence, and power. From such colonies, history had taught them, that the mother-country could derive no benefit, as it was not to be expected, that gratitude should operate in any colony, when the authority of the mother-country had lost its influence. Accordingly Paterculus † declares the law of Gracchus, by which a colony was ordered to be transplanted to Carthage, to have been one of the most pernicious to the commonwealth which ever was framed. That law was passed in the midst of the most violent Agrarian contentions, and in opposition to the sentiments of many of the wisest and most powerful citizens. It is probable, for this reason, when the ferment had subsided, that the old opinions would regain their influence, and would prevent the farther establishment of provincial colonies, during the existence of the authority of the republic.

Though.

* 6000 families, Liv. 37. c. 46.

† Lib. 2. c. 15.

Though the principle of planting no colonies in the provinces, founded on jealousy of their eminence and power, certainly contained a considerable mixture of narrow politics, when adopted without limitation, it marks, at the same time, very strongly the opinion of the Romans, in the purest times of the republic, with regard to the objects of colonization: That they might have made settlements in Gaul, Spain, or even Africa, restricted and regulated in such a manner, as to secure to themselves the advantages resulting from them, can scarcely be doubted; and it is obvious, that the policy was imperfect which forfeited these advantages. But, when a small chance only of losing their jurisdiction over their colonies, induced them to forego manifest emolument to be derived from such establishments, it is a demonstration, that their notions of the subordination of the latter were extremely high.

The amount of what has been advanced, concerning the colonization of Rome, may be collected into one view, in the following manner. The Romans, learning wisdom from the Greek colonies, most of which, by their prosperity and distance from the mother-country, had been tempted to renounce their allegiance, and not doubting, that, in similar circumstances, their own colonists would act the same part, were extremely averse from the establishment of colonies, either very remote or very large. For this reason, during 663 years from the building of the city, they planted only one colony in the provinces, though they had established above fifty in Italy. They subjected all their colonies to such restrictions, and modelled their constitutions in such a manner, as they judged

judged necessary to secure their subordination and dependence. They deprived all of them of the right of suffrage in the comitia of Rome, partly to maintain the supremacy and dignity of these assemblies, by preventing them from becoming too numerous, and partly because the distance of the colonists rendered their attendance so inconvenient, that it could not be expected, except, on extraordinary occasions, to serve the purposes of faction. They deprived the Latin colonies of the freedom of the city altogether. They imposed, even on the Roman, their most favoured colonists, a temporary suspension of that privilege. They obliged all their colonies to acknowledge their supreme jurisdiction, and, in testimony of that acknowledgment, to furnish such sums of money in taxes, and such supplies of troops, as should be demanded of them for the service of the state. They regulated even the mode of levying these taxes and supplies. They appointed the rate (or formula, as they called it,) according to which the estates of the colonists should be subjected to taxation. They ascertained the number, and described sometimes the denominations of the colonists who should be enlisted for recruits. They disposed of their money as they judged proper, and sent their soldiers on military services, wherever the interest of the commonwealth required.

After settling the government of a colony, and dividing among the members of it the lands allotted by the senate, both which offices were performed by some persons of eminence, appointed to conduct them to their place of residence, the Romans permitted the colonists to manage their private affairs as they pleased. They accordingly

H h

framed

framed and executed such laws as they thought necessary for the internal government of the colony. They levied money, and punished crimes of every sort, within their own jurisdiction. And, that nothing might be done, even by the parent-state, which affected their interest, without their knowledge, they retained patrons or agents at Rome, who consulted their advantage, and defended their rights*.

Such

* That the reader may obtain a compleat view of the practice, both of antient and modern states, with regard to the taxation of colonies, I shall subjoin, in this note, a short account of the taxes imposed upon their colonists by the Dutch, French, Spaniards, and Portuguese. The Dutch are the nation whose policy, respecting colonization, would naturally be supposed to attract the attention of Britain. But the reader will perhaps be surpris'd to find, that it is conducted on principles less liberal than those of any other modern state. The species of government most disadvantageous to colonists, is to subject them to the jurisdiction of a company, possessed of exclusive privileges, for which it pays a certain revenue to the state; yet this kind of government is adopted by the United Provinces, in their settlements both in the East and West Indies. The Dutch East India company advance to the republic large sums of money for every renewal of their charter. They pay duties of import for all the commodities they receive from India, and duties of export for the articles they send abroad. The renewal of their grant, in the year 1743, was obtained on the condition, that the state should receive 3 per cent. on the dividends of the company.

In the French West India islands, all merchandise is liable to a duty on importation from France. The planters pay a certain tax for every Negroe upon their estates, and most of the articles produced in the islands are also subjected to taxation.

The King of Spain demands the fifth part of the silver, and the tenth of all the gold, collected in Mexico, besides a duty of 33 per cent. on all goods sent from Europe, 2½ per cent. on all sales, and large sums on extraordinary occasions, under the denomination of loans.

The King of Portugal receives the fifth part of all the gold found in the Brasils, and a tax of 1500 livres for every diamond mine which shall be wrought, whether the adventurer be successful or not.

Such were the maxims and conduct, in the management of colonies, of the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Romans, the nations of antiquity most remarkable for virtue, refinement, and political liberty; and for whose opinions and practice, in matters of government, all civilized nations have entertained the highest regard. What then is the wisdom we may derive from their example, to direct the councils of our own country at the present conjuncture? What are the precedents they afford, in the treatment of colonies, which may be useful to us in the settlement of our own?

CHAP.

C H A P. IV.

Application of the preceding NARRATIVE to the present CONTEST between GREAT BRITAIN and her COLONIES in AMERICA.

S E C T. I.

Ambitious Views of the American Colonists—Similar Views entertained by the rebellious Colonists of Carthage—Athens—and Rome—Right of Britain to tax America supported by the Practice of the Carthaginians—Greeks—and Romans—None of the Colonists of Antiquity admitted to a Participation of the Civil Government of the Parent State.

THE great object which the American colonists have long had in view, and which they have lately taken up arms to obtain, is to be totally independent, as to their internal government, of the two houses of parliament of Great Britain*. They claim that, in every colony, their respective houses of representatives shall engross the authority of the two houses of parliament, and that these houses of representatives, along with the King or

his

* American Bill of Rights, Article 4.

his viceroy, shall possess every parliamentary power within the colony, as fully is as done by the King and parliament of Great Britain within that island. Taking it for granted they have an indisputable title to this privilege, they easily resolve it into every demand and complaint they make ; for example, that they shall have the sole right to give and grant their own money ; that *constitutional* requisitions shall be made to them when money is wanted, the purpose specified, the sum named, an account given of the expenditure ; that they shall be allowed to judge and decide on every article ; in a word, that their houses of representatives shall be treated with the same respect and ceremony with which his Majesty treats the parliament of Great Britain. From this principle, also, they complain, that *our* parliament should presume to make laws to bind states, over which it has no authority ; that their charters or compacts with the crown should be altered, their money levied and disposed of, their civil and criminal laws framed, and their judges appointed by acts of *our* parliament, which has no jurisdiction over them, and all whose acts, consequently, of interference, are tyranny, oppression, and despotism*.

Having emancipated themselves from the stern authority of the two houses of parliament, they seem to have entertained little apprehension from the power of the crown. Their minds were easy on this article, when they reflected that they had all the game to play, by the grants of money, which was put in practice against the

I i

Sovereigns

* Journal of the Congress, July 31. 1775.

Sovereigns of the last century. And, as the crown had little influence in their assemblies by the gifts of places, they concluded the royal authority would be little better than an empty name*. Such only are the terms on which America would remain in friendship with Great Britain; such are the claims she has taken up arms to obtain. With regard to the people of this island in general, these terms are equally disadvantageous with the independence she has now avowed; with regard to his Majesty, they are very little preferable. But I mean not to undertake an examination of the rights and claims of the parties in this contest, which have been already so ably and fully discussed †. My design is to appeal to precedent and experience, which commonly have a greater influence with mankind than speculation.

It is obvious to remark, from the preceding history, that the colonies of America have acted the same part with the rebellious colonies of antiquity, in similar circumstances. They demand the immunities above specified, because they judge themselves now in a situation to assert them.

The article of the last peace, which took Canada out of the hands of France, was the immediate occasion of the present rebellion; but its cause is to be traced to an aera more distant. The principles from which it proceeded have been ripening and gathering strength during the whole course of this century. The colonists waited only for the

* Ibid. † See Rights Asserted; and Answer to the American declaration of independence.

the arrival of that seasonable period, when they should become so powerful, or Britain so weak, that they might expect to put them in practice with success. The extent and fertility of their country; the amazing increase of their population; the forbearance of the mother-country to impose taxes, long after they were able to bear them; her irresolution and repentance, after she had taken the decisive step by the stamp-act, the timidity and weakness of which even the Canada act was considered as a consequence; the exaggerated importance of American commerce, without which it was supposed Britain could not subsist; all concurred to make the colonists conclude, that the favourable juncture was arrived; and that this island, corrupted with luxury, distracted with factions, and loaded with debts, after a long and expensive war, could neither find men, money, nor provisions, to support armies to preserve the subordination of provinces so distant and so powerful.

Similar views of emancipating themselves from the dominion of the parent states, and similar opinions of the inability of the latter to assert their rights, excited the colonies of Africa to rebel against the Carthaginians *, the Lesbians to revolt from the Athenians †, and the refractory colonies, in the second Punic war, to refuse obedience to the Romans ‡.

The rich colonists of Africa, like the Americans, but with much better reason, thought themselves absolutely necessary to the existence of

* Page 18.

† Page 55.

‡ Page 99.

of the mother-country. From them had been drawn, during the first Punic war, a great part of the supplies which supported the expences of the Carthaginian state. They wished to moderate the exactions "of a people in whose legislation they had no share, "who disposed of their property without their consent," and levied their contributions with severity, unless when they were paid without reluctance. The coffers of Carthage were drained by the war, and the arrears of the mercenaries were unpaid. A mutiny ensued, followed by a rebellion, in which the colonists joined the foreign troops; because they expected to avail themselves of the embarrassment of the state, in order to procure an alleviation of their burdens. After wasting much more treasure than they might have paid in taxes for many years, and after causing the destruction of many thousands of their countrymen, they were compelled to return to their allegiance, and to submit themselves to that yoke they had attempted to shake off.

The Lesbians also, like the Americans, had formed a plan to render themselves independent of their parent state, and they waited only for a proper opportunity to put it in practice. They complained loudly of the tyranny and encroachments of the administration of Athens, that systems of slavery and despotism pervaded all her councils, and that she misapplied and squandered the money she levied from her colonists on spectacles and favourites, and neglected the interest of the public. The true meaning of this language was, not that the councils of the Athenians were more corrupted and tyrannical than usual, but that the Lesbians aspired after

after independence, and thought the occasion most seasonable to urge that claim. The Athenians were engaged in a formidable war with Sparta and her allies, for the sovereignty of Greece. They could scarcely support themselves against their foreign enemies, far less could they vindicate their authority over their colonists. If Athens should not yield to their pretensions, they needed only to throw themselves into the arms of Sparta, who would afford them their protection. This plan was exceedingly plausible and flattering, and was readily embraced at Lesbos. The activity, however, of the Athenians anticipated the execution of it, and the Lesbians had much reason to repent their treachery.

The conduct of the twelve refractory colonies of Rome was influenced by the same principle, introduced by similar pretensions, though more modestly expressed, and attended by correspondent circumstances. It seems evident, that these colonies had formed a design of independence, and that, had the Romans, instead of forbearance, proceeded to use force to compel them to submit, they would have rebelled, or revolted to the Carthaginians. They disputed not, however, the jurisdiction of Rome, nor complained of the oppression of her administration. They adopted the pretence of inability to comply with her demands, and remained, with fullness and obstinacy, on that ground. They wished, perhaps, for a specious cause of rebellion, or defection; and, after they had resolved to revolt, like the Americans, thought it a matter of mighty consequence who should first draw the sword. The season was most favourable for the advancement of their claims. Rome was in the

deepest distress, and her resources were about to fail. One formidable commander, with a powerful army, was at her gates. Another army was on its march, and in a few weeks would have reached the capital. Rome herself was obliged to give way, and to grant to these colonies a temporary independence. The sense, however, the Romans entertained of the ingratitude and treachery of their conduct, is strongly marked by the severe regulations introduced into their government, and the heavy additional burdens imposed on them.

It is farther observable, that the right of Great Britain to impose taxes on her American colonies, is supported by the practice of the greatest and freest states of antiquity, the Carthaginian, Greek, and Roman.

Carthage, like Britain, was a great commercial nation. She excelled all antiquity in the knowledge of naval affairs; and she had wisely applied that knowledge to promote the purposes of trade. Having experienced the emolument resulting from her commerce with foreign states, she was extremely eager to establish colonies, to render that commerce more beneficial. The voyages round Africa, and along the coasts of the Atlantic, but particularly the great armaments commanded by Hanno and Himilco *, are strong proofs of the prevalence of her commercial spirit. It is, however, of the management of her settlements in the islands of the Mediterranean, and along the coasts of that sea, that any accounts remain;

* Page 7.

remain ; and from these we learn, as similar causes, in all ages, produce similar effects, that her principles and practice, with respect to her colonies, resembled very much those of Great Britain. She superintended their commerce, and established such regulations concerning it, as might secure most effectually the benefit of it to the parent state. She relaxed or restricted these regulations, according to the situation of the colonists*. She did not, however; think that the monopoly of their trade was all the advantage she was entitled to derive from them. She most certainly collected recruits for her armies in her colonies of Sicily and Sardinia, and she employed these recruits in Africa or Spain, as the exigencies of the state required. She levied large contributions, both of money and corn, from her colonists in Africa, who submitted readily to her authority, and complained only of the exorbitancy of her demands, or of the severity of her farmers of the revenue.

Had the sentiments now so prevalent in America been understood by these colonists, they would have remonstrated to the Carthaginians, that they were entitled, by the laws of God and nature, to be free, and that their freedom consisted in giving and granting their own money †, which no power on earth had right to take from them, without their consent ; that they had no controul over the senate or people of Carthage, who imposed these taxes, and, if the latter could levy money from them for common defence, they might take from them all the property they possessed. What could defend them:

* Page 14.

† American Bill of Rights.

them against a power so dreadful? They would have urged, that legislation and taxation are inseparable; and they would therefore pay no taxes, because they had no share of the government of Carthage; that the monopoly of their trade was more than sufficient compensation for the protection they enjoyed; if the Carthaginians wanted more, let them abolish that monopoly, and they would cheerfully contribute their proportion of the public expence, when *constitutionally* required*; and that, to pay taxes on other terms, would be to confess themselves slaves, and to acknowledge that "the divine author of our being intended a part of the human race to hold an absolute property in, and unbounded power over others, marked out by his infinite goodness and wisdom as the objects of legal domination, never rightfully resistible, however severe and oppressive †." The colonists of Africa never heard such language, and were totally unacquainted with such principles. It was perhaps fortunate for them they were so ignorant, as little doubt seems to remain, that the state of Carthage would have constructed such opinions to be treasonable.

The situation of the Greeks, in respect of their colonies, was singular; and I have endeavoured to account for their conduct towards them, from the particular circumstances of that situation. It must be allowed, that the former levied no taxes from the latter, till the time of the Persian invasion, and that, even posterior to that era, regular taxes were demanded by no state of Greece, except Athens.

The

* American Petition to the King, July 8. 1775.

† American Declaration on taking up arms.

The authority, however, of this precedent cannot be employed in favour of the Americans; because the situations of the colonists are by no means similar. The reason of the conduct of the Greek states was not, that they judged taxation illegal, unjust, or tyrannical, but that no political connection subsisted between them and their colonies, which could entitle the former to levy supplies from the latter. Their colonists were not settled, like the Americans, on lands within the territories and under the jurisdiction of the parent states. They received from them no protection, no assistance, no privileges of any sort. They were bands of citizens who could find no employment at home, nor subsistence in any provinces of the mother-country. They were sent abroad as soldiers of fortune, to seek habitations, to procure subsistence, and to defend themselves in the best manner they could. The parent states could retain no dominion over such colonists, and had no emolument to expect from them. If the latter choosed to treat the former with the common formalities of ceremony practised in Greece in such cases, they had nothing farther to demand.

But, after the Persian invasion, Athens having acquired power, soon found a pretext for levying taxes from her colonies; and she continued this practice till she lost her dominions, and, along with them, her supplies. She regulated the amount of the money any colony should be obliged to furnish. She converted, sometimes, military services into taxes*, and even employed force, when it was necessary, to support her requisitions. The case of the

L 1

American

* Page 53.

American colonies resembles that of the colonists of Athens, posterior to the Persian expedition. They have been planted on territories within the dominions of the parent state. They have received from her encouragement, protection, and support, and they have shared every advantage, consistent with their situation, she had to bestow. That the Athenians would have subjected such colonists to taxation, no doubt can exist. That they would have employed the sword, as Great Britain has done, to vindicate her authority and procure obedience, the whole history of their colonization evinces.

Even Sparta, the only other state of Greece, which possessed ability to levy contributions from her colonies, would have treated the Americans in a manner nearly the same as has been done by Great Britain. She would not, indeed, have required any annual tribute*; but she would have demanded very heavy occasional supplies, whenever the exigencies of her state made them necessary †.

Of

* Page 47.

† A late author of much ingenuity and erudition*, has published an imperfect account of the colonization of Greece. He has overlooked the practice both of Athens and Sparta, posterior to the Persian invasion, when these states levied contributions from their colonies. He seems to have attended only to the policy of Greece, preceding that æra; and, therefore, he represents the Greek states, as if they never had claimed any jurisdiction over their colonies, and the latter, as if they had afforded the

* Dr Adam Smith.

Of all the states of antiquity, the Romans exercised the most extensive authority over their colonies. They were jealous of their aiming at independence; and they took the most effectual methods to defeat that design. They subjected them all, without exception, to levies of money and troops; and they regulated the amount and the manner of collecting these levies. They disposed of both as they judged proper, without permitting the colonists to make the least inquiry into their management*.

The lives and fortunes of the Roman colonists were completely exposed to the operation of that unlimited power, of which the Americans so loudly complain, and which they reckon the essence of slavery; namely, to have their money taken from them without their consent, by a body of men extraneous to their constitutions, and over whom they had no controul; to have that money disposed of by this body of men as they judged expedient, without any right being retained by the colonists to inquire into the application of it, "or to see whether it be not wasted among the venal and corrupt, for the purpose of undermining the civil rights of the givers, nor yet to be diverted to the support of standing armies, inconsistent with their freedom and subversive of their quiet;" in a word, "to a power so unbounded, as to include an accumulation of
" all

the former every mark of respect and assistance, prompted solely by obligations of alliance or friendship. I have the highest respect for the judgment of this writer; but must be allowed to observe, that his information has been incomplete. The authorities I have quoted fully justify this assertion.

* Page 101:

"all injuries, a power which claimed a right to make laws, to bind them in all cases whatsoever*." If the apparently dutiful and temperate language of the twelve refractory colonies, in the second Punic war, representing their inclination to furnish supplies, had they possessed resources for that purpose, merited from the Roman consul the appellation of sedition and treachery, I leave the reader to determine what name he would have given to opinions which disclaimed the right to demand these supplies, and which held forth that right as iniquitous and tyrannical.

It may be remarked, in the last place, that none of the parent states of antiquity admitted their colonists to a participation of their civil government, till those of Rome were allowed that privilege by the Julian law.

The whole of the citizens of Carthage who had any share of the legislative power, resided within the original territories of the commonwealth, which were not very extensive †. The people, in all the antient republics, had such frequent occasions to attend the public assemblies on the business of the state, that they could not be conveniently stationed at a distance. A remote residence was equivalent almost to an exclusion from the right of citizenship; because that right could not be exercised without much detriment. The Tribus Faleria, one of the most distant of the Roman tribes, and which occupied territory near the mouth of the Liris, was not situated

* Minutes of the Congress, July 31. 1775.

† Page 14. See note.

ated above eighty miles from the city. The greater part of the tribes resided not beyond half that distance. From the nature of the case, therefore, it is obvious, that the colonists of the antient republics, who were established on lands generally much more remote, would neither demand nor be permitted to retain the privileges of citizens, because these could not be attended with any benefit.

This theory is supported by many facts, which necessarily presuppose its truth. The colonists of Africa cannot be imagined to have rebelled against the Carthaginians on account of the exorbitancy of exactions, to the imposition of which they had themselves consented. The colonists of Athens and Sparta could not possibly assemble from Italy and Sicily, from Asia and Thrace, to attend the different comitia of their parent states. But, with regard to the Romans, the accounts of whose colonization have descended to us most entire, we have positive evidence*, that their colonists possessed no share in the civil government of the mother-country antecedent to the Julian law. After that law, they were admitted into the legislative body † of the commonwealth, and contributed not a little to destroy its constitution.

M m

S E C T.

* Page 99.

† Page 108.

S E C T. II.

Independent Principles not easily to be eradicated from the Minds of the Americans—Modes of Settlement—The supporting a Standing Army in America—The admitting into Parliament Representatives from the Colonists—Respective Advantages and Disadvantages of each scheme.

THOUGH little doubt is to be entertained that his Majesty's arms will soon prevail against all opposition in America, and reduce his rebellious colonists to subjection ; yet it is not to be supposed, that the independent and unconstitutional principles, which have taken such fast hold of the minds of the people, can be suddenly eradicated. Time only is able to produce compleatly that effect. Till this, however, shall happen, all that government can do is to fortify itself against the consequences of these principles. That the colonists, who are now so opulent and powerful, as to think seriously of resisting the whole force of one of the greatest nations on the face of the earth, should be subjected to some part of the public expence, all the laws of justice and reason demand, and all the precedents of antiquity authorize. The difficulty is to accomplish this end, and to support, at the same time, the authority of government. One of two plans, it seems, must be adopted. Either the
obedience

obedience of the colonists must be enforced by a military power *, or they must be admitted to a share in the British legislature. The first will not satisfy the colonists; the latter is a piece of self-denial scarcely to be expected from the parent state. The first is countenanced by the practice of the purest republics of antiquity; the latter would be the greatest sacrifice to liberty that ever was offered by any nation. Each plan has its advantages and disadvantages. It may not be improper, perhaps, to take a short survey of both.

The American colonists have, for some time past, watched the principles and conduct of Parliament, with the same jealousy and solicitude which were exercised by the people of England during the last century, in order to guard against the encroachments of the crown. Assuming as an indisputable maxim, that their territories formed no part of the dominions subject to the jurisdiction of the British parliament, and that they owed obedience only to the legislatures composed of the King and their houses of representatives, they have considered all acts of parliament, imposing internal taxes, as infringements of their liberty, no less illegal than the levying of ship money by Charles the First. As they judged these deeds equally unjust, it appeared of little consequence, whether they were executed by one man or by five hundred, by the
King

* The object of the Americans is to submit themselves, not to the requisitions of parliament, but to those of the crown, which, consistently with their system, they reckon only constitutional. For this reason, the resolution of the House of Commons, permitting them to offer and collect their own money for the common defence, seems equally offensive with direct taxation. Though this mode of settlement, therefore, should be adopted, the necessity of a large army in America will still remain.

King alone, or by the King in conjunction with his parliament. It is not my purpose at present, to expose the sophistry of this political reasoning, nor to show from the nature of the constitution, the absurdity and falsehood of the principle on which it proceeds. My intention is to trace the origin of the opinions which unfortunately prevail in America; and it is obvious, that jealousy of the power of parliament has produced there the same aversion from a standing army, which the jealousy of the prerogative generated, during the last century, in England. In both cases, an army has been held in the highest detestation, because it has been reckoned an irresistible and ready engine, in the hands of power, to destroy the liberties of the subject.

During the course of the present century, the aversion against a standing army has gradually subsided in Britain. The establishment of it, in time of peace, has insensibly increased; and so little is it now apprehended to be hostile to liberty, that the chief reasons offered for its reduction are derived, rather from the expence than the danger of it. Supposing, then, from the example of our own country, that the Americans may hereafter acquire the same degree of indifference on this subject: yet that example will lead us to conclude, that this aera must still be at a considerable distance; and that, in the mean time, they will view a standing army as their oppressors, and the government which adopts such a measure as tyrannical. When, besides, we reflect on the ambitious prospects of independence, they have for some time entertained, and have lately avowed, the republican principles openly embraced and defended
by

by many of their leaders, but chiefly that spirit of turbulence and faction insinuated into them by the party at home, who wish to embarrass the operations of government for the purpose of forcing themselves into power, it is easy to perceive that this mode of settlement must be not a little disagreeable to the colonies.

Disagreeable, however, as it may be to modern colonists, little doubt can remain, that it would have been adopted readily by the Greeks and Romans in the management of theirs, had the practice been known in antient times. But neither the Greeks nor the Romans maintained standing armies in time of peace, unless the military colonies stationed in Italy during the civil wars may deserve that appellation. The antient commonwealths abounded with citizens trained to arms, from whom they were able, in a very short time, to levy troops, in order to suppress sedition or rebellion in any quarter of their territories. When the purpose was accomplished for which these troops were mustered, they were marched home and disbanded, to save the public the expence of supporting them. But, to modern states, filled with manufacturers and mechanics, few of whom are bred to war, an army becomes in some measure necessary to protect those liberties, which cannot otherwise be successfully defended. That the free governments of antiquity would have admitted such establishments, had they not had other resources, and that they would have judged them neither unreasonable nor tyrannical, their treatment of their rebellious colonies abundantly demonstrates. The exemplary punishment inflicted on the colonies

of Samos * and Lesbos † by the Athenians, and the confiscation and banishment of the colonists of Velitrae by the Romans ‡, fully evince that these antient states scrupled not to employ much severer chastisements than the maintenance of a standing army among their discontented colonies, and, consequently, that they would not have hesitated to adopt a measure comparatively mild.

These precedents of antiquity afford one of the strongest arguments in favour of this mode of settlement. There is great hazard of error in modelling any government on principles of speculation; and all changes of a civil constitution will ever be made, by wise politicians, with the utmost reserve. The most patent road, perhaps, to despotism, is too refined notions of government, attended with resolute and fearless exertions to realize whatever shall be thought practicable in speculation. It is impossible to foretell the consequences of important innovations in the constitution of a state, which may often prove fatal before we are aware; and a prudent legislator will seldom chuse to extend his re-formations far beyond the point at which the practice of the purest times supply him with precedents. Having reached that stage of perfection, which has been the fortune only of a very small part of polished nations, it is perhaps prudent to be satisfied, lest, by grasping what is unattainable, we lose what we possess.

What title, then, have the British colonists of America to be more independent than those of Athens or Rome? No colonists ever enjoyed greater

* Page 53.

† Page 55.

‡ Page 97.

greater advantages, or were subjected to fewer restrictions. The extraordinary increase of their population and riches, is the most incontestible proof of the moderation of the government under which they have hitherto lived. No colonies ever were so prosperous and so happy. Great Britain has not hitherto oppressed them. What will tempt her to do so in future? If she has been so favourable, when she could obtain no return, will her conduct be reversed when she may expect some compensation? If parliament incumber, and consequently diminish, the commerce of the colonists, so essential, as is contended, to the wealth and importance of the kingdom, will they not as effectually hurt their own interest as by the imposition of any tax which affects only the island of Britain? If the funds arising from America be deficient, they must be replaced by supplies collected at home; if the commerce of the colonies shall fail, the price of the commodities of this island must fall, and the authors of that failure will immediately feel the consequences of their error. If America, then, shall think it reasonable to allow any indemnification for the immense sums of money this country has spent in her defence, and in raising her to a condition which enables her to rebel, she has ample security against the exorbitancy of the demands of the parent kingdom. The interest, not to mention the justice or the honour of parliament, will be more connected with the flourishing state of the trade of America, if it be so important as is pretended, than it can be with any tax which is at present levied in Great Britain.

It

It is to be supposed also, that the members of parliament, who at present possess the right to impose taxes on every part of the British dominions, will be unwilling to have that right either taken from them or circumscribed. There is scarcely an obligation, of which individuals are susceptible, that has not a correspondent one to which societies may be subjected; and, if the obligations contain nothing unjust or illegal, their being more or less favourable to one of the contracting parties, is never reckoned a sufficient reason for setting them aside. If the condition of the colonists of America, in respect of taxation, is unfavourable, who is to blame? Did they not voluntarily subject themselves to this disadvantage, when they emigrated? Is the right of taxation relinquished in any one of their charters, the authority of which, in other respects, is held so inviolable? Is it not supposed in all, and expressly mentioned in some of them, to reside in the parliament of Great Britain? Can the colonists expect, that parliament will relinquish any part of their jurisdiction, because they choose to complain of it? Can complaints of that jurisdiction be well founded, when it has scarcely ever been exercised? Parliament is not only deprived of its rights, but insulted by such usurpations. Such ungrateful conduct, may render men of high spirits more tenacious of their powers, but will never induce them to resign these powers. No state ever made a similar resignation of its jurisdiction.

Most of these inconveniences may be removed, say the abettors of representation, by the admission of members from the colonies to seats in the house of commons, in proportion to the supplies they
they

they shall furnish to the state: The colonists will readily accept these terms of pacification, being the most equal and favourable they can possibly obtain. Their leading men will be attached to government, by the prospect of emoluments and honours, superior to any advantages they have to expect, on supposition of the independence of the colonies. The seeds of rebellion will be eradicated, by such a conspicuous proof of the justice and moderation of the parent state, and by the security the colonists will acquire, that their interests shall not be sacrificed. They will be captivated with the flattering hopes of seeing their influence increased, according to the augmentation of their contributions, and with the arrival, perhaps, of the period, when American influence may preponderate in parliament, when that influence may, therefore, transfer to their own country the seat of empire, and thus, without hazard or convulsion, may render that great continent, so admirably fitted by nature for the purpose, the residence of one of the greatest and freest governments which ever existed.

As it is absurd to suppose the constitution of any government absolutely perfect; as many improvements have already been made in our own, when time enlightened the minds of men, and circumstances rendered these improvements necessary; is it not preposterous to maintain, that, after the prodigious additions which have been lately made to the territories and riches of the British dominions, the same representation should be retained in situations so totally different from those in which it was established? Is it not highly expedient, that some considerable alteration should be adopted

in the representation of this island itself, suitable to the decrease of the population and importance of some places and districts, and to the increase of others, occasioned by causes which have come into existence since that representation was fixed? Is it not still more expedient, that some consideration should be had of the extensive continent of America, growing in population and importance, beyond all precedent in the history of civil society? Though the power of Great Britain may succeed at present, in supporting her jurisdiction over her colonists, though she may continue to preserve that jurisdiction for many years to come, by the terror of her arms; yet, it is scarcely to be supposed, that the same causes will always produce the same effects, under a continued alteration of circumstances on the part of the latter, and that the time will not arrive, when the resources of America may be adequate to the plan of independence. Is it not, therefore, the best policy, to adopt that mode of settlement, which most effectually secures the attachment and emoluments of the colonies, without checking their improvements and population, and which affords the most reasonable prospect of perpetuating these advantages to the latest posterity? That the execution of this plan will be attended with no convulsions or consequences destructive to the constitution, is apparent from the introduction, into the two houses of parliament, of the representatives of Scotland at the union, whose influence and votes produced no considerable alteration on the measures of government. It is, therefore, reasonably to be supposed, that the admission of an additional number of representatives from America, even larger,

larger, if it were necessary, than that from Scotland, would not occasion any immediate or important innovation.

But, not only will this mode of settlement secure to government a considerable additional revenue ; it will also save more money perhaps than can be drawn from America by taxation, on any other plan, for many years to come. By removing even the appearance of disaffection and discontent, it will supersede the necessity of expensive military establishments on that great continent, which can only be necessary to keep the inhabitants in subjection, because they are exposed to danger from no foreign enemy. The money, consequently, which would be expended in supporting these establishments, might be applied to purposes much more beneficial to the state.

Neither have the present members of parliament any good reason to oppose this mode of settlement, on the ground of being deprived by it of any part of that jurisdiction and influence they now enjoy. They have gradually, for many years past, been adding to both, in their character of legislators, by the natural progress of improvements, and the extension of the resources of the kingdom. It is now time to lay them under some restrictions. Although they should not gain any power by the disposal of an American revenue, and the offices resulting from the management of it, they will still retain much more influence than was enjoyed by their predecessors, when the present number of representatives was assigned. The additional business and offices which may arise from an American revenue,

revenue, will be sufficient to occupy the additional representation, and to gratify and employ the members from the colonies. The present members will bear the same proportion to the business and emoluments of the state as formerly; and, though they gain nothing, they will incur no loss. They have good reason to be satisfied, though they acquire not the additional power derived from an American revenue. They retain all they ever possessed, and they add stability to the constitution, which secures the long continuance of these possessions.

The plan is visionary and dangerous, reply the opposers of this mode of settlement, and should not be adopted in a government so situated as that of Great Britain. The colonists cannot properly be represented in parliament, on account of their distance, and other circumstances; and they request not that privilege. Is it not to encourage rebellion, to load the rebels with advantages superior to those they enjoyed before they renounced their allegiance, superior to those enjoyed by all the territories of Britain beyond the limits of this island? Will not the world affirm, that these privileges were conferred, because they could not be with-held? May not the inhabitants of Quebec, Nova Scotia, the two Floridas, and the West Indies, with equal propriety, demand representation? Is it an argument, consistent with the justice or honour of Great Britain, to maintain, that the latter are not in a condition to force her to grant their requisition; that their resources are so small, their situations so distant from one another, they cannot combine together, so as to render their union formidable to the authority of the mother-country?

She

She can govern them without representatives; and therefore they are not to expect to be indulged in such ambitious requests. May not, in like manner, the East India company, with a good grace, demand representation, in proportion to the large revenue they advance to the public, on account of the extensive territorial jurisdiction they possess in Asia, under the protection of Great Britain? In a word, if representatives be admitted from the colonies now in rebellion, is there any reason or justice in denying them to any part of the British dominions which now can, or which hereafter may, furnish as good a claim to that privilege as these colonies?

What are the probable consequences of such innovations? The house of commons will resemble a tumultuary Polish diet, or a seditious assembly of the people of Rome. That house, perhaps, is already too numerous to discuss with advantage the business it has to execute; and a great part of such a large body of men can scarcely be supposed to attend to that business. A wide field is displayed for the operations of faction and intrigue, by which the most salutary measures of government may be retarded or frustrated. The management and gratification of the members occupy the time of a minister, and leave him little leisure to concert or to execute plans of extensive and important service to the public. If such inconveniences exist at present, what is to be apprehended, should the House of Commons become much more numerous? All these inconveniences may at least be supposed to be augmented in proportion. It is of little consequence to reply, that the assemblies of the people

under the antient republics were much more numerous than the House of Commons will be, after any addition it can be supposed to receive. The truth is, very few of the members of these assemblies can be imagined to have understood the public business of which they pretended to judge. They had neither time nor capacity sufficient for that purpose. They were led by the oratory or influence of some individual, and they concluded their decisions to be right, because they were dictated by some partizan, in whose discernment and patriotism they reposed confidence. The people appeared to possess the power; but the demagogues really governed the state.

This mode of settlement resembles exactly, though on a less scale, the admission of all the allies and colonies of Italy to the freedom of Rome by the Julian law; and all the tumultuary and destructive consequences of the latter measure may be in part expected from the former. The admission of the allies and colonists appeared reasonable in itself, and seemed to improve the constitution of Rome; in fact, however, it destroyed that constitution. It appeared to introduce universal liberty, founded on the most reasonable and liberal principles; but it produced only anarchy and confusion. It appeared to provide full security for all the interests of all the allies and colonies of Italy; while it provided security only for the interests of faction. It appeared to exalt the authority of reason and justice in the government of Rome; but it banished forever both reason and justice from her assemblies. It appeared to establish peace and tranquillity in the state; but it gendered only convulsions,
assaf-

assassinations, and civil wars, and, after a few paroxysms, terminated in despotism.

What power will prevent Great Britain from sharing a similar fate in similar circumstances, with the republic of Rome? Factionous and ambitious leaders are to be found in modern times, as well as in those of antiquity. The members from the colonies may be attached to such men, or dependent on them. Party-spirit may blind their understandings, or corruption may procure their suffrages. Their fortunes will not be so independent, nor their sentiments perhaps, so liberal as those of most of the representatives from this island; and men of this disposition are half disposed to the purposes of faction. The House of Commons is already divided, and the junction of the new members may make either scale preponderate so much, that the consequences are to be dreaded. We have lived long in possession of much liberty: Let us be satisfied, lest, by grasping the shadow, we lose the substance.

I leave the reader to judge of the respective merits of these modes of settlement, and to determine which of them deserves to be preferred. He will probably conceive the advantages and disadvantages on both sides to be so equally balanced, and the decision so doubtful, that all parties ought to be satisfied whichever plan shall be adopted.

T H E E N D .

