



HOUSE OF COMMONS  
CANADA

## THE RESERVES



A Report of the  
Standing Committee  
on National Defence

June 1988

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HOUSE OF COMMONS  
Wednesday, May 18, 1988  
Tuesday, June 7, 1988  
Chairman: Patrick Carleton

HOUSE OF COMMONS

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES  
Le mardi 18 mai 1988  
Le mardi 7 juin 1988  
Président: Patrick Carleton

Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs  
Standing Committee on

THE RESERVES

National Defence


Defense nationale

RESPECTING

Consideration of the White Paper on National  
Defence (The Reserves), pursuant to Standing  
Order 96(2)

INCLUDING

The First Report to the House



A Report of the  
Standing Committee  
on National Defence

June 1988

Deuxième session de la trente-troisième législature  
1986-1987-1988

Second Session of the Thirty-third Parliament  
1986-87-88

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 39

Wednesday, May 18, 1988

Tuesday, June 7, 1988

Chairman: Patrick Crofton

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 39

Le mercredi 18 mai 1988

Le mardi 7 juin 1988

Président: Patrick Crofton

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*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the  
Standing Committee on*

## National Defence

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*Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Comité  
permanent de la*

## Défense nationale

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RESPECTING:

Consideration of the White Paper on National  
Defence (The Reserves), pursuant to Standing  
Order 96(2)

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CONCERNANT:

L'étude du Livre blanc de la Défense nationale (La  
Réserve), conformément à l'article 96(2) du  
Règlement

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INCLUDING:

The First Report to the House

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Y COMPRIS:

Le premier rapport à la Chambre

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*Le greffier du Comité*

Jean Michel Roy

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The Standing Committee on National Defence has the honour to present its

### **FIRST REPORT**

Pursuant to Standing Order 96(2), your Committee has considered the White Paper on National Defence, more specifically the question of Reserves.

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## CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTION

The members of the Militia are a unique segment of our society. They are citizen soldiers who balance their obligations to their family, business and community with those of their nation. They are proud of the units in which they serve and the service which those units have performed in the past in the defence of Canada.

(BGen Larry Gollner, Director General of Reserves and Cadets, December 1, 1987, Issue No. 18:9)

The stated role of the officers and non-commissioned members who serve in Canada's Reserve forces is to form the basis for augmenting the Regular Forces in wartime. In strategic terms, the Reserves are meant to contribute to Canada's deterrent capability by providing more depth to our defensive forces.

Through much of our history, Reservists have played a major role as defenders of first New France, then the burgeoning British colony, and finally the independent nation of Canada. From the time of the colonization of New France until 1939, Reservists consistently outnumbered Regulars. The watershed was the Second World War, when more than one million men and women, volunteers and conscripts, were enlisted on active service. During the ensuing Cold War between East and West, Regulars continued to marginally outweigh Reservists numerically. Since the early 1960s, the proportion of Reservists to Regulars slipped from being about half of the military establishment to one quarter of the total.

With the advent of the Nuclear Age and the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction in a war between the superpowers, Canada's conventional defences, including its Reserve forces, declined in importance as a government priority. However, since the late 1970s, substantial growth in defence spending has begun to redress the trend to lower manpower levels, to the obsolescence of equipment and to budget-based restrictions on operations. The turnaround has come as strategic thinkers embraced the premise of a prolonged conventional war pitting the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and gave less credence to the spectre of a brief, apocalyptic exchange of nuclear weapons between the superpowers.

To provide a more credible conventional defence in Europe and at home, Canada needs a considerable increase in military manpower, while keeping defence costs under control. Under the Total Force Concept set out in the Government's White Paper, the Reserves are to become an integral

part of Canada's defence structure on an equal footing with the Regular Forces. With relatively modest increases in funding, improvements to equipment, higher manpower levels and dedicated attention from the professionals within the Department of National Defence, the Reserves should re-emerge as a crucial pillar in Canada's security structure. In an era of soaring defence costs, the resuscitation of the Reserves will provide Canadians with more effective security for the dollars they spend on defence.

There will be other benefits as well.

Reservists and Reserve units have been and should continue to be the focus for a wide variety of training that will be of considerable value to the economic and social well-being of the country. An expanded, well-trained and well-equipped Reserve force should play an increasingly effective role in preventing and coping with natural disasters and in protecting and saving lives in search and rescue operations.

Together with the other Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and most Canadians, I share the view that our society, democratic institutions and territory—the Canadian heritage—is worth defending and must be protected through the most judicious and effective allocation of human and financial resources. An expanded, adequately equipped and efficient Reserve force is a cost-effective, purely defensive means of accomplishing that vital task.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While endorsing the Total Force Concept as the most cost-effective means of providing adequate armed forces for Canada's current commitments at home and abroad, the Committee urges the Department of National Defence to re-examine its overall manpower targets with the aim of providing the necessary human and material infrastructure to sustain our Forces for at least the first 120 days from the outbreak of hostilities. (Page 17)

2. In the interest of economy the Committee urges the Department of National Defence to use the planned 50-50 ratio of Regulars to Reservists as a benchmark for progress in the building up of the Reserves and not as an immutable barrier once that target is attained. (Page 18)

3. The Committee urges the Government to continue efforts to provide pay comparability between the Reserves and Regular Forces and to institute a voluntary pension plan, as soon as funding becomes available. Travel allowances to get Reservists to training exercises should also be provided, as soon as possible. (Page 20)

4. While it has been announced that the 25,000 members of a revitalized Supplementary Ready Reserve made up of former primary Reservists and Regulars will be provided with a \$300 a year bonus for turning out for one day a year to confirm that they are fit and able to serve, the Committee is of the opinion that that expenditure (at least \$7.5 million annually) would be better spent on pay, equipment or other spending for active Primary Reservists. (Page 20)

5. The Committee recommends that a high priority be attached to implementing the Reserve Force Management Information System to speed up delivery of pay and that short-term measures be implemented to ensure speedy processing and delivery of pay. (Page 20)

6. The Committee requests that the following information be provided to it by the Department of National Defence or by the Minister, either through the annual Main Estimates process, or in an annual Defence Update published within one month of the tabling of the Main Spending Estimates:

- a) The total direct funding available for the Primary and Supplementary Reserves for the current fiscal year and actual spending for the previous five years,

- b) Statements of manpower tasking, infrastructure, training and equipment goals, and a record of actual achievement to date,
- c) A comparison of actual Reserve and Regular pay and benefit levels, using 1988-89 levels as a baseline,
- d) A numerical breakdown of Reserve personnel by rank,
- e) A detailed explanation for any unused funding as forecast in the previous year's Estimates. (Page 21)

7. The Committee requests that the Canadian Forces Development Plan be made available to the Committee at the earliest possible opportunity. (Page 22)

8. The Committee recommends that all efforts be made to hold to the policy of including Reserve needs in all future equipment acquisitions. The Committee also recognizes that some existing equipment may retain some useful life and should be provided to Reserve units for training purposes on a priority basis. (Page 22)

9. The Committee recommends that, when possible, testing of new equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces include the participation of Reserve personnel to assess how "Reservist friendly" it may be. (Page 23)

10. The Committee fully agrees with the goal of vastly improving training facilities and opportunities for Reservists, but cautions that care should be taken not to undermine the effectiveness of existing regular units. (Page 24)

11. The Committee encourages the Department to make every effort to provide more Reservists with opportunities to serve with Canadian Forces Europe and Canadian peacekeeping forces in the Middle East. (Page 24)

12. The Committee fully supports the revival of Reserve training programs at Canadian universities, colleges and technical institutions and urges the Department to examine the possibility of providing scholarships in advanced studies to Reservists. (Page 24)

## SECTION I

13. The Committee recommends that the Prime Minister, the leaders of the opposition parties, the Minister of National Defence, as well as business, labour and other opinion leaders take an active part in promoting the expansion of the Reserves. (Page 27)

14. The Committee recommends that the Department of National Defence and the Minister continue to encourage employers to free up employees to participate in Reserve activities. Where possible, employers should top up salary shortfalls incurred by employees participating in Reserve activities. (Page 27)

15. If a significant amount of resistance is met from employers as the Reserves are expanded, the Government should consider the possibility of legislation to guarantee the availability of Reservists without loss of holidays and pay and without prejudice to their careers. (Page 28)

16. The Committee recommends that efforts be made to maintain units in rural Canada and, where and when possible, to revive historic units. New units with appropriate names should be established in areas of population growth. (Page 28)





## SECTION 1

### AN OVERVIEW: SOME FACTS AND FIGURES

#### *1. Introduction*

The purpose of the Reserve system is to provide an economical wartime mobilization capability—the men and women, equipment and organizational structure that would be sufficient to meet the perceived threat for an adequate period of time.

The Reserve system is made up of Primary and Supplementary Reservists, personnel on the Cadet Instructor List, the Canadian Rangers and National Defence Headquarters Primary Reserve List. On March 31, 1988, there was a paid ceiling of 21,777 for the Primary Reserve. With seasonal fluctuations, the actual numbers are about 25,000.

There are also an estimated 20,400 Supplementary Reservists. The Supplementary Reserve currently amounts to a mailing list of former Canadian Forces Regular and Primary Reserve personnel.

Most Primary Reservists, 80 per cent, are students, teachers, seasonal workers and the unemployed. Skilled tradespeople and other professionals are under-represented in the Reserves. Regular Support Staff working with Reserve units to handle training and administrative functions numbered 1,075 in 1987, but another 500 Reservists were being used on a full-time basis to handle administrative chores. Full-time Reserve members are paid from the Reserves' training budget.

There were 4,100 women in the Primary Reserve in 1987, or 17 per cent of the total strength.

Attrition was running at about 25 per cent a year, a comparable rate with the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, and about half the rate of a decade ago.

Although the total cost of the Reserve component of the Canadian Armed Forces is difficult to separate from overall Departmental Spending Estimates, the figures provided annually give an approximate indication. Forecast spending in 1988-89 is expected to be \$419 million, or 3.7 per cent of the total Defence Services Program. That figure includes operating costs,

support costs, assigned costs and capital expenditures for the Primary Reserves.

Defence officials calculate that the percentage of the defence budget that goes directly to the Reserve component provides about 23 per cent of Canada's military manpower. Reservists are indeed part-time soldiers, but given the cost of \$39,000 a year for each full-time Regular, compared with about \$6,500 for a Reservist, the cost-saving benefit of a much larger Reserve force is a potent argument in an era of huge defence costs.

## *2. The Militia*

The Militia is the legal name in Canada for the army reserve. Its wartime missions have been to provide wartime units or sub-units to augment the Regular Forces, provide support troops to back up all commands and National Defence Headquarters units; to aid in the first phase of mobilization by providing base defence personnel, operational training support and movement control; to provide a base for further mobilization and trained reinforcements for any deployed theatre, particularly Europe. In peacetime, the Militia's missions are to train for war, to provide troops in aid of the civil power for disaster relief and to carry out ceremonial functions.

The Militia is commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff through the Commander Mobile Command. In 1987 the total number of Militia units was 183: 18 armoured units, 18 artillery, 52 infantry, 11 field engineer, 20 service battalions, 12 medical companies and 52 bands. There were 802 Regular Force personnel attached to Reserve units, with 107 unfilled Regular Force posts with Reserve units.

On March 31, 1988, the authorized paid personnel ceiling for the Militia was established at 15,500. By counting soldiers who turn out for training and those who do not, the Department calculates "actual" Militia strength in recent years has been between 18,000 and 20,000.

About 11.3 per cent of the Militia is made up of women, who are eligible for all classifications and trades, except those where they might find themselves in combat roles, a policy which is under review.

Units train one or two nights a week and some weekends during the winter. At local armouries week-night training is aimed at honing individual skills. Weekend activities are to develop sub-unit skills. Summer training can

involve courses for individuals or concentrations for area and district units to hold collective training and manoeuvres. During concentrations, the goal is to have Militia members work as part of a team in operational scenarios.

Since 1981, Mobile Command has provided various operational tasks to Militia sub-units, which are trained to be attached to regular Force formations with war missions in Canada. For example, a single infantry unit may be given the job of working up a platoon for the Canadian Airborne Regiment for use in an emergency.

Current problems for the Militia include lack of funding, non-existent, obsolete, or broken-down equipment, under-qualified leadership and shoddy and often cramped accommodations. Insufficient pay and benefits and the lateness of pay also have been major problems.

The Militia's units are dispersed across the country in locations bequeathed by history, not operational necessity. Most areas of recent rapid demographic growth have no units, while some small towns boast Militia battalions. However, the term battalion can be misleading. Parade strength can amount to only 150 troops, a far cry from the 800-member wartime unit whose tradition is being carried on. Despite the trappings of lieutenant colonels, several majors, honorary colonels, and Colours, Regular Forces Support Staff is usually limited to one Regular captain and a couple of non-commissioned officers. In recent years, equipment for training has been embarrassingly sparse. Warstocks have been virtually non-existent.

Knowledgeable observers of the Reserves, such as Col. James S.H. Kempling, former Deputy Chief of Staff of Reserves at Mobile Command Headquarters, have noted that: "While it may have so-called 'operational tasks,' few Militia units could realistically field much more than a single platoon that could approach combat-ready level."

Kempling also pointed out that the Militia is handicapped by a lack of funds available for training purposes at the unit level after overhead is covered. The average Militia member trains 40-45 days a year, while funding is supposed to cover 85 training days. The difference is consumed by administrative costs. Kempling noted as well that "an overly complex individual training system, combined with a relatively high turnover rate, have produced serious shortfalls in junior leaders and in skilled tradesmen. And in some units there have been major problems in finding qualified Militia officers to command."

(Canadian Defence Quarterly, Winter 1987-1988)

### **3. *The Naval Reserve***

The stated pre-White Paper roles of the Naval Reserve were maritime coastal defence through the manning of coastal and harbour patrol vessels; the manning of naval control of shipping organizations and convoy commodore organizations; provision of augmentation personnel for major fleet units, diving unit schools and other shore facilities; and, in general, serving as a base for expansion of the navy in wartime.

The line of command for the Naval Reserve extends from the Chief of the Defence Staff to the Commander Maritime Command, who delegates some administrative, training and force development planning authority to the Commander Naval Reserve Divisions in Quebec City. That Commander is a Regular Forces naval captain. The commanding officers of the 21 naval reserve divisions spread across the country are Reserve Force commanders and captains. In 1987, the Regular Force Support Staff dedicated to naval Reserve units to handle administration and training was set at 174. However, only 129 positions were filled by Regulars. Some of the shortfall was made up by hiring Reservists on a full-time basis.

About 34.3 per cent of Naval Reservists are women and all trades are open to females.

Under the current system, most unit commanders, like many other Reservists, are generally tied to geographical areas by their family lives and careers. Therefore, promotions are usually from within those units. Only in exceptional cases are new arrivals fresh out of the Regular Forces or some other area available to be slotted into leadership roles.

With 21 divisions and a total paid ceiling on March 31, 1988, of 3,450, the Naval Reserve is not large enough to fulfil all its assigned tasks. Training equipment, such as minor war vessels, are old and in need of replacement. Another problem is the shortage of Regular Force support personnel.

### **4. *The Air Reserve***

The Air Reserve had an authorized personnel ceiling of 950 on March 31, 1988, with a headquarters in Winnipeg and two Reserve wings at Montreal and Toronto, made up of two squadrons each. Three other

independent squadrons are based at Winnipeg, Edmonton and Summerside. There are another nine small Air Reserve Augmentation Flights at Air Command bases throughout the country. The Chief of the Defence Staff commands the Air Reserve through the Commander Air Command and the Commander Air Reserve Group.

One hundred and eleven Regular Force personnel help support the Air Reserve, which is the authorized level.

The two Reserve wings in Montreal and Toronto support 10 Tactical Air Group, which is under the operational control of Mobile Command. The Reserve squadron in Summerside supports Maritime Air Group, the squadrons in Winnipeg and Edmonton are controlled by Air Transport Group, and the Air Augmentation Flights are to bolster the bases where they are located.

All military occupations in the Air Reserve are open to women and 45 per cent of the Air Reserve is female.

The major problems facing the Air Reserve are a lack of personnel, the lack of a permanent training facility to support the Air Reserve National Training School and the need to replace aged Dakota aircraft at 402 Squadron at Winnipeg.

##### *5. The Communication Reserve*

The Communication Reserve's stated missions in time of war are to provide personnel for Communication Command, Mobile Command, Canadian Forces Europe, Air Command, National Defence Headquarters units and the Canadian Forces Training System and to provide a base for further mobilization. In peace, they are to provide aid to the civil power, support for civil emergency organizations to help cope with natural disasters, to participate in ceremonial occasions, to participate in operational deployments with the Regular Forces and to support the Regular Forces in the manning of non-military communication systems.

The command structure is similar to those of the other Reserve components, with the Chief of the Defence Staff holding overall command of the Reserve segment, as well as Communication Command. Six groups under Regular Force commanders make up the strength of Communication

Command, while a Reserve "cell" exists at Communication Command headquarters to co-ordinate national activities.

In 1987, Regular Force staff helping with administration and training in Communication Reserve units numbered 73, the full complement. A number of Reservists are also employed full-time to make up the shortfall in administrative personnel.

With an authorized personnel ceiling of 1,594 on March 31, 1988, the Communication Reserve is not large enough to carry out all its tasks, particularly augmenting other commands. It is also short of both strategic and tactical equipment, and needs more buildings.

Approximately 37.7 per cent of the Communication Reserve is female and all trades except linesmen are open to women.

#### ***6. The Canadian Rangers and Cadet Instructor List***

The Canadian Rangers and the personnel on the Cadet Instructor List are also components of the Reserves. The 5,370 Cadet Instructors provide the command structure and leadership for the Sea, Army and Air Cadets. The Canadian Rangers are a surveillance and sovereignty demonstration force, now totalling about 1,600, with 900 under Maritime Command, and about 700 under the operational control of Northern Region Headquarters.

The Rangers, like the Cadet Instructors, will not see a change of their roles under the Total Force Concept, but there will be some expansion of the Rangers. The Rangers now are given a limited amount of training and are expected to receive some new equipment, including a new rifle to replace their Lee-Enfields, and communications equipment. By 1995, total Ranger strength in the Northern Region is expected to rise to about 1,000 with the formation of new patrols in several communities.

## SECTION 2

### PLANNING FOR TOMORROW

#### *1. Introduction*

The Minister of National Defence has termed the proposed changes affecting the Reserves, which are aimed at implementing a Total Force Concept that integrates effectively trained and equipped Regulars and Reservists throughout the Armed Forces, as being among the most ambitious initiatives of the Government's White Paper on defence. The Committee believes that the keys to the success of the Total Force Concept will be the level of funding available, the priority given development of the Reserves within the Department of National Defence, the attitudes of Regulars and Reservists to the changes and, not least of all, the encouragement and support of the Canadian public.

#### *2. The White Paper's Prescriptions*

In general, the White Paper reaffirmed many of Canada's traditional defence commitments; those to Western Europe, the defence of North America, international peacekeeping and aid to the civil power. It also set out a framework for the provision of more dependable funding and planning through a five-year rolling review of defence needs and financial resources. However, it underlined that the world has entered an era of dramatically increasing defence costs. In Canada's case, years of relative neglect have compounded the difficulties of providing enough well-equipped personnel to do the jobs assigned to the Canadian Forces. The Government's stated intention is to provide a greater share of available funding for capital projects to counter the "rustout" of equipment. Meanwhile, Defence budgets should grow by at least two per cent annually in real terms during the next five years.

To help close a part of what has come to be known as the "commitment-capability gap" between promised necessities and existing resources, the Government opted to implement a Total Force Concept in which Reserve and Regular Armed Forces personnel would be integrated in one structure; a force made up of about 90,000 Regulars, 65,000 Primary Reservists and 25,000 Supplementary Ready Reserves.

If the Reserve Force is to be used fully and effectively, the distinction between Regular and Reserve personnel must be greatly reduced. Their responsibilities must

be integrated into a Total Force Concept. For example a unit responding to an emergency could be manned by a mix of Regulars and Reservists. The proper ratio for a specific commitment would be determined by the type of unit, the reaction time and the skills needed. If we are to rely to a greater degree on the Reserves to augment the Regular Force, the size of the Reserves will have to be significantly increased and their training and equipment substantially improved.

(The Defence White Paper, "Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada", June 1987, p. 66).

In a Total Force Structure, the Reserve Force will be developed not only to augment the Regular Force but also to take on other specific tasks. The Naval Reserve will have two wartime functions of its own: Naval Control of Shipping and Maritime Coastal Defence, including the clearing of mines. The Militia will contribute to defence operations in Canada and elsewhere in North America and will train replacements for land forces deployed overseas. The Militia will also establish a relatively large force of lightly armed guards to protect military vital points and make a major contribution to the logistic and medical organizations required to support our consolidated European commitments. The Air Reserve will be more closely associated with the regular air force through the establishment of a number of integrated Regular-Reserve units. The Communication Reserve will continue to contribute to the provision of strategic and tactical communications. All of this will, of course, require a significant increase in strength, as well as new and improved equipment.

(Ibid., p. 66).

The increases are to take place in annual increments of approximately 2,000 a year for the first three years and approximately 3,500 a year for the remainder of the 15-year period. The Militia is to grow from 15,500 to 50,838, the Air Reserve from 950 to 5,150, the Naval Reserve from 3,450 to 5,325, the Communication Reserve from 1,594 to 1,705, and personnel involved in the national infrastructure to about 1,000 from about 280.

The Supplementary Reserve is to be split into two elements. The Supplementary Ready Reserve, with 25,000 members once its manpower target is reached, will have specific tasks such as the guarding of vital points. The Supplementary Holding Reserve will serve as a personnel pool for unspecified tasks in a crisis.

All Primary Reserve units are to receive specific wartime tasks, the quantity and quality of training is to be improved, equipment will be upgraded, pay and benefits improved and the possibility of reactivating the university Reserve officer training programs examined.

In the words of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, RAdm Wally Fox-Decent, in testimony before the Committee:



SECTION 3

What I find exciting about the White Paper is that I think that it actually provides the basis for a very dramatic change to the situation. I will give you a couple of examples. The Reserve part of the army, the Militia, is going to be the largest part of the army; and it will be so integrated in terms of the taskings of the Canadian army that you will simply not be able to ignore your Militia. If you want a ready army, it is going to depend on that Militia's being trained and equipped and up to strength. So the change of role from a kind of augmentation tail-end-Charlie situation to a full role of army participation—in fact more than 50 per cent of army participation—I think changes the whole role of the Militia.

(November 26, 1987, Issue No. 17:16)

Air Reservists will move from Dakota aircraft to the DASH 8 and will train Regular Force navigators; in the Naval Reserve small, unarmed vessels will give way to "vessels that will be the mine countermeasures and coastal defence component of the navy of Canada."

Finally, Fox-Decent underlined the vital role the Reserves would be playing within the Total Force Concept and noted that the vitality of this role "drives entitlement to budget."



## SECTION 3

### THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS

#### *1. How Many Are Enough?*

In an age of increasing defence costs and other pressing financial needs for governments, no one legitimately concerned with Canada's defence can object to seeking and implementing the most cost-effective method of providing the personnel necessary to fulfil the country's commitments at home and abroad. This Committee, therefore, endorses the initiative to implement the Total Force Concept as a means of providing the necessary personnel to fulfil the present commitments.

However, National Defence officials and outside witnesses noted that there are a number of potentially daunting problems associated with implementing the concept. A fundamental question is how high should Canada set the total manpower target for both Regulars and Reserves?

The Department has set its sights on arriving by the year 2002 at a Total Force of 180,000 made up of 90,000 Regulars, 65,000 Primary Reservists and 25,000 Supplementary Ready Reservists. However, several witnesses pointed out to the Committee that that figure may be inadequate to bridge the period after an outbreak of hostilities beyond 30 days until the time when enough new recruits can be trained and equipped as replacements for frontline troops.

Given the commonly used casualty rate estimate of one to three per cent a day over 30 days on Europe's Central Front, a figure that could prove to be disastrously low with the quantum leap in the destructive potential of conventional weapons since the Second World War, 50,000 more trained Reservists could be needed from 30 days after the outbreak of hostilities to the 120th day, when newly trained soldiers should be available.

#### **RECOMMENDATION:**

While endorsing the Total Force Concept as the most cost-effective means of providing adequate armed forces for Canada's current commitments at home and abroad, the Committee urges the Department of National Defence to re-examine its overall manpower targets with the aim of providing the necessary human and material infrastructure to sustain our Forces for at least the first 120 days from the outbreak of hostilities.

## 2. *Is the Mix Right?*

Another key question is how appropriate in terms of efficiency and cost is the projected overall 50-50 ratio of Regulars and Reservists that Department planners are now using as a model for the integrated Total Force of the next century.

While no explanation was given to the Committee of how the Department arrived at the 50-50 mix, Members did note testimony indicating that Reservists represent a considerable cost saving and that most defence establishments in Western and Eastern Europe are weighted in favour of Reserves, the outstanding exceptions being the United States, the United Kingdom and France. An important factor to note in the case of our Allies with large Reserve contingents is the use of compulsory Reserve duty, except in the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Committee recognizes that any modern, effective military establishment needs a substantial cadre of full-time professionals, particularly to handle sophisticated equipment such as advanced aircraft, air defence systems, frigates and submarines. However, Members are also convinced that every effort should be made to obtain the best value possible for defence funds, while maintaining the utmost efficiency and without jeopardizing the readiness, operational effectiveness, and sustainability of the Forces necessary to fulfil Canada's commitments at home and abroad.

The Committee also recognizes that the Canadian public would find compulsory Reserve or Regular service in peacetime unacceptable.

### **RECOMMENDATION:**

In the interest of economy the Committee urges the Department of National Defence to use the planned 50-50 ratio of Regulars to Reservists as a benchmark for progress in the building up of the Reserves and not as an immutable barrier once that target is attained.

## 3. *Pay and Benefits*

Pay and benefits—or more precisely low pay compared to the Regular Forces and many civilian occupations, and the lack of employment benefits—have been cited repeatedly to the Committee as critical reasons for the high attrition rate among Reservists. Another major irritant has been the

slowness, at times several months, in providing pay—the fault of an inadequate computer system and poorly-trained administrative personnel.

The Reserve pay system sets out three categories of pay:

- Class A service for 12 consecutive days or less in one month. Class A is generally the category covering most primary Reservists who turn out for evening parades, weekend training and short courses or training periods. Pay is for the day or half day, the latter counted as being less than six hours.
- Class B service is for authorized, extended courses or service exceeding 12 days. Pay is at the normal Reserve daily rate multiplied by the number of days.
- Class C service covers the Reservist working full-time in a Regular Force establishment position and is at Regular Force rates.

Under the current system, Class B and C personnel can be employed at the same duties but will receive substantially different pay. To close the gap between Regular and Reserve personnel would involve an increase of 7 to 10 per cent at all rank levels except lieutenant and private, which are currently higher than regular pay levels to aid recruiting.

The cost for pay comparability at current personnel levels has been estimated at about \$50 million annually in 1987-88 dollars.

What could drive up personnel costs further would be implementation of a comprehensive benefits package, including a Reserve pension plan, the provision of death and disability benefits, group disability insurance, commuting assistance and income tax incentives.

Committee Members are convinced that effective integration of the Reserves and the Regulars can only be brought about if compensation for Reservists is comparable with that of the Regular Force and competitive with the private sector, not just for young recruits, but also for the older, technically skilled recruits who will be necessary to carry a growing share of the Total Forces' support and maintenance.

However, Members also note that measures such as the provision of adequate amounts of up-to-date equipment, good training facilities,

operational tasking, the shifting of administrative tasks to Regular Support Staff and competent leadership can all be important contributing factors to making the Reserve service experience a rewarding and attractive one for many.

Increases in pay and benefits announced in March 1988 by the Minister for Class A and B Reservists totalling a 12 per cent increase should help narrow the gap in basic pay between Reservists and Regular Force personnel. However, while equality has been reached for some ranks, gaps ranging from 8 to 22 per cent between Reserve and Regular basic rates of pay remain.

The Committee notes with pleasure that a half-day's pay for less than six-hour's work will be increased to 50 per cent of the basic rate from 45 per cent and that Reservists will be eligible for a term insurance plan and travel on regularly scheduled Canadian Forces passenger flights.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

The Committee urges the Government to continue efforts to provide pay comparability between the Reserves and Regular Forces and to institute a voluntary pension plan, as soon as funding becomes available. Travel allowances to get Reservists to training exercises should also be provided, as soon as possible.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

While it has been announced that the 25,000 members of a revitalized Supplementary Ready Reserve made up of former primary Reservists and Regulars will be provided with a \$300 a year bonus for turning out for one day a year to confirm that they are fit and able to serve, the Committee is of the opinion that that expenditure (at least \$7.5 million annually) would be better spent on pay, equipment or other spending for active Primary Reservists.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

The Committee recommends that a high priority be attached to implementing the Reserve Force Management Information System to speed up delivery of pay and that short-term measures be implemented to ensure speedy processing and delivery of pay.

#### *4. A Separate Reserve Budget: The Debate Continues*

The decision we have taken is that for too long Reservists have been ghettoized. They have tended to be treated as the poor cousins of the Forces and there has been an effect, both in terms of financing and equipping, but also in terms of morale, where there has been the attitude that there are soldiers and then there is the Militia. That has been very corrosive, in my view, in terms of morale. As a

consequence, we took the decision to have a Total Force Concept to integrate the Reserves fully into the defence plans for the country.

Now we cannot have it both ways if we want to have a fully integrated Reserve Force, giving them functions in the defence responsibilities of Canada. The idea of separating out the budget entirely and totally separate administrative and command structures would go against that. That was the reason why we decided that they should continue to be integrated within the general structure.

(The Honourable Perrin Beatty, Minister of National Defence, November 26, 1987, Issue No. 17:13)

I wish they could have (a separate budget). It has bothered me for many years that they do not have that, but I do not believe it is feasible. I have had some experience in running the finances and so on in NDHQ (National Defence Headquarters), and it is simply impossible to separate the financial allocation of funds for equipment, for training, from many other things in that way.

(William J. Yost, Director of Operations, Conference of Defence Associations, December 7, 1987, Issue No. 20:38).

The subject of a separate budget for the Reserves was a matter of keen interest for all Members of the Committee, as it has been for previous parliamentary committees which have examined the status of the Reserves. The lack of a separate budget is generally credited with allowing the Department of National Defence to scrimp on Reserve funding during the leanest years and for not enabling the parliamentary scrutiny that could focus public pressure in support of the Reserves.

While the Committee considers the Total Force Concept a laudable and achievable goal, it is also mindful of the difficulties that are likely to be encountered along the way. The Committee is of the opinion that parliamentary scrutiny of the process of expanding, re-equipping and tasking the Reserves must be based on accurate baseline assumptions and timely updates, so that the Committee and the public are aware of the nature and rate of the changes being implemented. Keeping the public well-informed of the process can only serve to smooth implementation by focusing attention on a long-neglected aspect of Canada's defence.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee requests that the following information be provided to it by the Department of National Defence or by the Minister, either through the annual Main Estimates process, or in an annual Defence Update published within one month of the tabling of the Main Spending Estimates:

- a) The total direct funding available for the Primary and Supplementary Reserves for the current fiscal year and actual spending for the previous five years,

- b) Statements of manpower tasking, infrastructure, training and equipment goals, and a record of actual achievement to date,
- c) A comparison of actual Reserve and Regular pay and benefit levels, using 1988-89 levels as a baseline,
- d) A numerical breakdown of Reserve personnel by rank,
- e) A detailed explanation for any unused funding as forecast in the previous year's Estimates.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee requests that the Canadian Forces Development Plan be made available to the Committee at the earliest possible opportunity.

## 5. Equipment

Policy Directive P26, which dates back to January 1978, states that all Department of National Defence equipment purchases include the Reserves. However, until recently, the Reserves have received less than their due, leaving units with endemic shortages in small arms, mortars, communications equipment, working vehicles and even uniforms. Progress now is beginning to be made and the Reserves have received a share of new ILTIS jeeps, armoured personnel vehicles, medium-size trucks, small arms and MILIPAC artillery computers. On the near horizon are mine countermeasure vessels and DASH-8 aircraft.

Although a wide range of new equipment must be purchased to replace aging and obsolete stock held by the Regular Forces, some replaced equipment, such as Leopard 1 tanks now being used by Canadian Forces Europe, may be of some use for Reserve units when it is phased out.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee recommends that all efforts be made to hold to the policy of including Reserve needs in all future equipment acquisitions. The Committee also recognizes that some existing equipment may retain some useful life and should be provided to Reserve units for training purposes on a priority basis.

The Committee also heard testimony from Canadian, British, Australian, German and Swiss defence officials on the benefits and drawbacks associated with equipment purchases for part-time personnel. The consensus that emerged was that while highly-sophisticated weapons systems need full-time, technically-qualified operators, many pieces of modern equipment are becoming simpler to operate than in the past. Several witnesses also



noted that civilian soldiers often have precisely the skills needed to operate such up-to-date equipment.

*RECOMMENDATION:*

The Committee recommends that, when possible, testing of new equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces include the participation of Reserve personnel to assess how "Reservist friendly" it may be.

*6. Training and Infrastructure*

Even with adequate funding and equipment, the difficult task of teaching appropriate levels of skills to part-time soldiers, sailors, air force and communications personnel will remain. How the Canadian Forces meet that challenge could mean the difference between an inadequate augmentation pool and an effective, integrated Reservist-Regular force.

The consensus drawn from testimony before the Committee indicates that training will have to be improved for individuals, sub-units, units, and at the formation level. Committee Members feel that special efforts should be made to recruit Canadians with previously acquired skills such as flying and seamanship.

Reservists are already making extensive use of Regular Force schools for some of their individual training. LtGen John Vance told the Committee, "Our program is to increase that very largely." As well, four Militia training and support centres are to be established for training at the section, platoon, company and battalion levels. The centres will serve as repositories for sets of up-to-date equipment for training purposes.

For the Naval Reserve, minesweeping techniques are to be taught at a Naval Reserve Training Centre, where instruction will be concentrated on mine warfare and the operation of the ships that carry the mine countermeasure equipment.

Additional measures to improve training could include the following:

- Transferring much of the paper burden now imposed on field units to Regular Force Support Staff or a centralized administration,

- Provision of more sophisticated and efficient training equipment, such as simulators,
- Co-operative arrangements with post-secondary education institutions in which students would promise two or three years' Reserve duty in exchange for eight to ten weeks of summer employment,
- Increasing the number of overseas tasks open to Reservists.

The Department is also reviewing the possibility of reinstating Reserve training programs at several universities similar to the Canadian Officer Training Corps, the University Naval Training Division, or the University Reserve Training Plan, which were disbanded in the late 1960s. Such programs could provide some of the young, motivated and well-qualified leaders that an expanded Reserve force will need.

Another means of improving the quality of Reserve personnel could be through specifically designating appropriate scholarships in advanced studies for Reservists. Earmarking some of the existing scholarships now funded by the Ministry of State for Science and Technology for Reservists could serve as an incentive to join and remain with the Reserves.

One of the pitfalls foreseen in an expansion of the Reserves and the consequent necessity for more experienced instructors is that it will draw needed personnel from Regular units.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee fully agrees with the goal of vastly improving training facilities and opportunities for Reservists, but cautions that care should be taken not to undermine the effectiveness of existing regular units.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee encourages the Department to make every effort to provide more Reservists with opportunities to serve with Canadian Forces Europe and Canadian peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee fully supports the revival of Reserve training programs at Canadian universities, colleges and technical institutions and urges the Department

to examine the possibility of providing scholarships in advanced studies to Reservists.

## **7. Organizational Changes**

The Committee agrees with the decision to permit the Chief of Reserves and Cadets to attend the Department of National Defence's decision-making Defence Council, rather than the past practice of having him act merely in an advisory capacity.

Lower down on the organizational chart, it would appear that an effort will be necessary to redress the officer top-heaviness of Reserve units, although an increase of funding and manning levels will go some way to correcting the imbalance.

The Committee is also of the opinion that every effort should be made to reduce the administrative burden on Reserve units by allocating more administrative functions to Regular Support Staff.

## **8. The Reserves and Canadians**

No matter what sort of advertising campaigns there are, the most effective thing is to clean up the Reserves now to make the people in there appreciate it more, and they will bring in other people. If you make it more attractive within the structure and you make the role more meaningful, then that will bring people in, because then they will not only tell their friends but encourage them . . . . That is the best advertising you could ever have.

(Robert O'Brien, former Reservist, December 7, 1987, Issue No. 20:61)

In the context of how Europeans see the threat, I do not believe for a moment that you could sell it in Canada. I think you would have to talk to Canadians about defence as an integral part of being a sovereign nation and being prepared to pay your way, not to roll over and allow your neighbour to the south to do everything for you in terms of defending that sovereignty. Raising the image of the Reserves, in my view, would be one of the most demonstrable ways at home to raise the whole awareness of defence.

(Thomas Savage, Chairman and President of ITT Canada Limited, Chairman of the Task Force on Foreign Policy and Defence of the Business Council on National Issues, January 27, 1988, Issue No. 23:27)

It would be a mistake to think that increased defence spending is going to be popular irrespective of the tasks for which it is needed. Reviving the Militia could be seen as a worthwhile and necessary response to concerns that are growing—concerns for example about Arctic sovereignty. On the other hand, reviving the Militia could be seen as an anachronism, the encouragement of militarism.

(John Harker, private citizen, January 26, 1988, Issue No. 22:5)

There is little doubt that tripling the number of Canada's Reserves and providing them with the tools to help deter East-West conflict, defend Canada, provide peacekeepers and come to the assistance of civilian authorities will be an expensive, complex, long-term undertaking needing sustained political and public support. Throughout the years of decline, thousands of dedicated men and women have made considerable personal sacrifices to contribute as Reservists, soldiering on despite the parsimony of Government. To them, Canadians owe a debt of gratitude for preserving a solid base to build upon.

Canada is a peace-loving nation, where opinion is divided on whether East and West are moving toward an era of accommodation that will lessen the danger of a cataclysmic confrontation, or whether the West is being lulled into adopting a false sense of security and will eventually have to pay the exorbitant price of a shattered peace. Whatever the outcome, Canada as a nation will continue to maintain for the foreseeable future bilateral and multilateral security arrangements that must be not only honoured, but carried out as effectively as possible for the sake of the country's Allies, Canadian Forces personnel, who would be on the frontlines in any conflict, and the Canadian public for which they stand on guard.

Canada's integrity as a sovereign nation is also a growing concern of many Canadians. Increasing the size of the Reserves and making them a credible component of the Canadian defence establishment should lead to a greater and much more visible capability to control Canadian territory, particularly in the North.

As an institution, the Reserves have the tasks of helping defend the country and saving lives in times of emergency. They are also a valuable training ground for learning teamwork and new technical and leadership skills that can benefit individuals, their employers and Canadian society in general. Historically, they have been an integral part of thousands of small and large Canadian communities, contributing to education and civic and national pride. While new Reserve units probably will be raised mainly in major population centres, care must be taken to recognize the merit of both geographical and rural representation.

As previously stated, the Committee is convinced that enhancing the Reserves will be a cost-effective measure that will buttress the security of

Canadians and our Allies. However, several witnesses who came before the Committee cautioned that without the political will to follow through on the expansion and sustainment of the Reserves, the task will be doomed to failure. To avoid that outcome, national leaders—political leaders, business and labour leaders—should assume a greater role in promoting the growth of the Reserves.

On the part of business, every possible effort should be made to free up Reservists for training. Ideally, businesses should top up Reserve pay for their employees when it falls short of regular salary.

On the part of labour, contractual arrangements with employers should be reached which facilitate Reserve duty and provide any necessary career protection.

On the part of political leaders, they should play a more active and visible role in promoting acceptance of the Reserves as an integral and essential part of Canadian national life.

The Government should also remain open to the counsel and concrete contributions individuals and organizations can bring to expanding the Reserves and rendering them more effective.

Although it does not appear that a large number of current Reservists have had difficulties gaining permission from their employers to carry out their Reserve duties, as the Reserves are tripled in size, pay and benefits improved, training ameliorated and more skilled technicians and professionals are sought as recruits, now relatively minor irritants could grow proportionately.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee recommends that the Prime Minister, the leaders of the opposition parties, the Minister of National Defence, as well as business, labour and other opinion leaders take an active part in promoting the expansion of the Reserves.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee recommends that the Department of National Defence and the Minister continue to encourage employers to free up employees to participate in Reserve activities. Where possible, employers should top up salary shortfalls incurred by employees participating in Reserve activities.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

If a significant amount of resistance is met from employers as the Reserves are expanded, the Government should consider the possibility of legislation to guarantee the availability of Reservists without loss of holidays and pay and without prejudice to their careers.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

The Committee recommends that efforts be made to maintain units in rural Canada and, where and when possible, to revive historic units. New units with appropriate names should be established in areas of population growth.

**APPENDIX A**  
**LIST OF WITNESSES**

THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1987 (Issue No. 13):

*Appearing:*

The Honourable Perrin Beatty,  
Minister of National Defence.

*From the Department of National Defence:*

Eldon J. Healey,  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel);

Vice-Admiral Nigel D. Brodeur,  
Deputy Chief of the Defence staff;

General Paul D. Manson,  
Chief of the Defence staff;

Rear-Admiral Charles M. Thomas,  
Chief,  
Maritime Doctrine and Operations.

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1987 (Issue No. 14):

*Appearing:*

The Honourable Perrin Beatty,  
Minister of National Defence.

*From the Department of National Defence:*

General Paul D. Manson,  
Chief of the Defence staff;

Major-General Reginald W. Lewis,  
Chief of Reserves;

Eldon J. Healey,  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel);

Robert W. Fowler,  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy).

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1987 (Issue No. 16):

Major-General Kevin George Cooke,  
Chief of the Australian Army Reserve.

Major-General Charles Alexander Ramsey,  
Director General,  
Territorial Army and Organization,  
United Kingdom.

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1987 (Issue No. 17):

*Appearing:*

The Honourable Perrin Beatty,  
Minister of National Defence.

*From the Department of National Defence:*

General Paul D. Manson,  
Chief of the Defence Staff;  
Lieutenant-General John E. Vance,  
Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff;  
Rear-Admiral Wally Fox-Decent,  
Chief of Reserves;  
Vice-Admiral Hugh MacNeil,  
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1987 (Issue No. 18):

*From the Department of National Defence:*

Lieutenant-General John E. Vance,  
Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff;  
Brigadier-General Larry Gollner,  
Director General,  
Reserves and Cadets;  
Vice-Admiral Hugh MacNeil,  
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff;  
Lieutenant-General John de Chastelain,  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel).

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1987 (Issue No. 19):

*From the Department of National Defence:*

Vice-Admiral Hugh MacNeil,  
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff;  
Lieutenant-General John de Chastelain,  
Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel);  
Brigadier-General Bob Dobson,  
Director General,  
Force Development;  
Colonel G.E. (Gerry) Morrison,  
Program Director,  
Air Reserve Modernization;  
Brigadier-General Larry Gollner,  
Director General,  
Reserves and Cadets;



Colonel Roméo A. Dallaire,  
Director of Land Requirements,  
Chief Land Doctrine and Operations.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1987 (Issue No. 19):

Major-General (retired) Richard Rohmer,  
Markham, Ontario,  
Former Chief of Reserves.

Terrence C. Willett,  
Sociologist,  
Queen's University,  
Kingston, Ontario.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1987 (Issue No. 20):

*From the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies:*

Brian S. MacDonald,  
Executive Director.

*From the Conference of Defence Associations:*

Brigadier-General William J. Yost,  
Director of Operations.

*Private citizen:*

Robert O'Brien,  
Ottawa, Ontario,  
Former Reservist.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1987 (Issue No. 21):

*From the Canadian Federation of Independent Business:*

William Parsons,  
Director of National Affairs;

Jim Bennett,  
Vice-President,  
Legislative Affairs.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1988 (Issue No. 22):

John Harker,  
Ottawa, Ontario,  
Private citizen.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1988 (Issue No. 23):

*From the Business Council on National Issues:*

Thomas d'Aquino,  
President and Chief Executive Officer;

Peter Cameron,  
Member,  
Task Force on Foreign Policy and Defence;

Thomas Savage,  
Chairman,  
Task Force on Foreign Policy and Defence;

George G. Bell,  
Advisor,  
Task Force on Foreign Policy and Defence.

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1988 (Issue No. 27):

*From the National Employers' Support Committee:*

William A. Howard,  
Chairman;

Lorne Glendinning,  
Executive Director.

**APPENDIX B**  
**ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO BRIEFED**  
**THE COMMITTEE**

MONDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1987 (Bern, Switzerland):

*From the Federal Defence Department:*

Director Hans Ulrich Ernst,  
General Secretary.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1987 (Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany):

*From the Ministry of Defence:*

Generalmajor Rolf Hüttel,  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
(Political Military Affairs and Operations),  
Armed Forces Staff.

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The Committee also received some background material from William N. Turner, Vice-President, Government Affairs, Suncor Inc.



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1988

(56)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met, in camera, at 3:41 o'clock p.m., this day, in Room 371 West Block, the Chairman, Patrick Crofton, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Derek Blackburn, Patrick Crofton.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 13, 14, 16 to 23, 27 and 39 which includes this Report*) is tabled.

Acting members present: Mike Forreault (by W.R. (Dan) Jardine, Len Hopkins (or Douglas Ford).

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Clerks for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: David Lord, Research Advisor.

Respectfully submitted,

Pursuant to Standing Order 98(3), the Committee resumed consideration of the White Paper on National Defence, *Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, June 15, 1987*.

**PATRICK CROFTON**  
Chairman

The Committee commenced consideration of a draft report on the Reserve.

At 5:11 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the rest of the Chair.

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1988

(57)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met, in camera, at 10:01 o'clock a.m., this day, in Room 371 West Block, the Chairman, Patrick Crofton, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Derek Blackburn, Patrick Crofton, W.R. (Dan) Jardine, Alan G. MacLennan.

Acting Members present: Len Hopkins (or Douglas Ford), Mike Forreault (or Mike Forreault).



## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

[Text]

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1988

(56)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met, *in camera*, at 3:41 o'clock p.m., this day, in Room 371 West Block, the Chairman, Patrick Crofton, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Derek Blackburn, Patrick Crofton, Allan B. McKinnon.

*Acting Members present:* Mike Forrestall for W.R. (Bud) Jardine, Len Hopkins for Douglas Frith.

*In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* David Lord, Research Advisor.

Pursuant to Standing Order 96(2), the Committee resumed consideration of the White Paper on National Defence. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, June 16, 1987, Issue No. 13*).

The Committee commenced consideration of a draft report on the Reserves.

At 5:11 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1988

(57)

The Standing Committee on National Defence met, *in camera*, at 9:10 o'clock a.m., this day, in Room 371 West Block, the Chairman, Patrick Crofton, presiding.

*Members of the Committee present:* Derek Blackburn, Patrick Crofton, W.R. (Bud) Jardine, Allan B. McKinnon.

*Acting Members present:* Len Hopkins for Douglas Frith, Dan McKenzie for Stan Darling.

*Other Member present:* Stan Graham.

*In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade:* David Lord, Research Advisor.

Pursuant to Standing Order 96(2), the Committee resumed consideration of the White Paper on National Defence. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, June 16, 1987, Issue No. 13*).

The Committee resumed consideration of a draft report on the Reserves.

It was agreed,—That the draft report, as amended, be adopted as the Committee's First Report to the House and that the Chairman present it to the House.

It was agreed,—That the Committee print an additional 1,500 copies of Issue No. 39 of the Committee's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, which will contain the First Report to the House.

It was agreed,—That the Report be printed in tumble format.

It was agreed,—That all copies of Issue No. 39 which will contain the First Report have a distinctive cover to be approved by the Chairman of the Committee.

At 11:05 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Jean Michel Roy,  
*Clerk of the Committee*