





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

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
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THE CANADAS:

SHALL THEY

“BE LOST OR GIVEN AWAY?”

A QUESTION TO BE DECIDED BY THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND
IN CHOOSING BETWEEN

FREE TRADE OR PROTECTION.

- An Essay

ON THE HARMONY OF INTERESTS WHICH SUBSISTED BETWEEN THESE
COLONIES AND THE MOTHER COUNTRY UNDER THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM,
AND SHOWING THE VALUE OF THEIR TRADE AND SHIPPING, THE
RAPID TRANSFERENCE OF THESE TO THE UNITED STATES,
SINCE THE ADOPTION OF FREE TRADE, AND THE
INEVITABLE LOSS OF THESE COLONIES, IF THAT
COMMERCIAL POLICY BE PERSISTED IN.

COLONIAL EDITION.

TORONTO:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR BY LOVEL & GIBSON.

—
1852.

127

Dedication.

TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF RICHMOND, K. G., &c., &c.

MY LORD DUKE,

The North American Colonies, but more especially the Canadas, are deeply interested in the verdict about to be rendered by the people of England upon their commercial policy commonly known as Free Trade. I have collected together, in the following Essay, some of the evidence which they could give, were they in a position to do so, as to the disastrous effects of this policy upon them. But, though I believe—and I think I have sufficiently proved it in this Essay—that their prosperity largely, and their national destiny, or separation from the Mother Country, absolutely, depend upon the verdict the English people may give upon the trial of this portentous issue; yet there seems little disposition manifested by a large party in England, to consult either their interests or their feelings in the premises. Knowing your Grace to be at the head of the "*National Association for the Defence of British Industry and Capital*;" and that that Association seeks to preserve the integrity of the Empire, and to equalize the burthens as well as the prosperity of the whole people, I have taken the liberty of dedicating this Essay to you, in the hope that if it contain anything worthy of being considered by the people of England, or which may serve to warn them of how effectually "Free Trade" is severing these magnificent Colonies from the Mother Country, it may have its proper weight, by being associated with your Grace's distinguished name.

I have the honour to remain,


My Lord Duke,

You Grace's obedient humble Servant,

THE AUTHOR.

Toronto, Canada West,

25th May, 1852.



PROTECTION :

OR,

THE HARMONY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN
AND HER NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES.

—:—

A nation cannot prosper or be enduring unless all its interests advance together. Yet it must happen, in the ordinary course of its affairs, that some of its classes will have callings by which they will succeed less than their deserts, whilst others will have greater success in theirs than they merit. Competition beyond the reach of all human forecast, may operate to the detriment and ruin of one class's labour, whilst accidental advantages, impossible of contemplation, may, in an equal ratio, favour another's. Now if the fortunate class does not endeavour to harmonise interests with the unsuccessful ; if out of the one's strength, more than it looked for, there is not subtracted enough, or at least something, to make up for the others weakness, more than it expected, or deserved, the nation, as a whole, cannot be permanent, powerful, or capable of any great achievement.—For a nation, as a whole, cannot long subsist with any of its important members decaying.—If the prospering will not endeavour to carry the less fortunate with them, a plague will arise among the classes left to ruin, that will reach those who left them so, and the whole will ultimately sink together. Therefore, the virtue and the beauty of all just political economy consists, in its so arranging

PROTECTION,

burthens, and so harmonising interests, as that one class cannot be left behind; that the whole nation may fare, for better or for worse, the same.

But a nation is sometimes called upon to extend the application of these duties beyond its own borders; for where population increases faster than useful employments, and professions cease to become guarantees for support, manhood is called upon to undertake the hazards and trials of finding a new and a more prosperous home. Then does it become the duty of a great nation, to expand its intellect so as to encompass the interests of its children, who thus become the pioneers of new Kingdoms; and to enlarge its sympathies, so as to take in their welfare, and to second their endeavours.

And this is the position Great Britain occupies to her Colonies. Mouths having accumulated with her faster than means of living, and her manhood having less to do than should occupy it, or that would give it that respectability and pride which it sought, willingly struck out in far and unknown regions, to build itself a home suitable to its dignity, and to form kingdoms for England. But the question has arisen, since this voluntary expatriation for noble and manly purposes, of some of Britain's children whether, in their new situations, it was possible for them to harmonise interests with the Mother Country, so as to continue their national connection with her? whether her intelligence has so far followed them, and watched over their struggles, and the development of their interests, as to legislate, where her legislation has affected them, to their advantage, and to their happy and prosperous connection with her? and whether, if any thing has been done to des-

trophy their harmony of interests with her, any thing can now be done to restore it? It is the purpose of this Essay to consider these various questions as far as Canada is concerned.

And we shall begin by laying down this plain and distinct principle—that the Colonies cannot remain connected with the Mother Country, without a harmony of interests subsists between them. England cannot afford to be a perpetual loser by the Colonies. Neither can the Colonies afford to perpetuate injury with allegiance, love with decay. No connection can be either happy or enduring between them that is not based upon mutuality of advantage. If measures, useful and necessary for the people of England, were found prejudicial to the Colonies, it would be too much to expect that England would forego them on that account. It would be equally unreasonable to bind the Colonies to what was continuously and palpably to their disadvantage. It becomes the duty then of honest manhood to inquire whether or not such a state of things exists. For nations are like individuals—the going on in the dark, not knowing whether they are losing or gaining, is a ruinous system. To succeed, it is as necessary to know what may add to our strength, as it is to find out what may occasion our weakness.

This brings us naturally to consider, whether there have been any measures, which England considered necessary for her prosperity, that operated ruinously to the Colonies; and whether, if such be the case, the Colonies can show good and sufficient reasons why they should be changed. For, if good reasons cannot be given why England should forego her measures to harmonise interests with the Colonies,

it is idle to ask her to do so ; and the Colonies must seek some other means of prospering.

One of these measures—the most momentous too that both have ever known—is the *Free Trade policy of England*. For by *that policy, the interest that each had ever previously had in the others' industry became extinct ; and their power of working together for common good, or a common destiny, was annihilated*. It has effectually rendered them, as far as the future rise, or fall of either is concerned, two distinct nations. The Colonies by their industry, may rise to power and greatness ; but their relation to Great Britain, under the free trade system, is now no guarantee to her, that their strength may not become her weakness, and their wealth her poverty. We shall now proceed to show wherefore.

Previous to 1846 the Colonies were connected with the Mother Country upon the principle of mutually protecting and fostering each others' labour. England had her people to feed, and her poor to find work for. The Colonies had their produce to sell, and their clothing, implements of husbandry, and other necessaries to purchase. What could be a more natural and rational way of benefiting each other, than by the Colonies giving the poor of Britain employment, by using the products of their labour, and Britain's fostering the labour of the Colonies, by receiving their produce upon such terms as would make up for the advantages she might enjoy by manufacturing for them ? Nor let it be imagined that these were few or insignificant. They were, as we shall presently show, of vast importance to her, and of vastly greater consequence than might be, at first sight, imagined. The Colonial trade too had peculiar advantages to England over that of any of the rest of the

world. It could always be relied upon ; for the Colonies were customers that no revolutions kept away, and no adverse policy influenced. When other countries, even under the most favourable circumstances, wanted British goods, they sent their own ships for them, manned by their own people, and accompanied by their own merchants and agents. But what the Colonies required, British ships brought to them, and these ships returned, freighted with their produce and resources received in exchange for them—the whole of the employment connected with the double sale, first of the goods, and then of the produce and resources, and the brokerage, banking and agency, being confined to British subjects. If other countries had profits by their trade with England, they spent them to enrich their own homes, or to create interests to rival her's, or to raise up an adverse power. If there was profits made by the trade with the Colonies, they went to enrich England, and to give increased employment to her poor ; or, if there were any of these profits remained in the Colonies, they went to make roads, and to open ways into the wilds, for England's poor to travel over to comfort, independence and respectability.

To make up for the advantages of this trade and for what the Colonies would lose—which we shall in due time point out—by not manufacturing, as the United States did, for themselves, England discriminated in favour of their produce in her markets ; or, she established what we prefer calling a mutuality of benefit system with them, returning them in protection what they gave her in profits upon her manufactures and commerce. And that the protection the Colonies enjoyed in her markets was but this, we shall now prove.

In 1817—for, from paucity of reliable information and statistics, we prefer not going far back into the history of their trade, especially as it is not material to our purpose—the North American Colonies consumed, in round numbers, £4,000,000 worth, sterling, of British Manufactured Goods;* and they employed, incident to the transportation of these Goods, and the exportation of their productions and resources to pay for them, 1,200,000 tons of British Shipping—one-fifth of the entire tonnage of the *Empire*, the whole being 6,000,000.†

* The trade returns laid before the Imperial Parliament, in 1848, show the *declared* value of the exports of British manufactured Goods to the North American Colonies, in the year previous, to have been £3,231,480. But it is well known that the *declared* value is under the *real* one; and we have, therefore, assumed the latter, in round numbers, at £4,000,000, which agrees with the Estimate of Montgomery Martin, and Blackwood.

† The tonnage between Great Britain and Canada is about 1,200,000 tons. Our whole tonnage, foreign and British is, in round numbers, about 6,000,000—*Blackwood's Magazine*, Feb., 1851.

And it may not be *inapropos* that I here quote the following from my letter in the *Scotch Reformers' Gazette* of 14th March, as proving the inestimable value of colonial trade, as well as the MIGHTY FLUCTUATION WHICH IS THE INSEPARABLE CHARACTER OF TRADE WITH ALL COUNTRIES WHICH ARE BEYOND THE PALE OF OUR OWN CURRENCY AND TRADE LAWS AND REGULATIONS :

“I desire shortly to recur to the subject of colonial trade to show its infinite superiority over a foreign trade, or a *merely manufacturing commerce*, and I take my figures from the official statements, of the exports and imports of Great Britain in 1843, not having the later returns at hand.

“In the trade with Britain and her colonies in the western world, about 60,000 seamen are yearly employed, for whom the amount of wages and cost of provisions cannot be less than £3,500,000 per annum; and the repairs, insurance, and replacing of capital in the ships £4,500,000 more.

“In the trade between Britain and India and China, 10,000 seamen are employed, and at a similar rate their wages, provisions, &c., will amount to 500,000; and the replacement of capital and increase £800,000; in all £1,300,000. The whole, or nearly the whole of the supplies necessary to maintain these seamen and tonnage, are the productions of British soil and labour, which, in a national point of view, shows the superiority of such a trade over a *merely manufacturing commerce*.

Now we have not by us the means of ascertaining the exact profits upon this trade; nor are we aware that any definite estimates have ever been made of them. Its certainly alone, as already pointed out, rendering it of singular advantage; for when revolutions in other countries, non-intercourse, prohibitory tariffs, or other causes, occasioned a surplus of manufactures in the home market, the Colonies generally consumed these, which, otherwise, might have been a total loss. When the mutations of fashion, too, and the miscalculations of manufacture's caused the market to be overstocked with some descriptions of goods, and to have others that would not sell at all, it is well known that the Colonies became, in such cases, the safety-valves, through which they escaped, and generally at full prices. Another, and a very important advantage of Colonial trade, is, that the Colonists go home and pur-

“A comparison of the trade of the eastern with that of the western world, taking the value of imports and exports, stands nearly thus:— From and to China and the East Indies, about £16,000,000; and from and to British North America and the West Indian Colonies, £14,000,000.

“It thus appears that the latter or British American trade requires nearly five times more ships, tonnage, and seamen to carry it on, than the former, or trade to all India and China! thereby affording an incalculable advantage to a naval power, and the support of a naval force, and also to the employment of British labour and capital.

“From the official statement of the exports and imports of Great Britain to the different parts of the world for the year 1843, to which we have alluded, we find that the whole weight of cotton yarn and cotton goods exported from Great Britain annually is 120,000 tons, and the value £23,500,000.

“It follows, then, that one half the tonnage employed in carrying the West Indian exports (value £2,882,441) would be sufficient to carry the whole cotton export trade of this country; and as regards the North American trade, one-seventh of the tonnage would be sufficient to carry all that cotton trade about which Mr. Cobden has made such a noise, but whose real and great intrinsic importance to the empire, no agriculturist nor colonist has ever shown any disposition to undervalue, that I am aware of.—[Reciprocal Free Trade *versus* irreciprocal Free Trade, by Isaac Buchanan, Esq.]

chase their goods directly of the British Merchant. Whereas, in her trade with others, England is often compelled to send out goods upon consignment, to sell for whatever they will bring. During last summer a large quantity of British cotton and woollen goods so sent out, were disposed of at New York at prices ranging from 20 to 40 per cent. under what they were bought for by Canadian Merchants in the English markets the same season. And it is so with English goods, to a greater or less extent, all over the world.—Now, what precise profit to set upon a Colonial trade, having all the advantages we have pointed out, is difficult to say. But in view of its direct advantages, and the incidental ones, arising from the sale of the products and resources received by England in exchange for her goods, and the profitable employment connected therewith, from the time the grain is actually cut in the farmers' fields, and the trees in the forests of the Colonies, till the one is baked into bread, and the other made into ships at home, we think the profits are not overrated at fifteen per cent. By many our estimate may be regarded as too low. We wish none, however, may have occasion to consider it too high. This would, therefore, on Colonial purchases of £4,000,000, give England a profit of £600,000.

The profits arising from the shipping of the Colonies are more easily ascertained. In a return of the whole annual income of the United Kingdom, we find the profits of the shipping interest definitely stated, and from these we are enabled to assign to the Colonies their proper proportion. The whole returns are valuable, and we sub-join them :

Annual Income of the United Kingdom.

Annual value of Agricultural productions	£250,000,000
Annual value of manufacturing productions	£177,184,292
from which deduct value of raw material...£50,000,000	
	————— £127,185,292
Annual value of produce of Mining interest.....	36,121,000
<i>Annual Value of Profits of Shipping interest</i>	<i>3,637,231</i>
Annual income from Colonies, about	15,000,000
Annual income from foreign trade.....	15,000,000
Annual income from Fisheries, about	3,000,000
	—————
Total income of the United Kingdom.....	£449,942,523

—[*Spackman's Tables.*

From these returns then, it appears, that the profits or income of the whole shipping interest of the United Kingdom, amount to £3,637,231. The trade of the North American Colonies, giving employment to *one-fifth*, as we have shown, of this shipping, is necessarily worth to Great Britain just one-fifth of the whole profits. This is apart from the accidental advantage it may have, of being more profitable than much of England's other shipping, which we believe to be the case. The profits, or income, therefore, to her from her shipping with the North American Colonies, amount to £727,446 annually; and this sum, added to the profits on the sale of her manufactures to them, computed at 15 per cent. on £4,000,000, being £600,000, make the total sum of £1,327,446. And this is but the simple business, or commercial, view of the matter. The value that these Colonies are to the Empire—in strengthening it, and in being a home for the very growth of people to strengthen it; in keeping one-fifth of its commercial navy in existence; and in giving profitable employment to thousands upon thousands of its poor, who might, otherwise, go unemployed, being left wholly out of the question.

Now the quantity of grain sent to Great Britain by the North American Colonies, in 1847, with which to pay, together with their other productions and resources, for the goods they purchased of her, was 484,143 quarters, or 3,873,144 bushels.—And let us inquire, if this was protected to the exact extent that the agriculturists of England and the Colonies say it should be, to render its production remunerative, how the account would stand with England?—whether she would gain or lose by the mutuality of benefit principle—namely protecting the products of the Colonies' labour, in proportion to the profit she reaped, as we have pointed out, by their consuming the products of hers, and contributing, at an annual profit or income to her of £727,446, one-fifth of her whole shipping.

But first let us ascertain what the protection is that the agriculturists of England, and of the Colonies, contend for. We shall do so, by showing—by the greatest Free Trade authorities that the advocates of that policy have had, namely, Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Willson, the member for Westbury and late Secretary of the Board of Control, what wheat can be produced at in Great Britain, “without distinct loss”; and *that is the exact price that the Protectionists ask it to be protected to, and no higher.* That is to say, they want that protection only, that will enable them to grow grain, without literally producing ruin to themselves. Sir Robert Peel, in giving a definite answer to the question as to what would be a remunerating price for producing wheat in Great Britain, taking climate, taxes poor rates, and other burthens upon the land, and the social habits of the people, into account, said :

“Now, with reference to the probable remunerating price, I should say that, or the protection for the agricultural interest, as far as I can

possibly form a judgment, if the price of wheat in this country, allowing for its natural oscillations, could be limited to some such amount as between 54s. and 58s., I do not believe that it is for the interest of the agriculturist that it should be higher. Take the average of the last ten years, excluding from some portion of the average the extreme prices of the last three years and 56s. would be found to be an average, and so far as I can form an idea of what would constitute a fair remunerating price, *I, for one, should never wish to see it vary more than I have said.* I cannot say, on the other hand, that I am able to see any great or permanent advantage to be derived from the diminution of the price of corn, *beyond the lowest amount I have named*, if I look at the subject in connection with the general position of the country, the existing relation of landlord and tenant, the burdens upon the land, and the habits of the country."

Mr. Wilson, the member for Westbury, in a work entitled "*The Influence of the Corn Laws*," thus wrote as to what he considered would be a remunerating price for growing wheat in England.

"As we shall afterwards show, we take 52s. 2d. to be the proper price for wheat, at which an exactly sufficient amount of production would be kept up, it having been the average price for the last seven years; we therefore take it as the standing price at which wheat can be sold to the consumer. It must be clear that whatever average annual price the farmer receives in any year above that price, he obtains so much profit beyond the average rate; and that whatever average annual price he receives in any year less than that standard price, he makes so much distinct loss; and therefore the difference between the profit derived from the higher prices, and the loss from the lower prices, must show the balance in favour or against the home grower."

Thus it will be seen, that Sir Robert Peel's lowest estimate was 54s. 4d., and Mr. Wilson's lowest estimate 52s. 2d. the quarter, at which wheat could be produced in Great Britain.—Now waiving for the present the reflections that naturally arise from the fact, that *Free Trade brought down the price of grain in 1849 to 44s. 4d.; in 1850, to 40s.,**

* "In the commencement of the year now about to terminate, an opinion was very prevalent that the prices of grain (more especially those of wheat) had been somewhat unduly depressed; and it was then thought that, even with Free Trade, the value of the article would not for any lengthened period be kept down below the cost of production in this Country. The experience of the last twelve months has, however, proved that this idea was erroneous; for, with a crop very much inferior to that of 1839, quotations have, on the whole, rated lower, the average price for the Kingdom

and so far in 1851, to about 38s.—the last price being 14s. 2d. less than the great free trade economist of England, Mr. Wilson said, it could be produced at in Great Britain, without distinct loss ;” leaving for the present the consideration of the enormous loss that must have been sustained by the whole agricultural interest of Great Britain, at such a fearful amount of labour and capital as must have been employed in producing this kind of grain, not only being unproductive, but occasioning an absolute loss ; leaving this out of the question, let us suppose, that instead of the average free trade price for 1849, '50 and '51, which would be 40s. 9d., England had paid 54s. 4d.,—Sir Robert Peel’s lowest estimate,—for the wheat of the Colonies we have mentioned—would England have lost, by granting the Colonies this protection,—which would secure them about six shillings, Canadian currency, a bushel for their wheat in Canada—more than she gained by their consumption of her Manufactures, and by their creating one-fifth of her whole shipping, at a profit or increase to her on this alone of £727,446 sterling annually ? The account would stand thus :—

for 1850 being only 40s. whilst that for the preceding twelve months was 44s. 4d. per quarter. This fact is, we think, sufficient to convince all parties that, so long as the laws of import remain as they now stand, that a higher range of prices than what we have had since our ports have been thrown open cannot be safely reckoned on. The experiment has now had two years’ trial; the first was one in which a considerable failure of the potato crop took place in England and Ireland; and this season we have had a deficient harvest of almost all descriptions of grain over the whole of Great Britain. If, under these circumstances, foreign growers have found no difficulty in furnishing supplies so extensive as to keep down prices here at a point at which farmers have been unable to obtain a fair return for their industry and interest for the capital employed, we can hardly calculate on more remunerating rates during fair average seasons. Under certain combinations of circumstances, prices may, perhaps, at times be somewhat higher; but viewing the matter on the broad principle, we feel satisfied that, with Free Trade, the producers of wheat will rarely receive equal to 5s. per bushel for their crop.”—[Mark Lane Express, Dec. 28, 1850.]

484,143 quarters of Wheat at Protection prices— namely, at Sir Robert Peel's lowest estimate of its cost of production, being 54s. 4d..... ..	£1,315,253 3 0
484,143 quarters of wheat, at Free Trade prices— namely, the average of 1849, '50 and '51—being 40s. 9d..... ..	986,441 17 3

Difference England would have had to pay by Protection.....£ 328,811 5 9

Now by deducting this from England's profits on her trade and commerce with the Colonies ; which were, as we have shewn, upon the goods they bought, and upon the shipping, together, £1,327,446, *we find a balance in her favour, after allowing the Colonies all the protection they ever asked for, of £998,632 14s 3d Sterling !*

In the face of this extraordinary result, have we not a right to assume, that the Protection England afforded to the Colonies, was but a simple exchange of a benefit for an advantage, and that an immense one, received by her from them! Was it more than simple justice, Upon the only principle upon which the Colonies ever could, or ever can, be happily or advantageously united with the Mother Country—namely, upon the principle of their working together for each other's good—did not England, as a matter of common equity, owe this protection to the Colonies, as a return for their having laid under tribute all they ever earned, or produced, to build up her commerce, to give her people employment; to keep, literally, a British people working for a British people's existence! There were features too connected with the conduct of these Colonies towards England that peculiarly entitled them to her consideration and protection, were it even at a sacrifice. Whilst the rest of America manufactured for itself, that it might not con-

tribute to support Britain's poor, by giving them employment, and increase her wealth and power, by extending her manufactures and commerce ; the rather, that it might create a commerce to rival her's, and manufactures to cut her out in the markets of the world, these steadfast Colonies made the ashes of every tree they cut, and the issue of every grain of corn they planted, go to increase her ships, and give work to her poor. The axe, the plough, the hoe and the spade, by which they have raised themselves to respectability and independence, served likewise to bring bread to England's poor, for they afforded them profitable employment in the making of them. And what has the attempted free trade now made the consequence of this conduct of the Colonies, as opposed to that of the people of the United States ? It is this—that the latter have created for themselves a profitable and valuable home-market, through a manufacturing population, which population itself is of inestimable benefit to them. It is that the former have no home-market ; have no manufacturing population ; and have no wealth in houses, in towns, in railroads, in all those magnificent improvements that mark the New England States of America ;—because they loved England and her poor, and wished to work for them, and harmonize interests with them, and have a common destiny in the Empire of their forefathers with them. Yes, and the further consequence, is, that for the first time, we believe, in the whole history of the British Empire, her children have been forced, by the effects of her free trade policy, to become the suppliant mendicants of a foreign State, to make up for the ruinous policy of their own—to proclaim to the world, that England's policy of making the Colonies

work for the benefit of her poor, has been the Colonies ruin ; and that in order to exist, they must now take advantage of America's policy, of giving England's poor no work, and England's shipping no employment. For, for the last four years, agent after agent from the Colonial Governments—even the leading members of the government of Canada, have been playing the degrading, *the un-British part*, of "lobby membering" in the legislative halls of the United States, to beg for that reciprocity of trade, which England's free trade policy has annihilated with her, until Mr. Hincks, the Inspector General of Canadas', importunities, became at last so intolerable to them, that he was literally sneered and frowned out of Boston, in the midst of universal hospitality.

But let us pass on from the consideration of the protection afforded by England to the Colonies, being but a simple reciprocation of advantages with them—the which we trust we have sufficiently proved—to the consideration of the other matter that we said we should prove—namely, *that the attempted Free Trade policy has destroyed the interest that each had previously had in the other's labour, and that the rise, or increase of the Colonies, does not now necessarily involve the rise or increase of Great Britain ; that, on the contrary, there is no security, that their riches may not now become her poverty, and their strength her weakness.*

The Colonies, educated in the first place by free trade philosophy, to seek advantages wherever they could best get them, irrespective of country, loyalty, home, or kindred—of whether Briton's flag might "brave the battle and the breeze" for another thousand years, or be driven from the ocean in a twelve month—for such is the cosmopolitan

philosophy of the Manchester School of politicians; the Colonies, driven too, by the same free trade policy, to cultivate commercial intercourse with the States; to send their produce through them to the Sea Coast; and then to employ them to convey it to England for them; to consume their manufactures, when there was the least possible advantage gained by doing so—for they were no longer able to make sacrifices to give employment to Britain's poor;—the Colonies, at once educated and driven to these things, have literally now become nearly, if not quite, as much American as British in all things that relate to interest; they are absolutely at this time as much the Colonies of the United States, as they are the Colonies of Great Britain! Startling assertions truly. But we are, *unfortunately*, but too well able to prove them.—

The Trade and Navigation returns of Canada for the year ending the fifth day of January, 1851, show, in view of about £4,000,000 worth of goods being imported into these Provinces in 1847, the following almost incredible falling off. But they show, at the same time, into whose lap the lost trade of England has fallen.

	Sterling.
Amount of British Goods imported into the Canadas from 5th January, 1850, to the 5th January, 1851.....	£1,926,384
Amount of United States goods imported into the Canadas during the same period.....	£1 318,972
	<hr/>
In favour of Great Britain.....	£ 607,412

And upon examining the Imperial accounts of exports to the Canadas for 1847, and comparing them with the imports of British goods into the same Provinces for the year ending 5th January, 1851, we find the following extraordinary declension in the importation of leading articles—

a declension, considering that there has nothing happened to interrupt the trade, and that these colonies have largely increased in population since 1847, that may well excite astonishment, if nothing more.

	Imported	Sterling.		Declension.
		1847.	1850.	
Iron, Steel, Hardware & Cutlery.	£508,160	£191,702	£317,358	
Woollen Manufactures ...	586,151	316,069	240,082	
Linen do ...	147,570	46,764	100,916	
Cotton do ...	606,614	554,747	51,867	
Silk do ...	117,425	78,821	38,604	
Cordage ...	102,807	11,012	61,795	
Leather, Saddlery and Hardware	73,754	7,018	66,736	
Glass ...	33,880	8,452	25,428	
Total decrease on leading articles		...	£ 932,786	

The causes of this declension are sufficiently obvious—the trade of the Colonies is going almost bodily over to the United States. Mr. Cobden boasted, “that free trade would lay the valley of the Mississippi alongside of Manchester.” It is far more likely to lay the Canadas alongside of the New England Manufacturers.

But let us go on and see what it is doing in regard to their carrying trade; let us see how long Great Britain, if the Free Trade policy continues, is likely to have one-fifth of her whole shipping employed in the trade of the North American Colonies, at a profit, or income to her of £727,446 annually on this alone.

The Quebec Chronicle makes the following synopsis of, and quotations from, an article of more than ordinary value, published in the Toronto Patriot:

“In an excellent article, the *Patriot* alludes to a circular issued by the head of a leading Canadian commercial house in New York, Mr. Rigney, in which that gentleman gives us the total imports of grain in bond to the United States from Canada during the past year, and is as follows:

Flour, barrels	345,069
Wheat, bushels	1,237,336
Corn, bushels	2,457
Meal, barrels	1,950

From which it will be perceived, says that gentleman, "that the total export from the United States in 1850, reducing the wheat to flour was equivalent to 1,389,354 barrels; and the import from Canada the same year equivalent to 609,960 barrels, being almost *one-half of the total export from the United States.*" But we cannot do better, for the information of those who rejoice to notice the unfavourable turn which the railway "bubble scheme" has taken in Nova Scotia, than give entire the remainder of the *Patriot's* remark. Our contemporary says, speaking of the immense yearly import of breadstuffs from Canada.

Nor is this import of Canadian produce by a neighbouring State declining; on the contrary, Mr. Wigney tells us, "The demands for Canada flour for the lower British ports still continues to absorb a large proportion of the receipts from Canada, at prices somewhat higher than the ruling rates of domestic;" and he adds: "if bought in Canada at reasonable prices, cannot fail to pay at the present rates of canal freight."

Here then is important information for the Canadian farmer. One-half of the total export of grain from the United States was of Canadian growth, which brings a higher price than the domestic growth, and is consequently more profitable to our Yankee customer in the British market. Now, let us see what benefit our Yankee neighbour derived by this his trade with us in grain during the past year, and what we lost by not sending it direct to the British market. Let us suppose that this equivalent to 609,960 barrels of flour was sent from Buffalo to New York. The present *low* freight and toll from that port is 85 cents per barrel, so that on 609,960 barrels of flour, the tolls and freight from Buffalo to New York would amount to the large sum of £129,616, exclusive of a duty of 2½ per cent., and as the average value of a barrel of flour during the past year was 21s. 3d, the gross value of this flour, is £648,082, and the duty thereon paid to the States for its transit in bond, would be £16,204; so that for freight, tolls, and duty on this single article of our produce, we put into the pockets of our neighbours last year £145,820. But with wharfage, storage, &c. added, we may safely say the sum of £150,000 was thus lost to Canada during the past year by shipping our grain from New York, instead of a Canadian port.

But this is not all. The average profit to the Yankee exporter of our flour is two shillings per barrel, or £60,996 in the past year, and this added to the foregoing £160,000, swells our loss on flour alone in that year to £220,996. If we calculate the money we thus pay annually on other articles of Canadian produce, the total, we suspect, would exceed the whole revenue of the province."

The Montreal Broker's Circular, for May, 1851, contains the following startling returns of, and observations upon, this trade,—startling even to people in Canada, the transition is at once so extraordinary and so sudden,

"Another very noticeable fact, to which we draw attention, is the remarkable increase in our Export Trade to the United States by inland Ports, and which is shown in the following Comparative Table for the three last years.

EXPORTS FROM CANADA BY INLAND PORTS.

ARTICLES.	1848.	1849.	1850
Ashes, brls	7,718	11,332	21,700
Flour, brls.....	277,044	168,635	369,761
Wheat, bushels.....	297,011	929,980	1,213,078
Peas, do	27,561	72,183	56,672
Barley, do	11,156	26,060	63,025
Oats, do ..	43,234	4,864	657,039
Oatmeal, brls.....	986	4,864	1,780
Indian Corn, bushels.....	2,941	21,700
Pork, brls.....	25	730
Beef, do.....	2,798	975	3,952
Butter, lbs.....	375,233	536,619	296,912
Lard.....
White Pine, feet.....	685,330	939,782	1,869,160
Sawn Lumber do.....	58,140,027	102,788,908	124,366,904

When it is considered that this latter Trade is still in its infancy, and, in fact, had no existence only a few years ago—and that in many articles it already equals, and in some exceeds our exports to the Mother Country—it affords matter for reflection, as to what the future Commercial Policy of this Country should be. For instance, the quantity of Ashes exported by inland last year, was 21,700 brls. against 25,620 brls. by Sea. The quantity of Flour was 369,761 brls. against 280,678 brls. by Sea. That of wheat was 1,213,078 bushels, against only 81,951 bushels; and of Oats, 657,030 bushels, against only 12,613 bushels by Sea. The Export of Timber and Sawed Lumber also shows that our Trade with the United States in these articles is increasing in a rapid ratio, whilst that with England, in the same articles, has apparently seen its maximum, being for the last four years less, in the aggregate, than for the two years preceding."

But let us now enquire, if the goods which the Colonies were both forced and led, by the teaching of Free Trade on the one hand and the necessities it imposed upon them, on the other, to purchase of the United States, had been bought of England, and the carrying trade, which is now transferred to these States, was enjoyed solely by her, as it was before

protection was removed, and as it would be again, were it re-established,—whether she would not have gained more by such trade and commerce, than all the protection the Colonies asked would have amounted to? The account would stand thus :

Profits on £1,648,715—worth of Manufactures and Goods which the United States sold to the Canadas, and which would, had Britain and the Colonies mutually protected each other's labour, have been bought of her by them, at 15 per cent.....	£247,207 5 0
Profits or income on produce Shipped by the United States for the Colonies, which would have been conveyed by English shipping from Montreal, had not protection been removed, it having been always so conveyed, before free trade.*	£128,528 0 0
Total loss in trade and Commerce to Britain	£375,835 5 0

Now, the whole exports of wheat from Canada to Great Britain, whether sent by way of Montreal or through the United States, in 1850, were 568,403 quarters; and allowing that the Colonies received—which was, unfortunately, the fact—but free trade prices for it, namely, 40s. 9d. the quarter—that being the average, as already shown, of the prices of 1849, '50, and '51—it would come to £1,158,121 2s. 3d. But supposing that it brought protection prices—namely, 54s. 4d. the quarter—Sir Robert Peel's lowest estimate at which wheat could be produced in Britain—it would come to £1,544,161 9s. 8d. The difference between the two prices is, £386,040 7s. 5d. By deducting the loss sustained by England, as above, by her trade and commerce passing over to the United States, being £375,835 5s., from this difference, it will be seen, *that the whole protection the Colonies ever sought for, or demanded,*

* Computed from the Montreal Brokers' circular of May 1851.—The exchange, in converting Canadian currency into sterling, reckoned at 12½ per cent.

amounts to but £10,205 2s. 5d. more than the loss England's trade and shipping have sustained, in the very infancy too of the trade that the removal of protection has forced, and is forcing, the Colonies into with the United States; and this is wholly apart from the loss, in a national point of view, of that shipping by which Great Britain maintains her position in the world, and of that labour for her poor, which is necessary to their existence and her safety.

To convey an idea, too, of the influence, *and power even*, that the United States are acquiring over the Colonies, through this trade and commerce, *and the state of dependence it necessarily begets*, we will mention one very significant fact. The Council of the Board of Trade of Toronto, irritated at the conduct of the United States, in refusing reciprocity, when benefitting so largely by Canadian trade and commerce, reported, in June last, in favour of placing differential duties upon their manufactures. This report, in due course, reached New York; and, as a matter of course, alarmed Brother Jonathan, the dollars and cents being in danger. But it had to be submitted to the whole Board of Trade, before it was adopted, the Council being but fifteen, and the whole Board consisting of nearly all the merchants of Toronto. Well it was brought up for adoption; but New York, having had time to rally its influence, and to bring to bear its power over the mercantile community of Toronto, *was enabled to procure its rejection*; and though the most intelligent and valuable members of the Board declared, that if American influence and power were thus brought in to control the opinions and commercial policy of a people they had no right to interfere with, they would resign,—yet they were allowed to do so; and

the report remains to this day just where the New York merchants wished, and placed it. *See Toronto Patriot, July 14, 1851.*

But the losses we have shown, in her trade and commerce, are by no means the greatest or the worst, that Great Britain is sustaining in America, through her free trade policy's having destroyed the Colonies' power of working for her good, as that policy has destroyed her's of working for theirs. The chief cause of the extraordinary advancement of the United States of late years, has been the large bodies of valuable, well-to-do, and industrious emigrants who have settled in them. During the first eight months of the last season there arrived at the port of New York alone 192,836 emigrants, about two-thirds of these being from the British Isles; besides those that arrived at Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, Baltimore and New Orleans, and by way of the St. Lawrence. Now, out of this large host, some must have had considerable means; many a trifle; all must have been rich in manhood.

From among these, many—especially the more respectable and valuable of them from the British Isles—would love England still, and be glad to settle, with their families, under her flag. But they, as all emigrants do, the moment they land, begin to enquire all about the country they purpose settling in. What was the state of the Canadas? Were they contented and prosperous, and so on? And how were they answered by the Americans who met them in New York; who, it may be safely sworn to, never let a valuable person leave their shores, if praising themselves at the expense of their neighbours, could keep him—how were they answered? In this wise—"Well, I guess

the Canadas are pretty badly off just now. They have been a-beggin on us to grant them reciprocity for some time, because British free trade has about used them up. But I guess we'll let the blister kind-a draw a while. These here Canadians will make good democrats yet. But they want a little more seasoning to hard times. But, friend, you don't mean to say that you are a-goin to settle there, where wheat is twenty cents a bushel lower than we can give for it ; and where the critters have been a-usin John Bull's manufactures so long, that it will take them an almighty while before they can make a home market for themselves, by manufacturing, as we have done. *I guess, friend, you don't take a daily paper.* Just hear what your great *London Times* says about the critters"—reads :

"New York has become almost the rival of England ; but Canada is still a petty Province. Her land is as fertile, her rivers are just as fit for the purposes of traffic and transport as those of New York ; but in New York the common sense of practical men is the guide of the Government. In Canada, hitherto, the terrible clerks of Downing Street have borne sway. Every traveller who has passed from one side of the River St. Lawrence to the other has been struck by the extraordinary difference under circumstances so similar, and has been compelled to ask to what can such a painful inferiority be ascribed.—The result cannot be disputed; the climate is the same, the soil is equally fertile, the men are in both countries Englishmen—what is it that in the one case stamps *wretchedness and miserable inferiority on the country*, and in the other marks the whole people with the unmistakable signs of prosperity and vigorous advance? The only difference is the government. Your Government is a blight ; wherever you have sway, you destroy hope, energy, and self-reliance ; your dominion is a curse, and the name of England, which you have been permitted to employ, has become a bye-word of reproach. Her sons shun her dominions, and flee to other and more happy States, in order to escape from the thraldom of her Colonial Empire.' No man who has travelled through the Colonies of England, and compared their destinies with the self-govered Colonies or Territories of America, will say that the description we have here given is untrue ; no enlightened Englishmen, who has had an opportunity of knowing and feeling all the abominations of our Colonial rule, will say that he marvels at the scenes now enacted in South Africa, or will assert that such things would continue a month if the Englishmen in these lands were permitted to take care of their own concerns without being hampered by the superintendence of a Colonial Minister."—*London Times.*

Now this scene is taken from the life.

The emigrant, thus borne down by the Yankee on the one hand, and by the worse than Yankee on the other, has a family. He loves England much; but he loves them more. He inquires into the Yankee's statements, and he finds, that England's system, of making the Colonies consume her manufactures, has left them without a home market, which the Americans have got, by manufacturing for themselves; and in which they can *always* get a better price for their productions than can be got in the Colonies, the consumer being alongside of the producer; and especially can they get a better price, as in 1849—in the event of a short crop in the States—for wheat. He despairs of protection ever raising the agricultural interest of the Colonies again above the rest of America. He thinks of his children's prospects, and he is lost to England. And she not only loses his labour and means, and his children's labour and earnings, but she loses his and their contributions to the support of her manufactures and commerce ever afterwards. For he and they immediately become the consumers of America's goods, and the builders-up of her commerce. Thus is England, by the operation of a policy, first of getting the Colonies to consume her manufactures, and giving them a just and equitable protection, as we have pointed out, in return for their doing so, and then cruelly and unfairly leaving them the sufferers for their generosity, losing the best of her manhood; aye, more, driving them where the measure of their prosperity hereafter may be the measure of her weakness; for it will go to add to the general wealth and power of a rival. Thus is Mr. Cobden laying the Valley of the Mississippi alongside of Manchester.

But of all the methods of covering over the palpably ruinous effects of Free Trade upon the colonies—for that is the common object of such articles as we have quoted from the *Times*, the most vile and infamous, is that of libelling and under-rating them. It is incomprehensible how the English people—in view of the fact that among the most profitable and honorable of all her trade, is that with these colonies; that it is in goods that no people could wear, or use, in their situation as agriculturists, unless they enjoyed comfort and prosperity in an eminent degree in their callings; and that the very best manhood of Britain has settled, from the very first in them—it is incomprehensible, in the face of these facts—the most powerful that manhood can offer to intelligence, of its success—that England will countenance—for countenanced they are—these atrocious attacks upon them, and, incidentally upon herself. It is impossible, in carrying out the general design of this paper to vindicate them—by statistics and by facts, that the wretched scribblers that skim along their borders and write journals about them, are alike incapable of gathering or understanding—against such traduction. But let these traducers point out a single American of character or candour, who has had an opportunity of comparing the only interest that England has allowed to spring up in Canada, her agricultural interest—with the same in any, or all of his States, or any portion of them, who has placed that interest below his country's. There are none to be found. Who, at the Agricultural Exhibition for the State of New York, with its two millions of inhabitants, its Genesee Valley, its long period of settlement, and its farmers with fortunes to spend on their lands, made in trade; and with Ohio and the

adjacent States' agricultural productions and stock represented—who against such odds, for the last four years, has taken the principal prizes for grain and for stock? It was Canada. Who, at the World's Exhibition, unheralded and unpretending, stepped into the foremost ranks of the world's most successful labourers? They were Canadians. Who sent from New York, during the last season, nearly one-half of the whole wheat that left the Continent of America? It was the humble, hard-working eight hundred thousand people who inhabit Upper Canada. If any man is not satisfied, that a people who work hard enough to produce these results, have not the elements of prosperity, and comfort, and respectability around them, let him travel through the Counties of Upper Canada; let him look at the widespread, well-tilled, and well-fenced farms; let him see the barns—larger, and more numerous than in any part of America, taking acre for acre tilled—well filled with grain; and let him examine their stock; and if he does not say, that England should feel proud of Her British American offspring, we know not England or her love of justice. Yet the unprincipled *Times*, in the face of these facts, which should be patent to the world, must endeavour to degrade his country and her situation, and to drive from Britain the Briton.

But to return to our argument,—We have already shown how deeply, how *dangerously*, Great Britain is affected by her Free Trade policy's driving the Colonies into the United States markets, and withdrawing from her one-fifth of her whole shipping. Let us now point how that policy has affected the Colonies themselves, and what it must, if persisted in, ultimately lead to.

Educated to rely upon the equitable protection in the British Markets we have pointed out, and their whole business, their mode of living, the obligations they contracted, the clothing they wore, the houses they built, or were building, their shops, ships, steamboats, and store-houses, being all shaped and designed with a view to its advantages, the colonies were wellnigh bankrupted by the change. In 1818 and '49, there probably never was a country in which the people had worked so hard as they had in Canada, that presented so melancholy a spectacle of depression, depreciation in property, and ruin of hard-working, well-managing business men. The advertisements in the *Canada Gazette*, by Sheriffs and Assignees of Bankrupt's estates, in these years, would form a fearful history of the disasters of Free Trade. The title deeds of property that passed out of the owner's hands, in Montreal, and other places, could they be exhibited, with what that property cost, and what was got for it, would tell a fearful tale. But probably the best comment we can give upon the disasters free trade occasioned in these years, is the subjoined extract from the Montreal Broker's Circular:—

“The comparison which we made in 1848 of the trade of that year with the trade of 1847, showed the following extraordinary falling off in IMPORTS.

ARTICLES.	1848.	
	Decrease.	Increase.
Vessels.....	84	
Wines, gallons.....	91,355	
Run, do.	47,728	
Spirits, do.	58,539	
Molasses, do.	84,631	

ARTICLES—*continued.*

<i>Sugar—</i>		
Refined, lbs.....	256,761	
Muscovado and Bastards, lbs.....	4,690,290	
Coffee, lbs	94,025	
Tea, lbs.....	1,169,621	
<i>Tobacco—</i>		
Manufactured, lbs.....	594,131	
Unmanufactured, lbs.....	215,794	
Salt, bushels.....		722,001
Value of Goods paying <i>ad valorem</i> duty sterling.....	£445,946	

No single article in this table showing an increase, except Salt.

The whole imports for last year being but £2,058,798 Canadian currency, or £1,647,039 sterling. Whilst in 1835, when the population of the Canadas was greatly less, the imports amounted to £2,730,082 sterling; in 1846 to £4,052,375* ; and in 1847, as we have shown, to about £4,000,000. And as the trade with the United States had not, in 1848, commenced, the falling off could only have been occasioned by the altered circumstances of the country under free trade prices. Thus, from forwarders, from merchants, from shopkeepers, from the whole trade of a country, whose business arrangements, vessels, shops, wharves, and store houses, were arranged for increasing business, was cut off nearly two-thirds of that they had already had. A more withering shock a country's prosperity never had; and it is a matter of wonder, and infinite credit to the Canadas, that it did not entirely bankrupt their business community.

* As to the imports and exports of Canada in the last few years, results are not less remarkable. The imports in 1835, amounted to £2,730,082; in 1846, £4,052,378. The exports in 1835 amounted to £1,929,605; in 1846 to £3,201,992.—[Lord John Russell's Speech, in the House of Commons, Friday, February 2nd, 1850.]

But let us now inquire more closely into what occasioned the people's inability to purchase as they had purchased previous to free trade. The subject is of great importance to every one having anything to do with these Colonies; to every one having property in them; but especially to all who look forward to living by the products of their labor and land in them.

Let us, however, in the first place, lay down a rule by which we can judge of whether they prosper, stand still, or retrograde. That rule is—*the price they can now get, or are likely to get hereafter for their wheat.* For that grain is the sole currency of Canada. It is what the farmer pays for his land with; what pays for the education of his children; and what supplies him with every necessary of life that he himself does not, and cannot, produce.

From agriculturists, apart from our own information on the subject, of the highest authority, and of such long standing—from thirty to fifty years in Canada,—as enables them to judge under all possible circumstances, we have obtained the following estimate at which wheat can be produced in Upper Canada. It will be borne in mind that fifteen bushels to the acre is the average yield of the Province.

COST OF PRODUCING AN ACRE OF WHEAT IN UPPER CANADA.

Summer fallowing and three ploughings at 10s. Provincial currency each	£ 1 10 0
Two harrowings at 2s. 6d. each, and sowing	0 5 0
Seed, 1½ bushels at present price in Canada, <i>i. e.</i> 2s. 10d. Provincial currency a bushel	0 4 3
Cradling, or cutting, raking and binding	0 10 0
Carrying and housing, or "winning"	0 2 6
Thrashing and cleaning with machine	0 3 0
Allowance for half the horses and half the hands allowed by farmer himself for thrashing and cleaning	0 1 0

Carting to market at a supposed distance of ten miles, 2d. per bushel	0 2 6
Rent, being the simple interest, at 6 per cent., of £7 10s., that being the average price of wheat land.	0 9 0
Total cost of producing an acre of wheat	£ 3 7 3

Now this would make this wheat stand the farmer in within a fraction of 4s. 6d. Provincial currency, a bushel.— That is, he would not receive a fair allowance for his labor, and consideration for the use of his horses and farming implements, and interest upon the price of his land, at a less price than this. All he could get over this, would be profit, taking one year's crop with another. All he would be obliged to take under, would be so much direct loss.

Then how does the matter stand with the farmer at the present time? and how has it stood, and does it stand under free trade prices?—It stood, and stands thus.—In 1849, the price of wheat in England, as already stated, was 44s. 4d. the quarter. This would afford about 3s. 9d. a bushel in Upper Canada, of her own currency. In 1850, it was 40s. This would afford about 3s. 3d. in Canada. In 1851, it was about 38s in England, and the average price over the whole face of Upper Canada, was about 2s 10d Canadian currency a bushel. Higher prices, than the above, in 1849 and '50, may have been given in some places, and at some periods in Canada, but it was unjustified; and all who gave it were injured in proportion to their business, or were ruined, if they were without capital or support from others.

Therefore the average price of wheat, under free trade in Canada, for 1849, '50, and '51, being 3s 3d and a fraction, is just 1s 3d less than the actual cost of its production.

Now how is it possible that a people whose sole interest is that of agriculture, and whose sole means of paying their

debts and buying the necessaries of life, are the wheat they can produce, can have prosperity—the rather, can keep from actual want, or ruinous debt, when that produce is below the cost of its production? How can merchants expect to do a healthy business among a people so situated? How can absolute ruin be prevented, in the face of the absolute destruction of the whole ground work of solvency?

But are these prices under the free trade system, likely to last? One of the profoundest writers in Great Britain prophesied, nearly two years ago, what we should be receiving at this time for wheat, if free trade so long lasted; and what we shall continue to get, as long as it does last.—His elaborate and deeply interesting account of the facilities for raising wheat in various parts of Europe, are of especial importance in Canada, and in the rest of America too.—His prophecies have proved true, and more than true, so far:

“But we have by no means as yet attained the lowest point of depression. At the close of the year 1849, we take the general average price of wheat as at 40s. per quarter, and we shall probably have a breathing time of two or three months, until the Continental ports are again available for navigation. We shall hereafter consider whether, under any circumstances, the price which we have just quoted can remunerate the farmer: in the mean time, let us see whether it is likely that, in future, even this price can be maintained.”

“It is no easy matter to ascertain the rates at which corn may be grown on the Continent.”

“We are, however, fortunately enabled to throw some useful light upon this matter. Our informant is a Scottish agriculturist, who, some years ago, was engaged as land-steward on the estates of a Popish nobleman in Galicia, and who, therefore, had ample opportunity of witnessing the foreign system. If the reader glances at the map of Europe, tracing the course of the Vistula from Dantzic, and then following the upward line of its tributary, the Bug, he will find laid down in close proximity the extensive districts of Volhynia, Podolia, Kiow, Galicia, and others, formerly Palatinates, which together constitute the largest, richest, and most productive corn field of Europe. Here there are no farmers, and—what is more, strange to us—no free labourers who receive a weekly wage. The land is tilled for the profit of the owner; a superintendent presides over it as taskmaster; and the

workers of the soil are serfs in the actual position of slaves, who toil late and early without other remuneration than the coarse rye bread, and similar fare, that is necessary to support existence. The manufactures of Manchester and Sheffield have not found their way into this region, and never will; because the population being utterly without means, could not purchase them, and probably would not were the means within their power. Their dress is of the most primitive kind, and differs in no respect from that of tribes utterly barbarous—being chiefly constructed of the skins of animals. They are hardy, docile, and exceedingly sensitive to kindness, but as far removed from civilization as the tribes of Tartary; and their owners—for that is the proper term—take especial care that no doctrine shall reach them which in any way may interfere with the exercise of despotic rule. In short they are like so many cattle cultivating the land for their masters at the bare expense of their keep. To demonstrate more clearly the difference of the value of labour, we may here state, on the best authority, that in that district where the finest wheat, distinctively known as “high-mixed Dantzic,” is grown, the ordinary price of a quarter of wheat will defray the expense of from forty to forty-five day’s work, whilst here it can procure only from twenty to twenty-five days. The climate is excellent, and the yield of the soil considerable. Wheat may be grown for several years successively without manure, and always with comparatively little work. The produce is floated down the numerous rivers which intersect the district, to Dantzic and other coast towns on the Baltic, where it is stored; and these will in future form the great depôts of the grain furnished by central Europe for British consumption. We are almost afraid to state our conviction, lest it should appear exaggerated; but we do not doubt that Polish wheat could be delivered at Dantzic at 16s., and yet leave a considerable profit to the grower. We must also note that the variableness of our climate, and the comparative poorness of our soil, places us at a vast disadvantage in point of quality, as compared with the southern grower. It can be established, by consulting the prices current of Mark Lane for a series of years, that it would require a differential duty of 6s. per quarter on wheat, on this account alone, to put the British farmer on a fair footing with the great bulk of his foreign competitors. Last season, the difference between the best foreign and English wheat throughout the year, as proved by the best authority, was upwards of 10s. per quarter.”

“The price of grain in Britain has been beat down by competition with a poor foreign crop, for such unquestionably was the yield of 1848. That of 1849 was a splendid one, and the moment the ports are opened in spring, its influence will be felt. The question will not then be of 40s, but of a price still lower; and we apprehend that, in that event, the argument will be nearly closed. We do not, however, anticipate that the reduction will be rapid. The dealers at the different foreign ports will best consult their own interest by keeping, as nearly as possible, just below the quotations current in the British market. In this way large profit will be secured during the whole maintenance of the struggle, which must end by the British farmer, over loaded with rent, taxes, and public burdens, giving way to his competitors, who, with no such impediments, and with a better climate

and richer soil, will monopolize his proper function. We shall then experience in corn, what our West India colonists, under the same kind of legislation, have experienced in sugar. The greater part of the soil of Britain will be delivered from cereal growth; and as the earth does not yield her produce without long wooing, we shall be at the mercy of the foreigner for our supplies of food, at any rates which he may choose to impose." *

But let us now inquire the cause of the prosperity indicated by the fact, that the imports of Canada were in 1835, £2,730,082 sterling; in 1846, £1,052,378; and in 1847, £1,000,000; as against the adversity indicated by the imports of £1,647,039 in 1848, and 1,926,384, for that was the amount in sterling, in 1850.—We have already shown the causes of the adversity. The causes of the prosperity will sufficiently appear by the following averages of prices of Wheat in the several years respectively, in Canada, taken from the returns of the Imperial Parliament:

In 1831, Wheat per bushel in Canada,	6s.	11d.	Provincial Currency.
1832	"	"	"
1832	"	"	5s 11d
1833	"	"	"
1833	"	"	5s 11d
1834	"	"	"
1834	"	"	5s 1d
1835	"	"	"
1835	"	"	5s 1d
1836	"	"	"
1836	"	"	5s 10d
1837	"	"	"
1837	"	"	7s 0d
1838	"	"	"
1838	"	"	7s 0d
1839	"	"	"
1839	"	"	7s 2d
1840	"	"	"
1840	"	"	5s 9d
1841	"	"	"
1841	"	"	6s 2d
1842	"	"	"
1842	"	"	5s 9d
1843	"	"	"
1843	"	"	5s 0d
1844	"	"	"
1844	"	"	5s 4d
1845	"	"	"
1845	"	"	5s 8d
1846	"	"	"
1846	"	"	5s 3½d
1847	"	"	"
1847	"	"	6s 5½d

Now if any circumstance more than another could show the thrift and industry of the people, and the advancement of a country, the fact of Canada's prospering to the extent indicated in the imports of 1835, '46 and '47, would

* Alison.

show it. Upon the small profits upon their Wheat, shown by the prices for the years quoted,—over the cost of production, did this people go on increasing their imports from 1835 to 1846, to the extent of £1,322,296 sterling. What could be a stronger proof of industrious manhood's rising to comfort, respectability and independence? But what could be a clearer proof of that manhood's efforts going unrewarded, than that free trade prices brought down their whole imports, in 1848, with a largely increased population, to £1,647,039!

But disastrous as have been the direct effects of free trade upon the North American Colonies, in reducing the only grain they ever could, or ever can, depend upon, to discharge their debts, or to live as a civilized people, the indirect effects of it upon their advancement, have been equally great, through its keeping away from them the valuable Emigrants from Britain and Ireland, who used to come to them; but who now go to the United States, *because the peculiar situation of the Colonies, in having consumed England's Manufacturers, and creating no home market of their own, places their agricultural interest below that of theirs.* The whole difference, in truth, that England would have had to pay, by protecting the Colonies' grain in her markets; and thus raising their agricultural interest above that of all the rest of America,—as it was before free trade,—would bear no proportion, if ten times added, to what the Colonies have lost, by losing the manhood that Britain has contributed to the strength of America within the last four years. We have seen, by Lord John Russell's own statistics, that they increased their consumption of British Manufactures, between 1835 and 1845, £1,322,296

sterling. What an immense creation of property must there have been in the Colonies, to have made this, as it were, the simple interest of it,—for such it was,—the goods the Colonies buy, being with the issues of the lands they found a valueless wild. Nor need it be wondered at. When it is considered, that every acre of land that is cleared in Upper Canada, not only itself becomes of double and treble value, but adds double and treble to the value of all the acres around it, should it excite surprise? While every house that is built in a rising Town, or a Village, not only adds many fold to the value of the lot on which it is built, but adds equally to the value of every adjacent lot, every adjacent lot's improvements doing the same by it. It is impossible, in fact, to compute the magnificent advantages which would have accrued—alike to the parent Empire and to the Colonies—had the people who have been transferred from Britain to the United States, since free trade, to build up their Commerce, and to consume their manufactures, been transferred to British North America, to develop its unused resources; to give the poor of England employment, by consuming the work of their hands; and to beget a Commerce to support and perpetuate the Monarchy itself.

But we began this essay, by laying down the common principle, that the Colonies and the Mother Country could not continue happily or beneficially united, without a harmony of interests subsisting between them; that they must have an interest in each others' industry, if they would be benefitted by each others' prosperity, or if they would seek a common destiny. Now in view of what we have proved, as the effects of England's free trade policy, can it

be said, that such a harmony of interests now subsists between them? In view of England's first educating the Colonies to consume her manufactures, and to neglect the means of providing a home market for themselves, as the United States did, by manufacturing, *and protecting their manufactures*, and as they are now reaping the benefit of—can it be said that it is cultivating such a harmony of interests, for England's manufacturing politicians to say to them—and to get England's legislation to say to them—"we want to manufacture for the world—we care not what we have educated you to—we must pursue our object, if we have to walk over your ruins. Our purpose is to lay the Mississippi valley alongside of Manchester, no matter where may lie the Colonies. Our Empire is the workshop—our loyalty is trade. We want no Colonies to benefit our labor; and we'll benefit the labor of no Colonies." Or is it establishing that interest in each other's industry, necessary for common prosperity and a common destiny, for the Colonies to be forced into the markets of an adverse State to buy those things which England's poor live by the manufacture of, and England's commerce is kept in existence by conveying from her shores to those of her Colonies? Yet have we not proved these to be the experiences of free trade in British America? Have we not shown in the face of advantages to England far greater than any protection the Colonies ever asked, they have been sacrificed; that the grain by which they can alone preserve an honest face to the world is reduced below the cost of its production; and that if there had been a bad harvest in 1850, or in 1851—there having been harvests of unequalled abundance—the whole goods imported into Canada must

have been sold to a people who could have had nothing wherewith to pay for them, and the whole mercantile community of the country left with mortgages on the finest land in the world, rendered valueless, whilst they would have had to face their English creditors. These, however alarming or unpalatable they look, are the plain, unmistakeable, common sense deductions from the state of things free trade has brought about in the Canadas. And they should, and must, be looked in the face by every man whose interests are bound up in these Colonies, whether as a tiller of the soil, or an importer of goods to sell to him. It is painful under any circumstance, to be prophets of evil. It is withering to our hearts' best impulses to see these magnificent Provinces, capable of adding so much to the strength, the wealth and the glory of Great Britain—the brightest jewels in her crown—ready to fall; nay already falling from it.—Yet who can say, in the face of the facts we have placed before him, that these Colonies are any more England's now, than they are the United States'? that they are not, in fact, virtually lost to Great Britain? What are the garrisons of Quebec, and Kingston, and Toronto now, when the British people of these Colonies are forced to build up the commerce of the United States, at the expense of Britain's? are forced to patronize American labor, to the injury of Britain's poor? *They are but as the last remains of expensive furniture in a ruined house.* What are the officers and soldiers who keep these garrisons, when British prosperity no longer exists, and British labor goes to support a foreign State? *They are but the livery of greatness, after the greatness itself has departed.* Yet such is the plain, unmistakeable state of the Canadas at this

moment, and it is time that every man in them and the people of England, were fully aware of their true position.

But what remedy would we propose for this? We have but one. Sir Robert Peel laid it down, as the result of all his inquiries and experience, that wheat could not be produced in Great Britain for less than 54s. 4d. the qr. Mr. Wilson, the great Free Trade economist, stated that it could not be grown, "without distinct loss," for less than 52s. 2d. The former price would afford 6s. Provincial currency a bushel for it in Canada.—The latter would afford about 5s. 6d., or 9 shillings, York. The protectionists of England ask no greater protection than this. It would raise Canada to be the first agricultural country in the world; and would double its whole population, trade and commerce in less than five years.—Both must have it, the one to live—the other to live with Britain. And they must live, or Britain herself must perish. Let us, however, place before the reader a short, plain statement, by one of themselves, of their case. If England's Free Trade policy will lose her Colonies—and it has already forced the wedge so far that it may be difficult to draw it back—they will fall with their agricultural brethren of the Empire, and the Empire itself will follow after them. But let us see what the English agriculturists say for themselves:

This is a state of matters which cannot continue long without manifest danger even to the tranquility of the country. It is quite plain that, at present rates, agriculture cannot be carried on as heretofore in Great Britain. The farmer has been the first sufferer; the turn of the landowner is approaching. Let us illustrate this shortly. There must be, on an average of ordinary years, a certain price at which wheat can be grown remuneratively in this country. Sir Robert Peel, no mean authority on the subject, has indicated his opinion that such price may be stated at or about 56s. per quarter. Mr. James Wilson, rating it somewhat lower, fixes it at 52s. 2d. Let us suppose, that wheat for the future shall average over England 39s. per quarter, and

that the produce of the acre is twenty-four bushels, the loss on each acre of wheat hereafter raised will be, according to Sir Robert Peel, £2 11s.—according to Mr. Wilson, £1 19s. 6d. What deduction of rent can meet such a depreciation as this? Excluding Middlesex, which is clearly exceptional, the highest rented county of England, Leicester, is estimated at £1 14s. 10d. per acre; Warwickshire, at £1 11s. 6d.; and Lincolnshire, at £1 8s. Haddington and Fife, the highest rented counties of Scotland, are estimated at £1 5s. 6d. per acre. This, of course, includes much land of an inferior description; but we believe that, for the best arable land, an average rent of 40s. per acre may be assumed. In that case, supposing the whole rent to be given up, the farmer would still be a loser by cultivation, if Sir Robert Peel is correct in his figures.

The inevitable result of the continuance of such a state of matters is too clear to admit of argument. The land must go out of cultivation. The process may be slow, but it will be sure. It may, doubtless, be retarded by remissions of rent, not sufficient to cover the farmer's losses, but great enough to induce him to renew his efforts for another year with the like miserable result; until at length the tiller of the soil is made bankrupt, and the landowner occupies his place. We can hardly trust ourselves to depict the effect of such a social revolution. All the misery which has been already felt—and that is far greater than our rulers will permit themselves to believe—would be as nothing compared with the calamitous consummation of Free Trade.

Now, assuming—as experience warrants us in doing—this state of matters to be permanent, and the growth of wheat in the British Islands to be progressively superseded by importations from abroad, how is the *national independence* to be maintained, when a *fourth of our people* have come to depend on foreign supplies for their daily food? Nearly all this grain, be it recollected, comes from two countries only—Russia, or Poland which it governs, and America. If these two powers are desirous of beating down the naval superiority, or winning the commerce and manufactures of Great Britain, they need not fit out a ship of the line, or embark a battalion to effect their purpose; they have only to pass a *Non-Intercourse Act*, as they both did in 1811, and wheat will at once rise to 120s. the quarter in this country; and in three months we must haul down our colours, and submit to any terms they may choose to dictate.—*Blackwood's Magazine*.

Thus it will be seen, that the policy which is forcing the Colonies into a connection with other powers, which may to-morrow turn the very ships their trade create for them, into so many engines of destruction to Britain, is making the Empire itself dependent, for its existence, upon foreign forbearance, interest, or generosity. Can such a policy as this last? Can England last, with her whole farming

interest destroyed? And can free trade live over the fact of its losing Great Britain her magnificent possessions in North America? And can any man doubt, if it be persisted in, that England, having ceased to have any interest in these Colonies, must soon cease to have any connection with them? And then—then will come the time when the revilers of these Colonies will have to answer for their conduct.—Then will these Colonies, slighted heretofore by England, insulted when they have worked hardest, and reviled, when their manhood appealed, by the strongest argument of manhood, its success, for the love and sympathy of a mother country—then will that Mother Country hear, through the boasts of Republican America, the value of what she will have lost. And then—but God grant she may find it out before—will she learn the value to place upon the wisdom and policy of her Free Trade politicians.



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