




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

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THE

**LETTER,**

*etc. etc.*



A  
**LETTER**  
TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
**LORD CASTLEREAGH,**  
&c. &c. &c.  
ON THE  
NORTH AMERICAN EXPORT-TRADE  
During the War,  
AND  
DURING ANY TIME  
THE  
*IMPORT AND USE OF OUR MANUFACTURES*  
ARE INTERDICTED IN  
**THE UNITED STATES.**

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BY CHARLES LYNE.

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LONDON:  
PRINTED FOR J. M. RICHARDSON,  
23, CORNHILL.

1813.

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L E T T E R,

*&c. &c.*

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MY LORD,

IT is with great reluctance that I am again about to intrude upon your Lordship's time, on the subject of the North American export-trade during the war, more particularly concerning that in cotton-wool; the subject is, however, so extremely important, whether it be taken in reference to the interest of the British shipping; whether in reference to the trade with our own colonies in the West Indies; whether to that with the East Indies; to that with our allies, who are constantly consuming so great a portion of our

B

manufactured goods, and consequently in immediate reference to the manufacturers themselves ; and also whether in reference to the financial means of the country, in regard to a supply of gold and silver, so indispensably necessary for the support of our armies abroad ; I say, my Lord, whether the subject be considered severally or collectively, in reference to either, or to all of these points, it will be found so extremely important, that I cannot but consider myself fully justified in submitting to your Lordship what is further held to be very applicable to the question at issue.

In the letter I had the honour of addressing your Lordship, on the 23d of last month, I transmitted a sketch of what I had reason to believe would form the grounds of a memorial to the First Lord of the Treasury: those grounds were adopted, and a memorial to that effect was accordingly transmitted on Wednesday, the 24th of last month, by John Whitmore, Esq. the chairman of the Joint Committees of British Merchants, trading to and from the Brazils and Portugal, to my Lord Liverpool, a correct copy

of which I do myself the honour of transmitting your Lordship herewith, though it does not differ from that which your Lordship is in possession of, except in the transposition of the order of the grounds therein stated, by commencing with the commercial view of the question, and following it up with the political part.

Those grounds, my Lord, founded in facts, appear so strikingly obvious, and at the same time so very conclusive, that people of all ranks, in addition to those the more immediate sufferers by the present system now open to the enemy, are at a total loss to account for any motive, that can induce the government of this country thus to persevere in a system which appears so evidently pernicious to the interests of Great Britain, while it is at the same time as obviously beneficial to our enemy; and having, as I conceive, discovered what may, and probably has, influenced the minds of some of those who, as I am informed, have, and will again, be consulted on this important question, the object of this letter is principally for the purpose of further putting the matter in its proper point of view;

and thereby confuting the arguments that have been, as I understand, advanced by a very circumscribed number of individuals, who unfortunately, on this occasion, are apprehended to have monopolized the ears of gentlemen filling important situations.

I allude to gentlemen of irreproachable character, and of great eminence as cotton-spinners, but who, however, have obviously taken a very erroneous view of the question ; and who, moreover, cannot be considered to be possessed of such complete information as is evidently necessary to form a correct opinion on the different important bearings of the case.

I am informed, my Lord, that these cotton-spinners are understood to have advanced, that it would be impolitic to prevent the admission into Great Britain of North American cotton-wool, for the following reasons :

1st, Because we cannot do without it with perfect safety, as to our being supplied from other parts with a sufficient quantity

for the consumption of our manufacturers.

2dly, Because we stand in need of a particular description of cotton-wool, namely, bowed Georgia, which we cannot obtain from any other part of the world.

3dly, Because, if the admission of North American cotton-wool be not permitted, the supply from other places is likely to be so small as to occasion such a very considerable rise in the price of the raw material as will injure the manufacturing interest of the country, and throw an immense number of manufacturing people out of employ.—And,—

4thly, Because, if we do not take off from the hands of the North Americans their cotton-wool, they will themselves manufacture the articles they would otherwise take from us.

Now, my Lord, to elucidate and to confute these

positions, strong as they might otherwise appear to be to those not conversant in the matter, is, as I state before, the principal object of this letter.

In answer to the first assertion, as to quantity, I shall begin by stating, that the annual average consumption of cotton-wool, in the United Kingdom, is 72,800,000 pounds; or say at the rate of 1,400,000lbs. per week; and, in the next place, that, according to the best computation that can be made, there is now in Great Britain 310,000 bales, bags, and other packages, of a computed average weight, one with another, of 280lbs. making, consequently, 86,800,000lbs. being equal to the average consumption from this time to the 9th of May, 1814.

That, from different parts of the Brazils, namely, Maranham, Para, Paraiba, Siara, Penambuco, Pernaiba, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, &c. &c. places at the distance of from one to two and three months sail, at the very utmost, from Great Britain, we can bring hither about 270,000 bags of cotton-wool of various descriptions, of an average weight of 150lbs. each, making 40,500,000lbs.

and consequently providing for a further consumption from the last-mentioned date of the 9th of May, 1814, to 27th of November of the same year.

That from our own colonies in the West Indies, of Surinam, Demarara, Berbice, Tobago, Barbadoes, Bahama, &c. &c. &c. we may expect about 66,635 bags, of an average weight of 290lbs. each, making 19,324,150lbs. consequently furnishing a further supply for the consumption from the last-mentioned date of 27th of November, 1814, to the 3d of March, 1815.

That from Surat and Bengal we may expect about 80,000 bales, of an average weight, of 340lb. each making 27,200,000lbs. and consequently producing a further supply from the aforementioned date of 3d of March, 1815, to the remote period of the 17th of July of that year.

And thus, therefore, without counting on what we are likely to receive from the Island of Bourbon, now in our possession, or on what we may receive from the Spanish colonies and from

Turkey; and exclusive also of what we may naturally expect by the capture of cotton in American vessels, it appears, in the first place, that we have now cotton-wool in England to the amount of 86,800,000lbs. and that we may reasonably expect from the places above enumerated (if the entry of North American cotton be prevented) the enormous quantity of 86,934,800lbs. making together the grand total of 173,734,800lbs. this, equal to the average consumption of our manufacturers for no less space of time than two years and four months and a half, carrying the period down to the very remote date of the middle of July, 1815; and, moreover, a portion of the additional quantity of 86,934,800lbs. is daily arriving, and the whole can be imported, and will probably be imported, into Great Britain long before it be possible to consume what is now here; this, however, provided that due encouragement is given to that effect, by preventing the import of that from our enemies the North Americans; otherwise there is no ground for supposing that one-half of the quantity, or any thing near it, will come.

By this statement, therefore, it will appear, not only that there is not any the most distant ground for apprehending, that the keeping out of the North American cotton will cause the assumed scarcity, which is understood to have been advanced; but it is actually a matter of doubt, whether, by preventing the import of North American cotton, we shall not have as great a supply as if it were admitted; as the admission from North America will evidently prevent from coming, any thing like the quantity that will otherwise be imported from our own colonies, and those of our allies, in our own ships, and payable in our own manufactured goods.

But, my Lord, I can well conceive, that manufacturers who are not in the knowledge of these great resources of the raw material, which are, in fact, at the command of this country, can either through ignorance, or insidiously, be taught to apprehend, that if the import of cotton-wool from North America be stopped, they may be in danger of not receiving a sufficient supply. But should we, by any possible contin-

gency, be disappointed of any part of these supplies from our own settlements, or of those from our allies, (of which contingency, however, there is not the most distant apprehension,) we have still the staff in our hands, and can still import by licence; from North America, any portion we may think proper, within the short space of time of from three to four months.

The next question to be considered, is, whether we can dispense with the particular description of Bowed Georgia Cotton, the growth of North America; or, whether we are under the necessity, by our conduct on the present occasion, of assuring the enemy, that we are (as it would appear by what has been so erroneously advanced) dependant upon him for the welfare of our manufacturers, and that we cannot go on without his assistance with the above-named description of cotton.

Now, my Lord, it will be admitted, that this particular description of cotton-wool is not many years known in this country; and it might be well, therefore, to inquire of these gentlemen,

how we contrived to go on so well before any such cotton was imported : and it does besides appear, by the testimony of those well and long conversant in this branch of our manufacture, (the spinning branch,) that, when Bowed Georgia Cotton was first introduced into this country, our spinners in general set their faces against the use of it ; and that, because their spinning machinery was not then so well adapted to the spinning of that particular description, the consequence was, that the price of Bowed Georgia Cotton fell very considerably ; and it then became an object, therefore, to the spinners, to alter and adapt their machinery, for the spinning of that particular description : and it now so happens, my Lord, that, on the breaking out of the present American war, the price of this Bowed Georgia Cotton rose considerably, while that from Surat and Bengal, not having rose beyond a very moderate price, the spinners are again finding it their interest to alter and adapt their machinery to the spinning of the Surat and Bengal cotton, which is still obtainable at very low rates ; and many of the most respectable spinners are now actually spinning these, and other

cottons, in lieu of Bowed Georgias ; while others are altering their machinery for the same purpose: thus proving to the enemy that we can do, and do well, too, without his assistance, for the support of our manufacturers.

Now, my Lord, although this appears to be the fact, I am credibly informed, that if any of these spinners, even those who are now actually spinning the Surat, Bengal, and other cotton-wools, in lieu of the Bowed Georgias, are called and examined by gentlemen not very conversant in the business, or by those who are interested in another view of the question, their testimony is likely to go to establish the almost indispensable necessity of this last-mentioned description of cotton, being apprehensive that the establishment of the contrary will have the effect of preventing the import of North American cotton, and that such prevention will create the assumed scarcity of cotton-wool, which, from a want of better information, they have been erroneously taught to believe, will positively be the case; and that their testimony, if not very cautiously given, may therefore tend to destroy their own trade, if not

the spinning for the manufacture of piece-goods in the United Kingdom, they expect, at least, to be deprived of the export of cotton-twist ; which export of cotton-twist they have, by the bye, too long, and too impolitically, enjoyed, to the detriment of our manufactured piece-goods : not that I contend, that there is the smallest likelihood of a want of an abundant supply of cotton-wool, that there will be any necessity to stop the exports of cotton-twist on that account ; but I contend it would be politic, for the benefit of our weavers, and in a very different point of view, than that in which this particular subject has hitherto been considered : but this is foreign to the question now under discussion.

Next follows the assumed apprehension, that the non-admission of cotton-wool, from North America, will occasion such a very considerable rise in the price of the raw material, as will injure the manufacturing interest of the country, by supposing, that, by a proportionate rise in the price of piece-goods, the demand will be lessened, and a large number of manufacturing people be thrown out of employ.

It very opportunely happens, that the very reverse of this position can also be proved ; and that, by recent and actual facts, of what has been, and is now, the case, in contraversion of this unfounded apprehension.

It will be universally admitted, that, for many months previous to the breaking out of the present American war, and up to the declaration thereof, cotton-wool, of every description, was at excessive low prices ; in most instances, indeed, not leaving a sufficient net price to encourage the growth ; and much less so, to encourage the importation of very large quantities, that would otherwise have been imported from the Brazils, and other places, in exchange for our manufactures ; that, during this same period of time, the trade of British piece-goods was, in an extreme depressed state, which was accounted for by the want of saving prices at which cotton-wool could be sold in this country in exchange for manufactured piece-goods, to be exported in return ; thus, therefore, cotton-wool and cotton piece-goods, equally continued in a very depressed state, and other British manufactures participated in the same state of depression.

A fact, indeed, which has long existed, and which has been already clearly proved by the evidence given last year in the House of Commons, on the investigation of the orders-in-council-question.

On the breaking out of the American war, however, with the natural and general expectation, that a stop would, no doubt, be put to her export-trade, the prices of cotton-wool rose, and, with it, the price of twist and of manufactured piece-goods; and with this rise of price in cotton-wool, twist, and piece-goods, the demand for the latter increased; and the moment people became of opinion, that the American war was likely to continue, that moment, the price of all three articles took another start; and, as the price continued to advance, so increased the demand for piece-goods, and still in a greater proportion; the manufacturers became full-handed, and a rise in the price of wages took place; and all this, very contrary to what has been so repeatedly predicted by some of the American advocates; so that the fact proves equally contradictory to the assumed apprehen-

sion of the one party, and to the prediction of the other ; for, instead of an increased depression of the manufacturing trade by the American war, and by a rise in the price of cotton-wool ; a great impulse, and an additional activity, were given thereto ; and that, by what indeed was foretold by most people conversant in the Brazilian and other trades, namely, by the rise in the price of cotton-wool, with the prospect of no more being permitted from North America, during the war ; which prospect encouraged those trading to the Brazils, and other places, to export the manufactured piece-goods, for the purpose of having cotton-wool in return ; as they then conceived there was no apprehension, but that they would be able to realise their returns in cotton-wool, at saving, if not at lucrative prices ; but all this, to those, who, on the one hand, are totally ignorant of the Brazil trade, and of its resources ; or, on the other, either appear to be blind to the interest of Great Britain, or conceive that we could not go on without the North American trade, seems paradoxical.

I have stated above, what has been the fact

previous to, and on the breaking out of, the American war, and of what has occurred consequent on the expectation, that a stop would be put to the import of cotton-wool from North America.

Permit me now, my Lord, for a moment, to examine into the fact, that has been produced on the manufacturing interest of the country, by the advice lately received from North America, that cotton-wool was then shipping for Great Britain under neutral flags; and that, upon investigation, it has been found that it is admissible, under an old act of parliament, even during the war; why, my Lord, the effect which has been produced by the promulgation of this information, is the strongest proof that could possibly have occurred to establish the fallacy of what has been so erroneously assumed, or apprehended, by the adverse party; while it is, at the same time, as strongly affirmative of what I, in common with most others, have all along contended for; that the manufacturing interest of this country will in no shape be prejudiced by preventing the imports of the North American

cotton, as long as that government interdicts the imports of our manufactured goods; but, on the contrary, that our manufacturers will be benefited by not admitting North American cotton-wool under such predicaments; inasmuch, by not taking the cotton-wool from North America, we shall import a greater quantity of the same article from other places, which we shall not only have the carrying of, but we shall pay for, in our manufactured goods.

Now, my Lord, the late occurrence proves this to be the case; for, the moment the late information from America was received, with the knowledge of the afore-mentioned unrepealed act of parliament, the sale of cotton-wool became dull, the prices fell back, and counter-orders, for manufactured goods, were immediately sent to Manchester, and other manufacturing places; and the manufacturing trade and the shipping interest, together with the trade to and from the Brazils and other places, have received a very great shock, it is indeed, to a great degree, become paralysed; for, not only counter-orders for the export of

manufactured goods have taken place, but counter-orders for the import of cotton-wool have been sent to the Brazils and to Portugal, and will go to the East and West Indies, which must consequently stop a considerable import of the raw material, if government does not come to a speedy determination of stopping the North American export-trade during the war; the want of which interdiction will, in reality, leave us, in a great measure, dependant for a supply from our enemies, as in this letter is shewn.

There now remains to be confuted the fourth and last assumption, which is understood to have been advanced, namely, that if we do not take off from the hands of the North Americans their cotton-wool, they will themselves manufacture articles they otherwise would take from us.

However absurd this proposition certainly is, it has, notwithstanding, been advanced, not only by a very few of those who, it is apprehended, have the ear of gentlemen filling important situations, but it has besides, however extraordinary it may appear, been seriously advanced in the

House of Commons, and that, too, without the absurdity of such a proposition being at the moment exposed.

To set this ridiculous point at rest, I need only state, in answer to the proposition, a few very simple questions, namely —

Is it then from the want of the raw material, which the North Americans themselves grow, that they do not manufacture those articles? or is it because they have not as yet brought their manufacturing system to that degree of perfection that will enable them to manufacture them? —  
And again —

Is it not, in reality, by their own interdiction of the import of our manufactured goods, that they are looking forward to the manufacturing of those articles themselves? and in which it is greatly to be apprehended that they will, in the course of no great length of time, succeed.  
And —

Is it not, therefore, in that point of view, in-

cumbent on the government of Great Britain to consider this probable contingency in its full extent; and, as no enactments of ours, in respect to North America, can, in any shape, prevent what is so likely to occur; would it not be provident to encourage, without a moment's further delay, an extended growth of cotton-wool in our own colonies and settlements, in the West and in the East Indies, and in those of our allies, the inhabitants of which, not like the North Americans, who, even in time of peace, are continually harassing our commerce, and impeding the import and use of our manufactures, by their embargoes, non-imports, and non-intercourses, but which friendly inhabitants are, on the contrary, constantly taking and consuming so great a proportion of our manufactures, and are besides giving us the great and national advantage of at least three-fourth parts of the carrying-trade of their own exports and imports. And is it not, moreover, equally clear, that, by encouraging those planters and inhabitants of our own colonies, and those of our allies, we shall extend the consumption of our own manufactures and articles of luxury?

In having thus exposed the fallacy of what has so absurdly been advanced, as to the apprehension of prejudicing our manufacturers, by the stopping of the import of North American cotton wool, during the war, and during their prohibition of our manufactured goods ; it will, on a full and fair investigation, be found, that I have been the best advocate for the manufacturing interest ; and not those who, from a want of information, have so obviously founded their arguments upon erroneous *data*.

My letter is already extended to such a great length, that I shall, for the present, leave untouched the many other essential and most important views and results which are already before your Lordship, in the memorial to my Lord Liverpool ; and as they will, besides, be set forth to his Majesty's ministers, by the committees representing the interests of the British shipping, the East-India trade, the West-India trade, and also from other numerous quarters ; but I cannot refrain, my Lord, from touching upon one or two extremely important points, which will be found not only very applicable to this important subject,

but are so also on yet more important grounds, and, therefore, cannot, indeed, be too seriously considered ; the first is, the effect that the continuance of this open export-trade, from North America, must, unavoidably, have upon the financial means of the country, during the war ; and, during any period of time, that the Americans will not receive from us in return our manufactured goods.

It has, my Lord, I believe, been stated in parliament, in the course of the last session, and by the best authority, that our expenditure, for the supply and support of our armies and the contest in the Peninsula, is to no less amount than from ten to twelve millions per annum ; and it is well known, my Lord, that however politic, and, indeed, necessary, that the support of this contest should be continued for the honour, and for the welfare, of Great Britain, it cannot be so supported, nor our armies kept in the field, nay, not even in the Peninsula, if a certain quantity of metal money be not obtainable for that express purpose.

The hitherto victorious career of my Lord

Wellington and of the brave troops under his skilful command, matters not, if a supply of metal money be not transmitted, for the pay of the soldiers and for the other indispensable supplies of the army.

In the late and present unparelled scarcity of gold and silver, a contest for the attainment of them, should have been as skilfully managed as the contest in the field of battle; and fortunate would it have been, had there been more practical knowledge and means called in for the management of this important branch of the warfare, so as, in some degree, to have kept pace with the judicious arrangements of the other branches; but, my Lord, as I trust this particular branch of commissariat-means, will be a matter for serious consideration and early improvement, as to what may be done for the future, (seeing no good now, in its having any retrospective view), I shall point out only some of the items of the enormous increase of our expenditure in the Peninsula, occasioned, principally, by the want of metal money.

The advance, in the price of gold and sil-

ver, arising from the absolute necessity thereof, for the use of our armies abroad, has been, and continues to be, to an alarming extent: for gold in particular, from 25 to 35 per cent. above its standard value: to this important additional item of our expenditure, I have unfortunately to name two others, which, combined, are nearly to double that extent; the first of these is, the discount on the value or amount of what I may with propriety term British government-bills, although the precise denomination by which they are technically called, is British commissariat-checks, drawn by British commissaries from the interior of the Peninsula for the support of the army on the British commissariat at Lisbon; and will it be believed, my Lord, that I can assert, without the fear of contradiction, that at Lisbon, a capital within a few days sail of Great Britain, this British government-paper, has, for a length of time, been hawked about, and sold at a discount of from 10, to 15, to 20, to 25, and up to 28 per cent. to the discredit as well as to the loss of Great Britain; and this up to the last advices received from thence, when the British commissary-bills were still offering at a discount



that they need only to be known to your Lordship, to ensure to the subject your Lordship's immediate attention.

That it is extremely difficult to obtain any thing like a sufficient supply of gold and silver, I am myself particularly aware of; and that it is also very much to be apprehended, that a very small portion of what is so indispensably necessary, can at all be reckoned upon, I am likewise very well aware of. Is it then possible, my Lord, that, under all the aforementioned pressure and accumulated burthen to the country, its government will, in the face of all these glaring and pernicious consequences, persist in keeping open to the enemy his export-trade, that will enable him to deprive the country of that portion of gold and silver, which may be otherwise obtainable, and is so absolutely necessary for great national purposes at home and abroad, and that, too, to the replenishment of the enemy's own coffers; I say it is impossible, my Lord, that his Majesty's Ministers, will continue to shut their ears to all these irresistible facts and consequences, which are, upon the whole, much

more of a political nature than of a commercial one, and is consequently a question, if question it can be termed, more fit for the decision of the cabinet, than for the Board of Trade.

Exclusive of all those facts and pernicious consequences, that are set forth to government in the various representations already made and preparing, there is, my Lord, independent of these, and as if none such existed; there is, I say, a claim upon the administration of the country, for relief to all the different classes of his Majesty's subjects who are, and will be, the more immediate sufferers by this system; and that claim arises from the conduct of the Board of Trade.

On the breaking out of the American war, and on many subsequent occasions, it is generally understood, and will not, I apprehend, be denied, that when merchants who had been engaged in the North American trade, and others, applied to the present Board for licenses to import North American produce, that the answers received were, that no such licenses would be granted under the circumstances of the exist-

ing war ; that strong cases were then made out, with a view of inducing the Board, or more properly of inducing his Majesty's Ministers, to desist from their apparent determination ; such as that of proposing to commence the transaction, by an export of an equal amount of British manufactured goods ; another, that of applying for licenses for the sole purpose of bringing home the amount of debts owing to British subjects residents in this country, under the apprehension, if not under the conviction, that the property would otherwise be lost ; these cases, even so very strong as they are, were not however of sufficient weight to induce the granting of licenses for the import of American produce ; such appeared to be, by this continued and repeated refusal of licenses, even on the application for bringing from North America an additional supply of corn for the support of our army in the Peninsula ; such, I say, appeared to be the determination of his Majesty's Ministers to make the enemy feel the pressure of his own unjust and aggressive war ; and although many of the applicants for Licenses, felt, as merchants, and as creditors to North

America, extremely disappointed, yet they could not but applaud the wise policy of his Majesty's Ministers, in thus making the enemy feel the pressure of his own unprovoked act; and this wise policy, has, it would seem, by the late addresses of both Houses of Parliament, met the unanimous approbation of the whole population of the Country.

During the period that this refusal of licenses by the Board of Trade for the North American export, was so wisely persevered in, cotton-wool, of every description, was, as is before stated, at excessive low prices, so as, in many instances, not to leave a sufficient net price for the planters; and, in scarcely any instance, to encourage the importation thereof by an export of our manufactured goods; which manufactured goods were also at excessive low prices; and the trade consequently in an extreme dull state; and this also was the case with the British shipping; thus then was the stagnant state of these several branches of manufacture, commerce, and navigation.

Permit me, in the next place, my Lord, to

point out, what has been the result to these different interests, occasioned solely and wholly by the conduct that was, as before stated, so perseveringly adhered to in refusing licenses for the import of North American produce; the result of this was, my Lord, that the East-India, West-India, Brazilian, and other cotton-wool importing merchants, actuated by the consequent confidence they were thus put in by the Board of Trade, that no more cotton-wool from North America would be admitted during the war, then determined on importing cotton-wool from our own colonies and settlements, and from those of our allies, in the expectation of bringing the same to a saving, if not to profitable markets; manufactured goods were immediately purchased and others ordered to be manufactured for exportation in payment of the raw material, and these orders for the manufactured goods, as also for the cotton-wool, were given at advanced prices; the price of freight of British shipping in the Brazil trade, which was, till then, excessive low, got up from the low rate of 2d. to 3d. per lb. for cotton, and numerous British vessels are gone to the Brazils in expectation of still higher freights; all this re-

sulting from the different parties having so fully relied, that the Board of Trade, which now-a-days has so much to do in the regulation of a great portion of the commerce of the country, could not possibly mislead them : but now, all of a sudden, we are told, that, notwithstanding all this perseverance of the Board of Trade to stop the American export-trade by the repeated refusal to grant licenses, this American export-trade and import into Great Britain is, after all, actually open, and that the enemy is now acting upon it, and all this, too, in virtue of one of our own acts of parliament.

Why, surely, my Lord, the Board of Trade, which has now the entire regulation of so great a proportion of our foreign commerce, was in duty bound to know, and to acquaint its applicants, of what could be done under the existing laws of the country ; it was the bounden duty therefore of the Board of Trade, when the merchants applied so repeatedly for licenses to import American produce, to have told them that no license was necessary for such trade under the existing laws of the country ; and not to mislead them, as has been the case,

by the refusal of licenses, in the understanding that no such trade would be permitted from North America.

The trade of the country should not thus be trifled with; and under such grievous circumstances, (and under others indeed which need not here be mentioned) is it at all to be wondered at, my Lord, if an occurrence totally novel in the annals of the commerce of this country was to take place? namely, that of the trading-interest of the country to petition His Royal Highness the Prince Regent that he will be graciously pleased to give directions for the appointment of an efficient Board of Commerce.

The great importance of the subject, my Lord, together with the extension of the arguments into which I have been consequently led, has drawn me into a greater degree of warmth on it than I intended or could have wished; and for which, I most humbly beg your Lordship's pardon.

It may, however, possibly be conceived, that this degree of warmth has been produced by my

being personally and deeply interested in the stopping of the North American export-trade; I am, my Lord, personally interested in the stopping of it, though to no extent of consequence; and I can conscientiously assure your Lordship, that I have thus taken up the question, more on public grounds than on any of a private nature: but be that as it may, my Lord, whether individually interested or not, much or little, I am fully persuaded that, such consideration, will in no shape or degree, prevent your Lordship from giving the subject all that scrupulous attention that its vast importance will be found to deserve.

I am, my Lord,

With the greatest deference and respect,

Your Lordship's

Most obedient and most humble servant,

CHARLES LYNE.

14, Devonshire Place,

2d March, 1813.

To

*The Right Honourable*

*Lord Castlereagh,*

*&c. &c. &c.*

TO

**THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL,**

**FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY,**

*&c. &c. &c.*

*The humble Memorial of the United Committee of  
Merchants trading to and from Portugal and  
Brazil,*

**HUMBLY SHEWETH,**

**THAT,** notwithstanding the existing hostilities between Great Britain and the United States of North America, and their prohibitory laws against the import of all British manufactures and produce into the American States, cotton-wool, the growth of North America, is nevertheless admissible into the United Kingdom by neutral vessels under the act of the 43d George III. Cap. 153.

no act having since been enacted for the repeal thereof.

That cotton-wool, the growth of our own colonies in the East and West Indies, together with that of the Brazils, and other places in amity with this country, is already beyond the consumption of our manufactures, and that the growth thereof will moreover be increased to an immense extent, if not discouraged by the unrestrained admission of North American cotton, in time of war.

That from the best calculation which can be formed, it is computed there is cotton-wool now in England, equal to  $1\frac{1}{4}$  years consumption.

That there are in the Brazils very considerable depots of cotton-wool remaining from the old crops, which depots will be more than doubled by the new crops just gathered, all which will undoubtedly be brought to this country, if that from the United States be prohibited during the war.

That the large stock of cotton-wool in Bra-

zil, and at other places, has been kept back by the losing prices, which, till of late, have been prevalent in Great Britain; the consequence of which has been, a diminished export of our manufactured goods.

That in the confident and general expectation that the North Americans would not be permitted to carry on their export-trade during their war against this country, considerable shipments of manufactured goods have already taken place; and others to a much greater extent are now preparing for Brazil and other places, for the sole purpose of having cotton-wool in return, which intended export of manufactured goods, will, however, now receive a severe check, by the knowledge of the afore-mentioned act of parliament, permitting the import of cotton-wool from the United States, by neutral vessels.

That many of our manufacturing people will consequently be thrown out of employ, and many of our commercial men meet with severe losses.

That much of our shipping, which would otherwise be beneficially employed in the export of our manufactures and the bringing home of considerable quantities of cotton-wool from the Brazils, and from the East and West Indies, will now remain unemployed, the effects of which are already felt to a very considerable extent, by the fall in price of freight for British shipping to and from the Brazils.

That it is humbly submitted to be sound policy and consequently to be highly expedient, that the natives and residents of our own colonies, together with those of our allies, who *constantly* take from us our manufactured goods in payment of their produce, should have the exclusive privilege of supplying us with the raw material, in preference to those who prohibit and interdict our commerce and manufactures

That if North America be permitted to carry on her export-trade during the war, by neutrals; she will, by such means, have the exclusive advantage of supplying with her cotton-wool, and other articles, all the European markets,

where the ports are not blockaded; to the obvious disadvantage of our manufacturers, merchants, and ship-owners, who would otherwise have the supplying of those markets from hence with our manufactured goods.

That the Americans themselves did not contemplate the continuance of the indulgence granted to their trade by this act, is evident; for otherwise a trade so obviously calculated to enrich their planters and merchants, and to replenish besides with gold and silver their public coffers, for the support of their aggressive war, would not have been so long deferred, it being only by the last advices received from North America that we are informed of their beginning this commerce under neutral flags, insurances on which have actually been made in Liverpool and in London.

That a proportion of not less than  $\frac{1}{4}$  ths of all the Brazilian produce, consisting chiefly of cotton-wool, and sugars, is brought to this country in British ships; that the whole amount is paid for in British manufactured goods and produce, and mostly carried from hence also in British shipping.

That under the existing regulations, our allies, the Brazilians and Portuguese, are compelled to re-export from the United Kingdom their sugars, by a prohibitory duty against their consumption in this country; while their cotton-wool, on the other hand, is not now allowed to be exported from hence on any conditions.

That while we are thus preventing our allies from supplying any of the continental markets from hence with their cotton-wool, (although we have the advantage of so great a proportion of their carrying trade, to and from the Brazils, and are besides paying for their cotton-wool in our manufactured goods,) it appears nothing more than common justice to these our allies, that, while we are thus preventing them from supplying those continental markets, we should endeavour to deprive also, by blockades and otherwise, our present enemy, the Americans, from supplying them with the very same article, to the common prejudice of our own trade and that of our good allies.

That this policy will apply with still greater

force, in regard to the produce and trade of our own colonies, the East and West Indies, the welfare of all which is deeply interested in the stopping of this trade in neutrals from North America to Great Britain, and to and from the continental markets.

That such traffic is not only to the decided advantage of the enemy in a commercial point of view, but it must moreover be to him a great source of financial means; while, on the other hand, it must prove extremely prejudicial to the financial resources of Great Britain, by keeping it bare of gold and silver, now more than ever wanted for the supply of our armies abroad; it being obvious, that, during the prohibitory laws against the introduction of our manufactured goods, North America can receive no other return than gold and silver for their cotton-wool, and for every other article that we may receive from thence.

That this export-trade will not only thus furnish the enemy with the sinews of war; but, the war itself will be less unpopular in America;

than if its commerce were interdicted, and its means curtailed; and that such inexpedient policy must consequently tend to lengthen this war, to the detriment of our commerce, of our navigation, of our finances, and of our national prosperity; while the enemy, on the other hand, are left comparatively to the pressure only of their own enactments.

That, under the impression of all the foregoing considerations, your memorialists presume to conceive, that Government never could have designed to benefit the enemy, by this extraordinary advantage to their export-trade, and that the aforementioned act of parliament, permitting the entry of North American cotton-wool by neutral vessels, must consequently have been overlooked, or that otherwise his Majesty's Ministers would, no doubt, have taken such steps as would have, ere now, put an effectual stop to the many baneful consequences resulting therefrom: And they now humbly pray your Lordship's immediate attention to this important subject, in full confidence that such enactments and blockades will speedily ensue, as will completely prevent our enemies

from the undue advantage they now enjoy, of supplying, under neutral flags, these and other European markets with their produce during this unprovoked war, to the manifest prejudice of our commerce, of our shipping, of our revenue, and of our national prosperity.

THE END.

